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gao_GAO-04-462 | gao_GAO-04-462_0 | Buyers Frequently Use and Report Benefits from Home Inspections, with Some Noting Problems with Quality and Cost
A substantial majority of the homebuyers using FHA-insured financing in 2002 report getting home inspections and benefiting from them primarily by being able to renegotiate their purchases. Typically, buyers chose to get home inspections to make sure there were no serious problems with the homes they were purchasing and most say the inspection was a positive experience. Buyers reported that they benefited from the home inspections because they identified problems that buyers were often able to get sellers to address before closing. Even though home inspections are optional, over 60 percent of all buyers (existing homes and new construction) believed FHA required them. The results may point as much or more to the difficulty of judging an individual’s understanding with an instrument such as a survey. More Than One-Third of Homebuyers Understand the Differences between Home Inspections and Appraisals
About 36 percent of all homebuyers appeared to understand the differences between appraisals and home inspections, according to our analysis of the answers they gave to certain questions in our survey of recent buyers. For example, lower loan-to-value ratios are often associated with better loan performance because the borrowers have more equity in their properties than those with higher ratios. Because other factors have been shown to strongly predict loan performance, simply comparing the foreclosure rates of borrowers who got inspections with those who did not could be misleading. Enforcing Mandatory Home Inspections Would Pose Significant Challenges to FHA but Would Offer Varied Results for Homebuyers and Inspectors
The implications for FHA of mandatory home inspections mainly have to do with the need to set national standards for inspections and the resources FHA would need to enforce compliance with them. Consequently, according to FHA, its sanctioning of appraisers was inconsistent. FHA officials said the agency currently does not have the human capital or other resources it needs to enforce a home inspection requirement. Comments from the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development
Scope and Methodology for GAO Survey of Recent Homebuyers
Overview
GAO conducted a general population survey of homeowners who closed on their home purchases in calendar year 2002 to determine: (1) how many recent homebuyers got home inspections, (2) what recent buyers report as the primary benefits and drawbacks of the inspections, (3) the extent that recent homebuyers understand the differences between appraisals and inspections, and (4) by what means buyers develop their understanding of these differences. (See app. Scope and Methodology
To determine the extent to which getting a home inspection might affect the performance of FHA-insured loans, we reviewed a random sample of loan files for FHA-insured mortgages originated in fiscal years 1996 through 1999 to (1) determine whether the buyer(s) got a home inspection and what credit score(s), if any, the lender considered in underwriting the loan and (2) assess the reliability of selected key data elements whose original source(s) are the documents in the loan file and which FHA provided us from its electronic databases. How many? HOME INSPECTION. | Why GAO Did This Study
In the 1990s, the Department of Housing and Urban Development's (HUD) Federal Housing Administration (FHA) dealt with a series of instances where buyers had not been notified of serious problems revealed by their appraisals. This led to several reforms, some of which allegedly may have caused some buyers to forgo home inspections, confusing that service with appraisals. Advocates of mandating home inspections claim that FHA will benefit from fewer foreclosures, and buyers will benefit by avoiding homes with costly problems. GAO was asked to assess (1) how many recent FHA homebuyers got home inspections and what were the perceived benefits, (2) whether homebuyers understand the differences between appraisals and home inspections, (3) whether inspections are associated with loan performance, and (4) the implications of mandating home inspections.
What GAO Found
From its survey of recent homebuyers, GAO estimates 86 percent of those using FHA-insured mortgages in 2002 got home inspections. These buyers frequently reported the inspections to be positive and beneficial, but occasionally said the inspections had drawbacks, mainly related to their cost and quality. Home inspections do not appear to be associated with loan performance; other factors, such as borrowers' credit scores, are stronger predictors of how FHA-insured loans perform. Because of this, and because mandating inspections for all homebuyers could pose serious resource challenges for FHA, the marginal benefit of requiring inspections is questionable. One of the reasons often cited for getting a home inspection was to ensure there were no serious problems with the house. Homebuyers reported that two-thirds of inspections uncovered problems with homes. As a result, they benefited by being able to renegotiate their purchases. Buyers also reported inspections were worth as much or more than they cost and increased their confidence in their decisions to buy homes. Inspections are a more in-depth review of property condition than FHA appraisals, take longer, and more often give buyers the option to back out of a purchase. GAO estimates 36 percent of FHA homebuyers understand the differences between FHA's mandatory home appraisal and its recommended home inspection. For most of the remaining buyers, GAO was not able to determine definitively the extent to which they understood the differences. Finally, FHA officials believe mandating home inspections would be difficult to enforce because the agency lacks the human capital and other resources to do so effectively. FHA also might see its pool of higher risk borrowers grow, as some buyers go elsewhere for non-FHA financing options available to lower income buyers. Benefits experienced by survey respondents might carry over to all homebuyers, but a mandatory inspection could put them at a disadvantage in highly competitive markets. |
gao_GAO-06-156 | gao_GAO-06-156_0 | FMCSA’s Enforcement Programs and Actions Have Been Stronger Since 2000
In response to criticisms in 1999 that its enforcement programs were ineffective at improving safety, FMCSA has strengthened its enforcement approach. However, while implementing this approach, the fatality rate from crashes involving large trucks continued to increase. In this respect, the number of compliance reviews more than doubled from approximately 6,400 in 1998 to more than 13,400 in 2001. The agency completed almost 31,000 homeland security-related visits in fiscal year 2002. FMCSA Has a Well- Defined Enforcement Approach and Has Efforts Underway to Help It Refine and Set Priorities for Its Enforcement Programs
To a large extent, FMCSA follows key effective management practices in making decisions about its enforcement approach. FMCSA’s enforcement approach addresses major risk factors that contribute to or cause crashes, and FMCSA targets its enforcement resources at the motor carriers that it assesses as having the greatest crash risk. FMCSA is also working to obtain additional information on crash risk factors, and on the costs and effectiveness of its enforcement programs, needed to help it further refine and set priorities for the programs. FMCSA Has a Broad Range of Enforcement Goals and Performance Measures but It Does Not Measure the Effectiveness of Its Civil Penalties
FMCSA has a broad range of goals and related performance measures that it uses to provide direction to—and track the progress of—its enforcement programs, but it does not measure the effect that one of its key enforcement actions—civil penalties against motor carriers—has on carriers’ compliance with safety regulations. MCSAP Is Designed to Improve Safety but Program Oversight Is Inadequate
MCSAP employs a performance-based approach to truck safety by encouraging states to analyze data to identify safety problems and target their grant activities to achieve reductions in truck crashes, injuries, and fatalities. Of the 61 goals in states’ safety plans, we could not determine whether 61 percent of these goals were substantially met. In the past 3 years, the four service centers reviewed only 15 of 52 division offices (29 percent). We believe that it is noteworthy that FMCSA has begun to refine its enforcement approach based on information about the causes of crashes, that it plans to develop a tool to help it set priorities for its enforcement programs based on estimates of their cost-effectiveness, and that it has conducted—and continues to conduct—program evaluations of its enforcement programs, including evaluations that are assessing alternative approaches to enforcement. In addition, because FMCSA does not know how much its civil penalties increase carriers’ compliance with safety regulations, it lacks the information it needs to make sound decisions about any changes to its use of civil penalties; it also may be missing opportunities to increase carrier compliance, and ultimately safety, that could result from such changes. To improve FMCSA’s oversight of MCSAP grantees, we recommend that the Secretary of Transportation direct the FMCSA administrator to (1) assess, upon implementation, whether the improved performance review of state activities are meeting the agency’s intended goals; (2) incorporate MCSAP oversight as a segment of the effectiveness study of division offices; and (3) assess the oversight activities of service centers. | Why GAO Did This Study
About 5,000 people die and more than 120,000 are injured each year from crashes involving large trucks. The Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) has several enforcement programs to improve truck safety and funds similar enforcement programs in states through its Motor Carrier Safety Assistance Program (MCSAP). Following concern by Congress and others in 1999 that FMCSA's enforcement approach was ineffective, the agency committed to take stronger actions. This study reports on how FMCSA's enforcement approach has changed, how it makes decisions about its enforcement approach, and how it ensures that its grants to states contribute to the agency's mission of saving lives.
What GAO Found
FMCSA has made considerable strides in strengthening its enforcement programs and actions. For example, it almost doubled the number of on-site safety reviews (called compliance reviews) at carriers' bases of operations, from approximately 6,400 in 1998 to 11,300 in 2004. Further, it has increased the average civil penalty by about 75 percent (from $820 to $1,400) over the same period. FMCSA generally maintained its firmer approach to enforcement at a time when it took on the additional responsibilities of conducting homeland security-related reviews of hazardous materials carriers and safety reviews of new carriers. To a large extent, FMCSA follows key effective management practices in making decisions about its enforcement approach. For example, its enforcement approach addresses major risk areas that contribute to (or cause) crashes, and targets its enforcement resources at the motor carriers with the greatest crash risk. FMCSA also has a broad range of enforcement goals and performance measures that it uses to provide direction to--and track the performance of--its enforcement programs. Furthermore, FMCSA is working to obtain additional information on crash risk factors and on the costs and effectiveness of its enforcement programs, as well as alternative approaches that it needs to further refine and set priorities for its programs. However, because FMCSA does not measure the effect that one of its key enforcement tools--civil penalties--has on carriers' compliance with safety regulations, it lacks the information needed to make sound decisions about any changes to its use of civil penalties. MCSAP is designed to improve safety by employing a performance-based approach; however, FMCSA's oversight for these grants is inadequate. In reviewing the 61 program goals set by the seven states that received the largest MCSAP grants, we could not determine whether states substantially met almost two-thirds of these goals due to missing performance information, among other reasons. Further, although FMCSA requires that its various offices periodically review grant activities for adequacy of oversight, few of these reviews are being completed. For example, in the past 3 years, FMCSA's service centers have assessed only 15 of the agency's 52 field division offices (29 percent). FMCSA did not conduct these reviews for various reasons, including a curbed oversight role for service centers and markedly reduced headquarters staffing for MCSAP. |
gao_GAO-11-858 | gao_GAO-11-858_0 | In addition, FMCSA’s field offices in each state, known as divisions, have investigators who conduct safety reviews of carriers identified by state inspection and other data as unsafe or at risk of being unsafe. However, compliance reviews are extremely resource intensive; therefore, only a small percentage of the motor carrier industry can be evaluated in this manner, given limited federal and state resources. Annually, for example, FMCSA and its state partners have conducted compliance reviews of about 3 percent of registered motor carriers. In 2004, FMCSA began to design and develop CSA, a program to better target resources toward unsafe carriers, deploy a more comprehensive array of interventions, and proactively evaluate safety performance based on data, rather than solely based on compliance reviews. Additionally, FMCSA expects to use data to identify unsafe carriers and drivers earlier to address safety problems before crashes occur. Some CSA Oversight Activities Are Functional but Others Are Indefinitely Delayed, and Implementation Problems Could Compromise the Program’s Effectiveness
Close to a year after the anticipated completion date, FMCSA has partially implemented two of the three planned CSA oversight activities—the SMS and an expanded set of interventions—in all states; however, it still cannot use CSA safety ratings to (1) use CSA to assess the fitness of motor carriers or (2) assign safety fitness determinations to individual drivers that would prohibit them from operating trucks and buses. Although it has been delayed, FMCSA has begun to implement the CSA oversight activities directed at carrier safety, including SMS and carrier interventions, such as Warning Letters and On-site Focused investigations. However, FMCSA has yet to issue the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM), originally scheduled to be finalized in 2009, that would allow it to use CSA data to get unsafe carriers off the road. However, FMCSA has not provided comprehensive information to Congress and the public on the status of CSA as well as the risks associated with these delays and issues, and how it plans to mitigate those risks. Moreover, FMCSA has only recently taken steps to separately measure the fitness of drivers to operate trucks and buses, as research has shown that drivers—not vehicle problems—cause most carrier crashes. FMCSA has not specified time frames for developing this component or how it will ultimately be used. With respect to the third planned oversight activity, suspending unfit carriers on the basis of SMS scores, FMCSA originally intended to finalize the rulemaking by 2009 but this effort has been delayed; FMCSA now plans to issue the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking later this year and will not finalize the rulemaking until 2013. This information is provided to carriers to help them identify and address their own safety issues. While FMCSA previously expected to implement two other new interventions—Off-site Investigations and Cooperative Safety Plans—nationwide by August 2011, it has delayed their implementation in the nonpilot states because it has not yet finished developing the key technology required to manage them. FMCSA Has Had Mixed Success Managing CSA’s Implementation and Has Not Communicated to Congress Its Strategy to Address Identified Weaknesses and Delays
In some areas, FMCSA performed well as it implemented CSA, most notably, in conducting extensive outreach to carriers. Specifically, FMCSA has not completed a key technology to fully implement the interventions and provided training on interventions yet to be implemented, developed and issued the NPRM to take action against unfit carriers based on CSA data, addressed staffing issues and completed efforts to help staff shift to a new safety enforcement paradigm. Other systems also now allow FMCSA to evaluate drivers: The Driver Safety Measurement System (DSMS) uses safety data from roadside inspections and crashes to measure drivers’ safety in a manner similar to that used under SMS and allows FMCSA and state partners to identify unsafe, or “red flag,” drivers. Furthermore, until FMCSA completes new performance metrics, gauging the extent to which CSA improves safety will be problematic. In SMS, any violation found is used in calculating a carrier BASIC score. The reason FMCSA can contact carriers with a wider range of violations—including less severe violations—than it did under SafeStat is that CSA provides a wider range of intervention tools, some of them requiring few resources to implement. Not All Carriers Have Enough Inspections to Receive Safety Rankings
While the pilot test suggests that SMS has the potential to improve safety over the prior SafeStat system, SMS’s ability to calculate BASIC scores for carriers is dependent upon sufficient roadside inspection data for that carrier, which are not always available for a significant segment of carriers. regularly report to Congress on CSA’s status; the problems that FMCSA has encountered during the implementation of CSA and the risks they pose to full implementation of CSA; its strategy for mitigating these risks; and a timetable for fully implementing CSA and reporting the progress made in developing and implementing CSA performance measures. Specifically, this report addresses (1) the status of the CSA rollout and what issues, if any, could affect the full and effective implementation of the program and (2) CSA’s potential to improve safety. | Why GAO Did This Study
Over 3,600 people in this country died in 2009 as a result of crashes involving large commercial trucks and buses. Until recently the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) and its state partners tracked the safety of motor carriers--companies that own these vehicles--by conducting resource-intensive compliance reviews of a small percentage of carriers. In 2004, FMCSA began its Compliance, Safety, and Accountability (CSA) program. CSA is intended to identify and evaluate carriers and drivers posing high safety risks. FMCSA has focused on three key CSA oversight activities to evaluate carriers: a new Safety Measurement System (SMS) using more roadside inspection and other data to identify at-risk carriers; a wider range of "interventions" to reach more at-risk carriers; and using SMS data to suspend unfit carriers. FMCSA expected to fully implement CSA by late 2010. FMCSA also plans to separately use data to rate drivers' fitness. In this report, GAO assessed: (1) the status of the CSA rollout and issues that could affect it and (2) CSA's potential to improve safety. GAO reviewed CSA plans and data, visited eight states, and interviewed FMCSA, state, and industry officials.
What GAO Found
Close to a year after the anticipated completion date, FMCSA has partially implemented two of the three planned CSA carrier oversight activities--the new SMS and an expanded set of interventions--in all states; however, it still cannot use CSA safety ratings to get unsafe carriers off the road because it has not completed a rulemaking needed to do so. Specifically, (1) FMCSA implemented SMS in 2010, as scheduled, to replace the prior system, known as SafeStat. The system allows FMCSA to evaluate, score and rank the safety of carriers and identify at-risk carriers needing intervention. However, states have had to expend resources to respond to carriers that have requested reviews of inspection violations shown in the system. (2) FMCSA has implemented most of the expanded array of enforcement interventions for at-risk carriers, including issuing warning letters and initiating focused reviews of carriers' safety operations that allow FMCSA to reach more at-risk carriers; however, it has delayed implementation of two interventions--Off-site Investigations and Cooperative Safety Plans--because the technology needed to implement them will not be completed until at least 2012. (3) FMCSA has not yet begun using SMS data to suspend unfit carriers, and is 2 years behind in issuing and completing the rulemaking needed to use these data instead of a time-consuming compliance review. FMCSA expects to finalize the rulemaking in 2013. In addition, FMCSA has had mixed success managing implementation of CSA oversight activities thus far. FMCSA performed well in conducting outreach to carriers and responding to stakeholder concerns, but experienced difficulties in realigning its workforce for CSA and adapting staff to CSA's new safety paradigm. FMCSA has not provided comprehensive information to Congress and the public on the risks associated with either the delayed carrier intervention activities or operational and management issues that arose during implementation and its plans to mitigate these risks; thus Congress may lack information needed to make decisions about CSA. Moreover, FMCSA has taken initial steps to separately measure drivers' fitness to operate trucks and buses by seeking new legislative authority to prohibit unsafe drivers from operating in interstate commerce. However, FMCSA has not specified time frames for developing this measurement, how it will ultimately be used, or whether delaying the implementation will affect safety. It is too early to definitively assess the extent to which CSA will improve truck and bus safety nationwide. Data from a pilot test suggest that SMS and the expanded range of intervention tools provides a more effective means of contacting these carriers and addressing their safety issues. However, CSA's success depends on the availability of sufficient inspection data for carriers. For example, small carriers are less likely to receive enough roadside inspections to be scored and ranked in SMS. FMCSA has begun but not finished performance measures for CSA and has not yet collected the data needed to use them, so the extent that it can show CSA improves safety is unclear.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that FMCSA (1) develop a plan to implement driver fitness ratings in a reasonable timeframe and (2) regularly report to Congress on problems and delays in implementing CSA and plans to mitigate risks. FMCSA provided technical comments and agreed to consider the recommendations. |
gao_GAO-06-816 | gao_GAO-06-816_0 | Non-Homeland Security Primary Performance Measures Are Generally Sound and Data Are Generally Reliable, but Weaknesses Exist
While the six non-homeland security primary performance measures are generally sound, and the data used to calculate these measures are generally reliable, we found weaknesses with the soundness of three measures and the reliability of the data used in one measure (see table 2). All six measures cover key program activities and are objective, measurable, and quantifiable, but three are not completely clear, that is, they do not consistently provide clear and specific descriptions of the data, events, or geographic areas they include. The Coast Guard’s processes for entering and reviewing its own internal data are likely to produce reliable data. However, processes for reviewing or verifying data gathered from external sources vary from source to source, and for the marine environmental protection measure, the processes are insufficient. Measure without criteria or guidance to accurately reflect program results and ensure objectivity. Challenges Exist in Using Measures to Link Resources to Results, but the Coast Guard Is Working on Ways to Address Them
While the primary measures for the Coast Guard’s six non-homeland security programs are generally sound and use reliable data, challenges exist with using the primary measures to assess the link between resources expended and results achieved. Each of the Coast Guard’s primary measures for its six non- homeland security programs meets our criteria of covering a key activity. For example, the primary performance measure for the marine environmental protection program relates to preventing oil and chemical spills. Developing a system or model that could realistically take all of these other factors into account is perhaps impossible, and it would be a mistake to view this second challenge as a need to do so. Coast Guard Has Developed a Range of Initiatives to Forge Better Links between Resources and Results
The Coast Guard is actively seeking to address such challenges, as those discussed above, through efforts, some of which have been under way for several years. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve the quality of program performance reporting and to more efficiently and effectively assess progress toward achieving the goals or objectives stated in agency plans, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the Commandant of the Coast Guard to: Refine certain Coast Guard primary and secondary performance further clarifying the ice operations primary measure by clearly and consistently describing the geographic area and number of waterways included in the measure; the living marine resources primary measure by clearly and consistently reporting the scope of the measure; and the search and rescue primary measure and the search and rescue “percent of lives saved after Coast Guard notification” secondary measure by reporting those incidents or data that are not included in the measures; developing measurable performance targets to facilitate assessments of whether program and agency goals and objectives are being achieved for the 11 living marine resources secondary measures and the 1 marine environmental protection secondary measure, “Tokyo and Paris memorandums of understanding port state control reports,” that lack annual targets; and establishing agencywide criteria or guidance to help ensure the objectivity and consistency of the search and rescue program’s “percent of property saved” secondary performance measure. | Why GAO Did This Study
Using performance measures, the Coast Guard explains how well its programs are performing. To do so, it reports one "primary" measure for each program (such as percent of mariners rescued) and maintains data on other, "secondary" measures (such as percent of property saved). Concerns have been raised about whether measures for non-homeland security programs accurately reflect performance, that is, they did not rise or fall as resources were added or reduced. For the six non-homeland security programs, GAO used established criteria to assess the soundness of the primary measures--that is, whether measures cover key activities; are clearly stated; and are objective, measurable, and quantifiable--and the reliability of data used to calculate them. GAO also used these criteria to assess the soundness of 23 selected secondary measures. Finally, through interviews and report review, GAO assessed challenges in using measures to link resources to results.
What GAO Found
While some opportunities for improvement exist, the primary measures for the Coast Guard's six non-homeland security programs are generally sound, and the data used to calculate them are generally reliable. All six measures cover key program activities and are objective, measurable, and quantifiable, but three are not completely clear--that is, they do not consistently provide clear and specific descriptions of the data, events, or geographic areas they include. Also, the processes used to enter and review the Coast Guard's own internal data are likely to produce reliable data; however, neither the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) nor the Coast Guard have policies or procedures for reviewing or verifying data from external sources, such as other federal agencies. Currently, the review processes vary from source to source, and for the primary measure covering marine environmental protection (which concerns oil and chemical spills), the processes are insufficient. Of the 23 secondary performance measures GAO assessed, 9 are generally sound, with weaknesses existing in the remaining 14. These weaknesses include (1) a lack of measurable performance targets, (2) a lack of agencywide criteria or guidance to ensure objectivity, and (3) unclear descriptions of the measures. Two main challenges exist with using primary measures to link resources to results. In one case, the challenge is comprehensiveness--that is, although each primary measure captures a major segment of program activity, no one measure captures all program activities and thereby accounts for all program resources. The other challenge involves external factors, some of which are outside the Coast Guard's control, that affect performance. For example, weather conditions can affect the amount of ice that must be cleared, the number of aids to navigation that need repair, or mariners that must be rescued. As a result, linking resources and results is difficult, and although the Coast Guard has a range of ongoing initiatives to do so, it is still too early to assess the agency's ability to successfully provide this link. |
gao_GGD-97-5 | gao_GGD-97-5_0 | The 1981 Banking Law designated the Ministry of Finance (MOF) as solely responsible for authorizing and regulating the banking industry in Japan, and it maintained MOF’s legal supervisory authority over banks. The central bank of Japan, BOJ, was founded in 1882, although it was later reorganized under the Bank of Japan Law of 1942. Specifically, our objectives were to describe how (1) Japanese bank regulation and supervision is organized; (2) Japan’s banking oversight structure functions, particularly with respect to bank licensing, regulation, and supervision; (3) banks are monitored by their supervisors; and (4) participants handle other financial system responsibilities. This report does not include an evaluation of the efficiency or effectiveness of the Japanese bank regulatory structure. BOJ as the Bankers’ Bank
In its role as Japan’s bankers’ bank, BOJ maintains current accounts for its client institutions. In conducting its supervisory responsibilities, MOF is required to ensure that each bank subject to MOF’s supervision operates within limits set by both Japanese banking legislation and the bank’s own internal policies, and monitor any developments in bank operations that may have an adverse effect on the integrity of the bank involved or the banking system as a whole. BOJ also requires banks to undergo periodic on-site examinations and to submit necessary information upon request, which allow BOJ to obtain an understanding of the bank’s operations to fulfill its responsibility to maintain and foster the safety and soundness of the financial system. MOF and BOJ Share Monitoring Information When Necessary
Although MOF and BOJ at times share information informally on a case-by-case basis, there is no legal or formal requirement for MOF or BOJ to share supervisory information with each other. BOJ is responsible for maintaining liquidity, serving as the lender of last resort, and providing funds transfer service. Both BOJ and MOF share responsibility for managing financial crises and for participating in international forums. According to BOJ officials, BOJ’s function as lender of last resort basically involves its providing liquidity to troubled financial institutions or to the financial system, to prevent a systemic crisis. BOJ also provided needed liquidity to the two institutions. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Japanese bank regulatory structure and its key participants, focusing on how: (1) the Japanese bank regulation and supervision is organized; (2) Japan's banking oversight structure functions, particularly with respect to bank licensing, regulation, and supervision; (3) Japanese banks are monitored by their supervisors; and (4) participants handle other financial system responsibilities.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) in Japan, two entities, the Ministry of Finance (MOF) and the Bank of Japan (BOJ), are responsible for ensuring the safety and soundness of the nation's banking system; (2) MOF, as a governmental agency, has the sole responsibility for licensing banking institutions and for developing and enforcing banking regulations; (3) in addition to its power to order business suspensions and to rescind a bank's license, MOF can seek the imposition of fines, and, in some cases, imprisonment as enforcement measures; (4) to fulfill its responsibility stipulated in the Bank of Japan Law, BOJ has contractual arrangements with 700 financial institutions, including all commercial banks, that allow it to examine these financial institutions and provide advice; (5) over the period 1990 to 1994, MOF and BOJ have examined approximately 500 banks annually, and, although MOF and BOJ do not regularly share information obtained during their separate on-site monitoring visits to the same banks, they do work together on a case-by-case basis to resolve crisis situations; (6) in connection with its responsibility to maintain the financial system's stability, BOJ is the lender of last resort and, as the central bank, BOJ can provide funds to banks in trouble or to the system as a whole if there is no alternative financial provider of liquidity to prevent a systemic crisis, and such liquidity is needed; (7) under the Bank of Japan Law, BOJ sets monetary policy and the interest rate at which it loans or discounts bills for its client banks; and (8) MOF and BOJ share responsibilities for such functions as failure resolution and representing Japan's interests in international forums. |
gao_GAO-06-259 | gao_GAO-06-259_0 | The Homeland Security Act of 2002 created the office of the Citizenship and Immigration Services Ombudsman. Fraud Is A Serious Problem, But Its Full Extent Is Unknown
Fraudulent schemes used in several high-profile immigration benefit fraud cases sheds light on some aspects of the nature of immigration benefit fraud—particularly that it is accomplished by submitting fraudulent documents, that it can be committed by organized white-collar and other criminals, and that it has the potential to result in large profits for these criminals. Although the full extent of immigration benefit fraud is unknown, available USCIS data indicate that it is a serious problem. According to USCIS PAS data, in fiscal year 2005, USCIS denied just over 20,000 applications because USCIS staff detected fraudulent application information or supporting evidence during the course of adjudicating the benefit request. Specifically, it has established an internal unit to act as its focal point for addressing immigration benefit fraud, outlined a strategy for detecting immigration benefit fraud, and is undertaking a series of fraud assessments to identify the extent and nature of fraud for certain immigration benefits. However, USCIS has not applied some aspects of internal control standards and fraud control best practices that could further enhance its ability to detect fraud. Specifically, it lacks (1) a comprehensive approach for managing risk, (2) a monitoring mechanism to ensure that knowledge arising from routine operations informs the assessment of policies and procedures, (3) clear communication regarding how to balance multiple agency objectives, (4) a mechanism to help ensure that adjudicators staff have access to important information, and (5) performance goals related to fraud prevention. Most Benefit Fraud Is Not Criminally Prosecuted, but DHS Does Not Have an Administrative Sanctions Program
Although best practice guidance suggests that sanctions for those who commit benefit fraud are central to a strong fraud control environment, and the INA provides for criminal and administrative sanctioning, DHS does not currently actively use the administrative sanctions available to it. Fraud control best practices advise that a credible sanctions program, which incorporates a mechanism for evaluating its effectiveness, including the wider value of deterrence, is an integral part of fraud control. Therefore, the principal means of imposing sanctions on most immigration benefit fraud would be through administrative penalties. Therefore, according to the director, ICE does not consider implementing the administrative penalties for document fraud to be cost-effective. Attorneys within the Department of Justice. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 2002, GAO reported that immigration benefit fraud was pervasive and significant and the approach to controlling it was fragmented. Experts believe that individuals ineligible for these benefits, including terrorists and criminals, could use fraudulent means to enter or remain in the U.S. You asked that GAO evaluate U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service's (USCIS) anti-fraud efforts. This report addresses the questions: (1) What do available data and information indicate regarding the nature and extent of fraud? (2) What actions has USCIS taken to improve its ability to detect fraud? (3) What actions does the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) take to sanction those who commit fraud?
What GAO Found
Although the full extent of benefit fraud is unknown, available evidence suggests that it is a serious problem. Several high-profile immigration benefit fraud cases shed light on aspects of its nature--particularly that it is accomplished by submitting fraudulent documents and can be facilitated by white collar and other criminals, with the potential for large profits. USCIS staff denied about 20,000 applications for fraud in fiscal year 2005. USCIS has established a focal point for immigration fraud, outlined a fraud control strategy that relies on the use of automation to detect fraud, and is performing risk assessments to identify the extent and nature of fraud for certain benefits. However, USCIS has not implemented important aspects of internal control standards established by GAO and fraud control best practices identified by leading audit organizations--particularly a comprehensive risk management approach, a mechanism to ensure ongoing monitoring during the course of normal activities, clear communication regarding how to balance multiple objectives, mechanisms to help ensure that staff have access to key information, and performance goals for fraud prevention. DHS does not have a strategy for sanctioning fraud. Best practices advise that a credible sanctions program, which includes a mechanism for evaluating effectiveness, is an integral part of fraud control. Because most immigration benefit fraud is not prosecuted criminally, the principal means of sanctioning it would be administrative penalties. Although immigration law gives DHS the authority to levy administrative penalties, the component of DHS that administers them does not consider them to be cost-effective and does not routinely impose them. However, DHS has not evaluated the costs and benefits of sanctions, including the value of potential deterrence. Without a credible sanctions program, DHS's efforts to deter fraud may be less effective, when applicants perceive little threat of punishment. |
gao_GAO-10-113 | gao_GAO-10-113_0 | Federal, State, Local, and International Efforts to Adapt to Climate Change
While federal agencies are beginning to recognize the need to adapt to climate change, there is a general lack of strategic coordination across agencies, and most efforts to adapt to potential climate change impacts are preliminary. The subjects of our site visits in the United States—New York City; King County, Washington; and Maryland— have all taken steps to plan for climate change and have begun to implement adaptive measures in sectors such as natural resource management and infrastructure. NOAA’s Regional Integrated Sciences and Assessments (RISA) program supports climate change research to meet the needs of decision makers and policy planners at the national, regional, and local levels. Similarly, the U.S. As part of this effort, DNR chaired an Adaptation and Response Working Group, which issued a report on sea level rise and coastal storms. Federal, State, and Local Officials Face Numerous Challenges When Considering Climate Change Adaptation Efforts
The challenges faced by federal, state, and local officials in their efforts to adapt fell into three categories, based on our analysis of questionnaire results, site visits, and available studies. First, available attention and resources are focused on more immediate needs, making it difficult for adaptation efforts to compete for limited funds. Specifically, about 71 percent (128 of 180) of the respondents rated the challenge “non-adaptation activities are higher priorities” as very or extremely challenging. In particular, the managers lacked computational models for local projections of expected changes. Similarly, King County officials said they are not sure how to translate climate change information into effects on salmon recovery efforts. Adaptation Efforts Are Constrained by a Lack of Clear Roles and Responsibilities
A lack of clear roles and responsibilities for addressing adaptation across all levels of government limits adaptation efforts, based on our analysis of federal, state, and local officials’ responses to our Web-based questionnaire, site visits, and relevant studies. A systems view is essential in order to manage change optimally.”
Federal Efforts to Increase Awareness, Provide Relevant Information, and Define Responsibilities Could Help Government Officials Make Decisions about Adaptation
Potential federal actions for addressing challenges to adaptation efforts fall into three areas, based on our analysis of questionnaire results, site visits, and available studies: (1) federal training and education initiatives that could increase awareness among government officials and the public about the impacts of climate change and available adaptation strategies; (2) actions to provide and interpret site-specific information that could help officials understand the impacts of climate change at a scale that would enable them to respond; and (3) steps Congress and federal agencies could take to encourage adaptation by setting priorities and re- evaluating programs that hinder adaptation efforts. Public education: About 70 percent (129 of 184) of the respondents rated the “creation of a campaign to educate the public about climate change adaptation” as very or extremely useful. Nearly 94 percent (43 of 46) of the state officials and about 83 percent (52 of 63) of the local officials who responded to the question rated the development of state and local climate change impact and vulnerability assessments as either very or extremely useful, compared to about 69 percent (49 of 71) of federal officials. United Kingdom officials noted that the Climate Impacts Programme provides similar tools to assist decision makers in the United Kingdom. About 71 percent (129 of 181) of the officials who responded to our questionnaire rated the “development of a national adaptation strategy that defines federal government priorities and responsibilities” as very or extremely useful. Governmentwide Planning and Collaboration Could Assist Adaptation Efforts
Climate change is a complex, interdisciplinary issue with the potential to affect every sector and level of government operations. Our past work on crosscutting issues suggests that governmentwide strategic planning can integrate activities that span a wide array of federal, state, and local entities. We also provide information about our prior work on responding to similarly complex, interdisciplinary issues. To describe the challenges that federal, state, and local officials face in their efforts to adapt and the potential actions that Congress and federal agencies could take to help address these challenges, we administered a Web-based questionnaire to a nonprobability sample of 274 federal, state, and local officials who were identified by their organizations to be knowledgeable about adaptation. | Why GAO Did This Study
Changes in the climate attributable to increased concentrations of greenhouse gases may have significant impacts in the United States and the world. For example, climate change could threaten coastal areas with rising sea levels. Greenhouse gases already in the atmosphere will continue altering the climate system into the future, regardless of emissions control efforts. Therefore, adaptation--defined as adjustments to natural or human systems in response to actual or expected climate change--is an important part of the response to climate change. GAO was asked to examine (1) what actions federal, state, local, and international authorities are taking to adapt to a changing climate; (2) the challenges that federal, state, and local officials face in their efforts to adapt; and (3) actions that Congress and federal agencies could take to help address these challenges. We also discuss our prior work on similarly complex, interdisciplinary issues. This report is based on analysis of studies, site visits to areas pursuing adaptation efforts, and responses to a Web-based questionnaire sent to federal, state, and local officials.
What GAO Found
While available information indicates that many governments have not yet begun to adapt to climate change, some federal, state, local, and international authorities have started to act. For example, the U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's Regional Integrated Sciences and Assessments program supports research to meet the adaptation-related information needs of local decision makers. In another example, the state of Maryland's strategy for reducing vulnerability to climate change focuses on protecting habitat and infrastructure from future risks associated with sea level rise and coastal storms. Other GAO discussions with officials from New York City; King County, Washington; and the United Kingdom show how some governments have started to adapt to current and projected impacts in their jurisdictions. The challenges faced by federal, state, and local officials in their efforts to adapt fell into three categories, based on GAO's analysis of questionnaire results, site visits, and available studies. First, competing priorities make it difficult to pursue adaptation efforts when there may be more immediate needs for attention and resources. For example, about 71 percent (128 of 180) of the officials who responded to our questionnaire rated "non-adaptation activities are higher priorities" as very or extremely challenging. Second, a lack of site-specific data, such as local projections of expected changes, can reduce the ability of officials to manage the effects of climate change. For example, King County officials noted that they are not sure how to translate climate data into effects on salmon recovery. Third, adaptation efforts are constrained by a lack of clear roles and responsibilities among federal, state, and local agencies. Of particular note, about 70 percent (124 of 178) of the respondents rated the "lack of clear roles and responsibilities for addressing adaptation across all levels of government" as very or extremely challenging. GAO's analysis also found that potential federal actions for addressing challenges to adaptation efforts fell into three areas. First, training and education efforts could increase awareness among government officials and the public about the impacts of climate change and available adaptation strategies. Second, actions to provide and interpret site-specific information would help officials understand the impacts of climate change at a scale that would enable them to respond. For instance, about 80 percent (147 of 183) of the respondents rated the "development of state and local climate change impact and vulnerability assessments" as very or extremely useful. Third, Congress and federal agencies could encourage adaptation by clarifying roles and responsibilities. About 71 percent (129 of 181) of the respondents rated the development of a national adaptation strategy as very or extremely useful. Climate change is a complex, interdisciplinary issue with the potential to affect every sector and level of government operations. Our past work on crosscutting issues suggests that governmentwide strategic planning--with the commitment of top leaders--can integrate activities that span a wide array of federal, state, and local entities. |
gao_GAO-17-414 | gao_GAO-17-414_0 | All three programs—SLS, Orion, and EGS—must be ready on or before this launch readiness date to support this integrated test flight. Ongoing Delays Foreshadow a Likely Schedule Slip as NASA Reassesses the Launch Readiness Date
With less than two years until the committed November 2018 launch readiness date for EM-1, the three human exploration programs—Orion, SLS, and EGS—are making progress, but schedule pressure is escalating as technical challenges continue to cause schedule delays. All three programs face development challenges in completing work, and each has little to no schedule reserve remaining to the EM-1 date— meaning they will have to complete all remaining work with minimal delay during the most challenging stage of development. Orion program officials told us that following delivery from ESA, they will need the service module for 12 months for integration with the crew module and testing prior to providing the completed Orion spacecraft to the ground systems at Kennedy Space Center. Development of the core stage—which functions as the SLS’s fuel tank and structural backbone—is the program’s critical path, meaning any delay in its development reduces schedule reserves for the whole program. While officials indicate that they now have a corrective action plan in place, and welding resumed in April 2017, they did not provide detail on the impact to program schedule reserve. NASA concurred with our recommendation and as of January 2017, senior NASA officials told us that they have reordered integration activities to try to meet the EM-1 launch schedule, but further analysis indicates that they will have to delay the launch readiness date. These officials stated that no decision has been made and NASA has not committed to a timeline in which to report its findings. Given that these three human space exploration programs represent more than half of NASA’s current portfolio development cost baseline, a cost increase or delay could have substantial repercussions for not only these programs but NASA’s entire portfolio. If NASA’s ongoing assessment of the November 2018 EM-1 launch readiness date reveals that a new, more realistic, date is warranted, prolonging any decisions regarding the extent of delays and cost overruns—no matter the magnitude—until after deliberations on NASA’s fiscal year 2018 budget request would increase the risk that both NASA and the Congress continue making decisions potentially involving hundreds of millions of taxpayer dollars based on schedules that may no longer be feasible. While the Orion, SLS, and EGS programs are working toward a target EM-1 launch readiness date of November 2018, the threats to each program’s schedule continue to mount, and the schedule reserve of each program is either very limited or nonexistent. However, beyond that, the programs have little to no cost reserves remaining to deal with challenges that may arise. Recommendations for Executive Action
In order to ensure that the Congress is able to make informed resource decisions regarding a viable EM-1 launch readiness date, we recommend that the NASA Administrator or Acting Administrator direct the Human Exploration and Operations Mission Directorate to take the following two actions:
Confirm whether the EM-1 launch readiness date of November 2018 is achievable, as soon as practicable but no later than as part of its fiscal year 2018 budget submission process; and
Propose a new, more realistic EM-1 date if warranted and report to Congress on the results of its EM-1 schedule analysis. Appendix I: Objective, Scope, and Methodology
To assess the extent to which the National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s (NASA) Orion Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle (Orion), Space Launch System (SLS), and Exploration Ground Systems (EGS) programs have risks that affect their progress towards meeting their Exploration Mission 1 (EM-1) cost and schedule commitments, we compared current program status information against program cost and schedule baselines. To determine the programs’ cost and schedule posture and to assess the availability of the programs’ cost and schedule reserves approaching EM-1, we analyzed its budget documentation, interviewed program officials from all three programs with insight into the programs’ budget and schedule and discussed how reserves were being used to mitigate known risks. | Why GAO Did This Study
NASA is undertaking a trio of closely related programs to continue human space exploration beyond low-Earth orbit: the SLS vehicle; the Orion capsule, which will launch atop the SLS and carry astronauts; and EGS, the supporting ground systems. NASA's current exploration efforts are estimated to cost almost $24 billion—to include two Orion flights and one each for SLS and EGS—and constitute more than half of NASA's current portfolio development cost baseline. All three programs are necessary for EM-1 and are working toward a launch readiness date of November 2018. In a large body of work on this issue, including two separate July 2016 reports, GAO has found that these programs have a history of working to aggressive schedules.
