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gao_GAO-06-95 | gao_GAO-06-95_0 | From 1986 to 1990, Congress amended these three acts to authorize EPA to treat Indian tribes in the same manner as states for purposes of program authorization. EPA officials agreed that more could be done to improve the timeliness of the review process, and the agency has recently begun working with its regions to determine the status of outstanding requests and how best to expedite reviews. EPA Followed Its Procedures for Reviewing and Approving Tribal Requests, except for Timely Notification to Affected Governmental Entities
According to our review of 20 approved cases in Regions 6, 9, and 10, EPA generally followed its established processes for reviewing and approving TAS requests. Specifically, for the 20 cases we examined, 10 took more than 1 year for approval, with 2 taking more than 4 years. In this regard, officials cited evolving Indian case law and complexities associated with some jurisdictional issues as significant contributing factors to added review time. This lack of transparency may hinder a tribe’s understanding of what issues are delaying EPA’s approval and what actions, if any, may be needed to address these issues. EPA Provides a Variety of Grants to Help Tribes Manage Their Environmental Programs
For fiscal years 2002 through 2004, EPA provided Indian tribes about $360 million in grants for a broad range of environmental activities. Differences between Tribes and States over Environmental Issues Have Been Addressed in Various Ways
Since the three environmental acts were amended to allow tribes to receive TAS status and to implement EPA programs, some tribes, states, and municipalities have disagreed over tribal land boundaries and environmental standards that may differ from state standards. However, EPA has generally not laid out a written strategy, including an estimated time frame, for the TAS review process. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The Chairman of the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works and the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs asked us to report on (1) the extent to which the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has followed its processes for reviewing and approving tribal requests for treatment in the same manner as a state (TAS) and program authorization under the Clean Water, the Safe Drinking Water, and the Clean Air Acts, (2) EPA’s programs for funding tribes’ environmental programs and the amount of dollars provided to tribes in fiscal years 2002 through 2004, and (3) types of disagreements that have occurred between parties over EPA’s approval for granting tribes TAS status and program authorization and the methods that have been used to address these disagreements. In addition, we reviewed and documented the various programs available to Indian tribes under the Indian Environmental General Assistance Program Act of 1992 and the Clean Water, Safe Drinking Water, and Clean Air Acts for fiscal years 2002 through 2004; and EPA’s guidelines for providing funding to tribes through these programs. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Clean Water, Safe Drinking Water, and Clean Air Acts authorize the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to treat eligible Indian tribes in the same manner as a state (referred to as TAS) for implementing and managing environmental programs on Indian lands. Some states are concerned that tribes receiving authority to manage these programs may set standards that exceed the state standards and hinder states' economic development. GAO was asked to report on the (1) extent to which EPA has followed its processes for reviewing and approving tribal applications for TAS and program authorization under the three acts, (2) programs EPA uses to fund tribal environmental activities and the amount of funds provided to tribes between fiscal years 2002 and 2004, and (3) types of disagreements between parties over EPA's approval of TAS status and program authorization and methods used to address these disagreements.
What GAO Found
EPA generally followed its established processes for reviewing and approving tribal requests for TAS and program authority under the three acts, according to GAO's analysis of approved requests. However, the review time for approving these requests generally took from about 1 year to more than 4 years. In addition, nearly all of the requests currently under review were submitted more than 1 year ago. Key factors contributing to the lengthy reviews include the multiple reviews required by the agency's regional and headquarters offices, a lack of emphasis within the agency to complete the reviews in a timely manner, and turnover of tribal and EPA staff. Moreover, EPA has not developed a written strategy that establishes overall time frames for reviewing requests. EPA officials agreed that more could be done to improve the timeliness of the review process but said that complex issues--including evolving Indian case law and jurisdictional issues--may have contributed to the lengthy reviews. Furthermore, EPA's review process is not always transparent on the status of tribes' TAS requests. Lack of transparency limits tribes' understanding of what issues may be delaying EPA's approval and what actions, if any, may be needed to address the issues. EPA provided Indian tribes about $360 million in grants to fund a broad range of tribal environmental activities from fiscal years 2002 through 2004. About half of these funds were distributed through two acts: the Indian Environmental General Assistance Program Act (about $114 million)--to help build capacity to administer environmental programs--and the Clean Water Act (about $66 million)--to help prevent and reduce water pollution. Since 1986, when Congress began amending the three environmental acts to allow TAS for tribes, disagreements over land boundaries and environmental standards have arisen between tribes, states, and others. Disagreements have been addressed through litigation, collaboration, and federal laws. |
gao_GAO-07-157 | gao_GAO-07-157_0 | To be eligible to request an inspection of an establishment by an accredited organization, a manufacturer must manufacture a class II or class III medical device; market at least one of those devices in the United States; market or intend to market at least one of those devices in a foreign country and either (a) one of those countries certifies, accredits, or otherwise recognizes the FDA-accredited organization as authorized to conduct inspections of establishments or (b) the manufacturer submits a statement to FDA that the law of one of the countries recognizes an inspection by FDA or the FDA-accredited organization; have received, after its most recent inspection, a classification by FDA as “no action indicated” or “voluntary action indicated” for the establishment that it seeks to have inspected by an accredited organization; and request and receive FDA’s approval to use a specific accredited organization. In addition, some applicants were denied accreditation because MDUFMA limited the number of organizations that could be accredited to 15 during the first year after FDA issued criteria for accreditation. FDA denied accreditation to applicants that did not meet minimum criteria because their applications were not correctly completed or did not demonstrate the applicants’ technical competence and because more organizations met the minimum criteria for accreditation than FDA could legally accredit. During the first accreditation year, FDA received a total of 23 applications from 22 organizations. Of these 23 applications, 2 were not correctly completed and the applicants were denied accreditation. FDA also denied accreditation to applicants that did not meet minimum criteria because their applications did not demonstrate that the applicants had adequate technical competence. FDA granted accreditation to the 15 organizations with the highest ranking applications, and denied accreditation to the remaining 4 organizations with lower-ranking applications. Two Inspections Independently Conducted by an Accredited Organization
Between March 11, 2004—the date when FDA first cleared an accredited organization to conduct independent inspections of establishments—and October 31, 2006, two accredited organizations conducted independent inspections—one inspection of a domestic establishment and one inspection of a foreign establishment. During the same time period, 36 inspections of domestic establishments and 1 inspection of a foreign establishment were conducted by accredited organizations jointly with FDA officials as part of the training FDA required of accredited organizations. The remaining 9 accredited organizations had not completed all training requirements as of October 31, 2006. Additional factors may influence manufacturers’ interest in participating in the program by hosting required training inspections. Potential incentives to having an inspection by an accredited organization include the opportunity to reduce the number of inspections conducted to meet FDA and other countries’ requirements and to control the scheduling of the inspection by an accredited organization. FDA and representatives of affected entities told us that the potential disincentives to having an inspection by an accredited organization include bearing the cost for the inspection, doubts about whether accredited organizations can cover multiple requirements in a single inspection, and uncertainty about the potential consequences of making a commitment to having an inspection to assess compliance with FDA requirements in the near future. Manufacturers that already contract with a specific accredited organization to conduct inspections to meet the requirements of other countries might defer participation until that organization has completed all required training and been cleared by FDA to conduct independent inspections. Agency Comments
We provided a draft of this report to the Department of Health and Human Services for comment. Appendix I: Inspections Conducted by the Food and Drug Administration
The Medical Device User Fee and Modernization Act of 2002 (MDUFMA) requires us to report on the number of inspections of medical device establishments conducted by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). Appendix II: Scope and Methodology
To determine the number of organizations that sought accreditation, the number that were accredited, and reasons for denial of accreditation, we reviewed FDA documentation of the number of applications for accreditation it received and its evaluation of those applications, and we interviewed FDA officials. To determine the number of inspections of foreign and domestic establishments conducted by accredited persons, we asked FDA to provide counts of the number of inspections conducted from March 11, 2004—the date when FDA first cleared an accredited organization to conduct independent inspections—through October 31, 2006. To determine whether there are factors that could influence manufacturers’ interest in voluntarily participating in FDA’s accredited persons inspection program, we interviewed FDA officials and representatives of affected entities. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) inspects domestic and foreign establishments where U.S.-marketed medical devices are manufactured to assess compliance with FDA's quality system requirements for ensuring good manufacturing practices and other applicable requirements. The Medical Device User Fee and Modernization Act of 2002 (MDUFMA) required FDA to accredit organizations to inspect certain establishments where devices that are marketed in both the United States and other countries are manufactured. This report includes information that MDUFMA requires GAO to provide on (1) the number of organizations that sought accreditation, the number that were accredited, and reasons for denial of accreditation and (2) the number of inspections conducted by accredited organizations. It also includes information about factors that could influence manufacturers' interest in voluntarily requesting and paying for an inspection by an accredited organization. GAO examined FDA documents, interviewed FDA officials, and obtained information from FDA on the number of inspections conducted from March 11, 2004--when FDA first cleared an accredited organization to conduct independent inspections--through October 31, 2006. GAO also interviewed affected entities, including accredited organizations and medical device manufacturers.
What GAO Found
FDA granted accreditation to 17 of 23 organizations that applied to conduct inspections of establishments where medical devices are manufactured. FDA denied accreditation to applicants that did not meet minimum criteria because their applications were not correctly completed or did not demonstrate the applicants' technical competence. During the first accreditation year, which started in April 2003, FDA received 23 applications. Of the 23 applications, 2 were not correctly completed and 2 did not demonstrate that the applicants had adequate technical competence. Although the remaining 19 applicants met the minimum criteria, MDUFMA limited the number of organizations that could be accredited to 15 during the first year after FDA issued criteria for accreditation. FDA scored the 19 applications against these criteria and rank-ordered them. It accredited the 15 organizations with the highest ranking applications, but 1 organization later withdrew. After the initial accreditation year, FDA received 2 more applications for accreditation and it accredited both organizations. These 16 organizations remained accredited as of October 31, 2006. Between March 11, 2004, and October 31, 2006, two accredited organizations conducted independent inspections--one inspection of a domestic establishment and one inspection of a foreign establishment. During that same period, 36 inspections of domestic establishments and 1 inspection of a foreign establishment were conducted by accredited organizations jointly with FDA officials as part of training that FDA requires of accredited organizations. As of October 31, 2006, individuals from 7 of the 16 accredited organizations had completed all training requirements and were cleared to conduct independent inspections. Several factors may influence manufacturers' interest in voluntarily requesting an inspection by an accredited organization. According to FDA and representatives of affected entities, there are potential incentives and disincentives to requesting an inspection, as well as reasons for deferring participation in the program. Potential incentives include the opportunity to reduce the number of inspections conducted to meet FDA and other countries' requirements and to control the scheduling of the inspection. Potential disincentives include bearing the cost for the inspection and uncertainty about the potential consequences of making a commitment to having an inspection to assess compliance with FDA requirements in the near future. Some manufacturers might be deferring participation. For example, manufacturers that already contract with a specific accredited organization to conduct inspections to meet the requirements of other countries might defer participation until FDA has cleared that organization to conduct independent inspections. The Department of Health and Human Services provided technical comments on a draft of this report, which GAO incorporated as appropriate. |
gao_GGD-96-3 | gao_GGD-96-3_0 | Achieving Customer Service Goals Is Expected to Benefit Both Taxpayers and IRS
IRS’ customer service goals are to greatly improve both its service to taxpayers and its efficiency in using resources. IRS intends to achieve these goals by consolidating several taxpayer interaction functions in customer service centers, giving customer service representatives broad training and responsibility, and using better technology. Another IRS goal is to improve telephone accessibility. IRS plans to give its customer service representatives additional on-line access to taxpayer data nationwide. IRS has made progress in recent years in handling its correspondence. Intended Revenue Benefit Is Improved Compliance With Tax Laws
IRS has stated that achievement of its customer service vision will contribute to improved compliance with tax laws. Challenges Facing IRS
In reviewing IRS’ early progress toward its customer service vision, we identified four important challenges that IRS must cope with and which we intend to monitor: (1) how to manage the transition to a substantially different organization while meeting ongoing workload demands, (2) how to define the responsibilities of customer service representatives to achieve a successful balance of generalization and specialization, (3) how to realize the expected benefits of new technology, and (4) how to measure success and balance multiple workload goals in the new centers. The problems we identified have not had a serious adverse effect to date because IRS’ implementation of the customer service vision is still in the early stages. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO reviewed the Internal Revenue Service's (IRS) progress in realizing its plan for improving its customer service, focusing on: (1) IRS customer service goals and its plans to meet these goals; (2) the difficulty IRS has in meeting these goals; (3) current management concerns; and (4) important challenges IRS faces.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) IRS customer service goals are to provide better service to taxpayers, utilize its resources more efficiently, and improve taxpayers' compliance with tax laws; (2) IRS expects to improve its efficiency by having fewer work locations and automated workload management, giving customer service representatives better computer resources and access to taxpayer accounts, improving taxpayers' accessibility to telephone service, and allowing taxpayers to resolve their inquiries after a single telephone contact; (3) IRS has made progress toward its vision by initiating limited operations in new customer service centers; (4) current IRS management concerns include the lack of ownership for customer service, the absence of owner involvement during project development, and inadequate quality control to measure interactive telephone systems performance; (5) these management concerns have not had serious adverse effects on IRS goals because implementation of the customer service vision is still in the beginning stages; and (6) IRS will have to determine how to manage the transition to a different organization while maintaining ongoing workloads and developing and using new information technology in order to attain its customer service goals. |
gao_GAO-17-726 | gao_GAO-17-726_0 | Examples of institutional investors include federal, state, and local government, and private retirement plans, endowments, and foundations. Asset Classes and Portfolio Management
Asset management firms registered in the United States manage more than $70 trillion. Minority- and Women- Owned Asset Managers Face Challenges, but Found Opportunities at Some Nonfederal Retirement Plans and Foundations
According to many asset managers and industry associations with which we spoke, MWO asset managers face various challenges when competing for investment management opportunities with institutional investors, including retirement plans and foundations. According to most asset managers and industry associations we interviewed, institutional investors and their consultants often prefer to contract with larger asset managers with brand recognition or with whom they are familiar. In light of these minimum threshold challenges for MWO firms and smaller firms in general, many nonfederal plans adjusted requirements to allow these firms to compete, while noting that they maintained the same performance requirements for all asset managers in their selection processes. Specifically, most nonfederal plans and two foundations either lowered their minimum requirements for assets under management, length of track record, or amount of liability insurance to help ensure the requirements were proportional to the size of the firms, or did not set any minimum or maximum assets under management threshold levels. Finally, the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation did not use MWO asset managers in 2015, but did retain four MWO asset managers in 2016. We identified four key practices that institutional investors can use to increase opportunities for MWO asset managers: establishing and maintaining top leadership commitment, removing potential barriers, conducting outreach to MWO firms, and communicating priorities and expectations about inclusive practices to investment staff and consultants. Some of the federal entities we reviewed implemented all these key practices, but others made partial, limited, or no use of the practices. Almost all of the entities used consultants to some extent in their selection processes, but some entities relied on consultants more than others. However, the Tennessee Valley Authority Retirement System has not used the other three practices (top leadership commitment, outreach, and communicating priorities and expectations). By fully implementing the key practices, the four entities could widen the pool of potential candidates in their asset manager searches and help ensure that they are finding the most qualified firms that meet their investment needs. In keeping with federal interests, the practices could also help address barriers MWO firms face and increase opportunities for these firms. Specifically, the Army and Air Force Exchange Service, Navy Exchange Service Command, and Tennessee Valley Authority Retirement System have used one or more of the key practices to increase opportunities for MWO firms, but have not fully implemented all of them. Additionally, in keeping with federal interests, if implemented, the practices could eliminate or mitigate some of the barriers that MWO firms face and increase opportunities for MWO firms. (Recommendation 1)
The Chief Investment Officer of the Federal Retirement Thrift Investment Board should use key practices as appropriate to increase opportunities for MWO asset managers if and when implementing its mutual fund window platform. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
In this report we examined (1) the challenges minority- and women- owned (MWO) asset managers may face when competing for investment opportunities, and practices used by selected state, local, and private entities that administer or oversee retirement plans and foundations to increase opportunities for MWO firms; (2) the major asset classes in which selected federal entities invested, their use of MWO firms, and the market presence of MWO firms in these asset classes; and (3) the policies and processes selected federal entities use to identify and select asset management firms, and their use of key practices to increase opportunities for MWO firms. We reviewed federal retirement plans, an endowment, and an insurance program administered or overseen by eight entities (collectively referred to as federal entities): Army and Air Force Exchange Service, Federal Reserve System, Federal Retirement Thrift Investment Board, Railroad Retirement Board, Smithsonian Institution, Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, Navy Exchange Service Command, and Tennessee Valley Authority. | Why GAO Did This Study
Asset management firms registered in the United States manage more than $70 trillion. MWO firms manage less than 1 percent of those assets. The federal government has an interest in increasing opportunities for MWO businesses. Questions have been raised about how often federal entities use MWO asset managers and the transparency of their selection processes. GAO was asked to examine, among other things, (1) competitive challenges MWO firms face and how institutional investors address them, (2) selected federal entities' use of MWO firms, and (3) the entities' asset manager selection processes, including their use of key practices. GAO reviewed investment policies and financial statements of 8 entities that manage or sponsor federal retirement plans, an endowment, and an insurance program. GAO also interviewed 14 state, local, and private retirement plans and foundations and 10 MWO asset managers (selected based on size and other factors).
What GAO Found
According to asset managers and industry associations with which GAO spoke, minority- and women-owned (MWO) asset managers face challenges when competing for investment management opportunities with institutional investors, such as retirement plans and foundations. For example, institutional investors and their consultants often prefer to contract with large asset managers with brand recognition and with whom they are familiar. Also, small firms, including MWO firms, are often unable to meet minimum requirements set by institutional investors, such as size (assets under management) and past experience (length of track record). State, local, and private retirement plans and foundations GAO interviewed addressed these challenges in a variety of ways, such as asking their consultants to include MWO firms in their searches. Many plans also lowered their minimum threshold requirements so that the requirements were proportional to the size of the firms while maintaining the same performance requirements for all asset managers in their selection processes.
Federal retirement plans, the endowment, and the insurance program GAO reviewed invest in asset classes in which MWO asset managers have a market presence, but overall use of MWO firms varied. For example, some retirement plans either did not use any MWO firms or did not track this information. The endowment and insurance program reported using some MWO asset managers.
GAO identified four key practices institutional investors can use to increase opportunities for MWO asset managers. These practices are consistent with federal interests in increasing opportunities for MWO businesses.
Top leadership commitment . Demonstrate commitment to increasing opportunities for MWO asset managers.
Remove potential barriers. Review investment policies and practices to remove barriers that limit the participation of smaller, newer firms.
Outreach. Conduct outreach to inform MWO asset managers about investment opportunities and selection processes.
Communicate priorities and expectations. Explicitly communicate priorities and expectations about inclusive practices to investment staff and consultants and ensure those expectations are met.
Some federal entities we reviewed, such as the Federal Reserve System, have used all the practices, but others made partial, limited, or no use of the practices.
The Federal Retirement Thrift Investment Board does not intend to use the practices in its planned mutual fund window platform.
The Navy Exchange Service Command and Tennessee Valley Authority Retirement System used one practice, but have not used the others.
The Army and Air Force Exchange Service has used two practices, and partially used two practices.
By using the key practices, the entities GAO reviewed could widen the pool of candidates in their asset manager searches and help ensure that they find the most qualified firms. In keeping with federal interests, the practices could also help address barriers MWO firms face and increase opportunities for them.
What GAO Recommends
GAO makes four recommendations to increase opportunities for MWO firms, in keeping with federal interests. Four federal entities should use key practices, as appropriate. The Army and Air Force Exchange Service, Navy Exchange Service Command, and Tennessee Valley Authority Retirement System agreed. The Federal Retirement Thrift Investment Board disagreed. GAO maintains that key practices should be used, as discussed in the report. |
gao_GAO-04-635T | gao_GAO-04-635T_0 | The first increment is an information network linking a new generation of 18 manned and unmanned ground vehicles, air vehicles, sensors, and munitions. At a fundamental level, the FCS concept is replacing mass with superior information; that is, to see and hit the enemy first, rather than to rely on heavy armor to withstand attack. For example, it provides an architecture within which individual systems will be designed—an improvement over designing systems independently and making them interoperable after the fact. To be as survivable as the current heavy force, the Unit of Action is primarily dependent upon the ability to kill the enemy before being detected. For example, the FCS vehicles’ small size and lighter weight are factors that improve agility, responsiveness, and deployability. This transformation of the Army, both in terms of operations and in equipment, is underway with the full cooperation of the Army warfighter community. FCS at Significant Risk of Not Delivering Required Capability Within Estimated Resources
The FCS program has yet to—and will not—demonstrate high levels of knowledge at key decision points. The Army began system development and demonstration in May 2003 and plans to make its initial FCS production decision in November 2008—a schedule of about 5 ½ years. If the lessons learned from best practices and the experiences of past programs have any bearing, the FCS strategy is susceptible to “late cycle churn,” a phrase used by private industry to describe the discovery of significant problems late in development and the attendant search for fixes when costs are high and time is short. FCS Is an Unprecedented Technical Challenge
In the Army’s own words, FCS is “the greatest technology and integration challenge the Army has ever undertaken.” It intends to develop a complex, family of systems–an extensive information network and 14 major weapon systems—in less time than is typically taken to develop, demonstrate, and field a single system. At least 53 technologies that are considered critical to achieving critical performance capabilities will need to be matured and integrated into the system of systems. The Army’s Acquisition Strategy Report states that at the Initial Production Decision, all elements of the FCS may not be ready for initial production and will require a continuation of system development and demonstration efforts to complete integration and testing in accordance with the program–tailoring plan. Alternatives to FCS Strategy Merit Consideration
We have reported on options that warrant consideration as alternatives for developing FCS capabilities with less risk. It has to be as lethal and survivable as the current force and its combat vehicles have to be a fraction of the weight of current vehicles to be air transportable on the C-130 aircraft. The opportunity for increasing funds to cover cost increases poses a challenge because FCS already dominates the Army’s investment budget. It might be difficult to find enough other programs to cut or defer to offset FCS increases. Focus on the development and demonstration of its most critical capabilities first, such as the network. This would take more time than if the current FCS schedule were successfully carried out. Focus on maturing the most critical technologies first, then bundle them in demonstrations of capabilities, such as Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations, then proceed with an acquisition program that would attain sufficient knowledge at the right acquisition junctures. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
To develop the information on whether the FCS program was following a knowledge-based acquisition strategy and the current status of that strategy, we contacted, interviewed, and obtained documents from officials of the Offices of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics); the Secretary of Defense Cost Analysis Improvement Group; the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology); the Program Executive Officer for Ground Combat Systems; the Program Manager for Future Combat Systems; and the Future Combat Systems Lead Systems Integrator. | Why GAO Did This Study
To become a more responsive and dominant combat force, the U.S. Army is changing its strategy from bigger and stronger weapons to faster and more agile ones. The Future Combat Systems (FCS)--which the Army calls the "greatest technology and integration challenge ever undertaken"--is expected to meet the Army's transformational objectives. Forming FCS' backbone is an information network that links 18 systems. Not only is FCS to play a pivotal role in the Army's military operations, FCS and its future iterations are expected to eventually replace all Army forces. For FCS' first developmental increment, the Army has set aside a 5 1/2-year timetable from program start (May 2003) until the initial production decision (November 2008). GAO was asked to testify about FCS' key features, whether the program carries any risks, and, if so, whether there are alternatives for developing FCS capabilities with fewer risks.
What GAO Found
The FCS concept is a new generation of manned and unmanned ground vehicles, air vehicles, and munitions, each of which taps into a secure network of superior combat information. These weapon systems are to be a fraction of the weight of current weapons yet as lethal and survivable. FCS' lightweight and small size are critical to meeting the Army's goals of deploying faster and being more transportable for big or small military operations. Rather than rely on heavy armor to withstand an enemy attack, FCS' systems will depend on superior communications to kill the enemy before being detected. One of FCS' key advantages is that it provides an architecture within which individual systems will be designed--an improvement over designing systems independently and making them interoperable after the fact. Another merit is that FCS is being acquired and developed with the full cooperation of the Army's program managers, contractors, and the warfighter community. FCS is at significant risk for not delivering required capability within budgeted resources. Three-fourths of FCS' needed technologies were still immature when the program started. The first prototypes of FCS will not be delivered until just before the production decision. Full demonstration of FCS' ability to work as an overarching system will not occur until after production has begun. This demonstration assumes complete success-- including delivery and integration of numerous complementary systems that are not inherently a part of FCS but are essential for FCS to work as a whole. When taking into account the lessons learned from commercial best practices and the experiences of past programs, the FCS strategy is likely to result in cost and schedule consequences if problems are discovered late in development. Because it is promising to deliver unprecedented performance capabilities to the warfighter community, the Army has little choice but to meet a very high standard and has limited flexibility in cutting FCS requirements. Because the cost already dominates its investment budget, the Army may find it difficult to find other programs to cut in order to further fund FCS. To avoid unanticipated cost and schedule problems late in development, several alternatives can be considered: (1) add time to FCS' acquisition schedule to reduce concurrent development; (2) take the time to develop and demonstrate the most critical capabilities first, such as the FCS network, then proceed with an acquisition program; and (3) focus on maturing the most critical technologies first, then bundle them in demonstrations of capabilities, and ensure that decision makers have attained the knowledge they need at critical junctures before moving forward. |
gao_GAO-12-312 | gao_GAO-12-312_0 | Background
Foster Care Program
Title IV-E of the Social Security Act provides for states to obtain federal reimbursement for the costs of their Foster Care programs. Figure 1 shows federal outlays, as reported by HHS, by type of expenditure for fiscal year 2010. OMB granted this approval in December 2004 with the expectation that continuing efforts would be taken to improve the accuracy of ACF’s estimates of improper payments in the ensuing years. ACF’s Methodology for Estimating Foster Care Program Improper Payments Is Not Statistically Valid or Complete
ACF’s methodology, which resulted in a reported $73 million (or 4.9 percent) estimate of improper payments in the Foster Care program for had deficiencies in all three phases of its estimation fiscal year 2010,methodology—planning, selection, and evaluation—when compared to OMB’s statistical guidance, GAO guidance, and federal internal control standards, as summarized in table 2. Validity of Reported Foster Care Program Improper Payment Reductions is Questionable
ACF has reported significantly reduced estimated improper maintenance payments, from a baseline error rate of 10.33 percent for 2004 to a 4.9 percent error rate for 2010, but the validity of ACF’s reporting of reduced improper payment error rates is questionable. Further, we found that ACF’s ability to reliably assess the extent to which its corrective actions reduced Foster Care program improper payments was impaired by deficiencies in (1) its method for requiring when states implement corrective actions and (2) information technology limitations related to monitoring states’ Foster Care program-related Single Audit findings. ACF did not use reported improper payment error rates—which are based on the dollar amount of improper payments identified in a sample of state Foster Care cases—to determine whether or not a state is required to implement corrective actions. Instead, ACF uses the number of sample cases found in error to determine which states should develop a PIP. Therefore, some states with improper payment dollar error rates exceeding 5 percent were not required to implement corrective actions to reduce these rates. Similarly, deficiencies in its system for monitoring Single Audit findings limit ACF’s ability to efficiently track and compare trends across states. Recommendations for Executive Action
In order to more accurately and completely estimate improper payments for the Foster Care program and ensure that its methodology is statistically valid, we recommend that the Secretary of Health and Human Services direct the Assistant Secretary for the Administration for Children and Families to take the following four actions: augment procedures for estimating and reporting Foster Care program improper payments, to include administrative costs; develop and implement procedures to provide a statistically valid methodology for estimating and reporting Foster Care program improper payments based on complete and accurate payment data; augment guidance to teams gathering state-level Foster Care program improper payment estimate data to include specific procedures to follow in identifying and reporting any underpayments and duplicate or excessive payment errors; and revise existing procedures for calculating a national improper payment estimate for the Foster Care program to include a statistically valid method for aggregating state-level margins of error to derive an overall, inflation adjusted, program estimate. In its written comments, reprinted in appendix IV, HHS agreed that its improper payment estimation efforts can and should be improved. With regard to our seven recommendations to help improve ACF’s methodology to estimate improper payments and its corrective action process, HHS generally concurred with four of the recommendations and agreed to continue to study the remaining three recommendations. We also reviewed results from the Title IV-E eligibility reviews for periods 2000 through 2010, and prior GAO and HHS Office of Inspector General (OIG) reports. To further determine the extent to which ACF’s methodology generated a reasonably accurate and complete estimate of improper payments across the Foster Care program, we:
Performed an independent analysis of ACF’s sampling methodology, including a review of the sampling plan and other underlying documentation, as well as evaluated whether ACF’s sampling methodology complied with OMB statistical guidance, GAO guidance, and federal internal control standards as criteria to determine the accuracy and completeness of ACF’s reported fiscal year 2010 improper payment estimate for the Foster Care program. | Why GAO Did This Study
Each year, hundreds of thousands of the nations most vulnerable children are removed from their homes and placed in foster care. While states are primarily responsible for providing safe and stable out-of-home care for these children, Title IV-E of the Social Security Act provides federal financial support. The Administration for Children and Families (ACF) in the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) is responsible for administering and overseeing federal funding for Foster Care. Past work by the HHS Office of Inspector General (OIG), GAO, and others have identified numerous financial deficiencies associated with the Title IV-E Foster Care program. GAO was asked to determine the extent to which (1) ACFs estimation methodology generated a reasonably accurate and complete estimate of improper payments across the Foster Care program and (2) ACFs corrective actions reduced Foster Care program improper payments. To complete this work, GAO reviewed HHSs fiscal year 2010 improper payments estimation procedures, conducted site visits, and met with cognizant ACF officials.
What GAO Found
Although ACF has established a process to calculate a national improper payment estimate for the Foster Care program, the estimate is not based on a statistically valid methodology and consequently does not reflect a reasonably accurate estimate of the extent of Foster Care improper payments. In addition, the estimate deals with only about one-third of the federal expenditures for Foster Care, and is therefore incomplete. ACFs methodology for estimating Foster Care improper payments was approved by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) in 2004 with the understanding that continuing efforts would be taken to improve the accuracy of ACFs estimates of improper payments in the ensuing years. ACF, however, continued to generally follow its initial methodology which, when compared to federal statistical guidance and internal control standards, GAO found to be deficient in all three phases of ACFs estimation methodologyplanning, selection, and evaluation. These deficiencies impaired the accuracy and completeness of the Foster Care program improper payments estimate of $73 million reported for fiscal year 2010.
ACF has reported significantly reduced estimated improper payments for its Foster Care maintenance payments, from a baseline of 10.33 percent for fiscal year 2004 to a 4.9 percent error rate for fiscal year 2010. However, the validity of ACFs reporting of reduced error rates is questionable. GAO found that ACFs ability to reliably assess the extent to which its corrective actions reduced improper payments was impaired by weaknesses in its requirements for state-level corrective actions. For example, ACF used the number of cases found in error rather than the dollar amount of improper payments identified to determine whether or not a state was required to implement corrective actions. As such, some states with higher improper payment dollar error rates were not required to implement actions to reduce these rates. GAO also found deficiencies in ACFs Audit Resolution Tracking and Monitoring System that limited its ability to efficiently track and compare trends across states Single Audit findings.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is making seven recommendations to help improve ACFs methodology for estimating improper payments for the Foster Care program and its corrective action process. HHS agreed that its improper payment estimation efforts can and should be improved, and generally concurred with four of the recommendations and agreed to continue to study the remaining three recommendations. GAO reaffirms the need for all seven recommendations. |
gao_NSIAD-96-30 | gao_NSIAD-96-30_0 | Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
As requested, we reviewed the Navy’s public-private competition program for aviation depot maintenance to determine (1) the nature and extent of past competitions, (2) whether savings resulted, (3) prospects for and impediments to future competitions, and (4) whether program improvements can be made. Public-Private Competition for Navy Aviation Repairs Has Been Limited
Between fiscal years 1987 and 1990, the Navy’s public-private competition program for aviation depot maintenance went from a limited pilot program to a planned program that was to include nearly all aircraft and engine maintenance work and result in savings of $550 million over 6 years. The public and private sectors both performed maintenance on the remaining three components. Although the Navy subsequently initiated action that was expected to substantially increase the amount of competed work, the planned expansion never occurred for the following reasons:
The time and cost of performing competitions. Defense downsizing resulted in rapidly declining maintenance workloads and less workload available for public-private competition. These cost increases can be a significant factor over a 5-year period such as that involving the F-14 competition work. However, quantifying the precise savings is not possible. Future Use of Public-Private Competition Appears Advantageous
Although it appears the Navy’s aviation public-private competitions resulted in benefits and DOD plans to privatize more of its depot work, DOD is not allowing the use of public-private competitions. The Commission report recommended that the DOD transition to a depot maintenance system relying mostly on the private sector. Following DOD’s 1994 decision to terminate the public-private depot competition program, the fiscal year 1995 defense appropriations conference report directed DOD to reinstitute public-private competition and to report its policy regarding public versus private competition for depot maintenance workloads. The officials further commented about problems with the NADEPs’ cost accounting and work control systems in a competitive environment. However, they noted their concern over the fairness issue, which centers on concerns that depot prices may not reflect the cost to the government of performing competition work, including all labor, material and overhead. In practice the competition program has not been reinstituted. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Navy's aviation depot maintenance competition program, focusing on: (1) the nature and extent of past competitions; (2) whether savings resulted from the program; (3) the prospects for and impediments to future competitions; and (4) whether the program can be improved.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) Navy public-private competitions generally resulted in savings and benefits, although precisely quantifying such savings is not possible; (2) for competition workloads, public depots substantially reduced operating costs by streamlining production processes and reducing overhead, but the Navy's expectations to greatly expand public-private competitions and to thereby achieve over $550 million in savings over a 6-year period never materialized; (3) the time and cost of performing such competitions, combined with a rapidly declining depot maintenance workload and a private-sector concern about fairness, resulted in much less maintenance work being subjected to public-private competition than had been projected; (4) the fairness issue centers on private-sector concerns that military depot prices did not reflect the total cost to the government of performing this work; (5) congressional direction to reinstitute public-private competitions, together with recommendations by the Commission on Roles and Missions to privatize most depot maintenance work has resulted in DOD reexamining its deport workload with a view toward moving more work to the private sector; (6) while DOD maintains it has reinstituted its public-private competition program, in practice no competitions have been held since DOD terminated the program in 1994; (7) a number of factors may limit or impede a major competition program in the current environment, including the cost and difficulties of performing such competitions and the amount of work available for competition under current law and policies limiting the mix of public and private depot maintenance work; and (8) initiatives, such as improving cost accounting systems for deport work, can be undertaken to improve public-private competitions to ensure their future usefulness in identifying the most cost-effective source of repair for depot maintenance workloads. |
gao_GAO-10-200 | gao_GAO-10-200_0 | NASA Has Made Some Changes to Improve Dissemination of Research Results
Since May 2007, NASA has changed some of its policies on the dissemination of research results through publications and presentations, and it has made a key leadership change in its main public affairs office to address allegations that an official in this office had played a key role in suppressing climate change science and media access to climate scientists in the past. Since 2007, NASA has made no changes to its policy on dissemination through news releases and media interviews. NASA Has Clarified the Roles and Responsibilities of Reviewing Officials for Dissemination of Research Results through Publications and Presentations
In late 2007 and early 2009, NASA changed one of its policies on dissemination of research results through publications and presentations. NASA Changed a Key Public Affairs Position to Help Ensure Dissemination of Research Results to the Public through the Media
Since 2007, NASA has not made any changes to its media policy, but in May 2007 it converted a key management position in the Headquarters Office of Public Affairs from a political appointment to a career civil service position. This change followed a management review—conducted in early 2006 by NASA’s leadership—of allegations that its Headquarters Office of Public Affairs had suppressed climate change science and denied media access to scientists in 2004 and 2005. Fewer Researchers Are Familiar with NASA’s Dissemination Policies, but Most Believe the Policies Effectively Ensure Access to Research Results
Although NASA has taken some steps to increase researchers’ awareness of its dissemination policies, our survey results in 2009 indicate that while most researchers are familiar with the dissemination policies, fewer researchers were familiar with them than in 2007, and slightly fewer were confident they understood the policies well enough to follow them. Our 2007 and 2009 surveys also indicate that many researchers remain unclear about when they may discuss research results that have potential policy implications. However, in 2009, fewer researchers believed that NASA’s efforts to inform them about the policies for disseminating research through agency releases were extremely to moderately effective (72 percent said so in 2009 compared with 81 percent in 2007). Nevertheless, we found in 2009, relatively few NASA researchers are aware of and familiar with the agency’s process to appeal dissemination decisions. NASA’s Policy on Dissemination through the Media Includes an Appeals Process, but Many Researchers Remain Unfamiliar with It
NASA has not adopted any new processes or procedures since 2007 for researchers to use if they wish to appeal decisions regarding their requests to disseminate their research results. Nonetheless, our 2009 survey shows that, as in 2007, about one-third of NASA researchers reported that they were aware of NASA’s process to appeal decisions about dissemination of research results, but only 8 percent responded that they were familiar with the process. According to our survey results, more researchers in 2009 had their requests to disseminate research results denied for reasons other than those stemming from standard technical reviews (about 12 percent of researchers in 2009, compared with about 7 percent in 2007). In 2007, while we found that NASA’s policies were generally clear, we also raised a number of concerns, including that many NASA researchers did not understand the full range of the agency’s policies and were generally unaware of NASA’s policy for appealing dissemination decisions. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Authorization Act of 2008 directed GAO to determine whether NASA is implementing the regulations governing the dissemination of research in a clear and consistent manner. In response, this report discusses (1) what changes, if any, have been made since 2007 to the policies that guide the dissemination of federally funded research results at NASA; (2) the extent to which NASA researchers believe that the agency’s dissemination policies have been more effectively communicated since 2007 and what their experiences have been in using the process; and (3) what processes, if any, NASA has adopted since 2007 for researchers to follow if they have concerns about decisions regarding the dissemination of their research results and how those concerns have been addressed. In all, we received a 57.5 percent response rate. During these pretests, we asked the researchers to complete the survey as they would when they received it. | Why GAO Did This Study
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) researchers generally disseminate their agency-funded research results through publications, presentations, agency releases, and media interviews. In 2007, GAO reviewed dissemination policies at NASA and two other agencies and found that NASA's policies were generally clear, but GAO's survey of NASA researchers raised concerns that many of them did not understand some of the policies and were generally unaware of how to appeal dissemination decisions. Congress in 2008 directed GAO to determine whether NASA is implementing its policies in a clear and consistent manner. To meet that requirement, GAO determined (1) what changes have been made to NASA's policies since 2007, (2) the views of NASA researchers on whether the policies have been more effectively communicated since 2007, and (3) what changes have occurred since 2007 in NASA's processes for researchers to follow if they wish to appeal decisions about the dissemination of their research results. GAO conducted a Web-based survey of all 2,790 NASA researchers and had a 57.5 percent response rate.
What GAO Found
Since May 2007, NASA has changed some of its policies on the dissemination of research results through publications and presentations, but has not changed its policy on dissemination through news releases and media interviews, although it has made a key leadership change in its main public affairs office. Regarding its policies for dissemination through publications and presentations, in 2007 and 2009, NASA clarified the roles and responsibilities of officials who participate in the review and approval process that is required before agency-funded research is released. The changes also required managers to notify researchers when their requests to release research results have been approved or denied, and they required researchers to refrain from releasing results until they received approval. In contrast, although NASA has not made any changes to its policy that guides the dissemination of research through the media, in May 2007, it converted a key management position in the Headquarters Office of Public Affairs from a political appointment to a career civil service position. This was done to address allegations that an official in this office had suppressed climate change science and denied media access to scientists during 2004 and 2005. The change resulted from a management review conducted in early 2006 by NASA's leadership looking into these allegations. While the majority of researchers are familiar with the dissemination policies, GAO's survey indicates that in 2009, 87 percent of researchers were familiar with NASA's dissemination policies, compared with 92 percent in 2007, and slightly less were confident they understood the policies well enough to follow them for certain kinds of dissemination routes, such as publications, presentations, and agency releases. As in 2007, researchers continue to learn about the policies mainly through on-the-job training and e-mails from NASA officials. GAO's 2009 survey, like the 2007 survey, also indicates that researchers remain unclear about when they may discuss research results that have policy implications, including when they may discuss their own views, even though NASA has clarified its policy to allow researchers to do so as long as they do not attribute their views to the agency. Since 2007, NASA has not adopted any new procedures for appealing dissemination decisions. As in 2007, in 2009 relatively few NASA researchers were aware of and familiar with the agency's appeals process. Specifically, GAO's survey found that about one-third of NASA researchers were aware that the agency has a process to appeal decisions related to dissemination, but only about 8 percent said they were familiar with it. Fewer researchers in 2009 than in 2007 said they had sought to disseminate their research in the past 5 years (83 percent compared with 91 percent), and more researchers had their requests denied for other than technical reasons (12 percent in 2009 compared with 7 percent in 2007). Nonetheless, 85 percent of researchers continue to believe that the agency generally supports the dissemination of research results and that the agency's efforts to inform them about policies for all dissemination routes are generally effective. |
gao_GAO-07-595T | gao_GAO-07-595T_0 | Background
The President’s Vision for Space Exploration for NASA announced in 2004 calls for the retirement of the shuttle upon completion of the ISS and the creation of new vehicles for human space flight that will allow a return to the moon by 2020 and voyages to Mars and points beyond. Congress has voiced concern over the United States not having continuous access to space. NASA has made it a priority to minimize the gap to the extent possible. Another key challenge will be developing the Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle within cost, schedule, and performance goals. Some of these challenges include managing the supplier base to ensure its continued viability, developing the Ares I Crew Launch Vehicle, and completing and supporting the space station. NASA has recently issued its updated program and project management requirements for flight systems in response to our recommendation. However, it should be noted that implementation of the policy in a disciplined manner will ensure success, not the existence of the policy itself. We are in the process of assessing how well NASA is positioning itself to effectively manage its supplier base to ensure both sustainment of the Space Shuttle Program through its scheduled retirement in 2010 and successful transition to planned exploration activities. A February 2007 report by the International Space Station Independent Safety Task Force, which was required by the NASA Authorization Act of 2005, noted that the transition from the space shuttle to post-shuttle systems for logistical support to the ISS will require careful planning and phasing of new capabilities. Disposing of Property and Equipment
NASA has not developed a comprehensive cost estimate for transitioning or disposing of Space Shuttle Program facilities and equipment. This poses a financial risk to the agency. Further, NASA has indicated that it is preparing a package of legislative and administrative tools to help in the transition from the Space Shuttle Program to the Constellation Program. Implementing the Vision over the coming decades will require hundreds of billions of dollars and a sustained commitment from multiple administrations and Congresses over the length of the program. How well NASA overcomes the transition challenges that we and others have identified will not only have an effect on NASA’s ability to effectively manage the gap in the U. S. human access to space, but also will affect the agency’s ability to secure a sound foundation of support for the President’s space exploration policy. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. | Why GAO Did This Study
On January 14, 2004, the President announced a new Vision for space exploration that directs the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) to focus its efforts on returning humans to the moon by 2020 in preparation for future, more ambitions missions. Implementing the Vision will require hundreds of billions of dollars and a sustained commitment from multiple administrations and Congresses. Some of the funding for implementing exploration activities is expected to come from funding freed up after the retirement of the Space Shuttle, scheduled for 2010, and projected termination of U.S. participation in the International Space Station by 2016. Congress, while supportive of the effort has voiced concern over the potential gap in human space flight. In the NASA Authorization Act of 2005, Congress stated that it is the policy of the United States to have the capability for human access to space on a continuous basis. NASA has made it a priority to minimize the gap to the extent possible. GAO provides no recommendations in this statement. However, GAO continues to emphasize that given the Nation's fiscal challenges and NASA's past difficulty developing systems within cost, schedule, and performance parameters, it is imperative that the agency adequately manage this transition in a fiscally competent and prudent manner.
What GAO Found
NASA is in the midst of a transition effort of a magnitude not seen since the end of the Apollo program and the start of the Space Shuttle Program more than 3 decades ago. This transition will include a massive transfer of people, hardware, and infrastructure. Based on ongoing and work completed to-date, we have identified a number of issues that pose unique challenges to NASA as it transitions from the shuttle to the next generation of human space flight systems while at the same time seeking to minimize the time the United States will be without its own means to put humans in space. These issues include: sustaining a viable workforce; effectively managing systems development efforts; managing the supplier base; providing logistical support to the International Space Station; identifying and disposing of property and equipment; ensuring adequate environmental remediation; and transforming its business processes and financial management system. NASA already has in place many processes, policies, procedures and support systems to carry out this transition. However, successful implementation of the transition will depend on thoughtful execution and effective oversight. How well NASA overcomes some of the challenges we have identified will not only have an effect on NASA's ability to effectively manage the gap in the U.S. human access to space, but will also affect the agency's ability to secure a sound foundation for the President's space exploration policy. |
gao_GAO-10-861 | gao_GAO-10-861_0 | In addition, according to regulators, the process resulted in a methodology that yielded credible results and by design helped to assure that the BHCs would be sufficiently capitalized to weather a more adverse economic downturn. SCAP Process Included Coordination and Communication among the Federal Bank Regulators and with the BHCs
Robust coordination and communication are essential to programs like SCAP when bringing together regulatory staff from multiple agencies and disciplines to effectively analyze complex financial institutions and understand the interactions among multiple layers of risk. They also thought that the SCAP process could serve as a model for future supervisory efforts. Such officials also stated that publicly releasing the methodology and results of the stress test helped strengthen market confidence. Not all SCAP participants agreed that the SCAP process was fully transparent. Some BHC officials believed that this requirement resulted in the BHCs having to raise additional capital because the required ALLL increases were subtracted from the revenue estimates in calculating the resources available to absorb losses. While SCAP Increased Capital Levels and Improved Confidence in the Banking System, BHCs Could Face Ongoing Challenges
SCAP largely met its goals of increasing the level and quality of capital held by the 19 largest BHCs and, more broadly, of strengthening market confidence in the banking system. Nine of the 10 BHCs were able to raise the required SCAP amount of new common equity in the private markets by the November 9, 2009, deadline (see table 2). Capital adequacy generally improved across all 19 SCAP BHCs during 2009. Some officials from participating BHCs and credit rating agencies also viewed the BHCs’ ability to raise the capital required by the stress test as further evidence of SCAP’s success in increasing market confidence and reducing uncertainty. The 19 Tested BHCs Experienced Better Performance Than a Pro Rata Estimate under the More Adverse Scenario
As of the end of 2009, while the SCAP BHCs generally had not experienced the level of losses that were estimated on a pro rata basis under the stress test’s more adverse economic scenario, concerns remain that some banks could absorb potentially significant losses in certain asset categories that would erode capital levels. Specifically, GMAC exceeded the SCAP 2-year estimated losses in the first-lien, second/junior lien, and commercial real estate portfolios and the 1-year pro rata losses in the “Other” portfolio; Citigroup exceeded the 1-year pro rata estimated losses in the commercial and industrial loan portfolio; and SunTrust exceeded the 1-year estimated losses in the first-lien and credit card portfolios. In addition, the Federal Reserve is finalizing guidance for examiners to assess the capital adequacy process, including stress testing, for BHCs. Recommendations
To gain a better understanding of SCAP and inform the use of similar stress tests in the future, we recommend that the Chairman of the Federal Reserve direct the Division of Banking Supervision and Regulation to: Compare the performance of the 19 largest BHCs against the more adverse scenario projections following the completion of the 2-year period covered in the SCAP stress test ending December 31, 2010, and disclose the results of the analysis to the public. To leverage the lessons learned from SCAP to the benefit of other regulated bank and thrift institutions, we recommend that the Chairman of the Federal Reserve in consultation with the heads of the FDIC and OCC take the following actions: Follow through on the Federal Reserve’s commitment to improve the transparency of bank supervision by developing a plan that reconciles the divergent views on transparency and allows for increased transparency in the regular supervisory process. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of this report were to (1) describe the process used to design and conduct the stress test and participants views’ of the process, (2) describe the extent to which the stress test achieved its goals and compare its estimates with the bank holding companies’ (BHC) actual results, and (3) identify the lessons regulators and BHCs learned from the Supervisory Capital Assessment Program (SCAP) and examine how each are using those lessons to enhance their risk identification and assessment practices. Our primary source for the actual results at the BHCs was the Federal Reserve’s Y-9C. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Supervisory Capital Assessment Program (SCAP) was established under the Capital Assistance Program (CAP)--a component of the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP)--to assess whether the 19 largest U.S. bank holding companies (BHC) had enough capital to withstand a severe economic downturn. Led by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Federal Reserve), federal bank regulators conducted a stress test to determine if these banks needed to raise additional capital, either privately or through CAP. This report (1) describes the SCAP process and participants' views of the process, (2) assesses SCAP's goals and results and BHCs' performance, and (3) identifies how regulators and the BHCs are applying lessons learned from SCAP. To do this work, GAO reviewed SCAP documents, analyzed financial data, and interviewed regulatory, industry, and BHC officials.
What GAO Found
The SCAP process appeared to have been mostly successful in promoting coordination, transparency, and capital adequacy. The process utilized an organizational structure that facilitated coordination and communication among regulatory staff from multiple disciplines and organizations and with the BHCs. Because SCAP was designed to help restore confidence in the banking industry, regulators took unusual steps to increase transparency by releasing details of their methodology and sensitive BHC-specific results. However, several participants criticized aspects of the SCAP process. For example, some supervisory and bank industry officials stated that the Federal Reserve was not transparent about the linkages between some of the test's assumptions and results. But most of the participants in SCAP agreed that despite these views, coordination and communication were effective and could serve as a model for future supervisory efforts. According to regulators, the process resulted in a methodology that yielded credible results. By design, the process helped to ensure that BHCs would be capitalized for a potentially more severe downturn in economic conditions from 2009 through 2010. SCAP largely met its goals of increasing the level and quality of capital held by the 19 largest U.S. BHCs and, more broadly, strengthening market confidence in the banking system. The stress test identified 9 BHCs that met the capital requirements under the more adverse scenario and 10 that needed to raise additional capital. Nine of the 10 BHCs were able to raise capital in the private market, with the exception of GMAC LLC, which received additional capital from the U.S. Department of the Treasury (Treasury). The resulting capital adequacy of the 19 BHCs has generally exceeded SCAP's requirements, and two-thirds of the BHCs have either fully repaid or begun to repay their TARP investments. Officials from the BHCs, credit rating agencies, and federal banking agencies indicated that the Federal Reserve's public release of the stress test methodology and results in the spring of 2009 helped strengthen market confidence. During the first year of SCAP (2009), overall actual losses for these 19 BHCs have generally been below GAO's 1-year pro rata loss estimates under the more adverse economic scenario. Collectively, the BHCs experienced gains in their securities and trading and counterparty portfolios. However, some BHCs exceeded the GAO 1-year pro rata estimated 2009 losses in certain areas, such as consumer and commercial lending. Most notably, in 2009, GMAC LLC exceeded the loss estimates in multiple categories for the full 2-year SCAP period. More losses in the residential and commercial real estate markets and further deterioration in economic conditions could challenge the BHCs, even though they have been deemed to have adequate capital levels under SCAP. This report recommends that the Federal Reserve complete a final 2-year SCAP analysis, and apply lessons learned from SCAP to improve transparency of bank supervision, examiner guidance, risk identification and assessment, and regulatory coordination. The Federal Reserve agreed with our five recommendations and noted current actions that it has underway to address them. Treasury agreed with the report's findings. |
gao_GAO-11-308 | gao_GAO-11-308_0 | IRS Is the Tax Collector for the United States
IRS has demanding responsibilities in collecting taxes, processing tax returns, and enforcing federal tax laws, and relies extensively on computerized systems to support its financial and mission-related operations. These weaknesses continue to jeopardize the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the financial and sensitive taxpayer information processed by IRS’s systems and, considered collectively, are the basis of our determination that IRS had a material weakness in internal control over its financial reporting related to information security in fiscal year 2010. Organizations accomplish this objective by designing and implementing controls that are intended to prevent, limit, and detect unauthorized access to computing resources, programs, information, and facilities. For example, IRS granted excessive privileges to a database account on the online system used to support and manage its computer access request, approval, and review process. For example, IRS did not enable security event auditing or system privilege auditing features on databases that support its access authorization, administrative accounting, and procurement systems. Although IRS had implemented numerous physical security controls, certain controls were not working as intended, and the agency had not consistently applied the policy in others. Although IRS made progress in updating certain systems, it did not always apply critical patches to its databases that support two financial applications. IRS Has Not Fully Implemented Key Components of Its Information Security Program
An underlying reason for the information security weaknesses in IRS’s financial and tax processing systems is that it has not yet fully implemented key components of its comprehensive information security program. FISMA requires each agency to develop, document, and implement an information security program that, among other things, includes: periodic assessments of the risk and magnitude of harm that could result from the unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification, or destruction of information and information systems; policies and procedures that (1) are based on risk assessments, (2) cost- effectively reduce information security risks to an acceptable level, (3) ensure that information security is addressed throughout the life cycle of each system, and (4) ensure compliance with applicable requirements; plans for providing adequate information security for networks, facilities, security awareness training to inform personnel of information security risks and of their responsibilities in complying with agency policies and procedures, as well as training personnel with significant security responsibilities for information security; periodic testing and evaluation of the effectiveness of information security policies, procedures, and practices, to be performed with a frequency depending on risk, but no less than annually, and that includes testing of management, operational, and technical controls for every system identified in the agency’s required inventory of major information systems; a process for planning, implementing, evaluating, and documenting remedial action to address any deficiencies in its information security policies, procedures, or practices; and plans and procedures to ensure continuity of operations for information systems that support the operations and assets of the agency. To bolster security over its networks and systems and to address its information security weaknesses, IRS has developed various initiatives. However, one application’s system security plan did not describe controls in place in the current environment. Although IRS has processes in place intended to monitor, test, and evaluate its security policies and procedures, these processes were not always effective. For example, IRS did not: Detect many of the readily identifiable vulnerabilities we are reporting. In addition, during fiscal year 2010, IRS made progress toward correcting previously reported information security weaknesses, correcting or mitigating 23 of the 88 previously identified weaknesses that were unresolved at the end of our prior audit. However, at the time of our review, 65 of 88—about 74 percent—of the previously reported weaknesses remained unresolved or unmitigated. The agency informed us that it had corrected 39 of the 88 previously reported weaknesses, but we determined that IRS had not fully implemented the remedial actions for 16 of the 39 weaknesses that it considered corrected. Until IRS takes these further steps, financial and taxpayer information are at increased risk of unauthorized disclosure, modification, or destruction; financial data is at increased risk of errors that result in misstatement; and the agency’s management decisions may be based on unreliable or inaccurate financial information. We are also making 32 detailed recommendations in a separate report with limited distribution. Further, he stated that IRS will provide a detailed corrective action plan addressing each of our recommendations. This report contains recommendations to you. Appendix I: Objective, Scope, and Methodology
The objective of our review was to determine whether controls over key financial and tax processing systems were effective in protecting the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of financial and sensitive taxpayer information at the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). To do this, we examined IRS information security policies, plans, and procedures; tested controls over key financial applications; and interviewed key agency officials in order to (1) assess the effectiveness of corrective actions taken by IRS to address weaknesses we previously reported and (2) determine whether any additional weaknesses existed. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has a demanding responsibility in collecting taxes, processing tax returns, and enforcing the nation's tax laws. It relies extensively on computerized systems to support its financial and mission-related operations and on information security controls to protect financial and sensitive taxpayer information that resides on those systems. As part of its audit of IRS's fiscal years 2010 and 2009 financial statements, GAO assessed whether controls over key financial and tax processing systems are effective in ensuring the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of financial and sensitive taxpayer information. To do this, GAO examined IRS information security policies, plans, and procedures; tested controls over key financial applications; and interviewed key agency officials at four sites.
What GAO Found
Although IRS made progress in correcting previously reported information security weaknesses, control weaknesses over key financial and tax processing systems continue to jeopardize the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of financial and sensitive taxpayer information. Specifically, IRS did not consistently implement controls that were intended to prevent, limit, and detect unauthorized access to its financial systems and information. For example, the agency did not sufficiently (1) restrict users' access to databases to only the access needed to perform their jobs; (2) secure the system it uses to support and manage its computer access request, approval, and review processes; (3) update database software residing on servers that support its general ledger system; and (4) enable certain auditing features on databases supporting several key systems. In addition, 65 of 88--about 74 percent--of previously reported weaknesses remain unresolved or unmitigated. An underlying reason for these weaknesses is that IRS has not yet fully implemented key components of its comprehensive information security program. Although IRS has processes in place intended to monitor and assess its internal controls, these processes were not always effective. For example, IRS's testing did not detect many of the vulnerabilities GAO identified during this audit and did not assess a key application in its current environment. Further, the agency had not effectively validated corrective actions reported to resolve previously identified weaknesses. Although IRS had a process in place for verifying whether each weakness had been corrected, this process was not always working as intended. For example, the agency reported that it had resolved 39 of the 88 previously identified weaknesses; however, 16 of the 39 weaknesses had not been mitigated. IRS has various initiatives underway to bolster security over its networks and systems; however, until the agency corrects the identified weaknesses, its financial systems and information remain unnecessarily vulnerable to insider threats, including errors or mistakes and fraudulent or malevolent acts by insiders. As a result, financial and taxpayer information are at increased risk of unauthorized disclosure, modification, or destruction; financial data is at increased risk of errors that result in misstatement; and the agency's management decisions may be based on unreliable or inaccurate financial information. These weaknesses, considered collectively, are the basis for GAO's determination that IRS had a material weakness in internal control over financial reporting related to information security in fiscal year 2010.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that IRS take eight actions to fully implement key components of its comprehensive information security program. In a separate report with limited distribution, GAO is recommending 32 specific actions for correcting newly identified control weaknesses. In commenting on a draft of this report, IRS agreed to develop a detailed corrective action plan to address each recommendation. |
gao_GAO-14-27 | gao_GAO-14-27_0 | DHS Components Define M&A Activities Differently and Can Identify M&A Spending, but Limitations Exist in Obtaining Data from Fiscal Years 1999 through 2013
The eight DHS components we reviewed define M&A spending differently. According to component officials, the components can identify M&A spending, but they do not do so because they are not required to by the department. Because components define M&A differently, have different methods for identifying spending, and limitations exist in obtaining data, it is not possible to compare components’ M&A spending data from fiscal years 1999 through 2013. Four of the eight components in our review—FEMA, FLETC, ICE, and TSA—define their M&A activities according to the activities funded through their appropriations accounts and PPAs that are M&A in nature (i.e., activities of a support nature such as planning and budgeting, legal support, and IT infrastructure), while the other four—Coast Guard, DMO, CBP, and USSS—each define M&A activities differently and their definitions are not tied to activities in specific appropriation accounts or PPAs. For example, TSA officials stated that TSA’s M&A activities are those found within its Transportation Security Support appropriations account, specifically the following three PPAs: Headquarters Administration, Human Capital Services, and Information Technology. While FEMA officials stated that FEMA could provide data since fiscal year 1999, officials from seven of the eight DHS components we reviewed told us they would be able to provide M&A spending data for some, but not all, fiscal years since 1999 because of changes in their financial systems and data reliability issues, among other reasons. DHS Identifies Some M&A Spending and Is Taking Steps to Define and Collect Data on M&A Activities, but Could Improve Reliability of Data for Estimating Future Resource Requests
DHS has not identified the department’s total spending on M&A activities, but through two efforts to achieve efficiencies and reduce spending, it identifies spending on some M&A activities. However, on the basis of our analysis of the activities entered into the FYHSP System PDM for fiscal years 2012 and 2013, we determined that 1 component did not enter any business support/M&A activities, and 5 components did not correctly categorize their business support activities since they entered some business support activities as mission support activities. According to DHS PA&E officials, the errors are a result of manual data entry or components not adhering to the guidance in the PDM user manual. DHS does not have a mechanism in place to work with the components to correct data errors in the PDM. By implementing a mechanism to assess whether components have entered the appropriate M&A activities into the PDM, and working with the components to correct the data, as needed, DHS would be better positioned to reliably estimate and report to external stakeholders, such as Congress, what percentage of the department’s resource allocations requests are identified as M&A. How have select DHS components defined and identified their M&A activities and spending, and to what extent are M&A data available from fiscal years 1999 through 2013? How has DHS identified M&A spending department-wide, and to what extent has DHS defined M&A activities and taken steps to enhance efforts to collect M&A data? To determine how selected DHS components define their M&A activities and how they would go about identifying spending associated with these activities, we interviewed officials representing two of DHS’s eight support components— Departmental Management and Operations (DMO) and FLETC—and six of DHS’s seven operational components—FEMA, CBP, the U.S. Coast Guard, the Transportation Security Administration, ICE, and USSS.selected these eight components based on the amount of their budget authority (totaling nearly 88 percent of DHS’s fiscal year 2013 budget authority); their mission, for components with both operational and support missions; and date established, for components established both before and after the inception of DHS. To address the second objective, we examined DHS’s two efforts to identify and manage its spending on specific M&A activities—DHS’s Efficiency Review (ER)—an effort to identify opportunities to improve efficiency and streamline decision making through a series of initiatives— and the Obama administration’s Campaign to Cut Waste—a government- wide effort to reduce administrative spending. We also analyzed fiscal year 2012 and 2013 data in the Future Years Homeland Security Program (FYHSP) System Program Data Module (PDM), which was developed by DHS, in part to model the percentage of DHS’s resource allocation requests that are for activities identified as M&A in future years. | Why GAO Did This Study
DHS is the third-largest federal department, with budget authority of approximately $60 billion. Since its inception in 2003, DHS has faced challenges strengthening its multiple management systems and processes. Some Members of Congress said that DHS's components' budget requests do not provide sufficient detail to allow them to distinguish between funding for mission and M&A activities. GAO was asked to provide information on what DHS spends on M&A activities, including spending by its components since fiscal year 1999.
This report addresses the following questions: (1) How have select DHS components defined and identified their M&A activities and spending, and to what extent are M&A data available from fiscal years 1999 through 2013? (2) How has DHS identified M&A spending department-wide, and to what extent has DHS defined M&A activities and taken steps to enhance efforts to collect M&A data? GAO analyzed documents, such as DHS's budget execution reports, and efforts to identify spending on M&A activities since fiscal year 1999. GAO interviewed officials from eight DHS components, selected on the basis of their budget authority, which in total accounts for nearly 88 percent of DHS's fiscal year 2013 budget authority. Though not generalizable, the interviews provided insights.
What GAO Found
Officials from all eight Department of Homeland Security (DHS) components in GAO's review define management and administration (M&A) activities--activities that help agencies achieve their mission and program goals--differently, and while component officials said they can identify M&A spending, limitations exist in obtaining spending data from fiscal years 1999 through 2013. Officials from four of the eight components define their M&A activities according to the activities funded through their appropriations accounts and programs, projects, or activities (PPA) that are M&A in nature. For example, officials from the Transportation Security Administration said its M&A activities are those found within three PPAs within its Transportation Security Support appropriations account. The remaining four components each define M&A activities differently, and those definitions are not tied to activities contained in specific appropriations accounts. For example, the Coast Guard's M&A activities are those associated with headquarters and its service centers (e.g., personnel support), according to officials. According to component officials, the eight components GAO reviewed can identify their M&A spending, but currently do not because they are not required to do so by the department. Officials from seven of the eight components said they could provide M&A spending data for some, but not all, fiscal years since 1999 because of changes in their financial systems, among other reasons. Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) officials stated that FEMA could provide data since fiscal year 1999. Because components define M&A differently, have different methods for identifying spending, and limitations exist in obtaining data, it is not possible to compare components' M&A spending data from fiscal years 1999 through 2013.
DHS has not identified the department's total spending on M&A activities, but has identified some M&A spending through DHS's Efficiency Review--an effort to identify opportunities to improve efficiency--and the Campaign to Cut Waste--a government-wide effort to reduce administrative spending. DHS is also taking steps to define and collect data on M&A activities, but has encountered difficulties in implementing these steps. Specifically, in 2010, DHS developed a common definition of M&A in conjunction with the Future Years Homeland Security Program (FYHSP) System Program Data Module (PDM) for components to submit resource allocation requests for future years by activity type: mission/operational, mission support, and business support/M&A. However, DHS is unable to reliably estimate what percentage of its requests are identified as M&A because 4 out of 15 components did not enter all appropriate business support/M&A activities and 1 component did not enter any business support/M&A activities, among other errors, which DHS officials said are a result of manual data entry and components not adhering to the guidance in the user manual. DHS does not have a mechanism in place to work with the components to correct data errors in the FYHSP System PDM. By implementing a mechanism to assess whether components have entered the appropriate M&A activities into the PDM, and working with the components to correct the data, as needed, DHS would be better positioned to reliably estimate and report to external stakeholders what percentage of DHS's resource allocations requests are identified as M&A.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DHS implement a mechanism to assess and correct M&A data entered by components into the PDM. DHS concurred with GAO's recommendation. |
gao_GAO-08-714 | gao_GAO-08-714_0 | Our analysis of the plan and first quarter fiscal years 2007 and 2008 execution data show that the depots performed significantly more work than they performed during the same period in the prior year but the depots missed their goal by $173 million at the end of December 2007. Army Depots’ Carryover Significantly Increased in Fiscal Years 2006 and 2007
From fiscal years 2004 through 2007, the Army depots’ total carryover significantly increased from $1.1 billion to $2.7 billion. The dollar amount of new orders received in fiscal years 2006 and 2007 (about $9.5 billion) by the depots significantly exceeded the dollar amount of work performed (about $7.8 billion) by the depots during those same years. The depots carried over about 7.6 months of work into fiscal year 2008. New orders increased from about $2.6 billion to about $5.2 billion (about 100 percent increase) while the amount of revenue earned increased from $2.7 billion to about $4.2 billion (56 percent increase). Reported Carryover Amounts for Fiscal Years 2006 and 2007 Were Artificially Lowered
Reported Army depot maintenance activities’ carryover was reduced by tens of million of dollars by (1) funds being deobligated at the end of fiscal year 2006 and then reobligated in the beginning of fiscal year 2007 and (2) amounts that were exempted from carryover calculations in fiscal year 2007. However, with the exemptions, the depots exceeded the carryover ceiling by $96.8 million. Four Primary Reasons for Significant Growth in Fiscal Years 2006 and 2007 Carryover
Our analysis of depot reports and discussions with Army officials identified four primary reasons for the growth in carryover. Fourth, unserviceable assets (assets that need to be repaired) scheduled for repair did not arrive at the depots as planned. Army headquarters officials said that the Army underestimated the amount of new orders received by the depots because (1) the Army did not have any historical information on the amount of funds the depots would receive in the supplemental appropriations for depot maintenance work and (2) of the uncertainty related to the amount of funds the Army would receive in the supplemental appropriations for this depot maintenance work. We recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Army to take the following actions: Direct the Army headquarters budget office to compare the amounts contained in the Army’s carryover reduction plan to reported actual execution data on a monthly basis to determine (1) if the depots met established targets and (2) if the overall plan’s execution has the desired effect of reducing fiscal year 2008 year-end carryover, and work with the Army Materiel Command and the Army depots to identify ways to further reduce fiscal year 2008 carryover if monthly revenue goals are not met. However, as discussed in our draft report, the exemptions do not provide the right incentives to correct long-standing problems associated with receiving orders from other services late in the fiscal year and program delays caused by long lead time material. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To determine the growth in reported total carryover from fiscal year 2004 through fiscal year 2007 and the actions the Army is taking to reduce the carryover, we obtained and analyzed Army depot maintenance reports that contained information on new order, revenue, and carryover data for the 4-year period. | Why GAO Did This Study
The five Army depot maintenance activities support combat readiness by providing services to keep Army units operating worldwide. From fiscal years 2004 through 2007, the amount of new orders received to perform work increased 100 percent from $2.6 billion to $5.2 billion. The number of new orders is a factor in the amount of work the depots carry over from one fiscal year to the next. While past congressional defense committees recognize the need for carryover, the committees have raised concerns that carryover may be more than needed. GAO was asked to determine (1) the growth in reported total carryover from fiscal years 2004 through 2007 and the actions the Army is taking to reduce the carryover, (2) whether reported carryover amounts exceeded carryover ceilings for fiscal years 2006 and 2007 and adjustments made to reduce those amounts, and (3) the primary reasons for the increased carryover at the five Army depots. GAO analyzed reported carryover and related data at the five depots.