The House Committee on Appropriations report accompanying H.R. 2578 included a provision for GAO to assess the acquisition progress of the Orion, SLS, and EGS, programs. This report assesses the extent to which these programs have risks that affect their progress toward meeting their commitments for EM-1. To do this work, GAO assessed documentation on schedule and program risks and interviewed program and NASA officials.
What GAO Found
With less than 2 years until the planned November 2018 launch date for its first exploration mission (EM-1), the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) three human exploration programs—Orion Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle (Orion), Space Launch System (SLS), and Exploration Ground Systems (EGS)—are making progress on their respective systems, but the EM-1 launch date is likely unachievable as technical challenges continue to cause schedule delays. All three programs face unique challenges in completing development, and each has little to no schedule reserve remaining between now and the EM-1 date, meaning they will have to complete all remaining work with little margin for error for unexpected challenges that may arise. The table below lists the remaining schedule reserve for each of the programs.
The programs all face challenges that may impact their remaining schedule reserve. For instance
the Orion program's European Service Module is late and is currently driving the program schedule;
the SLS program had to stop welding on the core stage—which functions as the SLS's fuel tank and structural backbone—for months after identifying low weld strengths. Program officials stated that welding resumed in April 2017 following the establishment of a corrective action plan;
the EGS program is considering performing concurrent hardware installation and testing, which officials acknowledge would increase complexity; and
each program must integrate its own hardware and software individually, after which EGS is responsible for integrating all three programs' components into one effort at Kennedy Space Center.
Low cost reserves further intensify the schedule pressure. Senior NASA officials said they are analyzing the launch schedule and expect that the EM-1 date will have to slip, but they have yet to make a decision on the feasibility of the current date or report on their findings. With budget discussions currently ongoing for fiscal year 2018, the last year prior to launch, Congress does not yet have insight into the feasibility of the EM-1 launch date, or the repercussions that any cost increase or delays could have in terms of cost and schedule impacts for NASA's entire portfolio. Unless NASA provides Congress with up-to-date information on whether the current EM-1 date is still achievable, as of the time the agency submits its 2018 budget request, both NASA and Congress will continue to be at risk of making decisions based on less than the entire picture and on likely unachievable schedules.
What GAO Recommends
NASA should confirm whether the current EM-1 date is still achievable no later than as part of its fiscal year 2018 budget submission, and propose a new, realistic EM-1 launch readiness date, if warranted, and report its findings to Congress. NASA concurred with both recommendations and agreed that EM-1 will be delayed. |
gao_GAO-13-525 | gao_GAO-13-525_0 | Background
Prostate cancer patients choose among multiple treatments that are often considered equally appropriate but can have different risks and side effects. Number of Prostate Cancer–Related IMRT Services Performed Increased among Self- Referring Groups— Specifically, Limited- Specialty Groups—and Decreased among Non- Self-Referring Groups
From 2006 through 2010, the number of prostate cancer–related IMRT services performed by self-referring groups increased rapidly, while the number performed by non-self-referring groups decreased. The number of prostate cancer–related IMRT services performed by self-referring groups increased from approximately 80,000 to 366,000, an annual growth rate of 46 percent (see fig. Consistent with that growth, the number of self-referring groups also increased rapidly over the period. In contrast, self-referring providers who belonged to a multispecialty group referred approximately 36 percent of their patients diagnosed with prostate cancer in 2007 or 2009 for IMRT, only moderately higher than the 33 percent of non-self- referring providers’ patients diagnosed with prostate cancer in 2007 or 2009 who were referred for IMRT. While providers that did not begin to self-refer— that is, self-referrers and non-self-referrers—referred different percentages of their patients who were diagnosed with prostate cancer in 2007 for IMRT, the percentages of their patients they referred for IMRT remained relatively consistent over the same period when switchers dramatically increased the percentage of their patients they referred for IMRT. However, our review indicates that Medicare providers that self-referred IMRT services—particularly those practicing in limited-specialty groups—were substantially more likely to refer their prostate cancer patients for IMRT and less likely to refer them for other, less costly treatments, especially brachytherapy or a radical prostatectomy, compared to providers who did not self-refer. Without a way to identify self- referred services, such as a self-referral flag on Medicare Part B claims, CMS does not have the ongoing ability to monitor self-referral and its effects on beneficiary treatment selection and costs to both Medicare and beneficiaries. In addition, Medicare providers who self-refer IMRT services are generally not required to disclose their financial interest in IMRT. Thus, beneficiaries may not be aware that their provider has an incentive to recommend IMRT over alternative treatments which may be equally effective, have different risks and side effects, and are less expensive for Medicare and beneficiaries. Currently, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), the agency that administers CMS, lacks the authority to establish a disclosure protocol for providers who self-refer IMRT services. Matter for Congressional Consideration
To increase beneficiaries’ awareness of providers’ financial interest in a particular treatment, Congress should consider directing the Secretary of Health and Human Services to require providers who self-refer IMRT services to disclose to their patients that they have a financial interest in the service. AUA representatives said we did not have sufficient evidence to link financial incentives to the increase in IMRT use among self-referring providers and disagreed with our conclusion that financial incentives for self-referring providers belonging to limited specialty groups were likely a major factor driving the increase in the percentage of prostate cancer patients referred for IMRT. Appendix I: Scope and Methods
This section describes the scope and methodology used to analyze our two objectives: (1) comparing trends in the number of and expenditures for Medicare prostate cancer–related intensity-modulated radiation therapy (IMRT) services provided by self-referring and non-self-referring groups from 2006 through 2010 and (2) examining how the percentage of Medicare prostate cancer patients referred for IMRT may differ on the basis of whether providers self-refer. | Why GAO Did This Study
Questions have been raised about self-referral's role in Medicare Part B expenditures' rapid growth. Self-referral occurs when a provider refers patients to entities in which the provider or the provider's family members have a financial interest. Services that can be self-referred under certain circumstances include IMRT, a common and costly treatment for prostate cancer. GAO was asked to examine Medicare self-referral trends among radiation oncology services. This report examines (1) trends in the number of and expenditures for prostate cancer-related IMRT services provided by self-referring and non-self-referring provider groups from 2006 through 2010 and (2) how the percentage of prostate cancer patients referred for IMRT may differ on the basis of whether providers self-refer. GAO analyzed Medicare Part B claims and developed a claims-based methodology to identify self-referring groups and providers. GAO also interviewed officials from the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), which administers Medicare, and other stakeholders.
What GAO Found
The number of Medicare prostate cancer-related intensity-modulated radiation therapy (IMRT) services performed by self-referring groups increased rapidly, while declining for non-self-referring groups from 2006 to 2010. Over this period, the number of prostate cancer-related IMRT services performed by self-referring groups increased from about 80,000 to 366,000. Consistent with that growth, expenditures associated with these services and the number of self-referring groups also increased. The growth in services performed by self-referring groups was due entirely to limited-specialty groups--groups comprised of urologists and a small number of other specialties--rather than multispecialty groups.
Providers substantially increased the percentage of their prostate cancer patients they referred for IMRT after they began to self-refer. Providers that began self-referring in 2008 or 2009--referred to as switchers--referred 54 percent of their patients who were diagnosed with prostate cancer in 2009 for IMRT, compared to 37 percent of their patients diagnosed in 2007. In contrast, providers who did not begin to self-refer--that is, non-self-referrers and providers who self-referred the entire period--experienced much smaller changes over the same period. Among all providers who referred a Medicare beneficiary diagnosed with prostate cancer in 2009, those that self-referred were 53 percent more likely to refer their patients for IMRT and less likely to refer them for other treatments, especially a radical prostatectomy or brachytherapy. Compared to IMRT, those treatments are less costly and often considered equally appropriate but have different risks and side effects. Factors such as age, geographic location, and patient health did not explain the large differences between self-referring and non-self-referring providers. These analyses suggest that financial incentives for self-referring providers--specifically those in limited specialty groups--were likely a major factor driving the increase in the percentage of prostate cancer patients referred for IMRT. Medicare providers are generally not required to disclose that they self-refer IMRT services, and the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) lacks the authority to establish such a requirement. Thus, beneficiaries may not be aware that their provider has a financial interest in recommending IMRT over alternative treatments that may be equally effective, have different risks and side effects, and are less expensive for Medicare and beneficiaries.
What GAO Recommends
Congress should consider directing the Secretary of Health and Human Services, whose agency oversees CMS, to require providers to disclose their financial interests in IMRT to their patients. GAO also recommends that CMS identify and monitor self-referral of IMRT services. HHS disagreed with GAO's recommendation. Given the magnitude of GAO's findings, GAO maintains CMS should identify and monitor self-referral of IMRT services. |
gao_GAO-12-757 | gao_GAO-12-757_0 | Mobile Devices Face a Broad Range of Security Threats and Vulnerabilities
Threats to the security of mobile devices and the information they store and process have been increasing significantly. For example, cyber criminals and hackers have a variety of attack methods readily available to them, including using software tools to intercept data as they are transmitted to and from a mobile device, inserting malicious software code into the operating systems of mobile devices by including it in seemingly harmless software applications, and using e-mail phishing techniques to gain access to mobile-device users’ sensitive information. For example, the number of variants of malicious software, known as “malware,” aimed at mobile devices has reportedly risen from about 14,000 to 40,000, a 185 percent increase in less than a year. A Range of Vulnerabilities Facilitate Attacks
Mobile devices are subject to numerous security vulnerabilities, including a failure to enable password protection, the inability to intercept malware, and operating systems that are not kept up to date with the latest security patches. Security Controls and Practices Identified by Experts Can Reduce Vulnerabilities
Mobile device manufacturers and wireless carriers can implement a number of technical features, such as enabling passwords and encryption, to limit or prevent attacks. In addition, consumers can adopt key practices, such as setting passwords, installing software to combat malware, and limiting the use of public wireless connections for sensitive transactions, which also can significantly mitigate the risk that their devices will be compromised. Although FCC has facilitated public-private coordination to address specific challenges, such as cellphone theft, and developed cybersecurity best practices, it has not yet taken similar steps to encourage device manufacturers and wireless carriers to implement a more complete industry baseline of mobile security safeguards. Furthermore, DHS, FTC, NIST, and the private sector have taken steps to raise public awareness about mobile security threats. However, security experts agree that many consumers still do not know how to protect themselves from mobile security vulnerabilities. DHS and NIST have not yet developed performance measures that would allow them to determine whether they are making progress in improving awareness of mobile security issues. However, neither DHS nor NIST has developed a baseline measure of the state of national cybersecurity awareness. Recommendations for Executive Action
To help mitigate vulnerabilities in mobile devices, we recommend that the Chairman of the Federal Communications Commission continue to work with wireless carriers and device manufacturers on implementing cybersecurity best practices by encouraging them to implement a complete industry baseline of mobile security safeguards based on commonly accepted security features and practices; and monitor progress of wireless carriers and device manufacturers in achieving their milestones and time frames once an industry baseline of mobile security safeguards has been implemented. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of our review were to determine: (1) what common security threats and vulnerabilities currently exist in mobile devices, (2) what security features are currently available and what practices have been identified to mitigate the risks associated with these vulnerabilities, and (3) the extent to which government and private entities are addressing security vulnerabilities of mobile devices. To determine the common security threats and vulnerabilities that currently exist in mobile devices (cellphones, smartphones, and tablets), as well as security features and practices to mitigate them, we identified agencies and private companies with responsibilities in the telecommunication and cybersecurity arena, and reviewed and analyzed information security-related websites, white papers, and mobile security studies. | Why GAO Did This Study
Millions of Americans currently use mobile devicese.g., cellphones, smartphones, and tablet computerson a daily basis to communicate, obtain Internet-based information, and share their own information, photographs, and videos. Given the extent of consumer reliance on mobile interactions, it is increasingly important that these devices be secured from expanding threats to the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the information they maintain and share.
Accordingly, GAO was asked to determine (1) what common security threats and vulnerabilities affect mobile devices, (2) what security features and practices have been identified to mitigate the risks associated with these vulnerabilities, and (3) the extent to which government and private entities have been addressing the security vulnerabilities of mobile devices. To do so, GAO analyzed publically available mobile security reports, surveys related to consumer cybersecurity practices, as well as statutes, regulations, and agency policies; GAO also interviewed representatives from federal agencies and private companies with responsibilities in telecommunications and cybersecurity.
What GAO Found
Threats to the security of mobile devices and the information they store and process have been increasing significantly. For example, the number of variants of malicious software, known as malware, aimed at mobile devices has reportedly risen from about 14,000 to 40,000 or about 185 percent in less than a year (see figure). Cyber criminals may use a variety of attack methods, including intercepting data as they are transmitted to and from mobile devices and inserting malicious code into software applications to gain access to users sensitive information. These threats and attacks are facilitated by vulnerabilities in the design and configuration of mobile devices, as well as the ways consumers use them. Common vulnerabilities include a failure to enable password protection and operating systems that are not kept up to date with the latest security patches.
Mobile device manufacturers and wireless carriers can implement technical features, such as enabling passwords and encryption to limit or prevent attacks. In addition, consumers can adopt key practices, such as setting passwords and limiting the use of public wireless connections for sensitive transactions, which can significantly mitigate the risk that their devices will be compromised.
Federal agencies and private companies have promoted secure technologies and practices through standards and public private partnerships. Despite these efforts, safeguards have not been consistently implemented. Although the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has facilitated public-private coordination to address specific challenges such as cellphone theft, it has not yet taken similar steps to encourage device manufacturers and wireless carriers to implement a more complete industry baseline of mobile security safeguards. In addition, many consumers still do not know how to protect themselves from mobile security vulnerabilities, raising questions about the effectiveness of public awareness efforts. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) have not yet developed performance measures or a baseline understanding of the current state of national cybersecurity awareness that would help them determine whether public awareness efforts are achieving stated goals and objectives.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that FCC encourage the private sector to implement a broad, industry-defined baseline of mobile security safeguards. GAO also recommends that DHS and NIST take steps to better measure progress in raising national cybersecurity awareness. The FCC, DHS, and NIST generally concurred with GAOs recommendations. |
gao_GAO-12-100 | gao_GAO-12-100_0 | These alternatives have the potential to provide postal services at a lower cost to USPS than post offices, since USPS does not staff or maintain retail partners’ facilities, and self-service options reduce the need for labor and facilities. These oversight duties include monitoring and servicing kiosks and training and monitoring retail partners. According to USPS, retail alternatives improve service by providing access to customers not only in more places but also for longer hours. Although retail alternatives expand service locations and hours, certain characteristics of these alternatives could be problematic for some postal customers. USPS Has Increased Revenue from Retail Alternatives, but Has Not Demonstrated Cost Savings
USPS has stated that retail alternatives support its goal to improve financial performance by generating revenue while offering products and services through outlets that are less costly than post offices. USPS has projected that by 2020 alternatives to post offices will likely account for 60 percent of its retail revenue. USPS announced in September 2011, that it will review as many as 15,000 post offices for possible closure, which it stated could produce annual savings of $1.5 billion as part of an effort to eliminate $20 billion in annual costs by 2015. Retail Network Plan Needed to Maximize the Potential of Retail Alternatives
Given USPS’s financial challenges, a clear plan guiding investments in its retail network is essential, including how it intends to increase access through retail alternatives while considering cuts to its network of post offices. Feedback about customers’ awareness and use of retail alternatives can help USPS be sure its message is reaching its intended audience. If USPS closes these post offices as planned, it will be increasingly important for it to effectively encourage widespread adoption of retail alternatives. USPS Takes Steps to Help Ensure Retail Partners Follow Procedures, but Could Improve Oversight
As USPS has expanded its use of retail partners, it has taken steps to help ensure that such third-party retailers offer products and services in accordance with its procedures. Specifically, USPS has established procedures for entering into written agreements with retail partners, training them, and monitoring their performance. Monitoring
USPS’s guidance for overseeing CPUs states that local USPS officials are required to monitor the performance of CPUs on a quarterly basis through on-site reviews of their operations and compliance with policies. Recommendations for Executive Action
We are making the following two recommendations to the Postmaster General:
To better ensure that USPS’s efforts to expand access through retail alternatives support its strategic goals to improve its service and financial performance, the Postmaster General should develop and implement a plan with a timeline to guide efforts to modernize USPS’s retail network that addresses both traditional post offices and retail alternatives. This plan should also include: criteria for ensuring the retail network continues to provide adequate access for customers as it is restructured; procedures for obtaining reliable retail revenue and cost data to measure progress and inform future decision making; and a method to assess whether USPS’s communications strategy is effectively reaching customers, particularly those customers in areas where post offices may close. Agency Comments
We provided a draft of this report to USPS for review and comment. Postal Service’s (USPS) efforts to expand access through retail alternatives support its strategic goals of improving service and financial performance, (2) how USPS communicates with customers about the availability of its products and services at retail alternatives, and (3) what actions USPS has taken to oversee third parties that provide postal products and services. Because of these adjustments, USPS officials said this data source is more accurate for reporting overall retail revenue. To determine what actions USPS has taken to oversee third parties that provide access to postal products and services, in addition to the site visits previously discussed, we reviewed USPS documents and interviewed USPS officials in headquarters and at the local level to determine how USPS recruits, contracts with, trains, and monitors retail partners. We did not assess other aspects of management, such as project planning or management of financial systems. Related GAO Products
U.S. Postal Service: Restructuring Urgently Needed to Achieve Financial Viability. | Why GAO Did This Study
Declines in mail volume have brought the U.S. Postal Service (USPS) to the brink of financial insolvency. Action to ensure its financial viability is urgently needed. Visits to post offices have also declined, and in an effort to cut costs, USPS is considering closing nearly half of its 32,000 post offices by 2015. In their place, alternatives to post offices, such as the Internet, self-service kiosks, and partnerships with retailers, are increasingly important for providing access to postal services. Retail alternatives also hold potential to help improve financial performance by providing services at a lower cost than post offices. As requested, this report discusses how (1) USPS's efforts to expand access through retail alternatives support its service and financial performance goals, (2) USPS communicates with the public about retail alternatives, and (3) USPS oversees its retail partners. To conduct this work, GAO analyzed USPS documents and data and interviewed USPS officials and stakeholders. GAO also interviewed operators of postal retail partnerships.
What GAO Found
USPS has expanded access to its services through alternatives to post offices in support of its goals to improve service and financial performance. Retail alternatives offer service in more locations and for longer hours, enhancing convenience for many customers, but certain characteristics of these alternatives could be problematic for others. For example, services obtained from some alternatives cost more because of additional fees, which could deter use by price-sensitive customers. Furthermore, although about $5 billion of its $18 billion in fiscal year 2010 retail revenue came from alternatives, USPS officials said it is too early to realize related cost savings. USPS also lacks the performance measures and data needed to show how alternatives have affected its financial performance. A data-driven plan to guide its retail network restructuring could provide a clear path for achieving goals. Without such a plan, USPS may miss opportunities to achieve cost savings and identify which alternatives hold the most promise. USPS has sought to raise customers' awareness by developing media campaigns, enhancing its online tools for locating postal access points, and creating standard symbols for post offices and retail alternatives to show which products and services they offer. However, USPS has not assessed whether its message is reaching its customers, such as by using one of its existing customer surveys, and therefore does not know to what extent customers are aware of and willing to use its various retail alternatives. Although the public increasingly uses postal retail alternatives, more widespread adoption will be needed if USPS is to close thousands of post offices as planned in the next few years. USPS has projected that by 2020 alternatives to post offices will account for 60 percent of its retail revenue. USPS's oversight of its retail partners, which includes entering into written agreements with them and providing training and guidance, could be improved if USPS modified its approach to monitoring compliance with its procedures. Local USPS officials are supposed to conduct quarterly reviews of retail partners to make sure they are following mailing procedures, but according to retail partners and USPS officials in field and local offices, these reviews do not always occur as often as intended because of resource constraints. A risk-based monitoring approach would allow targeting limited USPS oversight resources to areas of concern and thus address issues that could otherwise discourage customers from adopting retail alternatives, such as inadequate service. USPS should develop a plan to guide its retail network restructuring that is supported by relevant performance measures and data and includes a method to assess the effectiveness of its public communication strategy. USPS should also implement a risk-based approach to monitoring retail partners. USPS reviewed a draft of this report and stated it is developing a plan to guide its retail network restructuring and agreed to review how it monitors retail partners. |
gao_GAO-07-635T | gao_GAO-07-635T_0 | Significant Trends in IPIA Reporting
I would now like to focus on agencies’ efforts to address select IPIA reporting requirements during the first 3 years of IPIA implementation, fiscal years 2004 through 2006. For fiscal years 2004 through 2006, we found that some agencies still had not instituted systematic methods of reviewing all programs and activities or had not identified all programs susceptible to significant improper payments. We also reported that certain agencies’ risk assessments appear questionable. Other agencies reported improving and refining their risk assessment methodologies for fiscal year 2006. Finally, we noted that the number of agencies conducting risk assessments may decrease in future reporting, because OMB’s revised IPIA implementing guidance allows agencies to perform risk assessments every 3 years for those agency programs not deemed susceptible to significant improper payments. Improper Payment Dollar and Error Rate Estimates
Since fiscal year 2004, agencies have made progress in reporting improper payment information. For example, the number of programs reporting improper payment estimates for fiscal year 2004 totaled 41, as compared to 60 programs reporting for fiscal year 2006, a net increase of 19 programs. The total improper payments dollar estimate was $45 billion in fiscal year 2004, $38 billion in fiscal year 2005, and about $42 billion in fiscal year 2006. We noted that agency auditors reported problems related to agencies’ risk assessments, the definition of programs for IPIA purposes, sampling methodologies, lack of reporting for all risk- susceptible programs, and supporting documentation, as shown in table 2. Challenges Continue in Reporting Improper Payment Information and Improving Internal Control
While showing progress, agencies’ fiscal year 2006 reporting under IPIA does not yet reflect the full scope of improper payments across executive branch agencies. Major challenges remain in meeting the goals of the act and ultimately improving the integrity of payments. Specifically, some agencies have not yet reported for all risk-susceptible programs, and certain methodologies used to estimate improper payments do not result in reliable estimates. Improper Payments Estimate Excludes Several Large Risk-Susceptible Programs
The fiscal year 2006 total improper payment estimate of about $42 billion did not include any amounts for 13 risk-susceptible programs having fiscal year 2006 outlays totaling about $329 billion. After passage of IPIA, OMB’s implementing guidance required that these programs continue to report improper payment information under IPIA. Improved Internal Control Is Key to Resolving Improper Payments
Agency OIGs reported management challenges in the annual PARs related to agencies’ internal control weaknesses that continue to plague programs susceptible to significant improper payments. I would like to emphasize that effective internal control calls for a sound, ongoing invoice review and approval process as the first line of defense in preventing unallowable contract costs. Given the large volume and complexity of federal payments and historically low recovery rates for certain programs, it is much more efficient and effective to pay bills and provide benefits properly in the first place. From fiscal year 2004 to 2006, we noted that the number of agencies reporting recovery auditing information and the dollar amounts identified for recovery and actually recovered had increased, as shown in table 4. From our review, we noted that 12 agencies reported recovering about $53 million for fiscal year 2004 compared to 18 agencies that reported recovering about $256 million for fiscal year 2006. Appendix I: Agencies and Related Programs Included in Our Review of Fiscal Year 2006 Performance and Accountability Reports and Annual Reports
Appendix II: Improper Payment Estimates Reported in Agency Fiscal Year 2005 and 2006 Performance and Accountability Reports or Annual Reports
millions) (percent) millions) (percent)
Cooperative Agreements, Grants, and Contracts Child and Adult Care Food Program Farm Security and Rural Investment Program (previously Commodity Loan Programs) 12 Milk Income Loss Contract 13 National School Lunch and School Breakfast Programs (previously School Programs)17 Women, Infants, and Children 18 All programs and activities4 Department of Defense 19 Civilian Pay 0.1 millions) (percent) millions) (percent)
5 Department of Education 25 Student Financial Assistance— 29 Clean Water State Revolving 30 Drinking Water State Revolving 31 All programs and activities 32 All programs and activities 33 High Cost Support Program34 Universal Service Fund’s 35 All programs and activities 36 All programs and activities 37 All programs and activities38 Child Care and Development 45 State Children’s Insurance Programmillions) (percent) millions) (percent)
Block Grant (Entitlement Grants, States/Small Cities)
Administration’s Single Family Acquired Asset Management System 51 Low Income Public Housing 52 Public Housing Capital Fund 55 All programs and activities56 All programs and activities60 All programs and activities61 All programs and activities 62 All programs and activities 64 All programs and activities 65 All programs and activities0.0 millions) (percent) millions) (percent)
66 Federal Employees Group Life 68 Retirement Program (Civil Service Retirement System and Federal Employees Retirement System) 69 All programs and activities 70 All programs and activities 73 All programs and activities75 7(a) Business Loan Program 78 All programs and activities 79 Old Age and Survivors’ International Information Program—U.S. | Why GAO Did This Study
The federal government is accountable for how its agencies and grantees spend hundreds of billions of taxpayer dollars and is responsible for safeguarding those funds against improper payments as well as for recouping those funds when improper payments occur. The Congress enacted the Improper Payments Information Act of 2002 (IPIA) and the Recovery Auditing Act to address these issues. Fiscal year 2006 marked the 3rd year that agencies were required to report improper payment and recovery audit information in their Performance and Accountability Reports. GAO was asked to testify on the progress agencies have made in these areas. Specifically, GAO focused on (1) trends in agencies' reporting under IPIA from fiscal years 2004 through 2006, (2) challenges in reporting improper payment information and improving internal control, and (3) agencies' reporting of recovery auditing efforts. This testimony is based on GAO's previous reports on agencies' efforts to implement IPIA requirements for fiscal years 2005 and 2004 and current review of available fiscal year 2006 improper payment and recovery auditing information. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) provided technical comments that were incorporated as appropriate.
What GAO Found
GAO identified several key trends related to IPIA reporting requirements. (1) Risk assessments: For fiscal years 2004 through 2006, some agencies still had not instituted systematic methods of reviewing all programs and activities or had not identified all programs susceptible to significant improper payments. Further, certain agencies' risk assessments appeared questionable. GAO also noted that OMB's recently revised IPIA implementing guidance, which allows certain agencies to perform risk assessments every 3 years instead of annually, may result in fewer agencies conducting risk assessments in the future. (2) Improper payment estimates: Since fiscal year 2004, agencies have made some progress in reporting improper payment information. The number of programs reporting improper payment estimates for fiscal year 2004 totaled 41, compared to 60 programs for fiscal year 2006. The total improper payments dollar estimate was $45 billion in fiscal year 2004, $38 billion in fiscal year 2005, and about $42 billion in fiscal year 2006. (3) Noncompliance issues: Although not currently required by IPIA to do so, some agency auditors continued to report problems related to agencies' risk assessments, definition of programs for IPIA purposes, sampling methodologies, lack of reporting for all risk-susceptible programs, and supporting documentation. Although showing progress under OMB's continuing leadership, agencies' fiscal year 2006 reporting under IPIA does not yet reflect the full scope of improper payments. Major challenges remain in meeting the goals of the act and ultimately improving the integrity of payments. First, some agencies have not yet reported for all risk-susceptible programs. For example, the fiscal year 2006 total improper payment estimate of about $42 billion did not include any amounts for 13 risk-susceptible programs that had fiscal year 2006 outlays totaling about $329 billion. Second, certain methodologies used to estimate improper payments did not result in accurate estimates. Finally, GAO noted that internal control weaknesses continued to plague programs susceptible to significant improper payments. From fiscal years 2004 through 2006, the number of agencies reporting recovery auditing information for contract overpayments and the dollar amounts identified for recovery and actually recovered increased. For fiscal year 2004, 12 agencies reported recovering about $53 million, compared to 18 agencies that reported recovering about $256 million for fiscal year 2006. Given the large volume and complexity of federal contract payments and historically low recovery rates for certain programs, GAO emphasized that it is much more efficient to pay bills properly in the first place. Effective internal control calls for a sound, ongoing invoice review and approval process as the first line of defense in preventing erroneous payments. |
gao_GAO-02-787 | gao_GAO-02-787_0 | In addition to its regular program and financial controls, USAID set up some additional oversight measures, such as hiring accounting firms to oversee a host country’s expenditures. USAID Coordinated with U.S. Government Entities and International Donors
USAID worked with the 12 U.S. departments and agencies that implemented about $96 million in disaster recovery activities to help plan their efforts and provide administrative support. USAID officials noted, however, that some agencies provided needed technical expertise. USAID also coordinated with other bilateral and multilateral donors through formal consultative group meetings and informal contacts among mission staff and other donors. USAID Did Not Begin Expending Supplemental Funds Until 2000
With a few exceptions, USAID began expending disaster recovery funds from the supplemental appropriation in January 2000, about 7 months after the supplemental appropriation of $621 million was approved. USAID then had to complete its contracting processes and ensure that program management and oversight were in place. During 1999, before the supplemental funds were available for use, USAID missions used $189 million in other funds for emergency relief and initial reconstruction programs, such as food-for-work activities to rebuild infrastructure in hurricane-affected areas. Conclusions
USAID and the other U.S. departments and agencies provided disaster recovery assistance that helped the affected countries recover from the devastating effects of Hurricanes Mitch and Georges. Increased oversight of the disaster recovery program helped ensure that funds were spent for intended purposes and not misused. Available USAID mission staff were also involved in providing emergency relief, initial reconstruction assistance, and continuing regular development programs. Scope and Methodology
To determine whether the program and projects funded by USAID and the other U.S. departments and agencies addressed the intended purposes of disaster recovery and reconstruction, we conducted work at the headquarters offices of USAID and other U.S. government entities and made more than 30 trips to the countries affected by Hurricanes Mitch or Georges. Accountability
USAID’s Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean and mission staff, the Office of Management and Budget, and we conducted most of the oversight and review of the other U.S. departments and agencies. | What GAO Found
In the fall of 1998, when hurricanes Mitch and Georges struck Central America and the Caribbean, the United States and other donors responded by providing emergency relief, such as food, water, medical supplies, and temporary shelter. Also, In May 1999, Congress passed emergency supplemental legislation that provided $621 million for a disaster recovery and reconstruction fund for the affected countries, as well as reimbursement for costs incurred by U.S. departments and agencies during the immediate relief phase. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and other departments and agencies made significant achievements in helping the affected countries rebuild their infrastructure and recover from the hurricanes. USAID and others used the disaster recovery assistance to bring about economic recovery, improve public health and access to education, provide permanent housing for displaced families, and improve disaster mitigation and preparedness. To achieve these broad objectives, USAID funded infrastructure construction and repair, technical assistance and training, loans for farmers and small businesses, and some equipment. In addition to its normal controls, USAID ensured that the funds were spent for intended purposes. USAID coordinated its activities with 12 other departments and agencies that were allocated $96 million for disaster recovery efforts. USAID also coordinated with other bilateral and multilateral donors through formal consultative group meetings and informal contacts among mission staff and other donors. USAID attempted to strengthen the capacity of host government audit in situations as a means to resist corruption. However, USAID was not successful in this area, mostly due to country conditions. USAID did not begin expending the supplemental funds until January 2000, 7 months after the appropriation was enacted. Some of the factors that added time included arranging for additional program staff and contractor support; ensuring that financial controls and other oversight measures were in place; coordinating with and planning for the involvement of numerous other departments and agencies; and providing for U.S. contractors and other organizations to compete for most of the contracts, grants, and cooperative agreements that were awarded. |
gao_GAO-16-219 | gao_GAO-16-219_0 | The exchanges include certified QHPs offered in the states by the participating issuers of coverage. At the state level, most of the five states we reviewed required CHIP plans to adhere to network adequacy standards that related specifically to pediatric provider types. CMS is considering changes to CHIP plan and QHP network adequacy requirements. Selected States Also Had Network Adequacy Standards, but Held CHIP Plans More Often Than QHPs to Pediatric-Specific Standards
Overall Network Adequacy Standards in Selected States
The five selected states we examined had one or more specific network adequacy standards for CHIP plans and QHPs. Two of the selected states—Massachusetts and Washington—required CHIP plan networks to follow specific provider-to-enrollee ratios. Three of the selected states—Massachusetts, Texas, and Washington—required CHIP plan networks to follow provider capacity or availability standards. For CHIP plans, most selected states had specific requirements for pediatric provider types, but, for QHPs, only two states had specific requirements for pediatric provider types. Nearly All Selected Issuers Included at Least One Children’s Hospital in Their Networks, but Many Expressed Challenges Recruiting Certain Specialists
Eighteen of 19 selected issuers that offered CHIP plans, QHPs, or both, in the most populous counties of the five selected states reported including at least one children’s hospital in their provider networks for their CHIP plans and QHPs. Most of them—16 of the 18—reported including more than one children’s hospital. Representatives from one QHP-only issuer told us they did not include a children’s hospital in their QHP network, but they instead provide access to children’s pediatric services—such as neonatal intensive care and general pediatric surgery—through an agreement with four hospitals that treat children but are not limited to children. Officials representing some of the children’s hospitals we spoke with, however, raised concerns around not being included in all plan networks and the potential effect on children’s access to specialty care they may need. However, many expressed challenges recruiting certain types of pediatric specialists. Many of the challenges related to location or compensation as well as reflecting provider availability nationwide:
Location. CMS Monitors State Oversight of Network Adequacy for CHIP Plans and Directly Monitors Adequacy for QHPs in Federally Facilitated Exchanges; Selected States’ Monitoring Varied CMS Monitored State Oversight of CHIP Network Adequacy through Contract and State Plan Reviews, and Directly Monitored Adequacy for QHPs in Federally Facilitated Exchange States
States have primary responsibility for administering CHIP and for overseeing CHIP plan compliance with network adequacy standards, and CMS monitors these state oversight activities. These standards may include, for example, provider-to-enrollee ratios, travel time or distance standards, and capacity or availability standards. CMS is required to monitor the development and implementation of this plan. CMS conducts an annual certification process of QHPs in FFE states. Most Selected States Monitored CHIP and QHP Network Adequacy, but the Frequency of Monitoring Varied
Selected States’ Monitoring of CHIP Network Adequacy
Officials from CHIP agencies in three of the five selected states— Massachusetts, Texas, and Washington—told us they regularly monitor CHIP plan issuers’ compliance with the states’ CHIP network adequacy standards, but the frequency with which they reported doing this varied. Specifically:
CHIP officials from these three states told us they require CHIP plan issuers to submit certain provider network information at the time the plan and network are established and then quarterly or annually thereafter. Selected States’ Monitoring of QHP Network Adequacy
Officials from most of the selected states—Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Texas, and Washington—told us that they rely primarily on complaints, network changes, and other concerns to prompt the frequency with which they monitor QHPs’ network adequacy. Agency Comments
We provided a draft of this report to the Secretary of Health and Human Services. HHS provided technical comments that we incorporated as appropriate. Appendix I: Selection Criteria for States, Issuers, and Children’s Hospitals
This appendix describes the methodology we used to select states, issuers, and children’s hospitals to address our objectives to examine: (1) federal and state provider network adequacy standards State Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP) plans must meet, particularly for pediatric providers, and how these compare to standards for qualified health plans (QHP); (2) the extent to which selected issuers of CHIP plans and QHPs include children’s hospitals in their networks and otherwise help to ensure access to pediatric specialists; and (3) how the federal government and selected states monitor CHIP plan and QHP compliance with provider network adequacy standards. To do this, we obtained data on 2014 or 2015 enrollment for all CHIP plans and QHPs offered in each selected county, as well as QHP 2014 or 2015 premium data, from officials at the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) and agencies in each selected state that administer CHIP, departments of insurance, and exchanges (in the two state-based exchange states). | Why GAO Did This Study
Federal funding for CHIP expires at the end of fiscal year 2017. Any state with insufficient federal CHIP funding is required to have procedures to enroll eligible children in QHPs certified by HHS as comparable to CHIP, if any such QHPs are available. Little is known about how provider networks offered in QHPs compare with those in CHIP plans.
GAO was asked to review the inclusion of pediatric providers, including children's hospitals—where many children access pediatric specialists—in CHIP and QHP networks. This report examines (1) federal and selected state CHIP and QHP network adequacy standards, (2) the extent to which selected issuers of CHIP plans and QHPs include children's hospitals and otherwise help ensure access to pediatric specialists, and (3) how CMS and selected states monitor CHIP plan and QHP compliance with adequacy standards. GAO selected five states—Alabama, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Texas, and Washington—that varied based on whether the state or CMS operated the exchange on which QHPs were offered, as well as in the number of children in CHIP and in the state overall. GAO then selected issuers of the largest CHIP plan and QHP in the states' largest county, based on the most recently available enrollment data, and at least one children's hospital in each state. GAO reviewed federal and state laws and regulations and interviewed officials from CMS, the selected states, issuers, and children's hospitals. GAO findings on selected states and entities are not generalizable.
What GAO Found
Broad federal provider network adequacy standards apply to health plans in the joint federal-state State Children's Health Insurance Program (CHIP) and to qualified health plans (QHP)—private health plans offered on health insurance exchanges. These standards measure the adequacy of the networks of physicians, hospitals, and other providers participating in each plan. The five selected states GAO reviewed had one or more specific network adequacy standards, including:
All five states required CHIP plans and QHPs to adhere to specific and quantitative standards for travel time or distance for the proximity of network providers' locations to enrollees' residences; some had both.
Three selected states required CHIP plan and QHP networks to follow provider capacity or availability standards, including, for example, specific limits on appointment wait times.
Two selected states required CHIP plan and QHP networks to follow specific provider-to-enrollee ratios.
More of the five states that GAO reviewed had child-focused network adequacy standards for CHIP plans than for QHPs. For CHIP plans, four of the five states had specific requirements for pediatric provider types, but, for QHPs, two of the five selected states had requirements for pediatric provider types.
Nearly all of the 19 selected issuers that GAO interviewed stated that they included at least one children's hospital in their CHIP and QHP networks. Most of the issuers noted they included more than one. One of the selected issuers—a QHP-only issuer—informed GAO that it did not include any children's hospitals, but noted having an arrangement with another hospital to provide certain pediatric services. Officials from most of the nine selected children's hospitals GAO interviewed raised concerns around not being included in all plan networks and the potential effect of this on children's access to specialty care they may need. Officials from the selected issuers also noted challenges recruiting certain types of pediatric specialists related to geographic location and compensation.
The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS)—the federal agency that oversees CHIP and QHPs—monitors state oversight of network adequacy for CHIP plans and is responsible for directly monitoring QHPs' network adequacy in states with federally facilitated exchanges. For CHIP, CMS officials told GAO they review state contracts and plans to assure compliance with access requirements, and, for QHPs, they monitor network adequacy through an annual certification process as well as other types of review. Officials from most of the five selected states told GAO they also monitored issuers' network adequacy compliance, but the frequency of monitoring varied. For example, three of the five selected states told GAO they require CHIP plan issuers to submit certain provider network information when the plan and network are established, then quarterly or annually thereafter. Officials from most of the selected states told GAO that they rely primarily on complaints, network changes, and other concerns to prompt the frequency with which they monitor QHPs' network adequacy. The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) provided technical comments on a draft of this report that GAO incorporated, as appropriate. |
gao_GAO-07-59 | gao_GAO-07-59_0 | Beneficiaries typically obtain DMEPOS items from suppliers, who submit claims to Medicare on the beneficiaries’ behalf. DMEPOS suppliers are required by CMS to meet certain standards before they are authorized to bill Medicare. To prevent and minimize improper payments for DMEPOS, PSCs rely on automated prepayment controls—called edits. First, DMERCs and the Region A PSC generally did not have medical review edits in place to identify claims associated with atypical billing patterns. Such claims represent items unlikely to be prescribed, or unlikely to be prescribed in the quantity billed, for a beneficiary as part of routine quality care. In conjunction with the SADMERC, we identified three instances where medically improbable claims were routinely being paid by Medicare for more than a year. Finally, CMS does not require its contractors to share information on their edits with contractors in other regions or adopt edits that have been effective in other contractors’ regions. For example, in 2005, the DMERC in Region C had an edit in place to restrict payment for the same or similar types of home-use hospital beds to one item per month per beneficiary, by automatically denying any additional claims submitted for these items. CMS has developed three evaluation tools to assess each PSC’s (1) general performance, (2) performance in conducting medical review, and (3) performance in conducting benefit integrity activities. CMS officials said that the agency will use the results to decide whether to renew a PSC’s contract. The officials also said that CMS will use these results to determine whether a PSC may earn award fees—a monetary performance reward for good performance—in addition to the regular payments it receives under its contract. The agency and its contractors conduct a number of program integrity activities designed to prevent and minimize improper payments for DMEPOS. However, we found that CMS’s contractors did not have sufficient automated prepayment controls to flag claims that are part of unexplained increases in billing, or that were medically improbable. CMS’s recent initiative to add automated prepayment controls that would deny certain medically improbable claims is a positive step towards reducing improper DMEPOS payments. Require the DME MACs, DMERC, and PSCs to exchange information on their automated prepayment controls, and have each of these contractors consider whether the automated prepayment controls developed by the others could reduce their incidence of improper payments. Appendix II: Scope and Methodology
To discuss the program integrity activities of the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) and its contractors to prevent and minimize improper payments made for durable medical equipment, prosthetics, orthotics, and supplies (DMEPOS), we reviewed aspects of the contractors’ medical review and benefit integrity responsibilities. As part of our work, we reviewed related GAO reports and CMS’s Medicare Program Integrity Manual (PIM), which establishes CMS’s guidelines for contractors’ program integrity activities. We also conducted interviews with CMS officials responsible for safeguarding Medicare, as well as contractor officials responsible for program integrity activities in three of the four DMEPOS regions— Regions A, C, and D. These contractor officials included staff at the outgoing Durable Medical Equipment Regional Carriers (DMERC) for Regions C and D, and the incoming Program Safeguard Contractors (PSC) for Regions A, C, and D. We interviewed staff at the incoming Durable Medical Equipment Medicare Administrative Contractor (DME MAC) for Region A, which had the only DME MAC contract within our selected regions that had been implemented at the time of our interviews. In addition, we interviewed PSC contractors about CMS’s oversight of its PSCs. Medicare: CMS Did Not Control Rising Power Wheelchair Spending. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS)--the agency that administers Medicare--estimated that the program made about $700 million in improper payments for durable medical equipment, prosthetics, orthotics, and supplies (DMEPOS) from April 1, 2005, through March 31, 2006. To protect Medicare from improper DMEPOS payments, CMS relies on three Program Safeguard Contractors (PSC), and four contractors that process Medicare claims, to conduct critical program integrity activities. GAO was requested to examine CMS's and CMS's contractors' activities to prevent and minimize improper payments for DMEPOS, and describe CMS's oversight of PSC program integrity activities. To do this, GAO analyzed DMEPOS claims data by supplier and item to identify atypical, or large, increases in billing; reviewed CMS documents; and conducted interviews with CMS and contractor officials. GAO focused its work on contractors' automated prepayment controls and described related claims analysis functions.
What GAO Found
To prevent and minimize improper DMEPOS payments, CMS's contractors conduct program integrity activities, which include performing medical reviews of certain claims before they are paid to determine whether the items meet criteria for Medicare coverage. As part of their efforts, CMS's contractors responsible for medical review use automated prepayment controls to deny claims that should not be paid or identify claims that should be reviewed. However, GAO found three shortfalls in these automated prepayment controls that make the Medicare program vulnerable to improper payments. (1) Contractors responsible for medical review did not have automated prepayment controls in place to identify questionable claims that are part of an atypically rapid increase in billing. (2) In some instances, these contractors did not have automated prepayment controls in place to identify claims for items unlikely to be prescribed in the course of routine quality medical care. CMS has recently begun an initiative to add controls of this kind for some DMEPOS items. (3) CMS does not require these contractors to share information on the most effective automated prepayment controls of the other contractors or consider adopting them. For example, Medicare might have saved almost $71 million in less than 2 years if one effective automated prepayment control designed to prevent Medicare from paying for more than one home-use hospital bed per month for a beneficiary, which was used by one of these contractors, had been used by the others. CMS oversees the PSCs' program integrity activities by providing written manuals and contracts to guide their work. As part of its oversight, CMS is implementing an annual contractor performance evaluation process, based on three evaluation tools, to assess each PSC's performance. CMS officials said that the agency will use the results of these evaluations to determine two things: whether to renew a PSC's contract, and whether a PSC may earn award fees--a monetary reward for good performance--in addition to the regular payments it receives under its contract. |
gao_GAO-05-267 | gao_GAO-05-267_0 | Nevertheless, progress has been slow in addressing some of our recommendations, such as the one encouraging proactive management of the relationships between ACE and other DHS border security programs, like US-VISIT. Given that these programs have made and will continue to make decisions that determine how they will operate, delays in managing their relationships will increase the chances that later system rework will eventually be required to allow the programs to interoperate. This is because DHS has met its recently revised cost and schedule commitments in part by relaxing system quality standards, so that milestones are being passed despite material system defects, and because correcting such defects will ultimately require the program to expend resources, such as people and test environments, at the expense of later system releases (some of which are now under way). Recommendations for Executive Action
To strengthen accountability for the ACE program and better ensure that future ACE releases deliver promised capabilities and benefits within budget and on time, we recommend that the DHS Secretary, through the Under Secretary for Border and Transportation Security, direct the Commissioner, Customs and Border Protection, to define and implement an ACE accountability framework that ensures coverage of all program commitment areas, including key expected or estimated system (1) capabilities, use, and quality; (2) benefits and mission value; (3) costs; and (4) milestones and schedules; currency, relevance, and completeness of all such commitments made to the Congress in expenditure plans; reliability of data relevant to measuring progress against commitments; reporting in future expenditure plans of progress against commitments contained in prior expenditure plans; use of criteria for exiting key readiness milestones that adequately consider indicators of system maturity, such as severity of open defects; and clear and unambiguous delineation of the respective roles and responsibilities of the government and the prime contractor. Objectives
As agreed, our objectives were to
determine whether the ACE fiscal year 2005 expenditure plan satisfies the determine the status of our open recommendations on ACE, and provide any other observations about the expenditure plan and DHS’s management of the ACE program. Is reviewed by GAO. Complete means that actions have been taken to fully implement the recommendation. Recent changes to the respective roles and responsibilities of the ACE development contractor and CBP’s Modernization Office are not reflected in the program and expenditure plans. The plan, including related program documentation and program officials’ statements, partially satisfied this condition by providing for future compliance with DHS’s enterprise architecture (EA). For example, it plans to use contract options to extend the initial 5-year performance period. The Under Secretary for Management approved the expenditure plan on behalf of the Secretary of Homeland Security on November 8, 2004. Observation 6: The fiscal year 2005 expenditure plan does not adequately describe progress against commitments (e.g., ACE capabilities, schedule, cost, and benefits) made in previous plans. The fiscal year 2005 plan, however, did not address progress against these commitments. Without such information, meaningful congressional oversight of CBP progress and accountability is impaired. Recent program developments and program changes have altered some key bases (e.g., assumptions, release construct, organizational change management approach, and roles and responsibilities) of the ACE program plan, and thus the current expenditure plan. Additionally, while DHS has taken important actions to help address ACE release- by-release cost and schedule overruns that we previously identified, it is unlikely that the effect of these actions will prevent the past pattern of overruns from recurring. Moreover, the commitments that DHS made in the fiscal year 2005 expenditure plan have been overcome by events, which limits the currency and relevance of this plan and its utility to the Congress as an accountability mechanism. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is conducting a multiyear, multibillion-dollar acquisition of a new trade processing system, planned to support the movement of legitimate imports and exports and strengthen border security. By congressional mandate, plans for expenditure of appropriated funds on this system, the Automated Commercial Environment (ACE), must meet certain conditions, including GAO review. This study addresses whether the fiscal year 2005 plan satisfies these conditions, describes the status of DHS's efforts to implement prior GAO recommendations for improving ACE management, and provides observations about the plan and DHS's management of the program.
What GAO Found
The fiscal year 2005 ACE expenditure plan, including related program documentation and program officials' statements, largely satisfies the legislative conditions imposed by the Congress. In addition, some of the recommendations that GAO has previously made to strengthen ACE management have been addressed, and DHS has committed to addressing those that remain. However, much remains to be done before these recommendations are fully implemented. For example, progress has been slow on implementing the recommendation that the department proactively manage the dependencies between ACE and related DHS border security programs. Delays in managing the relationships among such programs will increase the chances that later system rework will be needed to allow the programs to interoperate. Among GAO's observations about the ACE program and its management are several regarding DHS's approach to addressing previously identified cost and schedule overruns. DHS has taken actions intended to address these overruns (such as revising its baselines for cost and schedule, as GAO previously recommended); however, it is unlikely that these actions will prevent future overruns, because DHS has relaxed system quality standards, meaning that milestones are being passed despite material system defects. Correcting such defects will require the program to use resources (e.g., people and test environments) at the expense of later system releases. Until the ACE program is held accountable not only for cost and schedule but also for system capabilities and benefits, the program is likely to continue to fall short of expectations. Finally, the usefulness of the fiscal year 2005 expenditure plan for congressional oversight is limited. For example, it does not adequately describe progress against commitments (e.g., ACE capabilities, schedule, cost, and benefits) made in previous plans, which makes it difficult to make well-informed judgments on the program's overall progress. Also, in light of recent program changes, GAO questions the expenditure plan's usefulness to the Congress as an accountability mechanism. The expenditure plan is based largely on the ACE program plan of July 8, 2004. However, recent program developments have altered some key bases of the ACE program plan and thus the current expenditure plan. In particular, the expenditure plan does not reflect additional program releases that are now planned or recent changes to the roles and responsibilities of the ACE development contractor and the program office. Without complete information and an up-to-date plan, meaningful congressional oversight of program progress and accountability is impaired. |
gao_GAO-13-414T | gao_GAO-13-414T_0 | CBP Has Reported Progress in Stemming Illegal Cross-Border Activity, but Could Strengthen Assessment of Its Efforts
Border Patrol Has Reported Some Success in Reducing Illegal Migration, but Challenges Remain in Assessing Efforts
Since fiscal year 2011, DHS has used changes in the number of apprehensions on the southwest border between POEs as an interim measure for border security, as reported in its annual performance reports. These data generally mirrored a decrease in estimated known illegal entries in each southwest border sector. As we testified in February 2013, data reported by Border Patrol following the issuance of our December 2012 report show that total apprehensions across the southwest border increased from over 327,000 in fiscal year 2011 to about 357,000 in fiscal year 2012.assess whether this increase indicates a change in the trend for Border Patrol apprehensions across the southwest border. Through fiscal year 2011, Border Patrol attributed decreases in apprehensions across sectors in part to changes in the U.S. economy, achievement of strategic objectives, and increased resources for border security. Further, the number of seizures of drugs and other contraband across the border increased from 10,321 in fiscal year 2006 to 18,898 in fiscal year 2011. Border Patrol is in the process of developing performance goals and measures for assessing the progress of its efforts to secure the border between ports of entry and for informing the identification and allocation of resources needed to secure the border, but has not identified milestones and time frames for developing and implementing them. DHS concurred with our recommendations and stated that it plans to set milestones and timeframes for developing goals and measures by November 2013. We have previously identified vulnerabilities in the traveler inspection program and made recommendations to DHS for addressing these vulnerabilities, and DHS implemented these recommendations. We recommended in December 2011 that CBP conduct a training needs assessment. DHS concurred with this recommendation. DHS Law Enforcement Partners Reported Improved Results for Interagency Coordination and Oversight of Intelligence and Enforcement Operations, but Gaps Remain
DOI and USDA Reported Improved DHS Coordination to Secure Federal Borderlands, but Critical Gaps Remained in Sharing Intelligence and Communications for Daily Operations
Illegal cross-border activity remains a significant threat to federal lands protected by DOI and USDA law enforcement personnel on the southwest and northern borders and can cause damage to natural, historic, and cultural resources, and put agency personnel and the visiting public at risk. We reported in November 2010 that information sharing and communication among DHS, DOI, and USDA law enforcement officials For example, interagency forums were had increased in recent years.used to exchange information about border issues, and interagency liaisons facilitated exchange of operational statistics. However, gaps remained in implementing interagency agreements to ensure law enforcement officials had access to daily threat information to better ensure officer safety and an efficient law enforcement response to illegal activity. These agencies agreed with our recommendations, and in January 2011, CBP issued a memorandum to all Border Patrol division chiefs and chief patrol agents emphasizing the importance of USDA and DOI partnerships to address border security threats on federal lands. While this is a positive step, to fully satisfy the intent of our recommendation, DHS would need to take further action to monitor and uphold implementation of the existing interagency agreements to enhance border security on federal lands. DHS agreed with our recommendations and has reported taking action to address them. Opportunities Exist to Improve DHS’s Management of Border Security Assets
DHS Has Deployed Assets to Secure the Borders, but Needs to Provide More Information on Plans, Metrics, and Costs
In November 2005, DHS launched the Secure Border Initiative (SBI), a multiyear, multibillion-dollar program aimed at securing U.S. borders and reducing illegal immigration. SBInet was conceived as a surveillance technology to create a “virtual fence” along the border, and after spending nearly $1 billion, DHS deployed SBInet systems along 53 miles of Arizona’s border that represent the highest risk for illegal entry. In January 2011, in response to concerns regarding SBInet’s performance, cost, and schedule, DHS canceled future procurements. CBP developed the Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan (the Plan) for the remainder of the Arizona border. As we reported in November 2011, without documentation of the analysis justifying the specific types, quantities, and deployment locations of border surveillance technologies proposed in the Plan, an independent party cannot verify the process followed, identify how the analysis of alternatives was used, assess the validity of the decisions made, or justify the funding requested. DHS concurred with these recommendations, and has reported taking action to address some of the recommendations. We currently have ongoing work for congressional requesters to assess CBP’s progress in this area and expect to issue a report with our final results in the fall of 2013. Border Security: Enhanced DHS Oversight and Assessment of Interagency Coordination is Needed for the Northern Border. GAO-11-177. | Why GAO Did This Study
At the end of fiscal year 2004, DHS had about 28,100 personnel assigned to patrol U.S. land borders and inspect travelers at air, land, and sea POEs, at a cost of about $5.9 billion. At the end of fiscal year 2011, DHS had about 41,400 personnel assigned to air, land, and sea POEs and along the border, at a cost of about $11.8 billion. DHS has reported that this stronger enforcement presence was one of several reasons why fewer people were attempting to illegally cross the border. However, challenges remain in securing the border. In recent years, GAO has reported on a variety of DHS border security programs and operations. As requested, this statement addresses some of the key issues and recommendations GAO has made in the following areas: (1) DHS's efforts to secure the border at and between POEs; (2) DHS interagency coordination and oversight of border security information sharing and enforcement efforts; and (3) DHS management of infrastructure, technology, and other assets used to secure the border. This statement is based on prior products GAO issued from January 2008 through February 2013, along with selected updates conducted in February 2013. For the selected updates, GAO reviewed information from DHS on actions it has taken to address prior GAO recommendations.
What GAO Found
U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), part of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), has reported progress in stemming illegal cross-border activity, but it could strengthen the assessment of its efforts. For example, since fiscal year 2011, DHS has used the number of apprehensions on the southwest border between ports of entry (POE) as an interim measure for border security. GAO reported in December 2012 that apprehensions decreased across the southwest border from fiscal years 2006 to 2011, which generally mirrored a decrease in estimated known illegal entries in each southwest border sector. CBP attributed this decrease in part to changes in the U.S. economy and increased resources for border security. Data reported by CBP's Office of Border Patrol (Border Patrol) show that total apprehensions across the southwest border increased from over 327,000 in fiscal year 2011 to about 357,000 in fiscal year 2012. It is too early to assess whether this increase indicates a change in the trend. GAO reported in December 2012 that the number of apprehensions provides information on activity levels but does not inform program results or resource allocation decisions. Border Patrol is in the process of developing performance goals and measures for assessing the progress of its efforts to secure the border between POEs, but it has not identified milestones and time frames for developing and implementing them, which GAO recommended that it do. DHS agreed and said that it plans to set a date for establishing such milestones and time frames by November 2013.
DHS law enforcement partners reported improvements in interagency coordination and oversight of intelligence and enforcement operations, but gaps remain. GAO reported in November 2010 that information sharing and communication among federal law enforcement officials had increased; however, gaps remained in ensuring law enforcement officials had access to daily threat information. GAO recommended that relevant federal agencies determine if more guidance is needed for federal land closures and that they ensure interagency agreements for coordinating information and integrating operations are further implemented. These agencies agreed and in January 2011, CBP issued a memorandum affirming the importance of federal partnerships to address border security threats on federal lands. While this is a positive step, to fully satisfy the intent of GAO's recommendation, DHS needs to take further action to monitor and uphold implementation of the existing interagency agreements.
Opportunities exist to improve DHS's management of border security assets. For example, DHS conceived the Secure Border Initiative Network as a surveillance technology and deployed such systems along 53 miles of Arizona's border. In January 2011, in response to performance, cost, and schedule concerns, DHS canceled future procurements, and developed the Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan (Plan) for the remainder of the Arizona border. GAO reported in November 2011 that in developing the new Plan, CBP conducted an analysis of alternatives, but it had not documented the analysis justifying the specific types, quantities, and deployment locations of technologies proposed in the Plan, which GAO recommended that it do. DHS concurred with this recommendation. GAO has ongoing work in this area and expects to issue a report in fall 2013.
What GAO Recommends
While this statement contains no new recommendations, GAO has previously made recommendations to DHS to enhance border security. DHS has generally concurred with these recommendations and has taken actions, or has actions planned or under way, to address them. |
gao_GAO-08-775T | gao_GAO-08-775T_0 | Of particular importance is the security of information and systems supporting critical infrastructures—physical or virtual systems and assets so vital to the nation that their incapacitation or destruction would have a debilitating impact on national and economic security and on public health and safety. Critical infrastructure control systems face increasing risks due to cyber threats, system vulnerabilities, and the potential impact of attacks as demonstrated by reported incidents. TVA Provides Power to the Southeastern United States
The TVA is a federal corporation and the nation’s largest public power company. TVA Had Not Fully Implemented Appropriate Controls to Protect Control Systems from Unauthorized Access
TVA had not fully implemented appropriate security practices to secure the networks on which its control systems rely. Specifically, the interconnected corporate and control systems networks at certain facilities that we reviewed did not have sufficient information security safeguards in place to adequately protect control systems. As a result TVA, control systems were at increased risk of unauthorized modification or disruption by both internal and external threats. Weaknesses in TVA’s Corporate Network Controls Placed Network Devices at Risk
Multiple weaknesses within the TVA corporate network left it vulnerable to potential compromise of the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of network devices and the information transmitted by the network. For example: Almost all of the workstations and servers that we examined on the corporate network lacked key security patches or had inadequate security settings. Weaknesses in TVA Control Systems Networks Jeopardized the Security of its Control Systems
The access controls implemented by TVA did not adequately secure its control systems networks and devices, leaving the control systems vulnerable to disruption by unauthorized individuals. For example: Live network jacks connected to TVA’s internal network at certain facilities we reviewed had not been adequately secured from unauthorized access. Information Security Management Program Was Not Consistently Implemented Across TVA’s Critical Infrastructure
An underlying reason for TVA’s information security control weaknesses was that it had not consistently implemented significant elements of its information security program, such as: documenting a complete inventory of systems; assessing risk of all systems identified; developing, documenting, and implementing information security policies and procedures; and documenting plans for security of control systems as well as for remedial actions to mitigate known vulnerabilities. Furthermore, TVA’s written guidance on patch management provided only limited guidance on how to prioritize vulnerabilities. As a result, patches that were identified as critical were not applied in a timely manner; in some cases, a patch was applied more than 6 months past TVA deadlines for installation. Opportunities Exist to Improve Security of TVA’s Control Systems
Numerous opportunities exist for TVA to improve the security of its control systems. An underlying cause for these weaknesses is that the agency had not consistently implemented its information security program throughout the agency. If TVA does not take sufficient steps to secure its control systems and implement an information security program, it risks not being able to respond properly to a major disruption that is the result of an intended or unintended cyber incident. | Why GAO Did This Study
The control systems that regulate the nation's critical infrastructures face risks of cyber threats, system vulnerabilities, and potential attacks. Securing these systems is therefore vital to ensuring national security, economic well-being, and public health and safety. While most critical infrastructures are privately owned, the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), a federal corporation and the nation's largest public power company, provides power and other services to a large swath of the American Southeast. GAO was asked to testify on its public report being released today on the security controls in place over TVA's critical infrastructure control systems. In doing this work, GAO examined the security practices in place at TVA facilities; analyzed the agency's information security policies, plans, and procedures in light of federal law and guidance; and interviewed agency officials responsible for overseeing TVA's control systems and their security.
What GAO Found
TVA had not fully implemented appropriate security practices to secure the control systems used to operate its critical infrastructures at facilities GAO reviewed. Multiple weaknesses within the TVA corporate network left it vulnerable to potential compromise of the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of network devices and the information transmitted by the network. For example, almost all of the workstations and servers that GAO examined on the corporate network lacked key security patches or had inadequate security settings. Furthermore, TVA did not adequately secure its control system networks and devices on these networks, leaving the control systems vulnerable to disruption by unauthorized individuals. Network interconnections provided opportunities for weaknesses on one network to potentially affect systems on other networks. For example, weaknesses in the separation of network segments could allow an individual who gained access to a computing device connected to a less secure portion of the network to compromise systems in a more secure portion of the network, such as the control systems. In addition, physical security at multiple locations that GAO reviewed did not sufficiently protect the control systems. For example, live network jacks connected to TVA's internal network at certain facilities GAO reviewed had not been adequately secured from unauthorized access. As a result, TVA's control systems were at increased risk of unauthorized modification or disruption by both internal and external threats. An underlying reason for these weaknesses was that TVA had not consistently implemented significant elements of its information security program. For example, the agency lacked a complete and accurate inventory of its control systems and had not categorized all of its control systems according to risk, limiting assurance that these systems are adequately protected. In addition, TVA's patch management process lacked a mechanism to effectively prioritize vulnerabilities. As a result, patches that were identified as critical, meaning they should be applied immediately to vulnerable systems, were not applied in a timely manner. Numerous opportunities exist for TVA to improve the security of its control systems. For example, TVA can strengthen logical access controls, improve physical security, and fully implement its information security program. If TVA does not take sufficient steps to secure its control systems and fully implement an information security program, it risks not being able to respond properly to a major disruption that is the result of an intended or unintended cyber incident. |
gao_GAO-03-732T | gao_GAO-03-732T_0 | These trends have triggered concerns that taxpayers’ motivation to voluntarily comply with their tax obligations could be adversely affected. Compliance Trends Are Mixed; the Often Cited Audit Rate Has Declined Steeply
Taxpayers’ willingness to voluntarily comply with the tax laws depends in part on their confidence that their friends, neighbors, and business competitors are paying their fair share of taxes. IRS’s compliance programs, including audits, document matching, and other efforts, are viewed by many as critical to maintaining the public’s confidence in our tax system. Collection Trends Have Declined
As we reported in May 2002, between fiscal years 1996 and 2001 trends in the collection of delinquent taxes showed almost universal declines in collection program performance, in terms of coverage of workload, cases closed, direct staff time used, productivity, and dollar of unpaid taxes collected. Concerns Regarding the Compliance and Collection Trends
Many parties have expressed concern about these trends in IRS’s compliance and collection programs. However, as shown in figures 4 and 5, staffing in two key compliance and collection occupations were lower in 2002 than in 2000. Given its scope, potential effects on EIC claimants, and planned rapid expansion, the success of the initiative will depend on careful planning and close management attention as IRS implements the initiative. For over a decade we have reported on IRS’s efforts to reduce EIC noncompliance. This initiative is a substantial undertaking with a relatively aggressive implementation schedule. Challenges Must Be Met if IRS Is to Successfully Use Private Collection Agencies
IRS’s 2004 budget requests $2 million and legislative authorization for use of private collection agencies (PCA) to assist IRS in collecting certain types of delinquent tax debt. Earlier pilot efforts to study use of PCAs in 1996 and 1997 were hindered, in part, because IRS was unable to do this. Another IRS capacity issue relates to the cases that PCAs, for several reasons, will refer back to IRS. Concluding Observations
Although IRS has received increases in its budgets since fiscal year 2001 in part to increase staffing to enhance in its compliance and collection programs, IRS has been unable to achieve the desired staffing levels. Based on past experience and uncertainty regarding some expected internal savings that would enable IRS to reallocate staff to these programs, fiscal year 2004 staff increases might not fully materialize. IRS has defined the scope and nature of its proposed new initiatives to address known sources of EIC noncompliance and to use private collection agencies to assist in collecting certain delinquent taxes. | Why GAO Did This Study
Taxpayers' willingness to voluntarily comply with tax laws depends in part on their confidence that friends, neighbors, and business competitors are paying their fair share of taxes. The Internal Revenue Service's (IRS) programs to ensure compliance and to collect delinquent taxes are viewed by many as critical for maintaining the public's confidence in our tax system. Congress asked GAO to present information on trends in IRS's compliance and collection programs and to discuss issues related to IRS's efforts to increase staffing for these programs. GAO was also asked to discuss IRS's plans to launch new initiatives to reduce noncompliance with the Earned Income Tax Credit (EIC) and to use private collection agencies to assist in collecting delinquent taxes.
What GAO Found
From fiscal years 1993 through 2002, IRS's four major compliance programs for individual taxpayers had mixed trends in the portion of taxpayers they contacted with two declining, one increasing, and one staying relatively the same. Among the programs, IRS's often-cited audit rate declined about 38 percent. From fiscal years 1996 through 2001, IRS's collection program experienced almost universal declines in workload coverage, cases closed, direct staff time used, productivity, and dollars of unpaid taxes collected. Many parties have expressed concern about the compliance--especially audit--and collections trends for their potential to undermine taxpayers' motivation to fulfill their tax obligations. Since 2001 IRS has sought more resources including increased staffing for compliance and collections. Despite receiving requested budget increases, staffing levels in key occupations were lower in 2002 than in 2000. These declines occurred for reasons such as unbudgeted expenses consuming budget increases and other operational workload increases. Based on past experience and uncertainty regarding some expected internal savings, fiscal year 2004 anticipated staff increases might not fully materialize. IRS's 2004 budget proposes a substantial initiative to address known sources of EIC noncompliance. IRS intends to ramp up the initiative rapidly with planning and implementation proceeding simultaneously. If it is to succeed, the initiative will require careful planning and close management attention. IRS also proposes to use private collection agencies to assist in collecting certain delinquent tax debt. IRS is seeking authority to retain some tax receipts in a revolving fund to pay the private collectors. A pilot effort to use private collectors in 1996 was unsuccessful, in part because IRS was unable to identify and channel appropriate collection cases to the private collectors. Key implementation details for this proposal must be worked out and it too will require careful planning and close management attention. |
gao_GAO-05-424 | gao_GAO-05-424_0 | Regulatory review. As part of that review, the agency CIO must ensure that each information collection instrument (form, survey, or questionnaire) complies with the act. Agency Review Processes Were Not Rigorous, and Public Consultation Was Limited
Governmentwide, agency CIOs generally reviewed information collections before they were submitted to OMB and certified that the 10 standards in the act were met. Further, although the law requires CIOs to provide support for certifications, agency files contained little evidence that CIO reviewers had made efforts to improve the support offered by program offices. Without appropriate support and public consultation, agencies have reduced assurance that collections satisfy the standards in the act. In contrast, IRS and EPA have used additional evaluative processes that focus on reducing burden and that involve potential respondents to a much greater extent. Table 2 shows the result of our analysis of the case studies. Support for Certifications Concerning Duplication Was Often Missing or Partial
Under the act, CIOs are required to certify that each information collection is not unnecessarily duplicative. Once the forms are chosen, the office performs highly detailed, in-depth analyses, including extensive outreach to the public affected, the users of the information within and outside the agency, and other stakeholders. IRS reports that this targeted, resource-intensive process has achieved significant reductions in burden: over 200 million burden hours since 2002. Similarly, both IRS and EPA addressed information collections that had undergone CIO review and received OMB approval and nonetheless found significant opportunities to reduce burden. OMB similarly disagrees with our conclusion that “the standard PRA review process resulted in no reduction in burden” in the 12 case studies, because we did not demonstrate that burden reduction would have been feasible if the CIO review of these collections had been more rigorous. 1320.8(b)(3) requires that each collection of information “informs and provides reasonable notice to the potential persons to whom the collection of information is addressed of: “(i) the reasons the information is planned to be and/or has been “(ii) the way such information is planned to be and/or has been used to further the proper performance of the functions of the agency; “(iii) an estimate, to the extent practicable, the average burden of the collection (together with a request that the public direct to the agency any comments concerning the accuracy of this burden estimate and any suggestions for reducing this burden); “(iv) whether responses to the collection of information are voluntary, required to obtain or retain a benefit (citing authority) or mandatory (citing authority); “(v) the nature and extent of confidentiality to be provided, if any (citing authority); and “(vi) the fact that an agency may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, a collection of information unless it displays a currently valid OMB control number.”] “(h) has been developed by an office that has planned and allocated resources for the efficient and effective management and use of the information to be collected, including the processing of the information in a manner which shall enhance, where appropriate, the utility of the information to agencies and the public; “(i) uses effective and efficient statistical survey methodology appropriate to the purpose for which the information is to be collected; and “(j) to the maximum extent practicable, uses appropriate information technology to reduce burden and improve data quality, agency efficiency and responsiveness to the public.”
Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to assess the extent to which, before information collections are submitted to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) for approval, agencies have (1) established effective processes for Chief Information Officers (CIO) to review information collections and certify that the 10 standards in the act were met and (2) complied with the requirements to consult with the public on such collections; the extent to which agencies ensure that collection forms on agency Web sites are properly approved by OMB and included in an inventory of approved collections; and the extent to which agencies ensure that collection forms on agency Web sites disclose certain required information that the public needs to exercise scrutiny of agency activities. At the detailed agency audit level, we compared the act’s requirements with the paperwork clearance processes used at three departments and one agency: the Departments of Veterans Affairs (VA), Housing and Urban Development (HUD), and Labor, as well as the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) in the Department of the Treasury. In addition to the 12 case studies, we randomly selected 343 cases from over 8,200 collections at 68 agencies that we used to determine compliance levels at the four agencies and governmentwide with the act’s requirements to issue a notice in the Federal Register providing a 60-day public comment period; for the CIO to certify that the 10 information management standards in the act had been met; and for the agency to consult with the public and affected agencies on ways to minimize burden. 12. | Why GAO Did This Study
Americans spend billions of hours each year providing information to federal agencies by filling out information collections (forms, surveys, or questionnaires). A major aim of the Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA) is to balance the burden of these collections with their public benefit. Under the act, agencies' Chief Information Officers (CIO) are responsible for reviewing information collections before they are submitted to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) for approval. As part of this review, CIOs must certify that the collections meet 10 standards set forth in the act. GAO was asked to assess, among other things, this review and certification process, including agencies' efforts to consult with the public. To do this, GAO reviewed a governmentwide sample of collections, reviewed processes and collections at four agencies that account for a large proportion of burden, and performed case studies of 12 approved collections.