What GAO Found
From fiscal years2004 through 2007, the Army depots' total carryover significantly increased from $1.1 billion to $2.7 billion--about 7.6 months of work. The amount of carryover increased because new orders received (about $9.5 billion) by the depots significantly outpaced the work performed (about $7.8 billion) in fiscal years 2006 and 2007. GAO analysis of the Army's plan to reduce carryover showed that the depots performed $293 million more work in the first 3 months of fiscal year 2008 than they performed during the same period a year earlier, but the depots missed their planned goal by $173 million. The Army depots reported that they were under the carryover ceiling by $67 million in fiscal year 2006 but over the ceiling by $96.8 million in fiscal year 2007. GAO identified two factors that affected reported carryover amounts. First, the Army Materiel Command directed the Tobyhanna Army Depot to deobligate $30 million at the end of fiscal year 2006 and reobligate the same amount at the beginning of the next fiscal year, which artificially lowered reported carryover and was not in accordance with existing DOD policy. Second, the Army excluded about $299.7 million in fiscal year 2007 orders from the carryover calculations. The exemptions for fourth quarter orders from other services and long lead time material did not provide the right incentives for DOD to resolve long-standing problems. GAO analysis of reports and discussions with Army officials identified four primary reasons for growth in carryover: (1) the Army depot maintenance budget underestimated the amount of new orders during fiscal years 2006 and 2007 by about $1.7 billion and $1.5 billion, respectively; (2) the depots accepted orders late in the fiscal year that generally could not be completed by the end of the fiscal year; (3) the depots experienced parts shortages; and (4) the depots did not receive assets that had been scheduled for repair. |
gao_GAO-10-872T | gao_GAO-10-872T_0 | Some of the most popular Web 2.0 technologies in use today are social networking services, such as Facebook and Twitter. Federal Agencies are Increasingly Using Web 2.0 Technologies
Federal agencies are increasingly using Web 2.0 technologies to enhance services and interactions with the public. Federal Web managers use these applications to connect to people in new ways. As of July 2010, we identified that 22 of 24 major federal agencies had a presence on Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube. Table 1 presents examples of Web 2.0 technologies and their current uses in the federal government. Federal agencies have been adapting Web 2.0 technologies to support their individual missions. Determining Appropriate Agency Use of Web 2.0 Technologies Presents Challenges
While the use of Web 2.0 technologies can transform how federal agencies engage the public by allowing citizens to be more involved in the governing process, agency use of such technologies can also present challenges related to privacy, security, records management, and freedom of information. Privacy and Security Challenges
Determining how the Privacy Act of 1974 applies to government use of social media. Extending privacy protections to the collection and use of personal information by third party providers. Safeguarding personal information from security threats that target Web 2.0 technologies. However, federal guidance may be needed for employees on how to use social media Web sites properly and how to handle personal information in the context of social media. A challenge associated with government use of Web 2.0 technologies, including government blogs and wikis and Web pages hosted by commercial providers, is the question of whether information exchanged through these technologies constitute federal records pursuant to the Federal Records Act. Given these complex considerations, it may be challenging for federal agencies engaging the public via Web 2.0 technologies to assess the information they generate and receive via these technologies to determine its status as federal records. Establishing mechanisms for preserving Web 2.0 information as records. Federal agencies’ use of Web 2.0 technologies could pose challenges in appropriately responding to FOIA requests. Federal Agencies Have Taken Steps to Identify and Start Addressing Web 2.0 Technology Issues
As federal agencies have increasingly adopted Web 2.0 technologies, often by making use of commercially provided services, information technology officials have begun to consider the array of privacy, security, records management, and freedom of information issues that such usage poses. In April 2009, the General Services Administration announced ● The Office of Management and Budget (OMB), in response to President Obama’s January 2009 memorandum promoting transparency and open government, recently issued guidance intended to (1) clarify when and how the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (PRA) applies to federal agency use of social media and Web-based interactive technologies; and (2) help federal agencies protect privacy when using third-party Web sites and applications. However, determining the appropriate use of these new technologies presents new potential challenges to the ability of agencies to protect the privacy and security of sensitive information, including personal information, shared by individuals interacting with the government and to the ability of agencies to manage, preserve, and make available official government records. | Why GAO Did This Study
"Web 2.0" technologies--such as Web logs ("blogs"), social networking Web sites, video- and multimedia-sharing sites, and "wikis"--are increasingly being utilized by federal agencies to communicate with the public. These tools have the potential to, among other things, better include the public in the governing process. However, agency use of these technologies can present risks associated with properly managing and protecting government records and sensitive information, including personally identifiable information. In light of the rapidly increasing popularity of Web 2.0 technologies, GAO was asked to identify and describe current uses of Web 2.0 technologies by federal agencies and key challenges associated with their use. To accomplish this, GAO analyzed federal policies, reports, and guidance related to the use of Web 2.0 technologies and interviewed officials at selected federal agencies, including the Department of Homeland Security, the General Services Administration, and the National Archives and Records Administration.
What GAO Found
Federal agencies are using Web 2.0 technologies to enhance services and support their individual missions. Federal Web managers use these applications to connect to people in new ways. As of July 2010, we identified that 22 of 24 major federal agencies had a presence on Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube. Several challenges in federal agencies' use of Web 2.0 technologies have been identified: (1) Privacy and security. Agencies are faced with the challenges of determining how the Privacy Act of 1974, which provides certain protections to personally identifiable information, applies to information exchanged in the use of Web 2.0 technologies, such as social networking sites. Further, the federal government may face challenges in determining how to appropriately limit collection and use of personal information as agencies utilize these technologies and how and when to extend privacy protections to information collected and used by third-party providers of Web 2.0 services. In addition, personal information needs to be safeguarded from security threats, and guidance may be needed for employees on how to use social media Web sites properly and how to handle personal information in the context of social media. (2) Records management and freedom of information. Web 2.0 technologies raise issues in the government's ability to identify and preserve federal records. Agencies may face challenges in assessing whether the information they generate and receive by means of these technologies constitutes federal records and establish mechanisms for preserving such records, which involves, among other things, determining the appropriate intervals at which to capture constantly changing Web content. The use of Web 2.0 technologies can also present challenges in appropriately responding to Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests because there are significant complexities in determining whether agencies control Web 2.0-generated content, as understood within the context of FOIA. Federal agencies have begun to identify some of the issues associated with Web 2.0 technologies and have taken steps to start addressing them. For example, the Office of Management and Budget recently issued guidance intended to (1) clarify when and how the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 applies to federal agency use of social media and Web-based interactive technologies; and (2) help federal agencies protect privacy when using third-party Web sites and applications. |
gao_GAO-11-271 | gao_GAO-11-271_0 | 1). Frequent Policy Changes Occurred, but Changes to Actual Asset Allocation Were Moderate
PBGC’s investment policy has changed frequently since 1990, alternating between more conservative and more aggressive approaches to investment. PBGC’s Investment Objective Changes Have Had Moderate Effect on Actual Asset Allocations
Since 1990, PBGC has shifted its investment policy five times. In 2006, PBGC adopted a new policy as a result of its biennial review process. Due in part to the market downturn during the period the 2008 policy was in place, the transaction costs associated with asset trades of about $9.3 billion that were tracked during the last two phases of the transition totaled nearly $74.6 million (or 80 basis points). PBGC’s Investment Performance Results Have Been Mixed
Our analysis of PBGC’s investment performance found that PBGC’s investments performed better than most on an asset-only basis compared with the seven benchmark portfolios (see table 3). PBGC Investments Underperformed Relative to Benchmark Portfolios When Returns Were Assessed with the Liability Return
When consideration of changes in liabilities was included in our analysis, we found that PBGC’s investments did not perform as well as the seven benchmark portfolios. PBGC’s Policies and Procedures for Implementing Its Investment Policy Are Incomplete
In our review of PBGC’s internal documents, we found that the agency has largely functioned without complete investment policy statements and operating procedures. Further, PBGC staff have largely functioned without the benefit of fully developed and documented operating procedures. Investment Policy Statements Generally Lack Specifics in Key Areas
The investment policies issued by PBGC’s board for strategic guidance in the planning and execution of investments have generally lacked a number of provisions recommended for sound investment management or have been insufficiently detailed to provide adequate guidance for staff concerning certain investment objectives. Conclusions
PBGC has grown from a relatively small agency with about $34 million in assets in its first year after its establishment in 1974, to one with almost $80 billion in assets in fiscal year 2010. The agency’s policies and procedures for asset management still reflect its small agency past. Current work under way by PBGC’s CID staff to develop such policies and procedure is an important first step, but greater commitment is needed from both the PBGC board and its management to assure that PBGC can effectively and consistently meet its obligation to conduct the many investment related functions it performs. To ensure a disciplined and long-term approach to investment, we recommend PBGC and its board of directors develop and maintain a comprehensive investment policy statement that provides clear organizational accountability, well-defined goals, and risk management parameters. 2. To ensure proper stewardship of PBGC’s assets and effective implementation of its investment policy, we recommend that PBGC develop a complete set of operating procedures and guidelines consistent with recognized best practices in industry and government. In our view, these initial actions and continued efforts to implement our recommendations fully can only strengthen the stewardship of PBGC’s investments to better assure that PBGC can effectively and consistently meet its obligation to conduct the many investment-related functions it performs. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To determine how Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation’s (PBGC) investment objectives have changed over time and whether policy goals have been met, we collected and reviewed investment policies used by PBGC from 1990 through the policy dated October 2009. To determine how PBGC’s changes in investment policy compared to other entities, we interviewed officials from several pension consultants, investment and transition managers, life and property and casualty insurers, and large state pension plans. Pension Protection Act Benchmark Portfolio. To determine how well PBGC’s investment policies and operations comport with best practices in the industry, we interviewed PBGC’s Inspector General, current PBGC board member’s representatives, and PBGC staff. These organizations include the Chartered Financial Analyst Institute, the Foundation for Fiduciary Studies, the Association of Pension Plan Fund Auditors, the Government Finance Officers Association, and Independent Fiduciary Services. 2. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation's (PBGC) insures the pension benefits of more than 44 million people. Since its inception in 1974, PBGC's assets have grown from about $34 million to almost $80 billion in 2010, largely through assets received in plan terminations. Despite significant swings in PBGC's investment history, there has been little focus on the extent to which it has met its investment goals, the nature of its investment policies or how they compare with best practices in the industry. GAO examined (1) how PBGC's investment objectives have changed over time and the outcomes associated with those changes, (2) the performance of PBGC's investments, and (3) how well PBGC's investment policies and operations comport with best practices in the industry. To address these questions, GAO reviewed PBGC's investment policy statements and operational procedures; analyzed data on investments; and interviewed PBGC officials, officials from several state pension plans and foreign pension insurers, and other experts.
What GAO Found
PBGC's investment objectives and stated asset allocation targets have changed frequently in the last 8 years, alternating between more conservative and more aggressive approaches to investing. Yet these changes in stated objectives had only a moderate effect on PBGC's actual asset allocation because, for a variety of reasons, PBGC did not meet its targets. In our review of their investment history, we found that PBGC did not routinely monitor transaction costs related to its policy shifts and, at certain times, significant transaction costs were incurred. For example, we determined based on data obtained from PBGC's investment managers that nearly $75 million in transaction costs were incurred during the economic downturn which coincided with the period when the 2008 policy was being implemented and subsequently suspended. Using seven benchmarks, one of which was a Pension Protection Act benchmark that GAO constructed, GAO's analysis shows that PBGC's investments performed better than most benchmarks on an asset-only basis, but tended to underperform all seven of the benchmarks when returns were assessed together with the growth in liabilities. GAO notes that both analyses have limitations and can be seen by some experts as incomplete. However, GAO's method of analysis is consistent with how financial economics literature suggests investment performance analysis should be conducted. Finally, GAO's analysis found no apparent adverse effect on PBGC's investment performance as a result of changes in policy. PBGC's policy statements and operating procedures are incomplete and do not provide sufficient guidance to ensure sound implementation of its investment policies. The investment policies issued by PBGC's board for strategic guidance in the planning and execution of investments have generally lacked a number of provisions recommended by the Chartered Financial Analyst Institute; Independent Fiduciary Services; and other experts of sound investment management, such as the Government Finance Officers Association. Moreover, according to our review and based on interviews with PBGC staff, the policy statements have been insufficiently detailed to provide adequate guidance for staff. In addition, PBGC's Corporate Investments Department's staff have largely functioned without the benefit of fully-developed and documented operating procedures. Although PBGC has grown from a relatively small agency to one holding almost $80 billion in assets, its policies and procedures still reflect in many ways its small agency past. To ensure that PBGC can effectively and consistently meet its obligation to manage a fund of this size and its liabilities, PBGC's board and its management must enact better stewardship, standards, and procedures to ensure that PBGC can effectively and consistently meet its obligation to conduct the many investment related functions it performs.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the PBGC and its board of directors (1) develop and maintain comprehensive investment policy statements and (2) develop a complete set of operating procedures and guidelines for its investment activities. GAO received comments from the Department of Labor and the PBGC. They generally agreed with our recommendations. |
gao_NSIAD-96-186 | gao_NSIAD-96-186_0 | MFA also contained a “safeguard” provision, which allowed importing countries to impose unilateral quotas when it determined that imports were causing actual or threatened serious damage to the U.S. domestic market based on factors specified in MFA. The committee will continue to participate in negotiations (led by USTR) for bilateral quota agreements with non-WTO member countries. CITA has no budget of its own, but portions of the individual budgets of the five principal agencies related to CITA functions added up to $3.6 million in fiscal year 1995. To date, CITA has not published guidelines or documented procedures that describe its decision-making process for imposing quotas. For example, they questioned (1) whether in some cases import increases had been “sharp and substantial” as required under ATC, (2) why changes occurred in the direction of data levels—in one case in U.S. domestic production levels and in another case in U.S. employment levels—between the consultation period and the TMB review, (3) whether the United States had adequately considered the exporting country’s world market share of the products in question, and (4) whether reimports under the U.S. Special Access Program could damage U.S. producers. Japan has not invoked safeguard measures under MFA or ATC. The act mandates that ITC hold public hearings, solicit briefs from interested parties, and issue public reports throughout the course of its investigation. IX for more information on the ITC safeguard process.) The Committee for the Implementation of Textile Agreements: Functions, Resources, and Costs
The Committee for the Implementation of Textile Agreements CITA carries on several functions beyond overseeing the gradual integration of quotas and utilizing the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing’s (ATC) transitional safeguard mechanism. It will make all decisions on a consensus basis. We also found that some compatibility problems exist between the domestic producer price and employment data CITA uses and the CITA categories. Import data are more current than production data because it is provided monthly, while production data is provided quarterly. The data shows that CITA does not apply any standard numerical thresholds in finding damage to U.S. industry and in deciding to request consultations to impose quotas. In 1995, CITA requested consultations with some small suppliers. Both the EU and Canada imposed quotas under MFA and have well-established processes for determining whether to make a call to a foreign country for consultations. In 1994, Canada imported $4.3 billion in textiles, up from about $3 billion in 1990. Scope and Methodology
To identify and describe CITA’s authority, functions, resources, and costs under MFA and ATC, we reviewed pertinent CITA agency and other government documents, including (1) the executive order establishing CITA’s authority in textile trade matters; (2) U.S. legislation to implement ATC; and (3) budget data provided to us by officials of USTR and the Departments of Commerce, Labor, State, and the Treasury. GAO Comments
1. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the U.S. Committee for the Implementation of Textile Agreements' (CITA) role in administering the U.S. textile program, focusing on: (1) CITA authority, functions, resources, and costs under the Multifiber Arrangement (MFA) and the 1994 Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC); (2) the CITA process for imposing quotas; (3) CITA use of data to make quota decisions; (4) CITA use of ATC temporary import quota safeguards in 1995; (5) European Union (EU), Canadian, and Japanese use of quotas under MFA and ATC and their processes for imposing quotas; and (6) the U.S. International Trade Commission's (ITC) safeguard process.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) CITA has broad delegated authority to impose quotas when it determines that imports are causing or threatening to cause damage to the domestic textile industry; (2) since its main function, to implement textile agreements, has not changed under ATC, CITA does not expect its workload to increase significantly, but it will continue to participate in negotiations for bilateral quota agreements; (3) CITA received about $3.6 million in fiscal year 1995 from five agencies and had a staff of 33 provided by the Department of Commerce to support CITA operations; (4) CITA has not published guidelines or procedures describing its quota decisionmaking process; (5) CITA tries to match import data and domestic production data to establish a causal link between imports and damage to domestic producers on a case-by-case basis before requesting consultations with exporting countries and seeking comments from interested parties; (6) CITA uses U.S. government statistics in its quota decisionmaking process, but some data compatibility problems occur due to varying collection methods; (7) the United States has been the only country to impose quotas under ATC; (8) EU and Canada have imposed quotas under MFA, but Japan has never imposed any quotas; (9) although EU and Canada use similar import data, their decisionmaking processes are different; and (10) the ITC quota decisionmaking process differs significantly from CITA because it is based on U.S. legislation that stipulates specific procedures and time-frames for imposing quotas and holding public hearings. |
gao_GAO-05-714T | gao_GAO-05-714T_0 | The project’s schedule delays are due in part to scope changes, design changes, and unforeseen conditions beyond AOC’s control (e.g., adding the Senate and House expansion spaces and encountering underground obstructions). However, factors more within AOC’s control also contributed to the delays. More specifically, AOC needs to give priority attention to: obtaining and maintaining acceptable project schedules, including reassessing the times allotted for completing sequence 2 work; aggressively monitoring and managing contractors’ adherence to the schedule, including documenting and addressing the causes of delays; developing and implementing risk mitigation plans; reaching agreement on what project elements must be complete before CVC can open to the public; and preparing a summary schedule, as Congress requested, that integrates the major steps needed to complete CVC construction with the steps necessary to prepare for operations. AOC has obligated over $350 million for contracts and contract modifications for these activities. We have made several recommendations to enhance AOC’s contract management. To help prevent further schedule delays and control cost growth, AOC needs to aggressively manage its contractors’ performance, particularly in the areas of managing schedules and obtaining reasonable prices on contractual actions, and continue to ensure that contractors’ requests for payment based on incurred costs are adequately evaluated. It also needs to ensure that its contractors report accurate safety data and promptly act to correct safety concerns. Project Costs and Funding Provided as of May 2005
We currently estimate that the cost to complete the construction of the CVC project, including proposed additions to its scope, is about $522 million without any allowance for risks and uncertainties. We continue to believe that this estimate of the project’s total costs is appropriate. Most of these costs were outside or largely outside AOC’s control, but other costs were more within its control. About $147 million of the cost increase was due to changes in the project’s scope, many of which were for security enhancements following September 11 and the anthrax attacks in October 2001. Congress added the House and Senate expansion spaces and the Library of Congress tunnel to the project’s scope after the original project’s cost was estimated; similarly, the Department of Defense recommended and funded an air filtration system for the facility. Other factors also outside or largely outside AOC’s control contributed about $45 million to the increase. Finally, factors more within AOC’s control accounted for about $58 million of the expected additional project costs. To continue to move the project forward, Congress will have to consider the additional funding AOC has requested for fiscal year 2006 to complete the project, including the $4.2 million in additional scope items. Worker Safety Issues
Because the number of construction workers at the CVC site is soon expected to increase significantly, worker safety will continue to be an important issue during the remainder of the project. According to our analysis, the rates for injuries and illnesses and for lost time were higher for CVC than for comparable construction sites. For 2003, the injury and illness rate was about 50 percent higher, and the lost- time rate was about 160 percent higher. AOC and its contractors have taken some actions to promote and manage safety on the site, such as conducting monthly safety audits and making recommendations to improve safety. We have found that AOC’s reports have sometimes failed to identify problems, such as cost increases and schedule delays. This has resulted in certain “expectation gaps” within Congress. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. | Why GAO Did This Study
Approved in the late 1990s, the Capitol Visitor Center (CVC) is the largest project on the Capitol grounds in over 140 years. Its purposes are to provide greater security for all persons working in or visiting the U.S. Capitol and to enhance the educational experience of visitors who have come to learn about Congress and the Capitol building. When completed, this three-story, underground facility, located on the east side of the Capitol, is designed to be a seamless addition to the Capitol complex that does not detract from the appearance of the Capitol or its historic landscaping. According to current plans, it will include theaters, an auditorium, exhibit space, a service tunnel for truck loading and deliveries, storage, and additional space for use by the House and Senate. This testimony discusses the Architect of the Capitol's (AOC) management of the project's schedules and contracts; the project's estimated costs, including risks and uncertainties; worker safety issues; and AOC's monthly reporting to Congress on the project. This testimony also discusses recommendations that we have made in previous testimony and briefings and the actions AOC has taken in response.
What GAO Found
In summary, the CVC project is taking about 2 years longer than planned and is expected to cost between about $522 million and $559 million--significantly more than originally estimated. The majority of delays and cost increases were largely outside AOC's control, but weaknesses in AOC's schedule and contract management contributed to a portion of the delays and cost overruns. Of the project's estimated cost increase, about $147 million is due to scope changes, such as the addition of the House and Senate expansion spaces; about $45 million to other factors also outside or largely outside AOC's control, such as higher than expected bid prices on the sequence 2 contract; and about $58 million to factors more within AOC's control, such as delays. Also, our analysis of CVC worker safety data showed that the injury and illness rate for 2003 was about 50 percent higher for CVC than for comparable construction sites and that the rate for 2004 was about 30 percent higher than the rate for 2003. Finally, a number of AOC's monthly reports to Congress have not accurately reflected the status of the project's construction schedules and costs and have transmitted inaccurate worker safety data. This has led to certain "expectation gaps" within Congress. AOC has taken a number of actions to improve its management of the project; however, these actions have not yet fully corrected all identified problems. To help prevent further schedule delays, control cost growth, and enhance worker safety, AOC urgently needs to give priority attention to managing the project's construction schedules and contracts, including those contract provisions that address worker safety. These actions are imperative if further cost growth, schedule delays, and worker safety problems are to be avoided. AOC also needs to see that it reports accurate information to Congress on the project. Furthermore, decisions by Congress will have to be made regarding the additional funding needed to complete construction and address any risks and uncertainties that arise. |
gao_GAO-08-317 | gao_GAO-08-317_0 | The measures are: Net lending or borrowing—the balance of all receipts and expenditures during a given time frame. This indicates the need for the sector to borrow funds or draw down assets to cover its expenditures. Operating balance net of funds for capital expenditures—or simply the “operating balance”—a measure of the ability of the sector to cover its current expenditures out of current receipts. In developing this measure we subtract funds used to finance longer-term projects—such as investments in buildings and roads—from receipts since these funds would not be available to cover current expenses. But the simulation suggests that while projected balances for both net lending or borrowing and the operating balance remain in their historical ranges for the next several years, the balances will soon begin to decline and will fall below their historical ranges within a decade. That is, the model suggests that the state and local government sector will face increasing fiscal stress in just a few years. These projected deficits—worsening throughout the projection time frame under an unchanged policy scenario—indicate that, because most state and local governments cannot actually run such deficits for any length of time, these governments will need to make tough choices on spending and tax policy to meet their budget requirements and to promote favorable bond ratings. Another way of measuring the long-term challenges faced by the state and local sector is through a measure known as the “fiscal gap.” With deficits rising rapidly as shown in figure 1, the outstanding debt of the state and local sector will experience unprecedented growth. Two types of state and local expenditures in particular will likely rise quickly due to escalating medical costs. For example, even though the wages and salaries of primary and secondary education employees are a large expenditure of the state and local sector, under our base-case assumptions these costs are not expected to grow any faster than the rate of growth of the general economy and will not represent an increasing burden on governments relative to their revenues. Substantial Policy Changes Would Be Needed to Prevent the Fiscal Decline in the State and Local Government Sector
We developed several scenarios with alternative assumptions to better understand the sensitivity of our results. The assumptions varied in these alternative scenarios include (1) the growth of tax receipts, (2) the growth in state and local expenditures, and (3) the rate of growth in health care costs. Tax Receipts Would Need to Rise Considerably Faster than Historical Experience to Enable the Operating Balance to Remain in Historical Range
In the base-case model, we assume that current policy, such as tax rates and structures, will remain unchanged. State and Local Expenditures Would Need to Be Cut Substantially to Maintain Fiscal Balance
Our base-case model assumes that current policies are maintained, primarily by holding the number of employees in the sector constant as a percentage of population, assuming state and local workers receive pay increases equal to those of private-sector employees, and assuming the total cost of many goods procured by the sector to provide services rises with increases in the population being served and the rate of inflation in the economy. Given the importance of health care expenditures as a driver for the long-term fiscal outlook, we also model the impact of different health care expenditure growth assumptions. State and Local Fiscal Challenges Add to the Nation’s Fiscal Difficulties
Since 1992, we have produced long-term simulations of what might happen to federal deficits and debt under various policy scenarios. Our most recent long-term federal simulations show ever-larger deficits resulting in a very large and growing federal debt burden over time. Just as in the state and local government sector, the federal fiscal difficulties stem primarily from an expected explosion of health-related expenditures. Once all receipts and expenditures of the sector are simulated forward through 2050, we develop summary indicators of the state and local government sector’s fiscal status. Because the model covers the state and local government sector in the aggregate, the fiscal outcome of individual states and localities cannot be captured. Projection of Receipts of the State and Local Government Sector
The model provides projections for each type of receipt of state and local governments. Accordingly, several tax receipt categories grow at the same rate as their underlying tax bases. Other Federal Grants to Finance Current Expenditures
In addition to Medicaid grants, the federal government provides grants intended to finance other current expenditures of state and local governments. Measures of Fiscal Balance
We use two measures of fiscal balance in our report: net lending or borrowing and the operating balance. Net Lending or Borrowing
The first projected balance measure is NIPA’s net lending or borrowing, which is the difference between total receipts and total expenditures and is analogous to the federal unified surplus or deficit. Operating Balance Net of Funds for Capital Expenditures
The second balance measure we use is a GAO-developed measure that we call the operating balance excluding funds for capital expenditures. This measure is designed to be roughly akin to the operating budgets of subnational governments—budgets which these governments are generally required to balance or nearly balance. Some combination of tax receipts, federal investment grants, and debt can be used to finance state and local government investment. In particular, we provide information on (1) the development of several key demographic and economic factors such as future employment, retirement, and wages for the state and local workforce that are necessary for the simulations of future pension and retiree health care costs; (2) how we project the necessary contribution rate to pension funds of state and local governments; and (3) how we project the future yearly pay-as-you-go expenditures of employee and retiree health insurance. The cost of health care has been increasing faster than gross domestic product (GDP) for many years. | Why GAO Did This Study
State and local governments provide an array of services to their residents, such as primary and secondary education, libraries, police and fire services, social programs, roads and other infrastructure, public colleges and universities, and more. These subnational governments may face fiscal stress similar to the federal government. Given the nature of the partnership among levels of government in providing services to Americans and the economic interrelationships among levels of government, understanding potential future fiscal conditions of the state and local government sector is important for federal policymaking. To provide Congress and the public with this broader context, we developed a fiscal model of the state and local sector. This report describes this model and provides (1) simulations of the state and local government sector's long-term fiscal outlook, (2) an analysis of the underlying causes of potential fiscal difficulties for the sector, (3) a discussion of the extent to which the long-term simulations are sensitive to alternative assumptions, and (4) an examination of how the state and local government sector could add to future federal fiscal challenges. The potential fiscal outcomes of the state and local government sector are projected through two fiscal balance measures: net lending or borrowing and what we call the operating balance. Net lending or borrowing--which is roughly analogous to the federal unified surplus or deficit--is a measure of the balance of all receipts and expenditures during a given time frame. Historically, total expenditures have usually exceeded total receipts, and the sector issues debt to cover part of the costs of its capital projects. As such, net lending or borrowing typically measures the need for the sector to borrow funds or draw down assets to cover its expenditures. The operating balance net of funds for capital expenditures--referred to in this report as the "operating balance"--is a measure of the ability of the sector to cover its current expenditures out of current receipts, that is, the balance of expenditures and receipts related to activities taking place in a given year. Most states have some sort of requirement to balance operating budgets. Projects with longer time frames are typically budgeted separately from the operating budgets and financed by a combination of current receipts, federal grants, and the issuance of debt. Because some current receipts may be used to fund part of longer-term investments, we developed a measure of the operating balance that makes adjustments for the extent to which current receipts are unavailable to fund current expenditures because they have been spent on longer-term projects, such as investments in buildings and roads.
What GAO Found
Our model shows that in less than a decade the state and local government sector will begin to face growing fiscal challenges. Both fiscal balance measures (1) net lending or borrowing and (2) the operating balance--are likely to remain within their historical ranges in the next few years, but both begin to decline thereafter and fall below their historical ranges within a decade. That is, absent policy changes, state and local governments will face an increasing gap between receipts and expenditures in the coming years. Since most state and local governments actually face requirements that their operating budgets be balanced or nearly balanced in most years, the declining fiscal conditions our simulations suggest are really just a foreshadowing of the extent to which these governments will need to make substantial policy changes to avoid these potential growing fiscal imbalances. As is true for the federal sector, the growth in health-related expenditures is the primary driver of the fiscal challenges facing the state and local government sector. In particular, two types of state and local expenditures will likely rise quickly. The first is Medicaid expenditures, and the second is expenditures by these governments for health insurance for state and local employees and retirees. Conversely, other types of expenditures of state and local governments in the aggregate--such as wages and salaries of state and local workers, nonhealth transfer payments (e.g., family assistance), and investments in capital goods--are assumed to grow slower than gross domestic product (GDP). Moreover, under the current policy scenario of the base case, most revenue categories grow at approximately the same rate as GDP. Therefore, the projected rise in health-related expenditures is the root of the fiscal difficulties these simulations suggest will occur. Although health care expenditures clearly appear to be a looming problem for the state and local government sector, the extent of fiscal difficulties faced by any given state or local government will vary with its individual expenditure and tax profile. We also used the model to examine how the fiscal balance measures would be affected over the long-term under assumptions that differed from those of our base case. In particular, we analyzed scenarios that differ across three factors: (1) the rate of growth in tax receipts, (2) the rate of growth in expenditures, and (3) the rate of growth in medical care expenditures. Some of the alternative scenarios were designed to examine the extent to which a change in base-case assumptions for any of these factors would enable the state and local government sector to maintain fiscal balances in their historical ranges. We found that it would be difficult to address the expected future fiscal deficits solely through tax increases or solely through expenditure cuts. Since 1992, we have produced long-term simulations of what might happen to federal deficits and debt under various policy scenarios. Our most recent long-term federal simulations show ever larger deficits resulting in a very large and growing federal debt burden over time.4 In that work, we found that federal fiscal difficulties stem primarily from an expected explosion of health-related expenditures. Our findings thus show that the state and local sector will provide an additional drag on an already declining federal government fiscal outlook and that the critical problem of escalating costs of health care is an economywide problem that will need to be addressed by all levels of government. |
gao_GAO-12-269 | gao_GAO-12-269_0 | CBP Revised Its Training for Newly Hired CBP Officers Consistent with Its Training Standards
In 2009, CBP revised its training program for new officers in accordance with its training development standards. Consistent with these standards, OTD convened a team of subject matter experts (SMEs) to identify and rank the tasks that new CBP officers are expected to perform. As a result, the new curriculum is designed to produce a professional law enforcement officer capable of protecting the homeland from terrorist, criminal, biological, and agricultural threats. Specifically, the new curriculum states that the CBP officer is expected, among other tasks, to draw appropriate conclusions and take appropriate action to identify behavioral indicators displayed by criminals and terrorists, effectively interview and analyze travelers to identify potential threats, expertly identify altered and counterfeit documents and impostors, and use technology in support of the inspection process.officer is expected to be able to perform the primary inspection function, as well as some aspects of the secondary inspection function. CBP Has Taken Steps to Identify and Address Incumbent Officer Training Needs but Could Do More to Improve Oversight
CBP has taken steps to identify the training needs of its incumbent officers, by for example, conducting covert tests to assess vulnerabilities and systemic weaknesses at ports of entry and identifying possible officer training needs, but could do more to analyze the tests’ results. We examined CBP’s results of covert tests conducted over more than 2 years and found significant weaknesses in the CBP inspection process at the ports of entry that were tested.all ports, OFO officials stated that the tests are useful to identify possible Although the results are not fully generalizable to weaknesses and vulnerabilities. However, we have previously reported that agencies should assess the extent to which training and development efforts contribute to improved performance and results to help ensure that the agency is not devoting resources to training that may An evaluation of the impact of these training courses on be ineffective.CBP officer performance could help CBP know the extent to which such training is a sufficient response to the covert test results or whether adjustments to the training or other management actions are needed. CBP has not conducted an analysis of all the possible causes or systemic issues that may be contributing to the test results. A policy outlining the roles and responsibilities of offices and positions for training could help eliminate such confusion and clarify which offices and positions are responsible for identifying and addressing training needs and for holding these offices and individuals accountable for their responsibilities. CBP currently lacks reliable training completion records to ensure CBP officers received required training or other training relevant to their assigned duties. We found, based on our analysis of TRAEN records, more than 4,000 onboard legacy customs officers have not completed the immigration fundamentals, immigration law, and agricultural fundamentals courses although they were required to complete them during the cross-training program. According to OFO officials, the training completion records maintained in TRAEN are incomplete, and it is unlikely that legacy officers did not complete required cross-training. Nevertheless, without reliable training records, CBP cannot provide reasonable assurance that all legacy customs officers completed required cross-training courses. OTD stated that CBP offices are responsible for recording their employees’ training records in TRAEN. However, CBP does not have a policy that assigns the responsibility for entering records to its offices or that assigns oversight responsibility to port management to ensure that their staff enter data into TRAEN completely and accurately. Conclusions
CBP has designed its training program for newly-hired CBP officers to comply with its standards. Such compliance can contribute to ensuring that newly-hired officers are prepared to accomplish CBP’s mission of securing the border and simultaneously facilitating the cross-border movement of millions of legitimate travelers and billions of dollars in international trade. However, CBP faces challenges in ensuring that the training needs of its nearly 20,000 incumbent CBP officers are properly identified and addressed. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve CBP training efforts, we recommend that the CBP Commissioner take the following four actions: (1) Conduct an evaluation of the effectiveness of the “Back to Basics” and subsequent follow-on training, (2) Conduct a comprehensive assessment of its covert test results to identify the causes of and systemic issues underlying the results, (3) Establish a policy that specifies roles and responsibilities for CBP officer training implementation and related oversight, including oversight responsibilities to ensure that training records are entered in TRAEN completely and accurately and (4) Develop a plan for conducting a training needs assessment to address any skill gaps for incumbent CBP officers and then implement that plan. | Why GAO Did This Study
Recent incidents involving potential terrorists attempting to enter the country highlight the need for a vigilant and well-trained workforce at the border. U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), within the Department of Homeland Security, is the lead federal agency in charge of inspecting travelers and goods for admission into the United States. About 20,000 CBP officers play a central role in ensuring that CBP accomplishes its mission of securing the border while also facilitating the movement of millions of legitimate travelers and billions of dollars in international trade. GAO was asked to assess the extent to which CBP has (1) revised its training program for newly hired CBP officers in accordance with training standards and (2) identified and addressed the training needs of incumbent CBP officers. GAO analyzed data and documentation related to the agencys training efforts, such as its covert test program and its training records. GAO also interviewed CBP officials and CBP officers. This is a public version of a sensitive report that GAO issued in October 2011. Information CBP deemed sensitive has been redacted.
What GAO Found
CBP revised its training program for newly hired CBP officers in accordance with its own training development standards. Consistent with these standards, CBP convened a team of subject-matter experts to identify and rank the tasks that new CBP officers are expected to perform. As a result, the new curriculum was designed to produce a professional law enforcement officer capable of protecting the homeland from terrorist, criminal, biological and agricultural threats. In addition, the curriculum stated that the CBP officer is to draw conclusions and take appropriate action to identify behavioral indicators displayed by criminals, effectively interview travelers to identify potential threats, identify fraudulent documents, and use technology in support of the inspection process.
CBP has taken some steps to identify and address the training needs of its incumbent CBP officers, but could do more to ensure that these officers are fully trained. GAO examined CBPs results of covert tests conducted over more than 2 years and found significant weaknesses in the CBP inspection process at the ports of entry that were tested. In response to these tests, CBP developed a Back to Basics course in March 2010 for incumbent officers but has no plans to evaluate the effectiveness of the training. Moreover, CBP has not conducted an analysis of all the possible causes or systemic issues that may be contributing to the test results. Further evaluation of the training and causes underlying covert test results could help inform CBP about whether the training is sufficient to address the weaknesses identified by the covert tests or if adjustments are needed. In addition, CBP offices are responsible for recording their employees training records; however, CBP does not have a policy that assigns responsibility to port management to ensure that their staff enter data into its training records system completely and accurately. A policy outlining the roles and responsibilities of offices and positions for training could help clarify which offices and positions are responsible for identifying and addressing training needs and for holding these offices accountable for their responsibilities. Moreover, CBP currently does not have reliable training completion records to ensure CBP officers received required training or other training relevant to their assigned duties. Based on GAOs analysis of training records, more than 4,000 customs officers have not completed the immigration fundamentals, immigration law, and agricultural fundamentals courses, although they were required to complete them during a cross-training program. According to CBP, the training completion records are incomplete, and it is unlikely that the officers did not complete the required cross-training. Nevertheless, without reliable training records; CBP cannot provide reasonable assurance that all customs officers completed the required cross-training. Further, CBP has not conducted a needs assessment that would identify any gaps between identified critical skills and incumbent officers current skills and competencies. A needs assessment could enhance CBPs ability to ensure its workforce is training to meet its mission.
What GAO Recommends
To improve CBP training efforts, GAO recommends that the CBP Commissioner evaluate the Back to Basics training course; analyze covert test results; establish a policy for training responsibilities, including oversight of training records; and, conduct a training needs assessment. CBP concurred with the recommendations and is taking steps to address them. |
gao_GAO-01-224 | gao_GAO-01-224_0 | Federal Mental Health Spending Grew Faster Than State and Local Spending, and the Role of Medicaid and Medicare Increased
In 1997, the nation spent about $73 billion for the treatment of all mental illness, up from $37 billion in 1987.Mental health spending grew at about the same rate as overall health spending during this period. The continued development of psychotropic medications that both are more effective and produce fewer side effects has facilitated the ability to care for more people with SMI in the community. Furthermore, treatment approaches such as ACT, supported employment, and supportive housing can provide the multiple forms of ongoing assistance that adults with SMI often need to function. Many people with SMI need a range of services to help them function in the community. HCFA Is Supportive of New Community- Based Services and Is Developing Safeguards for the Use of Managed Care
HCFA has disseminated information to states about the more effective medications and treatments for adults with SMI and has supported states’ use of Medicaid managed mental health care to provide a wider array of services not covered by traditional fee-for-service Medicaid. HCFA has also encouraged the use of newer medications. The draft indicates that HCFA intends to develop plans to implement its recommended safeguards, such as through legislative or regulatory action or changes in Medicaid administrative policies. The agency has indicated that it will devise a set of actions to implement these recommended safeguards. | What GAO Found
Between 1987 and 1997, the growth in mental health spending in the United States roughly paralleled the growth in overall health care spending. However, federal mental health spending grew at more than twice the rate of state and local spending. This led to the federal government's share surpassing that of state and local governments, while the share attributable to private sources declined slightly. The ability to care for more people in the community has been facilitated by the continued development of new medications that have fewer side effects and are more effective in helping people manage their illness. Furthermore, treatment approaches, such as assertive community treatment, supported employment, and supportive housing, provide the ongoing assistance that adults with serious mental illness (SMI) often need to function in the community. The Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) has encouraged the use of community-based services for Medicaid beneficiaries with SMI by disseminating information on the use of new medications and treatment models, which can help people function better in the community. HCFA also supports states' use of Medicaid managed health care services. However, incentives associated with capitated payment can lead to reduced service utilization. HCFA is developing a set of safeguards for people with special health care needs enrolled in Medicaid managed health care and has indicated that it will devise a plan to implement these safeguards, such as through legislative or regulatory action or making changes in Medicaid administrative policies. |
gao_GAO-15-503 | gao_GAO-15-503_0 | Operational test and evaluation is intended to evaluate a system’s effectiveness and suitability under realistic combat conditions before full-rate production or deployment occurs. Inherent Tension Exists in Operational Test Oversight, but Few Programs Experienced Significant Disputes with DOT&E
Different objectives and incentives exist between the acquisition and testing communities, which can potentially fuel tension over what is needed to accomplish operational testing for programs. According to DOD officials, differences usually are resolved in a reasonable and timely manner, with modest adjustments often required in the course of developing and executing a test approach. However, sometimes acquisition and test officials have differences about operational testing requirements, methods, costs, or results that develop into significant disputes that are more difficult to resolve. Acquisition and test officials in the military services identified a small number of cases where significant disputes occurred among programs receiving DOT&E oversight during fiscal years 2010 through 2014. Of the 454 programs on DOT&E’s oversight list during that period, officials identified 42 programs—less than 10 percent—that had significant operational test disputes with DOT&E.According to military service and DOT&E officials, while these disputes can require additional time and effort to work through, they generally do get resolved. A Variety of Factors Contributed to Disputes We Reviewed, but Only a Few Cases Had Significant Cost or Schedule Impacts
To gain a better understanding of the circumstances of disputes and assess the merits of disputes for cases where opinions varied, we selected and performed an in-depth review of 10 cases from among the 42 programs that had disputes. The 10 cases had a variety of factors that contributed to disputes between DOT&E and military service officials over operational testing, but only a few had considerable cost or schedule impacts. The factors typically involved the adequacy of proposed testing and differences over test requirements, assets, and the reporting of test results. In general, we found that DOT&E had valid and substantive operational test-related concerns for each program reviewed. Most of the disputes we reviewed had been, or are expected to be, resolved in favor of DOT&E’s concerns, and with limited cost and schedule impacts to the programs. In a few of these cases, military service officials acknowledged that benefits were achieved from resolving the disputes, such as a reduction in the scope of operational testing and better understanding of system requirements. However, resolution of disputes for three programs—DDG-51 Flight III Destroyer, F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, and CVN 78 aircraft carrier—had considerable potential cost or schedule effects that required formal involvement from senior DOD leadership. For the first two programs, hundreds of millions of dollars in additional costs are associated with resolving their disputes. For CVN 78, the dispute, which remains unresolved, has ramifications for the Navy’s carrier deployment schedule and whether a key test to assess the survivability of the carrier will be deferred by several years. For the other seven case studies included in our review, cost and schedule effects in resolving their disputes were more limited, and in some cases, were not related to operational testing requirements. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The Joint Explanatory Statement to Accompany the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015 directed GAO to review the oversight activities of the Department of Defense’s (DOD) Office of the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E), including how they may affect acquisition programs. Our objectives for this review were to examine (1) the extent to which there have been any significant disputes between DOT&E and acquisition programs over operational testing, and (2) the circumstances and impact of identified operational test-related disputes. In addition to our interview activities, we formally solicited input and received responses from officials within the military service acquisition executive offices, test and evaluation offices, and operational test agencies that identified programs that had experienced any of the following circumstances since fiscal year 2010: significant delays in obtaining DOT&E’s approval of test and evaluation master plans (TEMPs); significant delays in obtaining DOT&E approval of operational test plans to support initial operational test and evaluation (IOT&E); significant disputes over the test assets needed to conduct IOT&E; significant disputes with DOT&E related to what requirements were to be tested during IOT&E, such as testing key performance parameters only versus testing to intended mission capabilities in an operational environment; significant disagreements over the characterization of IOT&E results that led to a delay in reaching a full-rate production decision; significant disputes related to the need to conduct live fire testing or the extent of testing; substantially increased costs for operational test completion that were judged unwarranted by programs or the military services; or significant disputes over any other elements associated with DOT&E’s oversight role, such as decisions by DOT&E to add programs to its oversight list, DOT&E’s activities related to operational assessments, or the need to conduct follow-on operational testing and evaluation. Our case study programs are representative of the types of disputes identified overall by military service officials. | Why GAO Did This Study
DOD conducts extensive operational testing and evaluation of its military systems prior to full-rate production and fielding. DOT&E plays an integral role in operational test and evaluation by issuing policy and procedures, overseeing operational test planning, and independently evaluating and reporting test results. At times, DOT&E and acquisition programs may disagree about what is needed to adequately demonstrate operational capability, which sometimes may affect programs' cost or schedule.
The Joint Explanatory Statement to Accompany the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015 directed GAO to review DOT&E's oversight activities. This report examines (1) the extent to which DOD acquisition programs have had significant disputes, if any, with DOT&E over operational testing, and (2) the circumstances and impact of identified disputes. GAO evaluated documentation and interviewed officials from DOT&E, other DOD test organizations, and the acquisition community. GAO also conducted 10 case studies from among 42 programs identified by military service officials as having had significant disputes with DOT&E. GAO analyzed information received from acquisition and testing officials to verify the merits and degree of those disputes. Based on this assessment, GAO selected case studies that were representative of the most significant disputes identified across the military services.
What GAO Found
The Director, Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E) provided oversight for 454 Department of Defense (DOD) acquisition programs from fiscal years 2010-2014. Military service officials identified 42 programs from that period that they believed had significant disputes with DOT&E over operational testing—that is, disputes that may have led to cost and schedule impacts for programs. Operational testing is intended to evaluate a system's capability in realistic combat conditions before full-rate production or full deployment. Acquisition programs and DOT&E have different objectives and incentives, which can potentially fuel tension between the two over what is needed to accomplish operational testing for programs. According to military service officials, the tension is generally manageable and differences usually are resolved in a reasonable and timely manner, with modest adjustments often required in the course of developing and executing a test approach. However, sometimes differences about operational testing requirements, methods, costs, or results develop into significant disputes and are more difficult to resolve. Acquisition and test officials from the military services identified only a limited number of cases—less than 10 percent of programs receiving DOT&E operational test oversight since fiscal year 2010—that they believed had experienced significant operational testing disputes with DOT&E. Officials noted that although these disputes can require additional time and effort to work through, they generally get resolved.
In an in-depth review of 10 case studies selected from among the 42 programs with significant disputes, GAO identified a variety of factors that contributed to disputes between the acquisition programs and DOT&E, but only a few cases that involved considerable cost or schedule impacts. Key factors involved the adequacy of proposed testing and differences over test requirements, assets, and the reporting of test results. In general, GAO found that DOT&E had valid and substantive concerns about operational test and evaluation for each of the 10 cases reviewed. However, military service officials indicated to GAO that testing advocated by DOT&E was, in some instances, beyond what they believed was necessary and lacked consideration for programs' test resource limitations. Many of the disputes GAO reviewed were, or are expected to be, resolved in DOT&E's favor with limited cost and schedule impacts to the programs. In a few cases, military service officials acknowledged that benefits were achieved from resolving the disputes, such as a reduction in the scope of operational testing and better understanding of system requirements. Resolution of disputes for three programs—DDG-51 Flight III Destroyer, F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, and CVN 78 aircraft carrier—had considerable potential or realized cost or schedule effects and required formal involvement from senior DOD leadership. For the first two programs, hundreds of millions of dollars in additional costs were associated with resolving their disputes. For CVN 78, the dispute—which remains unresolved— involves the Navy's carrier deployment schedule and whether survivability testing will be deferred by several years. For the other seven case study programs that GAO reviewed, the cost and schedule effects tied to dispute resolution were more limited, and in some instances, not related to operational testing requirements.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is not making any recommendations in this report. |
gao_GAO-16-416 | gao_GAO-16-416_0 | MHS Coverage Eligibility for Reservists and Deployed DOD Civilians
Reservists have a general cycle of coverage during which they are eligible for MHS care through various TRICARE options based on their duty status – preactivation, active duty, deactivation, and inactive. DOD Makes a Variety of Inpatient and Outpatient Mental Health Care Available Domestically and Overseas
DOD Offers a Variety of Mental Health Care Services
DOD makes a variety of mental health care services available both domestically and overseas to active duty servicemembers, ranging from outpatient services such as psychotherapy and telehealth, to inpatient services such as acute psychiatric care, as well as emergency services. Consistent with the availability of outpatient mental health services at MTFs and clinics, about 76 percent of outpatient mental health encounters for active duty servicemembers were provided through direct care across all military services in fiscal year 2014 (see table 3). Military Services Also Make Mental Health Care Available through Non- Traditional Methods
To address the mental health needs of servicemembers, the military services have integrated mental health providers in primary care settings, embedded mental health providers within units, and used telehealth. DOD Has Increased the Number of Available Mental Health Providers, but DOD Data Show Shortages for Some Provider Types
Our analysis of DOD staffing data for the direct care system from fiscal years 2009 through 2015 and for the purchased care system from December 2010 through July 2015 shows that DOD increased the number of available mental health providers in both delivery systems, thereby increasing DOD’s mental health capabilities to meet servicemembers’ mental health care needs. MHS Mental Health Care Available to Inactive Reservists is Generally Limited to Assessments and Referrals or to Care Purchased through TRICARE Reserve Select
Unlike the mental health care made available to active duty servicemembers, DOD generally does not make mental health care available to inactive reservists at no cost to them. Air National Guard. While DOD Met Most of Its Mental Health Appointment Access Standards, DOD Lacks a Key Standard, and Its Surveys Suggest Potential Access Problems Recent Data Show That DOD Generally Met Its Access Standards for Most Direct Care Mental Health Appointment Types
Data from DHA’s TRICARE Operation Center for April 2014 through August 2015 showed that MHS-wide, for appointments by active duty servicemembers in the direct care system, the mental health access to care standards were generally met for all domestic and overseas appointment types except routine appointments. Although the mental health appointment access data suggest that DOD is not meeting the 7-day standard for routine appointments, officials suggested that these data are misleading, as some appointments were coded incorrectly—negatively impacting the routine appointment access results. DOD Lacks an Access Standard for the Most Common Type of Direct Care Mental Health Appointment
Although DOD has established standards and is monitoring access for four types of mental health appointments, DOD told us that most mental health appointments provided in the MHS’s direct care system fall into a fifth category—follow-up appointments—which generally do not have an official DOD access to care standard. Limited Data on Mental Health Access in Purchased Care Are Available, but DOD Instead Relies on Beneficiary Surveys and Complaints to Monitor Access
Limited data are available regarding access to care in the MHS’s purchased care system. For example, fiscal year 2011 through fiscal year 2014 data from DOD’s Health Care Survey of DOD Beneficiaries—the principal tool with which DHA monitors the opinions and experiences of MHS beneficiaries directly—found that about one in three servicemembers who had a need for treatment or counseling experienced problems accessing mental health care in the MHS. Data from the 2012 and 2013 TRICARE Standard Survey of Civilian Providers provided by DOD showed that this percentage had not improved over time, with an estimated 37 percent of civilian mental health providers accepting new TRICARE patients during the surveys. It is too early to determine the extent to which DOD’s ongoing efforts will resolve all of these concerns. Mental health care is provided to deployed servicemembers and DOD civilians through various means. Our work also shows that despite federal internal control standards that call for agencies to have sufficient information to monitor agency performance, DOD lacks an important standard for follow-up appointments, which represent nearly two-thirds of the mental health care provided in the MHS’s direct care system. Recommendation for Executive Action
To enhance oversight of access to mental health care and help ensure that servicemembers have timely access to mental health care, we recommend that that Secretary of Defense direct the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs to establish an access standard for mental health follow-up appointments and regularly monitor data on these appointments. DOD did not provide a time frame for implementing this recommendation. | Why GAO Did This Study
DOD reports that between 2005 and 2013, the number of individuals who received mental health care through DOD's MHS grew by 32 percent. MHS mental health care is provided free to active duty servicemembers. Reservists and DOD civilians are eligible for MHS care under certain circumstances.
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015 contains a provision for GAO to assess the availability and accessibility of mental health care in DOD's MHS for military servicemembers. This report examines, among other things, (1) the mental health care DOD makes available to servicemembers domestically and overseas and (2) the accessibility of mental health care provided to servicemembers domestically and overseas. GAO analyzed recent, available data on MHS mental health utilization, staffing, and appointment access and compared access data to relevant DOD standards. GAO reviewed mental health data from several DOD surveys as well as documents related to MHS mental health care. GAO also interviewed DOD and service officials and representatives from servicemember and provider associations.
What GAO Found
The Department of Defense's (DOD) Military Health System (MHS) makes a variety of inpatient and outpatient mental health care available to active duty servicemembers and activated National Guard and Reserve servicemembers (reservists) domestically and overseas through its TRICARE health care system. The type of care includes psychological testing and assessment, psychotherapy, medication management, and inpatient psychiatric care. This care is typically available through military treatment facilities and clinics (direct care), and it is supplemented by care provided through networks of civilian providers (purchased care). In fiscal year 2014, DOD provided 76 percent of 2.9 million outpatient mental health encounters through direct care and 69 percent of 0.2 million inpatient mental health bed days through purchased care. To deliver mental health care, the military services use a range of strategies including telehealth, embedding mental health providers within units, and integrating mental health providers in primary care. While DOD has increased the number of available mental health providers in both direct and purchased care in recent years, DOD data indicate that the military services still face shortages for certain providers, such as psychiatrists. Unlike the care available for active duty servicemembers and activated reservists, MHS mental health care for inactive reservists is generally limited to referrals to non-DOD community resources or, if eligible, the reservists can purchase coverage for health care, including mental health care, through TRICARE Reserve Select, a premium-based health plan for reservists.
DOD data on domestic and overseas direct care from April 2014 through August 2015 show that MHS-wide DOD's access to care standards were generally met for three of four mental health appointment types. However, in the case of routine appointments—initial appointments for a new or exacerbated condition—data show that other than the Air Force, MHS routine mental health appointments generally did not meet the 7-day access standard. DOD and service officials attributed this to several factors, including some appointments being incorrectly coded, thus negatively impacting the routine appointment access results. They told GAO that DOD was taking steps to address the coding problem and improve oversight of mental health access. Additionally, the data show that about 59 percent of mental health appointments are follow-up appointments, which generally do not have an official DOD access standard. Federal internal control standards call for agencies to have sufficient information to monitor agency performance. By not establishing and monitoring a follow-up appointment standard, DOD cannot hold the military services accountable for the majority of mental health care provided in the direct care system. For purchased care, limited access data are available, and DOD instead relies on beneficiary surveys and complaints to monitor access—consistent with methods used by civilian health plans. DOD surveys have identified access problems for some servicemembers. For example, a DOD beneficiary survey estimated that about one-third of active duty servicemembers experienced problems accessing mental health care from 2011 through 2014. Additionally, provider surveys from 2012 and 2013 found that only an estimated 37 percent of civilian mental health providers were accepting any new TRICARE patients. DOD's ongoing efforts to improve oversight of mental health access, including implementing a strategic plan, may help address some of these problems, but it is too early to tell.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOD establish an access standard for mental health follow-up appointments and regularly monitor data on these appointments. DOD concurred with GAO's recommendation. |
gao_GAO-13-744 | gao_GAO-13-744_0 | For example, GSA has helped agencies reduce their space needs and consolidate space as high-value leases expire. Characteristics of High- Value Leases
As of November 2012, GSA’s 218 high-value leases represented only about 3 percent of the total number of GSA leases, yet made up about one-third of GSA’s leased portfolio in terms of cost and size. GSA’s Capital- Planning Approach Does Not Promote Informed Decision Making about Leasing versus Ownership
Although GSA officials stated that for most high-value leases, constructing federally-owned space would be more cost effective over time than continuing to lease, GSA’s capital planning approach lacks a strategic focus that addresses its reliance on high-value leases. We identified three leading practices that characterize sound capital investment decision making and pertain to GSA’s high-value leased portfolio: (1) alternatives evaluation, (2) project prioritization, and (3) creating a long-term capital plan. In addition, we found that nine high-value leases did not go through the prospectus process. Nevertheless, in our review, we found that 9 of our 12 case study leases included space for long-term or mission critical space needs for tenant agencies. According to GSA officials, in three of these cases, GSA mistakenly did not provide a prospectus to Congress. For example, one of our case study leases, a 146,000 square foot lease in Los Angeles that houses the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, has a 10-year term (from May 3, 2006 through May 2, 2016) with a net annual rent of $3.2 million, thus over the fiscal year 2012 prospectus threshold of $2.79 million. However, GSA did not submit a prospectus for this project prior to the beginning of the lease term or otherwise notify or obtain approval from the congressional authorizing committees. Without evaluating alternatives to continuing to lease its high-value leases, GSA does not have information that it could use to prioritize potential capital projects for those space needs currently in high-value leases for which it would most benefit the federal government to own rather than lease. While it has not performed a systematic analysis to determine which space needs represented by high-value leases would be most beneficial to move to federal ownership—or prioritized these space needs for ownership accordingly—in some cases, GSA has turned leased space into federally- owned space. In 2009, Congress made funds available from the Federal Buildings Fund for the purchase. Without having taken these steps for high-value leases, GSA has not incorporated the high-value leases that should be the highest priority for ownership into a long-term capital plan. This lack of information on the long-term consequences of high-value leases could inadvertently contribute to the federal government’s overspending on agencies’ long-term space needs—even as the federal government tries to trim costs through reducing its leased footprint. In contrast, a strategic vision for these leases that incorporates leading practices of capital decision making could better position the federal government to save money over time. Increased transparency could also promote collaboration with decision makers and better position GSA and tenant agencies to address funding and other challenges that are impeding progress in GSA’s efforts to reduce the federal real property footprint through improved space utilization as leases expire. GSA lacks analysis of the effect of these long-term leases on its portfolio and on the tenant agency in line with capital-planning principles—and it therefore cannot share this information with Congress, for example, by incorporating proposals for those space needs currently housed in high-value leases for which it would be most beneficial to transfer to an ownership solution into the capital plan we recommended that GSA develop in 2012. Moreover, cases in which high-value leases lack a prospectus further reduce the transparency of GSA’s full portfolio. Recommendations
To enhance transparency and allow for more informed decision making related to the appropriate role of leasing in GSA’s real property portfolio, we recommend that the Administrator of GSA take the following three actions: Include in the lease prospectus a description of the length of time that an agency estimates it will need the space, an historical account of how long the agency has been in the particular building it is occupying at the time of the prospectus, and any major investments the agency will have to make to the leased space to meet its mission. Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
We provided a draft of this report for review and comment to GSA and OMB. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to (1) identify the characteristics of the General Services Administration’s (GSA) high-value leases and what actions, if any, GSA has taken to reduce their cost, and (2) assess the extent to which GSA’s capital-planning approach promotes informed decision making about leasing versus ownership. | Why GAO Did This Study
Overreliance on costly leasing is one reason that federal real property has remained on GAO's high-risk list. GAO's work has shown that building ownership often costs less than leasing, especially for long-term space needs. For leases with a net annual rent above a threshold--$2.79 million in fiscal year 2012--GSA is required to submit a prospectus, or proposal, to Congress. GAO was asked to review these high-value leases. This report (1) identifies their characteristics and what GSA has done to reduce their cost and (2) assesses the extent to which GSA's capital-planning approach supports informed leasing decisions. GAO reviewed GSA data for all 218 active high-value leases as of November 2012 and selected 12 leases for case studies based on expiration dates, locations, and tenant agencies. GAO reviewed relevant legislation and guidance, interviewed agency officials, and compared GSA actions to leading practices.
What GAO Found
The General Services Administration's (GSA) 218 high-value leases GAO reviewed represented only about 3 percent of the total number of GSA leases, yet made up about one-third of its leased portfolio in terms of cost and size. GSA has reduced the costs of its high-value leases in line with the administration's goal to reduce real property costs. GSA's efforts include helping agencies improve space utilization. However, for leases nearing expiration, GSA and tenant agencies have faced challenges in funding space renovations and moving costs. This lack of funds has contributed to delays and some cases in which GSA continues to occupy space after the lease expires.
GSA officials stated that for most high-value leases, federal ownership would be more cost effective over the long term, but GSA did not have the funding available to purchase, renovate, or construct a building. GAO found that GSA's capital-planning approach lacks transparency and a strategic focus that could support more informed decision making in this area. Specifically, GSA does not follow capital-planning practices involving alternatives evaluation, project prioritization, and long-term capital planning:
GSA's lease prospectuses do not discuss the length of time of the space need or alternative approaches to meeting it--which are key to understanding whether leasing or owning would be more cost-effective. Twenty-seven of the prospectuses (for leases expiring from 2012 through 2027) contained an analysis that showed potential savings of over $866 million if the spaces were owned rather than leased. GSA and OMB have decided the analysis is no longer necessary in light of the lack of capital funding for acquisitions and construction. GAO's case studies highlighted long-term, mission critical space needs, such as a lease for the Environmental Protection Agency in Seattle for space it has occupied for over 40 years. Another high-value lease is for the State Department's diplomatic security bureau in Virginia. State invested at least $80 million in security upgrades into a facility that GSA leased for 10 years.
Further, GAO found that nine ongoing high-value leases did not go through the prospectus process. For example, GSA mistakenly did not prepare a prospectus for a 10-year Los Angeles lease for the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. GSA did not notify Congress of these leases, further limiting transparency.
GSA has not systematically prioritized which space needs currently in high-value leases it would be most beneficial to move to federally-owned solutions. GSA has not incorporated space needs that are the highest priority for ownership investment into a long-term capital plan.
This lack of information on the long-term consequences, including costs and risks, of high-value leases could inadvertently contribute to the federal government's overspending on long-term space needs. In contrast, a strategic vision incorporating leading practices for capital decision making could better position the government to save money over time. Increased transparency could promote collaboration with decision makers, which could help GSA address challenges and identify cost savings opportunities as leases expire.
What GAO Recommends
GSA should enhance the transparency of decision making for high-value leases by (1) including more information in the prospectus to Congress, such as the agency's prior and future need for the space, major investments needed, and an appropriate analysis of the cost of leasing versus the cost of ownership; (2) reporting to congressional committees about certain leases without a prospectus; and (3) prioritizing potential ownership solutions for current high-value leases to help create a long-term strategy for targeted ownership investments. GSA concurred with the recommendations. |
gao_GAO-01-46 | gao_GAO-01-46_0 | Conclusion
EPA performs limited oversight of states’ processes for verifying the accuracy of emissions reports submitted by major sources. EPA’s data show that most emissions determinations are based on generic emissions factors. While EPA allows facilities to estimate their emissions in this manner, EPA officials generally consider direct methods to be more reliable. The accuracy of these reports is important because they influence (1) the financing of states’ regulatory programs through fees and (2) the development of emissions inventories, which, in turn, assist regulators in developing control strategies and establishing permit limits. Furthermore, steps taken to assess the accuracy of these reports—such as more thoroughly reviewing the supporting information—could provide benefits in terms of compliance with Clean Air Act requirements. For example, a more thorough review of the information underlying a facility’s emissions reports or a more systematic comparison of these reports over a period of time could identify indications of increased emissions. Such indications could, in turn, trigger a review of compliance with New Source Review requirements, an area where EPA found widespread noncompliance in four industries. The state that performed the most detailed reviews found widespread inaccuracies. While taking steps to improve its overall compliance-monitoring strategy, EPA does not plan to evaluate state processes for verifying emissions reports from large facilities. | What GAO Found
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) performs limited oversight of states' processes for verifying the accuracy of large industrial facilities' emissions reports. EPA's data show that most emissions determinations from large sources are based on generic emissions factors. Although EPA allows facilities to estimate their emissions in this manner, EPA officials generally consider direct methods to be more reliable. The accuracy of these reports is important because they influence (1) the financing of states' regulatory programs through fees and (2) the development of emissions inventories, which, in turn, help regulators to develop control strategies and establish permit limits. Furthermore, steps taken to assess the accuracy of these reports, such as more thoroughly reviewing the supporting information, could improve compliance with Clean Air Act requirements. For example, a more thorough review of the information underlying a facility's emission reports, or a more systematic comparison of these reports over time, could identify increased emissions. Such indications could, in turn, trigger a review of compliance with new source review requirements, an area in which EPA found widespread noncompliance in four industries. In the four states that GAO reviewed, the states that had done the most detailed reviews found widespread inaccuracies. Although it is taking steps to improve its overall compliance monitoring strategy, EPA does not plan to evaluate states' processes for verifying emissions reports from large facilities. |
gao_GAO-12-843 | gao_GAO-12-843_0 | Six Agencies Supported Sixty-Five Solar-Related Initiatives with a Variety of Key Characteristics
We identified 65 solar-related initiatives with a variety of key characteristics at six federal agencies. Over half of the 65 initiatives supported solar projects exclusively; the remaining initiatives supported solar energy technologies in addition to other renewable energy technologies. Agency officials reported that they obligated around $2.6 billion for the solar projects in these initiatives in fiscal years 2010 and 2011. These initiatives supported solar energy technologies through multiple technology advancement activities, ranging from basic research to commercialization. The initiatives supported these technology advancement activities by providing funding to four types of recipients: universities, industry, nonprofit organizations, and federal laboratories and researchers. As shown in figure 3, the initiatives primarily used grants and contracts. Initiatives Are Fragmented across Agencies and Sometimes Overlap, but Agency Officials Reported Coordination to Avoid Duplication
The 65 solar-related initiatives are fragmented across six agencies and many overlap to some degree, but agency officials reported a number of coordination activities to avoid duplication. We found that many initiatives overlapped in the key characteristics of technology advancement activities, types of technologies, types of funding recipients, or broad goals; however, these areas of overlap do not necessarily lead to duplication of efforts because the initiatives sometimes differ in meaningful ways or leverage the efforts of other initiatives, and we did not find clear evidence of duplication among initiatives. Fragmented Initiatives Overlapped in Their Technology Advancement Activities, Types of Technologies, Funding Recipients, and Goals
The 65 solar-related initiatives are fragmented in that they are implemented by various offices across six agencies and address the same broad area of national need. To Avoid Duplication, Agencies Coordinate and Verify That Recipients Did Not Receive Duplicative Funding
Officials from 57 of the 65 initiatives (88 percent) reported coordinating with other solar-related initiatives. Some agency officials reported undertaking formal activities within their own agency to coordinate the efforts of multiple initiatives. In addition to coordinating to avoid duplication, officials from 59 of the 65 initiatives (91 percent) reported that they determine whether applicants have received other sources of federal funding for the project for which they are applying. USDA generally agreed with the overall findings of the report. DOD, DOE, and EPA indicated that they had no comments on the report. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
The objectives of our report were to identify (1) solar-related initiatives supported by federal agencies in fiscal years 2010 and 2011 and key characteristics of those initiatives and (2) the extent of fragmentation, overlap, and duplication, if any, among federal solar-related initiatives, as well as the extent of coordination among these initiatives. Appendix II: Solar-Related Initiatives at Six Federal Agencies, Descriptions and Fiscal Years 2010 and 2011 Obligations
Tables 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9 provide descriptions, by agency, of the 65 initiatives that support solar energy technologies and the obligations for those initiatives’ solar activities in fiscal years 2010 and 2011. | Why GAO Did This Study
The United States has abundant solar energy resources and solar, along with wind, offers the greatest energy and power potential among all currently available domestic renewable resources. In February 2012, GAO reported that 23 federal agencies had implemented nearly 700 renewable energy initiatives in fiscal year 2010-- including initiatives that supported solar energy technologies (GAO-12-260). The existence of such initiatives at multiple agencies raised questions about the potential for duplication, which can occur when multiple initiatives support the same technology advancement activities and technologies, direct funding to the same recipients, and have the same goals.