What GAO Found
Governmentwide, agency CIOs generally reviewed information collections and certified that they met the standards in the act. However, GAO's analysis of 12 case studies at the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and the Departments of Veterans Affairs, Housing and Urban Development, and Labor showed that CIOs certified collections even though support was often missing or partial. For example, in nine of the case studies, agencies did not provide support, as the law requires, for the standard that the collection was developed by an office with a plan and resources to use the information effectively. Because OMB instructions do not ask explicitly for this support, agencies generally did not address it. Further, although the law requires agencies both to publish notices in the Federal Register and to otherwise consult with the public, agencies governmentwide generally limited consultation to the publication of notices, which generated little public comment. Without appropriate support and public consultation, agencies have reduced assurance that collections satisfy the standards in the act. Processes outside the PRA review process, which are more rigorous and involve greater public outreach, have been set up by IRS and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), whose missions involve numerous information collections and whose management is focused on minimizing burden. For example, each year, IRS subjects a few forms to highly detailed, in-depth analyses, including extensive outreach to the public affected and the information users. IRS reports that this process--performed on forms that have undergone CIO review and received OMB approval--has reduced burden by over 200 million hours since 2002. In contrast, for the 12 case studies, the CIO review process did not reduce burden. Without rigorous evaluative processes, agencies are unlikely to achieve the PRA goal of minimizing burden while maximizing utility. |
gao_RCED-98-87 | gao_RCED-98-87_0 | EPA Is Using Most of Its Brownfield Funding to Help State, Local, and Tribal Governments Assess Sites and Build Voluntary Cleanup Programs
Assessment Pilot Projects
EPA funds assessment pilot projects through cooperative agreements with state, local, and tribal governments, which use the funds to assess, identify, characterize, and plan cleanup activities at contaminated sites targeted for redevelopment. Cleanup Revolving Loan Fund
EPA provided financial support to state, local, and tribal governments to help them create revolving loan funds that would provide low-interest loans to public and private entities for site cleanups. Since fiscal year 1993, EPA has allocated a small portion of general funds to make five job training awards, three of them in fiscal year 1997. EPA’s Criteria and Process to Evaluate Unsolicited Proposals for Funds for Its Outreach, Technical Assistance, and Research Program and Job Training Program
Although recipients do not have to compete against each other for funds from either EPA’s outreach, technical assistance, and research program category or its job training program category, the agency has established criteria and set up an approval process to award funds for brownfield activities. EPA’s Outreach and Special Projects Staff awarded funds to nonprofit organizations if their unsolicited proposals addressed one of the following four broad criteria:increase community involvement in brownfields; promote the redevelopment of brownfields; provide for site assessment and cleanup; and promote the principal of sustainable development—that future economic well-being depends on the ability to sustain a healthy environment and productive, renewable natural resources. According to the brownfield program managers, they used the following process to approve the 24 awards we reviewed. This is because, generally, the organization submitting an outreach or job training proposal serves a unique group of constituents that is affected by brownfields or has unique brownfield expertise. EPA guidance allows the agency to use unique qualifications as a justification for a noncompetitive award. Recipients used these awards to provide outreach, technical assistance, research, and job training to support both brownfields specifically and Superfund or other programs more generally. We determined that about $3.7 million of these funds were for the following more specific brownfield activities, although some portion of the activities provided by the remaining funds could also indirectly benefit brownfields: issue reports or other documents on redevelopment activities; sponsor forums, conferences, or other meetings to disseminate research regarding brownfield issues and policies; conduct or sponsor workshops on brownfield issues or policies and on developing environmental curricula for job training related to hazardous waste cleanup; conduct research on brownfield and redevelopment issues, such as insurance coverage for entities conducting cleanups; and establish or develop programs to identify barriers to brownfield development. Project Officers Were Monitoring the Brownfield Grants and Agreements, but the Awards Will Not Likely Be Subject to Financial Audits Because of Their Small Dollar Value
Our review of the files for each of the 24 awards and our interviews with various members of the Outreach and Special Projects Staff responsible for managing some of the individual awards showed that project officers were monitoring recipients’ activities. Specifically, we were to determine (1) what activities EPA supported with the funds it targeted for brownfields in its fiscal years 1997 and 1998 budgets; (2) what criteria and approval process EPA used to award grants and agreements within its program categories for Outreach, Technical Assistance, and Research and Job Training that included brownfield funds or activities since 1993; (3) how recipients used the funds provided by the awards in these two categories; and (4) how EPA monitors and oversees these grants and agreements. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the grants and agreements the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) awarded since fiscal year 1993 under two program categories of brownfield expenditures, focusing on the: (1) criteria and process EPA used to award these grants and agreements; (2) uses recipients made of these funds; and (3) monitoring and oversight EPA provided for them.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) EPA primarily uses its brownfield funds to help state, local, and tribal governments build their capacities to assess, clean up, and revitalize brownfield sites; (2) EPA is using the majority of its $126 million in brownfield funds for fiscal years 1997 and 1998 to: (a) help these groups identify, assess, characterize, and develop clean-up plans for brownfield sites; (b) provide them with seed money to create revolving loan funds that they could use to award low-interest loans for cleanups; (c) support state development of programs that provide incentives for voluntary cleanup of sites, especially brownfields; and (d) provide outreach to groups affected by brownfields, technical assistance to them on clean-up and redevelopment methods, and research for them on brownfield issues; (3) EPA is using the remaining brownfield funds for support and other program activities, such as EPA's personal costs; (4) EPA set up four broad criteria and an approval process to award funds noncompetitively to nonprofit organizations for their unsolicited proposals to provide outreach, technical assistance, research, and job training; (5) the criteria included increasing community involvement at brownfields, promoting redevelopment, providing for site assessments, and sustaining a clean environment for the future; (6) if the proposals met one of the four criteria, the managers responsible for most of the brownfield activities explained that they generally would fund the proposals if the nonprofit organization represented unique constituents affected by brownfields, such as tribes, or offered unique brownfield expertise or experience; (7) although EPA has used the same process and criteria to award a few job training grants and agreements, it is developing a strategic plan to use as criteria for making future awards; (8) since fiscal year 1993, award recipients have used $3.7 million from the 24 outreach and job training awards GAO reviewed to conduct brownfield-specific activities; (9) award recipients used additional funds from the 24 awards for outreach and job training activities in support of the broader Superfund program or other EPA programs, although some of these activities would also indirectly help promote brownfield cleanup and redevelopment; and (10) EPA staff responsible for managing the 24 awards GAO reviewed were monitoring the overall status of the budget for each award and the content and quality of recipients' activities through various means. |
gao_GAO-11-91 | gao_GAO-11-91_0 | FAA Has Adopted Aspects of Some Leading Workforce Planning Practices but Lacks a Strategic Approach to Planning for Its Technician Workforce
FAA’s workforce planning for technicians partially or mostly incorporates key practices of leading organizations, but no practices are fully incorporated, and FAA has no comprehensive, written strategy to guide its efforts. To the extent that the agency does not incorporate leading practices, it may be limited in its ability to plan effectively for the right number of technicians with the right skill sets, both now and in the near term. FAA Has an Annual Process for Allocating Its Technician Workforce but Lacks a Succession Planning Strategy for Addressing Impending Retirements and a Staffing Model
FAA’s workforce planning efforts partially address leading practices in developing strategies to close the gap between needed and actual skills and competencies. FAA does not have a workforce planning communication strategy, a key practice designed to create shared expectations, promote transparency, and report progress. FAA’s Ability to Plan for Technician Training Is Limited by Shortfalls in Its Workforce Planning and Identification of Needed Skills and Competencies
FAA at least partially follows key practices of leading organizations in its training and development for technicians. FAA Is Identifying Annual Training Goals but Needs to Identify Strategic Training Goals and Those Skills and Competencies Needed to Meet Such Goals
FAA has partially implemented initiatives—such as establishing annual training goals and incorporating employees’ developmental goals—to plan for strategic training and development of its technicians. FAA is taking action to ensure that its training goals are consistent with its overall mission, goals, and culture in that it plans to train annually at least the minimum number of technicians that it believes it needs to maintain air traffic management facilities; however, FAA has not identified future training needs beyond the annual cycle and has only just begun to determine the critical skills and competencies that it will need to maintain NextGen systems. With the transition to NextGen, technicians’ training requirements—and thus critical skills and competencies—will increase, since technicians will have to learn how to maintain the new systems while remaining proficient in maintaining the legacy systems that FAA plans to continue operating indefinitely. No vendor courses have been approved to replace academy training for legacy courses, although Technical Operations Training is studying the feasibility of having vendors provide certain courses that are currently offered through the academy and are filled to capacity. Certain Academy Training Costs Have Been Roughly Stable, while Those Vendor Training Costs That FAA Can Identify Have Risen with the Rollout of Courses for New Equipment
Instructor Costs of Academy Training on Established Equipment Have Remained Stable, but Student Travel Costs Have Increased
In the past few years, the academy has provided hundreds of training classes to thousands of FAA technicians. The costs that FAA identified for academy training include those for instructor services and those for student travel to and from the academy in Oklahoma City. Recommendations for Executive Action
To ensure that FAA can hire and retain the technician staff it needs to install, maintain, repair, and certify equipment and facilities in the national airspace system, in the current and NextGen environments, we recommend that the Secretary of Transportation direct the FAA Administrator to take the following four actions: 1. develop and implement a comprehensive, written workforce strategy or policy for the technician workforce that incorporates the key leading practices in strategic workforce planning that FAA has not fully incorporated, such as determining the critical skills and competencies that will be needed to achieve current and future results; 2. develop and implement a strategic training plan that is aligned with a written technician workforce strategy and incorporates key leading practices in training and development that FAA has not fully incorporated, such as determining how training and development efforts are expected to contribute to improved performance and results; 3. improve planning for any future NextGen systems training by including input from FAA’s NextGen Integration and Implementation Office, ATO’s Technical Operations Training and Development Group, technician supervisors, technical experts, and technicians to develop an integrated way to address specific performance gaps or incorporate necessary enhancements in the technician training curriculum; and 4. consider modifying FAA’s cost accounting system or cost analysis techniques to develop information about the cost of in-house and vendor-provided training and of the travel related to those training activities to assist Congress in understanding the costs of operations and making informed decisions. The department provided technical corrections, which we incorporated as appropriate. Specifically, we addressed the following questions: (1) To what extent does FAA incorporate key practices of leading organizations in its workforce planning for technicians? (2) How does FAA’s technician training compare with key practices of leading organizations? (3) How have the costs of technician training, including travel costs, changed in recent years? We also conducted semistructured interviews with FAA management about technician training costs. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since 2006, air traffic control (ATC) equipment outages and failures at Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) facilities have caused hundreds of flight delays and raised questions about FAA's maintenance capabilities. About 6,100 technicians maintain FAA's current (legacy) facilities and equipment and will be responsible for the Next Generation (NextGen) technologies planned for the next 15 years. Safe and efficient air travel will therefore partly depend on FAA's having technicians with the right skills now and in the future. As requested, GAO reviewed how (1) FAA incorporates key practices of leading organizations in its workforce planning for technicians, (2) FAA's technician training compares with key practices of leading organizations, and (3) the costs of technician training, including travel costs, have changed in recent years. GAO analyzed FAA workforce and training data, compared FAA planning and training practices with criteria identified in prior GAO work, and conducted focus group interviews with FAA technicians and FAA Training Academy instructors.
What GAO Found
FAA has followed some key practices of leading organizations in its strategic workforce planning for technicians but lacks a comprehensive, written strategy to guide its efforts. GAO assessed whether FAA followed those practices fully, mostly, or partially, or did not follow them. For example, FAA partially follows one practice--determining critical skills and competencies--because it assesses those skills and competencies its technicians now have to maintain legacy systems, but has just begun to identify those they will need to maintain NextGen systems. FAA also partially develops strategies to close the gap between the technician workforce it needs and the one that it has: It determines staffing needs annually, but lacks a longer-term strategy to address the hundreds of technician retirements projected through 2020. Without a comprehensive, written technician workforce planning strategy, FAA does not have a transparent road map to acquire and retain the right number of technicians with the right skills at the right time. FAA mostly follows other leading workforce planning practices, although it only partially involves key stakeholders--managers, but not technicians--in workforce planning and may thus be missing opportunities for improvement. FAA at least partially follows key practices of leading organizations in its strategic training and development for technicians, but it lacks a strategic training plan, and workload issues limit its ability to fully incorporate key leading practices. With the transition to NextGen, technicians will need to be trained both to maintain new systems and to remain proficient in maintaining the legacy systems that FAA plans to continue operating. FAA has partially implemented a strategic approach to planning for training in that it has established annual training goals and incorporated employees' developmental goals in its planning processes. As noted, however, it has just begun to identify the skills and competencies technicians will need to maintain NextGen systems. FAA mostly follows other key practices for design and development, such as developing a mix of in-house and vendor training. FAA is studying the feasibility of having vendors provide certain courses that are currently offered through the FAA Training Academy and are filled to capacity. FAA partially follows leading practices for implementing training and development, but workload demands often limit technicians' opportunities to attend training. FAA also partially follows leading practices for demonstrating how training and development efforts contribute to improved performance and results. For example, FAA identifies annual training goals, but does not link them to specific performance goals. As a result, it is limited in its ability to assess the effectiveness of its investments in training. Recent compensation costs for instructors at the FAA Training Academy have been roughly stable, while those for student travel to and from the academy and for training courses provided by vendors, exclusive of travel costs, have risen. The higher student travel costs reflect increases in air fares, and vendor training costs have grown as FAA has rolled out more courses for new equipment in preparation for the deployment of NextGen systems. Among other things, FAA should develop a written technician workforce planning strategy that identifies needed skills and staffing, and a strategic training plan showing how training efforts contribute to performance goals. The Department of Transportation provided technical corrections. |
gao_GAO-16-572 | gao_GAO-16-572_0 | The CFATS program is intended to ensure the security of the nation’s chemical infrastructure by identifying, assessing the risk posed by, and requiring the implementation of measures to protect high-risk chemical facilities. According to the CFATS Act of 2014, among other things, DHS is to implement the following six provisions related to a whistleblower procedure: 1. not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of the CFATS Act of 2014, establish and provide information to the public regarding a procedure under which any employee or contractor of a chemical facility of interest may submit a report of a CFATS violation, 2. keep confidential the identity of an employee or contractor at a chemical facility of interest, who submits a report of a potential CFATS violation under the established whistleblower procedure, 3. promptly respond to an employee or contractor at a chemical facility of interest, who provides contact information, to acknowledge receipt of the report, 4. review and consider the information provided in any report submitted, and take action, as appropriate, to address any substantiated CFATS violation, 5. follow certain procedural requirements if the Secretary determines that a violation has occurred and decides to institute a civil enforcement or issue an emergency order against a chemical facility, as appropriate under the law, and 6. work in partnership with industry associations and labor organizations to make publicly available, physically and online, the rights that an individual who provides DHS with whistleblower information about a covered chemical facility, would have under federal law. DHS Received 105 Reports and Closed 97 Because They Did Not Involve CFATS Regulatory Requirements
From June 16, 2015 (when ISCD implemented its whistleblower process) to April 19, 2016, ISCD received 105 reports from individuals—90 via the ISCD telephone tip line, 14 via e-mail, and 1 from ISCD’s CFATS help desk. DHS has not received a whistleblower retaliation report that it substantiated since ISCD implemented the interim process for whistleblower reports on June 16, 2015. The officials stated that, in the meantime, they would address any future retaliation reports on a case-by-case basis. Guidance on the ISCD Telephone Tip Line and Website for Whistleblower Reports Is Insufficient for Gathering Adequate Information from Whistleblowers
The ISCD current telephone tip line greeting and ISCD website for CFATS whistleblower reports provide no guidance and limited guidance, respectively, to whistleblowers regarding the types of information that would be most useful to ISCD in vetting and determining next steps for the reports. Our analysis of 105 reports received by ISCD from June 16, 2015 to April 19, 2016 identified the following challenges that ISCD officials experienced in vetting reports due to insufficient information. However, DHS has not developed a documented process and procedures to investigate whether retaliation has occurred. A documented process and procedures for addressing and investigating whistleblower retaliation reports would better ensure that DHS can effectively and efficiently investigate reports to determine whether whistleblowers were retaliated against. Regarding our recommendation that DHS develop a documented process and procedures to address and investigate whistleblower retaliation reports that could include existing practices, such as OSHA’s recommended practices, DHS stated that due to the construction of the CFATS-authorizing legislation, developing formal processes and procedures for investigating whistleblower retaliation reports will require modifications to the CFATS regulations. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to determine (1) the number and types of Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS) whistleblower reports the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) received, and any actions DHS took as a result of the reports, and (2) the extent to which DHS has implemented and followed a process to address reports from the whistleblowers, including reports of retaliation against whistleblowers. Although we focused on analyzing reports that DHS received since June 16, 2015, for context, we reviewed the CFATS telephone tip line calls that ISCD received from February 2009, when the telephone tip line started, to June 15, 2015—the day prior to ISCD’s implementation of the whistleblower procedure required under the Protecting and Securing Chemical Facilities from Terrorist Attacks Act of 2014 (CFATS Act of 2014). | Why GAO Did This Study
The CFATS program is intended to ensure the security of the nation's chemical infrastructure by assessing risks and requiring the implementation of measures to protect high-risk chemical facilities. The CFATS Act of 2014 required DHS to establish a whistleblower process. Employees and contractors at hundreds of thousands of U.S. facilities with hazardous chemicals can play an important role in helping to ensure CFATS compliance by submitting a whistleblower report when they suspect noncompliance. Whistleblowers who disclose wrongdoing at chemical facilities can save lives and help improve public safety and health.
The CFATS Act of 2014 also requires GAO to review the CFATS whistleblower process. This report addresses (1) the number and types of CFATS whistleblower reports DHS received, and any actions DHS took as a result, and (2) the extent to which DHS has implemented and followed a process to address the whistleblower reports, including reports of retaliation against whistleblowers. GAO reviewed laws, regulations, and CFATS program documents; analyzed whistleblower reports DHS received from June 16, 2015 to April 19, 2016; and interviewed officials responsible for vetting the reports and deciding how to address them.
What GAO Found
Of the 105 reports that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) received under its interim process for whistleblowers from June 16, 2015 (the date DHS was mandated to begin collecting reports by), to April 19, 2016, DHS closed 97 because they did not pertain to Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS) regulations, and referred 70 of the 97 to other federal agencies with legal authority relevant to the reports. DHS determined that 8 of the 105 reports involved potential CFATS violations, and after further review, that 1 report involved an actual CFATS violation. As a result of this report, DHS required the chemical facility to register with DHS as a CFATS-regulated facility.
Total Reports Received by DHS and Disposition for Reports, June 16, 2015 to April 19, 2016
In June 2015, DHS implemented an interim process to respond to whistleblower reports involving CFATS and has followed its process since then; however, DHS does not have a documented process and procedures to investigate whistleblower retaliation reports. The Protecting and Securing Chemical Facilities from Terrorist Attacks Act of 2014 (CFATS Act of 2014) prohibits retaliation against whistleblowers. According to DHS, the department has not received a report of whistleblower retaliation that it substantiated since implementing the interim process and any future retaliation reports would be addressed on a case-by-case basis. However, without a documented process and procedures for investigating whistleblower retaliation reports, DHS may not be able to effectively and efficiently investigate any future retaliation reports. In addition, DHS maintains a telephone tip line and a website with an e-mail address to receive CFATS whistleblower reports. However, the tip line greeting provides no guidance and the website provides limited guidance about the type of information that would be most useful to DHS for addressing the reports. GAO's analysis of 105 reports received by DHS from June 16, 2015, to April 19, 2016, identified challenges that DHS experienced in vetting reports due to insufficient information, such as the name or location of the chemical facility. Additional guidance explaining the detailed information that DHS needs to review reports could help reduce the amount of follow-up time to obtain this information.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DHS develop a documented process and procedures to address whistleblower retaliation reports, and provide additional guidance on the DHS whistleblower website and telephone tip line. DHS agreed with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-14-482 | gao_GAO-14-482_0 | The Army and Marine Corps Have Taken Steps to Identify and Track Personnel with SFA-Related Training, Education, and Experience, but the Army Does Not Have a Plan or Time Frame for Completion
DOD has established a requirement for the services to identify and track personnel who have completed SFA-related training, education, or experience in the Defense Readiness Reporting System with a relevant skill-designator indicating their SFA qualifications. Further, the Army has not developed a plan with goals and milestones to identify and track personnel with SFA-related experience. The Army Is Able to Identify and Track Personnel with Certain SFA-Related Training and Education, but It Lacks a Mechanism to Identify and Track SFA-Related Experience
The Army has taken steps toward identifying and tracking personnel with certain SFA-related training and education, but efforts to identify and track SFA-related experience are incomplete. The Army and Marine Corps Have Taken a Number of Actions to Give Consideration to Those Serving in SFA-Related Positions during the Promotion Process
The Army and the Marine Corps have taken a number of steps to ensure that servicemembers with SFA-related experience receive consideration for serving in these positions during the promotion process. Both services have incorporated language into the guidance given to each promotion board member every time a promotion board is held to ensure that appropriate consideration is given to individuals who have served on advisor teams. Opinions Differ Regarding the Effect of Serving in an SFA-Related Position on Career Progression
We found differing opinions regarding the effect that Army and Marine Corps guidance have on the manner in which individuals with SFA-related training, education, and experience are considered during the promotion process. They noted that the promotion process considers the entirety of an individual’s career and not just the time spent as an advisor. As a result, officials are not able to conduct an assessment of personnel to determine whether there are different promotion rates for people who served on advisor teams versus those who did not, which could be a potential indicator that servicemembers with SFA-related experience were negatively affected during the promotion process. During this review, officials from the SFA brigades we met with stated that the brigades’ predeployment planning efforts ensured that the brigades left behind sufficient leadership to manage the rear detachments and develop training plans to maintain readiness. Leaving Key Leadership Personnel: Officials told us that leaving the right personnel behind to manage the rear detachment is just as important as deploying the right personnel. However, it is still up to the rear-detachment brigade leadership to determine the level of readiness that they can achieve with the personnel and equipment remaining at the home station. Conclusions
SFA has been and continues to be an enduring part of the U.S. military effort in Afghanistan and other locations around the world. Until the Army develops such a plan, it is at risk of not being able to readily identify the right personnel with the right skills and experience to serve in an SFA mission. Recommendation for Executive Action
To enable the Army to address the requirement to identify and track personnel with SFA-related experience, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Army to develop and implement a plan with goals and milestones for how it will develop the means for systematically identifying and tracking personnel with SFA- related experience. In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD partially concurred with the report’s recommendation. However, DOD stated that sufficient guidance and direction exists for the Army to continue refining its processes and procedures. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of this engagement were to assess the extent to which (1) the Army and Marine Corps identify and track personnel with SFA-related training, education, and experience; and (2) the Army and Marine Corps consider SFA-related training, education, and experience in the promotion process; and to describe the process the Army uses to prepare units to perform their core missions while some unit members are deployed to support SFA activities. | Why GAO Did This Study
SFA—DOD activities that contribute to supporting the development of foreign security forces and their supporting institutions—is a key component of U.S. efforts to create sustainable security around the world. These activities are carried out by DOD personnel serving as advisors who may have SFA-related training, education, and prior experience to conduct the advising mission.
GAO was mandated to review the Army's and Marine Corps' approaches to the SFA mission. GAO assessed the extent to which the Army and Marine Corps (1) identify and track personnel with SFA-related training, education, and experience and (2) consider SFA-related training, education, and experience in the promotion process. This report also describes the Army's process for preparing units to perform their core mission while some members are deployed to support SFA activities. GAO reviewed DOD policies, directives, and other documents and interviewed cognizant DOD and service officials.
What GAO Found
The Army and Marine Corps have taken steps to identify and track personnel with Security Force Assistance (SFA)-related training, education, and experience, but the Army does not have a plan with goals and milestones to fully capture advising experience. A key element in conducting SFA missions is being able to identify the right personnel with the right training, education, and experience to execute SFA activities. The Department of Defense (DOD) established a requirement for the services to identify and track personnel with SFA-related training, education, and experience. Although the Army is able to identify and track soldiers with certain SFA-related training and education, it does not have a mechanism to identify and track SFA-related experience. Moreover, the Army has not developed a plan with goals and milestones on how it will capture this information. As a result, it is unclear how long it will take the Army to implement DOD's requirement and be able to readily identify the right personnel to serve in the SFA mission. The Marine Corps is implementing a mechanism to identify and track personnel with SFA-related training, education, and experience that is planned to be available in October 2014.
The Army and the Marine Corps have taken steps to ensure the consideration of SFA-related training, education, and experience in the promotion process. Both services have incorporated language into the guidance given to promotion boards to ensure that appropriate consideration is given to individuals who have served on advisor teams. However, opinions differ regarding the effect the guidance has had on the manner in which individuals with SFA-related training, education, and experience are considered during the promotion process. Some officials said that serving in an SFA role could potentially negatively affect career progression. Others noted that the promotion process considers the entirety of an individual's career and not just the time spent as an SFA advisor. However, because the Army and Marine Corps do not yet have comprehensive information on SFA advisors, officials are unable to determine whether promotion rates differ for people who served on SFA advisor teams versus those who did not. Such differences could be a potential indicator that servicemembers with SFA-related experience were negatively affected during the promotion process.
According to Army officials, the Army has taken a number of actions to ensure that units are prepared to perform their core mission when part of the unit is deployed in support of SFA activities. Officials stated that some actions taken to manage units that remain at the home station, also known as the rear detachment, when part of the unit deploys include consolidating units so that they can conduct training, ensuring the right personnel are left behind to lead the rear detachment, developing training plans for what the rear detachment would train to, and reporting on the availability of all personnel and equipment.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the Army develop and implement a plan, with goals and milestones, for how it will develop the means for systematically identifying and tracking personnel with SFA-related experience. DOD partially concurred with the recommendation, stating that sufficient guidance and direction exists for the Army to continue refining its processes and procedures. GAO continues to believe the recommendation is valid, as discussed in the report. |
gao_GAO-06-628T | gao_GAO-06-628T_0 | In 2005 the unified federal budget deficit was around $318 billion or 2.6 percent of gross domestic product (GDP). National saving is the sum of personal saving, corporate saving, and government saving. Last year, for the first time since 1934, net national saving declined to less than 1 percent of GDP and the personal saving rate was slightly negative (see fig. The current account deficit is the difference between domestic investment and national saving. Over most of the last 25 years, the United States has run a current account deficit, but in 2005 the current account deficit hit an all-time record—$782 billion, or over 6 percent of GDP (see fig.4). Economic growth in recent years has been high despite the fact that national saving was low by U.S. historical standards. This is because more and better investments were made. However, we cannot let our recent good fortune lull us into complacency. If the net inflow of foreign investment were to diminish, so too would domestic investment and potentially economic growth if that saving is not offset by saving here in the U.S. Also, our nation faces daunting fiscal and demographic challenges, which may be even more of a reason to address our nation’s low saving rates. Nation Faces Long-term Fiscal Challenges
Given our nation’s long-term fiscal outlook, acting sooner rather than later to increase national saving is imperative. Greater economic growth from saving more now would make it easier for future workers to achieve a rising standard of living for themselves while also paying for the government’s commitments to the elderly. While economic growth will help society bear the burden of financing Social Security and Medicare, it alone will not solve the long-term fiscal challenge. Tough choices are inevitable, and the sooner we act the better. Acting sooner rather than later could allow the miracle of compounding to turn from enemy to ally. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Chairman of the Senate Committee on Finance asked GAO to testify on our nation's low saving and discuss the implications for long-term economic growth. National saving--the portion of a nation's current income not consumed--is the sum of saving by households, businesses, and all levels of government. National saving represents resources available for investment to replace old factories and equipment and to buy more and better capital goods. Higher saving and investment in a nation's capital stock contribute to increased productivity and stronger economic growth over the long term.
What GAO Found
Our nation faces a number of deficits, including our nation's budget deficit, a saving deficit, and a current account deficit. Unfortunately, America has been heading in the wrong direction on all three deficits in recent years. In 2005 our nation's budget deficit was around $318 billion or 2.6 percent of GDP. For the first time since 1934, net national saving declined to less than 1 percent of GDP and the personal saving rate was slightly negative in 2005. While the United States has run a current account deficit--or borrowed to finance domestic investment--over most of the last 25 years, the current account deficit hit an all time record--$782 billion, or over 6 percent of GDP in 2005. Despite low national saving in recent years, economic growth has been high. However, we cannot let our recent good fortune lull us into complacency. If the net inflow of foreign investment were to diminish, so too would domestic investment and potentially economic growth if that saving is not offset by saving here in the U.S. Also, our nation faces daunting fiscal and demographic challenges, which provide even more of a reason to address our nation's low saving rates. Greater economic growth from saving more now would make it easier for future workers to bear the burden of financing Social Security and Medicare, but economic growth alone will not solve the long-term fiscal challenge. Tough choices are inevitable, and the sooner we act the better in order to allow the miracle of compounding to turn from enemy to ally. |
gao_GAO-15-16 | gao_GAO-15-16_0 | Few Taxpayers Had Reported IRA Balances Greater Than $5 Million
Most Taxpayers with IRAs Have IRA Balances of $1 Million or Less
Of the 145 million married couples and individuals who filed individual income tax returns for tax year 2011, an estimated 43 million, or 30 percent, had IRAs with an estimated total balance—in terms of FMV reported by custodians—of $5.2 trillion at the end of 2011.percent of those taxpayers had aggregate IRA balances of $1 million or less and accounted for around 78 percent of the total balance. For those with IRA balances of more than $5 million, most (about 90 percent) have AGI greater than $200,000. IRA Balances Greater Than $5 Million Could Be Considered Large Based on What Individuals Typically Contribute
While there is no total limit on IRA or DC plan accumulations, scenarios illustrating the maximum annual contributions by an individual and employer over time can shed light on what could be considered a large IRA (see appendix I for the statutory annual contributions limits and more detailed scenario descriptions). Alternate Strategies Are Likely the Cause of Large IRA Balances That Congress May Not Have Intended
Investments with Low Initial Values Not Available to Most Investors Help a Small Number of Individuals Accumulate Large IRA Balances
Our interviews with industry stakeholders and review of publicly available filings with the SEC and DOL indicate that a small number of individuals with access to certain types of nonpublicly traded shares in companies or a particular type of partnership interest, as shown in table 4, can generate IRA balances far exceeding $10 million. Most investors are unlikely to have access to these investments when their value is low enough to accumulate such disproportionate investment returns. Third, the statute of limitations for IRS to pursue cases is generally only 3 years, which poses certain obstacles to pursuing noncompliant activity that spans years of IRA investment. Congress Likely Did Not Intend IRAs to Result in Tax-Favored Accumulations of Funds beyond Those Reasonably Necessary to Support Individuals in Retirement
Congress enacted ERISA to promote opportunities for individuals to accumulate resources for their retirement and IRAs were originally authorized largely to ensure equitable tax treatment for individuals without access to an employer-sponsored plan. This resulted in inequitable tax treatment of individuals not covered by employer-sponsored plans. Congress established similar contribution limits on IRAs. In discussions with industry stakeholders and government officials, a number of proposals have been raised to address the accumulation of large IRAs. For example, asset valuation issues may originate in an employer DC plan before being rolled over to an IRA. IRS Plans to Collect Data to Identify IRAs with Riskier Nonpublic Assets, and Examiner Use Depends on Digitizing the Data
IRS plans to evaluate more data on hard-to-value IRA assets that would help to refine its enforcement efforts. SB/SE examination officials said that the new Form 5498 data will help them better identify taxpayers with IRAs invested in nonpublicly traded assets. Recommendations for Executive Action
We are making five recommendations to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. To improve IRS’s ability to detect and pursue noncompliance associated with undervalued assets sheltered in IRAs and prohibited transactions, we recommend that the Commissioner of Internal Revenue:
Approve plans to fully compile and digitize the new data from electronic and paper-filed Form 5498s to ensure the efficient use of the information on nonpublicly traded IRA assets. The Deputy Commissioner agreed that legislation to extend the period of limitations for assessment of tax associated with IRA noncompliance would remove an obstacle to IRS efforts to pursue identified IRA noncompliance. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report: (1) describes the number and types of taxpayers with individual retirement accounts (IRA) and the size of IRA balances in terms of aggregate fair market value (FMV), adjusted gross income (AGI), filing status and age; (2) examines how IRA balances can become large; and (3) assesses how the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) ensures that taxpayers with IRAs comply with IRA tax laws. These individuals often comprise the company’s founders. Assessing IRS Enforcement
To assess IRS’s examinations of IRA rules and provisions, we developed criteria for evaluating an enforcement program on IRAs. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 2014, the federal government will forgo an estimated $17.45 billion in tax revenue from IRAs, which Congress created to ensure equitable tax treatment for those not covered by employer-sponsored retirement plans. Congress limited annual contributions to IRAs to prevent the tax-favored accumulation of unduly large balances. But concerns have been raised about whether the tax incentives encourage new or additional saving. Congress is reexamining retirement tax incentives as part of tax reform.GAO was asked to measure IRA balances and assess IRS enforcement of IRA laws.
This report (1) describes IRA balances in terms of reported FMV aggregated by taxpayers; (2) examines how IRA balances can become large; and (3) assesses how IRS ensures that taxpayers comply with IRA tax laws. To address these objectives, GAO analyzed 2011 IRS statistical data, reviewed IRS documentation and relevant literature, and interviewed government officials, financial industry stakeholders, and academics. GAO compared IRS enforcement plans and procedures with law and criteria for evaluating an enforcement program.
What GAO Found
For tax year 2011 (the most recent year available), an estimated 43 million taxpayers had individual retirement accounts (IRA) with a total reported fair market value (FMV) of $5.2 trillion. As shown in the table below, few taxpayers had aggregated balances exceeding $5 million as of 2011. Generally, taxpayers with IRA balances greater than $5 million tend to have adjusted gross incomes greater than $200,000, be joint filers, and are age 65 or older. Large individual and employer contributions sustained over decades and rolled over from an employer plan would be necessary to accumulate an IRA balance of more than $5 million. There is no total statutory limit on IRA accumulations or rollovers from employer defined contribution plans.
A small number of taxpayers has accumulated larger IRA balances, likely by investing in assets unavailable to most investors—initially valued very low and offering disproportionately high potential investment returns if successful. Individuals who invest in these assets using certain types of IRAs can escape taxation on investment gains. For example, founders of companies who use IRAs to invest in nonpublicly traded shares of their newly formed companies can realize many millions of dollars in tax-favored gains on their investment if the company is successful. With no total limit on IRA accumulations, the government forgoes millions in tax revenue. The accumulation of these large IRA balances by a small number of investors stands in contrast to Congress's aim to prevent the tax-favored accumulation of balances exceeding what is needed for retirement.
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has enforcement programs covering specific aspects of IRA noncompliance, such as excess contributions and undervalued assets. As recommended by an internal task team, IRS plans to collect data identifying nonpublicly traded assets comprising IRA investments. IRS expects the data will help it identify potential IRA noncompliance. However, research on those taxpayers and IRA assets at risk will hinge on getting resources to effectively compile and analyze the additional data. IRS officials said IRA valuation cases are audit-intensive and difficult to litigate because of the subjective nature of valuation. Additionally, the 3-year statute of limitations for assessing taxes owed can pose an obstacle for IRS pursuing noncompliant activity that spans years of IRA investment.
What GAO Recommends
Congress should consider revisiting its legislative vision for the use of IRAs. GAO makes five recommendations to IRS, including approving plans to fully compile and digitize new data on nonpublicly traded IRA assets and seeking to extend the statute of limitations for IRA noncompliance. IRS generally agreed with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-15-474 | gao_GAO-15-474_0 | As such, MREs are a special category of WRM that is managed differently than other DLA-managed items. DLA compares the service-identified WRM requirements against its assets to identify the level of available inventory, including any potential shortfalls, and communicates this information back to the military services, which in turn use this information to make procurement decisions regarding WRM. Services Use Operational Plans and Other Inputs in Determining WRM Requirements
The military services determine their WRM requirements for most DLA- managed items based on operational plans that support warfighting scenarios approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and other inputs such as deployment schedules and equipment usage data. Some service officials stated that changes to troop end strength, force posture, and force structure could over time be reflected in operational plans, and ultimately affect WRM requirements, but these factors are more long-term influences than the primary drivers of the annual WRM requirements that are the focus of DLA’s annual data call process. DLA Monitors Data on MREs but Lacks Analysis and Information That Could Be Useful for Managing Inventory Levels
As the DOD Executive Agent for subsistence, DLA monitors various types of data on MREs, but it lacks other analysis and information that could be useful for managing inventory levels. However, DLA has not conducted recent analysis to determine the level of purchases needed annually to sustain the current industrial base while retaining the ability to meet a surge in requirements. In addition, while the military services provide DLA with their estimated future demand for MREs, DLA does not obtain information from the services, as part of existing coordination efforts, about potential changes to consumption and disposals that could affect future demand. DLA has identified an MRE war reserve level of 5 million cases. DLA monitors purchases from industry and sales to the services for planning purposes. Military Services May Not Be Able to Maintain Sufficient Rotations of MREs through Future Consumption
Military service officials who manage MREs expressed concerns that in light of changing needs, resulting from budgetary impacts and smaller end strengths, it may be difficult for the services to consume MREs in the future at a rate that will allow them to maintain sufficient rotations of MREs and prevent disposals due to expiring shelf life. However, DLA acknowledges in the strategic plan that sharing information about the military services’ demand and usage patterns will be vital to making purchase decisions. DLA Employs Various Strategies to Balance Cost and Readiness in Managing WRM Requirements
DLA uses various supply-chain strategies to balance cost with readiness in meeting the need for items identified as WRM and needed for surges associated with new contingencies or crises. On the other hand, DLA seeks to contract for fast access to those items that are readily available on the commercial market that would be costly to stock, such as medical supplies. Further, DLA for many years has been seeking to facilitate and improve access to certain WRM items through its Warstopper Program. DLA Is Working to Reduce Its On-Hand Inventory but Will Continue to Stock Certain Types of Items
DLA has sought to reduce its on-hand inventory, including WRM items, to gain certain benefits, but will continue to stock items that are, among other things, military-unique or of limited availability. DLA uses Warstopper funds to address weaknesses in certain supply chains by making targeted investments in industry that guarantee DLA access to materiel and enable industry to increase production when needed. For instance, without conducting an analysis that provides more information on industry capabilities than its previous studies, DLA does not have reasonable assurance that it is balancing readiness and budget priorities with the need to sustain the industrial base in the most efficient way. Similarly, without obtaining information from the military services about potential changes to consumption and disposals of MREs that could affect future demand, DLA may be limited in its ability to optimize the supply chain across the department. Recommendations for Executive Action
To obtain information useful to DLA’s decision making regarding MRE inventory levels, we recommend that the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Logistics and Materiel Readiness direct the Director, DLA, to take the following two actions:
Conduct an analytical study of the MRE industry’s capabilities that provides information on the level of MRE purchases needed to sustain the industrial base, including the ability to respond to a surge requirement. DOD concurred with our second recommendation that DLA request that the military services, as part of existing coordination efforts, share information on potential changes to MRE consumption and disposals that could affect future demand. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Defense (DOD) maintains WRM to reduce reaction time and sustain forces in future military operations. WRM is managed by DLA and the military services. WRM is intended to meet short-term needs until supply pipelines are established. Cost-effective management of WRM that maintains war-fighting capabilities is important as the department faces budget constraints and changes in force structure.