GAO was asked to identify (1) solar- related initiatives supported by federal agencies in fiscal years 2010 and 2011 and key characteristics of those initiatives and (2) the extent of fragmentation, overlap, and duplication, if any, of federal solar- related initiatives, as well as the extent of any coordination among these initiatives. GAO reviewed its previous work and interviewed officials at each of the agencies identified as having federal solar initiatives active in fiscal years 2010 and 2011. GAO developed a questionnaire and administered it to officials involved in each initiative to collect information on: initiative goals, technology advancement activities, funding obligations, number of projects, and coordination activities.
This report contains no recommendations. In response to the draft report, USDA generally agreed with the findings, while the other agencies had no comments.
What GAO Found
Sixty-five solar-related initiatives with a variety of key characteristics were supported by six federal agencies. Over half of these 65 initiatives supported solar projects exclusively; the remaining initiatives supported solar and other renewable energy technologies. The 65 initiatives exhibited a variety of key characteristics, including multiple technology advancement activities ranging from basic research to commercialization by providing funding to various types of recipients including universities, industry, and federal laboratories and researchers, primarily through grants and contracts. Agency officials reported that they obligated about $2.6 billion for the solar projects in these initiatives in fiscal years 2010 and 2011, an amount higher than in previous years, in part, because of additional funding from the 2009 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act.
The 65 solar-related initiatives are fragmented across six agencies and overlap to some degree in their key characteristics, but most agency officials reported coordination efforts to avoid duplication. The initiatives are fragmented in that they are implemented by various offices across the six agencies and address the same broad areas of national need. However, the agencies tailor their initiatives to meet their specific missions, such as DOD's energy security mission and NASA's space exploration mission. Many of the initiatives overlapped with at least one other initiative in the technology advancement activity, technology type, funding recipient, or goal. However, GAO found no clear instances of duplicative initiatives. Furthermore, officials at 57 of the 65 initiatives (88 percent) indicated that they coordinated in some way with other solar-related initiatives, including both within their own agencies and with other agencies. Such coordination may reduce the risk of duplication. Moreover, 59 of the 65 initiatives (91 percent) require applicants to disclose other federal sources of funding on their applications to help ensure that they do not receive duplicative funding. |
gao_GAO-10-389 | gao_GAO-10-389_0 | The Extent of Counterfeit Parts in DOD’s Supply Chain Is Unknown
DOD Does Not Have a Common Definition for Counterfeit Parts
DOD lacks a departmentwide definition of the term counterfeit. In the absence of a departmentwide definition of counterfeit parts, some DOD entities have developed their own. DOD Databases Do Not Capture Data on Counterfeit Parts
The two primary databases DOD uses to report deficient parts—the Product Data Reporting and Evaluation Program (PDREP) and the Joint Deficiency Reporting System (JDRS)—have data fields that enable users primarily to track information on deficient parts, but neither is designed specifically to track counterfeit parts. As definitions of “counterfeit” vary within DOD, they generally refer to instances in which individuals or companies knowingly misrepresent the identity or pedigree of a part. However, several DOD officials told us that staff responsible for assembling and repairing systems and equipment may not have the expertise to identify suspect counterfeit parts outside of those that demonstrate performance failures because they are not trained to identify counterfeit parts and have limited awareness of the issue. However, DOD does not have a consistent method to identify parts as counterfeit when they are sent for disposal. Some DOD Components and Contractors Have Taken Initial Steps to Address Counterfeit Parts
In the absence of a departmentwide policy, some DOD components and their contractors have supplemented existing procurement and quality- control practices to help mitigate the risk of counterfeit parts in the DOD supply chain. A Number of Commercial Initiatives Exist to Mitigate the Risk of Counterfeit Parts in Supply Chains
Companies Have Developed Anticounterfeiting Practices to Address Vulnerabilities to Counterfeit Parts
As supply chains across industries are also vulnerable to the risk of counterfeit parts, we met with selected companies representing commercial aerospace, electronics, and automotive sectors that have taken measures to address the counterfeiting challenges they face. The symposium also provided information on technical tools and methods to detect and prevent counterfeit parts. Conclusions
As DOD draws from a large network of suppliers in an increasingly global supply chain, there can be limited visibility into these sources and greater risk of procuring counterfeit parts, which have the potential to threaten the reliability of DOD’s weapon systems and the success of its missions. Collaboration with government agencies, industry associations, and commercial-sector companies that produce items similar to those used by DOD and have reported taking actions to mitigate the risks of counterfeit parts in their supply chains offers DOD the opportunity to leverage ongoing and planned initiatives in this area. The Department of Commerce’s comments are reprinted in appendix IV. We met with officials from the DOD Acquisition and Technology, Logistics and Material Readiness, Supply Chain Integration office; the DOD Defense Logistics Agency and its Supply Centers located in Columbus, Ohio; Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; and Richmond, Virginia; the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Missile Defense Agency; and five defense prime contractors— BAE, Boeing, Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, and Raytheon—to discuss (1) their definition of the term counterfeit,(2) their procedures and practices for obtaining knowledge of counterfeit parts, (3) databases available for documenting instances of counterfeit or suspect counterfeit parts, (4) their knowledge of the existence of counterfeit parts, and (5) instances of counterfeit parts within the DOD supply chain. To further examine the processes that DOD has in place to detect and prevent counterfeit parts from entering its supply chain, we conducted a case study of DOD weapon programs and interviewed program officials as well as several logistics support providers. | Why GAO Did This Study
Counterfeit parts--generally those whose sources knowingly misrepresent the parts' identity or pedigree--have the potential to seriously disrupt the Department of Defense (DOD) supply chain, delay missions, and affect the integrity of weapon systems. Almost anything is at risk of being counterfeited, from fasteners used on aircraft to electronics used on missile guidance systems. Further, there can be many sources of counterfeit parts as DOD draws from a large network of global suppliers. Based on a congressional request, GAO examined (1) DOD's knowledge of counterfeit parts in its supply chain, (2) DOD processes to detect and prevent counterfeit parts, and (3) commercial initiatives to mitigate the risk of counterfeit parts. GAO's findings are based on an examination of DOD regulations, guidance, and databases used to track deficient parts, as well as a Department of Commerce study on counterfeit parts; interviews with Commerce, DOD, and commercial-sector officials at selected locations; and a review of planned and existing efforts for counterfeit-part mitigation.
What GAO Found
DOD is limited in its ability to determine the extent to which counterfeit parts exist in its supply chain because it does not have a departmentwide definition of the term "counterfeit" and a consistent means to identify instances of suspected counterfeit parts. While some DOD entities have developed their own definitions, these can vary in scope. Further, two DOD databases that track deficient parts--those that do not conform to standards--are not designed to track counterfeit parts. A third governmentwide database can track suspected counterfeit parts, but according to officials, reporting is low due to the perceived legal implications of reporting prior to a full investigation. Nonetheless, officials we met with across DOD cited instances of counterfeit parts, as shown in the table below. A recent Department of Commerce study also identified the existence of counterfeit electronic parts within DOD and industry supply chains. DOD is in the early stages of developing a program to help mitigate the risks of counterfeit parts. DOD does not currently have a policy or specific processes for detecting and preventing counterfeit parts. Existing procurement and quality-control practices used to identify deficient parts are limited in their ability to prevent and detect counterfeit parts in DOD's supply chain. For example, several DOD weapon system program and logistics officials told us that staff responsible for assembling and repairing equipment are not trained to identify counterfeit parts. Some DOD components and prime defense contractors have taken initial steps to mitigate the risk of counterfeit parts, such as creating risk-assessment tools and implementing a new electronic parts standard. Also facing risks from counterfeit parts, individual commercial sector companies have developed a number of anticounterfeiting measures, including increased supplier visibility, detection, reporting, and disposal. Recent collaborative industry initiatives have focused on identifying and sharing methods to reduce the likelihood of counterfeit parts entering the supply chain. Because many of the commercial sector companies produce items similar to those used by DOD, agency officials have an opportunity to leverage knowledge and ongoing and planned initiatives to help mitigate the risk of counterfeit parts as DOD develops its anticounterfeiting strategy. |
gao_GAO-01-19 | gao_GAO-01-19_0 | Introduction
During 1998, the Navy consolidated the Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard and the Naval Intermediate Maintenance Facility in Hawaii. Because of concerns raised about certain aspects of the consolidation, the Navy implemented a test project, commonly called the Pearl Harbor pilot, to determine if integrating the management, operations, and funding of the shipyard and the intermediate maintenance facility can result in greater efficiency and lower overall ship maintenance costs. In September 1999, we reported the Pearl Harbor pilot was not yet complete and preliminary results were mixed, and we recommended that the Navy take steps to address unresolved issues related to financial management of the consolidated facility. Cost visibility and accountability for consolidated ship maintenance operations. OSD concurred with the intent of our recommendations to resolve financial management issues related to the consolidation at Pearl Harbor and indicated that the Departments of Defense and the Navy would correct them. Issues Related to the Financial Structure for Consolidations of Ship Maintenance Activities at Pearl Harbor and Elsewhere Are Still Not Resolved
As we discussed in our prior report, OSD and Navy officials differ still over three key issues related to the financial structure for the consolidation of ship maintenance activities at Pearl Harbor and other locations. Because of the consolidation, the Navy has reduced the maintenance infrastructure at Pearl Harbor. The Navy has not yet generated the rework figures for fiscal year 2000. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 1998, the Navy consolidated the Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard and the Naval Intermediate Maintenance Facility in Hawaii. Because of concerns about some aspects of the consolidation, the Navy began a test project, commonly called the Pearl Harbor pilot, to determine if integrating the management, operations, and funding of the shipyard and the intermediate maintenance facility can result in greater efficiency and lower overall ship maintenance costs. In September 1999, GAO reported that the preliminary results of the ongoing Pearl Harbor pilot were mixed and recommended that the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Navy address unresolved issues related to the financial management of the consolidation as the Navy proceeds with similar consolidations in other locations. This report updates GAO's earlier report and discusses whether (1) the Navy has provided adequate cost visibility and accountability over the consolidation, (2) DOD and the Navy have resolved other issues related to the financial structure for consolidations at Pearl Harbor and elsewhere, and (3) the consolidation has generated greater efficiency and lower costs for ship maintenance at Pearl Harbor.
What GAO Found
GAO found that the Navy still has not provided adequate cost visibility and accountability over ship maintenance following the consolidation. DOD and the Navy have made little progress in resolving other issues related to the financial structure for the consolidation. GAO is unable to determine whether the consolidations have produced greater efficiency and lower costs for ship maintenance. |
gao_GAO-01-858 | gao_GAO-01-858_0 | Conclusions
On-line trading continues to be an important segment of the securities trading market. The industry reports investing greater resources toward improving performance of their systems, and regulators have made substantial progress in ensuring that investors receive better information in key investor protection areas. However, investors trading on-line continue to file a substantial number of complaints that indicate concern about failures and delays in processing orders, and according to OCIE, a lack of knowledge about trading and investing. OCIE’s findings in its January 2001 report confirmed those we reported 1 year ago and provide further support for our conclusion that providing complete information on the Web sites of on-line broker-dealers would provide greater opportunities for investors to make more informed investment decisions. | What GAO Found
On-line trading continues to be an important part of the securities trading market. The industry reports investing greater resources to improve the performance of their systems, and regulators have made substantial progress in ensuring that investors receive better information in key investor protection areas. However, investors trading on-line continue to file many complaints about failures and delays in processing orders. GAO believes that providing complete information on the websites of on-line broker-dealers would allow investors to make more informed investment decisions. |
gao_GAO-07-842T | gao_GAO-07-842T_0 | Determining Top Secret Clearances for Industry Personnel Averaged More Than a Year, and Government Statistics Did Not Portray All Delays
At the time of our September 2006 report, our independent analysis of timeliness data showed that industry personnel contracted to work for the federal government waited more than 1 year on average to receive top secret security clearances, and government statistics did not portray the full length of time it takes many applicants to obtain clearances. Delays in Determining Eligibility Are Caused by Many Factors
As table 1 shows, industry personnel granted eligibility for top secret clearances from DISCO from January to February 2006 waited an average of 446 days for their initial clearances or 545 days for their clearance updates. The application-submission phase of the clearance process took an average of 111 days for the initial clearances that DISCO adjudicated in January and February 2006 (see table 1). Investigations for the initial top secret clearances of industry personnel adjudicated in January and February 2006 took an average of 286 days, compared to OMB’s 180-day goal for that period (see table 1). Delays in any phase of the clearance process cost money and threaten national security. OMB’s and OPM’s Timeliness Reporting Does Not Convey Full Magnitude of Delays
The statistics that OMB and OPM have provided to Congress on the timeliness of the personnel security clearance process do not convey the full magnitude of the investigation-related delays facing the government. While our September 2006 report noted additional problems with the transparency of the timeliness statistics, I will review our concerns about five such issues: (1) limited information on reinvestigations for clearance updating, (2) not counting the total number of days to finish the application-submission phase, (3) shifting some investigation-related days to the adjudication phase or not counting them, (4) not counting the total number of days to complete closed pending cases, and (5) not counting the total number of days to complete investigations sent back for rework. We have noted in the past that focusing on completing initial clearance investigations could negatively affect the completion of clearance update reinvestigations and thereby increase the risk of unauthorized disclosure of classified information. In addition, use of incomplete investigative reports and not fully documenting adjudicative considerations may undermine the government’s efforts to increase the acceptance of security clearances granted by other federal agencies. Almost All of the Sampled Investigative Reports Were Incomplete
In our review of 50 initial investigations randomly sampled from the population used in our timeliness analyses, we found that 47 of 50 of the investigative reports were missing documentation required by the federal investigative standards. We also found a total of 36 unresolved issues in 27 of the investigative reports. Federal standards indicate that investigations may be expanded as necessary to resolve issues. In our November 2005 testimony evaluating the government plan for improving the personnel security clearance process, we stated that developers of the plan may wish to consider adding other indicators of the quality of investigations. DISCO Adjudicators Granted Top Secret Clearance Eligibility for Cases with Missing Information
Our review found that DISCO adjudicators granted top secret clearance eligibility for all 47 of the 50 industry personnel whose investigative reports did not have full documentation. The adjudicators granted eligibility for the 27 industry personnel whose investigative reports (discussed in the prior section) contained unresolved issues without requesting additional information or documenting in the adjudicative report that the information was missing. DISCO began using JPAS in February 2003, and it became the official system for all of DOD in February 2005. Delivery and Use of Incomplete Investigations Increase Risks to National Security and Reciprocity
Decisions to grant clearances based on incomplete investigations increase risks to national security because individuals can gain access to classified information without being vetted against the full federal standards and guidelines. When I testified before this Subcommittee in November 2005, we were optimistic that the government plan for improving the clearance process prepared under the direction of OMB’s Deputy Director for Management would be a living document that would provide the strategic vision for correcting long-standing problems in the personnel security clearance process. Continued failure to address the shortcomings we have cited could significantly limit the positive impact that the government has made in other portions of the clearance process through improvements such as hiring more investigators and promoting reciprocity. GAO-06-748T. GAO’s High-Risk Program. Questions for the Record Related to DOD’s Personnel Security Clearance Program. DOD Personnel Clearances: Some Progress Has Been Made but Hurdles Remain to Overcome the Challenges That Led to GAO's High-Risk Designation. | Why GAO Did This Study
Individuals working for the private industry are playing a larger role in national security work conducted by Department of Defense (DOD) and other federal agencies. As of May 2006, industry personnel held about 34 percent of DOD-maintained personnel security clearances. The damage that the unauthorized disclosure of classified information can cause to national security necessitates the prompt and careful consideration of who is granted a security clearance. Long-standing delays in determining clearance eligibility and other challenges led GAO to designate the DOD personnel security clearance program as a high-risk area in January 2005 and again in GAO's January 2007 update of the high-risk areas. In February 2005, DOD transferred its security clearance investigations functions to the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) and now obtains almost all of its clearance investigations from OPM. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) is responsible for effective implementation of policy relating to determinations of eligibility for access to classified information. This testimony addresses the timeliness of the process and completeness of documentation used to determine eligibility of industry personnel for top secret clearances in January and February 2006. This statement relies primarily on GAO's September 2006 report (GAO-06-1070).
What GAO Found
GAO's analysis of timeliness data showed that industry personnel contracted to work for the federal government waited more than 1 year on average to receive top secret clearances, longer than OMB- and OPM-produced statistics would suggest. GAO's analysis of 2,259 cases in its population showed the process took an average of 446 days for initial clearances and 545 days for clearance updates. While the government plan has a goal for the application-submission phase of the process to take 14 days or less, it took an average of 111 days. In addition, GAO's analyses showed that OPM used an average of 286 days to complete initial investigations for top secret clearances, well in excess of the 180-day goal specified in the plan that OMB and others developed for improving the clearance process. Finally, the average time for adjudication (determination of clearance eligibility) was 39 days, compared to the 30-day requirement that began in December 2006. An inexperienced investigative workforce, not fully using technology, and other causes underlie these delays. Delays may increase costs for contracts and risks to national security. In addition, statistics that OMB and OPM report to Congress on the timeliness of the clearance process do not portray the full length of time it takes many applicants to receive a clearance. GAO found several issues with the statistics, including limited information on reinvestigations for clearance updating and failure to measure the total time it took to complete the various phases of the clearance process. Not fully accounting for all the time used in the process hinders congressional oversight of the efforts to address the delays. OPM provided incomplete investigative reports to DOD, and DOD personnel who review the reports to determine a person's eligibility to hold a clearance (adjudicators) granted eligibility for industry personnel whose investigative reports contained unresolved issues, such as unexplained affluence and potential foreign influence. In its review of 50 investigative reports for initial clearances, GAO found that that almost all (47 of 50) cases were missing documentation required by federal investigative standards. Moreover, federal standards indicate expansion of investigations may be necessary to resolve issues, but GAO found at least one unresolved issue in 27 of the reports. GAO also found that the DOD adjudicators granted top secret clearance eligibility for all 27 industry personnel whose investigative reports contained unresolved issues without requesting additional information or documenting in the adjudicative report that the information was missing. In its November 2005 assessment of the government plan for improving the clearance process, GAO raised concerns about the limited attention devoted to assessing quality in the clearance process, but the plan has not been revised to address the shortcomings GAO identified. The use of incomplete investigations and adjudications in granting top secret clearance eligibility increases the risk of unauthorized disclosure of classified information. Also, it could negatively affect efforts to promote reciprocity (an agency's acceptance of a clearance issued by another agency) being developed by an interagency working group headed by OMB's Deputy Director. |
gao_GAO-05-245 | gao_GAO-05-245_0 | The Food Stamp Error Rate, Which Combines Overpayments and Underpayments, Has Declined by Almost One-Third over the Last 5 Years
The national Food Stamp Program payment error rate combines overpayments and underpayments to participants, and has declined by about one-third in recent years from 9.86 percent in 1999 to a record low of 6.63 percent in 2003. Of the total $1.4 billion in payment error in fiscal year 2003, $1.1 billion, or about 76 percent, were overpayments, which represent a financial loss to the federal government. Error rates fell in 41 states and the District of Columbia, and 18 states reduced their error rates by one-third or more, as shown in figure 3. Despite the decrease in many states’ error rates over the past few years, some states continue to have high payment error rates. For example, 7 states had payment error rates of 10 percent or higher in 2003. Caseworkers Cause about Two-Thirds and Participants Cause about One-Third of Payment Errors
Almost two-thirds of the payment errors in the Food Stamp Program are caused by caseworkers, usually when they fail to act on new information or make mistakes when applying program rules, and one-third are caused by participants, when they unintentionally or intentionally do not report needed information or provide incomplete or incorrect information (see fig. Program complexity and other factors, such as the lack of resources and staff turnover, can contribute to caseworker mistakes. State and local officials from 8 of the 9 states we interviewed said managing cases with earnings contributes to payment error in part because caseworkers may find it difficult to keep up with the frequent changes reported to them. In 2003, about 5 percent of all payment errors were referred for fraud investigation. FNS and States Have Taken Steps to Increase Payment Accuracy
FNS and the states we reviewed have taken many approaches to increasing food stamp payment accuracy, most of which are parallel with internal control practices known to reduce improper payments. These include practices to improve accountability, perform risk assessments, implement changes based on such assessments, and monitor program performance. State officials point to their low or dropping error rates as evidence that, collectively, their new practices are having a positive impact. Appendix I: Methodology for Determining the Causes of Food Stamp Payment Errors for Fiscal Years 1999 through 2003
To determine the causes of food stamp payment errors for fiscal years 1999 through 2003, we analyzed the Food and Nutrition Service’s (FNS) quality control (QC) system data of active cases used in error rate calculations. FNS stated that no quantitative analysis of the differences across states has been made. Food Stamp Program: States’ Use of Options and Waivers to Improve Program Administration and Promote Access. | Why GAO Did This Study
In fiscal year 2003, the federal Food Stamp Program made payment errors totaling about $1.4 billion in benefits, or about 7 percent of the total $21.4 billion in benefits provided to a monthly average of 21 million low-income participants. Because payment errors are a misuse of public funds and can undermine public support of the program, it is important that the government minimize them. Because of concerns about ensuring payment accuracy GAO examined: (1) what is included in the national food stamp payment error rate and how it has changed over time, (2) what is known about the causes of food stamp payment errors, and (3) what actions the Food and Nutrition Service (FNS) and states have taken to reduce these payment errors. To answer these questions, GAO analyzed program quality control data for fiscal years 1999 through 2003 and interviewed program stakeholders, including state and local officials from nine states.
What GAO Found
The national dollar payment error rate for the Food Stamp Program, which combines states' overpayments and underpayments to program participants in all states, has declined by almost one-third over the last 5 years to a record low of 6.63 percent. This decline has been widespread; the rate fell in 41 states and the District of Columbia, and rates in 18 of these states fell by at least one-third. However, despite this decrease, some states continue to have relatively high payment error rates. For example, in 2003, 7 states had payment error rates of more than 10 percent. Almost two-thirds of food stamp payment errors are caused by caseworkers, usually when they fail to keep up with reported changes or make mistakes applying program rules, and one-third are caused by participant failure to report required, complete, or correct information, such as household income and composition. State officials said program complexity and other factors, such as the lack of resources and staff turnover, can contribute to these errors. In fiscal year 2003, states referred about 5 percent of all cases identified with errors for suspected participant fraud investigation. To increase food stamp payment accuracy, FNS and the 9 states GAO reviewed took many approaches that parallel good internal control practices. These efforts include increasing the leadership and accountability in the program, performing risk assessments to identify problem areas, implementing various program and process changes in response to the findings from risk assessments, and monitoring and promoting improved performance. The states are using a combination of approaches to improve payment accuracy, making it difficult to tie error rate improvements to specific practices. However, state officials point to their improved state error rates as evidence of a collective impact. |
gao_GAO-12-134 | gao_GAO-12-134_0 | To support its operations, DOD performs an assortment of interrelated and interdependent business functions, such as logistics, procurement, health care, and financial management. Independent assessments conducted by ATEC and AFOTEC have identified operational problems with each system. Monitoring the status of the corrective actions, along with the overall progress of DOD ERPs, is essential to help ensure that the systems are implemented on schedule and within budget, and provide the promised capabilities. Further, at the time of our review, GFEBS and DEAMS were not providing DFAS users with the expected capabilities in accounting, management information, and decision support. DFAS users stated that approximately two-thirds of invoice and receipt data must be manually entered into GFEBS from the invoicing and receiving system (i.e., Wide Area Work Flow) due to interface problems.DFAS personnel told us that manual data entry will eventually become infeasible due to increased quantities of data that will have to be manually entered as GFEBS is deployed to additional locations. Army officials explained that the primary cause of the problem is that the interface specification that GFEBS is required to use by the department does not provide the same level of functionality as the interface specification that the legacy systems are allowed to use. Army officials stated they are working with DOD to resolve the problem. DEAMS is not able to produce the monthly accounts receivable aging report as intended, officials told us, and therefore, the report is produced manually.capability to produce the aging report existed in the legacy systems. The DEAMS Financial Management Office (FMO) is aware of the problems and is in the process of resolving them. However, at the time of our review, no timetable had been set for the problem resolution. Further, given the Secretary of Defense’s goal for the department, that the Statement of Budgetary Resources is to be audit ready by fiscal year 2014, the resolution of the issues identified at DFAS is even more critical since GFEBS and DEAMS are an essential part of the ability of the Army and the Air Force to meet the Secretary’s goal. Without timely and effective corrective action, the department is at risk of making investment decisions that may not provide the desired results—improvements in the department’s business operations—and the ERP efforts could continue to experience unnecessary schedule delays and cost increases. However, according to DFAS personnel, the training they received for GFEBS and DEAMS, prior to the systems becoming operational at the various DFAS locations, did not fully meet their needs as users. DFAS personnel informed us that the training focused on an overview of GFEBS and DEAMS and how the systems were supposed to operate. While this was beneficial in identifying how GFEBS and DEAMS were different from the existing legacy systems, the instruction focused too much on concepts rather than the skills needed for DFAS users to perform their day-to-day operations. During its implementation efforts, the department has identified system weaknesses. In light of the Secretary of Defense’s recent decision that the Statement of Budgetary Resources is to be audit ready by fiscal year 2014, it is critical that the department have effective business systems in place to support its auditability goals. Recommendations for Executive Action
To help provide for the successful implementation of Army and Air Force ERPs, and to help ensure that DFAS users have the training needed, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following five actions:
Direct that the MDA for GFEBS, GCSS-Army, DEAMS, and ECSS ensure that any future system deficiencies identified through independent assessments are resolved or mitigated prior to further deployment of the systems. Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
DOD concurred with four and partially concurred with one of the recommendations in our draft report. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Defense (DOD) has stated that successful implementation of its enterprise resource planning (ERP) systems is critical to DODs auditability goals. An ERP is an automated system that performs a variety of business-related functions. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 mandates that DOD be able to validate its financial statements as audit ready by September 30, 2017. GAO has previously reported that DOD has not effectively employed acquisition management controls to help ensure that the ERPs deliver the promised capabilities on time and within budget. GAO was asked to determine issues being encountered by the Army and the Air Force in the implementation of selected ERPs. GAO reviewed independent assessments and reports and interviewed the systems users and program management office officials.
What GAO Found
DOD has invested billions of dollars and will invest billions more to develop and implement its ERPs. The ERPs play a key role in DODs goal of audit readiness by fiscal year 2017. Furthermore, in light of the Secretary of Defenses decision that the Statement of Budgetary Resources is to be audit ready by fiscal year 2014, it is critical that DOD effectively implement the ERPs to support its auditability goals.
Assessments by independent agencies of the Armys General Fund Enterprise Business System (GFEBS) and the Global Combat Support System and the Air Forces Defense Enterprise and Accounting Management System (DEAMS) and Expeditionary Combat Support System identified operational problems, such as deficiencies in data accuracy, inability to generate auditable financial reports, and the need for manual workarounds. Further, according to DFAS users, GFEBS and DEAMS did not provide all expected capabilities in accounting and decision support. For example:
Approximately two-thirds of invoice and receipt data must be manually entered into GFEBS from the invoicing and receiving system due to interface problems. Army officials explained that the primary cause of the problem is that the interface specification that GFEBS is required by DOD to use does not provide the same level of functionality as the interface specification used by the legacy systems. At the time of our review, Army officials stated that they are working with DOD to resolve the problem, but no time frame for resolution had been established.
DEAMS cannot produce the monthly accounts receivable aging report as intended. The DEAMS Financial Management Office is aware of the problems and is in the process of resolving them. However, at the time of our review, no timetable had been set for the problems resolution.
DOD oversight authority has limited the deployment of GFEBS and DEAMS based upon the results of the independent assessments. Continued monitoring of DOD ERPs is essential to identify system weaknesses and to help ensure that the systems provide the promised capabilities. Without timely and effective corrective action, the department is at risk of making investment and system deployment decisions that may not provide the desired resultsimprovements in the departments business operations.
According to DFAS personnel, the training they received for GFEBS and DEAMS did not fully meet their needs. DFAS personnel informed us that the training focused on an overview of GFEBS and DEAMS and how the systems were supposed to operate. While this was beneficial in identifying how GFEBS and DEAMS were different from the existing legacy systems, the training focused too much on concepts rather than the skills needed for DFAS users to perform their day-to-day operations.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is making five recommendations to the Secretary of Defense to ensure the correction of system problems prior to further system deployment, including user training. DOD concurred with four and partially concurred with one of the recommendations and described its efforts to address them. |
gao_GAO-06-405 | gao_GAO-06-405_0 | 1). HUD estimated that over 9 million very low income households (about 59 percent) did not receive assistance and had housing needs. Increases in the Number of Vouchers Drove Growth in the Size of Section 8 from 1998 through 2004
The combined number of authorized vouchers and project-based units grew from about 2.93 million to 3.36 million from 1998 through 2004—an overall increase of about 15 percent and an average annual increase of about 2 percent (see fig. Renewal of an Increasing Number of Expiring Contracts Contributed to Much of the Growth in Budget Authority
Appropriations of new budget authority for Section 8 grew from $9.4 billion in 1998 to $19.3 billion in 2004, an overall increase of about 105 percent and an average annual rate of 13 percent (see fig. Specifically, after adjusting for inflation, outlays dropped from $8.3 billion to $7.8 billion, a decrease of 6 percent. The growth in voucher outlays, however, significantly outpaced the rate of inflation, increasing from $8.5 billion to $14.6 billion (71 percent) in inflation-adjusted dollars. Policy Decisions and Market Factors Drove Increases in Section 8 Outlays, but HUD and Congress Have Acted to Limit Further Growth
A number of policy decisions and market factors contributed to the growth in total Section 8 outlays from 1998 through 2004, including decisions to expand the number of households receiving vouchers, increases in the average rental subsidy per household, and other program costs. To reduce their costs, these PHAs can raise the minimum rent to $50. Changes in market rents explained a significant part of the increase in the average rental subsidy per household. Specifically, we estimate that from 1999 through 2004, over one-half of the increase in the average per household subsidy was explained by higher market rents, all other things being equal. Household and Neighborhood Characteristics of Voucher Holders Did Not Have a Significant Effect on the Growth in the Average Rental Subsidy per Household
We analyzed certain household characteristics, such as family size, family types (for example, whether the household was headed by an elderly person or a person with a disability), and others, and found that, while they were major determinants of per household rental subsidies, they did not vary enough over this period to effect significant change in the average per household rental subsidy. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report provides information on trends in the size and cost of the Department of Housing and Urban Development’s (HUD) Section 8 program from 1998 through 2004. Specifically, our report objectives were to determine (1) the annual numbers of vouchers in the voucher program and units in the project-based programs, (2) the annual new budget authority and outlays for each program, (3) the factors that have affected outlays, and (4) the impact of factors on the average rental subsidy cost per household for the voucher program. These subsidies, which make up the difference between households’ payments (usually 30 percent of adjusted income) and the actual unit rent, are limited by the payment standards set by local public housing agencies. Trends in Rents and Household Payments for the Voucher and Project-Based Programs
The rental subsidy per household of both Section 8 programs is the difference between a household’s payment and the lesser of either the payment standard or the unit’s gross rent. | Why GAO Did This Study
Annual appropriations for the Department of Housing and Urban Development's (HUD) Section 8 programs--a key federal tool for subsidizing rents of low-income households--have increased sharply in recent years, raising concerns about their cost. Section 8 pays the difference between a unit's rent and the household's payment (generally 30 percent of adjusted income). Section 8 includes a voucher program administered by public housing agencies (PHA) that allows eligible households to use vouchers to rent units in the private market and a project-based program administered by property owners who receive subsidies to rent specific units to eligible households. In both programs, contracts between HUD and the administrators specify the duration and amount of the subsidy. GAO assessed Section 8 trends from fiscal years 1998 through 2004 and examined (1) annual budget authority and outlays for each program; (2) factors that have affected outlays; and (3) the estimated impact of factors, such as market rents, on the average rental subsidy per voucher household.
What GAO Found
From 1998 through 2004, annual budget authority for Section 8 grew from $9.4 billion to $19.3 billion (105 percent, or 82 percent after adjusting for inflation), while outlays grew from $14.8 billion to $22.2 billion (50 percent, or 33 percent after inflation adjustment). The steep rise in budget authority was partly due to the additional funding needed to cover the cost of renewing long-term contracts. GAO estimates that voucher outlays grew by 93 percent from 1998 through 2004 (71 percent after inflation adjustment), accounting for almost all of the growth in total Section 8 outlays. Estimated project-based outlays grew by 6 percent (and actually declined after inflation adjustment) over this period. GAO estimates that about 43 percent of the growth in voucher outlays from 1998 through 2004 stemmed from policy decisions that increased the number (from 1.6 million to 2.1 million) and use of vouchers, while over half of this growth was due to an increase in the average rental subsidy per household. For the project-based program, a modest increase in the average rental subsidy per household drove the growth in outlays but was partly offset by a reduction of 62,000 in the number of units. On the basis of statistical analysis of cost data, GAO estimates that growth in the average annual rental subsidy per voucher household from 1999 through 2004 is primarily explained by changes in market rents (about one-half of the growth), PHAs' decisions to increase the maximum subsidized rents (about one-quarter), and lagging growth in assisted household incomes (about 16 percent.) Household and neighborhood characteristics, while important cost determinants, did not vary enough to cause a substantial change in the average rental subsidy per household. |
gao_GAO-01-991T | gao_GAO-01-991T_0 | Rather, discussion shifts toward how to allocate surpluses among debt reduction, spending increases, and tax cuts. Alternatives for Improving the Budget Process
There is a broad consensus among observers and analysts who focus on the budget both that BEA has constrained spending and that continuation of some restraint is necessary even with the advent of actual and projected surpluses. Where discussion has moved beyond a general call for continued restraint to specific control devices, the ones most frequently discussed are (1) extending the discretionary spending caps, (2) extending the PAYGO mechanism, and (3) creating a trigger device or a set of rules specifically designed to deal with the uncertainty of budget projections. In the budget resolution for fiscal year 2001 [H. Con. Other Ideas Proposed to Smooth the Process
Others have suggested that mechanisms such as a joint budget resolution and/or an automatic continuing resolution could avert the year-end disruption caused by an inability to reach agreement on funding the government. The budget is highly sensitive to the economy. For many years the goal of “zero deficit”—or the norm of budget balance—was accepted as the right goal for the budget process. The current budget challenge is not to achieve a balanced unified budget. | Why GAO Did This Study
This testimony discusses the budget process established by the Budget Enforcement Act, which will expire in fiscal year 2002.
What GAO Found
Because the goal of achieving zero deficits has been achieved, the focus of the budget process has shifted to to the allocation of surpluses among debt reduction, spending increases, and tax cuts. The budget process should be designed to avoid what has been described as the year-end "train wreck." A year-end "train wreck" results from a failure to reach agreement--or at least a compromise acceptable to all parties--earlier in the year. Although it is possible that early agreement on some broad parameters could facilitate a smoother process, it is not clear that such an agreement will always prevent gridlock--it may just come earlier. Two ideas that have been proposed to avert the year-end disruption caused by an inability to reach agreement on funding the government include joint budget resolutions and biennial budgeting. In discussing alternatives for improving the budget process, there is a broad consensus among observers and budget analysts that the spending constraints established by the act are necessary even with the advent of actual and projected surpluses. Such constraints include (1) extending the discretionary spending caps, (2) extending the pay-as-you-go mechanism, and (3) creating a trigger device or set of rules specifically designed to deal with the uncertainty of budget projections. |
gao_AIMD-98-70 | gao_AIMD-98-70_0 | Customs expects its reliance on information systems to increase as a result of its burgeoning workload. Customs plans to develop and deploy ACE in multiple phases. For five of its six business areas (outbound, passenger, finance, human resources, and investigations), Custom’s architecture does not (1) describe all the agency’s business functions, (2) outline the information needed to perform the functions, and (3) completely identify the users and locations of the functions. Further, while the architecture and related documentation describe business functions and users and locations for one business area (trade compliance), they do not identify the information needs and flows for all the functions. Because these characteristics are not based on a complete understanding of its enterprisewide functional and information needs, Customs does not have adequate assurance that its information systems will optimally support its ability to (1) fully collect and accurately account for billions of dollars in annual federal revenue and (2) allow for the expeditious movement of legal goods and passengers across our nation’s borders while preventing and detecting the movement of illegal goods and passengers. Information: A description of what information is needed to support business operations. Treasury officials responsible for developing and implementing TISAF stated that development of the architecture begins with defining and describing the agency’s major business functions. Incomplete Enterprise Architecture Increases the Risk of Building Systems That Do Not Effectively Support Business Needs
Customs does not have a complete systems architecture to effectively and efficiently guide and constrain the millions of dollars it invests each year in developing, acquiring, and maintaining the information systems that support its six business areas. For the sixth business area (trade compliance), Customs has defined all the business functions and users and work locations and some, but not all, of the information and data needs and flows. Customs also plans to reevaluate its enterprise infrastructure. According to Customs officials, architectural compliance will be assessed and enforced as Customs implements its recently defined investment management process. Conclusions
Customs’ incomplete enterprise information systems architecture and limitations in its plans for enforcing compliance with an architecture once one is completed impair the agency’s ability to effectively and efficiently develop or acquire operational systems, such as ACE, and to maintain existing systems. Recommendations
To ensure that the Customs Service develops and effectively enforces a complete enterprise information systems architecture, we recommend that the Commissioner of Customs direct the Customs CIO, in consultation with the Treasury CIO, to follow through on plans to complete the enterprise information systems architecture. Customs has not followed this approach and, therefore, does not have adequate assurance that its infrastructure (i.e., technical architecture) will meet its business requirements. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Customs Service's enterprise information systems architecture, focusing on determining whether: (1) the architecture is complete; and (2) Customs has processes and procedures to enforce compliance with the architecture.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) Customs does not yet have a complete enterprise information systems architecture to guide and constrain the millions of dollars it spends annually to develop and acquire new information systems and evolve existing ones; (2) for five of its six business areas Custom's architecture does not: (a) describe all the agency's business functions; (b) define the information needed to perform the functions; and (c) completely identify the users and locations of the functions; (3) while the architecture and related documentation describe business functions, and users and work locations for the sixth business area, they do not identify all the information needs and flows for all the trade functions; (4) also, Customs has named certain technical standards, products, and services that it will use in building systems to support all its business areas; (5) however, Customs has not chosen these based on a complete description of its business needs; (6) the limitations in Customs' architecture are rooted in its decision to focus on defining the technical characteristics of its systems environment; (7) Customs' view does not include the logical characteristics of its enterprise system environment, which would enable it to define and implement systems that optimally support the agency's mission needs; (8) Customs plans to develop the architecture in accordance with Department of the Treasury architectural guidance; (9) specifically, Customs plans to define its functional, information, and work needs and their interrelationships across its six business areas and, in light of these needs and interrelationships, reevaluate the technical characteristics it has selected for its systems environment; (10) until Customs defines the logical characteristics of its business environment and uses them to establish technical standards and approaches, it does not have adequate assurance that the systems it plans to build and operationally deploy will effectively support the agency's business needs; (11) Customs also has not developed and implemented effective procedures to enforce its architecture once it is completed; (12) Customs officials stated that a newly established investment management process will be used to enforce architectural compliance; (13) this process, however, does not require that system investments be architecturally compliant or that architectural deviations be justified and documented; and (14) as a result, Customs risks incurring the same problems as other federal agencies that have not effectively defined and enforced an architecture. |
gao_GAO-15-462 | gao_GAO-15-462_0 | DOD’s Financial Management Regulation also provides that (1) nonfederal orders, non-DOD orders, foreign military sales, work related to base realignment and closure, and work in progress are to be excluded from the carryover calculation; (2) exceptions to the carryover policy approved by the Director for Revolving Fund, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), are to be excluded from the carryover calculation; and (3) the reported actual carryover after applying these exclusions and exceptions (which is referred to as actual adjusted carryover in this report) is then compared to the amount of allowable carryover that was calculated using the above-described outlay rate method to determine whether the actual carryover amount is over or under the allowable carryover amount. In fiscal year 2014, the FRCs’ actual adjusted carryover amount was under the allowable amount for the first time in 11 years because the FRCs received a new waiver that reduced the actual adjusted carryover amount below the allowable amount. Navy headquarters and FRC officials stated that carryover exceeded allowable amounts because orders received from customers exceeded work performed by more than expected. Similar to crash-damaged aircraft, repairs on high flight hour F/A-18 Hornet aircraft required nonstandard repairs, which necessitated long lead time for parts and engineering assistance for developing repair solutions. Further, the FRCs did not provide the dollar amount for each waiver in their fiscal year 2014 budget. In fiscal year 2004, the budgeted amount was greater than the allowable amount by $40 million. In 10 of the 11 years, the actual carryover information was greater than the budgeted carryover information by a low of $30 million in fiscal year 2010 to a high of $285 million in fiscal year 2007. According to Navy officials, these differences can be attributed to uncertainty in overseas contingency operations orders or changing customer requirements after budget preparations. Although the Navy has efforts ongoing to address these two issues in the future, we found that the Navy’s guidance does not require trend analysis. Such analysis could help ensure more accurate estimates. Navy officials agreed that the guidance does not require the FRCs to develop trend data on actual orders. Work on Orders Began in the Fourth Quarter of the Fiscal Year Resulting in Work Carrying Over into the Next Fiscal Year
Our analysis of 60 orders (and related amendments) for fiscal years 2013 and 2014 determined that 33 orders involved work that was scheduled to begin in the fourth quarter of the fiscal year and carry over into the next fiscal year. Parts were not available to perform the work because the DOD supply system did not maintain sufficient parts in the right mix to meet demand because of inaccurate forecasts of parts needed to perform the work. Without consistent and complete reporting of waiver information, policymakers do not have complete information for making informed budget decisions. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To determine the extent to which the Navy Fleet Readiness Centers’ (FRC) actual carryover differed from the allowable amounts from fiscal years 2004 through 2014 and the reasons for any differences, we obtained and analyzed FRC reports and Navy Working Capital Fund budget estimates submitted to Congress that contained information on actual carryover and the allowable amount of carryover for fiscal years 2004 through 2014. To determine the extent to which the Navy FRCs’ reported budget information on carryover differed from reported actual information on carryover from fiscal years 2004 through 2014 and the reasons for any differences, we obtained and analyzed FRC reports and Navy Working Capital Fund budget estimates submitted to Congress that contained information on budgeted and actual new orders, revenue, and carryover data for fiscal years 2004 through 2014. To determine the key drivers for orders with large carryover balances for fiscal years 2013 and 2014 and the actions, if any, the Navy’s FRCs are taking or planning to take to reduce carryover, we met with responsible officials from Navy headquarters and FRCs to identify contributing factors that led to carryover. | Why GAO Did This Study
Three Navy FRCs support combat readiness by providing repair services to keep Navy units operating worldwide. To the extent that the FRCs do not complete work ordered and funded by year-end, the work and related funding will be carried over into the next fiscal year. The Department of Defense (DOD) established a formula based on new orders received from customers for determining the allowable carryover amount at year-end as defined by the DOD Financial Management Regulation. As requested, GAO reviewed issues related to FRC carryover.
GAO's objectives were to determine (1) the extent to which the FRCs' actual carryover differed from the allowable amounts and the reasons for any differences, (2) the extent to which the FRCs' reported budget information on carryover differed from reported actual information and the reasons for any differences, and (3) the key drivers for orders with large carryover balances for fiscal years 2013 and 2014 and the actions the FRCs are taking or planning to take to reduce carryover. GAO reviewed carryover guidance, analyzed carryover and related data for the FRCs for fiscal years 2004 to 2014, and interviewed Navy officials.
What GAO Found
GAO's analysis of Navy Working Capital Fund Fleet Readiness Centers' (FRC) budgets found that actual adjusted carryover exceeded allowable carryover in 10 of 11 fiscal years reviewed because orders exceeded work performed (revenue) by more than expected. As a result, total carryover grew to about $1 billion at the end of fiscal year 2014. In fiscal year 2014, the FRCs' actual adjusted carryover amount was under the allowable amount because the FRCs received a new waiver that reduced the adjusted carryover below the allowable amount. The FRCs did not present the purpose and amount of the waiver in their budget to Congress. Having complete information in the budget is needed to help policymakers make informed decisions.
The FRCs budgeted the carryover amount to be under the allowable amount in 10 out of the 11 fiscal years GAO reviewed. In fiscal year 2004, the budgeted amount was greater than the allowable amount by $40 million. In 10 of the 11 years, the actual carryover information was greater than the budgeted carryover information by a low of $30 million in fiscal year 2010 to a high of $285 million in fiscal year 2007. According to Navy officials, these differences can be attributed to uncertainty in overseas contingency operations orders or changing customer requirements after budget preparations. Although the Navy has efforts ongoing to address these two issues in the future, GAO found that the Navy's guidance does not require trend analysis. Such analysis could help ensure more accurate estimates.
GAO identified four key drivers for large FRC carryover balances in fiscal years 2013 and 2014: (1) orders for work scheduled to begin in the fourth quarter carried over into the next fiscal year; (2) work on F/A-18 Hornet aircraft required structural repair and the FRCs had limited engineers and artisans, support equipment, and facilities to perform the work; (3) work on crash-damaged aircraft was difficult to predict and required nonstandard repairs that necessitated long lead time for parts to perform the work; and (4) the unavailability of parts to perform work. The Navy is taking several actions, such as hiring engineers and artisans to perform F/A-18 Hornet work.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOD improve the budgeting for carryover by reporting the purpose and amount of waivers in FRC budgets and augmenting Navy guidance to include trend data on actual orders in developing budget estimates. DOD concurred with GAO's recommendations and cited related actions planned or under way. |
gao_GAO-13-732 | gao_GAO-13-732_0 | Background
DHS Border and Maritime R&D Roles, Responsibilities, and Processes
Within DHS, three components have responsibilities for conducting border and maritime R&D—S&T, the Coast Guard, and DNDO. In addition to conducting projects for its DHS customers, S&T conducts projects for other federal agencies and first responders. Table 1 provides DHS’s R&D budgets from fiscal years 2010 through 2013 for the various entities that conduct border and maritime R&D. R&D Results Include Knowledge Products, Technology Prototypes, and Software, but S&T Should Do More to Obtain Feedback and Evaluate the Impact of Its Efforts
Costs and Types of Completed Border and Maritime R&D Projects Varied
Between fiscal years 2010 and 2012, DHS border and maritime R&D agencies reported producing 97 deliverables at an estimated cost of about $177 million and 29 discontinued projects at a cost of about $48 million. DHS R&D deliverables were wide-ranging in their cost, scope, and scale. Customers Reported Mixed Views on the Impact of DHS’s Border and Maritime R&D Project Deliverables
S&T BMD, the Coast Guard, and DNDO’s R&D customers had mixed views regarding the impact of the R&D products or deliverables they received. Feedback Processes and Evaluation
Both the Coast Guard and DNDO reported having processes in place for gathering the views of customers regarding the results of R&D deliverables. Establishing time frames and milestones for collecting and evaluating feedback from its customers could help S&T better determine the usefulness and impact of its R&D projects and deliverables and make better-informed decisions regarding future work. DHS Has Taken Steps to Coordinate Border and Maritime R&D, but Opportunities Exist to Further Strengthen Internal and External Coordination
DHS Uses Various Approaches to Internally Coordinate R&D; Broader Efforts to Develop Departmental Policies for Overseeing and Coordinating R&D Are Ongoing
S&T’s BMD, the Coast Guard, and DNDO reported taking a range of actions to coordinate with one another and their customers to ensure that R&D is addressing high priority needs. While BMD, the Coast Guard, and DNDO were each taking actions to coordinate with their R&D customers, work remains to be done at the departmental level to ensure border and maritime R&D efforts are mutually reinforcing and are being directed toward the highest priority needs. However, officials from DHS’s primary land border security Center of Excellence reported challenges with respect to a lack of clarity regarding protocols for access to DHS information when conducting R&D. But given the challenges raised by the primary border security center, the Office of University Programs could help ensure that the approximately $3 million to $4 million a year dedicated to each university center is used more effectively by more carefully considering data needs, potential access issues, and potential data limitations with its federal partners before approving projects. Establishing timeframes and milestones for collecting and evaluating feedback from its customers on the usefulness and impact of the R&D projects and deliverables they receive could help S&T ensure that the technologies being developed and delivered to the Coast Guard, Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and other DHS components are meeting customer needs and achieving their intended goals. Recommendations for Executive Action
To help ensure that DHS effectively manages and coordinates its border and maritime R&D efforts, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security instruct the Under Secretary for Science and Technology to: establish timeframes and milestones for collecting and evaluating feedback from its customers to determine the usefulness and impact of its R&D projects and deliverables, and use it to make better- informed decisions regarding future work, and ensure that design limitations with regard to data reliability, accessibility, and availability are reviewed and understood before approving Center of Excellence R&D projects. | Why GAO Did This Study
Conducting border and maritime R&D to develop technologies for detecting, preventing, and mitigating terrorist threats is vital to enhancing the security of the nation. S&T, the Coast Guard, and DNDO conduct these R&D activities and S&T has responsibility for coordinating and integrating R&D activities across DHS. The Centers of Excellence are a network of university R&D centers that provide DHS with tools, expertise, and access to research facilities and laboratories, among other things. GAO was asked to review DHS's border and maritime R&D efforts.
This report addresses (1) the results of DHS border and maritime security R&D efforts and the extent to which DHS has obtained and evaluated feedback on these efforts, and (2) the extent that DHS coordinates its border and maritime R&D efforts internally and externally with other federal agencies and the private sector. GAO reviewed completed and ongoing R&D project information and documentation from fiscal years 2010 through 2013 and interviewed DHS component officials, among other actions.
What GAO Found
Between fiscal years 2010 and 2012, the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) border and maritime research and development (R&D) components reported producing 97 R&D deliverables at an estimated cost of $177 million. The type of border and maritime R&D deliverables produced by DHS's Science and Technology (S&T) Directorate, the Coast Guard, and the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) varied, and R&D customers we met with reported mixed views on the impact of the R&D deliverables they received. These deliverables were wide-ranging in their cost and scale, and included knowledge products and reports, technology prototypes, and software. The Coast Guard and DNDO reported having processes in place to collect and evaluate feedback from its customers regarding the results of R&D deliverables. However, S&T has not established timeframes and milestones for collecting and evaluating feedback from its customers on the extent to which the deliverables it provides to DHS components--such as US Customs and Border Protection (CBP)--are meeting its customer's needs. Doing so could help S&T better determine the usefulness and impact of its R&D projects and deliverables and make better-informed decisions regarding future work.
DHS has taken actions and is working to develop departmental policies to better define and coordinate R&D, but additional actions could strengthen internal and external coordination of border and maritime R&D. S&T's Borders and Maritime Security Division, the Coast Guard, and DNDO reported taking a range of actions to coordinate with their internal DHS customers to ensure, among other things, that R&D is addressing high priority needs. However, work remains to be done at the agency level to ensure border and maritime R&D efforts are mutually reinforcing and are being directed towards the highest priority needs. For example, officials from university centers of excellence reported difficulties in determining DHS headquarters contacts, and officials from the primary land-border security R&D center reported delayed and cancelled projects due to the inability to obtain data. DHS could help ensure that the approximately $3 million to $4 million a year dedicated to the university Centers of Excellence is used more effectively by more carefully considering potential challenges with regard to data needs, access issues and data limitations before approving projects.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DHS S&T establish timeframes and milestones for collecting and evaluating feedback from its customers to determine the usefulness and impact of its R&D efforts, and ensure that potential challenges with regard to data reliability, accessibility, and availability are reviewed and understood before approving Centers of Excellence R&D projects. DHS concurred with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_AIMD-97-6 | gao_AIMD-97-6_0 | Logistics business operations include four major business activities—depot maintenance, distribution, materiel management, and transportation. Recently, DOD acknowledged that the deployment of standard information systems will not provide the dramatic improvements and cost reductions envisioned under the CIM initiative and is now emphasizing alternative ways for meeting these objectives. At the same time, however, it is continuing to deploy the information systems selected under the failed migration strategy. GAO Reviews of DOD’s Migration System Efforts
Our reviews of DOD migration system efforts for depot maintenance, materiel management, and transportation operations confirm that, to date, the strategy has failed to produce the dramatic gains in efficiency and effectiveness that DOD anticipated. Our review of Defense’s transportation migration efforts found that the current migration strategy in the transportation area will not ensure improvements are made that Defense recognizes are critical to the transportation function. DOD Is Emphasizing Alternative Ways to Improve Logistics Operations
Currently, for all business areas, DOD is trying alternative ways to achieve its CIM objectives of dramatic business improvement and cost reductions while, at the same time, continuing to deploy migration systems. First, Defense still has not completed the analyses required to determine that its logistics system deployment effort will yield a positive return on investment. Second, Defense has not yet sufficiently tied its improvement efforts to its overall business objectives through the use of strategic planning—a necessary step to ensure that the billions of dollars being invested in logistics improvement efforts will result in significant improvements in operations. Fundamental Cost-Benefit Analyses Necessary to Ensure Success of System Efforts
In continuing to deploy migration systems without addressing the fundamental problems associated with its selection and deployment of migration systems to date, DOD risks wasting a substantial amount of the additional $7.7 billion it plans to spend over the next few years. Through the Clinger-Cohen Act, the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA), and the Paperwork Reduction Act(PRA), the Congress has underscored the importance of strategic planning for the efficient and effective use of information technology. These new improvements in turn increased productivity and the quality of customer service. Recommendations
To ensure that DOD optimizes its use of information technology to achieve its logistics CIM goals of dramatic business process improvement and operational cost reduction, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense:
Direct that immediate cost-benefit analyses of each logistics migration system be undertaken and halt deployment of those that (1) cannot be shown to have significant return-on-investment, (2) will not facilitate ongoing efforts to privatize logistics business functions, or (3) do not support efforts to achieve interoperability between and among business activities. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
To determine whether DOD’s efforts to standardize its logistics migration systems will allow Defense to meet its business objectives of dramatically improving the efficiency and effectiveness of its logistics operations, we identified problems DOD has had implementing information systems selected under its migration strategy by analyzing prior GAO reports on DOD’s CIM efforts related to logistics business activities. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Department of Defense's (DOD) efforts over the last 4 years to improve its information systems in the depot maintenance, materiel management, and transportation business areas, focusing on whether selected standard information systems will allow DOD to meet its business objective to dramatically improve the efficiency and effectiveness of its logistics operations.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) DOD's continued deployment of information systems using a migration strategy for the depot maintenance, materiel management, and transportation business areas will not likely produce the significant improvements originally envisioned; (2) for the most part, these efforts, which were intended to lay the groundwork for future dramatic change by first standardizing information systems and the related processes throughout DOD, are merely increasing the risk that the new systems that are deployed will not be significantly better or less costly to operate than the hundreds of logistics information systems already in place; (3) DOD itself has acknowledged that its migration systems strategy will not provide necessary dramatic improvements and cost reductions and is now emphasizing alternative ways of improving logistics business operations, such as turning to the private sector to carry out major logistics functions; (4) at the same time, however, it is continuing to deploy information systems selected under the migration strategy that are linked to the very same business functions it wishes to make more efficient and economical through outsourcing and/or privatization; (5) while GAO is encouraged that DOD is exploring alternative ways to improve its logistics operations, it is concerned that the current path needlessly risks wasting a substantial amount of the more than $7.7 billion DOD plans to invest in improving automated logistics systems; (6) DOD still has not taken the fundamental steps necessary to ensure that the automated systems it continues to deploy will yield a positive return on investment; (7) even as DOD embarks on its new improvement efforts, it has not yet sufficiently tied these new efforts to its overall business objectives through the use of a strategic investment strategy to ensure that the billions of dollars will be wisely spent; (8) such planning would be in keeping with best private- and government-sector practices as well as with new legislation which underscores the importance of strategic information planning for the efficient and effective use of information technology; and (9) without addressing these concerns, DOD's new improvement efforts, like the failed standard migration strategy, will proceed with little chance of achieving the objectives originally envisioned for substantial operational improvements and reduction in costs. |
gao_GAO-04-409 | gao_GAO-04-409_0 | Finally, MDA does not plan to demonstrate the operation of the critical GMD radar, called Cobra Dane, in flight tests before fielding IDO. While MDA is increasing the operational realism of its developmental flight tests—e.g., the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense element employed an operational crew during its December 2003 intercept attempt—tests completed to date are highly scripted. Cost Assessment: Prime Contractor Fiscal Year 2003 Performance Mixed
We used contractor Cost Performance Reports to assess the prime contractors’ progress toward MDA’s cost and schedule goals during fiscal year 2003. Observations on the Usefulness of MDA Program Goals for Conducting Oversight
MDA revised its program goals in February 2004 to reflect that the first BMDS block—Block 2004—will cost $1.12 billion more but consist of fewer fielded components than originally planned. Despite these revisions, we observed shortcomings in how MDA defines its goals. Specifically, the goals do not provide a reliable and complete baseline for accountability purposes and investment decision making because they can vary year to year, do not include life-cycle costs, and are based on assumptions about performance not explicitly stated. Programs that have not begun the SDD phase are not required to report life-cycle cost estimates, including all costs for procurement, military construction, and operations and maintenance, in the Selected Acquisition Report. However, critical assumptions used in establishing these goals—such as the type and number of decoys—are not clearly explained. Recommendations for Executive Action
To provide increased confidence that a fielded block of the BMDS will perform as intended when placed in the hands of the warfighter and that further investments to improve the BMDS through block upgrades are warranted, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following three actions: direct the Director, MDA, to prepare for independent, operationally realistic testing and evaluation for each BMDS block configuration being fielded and appoint an independent operational test agent to plan and conduct those tests; assign DOT&E responsibility for approving such test plans; and direct DOT&E to report its evaluation of the results of such tests to the Secretary and the congressional defense committees. Initial fielding of an intercept capability. For example, four of six key test events were either deferred indefinitely or delayed over a year. Schedule: Site preparation, including construction of missile silos and facilities at Fort Greely, Alaska, and Vandenberg Air Force Base, California, is on schedule. As a result, MDA has a limited opportunity to characterize GMD’s performance before initial fielding. Ground-based Midcourse Defense
Background: Element Description
The Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) program expects to deliver an operational capability in the 2004-2005 time frame as an interoperable element of the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS). However, the December 2002 directive by the President to begin fielding a missile defense system in 2004 affected the program’s Block 2004 direction. However, delays in the development and delivery of the GMD interceptor—particularly due to one of its two boosters—caused intercept attempts leading up to IDO to slip 10 months or more. Progress Assessment: Cost
DOD budgeted about $12.8 billion during fiscal years 2004 through 2009 for research, development, and fielding of the GMD element. Block 2004 activities, scheduled for fiscal years 2004 and 2005, which are budgeted at $2.20 billion. For example, the cost of flight tests conducted during Block 2004 was accounted for in the Block 2006 budget. Work in this area was initiated in fiscal year 2003 under the Kinetic Energy Boost program as part of MDA’s Boost Defense Segment. Software development activities also have been completed. However, it is too early to state with confidence whether the element will or will not be ready for integration into the Ballistic Missile Defense System during this time. Fiscal Year 2002 Assessment
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 directed the Department of Defense (DOD) to establish cost, schedule, testing, and performance goals for its ballistic missile defense programs for the years covered by the Future Years Defense Plan. In the act, Congress also directed us to assess the extent to which the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) achieved these goals each in fiscal years 2002 and 2003. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Defense (DOD) has treated ballistic missile defense as a priority since the mid-1980s and has invested tens of billions of dollars to research and develop such capabilities. In 2002 two key events transformed DOD's approach in this area: (1) the Secretary of Defense consolidated existing missile defense elements into a single acquisition program and placed them under the management of the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) and (2) the President directed MDA to begin fielding an initial configuration, or block, of missile defense capabilities in 2004. MDA estimates it will need $53 billion between fiscal years 2004 and 2009 to continue the development, fielding, and evolution of ballistic missile defenses. To fulfill a congressional mandate, GAO assessed the extent to which MDA achieved program goals in fiscal year 2003. While conducting this review, GAO also observed shortcomings in how MDA defines its goals.
What GAO Found
MDA accomplished many activities in fiscal year 2003--such as software development, ground and flight testing, and the construction of facilities at Fort Greely, Alaska--leading up to the fielding of the initial block of the Ballistic Missile Defense System. During this time, however, MDA experienced schedule delays and testing setbacks, resulting in the fielding of fewer components than planned in the 2004-2005 time frame. For example, delays in interceptor development and delivery have caused flight tests (intercept attempts) of the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) element to slip over 10 months. In flight tests conducted during fiscal year 2003, MDA achieved a 50 percent success rate in intercepting target missiles. While MDA is increasing the operational realism of its developmental flight tests--e.g., employing an operational crew during its late 2003 ship-based intercept attempt--the GMD element has not been tested under unscripted, operationally realistic conditions. Therefore, MDA faces the challenge of demonstrating whether the capabilities being fielded, consisting primarily of the GMD element, will perform as intended when the system becomes operational in 2004. Finally, MDA's cost performance during fiscal year 2003 was mixed. The prime contractors of four system elements completed work at or near budgeted costs during this time, but prime contractors for two system elements overran budgeted costs by a total of about $380 million. GAO found that program goals do not serve as a reliable and complete baseline for accountability purposes and investment decision making because they can vary year to year, do not include all costs, and are based on assumptions about performance not explicitly stated. For example, between its budget requests for fiscal years 2004 and 2005, MDA revised its estimated cost for the first fielded block of missile defense capability. This first block is costing $1.12 billion more and consists of fewer fielded components than that planned a year earlier. In addition, MDA's acquisition reports for Congress do not include life-cycle costs, which normally provide explicit estimates for inventory procurement, military construction, operations, and maintenance. Finally, MDA does not explain some critical assumptions-- such as an enemy's type and number of decoys--underlying its performance goals. As a result, decision makers in DOD and Congress do not have a full understanding of the overall cost of developing and fielding the Ballistic Missile Defense System and what the system's true capabilities will be. |
gao_GAO-12-373 | gao_GAO-12-373_0 | Our work notes the importance of screening potential contractors before awarding contracts, as well as regular evaluation in order to ensure contractors are providing timely and quality services with government funds. In addition to these state level issues, many districts also struggled to develop the necessary staff capacity to implement successful school reforms. More specifically: Interventions required extensive planning. Teachers and teachers’ unions were sometimes concerned about increasing student learning time or implementing new teacher evaluations in SIG schools, according to Education, state, and district officials. Some States Had Limited Evidence about SIG Grant Performance When Making Grant Renewal Decisions
States often had limited evidence for making decisions about whether to renew schools’ SIG funding. However, making this assessment can involve a high degree of subjectivity and states’ determinations were not always developed based on extensive interaction with schools or systematic monitoring of their implementation efforts. For example, states that told us they were unable to use annual goals data to make renewal decisions had originally identified these goals as a key renewal criterion in their applications to Education. Education Does Not Require that All Contractors’ Performance Be Reviewed, and State Review Approaches Vary
Education’s monitoring protocols for the SIG program require the review of contractors in schools using the restart model, but they do not require review of contractors during contract performance for the other school improvement models. Education’s Assistance and Oversight Are Supporting SIG Implementation
Education’s Technical Assistance Was Well Received by States
Education’s guidance and technical assistance on SIG implementation was well received by nearly all states. Most states reported that Education’s guidance and technical assistance were helpful and many reported they were very helpful (see fig. Education is Now Using a Risk-Based Approach to Monitor All States within 3 Years
Education’s oversight strategy is to monitor all states during the 3-year period—starting with SY 2010-2011—in which the first cohort of schools will receive SIG funding. For SY 2011-2012, Education officials initially selected 12 states to conduct on-site monitoring. To maximize its oversight resources, Education plans to conduct some limited “desk monitoring” in five additional states in SY 2011-2012.monitoring protocol is similar to the on-site visit protocol, but—unlike the on-site monitoring—does not include interviews with school officials. Finally, Education officials told us that they plan to monitor the remaining states in SY 2012-2013, and that these states represent a small percentage of SIG funds. Recommendations for Executive Action
To ensure that SIG grant renewal decisions serve to hold districts and schools accountable, we recommend that the Secretary of Education provide additional support to states about how to make evidence-based grant renewal decisions, particularly when states do not have annual student achievement goal information available at the time renewal decisions are made. To ensure that contractors hired with SIG funding are accountable for their performance, we recommend that the Secretary of Education take steps to ensure that the performance of SIG funded contractors, including those in turnaround and transformation schools, is reviewed during contract performance. We agree with Education that the need for performance reviews should be dependent on the specific role of the contractor, and we modified our recommendation to address some of Education’s concerns. (2) How do U.S. Department of Education (Education) and state guidance and procedures for screening potential contractors and reviewing contractor performance compare with leading practices? (3) To what extent are Education’s oversight and technical assistance activities effectively supporting SIG implementation? Providing Information on Challenges to Successful SIG Implementation
To identify aspects of the SIG program that pose challenges for successful SIG implementation, we analyzed responses to our survey of state educational agency officials with responsibility for SIG in the 50 states and the District of Columbia. In addition, we analyzed survey results. | Why GAO Did This Study
The School Improvement Grant (SIG) program funds reforms in low performing schools. Congress provided $3.5 billion for SIG in fiscal year 2009, and a total of about $1.6 billion was appropriated in fiscal years 2010-2012. SIG requirements changed significantly in 2010. Many schools receiving SIG funds must now use the funding for specific interventions, such as turning over certain school operations to an outside organization (contractor). GAO examined (1) what, if any, aspects of SIG pose challenges for successful implementation; (2) how Education and state guidance and procedures for screening potential contractors and reviewing contractor performance compare with leading practices; and (3) to what extent Educations technical assistance and oversight activities are effectively supporting SIG implementation. GAO surveyed SIG directors in all 50 states and the District of Columbia; analyzed Education and state documents; and interviewed officials from 8 states and school districts in those states, SIG contractors, and education experts.
What GAO Found
Successful SIG implementation posed a number of challenges. Specifically, state and district officials were challenged to build staff capacity and commitment for reform, facing difficulties such as recruiting and retaining strong staff members. In addition, the SIG requirements to develop teacher evaluations and increase student learning time were difficult to implement quickly and effectively because they required extensive planning and coordination. Furthermore, states sometimes had limited evidence about the performance of SIG schools when making grant renewal decisions. For example, although Educations guidance identifies meeting annual student achievement goals as a key criterion for making renewal decisions, some states did not receive student achievement data by the time decisions had to be made. States also made decisions through qualitative assessments of schools implementation efforts, but such determinations were not always based on extensive interaction with schools or systematic monitoring. Education did not provide written guidance to states about making evidence-based grant renewal decisions after they encountered these challenges.
Districts used a significant portion of their SIG funds to hire contractors for a range of services, such as managing school operations and conducting teacher professional development. Leading practices show that screening potential contractors and then reviewing their performance are important for ensuring accountability and quality of results. Education required screening of contractors before contract awards were made. However, Education did not require review of contractors during contract performance, and states varied in whether they ensured that contractors were reviewed during the course of contract performance.
Educations assistance and oversight activities are generally supporting SIG implementation. In our survey, nearly all states reported they were satisfied with Educations technical assistance, particularly the agencys SIG guidance and conferences. In addition, many states reported that Educations guidance was timely. With respect to oversight, Education monitored 12 states in school year (SY) 2010-2011 and found deficiencies in 11 of the 12 states. Education is working with states to correct these deficiencies. For SY 2011-2012, the agency plans to use a risk-based approach to conduct on-site monitoring in 14 additional states. To maximize its oversight resources, Education also plans to conduct some limited monitoring in five additional states in SY 2011-2012. Education officials told us that they plan to monitor the remaining states in SY 2012-2013 and that these states represent a small percentage of SIG funds.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that Education (1) provide additional support to states about making evidence-based grant renewal decisions and (2) ensure that contractor performance is reviewed. Education generally supported our first recommendation but disagreed with the second. We modified our recommendation to address some of Educations concerns. |
gao_GAO-10-825 | gao_GAO-10-825_0 | Broadband Deployment Rates Are Generally Comparable across OECD Countries, but Adoption Rates Vary because of Cost and Other Factors
Broadband Infrastructure Has Been Deployed to Nearly All Households in Developed Countries despite Significant Demographic and Geographic Differences
In 27 of the 30 OECD countries, including the United States, broadband has been deployed to 90 percent or more of households regardless of demographic or geographic differences. Broadband Adoption Rates Are Variable and Are Affected by Cost and Demographic Factors
A number of demographic factors, such as population, cost, and computer ownership, affect broadband adoption rates. Seventeen OECD countries have broadband adoption rates that exceed the average of 23.3 subscriber lines per 100 inhabitants, including the United States, at 26.4 subscriber lines. Stakeholders in Selected Countries Have Taken a Wide Variety of Similar Actions to Increase Broadband Deployment and Adoption
The seven countries we selected as case studies, all of which had achieved higher levels of either broadband deployment or broadband adoption than the United States as of the fourth quarter of 2009, have taken similar actions to increase deployment and adoption—actions that stakeholders in these countries told us they considered effective. All Seven Selected Countries Have Instituted Broadband Plans, and Leaders Have Emphasized Broadband Initiatives
All seven selected countries have instituted broadband plans. To Increase Broadband Usage among Targeted Populations, Governments in Several Countries Have Provided Digital Training or Offered Subsidies or Both
Research in the United States has shown that portions of the population do not use and have not adopted broadband Internet for various reasons, including lack of knowledge, lack of interest, lack of access to a computer, or inability to pay for broadband service. Recommendations in the National Broadband Plan Generally Reflect Selected Countries’ Actions to Increase Broadband Deployment, Usage, and Adoption
The National Broadband Plan includes over 200 recommendations, which the plan’s executive summary groups into four areas—(1) designing policies to ensure robust competition; (2) managing government assets, such as rights-of-way, to encourage network upgrades; (3) using government funds to help subsidize both deployment in high-cost areas and adoption among low-income groups; and (4) maximizing the benefits of broadband in the sectors government influences significantly, such as education, health care, and government operations. These four areas are not identical to the five types of actions we identified in our case-study countries, but the areas and the types of actions overlap and represent similar approaches to expanding broadband deployment and adoption. Implementing the plan’s recommendations will be challenging, requiring the coordination of multiple public- and private-sector entities. In all seven of our selected countries, public/private partnerships have helped fund the deployment of broadband infrastructure. Implementing the National Broadband Plan Will Be Challenging
While the United States plans to take actions similar to those of other leading countries to achieve the National Broadband Plan’s goals of universal access and increased usage and adoption, implementing the plan will be challenging. Furthermore, as the Chairman, FCC, has acknowledged, implementing the plan will require obtaining sufficient funding and coordinating the work of multiple federal, state, local, and private entities, among other actions. It remains to be seen whether and how effectively federal agencies will be able address these challenges and implement the plan’s recommendations, as well as what the private sector will do to further deployment and adoption. FCC provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To determine the status of broadband deployment and adoption in developed countries, we reviewed data collected by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) for the 30 countries that were members of OECD as of January 1, 2010. The seven countries we selected for case-study analysis were Canada, France, Japan, the Netherlands, South Korea, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. To determine how recommendations outlined in the National Broadband Plan reflect the actions of selected countries to increase broadband deployment and adoption, we analyzed the results of our case studies and placed the actions of the 7 countries in five categories. We placed the actions to increase deployment in two categories—(1) instituting plans and policies and (2) providing government funding through public/private partnerships—and the actions to increase adoption in three categories— (3) increasing competition, (4) implementing strategies to increase the usefulness of the Internet to citizens, and (5) providing digital literacy training and consumer subsidies. | Why GAO Did This Study
Increasingly, broadband Internet service is seen as critical to a nation's physical infrastructure and economic growth. Universal access to, and increased use and adoption of, broadband service are policy goals stated in the National Broadband Plan, which the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) released in March 2010. Some recent studies indicate that despite achieving nearly 95 percent broadband deployment and globally competitive adoption rates, the United States has moved from the top to the middle of the international rankings. Other developed countries, which have made universal access and increased adoption priorities, rank higher than the United States in these areas, and their experiences may be of interest to U.S. policymakers. GAO was asked to address (1) the status of broadband deployment and adoption in developed countries, (2) actions selected countries have taken to increase deployment and adoption, and (3) how recommendations in the National Broadband Plan align with the selected countries' actions. GAO analyzed relevant information for 30 developed countries that are members of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and visited 7 of these countries selected for their broadband policies and economic or demographic characteristics. GAO also interviewed public- and private-sector contacts in these countries and FCC officials. FCC provided technical comments on this report.
What GAO Found
Broadband infrastructure has been widely deployed in developed countries, but broadband adoption rates are more variable because of cost and other factors. In 27 of the 30 OECD countries, including the United States, broadband has been deployed to 90 percent or more of households, regardless of differences in demographic and geographic factors, while broadband adoption rates are affected by factors such as population, cost, and computer ownership. In the United States, which ranks 15th for both deployment and adoption, broadband has been deployed to 95 percent of households, with 26.4 subscribers per 100 inhabitants--above the OECD average of 23.3. To increase broadband deployment adoption, the 7 countries GAO selected--Canada, France, Japan, the Netherlands, South Korea, Sweden, and the United Kingdom--have taken actions that stakeholders in these countries considered effective. GAO placed these actions in five categories--(1) instituting plans and policies (2) providing funds through public/private partnerships, (3) increasing competition, (4) expanding online services, and (5) providing digital literacy training, consumer subsidies, or both. All 7 countries have instituted some type of broadband plan. To help increase deployment in areas private enterprise views as unprofitable, national or regional governments in all 7 countries have used public/private partnerships. To help increase usage and thus expand adoption, all 7 have enacted policies to encourage competition and have increased the number of government services available online. Several countries have also offered training or subsidies, often targeting populations with low adoption rates. The recommendations outlined in the National Broadband Plan reflect actions taken in GAO's 7 selected countries to increase broadband deployment and adoption. The plan contains over 200 recommendations for FCC, other government agencies, and Congress, which the plan's executive summary groups in four broad areas. These four areas are not identical to the five types of actions GAO identified in the selected countries, but both represent similar approaches to expanding broadband deployment and adoption. For example, the plan calls for adopting strategies and long-term goals, while the actions taken by the selected countries include instituting plans that contain strategies and goals. Similarly, the plan advocates policies to promote robust competition, just as the selected countries have taken actions to promote competition. While the United States plans to take actions similar to those of other leading countries to achieve the National Broadband Plan's goals of universal access and increased adoption, achieving these goals will be challenging. Actions will be required by governments at all levels and the private sector. Furthermore, implementing the plan's recommendations will require coordinating the work of multiple stakeholders and obtaining sufficient funding, among other actions. How effectively federal agencies will be able to address these challenges and implement the plan's recommendations, as well as what the private sector will do to further deployment, use and adoption, remains to be seen. |
gao_GAO-07-11 | gao_GAO-07-11_0 | The Higher Education Relief Opportunities for Students (HEROES) Act of 2003 was enacted to recognize the difficulties that postsecondary students and federal student financial aid recipients serving on active duty may experience in transitioning in and out of college and repaying their student loans. Education Has Issued Waivers and Modifications to Provide Relief for Aid Recipients Serving on Active Duty, but the Impact of These Changes Is Not Known
Education has implemented HEROES by waiving and modifying certain federal student financial aid provisions to ease the financial impact and administrative burden of meeting aid obligations for recipients serving on active duty. The extent to which servicemembers are benefiting from these waivers and modifications is not known, however, because Education has not collected key information that would allow it to assess the impact of these changes as required by HEROES. Moreover, students who leave school for active duty service are considered to be still enrolled in school, which means that they do not yet have to begin repaying their student loans. Borrowers in repayment no longer have to provide their lender written documentation of active duty service to have loan repayment suspended for up to 1 year. Figure 1 illustrates the options available to suspend or postpone loan repayment for federal student loan borrowers serving on active duty. 2.) While HEROES does not specify how Education should go about assessing the impact of its waivers and modifications, Education officials interpreted the Act as requiring a rigorous experimental design that they say would be costly and cannot currently be supported with Education’s data systems. Therefore, Education currently has no plans to complete the required study. Lenders Are Assisting Borrowers as Required by Education and Some Are Providing Additional Benefits
Lenders have a variety of policies and practices in place designed to provide relief for federal student loan borrowers serving on active duty, many of which are required under Education’s waivers and modifications. To minimize the financial impact on borrowers, lenders provide them with options to suspend or postpone repayment on their student loans. Additionally, one Pennsylvania-based lender has extended benefits beyond the requirements of HEROES by offering loan forgiveness for servicemembers who have lived in Pennsylvania or attended college there. Most Schools Have Had Students Leave for Active Duty and Have Policies in Place to Aid Their Departure and Return
The majority of colleges and universities have had students who left school for active duty service before the end of their academic term and have policies to assist these students when they leave and when they return to school. 3). Based on these checks, we believe our survey data are sufficiently reliable to be used in determining the policies or practices schools have in place to assist students who are called to active duty. | Why GAO Did This Study
million members of the armed forces have been deployed in service to the United States. Congress enacted the Higher Education Relief Opportunities for Students (HEROES) Act to recognize the needs of those servicemembers who are deployed in the midst of pursuing postsecondary education or repaying student loans. GAO was asked to determine (1) how the Department of Education has implemented HEROES, (2) the policies and practices federal student loan lenders have in place to assist borrowers serving on active duty, and (3) the policies and practices postsecondary schools have to assist students who are serving on active duty. To address these objectives, GAO interviewed representatives from the nine largest Federal Family Education Loan program lenders, surveyed a random sample of postsecondary schools, and visited four colleges and universities.
What GAO Found
Education has issued waivers and modifications to certain federal student financial aid provisions to minimize the financial impact and administrative burden for servicemembers on active duty, for example, by making it easier to postpone or suspend loan payment. Students who leave school for active duty service are treated as still enrolled to ensure that they do not have to begin repaying their student loans. Borrowers already repaying their student loans no longer have to provide written documentation of active duty service to suspend repayment for up to 1 year. However, Education did not complete a study to assess the extent to which servicemembers are benefiting from these waivers and modifications by March 2005, as required by HEROES, and currently has no plans to do so. While HEROES does not specify how Education should go about assessing the impact of its waivers and modifications, Education officials said that such a study would require a rigorous experimental design that would be costly and cannot be supported with Education's data systems. However, Education has not explored the possibility of leveraging outside data sources to fulfill the requirement. Federal student loan lenders have implemented policies and practices, many of which are required under Education's waivers and modifications, to provide relief for borrowers serving on active duty. For example, lenders reported that they provide options that allow borrowers to suspend or postpone repayment of their student loans, often with one telephone call. Some lenders are providing additional benefits beyond those covered by HEROES. For example, one lender offered to forgive $2,500 in loans for servicemembers who have lived or attended college in Pennsylvania. Most colleges and universities have had students leave for active duty service prior to the end of an academic term, and have policies or practices to assist them both when they depart and when they return, such as providing tuition refunds and allowing them to withdraw from their classes. When students return, schools often guarantee their readmission and exempt them from changes to degree requirements. |
gao_GAO-09-353 | gao_GAO-09-353_0 | Some specific uses of data from the CDC’s biomonitoring program are to determine which chemicals are present in individuals in the U.S. population, and at what concentrations; determine, for chemicals with a known toxicity level, the prevalence of people with levels above those toxicity levels; establish reference ranges that can be used by physicians and scientists to determine whether a person or group has an unusually high exposure; assess the effectiveness of public health efforts to reduce exposure of individuals to specific chemicals; determine whether exposure levels are higher among minorities, children, women of childbearing age, or other potentially vulnerable groups; track, over time, trends in levels of exposure of the population; and set priorities for research on human health effects. In addition, some legislation is based on the default assumption that children may be more sensitive to chemicals than adults. EPA Has Made Limited Use of Biomonitoring Data to Assess Risks Posed by Chemicals
EPA makes limited use of current biomonitoring studies because such studies cover relatively few chemicals, and EPA rarely knows whether the measured amounts in people indicate a risk to human health. The CDC’s biomonitoring program provides the most comprehensive biomonitoring data relevant to the U.S. population. As a result, EPA has made few changes to its chemical risk assessments or safeguards in response to the recent proliferation of biomonitoring data. However, as we have discussed in prior reports, EPA will face difficulty in using its authorities under TSCA to require chemical companies to develop health and safety information on the chemicals they produce. EPA Lacks a Comprehensive Research Strategy and Has Taken Limited Steps to Improve the Usefulness of Biomonitoring Data
EPA has several biomonitoring research projects under way, but the agency has no system in place to track progress or assess the resources needed specifically for biomonitoring research. A national biomonitoring research plan could help better coordinate research and link data needs with collection efforts. Similarly, the National Academy of Sciences found that the lack of a coordinated research strategy allowed widespread exposures to go undetected, including exposures to PFOA and flame retardants known as polybrominated diphenyl ethers. However, EPA does not routinely collect this information. EPA’s Authority to Obtain Biomonitoring Data under TSCA Is Untested and May Be Limited
EPA’s authorities under TSCA to obtain biomonitoring data are generally untested. Generally, section 4 allows EPA, if it makes the necessary findings, to promulgate a “test rule” requiring a company to “develop data with respect to the health and environmental effects for which there is an insufficiency of data.” Biomonitoring data indicate only the presence of a chemical in a person’s body, and not its impact on the person’s health. . . any study of any effect of a chemical substance or mixture on health or the environment or on both, including underlying data and epidemiological studies, studies of occupational exposure to a chemical substance or mixture, toxicological, clinical, and ecological studies of a chemical, substance or mixture, and any test performed pursuant to this chapter.”
While the agency has no formal position on whether biomonitoring data can be obtained under section 8(d), an EPA official stated that this provision authorizes the agency to promulgate a rule requiring a company to submit existing biomonitoring data. Section 8(e) requires chemical companies, on their own initiative, to report to EPA any information they have obtained that reasonably supports the conclusion that a chemical presents a substantial risk of injury to health or the environment. “Substantial risk” is currently defined by EPA in nonbinding guidance as “a risk of considerable concern because of (a) the seriousness of the effect, and (b) the fact or probability of its occurrence.” EPA asserts that biomonitoring data are reportable as demonstrating a substantial risk if the chemical in question is known to have serious toxic effects and the biomonitoring data indicate a level of exposure previously unknown to EPA. These challenges also affect EPA’s ability to require that chemical companies provide biomonitoring data. However, EPA has not determined the extent of its authority to require a company to develop and submit biomonitoring data that may aid EPA in assessing chemicals’ risks, and EPA has not developed regulations or formal guidance concerning the conditions under which biomonitoring data might be required. Recommendations for Executive Action
To ensure that EPA effectively obtains the information needed to integrate biomonitoring into its chemical risk assessment and management programs, coordinates with other federal agencies, and leverages available resources for the creation and interpretation of biomonitoring research, we recommend that the EPA Administrator take the following two actions: Develop a comprehensive biomonitoring research strategy that includes the data EPA needs to incorporate biomonitoring information into chemical risk assessment and management activities, identifies federal partners and efforts that may address these needs, and quantifies the time frames and resources needed to implement the strategy. Of the 23 VCCEP chemicals, EPA has received what it deems to be sufficient data for only 6 chemicals. Approximately 3,000 chemicals meet this criterion. | Why GAO Did This Study
Biomonitoring, which measures chemicals in people's tissues or body fluids, has shown that the U.S. population is widely exposed to chemicals used in everyday products. Some of these have the potential to cause cancer or birth defects. Moreover, children may be more vulnerable to harm from these chemicals than adults. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is authorized under the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) to control chemicals that pose unreasonable health risks. GAO was asked to review the (1) extent to which EPA incorporates information from biomonitoring studies into its assessments of chemicals, (2) steps that EPA has taken to improve the usefulness of biomonitoring data, and (3) extent to which EPA has the authority under TSCA to require chemical companies to develop and submit biomonitoring data to EPA.
What GAO Found
EPA has made limited use of biomonitoring data in its assessments of risks posed by commercial chemicals. One reason is that biomonitoring data relevant to the entire U.S. population exist for only 148 of the over 6,000 chemicals EPA considers the most likely sources of human or environmental exposure. In addition, biomonitoring data alone indicate only that a person was somehow exposed to a chemical, not the source of the exposure or its effect on the person's health. For most of the chemicals studied under current biomonitoring programs, more data on chemical effects are needed to understand if the levels measured in people pose a health concern, but EPA's ability to require chemical companies to develop such data is limited. Thus, the agency has made few changes to its chemical risk assessments or safeguards in response to the recent increase in available biomonitoring data. While EPA has initiated several research programs to make biomonitoring more useful to its risk assessment process, it has not developed a comprehensive strategy for this research that takes into account its own research efforts and those of the multiple federal agencies and other organizations involved in biomonitoring research. EPA does have several important biomonitoring research efforts, including research into the relationships between exposure to harmful chemicals, the resulting concentration of those chemicals in human tissue, and the corresponding health effects. However, without a plan to coordinate its research efforts, EPA has no means to track progress or assess the resources needed specifically for biomonitoring research. Furthermore, according to the National Academy of Sciences, the lack of a coordinated national research strategy has allowed widespread chemical exposures to go undetected, such as exposures to flame retardants. The development of such a strategy could enhance biomonitoring research and link data needs with collection efforts. EPA has not determined the extent of its authority to obtain biomonitoring data under TSCA, and this authority is untested and may be limited. The TSCA provision that authorizes EPA to require companies to develop data focuses on the health and environmental effects of chemicals. Since biomonitoring data alone may not demonstrate the effects of a chemical, EPA may face difficulty in using this authority to obtain biomonitoring data. It may be easier for EPA to obtain biomonitoring data under other TSCA provisions, which allow EPA to collect existing information on chemicals. For example, TSCA obligates chemical companies to report information that reasonably supports the conclusion that a chemical presents a substantial risk of injury to health or the environment. EPA asserts that biomonitoring data are reportable if the chemical in question is known to have serious toxic effects and biomonitoring information indicates a level of exposure previously unknown to EPA. EPA took action against a chemical company under this authority in 2004. However, the action was settled without an admission of liability by the View GAO-09-353 or key components. company, so EPA's authority to obtain biomonitoring data remains untested. |
gao_GAO-16-570 | gao_GAO-16-570_0 | II for additional information about the CBP phases.) CMS’s CBP-related Monitoring Activities
CMS has implemented several activities to monitor whether beneficiary access or satisfaction have been affected by the implementation of CBP and to ensure that contract suppliers are meeting their contract obligations. Health Status Monitoring Tool. CMS analyzes Medicare claims data to monitor health measures, including encounters with the health care system (such as hospitalizations, emergency room visits, and physician visits) and one outcome (death) for beneficiaries in both CBP-covered areas and non-CBP areas for both round 2 and the national mail-order program. Number of Beneficiaries Receiving CBP- covered Items Generally Decreased after Implementation of Round 2 and the National Mail-Order Program
The number of beneficiaries receiving DME items covered under CBP round 2 generally decreased after the implementation of round 2, and these utilization decreases generally were larger than the decreases for items or areas that were not included in CBP. However, CMS stated that CBP has helped limit fraud and abuse and may have curbed unnecessary utilization of some CBP-covered items in competitive bidding areas. 3.) Specifically, 95 of the 100 round 2 areas experienced a decrease between 2012 and 2014 in the number of beneficiaries receiving CBP round 2 items, ranging from 2 to 42 percent. Number of Beneficiaries Receiving National Mail- Order Program Items Generally Decreased after Implementation, Though Utilization Increased for Some Items Acquired through Retail Outlets
The total number of beneficiaries receiving at least one diabetes testing supply item covered under the national mail-order program decreased after implementation of the program, although there was an increase in the number of beneficiaries receiving some of these items through retail outlets. CMS Reports That Available Evidence Indicates No Widespread Effects of Round 2 and the National Mail-Order Program on Beneficiary Access
Based on its monitoring of health measures, CMS reported that the implementation of the CBP has not resulted in widespread beneficiary access issues. CMS told us that it investigates complaints using secret shopping calls and that its post-implementation beneficiary satisfaction surveys remained positive. CMS uses the tool to review Medicare claims data on a bi-weekly basis. Number of Round 2 and National Mail-Order Program Inquiries and Complaints to 1-800- MEDICARE Generally Decreased throughout the First 2 Years
The number of inquiries and complaints to 1-800-MEDICARE regarding CBP round 2 or the national mail-order program represented less than 1 percent of all calls to 1-800-MEDICARE, and inquiries and complaints generally decreased throughout the programs’ first 2 years of implementation. 6.) CMS Investigates CBP Complaints Using Secret Shopping Calls, and Terminates Contracts of Suppliers That Remain Noncompliant after Targeted Education
CMS officials told us that the agency monitors contract suppliers to ensure that they are complying with the terms of their contracts, such as servicing all beneficiaries that reside in their competitive bidding areas and furnishing the same items to Medicare beneficiaries that they make available to other customers. However, stakeholders from four beneficiary advocacy groups reported that their members experienced several access issues with the implementation of CBP round 2 and the national mail-order program. In addition, discharge planners and other stakeholders from three state hospital associations reported that beneficiaries also experienced delays in delivery of CBP-covered items, such as walkers and wheelchairs, and had difficulty locating contract suppliers to provide oxygen or service DME items when the beneficiaries were visiting in a competitive bidding area but resided elsewhere. Most Round 2 and National Mail-Order Program Competitions Had Several Active Contract Suppliers in 2014, but Others Had Just One or a Few Active Suppliers
A large majority of the possible 801 individual competitions in which a contract supplier could be awarded a contract had at least five contract suppliers that were active in 2014, which we defined as having furnished at least one covered item during 2014 in at least one of the competitive bidding areas and product category competitions in which they were awarded and accepted a contract. We found that 84 percent of the competitions had at least five active contract suppliers; however, 11 percent of competitions had three or fewer active suppliers and 1 percent had just one active supplier. Some Competitions Had a Single Supplier with a Large Market Share
While multiple suppliers had substantial shares of the market for most competitions, in some competitions a single supplier had a majority. HHS provided technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate. Appendix II: Description of the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services’ Phase-In of the Competitive Bidding Program
Since the durable medical equipment (DME) competitive bidding program (CBP) was implemented in 2008, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) has phased in several additional CBP rounds and programs. Round 1 rebid. | Why GAO Did This Study
To achieve Medicare savings for DME, the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003 required that CMS implement the CBP for certain DME, such as wheelchairs and oxygen, in phases, or rounds. Round 1 started in 2008, and round 2 and the national mail-order program started in 2013. CMS estimated that the first 2 years of round 2 and the national mail-order program saved Medicare approximately $3.6 billion. GAO has reported on several prior CBP rounds.
GAO was asked to continue to review the implementation of the CBP. In this report, GAO examines the extent to which round 2 and the national mail-order program have affected (1) utilization of CBP-covered DME items, and (2) beneficiaries' access to DME items. This report also (3) describes the number and market shares of the round 2 and mail-order program suppliers.
To examine the effect of CBP on utilization, GAO used Medicare DME claims data from 2012 and 2014—the year before and the year after implementation of round 2—to compare the number of beneficiaries who received CBP-covered DME items. To examine the effect of CBP on beneficiary access, GAO reviewed information about CMS's efforts to monitor the effects of the CBP, and interviewed selected Medicare beneficiary organizations and state hospital associations. To describe the supplier markets, GAO analyzed 2014 Medicare claims data, the latest year with complete available data when GAO began this engagement.
What GAO Found
The number of beneficiaries receiving durable medical equipment (DME) items covered under the competitive bidding program (CBP) generally decreased after implementation of two CBP phases that began July 1, 2013—round 2 and the national mail-order program for diabetes testing supplies. Under the CBP, (administered by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS)), only competitively selected contract suppliers can furnish certain DME items at competitively determined prices to beneficiaries in designated competitive bidding areas. From the year before (2012) to the year after (2014) implementation, the number of beneficiaries receiving covered items in round 2 areas decreased 17 percent, compared with a 6 percent decrease for beneficiaries in non-CBP areas. The number of beneficiaries that received diabetes testing supplies through the national mail-order program also decreased 39 percent between 2012 and 2014, with a corresponding 13 percent increase in the number of beneficiaries receiving these items through retail outlets. CMS officials stated that CBP has helped limit fraud and abuse and may have curbed unnecessary utilization of some CBP-covered items in competitive bidding areas.
CMS reports that available evidence from the agency's monitoring efforts indicates that the implementation of round 2 and the national mail-order program have had no widespread effects on beneficiary access. In particular, CMS has reported that its health status monitoring tool has not detected any changes in health measures attributable to the CBP, and the results of its 2014 post-CBP beneficiary satisfaction surveys remained positive. In addition, the number of CBP inquiries and complaints generally decreased throughout the first 2 years of round 2 and the national mail-order program. CMS officials told GAO that CMS took measures to ensure that contract suppliers met their contract obligations, such as investigating complaints using secret shopping calls, and terminating contracts of suppliers that remained noncompliant after receiving targeted education. However, some beneficiary advocacy groups and state hospital associations reported specific access issues, such as difficulty locating contract suppliers that will furnish certain items and delays in delivery of DME items.
Round 2 and the national mail-order program included 801 separate competitive bidding area and product category competitions. Most of these competitions had at least five active contract suppliers in 2014. However, 11 percent of the competitions had three or fewer active contract suppliers and 1 percent had just one active contract supplier. In addition, while multiple suppliers had substantial shares of the market for most competitions, in some competitions a single supplier had a majority. For example, in 6 percent of the competitions, one contract supplier had at least 90 percent of the market. Conversely, 11 percent of contract suppliers did not furnish any CBP-covered items for any competitions in their contract. CMS officials told GAO that CMS monitors these suppliers to help ensure that they are meeting their contractual obligations, such as being willing to service all beneficiaries in their areas and to furnish the same items to Medicare beneficiaries that they make available to other customers.
The Department of Health and Human Services provided technical comments on a draft of this report, which were incorporated as appropriate. |
gao_GAO-14-758 | gao_GAO-14-758_0 | The Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA) requires agencies to obtain OMB approval for identical collections of information from 10 or more individuals or entities. The information security program should include periodic assessments of the risk and magnitude of harm that could result from the unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification, or destruction of information or information systems; policies and procedures that (1) are based on risk assessments, (2) cost-effectively reduce information security risks to an acceptable level, (3) ensure that information security is addressed throughout the life-cycle of each system, and (4) ensure compliance with applicable requirements; subordinate plans for providing adequate information security for networks, facilities, and systems or groups of information systems, as appropriate; security awareness training to inform personnel of information security risks and of their responsibilities in implementing agency policies and procedures, as well as training personnel with significant security responsibilities for information security; periodic testing and evaluation of the effectiveness of information security policies, procedures, and practices, to be performed with a frequency depending on risk, but no less than annually—including testing of management, operational, and technical controls for every system identified in the agency’s required inventory of major information systems; a process for planning, implementing, evaluating, and documenting remedial action to address any deficiencies in the information security policies, procedures, and practices of the agency; procedures for detecting, reporting, and responding to security plans and procedures to ensure continuity of operations for information systems that support the operations and assets of the agency. CFPB Collects a Wide Range of Consumer Financial Data
From January 2012 to July 2014, CFPB undertook 12 large-scale data collection efforts. CFPB and Other Regulators Have Established Information- Sharing Agreements, but Some Overlap Exists
CFPB’s Information-Sharing Agreements and Coordination
To minimize overlap and burden on financial institutions, CFPB has coordinated with the prudential regulators and shared consumer financial data through various formal agreements. In total, the collections cover approximately 87 percent of outstanding credit card balances by volume. As shown in figure 1, CFPB and OCC collect similar credit card information, but from different institutions. CFPB has taken steps to minimize burden on financial institutions. CFPB Lacks Written Procedures for Data Intake
CFPB reviews data collections to determine whether the Dodd-Frank Act’s restrictions apply, but it has not yet created written procedures for its data intake process. However, CFPB staff said they have not developed written procedures for removing personal identifiers from supervisory data or implemented controls such as requiring reviews of anonymized files to ensure that all fields with information that directly identifies individuals had been removed. Such data are commercially available products and did not constitute information collections under PRA, according to CFPB staff. CFPB Established Access Controls for Protecting Consumer Financial Data
CFPB had implemented several logical access controls for the component of the information system that maintains the consumer financial data collections we reviewed and was scanning for problems or vulnerabilities. CFPB Generally Followed Steps of the NIST Risk Management Framework for the System That Maintains Consumer Financial Data
Although the collection of consumer financial data can create concerns over improper use or unauthorized disclosure, CFPB has taken steps to assess the risks posed by these data and implemented controls or taken other actions to address the risks. For example, the agency created a data intake process that brings together staff with relevant expertise to consider the statutory, privacy, and information security implications of proposals to collect consumer financial data. Staff also described a process for anonymizing large-scale data collections that directly identify individuals. OCC also had not sought OMB approval for its credit card and mortgage data collections even though it now obtains data from more than nine entities for each of these collections. Obtaining further guidance from OMB on whether the information- sharing agreement requires CFPB and OCC to follow procedures outlined in PRA and getting OMB approval for OCC’s credit card and mortgage data collections would help both agencies ensure they fully comply with the law, do not unduly burden financial institutions, and maximize the practical utility of the information collected. To help ensure consistent implementation of its current processes and practices, the Director of CFPB should establish or enhance written procedures for: 1. the data intake process, including reviews of proposed data collections for compliance applicable legal requirements and restrictions and documentation requirements for consultations with OMB about PRA applicability; 2. anonymizing data, including how staff should assess data sensitivity, which steps to take to anonymize data fields, and responsibilities for reviews of anonymized data collections; 3. assessing and managing privacy risks, including documentation requirements to support statements about potential privacy risks in PIAs and for determinations that PIAs are not required; 4. monitoring and auditing privacy controls; and 5. documenting information security risk-assessment results consistently and comprehensively to include all NIST- recommended elements. To enhance the protection of collected consumer financial data, the Director of CFPB should fully implement the following five privacy and security steps: 1. develop a comprehensive written privacy plan that brings together existing privacy policies and guidance; 2. obtain periodic reviews of the privacy program’s practices as part of the independent audit of CFPB’s operations and budget; 3. develop and implement role-based privacy training; 4. update remedial plans for the information system that maintains consumer financial data and related components to include all identified weaknesses and realistic scheduled completion dates that reflect current priorities and available resources; and 5. include an evaluation of compliance with contract provisions relating to information security in CFPB’s review of the service provider that processes consumer financial data for CFPB. We are also making a recommendation to the Comptroller of the Currency. To ensure compliance with federal law, the Comptroller of the Currency should seek timely approval from OMB under PRA for OCC’s credit card and mortgage collections, including the information-sharing agreement with CFPB for credit card data. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of this report were to review (1) the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau’s (CFPB) consumer financial data collection efforts, including the authorities, scope, purposes, and uses of these collections, and the ways in which CFPB has collaborated with other federal financial regulators as part of these collections; (2) the extent to which CFPB complied with statutory restrictions on its consumer financial data collection authorities and federal privacy requirements; and (3) the extent to which CFPB has assessed the risks of these collections and applied appropriate information security protections over these data. We also reviewed the Federal Reserve’s public notifications about its collections for conducting bank holding company stress tests (Y-14 collections), which included notices in the Federal Register about its credit card and mortgage data collections, and OCC’s documents related its credit card and mortgage data collections, including its contract with a data aggregator. We also randomly selected and interviewed 1 additional financial institution to interview that was supervised by CFPB but does not provide credit card data on an ongoing basis. We compared CFPB’s policies and practices against Dodd-Frank Act requirements, Office of Management and Budget (OMB) guidance, and recommendations of the National Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST). We reviewed prior audit work conducted by the Inspector General for the Federal Reserve and CFPB in this area. More than 1,000 arbitration case records from the American Arbitration Association from January 2010 through 2012. | Why GAO Did This Study
Congress created CFPB in 2010 as an independent agency to regulate the provision of consumer financial products and services, such as mortgages and student loans. CFPB has begun collecting consumer financial data from banks, credit unions, payday lenders, and other institutions. GAO was mandated to examine CFPB's collection of consumer financial data. This report addresses (1) the scope, purposes, uses, and authorities of CFPB consumer financial data collections and (2) CFPB's compliance with laws and federal requirements, including government-wide privacy and information security requirements.
GAO reviewed laws, regulations, and contracts pertaining to CFPB's data collections; reviewed privacy and information security policies; reviewed inspector general reports on CFPB's information security program; assessed how CFPB applied NIST's framework for managing risks of storing data; examined access controls on the system maintaining consumer financial data; and interviewed CFPB and other regulatory officials, privacy experts, and representatives from randomly selected financial institutions.
What GAO Found
To carry out its statutory responsibilities, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) has collected consumer financial data on credit card accounts, mortgage loans, and other products through one-time or ongoing collections. As the following table shows, these large-scale data collections varied from about 11,000 consumer arbitration case records from a trade association to 173 million mortgage loans from a data aggregator. Of the 12 large-scale collections GAO reviewed, 3 included information that identified individual consumers, but CFPB staff indicated that those 3 were not subject to statutory restrictions on collecting such information. Other regulators, such as the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Federal Reserve) and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), collect similarly large amounts of data.
CFPB has taken steps to protect and secure these data collections. For example, it created a data intake process that brings together staff with relevant expertise to consider the statutory, privacy, and information security implications of proposed consumer financial data collections. CFPB staff described a process for anonymizing large-scale data collections that directly identify individuals. In addition, CFPB had taken steps to implement an information security program that is consistent with Federal Information Security Management Act requirements, according to the Office of Inspector General for the Federal Reserve and CFPB. GAO found that CFPB had implemented logical access controls for the information system that maintains the consumer financial data collections and was appropriately scanning for problems or vulnerabilities. CFPB also established a risk-management process for the information system that maintains consumer financial data consistent with guidelines developed by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST).
However, GAO determined that additional efforts are needed in several areas to reduce the risk of improper collection, use, or release of consumer financial data.
Written procedures and documentation: CFPB lacks written procedures and comprehensive documentation for a number of processes, including data intake and information security risk assessments. The lack of written procedures could result in inconsistent application of the established practices. For example, CFPB unnecessarily retained sensitive data in two collections GAO reviewed, but its staff said they plan to remove this information. GAO recommends CFPB establish or enhance written procedures for (1) data intake, including reviews of proposed data collections for compliance with applicable legal requirements and restrictions; (2) anonymizing data; (3) assessing and managing privacy risks; and (4) monitoring and auditing privacy controls; and (5) documenting results of information security risk-assessments consistently and comprehensively.
Implementation of privacy and security steps: CFPB has not yet fully implemented a number of privacy control steps and information security practices, which could hamper the agency's ability to identify and monitor privacy risks and protect consumer financial data. GAO recommends CFPB take or complete action to (1) develop a comprehensive written privacy plan that brings together existing privacy policies and guidance; (2) obtain periodic independent reviews of its privacy practices; (3) develop and implement targeted privacy training for staff responsible for working with sensitive personal information; (4) update remedial action plans to include all identified weaknesses and realistic planned remediation dates that reflect priorities and resources; and (5) include an evaluation of compliance with contract provisions relating to information security in CFPB's review of the service provider that processes consumer financial data on its behalf.
Paperwork Reduction Act compliance: Under the Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA), agencies generally must obtain Office of Management and Budget (OMB) approval when collecting data from 10 or more entities to minimize burden and maximize the practical utility of the information collected. CFPB and OCC collect, on an ongoing basis, credit card data from different institutions—representing about 87 percent of outstanding credit card balances—and agreed to share data. However, OMB staff said the agencies' collections and data-sharing agreement may warrant OMB review and approval. Additional consultation with OMB regarding these collections and the data-sharing agreement would help both agencies ensure they are fully complying with the law. Furthermore, OCC had not obtained OMB approval for its credit card and mortgage data collections, which each included more than nine entities. Without approval, OCC lacks reasonable assurance that its collections comply with PRA requirements intended to reduce burden. GAO recommends (1) CFPB consult further with OMB about its credit card collection and data-sharing agreement, and (2) OCC seek OMB approval for its credit card and mortgage data collections.
a CFPB has access to credit card data from additional credit card issuers through an information-sharing agreement with the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, which collects more than 500 million total accounts on a monthly basis. When combined, these data contain information about 87 percent of outstanding credit card balances by volume as of March 2014.
b CFPB removed information that directly identifies individuals from the files staff use to analyze these data.
What GAO Recommends
GAO makes 11 recommendations to enhance CFPB's privacy and information security and 1 recommendation to OCC to ensure its data collections comply with appropriate disclosure requirements. CFPB and OCC agreed with GAO's recommendations and noted steps they plan to take or have taken to address them. |
gao_GAO-01-953 | gao_GAO-01-953_0 | First, VA contracted with IHI, a Boston-based contractor, to help develop strategies to reduce waiting times. The chiefs of primary care at the 10 VA medical centers we visited reported that 15 of their 17 primary care clinics—or about 88 percent— met VA’s 30-day timeliness standard. At one location, veterans had to wait 282 days—more than 9 months—for an optometry appointment. At one gastroenterology clinic, half of the scheduled patients did not show up for their appointments. Some Clinics Have Made Progress in Their Efforts to Reduce Waiting Times
While most of the clinics we visited continue to experience waiting times problems, several have reported success in reducing their waiting times— primarily by improving their scheduling processes or making better use of staff. VA also lacks a systematic process for determining the causes of long waiting times, for monitoring clinics’ progress in reducing waiting times, and for helping those centers and clinics that continue to have long waiting times. However, as of July 2001, none of the 134 teams’ findings have been summarized and publicized, leaving the medical centers and clinics nationwide to independently determine how to implement IHI’s strategies for reducing waiting times. VA Has Identified Clinics With Excessive Waiting Times but Has Not Developed a Process to Analyze Their Root Causes
When VA established its 30-day waiting times standard for primary and specialty care over 5 years ago, it also established the objective that clinics meet this standard by 1998. Conclusions
Some of the 71 clinics in the 10 medical centers we visited have successfully begun to address their waiting times problems for patients— often by implementing IHI’s strategies—and several are meeting VA’s 30- day goal to provide nonurgent, outpatient primary and specialty care. In addition, VA has not provided medical centers and clinics with an analytic framework for identifying the root causes of their long waiting times. Recommendations for Executive Action
To help ensure that clinics meet VA’s 30-day waiting times standard, we recommend that the Secretary of Veterans Affairs direct the Under Secretary for Health to take the following actions: Create a national set of referral guidelines for medical centers to use when referring patients from primary care to specialty care as well as guidelines for specialty clinics to follow in returning patients to primary care when they no longer need specialty care. | What GAO Found
The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) runs one of the nation's largest health care systems. In fiscal year 2000, roughly four million patients made 39 million outpatient visits to more than 700 VA health care facilities nationwide. However, excessive waiting times for outpatient care have been a long-standing problem. To ensure timely access to care, VA established a goal that all nonurgent primary and specialty care appointments be scheduled within 30 days of request and that clinics meet this goal by 1998. Yet, three years later, reports of long waiting times persist. Waiting times at the clinics in the 10 medical centers GAO visited indicate that meeting VA's 30-day standard is a continuing challenge for many clinics. Although most of the primary care clinics GAO visited (15 of 17) reported meeting VA's standard for nonurgent, outpatient appointments, only one-third of the specialty care clinics visited (18 of 54) met VA's 30-day standard. For the remaining two-thirds, waiting times ranged from 33 days at one urology clinic to 282 days at an optometry clinic. Although two-thirds of the specialty clinics GAO visited continued to have long waiting times, some were making progress in reducing waiting times, primarily by improving their scheduling processes and making better use of their staff. These successes were often the result of medical centers' and clinics' working with the Institute for Healthcare Improvement (IHI)--a private contractor VA retained in July 1999--to develop strategies to reduce patient waiting times. Medical centers and clinics participating in VA's IHI project have received valuable information and strategies for successfully reducing waiting times. However, VA has not provided guidance to its medical centers on how to implement IHI strategies, and VA has only recently contracted with IHI to disseminate best practices agency-wide. VA has not developed other national guidance to help clinics reduce waiting times. Although clinics that did not have guidelines could have benefited from headquarters' assistance, VA has not established a national set of referral guidelines. Moreover, VA lacks an analytic framework for its medical centers and clinics to use in determining the root causes of lengthy waits. |
gao_NSIAD-96-97 | gao_NSIAD-96-97_0 | NASA’s ability to add more investigations is uncertain within its expected future budgets, especially if it must depend on savings from improved technology and increased collaboration with others. Current Number of EOS Investigations Is Relatively Small
The EOS program is currently funding 29 interdisciplinary science investigations that were selected in 1989 and 1990 to use data from EOS instruments in more than one earth science discipline, such as geology, oceanography, meteorology, and climatology. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) used similar comparisons in its 1993 and 1995 editions of the EOS reference handbook. To counter this perception, NASA’s current strategy to expand the EOS research community involves (1) an open data access policy and (2) efforts to broaden and change the current community by adding investigations, reevaluating the current science investigations, and recruiting new investigators. Despite this apprehension, most interdisciplinary science investigators have experienced or expect little or no effect of budgetary turbulence on their own research. New Earth System Science Pathfinder Program: Implications for EOS Science Funding
Starting in 1996, NASA plans to solicit additional Earth science research through a new Earth System Science Pathfinder program. The administration is requesting $20 million for Pathfinder in fiscal year 1997 and plans to request $30 million, $75 million, and $75 million for fiscal years 1998, 1999, and 2000, respectively—a total of $200 million over the next 4 fiscal years. We used the scientists’ progress reports for 1992 to 1993, and 1995 to assess whether changes to EOS have adversely affected EOS’ interdisciplinary research. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) plans for funding its Earth Observing System (EOS) and developing EOS-related basic research, focusing on: (1) the current number of EOS science investigations; (2) researchers' views on whether changes to EOS have adversely affected their ability to carry out their interdisciplinary earth sciences investigations; and (3) the Earth System Science Pathfinder program and its potential impact on future EOS investigations.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) NASA funds 29 interdisciplinary science investigations that use data from EOS instruments in more than one earth science discipline; (2) to expand the EOS research community, NASA plans to maintain an open data access policy, add investigations, reevaluate current science investigations, and recruit new investigators; (3) most EOS interdisciplinary scientists believe that EOS budgetary reductions have little or no effect on their work; and (4) NASA plans to use anticipated savings resulting from improved technology to fund more investigations and request a total of $200 million over the next 4 fiscal years for its Earth System Science Pathfinder program. |
gao_GAO-15-434 | gao_GAO-15-434_0 | Overview of the RUC’s Process for Developing Relative Value Recommendations and How CMS Uses These Recommendations when Establishing Relative Values for Medicare Physicians’ Services
The process to develop and establish relative values involves three main steps: (1) CMS, the RUC, and AMA’s Current Procedural Terminology (CPT) Editorial Panel identify services for RUC review, (2) the RUC works with specialty societies to use surveys and other methods to develop work relative value and DPEI recommendations for CMS for identified services, and (3) CMS reviews each RUC recommendation it receives to determine whether to use it when establishing relative values for physicians’ services. For example, of the 231 active Medicare physicians’ services that specialty societies surveyed for payment year 2015, the median response rate was 2.2 percent and while the median number of respondents was 52, for 23 of these services, the number of respondents failed the minimum survey response thresholds that the RUC implemented in 2014. The median number of times respondents reported performing the service in the past year was 10. undermined by data weaknesses and weaknesses in its process due to potential conflicts of interest. As a result of these efforts, the public can have a better understanding of the RUC’s process and knowledge of the recommendations submitted to CMS. CMS’s Process for Establishing Relative Values May Not Ensure Accurate Medicare Payment Rates and Lacks Transparency
CMS’s process for establishing relative values embodies several elements that cast doubt on whether it provides assurance of accurate Medicare payment rates. While CMS stated that it complies with a statutory requirement governing how often physicians’ services are to be reviewed, CMS does not track when a service was last valued or have a documented standardized process for prioritizing its review of services. The agency also has limited documentation about its process, and does not have any documentation with specific information about the selected method used to review a specific RUC recommendation. Lack of transparency in its process and lack of data sources to validate RUC recommendations, combined with evidence that CMS relies heavily on the RUC for relative value recommendations despite weaknesses with the RUC’s data, may undermine payment rate accuracy. This indicates that CMS has a process in place to ensure that relative values are reviewed regularly and revalued if necessary. CMS Process for Establishing Relative Values Lacks Transparency, and Heavy Reliance on RUC Recommendations May Undermine Payment Rate Accuracy
CMS makes some information about its process for establishing relative values available to the public, but some information on the services under review is not included, which limits stakeholders’ knowledge about whether payment rates are likely to change for these services. Moreover, while CMS provides general information on how it reviews RUC recommendations, it does not document a process for reviewing recommendations that would identify the resources considered during its review of specific RUC recommendations. As a result, in the majority of cases, CMS has accepted the RUC’s work relative value recommendation. 5.) CMS Is Developing an Approach for Validating Relative Values, but Does Not Yet Have a Specific Plan for Doing So or for Addressing Other Data Challenges
CMS does not yet have a formal process for validating RUC recommendations, but is developing an approach as required by PPACA.as part of its process for establishing relative values and agrees with or refines them based on, for example, the agency’s assessment of the RUC’s data or completion of a clinical review. First, physicians who serve Medicare beneficiaries—including members of the RUC and specialty societies—may have potential conflicts of interest with respect to the outcomes of CMS’s process for setting payment rates for Medicare physicians’ services. Second, we found some of the RUC’s survey data to have low response rates, low total number of responses, and large ranges in responses. Furthermore, because CMS relies on the RUC’s recommendations when establishing relative values, these challenges may also result in CMS setting inaccurate Medicare payment rates for physicians’ services. In addition, CMS’s process lacks transparency. HHS did not concur with our recommendation to include the services identified as potentially misvalued by the RUC in its rulemaking to allow for public comment, prior to finalizing its list of potentially misvalued services for the RUC to review. However, under the new process CMS does not plan to inform the public of services identified by the RUC as potentially misvalued. Appendix I: Establishing Relative Values for a Medicare Physician Service through the RUC and CMS Processes
The process to develop and establish relative values involves three main steps: (1) the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), the American Medical Association’s (AMA) Relative Value Scale Update Committee (RUC), and the AMA’s Current Procedural Terminology (CPT) Editorial Panel identify services for the RUC to review; (2) the RUC works with specialty societies to use surveys and other methods to develop work relative value and direct practice expense input (DPEI) recommendations for CMS for identified services; and (3) CMS considers each RUC recommendation it receives to determine whether to use it when establishing relative values for physicians’ services. | Why GAO Did This Study
Payments for Medicare physicians' services totaled about $70 billion in 2013. CMS sets payment rates for about 7,000 physicians' services primarily on the basis of the relative values assigned to each service. Relative values largely reflect estimates of the physician work and practice expenses needed to provide one service relative to other services.
The Protecting Access to Medicare Act of 2014 included a provision for GAO to study the RUC's process for developing relative value recommendations for CMS. GAO evaluated (1) the RUC's process for recommending relative values for CMS to consider when setting Medicare payment rates; and (2) CMS's process for establishing relative values, including how it uses RUC recommendations. GAO reviewed RUC and CMS documents and applicable statutes and internal control standards, analyzed RUC and CMS data for payment years 2011 through 2015, and interviewed RUC staff and CMS officials.
What GAO Found
The American Medical Association/Specialty Society Relative Value Scale Update Committee (RUC) has a process in place to regularly review Medicare physicians' services' work relative values (which reflect the time and intensity needed to perform a service). Its recommendations to the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), the agency within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) that administers Medicare, though, may not be accurate due to process and data-related weaknesses. First, the RUC's process for developing relative value recommendations relies on the input of physicians who may have potential conflicts of interest with respect to the outcomes of CMS's process. While the RUC has taken steps to mitigate the impact of physicians' potential conflicts of interest, a member of the RUC told GAO that specialty societies' work relative value recommendations may still be inflated. RUC staff indicated that the RUC may recommend a work relative value to CMS that is less than the specialty societies' median survey result if the value seems accurate based on the RUC members' clinical expertise or by comparing the value to those of related services. Second, GAO found weaknesses with the RUC's survey data, including that some of the RUC's survey data had low response rates, low total number of responses, and large ranges in responses, all of which may undermine the accuracy of the RUC's recommendations. For example, while GAO found that the median number of responses to surveys for payment year 2015 was 52, the median response rate was only 2.2 percent, and 23 of the 231 surveys had under 30 respondents.
CMS's process for establishing relative values embodies several elements that cast doubt on whether it can ensure accurate Medicare payment rates and a transparent process. First, although CMS officials stated that CMS complies with the statutory requirement to review all Medicare services every 5 years, the agency does not maintain a database to track when a service was last valued or have a documented standardized process for prioritizing its reviews. Second, CMS's process is not fully transparent because the agency does not publish the potentially misvalued services identified by the RUC in its rulemaking or otherwise, and thus stakeholders are unaware that these services will be reviewed and payment rates for these services may change. Third, CMS provides some information about its process in its rulemaking, but does not document the methods used to review specific RUC recommendations. For example, CMS does not document what resources were considered during its review of the RUC's recommendations for specific services. Finally, the evidence suggests—and CMS officials acknowledge—that the agency relies heavily on RUC recommendations when establishing relative values. For example, GAO found that, in the majority of cases, CMS accepts the RUC's recommendations and participation by other stakeholders is limited. Given the process and data-related weaknesses associated with the RUC's recommendations, such heavy reliance on the RUC could result in inaccurate Medicare payment rates. CMS has begun to research ways to develop an approach for validating RUC recommendations, but does not yet have a specific plan for doing so. In addition, CMS does not yet have a plan for how it will use funds Congress appropriated for the collection and use of data on physicians' services or address the other data challenges GAO identified.
What GAO Recommends
CMS should better document its process for establishing relative values and develop a process to inform the public of potentially misvalued services identified by the RUC. CMS should also develop a plan for using funds appropriated for the collection and use of information on physicians' services in the determination of relative values. HHS agreed with two of GAO's recommendations, but disagreed with using rulemaking to inform the public of RUC-identified services. GAO clarified that the recommendation is not limited to rulemaking. |
gao_GAO-07-1033T | gao_GAO-07-1033T_0 | For example, from 2000 to 2004, the total proportion of FHA-insured single-family purchase loans that had a loan-to-value (LTV) ratio greater than 95 percent and that also involved down-payment assistance from any source grew from 35 to nearly 50 percent. Assistance from nonprofit organizations, about 93 percent of which were funded by sellers, accounted for an increasing proportion of this assistance. Approximately 6 percent of FHA- insured loans received down-payment assistance from nonprofit organizations in 2000, but, by 2004 this figure had grown to about 30 percent. FHA data for 2005 and 2006 indicate that the percentages of loans with down-payment assistance from any source and from seller-funded nonprofits remained at roughly 2004 levels. Seller-Funded Assistance Affects Home Purchase Transactions and Can Raise House Prices
The presence of down-payment assistance from seller-funded nonprofits can alter the structure of purchase transactions. When buyers receive assistance from sources other than seller-funded nonprofits, the home purchase takes place like any other purchase transaction—buyers use the funds to pay part of the house price, the closing costs, or both, reducing the mortgage by the amount they pay and creating “instant equity.” However, seller-funded down-payment assistance programs typically require property sellers to make a financial contribution and pay a service fee after the closing, creating an indirect funding stream from property sellers to homebuyers that does not exist in a typical transaction (see fig. Several mortgage industry participants we interviewed noted that when homebuyers obtained down- payment assistance from seller-funded nonprofits, property sellers increased their sales prices to recover their payments to the nonprofits providing the assistance. Our analysis of a national sample of FHA-insured loans endorsed in 2000, 2001, and 2002 suggested that homes with seller-funded assistance were appraised and sold for about 3 percent more than comparable homes without such assistance. FHA-Insured Loans with Down Payment Assistance, Particularly from Seller-Funded Nonprofits, Do Not Perform as Well as Similar Loans without Assistance
We found that FHA-insured loans with down-payment assistance do not perform as well as loans without it. In addition, we analyzed loan performance by source of down-payment assistance holding other variables constant. Here we found that FHA- insured loans with down-payment assistance had higher delinquency and claim rates than similar loans without such assistance (see fig. The weaker performance of loans with seller-funded down-payment assistance may be explained, in part, by the higher sales prices of homes bought with this assistance and the homebuyer having less equity in the transaction. According to FHA, the growing share of FHA-insured purchase loans with seller-funded assistance has contributed to FHA’s worsening financial performance. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Federal Housing Administration (FHA) differs from other key mortgage industry participants in that it allows borrowers to obtain down-payment assistance from nonprofit organizations (nonprofits) that operate programs supported partly by property sellers. Research has raised concerns about how this type of assistance affects home purchase transactions. To assist Congress in considering issues related to down-payment assistance, this testimony provides information from GAO's November 2005 report, Mortgage Financing: Additional Action Needed to Manage Risks of FHA-Insured Loans with Down Payment Assistance (GAO-06-24). Specifically, this testimony discusses (1) trends in the use of down-payment assistance with FHA-insured loans, (2) the impact that the presence of such assistance has on purchase transactions and house prices, and (3) the influence of such assistance on loan performance.
What GAO Found
The proportion of FHA-insured purchase loans that were financed in part by down-payment assistance increased from 35 percent to nearly 50 percent from 2000 through 2004. Assistance from nonprofit organizations that received at least part of their funding from property sellers accounted for much of this increase, growing from about 6 percent of FHA-insured purchase loans in 2000 to approximately 30 percent in 2004. More recent data indicate that in 2005 and 2006, the percentages of FHA-insured loans with down-payment assistance from all sources and from seller-funded nonprofits were roughly equivalent to 2004 levels. Assistance from seller-funded nonprofits alters the structure of the purchase transaction in important ways. First, because many seller-funded nonprofits require property sellers to make a payment to their organization, assistance from these nonprofits creates an indirect funding stream from property sellers to homebuyers. Second, GAO analysis indicated that FHA-insured homes bought with seller-funded nonprofit assistance were appraised at and sold for about 2 to 3 percent more than comparable homes bought without such assistance. Regardless of the source of assistance and holding other variables constant, GAO analysis indicated that FHA-insured loans with down-payment assistance have higher delinquency and insurance claim rates than do similar loans without such assistance. Furthermore, loans with assistance from seller-funded nonprofits do not perform as well as loans with assistance from other sources. This difference may be explained, in part, by the higher sales prices of comparable homes bought with seller-funded assistance and the homebuyers having less equity in the transaction. |
gao_GAO-07-344 | gao_GAO-07-344_0 | Poverty Rates
In 2005, close to 13 percent of the total U.S. population—about 37 million people—were counted as living below the poverty line, a number that essentially remained unchanged from 2004. Economic Research Links Poverty with Adverse Outcomes for Individuals Such as Poor Health and Crime
Economic research suggests that individuals living in poverty face an increased risk for adverse outcomes, such as poor health, criminal activity, and low participation in the workforce. The relationship between poverty and outcomes for individuals is complex, in part because most variables, like health status, can be both a cause and a result of poverty. Individuals Living in Poverty Experience Higher Rates of Adverse Health Outcomes, in Part because of Limited Access to Health Care, Environmental Hazards, and Risky Behaviors
Health outcomes are worse for individuals with low incomes than for their more affluent counterparts. 2). Some research examining government health insurance suggests that increased health insurance availability improves health outcomes. Sedentary life-style: the use of alcohol and drugs; as well as lower consumption of fiber, fresh fruits, and vegetables are some of the behaviors that have been associated with lower socioeconomic status. Additionally, the relationship between poverty and health outcomes could also vary by demographic group. For example, one study shows that higher levels of unemployment are associated with higher levels of property crime, but is less conclusive in predicting violent crime.Another study has shown that both wages and unemployment affect crime, but that wages play a larger role. Adverse Outcomes, Such as Poor Health and Low Educational Attainment, Lead to Reduced Participation in the Labor Market
Regardless of whether poverty is a cause or an effect, the conditions associated with poverty limit the ability of low-income individuals to develop the skills, abilities, knowledge, and habits necessary to fully participate in the labor force, in turn, leads to lower incomes. Economic Research Suggests a Negative Association between Poverty and Economic Growth
The economic literature suggests that poverty not only affects individuals but can also create larger challenges for economic growth. In the United States, poverty can impact economic growth by affecting the accumulation of human capital and rates of crime and social unrest. While the empirical research is limited, it points to the negative association between poverty and economic growth consistent with the theoretical literature’s conclusion that higher rates of poverty can result in lower rates of growth. Research has shown that accumulation of human capital is one of the fundamental drivers of economic growth. The accumulation of human capital is generally held to be a function of the education level, work experience, training, and healthiness of the workforce. Therefore, schooling at the secondary and higher levels is a key component for building an educated labor force that is better at learning, creating, and implementing new technologies. In addition to the effects of poverty on human capital, some economic literature suggests that poverty can affect economic growth to the extent that it is associated with crime, violence, and social unrest. Economists have long recognized the strong association between poverty and a range of adverse outcomes for individuals, and empirical research, while limited, has also begun to help us better understand the impact of poverty on a nation’s economic growth. U.S. Census Bureau. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 2005, 37 million people, approximately 13 percent of the total population, lived below the poverty line, as defined by the Census Bureau. Poverty imposes costs on the nation in terms of both programmatic outlays and productivity losses that can affect the economy as a whole. To better understand the potential range of effects of poverty, GAO was asked to examine (1) what the economic research tells us about the relationship between poverty and adverse social conditions, such as poor health outcomes, crime, and labor force attachment, and (2) what links economic research has found between poverty and economic growth. To answer these questions, GAO reviewed the economic literature by academic experts, think tanks, and government agencies, and reviewed additional literature by searching various databases for peer- reviewed economic journals, specialty journals, and books. We also provided our draft report for review by experts on this topic.
What GAO Found
Economic research suggests that individuals living in poverty face an increased risk of adverse outcomes, such as poor health and criminal activity, both of which may lead to reduced participation in the labor market. While the mechanisms by which poverty affects health are complex, some research suggests that adverse health outcomes can be due, in part, to limited access to health care as well as greater exposure to environmental hazards and engaging in risky behaviors. For example, some research has shown that increased availability of health insurance such as Medicaid for low-income mothers led to a decrease in infant mortality. Additionally, exposure to higher levels of air pollution from living in urban areas close to highways can lead to acute health conditions. Data suggest that engaging in risky behaviors, such as tobacco and alcohol use, a sedentary life-style, and a low consumption of nutritional foods, can account for some health disparities between lower and upper income groups. The economic research we reviewed also points to links between poverty and crime. For example, one study indicated that higher levels of unemployment are associated with higher levels of property crime. The relationship between poverty and adverse outcomes for individuals is complex, in part because most variables, like health status, can be both a cause and a result of poverty. These adverse outcomes affect individuals in many ways, including limiting their development of the skills, abilities, knowledge, and habits necessary to fully participate in the labor force. Research shows that poverty can negatively affect economic growth by affecting the accumulation of human capital and rates of crime and social unrest. Economic theory has long suggested that human capital--that is, the education, work experience, training, and health of the workforce--is considered one of the fundamental drivers of economic growth. The conditions associated with poverty can work against this human capital development by limiting individuals' ability to remain healthy and develop skills, in turn decreasing the potential to contribute talents, ideas, and even labor to the economy. An educated labor force, for example, is better at learning, creating and implementing new technologies. Economic theory suggests that when poverty affects a significant portion of the population, these effects can extend to the society at large and produce slower rates of growth. Although historically research has focused mainly on the extent to which economic growth alleviates poverty, some recent empirical studies have begun to demonstrate that higher rates of poverty are associated with lower rates of growth in the economy as a whole. For example, areas with higher poverty rates experience, on average, slower per capita income growth rates than low-poverty areas. |
gao_GAO-04-540 | gao_GAO-04-540_0 | Success of Savings Initiatives Has Been Mixed, and Some Reported Savings Cannot Be Validated
The Postal Service has had mixed success in implementing the supply chain management initiatives we reviewed. However, some of the claimed savings from reverse auctions were overstated, and we could not validate the $71.1 million in reported savings and revenue from the national contracts we reviewed because the Postal Service lacked accurate baseline data on what had been spent on the commodities before the supply chain management initiative. Because of the success of this pilot effort, the Postal Service plans to use the system for all contracts under the bulk fuel program. The Postal Service claimed over $5.9 million in savings from these reverse auctions in fiscal year 2003, but about $2.1 million of these savings are questionable. The Postal Service is not the only major organization that has had difficulty in tracking what it is buying. In planning these acquisitions, Postal Service officials often did not proactively explore ways in which to make these contracting dollars available to small businesses, either as prime or subcontractors. We could not gauge the effect on small businesses as a result of the other supply chain management initiatives we reviewed—the bulk fuel program and reverse auctions for highway contracts—because contracting officers and highway contractors used incorrect small business size standards and, consequently, the reported small business dollar amounts are unreliable. As it proceeds with its supply chain management initiatives, the Postal Service will have difficulty measuring the effect on small businesses because its new supplier diversity policy, while indicating a commitment to increasing contracts to small and diverse businesses, does not establish targets—such as dollar amounts or number of contracts—to measure success. Further, there is no mechanism in place to hold Postal Service officials accountable for implementing the Postal Service’s objective of ensuring a continuing focus on, and improvement in, its relationships with small and diverse businesses. Given the lack of targets for small business participation in the new supplier diversity policy, however, it will be difficult to hold contracting officers and other key officials accountable for improving the Postal Service’s relationships with small businesses. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To determine the extent to which the Postal Service’s supply chain management initiatives have resulted in savings, we reviewed the highway contractor bulk fuel program and reverse auctions for transportation services and selected five commodities that have been consolidated into national contracts: corrugated boxes, custodial products, pressure- sensitive labels, retail packaging, and delivery vehicle tires. Postal Service | Why GAO Did This Study
The Postal Service is on the cusp of a major transformation to improve its fiscal outlook. One part of this transformation involves procurement. The Postal Service is homing in on supply chain management, a process that has helped successful private-sector companies leverage their buying power and identify more efficient ways to procure goods and services. To assist congressional efforts to enact fundamental postal reform, GAO was asked to determine (1) the extent to which the Postal Service has been successful in implementing and realizing savings from its supply chain management initiatives and (2) whether these initiatives have had an effect on small businesses.