Senate Report 113-176, accompanying S. 2410, a proposed bill for the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015, included a provision for GAO to review the management of DOD's WRM. This report examines (1) how DOD determines WRM requirements for DLA-managed items, (2) the extent to which DLA has the information needed for MRE inventory decision making, and (3) any strategies DLA pursues to balance cost with readiness in supplying WRM. GAO obtained information from the services on their processes for identifying WRM requirements, reviewed DLA's inventory-management processes and related guidance, and interviewed DLA and military service officials.
What GAO Found
The military services determine their war reserve materiel (WRM) requirements for Defense Logistics Agency (DLA)-managed items based on operational plans that support warfighting scenarios and other inputs such as deployment schedules and equipment-usage data. WRM can include repair parts, construction equipment and supplies, and chemical protection suits, among other items. Service officials stated that changes to troop end strength, force posture, and force structure could over time be reflected in operational plans, but these factors are more long-term influences than the primary drivers of service WRM requirements for DLA-managed items. DLA compares service WRM requirements against its assets to identify the level of available inventory, including any potential inventory shortfalls, and communicates this information to the military services, which use it to inform their procurement decisions.
DLA monitors various types of data to manage Meals Ready to Eat (MRE), but it lacks other analysis and information that could be useful for managing this category of WRM. DLA monitors data such as purchases from industry and sales to the military services and currently has a yearly purchase objective of 2.5 million MRE cases. Service officials have expressed concerns that in light of changing needs resulting from budgetary effects and reduced end strengths, it may be difficult for the services to consume MREs in the future at a rate that will prevent disposals due to expiring shelf life. However, DLA has not conducted an analysis of the MRE industry to determine the level of purchases needed annually to sustain the industrial base while retaining the ability to meet a surge in requirements. Without conducting an analysis that provides more information on industry capabilities, DLA does not have reasonable assurance that it is balancing readiness and budget priorities with the need to sustain the industrial base in the most efficient way. DLA acknowledges in its strategic plan for MRE inventory that sharing information about the military services' usage patterns among DLA and the services will be vital to making purchase decisions. While the military services provide DLA with their estimated future demand for MREs, DLA does not obtain information from the services, as part of existing coordination efforts, about potential changes to MRE consumption and disposals that could affect future demand. Without obtaining this information from the military services, DLA may be limited in its ability to optimize the supply chain across the department.
DLA uses various supply-chain strategies to balance cost with readiness in meeting the need for items identified as WRM and needed for surges associated with new contingencies or crises. For instance, DLA continues to stock certain types of items, such as those that are military-unique or of limited availability, but seeks to contract for fast access to those items that are readily available on the commercial market, such as medical supplies. Further, for many years DLA has sought to facilitate and improve access to certain items through its Warstopper Program, which addresses weaknesses in certain supply chains, such as MREs, by making targeted investments in industry that guarantee DLA access to materiel and enable industry to increase production when needed.
What GAO Recommends
To assist with DOD's decision making regarding MRE inventory levels, GAO recommends that DLA conduct analysis to obtain information on MRE industry capabilities and request information on MRE consumption and disposals is shared among DLA and the services as part of existing coordination with the services. DOD concurred with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-07-404 | gao_GAO-07-404_0 | Since Fiscal Year 1993, DOE Has Spent About $1.3 Billion to Provide Security Upgrades at Nuclear Material Sites in Russia and Other Countries, but DOE’s Reporting of the Number of Buildings Secured May Be Misleading
DOE spent about $1.3 billion between fiscal year 1993 and fiscal year 2006 to provide security upgrades and other related assistance to facilities that house weapons-usable nuclear material in Russia and other countries and reports to have “secured” 175 buildings containing about 300 metric tons of weapons-usable nuclear material in Russia and the former Soviet Union. The number of buildings that DOE reports as secured, however, does not recognize that additional upgrades remain to be completed at some buildings because DOE considers a building to be “secure” after it has received only limited MPC&A upgrades (rapid upgrades), even when additional comprehensive upgrades have yet to be completed. Finally, DOE and Rosatom have developed a Joint Action Plan that includes 20 civilian and nuclear weapons complex sites housing buildings with weapons-usable nuclear material. The agencies plan to help Russia secure a total of 97 nuclear warhead sites by the end of 2008. Coordination between DOE and DOD has improved since 2003, when we reported that the agencies had inconsistent policies toward providing security assistance to Russian nuclear warhead sites. DOE has not used EVM on its fixed- price contracts to install security upgrades at Russian nuclear warhead sites, but, during the course of our review, the department augmented its contract performance management system to include additional reporting mechanisms to identify and address schedule variances, which DOE officials believe constitute a comparable alternative to an EVM system. DOE and DOD Helped Russia Improve Security at 62 Nuclear Warhead Storage Sites and Provided Assistance to Improve Security of Warheads in Transit
Through the end of fiscal year 2006, DOE had spent about $374 million to improve security at 50 Russian nuclear warhead sites and plans to install security upgrades at 23 additional sites by the end of 2008. Coordination between DOE and DOD’s Nuclear Warhead Security Efforts in Russia Has Improved
DOE and DOD have mechanisms for sharing information and avoiding duplication of effort. DOE and DOD Use Similar Systems to Manage Large Contracts to Improve Security at Russian Nuclear Warhead Sites
In their efforts to provide security upgrades at Russian nuclear warhead sites, DOE and DOD are taking similar approaches to managing large contracts. DOE’s Ability to Ensure That U.S.-Funded Security Upgrades at Nuclear Material Sites Are Being Sustained May Be Hampered by Access Difficulties, Funding Concerns, and Other Issues
Several challenges could impact DOE’s ability to prepare Russia to sustain security upgrades on its own at sites that house weapons-usable nuclear material, including: (1) access difficulties at some sites, (2) the limited financial ability of some Russian sites to maintain DOE-funded MPC&A equipment, (3) the lack of certification of some DOE-funded MPC&A equipment, and (4) delays in installing the MPC&A Operations Monitoring (MOM) system at Rosatom facilities. If DOE and DOD cannot reach an agreement with the Russian MOD on access procedures for sustainability activities at these 44 sites, or develop acceptable alternatives to physical access, the agencies will be unable to determine if U.S.-funded security upgrades are being properly sustained and may not be able to spend funds allotted for these efforts. Recommendations for Executive Action
To increase the effectiveness of U.S. efforts to secure nuclear material and warheads in Russia and other countries, we recommend that the Secretary of Energy, working with the Administrator of NNSA, take the following two actions: revise the metrics used to measure progress in the MPC&A program to better reflect the level of completion of security upgrades at buildings reported as “secure;” and develop a sustainability management system or modify the Metrics Information Management System to more clearly track DOE’s progress in developing a sustainable MPC&A system across all sites where it has installed MPC&A upgrades, including evaluations of progress for each of the seven key elements of sustainability outlined in DOE’s Sustainability Guidelines. We visited Russia to discuss the implementation of U.S. nuclear material and warhead security assistance programs with Russian officials. | Why GAO Did This Study
Safeguarding nuclear warheads and materials that can be used to make nuclear weapons is a primary national security concern of the United States. Since 1993, the Departments of Energy (DOE) and Defense (DOD) have worked to improve security at sites housing weapons-usable nuclear material and warheads in Russia and other countries. In 1995, DOE established the Materials Protection, Control, and Accounting (MPC&A) program to implement these efforts. GAO examined the (1) progress DOE has made in improving security at nuclear material sites in Russia and other countries, (2) progress DOE and DOD have made in improving security at Russian nuclear warhead sites, and (3) efforts DOE and DOD have undertaken to ensure the continued effective use of U.S.-funded security upgrades. To address these objectives, among other things, GAO analyzed agency documents, conducted interviews with key program officials, and visited four Russian nuclear sites.
What GAO Found
Through fiscal year 2006, DOE and DOD spent over $2.2 billion to provide security upgrades and other assistance at sites in Russia and other countries that house weapons-usable nuclear materials and warheads. With regard to securing nuclear material, DOE reports to have "secured" 175 buildings and plans to improve security at 35 additional buildings by the end of 2008. However, DOE's reported total of buildings "secured" does not recognize that additional upgrades remain to be completed at some buildings because DOE considers a building "secured" after it has received only limited MPC&A upgrades, even when additional comprehensive upgrades are planned. Further, DOE and Russia have developed a Joint Action Plan that includes 20 sites and details the remaining work to be accomplished by 2008. However, the plan does not include two sites containing many buildings with vast amounts of nuclear material where Russia has denied DOE access. DOE and DOD report to have improved security at 62 Russian warhead sites and plan to help secure 35 additional sites by the end of 2008. The departments have improved their coordination mechanisms since our 2003 report, in which GAO reported that the agencies had inconsistent policies for installing site security upgrades at Russian warhead sites. Additionally, DOE and DOD are using similar approaches to manage large security upgrade contracts at warhead sites. DOD has used earned value management (EVM), which at early stages can identify cost and schedule shortfalls. DOE has not used EVM on its fixed-price contracts, but, during the course of GAO's review, augmented its contract oversight to increase reporting frequency, which DOE officials consider a comparable alternative to EVM. DOE has developed broad guidelines to direct its efforts to help ensure that Russia will be able to sustain (operate and maintain) U.S.-funded security systems at its nuclear material and warhead sites after U.S. assistance ends and is working with Russia to develop a joint sustainability plan. However, DOE lacks a management information system to track the progress made toward its goal of providing Russia with a sustainable MPC&A system by 2013. DOE and DOD's abilities to ensure the sustainability of U.S.-funded security upgrades may be hampered by access difficulties, funding concerns, and other issues. Finally, DOE and DOD plan to provide Russia with assistance to sustain security upgrades at nuclear warhead sites but have not reached agreement with Russia on access procedures for sustainability visits to 44 sites. As a result, the agencies may be unable to determine if U.S.-funded security upgrades are being properly sustained. |
gao_GAO-07-1268 | gao_GAO-07-1268_0 | The FTR authorizes premium class accommodations other than first class (business class) when at least one of the following conditions exists: regularly scheduled flights between origin/destination points provide only premium class, and this is certified on the travel voucher; coach class is not available in time to accomplish the mission, which is urgent and cannot be postponed; premium class travel is necessary to accommodate the traveler’s disability or other physical impairment, and the condition is substantiated in writing by competent medical authority; premium class travel is needed for security purposes or because exceptional circumstances make its use essential to the successful performance of the mission; coach class accommodations on authorized/approved foreign carriers do not provide adequate sanitation or meet health standards; premium class accommodations would result in overall savings to the government because of subsistence costs, overtime, or lost productive time that would be incurred while awaiting coach class accommodations; transportation is paid in full by a nonfederal source; travel is to or from a destination outside the continental United States, and the scheduled flight time (including stopovers) is in excess of 14 hours (however, a rest stop en route or a rest period upon arrival is prohibited when travel is authorized by premium class accommodations); or when required because of agency mission. Extent of Governmentwide Improper Premium Class Travel Is Significant
For 12 months of travel from July 1, 2005, through June 30, 2006, the government spent more than $230 million on over 53,000 airline tickets that contained at least one leg of premium class travel. Table 1 shows the results of our analysis of the frequency at which selected agencies purchased premium class tickets for flights involving airports in the United States and locations in Africa, the Middle East, and parts of Europe that likely lasted more than 14 hours. We also estimated, based on statistical sampling, that another 38 percent (a total of 67 percent) of premium class travel was not properly justified. Ineffective Oversight and Internal Control Weaknesses Contributed to Improper and Abusive Premium Class Travel
A weak control environment further exacerbated breakdowns in specific controls that led to at least $146 million in estimated improper premium class travel. Many agencies did not capture data related to business class travel, and therefore did not know the extent of premium class travel. Officials at several agencies we interviewed generally informed us that they did not track, and thus were not aware of, the extent of their business class travel. For example, officials at USDA and Treasury were not aware of the extent of business class travel at their respective agencies. For example, FAS’s and Treasury’s policies allowed employees to use “mission critical” or “exceptional circumstances” as criteria for premium class travel less than 14 hours. Data mining we performed at these agencies found that the mission critical criterion is typically used by senior executives to justify less than 10-hour trips to Western Europe. A comparison between these two agencies’ use of premium class travel to the same locations found that MCC travelers flew to these locations in premium class 83 percent of the time, compared to DOD’s use of premium class travel to the same locations only 3 percent of the time. For example a deputy director of FDIC flew business class from Washington, D.C., to London and back at a cost of $7,200 while a coach class ticket would have cost $800. These cases illustrate the improper and abusive use of premium class travel. We interviewed officials from the General Services Administration (GSA), Department of Defense (DOD), Department of State (State), Department of Agriculture, and Millennium Challenge Corporation. | Why GAO Did This Study
Previous GAO work on widespread improper premium class travel at the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Department of State (State) have led to concerns as to whether similar improper travel exists in the rest of the federal government. Consequently, GAO was asked to (1) determine the magnitude of premium class travel governmentwide and the extent such travel was improper, (2) identify internal control weaknesses that contributed to improper and abusive premium class travel, and (3) report on specific cases of improper and abusive premium class travel. GAO analyzed bank data and performed statistical sampling to quantify the extent premium class travel was improper. GAO also performed data mining, reviewed travel regulations, and interviewed agency officials.
What GAO Found
Breakdowns in internal controls and a weak control environment resulted in at least $146 million in improper first and business class travel governmentwide. The federal government spent over $230 million on about 53,000 premium class tickets from July 1, 2005, through June 30, 2006. Premium class tickets are costly--for example, a Department of Agriculture (USDA) executive flew business class from Washington, D.C., to Zurich, Switzerland, at a cost of $7,500 compared to $900 for a coach class ticket. Based on statistical sampling, GAO estimated that 67 percent of premium class travel was not properly authorized, justified, or both. While business class travel accounted for 96 percent of all premium class travel, many agencies informed us that they did not track, and thus did not know the extent of, business class travel. OMB and GSA also did not require reporting of business class travel. GAO found large differences in premium class guidance governmentwide, with some agencies issuing less restrictive guidance that were tailored for executive travel. For example, the FTR allows premium class travel for flights over 14 hours if properly authorized. However, executives at the Foreign Agricultural Service frequently used "mission critical" to justify flights to Western Europe that typically lasted less than 10 hours. Other agencies, such as State and the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), automatically approved premium class travel for all flights over 14 hours. GAO's analysis of flights involving destinations in the United States and Africa, the Middle East, and parts of Europe lasting 14 hours or more showed that 72 and 83 percent, respectively, of State's and MCC's flights involving these locations were in premium class. In contrast, 3 percent of all DOD's and the Department of Homeland Security's flights to the same locations were in premium class. There are examples representing specific cases of improper and abusive use of premium class, including employees of entities not subject to the Federal Travel Regulations that have issued policies that resulted in the purchase of costly premium class travel. |
gao_GAO-10-772 | gao_GAO-10-772_0 | IP’s Protective Security Coordination Division (PSCD) also operates the Protective Security Advisor Program, which deploys critical infrastructure protection and security specialists, called PSAs, to local communities throughout the country. DHS Efforts to Incorporate Resiliency into Programs Used to Work with Asset Owners and Operators Is Evolving but Program Management Could Be Strengthened
Consistent with recent changes to the NIPP, DHS has begun to increase its emphasis on resiliency in the various programs it uses to assess vulnerability and risk at and among CIKR facilities so that it can help asset owners and operators identify resiliency characteristics of their facilities and provide suggested actions, called options for consideration, to help them mitigate gaps that have been identified. However, DHS has not developed an approach to measure owners’ and operators’ actions to address resiliency gaps identified as a result of these assessments. The RRAP is an analysis of groups of related infrastructure, regions, and systems in major metropolitan areas. DHS Has Made Training on Resiliency Available to PSAs, but Guidelines on PSA Roles and Responsibilities Do Not Reflect DHS’s Growing Emphasis on Resiliency
DHS uses PSAs to provide assistance to asset owners and operators on CIKR protection strategies. However, the guidance does not articulate the role of PSAs with regard to resiliency issues, or how PSAs are to promote resiliency strategies and practices to asset owners and operators. DHS Could Better Position Itself to Disseminate Information about Resiliency Practices with Asset Owners and Operators within and across Sectors
DHS’s efforts to emphasize resiliency in the programs and tools it uses to work with asset owners and operators also creates an opportunity for DHS to better position itself to disseminate information about resiliency practices to asset owners and operators within and across sectors. DHS Shares Information on Vulnerabilities and Protective Measures on a Case-by-Case Basis
According to the NIPP, its effective implementation is predicated on active participation by government and private-sector partners in meaningful, multidirectional information sharing. DHS Is Uniquely Positioned to Disseminate Information about Resiliency Practices but Faces Barriers
Senior IP officials told us that they have considered ways to disseminate information that DHS currently collects or plans to collect with regard to resiliency. However, they have not explored the feasibility of developing an approach for doing so. Senior IP officials explained that given the voluntary nature of the CIKR partnership, DHS should not be viewed as identifying or promoting practices, particularly best practices, which could be construed to be standards or requirements. For example, the energy sector, which includes oil refineries, is inherently different than the government facilities sector, which includes government office buildings. These actions continue to evolve and could be improved if DHS were to strengthen program management by developing measures to assess the extent to which asset owners and operators are taking actions to address resiliency gaps identified during vulnerability assessments; and updating PSA guidelines to articulate PSA roles and responsibilities with regard to resiliency during their interactions with asset owners and operators. Related to its efforts to develop or update its programs designed to assess vulnerability at asset owners’ and operators’ individual facilities and groups of facilities, DHS has considered how it can disseminate information on resiliency practices it gathers or plans to gather with asset owners and operators within and across sectors. Nonetheless, as the primary federal agency responsible for coordinating and enhancing the protection and resiliency of critical infrastructure across the spectrum of CIKR sectors, DHS is uniquely positioned to disseminate this information. By determining the feasibility of overcoming barriers and developing an approach for disseminating resiliency information, DHS could better position itself to help asset owners and operators consider and adopt resiliency strategies, and provide them with information on potential security investments, based on the practices and experiences of their peers within the CIKR community, both within and across sectors. Recommendations for Executive Action
To better ensure that DHS’s efforts to incorporate resiliency into its overall CIKR protection efforts are effective and completed in a timely and consistent fashion, we recommend that the Assistant Secretary for Infrastructure Protection take the following two actions: develop performance measures to assess the extent to which asset owners and operators are taking actions to resolve resiliency gaps identified during the various vulnerability assessments; and update PSA guidance that discusses the role PSAs play during interactions with asset owners and operators with regard to resiliency, which could include how PSAs work with them to emphasize how resiliency strategies could help them mitigate vulnerabilities and strengthen their security posture and provide suggestions for enhancing resiliency at particular facilities. The Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Critical Infrastructure Protection Cost-Benefit Report. October 23, 2009. | Why GAO Did This Study
According to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), protecting and ensuring the resiliency (the ability to resist, absorb, recover from, or successfully adapt to adversity or changing conditions) of critical infrastructure and key resources (CIKR) is essential to the nation's security. By law, DHS is to lead and coordinate efforts to protect several thousand CIKR assets deemed vital to the nation's security, public health, and economy. In 2006, DHS created the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) to outline the approach for integrating CIKR and increased its emphasis on resiliency in its 2009 update. GAO was asked to assess the extent to which DHS (1) has incorporated resiliency into the programs it uses to work with asset owners and operators and (2) is positioned to disseminate information it gathers on resiliency practices to asset owners and operators. GAO reviewed DHS documents, such as the NIPP, and interviewed DHS officials and 15 owners and operators of assets selected on the basis of geographic diversity. The results of these interviews are not generalizable but provide insights.
What GAO Found
DHS's efforts to incorporate resiliency into the programs it uses to work with asset owners and operators is evolving but program management could be strengthened. Specifically, DHS is developing or updating programs to assess vulnerability and risk at CIKR facilities and within groups of related infrastructure, regions, and systems to place greater emphasis on resiliency. However, DHS has not taken commensurate efforts to measure asset owners' and operators' actions to address resiliency gaps. DHS operates its Protective Security Advisor Program, which deploys critical infrastructure protection and security specialists, called Protective Security Advisors (PSA), to assist asset owners and operators on CIKR protection strategies, and has provided guidelines to PSAs on key job tasks such as how to establish relationships between asset owners and operators and DHS, federal, state, and local officials. DHS has provided training to PSAs on resiliency topics, but has not updated PSA guidelines to articulate the role of PSAs with regard to resiliency issues, or how PSAs are to promote resiliency strategies and practices to asset owners and operators. A senior DHS official described plans to update PSA guidelines and the intent to outline this plan in October 2010, but did not provide information on what changes would be made to articulate PSA roles and responsibility with regard to resiliency. By developing measures to assess the extent to which asset owners and operators are addressing resiliency gaps and updating PSA guidance, DHS would be better positioned to manage its efforts to help asset owners and operators enhance their resiliency. DHS faces barriers disseminating information about resiliency practices across the spectrum of asset owners and operators. DHS shares information on potential protective measures with asset owners and operators and others including state and local officials (generally on a case-by-case basis) after it has completed vulnerability assessments at CIKR facilities. DHS officials told GAO that they have considered ways to disseminate information that they collect or plan to collect with regard to resiliency. However, DHS faces barriers sharing information about resiliency strategies. For example, given the voluntary nature of the CIKR partnership, DHS officials stated that DHS should not be viewed as identifying and promoting practices which could be construed by CIKR partners to be standards. Also, according to DHS officials, the need for and the emphasis on resiliency can vary across different types of facilities depending on the nature of the facility. For example, an oil refinery is inherently different than a government office building. DHS's efforts to emphasize resiliency when developing or updating the programs it uses to work with owners and operators creates an opportunity for DHS to position itself to disseminate information about resiliency practices within and across the spectrum of asset owners and operators. By determining the feasibility of overcoming barriers and developing an approach for disseminating information on resiliency practices within and across sectors, DHS could better position itself to help asset owners and operators consider and adopt resiliency strategies.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DHS develop resiliency performance measures, update PSA guidelines, and determine the feasibility of developing an approach to disseminate resiliency information. DHS is taking action to implement two recommendations and is internally considering the third. |
gao_GAO-14-529 | gao_GAO-14-529_0 | Background
The Office of Personnel Management (OPM) has identified two different kinds of furloughs—an administrative furlough, which is a planned event by an agency designed to absorb reductions necessitated by downsizing, reduced funding, lack of work, or other budget situation other than a lapse in appropriations, and a shutdown furlough, which results from a lapse in appropriations. In addition, in January 2013, DOD reduced its spending to prepare for a potential sequestration, a process of automatic, largely across-the-board spending reductions under which budgetary resources are permanently canceled to enforce certain budget policy goals. DOD Implemented a 6-Day Administrative Furlough of Its Civilian Personnel and Reported Approximately $1 Billion in Savings
DOD Issued Guidance Directing the Implementation of an Administrative Furlough of Its Civilian Personnel
On May 14, 2013, the Secretary of Defense, in an effort to minimize adverse affects on military readiness, issued a memorandum that directed a furlough of most of its civilian personnel in response to major budgetary shortfalls from the sequestration. The memorandum listed categories of exceptions to the furlough, including personnel assigned to a combat zone, those necessary to protect the safety of life and property, and Navy shipyard employees. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Readiness and Force Management issued clarifying guidance throughout the planning and implementation of the furlough that, among other things, provided standard templates for the proposal and decision notice letters to prepare and issue to civilian employees.provide clarification on the use of leave without pay during the time of the In addition, guidance was issued to furlough; to help ensure that borrowed military personnel were not used to compensate for work resulting from the furlough; and to prohibit contracted support from being assigned or permitted to perform additional work or duties to compensate for workload or productivity loss resulting from the furlough. On August 6, 2013, the Secretary of Defense issued a memorandum reducing the number of furlough days from 11 to 6 days for most civilians. DOD Reported Cost Savings of Approximately $1 Billion from the Administrative Furlough
As a result of DOD furloughing 624,404 civilians, the Office of the Comptroller reported that the department saved approximately $1 billion from the furlough. DOD Did Not Use Comprehensive and Updated Information on Estimated Cost Savings to Inform Its Decisions
DOD developed an estimated cost-savings for the furlough to assist in planning efforts to meet sequestration cost-reduction targets; however, DOD did not exclude pay for those excepted from the furlough and did not update its estimate throughout the furlough period as more information became available, such as real-time cost savings and when subsequent decisions were made to reduce the number of furlough days. Further the per person per day cost savings effects the total estimated savings. Officials we interviewed also described specific impacts that they believe can be attributed to the furlough, such as decline in civilian morale, attrition, mission delays, inconsistencies and clarification issues with the furlough guidance, and impacts on servicemembers’ morale. Further, DOD civilians filed over 32,000 appeals to the Merit Systems Protection Board related to the furlough in 2013. The following are examples of impacts reported by officials at the locations we visited that they believe can be linked to the implementation of the furlough:
Decline in Morale—Officials at all three sites stated that civilian morale declined due to the civilian workforce furlough that resulted in a 20 percent reduction in pay per week for 6 weeks. Further, because DOD only had 1 week’s worth of civilian payroll data at the time it reduced the number of furlough days, it did not track cost savings in real time. While DOD was able to mitigate the furlough as a result of transfer and reprogramming actions, DOD may face future furloughs where it may be limited in how much funding is available to transfer and reprogram and the length of a potential furlough period may be longer, thus having comprehensive, up-to-date information for decision makers would be important. Recommendation for Executive Action
To help ensure that DOD is better informed in its decision-making processes, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) and the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness to utilize comprehensive and up-to-date furlough cost-savings information as it becomes available in the event that DOD decides to implement another administrative furlough in the future. DOD stated that it had several concerns with the findings in the report. As we stated in the report, DOD calculated a cost estimated savings of $300 per person per day and used this estimate in discussions including the initial decision to furlough until it decided to reduce the number of furlough days from 11 to 6 days even though additional information was available regarding which civilians DOD excepted, as the exceptions decision was made 3 months earlier. However, DOD did not initially include or update the estimated savings per person per day of $300 to account for the 142,602 civilians that were excepted from the furlough. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope and Methodology
This report: (1) examines how the Department of Defense (DOD) implemented its civilian workforce furloughs and any reported cost savings, (2) examines the extent to which DOD utilized up-to-date cost- savings information in the planning and implementation of civilian workforce furloughs, and (3) identifies any reported examples of impacts that resulted from the DOD civilian workforce furloughs. | Why GAO Did This Study
In March 2013, DOD's discretionary budget was reduced by $37 billion as a result of sequestration—across-the-board spending reductions to enforce certain budget policy goals. In response, the Secretary of Defense implemented an administrative furlough, among other things by placing most of DOD's civilian personnel in a temporary nonduty, nonpay status. An administrative furlough is a planned event by an agency to absorb reductions due to budget situations other than a lapse in appropriations.
GAO was mandated to review DOD's implementation of its administrative furlough. This report (1) examined how DOD implemented its furloughs and any reported cost savings, (2) examined the extent to which DOD utilized up-to-date cost-savings information in the planning and implementation of furloughs, and (3) identified any reported examples of impacts that resulted from the furloughs. GAO reviewed DOD furlough guidance, interviewed officials, and conducted visits at selected sites that were selected to represent different categories of furlough exceptions and potential sequestration impacts, among other things.
What GAO Found
In January 2013, the Department of Defense (DOD) instructed components to plan for the possibility of up to a 22-day administrative furlough of civilian personnel. On May 14, 2013, the Secretary of Defense issued a memorandum directing up to an 11-day furlough of most of DOD's civilians, and on August 6, 2013, reduced the number of furlough days to 6, resulting in a cost savings of about $1 billion from civilian pay, excluding implementation costs. DOD officials stated the decision to reduce the number of furlough days was due to DOD gaining greater flexibility from fund transfers and reprogrammings that occurred towards the end of the fiscal year. DOD identified categories of furlough exceptions for personnel including those assigned to a combat zone and those necessary to protect safety of life and property. Clarifying guidance was issued to help ensure that borrowed military personnel were not used to compensate for work resulting from the furlough, and to prohibit contracted support from being assigned or permitted to perform additional work or duties to compensate for workload or productivity loss resulting from the furlough. Ultimately, DOD furloughed 624,404 civilians and excepted 142,602 civilians for 6 days.
DOD developed its initial estimated cost savings for the furlough without excluding pay for those excepted from the furlough and did not update its estimate throughout the furlough period as more information became available, such as real-time cost savings and when subsequent decisions were made to reduce the number of furlough days. The initial estimated cost savings were calculated at $300 per person per furlough day, totaling about $2.1 billion for 11 furlough days. When DOD reduced the furlough from 11 to 6 days, the estimated cost savings were reduced by about $900 million. However, the estimated savings per person per day was not updated to reflect actual payroll reductions, in part because, according to DOD officials, there was only 1 week's worth of payroll data available at the time the decision was made. While officials stated that the estimated savings per person per day was not updated because they thought it was sufficient for their purposes and that the decision to reduce the number of furlough days was primarily based on funding received from transfers and reprogramming actions, the determination of exceptions was made 3 months earlier. If this initial estimate had been updated it may have provided more-comprehensive information for DOD officials to consider regarding the length of the furlough and DOD's cost-savings estimate. As DOD continues to face budgetary uncertainty, and in the event of a future furlough, having comprehensive and updated cost information may help better inform decision makers.
Officials at selected sites GAO visited noted a number of actions taken to prepare for the furlough and described impacts of the furlough, such as decline in morale, mission delays, and inconsistencies and clarification issues with the furlough guidance. However, attributing these impacts directly to the furlough is difficult given other factors, such as a civilian hiring freeze and pay freeze that may also have contributed to declining morale. For example, satisfaction with the organization had declined from 63 percent in 2010 to 55 percent in 2013. Furthermore, a longer term impact may result from DOD civilians filing over 32,000 appeals related to the administrative furlough in 2013, most of which have not yet been resolved.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOD update and utilize its furlough cost-savings information as it becomes available in the event that it decides to implement another administrative furlough in the future. DOD partially concurred. GAO continues to believe the findings and recommendation are valid, as discussed in the report. |
gao_GAO-04-656 | gao_GAO-04-656_0 | More recently, the Social Security Advisory Board issued a 2001 report that identified many factors that could potentially affect the overall consistency of disability decision making between adjudication levels. As a result, some allowances at the hearings level could simply reflect the differing judgments of two adjudicators reviewing a case. SSA Has Partially Implemented Its Process Unification Initiative
SSA has partially implemented its process unification initiative. Although the agency initially made improvements in its policies and training intended to improve the consistency of decisions between adjudication levels, it has not continued to actively pursue these efforts. As part of the initiative, the agency also implemented a review of ALJs’ allowance decisions to identify additional ways to improve training and policies, but no new changes were made as a result of findings from the review. Finally, the agency also began two tests of process changes to help improve the consistency of decisions, but one ongoing test with design problems is not likely to lead to any conclusive results and the other test has been abandoned. Stakeholder groups representing DDS adjudicators told us that SSA’s training does not sufficiently cover process unification issues. SSA’s Review of ALJ Allowances Has Not Resulted in Improvements to Policy and Training
As part of its initiative, the agency has also implemented a quality review of ALJ decisions, but the review has not proved useful for identifying any new changes to SSA’s policies or training that would help to address the inconsistency of decisions. SSA Lacks a Clear Understanding of the Extent and Causes of Inconsistency between Levels
SSA’s assessments have not provided the agency with a clear understanding of the extent and causes of possible inconsistencies in decisions between adjudication levels. The two measures SSA uses to monitor changes in the extent of inconsistency of decisions have weaknesses and therefore do not provide a true picture of the changes in consistency. In addition, SSA has not sufficiently assessed the causes of possible inconsistency. The agency conducted an analysis in 1994 that identified some potential areas of inconsistency. SSA’s Assessments Have Not Identified the Areas and Causes of Possible Inconsistency in Decisions between Adjudication Levels
Despite some efforts to assess inconsistency in decisions, shortcomings in SSA’s analyses also limit its ability to identify areas and causes of possible inconsistency. SSA expects to gain some understanding of why about 60 percent of cases denied by the initial level and appealed to the hearings level are allowed. SSA’s New Proposal Incorporates Efforts to Improve the Consistency of Decisions, but Challenges May Impede Successful Implementation
Some changes included in SSA’s new proposal to overhaul its disability claims process may improve the consistency of DDS and ALJ decisions, but challenges may hinder the implementation of the proposal. The Agency and Most Stakeholders Viewed Several Aspects of the New Proposal as Offering Promise for Improving Consistency
SSA told us that several aspects of the new proposal may improve the consistency of decisions, and although opinions varied among stakeholder groups, most thought the following four proposed changes have the potential to improve the consistency of decisions between adjudication levels: (1) requiring state adjudicators to more fully develop and document their decisions, (2) centralizing the agency’s approach to quality control, (3) providing both adjudication levels with equal access to more centralized medical expertise, and (4) requiring ALJs to address agency reports that either recommend denying the claim or outline the evidence needed to fully support the claim. For example, initial claims for disability will continue to be handled by SSA’s field offices. | Why GAO Did This Study
Each year, about 2.5 million people file claims with the Social Security Administration (SSA) for disability benefits. If the claim is denied at the initial level, the claimant may appeal to the hearings level. The hearings level has allowed more than half of all appealed claims, an allowance rate that has raised concerns about the consistency of decisions made at the two levels. To help ensure consistency, SSA began a "process unification" initiative in 1994 and recently announced a new proposal to strengthen its disability programs. This report examines (1) the status of SSA's process unification initiative, (2) SSA's assessments of possible inconsistencies in decisions between adjudication levels, and (3) whether SSA's new proposal incorporates changes to improve consistency in decisions between adjudication levels.
What GAO Found
SSA has only partially implemented its process unification initiative. Although the agency initially made improvements in its policies and training intended to address inconsistency in decisions made at the two adjudication levels, it has not continued to actively pursue these efforts. Further, as part of this initiative, the agency implemented a review of hearings level decisions to identify ways to improve training and policies, but no new improvements were made as a result of the review. Finally, the agency began tests of two process changes intended to improve the consistency of decision making between the two adjudication levels. One test, which is ongoing, was not well designed and therefore will not provide conclusive results. The other test was abandoned because of implementation difficulties. SSA's assessments have not provided a clear understanding of the extent and causes of possible inconsistencies in decisions between adjudication levels. The two measures SSA uses to monitor inconsistency of decisions have weaknesses, such as not accounting for the many factors that can affect decision outcomes, and therefore do not provide a true picture of the changes in consistency. Furthermore, SSA has not sufficiently assessed the causes of possible inconsistency. For example, SSA conducted an analysis in 1994 that identified potential areas of inconsistency, but it did not employ more sophisticated techniques--such as multivariate analyses, followed by in-depth case studies--that would allow the agency to identify and address the key areas and leading causes of possible inconsistency. SSA has yet to repeat or expand upon this 10-year-old study. SSA's new proposal incorporates changes intended to improve consistency in decisions between levels. However, challenges may hinder its implementation. Most stakeholder groups for adjudicators and claimant representatives told us that a number of aspects of the proposal hold promise for improving consistency. These included one change, being tested as part of the process unification initiative, that requires state adjudicators to more fully develop and document their decisions, as well as several new changes, such as providing both adjudication levels with equal access to medical expertise. However, stakeholder groups also told us that insufficient resources and other obstacles might hinder the implementation of some changes. Adding to uncertainties about the proposal's overall success is its dependence on a new electronic folder system that would allow cases to be easily accessed by various adjudicators across the country. However, this technically complex project has not been fully tested. |
gao_GAO-12-688T | gao_GAO-12-688T_0 | Border Patrol headquarters officials stated that the 2012-2016 Strategic Plan will rely on Border Patrol and federal, state, local, tribal, and international partners working together to use a risk-based approach to secure the border that uses the key elements of “Information, Integration, and Rapid Response” to achieve Border Patrol strategic objectives. Obtaining Information Necessary for Border Security. Our prior work reviewing CBP’s efforts to deploy capabilities to, among other things, provide situational awareness along U.S. borders provides insights that could inform Border Patrol considerations in implementing its new strategic plan. Our past work highlighted the continuing challenges the agency faced implementing technology and infrastructure at the U.S. land borders. DHS concurred with our recommendation and reported that it planned to develop a set of measures to assess the effectiveness and benefits of future technology investments. In May 2010, we testified that CBP had not accounted for the effect of its investment in border fencing and infrastructure on Border fencing was designed to impede people on border security. In a September 2009 report, we recommended that CBP conduct an analysis of the effect of tactical infrastructure on border security.with the Homeland Security Institute (HSI)—a federally funded research and development center—to analyze the effect of tactical CBP concurred and reported that it had contracted infrastructure on the security of the border.had not provided an update on this effort. As of May 2012, CBP Integrating Border Security Operations with Federal, State, Local, Tribal, and International Partners. Leveraging the law enforcement resources of federal, state, local, tribal, and international partners was a key element of Border Patrol’s 2004 Strategy and Border Patrol’s implementation of the strategy, on the northern and coastal borders where Border Patrol had fewer resources relative to the size of the geographic area, and on the southwest border where Border Patrol used the assistance of law enforcement partners to conduct surge operations in high-priority areas. Our prior work reviewing coordination among various stakeholders with responsibilities for helping to secure the border provides insights for consideration as Border Patrol transitions to its new strategic plan. Further, we also reported that while Border Patrol and other federal partners stated that federal agency coordination to secure the northern border was improved, partners in all four sectors we visited cited long-standing and ongoing challenges sharing information and resources for daily border security related to operations and investigations. DHS officials stated that in January 2012 the department established an intercomponent Advisory Council to address our recommendation that DHS provide oversight of compliance with interagency agreements. DHS concurred with our recommendation and has taken action to formulate new policy and guidance in associated strategic planning efforts. Mobilizing a Rapid Response to Border Security Threats. Border Patrol Progress and Challenges in Achieving Its Strategic Goal for Border Security
The DHS goal and measure of operational control used in conjunction with the 2004 Strategy provided oversight of five levels of border control that were based on the increasing availability of information and resources, which Border Patrol used to detect, respond, and interdict illegal cross-border activity either at the border or after entry into the United States (see table 1). DHS reported achieving operational control for 1,107 (13 percent) of 8,607 miles across U.S. northern, southwest, and coastal borders at the time it discontinued use of this performance goal at the end of fiscal year 2010 (see fig. DHS transitioned from using operational control as its goal and outcome measure for border security in its Fiscal Year 2010-2012 Annual Performance Report, which since September 30, 2010, has reduced information provided to Congress and the public on program results. Citing a need to establish a new border security goal and measure that reflect a more quantitative methodology as well as the department’s evolving vision for border control, DHS established an interim performance measure until a new border control goal and measure could be developed. As we previously testified, this interim GPRA measure— the number of apprehensions on the southwest border between the ports of entry (POE)—is an output measure, which, while providing useful information on activity levels, does not inform on program results and therefore could reduce oversight and DHS accountability. However, as these measures have not yet been implemented, it is too early to assess them and determine how they will be used to provide oversight of border security efforts. National Security: Key Challenges and Solutions to Strengthen Interagency Collaboration. | Why GAO Did This Study
Border Patrol, within DHSs CBP, is the federal agency with primary responsibility for securing the national borders between the U.S. ports of entry (POE). DHS has completed a new 2012-2016 Border Patrol Strategic Plan (2012-2016 Strategic Plan) that Border Patrol officials stated will emphasize risk management instead of increased resources to achieve border security and continue to build on the foundation of the 2004 National Border Patrol Strategy (2004 Strategy). This statement highlights key issues from prior GAO reports that discuss Border Patrols progress and challenges in (1) implementing key elements of the 2004 Strategy and (2) achieving the 2004 strategic goal to gain operational control of the border. This statement is based on GAO reports issued since 2007 on border security, with selected updates from April and May 2012 on Border Patrol resource needs, actions taken to address prior GAO recommendations, and efforts to develop performance measures. To conduct these updates, GAO reviewed agency documents such as operational assessments and interviewed DHS officials.
What GAO Found
GAOs prior work has highlighted progress and challenges in various areas related to Border Patrols implementation of its 2004 National Strategy, which could provide insights as Border Patrol transitions to its 2012 Strategic Plan. Border Patrol officials stated that the 2012 Strategic Plan will rely on Border Patrol and federal, state, local, tribal, and international partners working together to use a risk-based approach to secure the border, and include the key elements of Information, Integration, and Rapid Response to achieve objectives. These elements were similar to those in the 2004 Strategy and GAOs past work highlighted the progress and challenges the agency faced obtaining information necessary for border security; integrating security operations with partners; and mobilizing a rapid response to security threats. Border Patrol successfully used interagency forums and joint operations to counter threats, but challenges included assessing the benefits of border technology and infrastructure to, among other things, provide information on situational awareness. For example, in May 2010 GAO reported that the Department of Homeland Securitys (DHS) U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) had not accounted for the effect of its investment in border fencing and infrastructure on security. GAO recommended that CBP conduct an analysis of the effect of tactical infrastructure on border security, with which CBP concurred. Further, GAO identified challenges in DHS efforts to coordinate with partners that help to secure the border. For example, in December 2010 GAO reported that various northern border security partners cited ongoing challenges sharing information and resources for border security operations and investigations, and that DHS did not have mechanisms for providing oversight. GAO recommended that DHS provide oversight, to which DHS concurred and stated that in January 2012 the department established an intercomponent Advisory Council to provide oversight of compliance with interagency agreements.
GAOs prior work showed that as of September 30, 2010, Border Patrol reported achieving its 2004 goal of operational controlwhere Border Patrol has the ability to detect and interdict illegal activityfor 1,107 (13 percent) of 8,607 miles across U.S. northern, southwest, and coastal borders. DHS transitioned at the end of fiscal year 2010 from using operational control as its goal and outcome measure for border security to using an interim measure of apprehensions on the southwest border. DHS reported that this interim measure would be used until such time as DHS developed a new goal and measure for border security that will reflect a more quantitative methodology across border locations and the agencys evolving view of border security. As GAO previously testified, this interim measure, while providing useful information on activity levels, is an output measure that does not inform on program results. Therefore, it limits oversight and accountability and has reduced information provided to Congress and the public on program results. DHS stated that it had several efforts underway to establish a new measure used to assess efforts to secure the border but as this measure is under development, it is too early to assess it.
What GAO Recommends
In prior reports, GAO made recommendations to, among other things, strengthen border security technology, infrastructure, and partnerships. DHS concurred with the recommendations and has reported actions planned or underway to address them. CBP reviewed a draft of information contained in this statement and provided comments that GAO incorporated as appropriate. |
gao_GAO-08-508T | gao_GAO-08-508T_0 | Figure 1 is a map of the southwest border and the Border Patrol sectors. As the prime contractor, Boeing is responsible for acquiring, deploying, and sustaining selected SBI technology and tactical infrastructure projects. First SBInet Technology Deployment Is Complete, but Lessons Have Been Learned
DHS announced its final acceptance of Project 28 from Boeing on February 22, 2008, completing its first efforts at implementing SBInet, and is now gathering lessons learned from the project that it plans to use for future technology development. The scope of the project, as described in the task order between Boeing and DHS, was to provide a system with the detection, identification, and classification capabilities required to control the border, at a minimum, along 28 miles within the Tucson sector. We reported in October 2007 that SBI program office officials expected to complete all of the first phase of technology projects by the end of calendar year 2008. Local Border Patrol Users Report that Project 28 is Not an Optimal System, but Those Trained on the System Will Operate it Until It Is Replaced
Since DHS conditionally accepted the task order from Boeing on December 7, 2007, those Border Patrol agents in the Tucson sector that have received updated training on Project 28 have been using the technologies as they conduct their border security activities. However, according to Border Patrol agents, Project 28 has provided them with improved capabilities over their previous equipment, which included items such as cameras and unattended ground sensors that were only linked to nearby Border Patrol units, not into a centralized command and control center. As of January 2008, 312 Border Patrol operators and 18 trainers had been retrained on Project 28. Tactical Infrastructure Deployment on Schedule, but Further Deployment Will Be Challenging and Total Costs Are Not Yet Known
Deployment of tactical infrastructure projects along the southwest border is on schedule, but meeting the SBI program office’s goal to have 370 miles of pedestrian fence and 300 miles of vehicle fencing in place by December 31, 2008, will be challenging and total costs are not yet known. As of February 21, 2008, the SBI program office reported that it had constructed 168 miles of pedestrian fence and 135 miles of vehicle fence (see table 3). SBI program office officials are unable to estimate the total cost of pedestrian and vehicle fencing because they do not yet know the type of terrain where the fencing is to be constructed, the materials to be used, or the cost to acquire the land. As the SBI program office moves forward with tactical infrastructure construction, it is making modifications based on lessons learned from previous fencing efforts. For example, for future fencing projects, the SBI program office plans to buy construction items, such as steel, in bulk; use approved fence designs; and contract out the maintenance and repair of the tactical infrastructure. Progress Made to Meet Staffing Goals and a Human Capital Plan Published, but Implementation Is in the Early Stages
The SBI program office established a staffing goal of 470 employees for fiscal year 2008, made progress toward meeting this goal and published a human capital plan in December 2007; however, the SBI program office is in the early stages of implementing this plan. These officials also told us that they believe they will be able to meet their staffing goal by the end of September 2008 and will have 261 government staff and 209 contractor support staff on board (see table 4). In December 2007, the SBI program office published the first version of its Strategic Human Capital Management Plan and is now in the early implementation phase. The SBI program office’s plan outlines seven main goals for the office and includes planned activities to accomplish those goals, which align with federal government best practices. In the tactical infrastructure area, although fencing projects are currently on schedule, meeting future deadlines will be challenging because of various factors, including difficulties in acquiring rights to border land. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. | Why GAO Did This Study
In November 2005, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) established the Secure Border Initiative (SBI), a multiyear, multibillion-dollar program to secure U.S. borders. One element of SBI is the U.S. Customs and Border Protection's (CBP) SBI program, which is responsible for developing a comprehensive border protection system through a mix of security infrastructure (e.g., fencing) and surveillance and communication technologies (e.g., radars, sensors, cameras, and satellite phones). GAO was asked to monitor DHS progress in implementing CBP's SBI program. This testimony provides GAO's observations on (1) technology implementation; (2) the extent to which Border Patrol agents have been trained and are using SBI technology; (3) infrastructure implementation; and (4) how the CBP SBI program office has defined its human capital goals and the progress it has made to achieve these goals. GAO's observations are based on analysis of DHS documentation, such as program schedules, contracts, status, and reports. GAO also conducted interviews with DHS officials and contractors, and visits to sites in the southwest border where SBI deployment is under way. GAO performed the work from November 2007 through February 2008. DHS generally agreed with GAO's findings.
What GAO Found
On February 22, 2008, DHS announced final acceptance of Project 28, a $20.6 million project to secure 28 miles along the southwest border, and is now gathering lessons learned to use in future technology development. The scope of the project, as described in the task order DHS issued to Boeing--the prime contractor DHS selected to acquire, deploy, and sustain systems of technology across the U.S. borders--was to provide a system with the capabilities required to control 28 miles of border in Arizona. CBP officials responsible for the program said that although Project 28 will not be replicated, they have learned lessons from their experience that they plan to integrate into future technology development. CBP has extended its timeline and approach for future projects and does not expect all of the first phase of its next technology project to be completed before the end of calendar year 2011. Border Patrol agents began using Project 28 technologies in December 2007, and as of January 2008, 312 agents in the area had received updated training. According to Border Patrol agents, while Project 28 is not an optimal system to support their operations, it has provided greater technological capabilities than did their previous equipment. Not all of the Border Patrol agents in the Tucson sector have been trained on Project 28 because the system will be replaced with newer technologies. Deployment of fencing along the southwest border is on schedule, but meeting CBP's goal to have 370 miles of pedestrian fence and 300 miles of vehicle fence in place by December 31, 2008, will be challenging and total costs are not yet known. As of February 21, 2008, the SBI program office reported that it had constructed 168 miles of pedestrian fence and 135 miles of vehicle fence. CBP officials reported that meeting deadlines has been difficult because of various factors including difficulties in acquiring rights to border lands. Moreover, CBP officials are unable to estimate the total cost of pedestrian and vehicle fencing because they do not yet know the type of terrain where the fencing is to be constructed, the materials to be used, and the cost to acquire the land. As CBP moves forward with construction, it is making modifications based on lessons learned from previous efforts. For example, CBP plans to buy construction items, such as steel, in bulk; use approved fence designs; and contract out the maintenance and repair. CBP's SBI program office established a staffing goal of 470 employees for fiscal year 2008, made progress toward meeting this goal and published its human capital plan in December 2007; however, it is in the early stages of implementing the plan. As of February 1, 2008, the office reported having a total of 305 employees. SBI program officials said that they believe they will be able to meet their staffing goal of 470 staff by the end of the fiscal year. In December 2007, the SBI office published the first version of its Strategic Human Capital Management Plan and is now in the early implementation phase. The plan outlines seven main goals for the office and activities to accomplish those goals, which align with federal government best practices. |
gao_GAO-12-966 | gao_GAO-12-966_0 | Self-Referred MRI and CT Services and Expenditures Grew Overall, While Non- Self-Referred Services and Expenditures Grew Slower or Decreased
From 2004 through 2010, the number of self-referred MRI and CT services performed in a provider’s office and non-self-referred MRI and CT services performed in a provider’s office or IDTF increased, with the larger increase for self-referred services. Number of Self-Referred and Non-Self-Referred MRI and CT Services Increased Overall from 2004 to 2010, with the Larger Increase among Self-Referred Services
While the number of self-referred MRI services performed in a provider’s office and non-self-referred MRI services performed in a provider’s office or IDTF both increased from 2004 through 2010, a significantly larger Specifically, the increase occurred among the self-referred services.number of self-referred MRI services increased from about 380,000 services in 2004 to about 700,000 services in 2010—an increase of more than 80 percent (see fig 2). Self-Referring Providers Referred Substantially More Advanced Imaging Services on Average Than Did Other Providers
We found that, in 2010, providers that self-referred beneficiaries for MRI and CT services referred substantially more of those services than did providers who did not self-refer these services, even after we accounted for differences in practice size, specialty, geography, and patient characteristics. We also found that the year after providers purchased MRI or CT equipment, leased MRI or CT equipment, or joined a group practice that self-referred, they increased the number of services they referred when compared with providers that did not begin to self-refer advanced imaging services. Our analysis indicated that providers’ referrals for MRI and CT services substantially increased the year after they began to self-refer. Overall, the switcher group of providers who began self-referring in 2009 increased the average number of MRI and CT referrals they made by about 67 percent in 2010 compared to the average in 2008. In the case of MRIs, the average number of referrals switchers made for MRI services increased from 25.1 in 2008 to 42.0 in 2010. This comparison suggests that the increase in the average number of referrals for switchers from 2008 to 2010 was not due to a general increase in the use of imaging services among all providers. This suggests that financial incentives for self-referring providers may be a major factor driving the increase in referrals. These financial incentives likely help explain why, in 2010, providers who self- referred made 400,000 more referrals for advanced imaging services than they would have if they were not self-referring. These additional referrals cost CMS more than $100 million in 2010 alone. To the extent that these additional referrals are unnecessary, they pose an unacceptable risk for beneficiaries, particularly in the case of CT services, which involve the use of ionizing radiation. CMS first needs to improve its ability to identify services that are self-referred. Including a self-referral flag on Medicare Part B claims submitted by providers who bill for advanced imaging services is likely the easiest and most cost-effective approach. In its comments, HHS stated that it would consider one of our recommendations but did not concur with our other two recommendations. Given these findings, we continue to believe that CMS should take steps to monitor the utilization of advanced imaging services and ensure that the services for which Medicare pays are appropriate. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Scope and Methods
This section describes the scope and methodology used to analyze our three objectives: (1) trends in the number of and expenditures for self- referred and non-self-referred advanced imaging services from 2004 through 2010, (2) the extent to which the provision of advanced imaging services differs for providers who self-refer when compared with other providers, and (3) the implications of self-referral for Medicare spending on advanced imaging services. As part of developing this claims-based methodology to identify self-referred services, we interviewed officials from CMS, provider groups, and other researchers. | Why GAO Did This Study
Medicare Part B expenditures--which include payment for advanced imaging services--are expected to continue growing at an unsustainable rate. Questions have been raised about self-referral's role in this growth. Self-referral occurs when a provider refers patients to entities in which the provider or the provider's family members have a financial interest. GAO was asked to examine the prevalence of advanced imaging self-referral and its effect on Medicare spending. This report examines (1) trends in the number of and expenditures for self-referred and non-self-referred advanced imaging services, (2) how provision of these services differs among providers on the basis of whether they self-refer, and (3) implications of self-referral for Medicare spending. GAO analyzed Medicare Part B claims data from 2004 through 2010 and interviewed officials from the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) and other stakeholders. Because Medicare claims lack an indicator identifying self-referred services, GAO developed a claims-based methodology to identify self-referred services and expenditures and to characterize providers as self-referring or not.
What GAO Found
From 2004 through 2010, the number of self-referred and non-self-referred advanced imaging services--magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) and computed tomography (CT) services--both increased, with the larger increase among self-referred services. For example, the number of self-referred MRI services increased over this period by more than 80 percent, compared with an increase of 12 percent for non-self-referred MRI services. Likewise, the growth rate of expenditures for self-referred MRI and CT services was also higher than for non-self-referred MRI and CT services.
GAO's analysis showed that providers' referrals of MRI and CT services substantially increased the year after they began to self-refer--that is, they purchased or leased imaging equipment, or joined a group practice that already self-referred. Providers that began self-referring in 2009--referred to as switchers--increased MRI and CT referrals on average by about 67 percent in 2010 compared to 2008. In the case of MRIs, the average number of referrals switchers made increased from 25.1 in 2008 to 42.0 in 2010. In contrast, the average number of referrals made by providers who remained self-referrers or non-self-referrers declined during this period. This comparison suggests that the increase in the average number of referrals for switchers was not due to a general increase in the use of imaging services among all providers. GAO's examination of all providers that referred an MRI or CT service in 2010 showed that self-referring providers referred about two times as many of these services as providers who did not self-refer. Differences persisted after accounting for practice size, specialty, geography, or patient characteristics. These two analyses suggest that financial incentives for self-referring providers were likely a major factor driving the increase in referrals.
GAO estimates that in 2010, providers who self-referred likely made 400,000 more referrals for advanced imaging services than they would have if they were not self-referring. These additional referrals cost Medicare about $109 million. To the extent that these additional referrals were unnecessary, they pose unacceptable risks for beneficiaries, particularly in the case of CT services, which involve the use of ionizing radiation that has been linked to an increased risk of developing cancer.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that CMS improve its ability to identify self-referral of advanced imaging services and address increases in these services. The Department of Health and Human Services, which oversees CMS, stated it would consider one recommendation, but did not concur with the others. GAO maintains CMS should monitor these self-referred services and ensure they are appropriate. |
gao_NSIAD-97-95 | gao_NSIAD-97-95_0 | Organizations Involved With Developing Explosives Detection Technologies
Four organizations—FAA, the National Security Council (NSC), the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and the Department of Transportation—are responsible for overseeing or developing explosives detection technologies. In response to the Commission’s recommendations, Customs is using $16 million to develop a system to identify high-risk cargo for closer inspection and $34 million to purchase detection technologies. ATF’s New Role in Developing Standards for Explosives Detection Canines
Although FAA has used canines for explosives detection at airports since the 1970s, in September 1996 Congress authorized the Secretary of the Treasury to develop governmentwide explosives detection certification standards for canines and to certify such canines for use at airports. The congressionally established Counterdrug Technology Assessment Center (CTAC) within ONDCP is responsible, among other things, for coordinating federal counterdrug technology efforts and assessing and recommending narcotics detection technologies. Customs, because of its mission to interdict drugs at U.S. ports of entry, is ultimately responsible for deciding on the types of technologies to be developed and used. Recently, OMB became involved in overseeing Customs’ plans for developing and deploying narcotics detection technologies. Agencies have not always agreed on the most appropriate technologies to detect narcotics at U.S. ports of entry. More recently, differing views between ONDCP and Customs regarding the type of systems needed along the southwest border led to varying directions from congressional committees. However, the developers of narcotics detection technologies have generally not been included in committees that oversee the development of explosives detection technologies. As noted earlier, this technology was developed to detect narcotics concealed in large containers but was not adopted for use by Customs because it did not believe that the system was affordable, safe, or operationally suitable for its needs. Opportunities to Strengthen Detection Technology Development
Our work identified efforts underway that if successfully completed could significantly strengthen development of explosives and narcotics technologies. However, these agencies have not yet established formal understandings on how to develop standards for aviation security enhancements and numerous related issues. Moreover, comprehensive reports on the U.S. government’s efforts to develop explosives and narcotics detection technology are not periodically provided to key decisionmakers. In addition, joint development of technology may prove beneficial for both explosives and narcotics detection. Recommendation
In line with the White House Commission of Aviation Safety and Security’s call for more clearly defining and coordinating the roles of law enforcement agencies in supporting the FAA, we recommend that the Secretaries of Transportation and the Treasury establish a memorandum of understanding on how FAA, Customs, ATF, and other agencies are to work together in establishing standards, including the use of explosives detection systems, development of a joint-use strategy, resolution of liability concerns, development of profiling and targeting systems to identify potentially threatening passengers and cargo, and deployment of canine teams at airports. Matter for Congressional Consideration
Because no single agency in the executive branch has aggregated into a single report information on what is being done on the development of explosives and narcotics detection technology, Congress may wish to direct the Secretaries of Transportation and the Treasury and the Director, ONDCP, to jointly provide to appropriate congressional oversight committees an annual report on all of the government’s efforts to develop and field explosives and narcotics detection technology. GAO Comments
1. 2. 2. 3. 4. GAO Comment
1. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed how the U.S. government is organized to develop technologies for detecting explosives and narcotics, focusing on: (1) the roles, responsibilities, and authority of agencies that establish policy, provide funds or oversee funding requests, and develop explosives and narcotics detection technologies; (2) mechanisms used to coordinate the joint development of technologies; and (3) efforts to strengthen detection technology development.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) numerous federal organizations are involved in developing technologies for detecting explosives and narcotics; (2) the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) is the key agency responsible for developing explosives detection technologies for civil aviation security; (3) in response to the explosion of TWA Flight 800, the President established the White House Commission on Aviation Security and Safety to recommend ways of improving security against terrorism; (4) the Commission's recommendations included assigning a new role to the U.S. Customs Service in screening outbound, international cargo for explosives; (5) in September 1996, Congress gave the Secretary of Treasury authority to develop governmentwide standards for canine teams; (6) regarding narcotics detection, the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) is responsible for coordinating federal counterdrug technology efforts and assessing and recommending detection technologies; (7) Customs, with technology development support and funding from the Department of Defense, ultimately decides which technologies will be developed and deployed at U.S. ports of entry; (8) Customs has not deployed some technologies because it did not believe that they were affordable, safe, or operationally suitable for its needs; (9) in addition, Customs and ONDCP have differing views regarding the types of detection technologies needed along the Southwest border; (10) joint technology development is important because the types of technologies used to detect explosives and narcotics are similar; (11) the developers of narcotics detection technologies have not always participated in committees that oversee the development of explosives detection technologies; (12) in the future, Customs plans to participate in these committees; (13) at the direction of Congress, an interagency working group on counterterrorism plans to spend $19 million to develop a system for detecting explosives that Customs may possibly use in a seaport environment to detect drugs; (14) despite efforts to strengthen development of explosives and narcotics technologies, GAO found that the cognizant agencies have not yet agreed to formal understandings on how to establish standards for explosives detection systems, profiling and targeting systems, and deploying canine teams at airports; (15) in addition, they have not agreed on how to resolve issues related to a joint-use strategy and liability; and (16) furthermore, key decisionmakers are not receiving periodic comprehensive reports on the aggregated efforts of the various government entities to develop and field explosives and narcotics detection technologies. |
gao_GAO-06-608T | gao_GAO-06-608T_0 | U.S. Options Available to the Department of Commerce to Apply CVDs Against China
The U.S. government does not apply its CVD laws against China because the Department of Commerce classifies China as an NME country and has adopted a policy against taking CVD actions against countries so designated. WTO rules, including relevant provisions of China’s WTO accession agreement, do not explicitly preclude the United States from pursuing either alternative. Commerce could reverse its 1984 position to do this; however, we believe that absent a clear grant of authority from Congress, such a reversal could be challenged in court. Moreover, the Statement of Administrative Action accompanying the Act acknowledged that the Georgetown Steel ruling stood for “the reasonable proposition that the CVD law cannot be applied to imports from nonmarket economy countries.”
Commerce Would Face Challenges in Applying CVDs against China
Although Commerce could proceed with CVD actions against China, it would continue to face substantial practical challenges in identifying Chinese subsidies and determining appropriate CVD levels. However, these approaches would not eliminate the challenges that such actions would present. Commerce may find employing third-country information or “facts available” helpful in completing China CVD actions. However, it is unclear whether, on a net basis, applying CVDs would provide greater protection than U.S. producers already obtain from antidumping duties. CVDs alone tend to be lower than antidumping duties. If Commerce grants China market economy status, both CVDs and antidumping duties could be applied simultaneously, but required methodological changes could well reduce antidumping duties. It is not clear whether CVDs would compensate for these reductions. Regardless of China’s status, some duties might need to be reduced to avoid double counting of subsidies. Commerce lacks clear authority to make such corrections when domestic subsidies are involved. Based on our analysis, we believe a change to a market economy methodology would lower AD duties for some Chinese companies. In the event that (1) Commerce changes China’s NME status or (2) Congress decides to adopt proposed legislation that would authorize Commerce to apply U.S. CVD laws to NME countries, including China, we suggested that Congress provide Commerce clear authority to: fully implement China’s WTO commitment regarding use of third-country information in CVD cases, and make corrections to avoid double counting domestic subsidy benefits when applying both CVDs and antidumping duties to the same products from NME countries, in situations where Commerce finds that double counting has in fact occurred, taking into account Commerce’s analyses of this issue prepared in response to our recommendation above. GAO-05-474. World Trade Organization: Selected U.S. Company Views about China’s Membership. | Why GAO Did This Study
Some U.S. companies allege that unfair subsidies are a factor in China's success in U.S. markets. U.S. producers injured by subsidized imports may normally seek countervailing duties (CVD), but the United States does not apply CVDs against countries, including China, that the Department of Commerce classifies as "non-market economies" (NME). In this testimony, which is based on a June 2005 report (GAO-05-474), GAO (1) describes the options for applying CVDs to China, (2) the challenges that would arise, and (3) examines the likely results of applying CVDs on Chinese products.
What GAO Found
There are two alternative paths for applying CVDs to China. First, Commerce could determine that China is no longer a nonmarket economy and apply CVDs against China as a market economy. Commerce has criteria for such determinations but stated that China is unlikely to satisfy them in the near term. Second, it could reverse its 1984 position, which was confirmed by a federal appeals court, and apply CVDs without changing China's NME status. However, absent a clear congressional grant of authority, such a decision could be challenged in court, with uncertain results. The House of Representatives passed legislation that would grant this authority in July 2005, and companion legislation was introduced in the Senate. World Trade Organization (WTO) rules do not explicitly preclude either alternative. Commerce would face challenges, regardless of the alternative adopted. Chinese subsidies remain difficult to identify and measure. Employing third-country information or "facts available" may help but would not eliminate these difficulties. Commerce lacks clear authority to fully implement China's WTO commitment on the use of third-country information in CVD cases. Making CVDs available against China would give U.S. producers an explicit import relief measure that targets unfair government subsidies. However, on a net basis, applying CVDs might not provide greater protection than U.S. producers already obtain from antidumping duties. CVDs alone tend to be lower than antidumping duties. If Commerce grants China market economy status, required methodological changes would reduce antidumping duties for some companies. It is not clear whether CVDs would compensate for these reductions. Regardless of China's status, some duties might need to be reduced to avoid double counting of subsidies. Commerce lacks clear authority to make such corrections when domestic subsidies are involved. |
gao_HEHS-97-53 | gao_HEHS-97-53_0 | SSA Steps Ahead With Customer Service Focus and Results-Oriented Management
At this time of heightened attention to the costs and effectiveness of all federal programs, the Congress and the administration have supported efforts to promote a more efficient federal government that is responsive and accountable to the public. In addition, SSA is a leader among federal agencies in producing complete, accurate, and timely financial statements that promote accountability to taxpayers. Meanwhile, the ratio of contributing workers to beneficiaries will decline. Given the magnitude of the financial problems facing the Social Security system and the nature of the proposals for changing the system, we can expect the debate over the financing and structure of the Social Security system to continue and intensify in the coming years. Disability Caseloads Continue to Grow
During the past decade, SSA has faced significant increases in caseloads and expenditures for its two disability programs—DI and SSI. In a recent report on the implementation challenges SSA faces as it redesigns its disability claims process, we concluded that SSA’s disability redesign is proving to be overly ambitious. Although SSA has begun many of its planned initiatives, none are complete and many are behind schedule. Consequently, SSA has not progressed as intended in determining whether specific initiatives will achieve their desired results. Although the main reason for emphasizing returning to work is so that people maximize their productive potential, it is also true that an estimated $3 billion could be saved in subsequent years if only an additional 1 percent of the 6.6 million working-age people receiving disability benefits in 1995 were to leave the rolls by returning to work. SSA Faces Difficult Challenges in Preparing for Future Workloads
While SSA is grappling with policy and program challenges, it will also need to meet customer expectations in the face of growing workloads and reduced resources. As the baby boom generation ages, more and more people will be applying for and receiving SSA program benefits. SSA now has plans to review the status of more than 8 million beneficiaries in the next 7 years. Although SSA has begun to take steps to better position itself to successfully develop and maintain its software, it faces many challenges as it works to develop software in its new computer network environment. However, it has been nearly 5 years since SSA has conducted an executive-level management development program. Observations on Leadership Needed to Manage Challenges
As the 21st century approaches, SSA faces dramatic challenges: funding future retirement benefits, rethinking disability processes and programs, combating fraud and abuse, and restructuring how work is performed and services are delivered. First, SSA must step up to its role as the nation’s expert on Social Security issues; it is uniquely positioned to inform the public policy debate on the future financing and structure of Social Security. Finally, SSA must manage technology investments and its workforce and make difficult decisions about handling increasing workloads with reduced resources. SSA’s success in meeting these challenges is critical. Supplemental Security Income: Administrative and Program Savings Possible by Directly Accessing State Data (GAO/HEHS-96-163, Aug. 29, 1996). 14, 1994). | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO reviewed the challenges facing the new Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (SSA).
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) SSA is ahead of many federal agencies in developing strategic plans, measuring its service to the public, and producing complete, accurate, and timely financial statements; (2) this gives SSA a sound base from which to manage significant current and future challenges; (3) these challenges include the aging of the baby boom generation, coupled with increasing life expectancy and the declining ratio of contributing workers to beneficiaries, which will place unprecedented strains on the Social Security program in the next century; (4) unless Congress acts, Social Security funds will be inadequate to pay all benefits by 2029; (5) SSA, however, has not preformed the research, analysis, and evaluation needed to inform the public debate on the future financing of Social Security, the most critical long-term issue facing SSA; (6) SSA has recently taken initial steps to more actively participate in the financing debate by reorganizing and strengthening its research, policy analysis, and evaluation activities; (7) also challenging SSA have been disability caseloads that have grown by nearly 70 percent in the past decade; (8) to its credit, SSA has undertaken an important effort to fundamentally redesign its inefficient disability claims process, however, while SSA has begun many of its planned initiatives, none is far enough along for SSA to know whether specific proposed process changes will achieve the desired results; (9) SSA has not sufficiently promoted return-to-work efforts in the administration and design of its disability programs; (10) if even an additional 1 percent of the 6.6 million working-age people receiving disability benefits were to leave SSA's disability rolls by returning to work, lifetime cash benefits would be reduced by an estimated $3 billion; (11) in its Supplemental Security Income program, SSA has not done enough to combat fraud and abuse and address program weaknesses; (12) SSA faces increasing responsibilities in the future and must manage its growing workloads with reduced resources; (13) to successfully meet its workload challenges, SSA knows that it must increasingly rely on technology and build a workforce with the flexibility and skills to operate in a changing environment; (14) SSA faces significant challenges, however, in modernizing its information systems, a complex, multiyear effort that could easily cost billions of dollars; (15) compounding this challenge will be the possible loss of many senior managers and executives; and (16) at this critical juncture, effective leadership is needed so SSA can take actions to better ensure its success in the 21st century. |
gao_GAO-15-402 | gao_GAO-15-402_0 | Background
Under TRICARE, beneficiaries may obtain health care through either the direct care system of military treatment facilities or the purchased care system of civilian providers and hospitals, including SCHs. SCHs were exempted from TRICARE’s reimbursement rules for hospitals until revised rules were implemented in January 2014. TRICARE’s Revised Reimbursement Rules for SCHs Approximate Those for Medicare
Under its revised reimbursement rules for SCHs, DHA’s methodology for TRICARE approximates the rules for Medicare for these hospitals. Specifically, both programs reimburse SCHs using the greater of either a cost-based amount or the allowed amount under a DRG-based payment system. However, each program takes a different approach in implementing these methods. Under TRICARE’s revised rules for SCHs, the cost-to-charge ratio will be multiplied by each hospital’s billed charges to determine its reimbursement amount. In order to minimize sudden significant reimbursement reductions on SCHs, DHA’s revised rules include a transition period to the new reimbursement levels for most SCHs. Eligible SCHs are reimbursed using an individually derived base-year ratio that is reduced annually until it matches the SCH’s Medicare cost-to-charge ratio that CMS has calculated for each hospital. Twenty-four percent (111 of 459) of the hospitals that were designated as SCHs during fiscal year 2012 with base-year ratios less than or equal to their Medicare cost-to-charge ratios did not qualify for a transition period because either their reimbursement increased to their Medicare cost-to- charge ratio, or they continued to be reimbursed at their Medicare cost-to- charge ratio. Early Indications Show That Access to Care Has Not Been Affected by TRICARE’s Revised Reimbursement Rules for SCHs
Because most SCHs have just completed the first year of a multi-year transition, it is too early to determine the full effect of the revised reimbursement rules on SCHs, including any effect on TRICARE beneficiaries’ ability to obtain care at these hospitals. Nonetheless, early indications show that TRICARE beneficiaries have not experienced problems accessing inpatient care at these facilities. For fiscal year 2013, we found that overall TRICARE reimbursements for SCHs averaged less than 1 percent of their net patient revenue, with TRICARE beneficiaries making up just over 1 percent of their total discharges. As a result, the impact of TRICARE’s revised reimbursement rules may likely be small for most SCHs. DHA officials reported that they do not think access to inpatient care at SCHs will be an issue because hospitals that participate in the Medicare program are required to participate in the TRICARE program and serve its beneficiaries. Officials from the 10 SCHs we identified as having the highest number of TRICARE admissions, the highest reimbursement amounts, or both, told us that they provide care to all patients, including TRICARE beneficiaries—although some of them were not familiar with this requirement. See table 1 for TRICARE percentages of net patient revenue and total discharges for each of these SCHs. DHA officials told us they track access issues pertaining to inpatient care at SCHs through concerns or complaints communicated to them through the TRICARE Regional Offices or directly from beneficiaries. They noted that they are looking at ways to measure changes in access to care at these facilities, possibly by comparing the number of discharges from one year to the next. Although their plans are under development, officials stated that they will likely focus on the 44 SCHs that had 100 or more TRICARE admissions. In addition, officials from national health care associations and military beneficiary coalition groups that we spoke with also reported that they have not heard any concerns about access to care at SCHs resulting from TRICARE’s revised reimbursement rules. Agency Comments
We provided a draft of this report to DOD for comment. DOD responded that it agreed with the report’s findings, and its comments are reprinted in appendix III. DOD also provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. Appendix I: Methodology for Selecting Sole Community Hospitals Based on Fiscal Year 2013 TRICARE Claims Data
We obtained TRICARE claims data on the number of admissions and reimbursement amounts for each sole community hospital (SCH) for fiscal year 2013. | Why GAO Did This Study
DOD offered health care to about 9.6 million eligible beneficiaries through TRICARE, which provides care through military treatment facilities and civilian providers. Because DOD determined that its approach for reimbursing SCHs (459 in 2014) based on their billed charges was inconsistent with TRICARE's governing statute to reimburse civilian providers in a manner similar to Medicare, it implemented revised rules in January 2014.
House Report 113-446, which accompanied the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015, included a provision for GAO to review issues related to the changes in TRICARE's reimbursement rules for SCHs. In this report, GAO examines (1) how TRICARE's revised reimbursement rules for SCHs compare to Medicare's reimbursement rules for these hospitals, and (2) the extent to which TRICARE's revised reimbursement rules for SCHs may have affected access to these facilities by servicemembers and their dependents. GAO reviewed federal laws and regulations as well as TRICARE and Medicare's rules for reimbursing SCHs. GAO analyzed fiscal year 2013 TRICARE claims data on SCH admissions and reimbursement amounts, and Medicare data on SCH net patient revenue and total discharges. GAO interviewed 10 SCHs with the highest number of TRICARE admissions or reimbursement amounts about access issues. GAO also interviewed officials from DOD and national health care associations and military beneficiary coalition groups.
What GAO Found
TRICARE's revised reimbursement rules for Sole Community Hospitals (SCHs), which provide health care in rural areas or where similar hospitals do not exist under certain criteria, approximate those for Medicare's. Specifically, both programs reimburse SCHs using the greater of either a cost-based amount or the allowed amount under a diagnostic-related-group-based payment system, although each program takes a different approach in implementing these methods. Each program also provides for reimbursement adjustments under specific circumstances. In order to minimize sudden significant reductions in SCHs' TRICARE reimbursements, the revised rules include a transition period during which an eligible SCH is reimbursed using a cost-based ratio that is reduced annually until it matches the SCH's Medicare cost-to-charge ratio, which is calculated by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services for each hospital. Under TRICARE's revised rules for SCHs, this cost-to-charge ratio will be multiplied by the hospitals' billed charges to determine their reimbursement amounts. Most SCHs—about 74 percent—qualified for a transition to their Medicare cost-to-charge ratios.
Because most SCHs have just completed the first year of a multi-year transition, it is too early to determine the full effect of the revised reimbursement rules, including any impact on TRICARE beneficiaries' access to care at these hospitals. Nonetheless, early indications show that TRICARE beneficiaries have not experienced problems accessing inpatient care at these facilities. Specifically, Defense Health Agency (DHA) officials reported that they do not think access to inpatient care at SCHs will be an issue because hospitals that participate in the Medicare program are required to participate in the TRICARE program and serve its beneficiaries. Although some of them were not familiar with this requirement, officials from the 10 SCHs GAO interviewed with the highest number of TRICARE admissions, the highest reimbursement amounts, or both, stated that they provide care to all patients, including TRICARE beneficiaries. DHA officials also said that they track access issues pertaining to inpatient care at SCHs through concerns or complaints, and as of February 2015, they had not received any access complaints. They noted that they are still looking at ways to measure changes in access to care at these facilities and will likely focus on the 44 SCHs that had 100 or more TRICARE admissions. In addition, other stakeholders, including representatives of national health care associations and military beneficiary coalition groups, said that they are not aware of TRICARE beneficiaries having difficulty accessing care at SCHs. Moreover, in its analysis of available Medicare data for these facilities (427 of 459 SCHs), GAO found that overall TRICARE reimbursements for SCHs averaged less than 1 percent of SCHs' net patient revenue, with TRICARE beneficiaries making up just over 1 percent of their total discharges for fiscal year 2013. As a result, the impact of TRICARE's revised reimbursement rules may likely be small for most SCHs.