What GAO Found
The Postal Service has had mixed success in implementing the supply chain management initiatives we reviewed: the bulk fuel program; reverse auctions for transportation contracts; and national contracts for boxes, custodial supplies, labels, retail packaging, and tires. The Postal Service reported over $78 million in fiscal year 2003 savings and revenue from these initiatives. However, the Postal Service has been unable to recover millions of dollars in potential savings because of implementation problems with the bulk fuel program. For other savings initiatives, baseline data used to calculate savings were, in some cases, inaccurate or could not be validated because the Postal Service lacks a system for harnessing annual spending data. Since the Postal Service started using the national contracts GAO reviewed, the number of small business suppliers has dropped dramatically. Acquisition plans for most of these contracts did not address small business participation, either at the prime or subcontractor level. GAO could not determine the effect that the bulk fuel program and reverse auctions have had on small businesses because Postal Service contracting officers and contractors have been using incorrect business size standards, and, as a result, the reported small business accomplishments are not accurate. Further, the Postal Service's new supplier diversity policy does not establish targets for contracting with small businesses. Therefore, the Postal Service will have difficulty gauging the effect of supply chain management initiatives on these businesses and holding contracting officers accountable for implementing the policy's objective of ensuring improvement in the Postal Service's relationships with small businesses. |
gao_HEHS-99-41 | gao_HEHS-99-41_0 | Background
States have contracted out social services for decades. About a quarter of these officials took positions with social service contractors. According to federal and state program officials, of the 41 states in which the child support enforcement director left that position, 11 directors went to work for social service contractors. Similarly, of the senior TANF program managers who left their positions in 40 states, 10 joined the staffs of social service contractors. No Relationship Between Contractors’ Hiring of State Employees and Contracts Awarded
Among the proposals we reviewed, we found that child support enforcement and TANF-related proposals listing former state employees from any state as key personnel resulted in contract awards about as frequently as did proposals that did not list such employees. When we examined the child support enforcement and TANF programs separately, we still found that, in each program, proposals not listing former state employees resulted in contract awards about as often as proposals listing such employees. Some States Lack Recommended Ethics Provisions; Enforcement Approaches Differ Widely
Many states, in an effort to help ensure open and fair competition among contractors, have established ethics policies. However, more than one-third of the states lack one or more of the key ethics provisions, such as those prohibiting certain postemployment activities and conflicts of interest, which ABA and other organizations recommend as critical to state efforts aimed at protecting competitive contracting. To address the disparities in state ethics policies, model laws prepared by organizations such as ABA offer frameworks that states can use to strengthen their ethics policies. State Strategies to Hold Contractors Accountable Are Focused More on Compliance With Program Rules Than on Results
Several states have established practices to help ensure that contract awardees are held accountable for program results, which provides added assurance that these states will receive the services for which they paid. These practices include performance measures states use when they assess contractor progress toward achieving program results. However, program officials in most states indicated that they rely on traditional accountability strategies, such as audits, that focus more on compliance with program rules than on results. To estimate the extent of national movement by former state employees to positions at social service contractors, we obtained information from federal and state program managers in the child support enforcement and Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) programs. We supplemented these data by interviewing officials of public employee unions and other organizations. We examined state ethics laws, policies, and enforcement approaches and their federal counterparts to determine the extent to which state ethics laws and policies parallel generally accepted ethics standards, as defined by the American Bar Association, contracting experts, and others. We also interviewed state program officials in the four selected states to identify the practices they used to hold contractors accountable for program results. In addition, these four states were using contractors to provide child support enforcement services or to design related automated systems. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on states' social service contracting, focusing on: (1) the extent to which state government employees have moved to positions at social service contractors and the impact such movement has had on the management of publicly provided social services; (2) determining the relative success in winning contracts by contractors who hired state employees and contractors who did not; (3) state ethics laws, policies, and enforcement approaches that address the employment of former state employees and other related issues; and (4) state practices for holding contractors accountable for achieving program results through contracted services.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) since 1993, 11 of 42 state child support enforcement directors who left their government positions accepted managerial positions with contractors providing child support enforcement services, according to federal and state program officials; (2) similarly, since 1993, federal and state officials indicated that 10 of the 41 high-level Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) managers who left state services accepted positions with social service contractors; (3) when the four states GAO examined lost child support enforcement and TANF managers and other staff, officials indicated that they experienced short-term difficulties because they were required to train staff selected to fill the managerial vacancies; (4) although, nationwide, these 21 directors and managers left the government to accept positions with social service contractors, GAO's review of 59 contract proposals in four states found that proposals listing former state employees as key personnel did not result in contract awards any more frequently than did proposals not listing such employees; (5) this was the case for both the child support enforcement and TANF-related programs; (6) GAO's analysis also showed that proposals listing former employees from the same state in which the bidding took place resulted in contracts about as frequently as did proposals not listing such employees; (7) most states have established some ethics policies designed to help ensure open and fair contracting by adopting provisions determined by the American Bar Association (ABA) and other organizations to be critical in prohibiting certain postemployment practices and conflicts of interest; (8) however, more than one-third of the states have ethics policies that lack one or more of these provisions; (9) among the four states GAO examined, enforcement approaches to help ensure compliance with applicable ethics provisions differed widely; (10) to address these inconsistencies, model laws prepared by ABA and others offer possible frameworks for strengthening state ethics policies; (11) once contracts have been awarded, several states have instituted mechanisms aimed at holding contractors accountable for program results; (12) these mechanisms include measures states apply when they assess contractor performance; and (13) while these states have established practices to assess contractor progress toward achieving program results, many others generally rely on basic accountability measures that focus on compliance with program rules rather than on results. |
gao_GAO-06-946 | gao_GAO-06-946_0 | As shown in figure 2, under these regulations, operators must identify and assess segments of their pipelines that are located in “high consequence areas,” which are highly populated or frequently used areas, such as parks, where pipeline leaks or ruptures could have the greatest impact on public safety. Using the results of the assessments, operators must repair or replace any defective sections of pipeline. Gas Integrity Management Benefits Public Safety, although Operators Have Some Implementation Concerns, and Performance Measures Could Be Improved
The gas integrity management program is designed to improve pipeline safety by supplementing existing standard safety requirements with risk- based management principles, including performance measures to monitor progress. For the first time, all operators are required to systematically assess the condition of their pipelines in high consequence areas and make identified repairs. As of December 31, 2005, operators report having assessed about 33 percent of their pipelines in high consequence areas and completed over 2,000 repairs. In addition, we estimate that up to 68 percent of people living along natural gas transmission pipelines are located in highly populated areas and are expected to receive additional protection as operators continue to assess and repair their pipelines in these areas. Early Indicators Show That Integrity Management Is Beneficial, Despite Some Operators’ Concerns about Implementation
Although the integrity management program is still being implemented, a number of representatives from pipeline industry organizations, state pipeline agencies, safety advocate groups, and operators we contacted agree that integrity management benefits public safety because it requires all operators to systematically assess their pipelines to gain a comprehensive knowledge about the risks to their pipeline systems. Overall, most state pipeline agency officials told us that these tools are useful; although about half of the state officials with whom we spoke have found it difficult to schedule the required training courses, and the majority have some concerns about the adequacy of their staffing. To address these concerns, PHMSA has taken steps to make it easier for state inspectors to attend training and supports a proposal from states to provide additional funding that could be used for staffing needs. PHMSA and states have begun inspections and expect to complete the first round of inspections no later than 2009. PHMSA and state officials reported that the initial results from these inspections show that operators are doing well in implementing the assessment and repair requirements of the integrity management program, but they need to improve documentation of their program’s processes. First Round of Inspections Is Expected to Be Completed by 2009 and Initial Inspections Show Operators Are Making Good Progress in Conducting Assessments
PHMSA and state pipeline agencies plan to conduct more than 700 gas integrity management inspections, with the majority expected to be completed no later than 2009. As the program matures, PHMSA’s performance measures should allow the agency to quantitatively demonstrate the program’s impact on the safety of pipelines. Scope and Methodology
The Pipeline Safety Improvement Act of 2002 directed GAO to assess the effects on public safety stemming from the gas transmission pipeline integrity management program. Accordingly, the objectives of our report were to examine (1) the effect on public safety of the gas transmission pipeline integrity management program and (2) the plans of the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) and state pipeline safety agencies to oversee gas transmission pipeline operators’ implementation of integrity management requirements. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Pipeline Safety Improvement Act of 2002 established a risk-based program for gas transmission pipelines--the integrity management program. The program requires operators of natural and other gas transmission pipelines to identify "high consequence areas" where pipeline incidents would most severely affect public safety, such as those occurring in highly populated or frequented areas. Operators must assess pipelines in these areas for safety risks and repair or replace any defective segments. Operators must also submit data on performance measures to the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA). The 2002 act also directed GAO to assess this program's effects on public safety. Accordingly, we examined (1) the effect on public safety of the integrity management program and (2) PHMSA and state pipeline agencies' plans to oversee operators' implementation of program requirements. To fulfill these objectives, GAO interviewed 51 gas pipeline operators and surveyed all state pipeline agencies.
What GAO Found
The gas integrity management program is designed to benefit public safety by supplementing existing safety requirements with risk-based management principles that focus on safety risks in high consequence areas, such as highly populated or frequented areas. Early indications show that the condition of transmission pipelines is improving as operators complete assessments and related repairs of their pipelines. For example, as of December 31, 2005, operators had assessed 33 percent of pipelines in high consequence areas and completed over 2,000 repairs. Furthermore, up to 68 percent of the population living near gas transmission pipelines is expected to benefit from improved pipeline safety because they live in highly populated areas. Representatives from the pipeline industry, safety advocacy groups, and state pipeline safety agencies generally agree that integrity management improves public safety, but operators noted that the program can be costly to implement and cited concerns with implementing the program, such as meeting the documentation requirements. PHMSA's performance measures should demonstrate the impact of the program over time. However, we are recommending revisions to improve the measures. For example, adjusting the incident reporting requirement to account for changes in the price of natural gas would allow PHMSA to more accurately track trends in pipeline incidents. PHMSA and states plan to use a variety of inspection tools to oversee operators' implementation of integrity management requirements and expect to complete the first round of inspections no later than 2009. To assist in conducting these inspections, PHMSA has developed a range of tools, including guidance documents and training courses for inspectors. Overall, state agencies have found these tools to be useful, although some states have found it difficult to schedule the required training courses and have some concerns about the adequacy of their staffing. To address these concerns, PHMSA is taking steps to make it easier for state inspectors to attend the training and supports providing additional funding to states. Initial results from 20 federal inspections and 117 state inspections show that operators are making good progress in assessing pipelines and making repairs, but they generally need to better document their decisions and processes. |
gao_GAO-02-846 | gao_GAO-02-846_0 | In June 2001, the Air Force proposed reducing the fleet from 93 to 60 aircraft and reducing the number of combat-coded aircraft to 36. Decision to Reduce and Consolidate the B-1Bs Based on Budget Concerns, Military Judgment, and Incomplete Cost Estimates
The decision to reduce the B-1B force was not based on a formal analysis of how a smaller B-1B force would impact DOD’s ability to meet wartime requirements. Air Force officials explained that their decision to reduce the fleet from 93 to 60 was made in response to an OSD suggestion to eliminate the entire B-1B fleet and to address significant funding shortages in the B-1B modification program. As a result, it is not clear whether they chose the most cost-effective alternative. As a result, Congress delayed implementation until the Air Force completed a review of bomber force structure and provided information on alternative missions and basing plans. The Air Force began relocating and retiring B-1Bs in July 2002. Guard B-1B Units Have Similar Missions, Lower Flying Hour Costs and Are at Least as Capable as Active Units
In comparing their assigned missions, flying hour costs, mission capable rates, aircrew experience, and operational readiness inspections, we found that Guard units (1) were assigned responsibility for substantially the same types of missions as their active duty counterparts, (2) had lower flying hour and higher mission capable rates during fiscal years 1999-2001, and (3) had more experienced crewmembers than the active duty units in terms of hours flown. We also found that active and Guard units received similar scores in their most recent operational readiness inspections. However, the Guard units’ mission capable rates were less affected. Guard B-1B Aircrews Are Generally More Experienced Than Their Active Duty Counterparts
The Air National Guard’s B-1B pilots and weapon systems officers are generally more experienced than their active duty counterparts. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To determine what types of analyses the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Air Force did of wartime requirements and basing options before deciding on the number of aircraft to retain and where to base them, we obtained and analyzed the only contemporaneous documents that were available from the Air Force—a briefing presented to the Secretary and the Chief of Staff of the Air Force on the fleet reduction and consolidation and a memorandum from the Secretary of the Air Force to the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) outlining the Air Force’s proposal to reduce and consolidate the fleet. B-1B Conventional Upgrades. B-1B Bomber: Evaluation of Air Force Report on B-1B Operational Readiness Assessment. | Why GAO Did This Study
The B-1B began operations in 1986 as a long-range heavy bomber designed primarily to carry nuclear munitions. Although the B-1B's nuclear mission was withdrawn in October 1997, the Air Force continues to rely on the B-1B to support conventional wartime missions. The B-1B has the largest payload of the Air Force's three bombers, and recent modifications have provided the capability to deliver near precision munitions. Future upgrades to the B-1B are expected to provide greater flexibility by enabling it to carry three different types of bombs simultaneously and eliminate some of its long-term survivability and maintainability problems by improving its radar warning systems, jamming ability, and other electronic countermeasures. In May 2001, the Office of the Secretary of Defense suggested retiring the entire B-1B fleet by October 2001. In June 2001, the Air Force proposed an alternative that reduced the B-1B fleet from 93 to 60 aircraft and consolidated them at two active duty locations instead of the three active duty and two National Guard locations that housed the aircraft. Congress delayed implementation of the fleet reduction until the Air Force completed a review of bomber force structure and provided a report on alternative missions and basing plans. The Air Force began consolidating the fleet in July 2002.
What GAO Found
GAO found that Air Force officials did not conduct a formal analysis to assess how a reduction in B-1B bombers from 93 to 60 would affect the Department of Defense's ability to meet wartime requirements. Nor did they complete a comprehensive analysis of potential basing options to know whether they were choosing the most cost-effective alternative. A comparison of active and Guard units' missions, flying hour costs, and capabilities showed that active and Guard units were responsible for substantially the same missions but Guard units had lower flying hour costs and higher mission-capable rates than their active duty counterparts. Additionally, the Guard's B-1B aircrew members were generally more experienced, in terms of the number of hours flown, than the active duty B-1B aircrews because most Guard aircrew members served on active duty prior to joining the Air National Guard. |
gao_GAO-14-151 | gao_GAO-14-151_0 | Background
OMB Circular A-126 sets forth executive branch policy with respect to the management and use of government aviation assets. In addition to other requirements for federal agencies, the circular directs agencies that use government aircraft to report semiannually to GSA each use of such aircraft for nonmission travel by senior federal officials, members of the families of such officials, and any nonfederal travelers, with certain exceptions. GSA’s Intelligence Agency Exemption for Reporting Senior Federal Official Travel for Nonmission Purposes Is Inconsistent with Executive Branch Requirements, and GSA Has Not Identified a Basis for the Exemption
Through issued executive branch documents, agencies are required to provide data about senior federal official nonmission travel—except for classified trips—to GSA, and GSA has been directed to collect this specified information. Specifically, GSA exempted intelligence agencies from reporting any information on senior federal travel on government aircraft regardless of whether it is classified or unclassified. GSA senior officials told us that the exemption for intelligence agencies enabled intelligence agencies to comply with Executive Order 12333, which requires the heads of departments and agencies with organizations in the intelligence community or the heads of such organizations, as appropriate, to “protect intelligence and intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure with guidance from the Director of Central Intelligence.” However, GSA has not articulated how an exemption for senior federal official travel data for nonmission purposes is necessary for agencies to Identifying an adequate basis for comply with Executive Order 12333.the intelligence agency reporting exemption or removing the exemption from its regulations if an adequate basis cannot be identified could help GSA ensure its regulations for senior federal official travel comply with executive branch requirements. GSA Does Not Identify Which Agencies Do Not Report Senior Federal Travel Data as a Result of the Intelligence Agency Exemption, Which Limits the Accuracy of Its Reports
GSA aggregates the data reported by agencies on senior federal travel to produce publically available reports describing the use of government aircraft by senior federal officials and how government aircraft are used to support agency missions. did not indicate that additional flights may have been omitted on the basis of GSA’s exemption for intelligence agencies. These officials stated that this is because they do not distinguish between instances where an agency reports no information because the agency is invoking the exemption and instances where the agency reports no information for some other reason, such as that no flights were taken on agency aircraft. to obtain follow-up information from agencies that did not provide travel data in order to determine why agencies had not reported data. Collecting additional information on which agencies are invoking the exemption and including such information in its reports could help ensure more complete reporting on the use of government aircraft, which could help provide GSA with reasonable assurance that its Federal Official Travel Reports are accurate and also provide the public a more comprehensive understanding of these trips. GSA has not identified the basis—specifically, a source of authority or rationale—for this exemption as applied to senior federal official travel for nonmission purposes that would allow for it to deviate from executive branch specifications. Recommendations for Executive Action
We recommend that the Administrator of GSA take the following two actions:
To help ensure that GSA regulations comply with applicable executive branch requirements, identify an adequate basis for any exemption that allows intelligence agencies not to report to GSA unclassified data on senior federal official travel for nonmission purposes. To help ensure the accuracy of its Senior Federal Official Travel Reports, collect additional information from agencies on instances where travel is not being reported because of an exemption for intelligence agencies, as opposed to some other reason, and include such information in its reports where departmental data do not include trips pursuant to an agency’s exercise of a reporting exemption. In commenting on our report, GSA concurred with both of the recommendations and identified actions to address them. As a consequence, the exemption for intelligence agencies, which is only contained in the FMR, will no longer be applicable to unclassified data on senior federal official travel for nonmission purposes. | Why GAO Did This Study
The federal government owns or leases over 1,700 aircraft to accomplish a wide variety of missions. Federal agencies are generally required to report trips taken by senior federal officials on their aircraft to GSA unless the trips are classified pursuant to executive branch requirements. In February 2013, GAO reported on DOJ senior executives' use of DOJ aviation assets for nonmission purposes for fiscal years 2007 through 2011. GAO identified several issues with respect to the implementation of a provision of GSA regulations that exempts intelligence agencies from reporting information about government aircraft to GSA and that provision's application to unclassified data on senior federal official travel for nonmission purposes.
GAO was asked to review GSA's oversight of executives' use of government aircraft for nonmission purposes. This report addresses the extent to which (1) GSA's reporting exemption for intelligence agencies is consistent with executive branch requirements and (2) GSA ensures the accuracy of its reporting on the use of government aircraft by senior federal officials. GAO reviewed relevant executive branch requirements and GSA regulations, as well as data submitted by DOJ to GSA on trips taken by senior federal officials on DOJ aircraft and interviewed GSA officials.
What GAO Found
The exemption in General Services Administration (GSA) regulations that allows intelligence agencies not to report unclassified data on senior federal official travel for nonmission purposes is not consistent with executive branch requirements, and GSA has not provided a basis for deviating from these requirements. Specifically, executive branch documents—including Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-126, OMB Bulletin 93-11, and a 1993 presidential memorandum to the heads of all executive departments and agencies—require agencies to report to GSA, and for GSA to collect data, on senior federal official travel on government aircraft for nonmission purposes, except for trips that are classified. As a result, GSA is not collecting all specified unclassified data as directed, and GSA has not provided a basis for deviating from executive branch requirements. Identifying an adequate basis for the intelligence agency reporting exemption or removing the exemption from its regulations if a basis cannot be identified could help GSA ensure its regulations for senior federal official travel comply with executive branch requirements.
GSA aggregates data on senior federal official travel to create publically available Senior Federal Official Travel Reports that, among other things, provide transparency of senior federal officials' use of government aircraft. However, GSA does not determine which agencies' travel is not reported under the exemption for intelligence agencies. For example, in February 2013 GAO found that the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)—which is a member of the intelligence community—did not report to GSA, based on the intelligence agency exemption, information for 395 unclassified nonmission flights taken by the Attorney General, FBI Director, and other Department of Justice (DOJ) executives from fiscal years 2009 through 2011. However, GSA's Senior Federal Official Travel Reports GAO reviewed for those years provided information on flights for other DOJ components but did not indicate that additional flights may have been omitted on the basis of GSA's exemption for intelligence agencies. GSA senior officials stated that they do not collect this information because they do not distinguish between instances where an agency reports no information because it is invoking the exemption or some other reason, such as that no flights were taken on its aircraft. However, these officials also stated that it could be possible to obtain follow-up information from agencies that did not provide travel data in order to determine why agencies had not reported data. Consistent with Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government , if GSA collected additional information from agencies on instances where nonmission travel was not reported because of the exemption for intelligence agencies, as opposed to some other reason, and included such information in its reports, it could help GSA ensure the accuracy of its Senior Federal Official Travel Reports.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that GSA identify the basis of its reporting exemption, and collect additional information when travel is not being reported. GSA concurred and identified actions to address our recommendations. |
gao_GAO-01-584 | gao_GAO-01-584_0 | Background
The final medical privacy regulation requires that most providers obtain patient consent to use or disclose health information before engaging in treatment, payment, or health care operations. The consent form must alert patients to the provider’s notice of privacy practices (described in a separate document) and notify them of their right to request restrictions on the use and disclosure of their information for routine health care purposes. Most Providers Obtain Consent to Disclose Patient Data for Insurance Payment
The extent to which the privacy regulation’s consent requirement will be a departure from business as usual varies by type of provider. The new consent requirement makes several important changes to current practices that have implications for patients and providers. In general, these organizations do not favor written consents for routine uses of patient information, although they support the regulation’s requirement to provide patients with privacy notices. Under the regulation, a patient must sign a consent form before a pharmacist can begin filling the prescription. AHA and Allina Health System representatives stated that the consent requirement could impede the ability of hospitals to collect patient information prior to admission, thus creating administrative delays for hospitals and inconvenience for some patients. Physician and hospital groups expressed concern that the requirement would hinder their ability to conduct health care management reviews using archived records. Concluding Observations
The privacy regulation expands the scope of the consent process to include the use and disclosure of personal health information for a wide range of purposes. | What GAO Found
The Department of Health and Human Services issued a final regulation in December 2000 that established rights for patients with respect to the use of their medical records. The regulation requires that most providers obtain patient consent to use or disclose health information before engaging in treatment, payment, or health care operations. The privacy regulation's consent requirement will be more of a departure from current practice for some providers than for others. Most health care providers, with the exception of pharmacists, obtain some type of consent from patients to release information to insurers for payment purposes. The new requirement obligates most providers to obtain consent before they can use and disclose patient information. It also broadens the scope of consent to include treatment and a range of health care management activities. Supporters of the requirement believe that the process of signing a consent form provides an opportunity to inform and focus patients on their privacy rights. Others, however, are skeptical and assert that most patients will simply sign the form with little thought. In addition, provider and other organizations interviewed are concerned that the new consent requirement poses implementation difficulties. They contend that it could cause delays in filling prescriptions for patients who do not have written consents on file with their pharmacies, impede the ability of hospitals to obtain patient information prior to admission, hamper efforts to assess health care quality by precluding the use of patient records from years past, and increase administrative burdens on providers. |
gao_GAO-08-1164T | gao_GAO-08-1164T_0 | DHS Has Made Some Progress in Acquisition Management
We have identified three key performance areas for acquisition management: assessing and organizing acquisition functions to meet agency needs; developing clear and transparent policies and processes for all acquisitions; developing an acquisition workforce to implement and monitor acquisitions. The following summarizes each of these three areas: Assessing and organizing the acquisition function: Since it was created in 2003, DHS has recognized the need to improve acquisition outcomes, and has taken some steps to organize and assess the acquisition function. DHS has worked to integrate the disparate acquisition processes and systems that the component organizations brought with them when the department was created. We have ongoing work on DHS’s acquisition workforce scheduled to be released later this year. Planning for Procurement and Major Acquisitions Need Improvement
Our work on both services contracting and major investments has consistently identified the need for improved acquisition planning to better ensure taxpayer dollars are spent prudently. For services procured through methods such as interagency and performance-based contracting, we found acquisition planning was lacking. To help ensure that the government does not lose control over and accountability for such decisions, longstanding federal procurement policy requires attention to the risk that government decisions may be influenced by, rather than independent from, contractor judgments when contracting for services that closely support inherently governmental functions. We found that DHS conducted limited evaluation of contracting alternatives to ensure good value when selecting among interagency contracts. Our prior reviews of complex DHS investments using a performance-based approach point to a number of shortcomings. Consistent with these findings, our 2008 report on performance-based acquisitions, for which we reviewed contracts for eight major investments at Coast Guard, CBP, and TSA, found that contracts for investments that did not have well-defined requirements, or a complete set of measurable performance standards, or both, at the time of contract award or the start of work experienced cost overruns, schedule delays, or did not otherwise meet performance expectations. Some of the four key oversight reviews have begun under this program, but management assessments, or evaluation of the outcomes of acquisition methods and contracted services, have not been conducted. Our work has found that the CPO continues to face challenges in maintaining the staffing levels needed to fully implement the oversight program, and CPO authority to ensure that components comply with the procurement oversight plan remains unclear. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since it was created in 2003, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has obligated billions of dollars annually to meet its expansive homeland security mission. The department's acquisitions support complex and critical trade, transportation, border security, and information technology investments. In fiscal year 2007, DHS spent over $12 billion on procurements to meet this mission including spending for complex services and major investments. Prior GAO work has found that while DHS has made some initial progress in developing its acquisition function since 2003, acquisition planning and oversight for procurement and major acquisitions need improvement. This testimony discusses GAO's findings in these areas and is based on GAO's body of work on acquisition management issues.
What GAO Found
Recognizing the need to improve its acquisition outcomes, DHS has taken some steps to integrate disparate acquisition processes and systems that the component organizations brought with them when the department was formed. However, we have reported that more needs to be done to develop clear and transparent policies and processes for all acquisitions, and to develop an acquisition workforce to implement and monitor acquisitions. With regard to acquisition planning, DHS did not assess the risk of hiring contractors to perform management and professional support services that have the potential to increase the risk that government decisions may be influenced by, rather than independent from, contractor judgments. Planning for services procured through interagency and performance-based contracting methods was also lacking. For example, DHS did not always consider alternatives to ensure good value when selecting among interagency contracts. Shortcomings in DHS's use of a performance-based approach for complex acquisitions included a lack of well-defined requirements, a complete set of measurable performance standards, or both, at the time of contract award or the start of work. Contracts for several investments we reviewed experienced cost overruns, schedule delays, or less than expected performance. Acquisition oversight also has consistently been identified as needing improvement. While the Chief Procurement Officer (CPO) has recently implemented a departmentwide oversight program, evaluations of the outcomes of acquisition methods and contracted services have not yet been conducted. Further, the CPO continues to face challenges in maintaining the staffing levels needed to fully implement the oversight program, and CPO authority to ensure that components comply with the procurement oversight plan remains unclear. |
gao_GAO-14-342T | gao_GAO-14-342T_0 | According to CBP, it is one of the largest, most important law enforcement systems currently in use, and is the primary system available to CBP officers and agents from other departments for use in determining the admissibility of persons wishing to enter the country. The system is managed by CBP’s Office of Passenger Systems Program Office and is currently hosted at CBP’s datacenter. TECS’s obsolescence also makes it difficult and expensive to maintain and support. It is to be fully operational by March 2015. Schedule and Cost of Both TECS Modernization Programs Are Unclear
CBP has begun delivering functionality to its users; however, its schedule and cost commitments continue to change and are still being revised. Specifically, CBP intends to modernize the functionality, data, and aging infrastructure of legacy TECS and move it to DHS’s data centers. To date, CBP has completed one of these five projects, having completed its deployment of functionality to improve its secondary inspection processes to air, sea, and land ports of entry in 2013. CBP is in the process of revising its schedule baseline for the second time in under a year, making it unclear when the program ultimately intends to deliver needed functionality. Exacerbating this situation is the fact that CBP has not developed its master schedule sufficiently to effectively manage work activities or monitor the program’s progress. However, as previously stated, the program is in the process of revising its estimate, and thus, it is unclear how much it will cost to complete the program. Meanwhile, ICE is replanning its $818 million TECS Mod program, having determined in June 2013 that the system under development was not technically viable and could not support ICE’s needs—this coming after having already reduced the scope of its initial program installment by about 70 percent due to protracted technical difficulties and schedule delays. In January 2014, ICE reported that it had rebaselined its program requirements and that it anticipates having its revised cost and schedule estimates finalized this coming spring. TECS Modernization’s Risk Management Is Generally Consistent with Leading Practices, but Requirements Management Has Had Mixed Results
Both CBP and ICE implemented risk management practices that are generally—though not fully—consistent with leading practices, and both had mixed results in managing program requirements. Specifically, neither program identified all known risks, nor escalated them for timely review by senior management. ICE issued new requirements guidance for the program in March 2013 that is consistent with leading practices, but has yet to demonstrate that these have been fully implemented. DHS’s Governance Bodies Have Taken Actions Aligned with Leading Practices, but Incomplete and Inaccurate Data Have Limited Their Effectiveness
DHS’s governance bodies have taken actions to oversee the two TECS Mod programs that are generally aligned with leading practices. Specifically, they have monitored TECS Mod performance and progress and have ensured that corrective actions have been identified and tracked. However, a lack of complete, timely, and accurate data have affected the ability of these governance bodies to make informed and timely decisions, thus limiting their effectiveness. Until these governance bodies base their reviews of performance on timely, complete, and accurate data, they will be limited in their ability to effectively provide oversight and to make timely decisions. Implementation of Recommendations Could Improve DHS’s Efforts to Develop and Implement Its TECS Mod Programs
In our report, we made several recommendations to improve DHS’s efforts to develop and implement its TECS Mod programs. Specifically, we recommended that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the CBP Commissioner to: (1) develop an integrated master schedule that accurately reflects all of the program’s work activities, as well as the timing, sequencing, and dependencies between them; (2) ensure that all significant risks associated with the TECS Mod acquisition are documented in the program’s risk and issue inventory—including acquisition risks mentioned in our report—and are briefed to senior management, as appropriate; (3) revise and implement the TECS Mod program’s risk management strategy and guidance to include clear thresholds for when to escalate risks to senior management, and implement as appropriate; and (4) revise and implement the TECS Mod program’s requirements management guidance to include the validation of requirements to ensure that each is unique, unambiguous, and testable. DHS concurred with all but one of our recommendations, disagreeing with the recommendation regarding the weaknesses in CBP’s schedule. However, given the weaknesses in CBP’s master schedule, we continue to believe that management will be unable to determine how a slip in the completion date of a particular task may affect the overall project or program schedule, and thus, absent any changes, continuing to use it as a tool to track progress will remain ineffective. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. | Why GAO Did This Study
DHS's border enforcement system, known as TECS, is the primary system for determining admissibility of persons to the United States. It is used to prevent terrorism, and provide border security and law enforcement, case management, and intelligence functions for multiple federal, state, and local agencies. It has become increasingly difficult and expensive to maintain and is unable to support new mission requirements. In 2008, DHS began an effort to modernize the system. It is being managed as two separate programs by CBP and ICE.
In December 2013, GAO reported that DHS needed to strengthen its efforts to modernize these key enforcement systems. This statement summarizes that report. Specifically, it covers (1) the scope and status of the two TECS Mod programs, (2) selected program management practices for TECS Mod, (3) the extent to which DHS is executing effective oversight and governance of the two TECS Mod programs, and (4) the importance of addressing our recommendations for improving DHS's development efforts.
What GAO Found
The schedule and cost for the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) border enforcement system modernization program known as TECS Mod that is managed by Customs and Border Protection's (CBP) continue to change; while the part managed in parallel by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) is undergoing major revisions to its scope, schedule, and cost after discovering that its initial solution is not technically viable. CBP's $724 million program intends to modernize the functionality, data, and aging infrastructure of legacy TECS and move it to DHS's data centers by 2016. To date, CBP has deployed functionality to improve its secondary inspection processes to air and sea ports of entry and, more recently, to land ports of entry in 2013. However, CBP is in the process of revising its schedule baseline for the second time in under a year. Further, CBP has not developed its master schedule sufficiently to reliably manage work activities or monitor program progress. These factors raise questions about the certainty of CBP's remaining schedule commitments. Regarding ICE's $818 million TECS Mod program, it is redesigning and replanning its program, having determined in June 2013 that its initial solution was not viable and could not support ICE's needs. As a result, ICE largely halted development and is now assessing design alternatives and is revising its schedule and cost estimates. Program officials stated the revisions will be complete in spring 2014. Until ICE completes the replanning effort, it is unclear what functionality it will deliver, when it will deliver it, or what it will cost to do so, thus putting it in jeopardy of not completing the modernization by its 2015 deadline.
CBP and ICE have managed many risks in accordance with some leading practices, but they have had mixed results in managing requirements for their programs. In particular, neither program identified all known risks, nor escalated them for timely management review. Further, CBP's guidance reflects most leading practices for effectively managing requirements, but important requirements development activities were underway before such guidance was established. ICE, meanwhile, operated without requirements management guidance for years, and its requirements activities were mismanaged, resulting in testing failures and delays. ICE issued requirements guidance in March 2013 that is consistent with leading practices, but it has not yet been implemented.
DHS's governance bodies have taken actions to oversee the two TECS Mod programs that are generally aligned with leading practices. Specifically, they have monitored TECS Mod performance and progress and have ensured that corrective actions have been identified and tracked. However, a lack of complete, timely, and accurate data have affected the ability of these governance bodies to make informed and timely decisions, thus limiting their effectiveness. Until these governance bodies base their performance reviews on timely, complete, and accurate data, they will be constrained in their ability to effectively provide oversight.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is making no new recommendations in this statement. In its December 2013 report, GAO recommended that DHS improve its efforts to manage requirements and risk, as well as its governance of the TECS Mod programs. DHS agreed with all but one of GAO's eight recommendations, disagreeing with the recommendation about improving CBP's master schedule. GAO continues to believe improvements are necessary to validate schedule commitments and monitor progress. |
gao_GAO-05-761T | gao_GAO-05-761T_0 | Food and beverages have been served onboard Amtrak trains since Amtrak was created. Since then, Amtrak has contracted out the responsibility for the commissaries and for ordering and stocking all food, beverages, and related items under a contract that expires in September 2006. Gate Gourmet charges Amtrak for the items used, as well as for labor, management, and other fees. Amtrak’s financial records show that for every dollar Amtrak earns in food and beverage revenue, it spends about $2—a pattern that has held consistent for all 3 years we reviewed. 2.) Amtrak’s financial records also indicate that Amtrak has lost a total of almost $245 million for fiscal year 2002 through fiscal year 2004 on food and beverage service. While Amtrak’s labor costs for its food and beverage service are significant, these costs are part of Amtrak’s overall labor cost structure, and as such, are beyond the scope of work we did for this testimony. Current Contract Does Not Provide Incentives to Reduce or Contain Costs
One way to control costs is to build provisions into a contract that motivate a contractor to keep costs as low as possible. Amtrak’s current cost reimbursable contract with Gate Gourmet creates, if anything, an incentive to increase Amtrak’s costs unless properly monitored. In addition, the contract also provides that Gate Gourmet deduct any trade or quantity discounts on items purchased for Amtrak either immediately from Amtrak’s invoices or retroactively based on the proportion of Amtrak’s purchases. Management Controls Over Food and Beverage Operations Not Fully Exercised
We identified five types of management controls that Amtrak did not fully exercise regarding oversight of its food and beverage service. Amtrak’s contract requires Gate Gourmet to provide an independently audited annual report within 120 days following the expiration of each contract year; this report must also be certified by Gate Gourmet officials. Amtrak did not adequately monitor its purchase price information for food and beverage items purchased by Gate Gourmet. Amtrak also does not include any information about its food and beverage expenses in any of its internal or external reports, including its monthly performance reports, its internal quarterly progress reports, or its annual consolidated financial statements. Absent this information, it is difficult for internal and external stakeholders to determine the amount of expense attributable to the food and beverage service and to gauge the profit or loss of the operation. This hinders oversight and accountability. Conclusions
Amtrak’s food and beverage service may represent a relatively small part of the company’s operating budget, but it speaks volumes about Amtrak’s need to get its operations in better order. 2. 3. Create separate revenue and expenditure reporting and other basic food service metrics to allow for internal and external accountability for its food and beverage service and create incentives to reduce costs and/or increase revenue. 4. | Why GAO Did This Study
Amtrak has provided food and beverage service on its trains since it began operations in 1971. Amtrak has struggled since its inception to earn sufficient revenues and depends heavily on federal subsidies to remain solvent. While a small part of Amtrak's overall expenditures, Amtrak's food and beverage service illustrates concerns in Amtrak's overall cost containment, management and accountability issues. This testimony is based on GAO's work on Amtrak's management and performance as well as additional information gained from Amtrak and other transportation providers. This testimony focuses on (1) the provisions written into Amtrak's contract with Gate Gourmet to control costs, (2) the types of management controls Amtrak exercises to prevent overpayments, and (3) the information Amtrak collects and uses to monitor the service and to report to stakeholders such as its Board of Directors.
What GAO Found
Amtrak's financial records show that for every dollar Amtrak earns in food and beverage revenue, it spends about $2--a pattern that has held consistent for all 3 years GAO reviewed. In GAO's estimation, Amtrak has lost a total of almost $245 million from fiscal year 2002 through fiscal year 2004 on food and beverage service. Since 1999, Amtrak has contracted out the responsibility to Gate Gourmet International (Gate Gourmet) for managing commissaries and for ordering and stocking all food and beverages and related items managing under a contract that expires in September 2006. Amtrak's current cost reimbursable contract with Gate Gourmet creates, if anything, an incentive to increase Amtrak's costs unless properly monitored. Gate Gourmet can charge Amtrak for the cost of the food and beverage items, as well as management, labor, and other expenses. Without defined controls and management, this type of contract structure provides little incentive for a contractor to reduce or contain costs to provide better value to its customer. GAO found five different management controls that Amtrak did not fully exercise regarding oversight of its food and beverage service. These controls include: (1) requiring an independently audited financial report, (2) auditing for all applicable rebates and discounts that Gate Gourmet could have applied to food and beverage items purchased for Amtrak, (3) adequately monitoring purchase price information for its food and beverage items, (4) not considering Amtrak's food and beverage labor costs, as a part of product markups, and that (5) not utilizing Amtrak's procurement department in negotiating the current contract. Information that could provide both internal and external accountability for the food and beverage function is limited. Amtrak does not include any information about its food and beverage expenses in any of its internal or external reports, including its monthly performance reports, its internal quarterly progress reports or its annual consolidated financial statements. This lack of information makes it difficult for internal and external stakeholders to gauge the profit or loss of the operation as well as to assign accountability. |
gao_GAO-14-91 | gao_GAO-14-91_0 | Figure 1 depicts the process for paying financial aid and other funds to students. Because these schools were generally larger, their student populations represented about 40 percent of total enrollment. At Least 852 Schools, Including Many Large Public Colleges, Have College Card Agreements
In our review of industry reports and school and provider websites, and our interviews with card providers, we identified 852 U.S. colleges and universities with college card agreements as of July 2013, representing about 11 percent of all schools participating in federal student aid programs. 2). Comprehensive data are not available on how many students choose to enroll in a college card. One Nonbank Financial Firm Had More Than Half of the College Card Market
As of July 2013, one provider, Higher One Holdings, Inc., held about a 57 percent share of the college card market, as measured by number of agreements between schools and card providers, as well as number of students at schools with agreements, according to our analysis. However, fees charged by credit unions typically were the same or lower than those charged by college cards. Data Unavailable on Total Fees Paid
Although college card fee schedules we reviewed generally were not higher than those of basic or student checking accounts, little information is available on the frequency with which students incur ATM, PIN, and other fees, and the total amount of college card fees paid by students is unknown. However, it is difficult for students and others to assess the influence of financial incentives on school behavior due to the lack of transparency for card agreements. Presentation of Card and Payment Options Was Not Always Neutral, Raising Questions about Student Choice
Although schools cannot require students to use college cards, federal officials and consumer advocates have raised concerns about the extent to which students have been able to make fully informed choices about whether to enroll in the debit or prepaid cards their schools offer. Some schools also recommended direct deposit over their campus card. In addition, in its best practices recommendations for college cards, NACUBO called for “a fair explanation of services misleading, biased, or aggressive marketing schemes.”
Payments to Schools May Create Potential Conflicts of Interest
Revenue-sharing agreements appear to be declining, but concerns remain that the payments and other benefits schools receive from card providers may motivate schools to encourage the use of college cards or potentially choose the arrangement that provides the schools the most revenue rather than one that provides students the best terms, according to federal officials and consumer advocates. Financial markets function best when consumers are fully informed about financial products and how to choose among them, and NACUBO has recommended that schools present students with information about their college cards in a neutral fashion. On another key issueaccess to fundsEducation’s regulations require that college card providers offer “convenient access” to ATMs or a bank branch office where students can withdraw federal student aid without incurring cost, but the agency has not specified what constitutes this level of access. Matter for Congressional Consideration
To help ensure a comprehensive understanding of the agreements between colleges and debit and prepaid card providers, Congress should consider requiring that providers file these agreements with CFPB for public review, and provide other relevant information, such as payments between schools and the providers and fees charged to students, and that Education provide reasonably prominent notice of the availability of such information. Recommendations for Executive Action
To help ensure that students can make an objective choice about whether to use a college card selected by their schools and have free and convenient access to federal student aid funds, the Secretary of Education should take the following actions: In consultation with CFPB, develop requirements that schools and college card providers present students with objective and neutral information on their options for receiving federal student aid payments. Provide a specific definition for what constitutes convenient access to ATMs or branch offices of debit and prepaid card providers where students will not incur costs in making cash withdrawals of federal student aid. Agency Comments
We provided a draft of this report to the Department of Education, the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report examines (1) functions of college cards and the characteristics of schools and card providers offering the cards, and (2) benefits and concerns regarding these cards. Selection of Schools for Extended Review
To complement our data analysis, we selected nine schools with college card agreements for extended interviews and data collection. To compare college card fees with fees for similar banking services, we also compiled fee information for basic and student checking accounts from five large banks (which account for about 30 percent of the market for large commercial banks) and for credit unions.monthly account maintenance, domestic out-of-network transactions at automated teller machines (ATM), overdraft or insufficient funds, inactivity, wire transfer, and debit transactions using personal identification numbers (PIN). Although there are some similarities, these card programs generally differ from the debit and prepaid cards that some U.S. colleges and universities use to pay financial aid and other funds, which can include federal student aid funds. | Why GAO Did This Study
A growing number of colleges and universities have entered into agreements with financial firms to provide debit and prepaid card services for students. As the number of agreements has grown, questions have arisen over fees and issues such as student choice. This report examines (1) the functions of college cards and the characteristics of schools and card providers offering the cards; and (2) benefits and concerns regarding these cards. GAO reviewed relevant federal laws and regulations, developed a tally of card agreements by reviewing industry reports and school and provider websites, and analyzed data and interviewed officials from federal agencies, banks and other financial firms, students, and industry and consumer groups. GAO selected nine schools (which vary by program length and sector) for extended interviews and data collection.
What GAO Found
At least 852 schools, or 11 percent of U.S. colleges and universities, had agreements to provide debit or prepaid card services to their students as of July 2013, and most offered students the ability to receive federal student aid and other payments on a card. These schools were disproportionately large; their enrollments constituted about 40 percent of all postsecondary students. However, the percentage of students enrolled in their schools' college card programs was unknown. In the majority of agreements, the schools also outsourced to their card provider the process for paying financial aid and other funds via college cards and other methods. Some schools also used college cards as student identification. The dominant provider was Higher One, a nonbank financial firm that had a 57 percent market share in 2013, as measured by number of card agreements.
Benefits of college cards can include convenience for students and cost savings and efficiencies for schools, but concerns exist in a number of areas:
Fees. GAO found that fees charged by college card providers generally were comparable with those for similar products provided by banks, although some college card fees were slightly higher than those of credit unions. However, two large providers charged a fee for card purchases using a personal identification number (PIN) rather than a signature—a fee mainstream debit cards typically do not charge. The total fees students pay are not known, and some providers declined or said they were unable to provide these data to GAO. In 2012, Higher One settled with the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, which alleged unfair and deceptive practices that resulted in consumers paying higher fees.
ATM access. Officials at nine selected schools generally did not report significant issues with the availability of fee-free automated teller machines (ATM) on campus. Although Department of Education regulations for college cards require that schools ensure “convenient access” to fee-free ATMs or bank branches for students receiving federal student aid payments, the agency has not specified what constitutes this level of access. The lack of a more specific definition may make avoiding unnecessary fees difficult for students when making cash withdrawals of federal aid.
Neutrality. GAO found instances in which schools or card providers appeared to encourage students to enroll in a college card rather than present neutral information about payment options. The financial marketplace functions best when consumers are fully informed and have unbiased information. However, schools may have incentives to influence student choice because some receive payments from card providers based on the number of card accounts or transactions, leading some consumer advocates to question whether schools always act in their students' best interests. Furthermore, the contracts between schools and card providers are not publicly available and data on these cards are limited, in contrast to another college-related product—affinity credit cards bearing the institution's name or logo—for which key information must be disclosed. Increased transparency for college card agreements could help ensure that the terms are fair and reasonable for students and the agreements are free from conflicts of interest.
What GAO Recommends
Congress should consider requiring that financial firms providing debit and prepaid card services to colleges file their agreements for public review and provide other relevant information. The Department of Education should (1) specify what constitutes convenient access to ATMs or bank branch offices for students receiving federal student aid funds and (2) develop requirements for schools and card providers to present neutral information to students about their options for receiving federal student aid funds. The Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection agreed with GAO's matter for Congress. Education agreed with GAO's recommendations to it and said it will address these issues in an upcoming process to develop new rules. |
gao_GAO-10-429 | gao_GAO-10-429_0 | Nonresident aliens cannot take some credits and deductions available to residents and citizens. As with U.S. citizens and residents, nonresidents must have a taxpayer identification number in order to file a tax return. Tax law also requires that both resident and nonresident aliens obtain a certificate of compliance, known as a sailing permit, to ensure that their outstanding U.S. tax obligations have been satisfied prior to departing the country. Departing Alien Income Tax Statement). Several Hundred Thousand Individuals File Form 1040NR and It Would Be Difficult to Measure Nonresident Alien Tax Noncompliance
According to IRS data, nonresident alien individuals filed about 634,000 Forms 1040NR for tax year 2007, a small number compared to the 143 million Forms 1040 other individual taxpayers filed for that year. IRS Lacks Comprehensive Data on Nonresident Alien Tax Compliance and Obtaining Data Would Be Challenging
IRS has not developed estimates for three types of nonresident alien tax noncompliance: (1) failing to file a tax return, known as nonfiling, (2) underreporting income on filed returns, and (3) filing Form 1040 instead of Form 1040NR. IRS Has Recently Expanded Nonresident Outreach and Education Efforts, but Nonresidents Still Face Challenges in Fulfilling Their Tax Obligations
IRS’s outreach efforts have focused on presenting information on nonresident tax issues to a variety of audiences. Nonresident Aliens Face Challenges in Fulfilling Their Tax Obligations
According to representatives from groups that work with employers and nonresidents to assist them in fulfilling their tax obligations, nonresident aliens face challenges in fulfilling their tax filing obligations. For example and despite IRS’s outreach and education efforts, some nonresidents and their employers may not be aware of the nonresident alien tax rules. Also, some paid tax return preparers may not be familiar with nonresident alien tax rules. As previously discussed, personal service income of $3,000 or less paid to a nonresident by a foreign employer is not considered to be from U.S. sources for individuals in the U.S. 90 days or less who have no other compensation for services within the U.S. Congress established this threshold in 1936 to permit foreign residents to visit the U.S. for business purposes without being subject to taxes on thecompensation they earn while in the U.S. In discussing this exemption, th Senate noted that the lack of a threshold had created ill will disproportionate to the small amount of revenue raised by taxing fo residents making short bus iness trips to the U.S.
Because the $3,000 threshold has not increased since 1936, it is likely that a greater proportion of nonresident aliens have a filing requirement today than when the threshold was established. Raising the threshold amount could result in lost tax revenue. IRS Has Increased Nonresident Alien Tax Enforcement but May Be Able to Identify Additional Noncompliant Taxpayers
IRS has expanded its enforcement efforts over the past decade. Nonresidents who recognize that IRS does not enforce the sailing permit requirement may assume that IRS will not enforce other requirements, which could lead to broader noncompliance. Congress passed legislation in 1936 to lessen the tax compliance burden for nonresidents paid by foreign employers in the U.S. for short periods of time. Recommendation for Executive Action
We recommend that the Commissioner of Internal Revenue determine if creating an automated program to identify nonresident aliens who may have improperly filed Form 1040 instead of Form 1040NR by using ITIN information would be a cost-effective means to improve compliance. To identify the availability of compliance data, we reviewed IRS documentation on the National Research Program and interviewed IRS research and compliance officials. To provide information on guidance IRS provides to nonresident aliens and associated third parties on tax and filing requirements and any burdens and challenges associated with filing, we reviewed IRS tax forms, guidance, and outreach materials. | Why GAO Did This Study
Every year, the U.S. receives millions of legal visits by foreign individuals. Nonresident aliens--who are neither U.S. citizens nor residents--may be required to file a federal tax return if they earn U.S.- source income, and their noncompliance can contribute to the tax gap. As with U.S. citizens and residents, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) is responsible for ensuring that nonresident aliens fulfill their tax obligations. GAO was asked to (1) identify what data are available on nonresident alien tax filing and compliance, (2) provide information on guidance IRS provides to nonresident aliens and third parties on tax requirements and any challenges associated with filing, and (3) assess actions IRS takes to enforce nonresident alien tax compliance. To meet its objectives, GAO examined IRS and other federal agency documentation, reviewed tax filing and other data, and interviewed IRS officials and other third parties.
What GAO Found
For tax year 2007, nonresident alien individuals filed about 634,000 Forms 1040NR, the U.S. Nonresident Alien Income Tax Return. IRS has not developed estimates for the extent of nonresident alien tax noncompliance because it often lacks information to distinguish between nonresident aliens and other filers, and examinations can be costly and difficult since many nonresident aliens would depart the country before IRS could examine their returns. IRS's outreach and education efforts have focused on presenting information on nonresident tax issues to a variety of audiences and making information available on its Web site and in its publications. Nevertheless, some nonresidents, their employers, and paid preparers may not be aware of nonresident alien tax rules, according to representatives of groups that work with employers and nonresidents to assist them in fulfilling their tax obligations. Other filing challenges exist. For example, individuals filing Forms 1040NR cannot file electronically. Also, nonresidents in the U.S. for less than 90 days who earn over $3,000 in compensation for services paid for by a foreign employer will likely have to file Form 1040NR, even if they owe no tax. The $3,000 exemption threshold, enacted by Congress in 1936 to lessen the tax compliance burden on nonresident aliens and never adjusted for inflation or other purposes, likely results in a greater proportion of nonresident aliens having a filing requirement today than in 1936. IRS has expanded its nonresident alien enforcement efforts over the past decade. However, IRS does not have a program to automatically identify nonresident aliens who improperly file Form 1040 instead of Form 1040NR, which can result in lost tax revenue when these taxpayers take unallowed deductions. IRS may be able to use taxpayer information to identify this type of noncompliance systematically. Finally, some nonresidents must file a certificate of compliance, referred to as a sailing permit, before departing the U.S. to ensure that tax obligations have been satisfied. The requirement is difficult to enforce and few nonresidents fulfill it, potentially leading to broader noncompliance if individuals assume the lack of enforcement extends to other tax rules.
What GAO Recommends
GAO suggests that Congress consider raising the exemption threshold for income paid by a foreign employer and eliminating the certificate of compliance, or sailing permit, requirement. GAO also recommends that IRS determine if creating an automated program to identify improper filing of Form 1040 by nonresident aliens would be a cost-effective means of improving compliance. In commenting on a draft of this report, IRS agreed with our recommendation. |
gao_GAO-17-562T | gao_GAO-17-562T_0 | Congress and Executive Branch Agencies Continue to Address Actions that Span the Federal Government
As shown in figure 2, Congress and executive branch agencies have made progress in addressing or partially addressing many actions we identified from 2011 to 2016. We found that these efforts have resulted in roughly $136 billion in financial benefits—$75 billion from 2010 through 2016, with at least an additional $61 billion in estimated benefits projected to be accrued in future years. Table 4 highlights examples of these results. Congress has also implemented a number of key government-wide statutory requirements in recent years that could help identify areas of fragmentation, overlap, or duplication, or help address issues we raise in this report, including the following:
The Program Management Improvement Accountability Act. This information could potentially help identify areas of fragmentation, overlap, or duplication. The effective and efficient acquisition and management of IT investments has been a long-standing challenge in the federal government. FITARA holds promise for improving agencies’ acquisition of IT and enabling Congress to monitor agencies’ progress and hold them accountable for reducing duplication and achieving cost savings. Action on Remaining and New Areas Could Yield Significant Additional Benefits
While Congress and executive branch agencies have made progress toward addressing the 724 total actions we have identified since 2011, further steps are needed to fully address the 395 actions that remain open (i.e., partially or not addressed). We estimate that tens of billions of dollars in additional financial benefits could be realized should Congress and executive branch agencies fully address open actions. Significant Open Actions Directed to Executive Branch Agencies
In our 2011 to 2017 annual reports, we directed 627 actions to executive branch agencies, including 77 new actions identified in 2017. While these open actions span the government, a substantial number of actions are directed to seven agencies that made up 84 percent—$3.6 trillion—of federal outlays in fiscal year 2016; see figure 3. In our 2011 to 2017 reports, we directed 168 actions to the Department of Defense (DOD) in areas that contribute to DOD’s effectiveness in providing the military forces needed to deter war and to protect the security of the United States. As of March 2017, 95 of these 168 actions remained open. In our 2011 to 2017 reports, we directed 98 actions to the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) in areas that contribute to HHS’s mission to enhance the health and well-being of Americans. HHS also administers Medicaid, which covered an estimated 72.2 million low- income people in fiscal year 2016 at a cost of $575.9 billion. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) manages and coordinates many government-wide efforts. In our 2011 to 2017 reports, we directed 64 actions to OMB in areas to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of government-wide programs and activities. We will continue to look for additional or emerging instances of fragmentation, overlap, and duplication and opportunities for cost savings or revenue enhancement. Contact points for the individual areas listed in our 2017 annual report can be found at the end of each area in GAO-17-491SP. Contact points for our Congressional Relations and Public Affairs offices may be found on the last page of this statement. | Why GAO Did This Study
The federal government faces a long-term, unsustainable fiscal path based on an imbalance between federal revenues and spending. While addressing this structural imbalance will require fiscal policy changes, in the near term opportunities exist in a number of areas to improve this situation, including where federal programs or activities are fragmented, overlapping, or duplicative.
To call attention to these opportunities, Congress included a provision in statute for GAO to identify and report on federal programs, agencies, offices, and initiatives—either within departments or government-wide—that have duplicative goals or activities. GAO also identifies areas that are fragmented or overlapping and additional opportunities to achieve cost savings or enhance revenue collection. GAO's 2017 annual report is its seventh in this series (GAO-17-491SP).
This statement discusses:
new issues GAO identifies in its 2017 report;
the progress made in addressing actions GAO identified in its 2011 to 2016 reports; and
examples of open actions directed to Congress or executive branch agencies.
To identify what actions exist to address these issues, GAO reviewed and updated prior work, including recommendations for executive action and matters for congressional consideration.
What GAO Found
GAO's 2017 annual report identifies 79 new actions that Congress and executive branch agencies can take to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of government in 29 new areas. Of these, GAO identified 15 areas in which there is evidence of fragmentation, overlap, or duplication. For example, GAO found that the Army and Air Force need to improve the management of their virtual training programs to avoid fragmentation and better acquire and integrate virtual devices into training to potentially save tens of millions of dollars. GAO also identified 14 areas to reduce the cost of government operations or enhance revenues. For example, GAO found that the Department of Energy could potentially save tens of billions of dollars by improving its analysis of options for storing defense and commercial high-level nuclear waste and fuel.
Congress and executive branch agencies have made progress in addressing the 645 actions that GAO identified from 2011 to 2016. Congressional and executive branch efforts to address these actions over the past 6 years have resulted in roughly $136 billion in financial benefits, of which $75 billion has accrued and at least an additional $61 billion in estimated benefits is projected to accrue in future years.
Status of 2011–2016 Actions as of March, 2017
Further steps are needed to fully address the remaining actions GAO identified. GAO estimates that tens of billions of additional dollars would be saved should Congress and executive branch agencies fully address the 395 actions that remain open, including the 79 new actions GAO identified in 2017. While these open actions span the government, a substantial number of them are directed to seven agencies: the Departments of Defense, Health and Human Services, Homeland Security, Veterans Affairs, the Internal Revenue Service, Office of Management and Budget, and the Social Security Administration. For example, the Department of Health and Human Services could potentially save over a billion dollars annually by better aligning its payments to hospitals for the uncompensated care they provide to uninsured and low-income patients. |
gao_GGD-96-30 | gao_GGD-96-30_0 | Introduction
Most Americans use the U.S. mail service. Increasingly, it is focusing on customer needs, expectations, and perceptions. We were also to determine (3) the steps that the Postal Service is taking to improve customer satisfaction using CSI and other data and (4) any additional steps the Service could take to improve customer service and thereby improve customer satisfaction. Opportunities Exist to Improve the Dissemination and Potential Use of Customer Satisfaction Data
The Postal Service makes extensive internal dissemination of residential CSI data to track customer satisfaction and identify opportunities to improve customer service. Moreover, the Service has gathered business CSI information but has not disseminated it internally or to Congress. In recent years, the Service has reduced the amount of residential customer satisfaction data and other performance data provided in required annual comprehensive statements to Congress. 2.1.) 2.4-2.6.) Competitors could target their market development efforts to these areas. We did not review the business customer satisfaction data compiled by Gallup, but such data would seem useful to Postal Service management for improving customer service and to Congress for its oversight activities. Numerous National and Local Initiatives Undertaken to Improve Customer Service
Using residential CSI data and other performance indicators, the Postal Service has begun numerous efforts to improve customer service and reduce significant levels of customer dissatisfaction. Its initiatives since 1990 include the following. The Service’s measures of residential customer satisfaction and its delivery performance support this notion. 3.1.) As a result, we could not determine whether the satisfaction of these customers is better or worse than residential customers and if business customer satisfaction has improved since it was first measured in early 1994. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the U.S. Postal Service's (USPS) efforts to measure, report and improve customer satisfaction, focusing on: (1) the extent to which USPS distributes customer satisfaction data for use internally and by Congress; (2) whether USPS can improve the distribution of such data; (3) how USPS is using customer satisfaction and other data to improve customer service; and (4) additional steps USPS could take to improve customer satisfaction.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) USPS widely distributes residential customer satisfaction data for internal use to improve customer service, but has reduced the amount of performance data it provides to Congress; (2) USPS does not distribute business customer satisfaction data internally or externally because USPS fears compromising its position in an increasingly competitive market; (3) adequate distribution of business customer data could help USPS assess and improve business customer service; (4) although USPS has initiated numerous innovative efforts to improve customer service and satisfaction since 1990, residential customer satisfaction has remained relatively constant; (5) USPS has not developed a well-coordinated overall national strategy for improving customer service or focused on areas causing the most customer dissatisfaction; and (6) USPS has not always made the best use of customer satisfaction and other performance data to evaluate its initiatives, but it is studying ways to improve the use of all of its performance measures to improve customer satisfaction. |
gao_GAO-04-642 | gao_GAO-04-642_0 | Since 1990, we have identified NASA’s contract management as a high-risk area. This assessment has been based in part on our repeated finding that NASA does not have good cost-estimating processes or the financial information needed to develop good cost estimates for its programs, making it difficult for NASA to oversee its contracts and control costs. More than half of the programs’ development cost estimates increased, and for some programs, this increase was significant. While 8 of the 27 programs experienced slight decreases in their development cost estimates, 17 experienced cost growth—as much as almost 94 percent. The development cost estimates for each of the 10 programs that we reviewed in detail have been rebaselined—for some programs, as many as four times—and for 7 of the 10 programs, the cost estimate increased each time it was rebaselined (see fig. For the 10 programs we reviewed in detail, NASA cited specific reasons for changes in the baseline development cost estimates and the recalculated baselines—many of which were related to technical problems and subsequent delays in the development or delivery of key system components, and insufficient funding and reserves, as illustrated in the following examples: Technical problems in the MERs program required a significant redesign of components and the development of a new landing system. Further, NASA lacks a process for systematically identifying and assessing programs that are not achieving their cost, schedule, and performance goals. Many of these criteria are included in NASA’s cost-estimating guidance. Further, none of the programs fully met certain key criteria. Failing to meet these criteria puts programs at certain risk. For example, underestimating a program’s full life-cycle costs creates the risk that a program could be underfunded and subject to major cost overruns, which would ultimately result in the program being reduced in scope or additional funding being requested and appropriated to ensure the program meets its objectives. Without this knowledge, NASA may have little specific basis to determine adequate financial reserves, schedule margins, and technical performance margins to provide managers the flexibility needed to address programmatic, technical, cost, and schedule risks, as required by NASA policy. Utility of Cost-Estimating Tools Depends on the Reliability of NASA’s Financial and Performance Data
According to NASA officials, state-of-the-art cost-estimating tools have been funded and implemented. For more than a decade, we have reported that NASA has failed to develop a system to capture reliable financial and performance information, posing significant challenges to NASA’s ability to estimate and control program costs. In addition, NASA implemented the system before it had the capability to capture the full costs of its programs and projects. Efforts Under Way to Remove Some Barriers and Improve Cost Estimating
NASA has several initiatives under way to improve the agency’s cost-estimating processes. Without a process that prevents programs from proceeding before they have sufficiently demonstrated that key cost-estimating criteria have been met, NASA programs will continue to be at risk of cost and schedule overruns. Further, because much of NASA’s work is performed through grants and contracts, NASA’s revised procedures will emphasize how risk and technical complexity affect contractor performance. To assess NASA’s cost-estimating processes and methodologies, we used cost-estimating criteria developed by Carnegie Mellon University’s Software Engineering Institute (SEI) designed to assess the reliability of project cost and schedule estimates. Assessments of 10 Programs Reviewed in Detail
This appendix provides a program by program assessment of the 10 NASA programs we reviewed in detail. Each assessment provides a brief description of the program’s mission; the status of the program—that is, whether it is in development, operational, or terminated; the year the program was initiated; the fiscal year in which the Congress approved the program—that is, when full-scale design and development funds were appropriated; a comparison of the initial and current (as of April 2003) baseline an assessment of the program’s cost-estimating processes, methodologies, and practices to determine the extent they met the 14 cost-estimating criteria that we used to measure program performance. | Why GAO Did This Study
For more than a decade, GAO has identified the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) contract management as a high-risk area--in part because of NASA's inability to collect, maintain, and report the full cost of its programs and projects. Lacking this information, NASA has been challenged to manage its programs and control program costs. The scientific and technical expectations inherent in NASA's mission create even greater challenges--especially if meeting those expectations requires NASA to reallocate funding from existing programs to support proposed new efforts. Because cost growth has been a persistent problem in a number of NASA programs, GAO was asked to examine NASA's cost estimating for selected programs, assess NASA's cost-estimating processes and methodologies, and describe any barriers to improving NASA's cost-estimating processes. To conduct GAO's work, GAO analyzed a total of 27 NASA programs--10 of which GAO reviewed in detail.
What GAO Found
Considerable change in NASA's program cost estimates--both increases and decreases--indicates that NASA lacks a clear understanding of how much its programs will cost and how long they will take to achieve their objectives. For example, the development cost estimates for more than half of the 27 programs that GAO reviewed have increased and for some programs this increase was significant--as much as 94 percent. Cost estimates changed for each of 10 programs that GAO reviewed in detail. For 8 of the 10 programs, the estimates increased. Although NASA cited specific reasons for the changes, such as technical problems and funding shortages, the variability in the cost estimates indicates that the programs lacked the sufficient knowledge needed to establish priorities, quantify risks, and make informed investment decisions, and thus predict costs. Most notably, NASA's basic cost-estimating processes--an important tool for managing programs--lack the discipline needed to ensure that program estimates are reasonable. Specifically, GAO found that none of the 10 NASA programs that GAO reviewed in detail met all of GAO's cost-estimating criteria, which are based on criteria developed by Carnegie Mellon University's Software Engineering Institute. Moreover, none of the 10 programs fully met certain key criteria--including clearly defining the program's life cycle to establish program commitment and manage program costs, as required by NASA. In addition, only three programs provided a breakdown of the work to be performed. Without this knowledge, the programs' estimated costs could be understated and thereby subject to underfunding and cost overruns, putting programs at risk of being reduced in scope or requiring additional funding to meet their objectives. Finally, only two programs have a process in place for measuring cost and performance to identify risks. NASA has limited ability to collect the program cost and schedule data needed to meet basic cost-estimating criteria. For example, as GAO has previously reported, NASA does not have a system to capture reliable financial and performance data--key to using effectively the cost-estimating tools that NASA officials state that programs employ. Further, without adequate financial and nonfinancial data, programs cannot easily track an acquisition's progress and assess whether the program can meet its cost and schedule goals before it incurs significant cost and schedule overruns. NASA identified other barriers, including limited cost-estimating staff. According to NASA officials, several initiatives are under way to remove such obstacles and improve the agency's cost-estimating practices. |
gao_GAO-08-866 | gao_GAO-08-866_0 | A major component of DOD’s business transformation effort is the Defense FIAR Plan. Air Force Financial Management Strategic Plan for Fiscal Years 2007-2012. Air Force Military Equipment Accountability Improvement Plan. While these programs are intended to provide the Air Force with the full spectrum of logistics and financial management capabilities, our review identified areas where the Air Force had not fully implemented key best practices related to risk management for ECSS and DEAMS and system testing for DEAMS. ECSS and DEAMS Are Intended to Help the Air Force Achieve Total Asset Visibility
ECSS and DEAMS are intended to support the Air Force’s efforts to transform its business operations and provide accurate, reliable, and timely information to support decision making and management of the Air Force’s business operations, including total asset visibility. The ECSS program was initiated in January 2004 and is expected to provide a single, integrated logistics system, including transportation, supply, maintenance and repair, and other key business functions directly related to logistics, such as engineering and acquisition, at a total life-cycle cost over $3 billion. When fully implemented, ECSS is expected to replace about 250 legacy logistics and procurement (acquisition) systems and support over 250,000 users Air Force-wide. According to Air Force officials, DEAMS will replace seven legacy accounting systems. By the end of the increment 1 deployment phase, which is expected to be completed by December 2010, DEAMS is intended to provide Scott Air Force Base with the entire spectrum of core financial management capabilities, including collections, commitments/obligations, cost accounting, general ledger, funds control, receipt and acceptance, accounts payable and disbursement, billing, and financial reporting. These findings increase the risk that these two business systems will not meet their stated functionality, cost, and milestone goals or effectively further the Air Force’s efforts to achieve total asset visibility. However, the relationship between the Air Force Military Equipment Accountability Improvement Plan to other Air Force transformation plans or initiatives, such as the Air Force Logistics Enterprise Architecture Concept of Operations, in transforming the Air Force’s business operations is not articulated in the plan. While these are notable goals, these metrics do not provide a means to measure incremental progress in improving the Air Force’s ability to locate and account for materiel assets throughout their life cycle. Conclusion
The Air Force’s efforts to transform its logistics and financial management operations through system, process, and control changes are being guided by numerous strategies and plans that are not fully integrated within the Air Force and with DOD’s business enterprise transformation priorities. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
In order to determine the implementation status of the Air Force’s current business system initiatives to achieve total asset visibility, and whether the Air Force has implemented related best practices, we reviewed Air Force business system budget documentation and met with Air Force Chief Information Officer personnel and DOD Business Transformation officials. To determine whether the Air Force’s business transformation efforts to achieve total asset visibility are aligned within the Air Force and with DOD’s broader business transformation priorities, we interviewed officials from the Air Force’s Financial Management and Comptroller Office and the Air Force Logistics Enterprise Architecture and ECSS Transformation Management Division. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Defense (DOD) established a goal to achieve total asset visibility over 30 years ago. This initiative aims to provide timely, accurate information on the location, movement, status, and identity of equipment and supplies. To date, the effort has been unsuccessful. GAO was requested to determine (1) the implementation status of the Air Force's business system initiatives to achieve total asset visibility, and whether the Air Force has implemented related best practices, and (2) whether the Air Force's business transformation efforts to achieve total asset visibility are aligned within the Air Force and with DOD's broader business transformation priorities. GAO interviewed Air Force officials and reviewed Air Force documentation to obtain an understanding of the Air Force's system initiatives and strategy for achieving total asset visibility and to identify areas for improvement.
What GAO Found
The Air Force has identified the Expeditionary Combat Support System (ECSS) and the Defense Enterprise Accounting and Management System (DEAMS) as key technology enablers of the Air Force's efforts to transform its logistics and financial management operations and achieve total asset visibility--a key DOD priority. ECSS is expected to provide a single, integrated logistics system, including transportation, supply, maintenance and repair, and other key business functions directly related to logistics such as engineering and acquisition. Additionally, ECSS will perform financial management and accounting for the Air Force working capital fund operations. ECSS is expected to be fully operational in fiscal year 2013, and replace about 250 legacy logistics and procurement systems. DEAMS is expected to provide the entire spectrum of core financial management capabilities, including collections, commitments/obligations, cost accounting, general ledger, funds control, receipts and acceptance, accounts payable and disbursement, billing, and financial reporting for the Air Force general fund operations. DEAMS is expected to replace seven legacy systems and be fully operational in fiscal year 2014. GAO identified several areas in which the Air Force had not fully implemented best practices related to risk management and system testing. These findings increase the risk that these business system initiatives will not meet their stated functionality, cost, and milestone goals, thereby limiting the Air Force's efforts to achieve total asset visibility and other DOD business transformation priorities. Further, key Air Force business transformation strategic plans and documents were not aligned within the Air Force nor with DOD's broader business transformation priorities. While each individual Air Force plan was intended to support the Air Force's business transformation efforts, the plans did not reflect a coordinated effort toward achieving a stated Air Force or DOD goal. For example, neither the Air Force's Military Equipment Accountability Improvement Plan for supporting DOD's military equipment valuation effort, nor the Air Force Logistics Enterprise Architecture Concept of Operations, its key strategic transformation plan for logistics, identified a shared relationship, including metrics, in supporting Air Force and DOD logistics and financial management transformation goals. As a result, neither the Air Force nor DOD will have the performance data needed to oversee efforts intended to improve the Air Force's ability to locate, manage, and account for assets throughout their life cycle. |
gao_GAO-07-861T | gao_GAO-07-861T_0 | Teacher Quality Provisions under HEA and NCLBA Have Somewhat Different Approaches and Are Funded Differently
While the overall goal of Title II under both HEA and NCLBA is to improve student achievement by improving the teacher workforce, some of the specific approaches differ. For example, a major focus of HEA provisions is on the training of prospective teachers (preservice training) while NCLBA provisions focus more on improving teacher quality in the classroom (in service training) and hiring highly qualified teachers. Also, both laws use reporting mechanisms to increase accountability. However, HEA focuses more on institutions of higher education while NCLBA focuses on schools and school districts. In addition, HEA and NCLBA Title II funds are distributed differently. Some HEA and NCLBA Funds Were Used for Similar Activities As Allowed under Both Acts
HEA provides grantees and NCLBA provides states and districts with the flexibility to use funds for a broad range of activities to improve teacher quality, including many activities that are similar under both acts. HEA funds can be used, among other activities, to reform teacher certification requirements, professional development activities, and recruitment efforts. For example, districts chose to spend about one-half of their NCLBA Title II funds ($1.2 billion) in 2004-2005 on class-size reduction efforts, which is not an activity specified by HEA. One district we visited focused its NCLBA-funded class-size reduction efforts on the eighth grade because the state already provided funding for reducing class size in other grades. HEA and NCLBA both funded professional development and recruitment efforts, although the specific activities varied somewhat. Many HEA grantees we interviewed used their funds to fill teacher shortages in urban schools or to recruit new teachers from nontraditional sources— mid-career professionals, community college students, and middle- and high-school students. Districts we visited used NCLBA Title II funds to provide bonuses to attract successful administrators, advertise open teaching positions, and attend recruitment events to identify qualified candidates. Education Is Working to Provide Better Assistance and Improve Its Evaluation and Oversight Efforts
Under both HEA and NCLBA, Education has provided assistance and guidance to recipients of these funds and is responsible for holding recipients accountable for the quality of their activities. In addition, Education provided examples of projects undertaken to improve teacher quality and how some of these efforts indicate improved teacher quality in its 2005 annual report on teacher quality. Under HEA, Education is required to annually report on the quality of teacher training programs and the qualifications of current teachers. According to Education, each of these states corrected their data and the department will continue to monitor states to ensure they are using the appropriate data. While HEA and NCLBA share the goal of improving teacher quality, it is not clear the extent to which they complement each other. Our separate studies of teacher quality programs under each of the laws have found common areas for improvement, such as data quality and assistance from Education. We have also found that states, districts, schools, and grantees under both laws engage in similar activities. However, not much is known about how well, if at all, these two laws are aligned. Thus, there may be opportunities to better understand how the two laws are working together at the federal, state, and local level. | Why GAO Did This Study
Teachers are the single largest resource in our nation's elementary and secondary education system. However, according to recent research, many teachers lack competency in the subjects they teach. In addition, research shows that most teacher training programs leave new teachers feeling unprepared for the classroom. While the hiring and training of teachers is primarily the responsibility of state and local governments and institutions of higher education, the federal investment in enhancing teacher quality is substantial and growing. In 1998, the Congress amended the Higher Education Act (HEA) to enhance the quality of teaching in the classroom and in 2001 the Congress passed the No Child Left Behind Act (NCLBA), which established federal requirements that all teachers of core academic subjects be highly qualified. This testimony focuses on (1) approaches used in teacher quality programs under HEA and NCLBA, (2) the allowable activities under these acts and how recipients are using the funds, and (3) how Education supports and evaluates these activities. This testimony is based on prior GAO reports. We updated information where appropriate.
What GAO Found
While the overall goal of Title II in both HEA and NCLBA is to improve teacher quality, some of their specific approaches differ. For example, a major focus of HEA provisions is on the training of prospective teachers while NCLBA provisions focus more on improving teacher quality in the classroom and hiring highly qualified teachers. Both laws use reporting mechanisms to increase accountability; however, HEA focuses more on institutions of higher education while NCLBA focuses on schools and districts. In addition, HEA and NCLBA grants are funded differently, with HEA funds distributed through one-time competitive grants, while Title II under NCLBA provides funds annually to all states through a formula. Both acts provide states, districts, or grantees with the flexibility to use funds for a broad range of activities to improve teacher quality, including many activities that are similar, such as professional development and recruitment. A difference is that NCLBA's Title II specifies that teachers can be hired to reduce class-size while HEA does not specifically mention class-size reduction. Districts chose to spend about one-half of their NCLBA Title II funds on class-size reduction in 2004-2005. On the other hand, professional development and recruitment efforts were the two broad areas where recipients used funds for similar activities, although the specific activities varied somewhat. Many HEA grantees we visited used their funds to fill teacher shortages in urban schools or recruit teachers from nontraditional sources, such as mid-career professionals. Districts we visited used NCLBA funds to provide bonuses, advertise open teaching positions, and attend recruitment events, among other activities. Under both HEA and NCLBA, Education has provided assistance and guidance to recipients of these funds and is responsible for holding recipients accountable for the quality of their activities. GAO's previous work identified areas where Education could improve its assistance on teacher quality efforts and more effectively measure the results of these activities. Education has made progress in addressing GAO's concerns by disseminating more information to recipients, particularly on teacher quality requirements, and improving how the department measures the results of teacher quality activities by establishing definitions and performance targets under HEA. While HEA and NCLBA share the goal of improving teacher quality, it is not clear the extent to which they complement each other. States, districts, schools, and grantees under both laws engage in similar activities. However, not much is known about how well, if at all, these two laws are aligned. Thus, there may be opportunities to better understand how the two laws are working together at the federal, state, and local level. |
gao_GAO-15-212 | gao_GAO-15-212_0 | The Bayh-Dole Act allows nonprofits, small businesses, and universities to retain ownership of federally funded inventions to promote the utilization of inventions created through federal research and development programs, and to provide an incentive for contractors to commercialize federally funded inventions for sale in the marketplace. DOE Relies on Contractor Self- Reporting and Agency Procedures to Help Ensure Disclosure of Agency Funded Inventions During Fiscal Years 2009 through 2013, DOE Initiated Nearly 6,000 Financial Assistance Awards
During fiscal years 2009 through 2013, DOE initiated nearly 6,000 financial assistance awards. During this period, according to DOE patent counsel, contractors reported approximately 5,800 inventions, elected to take ownership of about 2,800 inventions, and were issued more than 700 patents. DOE Relies on Contractor Self-Disclosure and Agency Procedures to Help Ensure Disclosure of Agency Funded Inventions
Contractors disclose agency funded inventions to DOE through a variety of reporting mechanisms including e-mail, regular mail, and Interagency Edison (iEdison)—which is an electronic reporting system that allows federal grantees and contractors to report federally funded inventions, patents, and utilization data.contractor discloses an invention developed with DOE funds, patent staff create a file for that invention. DOE Faces Challenges in Ensuring that Contractors Disclose Agency Funded Inventions and Is Taking Actions to Address Them
DOE faces challenges in ensuring that contractors disclose inventions they develop with agency funding and is taking actions to address them. Specifically, one challenge DOE faces is not having a documented process for ensuring that contractors disclose agency funded inventions after financial assistance awards end, and the agency has initiated two pilot projects to identify the extent of potentially undisclosed inventions. However, DOE has no documented process to monitor inventions after award closeout. As a result, the potential exists for DOE to be unaware of inventions that it funded and in which it would retain interests. One pilot project is an audit of a sample of previously completed financial assistance awards to determine the extent to which contractors did not disclose DOE funded inventions. The second pilot project involves cross- referencing U.S. Patent and Trademark Office data against DOE information on inventions it funded. Under the draft audit procedures, DOE patent counsel (1) audit contractor activities for any indication of patents, patent applications, or inventions that might have been developed with DOE funding but were not disclosed to DOE; (2) submit demand letters to contractors to obtain ownership of any potentially undisclosed inventions; and (3) work with contractors, depending on the circumstances of nondisclosure, to allow them to retain ownership of the inventions. DOE Is Planning to Update Data Systems to Address Challenges in Managing Invention Disclosure Information but Does Not Have an Implementation Plan with Key Milestones
DOE faces a challenge in managing information on disclosed inventions, which underpins its ability to protect its interests in agency funded inventions. This is because, according to DOE patent counsel, the department’s two older invention data management systems—IP Master and PATMIS—are outdated, unable to communicate with each other, and do not have functionality for electronically updating invention disclosure or patent status, hampering their ability to manage information and data related to inventions developed with DOE funding. Under federal standards for internal control, information should be recorded and communicated to management and others within the entity who need it and in a form and within a time frame that enables them to carry out their internal control and other responsibilities. Also, the implementation plan with milestones DOE developed for the additional capability it wants to add to the IP Manager system will help it track and communicate progress toward completing this effort. DOE Proposed Regulatory Changes to Address Challenges to Monitoring and Influencing Contractor Utilization and Domestic Manufacture of Agency Funded Inventions
DOE faces challenges in monitoring and influencing contractor utilization and domestic manufacture of agency funded inventions to protect its interests in them, and the agency has proposed regulatory changes to address these challenges. In turn, DOE would be able to use these plans as criteria in assessing funding proposals and making financial assistance award decisions. DOE patent counsel explained that requiring and enforcing U.S. Manufacturing Plans increases the agency’s ability to influence the domestic manufacture of inventions it funded. Recommendation for Executive Action
To help provide greater assurance that DOE is making timely progress toward obtaining the information management capabilities it needs to protect its interests by monitoring contractor disclosure of agency funded inventions, we recommend that the Secretary of Energy develop an implementation plan, including appropriate milestones, to guide DOE’s efforts to improve its data management capabilities. | Why GAO Did This Study
DOE provides funding to contractors for research and development of new technologies. To incentivize participation in federal research projects and promote the use of federally funded inventions, the 1980 Bayh-Dole Act and other laws and regulations allow contractors receiving federal research and development funds to retain ownership of inventions they create so long as they adhere to certain requirements, including disclosing inventions developed with agency funding. DOE's ability to protect its interests in these inventions—including their utilization and domestic manufacture—depends on its knowledge of their existence.
GAO was asked to review DOE efforts to protect its interests in agency funded inventions. This report examines: (1) DOE funding for contractor research for fiscal years 2009 through 2013 and how DOE ensures that contractors disclose agency funded inventions, (2) the challenges DOE faces in ensuring invention disclosure and actions it is taking to address them, and (3) the challenges DOE faces in protecting its interests in these inventions and the actions it is taking to address them. GAO reviewed laws, regulations, and other documents and interviewed DOE patent counsel responsible for intellectual property issues, representatives of organizations that facilitate the development of federally funded technology, and others.
What GAO Found
The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) provided at least a total of $11 billion ($12 billion in fiscal year 2014 dollars) in research and development funding to contractors for fiscal years 2009 through 2013. Contractors reported about 5,800 inventions and 700 patents developed with DOE funding during this time period. To ensure disclosure of these agency funded inventions, DOE relies primarily on contractor self-reporting and financial assistance award closeout procedures. Contractors are generally required to adhere to specific time frames for invention disclosure. Following contractor invention disclosure, DOE patent counsel monitor the invention through the end of a financial assistance award to ensure contractor compliance with time frame requirements for electing to retain ownership and applying for patent protection of the invention.
DOE faces challenges in (1) ensuring that contractors disclose agency funded inventions and (2) managing information related to these disclosures and is taking steps to address them.
Limited ability to ensure invention disclosure after funding ends: DOE does not have a documented process to ensure contractors disclose inventions after financial assistance awards end. To address this, DOE recently began two pilot efforts to determine the extent of undisclosed inventions. One is an audit of a sample of previously completed financial assistance awards and the other involves cross-referencing U.S. Patent and Trademark Office data against DOE information on inventions it funded. DOE is still implementing these efforts but reported identifying more than 100 potential undisclosed inventions. DOE will assess the results of the pilots to determine whether to continue them, according to DOE patent counsel.
Data management limitations: DOE faces a challenge in managing information related to agency funded inventions because it relies on two different data systems that are outdated, unable to communicate with each other, and do not allow for electronic reporting. Under federal internal control standards, information should be recorded and communicated to management and others within the entity who need it and in a form and within a time frame that enables them to carry out their responsibilities. DOE is in the process of updating its data systems and is planning the development of an electronic reporting function but has not established an implementation plan with milestones against which it can track its progress toward completing these efforts. By developing such a plan, DOE would have greater assurance that it is making timely progress toward these efforts.
In addition, DOE faces challenges in its ability to monitor and influence the utilization and domestic manufacture of inventions it funded to protect its interests in them. DOE has proposed regulatory changes to address these challenges that would (1) require contractors to report on the utilization and domestic manufacture of agency funded inventions, (2) allow DOE to assess manufacturing plans as criteria for funding decisions, and (3) require contractors to obtain DOE authorization for changes in their control—including ownership—under certain circumstances. According to patent counsel, DOE expects to finalize these regulatory changes in fiscal year 2015.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOE develop an implementation plan with milestones for improving its data management systems. DOE agreed with this recommendation. |
gao_GAO-03-277 | gao_GAO-03-277_0 | FCC assigns licenses for commercial enterprises, state and local governments, and others. However, concerns exist about the ability to meet the growing needs of both commercial and government users. Many are also concerned that current spectrum-management practices, which generally take a command and control approach—that is, policies wherein government largely dictates how spectrum is used—may not work effectively as spectrum needs rapidly change. This provided additional spectrum for commercial wireless services. Spectrum managers in the countries we studied shared their views on the advantages of market-based policies, which included their usefulness in facilitating the reallocation and reassignment of spectrum to its most efficient use; allowing the market to handle the assignment and allocation of spectrum, which some believe the market can do better than managers can; requiring government agencies to pay market prices for spectrum just as they do for other resources, such as land and electricity; and addressing the challenges of spectrum management under conditions of increasing demand and rising unpredictability of new opportunities for using spectrum. Some Countries Have Adopted Market-Based Mechanisms for Government and Commercial Users
According to spectrum managers in Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom, these countries have adopted market-based mechanisms as part of their spectrum-management approaches for both government and commercial users. Several mobile telephone companies supported a postponement of these auctions. Thus, while these current efforts may be beneficial within the current regulatory environment, an analysis of whether there is a need for comprehensive reforms—such as changes in the structure of spectrum management—may best be undertaken by an independent body. For more information on spectrum-management structures in other countries, see appendix V.
In the United States, Commissions Have Been Used to Look at Major Policy Change When Complex Policy Disputes Arise
In the past, commissions have been established to look at certain difficult policy issues. In 1927 a compromise was reached that led to a bifurcated framework for the management of radiofrequency spectrum by the federal government. However, technology, consumer demand, and government needs are growing rapidly. Moreover, no single agency has been given ultimate decisionmaking authority over all spectrum in the United States or the authority to impose fundamental reform. This commission would examine, among other things, whether structural reform of our current system is needed. Views among those we spoke with on this issue were mixed. For example, the commission should include representation from the government, commercial, and technical sectors. Possible Policies to Consider
Whether the current policies should be continued; Whether mechanisms that create economic incentives to encourage users to use spectrum more efficiently could be developed: If it is appropriate to apply these mechanisms to all users or only to subsets of users, including government users; Possible mechanisms to consider include: Requiring users to pay for spectrum licenses in the marketplace; Allowing users to sell spectrum in the market place; Allowing users to lease spectrum from other users; Charging an incentive-based fee that is designed to mimic a market where one does not exist; Increasing the flexibility of use embedded in a license; Providing more spectrum for experimental and unlicensed uses; Increasing the use of band managers. | Why GAO Did This Study
The radiofrequency spectrum--a natural resource used for wireless communications--is a critical input to various commercial and government functions. Because of expanding commercial and government demand for spectrum, there is increasing debate on how best to manage this resource to meet current and future needs. GAO was asked to examine whether future spectrum needs can be met, given the current regulatory framework; what benefits and difficulties have arisen with the application of market mechanisms to spectrum management; and what barriers exist to reforming spectrum management.
What GAO Found
In the past, the United States relied primarily on a command and control approach to spectrum management, wherein the federal government largely dictated the use of spectrum. This approach generally met commercial and government users' needs for spectrum. However, increased use of commercial wireless services, such as mobile telephones, and expanding government agency missions have created growing demand for spectrum resources. GAO found that concerns exist as to whether the current spectrum-management approach can adequately meet future needs for spectrum. The United States and most other countries that GAO spoke with are incrementally adopting market-based mechanisms for spectrum management. By invoking the forces of supply and demand, market-based mechanisms can help promote the efficient use of spectrum, especially in an environment with increasing and unpredictable demand. A prominent example of a market-based mechanism is the requirement for commercial spectrum users to bid at auction for the right to use spectrum. However, because of mission and system requirements, there is some question as to whether these mechanisms can or should be applied to certain government functions. Also, legal and technical limitations can, in some instances, hinder the application of these mechanisms to commercial users. GAO found several barriers to reforming spectrum management in the United States. While active dialogue among key stakeholders is ongoing, differing priorities have led to little consensus on appropriate reforms. In addition, the current spectrum-management structure--with multiple agency jurisdictions and a slow decisionmaking process--has hindered consideration of whether fundamental reform is needed. In the past, commissions--such as the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission--have been used to look at major policy change when complex problems arise. |
gao_NSIAD-98-82 | gao_NSIAD-98-82_0 | History and Characteristics of Single Contracts for Multiple Services Vary
Most of the multiple service contracts were initiated when the installation performed a commercial activities study and all but one were established in the 1980s or earlier. As shown in table 1, the estimated costs of the contracts range from $5.4 million to $100 million annually and most were awarded on a fixed-price basis. Single contracts for multiple support services were critical to meeting the overall requirements for base operations support at all 10 installations we reviewed; however, none used a single contract to meet all of its requirements. At the other three locations, officials told us that the decision to use a single contract for multiple services was made at the time that the installation or its current mission was established. Multiple Service Contracts Are One Tool for Accomplishing Base Operations Support
At the 10 installations we reviewed, base operations support requirements were being met through a variety of means, including in-house personnel, as well as single contracts for multiple services, single contracts for specific services, and regional contracts. Lessons Learned From Multiple Service Contracts
Contracting officials at the 10 installations we reviewed have learned a number of lessons from their experience with single contracts for multiple base operations support services. Contracting officials we spoke with during this review told us that coordination is much easier when there is a single contractor. Small Businesses Participate, but Concerns Remain
At 3 of the 10 installations we reviewed, small businesses were participating as prime contractors under single contracts for multiple base operations support activities. In each case, the small business was awarded the prime contract under programs designed to assist small and disadvantaged businesses. Concerns Remain About Overall Impact on Small Business Participation
Small Business Administration and DOD officials are concerned that consolidating multiple base operation services into single contracts may limit the participation of small businesses as prime contractors. Savings Are Not Documented, but Efficiency Gains Are Recognized
Although contracting officials reported efficiency gains, cost savings from using single contracts for multiple base operations support functions are not documented. The other three installations contracted out from the time of inception of the base or its mission and did not necessitate an A-76 study. Although some installations received extensive support through a single contract, none received all of their required services through a single contract. The history and characteristics of the contracts varied between the 10 installations and the services obtained through the contracts often reflected differences in mission and geographical location. Comparing and contrasting services between contracts and installations to precisely say what services were included or excluded from individual contracts in comparison with others is difficult because there are no generally accepted definitions for base operations support services. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO reviewed the Department of Defense's (DOD) use of single contracts for multiple base operations support functions, focusing on: (1) the history and characteristics of selected single contracts for multiple base operations support services; (2) the kinds of services procured under these contracts; (3) lessons DOD has learned from the use of these contracts; (4) whether small businesses participate in these contracts; and (5) whether cost and efficiency gains have been documented.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the history and characteristics of selected single contracts for multiple base operations support services varied at the 10 installations GAO reviewed; (2) the decisions to use a single contract for multiple services occurred in two ways; (a) at seven installations, the decision occurred at the time of a commercial activity, or OMB Circular A-76 study; and (b) in the other three cases, the decision was made at the time the installation or its current mission was established; (3) most of the contracts were awarded for 5 years and ranged from about $5.4 million to $100 million annually; (4) although some installations received extensive base operations support services through a single contract, none received all of its required services through a single contract; (5) at all 10 installations, base operations support requirements were met through some combination of single contracts for multiple services; (6) the kinds of services procured under the multiple service contracts also varied and were influenced by a number of factors; (7) comparing and contrasting services between contracts and installations to precisely say what services were included or excluded from individual contracts in comparison with others is difficult because there are no generally accepted definitions for base operations support services; (8) as a result, contracting officials often used the same or similar terms differently; (9) DOD officials at the 10 installations GAO reviewed have learned a number of lessons from their experiences with single contracts for multiple base operation support services; (10) although many contracting officials GAO spoke with stated that coordination is much easier when there is a single contract, they acknowledged problems can still arise; (11) at 3 of the 10 installations GAO reviewed, small businesses were participating in single contracts for multiple base operations support services; (12) in all three cases, the small business was the prime contractor and the contracts were awarded under various small business programs; (13) the Small Business Administration and DOD officials are aware that consolidating multiple base operation services into single contracts may reduce the participation of small business as prime contractors; (14) officials from both agencies have issued guidance for considering small businesses in contract consolidation decisions; and (15) although contracting officials reported efficiency gains, cost savings from using single contracts for multiple base operations support services are not documented. |
gao_GAO-17-408T | gao_GAO-17-408T_0 | The department’s health information system— the Veterans Health Information Systems and Technology Architecture (VistA)—serves an essential role in helping the department to fulfill its health care delivery mission. VA reported spending about $3.9 billion to improve and maintain its IT resources in fiscal year 2015. In addition, in its 2017 budget submission, the department requested appropriations to make improvements in a number of areas, including: veterans’ access to health care, to include enhancing health care- related systems, standardizing immunization data, and expanding telehealth services ($186.7 million); veterans’ access to benefits by modernizing systems supporting benefits delivery, such as VBMS and the Veterans Services Network ($236.3 million); veterans’ experiences with VA by focusing on integrated service delivery and streamlined identification processes ($171.3 million);
VA employees’ experiences by enhancing internal IT systems ($13 information security, including implementing strong authentication, ensuring repeatable processes and procedures, adopting modern technology, and enhancing the detection of cyber vulnerabilities and protection from cyber threats ($370.1 million). VA Has Begun to Implement VistA Modernization Plans amid Concerns about Its Long-term Approach, Metrics, and Duplication
Although VA has proceeded with its program to modernize VistA (known as VistA Evolution), the department’s long-term plan for meeting its electronic health record system needs beyond fiscal year 2018 is uncertain. VA, Together with DOD and the Interagency Program Office, Have Not Developed Goals and Metrics for Assessing Interoperability
Beyond modernizing VistA, VA has undertaken numerous initiatives with DOD that were intended to advance electronic health record interoperability between the two departments. Yet, a significant concern is that these departments have not identified outcome-oriented goals and metrics to clearly define what they aim to achieve from their interoperability efforts, and the value and benefits these efforts are expected to yield. VA’s Plan to Modernize VistA Raises Concern about Duplication with DOD’s Electronic Health Record System Acquisition
VA has moved forward with modernizing VistA despite concerns that doing so is potentially duplicative with DOD’s acquisition of a commercially available electronic health record system. Specifically, VA took this course of action even though it has many health care business needs in common with DOD. We recommended that VA and DOD develop cost and schedule estimates that would include all elements of their approach (i.e., to modernize both departments’ health information systems and establish interoperability between them) and compare them with estimates of the cost and schedule for developing a single, integrated system. However, as of January 2017, the departments had not provided us with a comparison of the estimated costs of their current and previous approaches. Scheduling System Challenges Contributed to Designation of VA Health Care as High Risk
In February 2015, we designated VA health care as a high-risk area. We have previously reported on the department’s outpatient appointment scheduling system, which is about 30 years old. In May 2010, we reported that, after spending an estimated $127 million over 9 years on its outpatient scheduling system modernization project, VA had not implemented any of the planned system’s capabilities and was essentially starting over by beginning a new initiative to build or purchase another scheduling system. Efforts to Develop and Use the Veterans Benefits Management System Can Be Improved
In September 2015, we reported that VBA had made progress in developing and implementing VBMS, its system that is to be used for processing disability benefit claims. We recommended, among other actions, that the department develop a plan with a time frame and a reliable cost estimate for completing VBMS, establish goals for system response time, assess user satisfaction, and establish satisfaction goals to promote improvement. Specifically, we reported that VA’s closure of 20 out of its total of 356 data centers gave the department a 6 percent closure rate through fiscal year 2015—ranking its closure rate 19th lowest out of the 24 agencies we studied. With regard to cost savings and avoidance resulting from data center consolidation, our analysis of the department’s data identified a total of $19.1 million in reported cost savings or avoidances from fiscal year 2011 though fiscal year 2015. This equated to only about 0.7 percent of the total of approximately $2.8 billion that all 24 agencies reported saving or avoiding during the same time period. VA also lagged behind other agencies in making progress toward addressing data center optimization metrics established by OMB in 2014. Accordingly, we recommended that VA take action to improve its progress in the data center optimization areas that we reported as not meeting OMB’s established targets. Personnel and Accounting Integrated Data (PAID)—This 53-year old system automates time and attendance for employees, timekeepers, payroll, and supervisors. Benefits Delivery Network (BDN)—This 51-year old system tracks claims filed by veterans for benefits, eligibility, and dates of death. Accordingly, we recommended that VA identify and plan to modernize or replace its legacy systems. Further, VA has not justified the development and operation of an electronic health record system that is separate from DOD’s system, even though the departments have common system needs. Further, the department has not yet demonstrated expected progress toward consolidating and optimizing the performance of its data centers. In addition, VA’s continued operation of two of the oldest legacy IT systems in the federal government raises concern about the extent to which the department continues to spend funds on IT systems that are no longer effective or cost beneficial. | Why GAO Did This Study
The use of IT is crucial to helping VA effectively serve the nation's veterans, and each year, the department spends over $4 billion on IT. However, over many years, VA has had difficulty managing its information systems, raising questions about the effectiveness of its operations and its ability to deliver intended outcomes needed to help advance the department's mission. GAO has previously reported on a number of the department's IT initiatives.
This statement summarizes results from key GAO reports related to increasing electronic health record interoperability between VA and DOD; system challenges that have contributed to GAO's designation of VA health care as a high-risk area; and VA's development of its system for processing disability benefits, data center consolidation, and legacy systems.
What GAO Found
GAO noted in July 2016 that the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) had moved forward with an effort to modernize its health information system—the Veterans Health Information Systems and Technology Architecture (VistA)—but that the department is uncertain of its long-term plan for addressing its electronic health record system needs beyond fiscal year 2018. Beyond modernizing VistA, GAO reported in August 2015 that VA and the Department of Defense (DOD) had not identified outcome-oriented goals and metrics to clearly define what they aim to achieve from their efforts to increase electronic health record interoperability (i.e., the electronic exchange and use of health records) between the two departments. Moreover, VA has begun to modernize VistA separate from DOD's planned acquisition of a commercially available electronic health record system, even though both departments have many health care business needs in common. In 2014, GAO noted that the departments' decision to abandon the development of a single system in favor of modernizing their two separate systems was not justified and was identified as an example of duplication among government activities. The departments have not yet provided a comparison of the estimated costs and schedules of their current and previous approaches as GAO recommended.
In February 2015, GAO designated VA health care as a high-risk area, with IT challenges being one contributing factor. Specifically, GAO noted that the outpatient appointment scheduling system, which is currently about 30 years old, is time-consuming to use and error prone. However, the project to modernize that system failed after VA spent an estimated $127 million over 9 years. VA has begun a new initiative to build or purchase another scheduling system.
GAO reported in September 2015, that VA had made progress implementing the Veterans Benefits Management System (VBMS) for processing disability benefits. However, the department had not developed a time frame and a reliable cost estimate for completing VBMS. VA also had not established goals for system response time, and had not minimized incidences of high and medium severity system defects for future VBMS releases. Further, the department had not assessed user satisfaction, or established user satisfaction goals.
In addition, VA's consolidation and closure of data centers has lagged behind other agencies, as GAO reported in March 2016. For example, VA's closure of 20 out of a total of 356 data centers gave the department a 6 percent closure rate through fiscal year 2015 that ranked 19th of the 24 agencies in GAO's study. Also, VA's reported $19.1 million in cost savings or avoidances from fiscal year 2011 through fiscal year 2015 was only about 0.7 percent of the total of about $2.8 billion that all 24 agencies reported saving. In addition, the department had not met any of the data center optimization areas established by the Office of Management and Budget.
VA was identified in a May 2016 GAO report as using antiquated and expensive to maintain, legacy IT systems. At that time, the 53-year-old Personnel and Accounting Integrated Data (PAID) system was slated to be replaced in 2017. Further, VA has plans to retire the 51-year-old Benefits Delivery Network, which tracks veterans' claims for benefits, eligibility, and death dates in 2018.
What GAO Recommends
GAO has made numerous recommendations to VA to improve the modernization of its IT systems. For example, GAO has recommended that VA develop goals and metrics for determining the extent to which its modernized electronic health record system is achieving interoperability with DOD's; address challenges associated with modernizing its scheduling system; address shortcomings with VBMS planning and implementation; take actions to improve progress in data center optimization; and modernize or replace obsolete legacy IT systems. VA agreed with these recommendations and said it has begun taking actions to implement them. |
gao_GAO-07-735 | gao_GAO-07-735_0 | CBP uses two primary methods to target IP violations: computer-based and manual targeting. Because of differing port practices, information on IP exams has been unevenly recorded across ports, according to officials, making it difficult for CBP to fully analyze the effect of its targeting efforts in this area. CBP’s process for enforcing IP concludes with ports seizing infringing goods and, if warranted, referring cases to ICE and assessing penalties. Seizures Have Been Concentrated among Certain Types of Products
Although the types and quantities of seized goods vary over time, seizures over the past 6 years have been highly concentrated among certain types of products. We analyzed CBP’s seizure and penalty data for fiscal years 2001 through 2006 and found that the bulk of enforcement activity was carried out by 10 or fewer ports in each of four enforcement categories we reviewed: (1) total number of seizures, (2) total seizures by domestic value, (3) total penalty cases opened, and (4) total amount of penalties assessed. We also found that some of the largest IP-importing ports had very small seizure rates relative to other IP-importing ports. For example, the majority of these top 25 ports had IP seizures that accounted for less than one hundredth of a percent of their IP import value. Lack of Integration across Key Offices Impedes Further Improvements in IP Enforcement
CBP lacks an integrated approach across key offices for further improving border enforcement outcomes. Recommendations for Executive Action
To develop a more effective approach to IP border enforcement, we recommended in the law enforcement sensitive report that the CBP Commissioner direct the Offices of International Trade and Field Operations to work together to take the following three actions: Clarify agencywide goals related to IP enforcement activity by working with the Office of Management and Budget to include in its agency’s strategic plan measures to guide and assess IP enforcement outcomes; Improve data on IP enforcement activity by: Determining the completeness and reliability of existing IP enforcement data and identifying aspects of the data that need to be improved; Ensuring uniformity in port practices to overcome any weaknesses in Use existing data to understand and improve IP border enforcement Analyzing IP enforcement outcomes across ports and other useful categories, such as modes of transportation; Reporting the results of this analysis internally to provide performance feedback to the ports, better link port performance to performance measures in CBP’s Strategic Plan, and inform resource allocation decisions. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
The Ranking Minority Member of the Senate Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the Federal Workforce and the District of Columbia, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs asked us to (1) examine key aspects of the U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s (CBP) process to carry out enforcement of intellectual property (IP) at U.S. borders; (2) analyze CBP’s border enforcement outcomes during fiscal years 2001 through 2006; and (3) evaluate CBP’s approach for improving border enforcement. To examine key aspects of CBP’s border enforcement process, we reviewed documents and interviewed officials at CBP headquarters in Washington, D.C., and at selected port locations. | Why GAO Did This Study
U.S. government efforts to protect and enforce intellectual property rights are crucial to preventing billions of dollars in economic losses and for mitigating health and safety risks from trade in counterfeit and pirated goods. The Department of Homeland Security's Customs and Border Protection (CBP) leads intellectual property (IP) enforcement activity at the U.S. border. GAO was asked to (1) examine key aspects of CBP's process to carry out border enforcement, (2) analyze CBP's border enforcement outcomes during fiscal years 2001 to 2006, and (3) evaluate CBP's approach for improving border enforcement. GAO examined relevant documents, interviewed agency officials in Washington, D.C. and seven port locations, and analyzed CBP data on trade and IP seizure and penalty activity. This is the public version of a law enforcement sensitive report by the same title (GAO-07-350SU).
What GAO Found
CBP's Office of International Trade (OT), formed in 2006, and Office of Field Operations (OFO) carry out IP border enforcement processes, including targeting and examining suspicious shipments, seizing infringing goods, and assessing penalties as warranted. CBP uses computer-based and manual targeting to determine which shipments it will examine, and both methods have strengths and limitations. Port practices for recording exam results vary, making it difficult for CBP to fully assess the effectiveness of its IP targeting efforts. Since 2001, CBP's IP enforcement outcomes have been concentrated among particular transport modes, product types, and ports. Rising numbers of low-value seizures from mail facilities have driven growth in seizure actions, but uneven seizures of high-value goods from sea containers have caused the estimated value of seizures to fluctuate. The vast majority of seizure and penalty outcomes in the last 6 years have been concentrated among 10 or fewer of CBP's 300-plus ports. For example, 10 ports account for 98 percent of the $1.1 billion in penalties assessed during fiscal years 2001 to 2006. CBP lacks agencywide performance measures in its strategic plan and an integrated approach across key offices to guide and improve IP enforcement. Narrowly focused initiatives led by offices now under OT have had limited results. CBP has not done a broader analysis to examine variances in port IP enforcement outcomes. For example, GAO found that some of the largest IP-importing ports had very small seizure rates relative to other top IP-importing ports. A lack of integration between OT and OFO impedes using this type of analysis to identify potential IP enforcement improvements. |
gao_GAO-17-197 | gao_GAO-17-197_0 | VA and DOD’s Evaluation of the FHCC Included Both Separate and Joint Reviews
VA and DOD’s approach for evaluating the FHCC included conducting both separate and joint reviews to determine whether it should continue operating as an integrated facility with a unified governance structure, workforce, and budget or revert to a “joint venture.” Under a joint venture arrangement, the departments would continue sharing medical facility space, but would manage their operations with separate governance structures, staff, and budgets. As a result, their recommendations to continue operating the FHCC as an integrated facility had more weight in DOD’s final determination. They reviewed the work of the subject matter teams, including the teams’ recommendations related to whether the FHCC should continue operating as an integrated facility as well as specific improvements the teams recommended implementing if the FHCC continued to operate as an integrated facility. They also studied the implications of either operating the FHCC as an integrated facility or converting it to a joint venture, and concluded that the latter was not advisable or achievable for two main reasons:
The former Naval Hospital Great Lakes had been demolished, and funding for the replacement facility was used to expand the former North Chicago VA Medical Center as part of the demonstration. Returning all or some of the 470 civilian employees from VA to DOD’s personnel system would require complex negotiations and could result in job reclassifications and salary changes. VA and DOD Did Not Provide Time Frames for Implementing the Recommended Improvements for the FHCC in Their Report to Congress
Although the departments’ report to Congress outlined a number of recommended improvements for the FHCC as part of their decision to continue operating it as an integrated facility, the report did not include time frames for implementing them. VA and DOD officials have been routinely tracking each of the recommended improvements through meetings held twice monthly, and have developed a spreadsheet that includes information on status and next steps. As we have previously reported, leading practices for organizational planning call for results-oriented organizations to develop comprehensive plans that provide tools to ensure accountability, among other things. Time frames and interim milestones could be used to monitor progress, hold staff accountable for achieving desired results, and make mid-course corrections, if needed. However, without time frames and interim milestones for most of the recommended improvements, VA and DOD officials are unable to ensure that these improvements will be implemented in a timely and efficient manner. Despite Acknowledging the Demonstration’s High Costs, VA and DOD Did Not Include an Updated Cost-Effectiveness Analysis of the FHCC in Their Report to Congress
In the letter that accompanied the report to Congress, both departments acknowledged that the costs associated with the demonstration project were “very high” and not in keeping with the initial goal of delivering more cost-effective health care. Specifically, the contractor found that integration was not more cost-effective than a joint venture and that the FHCC was not consistently performing as well as the separate VA and Navy facilities were before integration. The contractor’s analyses of the FHCC’s cost-effectiveness used cost data that ended in fiscal year 2014. Since that time, the FHCC has had a change in leadership and has made additional improvements that VA and DOD officials believe would positively impact cost-savings. In addition, VA and DOD officials stated that they did not have sufficient time to conduct their own analysis with updated cost data to include in the report to Congress after receiving the contractor’s final report in September 2015. According to OMB’s capital programming guide, at many key decision points, a cost-benefit or cost-effectiveness analysis of operations would be useful to help make decisions. Additionally, based on our prior work on evaluating physical infrastructure and management consolidation initiatives, the goals and likely costs and benefits of a consolidation are key questions to consider. Such an analysis would provide a baseline from which to measure and track the FHCC’s future efficiency, including the effect of the recommended improvements, once implemented. Recommendations for Executive Action
We recommend that the Secretaries of Veterans Affairs and Defense collaborate to take the following actions: develop time frames and interim milestones for tracking and implementing each of their jointly developed recommended improvements; and conduct a cost-effectiveness analysis for the FHCC to establish a baseline for measuring the facility’s efficiency over time. | Why GAO Did This Study
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (NDAA 2010) authorized VA and DOD to establish a 5-year demonstration to integrate their medical facilities in North Chicago, Ill. The NDAA 2010 also required VA and DOD to submit a report of their evaluation of the demonstration and their recommendation as to whether it should continue operating as a fully integrated facility after 5 years. In July 2016, VA and DOD submitted a report to Congress recommending that the FHCC continue operating as an integrated facility.
The NDAA 2015 included a provision for GAO to assess VA and DOD's evaluation to Congress. In this report, GAO assesses VA and DOD's approach for evaluating the FHCC and making the determination to continue operating it as an integrated facility. To do this, GAO reviewed the report to Congress and relevant supporting documents, and interviewed officials about the evaluation. In analyzing the evaluation, GAO used as criteria its prior work on planning practices, evaluating physical infrastructure, and management consolidation initiatives, as well as the Office of Management and Budget's (OMB) capital programming guide.
What GAO Found
The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) and the Department of Defense's (DOD) evaluation to determine whether the Captain James A. Lovell Federal Health Care Center (FHCC) should continue operating as an integrated facility or revert to a “joint venture” included conducting both separate and joint reviews. As an integrated facility, the FHCC has a unified governance structure, workforce, and budget. As a joint venture, the departments would continue sharing medical facility space, but would manage their operations with separate governance structures, workforces, and budgets. VA and DOD's joint review team concluded that converting the FHCC to a joint venture was not advisable or achievable because the Navy hospital had been demolished and money to replace it was used to expand the VA facility. In addition, returning the civilian employees from VA's to DOD's personnel system would require complex negotiations that could result in job reclassifications and salary changes. As a result, officials recommended continuing the FHCC as an integrated facility with the implementation of specific recommended improvements with the caveat that no similar integration efforts be undertaken until they “get it right” at the FHCC.
In the report to Congress, VA and DOD outlined 17 recommended improvements for the FHCC but did not include time frames for implementing them. As GAO has previously reported, leading practices for planning call for results-oriented organizations to develop plans that provide tools to assure accountability, such as time frames and interim milestones that could be used to monitor progress, hold staff accountable for achieving desired results, and make mid-course corrections, if needed. Although officials routinely track each improvement through twice monthly meetings, and use a spreadsheet to monitor status and next steps, they have not specified time frames and interim milestones. Without this information, officials cannot ensure that they will implement the recommended improvements in a timely and efficient manner.
The letter that accompanied the report to Congress stated that the FHCC's costs were “very high” and not in keeping with the initial goal of delivering more cost-effective health care. VA and DOD officials told GAO that this statement was based on their contractor's evaluation of the facility, which found that the FHCC was not more cost-effective than a joint venture. Officials told GAO that their contractor's analyses used cost data that ended in fiscal year 2014, and since that time, the FHCC has made improvements they believe would positively impact cost savings. However, officials said that they did not have sufficient time for the contractor to update the analysis after receiving the contractor's report in September 2015, and that one additional year of data would not likely have changed their conclusions or recommendations. According to OMB's capital programming guide, at many key decision points, a cost-effectiveness analysis of operations would be useful to help make decisions. Without an updated cost-effectiveness analysis for the FHCC, officials will not have a baseline from which to measure and track the FHCC's future efficiency, including the effect of the recommended improvements, once implemented.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the Secretaries of VA and DOD collaborate to establish time frames and interim milestones for tracking the implementation of the jointly recommended improvements and to conduct a cost-effectiveness analysis for the FHCC. VA and DOD concurred with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-11-622 | gao_GAO-11-622_0 | VA also receives reimbursements from services it provides to other government entities, such as the Department of Defense (DOD), or to private or nonprofit entities. Changes Were Made to VA’s Budget Estimate Based on Policy Decisions and Other Factors to Help Develop the President’s Budget Request
Changes to VA’s Budget Estimate Based on Policy Decisions and Operational Improvements Resulted in Reduced Requested Resource Levels
VA identified several changes that were made to its budget estimate to help develop the President’s budget request for VA for fiscal years 2012 and 2013. In one change, VA identified that the resources identified in its budget justification for non-recurring maintenance (NRM) were lower than the amount estimated using the EHCPM by $904 million for fiscal year 2012 and $1.27 billion for fiscal year 2013. OMB staff said that amounts identified for NRM in VA’s congressional budget justification were lower than estimated amounts due to a policy decision to fund other initiatives and to hold down the overall budget request for VA health care without affecting the quality and timeliness of VA’s health care services. According to VA’s budget justification, VA’s health care budget estimate was further reduced by $1.2 billion for fiscal year 2012 and by $1.3 billion for fiscal year 2013 to reflect expected savings from what VA identified as six operational improvements. The operational improvements with the largest amount of estimated cost savings are VA’s proposed changes to its purchasing and contracting strategies for which VA estimates a savings of $355 million a year for fiscal years 2012 and 2013. Changes to VA’s Budget Estimate Based on Administration’s Initiatives Resulted in Increased Requested Resource Levels
VA’s health care budget estimate was increased overall by about $1.4 billion for fiscal year 2012 and $1.3 billion for fiscal year 2013 to support health-care-related initiatives proposed by the administration, according to VA officials. Opening new health care facilities. The President’s Budget Request for VA Health Care Relied on Funding from Various Sources and Included a Request for Contingency Funding
The President’s Budget Request for New Appropriations Was Based in Part on Consideration of Collections, Unobligated Balances, and Reimbursements
The President’s request for appropriations for VA health care for fiscal years 2012 and 2013 relied on anticipated funding from several sources. The request assumes the availability of about $4.0 billion from collections, unobligated balances of mulitiyear appropriations, and reimbursements. Similarly, of the $56.7 billion requested by the President for fiscal year 2013, $52.5 billion was requested in new appropriations—an increase of 3.3 percent from the fiscal year 2012 request. The President’s Budget Request Included Funding Contingent on Certain Conditions
Of the $54.9 billion in total resources requested by the President for fiscal year 2012, $953 million represents contingency funding to be available under certain circumstances for health care services, supplies, and materials. Concluding Observations
Budgeting for VA health care, by its very nature, is complex because assumptions and imperfect information are used to project the likely demand and cost of the health care services VA expects to provide. VA’s continuing review of estimates in this iterative process does attempt to address some of these uncertainties, and as a result, VA’s estimates may change to better inform the President’s budget request. The President’s request for VA health care services for fiscal years 2012 and 2013 was based, in part, on reductions in VA’s estimates for certain activities that were made using the EHCPM or other methods. However, in 2006, we reported on a prior round of VA’s planned management efficiency savings and found that VA lacked a methodology for its assumptions about savings estimates. If the estimated savings for fiscal years 2012 and 2013 do not materialize and VA receives appropriations in the amount requested by the President, VA may have to make difficult tradeoffs to manage within the resources provided. Agency Comments
We provided a draft of this report to the Secretary of VA and the Director of OMB for comment. VA had no comments on this report. OMB provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Veterans Affairs, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, and appropriate congressional committees. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Veterans Health Care Budget Reform and Transparency Act of 2009 requires GAO to report whether the amounts for the Department of Veterans Affairs' (VA) health care services in the President's budget request are consistent with VA's budget estimates as projected by the Enrollee Health Care Projection Model (EHCPM) and other methodologies. Based on the information VA provided, this report describes (1) the key changes VA identified that were made to its budget estimate to develop the President's budget request for fiscal years 2012 and 2013 and (2) how various sources of funding for VA health care and other factors informed the President's budget request for fiscal years 2012 and 2013. GAO reviewed documents describing VA's estimates projected by the EHCPM and changes made to VA's budget estimate that affect all services, including estimates developed using other methodologies. GAO also reviewed the President's budget request, VA's congressional budget justification, and interviewed VA officials and staff from the Office of Management and Budget (OMB).
What GAO Found
VA officials identified changes made to its estimate of the resources needed to provide health care services to reflect policy decisions, savings from operational improvements, resource needs for initiatives, and other items to help develop the President's budget request for fiscal years 2012 and 2013. For example, VA's estimate for non-recurring maintenance to repair health care facilities was reduced by $904 million for fiscal year 2012 and $1.27 billion for fiscal year 2013, due to a policy decision to fund other initiatives and hold down the overall budget request for VA health care. VA's estimates were further reduced by $1.2 billion for fiscal year 2012 and $1.3 billion for fiscal year 2013 due to expected savings from operational improvements, such as proposed changes to purchasing and contracting. Other changes had a mixed impact on VA's budget estimate, according to VA officials; some of these changes increased the overall budget estimate, while other changes decreased the overall estimate. The President's request for appropriations for VA health care for fiscal years 2012 and 2013 relied on anticipated funding from various sources. Specifically, of the $54.9 billion in total resources requested for fiscal year 2012, $50.9 billion was requested in new appropriations. This request assumes the availability of $4.0 billion from collections, unobligated balances of multiyear appropriations, and reimbursements VA receives for services provided to other government entities. Of the $56.7 billion in total resources requested for fiscal year 2013, $52.5 billion was requested in new appropriations, and $4.1 billion was anticipated from other funding sources. The President's request for fiscal year 2012 also included a request for about $953 million in contingency funding to provide additional resources should a recent economic downturn result in increased use of VA health care. Contingency funding was not included in the advance appropriations request for fiscal year 2013. Budgeting for VA health care is inherently complex because it is based on assumptions and imperfect information used to project the likely demand and cost of the health care services VA expects to provide. The iterative and multilevel review of the budget estimates can address some of these uncertainties as new information becomes available about program needs, presidential policies, congressional actions, and future economic conditions. As a result, VA's estimates may change to better inform the President's budget request. The President's request for VA health care services for fiscal years 2012 and 2013 was based, in part, on reductions to VA's estimates of the resources required for certain activities and operational improvements. However, in 2006, GAO reported on a prior round of VA's planned management efficiency savings and found that VA lacked a methodology for its assumptions about savings estimates. If the estimated savings for fiscal years 2012 and 2013 do not materialize and VA receives appropriations in the amount requested by the President, VA may have to make difficult trade-offs to manage within the resources provided.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is not making recommendations in this report. GAO provided a draft of this report to the Secretary of VA and the Director of OMB for comment. VA had no comments on this report. OMB provided technical comments, which GAO incorporated as appropriate. |
gao_NSIAD-96-141 | gao_NSIAD-96-141_0 | The services’ annual O&M budget requests to Congress are presented in four broad categories referred to as budget activities: operating forces, mobilization, training and recruiting, and administrative and servicewide activities. As shown in table 3, the amounts obligated have increased slightly during the 3-year period, but, at their highest level, still only represent 21.5 percent of the Army’s and 26.8 percent of the Air Force’s total O&M obligations. In contrast, the Army obligated about $900 million less than the amounts requested.The fact that the Army did not obligate all the funds that it requested for its combat forces means that the amount initially requested for combat forces was probably used to fund other O&M programs. Table 5 shows the types of training and recruiting activities the Army and the Air Force obligated their O&M funds for in fiscal year 1995. However, overall, the Army and the Air Force obligated less than they requested for their training and recruiting activities. Funding for Base Support
For fiscal years 1993 through 1995, the Army obligated about 33 percent of its total O&M funds for base support and the Air Force about 30 percent. Table 6 shows the amounts requested and obligated for base support program elements during the 3-year period under review. Another area where the services obligated more than was requested was for environmental activities. The Air Force also obligated significantly more of its O&M funds for environmental activities than it requested—about $774 million versus $404 million. Funding for Management, Command, and Servicewide Activities
Between fiscal years 1993 through 1995, the Army obligated approximately 37 percent of its O&M funds for management, command, and servicewide activities. The Air Force obligated about 35 percent of its O&M funds for the same purposes. This is particularly true for the Army, which historically obligates less funds for its combat forces than it requests even when appropriated more than requested. Conversely, the opposite trend emerges for the infrastructure and management accounts. The reason why obligations exceed the amounts requested may be because Congress appropriated more than requested. DOD also commented that it disagreed with our statement that only one-third of Army’s and Air Force’s O&M funds are obligated for combat forces, including training and recruitment. The purpose of this delineation was to illustrate what portion of the O&M funds were used for those O&M activities that could be directly related to the combat forces as opposed to those O&M activities that were infrastructure related. 2. The report was clarified to point out that the Army obligated less than requested for combat forces and support of forces and that the Air Force obligated more than requested for combat forces and support of the forces. 4. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO reviewed how the Army and Air Force obligated their annual operation and maintenance (O&M) funds.
What GAO Found
GAO found that; (1) the services have a great deal of flexibility as to how they use their O&M funds; (2) this flexibility is evident in the O&M obligation trends, which illustrate that the proposed uses of O&M identified in the budget request may not always reflect how the funds are obligated; (3) this is particularly true for the Army, which historically obligates less funds for its combat forces than it requests even when Congress appropriates more than was requested; (4) the Army and the Air Force obligate about one-third of their O&M funds for activities directly related to combat forces, including training and recruitment; (5) the remainder goes to support infrastructure-type activities such as base support and management activities; (6) from fiscal years 1993 through 1995, the Army obligated less than 20 percent of its O&M funds for combat forces and support of the forces and the Air Force obligated about 26 percent of its O&M funds for such purposes; (7) when training and recruiting funds are added, the Army's and the Air Force's obligations are about 30 and 34 percent, respectively; (8) the balance of the O&M funds was obligated for infrastructure-type functions such as base support and management activities. During the 3-year period, the Army obligated 33 percent of its O&M funds for base support and 37 percent for management activities; (9) the Air Force obligated 30 percent of its O&M funds for base support and 35 percent for management activities for that same period; (10) the fastest growing accounts were minor construction, maintenance and repair, administrative activities, and international activities; (11) when the amounts obligated for combat forces and support of the forces and training and recruitment are compared to the amounts requested for these categories, the Army historically requested more than it obligated; (12) conversely, it often obligates more than requested for infrastructure and management activities; (13) in part, this may be due to Congress appropriating more than requested; (14) however, it can also be the result of O&M funds requested for one purpose being obligated for another purpose; (15) GAO's comparison of the amounts obligated and budgeted by the Air Force for these same functions showed that the Air Force obligated slightly more than it requested for combat forces; (16) with regard to training and recruiting, the Air Force obligated less than the amounts requested; and (17) it obligated more than it requested for base support and slightly less than it requested for management activities. |
gao_GAO-02-47T | gao_GAO-02-47T_0 | The resulting organizational and legal patchwork has given responsibility for specific food commodities to different agencies and provided them with significantly different regulatory authorities and responsibilities. The number of agencies involved in regulating a sandwich illustrates the fragmented nature of the current food safety system. Because the nation’s food safety system evolved piecemeal over time, the nation has essentially two very different approaches to food safety—one at USDA and the other at FDA—that have led to inefficient use of resources and inconsistencies in oversight and enforcement. These problems, along with ineffective coordination between the agencies, have hampered and continue to impede efforts to address public health concerns associated with existing and emerging food safety risks. These agents can be released through food as well as the air, water, or insects. Conclusions
To conclude, Mr. Chairman, we believe that creating a single food safety agency to administer a uniform, risk-based inspection system is the most effective way for the federal government to resolve long-standing problems; address emerging food safety issues, including acts of deliberate contamination involving biological agents; and ensure the safety of the nation’s food supply. | What GAO Found
Tens of millions of Americans become ill and thousands die each year from eating unsafe foods. The current food safety system is a patchwork structure that cannot address existing and emerging food safety risks. The current system was cobbled together over many years to address specific health threats from particular foods. The resulting fragmented organizational and legal structure causes inefficient use of resources, inconsistent oversight and enforcement, and ineffective coordination. Food safety issues must be addressed comprehensively--that is, by preventing contamination through the entire food production cycle, from farm to table. A single, food safety agency responsible for administering a uniform set of laws is needed to resolve long-standing problems with the current system; deal with emerging food safety issues, such as the safety of genetically modified foods or deliberate acts of contamination; and ensure a safe food supply. |
gao_GAO-16-816 | gao_GAO-16-816_0 | The A-10 is one of a number of DOD aircraft—both manned and unmanned—that conduct the CAS mission. Air Force and DOD Do Not Have Needed Information to Fully Understand Implications of A-10 Divestment and Could Face Similar Challenges with Future Divestments
The Air Force and DOD do not have needed information on the full implications of A-10 divestment, including the gaps that could be created by divestment and options for mitigating any potential gaps. Further, DOD may face similar decisions to divest other weapon systems before the end of their service lives in the future and does not have guidance to ensure that the services and the department overall are collecting quality information to inform these decisions. The Air Force has not formally determined what aircraft, if any, will replace the A-10 for this mission, according to Air Force officials. Without clearly understanding the capability gaps and risks that could result from A-10 divestment before again proposing to divest the A-10, it is unclear how effective or necessary the Air Force’s mitigation strategies will be. The A-10 divestment proposal is a case study of this kind of difficult decision. In its fiscal year 2015 divestment proposal, we found the Air Force’s cost estimates partially met best practices for being comprehensive, minimally met best practices for being well-documented and accurate, and did not meet best practices for being credible. In addition, we found in June 2015 that, in presenting its budget to Congress, the Air Force provided a number of alternatives to A-10 divestment that it said would also result in approximately $4.2 billion in cost savings. The GAO Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide lists 20 best practices for a reliable cost estimate. By applying similar cost estimation practices from its fiscal year 2015 budget process, the Air Force’s fiscal year 2016 and 2017 A-10 divestment cost estimates may continue to overstate or understate the actual figure and may not be reliable, as we found the 2015 estimate to be. Overall, since the A-10 divestment estimate did not meet all best practices, the Air Force cannot ensure that it has a reliable estimate of the cost savings it could generate by divesting the A-10. By developing a high-quality, reliable cost estimate of savings from A-10 divestment, the Air Force would have a sound basis from which to develop and compare alternatives and their associated risks that achieve similar savings or make adjustments to other fighter- attack programs or mission areas like air superiority or global strike. However, the fiscal year 2017 budget request marks the third consecutive year that the Air Force proposed divesting the A-10 without having determined its requirements for the A-10’s missions and the gaps and risks resulting from divestment. Should it continue to pursue the early divestment of the A-10 fleet as a way to balance current demands and future needs, the Air Force would benefit from quality information that fully identifies capacity and capability gaps and associated risks resulting from divestment and it could use that information to develop mitigation strategies. Recommendations for Executive Action
To make a well-informed decision about the future of its A-10 aircraft, we recommend that before again recommending divestment of the A-10, the Secretary of the Air Force:
Develop quality information that fully identifies gaps in capacity or capability that would result from A-10 divestment, including the timing and duration of any identified gaps, and the risks associated with those gaps; and
Use that information to develop strategies to mitigate any identified gaps. As DOD faces future decisions on how to balance its existing capabilities and capacities against future modernization requirements, it will need quality information to help inform such decisions. As we describe in our report, though the Air Force and DOD are taking steps to mitigate potential gaps, they have not established clear requirements for the missions that the A-10 performs, including CAS, FAC(A), and CSAR- Sandy, and in the absence of these requirements, have not fully identified the capability gaps and risks that could result from A-10 divestment and the effectiveness or necessity of the Air Force’s and the department’s mitigation strategies. A high-quality, reliable cost estimate would provide the Air Force with a sound basis from which to consider alternatives to achieve its budget targets. Without this guidance, DOD may continue to divest weapon systems and overlook the kinds of capability, capacity, and cost issues we point out in this report, which ultimately hinders DOD’s ability to best balance current demands and future needs. Appendix III: Scope and Methodology
To assess the extent to which the Air Force and the Department of Defense (DOD) have the quality information needed to understand the implications of A-10 divestment, we assessed strategic guidance, memorandums, aircraft inventory, training syllabi, and other documentation against DOD guidance on economic analysis for decision- making, Air Force guidance on business case analysis procedures, and GAO knowledge-based criteria. The additional details can be found in the classified version of this report (GAO-16-525C). | Why GAO Did This Study
DOD faces difficult decisions on how to best balance current demands and future needs within fiscal constraints. Decisions regarding the A-10 aircraft exemplify the difficulty. In the fiscal year 2015 budget request, DOD and the Air Force prioritized modern multi-role aircraft and proposed divesting the A-10 fleet, but Congress prohibited this action. DOD and the Air Force have continued to propose divesting the A-10 in two subsequent budget requests.
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015 included a provision for GAO to review the A-10 divestment proposal. This report reviews the extent to which (1) the Air Force and DOD have quality information needed to understand the implications of A-10 divestment; and (2) the Air Force followed best practices when estimating cost savings from A-10 divestment and evaluating alternatives. GAO analyzed agency documents and interviewed knowledgeable officials for this review.
What GAO Found
The Department of Defense (DOD) and Air Force do not have quality information on the full implications of A-10 divestment, including gaps that could be created by A-10 divestment and mitigation options. While A-10 pilots are recognized as the Air Force experts in providing close air support (CAS) to friendly forces, the A-10 and its pilots also perform other missions that are important to ongoing operations or to combatant commander operational plans and divestment will result in reduced capacity and capability in these other areas. The Air Force is taking a number of steps to try to mitigate any potential negative impacts from its proposed A-10 divestments. However, the Air Force has not established clear requirements for the missions the A-10 performs, and in the absence of these requirements, has not fully identified the capacity or capability gaps that could result from the A-10 divestment. Without a clear understanding of the capability or capacity gaps and risks that could result from A-10 divestment, it is also unclear how effective or necessary the Air Force's and the department's mitigation strategies will be. For example, although the Air Force has several efforts underway to generally mitigate the loss of capabilities that would result from A-10 divestment, it has not identified how or if it will replace the A-10's role in combat search and rescue missions. Depending on the specific mitigation strategy chosen, the Air Force may have to address a number of different secondary impacts that could affect its ability to execute existing missions. The A-10 is one example of a challenge DOD could continue to face as it balances current needs against investing in the future force to replace aging systems. For example, in June 2014, GAO reported on a Navy challenge in balancing current capability and capacity with future modernization needs. Overall, the department does not have guidance to ensure that the services and DOD are collecting quality information to inform divestment decisions on major weapon systems before the end of their service lives. Without quality information that fully identifies gaps and associated risks resulting from divestment that can be used to develop mitigation strategies, DOD and the Air Force may not be well-positioned to best balance current demands and future needs.
According to the GAO Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide , a high-quality, reliable cost estimate is comprehensive, well-documented, accurate, and credible. GAO's analysis found that the Air Force's cost estimate for its fiscal year 2015 divestment proposal partially met best practices for being comprehensive, minimally met best practices for being well-documented and accurate, and did not meet best practices for being credible. Additionally, Air Force officials stated they used similar practices when developing fiscal years 2016 and 2017 budget requests that included A-10 divestment. As a result, the Air Force cannot ensure that it has a reliable estimate of the cost savings it would generate by divesting the A-10. Further, without developing a reliable estimate, the Air Force does not have a sound basis from which to develop and consider alternatives to achieve budget targets, such as making adjustments to other fighter-attack programs or mission areas like air superiority or global strike.
This is a public version of a classified report GAO issued previously. It excludes classified information which described specific intelligence assessments, scenarios, and operational details.
What GAO Recommends
With regard to the A-10, GAO recommends that the Air Force fully identify mission gaps, risks, and mitigation strategies, and also develop high-quality, reliable cost estimates of the savings from divestment before again proposing to divest its A-10 fleet, and that DOD establish quality information requirements to guide major weapon system divestments. DOD non-concurred with the recommendations, but GAO continues to believe that they remain valid as discussed in the report. |
gao_GAO-14-239 | gao_GAO-14-239_0 | Scorekeeping in the Federal Budget What is scorekeeping? The FBF is the primary source of funds for operating and capital costs associated with federal space. GSA concurred with this recommendation. Case Study Agency Officials Experienced Challenges Receiving Full Upfront Funding for Federal Real Property Projects
Officials at four selected agencies—GSA, USDA, VA, and Interior— experienced challenges receiving full upfront funding for federal real property projects through the annual appropriations process. For example, GSA’s sole acquisition between 2008 and 2012 resulted from exercising a purchase option on a preexisting lease. Interior officials said that GSA has been unable to obtain FBF funding through the annual appropriations process to complete renovations in Interior’s federally-owned and GSA-managed headquarters building. Officials at GSA and USDA noted that the authority to retain proceeds provides a key incentive to initiate disposal transactions. For example, officials at GSA, which provides disposal services across the federal government, stated that the vast majority of current disposal transactions are by agencies or components that have the authority to retain the proceeds from sales or disposals. Alternative Funding Mechanisms Helped Agencies Meet Their Real Property Needs, but Also Posed Challenges
Agencies Use a Variety of Funding Mechanisms to Meet Their Real Property Needs
Selected agencies have been authorized to use a variety of funding mechanisms as an alternative to full upfront funding to meet their real property needs. Funding mechanisms leverage both monetary resources, such as retained fees, and non-monetary resources, such as property exchanged in a land swap or space offered in an enhanced use lease (EUL). Alternative funding mechanisms are not universally available to all agencies. Moreover, even within an agency, legal authorities may differ across agency components. In addition to an agency’s ability to share risk and manage stakeholder relationships, the availability of an appropriate partner and the geographic location of the property may affect the use and success of an alternative funding mechanism. For example, ARS needed to acquire land or build an incinerator to dispose of excess manure. Because of these legal, cost, and anticipated stakeholder challenges, ARS officials said that ARS held onto the land for about 10 years while seeking an appropriate partner with whom to exchange land. Alternative Budgetary Structures Have Potential to Help Congress and Agencies Recognize the Costs and Returns of Real Property Projects Upfront and Over Time
While different funding mechanisms have been used as an alternative to obtaining upfront funding for federal real property projects, changes to the budgetary structure itself—within the bounds of the unified budget that encompasses the full scope of federal programs and transactions—may also help agencies meet their real property needs. Alternative budgetary structures may be established to change budgetary incentives for agencies and therefore help Congress and agencies make more prudent long-term fiscal decisions. These alternatives could promote more complete consideration of the full costs of projects and associated returns over time as well as provide agencies with greater flexibility to manage their real property needs. Budgeting and Capital Planning Principles Offer a Framework for Considering Alternative Budgetary Structures
To assist congressional and agency-level decision makers in considering alternative budgetary structures, we identified two key budgeting and capital planning principles. An alternative budgetary structure should do two things: promote transparency and fiscal control with regard to the funding of federal real property projects; and provide agencies the flexibility to facilitate the acquisition, repair and alteration, and disposal of federal real property in support of federal missions. Discretionary Budget Authority Options Could Provide a Straightforward Means of Dedicating Funding to Real Property Projects
Changes to the current discretionary structure for funding federal real property projects may provide a relatively straightforward means of dedicating funding to federal real property while creating room for additional agency flexibility. As previously described, resources deposited into the FBF have exceeded the amount that Congress has appropriated to GSA in recent years, resulting in a $4.7 billion difference between the full balance of the FBF and amounts made available for spending in fiscal year 2013. 2. For each useful asset, agencies might provide updated business case analyses, which could include reestimates of both costs and returns. 3. 2. 4. We provided a draft of this report for review and comment to the Secretaries of the Departments of Agriculture (USDA), Interior, and Veterans Affairs (VA), and to the Administrator of the General Services Administration (GSA). All agencies generally concurred with our findings. We further clarified this point in our report. USDA, Interior, and VA provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. | Why GAO Did This Study
Federal real property projects are fully funded when Congress provides budget authority and appropriations for the estimated full cost of the projects up front—at the time they are undertaken. However, as agencies work to balance limited resources with mission demands, many have turned to approaches other than full upfront funding to acquire, renovate, or dispose of federal real property, such as buildings, structures, and land. GAO was asked to review alternative models for managing federal real property. This report examines (1) agency experiences funding federal real property projects, (2) some of the alternative funding mechanisms selected agencies use, as well as agency experiences using selected mechanisms, and (3) alternative budgetary structures within the current unified budget that may potentially help Congress and agencies better recognize the cost of real property projects and associated returns, promoting both transparency and fiscal control. GAO reviewed case study projects from 4 agencies among the top 10 in federal real property holdings and chosen based on their use of alternative funding mechanisms, as identified in our past and ongoing work. Finally, GAO identified alternative budgetary structures that may support real property projects and principles for considering them by reviewing published reports and interviewing federal budget staff and experts.