GAO provided a draft of this report to the Department of Defense (DOD) for comment. DOD responded that it agreed with the report's findings and provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. |
gao_GAO-14-449 | gao_GAO-14-449_0 | How NNSA Measures Progress Toward Its Dismantlement Performance Goal May Be Misleading, and NNSA Is Unlikely to Achieve This Goal
How NNSA measures progress toward its performance goal of dismantling all weapons retired prior to fiscal year 2009 by the end of fiscal year 2022 is unclear and may make its reported progress misleading, including its practice of not tracking the actual date of retirement of individual dismantled weapons and its plans to reinstate to the stockpile—rather than dismantle—certain weapons retired prior to fiscal year 2009. Due to the uncertainty on the timing of these retirements NNSA has not yet scheduled for dismantlement any weapons that may be removed from the stockpile under New START. In particular, an NNSA official expressed concern that this gap in dismantlement workload in the mid-2020s could result in the loss of certified dismantlement personnel because dismantlement technicians at Pantex lose their certifications if they have not worked on a weapon type within the past year. NNSA’s Ability to Significantly Accelerate Dismantlement and Complete Planned Workload Earlier Than Planned Could Be Costly
NNSA officials and Pantex site contractors said that they believe that significantly accelerating future dismantlement workload—to complete total planned workload earlier than fiscal year 2022—could be costly and that it is unclear whether the site would have sufficient capacity to do so. Disassembly and Disposition of Some Nuclear and Nonnuclear Components from Dismantled Weapons Is Complicated by Policy and Technical Challenges
We identified several policy and technical challenges affecting NNSA’s disassembly and disposition of nuclear and nonnuclear components from dismantled nuclear weapons. Third, NNSA is storing millions of nonnuclear components from dismantled weapons at Pantex in a contingency inventory that may exceed future weapons needs, and the agency’s ability to effectively manage this inventory is complicated by decisions to retain many components for potential reuse in weapons and by limitations in Pantex’s previous component inventory management system. However, efforts to address the need to retain older parts and upgrade Pantex’s component inventory management system are already under way. However, NNSA’s decision to retain many CSAs has reduced the number of CSAs available for disassembly at Y-12, which poses significant challenges to Y-12’s ability to plan its disassembly workload. However, NNSA’s ability to effectively manage and evaluate the retention of some parts in this inventory is complicated by decisions to retain many components for potential reuse in weapons, including old parts from weapons no longer in the stockpile, and by limitations in Pantex’s previous component inventory management system. By relaxing and extending the fiscal year 2022 dismantlement performance goal deadline, NNSA could give itself flexibility to account for the uncertainties associated with weapons in managed retirement and could allow the dismantlement workload to be leveled and extended through the mid-2020s to sustain the dismantlement workforce. Because the dismantlement performance goal as written does not make these practices clear, NNSA risks providing misleading or confusing information about the age or types of weapons being dismantled. In its comments, NNSA generally agreed with our two recommendations that it (1) reevaluate and consider extending the fiscal year 2022 dismantlement performance goal, to account for the uncertainties when weapons currently in managed retirement will be released for dismantlement, and to avoid a potential dismantlement workload gap due to the deferred retirement of large numbers of additional weapons following entry into force of the New START treaty and (2) revise the dismantlement performance goal to clarify that NNSA intends to dismantle all weapons retired prior to fiscal year 2009, or an equivalent number of weapons, by the end of fiscal year 2022 or an updated deadline. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to assess (1) the extent to which the annual inventories of weapons awaiting dismantlement and the National Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA) annual dismantlement rates have changed over time, and, if so, the reasons why; (2) how NNSA measures progress toward achieving its performance goal of dismantling all weapons retired prior to fiscal year 2009 by the end of fiscal year 2022, and any challenges it might face in meeting the goal; (3) NNSA’s schedule for dismantlement of weapons retired as a result of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) and the challenges, if any, NNSA faces in dismantling those weapons; (4) the physical capacity available at Pantex to meet NNSA’s planned future dismantlement workload and to potentially accelerate dismantlement; and (5) the challenges, if any, affecting disassembly and disposition of components from dismantled weapons. | Why GAO Did This Study
NNSA is responsible for the nation's nuclear weapons programs. As part of this mission, it oversees dismantlement of retired nuclear weapons and disposition of their components. Dismantlement occurs at NNSA's Pantex Plant, and disassembly of CSAs from dismantled weapons occurs at the Y-12 site. GAO was asked to assess NNSA's weapons dismantlement and component disposition efforts.
This report examines, among other things, (1) how NNSA measures progress toward its fiscal year 2022 dismantlement performance goal, as well as any challenges it might face in achieving the goal; (2) the schedule for and any challenges in dismantling weapons to be retired as a result of the New START treaty; (3) physical capacity available at Pantex to meet or accelerate planned dismantlement workload; and (4) any challenges in disassembling and disposing of weapon components. GAO analyzed NNSA's future dismantlement schedule, observed weapons dismantlement and component disposition activities at Pantex and Y-12, and interviewed NNSA officials. This report summarizes the findings of GAO's classified report on nuclear weapons dismantlement.
What GAO Found
How the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) measures progress toward its performance goal of dismantling all weapons retired prior to fiscal year 2009 by the end of fiscal year 2022 is unclear for two reasons. First, NNSA does not track the actual date that dismantled weapons were retired and may be counting some dismantled weapons retired after fiscal year 2009 as equivalent to weapons retired prior to fiscal year 2009. Second, NNSA will not dismantle some weapons retired prior to fiscal year 2009 but will reinstate them to the stockpile to save on rebuilding other weapons and count the reinstated weapons as equivalent dismantlements. Having clear goals and measures is a key element of program management. Because the dismantlement performance goal does not make these practices clear, NNSA risks providing misleading information about progress related to its goal.
NNSA has a schedule for future weapon dismantlements but has not scheduled for dismantlement any weapons to be removed from the stockpile resulting from implementation of the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START). These weapons are not expected to be retired until the late 2020s or early 2030s. The deferred retirement of these weapons could result in a significant dismantlement workload gap during the mid-2020s. Such a gap could result in the loss of certified dismantlement personnel because dismantlement technicians at Pantex lose their certifications if they have not worked on a weapon type in the past year. By extending the fiscal year 2022 dismantlement performance goal, NNSA could allow the current dismantlement workload to be leveled and extended through the mid-2020s to sustain its dismantlement workforce.
The physical capacity at the Pantex Plant in Texas should be sufficient to meet NNSA's planned dismantlement workload and other stockpile commitments through fiscal year 2022. According to NNSA officials and Pantex site contractors, the site's ability to significantly accelerate its dismantlement rates and complete planned workload earlier than fiscal year 2022 could be costly, and it is unclear whether the site would have sufficient capacity to do so.
GAO identified policy and technical challenges complicating NNSA's disassembly and disposition of nuclear and nonnuclear components from dismantled nuclear weapons. For instance, the Y-12 National Security Complex in Tennessee disassembles canned subassemblies (CSA)—a major nuclear component that can contain highly enriched uranium (HEU), which is uranium enriched in the isotope uranium-235 to 20 percent or greater. NNSA is retaining many CSAs, leaving far fewer of them for disassembly, and creating challenges for Y-12's ability to plan its disassembly workload. However, NNSA bases its retention decisions on national security considerations and not Y-12 workload. Moreover, NNSA's ability to effectively manage a contingency inventory of millions of nonnuclear components at Pantex is complicated by decisions to retain many components for potential reuse in weapons, including old parts for weapons no longer in the stockpile, and by limitations in Pantex's previous component inventory management system. GAO is not making a recommendation on these matters because of efforts already under way at Pantex to address the need to retain older parts and to upgrade its component inventory management system.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that NNSA (1) clarify the dismantlement performance goal and (2) consider extending the goal to avoid a dismantlement workload gap. NNSA generally agreed with these recommendations. |
gao_GAO-09-761 | gao_GAO-09-761_0 | Among other support and services, NWS provides four meteorologists at each of FAA’s 21 en route centers to provide on-site aviation weather services. Three of these en route centers also control air traffic over the oceans. In 2005, the agency requested that NWS restructure its aviation weather services by consolidating its center weather service units to a smaller number of sites, reducing personnel costs, and providing products and services 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. Proposal to Consolidate Center Weather Service Units Is under Consideration
NWS and FAA are considering plans to restructure the way aviation weather services are provided at en route centers. FAA responded to NWS in August 2009 by requesting more information regarding NWS’s proposal. While NWS subsequently identified 8 additional performance measures in its proposal, FAA has not yet approved these measures. However, the agencies have not established a baseline of performance for the 9 other performance measures. NWS officials reported that they are not collecting baseline information for a variety of reasons, including that the measures have not yet been approved by FAA and that selected measures involve products that have not yet been developed. While 4 of the potential measures are tied to new products or services under the restructuring, the other 5 could be measured using current products and services. It is important to obtain an understanding of the current level of performance in these measures before beginning any efforts to restructure aviation weather services. Without an understanding of the current level of performance, NWS and FAA will not be able to measure the success or failure of any changes they make to the center weather service unit operations. As a result, any changes to the current structure could degrade aviation operations and safety—and the agencies may not know it. NWS and FAA Face Challenges in Efforts to Modify the Current Aviation Weather Structure
NWS and FAA face challenges in their efforts to modify the current aviation weather structure. These include challenges associated with (1) interagency collaboration, (2) defining requirements, and (3) aligning any changes with the Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen)— a long-term initiative to increase the efficiency of the national airspace system. Looking forward, if a proposal is accepted, the agencies could face three additional challenges in implementing the proposal, including (1) developing a feasible schedule that includes adequate time for stakeholder involvement, (2) undertaking a comprehensive demonstration to ensure no services are degraded, and (3) effectively reconfiguring the infrastructure and technologies to the new structure. Unless and until these challenges are addressed, the proposed restructuring of aviation weather services at en route centers poses new risks and has little chance of success. Further, after requesting extensions twice, NWS provided its proposal to FAA in June 2009. However, FAA rejected all three of NWS’s proposals in September 2008 on the basis that the costs of the proposals were too high, even though cost was not specified in FAA’s requirements. Specifically, we are recommending that the Secretaries direct the NWS and FAA administrators, respectively, to immediately identify the current level of performance for the five potential measures that could be identified under current operations (forecast accuracy, customer satisfaction, service delivery conformity, timeliness of on-demand services, and training completion) so that there will be a baseline from which to measure the impact of any proposed operational changes; establish and approve a set of performance measures for the center weather service units; improve interagency collaboration by defining a common outcome, establishing joint strategies to achieve the outcome, and agreeing upon each agency’s responsibilities; establish and finalize requirements for aviation weather services at en ensure that any proposed organizational changes are aligned with NextGen initiatives by seeking a review by the Joint Program Development Office responsible for developing the NextGen vision; and before moving forward with any proposed operational changes, address developing a feasible schedule that includes adequate time for undertaking a comprehensive demonstration to ensure no services are effectively transitioning the infrastructure and technologies to the new consolidated structure. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of our review were to (1) determine the status and plans of efforts to restructure the center weather service units, (2) evaluate efforts to establish a baseline of the current performance provided by center weather service units so that the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and National Weather Service (NWS) can ensure that any operational changes do not degrade aviation weather services, and (3) evaluate challenges to restructuring the center weather service units. | Why GAO Did This Study
The National Weather Service's (NWS) weather products are a vital component of the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) air traffic control system. In addition to providing aviation weather products developed at its own facilities, NWS also provides on-site staff at each of FAA's en route centers--the facilities that control high-altitude flight outside the airport tower and terminal areas. Over the last few years, FAA and NWS have been exploring options for enhancing the efficiency of the aviation weather services provided at en route centers. GAO agreed to (1) determine the status and plans of efforts to restructure the center weather service units, (2) evaluate efforts to establish a baseline of the current performance provided by these units, and (3) evaluate challenges to restructuring them. To do so, GAO evaluated agency plans for the restructuring and for establishing performance measures. GAO also compared agency efforts to leading practices and interviewed agency officials.
What GAO Found
NWS and FAA are considering plans to restructure the way aviation weather services are provided at en route centers, but it is not yet clear whether and how these changes will be implemented. In 2005, FAA requested that NWS restructure its services by consolidating operations to a smaller number of sites, reducing personnel costs, and providing services 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. NWS developed two successive proposals, both of which were rejected by FAA--most recently because the costs were too high. FAA subsequently requested that NWS develop another proposal by late December 2008. In response, NWS developed a third proposal that involves consolidating 20 of 21 existing center weather service units into two locations. NWS sent this proposal to FAA in early June 2009. FAA responded to NWS in August 2009 by requesting more information regarding NWS's proposal. In response to GAO's prior concerns that NWS and FAA lacked performance measures and a baseline of current performance, the agencies have agreed on five measures and NWS has proposed eight others. In addition, the agencies initiated efforts to establish a performance baseline for 4 of 13 potential performance measures. However, the agencies have not established baseline performance for the other 9 measures. NWS officials stated they are not collecting baseline information on the 9 measures for a variety of reasons, including that some of the measures have not yet been approved by FAA, and that selected measures involve products that have not yet been developed. While 4 of the 9 measures are tied to new products or services that are to be developed if NWS's latest restructuring proposal is accepted, the other 5 could be measured in the current operational environment. For example, both accuracy and customer satisfaction measures are applicable to current operations. It is important to obtain an understanding of the current level of performance in these measures before beginning any efforts to restructure aviation weather services. Without an understanding of the current level of performance, NWS and FAA may not be able to measure the success or failure of changes they make to the center weather service unit operations. As a result, changes to the current structure could degrade aviation operations and safety--and the agencies may not know it. NWS and FAA face challenges in their efforts to improve the current aviation weather structure. These include challenges associated with (1) interagency collaboration, (2) defining FAA's requirements, and (3) aligning any changes with the Next Generation Air Transportation System--a long-term initiative to increase the efficiency of the national airspace system. If the restructuring proposal is accepted, the agencies face three additional challenges in implementing it: (1) developing a feasible schedule that includes adequate time for stakeholder involvement, (2) undertaking a comprehensive demonstration to ensure no services are degraded, and (3) effectively reconfiguring the infrastructure and technologies. Unless and until these challenges are addressed, the proposed restructuring of aviation weather services at en route centers poses new risks and has little chance of success. |
gao_GAO-02-1054T | gao_GAO-02-1054T_0 | IT Realignment Increases Authority and Oversight of VA’s Chief Information Officer
Successful implementation of VA’s information technology program requires strong leadership and management to help define and guide the department’s plans and actions. With the hiring of a department-level CIO in August 2001, VA took a significant step toward addressing critical and longstanding weaknesses in its management of information technology. VA’s new organizational structure holds promise for building a more solid foundation for investing in and improving the department’s accountability over information technology resources. One of the key activities that required attention was the establishment of a program management office headed by a permanent chief architect to manage the development and maintenance of the enterprise architecture. More recently, on September 5, the Secretary approved the initial version of the department’s One VA enterprise architecture. With the Federal CIO Council’s guide as a basis for analysis, table 1 illustrates the progress that the department has made since March in accomplishing key enterprise architecture process steps, along with examples of the various critical actions still required to successfully implement and sustain its enterprise architecture program. When we testified before the subcommittee in March, VA had begun a number of actions to strengthen its overall computer security management posture. Progress Continues, but Actions Still Needed to Achieve a Comprehensive Security Management Program
Since March, the department has taken important steps to further strengthen its computer security management program. VA has also acted to help provide a more solid foundation for detecting, reporting, and responding to security incidents. The department’s critical remaining actions include routinely monitoring and evaluating the effectiveness of security policies and controls and acting to address identified weaknesses. VBA Remains Far from Full Implementation of the VETSNET Compensation and Pension Replacement System
Mr. Chairman, we continue to be concerned about the slow progress that VBA is making in implementing the VETSNET compensation and pension replacement system. As you know, VBA currently relies on its aging Benefits Delivery Network to deliver over 3.5 million benefits payments to veterans and their dependents each month. Government Computer-Based Patient Record Initiative Has Changed Name, Goals, Strategy
Finally, Mr. Chairman, I would like to provide updated information on VA’s progress, in conjunction with the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Indian Health Service (IHS), in achieving the ability to share patient health care data as part of the government computer-based patient record (GCPR) initiative. VA and DOD Developing Interoperable Health Systems
Beyond FHIE, VA and DOD have envisioned a long-term strategy involving the two-way exchange of clinical information. | Why GAO Did This Study
In March of this year, GAO testified before the House Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Committee on Veterans' Affairs, about the Department of Veterans Affairs' (VA) information technology (IT) program, and the strides that the Secretary had made in improving departmental leadership and management of this critical area--including the hiring of a chief information officer. At the Subcommittee's request, GAO evaluated VA's new IT organizational structure, and provided an update on VA's progress in addressing other specific areas of IT concern and our related recommendations pertaining to enterprise architecture, information security, the Veterans Benefits Administration's replacement compensation and pension payment system and maintenance of the Benefits Delivery Network, and the government computer-based patient record initiative.
What GAO Found
Since our March testimony, VA has made important progress in its overall management of information technology. For example, the Secretary's decision to centralize IT functions, programs, and funding under the department-level CIO holds great promise for improving the accountability and management of IT spending--currently over $1 billion per year. But in this as well as the other areas of prior weakness, the strength of VA's leadership and continued management commitment to achieving improvements will ultimately determine the department's degree of success. As for its progress in other areas includes: enterprise architecture: the Secretary recently approved the initial, "as is" version of this blueprint for evolving its information systems, focused on defining the department's current environment for selected business functions. VA still, however, needs to select a permanent chief architect and establish a program office to facilitate, manage, and advance this effort. Information security: steps have been taken that should help provide a more solid foundation for detecting, reporting, and responding to security incidents. Nonetheless, the department has not yet fully implemented a comprehensive computer security management program that includes a process for routinely monitoring and evaluating the effectiveness of security policies and controls, acting to address identified vulnerabilities. Compensation and pension payment system: while some actions have been taken, after more than 6 years, full implementation of this system is not envisioned before 2005; this means that the 3.5 million payments that VA makes each month will continue to depend on its present, aging system. Government computer-based patient record initiative: VA and the Department of Defense have reported some progress in achieving the capability to share patient health care data under this program. Since March, the agencies have formally re named the initiative the Federal Health Information Exchange and have begun implementing a more narrowly defined strategy involving a one-way information transfer from Defense to VA; a two-way exchange is planned by 2005. |
gao_T-HEHS-98-46 | gao_T-HEHS-98-46_0 | Billions of Federal Education Dollars Distributed Through Hundreds of Programs and Multiple Agencies
Overall federal support for education includes not only federal funds, but also nonfederal funds associated with federal legislation. The remaining 15 percent is spent by more than 30 additional departments or agencies. 5.) Thirteen federal departments and agencies administered these programs and received about $2.3 billion. Kinds of Information Needed
To efficiently and effectively operate, manage, and oversee programs and activities, agencies need reliable, timely program performance and cost information and the analytic capacity to use that information. nationwide. Finally, the Congress needs the ability to look across all programs designed to help a given target group to assess how the programs are working together and whether the overall federal effort is accomplishing a mission such as preventing substance abuse among youths. The Department of Education also has contracts for evaluating what works. Challenges in Obtaining Important Information
If (1) process information is critical for program, agency, and interagency management of federal elementary and secondary programs, and (2) outcome and impact information is needed to assess results and focus efforts on what works, why is information not readily available? The challenges to collecting that information include competing priorities—such as reducing paperwork and regulatory burden and promoting flexibility in program implementation—that restrict data collection and evaluation activities; the cost of data collection; the secondary role of education in many programs; the difficulty of obtaining impact evaluation information (under any circumstances); the special challenge to assessing overall effects on federal efforts involving multiple federal programs in multiple agencies; and until recently, a lack of focus on results and accountability. If agencies and OMB use the annual planning process to highlight crosscutting program issues, the individual agency performance plans and the governmentwide performance plan should provide the Congress with the information needed to identify agencies and programs addressing similar missions. The Government Performance and Results Act: 1997 Governmentwide Implementation Will Be Uneven (GAO/GGD-97-109, June 2, 1997). | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed: (1) the amount and complexity of federal support for education; (2) additional planning, implementation, and evaluative information needed by agencies and the Congress on federal education programs; and (3) some of the challenges of obtaining more and better information.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) billions in federal education dollars are distributed through hundreds of programs and more than 30 agencies; (2) agencies and the Congress need information to plan, implement, and evaluate these programs; (3) to gauge and ensure the success of these programs, the Congress and agencies need several kinds of information; (4) they need to know which specific program approaches or models are most effective, the circumstances in which they are effective, and if the individual programs are working nationwide; (5) they also need to be able to look across all programs that are designed to help a given target group to see if individual programs are working efficiently together and whether the federal effort is working effectively overall; (6) GAO believes a close examination of these multiple education programs is needed; (7) the current situation has created the potential for inefficient service and reduced overall effectiveness; (8) basic information about programs and program results is lacking and there are many challenges in obtaining this important information; and (9) the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA) holds promise as a tool to help agencies manage for results, coordinate their efforts with other agencies, and obtain the information they need to plan and implement programs and evaluate program results. |
gao_GAO-01-808 | gao_GAO-01-808_0 | Virtually all of the Pacific Island nations, including the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM) and the Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMI), receive development assistance. The Major Donors
Five bilateral donors—Australia, Japan, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States—and two multilateral donors— the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the European Union (EU)—provided about $11 billion in official development assistance to Pacific Island nations between 1987 and 1999, according to our review of data from the OECD and annual financial audits of the FSM, the RMI, and Palau. Within this environment, the donors have tried several strategies to achieve their development objectives, such as incorporating flexibility and relying on trust funds. According to the ADB’s strategy, the implementation of its previous strategy in 1996 provided several lessons, including the need (1) for the Pacific Island nations to have stronger ownership of policy and reform programs and (2) to design development strategies that take account of local cultures and capacities. Approaches to Future Assistance
Our review of the lessons learned from the major donors’ experiences in the Pacific could provide some guidance to the United States as it negotiates further economic assistance to the FSM and the RMI. These lessons deserve attention because the current U.S. assistance to the two countries and the proposed approach for future assistance through the Compact of Free Association often contrast with the other major donors’ experiences, as discussed in the following points: Assistance Strategies May Involve Trade-offs in Expectations of Aid Effectiveness If the Main Motivation for Assistance Is Not Development. Assistance Strategies Involve Trade-offs Between Cost, Effectiveness, and Accountability. Effective Assistance Depends on a Good Policy Environment in the Recipient Country. Flexible Strategies Are Important to Adapt Assistance to Changing Circumstances and Needs. Well-designed Trust Funds Can Provide a Sustainable Source of Assistance and Reduce Long-term Aid Dependence. Sectorwide Approaches Depend on Recipient Governments’ Commitment and Ability. 3. 4. | What GAO Found
Australia, Japan, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States have been the major providers of bilateral development assistance to the Pacific Island nations since 1987. The Asian Development Bank and the European Union have been the major multilateral donors. The donors' main development objectives, according to the planning documents, have been to alleviate poverty and to set the Pacific Island nations on the path to economic self-sufficiency. To achieve these objectives, these donors focus their assistance in key areas, such as education, policy reform, and infrastructure. The United States could draw several lessons from the donors' experiences for providing assistance as well as the strategies and approaches the donors have adopted. These lessons could provide valuable insights for the United States as it negotiates additional economic assistance to the Federal States of Micronesia and the Republic of the Marshall Islands. On the basis of the donors' experiences, GAO observed that (1) assistance strategies may involve trade-offs in expectations of aid effectiveness if other objectives for providing assistance take priority over development objectives; (2) assistance strategies may involve trade-offs between effectiveness and accountability, on the one hand, and administrative costs, on the other hand; (3) effective assistance depends on a good policy environment in the recipient country to create the conditions for sustainable development; (4) strategies tailored to the individual needs of the recipient country might have greater chances of succeeding because they offer recipients opportunities for stronger ownership of the program; (5) flexible strategies enable donors to adapt their assistance to changing circumstances and provide incentives for development achievements; (6) well-designed trust funds can provide sustainable sources of assistance to Pacific Island nations with limited growth options; and (7) sectorwide approaches, although generally untested in the Pacific, depend on recipient government commitment and ability. |
gao_GAO-09-868 | gao_GAO-09-868_0 | For instance, about 52 percent of the 381 MPOs represent populations of fewer than 200,000 people; 36 percent of MPOs represent populations of 200,000 to 999,999 people; and 11 percent of MPOs represent populations of 1 million or more people. Beyond the requirements common to all MPOs, some MPOs have additional planning requirements. These factors require that the metropolitan planning process provide for consideration of projects and strategies that will support the economic vitality of the metropolitan area, especially by enabling global competitiveness, productivity, and efficiency; increase the safety of the transportation system for motorized and nonmotorized users; increase the security of the transportation system for motorized and nonmotorized users; increase the accessibility and mobility of people and freight; protect and enhance the environment, promote energy conservation, improve the quality of life, and promote consistency between transportation improvements and state and local planned growth and economic development patterns; enhance the integration and connectivity of the transportation system, across and between modes, for people and freight; promote efficient system management and operation; and emphasize the preservation of the existing transportation system. MPOs Vary Considerably in Terms of Capacity, Responsibilities, and Range of Activities
The Staffing, Financial, and Technical Capacity of MPOs Varies Significantly
The staff size and structure of MPOs vary significantly. Some MPOs are supported by one or two staff, while a few have over 100 full or part-time staff. Some MPOs are housed and staffed by a local jurisdiction (such as a city or county government) within its boundaries, others by a regional planning council, and still others operate independently. According to our survey respondents, about 80 percent of MPOs receive a majority of their planning funds from these federal sources. As a result, the type of model used by MPOs also varies. Project implementation. MPOs Face Resource, Authority, and Technical Challenges That Impact Their Ability to Conduct Transportation Planning
MPOs Report Funding and Staffing Limitations
MPOs we surveyed and interviewed cited several funding challenges that impact their ability to conduct transportation planning. About 85 percent of all MPOs responding to our survey cited the lack of transportation planning funding as a challenge to transportation planning. About half of the survey respondents cited lack of trained staff as a challenge in carrying out the federal requirements for transportation planning. Lack of Technical Capacity Makes It Difficult for MPOs to Meet Increasingly Complex Requirements
MPOs also face technical challenges, in part because the travel demand modeling required to forecast future growth and needs has become more complicated. Because the federal certification is focused on compliance, not outcomes, it is difficult to determine whether federal oversight is improving transportation planning. Most MPOs we interviewed generally view the federal certification reviews as pro forma in nature and place a greater value on informal assistance from the federal government. This may be due, in part, to the limited number of staff at FHWA and FTA. In reviewing these proposals or suggestions, we identified several recurring changes, or options, that could address some of the resource, authority, and technical challenges facing MPOs. Increasing Flexibility in Use of Federal Funds
Creating an expanded or clarified definition of eligibility for the use of transportation planning funds could allow MPOs to utilize planning funds in ways that best meet the needs of the area. Other proposals include changing the legal definition of MPOs to realign the MPO planning process with current capacity and planning needs. Moreover, many of the MPOs we interviewed agreed that federal government investment in modeling and data gathering is necessary to ensure greater reliability in travel demand forecasting across MPOs and to help account for the increasing complexity of transportation forecasting and data needs in urban areas. Matter for Congressional Consideration
Congress should consider making MPO transportation planning more performance-based—for example, by identifying specific transportation outcomes for transportation planning and charging the U.S. Department of Transportation with assessing MPOs’ progress in achieving these outcomes in the certification review process. Additionally, we interviewed representatives from industry associations, as well as MPO, Federal Transit Administration (FTA), Federal Highway Administration (FHWA), and DOT officials to clarify MPO planning responsibilities, identify transportation planning challenges, and assess how DOT provides oversight for MPOs and the extent to which this improves transportation planning. Using these procedures, we obtained an 86 percent response rate. | Why GAO Did This Study
Metropolitan planning organizations (MPO) are responsible for transportation planning in metropolitan areas; however, little is known about what has been achieved by the planning efforts. This congressionally requested report describes (1) the characteristics and responsibilities of MPOs, (2) the challenges that MPOs face in carrying out their responsibilities, (3) how the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) provides oversight for MPOs and the extent to which this improves transportation planning, and (4) the options that have been proposed to enhance transportation planning. To address these objectives, GAO surveyed all 381 MPOs (with an 86 percent response rate) and conducted case studies of eight metropolitan areas and conducted a survey of program managers.
What GAO Found
MPOs vary greatly in terms of capacity and responsibilities. Some MPOs are supported by one or two staff, while others have over 100 staff. While half of MPOs represent populations of less than 200,000, some represent millions. MPOs are typically housed within a regional planning council or a city or county government agency, but also may operate as independent agencies. Most MPOs receive the majority of their planning funds from federal sources, but also receive funds from other sources such as states or localities. The technical capacity of MPOs also varies significantly, both in terms of the type of model used to develop travel demand forecasts and the number of staff available to perform such forecasts. Some MPOs have acquired additional responsibilities, such as project implementation, beyond federal requirements. MPOs cited many challenges in our survey and interviews, primarily related to funding and staffing, authority, and technical capacity. About 85 percent of all MPOs responding to our survey cited the lack of transportation planning funding as a challenge to transportation planning. About half of our survey respondents stated that the lack of flexibility for using federal planning funds inhibits them from conducting comprehensive transportation planning. Staffing constraints, such as limited number of staff and lack of trained staff, also impact MPOs' ability to conduct transportation planning. Finally, according to our survey and interviews, some MPOs lack the technical capacity and data necessary to conduct the type of complex transportation modeling required to meet their planning needs. DOT's Federal Transit Administration (FTA) and Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) work together to oversee MPOs, but given the process-oriented approach of the oversight, it is difficult to determine whether their oversight is improving transportation planning. MPOs representing more than 200,000 in population are subject to federal certification reviews. The certification reviews focus on procedural compliance with planning requirements, not transportation outcomes. MPOs generally view this federal process as pro forma in nature and place a greater value on informal assistance provided by both federal and state governments. Several proposals have been developed by government and industry associations that could address some of the resource, authority, and technical challenges facing MPOs. For example, (1) allowing the use of transportation planning funds for more activities could better meet the needs of some metropolitan areas; (2) varying MPOs' planning requirements and authority or changing the legal definition of MPOs could address varying capacity and planning needs; (3) increasing federal investment in modeling and data gathering could improve the technical capability of MPOs and bring a greater degree of reliability and consistency across MPOs to travel demand forecasting; and (4) making the planning process more performance-based could allow FTA and FHWA to better assess MPOs' progress in achieving specific results. |
gao_GAO-02-924T | gao_GAO-02-924T_0 | What is the impact on agencies with homeland security missions left out of the new department? In the President’s proposal, the new Department of Homeland Security would be responsible for conducting a national scientific research and development program, including developing national policy and coordinating the federal government’s civilian efforts to counter chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons or other emerging terrorist threats. Proposed Department Could Improve Coordination of Research and Development Programs
The proposed Department of Homeland Security would be tasked with developing national policy for and coordinating the federal government’s civilian research and development efforts to counter chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear threats. Transfer of Control Over Dual-Purpose Research and Development Raises Concern
We are concerned about the implications of the proposed transfer of control and priority setting for dual-purpose research programs. The proposal to transfer to the new department responsibility for research and development programs that would continue to be carried out by HHS raises many concerns. Homeland Security: New Department Could Improve Coordination but May Complicate Public Health Priority Setting. | What GAO Found
Title III of the proposed Homeland Security Act of 2002 would transfer responsibility for certain chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear research and development programs and activities to the new department. The proposed Department of Homeland Security would develop national policy for, and coordination of, the federal government's civilian research and development efforts to counter chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear threats. Although the new department could improve coordination of existing research and development programs, the proposed transfer of control and priority setting for research from the organizations where the research would be conducted could be disruptive. Transferring control over these programs, including priority setting, to the new department has the potential to disrupt some programs that are critical to basic public health. The President's proposal is not clear on how both the homeland security and the biomedical research objectives would be accomplished. However, if an agency's mission fits with homeland security, its transfer to the new department is appropriate. |
gao_GAO-08-607 | gao_GAO-08-607_0 | Technological advances in these networks have led to a convergence of the previously separate networks used to transmit voice and data communications. Consequently, the tiger team task force recommended merging the two centers to establish an integrated operations center and further recommended that DHS adopt a three-step approach to integration of the centers. In addition, with regard to involving key private sector critical infrastructure officials in the new center, the task force recommended that the department also appoint a project manager to lead this effort. DHS Has Completed the First of Its Three- Step Integration Approach, but Has Yet to Implement the Remaining Steps
DHS has taken the first of three steps toward integrating NCSD and NCS by moving the two centers, NCC Watch and US-CERT, to adjacent office space in November 2007. This close proximity allows the approximately 41 coordination center and 95 readiness team analysts to, among other things, readily collaborate on planned and ongoing activities. In addition, the centers have jointly acquired common software tools to identify and share physical, telecommunications, and cyber information related to performing their missions. For example, the centers use one of the tools to develop a joint “morning report” specifying their respective security issues and problems, which is used by the analysts in coordinating responses to any resulting disruptions. With regard to involving key private sector officials to participate in the proposed joint center, the department has not accomplished this step and supporting actions either. A key factor contributing to DHS’s lack of progress in implementing these steps is that completing the integration is not a top department priority. Instead, DHS officials stated that their efforts have been focused on other initiatives, most notably the President’s recently announced cyber initiative, which is a federal governmentwide effort to manage the risks associated with the Internet’s nonsecure external connections. Officials from DHS’s Office of Cyber Security and Communications stated that they are in the process of drafting a strategic plan to provide overall direction for the activities of NCS and NCSD, including completing the integration of the centers. However, the plan is in draft and has been so since mid-2007. In addition, DHS officials could not provide a date for when it would be finalized. Consequently, the department does not have a strategic plan or related guidance that provides overall direction in this area and has not developed specific tasks and milestones for achieving the remaining two integration steps. Until DHS completes the integration of these two centers, it risks being unable to efficiently plan for and respond to disruptions to communication infrastructure, including voice and data networks, and the information traveling on these networks, increasing the probability that communications will be unavailable or limited in times of need. Conclusions
While DHS has taken initial steps toward integrating the key centers that plan for and respond to disruptions to the communications infrastructure, including voice and data networks, and the data and applications on these networks, these offices are still not fully integrated as envisioned. Appendix I: Objective, Scope, and Methodology
Our objective was to determine the status of Department of Homeland Security (DHS) efforts to integrate the activities of its National Cyber Security Division (NCSD) and National Communications System (NCS) in preparing for and responding to disruptions in converged voice and data networks. | Why GAO Did This Study
Technological advances have led to an increasing convergence of previously separate networks used to transmit voice and data communications. While the benefits of this convergence are enormous, such interconnectivity also poses significant challenges to our nation's ability to respond to major disruptions. Two operations centers--managed by the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) National Communications System and National Cyber Security Division--plan for and monitor disruptions on voice and data networks. In September 2007, a DHS expert task force made three recommendations toward establishing an integrated operations center that the department agreed to adopt. To determine the status of efforts to establish an integrated center, GAO reviewed documentation, interviewed relevant DHS and private sector officials, and reviewed laws and policies to identify DHS's responsibilities in addressing convergence.