GAO is not making any recommendations in this report. GSA, USDA, VA, and Interior generally agreed with our findings. USDA, Interior and VA provided technical comments that were incorporated as appropriate.
What GAO Found
Officials at four selected agencies—the General Services Administration (GSA), U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), and the Department of the Interior (Interior)—experienced challenges receiving full upfront funding for federal real property projects through the annual appropriations process. For example, due to budget constraints, GSA acquired one property between 2008 and 2012. In addition, GSA has been unable to access funding to complete renovations in Interior's headquarters building due to obligation limitations in the GSA-administered Federal Buildings Fund (FBF). The FBF, which is the primary funding source for operating and capital costs associated with federal space, held an unobligated carryover balance of $4.7 billion at the end of fiscal year 2013 as a result of congressional limits on obligations. Officials noted that authority to retain proceeds provides a key incentive to initiate disposals, as agencies without this authority must request upfront funding for disposal costs while resulting proceeds are paid to the Department of the Treasury. Nonetheless, officials at selected agencies with the authority to retain disposal proceeds cited barriers to disposals, such as poor market demand, historical status or necessary remediation.
Instead of full upfront funding, selected agencies sometimes used a variety of alternative funding mechanisms to meet their real property needs by leveraging authorized monetary resources, such as retained fees, and non-monetary resources, such as property exchanged in a swap or space offered in an enhanced use lease. Alternative funding mechanisms are not universally available to all agencies; even within an agency, legal authorities may differ across agency components. For alternative funding mechanisms that involve working with a partner, such as in a land swap, the agency's ability to find an appropriate partner, manage that partnering relationship, and share risk—both explicit and implicit—with the partner affected project outcomes. For example, because of legal, cost, and other challenges, officials from USDA's Agricultural Research Service (ARS) said that ARS held onto land for about 10 years while seeking an appropriate partner to successfully complete the land swap.
Changes to the budgetary structure itself—within the bounds of the unified budget—might provide a more consistent way to meet real property needs while helping Congress and agencies make more prudent long-term fiscal decisions. Alternative budgetary structures should balance tradeoffs across two key GAO-identified budgeting and capital planning principles: (1) promoting transparency and fiscal control with regard to the funding of federal real property; and (2) providing agencies the flexibility to facilitate the acquisition, repair and alteration, and disposal of federal real property in support of federal missions. GAO provides alternative budgetary structure options for Congress to consider. For example, in one option Congress would make the full balance of the FBF available for funding real property projects, which could create room for additional agency flexibility but may reduce fiscal control. Another option would establish a government-wide capital acquisition fund with authority to borrow from the Federal Financing Bank for approved projects, which could improve transparency of both costs and benefits upfront and over time while business case analyses could provide a means of assuring fiscal control. |
gao_GAO-02-416 | gao_GAO-02-416_0 | The DMP was originally designed to enable DEA to monitor the price and purity of retail- level heroin sold in the United States; it now also provides for the purchase of heroin for signature analysis. The DMP data are intended to provide law enforcement with a snapshot of where heroin at the retail level, in certain metropolitan areas, originates. For example, HSP and DMP data are frequently included in DEA intelligence and investigative reports to corroborate heroin trafficking trends in the United States and to inform DEA and other federal law enforcement agencies about heroin trafficking. Quantity of Heroin Seized at Ports-of- Entry by Customs but not Sent to DEA for Testing May Be Sufficient To Make a Difference in Results Reported by DEA
According to DEA officials, all ports-of-entry seizures sent to DEA by Customs are tested by DEA for geographic source. However, for several reasons, Customs is not required to send all seized heroin to DEA. This is incorrect. Appendix I: Heroin Signature Program
The Heroin Signature Program (HSP) sample was selected using sampling procedures for two categories of eligible exhibits. The first category included exhibits from seizures made by the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and the Washington D.C., Metropolitan Police Department. HSP Limitations
Our analysis of the HSP methodology found that the HSP data, with modifications, could produce valid estimates about the geographic source of all wholesale heroin seized in the United States and forwarded to DEA for testing. 1. Appendix II: Domestic Monitor Program
DEA produced tables using the Domestic Monitor Program (DMP) data. Appendix III: Comments from the Drug Enforcement Administration | Why GAO Did This Study
The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) runs two programs--the Heroin Signature Program and the Domestic Monitor Program--that provide information on trends in heroin trafficking. The only programs of their kind in this country, these two program conduct chemical analyses to pinpoint the geographic origin of heroin being sold on the streets. The Domestic Monitor Program determines (1) the source of heroin that has been bought undercover in 23 U.S. cities and (2) the purity and price of heroin at the retail level. The Heroin Signature Program provides law enforcement with information on the origins of heroin at the wholesale and retail level in some U.S. cities. Data from the two programs are included in intelligence and investigative reports provided to DEA and other federal law enforcement agencies, which use this information to adjust their drug enforcement efforts. The quantity of heroin seized by the Customs Service at ports-of-entry but not sent to DEA for testing may make a difference in the results reported by DEA. All seizures at ports-of-entry forwarded to DEA are tested for geographic source, according to DEA officials. However, Customs is not required to send all heroin seizures to DEA.
What GAO Found
GAO found that the usefulness of the data from and Heroin Signature Program and the Domestic Monitor Program is limited because they are based on nonrepresentative samples of their respective populations. GAO believes that DEA could produce stronger estimates if it modified its methodology. |
gao_GAO-04-783 | gao_GAO-04-783_0 | Background
CMS administers the Medicare program with the assistance of about 50 claims administration contractors. As part of their duties, contractors deny claims that are the responsibility of other insurers. This comparison allows CMS to determine whether Medicare may have mistakenly paid claims on behalf of the beneficiary. The recovery process is also constrained by procedures that prevent contractors from maximizing their recoveries of mistaken payments. To measure cost- effectiveness, we compared the amount that CMS spent on contractor recovery activities for a given fiscal year with the amount recovered from all cases that were opened during the same year—regardless of when the funds were recovered. In that year, Medicare lost money on EGHP recovery activities, recovering only 38 cents for every dollar spent. The number of new MSP EGHP debt cases has decreased by more than 80 percent in recent years, from 49,240 cases in fiscal year 2000 to 7,634 cases in fiscal year 2003. However, almost half of the contractors were assigned fewer than 50 cases. Moreover, CMS funded 8 contractors that were not assigned any EGHP debt cases. Our review of EGHP debt cases revealed that, during fiscal years 2000, 2001, and 2003, CMS neglected to transmit 2,364 cases to the contractors, representing more than $28 million in potential mistaken payments. As a result, no recovery action was ever initiated for these cases. Efforts to Improve MSP Management Have Not Focused on EGHP Debt Cases
Recognizing the need to improve the coordination of its MSP recovery efforts, CMS contracted for the development of a new recovery system— the Recovery Management and Accounting System (ReMAS)—in 1998. Once ReMAS determines that Medicare has paid claims that were the primary responsibility of another insurer, it will generate a case that can be assigned to any contractor for recovery. To date, only the initial software testing and validation for the liability and workers’ compensation components have been completed. The remaining contractors that process MSP liability cases are scheduled to implement ReMAS by October 2004. In addition, funding for these activities is not always related to contractors’ workloads—in fiscal year 2003, almost half of the contractors received fewer than 50 cases to process while 8 of these, which had a collective budget of more than $1.8 million, received no cases at all. Plans to expand the scope of ReMAS to recover debt associated with employer-sponsored group health plans could ultimately address current operational weaknesses, such as an inefficient distribution of workload and limited coordination among contractors. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To assess the cost-effectiveness of the current system for recovering Medicare Secondary Payer (MSP) debt, we analyzed information from two CMS databases—the Contractor Administrative-Budget and Financial Management (CAFM) system and the Mistaken Payment and Recovery Tracking System (MPaRTS). To identify the agency’s efforts to enhance the MSP process, we reviewed documents and interviewed CMS officials on CMS’s planned Recovery, Management and Accounting System (ReMAS), a new CMS system for MSP debt recovery activities that is under development. | Why GAO Did This Study
Last year, employer-sponsored group health plans (EGHP) were responsible for most of the nearly $183 million in outstanding Medicare secondary payer (MSP) debt. MSP debts arise when Medicare inadvertently pays for services that are subsequently determined to be the financial responsibility of another. The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) administers Medicare with the assistance of about 50 contractors that, as part of their duties, are required to recover MSP debt. GAO was asked to determine whether Medicare contractors are appropriately recovering MSP debt. GAO (1) assessed the cost-effectiveness of the current debt recovery system and (2) identified CMS's plans to enhance the recovery process. GAO analyzed workload and budget information and assessed plans to develop a new debt recovery system--the Recovery Management and Accounting System (ReMAS).
What GAO Found
Medicare's system for recovering MSP debt from EGHPs is no longer cost-effective, with CMS recovering only 38 cents for every dollar it spent on recovery activities in fiscal year 2003. This is largely due to workload and budgetary factors. While the number of new debt cases referred to contractors has declined by more than 80 percent since fiscal year 2000, CMS's budget for contractor recovery activities has remained relatively unchanged. As a result, contractors were funded at a level that exceeded their workload. Almost half of the contractors that CMS funded to process the 7,634 cases associated with the fiscal year 2003 workload were assigned fewer than 50 cases--and eight were not assigned any. The current system is also constrained by procedures that prevent contractors from maximizing recoveries. For example, CMS has instructed contractors not to pursue cases in which the amount of mistaken payments made on behalf of the same beneficiary is less than $1,000. In addition, CMS neglected to transmit more than 2,000 cases to the contractors--which depend on these transmittals to initiate recoveries--during fiscal years 2000, 2001, and 2003. CMS is developing a new recovery system--ReMAS--to enhance the MSP recovery process. This system has the potential to help increase savings, provide CMS with greater flexibility in distributing the workload, and simplify the collection of MSP debt. ReMAS is designed to identify relevant mistaken payments and will generate a case that can be assigned to any contractor for recovery--not only the contractor that processed the mistakenly paid claims. However, ReMAS has been under development for over 6 years and is currently only being used for liability and workers' compensation recoveries by a fraction of the contractors. Pilot testing of ReMAS on EGHP cases will not begin until October 2004. |
gao_GAO-04-765 | gao_GAO-04-765_0 | About 1 year after CMS’s demonstration authority ended, MMA required the agency to conduct competitive bidding for DME, supplies, off-the-shelf orthotics, and enteral nutrients and related equipment and supplies. As CMS implements competitive bidding, its payment- setting experience in the demonstration will prove useful as the agency considers items for competitive bidding and approaches to streamline implementation, collect information on specific items provided to beneficiaries, and ensure that beneficiaries’ access to quality items and services is not compromised. For example, nondemonstration items that CMS could choose include power wheelchairs and lancets and test strips used by diabetics. These three items accounted for about $1.7 billion, or about 17 percent, of Medicare allowed charges for DME, prosthetics, orthotics, and supplies in 2002. In order to expand competitive bidding, CMS could potentially use two streamlining approaches— developing standardized steps that are easily replicated in different locations and using mail-order delivery for selected items for which fees are determined through nationwide competitive bidding. Better Information on Specific Items Provided to Beneficiaries Could Ensure More Appropriate Payment
Finding ways to collect better information on the specific items provided to beneficiaries is the third issue for CMS to consider as it implements competitive bidding on a larger scale. As competitive bidding proceeds, routine monitoring of beneficiaries’ complaints, concerns, and satisfaction can be used as a tool to help ensure that beneficiaries continue to have access to quality items. As competitive bidding expands and affects larger numbers of beneficiaries, small problems could be potentially magnified. In the past, when implementing significant Medicare changes, such as new payment methods for skilled nursing facilities and home health services, the agency has lacked timely and accurate information about how the changes affected beneficiary access. Recommendations for Executive Action
To increase potential savings from competitive bidding, streamline implementation, help ensure that Medicare is paying appropriately for items, and promote beneficiary satisfaction, we recommend that the Administrator of CMS take the following seven actions: consider conducting competitive bidding for demonstration items and items that represent high Medicare spending that were not included in the competitive bidding demonstration; develop a standardized approach for competitive bidding for use at consider using mail delivery for items that can be provided directly to beneficiaries in the home, as a way to implement a national competitive bidding strategy; evaluate individual HCPCS codes to determine if codes need to be subdivided because the range in characteristics and price of items included under the individual codes is too broad; periodically obtain specific identifying information on selected high- cost items to monitor the characteristics of items subject to competitive bidding that are provided to beneficiaries, such as manufacturer, make, and model number; monitor beneficiary satisfaction with items and services provided; and seek input from individuals with technical knowledge about the items and services suppliers provide to beneficiaries. Scope and Methodology
To assess issues that the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) might consider as it implements the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003 (MMA) provisions concerning competitive bidding, we reviewed the relevant provisions of MMA. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003 (MMA) requires the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) to conduct large-scale competitive bidding for durable medical equipment, supplies, off-the-shelf orthotics, and enteral nutrients and related equipment and supplies provided to beneficiaries. The Balanced Budget Act of 1997 mandated that GAO study an earlier Medicare competitive bidding demonstration. To address this mandate, GAO assessed this past experience in relation to four issues that CMS might consider as it implements large-scale competitive bidding: (1) items for competitive bidding, (2) how to streamline implementation, (3) ways to collect information on specific items provided to beneficiaries, and (4) steps to ensure quality items and services.
What GAO Found
CMS's experience in the Medicare competitive bidding demonstration may prove instructive as the agency implements provisions in MMA to conduct large-scale competitive bidding for durable medical equipment, supplies, off-the-shelf orthotics, and enteral nutrients and related equipment and supplies. The experience gained during the demonstration provides insight as the agency considers four implementation issues. Items for competitive bidding: Items for competitive bidding could include those selected for the demonstration and others that account for high levels of Medicare spending. For example, nondemonstration items that CMS could choose for competitive bidding include power wheelchairs and lancets and test strips used by diabetics. In 2002, these three items accounted for about $1.7 billion in charges for the Medicare program and its beneficiaries. How to streamline implementation: Because of the large scale of future competitive bidding, it will be prudent for CMS to consider ways to streamline implementation. Two ways to streamline are developing a standardized competitive bidding approach that can be replicated in multiple geographic locations and using mail-order delivery for selected items, with uniform fees established through a nationwide competition. Ways to collect information on specific items provided to beneficiaries: Gathering specific information on competitively bid items provided to beneficiaries could help ensure that suppliers do not substitute lower-priced items to reduce their costs. Currently, CMS is not able, or does not routinely, collect specific information on the items that suppliers provide to beneficiaries. Steps to ensure quality items and services for beneficiaries: Routine monitoring could help ensure that beneficiaries continue to have access to suppliers that deliver quality items and services. The agency, when implementing significant Medicare changes in the past that affected payment methods, has lacked information on how the changes affected beneficiary access. As competitive bidding expands, small problems could be potentially magnified. Using quality measures to choose multiple suppliers and having suppliers meet more detailed standards than are currently required can also help ensure quality for beneficiaries. |
gao_GAO-08-1040 | gao_GAO-08-1040_0 | The Digital Television Transition and Public Safety Act of 2005 addresses the responsibilities of two federal agencies—FCC and NTIA—related to the DTV transition. The act directs FCC to require full-power television stations to cease analog broadcasting by February 17, 2009. Private and Federal Stakeholders Have Undertaken a Myriad of Activities Aimed at Increasing the Public’s Awareness of the DTV Transition
Private sector stakeholders from the broadcast, cable, retail, and consumer electronics industries have committed over $1 billion to voluntary and required consumer education efforts to inform the public of the DTV transition. Private sector stakeholders have also produced DTV transition educational programs for broadcast and distribution, developed Web sites that provide information on the transition, and engaged in various other forms of outreach to raise awareness. Specifically, they focused their efforts on 45 areas of the country that have at least 1 of the following population groups: (1) more than 150,000 over- the-air households, (2) more than 20 percent of all households relying on over-the-air broadcasts, or (3) a top 10 city of residence for the largest target demographic groups. The target demographic groups include seniors, low-income, minority and non-English speaking, rural households, and persons with disabilities. NTIA Is Effectively Implementing the Converter Box Subsidy Program, but Concerns Exist about NTIA’s Ability to Manage a Potential Spike in Coupon Demand
NTIA has processed and issued coupons to millions of consumers, but a sharp increase in demand might affect NTIA’s ability to respond to coupon requests in a timely manner. Through June 2008, households had requested almost 19 million coupons. In our recent consumer survey, we found that 35 percent of U.S. households are at risk of losing some television service because they have at least one television not connected to a subscription service, such as cable or satellite. As a result, consumers might incur significant wait time before they receive their coupons and might lose television service during the time they are waiting for the coupons. Participation in the Converter Box Subsidy Program by Hard-to-Reach Populations Varies
We analyzed data to compare areas of the country that comprise predominantly minority and elderly populations with the rest of the U.S. population and found some differences in the coupon request, redemption, and expiration rates for Hispanic, black, and senior households compared with the rest of the U.S. population. However, households in predominantly black and Latino or Hispanic zip codes were less likely, compared with households outside these areas, to redeem their coupons once they received them. To determine participation in the converter box subsidy program in the 45 areas of the country receiving targeted outreach by NTIA and FCC, we analyzed NTIA coupon data (including requests, redemptions, and expirations) in the 45 areas compared with the rest of the country not targeted by NTIA and FCC. As part of our work, we conducted a “mystery shopper” study by visiting 132 randomly selected retail locations in 12 cities across the United States that were listed as participating in the converter box subsidy program. At most retailers (118) we visited, a representative was able to correctly identify that the DTV transition would occur in February 2009. In addition, our analysis confirms that a spike in coupon requests is likely as the transition nears. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of this report are to provide information on issues surrounding the digital television (DTV) transition, specifically, (1) what consumer education efforts have been undertaken by private and federal stakeholders and (2) how effective the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) has been in implementing the converter box subsidy program, and to what extent consumers are participating in the program. According to FCC testimony, it has found that the majority of store managers are well- informed about the DTV transition and the converter box subsidy program. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Digital Television Transition and Public Safety Act of 2005 requires all full-power television stations in the United States to cease analog broadcasting after February 17, 2009, known as the digital television (DTV) transition. The National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) is responsible for implementing a subsidy program to provide households with up to two $40 coupons toward the purchase of converter boxes. In this requested report, GAO examines (1) what consumer education efforts have been undertaken by private and federal stakeholders and (2) how effective NTIA has been in implementing the converter box subsidy program, and to what extent consumers are participating in the program. To address these issues, GAO analyzed data from NTIA and reviewed legal, agency, and industry documents. Also, GAO interviewed a variety of stakeholders involved with the DTV transition.
What GAO Found
Private sector and federal stakeholders have undertaken various consumer education efforts to raise awareness about the DTV transition. For example, the National Association of Broadcasters and the National Cable and Telecommunications Association have committed over $1.4 billion to educate consumers about the transition. This funding has supported the development of public service announcements, education programs for broadcast, Web sites, and other activities. The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and NTIA have consumer education plans that target those populations most likely to be affected by the DTV transition. Specifically, they identified 45 areas of the country as high risk that included areas with at least 1 of the following population groups: (1) more than 150,000 over-the-air households, (2) more than 20 percent of all households relying on over-the-air broadcasts, or (3) a top 10 city of residence for the largest target demographic groups. The target demographic groups include seniors, low-income, minority and non-English speaking, rural households, and persons with disabilities. In addition to targeting these 45 areas of the country, FCC and NTIA developed partnerships with organizations that serve these hard-to-reach populations. NTIA is effectively implementing the converter box subsidy program, but its plans to address the likely increase in coupon demand as the transition nears remain unclear. Almost 19 million coupons have been issued by NTIA, but as of June 2008, only 9 percent of U.S. households had requested coupons. As found in GAO's recent consumer survey, up to 35 percent of U.S. households could be affected by the transition because they have at least one television not connected to a subscription service, such as cable or satellite. With a spike in demand likely as the transition date nears, NTIA has no specific plans to address an increase in demand; therefore, consumers might incur significant wait time before they receive coupons as the transition nears and might lose television service during the time they are waiting for the coupons. In terms of participation in the converter box subsidy program, GAO analyzed coupon data in areas of the country comprising predominantly minority and senior populations and found that households in both predominantly black and Hispanic or Latino areas were much less likely to redeem their coupons compared with households outside these areas. Additionally, GAO analyzed participation in the subsidy program in the 45 areas of the country on which NTIA and FCC focused their consumer education efforts and found coupon requests to be about the same for zip codes within the 45 targeted areas compared with areas that were not targeted. Retailers play an integral role in the subsidy program by selling the converter boxes and helping to inform their customers about the DTV transition and the program. GAO visited 132 randomly selected retail stores in 12 cities. Store representatives at a majority of the retail locations GAO visited were able to correctly state that the DTV transition would occur in February 2009 and explain how to apply for a converter box coupon. |
gao_GAO-10-454 | gao_GAO-10-454_0 | As stated in SAFETEA-LU, goals of this program are to encourage states to adopt and implement effective programs to: improve the timeliness, consistency, completeness, accuracy, accessibility, and integration of traffic safety data; evaluate the effectiveness of efforts to make such improvements; link these state traffic safety data systems with other data systems within the state; and improve the compatibility of the state data system with national and other state data systems to enhance the ability to observe and analyze national trends in crash occurrences, rates, outcomes, and circumstances. Traffic records assessments are an evaluation of states’ traffic safety data systems, which includes discussions of how systems met NHTSA’s performance measures. A NHTSA technical team or private sector contractors conduct assessments for states using a “peer” review approach. State Traffic Data System Quality Varies, but the Full Extent of Data System Quality Is Difficult to Determine
State Traffic Data System Quality Varies by System and Performance Measure
Data system quality also varies by performance measure. For example, across all traffic safety data systems, states met the consistency performance measure 72 percent of the time, but met the data integration measure only 13 percent of the time (see fig. In addition, 31 state driver systems met the performance measure for completeness of data. States Have Demonstrated Progress in Some Data Systems, but Face Resource and Coordination Challenges
States Have Demonstrated Some Progress Nationwide
Information collected by NHTSA from the states shows that 49 states and D.C. have demonstrated progress in improving the quality of all six traffic safety data systems. For example, some progress has resulted from smaller-scale projects, such as printers for citations or online tutorials. State officials in all states that we visited also reported that just maintaining one data system requires significant funding, time, or other limited resources. All of the technical-level TRCC’s activities are reported to the executive-level TRCC. Rural and Urban Areas May Face Distinct Challenges
Rural and urban areas across the country faced some distinct challenges in improving traffic safety data systems. Some rural areas face additional challenges due to limited technology options. Conclusions
Improving state traffic safety data systems is critical to state efforts to use data-driven approaches to improve traffic safety and reduce traffic fatalities and injuries. However, incomplete and inconsistent information in the assessments limits the usefulness of the assessments, which, according to NHTSA’s implementing guidance, should be an “in-depth, formal review of a state’s highway safety data and traffic records system.” Furthermore, assessments in the updated traffic records assessment format currently being used often do not systematically evaluate each of the six performance measures as they relate to each of the six data systems. One of these strategies—establishing an executive-level TRCC—can potentially address multiple resource and coordination challenges. In particular, we sought to identify (1) the extent to which state traffic safety data systems meet National Highway Transportation Safety Administration’s (NHTSA) performance measures for assessing the quality of data systems, and (2) what progress states have made in improving traffic safety data systems and what challenges remain. Assessments are conducted or updated at least every 5 years as one of the eligibility requirements for Section 408 grant program funding. | Why GAO Did This Study
Traffic crashes kill or injure millions of people each year. High-quality traffic safety data is vital to allocate resources and target programs as the Department of Transportation's (DOT) National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) and states work to improve traffic safety through data-driven approaches. To qualify for federal funding, states must submit plans which include fatality and crash data analyses to identify areas for improvement. This requested report provides information on (1) the extent to which state traffic safety data systems meet NHTSA performance measures for assessing the quality of data systems, and (2) progress states have made in improving traffic safety data systems, and related challenges. To conduct this work, GAO analyzed state traffic records assessments, visited eight states, and interviewed federal officials and other traffic safety experts.
What GAO Found
GAO's analysis of traffic records assessments--conducted for states by NHTSA technical teams or contractors at least every 5 years--indicates that the quality of state traffic safety data systems varies across the six data systems maintained by states. Assessments include an evaluation of system quality based on six performance measures. Across all states, GAO found that vehicle and driver data systems met performance measures 71 percent and 60 percent of the time, respectively, while roadway, crash, citation and adjudication, and injury surveillance data systems met performance measures less than 50 percent of the time. Also, data system quality varies by performance measure. For example, across all data systems, states met the performance measure for consistency 72 percent of the time, but states met the integration performance measure 13 percent of the time. According to NHTSA, assessments should be in-depth reviews of state traffic safety data systems; however, in some cases, incomplete or inconsistent information limits assessment usefulness. Of the 51 assessments we reviewed, 49 had insufficient information to fully determine the quality of at least one data system. Furthermore, an updated assessment format has resulted in more frequent instances of insufficient information. Despite varying state traffic safety data system performance, data collected by NHTSA show that states are making some progress toward improving system quality. All states GAO visited have implemented projects to improve data systems, such as switching to electronic data reporting and adopting forms consistent with national guidelines. However, states face resource and coordination challenges in improving traffic safety data systems. For example, custodians of data systems are often located in different state agencies, which may make coordination difficult. In addition, rural and urban areas may face different challenges in improving data systems, such as limited technology options for rural areas or timely processing of large volumes of data in urban areas. States GAO visited have used strategies to overcome these challenges, including establishing an executive-level traffic records coordinating committee, in addition to the technical-level committee that states are required to establish to qualify for traffic safety grant funding. An executive-level committee could help states address challenges by targeting limited resources and facilitating data sharing. |
gao_GAO-05-874 | gao_GAO-05-874_0 | These two programs are among the largest of the federal government’s credit programs. The borrower pays all interest costs. Subsidy costs are calculated by estimating the federal government’s future cash flows for loans made or guaranteed in a particular fiscal year, called a loan cohort. In FFELP, private lenders, such as banks, fund the loans, and the federal government guarantees lenders a statutorily specified minimum yield that is tied to, and varies with, market financial instruments. When the interest rate paid by borrowers is below that yield, the federal government gives lenders subsidy payments, called SAP. Moreover, the federal government, through state-designated guaranty agencies, guarantees repayment of loans if borrowers default. FFELP cash flows are spread out over the life of the loan. fees)
Under FDLP, the U.S. Treasury funds the loans, which are originated through participating schools and contractors. Reestimated Subsidy Costs Differed from Original Estimates for Both Loan Programs
Both FFELP and FDLP reestimated subsidy costs have differed from original estimates for loans made in fiscal years 1994 through 2004, highlighting the challenges in estimating the costs of federal student loans. FFELP reestimated subsidy costs were similar to or lower than original estimates for loans made in fiscal years 1994 to 2002, but higher than originally estimated for loans made in fiscal years 2003 and 2004. In comparison, FDLP reestimated subsidy costs were generally similar to or higher than original estimates for loans made in fiscal years 1994 through 2004. FFELP Reestimated Subsidy Costs Were Generally Similar to or Lower Than Original Estimates, with the Exception of Loans Disbursed in Fiscal Years 2003 and 2004
Reestimated subsidy costs for FFELP loans disbursed between fiscal years 1994 and 2002 were, in general, close to or lower than original estimates, while reestimated subsidy costs for loans disbursed in 2003 and 2004 were higher than originally expected, as shown in figure 3. Recent Low Interest Rates, Increased Loan Consolidation, and Additional Data Contributed to Differences between Reestimated and Original Subsidy Cost Estimates
Differences between original and reestimated subsidy cost estimates per $100 disbursed can be explained, in part, by lower than expected market interest rates, greater than anticipated loan consolidation, and more data on student loans incorporated into cash flow model. Differences between actual and expected interest rates and rates of consolidations affected reestimated subsidy costs for each loan program in a different way. Interest Rates Lower Than Previously Forecasted Contributed to Differences between Reestimated and Original Subsidy Cost Estimates
Interest rates fell to lower than expected levels in 2001 and persisted at those levels through 2004, which affected subsidy cost estimates in both FFELP and FDLP because estimates, especially for the FDLP, are highly sensitive to changes between projected and actual interest rates. For FFELP, lower than expected interest rates have resulted in lower than expected SAP to lenders, which, in turn, resulted in lower reestimated subsidy cost estimates. Certain Federal Costs and Revenues Associated with the Student Loan Programs Are Not Included in Subsidy Cost Estimates
Additional federal costs and revenues associated with the student loan programs, such as federal administrative expenses, some costs of risk associated with lending money over time, and federal tax revenues generated by both student loan programs are not included in subsidy cost estimates. Under current law, federal administrative expenses are excluded from subsidy cost estimates. Private-Sector Activity in Both Student Loan Programs Generates Tax Revenues for the Federal Government That Are Not Included in Subsidy Cost Estimates
Both FFELP and FDLP generate federal tax revenues that are reflected in the revenue portion of the budget but are not included in subsidy cost calculations. Education reviewed the report and had no comments. | Why GAO Did This Study
In fiscal year 2004, the federal government made or guaranteed about $84 billion in loans for postsecondary education through two loan programs--the Federal Family Education Loan Progam (FFELP) and the Federal Direct Loan Program (FDLP). Under FFELP, private lenders fund the loans and the government guarantees them a minimum yield and repayment if borrowers default. When the interest rate paid by borrowers is lower than the guaranteed minimum yield, the government pays lenders special allowance payments (SAP). Under FDLP, the U.S. Treasury funds the loans that are originated through participating schools. Under the Federal Credit Reform Act (FCRA) of 1990 the government calculates, for purposes of the budget, the net cost of extending or guaranteeing credit over the life of a loan, called a subsidy cost. Agencies generally update, or reestimate, subsidy costs annually to include actual program results and adjust future program estimates. GAO examined (1) whether reestimated subsidy costs have differed from original estimates for FFELP and FDLP loans disbursed in fiscal years 1994 through 2004, (2) what factors explain changes between reestimated and original subsidy rates--that is subsidy cost estimates per $100 disbursed; and (3) which federal costs and revenues associated with the student loan programs are not included in subsidy cost estimates.
What GAO Found
Both FFELP and FDLP subsidy cost reestimates have differed from original estimates for loans made in fiscal years 1994 through 2004, reflecting the challenges inherent in estimating the actual costs of loans made under each of these federal loan programs. Reestimated subsidy costs for FFELP loans were close to or lower than original estimates for loans made in fiscal years 1994 to 2002, but higher than originally estimated for loans made in fiscal years 2003 and 2004. FDLP reestimated subsidy costs were generally similar to or higher than originally estimated for loans made in fiscal years 1994 through 2004. Differences between original and reestimated subsidy cost estimates per $100 disbursed were, in part, due to market interest rates that were lower than originally forecasted, greater than anticipated loan consolidation, and the availability of additional data on student loans. Each of these factors has affected reestimated subsidy costs for each loan program in a different way. For example, interest rates fell to lower than expected levels in 2001 and the condition persisted through 2004. For FFELP, lower than expected interest rates have made the difference between the borrower interest rate and lender yield smaller than expected resulting in lower SAP paid to lenders, which in turn resulted in lower reestimated subsidy cost estimates. For FDLP, lower than expected interest rates contributed to higher reestimated subsidy costs because the government received smaller interest payments from borrowers than originally anticipated and, in some cases, the rate paid by student borrowers fell below the government's fixed borrowing rate. Certain federal costs and revenues associated with the student loan programs, such as federal administrative expenses, some costs of risk associated with lending money over time, and federal tax revenues generated by both student loan programs, are not included in subsidy cost estimates. For example, under current law, federal administrative expenses are excluded from subsidy cost estimates. Moreover, both loan programs generate federal tax revenues from private sector companies and investors that are encompassed in the revenue portion of the budget but are not included in subsidy cost calculations. Estimating the amount of federal tax revenues generated by the loan programs would be difficult and was beyond the scope of our review. Education reviewed a draft copy of this report and did not have any comments. |
gao_GAO-06-1110T | gao_GAO-06-1110T_0 | To that end, DOE is promoting further reliance on nuclear energy under the administration’s National Energy Policy. DOE Has Made Initial Progress Toward Meeting Near-Term Milestones for the Next Generation Nuclear Plant
DOE has developed a schedule for the R&D, design, and construction of the Next Generation Nuclear Plant that is intended to meet the requirements of the Energy Policy Act of 2005, which divides the project into two phases. DOE plans to use the studies, which are expected to be completed by May 2007, to establish initial design parameters for the plant and to further guide R&D efforts. DOE is planning to begin the second phase in fiscal year 2011 by issuing a request for proposal that will set forth the design parameters for the plant. As a result, DOE will not have the final results from all of its fuel tests before both design and construction begin. Nevertheless, much of the required R&D for the graphite has not yet begun and is not scheduled to be completed until fiscal year 2015. Regarding licensing of the plant, DOE and NRC are in the process of finalizing a memorandum of understanding that will establish a framework for developing a licensing strategy. As required by the Energy Policy Act of 2005, DOE and NRC are to jointly submit a licensing strategy by August 2008. DOE Is Pursuing a More Technologically Advanced Approach Than Other Options in an Effort to Ensure the Plant’s Commercial Viability
DOE is beginning to obtain input from potential industry participants that would help DOE determine its approach to ensuring the commercial viability of the Next Generation Nuclear Plant. In the interim, DOE is pursuing a more technologically advanced approach—with regard to size, fuel type, and the coupling of electricity generation and hydrogen production in one plant—compared with the recommendations of the Independent Technology Review Group and the Nuclear Energy Research Advisory Committee. As recommended by the Independent Technology Review Group, DOE revised its R&D plans to lessen the technological challenges of designing and building the Next Generation Nuclear Plant. The Nuclear Energy Research Advisory Committee also recommended that DOE re-evaluate the project’s dual mission of demonstrating both electricity and hydrogen production. Instead, DOE’s R&D is currently supporting both missions, and DOE officials said they consider the ability to produce hydrogen (or to use process heat for other applications) key to convincing industry to invest in the Next Generation Nuclear Plant rather than advanced light water reactors similar to the current generation of nuclear power plants operating in the United States. In addition, DOE officials said that even if the schedule is not accelerated, increasing the funding for the project would enable additional R&D to be conducted to increase the likelihood that the plant is completed by fiscal year 2021. Finally, DOE’s history of problems managing large projects on budget and within schedule raises concerns about the department’s ability to complete the Next Generation Nuclear Plant in the time frame set forth in the Energy Policy Act of 2005, and accelerating the schedule would only add to these concerns. | Why GAO Did This Study
Under the administration's National Energy Policy, the Department of Energy (DOE) is promoting nuclear energy to meet increased U.S. energy demand. In 2003, DOE began developing the Next Generation Nuclear Plant, an advanced nuclear reactor that seeks to improve upon the current generation of operating commercial nuclear power plants. DOE intends to demonstrate the plant's commercial application both for generating electricity and for using process heat from the reactor for the production of hydrogen, which then would be used in fuel cells for the transportation sector. The Energy Policy Act of 2005 required plant design and construction to be completed by 2021. This testimony, which summarizes a GAO report being issued today (GAO-06-1056), provides information on DOE's (1) progress in meeting its schedule for the Next Generation Nuclear Plant project and (2) approach to ensuring the project's commercial viability. For the report, GAO reviewed DOE's research and development (R&D) plans for the project and the reports of two independent project reviews, observed R&D activities, and interviewed DOE, Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), and industry representatives.
What GAO Found
DOE has prepared and begun to implement plans to meet its schedule to design and construct the Next Generation Nuclear Plant by 2021, as required by the Energy Policy Act of 2005. Initial R&D results are favorable, but DOE officials consider the schedule to be challenging, given the amount of R&D work that remains to be conducted. For example, while researchers have successfully demonstrated the manufacturing of coated particle fuel for the reactor, the last of eight planned fuel tests is not scheduled to conclude until 2019. DOE plans to initiate the design and construction phase in fiscal year 2011, if the R&D results support proceeding with the project. The act also requires that DOE and NRC develop a licensing strategy for the plant by August 2008. The two agencies are in the process of finalizing a memorandum of understanding to begin work on this requirement. DOE is just beginning to obtain input from potential industry participants that would help determine the approach to ensuring the commercial viability of the Next Generation Nuclear Plant. In the interim, DOE is pursuing a more technologically advanced approach, compared with other options, and DOE has implemented some (but not all) of the recommendations made by two advisory groups. For example, as recommended by one advisory group, DOE lessened the need for R&D by lowering the reactor's planned operating temperature. In contrast, DOE has not accelerated its schedule for completing the plant, as recommended by the Nuclear Energy Research Advisory Committee. The committee was concerned that the time frame for completing the plant is too long to be attractive to industry, given that other advanced reactors may be available sooner. However, DOE believes the approach proposed by the committee would increase the risk of designing a plant that ultimately would not be commercially viable. GAO believes DOE's problems with managing other major projects call into question its ability to accelerate design and completion of the Next Generation Nuclear Plant. |
gao_GAO-05-841T | gao_GAO-05-841T_0 | In 2003, 7 of the 10 states with the highest estimated rates of individuals living with HIV were located in the South. The CARE Act was enacted in 1990 to respond to the needs of individuals and families living with HIV or AIDS and to direct federal funding to areas disproportionately affected by the epidemic. Table 1 describes selected CARE Act formula grants for Titles I and II. CARE Act Funding Provisions Result in Disproportionate Funding
Some CARE Act provisions have led to jurisdictions receiving different amounts of funding per AIDS cases. The counting of AIDS cases within EMAs once to determine Title I funding and once again to determine Title II funding results in states with EMAs receiving more funding per AIDS case than states without an EMA. The Title I hold-harmless provision has primarily benefited one EMA. The hold-harmless provision guarantees each EMA a specified percentage, as legislated by the CARE Act, of the base grant it received in a previous year regardless of how much a grantee’s caseload may have decreased in the current year. Because the application of the Title I hold-harmless provision for San Francisco dates back to the 1996 reauthorization, San Francisco’s Title I base grant is determined in part by the number of cumulative cases in the San Francisco EMA as of 1995. The total amount of Severe Need grant funds available in fiscal year 2004 to distribute among the eligible states was less than it would have been without the hold-harmless deduction. Funding Impact of Using HIV Case Counts Would Depend on the Adequacy of HIV Reporting Systems and the Number of Reported HIV Cases
If HIV case counts had been used with AIDS case counts in allocating Title II base funding, about half of the states would have received increased funding and the other half would have received less funding. While all states have established HIV case reporting systems, there are currently characteristics of these systems that limit the use of HIV case counts in the distribution of CARE Act funds. The Use of HIV Case Counts in Funding Formulas Would Change the Distribution of CARE Act Funds
While we are aware of some of the limitations of HIV data, we used two approaches to examine the potential impact of using HIV cases in addition to AIDS cases on fiscal year 2004 Title II base grant distributions. Some CARE Act fiscal year 2004 funding would have shifted if HIV and AIDS case counts had been used to allocate the funds. State ADAP Eligibility Criteria and Funding Sources Vary Widely
Among state ADAP programs, there is wide variation in the eligibility criteria used to determine who is covered for ADAP services and in the funding sources available beyond each state’s Title II ADAP base grant. Eligibility Criteria Contribute to Coverage Differences Among States
States set different eligibility criteria for their ADAP programs, so a person with HIV or AIDS at a certain income level and needing medication assistance may be an eligible ADAP client in one state, but not in another. The CARE Act allows states to purchase health insurance to cover HIV and AIDS drugs for their clients. If an individual is eligible for a state’s Medicaid drug assistance, the state ADAP should not provide the same services under its program. This could result in eligible clients being on an ADAP waiting list. Appendix I: Combined CARE Act Title I and Title II Funding by State, Fiscal Year 2004
Combined Title I and
Total Title I and Title II awards per AIDS case State received a Title II base award of $500,000, the minimum it could receive based on the number of AIDS cases in the state. Appendix III: Estimated Funding Changes Using HIV and AIDS Cases with Hold- Harmless and Minimum Grant Provisions
Change in Title II base funding if CDC-
Change in Title II base funding if HIV case accepted HIV case counts and AIDS case counts from all states and AIDS case counts counts were used to distribute funding were used to distribute funding State received a Title II base award of $500,000, the minimum it could receive based on the number of AIDS cases in the state. Ryan White Funding Formulas. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Ryan White Comprehensive AIDS Resources Emergency Act (CARE Act) was enacted in 1990 to respond to the needs of individuals and families living with the Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) or Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome (AIDS). In fiscal year 2004, over $2 billion in funding was provided through the CARE Act, the majority of which was distributed through Title I grants to eligible metropolitan areas (EMA) and Title II grants to states, the District of Columbia, and territories. Titles I and II use formulas to distribute grants according to a jurisdiction's reported count of AIDS cases. Title II includes grants for state-administered AIDS Drug Assistance Programs (ADAP), which provide medications to HIV-infected individuals. GAO was asked to discuss the distribution of funding under the CARE Act. This testimony presents preliminary findings on (1) the impact of CARE Act provisions that distribute funds based upon the number of AIDS cases in metropolitan areas, (2) the impact of CARE Act provisions that limit annual funding decreases, (3) the potential shifts in funding among grantees if HIV case counts were incorporated with the AIDS cases that are currently used in funding formulas, and (4) the variation in eligibility criteria and funding sources among state ADAPs.
What GAO Found
Under the CARE Act, GAO's preliminary findings show that the amount of funding per AIDS case varied among states and metropolitan areas in fiscal year 2004. Some CARE Act provisions that distribute funds based on the AIDS case count within metropolitan areas result in differing amounts of funding per case. In particular, when a state or territory has an EMA within its borders, the cases within that EMA are counted twice during the distribution of CARE Act funds--once to determine the EMA's funding under Title I, and once again to determine a state's Title II grant. The hold-harmless provisions under Titles I and II guarantee a certain percentage of a previous year's funding amount, thus sustaining the funding levels of CARE Act grantees based upon previous years' measurements of AIDS cases. Title I's hold-harmless provision for EMAs has primarily benefited the San Francisco EMA, which received over 90 percent of the fiscal year 2004 Title I hold-harmless funding. San Francisco alone continues to have deceased cases factored in to its allocation, because it is the only EMA with hold-harmless funding that dates back to the mid-1990s when formula funding was based on the cumulative count of diagnosed AIDS cases. If HIV case counts had been incorporated with AIDS cases in allocating Title II funding to the states in fiscal year 2004, about half of the states would have received an increase in funding and half of the states would have received less funding. Many of those states receiving increased funding would have been in the South, a region that includes 7 of the 10 states with the highest estimated rates of individuals living with HIV. However, wide variation in the maturity of states' HIV reporting systems could limit the adequacy of their HIV case counts for the distribution of CARE Act funding. Among state ADAPs, there is wide variation in the criteria used to determine who is eligible for ADAP medications and services, and in the additional funding received beyond the Title II grant for each state ADAP. States have flexibility to determine what drugs they will cover for their ADAP clients and what income level will entitle a person to eligibility, among other criteria, and the resulting variation can contribute to client coverage differences among state ADAPs. There is similar variation in additional funding sources and eligibility criteria among states that have established waiting lists for eligible clients. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and the Health Resources and Services Administration provided comments on the facts contained in this testimony and GAO made changes as appropriate. |
gao_GAO-15-274 | gao_GAO-15-274_0 | HUD. LRAs. A Variety of Homeless Assistance Was Provided through BRAC 2005, but DOD and HUD Do Not Require Conveyance Data to Be Tracked after Agreements Are Reached
Thirty-nine of the 125 bases closed as a result of BRAC 2005 that had surplus property provided a variety of homeless assistance in response to notices of interest submitted by homeless assistance providers. Through our analysis of data collected from DOD, LRAs, and homeless assistance providers, we found that as of October 2014, 27 of the 75 providers with legally binding agreements have received their homeless assistance conveyance. HUD officials also stated that the homeless assistance program could be improved if HUD was required to track data over time regarding the status of the conveyances. By not requiring the tracking of the status of homeless assistance conveyances, neither HUD or DOD know the effectiveness of the program, to what extent properties are actually being conveyed to the homeless assistance providers, the extent to which the providers are using the properties for their intended use and, in the event of a provider dropping out, the extent to which LRAs are making sufficient efforts to find a replacement provider. BRAC Surplus Property Benefited Homeless Assistance Efforts, but Limited Information and Number of Dedicated HUD Resources Hampered the Timeliness and Feasibility of Assistance Provided
The process for conveying BRAC surplus property increased the potential for addressing homelessness in communities. Local Providers Cited Benefits of the BRAC Homeless Assistance Process
Homeless assistance providers told us that the BRAC homeless assistance program provided the overall benefit of a no-cost property conveyance or financial assistance to support local homeless assistance efforts, and at 11 of the 12 bases we contacted where homeless assistance providers received assistance, providers shared other perspectives on why they thought the program was beneficial. First, during required workshops and property tours, providers said that LRAs gave limited information to them on the condition of the property. However, the extensions resulted in LRAs taking an average of 654 days to submit their redevelopment plans. For example, an LRA official from the Sergeant J.W. However, HUD did not have enough resources dedicated to meet the 60- day deadline established in the BRAC statute for reviewing the surge of LRA redevelopment plans, which added to the delay in implementing the BRAC homeless assistance provision. However, HUD has not fully developed options to address reviewing the surge of plans. Without a means to ensure that sufficient staff resources are dedicated to HUD’s review process, it will be difficult for HUD to provide reasonable assurance that the delays experienced during BRAC 2005 will not be repeated in the event of future BRAC rounds, potentially hindering the effectiveness of the homeless assistance process as established and ultimately the redevelopment of the closed base. With 75 providers expected to receive nearly 50 parcels of property and over $29 million in assistance, the 2005 BRAC homeless assistance program offered benefits. To assist homeless assistance providers and LRAs in completing the steps of the BRAC homeless assistance process within required time frames, to provide additional information to reduce unfulfilled expectations about the decisions made in executing the homeless assistance agreements, and to promote a greater dissemination of this information, the Secretaries of Housing and Urban Development and Defense, for each of the following four elements, should update the BRAC homeless assistance regulations; establish information-sharing mechanisms, such as a website or informational pamphlets; or develop templates to include specific guidance that clearly identifies the information that should be provided to homeless assistance providers during tours of on-base property, such as the condition of the property; information for homeless assistance providers to use for preparing their notices of interest; guidance for legally binding agreements and clarification on the implications of unsigned agreements; and specific information on legal alternatives to providing on-base property, including acceptable alternative options such as financial assistance or off-base property in lieu of on-base property, information about rules of sale for on-base property conveyed to homeless assistance providers, and under what circumstances it is permissible to sell property for affordable housing alongside the no-cost homeless assistance conveyance. DOD partially concurred with three of the joint recommendations and did not concur with the remaining two joint recommendations. Also as noted in the report, HUD and DOD officials stated that they saw value in tracking the conveyance statuses. HUD also stated that this will require DOD and military department agreement to implement. DOD did not concur with the recommendation. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of our review were to address (1) the types of assistance provided to homeless assistance providers as part of the 2005 base realignment and closure (BRAC) round and the extent to which the Departments of Defense (DOD) and Housing and Urban Development (HUD) track implementation of the agreements reached and (2) any benefits and challenges encountered as DOD, HUD, and the local redevelopment authorities (LRA) addressed provisions for homeless assistance as a result of BRAC 2005. Specifically, to identify the scope of our review of 125 bases closed with surplus property during the 2005 BRAC round, we obtained comprehensive lists of base closures with surplus property from DOD and HUD. | Why GAO Did This Study
The 2005 BRAC round resulted in 125 closed bases with over 73,000 acres of surplus property available. The Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act, as amended, requires DOD and HUD to assist communities in determining the best reuse of land and facilities, balancing needs of the local economy with those of homeless individuals and families.
GAO was mandated to review the extent to which DOD and HUD implemented the homeless assistance provisions while disposing of BRAC surplus property. This report addresses (1) the assistance provided as a result of BRAC 2005 and the extent to which DOD and HUD track its implementation and (2) any benefits and challenges encountered as DOD, HUD, and LRAs addressed homeless assistance provisions. GAO reviewed homeless assistance plans; interviewed DOD and HUD officials; and interviewed LRAs and homeless assistance providers from a nongeneralizable sample of 23 closed bases, selected based on size, geography, and types of assistance provided.
What GAO Found
A variety of homeless assistance was provided as a result of the 2005 round of base realignments and closures (BRAC), but the Departments of Defense (DOD) and Housing and Urban Development (HUD) do not require homeless assistance conveyance data to be tracked. Of the 125 large and small bases closed with surplus property, local redevelopment authorities (LRA) at 39 bases agreed to provide homeless assistance to 75 providers. If implemented, these agreements would provide nearly 50 parcels of property and over $29 million in total assistance. As of October 2014, GAO found that 27 of the 75 providers with agreements had received their property or monetary conveyances. However, DOD and HUD do not require tracking of the status of the homeless assistance conveyances. In contrast, the program administrator of the Title V homeless assistance program, which oversees conveyances for non-BRAC properties, developed policies to perform oversight in part because the government retains an interest in Title V properties. Without tracking the status of the conveyances, neither DOD nor HUD know the extent to which properties are actually being conveyed; the extent to which the providers are using the properties for their intended use; the extent to which LRAs are making sufficient efforts to find a replacement provider in the event of a provider dropping out; and ultimately the effectiveness of the homeless assistance program.
BRAC surplus property benefited homeless assistance efforts, but limited information and dedicated HUD resources contributed to challenges in the timeliness and feasibility of assistance provided. Homeless assistance providers GAO interviewed said that, among other things, the BRAC homeless assistance program provided the overall benefit of a no-cost property conveyance or financial assistance to support local homeless assistance efforts. However, LRAs and providers GAO interviewed also stated that they did not have sufficient and clear information from DOD and HUD regarding four steps of the homeless assistance process: (1) what information LRAs should give providers during property tours and workshops, (2) what information to include in providers' notices of interest about properties, (3) what information to include in developing legally binding agreements for conveying assistance, and (4) what alternatives are available to on-base property conveyances. For example, during required property tours and workshops, LRAs were unaware of what information to give and gave providers limited property condition information, which led to some providers withdrawing after they identified the cost of needed repairs. Without detailed information on these four steps, LRAs and providers may not have the knowledge necessary to make informed decisions. LRA officials also stated that they appreciated advice from HUD staff on the BRAC process. However, GAO found that HUD did not have enough resources dedicated to meet the 60-day review deadline in the BRAC statue for reviewing LRA redevelopment plans. According to HUD, two staff were assigned to review the plans, taking an average of 151 days longer than allowed to approve redevelopment plans with homeless assistance. However, HUD has not developed options to address reviewing the surge of plans in any future BRAC rounds. Without a means to ensure that needed staff resources are dedicated to HUD's review process, it will be difficult for HUD to provide reasonable assurance that the delays experienced during the BRAC 2005 round will not be repeated.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOD and HUD track conveyance status and provide clear information on four steps of the homeless assistance process. HUD generally concurred, and DOD either partially concurred or did not concur with these recommendations, stating its existing guidance is sufficient. GAO believes these recommendations are still valid as discussed in the report. GAO also recommends that HUD address staff resources during a BRAC round, and HUD generally concurred. |
gao_GAO-15-234 | gao_GAO-15-234_0 | Background
There are four types of HUBZones. These areas—labeled redesignated areas—remain eligible for 3 years after “the date on which the census tract or nonmetropolitan county ceased to be so qualified.” During the 3-year period, firms in those areas can continue to apply to and participate in the program and receive contracting preferences. 1). For information about the characteristics of the HUBZones and differences in economic conditions (for example, as indicated by poverty and unemployment rates) among redesignated, qualified, and nonqualified areas, see appendix II. As a result, ineligible small businesses had participated in the program, and eligible businesses had not been able to participate. SBA Notifications about Program Changes May Not Reach All Affected Firms
SBA’s communications to firms about programmatic changes, including changes to the HUBZone map (area designations), generally have not been targeted or specific to individual firms and may not have reached all affected firms. SBA Has Improved Its Certification Reviews but Actions Related to Recertification Were Limited
Revised Certification Process Includes a Full Document Review, Which Helps to Ensure That Only Eligible Firms Participate in the Program
SBA revised its certification process in response to our June 2008 recommendation, and now requires firms to provide documentation and reviews this documentation to determine their eligibility for the HUBZone program. 2). SBA Relies on Firms’ Attestations of Continued Eligibility
SBA relies on firms’ attestations of continued eligibility and generally does not request supporting documentation during recertification. As a result, not all firms may be aware of changes that would affect their continuing program eligibility. SBA has strengthened its internal controls for initial HUBZone certifications but missed opportunities to address weaknesses in controls related to the recertification of firms. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve SBA’s administration and oversight of the HUBZone program and reduce the risk that firms that no longer meet program eligibility criteria receive HUBZone contracts, the Administrator of SBA should take the following two actions:
Establish a mechanism to better ensure that firms are notified of changes to HUBZone designations that may affect their participation in the program, such as ensuring that all certified firms and newly certified firms are signed up for the broadcast e-mail system or including more specific information in certification letters about how location in a redesignated area can affect their participation in the program. Conduct an assessment of the recertification process and implement additional controls, such as developing criteria and guidance on using a risk-based approach to requesting and verifying firm information, allowing firms to initiate the recertification process, and ensuring that sufficient staff will be dedicated to the effort so that a significant backlog in recertifications does not recur. SBA agreed with our recommendations and outlined steps it has taken or plans to take to address them. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report examines the Historically Underutilized Business Zone (HUBZone) program of the Small Business Administration (SBA). More specifically, the report (1) describes HUBZone designations and how SBA communicates with interested parties about the program, and (2) examines SBA’s certification and recertification processes for firms, including the extent to which SBA has implemented procedures to address recommendations previously made to improve these processes. We also interviewed representatives from local economic development agencies and from HUBZone firms. Firms in all redesignated areas were obligated almost $800 million in federal contracts in fiscal year 2013. | Why GAO Did This Study
Small firms participating in SBA's HUBZone program received about $4 billion in federal contracts in fiscal year 2013. The program's purpose is to stimulate economic development in economically distressed areas. A certified HUBZone firm is eligible for federal contracting benefits, including limited competition awards such as sole-source and set-aside contracts. GAO previously reported on weaknesses in SBA's internal controls and problems with ensuring that only eligible firms participate in the program. GAO was asked to examine the steps SBA has taken to address these issues. This report (1) describes HUBZone designations and how SBA communicates with interested parties about the program, and (2) examines SBA's certification and recertification processes for firms.
To address these objectives, GAO analyzed statutory provisions, SBA documents, and federal procurement data. GAO also interviewed SBA and representatives from applicant firms (certified, decertified, and denied) and local economic development agencies located in four HUBZones selected for geographic diversity.
What GAO Found
The Small Business Administration (SBA) designates economically distressed areas as Historically Underutilized Business Zones (HUBZone), based on demographic data such as unemployment and poverty rates, but lacks an effective way to communicate program changes to small businesses. The designations apply to areas such as nonmetropolitan counties and census tracts and are subject to periodic changes as economic conditions change. Small businesses in HUBZones can apply for certification to participate in the program. HUBZones that lose their qualifying status due to changes in economic conditions become “redesignated” and undergo a 3-year transition period. In 2015, 3,417 redesignated areas will lose their HUBZone status. There are 578 firms in those areas (see table below). SBA relies on website updates and broadcast e-mails to inform firms about program changes, and consequently not all affected may be informed about the changes before their resultant decertification. SBA has initiated efforts to improve notification of program changes, but its communications may not reach all affected firms and do not specify when the status of areas might change or what firms are located in those areas. As a result, some firms in the program lack timely awareness of information that could affect their eligibility.
SBA has addressed weaknesses in its certification process that GAO previously identified, but lacks key controls for its recertification process. For instance, to receive certification SBA now requires all firms to provide documentation to show they meet the eligibility requirements. SBA also conducts site visits at selected firms based on, for example, the amount of federal contracts they received. However, SBA does not require firms seeking recertification to submit any information to verify their continued eligibility or provide guidance on when staff should request or verify documentation for recertification. Instead, it relies on firms attesting that they continue to meet the program's eligibility requirements. By not routinely requiring and reviewing key supporting documentation from recertification applicants, SBA is missing an additional opportunity to reduce the risk that ineligible firms obtain HUBZone contracts.
What GAO Recommends
SBA should (1) establish a mechanism to better ensure firms are notified of changes that could affect their participation in the program, and (2) assess the recertification process and implement additional controls, such as criteria and guidance for a risk-based approach to requesting and verifying information during recertification. SBA agreed with both recommendations. |
gao_GAO-03-15 | gao_GAO-03-15_0 | The Departments of Defense and Transportation have identified 17 seaports on the Pacific, Atlantic, and Gulf Coasts (13 commercial ports, 1 military port, and 3 military ammunition ports) as “strategic,” meaning that they are necessary for use by DOD in the event of a large scale military deployment. Current Risk Management Approach Creates Uncertainties about the Security Environment at Strategic Seaports
The security environment at strategic seaports is uncertain because comprehensive assessments of threats, vulnerabilities, and port infrastructure and functions have not been completed. Assessments of the criticality of seaport infrastructure were not done at all the ports we visited prior to September 11. Weaknesses in DOD Force Protection Process Increase Risks for Deployments through Domestic Seaports
During our review, we identified two significant weaknesses in DOD’s force protection process. First, DOD lacks a central authority responsible for overseeing force protection measures of DOD organizations while carrying out the various domestic phases of military deployments to and through U.S. seaports. Second, there are instances during some phases of these deployments when DOD transfers custody of its military equipment to nongovernment entities. The vessel, GTS Katie, was owned by a U.S. company but registered in St. Vincent and the Grenadines and crewed by non-U.S. citizens. To improve DOD’s oversight and execution of force protection for deployments to and through domestic strategic seaports, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense designate a single authority (such as the recently established U.S.
Northern Command) to coordinate and execute force protection planning for deployments of units from installations in the United States through seaports and until ships enter the destination areas of operation (this responsibility would be similar to that of the overseas unified combatant commands for their respective areas of operation) and direct the single coordinating authority (once established), along with the U.S. Transportation Command, to develop and implement measures to maintain greater security over equipment transported by non-DOD carriers. Washington, D.C.: October 12, 2001. | What GAO Found
The October 12, 2000, attack against the Navy destroyer U.S.S. Cole in the port of Aden illustrated the danger of unconventional threats to U.S. ships in seaports. The September 11, 2001, attacks further heightened the need for a significant change in conventional antiterrorist thinking, particularly regarding threats to the U.S. homeland. The new security paradigm assumes that all U.S. forces, be they abroad or at home, are vulnerable to attack, and that even those infrastructures traditionally considered of little interest to terrorists, such as commercial seaports in the continental United States, are now commonly recognized as highly vulnerable to potential terrorist attack. Of the more than 300 seaports in the United States, the Departments of Defense (DOD) and Transportation have designated 17 as "strategic," because in the event of a large-scale military deployment, DOD would need to transport more than 95 percent of all equipment and supplies needed for military operations by sea. If the strategic ports were attacked, not only could massive civilian casualties be sustained, but DOD could also lose precious cargo and time and be forced to rely heavily on its overburdened airlift capabilities. The security environment at strategic seaports remains uncertain because comprehensive assessments of threats, vulnerabilities, and critical port infrastructure and functions have not been completed, and no effective mechanism exists to coordinate and disseminate threat information at the seaports. GAO identified two significant weaknesses in DOD's force protection process for deployments through domestic seaports. First, DOD lacks a central authority responsible for overseeing force protection measures of DOD organizations that move forces from domestic installations through U.S. seaports. Second, during some phases of a deployment, DOD transfers custody of its military equipment to non-DOD entities, including foreign-owned ships crewed by non-U.S. citizens. |
gao_GAO-02-839 | gao_GAO-02-839_0 | HUD Lacks a Comprehensive Strategic Workforce Plan to Guide Recruiting and Hiring
Although HUD has started to do workforce planning and has identified the resources required to do its current work, it does not have a comprehensive strategic workforce plan that identifies the knowledge, skills, and abilities it needs to build its workforce for the future. HUD Has Taken Some Workforce Planning Steps
Workforce planning steps HUD has taken thus far include completion of a detailed analysis of HUD’s potential staff losses due to retirement and the REAP, which estimates the staff needed to handle the current workload in each office. Managers and Staff Reported That the Lack of a Comprehensive Strategic Workforce Plan Sometimes Makes Accomplishing PIH’s Mission Difficult
In assessing how they believe workforce planning issues affect PIH’s ability to meet its mission, PIH managers and staff we interviewed reported that the lack of a comprehensive workforce plan makes it difficult for them to accomplish several PIH mission-related activities and provide service to their customers. The workforce planning issue of greatest concern for these PIH managers and staff is staffing shortages. The staffing shortages are exacerbated by skill gaps and uncertainties about what work should be done and the best mix of staff knowledge, skills, and abilities to do it. As arranged with your office, we are sending copies of this report to the Secretary, Department of Housing and Urban Development. | What GAO Found
Looming retirements during the next 5 years at the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) have brought the need for workforce planning to the forefront. HUD has done some workforce planning and has determined how many staff it needs to meet its current workload, but it does not have a comprehensive strategic workforce plan to guide its recruiting, hiring, and other key human capital efforts. Workforce planning steps taken include a detailed analysis of HUD's potential staff losses and completion of HUD's resource estimation and allocation process, which estimates the staff needed to handle the current workload in each office. Some of the Public and Indian Housing (PIH) managers and staff reported that the lack of workforce planning makes it difficult to accomplish mission-related activities and provide customer service. The issue of greatest concern for PIH managers and staff is the staffing shortage. Because HUD lacks a comprehensive strategic workforce plan, some PIH managers and staff were uncertain about what work should be done and the best mix of staff knowledge, skills, and abilities to do it. |
gao_GAO-03-373 | gao_GAO-03-373_0 | Other federal agencies may also assist state and local jurisdictions in the investigation of and response to bioterrorism and other public health emergencies. respond to bioterrorist attacks. State and Local Officials Reported Varying Levels of Bioterrorism Preparedness
State and local officials reported varying levels of preparedness to respond to a bioterrorist attack. Some elements, such as those involving coordination efforts and communication systems, were being addressed more readily, whereas others, such as infrastructure and workforce issues, were more resource-intensive and therefore more difficult to address. Despite these improvements, deficiencies in communication and coordination remained. State and Local Officials Expressed Concerns regarding Federal Funding and Lack of Guidance
State and local officials and hospital officials expressed concerns about the distribution and sustainability of federal bioterrorism preparedness funding, as well as about a lack of guidance on what it means to be prepared for a bioterrorism event. Officials from response organizations in every state we visited reported a lack of guidance from the federal government on what it means to be prepared for bioterrorism. State and local officials told us they needed specific benchmarks (such as how large an area a response team should be responsible for) to indicate what they should be doing to be adequately prepared. The need for federal guidance has continued to be an issue as states have proceeded in their planning and preparedness activities using the HHS funding. For example, in their progress reports to HHS in late 2002, two of the states we visited reported that they were seeking guidance from HHS on assessing vulnerabilities for foodborne or waterborne diseases and preparedness steps they should take for these hazards. One of these states declared that it could not make further efforts on testing for waterborne or agricultural diseases until it received more guidance. Officials at the state level also expressed a desire for more sharing of best practices. Officials stated that although each jurisdiction might need to adapt procedures to its own circumstances, time could be saved and needless duplication of effort avoided if there were better mechanisms for sharing strategies across jurisdictions. They contended that HHS was positioned to know about different strategies that states were pursuing. The cities visited are not identified in this report because of the sensitive nature of the issue. Bioterrorism: Public Health and Medical Preparedness. Bioterrorism: Coordination and Preparedness. | Why GAO Did This Study
Much of the response to a bioterrorist attack would occur at the local level. Many local areas and their supporting state agencies, however, may not be adequately prepared to respond to such an attack. In the Public Health Improvement Act that was passed in 2000, Congress directed GAO to examine state and local preparedness for a bioterrorist attack. In this report GAO provides information on state and local preparedness and state and local concerns regarding the federal role in funding and improving preparedness. To gather this information, GAO visited seven cities and their respective state governments, reviewed documents, and interviewed officials. Cities are not identified because of the sensitive nature of this issue.
What GAO Found
State and local officials reported varying levels of preparedness to respond to a bioterrorist attack. Officials reported deficiencies in capacity, communication, and coordination elements essential to preparedness and response, such as workforce shortages, inadequacies in disease surveillance and laboratory systems, and a lack of regional coordination and compatible communications systems. Some elements, such as those involving coordination efforts and communication systems, were being addressed more readily, whereas others, such as infrastructure and workforce issues, were more resource-intensive and therefore more difficult to address. Cities with more experience in dealing with public health emergencies were generally better prepared for a bioterrorist attack than other cities, although deficiencies remain in every city. State and local officials reported a lack of adequate guidance from the federal government on what it means to be prepared for bioterrorism. They said they needed specific standards (such as how large an area a response team should be responsible for) to indicate what they should be doing to be adequately prepared. The need for federal guidance has continued to be an issue as states have proceeded in their planning and preparedness activities with funding from HHS. For example, in their progress reports to HHS in late 2002 two states reported that they were seeking guidance from HHS on assessing vulnerabilities for foodborne or waterborne diseases and preparedness steps they should take for these hazards. One of these states has declared that it could not make further efforts on testing for these types of diseases until it receives more guidance. State officials also expressed a desire for more sharing of best practices. Officials stated that, while each jurisdiction might need to adapt procedures to its own circumstances, time could be saved and needless duplication of effort avoided if there were better mechanisms for sharing strategies across jurisdictions. They stated that HHS was better positioned to know about different strategies that states were pursuing and they want information on the best practices. |
gao_GAO-04-802 | gao_GAO-04-802_0 | States and Localities Invest More in Highways Than the Federal Government; However, Recent Federal Investment Has Outpaced State and Local Investment
The Nation’s capital investment in its highway system has doubled in the last 20 years, and during that time period as a whole, state and local investment in highways outstripped federal investment in highways—both in terms of the amount of and growth in spending. Most recently, in 2002, states and localities contributed 54 percent of the Nation’s capital investment in highways, spending $35.7 billion, while the federal government contributed 46 percent or $30.7 billion in real terms. Thus, from 1998 through 2002, federal investment increased 40 percent, while state and local investment decreased by 4 percent. Evidence Suggests Federal Highway Grants Have Increasingly Been Used to Substitute for Rather Than Supplement Spending from States’ Own Resources
The preponderance of evidence suggests that increases in federal-aid highway grants influence state and local governments to substitute federal funds for funding they would have otherwise spent on highway projects from their own resources. Specifically, the structure of the federal-aid highway program creates an opportunity for substitution because states typically spend substantially more in state and local funds than is required to meet current federal matching requirements. If states substitute some of the increase in federal funds for their own funds, then total highway spending may increase, but not by as much as it would have had substitution not occurred. These results are roughly consistent with previous studies that, when taken together, also seem to suggest increasing substitution rates over time. Substitution May Be Limiting the Effectiveness of Strategies to Accomplish the Federal-Aid Highway Program’s Overall Goals
The trends in funding and probable substitution described in this report imply that substitution may be limiting the effectiveness of strategies Congress has put into place to help the federal-aid highway program accomplish its overall goals. In part, this is because, while Congress can dedicate federal funds to highways, it cannot prevent state highway funds from being used for other purposes. Despite congressional efforts to increase the federal investment in the highway system and to ensure that funds collected by the federal government for highways are used for that purpose, due to probable substitution, the sizable increases in dedicated federal funding that Congress has provided for highways have not translated into commensurate increases in the Nation’s overall investment in its highway system. Adopting such an option could also be seen as recognizing that the ability of states to meet a variety of needs and fiscal pressures might be better accomplished by providing states with federal funding for highways through a more flexible federal program. While some options are mutually exclusive, others could be enacted in concert. The opportunity to better align the federal-aid highway program with performance goals and outcomes comes at a time when both houses of Congress have already approved separate legislation to create a National Commission to examine future revenue sources to support the Highway Trust Fund and to consider the roles of the various levels of government and the private sector in meeting future surface transportation financing needs. Thus, this commission may be an appropriate vehicle through which to examine these options for the future structure and design of the federal-aid highway program. This report (1) updates information on trends in federal, state, and local capital investment in highways; (2) assesses the influence that federal-aid highway grants have had on state and local highway spending; (3) discusses the implications of these issues on the federal-aid highway program; and (4) discusses options for the federal-aid highway program that could be considered in light of these issues. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 2004, both houses of Congress approved separate legislation to reauthorize the federal-aid highway program to help meet the Nation's surface transportation needs, enhance mobility, and promote economic growth. Both bills also recognized that the Nation faces significant transportation challenges in the future, and each established a National Commission to assess future revenue sources for the Highway Trust Fund and to consider the roles of the various levels of government and the private sector in meeting future surface transportation financing needs. This report (1) updates information on trends in federal, state, and local capital investment in highways; (2) assesses the influence that federal-aid highway grants have had on state and local highway spending; (3) discusses the implications of these trends for the federal-aid highway program; and (4) discusses options for the federal-aid highway program.
What GAO Found
The Nation's investment in its highway system has doubled in the last 20 years, as state and local investment outstripped federal investment--both in terms of the amount of and growth in spending. In 2002, states and localities contributed 54 percent of the Nation's capital investment in highways, while federal funds accounted for 46 percent. However, as state and local governments faced fiscal pressures and an economic downturn, their investment from 1998 through 2002 decreased by 4 percent in real terms, while the federal investment increased by 40 percent in real terms. Evidence suggests that increased federal highway grants influence states and localities to substitute federal funds for funds they otherwise would have spent on highways. Our model, which expanded on other recent models, estimated that states used roughly half of the increases in federal highway grants since 1982 to substitute for state and local highway funding, and that the rate of substitution increased during the 1990s. Therefore, while state and local highway spending increased over time, it did not increase as much as it would have had states not withdrawn some of their own highway funds. These results are consistent with our earlier work and with other evidence. For example, the federal-aid highway program creates the opportunity for substitution because states typically spend substantially more than the amount required to meet federal matching requirements--usually 20 percent. Thus, states can reduce their own highway spending and still obtain increased federal funds. These trends imply that substitution may be limiting the effectiveness of strategies Congress has put into place to meet the federal-aid highway program's goals. For example, one strategy has been to significantly increase the federal investment and ensure that funds collected for highways are used for that purpose. However, federal increases have not translated into commensurate increases in the nation's overall investment in highways, in part because while Congress can dedicate federal funds for highways, it cannot prevent state highway funds from being used for other purposes. GAO identified several options for the future design and structure of the federal-aid highway program that could be considered in light of these issues. For example, increasing the required state match, rewarding states that increase their spending, or requiring states to maintain levels of investment over time could all help reduce substitution. On the other hand, the ability of states to meet a variety of needs and fiscal pressures might be better accomplished by providing states with funds through a more flexible federal program--this could also reduce administrative expenses associated with the federal-aid highway program. While some of these options are mutually exclusive, others could be enacted in concert with each other. The commission separately approved by both houses of Congress in 2004 may be an appropriate vehicle to examine these options. |
gao_GAO-12-592 | gao_GAO-12-592_0 | Under this provision, FHA insured over $20 billion in mortgages for 87,000 homeowners who were approved for FHA mortgage insurance in 2009. Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-129 states that delinquent tax debtors are ineligible for federal loan insurance, such as FHA mortgage insurance, unless they repaid the debt or were in a valid repayment agreement with IRS, but the FTHBC was available to those who qualified regardless of their tax debt. FHA Insured over $1.44 Billion in Mortgages for Thousands of Recovery Act Beneficiaries with Federal Tax Debt
In 2009, FHA insured over $1.44 billion in mortgages for 6,327 borrowers who at the same time had delinquent tax debt and benefited from the Recovery Act. As figure 1 illustrates, our analysis included tax debtors who either benefited from FHA’s increased loan limits or who claimed the FTHBC and received FHA mortgage insurance of any value. We could not determine the proportion of borrowers who were ineligible because we could not systematically identify which of the 6,327 borrowers had valid repayment agreements at the time of the mortgage approval using IRS’s data; however, we found that five of our eight selected borrowers were not in valid repayment agreements at the time they obtained FHA mortgage insurance. In addition, FHA records indicate that borrowers with tax debt had serious delinquency (in default for 90 days or more) and foreclosure rates two to three times greater than borrowers without tax debt, which potentially represents an increased risk to FHA. Shortcomings in the Capacity of FHA- Required Documentation to Identify Tax Debts and in Certain Policies Allow Tax Debtors to Obtain Mortgage Insurance
Some ineligible tax debtors received FHA mortgage insurance, in part, due to shortcomings in the capacity of FHA-required documentation to identify tax debts and shortcomings in other policies that lenders may misinterpret. Lenders are required by FHA policy to perform steps to identify an applicant’s federal debt status, but the information provided by these steps does not reliably indicate an applicant’s tax debt. Statutory restrictions limit the disclosure of taxpayer information without the taxpayer’s consent. Lenders are already required to obtain such consent through an IRS form they use to validate the income of some applicants. This same form could also be used to obtain permission from applicants to access reliable tax-debt information directly from IRS, but doing so is not addressed in FHA’s policies. Further, FHA’s policies requiring lenders to investigate whether tax liens indicate unresolved tax debt are unclear and may be misinterpreted. The lenders we spoke with believed they were in compliance with FHA policies when they provided FHA- insured loans to applicants with tax liens, but FHA officials indicated otherwise. As a result of these shortcomings, lenders may approve federally insured mortgages for ineligible applicants with delinquent tax debt in violation of federal policies. Information That FHA Requires Lenders to Collect on Mortgage Applicants Does Not Reliably Indicate the Existence of Federal Tax Debt
Consistent with OMB policies, FHA has lender policies intended to prevent ineligible tax debtors from obtaining FHA mortgage insurance; however, the information the agency requires lenders to collect does not reliably indicate the existence of federal tax debt. Credit reports. Provide FHA lenders with revised policies or additional guidance on borrower ineligibility due to delinquent federal debts and tax liens to more clearly distinguish requirements for lenders to investigate any indication that an applicant has federal tax debt (such as a federal tax lien) to provide reasonable assurance that ineligible borrowers do not receive FHA mortgage insurance. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to determine: (1) the extent to which tax debtors benefited from the Recovery Act’s provisions for increased Federal Housing Administration (FHA) loan limits and the First-Time Homebuyer Credit (FTHBC); and (2) what challenges, if any, FHA faces in preventing ineligible tax debtors from receiving mortgage insurance. We also obtained and analyzed tax debt data from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) as of June 30, 2010. FHA officials agreed with this methodology. All of our cases were selected to illustrate the sizeable amounts of taxes owed by some individuals who benefitted from the Recovery Act. | Why GAO Did This Study
Under a Recovery Act provision that increased mortgage insurance loan limits, FHA insured $20 billion in mortgages for 87,000 homeowners. The Recovery Act also provided for the awarding of an estimated $12 billion of FTHBCs to 1.7 million individuals. GAO was asked to determine the (1) extent to which tax debtors benefited from the Recovery Acts provisions for increased FHA loan limits and the FTHBC, and (2) challenges, if any, FHA faces in preventing ineligible tax debtors from receiving mortgage insurance. Using IRS and FHA data, GAO identified Recovery Act recipients and compared them to federal tax debtors as of June 30, 2010. GAO reviewed relevant policies and interviewed agency officials and lenders. GAO also reviewed detailed IRS and FHA documents for a nonrepresentative selection of 18 individuals who received FHA mortgage insurance. These were selected based on a combination of factors, such as amount of taxes owed and number of delinquent tax periods. Due to data availability and other factors, GAO was able to completely evaluate only 8 of 18 individuals on their eligibility for FHA mortgage insurance. These cases cannot be generalized beyond those presented.
What GAO Found
The Federal Housing Administration (FHA) insured over $1.44 billion in mortgages for 6,327 borrowers with $77.6 million in federal tax debt who benefited from the 2009 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act. Of these borrowers, 3,815 individuals claimed and received $27.4 million in Recovery Act First-Time Homebuyer Credits (FTHBC). This analysis includes tax debtors who (1) benefited from FHAs increased loan limits, or (2) claimed the FTHBCs and received FHA mortgage insurance of any value. Federal policy makes delinquent tax debtors ineligible for FHA mortgage insurance unless they repay their debt or are in a valid repayment agreement with the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), but the FTHBC, like all tax credits, was available to those who qualified, regardless of their tax debt. GAO could not determine the proportion of borrowers who were ineligible for FHA insurance because GAO could not systematically identify which of the 6,327 borrowers were in valid repayment agreements using the data GAO received from IRS. However, GAO did find that 5 of the 8 borrowers completely evaluated were ineligible because they were not in valid repayment agreements at the time they obtained FHA mortgage insurance. In addition, GAO found that Recovery Act borrowers with unpaid taxes had foreclosure rates two to three times greater than borrowers without unpaid taxes, which potentially represents an increased risk to FHA.
Some ineligible tax debtors received FHA mortgage insurance, in part, due to shortcomings in the capacity of FHA-required documentation to identify tax debts, and shortcomings in other policies that lenders may misinterpret. Lenders must perform steps to identify an applicants federal debt status, but sources commonly used, such as the loan application and credit report, do not reliably indicate an applicants tax debt. Statutory restrictions generally prohibit the disclosure of taxpayer information, such as tax debt, without the taxpayers consent. Lenders are already required to obtain such consent through an IRS form they use to validate the income of some applicants. This same form could also be used to obtain permission from applicants to obtain reliable tax-debt information directly from IRS, but doing so is not addressed in FHA policies. Requiring lenders to collect more reliable information on tax debts could better prevent ineligible tax debtors from obtaining FHA mortgage insurance. Further, FHAs policies requiring lenders to investigate whether tax liens indicate unresolved tax debt are unclear and may be misinterpreted. The lenders GAO spoke with believed they were in compliance with FHAs policies when they provided FHA-insured loans to applicants with tax liens and no repayment agreements, but FHA officials indicated otherwise. As a result of these shortcomings, lenders may approve federally insured mortgages for ineligible applicants with delinquent tax debt in violation of federal policies.
What GAO Recommends
HUD should (1) consult with IRS to require lenders to collect more reliable tax debt information from applicants and (2) provide lenders with revised policies or guidance, including the consideration of tax liens, for approving FHA mortgage insurance. HUD agreed with the recommendations. |
gao_GAO-12-893 | gao_GAO-12-893_0 | In the area of identity verification, the Act establishes the following requirements, among others, for states seeking compliance:
Documentation: States must require license applicants to provide documentation of their name, date of birth, SSN, address of principal residence, and lawful status in the United States;
Verification: Requires states to verify with the issuing agency the issuance, validity, and completeness of the documents presented as proof of name, date of birth, SSN (or verify the applicant’s ineligibility for an SSN), address, and lawful status, with specific requirements to confirm SSNs with SSA and verify lawful status of non-citizens through an electronic DHS system; Image capture: Requires states to capture and store digital images of all documents presented by license applicants to establish identity, such as passports and birth certificates, and capture the facial images of all applicants;
Renewals: Requires states to establish an effective procedure for confirming or verifying the information provided by individuals seeking to renew their licenses;
One driver, one license: Requires states to refuse to issue a license to an applicant who already holds a license from another state, without confirming that this other license has been or is in the process of being terminated; and
Staff training: States must establish training programs on recognizing fraudulent documents for appropriate employees involved in issuing licenses. All states plus the District of Columbia are now using Social Security Online Verification (SSOLV) to verify license applicants’ SSNs and other personal data, consistent with the REAL ID Act’s requirement to confirm SSNs with SSA. Many states are using facial recognition techniques or fingerprinting which, while not required by the REAL ID Act, may detect applicants who attempt to obtain a license under an identity other than their own. Although states are already implementing a number of the identity verification procedures required by the REAL ID Act, some states may not comply with certain provisions for various reasons. Indeed, officials in the majority of our 11 selected states said they have seen a decline in attempts to obtain licenses using counterfeit documents. Officials in most of the states we interviewed said SSOLV checks have helped make the use of fraudulent documents more difficult. State officials also reported successes in using facial recognition technology to detect license fraud, particularly fraud involving identity theft. License Fraud across State Lines and the Use of Counterfeit Birth Certificates Remain Challenges
States Remain Vulnerable to Cross-State License Fraud
States’ vulnerability to license fraud perpetrated by individuals who cross state lines has been a longstanding issue, and it remains a challenge for states despite the success officials report in detecting other kinds of Officials in the majority of states we interviewed told us their fraud.states bar their license holders from also holding licenses in other states, and the REAL ID Act also prohibits states from issuing a license to an applicant who already has one in another state. For example, criminals may try to get licenses under different identities by using the identity of someone who resides—and may have a license—in one state to obtain a license under that identity in a different state, perhaps to commit financial fraud under their stolen identity. For example, officials in a number of states told us a check against the problem driver database (Problem Driver Pointer System) will not detect a license in another state if it is not associated with any driving violation. States are trying to develop additional mechanisms for addressing cross- state license fraud, but none are fully operational yet. SSA and DHS Have Enhanced Verification Systems but DHS Has Not Provided Adequate Guidance on REAL ID Implementation
Agencies Have Improved Existing Systems and Helped States Develop New Verification Systems
SSA has taken actions that enhance licensing agencies’ ability to verify SSNs and other personal data. Specifically, the agency has addressed two areas of concern that we raised in 2003. DHS has also provided grants to individual states to help them improve their driver’s license security procedures, including identity verification. DHS Has Not Provided Comprehensive Guidance to Help States Implement the REAL ID Act
Despite the approaching January 2013 deadline for compliance, DHS has not provided timely, comprehensive, or proactive guidance on how states seeking REAL ID compliance could meet the identity verification requirements. For example, DHS did not issue written guidance on how to meet specific REAL ID Act identity verification requirements for over 4 years after it issued its final regulations in 2008. However, DHS officials said they are now reevaluating that decision. DHS regulations require states to use electronic verification systems as they become available, but also authorize states to use alternative methods approved by DHS.not providing comprehensive guidance specifying what alternative procedures would be acceptable for compliance with these requirements, DHS officials also indicated they have no plans to promote certain strategies they consider potentially useful that might partially help states meet these requirements, such as: (1) expansion of the AAMVA photo However, in addition to sharing program to additional states, and (2) expansion of licensing agencies’ efforts to verify birth certificates through their own states’ birth records for applicants born in-state. However, officials in some states we interviewed expressed a need for direction from DHS to help identify possible alternatives. Similarly, even though EVVE is not yet fully operational, states can still make it harder for criminals to use forged birth certificates by, for example, checking their own birth records for license applicants born in-state. I), DHS did not concur with either of our recommendations, saying that interim strategies for addressing cross-state and birth certificate fraud are not needed. And, officials in many of the states we contacted still said they are confused about how to comply with certain REAL ID provisions, such as those related to cross-state and birth certificate fraud, despite DHS’ efforts to provide information through conferences and responses to individual state questions. Social Security Numbers: Federal Actions Could Further Decrease Availability in Public Records, though Other Vulnerabilities Remain. | Why GAO Did This Study
Obtaining a driver's license under another's identity can enable criminals to commit various crimes. The 9/11 terrorists, for example, possessed fraudulent licenses. The REAL ID Act sets minimum standards for states when verifying license applicants' identity, which go into effect in January 2013. If states do not meet these requirements, their licenses will not be accepted for official purposes such as boarding commercial aircraft. DHS is responsible for establishing how states may certify compliance and for determining compliance. SSA helps states verify SSNs. GAO was asked to examine (1) states' identity verification procedures for license applicants, (2) the procedures' effectiveness in addressing fraud, and (3) how federal agencies have helped states enhance procedures. GAO analyzed DHS and SSA data on states' use of verification systems; interviewed officials from DHS, SSA, and other organizations; and conducted on-site or phone interviews with licensing agency officials in 11 states. GAO tested state procedures in three states that have known vulnerabilities; results from these states are not generalizable.
What GAO Found
To verify license applicants' identity, all 50 states and the District of Columbia have procedures that may detect counterfeit documents. For example, all states are now verifying key personal information, such as Social Security numbers (SSN) through online queries to a Social Security Administration (SSA) database, a significant increase from about a decade ago. This effort helps ensure that the identity information presented belongs to a valid identity and also is not associated with a deceased person. Additionally, most states verify non-citizen applicants' immigration documents with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to ensure these individuals have lawful status in the United States. Many states are also using facial recognition techniques to better detect attempts to obtain a license under another's identity. While most states have taken steps required by the REAL ID Act of 2005 (Act), officials in some states indicated that they may not comply with certain provisions--such as re-verifying SSNs for license renewals--because of state laws or concerns that these requirements are unnecessary and burdensome.
State officials interviewed by GAO report that identity verification procedures have been effective at combating certain kinds of fraud, but vulnerabilities remain. Officials in most of the 11 states GAO contacted reported a decline in the use of counterfeit identity documents, and officials in states using facial recognition said they detected a number of identity theft attempts. However, criminals can still steal the identity of someone in one state and use it to get a license in another because states lack the capacity to consistently detect such cross-state fraud. A system for addressing such fraud would enable states to comply with the Act's prohibition against issuing licenses to individuals who already have a license from another state, but may not be fully operational until 2023. Furthermore, officials in many states said they have difficulties detecting forged birth certificates. Verifying date of birth is also required by the Act, and a system exists for doing so, but no licensing agencies are using it because of concerns about incomplete data, among other reasons. Partly because these two systems are not fully operational, GAO investigators were able to use counterfeit out-of-state drivers' licenses and birth certificates to fraudulently obtain licenses in three states.
By improving their respective verification systems, SSA and DHS have helped states enhance their identity verification procedures. For example, SSA has established timeliness goals for responding to state SSN queries and DHS has addressed data accuracy issues. DHS has also provided funding for states to develop new systems. However, DHS has not always provided timely, comprehensive, or proactive guidance to help states implement provisions of the Act related to identity verification. For example, DHS did not issue formal, written guidance in this area for more than 4 years after issuing final regulations, even though officials from most states GAO interviewed said they needed such guidance. Additionally, even though relevant national systems are not yet fully operational, DHS has no plans to promote certain alternatives states can use to comply with the Act's identity verification requirements and combat cross-state and birth certificate fraud. Officials in some states indicated they needed direction from DHS in this area.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DHS work with partners to take interim actions to help states address cross-state and birth certificate fraud. DHS did not concur with these recommendations, saying its ongoing efforts are sufficient. GAO has demonstrated that vulnerabilities remain as long as national systems are not yet fully operational. Therefore, GAO continues to believe additional DHS actions are needed. |
gao_GAO-16-87 | gao_GAO-16-87_0 | FEMA Emergency Evacuation Assistance and National Mass Evacuation Tracking System
Emergency evacuations are the responsibility of state and local governments. FEMA Has Taken Some Steps to Implement, Assess, and Improve Three Disaster Response Programs but Opportunities for Improvement Exist
FEMA Uses Leading Practices for Implementing and Assessing the US&R Program, but Lacks a Plan for Replacing Aging Task Force Equipment
FEMA Uses Leading Practices to Implement the US&R Program
FEMA uses leading program management practices for goal setting, communication, and program execution to provide urban search and rescue services for a wide variety of disasters. Goal setting: FEMA has ensured that the mission of the US&R program aligns with the goals and resources of the program. For example, one goal is to save lives and protect property in an all-hazards environment. FEMA Lacks a Comprehensive Plan to Improve Replacement of US&R Task Force Equipment
The aging status of the task forces’ equipment has not yet been an operational issue identified by the various US&R assessments, but all 9 task forces we interviewed reported challenges funding the maintenance and replacement of their equipment caches. However, FEMA has not developed a comprehensive plan that would enable program managers and task force leaders to prioritize and fund the replacement of all items in the equipment cache. Developing a plan to prioritize and fund equipment needs will help FEMA to ensure US&R teams have the equipment they need to fulfill their mission. FEMA Uses Some Leading Practices to Implement, Assess, and Improve the IMAT Program but Additional Actions Would Strengthen this Program
FEMA uses some leading program management practices in implementing, assessing, and improving the IMAT program components but does not use other practices that would enhance program management. FEMA also has not developed a plan to address challenges related to staff attrition. FEMA officials also communicate potential program risks and performance issues through three strategic working groups, which address program-specific challenges in the areas of retention, training, and equipment. However, these efforts do not address the cadre-specific training needs of CORE IMAT members. Program officials in FEMA headquarters are to review these reports after every deployment. In order to more consistently manage the program, NMETS program officials drafted an NMETS Strategic Implementation Plan in January 2015 to provide guidance to FEMA regional offices for communicating and training state and local officials on the use and implementation of NMETS. NMETS program officials said they are taking steps to address NMETS concerns identified by states such as finalizing the implementation plan and conducting a workshop on mass care and evacuation assistance in fiscal year 2016. Recommendations for Executive Action
To enable FEMA to and more effectively respond to disasters, we recommend the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the FEMA Administrator to: 1. develop a comprehensive plan to prioritize and finance the replacement of equipment for the US&R task forces, 2. develop a comprehensive training plan that links the IMAT training and cadre-specific training requirements to available training opportunities to help ensure timely completion of the requirements. 3. implement a process to document, track, and analyze recommendations and implement lessons learned from Regional and National IMAT teams after disaster deployments, and 4. develop a workforce strategy to manage and improve retention that includes a process for systematically gathering attrition data and a plan to retain IMAT CORE employees. DHS concurred with all four recommendations and described planned actions to address them. DHS concurred with our third recommendation that FEMA implement a process to document, track, and analyze recommendations and implement lessons learned from Regional and National IMAT teams after disaster deployments. Appendix I: Disasters Requiring FEMA Disaster Response Assistance from Urban Search and Rescue (US&R) Task Forces and Incident Management Assistance Teams (IMATS) for Fiscal Years 2010 to 2014
Year
FEMA assigns each major disaster a “disaster declaration number,” preceded by the abbreviation “DR.”
Appendix II: Urban Search and Rescue (US&R) Deployment Event History 1992- 2014
Not applicable (n/a)
Year- month
Appendix III: National and Regional Incident Management Assistance Team (IMAT) Locations1
Regions IV, VI and IX each have 2 Regional IMAT teams. | Why GAO Did This Study
In a disaster requiring a federal response, the Department of Homeland Security's FEMA provides various response resources to state, local, and tribal governments. Such assistance can include deploying US&R teams to help locate survivors and human remains, IMAT teams to help coordinate and provide federal support, and evacuation assistance, when applicable.
GAO was asked to review aspects of FEMA's disaster response programs. Specifically, this report addresses FEMA's efforts to implement, assess, and improve selected disaster response programs for urban search and rescue, incident management, and evacuation tracking. GAO reviewed documentation such as policies, procedures, after action reports, and readiness assessments for these programs and deployments to select disasters for fiscal years 2010 through 2014—capturing pre and post Hurricane Sandy disasters. GAO also interviewed FEMA and state officials, and a nongeneralizable sample of nine US&R task forces to gain insights into FEMA's efforts.
What GAO Found
The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) has taken steps to implement, assess, and improve select disaster response programs, but GAO identified opportunities to strengthen program management. Specifically, GAO found that FEMA uses leading management practices in implementing its Urban Search and Rescue (US&R) program. For example, FEMA has aligned the mission of the US&R Program--to save lives and reduce suffering in communities impacted by a disaster-- with its goal setting efforts in its US&R Strategic Plan. It also communicates program risks to stakeholders and assesses performance so the program can be continuously strengthened. However, all nine US&R task forces GAO interviewed reported challenges funding the maintenance and replacement of their aging equipment to ensure that it is not outdated and adheres to manufacturer standards. FEMA has not developed a plan to prioritize and fund the replacement of this equipment and doing so would help ensure that these task forces are capable of meeting their important response mission.
FEMA applies some leading program management practices in implementing, assessing, and improving its Incident Management Assistance Teams (IMAT)—such as setting strategic goals and identifying program risks—but does not use other practices that would enhance program management. National and regional IMAT team members are comprised of FEMA employees hired on temporary 4-year contracts. GAO found that FEMA lacks a standardized plan to ensure that all national and regional IMAT members receive required training, and IMAT teams do not always develop after action reports after disaster deployments and document lessons learned. GAO also found that the IMAT program has experienced high attrition across national and regional IMAT teams—since its implementation in fiscal year 2013—and FEMA has not developed a strategy to address these challenges. Developing a plan to address training and retention challenges would help FEMA better meet IMAT program goals.
FEMA's efforts to implement, assess, and improve its evacuation tracking system nationwide have been inconsistent due to lack of state and local resources and interest in using the system. However, FEMA officials said they are taking steps to address concerns raised by users of the system, including technical issues with the software. For example, FEMA has developed a new implementation plan to provide guidance to its regional offices for better communicating and training state and local officials on the use of its tracking software and intends to finalize a system strategic plan in the next nine to 15 months. Since these efforts are ongoing, GAO cannot yet assess the extent that they will address the inconsistences or user concerns with the system.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that FEMA develop a plan to prioritize and fund the replacement of US&R task force equipment; a plan to ensure that IMAT teams receive required training, and a workforce strategy for retention of IMAT staff; and document, track, and analyze recommendations and lessons learned from disaster deployments. DHS concurred with the recommendations and described plans to implement them. |
gao_GAO-15-107 | gao_GAO-15-107_0 | Background
PFCs are federally authorized fees which were established in 1990 to help pay for capital development at commercial service airports. About $2.8 billion in PFCs was collected by airlines on behalf of airports in 2013. 1). Most airports that are eligible to collect PFCs do so at the maximum rate $4.50 per flight segment. Increasing the Cap on PFCs Would Significantly Increase Airport Funding but Could Also Have Other Effects
Increasing the PFC Cap Would Significantly Increase Airport PFC Collections, but Key Assumptions Influence These Estimates
To estimate the potential amount of funding available to airports, as well as associated effects on passenger demand and ticket tax revenues from increasing the PFC cap, we developed an economic demand model. PFC pass-through. Increasing the PFC Cap Could Marginally Slow Growth in Revenues to the Airport and Airway Trust Fund
Increasing the PFC cap under the three different scenarios that we modeled could marginally slow the growth of AATF revenues compared to what it could have been without the PFC increase. Under all our cap scenarios, AATF revenues from passengers would likely continue to grow overall based on current projections of passenger growth; however, passenger growth could be slower with a PFC cap increase if it results in a higher total cost of air travel and thus reduces passenger demand. (See table 3.) Stakeholders Reported That the Current PFC Collection Method Works Well but Lacks Some Transparency for Airports
Stakeholders Said That the Current PFC Collection Method Works Well
In order to evaluate the current PFC collection method, we used the following factors that we identified as key considerations for evaluating passenger fee collection methods in our February 2013 report: passenger experience, costs to administer, legal issues, customer transparency, and technology readiness. Moreover, although airports have the right to review audits, our interviews with a limited number of airport officials raise questions about the extent to which airports are aware of their rights to review the audits. Given that FAA relies on airports to alert it to potential inaccuracies in PFC collections and those airports have difficulty determining the accuracy of PFC collections for the reasons discussed earlier in this report, it is important that airports are aware of their right to request copies of airline PFC audit reports and to ask for additional follow-up by FAA, such as an audit by the Department of Transportation’s Office of Inspector General if the audits or other information indicate discrepancies. This process suggests that, without adequate assurance that airlines are following FAA’s audit guidance, some PFCs may not be collected or, if collected, not accurately remitted to airports. Alternative Methods of PFC Collection Are Feasible but Would Impose Additional Steps and Costs
Stakeholders Identified Three Alternatives to the Current Ticket-Based PFC Collection but Said They Could Diminish Passenger Experience
Stakeholders we interviewed identified three general alternatives to the current method of PFC collection, alternatives that could be used in combination or independently. Stakeholders including airports and airlines and their respective domestic and international associations, and industry experts that we interviewed said that the current collection method is better than the identified alternatives. Online payments introduce an additional step to online ticket purchases and potentially additional costs. In this way, customers may not know the full cost of travel at the time of ticket purchase, which raises questions about transparency. Rulemaking that proposes to require airlines and ticket agents to disclose optional fees at the time of purchase. Thus, FAA is not well positioned to provide reasonable assurance to Congress, airports, or passengers who pay PFCs on the reliability of those audits and the PFCs collected. Recommendations for Executive Action
To ensure the accuracy of Passenger Facility Charge collections and remittances to airports, we recommend that the Secretary of Transportation should require the FAA to take the following two actions:
Review the extent to which airlines’ auditors use FAA’s audit guidance and, if found to be minimal, evaluate whether airlines’ auditors should be required to use the FAA’s audit guidance by considering the soundness of existing airline audits and the associated costs of airlines’ having to follow the guidance. DOT also provided technical comments that we incorporated as appropriate. (2) how well does the current PFC collection process work? Appendix II: Economic Demand Model
The model described in this appendix is designed to estimate the potential impact of increases in the PFC cap on funds available for airport investment and federal aviation revenues between 2016 and 2024. | Why GAO Did This Study
About $2.8 billion in Passenger Facility Charges (PFCs) were collected in 2013. PFCs are federally authorized fees paid by passengers at the time of ticket purchase to help pay for capital development at commercial service airports and have been capped at $4.50 per flight segment since 2000. Airports are seeking an increase in the PFC cap to $8.50. Airlines, which collect PFCs at the time of purchase and remit the fees to airports, oppose an increase because it could potentially reduce passenger demand. Some airports have suggested that alternative PFC collection methods could allow the PFC cap to be raised without adversely impacting demand.
GAO was asked to examine these issues. This report discusses (1) the potential effects of PFC cap increases, (2) how well the current PFC collection process works, and (3) alternative PFC collection methods. GAO developed a model to assess the potential effects of PFC cap increases on funds for airport investment and the aviation system. GAO interviewed 26 stakeholders, including airports and airlines representing a range of sizes, as well as consumer groups, to discuss PFC collection methods.
What GAO Found
Increasing the Passenger Facility Charges (PFC) cap would significantly increase PFC collections available to airports under the three scenarios GAO modeled but could also marginally slow passenger growth and therefore the growth in revenues to the Airport and Airway Trust Fund (AATF). GAO modeled the potential economic effects of increased PFC caps for fiscal years 2016 through 2024 as shown in the table below. Under all three scenarios, AATF revenues, which totaled $12.9 billion in 2013 and fund Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) activities, would likely continue to grow overall based on current projections of passenger growth; however, the modeled cap increases could reduce total AATF revenues by roughly 1 percent because of reduced passenger demand. These projected effects depend on key assumptions regarding consumers' sensitivity to a PFC cap increase, whether airlines would pass on the full increase to consumers, and the rate at which airports would adopt the increased PFC cap.
Stakeholders said that the current PFC collection method generally works well, but airport officials said that transparency over PFC collections could be enhanced. Stakeholders universally said that the current method is preferred because the PFC is paid at the time of purchase. Airlines are required to have audits of their PFC collections and FAA provides audit guidance to help provide assurance that collections are accurate. However, the guidance is voluntary and FAA does not know if airlines' auditors use it. FAA relies on airports to alert them of discrepancies but some airports may not be aware they can review audits. FAA could take additional steps beyond what is stated in the guidance to inform airports about their rights, and thus provide reasonable assurance to Congress, airports, and airline passengers about the reliability of those audits and PFCs remitted to airports.
Stakeholders GAO interviewed generally said that alternative methods to collect PFCs, such as airport kiosks or online or mobile payments, are technologically feasible but they would impose additional steps for passengers, costs for airports, and changes in business processes. Therefore, stakeholders said that that the current collection method is better than the identified alternatives.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that FAA review the extent to which airline independent audits of PFC collections follow FAA guidance and take additional steps to educate airports about their right to review these audits. The Department of Transportation (DOT) agreed to review the extent to which airline audits use FAA guidance, but noted they may not be able to require airlines to respond; and agreed to take additional steps to educate airports about their rights. DOT also provided technical comments which GAO incorporated as appropriate. |
gao_GAO-06-723 | gao_GAO-06-723_0 | Technetium, a radioactive metal that is produced as a by-product of fission in a nuclear reactor, is considered a contaminant by commercial specifications for nuclear fuel. USEC was able to determine that up to 9,550 metric tons of the 45,000 metric tons of uranium that DOE had transferred to the corporation prior to privatization had been processed through the contaminated production lines at Paducah and therefore was contaminated with technetium. USEC Reported About 10 Percent of the Contaminated Uranium DOE Transferred to the Corporation before Privatization Remains to Be Decontaminated
Through the end of February 2006, USEC reported that about 960 metric tons, or 10 percent, of the 9,550 metric tons of technetium-contaminated uranium transferred to it by DOE prior to privatization remains to be decontaminated. DOE estimates USEC will finish decontaminating this uranium by the end of December 2006. DOE compensated USEC for its decontamination costs using appropriated funds. From June 2002 through the end of February 2006, USEC had invoiced DOE for decontamination costs totaling about $152 million. DOE has compensated USEC for its decontamination services in three ways. DOE’s Oversight of USEC’s Uranium Decontamination Activities Has Been Hindered by Delays in Obtaining Key Information from USEC
DOE takes several steps to oversee USEC’s uranium decontamination activities, including reviewing monthly reports submitted by USEC detailing decontamination progress and costs and tracking the proceeds USEC generates from selling clean uranium that DOE has transferred to the corporation under the December 2004 agreement. As a result, DOE has some concerns about whether USEC consistently conducts decontamination work in a cost-effective manner and is currently uncertain whether the compensation the department provided the corporation matches USEC’s actual decontamination costs. Finally, DOE has also contracted with DCAA to audit the annual costs submitted by USEC, which DOE uses to verify that USEC’s decontamination costs match what DOE paid the corporation. DCAA uses these data in its audits to verify that USEC’s incurred costs are reasonable. USEC’s Delays in Responding to Inquiries and Providing Financial Data Have Affected DOE’s Oversight
DOE officials told us that they have had difficulties receiving complete and timely responses to their inquiries on USEC’s monthly reports. According to USEC, these other audits have not found significant deficiencies. In the absence of DCAA audits of USEC’s annual decontamination costs, DOE has taken steps to protect the government’s interests by limiting the amount of compensation paid to USEC. In addition, to assist the Congress in its continuing oversight of the department, we further recommend that the Secretary of Energy report the following information in DOE’s annual budget request to the Congress until USEC has completed uranium decontamination: the remaining quantities of uranium in USEC’s and DOE’s inventories that need to be decontaminated, the estimated costs of completing this decontamination work, the source of funds necessary to compensate USEC, and the progress DCAA has made completing the annual audits of USEC’s decontamination costs. | Why GAO Did This Study
Prior to the 1998 privatization of the U.S. Enrichment Corporation (USEC), the Department of Energy (DOE) transferred about 45,000 metric tons of natural uranium to USEC to, among other things, be enriched to fulfill USEC's nuclear fuel contracts. About 9,550 metric tons were subsequently discovered to be contaminated with technetium, a radioactive metal, at levels exceeding the specification for nuclear fuel. Although DOE has not admitted liability, DOE and USEC have entered into agreements under which USEC is decontaminating the uranium. DOE has compensated USEC for its decontamination costs in several ways, including using proceeds from sales of government-owned clean uranium. GAO was asked to examine (1) USEC's progress in decontaminating uranium and (2) DOE's oversight of USEC's decontamination activities. A forthcoming GAO legal opinion will address DOE's legal authority to transfer clean uranium to USEC for sale and use the proceeds to compensate USEC for its decontamination services.
What GAO Found
As of February 28, 2006, USEC reported that about 10 percent of the contaminated uranium that DOE transferred to the corporation prior to privatization remains to be decontaminated, or about 960 metric tons of the 9,550 contaminated metric tons transferred. DOE estimates USEC will finish decontaminating this uranium by the end of December 2006. Through the end of February 2006, USEC has invoiced DOE for a total of about $152 million in decontamination costs. DOE takes several steps to oversee USEC's uranium decontamination activities. DOE reviews monthly USEC reports that detail, among other things, the corporation's decontamination progress and costs. In addition, DOE, through the Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA), audits USEC to verify that USEC's actual costs match the amount DOE paid to the corporation and are in accordance with the provisions of the uranium decontamination agreement. However, DOE has had difficulties completing some of its oversight because of USEC's delays in providing financial data and other information. DOE officials told us that USEC sometimes takes up to 6 months before responding to its inquiries about the corporation's monthly reports. As a result, DOE has some concerns about whether USEC consistently conducts decontamination work in a cost-effective manner. DCAA has also experienced significant delays obtaining USEC financial data that it requires for its annual audit of USEC's costs. DOE uses these data to verify that USEC's actual decontamination costs match what DOE paid USEC. Until DCAA's audits are complete, DOE cannot be certain whether the compensation it provided to USEC matches USEC's actual decontamination costs. As a result, USEC may need to repay money to the government or DOE may owe additional money to USEC upon completion of these audits. In addition, the Congress has not received information to assist in the appropriations process on the progress and costs of decontamination. |
gao_OGC-95-15 | gao_OGC-95-15_0 | Over the years, presidentially appointed IGs have increasingly placed their primary source of legal services in their own offices, and only five still have principal legal advisors organizationally located in their agencies’ OGCs. Proponents raised concerns about the independence of legal advice provided to IGs by OGC attorneys and argued that reliance on such attorneys compromises IGs’ independence. In addition, to determine whether there are differences between the OGC and OIG attorneys currently providing legal services to IGs that might suggest that those located in OGCs are less able than those located in OIGs to provide independent legal services, we used a questionnaire to gather information from all 27 IGs on how IGs obtain legal services as well as on the composition, supervision, and budgetary independence of the legal staffs providing services to IGs; interviewed selected OIG staff and IGs’ principal legal advisors; and compared the mechanisms through which OGC and OIG attorneys provide legal services. The IGs were not confident that OGC attorneys could provide independent advice consistent with their needs. These IGs are satisfied with the arrangements under which they obtain legal services. The three IGs are satisfied with their current arrangements. The grade levels of the OGC and OIG staff attorneys are also mixed. We also found that the nature and scope of the legal services provided to the IGs vary from office to office and are not necessarily related to the location of the attorneys. Regardless of attorney location, IGs and their attorneys recognize that they may benefit from the assistance of other agency attorneys with expertise in particular programs. Three of the five IGs who obtain legal services from OGC attorneys have implemented MOUs, which include requirements for IG concurrence in the selection and appraisal of their principal legal advisors, to alleviate the potential that their attorneys’ location will adversely affect the independence of the advice the IGs receive and erode their independence. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO reviewed the legal services provided to presidentially-appointed Inspectors General (IG), focusing on the independence of legal services provided to IG by agencies' offices of general counsel (OGC) compared with those legal services provided within Offices of Inspector General (OIG).
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) OGC attorneys may not provide independent legal advice due to pressure by senior OGC officials and concerns about their professional relations and career advancement; (2) since OGC-provided legal services could compromise the independence of IG investigations and audits, most IG have placed attorneys within their own offices; (3) 3 of the 5 IG that still depend on OGC attorneys have implemented memoranda of understanding with their general counsels that delineate IG independence, their attorneys' responsibilities, the handling of sensitive information, and other requirements such as IG concurrence in attorney selection, retention, and appraisal; (4) the 3 IG are satisfied with their legal arrangements and note that they have the option of moving their attorneys into their offices if the attorneys' independence becomes suspect; (5) the other 2 agency IG are not satisfied with their legal arrangements and are currently reviewing them; (6) the size and grade levels of IG legal staff, the scope and nature of their work, and their reliance on other agency attorneys varies depending on which office they are located in; and (7) there are no indications that OGC attorneys are less able to provide independent legal services than OIG attorneys. |
gao_GAO-12-474 | gao_GAO-12-474_0 | Background
Federal assistance for highway and bridge infrastructure—about $40 billion each year—is distributed through multiple formula and discretionary grant programs collectively known as the federal-aid highway program. FHWA’s Partnership Role Was Established almost a Century Ago, but over Time Its Responsibilities Have Expanded
Over the years, the federal-aid highway program has grown to encompass broader goals, more responsibilities, and a variety of approaches; however, the concept of a federal-state partnership has been an integral feature of the highway program since it was established by the Federal Aid Road Act of 1916.legislation established federal-state responsibilities, wherein states select the placement of roads, construct, and maintain them, and the federal government sets standards and provides a portion of the funding. The Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1973 further refined the federal-state relationship by stating that “the authorization of the appropriation of Federal funds…shall in no way infringe on the sovereign rights of the States to determine which projects shall be federally financed” and defined the federal-aid highway program as a “federally assisted State This and other early highway program.” This language helped shape FHWA’s interpretation of the federal-state relationship, leading to an understanding of its role that anchors FHWA’s approach to oversight in partnership and is cited today in FHWA’s policy documents. For these and other reasons, funding surface transportation remains on GAO’s high-risk list. FHWA Benefits from Using Recognized Partnership Practices
Partnering Activities and Practices
In the face of its evolving roles and responsibilities, FHWA has relied on its historical partnership with the states in which FHWA and the states work collaboratively to construct highway infrastructure. We also observed instances in which FHWA sometimes showed a lack of independence in decisions, putting the states’ interests above federal ones, and other instances in which FHWA took extraordinary measures to advance the program to the point of becoming actively and closely involved in implementing solutions to state problems. This can create an inherent conflict when FHWA later must review and approve those actions or review their effectiveness. FHWA Sometimes Was Lax in Its Oversight or Reluctant to Take Corrective Action
In some instances, FHWA was lax in its oversight in that it did not verify compliance with the requirements of the federal-aid highway program, instead trusting states to ensure its actions were in compliance, which could have resulted in ineffective, wasteful, and potentially improper use of federal funds. The partnering relationship between FHWA and state DOTs at times may have also resulted in FHWA being reluctant to require corrective action to bring a state back into compliance with program requirements. FHWA division offices have the authority to de-obligate funds from inactive projects. However, FHWA division officials with oversight responsibility for three states we visited expressed reluctance to use this authority because of concerns that it would negatively affect their working relationship with the state. FHWA has not acted on this recommendation. Reexamining and refocusing surface transportation programs, which we have previously recommended, presents an opportunity to narrow the scope of FHWA’s responsibilities so that it is better equipped to transition to a performance- based system. This review identified areas where FHWA expends considerable time and resources but exercises little effective control— areas where devolving responsibilities to the states may be appropriate. Legislation Approved by the Senate for a Performance-Based Highway Program
A performance-based system is critical to the reexamination and restructuring of surface transportation programs that we and others have recommended. FHWA’s Partnership Approach Could Facilitate a Transition to a Performance-Based Program
FHWA’s partnership with states could offer several benefits in moving toward a performance-based program. FHWA Would Need to Mitigate Risks of Partnership
Moving to a more performance-based approach means monitoring and measuring states’ progress, holding states accountable for meeting performance targets, and taking corrective action objectively and consistently across states when needed. Conclusions
FHWA’s partnership approach with the states allows it to proactively identify issues before they become problems, achieve cost savings, and gain states’ commitment to improve their processes. Given that partnership produces benefits, the solution does not lie with eliminating FHWA’s partnership approach. Matter for Congressional Consideration
As we have previously recommended, Congress should consider reexamining and refocusing surface transportation programs, including establishing well-defined goals with direct links to identified federal interests and roles. Based on this review, there may be areas where national interests are less evident and where Congress may wish to consider narrowing FHWA’s responsibilities. | Why GAO Did This Study
The U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) provides about $40 billion to the states annually to build and maintain highways and bridges through the federal-aid highway program. While this program has grown and changed over time, the federal-state relationship has been consistently one of partnership since 1916. DOTs FHWA has offices in all 50 states that have developed close working relationships with states. Legislation approved by the Senate in March 2012 would establish a more performance-based highway program, introducing performance measures for highways and bridges and requiring FHWA to monitor states progress in meeting those measures. As requested, GAO examined (1) how the federal-aid highway program and FHWAs oversight have changed over time; (2) the extent to which FHWAs partnership approach produces benefits; (3) the extent to which FHWAs partnership approach poses risks; and (4) how FHWAs partnership with state DOTs could affect a transition toward a performance-based highway program. To do this work, GAO conducted site visits and a survey, reviewed relevant documentation, and interviewed FHWA and state officials.
What GAO Found
Over the years, the federal-aid highway program has expanded to encompass broader goals, more responsibilities, and a variety of approaches. As the program grew more complex, the Federal Highway Administrations (FHWA) oversight role also expanded, while its resources have not kept pace. As GAO has reported, this growth occurred without a well-defined overall vision of evident national interests and the federal role in achieving them. GAO has recommended Congress consider restructuring federal surface transportation programs, and for this and other reasons, funding surface transportation remains on GAOs high-risk list.
FHWA benefits from using recognized partnership practices to advance the federal-aid highway program and conduct program oversightsuch as clear delineation of roles and responsibilities between FHWA and its state partners and formal and informal conflict resolutionthat are recognized as leading practices. FHWAs partnership approach allows it to proactively identify issues before they become problems, achieve cost savings, and gain states commitment to improve their processes.
FHWAs partnership approach also poses risks. We observed cases where FHWA was lax in its oversight or reluctant to take corrective action to bring states back into compliance with federal requirements, potentially resulting in improper or ineffective use of federal funds. For example, while FHWA has made it a national priority to recoup funds from inactive highway projectsprojects that have not expended funds for over 1 yearFHWA officials in three states we visited were reluctant to do so because of concerns about harming their partnership with the state. In other cases, FHWA has shown a lack of independence in decisions, putting its partners interests above federal interests. For example, FHWA allowed two states to retain unused emergency relief allocations to fund new emergencies, despite FHWAs policy that these funds are made available to other states with potentially higher-priority emergencies. In some instances, FHWA became actively and closely involved in implementing solutions to state problemsthis can create a conflict when FHWA later must approve or review the effectiveness of those solutions.
If proposals for a performance-based highway program are adopted, FHWA would have to work with states to develop measures and take corrective action if states do not meet them. FHWAs partnership could help states develop measures, but it would need to mitigate the risks posed by its partnership to ensure corrective action was effective when needed. The fundamental reexamination of surface transportation programs, including the highway program, that GAO previously recommended presents an opportunity to narrow FHWAs responsibilities so that it is better equipped to transition to a performance-based system. GAO identified areas where national interests may be less evident but where FHWA expends considerable time and resourcesareas where devolving responsibilities to the states may be appropriate.
What GAO Recommends
Congress should consider restructuring federal surface transportation programs. Based on GAOs review, there may be areas where national interests are less evident and where opportunities exist to narrow FHWAs responsibilities. Also, DOT should address the risks posed by its partnership approach. DOT generally agreed with the recommendation. |
gao_HEHS-97-26 | gao_HEHS-97-26_0 | HHS endorses the philosophy that exchange visitors return home after completing their training to make their new knowledge and skills available to their home countries. As a result, HHS does not support waivers for physicians to remain in the United States to practice in underserved areas. The other major primary care specialties were pediatrics and family practice. By 1995, there were nearly 30 federal agencies and states processing requests for waivers for physicians with J-1 visas. The four federal agencies have no formal process for coordinating their waiver requests and they have overlapping jurisdictions. Monitoring Varies Among Federal Agencies and States
Agency controls to help ensure that physicians comply with waiver agreements vary among the federal agencies and states. The new regulations, if finalized, and the 1996 amendments could address many of the coordination and compliance problems, but not all of them. Many health care facilities and states cite examples of the utility of these waivers in providing a qualified physician for an underserved area. To look at coordination of physician placements, we cross-tabulated the agency data on waiver requests received by the agencies between 1994 and 1995 by state and selected those physicians whose waiver requests were sent to USIA between 1994 and 1995. Compliance
We identified instances where physicians did not comply with the terms of the waiver through (1) discussions with the ARC Inspector General and a review of reports from that office, (2) our survey of facilities where requesting agencies believed that the physicians were practicing, (3) site visits to facilities where the physicians were supposed to be practicing, and (4) discussions with USIA and other agency officials. (check all that apply)
15% We rely on other federal or state 38% We act in response to reports from other federal or state agencies 32% other (please specify)
97% Whether the practice location is in a health professional shortage area (HPSA) please continue on next page--> 65% Whether the practice location is in a medically underserved area/population (MUA/MUP) 29% Whether other state J-1 visa waiver physicians are practicing in the area 24% Whether other J-1 visa waiver physicians who received waivers through U.S. government agencies are practicing in the area 27% Whether physicians under National Health Service Corps (NHSC) obligations are practicing in the area 85% Whether the facility has tried recruiting in the past without success 0% None of the above factors J-1 VISA WAIVERS REQUESTED BY U.S. GOVERNMENT AGENCIES 9. 8. Waiver Requests for Physicians With J-1 Visas, by States and Federal Agency, 1990-95
Results of GAO Survey of Health Care Facilities Regarding Waivers for Physicians With J-1 Visas, 1994-95 Requests
This appendix contains the responses to questions we asked facilities that requested waivers of the J-1 visa foreign residence requirement for physicians. Table VI.3: Practice Specialties of Waiver Physicians Practicing on January 1, 1996
DOT (n=2)
ARC (n=38)
HUD (n=29)
USDA (n=81)
Physician Need and Number of Waiver and National Health Service Corps Physicians, by State, 1995
This appendix contains information for each state showing (1) the identified physician need in the state (2) the number of physicians with waivers granted or in process, and (3) the number of physicians who received NHSC scholarships or federal loan repayment who were practicing in the state. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 1988. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO reviewed the extent to which state and federal agencies used waivers to meet physician shortages in medically underserved areas, focusing on: (1) how many foreign physicians with J-1 visas receive waivers, where they practice, and their medical specialties; (2) whether federal agencies and states effectively coordinate policies and procedures for granting these waivers; and (3) the extent to which foreign physicians who receive waivers comply with waiver requirements to practice in underserved areas.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) the number of waivers for physicians with J-1 visas to work in underserved areas has risen from 70 in 1990 to over 1,300 in 1995; (2) requesting waivers for physicians with J-1 visas has become a major means of providing physicians for underserved areas; (3) in 1994 and 1995, the number of waivers processed for these physicians equaled about one-third of the total identified need for physicians in the country; (4) almost all of these waiver physicians have primary care medical specialties and they are practicing in 49 states and the District of Columbia; (5) nearly 30 federal and state agencies were processing waiver requests for physicians from hospitals, health centers, and other health care facilities by 1995; (6) among them, no agency has clear responsibility for ensuring that placement efforts are coordinated; (7) although the federal agencies are now working together informally, they still have differing policies, overlapping jurisdictions, and varying communication with the states; (8) the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) believes that the physicians should return home after completing their training to meet the intent of the exchange visitor program, and the other agencies view the waiver provision as a means to secure physicians to meet the health care needs of their constituents; (9) while more than 9 of every 10 physicians whose waivers were processed between 1994 and 1995 were practicing at their locations in January 1996, controls are somewhat weak for ensuring that physicians continue to meet the terms of their agreements; (10) even when the physicians and facilities follow the agencies' rules, the rules do not restrict physicians from working with those segments of the population that already are adequately served; and (11) proposed regulations published by the United States Information Agency and developed in working with the informal interagency group, coupled with recent amendments to the Immigration and Nationality Act would address many of the coordination and compliance problems, but not all of them. |
gao_GAO-08-904T | gao_GAO-08-904T_0 | Background
The Comptroller General convened this expert panel from the U.S. and abroad to advance a national dialogue on strengthening the use of risk management principles to better manage homeland security programs. The forum brought together a diverse array of experts from the public and private sectors, including, from the public sector, a former governor, a former DHS under secretary, a U.S. Coast Guard Admiral, and senior executives from DHS, the U.S. Army, and the National Intelligence Council, as well as state and local officials with homeland security responsibilities. Identifying Effective Risk Management Practices in the Private and Public Sectors
Participants discussed effective risk management practices used in the public and private sector. For example, they discussed the concept of a chief risk officer but did not reach consensus on how to apply the concept to the public sector. The participants also identified examples of public sector organizations that effectively integrated risk management into their operations and compared and contrasted public and private sector risk management practices. One key practice for creating an effective chief risk officer, participants said, was defining reporting relationships within the organization in a way that provides sufficient authority and autonomy for a chief risk officer to report to the highest levels of the organization. However, participants did not reach consensus on how to apply the concept of the chief risk officer to the public sector. Participants stated that the U.S. government needs a single risk manager. One participant suggested that this lack of central leadership has resulted in distributed responsibility for risk management within the administration and Congress and has contributed to a lack of coordination on spending decisions. Identifying and Addressing the Most Critical Homeland Security Risk Management Challenges
Participants identified three key challenges to strengthening the use of risk management in homeland security—risk communication, political obstacles to making risk-based investments, and a lack of strategic thinking. Key Challenges
Many participants, 35 percent, agreed that improving risk communication posed the single greatest challenge to using risk management principles (see fig. Risk Communication Challenges
Participants identified several risk communication challenges and recommended actions to address them as follows: Educate the public about risks and engage in public discourse to reach consensus on an acceptable level of risk. Develop new risk communication practices to alert the public during emergencies. Participants said there is a lack of a national strategic planning process to guide federal investments in homeland security. Fragmented approaches to managing security risk within and across the federal government could be addressed by developing governmentwide risk management guidance. Partnership and Coordination Challenges
Participants agreed that risk management should be viewed as the responsibility of both the public and private sector. They identified challenges related to public-private collaboration: Private sector should be more involved in public risk assessments. They recommended that more state and local practitioners and experts become involved in applying risk management principles to homeland security. Strategic Budgeting: Risk Management Principles Can Help DHS Allocate Resources to Highest Priorities. Homeland Security: Efforts to Improve Information Sharing Need to Be Strengthened. | Why GAO Did This Study
From the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, to Hurricane Katrina, homeland security risks vary widely. The nation can neither achieve total security nor afford to protect everything against all risks. Managing these risks is especially difficult in today's environment of globalization, increasing security interdependence, and growing fiscal challenges for the federal government. Broadly defined, risk management is a process that helps policymakers assess risk, strategically allocate finite resources, and take actions under conditions of uncertainty. GAO convened a forum of 25 national and international experts on October 25, 2007, to advance a national dialogue on applying risk management to homeland security. Participants included federal, state, and local officials and risk management experts from the private sector and academia. Forum participants identified (1) what they considered to be effective risk management practices used by organizations from the private and public sectors and (2) key challenges to applying risk management to homeland security and actions that could be taken to address them. Comments from the proceedings do not necessarily represent the views of all participants, the organizations of the participants, or GAO. Participants reviewed a draft of this report and their comments were incorporated, as appropriate.
What GAO Found
Forum participants identified what they considered to be effective public and private sector risk management practices. For example, participants discussed the private sector use of a chief risk officer, though they did not reach consensus on how to apply the concept of the chief risk officer to the public sector. One key practice for creating an effective chief risk officer, participants said, was defining reporting relationships within the organization in a way that provides sufficient authority and autonomy for a chief risk officer to report to the highest levels of the organization. Participants stated that the U.S. government needs a single risk manager. One participant suggested that this lack of central leadership has resulted in distributed responsibility for risk management within the administration and Congress and has contributed to a lack of coordination on spending decisions. Participants also discussed examples of public sector organizations that have effectively integrated risk management practices into their operations, such as the U.S. Coast Guard, and compared and contrasted public and private sector risk management practices. According to the participants at our forum, three key challenges exist to applying risk management to homeland security: improving risk communication, political obstacles to risk-based resource allocation, and a lack of strategic thinking about managing homeland security risks. Many participants agreed that improving risk communication posed the single greatest challenge to using risk management principles. To address this challenge, participants recommended educating the public and policymakers about the risks we face and the value of using risk management to establish priorities and allocate resources; engaging in a national discussion to reach a public consensus on an acceptable level of risk; and developing new communication practices and systems to alert the public during an emergency. In addition, to address strategic thinking challenges, participants recommended the government develop a national strategic planning process for homeland security and governmentwide risk management guidance. To improve public-private sector coordination, forum participants recommended that the private sector should be more involved in the public sector's efforts to assess risks and that more state and local practitioners and experts be involved through intergovernmental partnerships. |
gao_GAO-08-88 | gao_GAO-08-88_0 | To identify issues associated with using the licensed anthrax vaccine (BioThrax) in the stockpile, we interviewed officials from ASPR, CDC, and DOD. The act also authorizes HHS to procure these countermeasures for the Strategic National Stockpile. Several Factors Contributed to the Failure of ASPR’s First Project BioShield Effort for the Production of an rPA Anthrax Vaccine
Three major factors contributed to the failure of the first Project BioShield procurement effort. Second, VaxGen took unrealistic risks in accepting the contract terms. HHS Awarded the Procurement Contract Before Development Had Reached an Appropriate Level of Maturity
ASPR’s decision to launch the VaxGen procurement contract for the rPA anthrax vaccine at an early stage of development, combined with the delivery requirement for 25 million doses within 2 years, did not take the complexity of vaccine development into consideration and was overly aggressive. Moreover, VaxGen was still finishing up work on the original stability testing required under the first development contract. These risks arose from aggressive time lines, VaxGen’s limitations with regard to in-house technical expertise in stability and vaccine formulation—a condition exacerbated by the attrition of key staff from the company as the contract progressed—and its limited options for securing additional funding should the need arise. When VaxGen failed to meet a critical performance milestone of initiating the next clinical trial, ASPR terminated the contract. Key Parties Did Not Clearly Articulate and Understand Critical Requirements
Important requirements regarding the data and testing required for the rPA anthrax vaccine to be eligible for use in an emergency were not known at the outset of the procurement contract. In addition, ASPR’s anticipated use of the rPA anthrax vaccine was not articulated to all parties clearly enough and evolved over time. All of these factors created confusion over the acceptance criteria for VaxGen’s product and significantly diminished VaxGen’s ability to meet contract time lines. The EUA guidance states that FDA will “authorize” an unapproved or unlicensed product—such as the rPA anthrax vaccine candidate—only if “there is no adequate, approved and available alternative.” According to the minutes of the meeting between FDA and VaxGen, in January 2006, FDA reported that the unlicensed rPA anthrax vaccine would be used in an emergency after the stockpiled BioThrax, that is, “when all of the currently licensed had been deployed.” This diminished the likelihood of a scenario where the rPA vaccine might be expected to be used out of the stockpile. ASPR Lacks an Effective Strategy to Minimize Waste in the Strategic National Stockpile and Plans to Use Expired Anthrax Vaccine
We identified two issues related to using the BioThrax in the Strategic National Stockpile. Three lots of BioThrax vaccine in the stockpile have already expired, resulting in losses of over $12 million. According to the data provided by CDC, 28 lots of BioThrax vaccine will expire in calendar year 2008. ASPR could minimize the potential waste of these lots by developing a single inventory system with DOD—which uses large quantities of the BioThrax vaccine— with rotation based on a first-in, first-out principle. DOD and ASPR officials told us that they discussed a rotation option in 2004 but identified several obstacles. ASPR’s planned use of expired vaccine would violate FDA’s current rules and could undermine public confidence because ASPR would be unable to guarantee the potency of the vaccine. With the termination of the contract, the government does not have a new, improved anthrax vaccine for the public, and the rest of the biotech industry is now questioning whether the government can clearly define its requirements for future procurement contracts. Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
We provided a draft of this report to the Department of Health and Human Services and the Department of Defense for review and comment. HHS also disagreed with a number of our specific findings. HHS awards Strategic National Stockpile contract to VaxGen for rPA anthrax vaccine procurement. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) issues draft Guidance for Emergency Use Authorization of Medical Products. GAO Comments
1. 2. 3. We clarified the report text to attribute to VaxGen officials the statement that the purchase of BioThrax for the stockpile as a stopgap measure raised the bar for the VaxGen vaccine. GAO Comment
1. | Why GAO Did This Study
The anthrax attacks in September and October 2001 highlighted the need to develop medical countermeasures. The Project BioShield Act of 2004 authorized the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) to procure countermeasures for a Strategic National Stockpile. However, in December 2006, HHS terminated the contract for a recombinant protective antigen (rPA) anthrax vaccine because VaxGen failed to meet a critical contractual milestone. Also, supplies of the licensed BioThrax anthrax vaccine already in the stockpile will start expiring in 2008. GAO was asked to identify (1) factors contributing to the failure of the rPA vaccine contract and (2) issues associated with using the BioThrax in the stockpile. GAO interviewed agency and industry officials, reviewed documents, and consulted with biodefense experts.
What GAO Found
Three major factors contributed to the failure of the first Project BioShield procurement effort for an rPA anthrax vaccine. First, HHS's Office of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response (ASPR) awarded the procurement contract to VaxGen, a small biotechnology firm, while VaxGen was still in the early stages of developing a vaccine and had not addressed many critical manufacturing issues. This award preempted critical development work on the vaccine. Also, the contract required VaxGen to deliver 25 million doses of the vaccine in 2 years, which would have been unrealistic even for a larger manufacturer. Second, VaxGen took unrealistic risks in accepting the contract terms. VaxGen officials told GAO that they accepted the contract despite significant risks due to (1) the aggressive delivery time line for the vaccine, (2) VaxGen's lack of in-house technical expertise--a condition exacerbated by the attrition of key company staff as the contract progressed--and (3) VaxGen's limited options for securing any additional funding needed. Third, important Food and Drug Administration (FDA) requirements regarding the type of data and testing required for the rPA anthrax vaccine to be eligible for use in an emergency were not known at the outset of the procurement contract. In addition, ASPR's anticipated use of the rPA anthrax vaccine was not articulated to all parties clearly enough and evolved over time. Finally, according to VaxGen, the purchase of BioThrax for the stockpile as a stopgap measure raised the bar for the VaxGen vaccine. All these factors created confusion over the acceptance criteria for VaxGen's product and significantly diminished VaxGen's ability to meet contract time lines. ASPR has announced its intention to issue another request for proposal for an rPA anthrax vaccine procurement but, along with other HHS components, has not analyzed lessons learned from the first contract's failure and may repeat earlier mistakes. According to industry experts, the lack of specific requirements is a cause of concern to the biotechnology companies that have invested significant resources in trying to meet government needs and now question whether the government can clearly define future procurement contract requirements. GAO identified two issues related with the use of the BioThrax in the Strategic National Stockpile. First, ASPR lacks an effective strategy to minimize the waste of BioThrax. Starting in 2008, several lots of BioThrax in the Strategic National Stockpile will begin to expire. As a result, over $100 million per year could be lost for the life of the vaccine currently in the stockpile. ASPR could minimize such potential waste by developing a single inventory system with Department of Defense (DOD)--a high-volume user of BioThrax--with rotation based on a first-in, first-out principle. DOD and ASPR officials identified a number of obstacles to this type of rotation which may require legislative action. Second, ASPR planned to use three lots of expired BioThrax vaccine in the stockpile in the event of an emergency. This would violate FDA rules, which prohibit using an expired vaccine, and could also undermine public confidence because the vaccine's potency could not be guaranteed. |
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