What GAO Found
DHS has taken the first of three steps toward integrating its centers that are responsible for planning for, monitoring, and responding to disruptions to the communications infrastructure, including voice and data networks, and the security of data and applications that use these networks. Specifically, in November 2007, it moved the operations center for communications infrastructure (NCC Watch) to office space adjacent to the center for data and applications (US-CERT). This close proximity allows the approximately 41 coordination center and 95 readiness team analysts to, among other things, readily collaborate on planned and ongoing activities. In addition, the centers have jointly acquired common software tools to identify and share physical, telecommunications, and cyber information related to performing their missions. For example, the centers use one of the tools to develop a joint "morning report" specifying their respective network security issues and problems, which is used by the analysts in coordinating responses to any resulting disruptions. While DHS has completed the first integration step, it has yet to implement the remaining two steps. Specifically, although called for in the task force's recommendations, the department has not organizationally merged the two centers or invited key private sector critical infrastructure officials to participate in the planning, monitoring, and other activities of the proposed joint operations center. A key factor contributing to DHS's lack of progress in implementing the latter two steps is that completing the integration has not been a top DHS priority. Instead, DHS officials stated that their efforts have been focused on other initiatives, most notably the President's recently announced cyber initiative, which is a federal governmentwide effort to manage the risks associated with the Internet's nonsecure external connections. Nevertheless, DHS officials stated that they are in the process of drafting a strategic plan to provide overall direction for the activities of the National Communications System and the National Cyber Security Division. However, the plan is in draft and has been so since mid-2007. In addition, DHS officials could not provide a date for when it would be finalized. Consequently, the department does not have a strategic plan or related guidance that provides overall direction in this area and has not developed specific tasks and milestones for achieving the two remaining integration steps. Until DHS completes the integration of the two centers, it risks being unable to efficiently plan for and respond to disruptions to communications infrastructure and the data and applications that travel on this infrastructure, increasing the probability that communications will be unavailable or limited in times of need. |
gao_GAO-14-298 | gao_GAO-14-298_0 | In carrying out its mission, IRS annually collects over $2 trillion in taxes from millions of individual taxpayers and numerous other types of taxpayers and manages the distribution of over $300 billion in refunds. For fiscal year 2014, IRS requested about $2.6 billion for IT investments. The remaining 13 were reported as having significant cost and schedule variances for at least 1 month of the year. Specifically, IRS reported 8 investments as being below cost or ahead of schedule; 3 as behind schedule; and 2 as over cost (see fig. IRS reported a range of reasons for these significant variances, including cost savings from contract negotiations and scope deferrals for those below cost or ahead of schedule, and procurement delays for those behind schedule. Figure 2 shows a summary of investments with significant cost and schedule variances. It is important to note that the reported monthly cost and schedule variances are for the fiscal year only. IRS’s reporting would be more meaningful for determining whether IRS is effectively managing its investments if it included cumulative cost and schedule variances for the investments or investment segments, consistent with OMB’s guidance for measuring progress towards meeting investment goals. of reported information and provide Congress with a more accurate report of the agency’s performance in meeting cost and schedule goals. Ensuring the variances for completed activities are consistently updated with actual information within the 60-day time frame required by Treasury as we previously recommended would provide more reliable information on which to gauge IRS’s performance in meeting cost and schedule goals. IRS is currently not working on developing a quantitative measure of scope and does not plan on doing so because it believes it is difficult to develop a single measure that would allow it to measure progress in delivering scope for the range of IRS’s investments. First, we believe IRS could develop quantitative measures using different methods as appropriate. Until such a measure is developed, being more transparent about progress in delivering scope by reporting qualitatively on how delivered scope compares to what was planned in the congressional reports would help IRS provide Congress a complete picture of its performance in managing its major investments—particularly in those cases where functionality is deferred. Conclusions
For fiscal year, 2013, the cost and schedule performance for IRS’ major IT investments was mixed, with six investments reported as being within 10 percent of cost and schedule goals throughout the year, eight reported as being significantly below cost or ahead of schedule—although in some cases, these are due to scope deferrals or poor estimating practices— and 5 behind schedule or over cost. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve the reliability of reported cost and schedule variance information for major investments, we recommend that the Commissioner of IRS direct the Chief Technology Officer to take the following three actions: report cumulative investment and investment segment cost and schedule information in the quarterly reports to Congress, consistent with OMB requirements for measuring progress towards meeting goals; ensure that projected cost and schedule variances for in-process activities are updated monthly, for the six investments for which we reviewed monthly updates, consistent with OMB and Treasury reporting requirements, by ensuring investment staff have a consistent understanding of the information to be included in monthly reports; and until a quantitative measure of scope is developed, qualitatively report on how delivered scope compares to what was planned in its quarterly reports to Congress, for the seven investments for which we reviewed scope reporting. Further, while IRS has started to include scope performance (in the functional performance section) in its quarterly reports to Congress, there are no quantitative measures of progress in delivering scope. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to (1) summarize the reported cost and schedule performance for IRS’s major information technology (IT) investments and assess the reporting of the performance information; (2) for selected investments, evaluate the reliability of reported cost and schedule variances; and (3) determine IRS’s progress in implementing a quantitative measure of functionality delivered for projects. | Why GAO Did This Study
IRS relies extensively on IT systems to annually collect more than $2 trillion in taxes, distribute more than $300 billion in refunds, and carry out its mission of providing service to America's taxpayers in meeting their tax obligations. For fiscal year 2014, the agency's budget request is $2.6 billion for IT. Given the size and significance of IRS's IT investments, and the challenges inherent in successfully delivering these complex IT systems, it is important that Congress be provided reliable cost, schedule, and scope information to assist with its oversight responsibilities.
Accordingly, GAO's objectives were to (1) summarize the reported cost and schedule performance for IRS's major IT investments and assess the reporting of the performance information (2) for selected investments, evaluate the reliability of reported cost and schedule variances; and (3) determine IRS's progress in implementing a quantitative measure of functionality delivered for projects. To address these objectives, GAO reviewed documentation, including monthly cost and schedule variance reports, and interviewed staff, including those from selected investments which are critical to IRS's mission.
What GAO Found
According to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), 6 of its19 major information technology (IT) investments were within 10 percent of cost and schedule estimates during fiscal year 2013. The remaining 13 were reported as having significant cost and schedule variances for at least 1 month of the year. Specifically, IRS reported 8 investments as being below cost or ahead of schedule; 3 as behind schedule; and 2 as over cost (see figure). IRS reported a range of reasons for these variances, including cost savings from contract negotiations and scope deferrals for those below cost or ahead of schedule, and procurement delays for those behind schedule. It is important to note that the reported monthly cost and schedule variances are for the fiscal year only. IRS's reporting would be more meaningful if it were supplemented with cumulative cost and schedule variances for the investments or investment segments, consistent with the Office of Management and Budget's guidance for measuring progress towards meeting investment goals.
Summary of Investments with Significant Variances
The reported variances for six investments reviewed were not always reliable because the projected and actual cost and schedule amounts on which they depend were not consistently updated in accordance with OMB and Treasury reporting requirements. Specifically, projected amounts were not always updated on a monthly basis for in-process (i.e., ongoing) activities for a range of reasons; and actual information was not consistently updated for completed activities within the 60-day time frame required by Treasury guidance. Addressing these issues would help IRS improve the reliability of reported information and provide Congress with a more accurate report of the agency's performance in meeting cost and schedule goals.
IRS is currently not working on developing a quantitative measure of scope (i.e., functionality) as GAO recommended in June 2012 and does not plan on doing so, because it believes it is difficult to develop a single measure that would allow it to measure progress in delivering scope for the range of IRS's investments. However, the agency could develop measures using different methods as appropriate. In addition, IRS has started to include scope performance (in the functional performance section) in its quarterly reporting to Congress. However, this information does not include a quantitative measure of performance. In addition, it does not show how delivered scope compares to what was planned. Providing transparency into progress in delivering scope by reporting qualitatively in the congressional reports until a quantitative measure is developed would help IRS provide Congress a complete picture of the agency's performance in managing its major investments.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is making recommendations for IRS to report more comprehensive and reliable cost and schedule information and improve the transparency of reported scope information for its major investments. IRS agreed with GAO's recommendations and stated it believed it had addressed one of them. GAO continues to believe further actions are needed. |
gao_GAO-16-182 | gao_GAO-16-182_0 | These offices, along with the Chief Scientist, report to the FDA Commissioner and carry out their missions through seven centers and through FDA’s Office of Regulatory Affairs. Our Prior Work Has Included Recommendations to Address FDA’s Challenges with IT Strategic Planning and Management
In previously reporting on FDA’s IT challenges, we highlighted deficiencies in a number of the agency’s management processes and system modernization efforts. FDA Has Developed a New IT Strategic Plan, but It Lacks Key Elements
To be effective as a guide for managing IT investments and better address agency-wide business challenges, best practices show that an IT strategic plan should define the agency’s vision and provide a road map to help align information resources with business strategies and investment decisions. Accordingly, best practices call for a comprehensive and effective plan to (1) be aligned with the agency’s overall strategy; (2) identify the mission of the agency, results-oriented goals, and performance measures that permit the agency to determine whether implementation of the plan is succeeding; (3) include strategies the governing IT organization will use to achieve desired results; and (4) provide descriptions of interdependencies within and across projects so that they can be understood and managed. The CIO has stated that the intent of the plan, entitled Information Technology Strategic Plan, Version 1.0 and dated September 2015, is to allow OIMT to address business challenges facing the agency. The plan describes the current state and customer perception of the IT environment, along with OIMT’s mission, vision, and objectives of three strategic themes—quality service, security, and efficiency. Nevertheless, in its current state, the document that FDA has developed does not include the key elements of a comprehensive IT strategic plan. In discussing our concerns, the CIO stated that the intent of the first version of the September 2015 IT strategic plan was to identify improvements, based on an assessment of FDA’s IT environment, that needed to be made to existing IT processes, technologies, roles, functions, and capabilities within OIMT. However, according to OIM officials and the CIO, they have not yet established or documented schedules or milestones for managing and completing the development and implementation of the next version of the IT strategic plan. However, it has taken some actions, but has not yet fully implemented two recommendations regarding the development and use of schedules for managing and monitoring the progress of IT initiatives. In addition, FDA incorporated use of the system inventory into the agency’s IT investment management process. Until it incorporates these elements into and fully implements the plan, the agency will continue to lack critical information needed to align IT initiatives with business strategies and investment decisions, and to determine whether outcomes of the IT initiatives are succeeding in supporting the agency-wide mission, goals, and objectives. In addition, FDA has implemented most of our prior recommendations for improving IT management practices. Taking further actions to fully implement the remaining recommendations will improve the agency’s ability to successfully monitor the progress of one of FDA’s most critical and costly IT modernization projects throughout its remaining life cycle. Recommendations for Executive Action
To help ensure that FDA’s IT strategic planning activities are successful in supporting the agency’s mission, goals, and objectives, we recommend that the Commissioner of FDA require the CIO to take the following two actions: establish schedules and milestones for completing a version of an IT strategic plan that incorporates elements to align the plan’s strategies with agency-wide priorities; includes results-oriented goals and performance measures that support the agency’s mission, along with targets for measuring the extent to which outcomes of IT initiatives support FDA’s ability to achieve agency-wide goals and objectives; identifies key IT initiatives that support the agency’s goals; and describes interdependencies among the initiatives; and implement the plan to ensure that expected outcomes of the agency’s key IT initiatives are achieved. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of our review were to (1) determine the status of the Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA) efforts to develop and implement an information technology (IT) strategic plan that includes results-oriented goals, activities, milestones, and performance measures; and (2) assess the extent to which FDA has addressed our prior IT-related recommendations. For the first objective, our scope was focused on FDA’s efforts to develop an IT strategic plan to be used to manage and guide key initiatives, including modernization projects, in support of agency-wide goals and objectives. Specifically, to determine actions taken by FDA to implement the five recommendations related to IT planning that we made in our 2009 report, we collected and examined agency documentation related to its IT strategic planning, enterprise architecture development, and human capital planning. | Why GAO Did This Study
IT systems are critical to FDA's ability to achieve its mission. GAO previously reported on limitations in a number of FDA's key IT areas, including data availability and quality, information infrastructure, the ability to use technology to improve regulatory effectiveness, and investment management. GAO recommended FDA take actions to address these limitations, including the development of a comprehensive IT strategic plan to provide direction for modernizing the agency's IT environment.
The Food and Drug Administration Safety and Innovation Act of 2012 included a provision for GAO to report on FDA's progress regarding an IT strategic plan and implementation of GAO's prior recommendations. This report provides an assessment of the (1) status of FDA's efforts to develop and implement an IT strategic plan that includes results-oriented goals, activities, milestones, and performance measures; and (2) extent to which FDA has addressed GAO's prior IT-related recommendations.
To do so, GAO assessed the agency's 2015 IT strategic plan against best practices for IT management. GAO also reviewed supporting documents regarding FDA's actions on prior recommendations.
What GAO Found
As of September 2015, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), an agency within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), had developed and released a new information technology (IT) strategic plan, entitled Information Technology Strategic Plan, Version 1.0 . The plan, according to the agency's Chief Information Officer (CIO), was developed to help FDA's Office of Information Management and Technology (OIMT) address business challenges facing the agency through the implementation of IT. The plan describes the current state of the agency's IT environment, along with OIMT's mission, vision, and the objectives of three strategic themes—quality service, security, and efficiency. The plan also defines performance measures and initiatives intended to support the office's strategic themes.
Nevertheless, the plan lacks key elements that GAO previously recommended be included in a comprehensive strategy to align with the agency-wide mission and goals, and allow the plan to be used for managing IT investments to more effectively address business challenges. For example, FDA's IT strategic plan does not align with strategic priorities and goals that the agency defined for 2014 through 2018. Further, it does not identify results-oriented goals and performance measures and milestones, or targets for measuring the extent to which outcomes of IT initiatives support FDA's ability to achieve agency-wide goals and objectives; strategies that the governing IT organization will use to support agency-wide goals and objectives; and key IT initiatives and interdependencies to be managed. The agency's CIO stated that this version of the strategic plan was developed to address challenges related to processes, technologies, roles, functions, and capabilities for improving the operations of OIMT, which has the responsibility for managing IT. However, FDA has not yet defined schedules or milestones for managing and completing the development and implementation of future versions of the plan that would reflect actions intended to address the agency-wide mission and goals. Until FDA incorporates these key elements of comprehensive IT strategic planning into its plan and fully implements the plan, it will lack critical information needed to align information resources with business strategies and investment decisions, and be hindered in determining whether outcomes of its IT initiatives are succeeding in supporting agency-wide goals.
FDA has made progress in implementing GAO's prior IT-related recommendations. Although it has not yet developed a comprehensive IT strategic plan, the agency has improved enterprise architecture development and IT human capital planning by implementing four of nine prior recommendations. FDA implemented two recommendations to develop an IT systems inventory that can be used to help manage IT investments and to improve information-sharing capabilities of one of its centers, and took steps toward implementing the remaining two recommendations related to improvements in scheduling and monitoring progress of a key IT modernization initiative. However, the agency did not complete all actions needed to implement these two recommendations. Specifically, it did not develop project schedules or conduct IT project monitoring in accordance with best practices. FDA's continued efforts to implement the remaining recommendations are critical to assuring that the agency's ability to manage IT investments and resources will meet its overall mission and goals.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that FDA define schedules and milestones for incorporating into its IT strategic plan elements that align with the agency's mission and business strategies, and fully implement the plan. HHS agreed with the recommendations. |
gao_T-RCED-98-168 | gao_T-RCED-98-168_0 | Tribes may move these funds from one TPA activity to another. The tribes in BIA’s Juneau area each received $4,000, and the remainder was distributed on the basis of population and TPA base funding levels. Distribution of Fiscal Year 1998 TPA Funds and Per Capita Analysis
As of March 1998, 95 percent of the $757 million in TPA funds had been distributed among the tribes and BIA offices. Our per capita analysis shows that the distributions ranged from a low of $121 per tribal member within BIA’s Muskogee area to a high of $1,020 within the Portland area. However, according to Interior officials, there are reasons for the differences in TPA distributions and the differences should not all be perceived as inequities. Appendix I presents the distributions and per capita analyses for BIA’s area offices. Revenues and Income Reported Under the Single Audit Act
Nonfederal entities—including tribes—meeting the federal assistance thresholds for reporting under the Single Audit Act (those receiving at least $100,000 in federal funds before 1997 and those expending at least $300,000 in 1997 or later) must submit an audited general-purpose financial statement and a statement of federal financial assistance. We examined all 326 financial statements on file with Interior that were most recently submitted by tribes; these statements generally covered fiscal years 1995 or 1996. While some statements included only federal revenues, others also included revenues from state, local, and private sources; some included financial information only for tribal departments that expended federal funds, while others provided more complete reporting on their financial positions. In total, the statements reported that these tribes received more than $3.6 billion in revenues during the years covered by them. These revenues included such things as taxes and fees, lease and investment income, and funds received through governmental grants and contracts. The independent auditors’ opinions for the remaining financial statements indicated that the statements were deficient to varying degrees. Additional Tribal Revenue Information That Could Be Useful and Barriers to Collecting This Information
In deciding whether to consider tribal revenues or business income in order to determine the amount of TPA funds tribes should receive, information that might be useful to the Congress could include (1) financial information for all tribes, including those tribes not submitting reports under the Single Audit Act; (2) more complete information on the financial resources available to tribes from tribal businesses, including gaming; and (3) more reliable data on tribes’ financial positions. However, there are several impediments to obtaining this information. Distribution of Fiscal Year 1998 TPA Funds as of March 25, 1998
Scope and Methodology
We obtained information about (1) BIA’s bases for distributing 1998 TPA funds; (2) distributions of TPA funds in fiscal year 1998; (3) revenue and business income reported by tribes under the Single Audit Act; and (4) additional revenue and income information that might be useful to the Congress in deciding whether to distribute TPA funds considering total financial resources available to tribes. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed the preliminary results of its review of the Bureau of Indian Affairs' (BIA) distribution of Tribal Priority Allocation (TPA)--or TPA--funds, focusing on: (1) BIA's basis for distributing 1998 TPA funds; (2) total distributions of TPA funds in fiscal year (FY) 1998 and a per-capita analysis of those distributions; (3) revenue and business income information reported by tribes under the Single Audit Act; and (4) what additional revenue and income information may be useful to Congress in deciding whether to distribute TPA funds to tribes.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) two-thirds of the 1998 TPA funds were distributed primarily on the basis of historical levels, and tribes may shift these base funds among TPA activities according to their needs; (2) the remaining one-third, known as non-base funds, are used for such activities as road maintenance and housing improvement and were generally distributed on the basis of specific formulas; (3) in total, 95 percent of the TPA funds appropriated in FY 1998 have been distributed; (4) average TPA distributions varied widely among BIA's 12 area offices when analyzed and compared on a per-capita basis; (5) the per-capita averages ranged from $121 per tribal member with BIA's Muskogee area to $1,020 per tribal member within BIA's Portland area; (6) according to Interior officials, there are reasons for differences in TPA distributions, and they do not consider the population estimates to be reliable; (7) nonfederal entities--including tribes--meeting certain federal assistance thresholds must submit audited financial statements annually under the Single Audit Act; (8) GAO reviewed all 326 financial statements on file with the Department of the Interior that were most recently submitted by tribes; the statements generally covered fiscal years 1995 or 1996; (9) while some tribes reported only their federal revenues, others included revenues from state, local and private sources; (10) in total, the statements reported that these tribes received more than $3.6 billion in revenues during the years covered by them; (11) these revenues included such things as taxes and fees, lease and investment income, funds received through governmental grants and contracts; (12) some tribes also reported income from their businesses for the periods covered by the statements; (13) however, the quality of the information reported in the statements varied; only about half of the statements received unqualified opinions from auditors, while the others were deficient to varying degrees; (14) in deciding whether to consider tribal revenues or business income in distributing TPA funds, information that might be useful to Congress could include more complete and reliable financial information for all tribes; (15) however, there are several impediments to obtaining this information; and (16) for example, under the Single Audit Act, financial statements must be submitted by those nonfederal entities expending at least $300,000 of federal funds in a year and may not include income from tribes' businesses. |
gao_GAO-03-637T | gao_GAO-03-637T_0 | Key Actions Have Been Taken over the Last 2 Years to Address Human Capital Weaknesses
When we placed strategic human capital management on our high-risk list back in January 2001, as a governmentwide high-risk challenge, we noted that after a decade of government downsizing and curtailed investments of human capital, it had become increasingly clear that federal human capital strategies were not appropriately constituted to adequately meet the current and emerging needs of the government and its citizens. The first agency assessment was made public in February 2002 as part of the President’s proposed fiscal year 2003 budget. Strategic Human Capital Management Remains at High Risk
Despite the building momentum for comprehensive and systematic reforms, it remains clear that today’s federal human capital strategies are not yet appropriately constituted to meet current and emerging challenges or to drive the needed transformation across the federal government. The basic problem is the long-standing lack of a consistent strategic approach to marshaling, managing, and maintaining the human capital needed to maximize government performance and assure its accountability. Building on the Current Momentum Can Create Lasting Change
Committed and sustained leadership and persistent attention on behalf of all interested parties will continue to be essential to building on the progress that has been and is being made, if lasting reforms are to be successfully implemented. In response to these ongoing challenges, OPM has taken a number of important actions. Congressional Leadership Continues to Be Critical
Congress has had and will need to continue to have a central role in improving agencies’ human capital approaches. I believe that the basic principles underlying these legislative proposals have merit and collectively they would make a positive contribution to addressing high-risk human capital issues and advancing the needed cultural transformation across the federal government. I also believe that certain additional safeguards and provisions should be considered by Congress. The SES needs to lead the way in the federal government’s effort to better link pay to performance. Much of the federal government’s knowledge and real-world experience with performance-based pay reform has been obtained through demonstration projects. The management weaknesses in some agencies are deeply entrenched and long-standing and will take years of sustained attention and continuity to resolve. We must move beyond this outdated, “one-size-fits-all” approach to paying federal employees and seriously explore more market- and performance- based approaches to federal pay. As part of this exploration, we need to continue to experiment with providing agencies with the flexibility to pilot alternative approaches to setting pay and linking pay to performance. As with all pay for performance efforts, adequate safeguards, including reasonable transparency and appropriate accountability mechanisms, would need to be in place to ensure fairness, prevent politicalization, and prevent abuse. The bottom line is that in order to receive any additional performance- based pay flexibility for broad-based employee groups, agencies should have to demonstrate that they have the modern, effective, credible, and validated performance management systems in place that are capable of supporting such decisions. Unfortunately, most federal agencies are a long way from meeting this requirement. 2. We seek to be in the vanguard of the federal government’s overall transformation efforts, including in the critically important human capital area. 2.) We have taken a number of steps to empower and invest in our employees. This is a work-in-progress for us as it is for others. | Why GAO Did This Study
Federal employees represent the government's knowledge base, drive its capacity to perform, and define its character, and as such, are its greatest asset. The early years of the 21st century are proving to be a period of profound transition for our world, our country, and our government. In response, the federal government needs to engage in a comprehensive review, reassessment, reprioritization, and as appropriate, reengineering of what the government does, how it does business, and in some cases, who does the government's business. Leading public organizations here and abroad have found that strategic human capital management must be the centerpiece of any serious change management initiative and effort to transform the cultures of government agencies. In response to a Congressional request, GAO discussed the status of the federal government's efforts to address high-risk human capital weaknesses, possible short- and longer-term legislative solutions to those weaknesses, and other human capital actions that need to be taken to ensure that federal agencies are successfully transformed to meet current and emerging challenges.
What GAO Found
Since GAO designated strategic human capital management as a governmentwide high-risk area in January 2001, Congress, the administration, and agencies have taken a number of steps to address the federal government's human capital shortfalls. In fact, more progress in addressing the government's long-standing human capital challenges was made in the last 2 years than in the last 20, and GAO is confident that more progress will be made in the next 2 years than the last 2 years. Despite the building momentum for comprehensive and systematic reforms, it remains clear that today's federal human capital strategies are not yet appropriately constituted to meet current and emerging challenges or to drive the needed transformation across the federal government. The basic problem is the long-standing lack of a consistent strategic approach to marshaling, managing, and maintaining the human capital needed to maximize government performance and assure its accountability. Committed and sustained leadership and persistent attention on behalf of all interested parties will continue to be essential to building on the progress that has been and is being made. Congress has had and will need to continue to have a central role in improving agencies' human capital approaches. The basic principles underlying the legislative proposals Congress is considering have merit. Collectively, these proposals would make a positive contribution to addressing high-risk human capital issues and advancing the needed cultural transformation across the federal government. At the same time, additional safeguards should be considered by Congress in order to prevent potential abuse. Moreover, certain additional proposals should be considered as part of this legislative package. Looking forward, the time has come to seriously explore more market- and performance-based approaches to federal pay. As part of this exploration, we need to continue to experiment with providing agencies with the flexibility to pilot alternative approaches to setting pay and linking pay to performance. A more performance-based approach to Senior Executive Service pay would be a good place to start. The bottom line, however, is that in order to receive any additional performance-based pay flexibility for broad-based employee groups, agencies should have to demonstrate that they have modern, effective, credible, and validated performance management systems, with adequate safeguards, including reasonable transparency and appropriate accountability mechanisms in place, that are capable of supporting such decisions. Unfortunately, most federal agencies are a long way from meeting this requirement. GAO, on the other hand, has taken numerous steps to meet this requirement and is well positioned to experiment with additional pay for performance flexibility. |
gao_GAO-13-287 | gao_GAO-13-287_0 | Background
End-Stage Renal Disease (ESRD)
Treatment options for individuals with ESRD include kidney transplants or maintenance dialysis. LVPA Did Not Effectively Target Low-Volume Facilities That Appeared Necessary for Ensuring Access to Care and Had High Costs
Many of the 326 facilities eligible for the 2011 LVPA were located near other facilities, indicating that they might not have been necessary for ensuring access to care. Moreover, the design of the LVPA provides facilities with an adverse incentive to restrict their service provision to avoid reaching the 4,000 treatment threshold. Approximately 35 percent of the 326 LVPA-eligible facilities were located within 5 miles of a high-volume facility.94 percent were located in urban areas, compared with 51 percent of all LVPA-eligible facilities. Certain Ineligible Facilities Had Above-Average Costs and Appeared Necessary for Ensuring Access to Care; LVPA Design May Introduce Adverse Incentives
Compared with all freestanding facilities in our cost analysis, freestanding LVPA-eligible facilities had substantially higher costs per dialysis treatment in 2011, but other freestanding facilities that provided a relatively low volume of treatments were ineligible for the LVPA, even though they were isolated and incurred above-average costs, because they exceeded the treatment threshold. CMS has implemented an adjustment in another payment system that decreases as facility volume increases—an approach which, if applied to the LVPA, could diminish the incentive for providers to limit service provision by making the loss of potential revenue smaller for supplying additional services. In addition, such an adjustment—referred to as a tiered or phased-out adjustment—could more closely align the LVPA with the decline in cost per treatment that occurs as volume increases. The guidance that CMS issued for implementation of the regulatory requirements was sometimes unclear and not always available when needed, and the misunderstanding of LVPA eligibility likely was exacerbated because CMS conducted limited monitoring of the Medicare contractors’ administration of LVPA payments. Medicare Overpaid Facilities Ineligible for the 2011 LVPA by an Estimated $5.3 Million and Did Not Pay an Estimated $6.7 Million to Some Eligible Facilities, including Those That Did Not Request Payments
Medicare overpaid 83 dialysis facilities that were ineligible for the LVPA in 2011 by an estimated $5.3 million, which was nearly one-quarter of the approximately $22.7 million in LVPA payments made that year. For example, the majority of the facilities that incorrectly received the LVPA—54 of 83—were hospital-affiliated facilities that failed the volume threshold. Much of the misunderstanding and resulting payment problems related to eligibility were exacerbated by CMS’s limited monitoring of the Medicare contractors and its consequent limited knowledge about implementation of the LVPA. While CMS requested information about the 2011 LVPA from Medicare contractors in October 2011 and again in July 2012, as of January 2013, it had not yet verified whether the information it received was complete or in a usable form. In particular, CMS still did not know which facilities were eligible for the 2011 LVPA, which facilities had attested to being eligible for the adjustment, nor which facilities received the 2011 LVPA. To ensure that future LVPA payments are made only to eligible facilities and to rectify past overpayments, we recommend that the Administrator of CMS take the following four actions: require Medicare contractors to promptly recoup 2011 LVPA payments that were made in error; investigate any errors that contributed to eligible facilities not consistently receiving the 2011 LVPA and ensure that such errors are corrected; take steps to ensure that CMS regulations and guidance regarding the LVPA are clear, timely, and effectively disseminated to both dialysis facilities and Medicare contractors; and improve the timeliness and efficacy of CMS’s monitoring regarding the extent to which Medicare contractors are determining LVPA eligibility correctly and promptly redetermining eligibility when all necessary data become available. Our recommendations—that CMS should (1) more effectively target facilities necessary for ensuring access to care by considering restricting the LVPA to low-volume facilities that are isolated and (2) reduce the incentive for facilities to restrict their service provision by considering revisions such as changing the LVPA to a tiered adjustment—outlined the factors CMS should consider in improving the LVPA. We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Health and Human Services. | Why GAO Did This Study
Medicare spent about $10.1 billion in 2011 on dialysis treatments and related items and services for about 365,000 beneficiaries with end-stage renal disease (ESRD). Most individuals with ESRD are eligible for Medicare. As required by the Medicare Improvements for Patients and Providers Act of 2008 (MIPPA), CMS implemented the LVPA to compensate dialysis facilities that provided a low volume of dialysis treatments for the higher costs they incurred. MIPPA required GAO to study the LVPA; GAO examined (1) the extent to which the LVPA targeted low-volume, high-cost facilities that appeared necessary for ensuring access to care and (2) CMS's implementation of the LVPA, including the extent to which CMS paid the 2011 LVPA to facilities eligible to receive it. To do this work, GAO reviewed Medicare claims, facilities' annual reports of their costs, and data on dialysis facilities' location to identify and compare facilities that were eligible for the LVPA with those that received it.
What GAO Found
The low-volume payment adjustment (LVPA) did not effectively target low-volume facilities that had high costs and appeared necessary for ensuring access to care. Nearly 30 percent of LVPA-eligible facilities were located within 1 mile of another facility in 2011, and about 54 percent were within 5 miles, indicating these facilities might not have been necessary for ensuring access to care. Furthermore, in many cases, LVPA-eligible facilities were located near high-volume facilities. Among the freestanding facilities in GAO's analysis, LVPA-eligible facilities had substantially higher costs per dialysis treatment than the average facility ($272 compared with $235); however, so did other facilities that provided a relatively low volume of treatments (and were isolated) but were ineligible for the LVPA. The design of the LVPA gives facilities an adverse incentive to restrict service provision because facilities could lose a substantial amount of Medicare revenue over 3 years if they reach the treatment threshold. In another payment system, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) implemented a tiered adjustment that decreases as facility volume increases. Such an adjustment could diminish the incentive for dialysis facilities to limit service provision and also more closely align the LVPA with the decline in costs per treatment that occurs as volume increases.
Medicare overpaid an estimated $5.3 million in 2011 to dialysis facilities that were ineligible for the LVPA and did not pay an estimated $6.7 million that same year to facilities that were eligible. The payment problems occurred primarily because the guidance issued by CMS on facility eligibility was sometimes not clear or timely and CMS's monitoring of the LVPA was limited. For example, the majority of the ineligible facilities that received the LVPA were hospital-affiliated facilities that failed the volume requirement. Although CMS gave the Medicare contractors guidance for determining how to count treatments when facilities are affiliated with hospitals, the agency did not issue that guidance until July 2012. CMS has conducted limited monitoring of the LVPA, which has left CMS with incomplete information about LVPA administration and payments. For example, CMS was unaware as of January 2013 whether its contractors had recouped erroneous 2011 LVPA payments. In addition, CMS had requested information from its contractors about the implementation of the 2011 LVPA, such as which facilities were eligible for or had received the LVPA, but had not yet verified whether the information it received was complete or in a usable form. Without complete information about the administration of this payment adjustment, CMS is not in a position to ensure that the LVPA is reaching low-volume facilities as intended or that erroneous payments to ineligible facilities are recouped.
What GAO Recommends
To more effectively target the LVPA and ensure LVPA payment accuracy, GAO recommends that the Administrator of CMS consider restricting payments to low-volume facilities that are isolated; consider changing the LVPA to a tiered adjustment; recoup 2011 LVPA payments that the Medicare contractors made in error; improve monitoring of those contractors; and improve the clarity and timeliness of guidance. The Department of Health and Human Services, which oversees CMS, agreed with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-16-287 | gao_GAO-16-287_0 | Background
Among other things, WIOA requires that DOL and Education collaborate to implement a common performance accountability system for the six core programs identified in the law (see table 1). 2). Officials in Selected States Anticipate Changes in How They Collect and Report Performance Data, Such As Integrating Data Systems, Though the Full Extent is Not Yet Known
Programs Vary in How they Currently Collect and Report Performance Data
To store participant data used for federal performance reporting, as well as for other program management purposes, each WIOA core program in the states we visited has its own case management data system (see table 3). A data sharing agreement governs this process. To collect employment and earnings information for those individuals who participated in the reporting period, an official with the Title I programs sends participant Social Security numbers (SSNs) to the New Hampshire Employment Security agency to match with the state’s Unemployment Insurance (UI) wage records. Core programs in Illinois have not begun integrating data systems and state officials are currently considering what approach to take related to integration. New Hampshire
Officials from core programs in New Hampshire said they do not plan to develop major changes to integrate data systems because their existing, independent systems are functioning well and such changes would be too costly. The DOL-administered programs have experience with collecting and reporting data for employment and earnings indicators, and Title I and Wagner-Peyser officials in all three states we visited said they expected few or relatively minor changes to their performance reporting. To report on the new measures, these programs may have to develop new ways to collect information about employment and earnings and may need increased access to UI data. Limited Information About Reporting Requirements and the Difficulty of Integrating Data Systems Challenge Implementation in Selected States
Limited Information on Details of Reporting Requirements Slowed Implementation Planning
Program officials across all three states we visited reported challenges in the early stages of implementing the requirements of WIOA, in part because they are awaiting final regulations and seeking more guidance from DOL and Education. To avoid investing resources in implementing aspects of performance reporting that might later change with the publication of final regulations, some states are focusing on other WIOA efforts, such as working with new program partners and discussing ways to share participant data efficiently, according to officials we spoke with in two states and one DOL regional office. DOL and Education have provided some interim guidance in order to assist states as they await final regulations. In the President’s fiscal year 2016 congressional budget justification for ETA, the agency asked for $37 million under the Workforce Data Quality Initiative, of which $30 million would be to “help states build integrated or bridged data systems to facilitate WIOA implementation… support building state-based wage data matching infrastructure to enable and/or streamline WIOA performance reporting.” Similarly, as part of its fiscal year 2016 budget request for the Adult Education program, Education asked for $1 million to provide technical assistance to states in the collection of new data elements and integration of data systems. Aside from cost, state and federal officials also identified other capacity concerns in this area, including limited staff expertise and antiquated IT systems. Officials in two of the three states we visited and a DOL regional official said that concerns over data security may impede states’ efforts to obtain participant information from core program partners. Limitations on Available Data May Challenge the Quality of Performance Information
DOL and Education intend that WIOA’s common indicators of performance will, among other things, enable consistent outcome comparisons across states. For example, according to OCTAE officials, Adult Education programs in some states have reported to them that they have difficulty collecting SSNs due to state privacy laws. Three States GAO Visited Reported No Intrusions into their Data Systems and that they Take Steps to Limit and Safeguard Personal Information Collected
Three States GAO Visited Reported No Intrusions into their Data Systems, Though Some Officials Cited Other Limited Security Breaches
Officials in all three states we visited reported that they were not aware of any outside intrusions into the electronic data systems for core WIOA programs during the years they worked in the programs. However, officials in Illinois and Texas reported other types of occasional data or security breaches that resulted in inappropriate exposure of PII for small numbers of people in limited circumstances. Program Officials in the Three States Reported They Generally Limit the Collection and Use of Personally Identifiable Information
One of the ways that some programs reduce risks associated with the unauthorized disclosure of PII is to limit what is collected from participants, including involving participants in consenting to the collection of information, which is consistent with the Fair Information Practice Principles. Officials in the three states we visited reported using various practices in these areas. Agency Comments
We provided copies of this draft report to the Department of Education and the Department of Labor for review and comment. The letter highlights DOL’s work with Education to create a unified vision of WIOA performance accountability through guidance, technical assistance, and rulemaking. Related GAO Products
Workforce Innovation and Opportunity Act: Performance Reporting and Related Challenges. Workforce Investment Act: Additional Actions Would Further Improve the Workforce System. | Why GAO Did This Study
Enacted in 2014, the Workforce Innovation and Opportunity Act brought numerous changes to existing federal employment and training programs, including requiring DOL and Education to implement a common performance accountability system across the six WIOA-designated core programs.
WIOA includes a provision for GAO to issue an interim and final report on issues related to job training databases and data exchange agreements. This final report addresses (1) changes selected states plan to make in how they collect and report performance information for core programs; (2) challenges these states face related to performance reporting and how they might be addressed; and (3) whether these states have reported breaches to core program data systems and what practices they have to safeguard personal information.
GAO reviewed relevant federal laws, regulations, and policy guidance; and obtained information on the efforts under way in three states (Illinois, New Hampshire, and Texas) selected in part based on variation in level of experience with sharing data across programs. The views of these officials provide in-depth examples but are not generalizable to all states. GAO also interviewed DOL and Education officials, including selected DOL regional officials and Education state liaisons and area coordinators to obtain perspectives on more states.
GAO makes no recommendations in this report. In its comments on a draft of this report, DOL highlighted its efforts with Education to promote a unified vision of performance accountability.
What GAO Found
To implement the Workforce Innovation and Opportunity Act (WIOA), the 2014 law governing the nation's employment and training programs, the three states GAO visited are considering performance reporting changes such as integrating data systems and using new data sources. GAO selected states with varying levels of experience sharing data across programs. According to the Departments of Education (Education) and Labor (DOL), WIOA is intended, in part, to improve the consistency of states' performance reporting compared to reporting under the law it replaced, the Workforce Investment Act of 1998. For six core DOL and Education programs, WIOA establishes common indicators of performance in areas such as employment and earnings, and encourages states to integrate data systems related to these indicators. In the states GAO visited—Illinois, New Hampshire, and Texas—efforts to integrate data systems varied. For example, Texas is consolidating programs in one agency and building an integrated data system and Illinois is discussing integration options across the four agencies housing its programs. Officials in all three states expect changes in how they collect and report performance information. Though specific reporting requirements are not yet final, core programs—especially those administered by Education—face substantial changes. For example, Education programs in these states are exploring new ways to collect earnings data, such as adding survey questions or obtaining greater access to unemployment insurance wage records.
Program officials in the three states GAO visited identified challenges to WIOA performance reporting, including:
Limited guidance. Officials in all three states said early implementation was slowed because WIOA regulations are not yet final and certain details about performance reporting are not yet resolved. In the interim, DOL and Education have offered states additional guidance.
Cost and complexity of integrating data systems. Officials in Illinois and New Hampshire said that resource constraints pose challenges to integrating data systems. Among efforts to help defray integration costs, DOL and Education have sought additional federal funding for states.
Data quality concerns. Missing participant data may continue to affect the quality of information states report to federal agencies. For example, some states reported using participant surveys to collect employment data due to challenges with state privacy laws. In addition, federal law generally allows participants to opt out of providing Social Security numbers (SSNs). Officials in the states GAO visited said many participants in one of the Education-administered programs do not provide SSNs, making it harder to match data to track their outcomes and participation in other programs.
Officials in the three states GAO visited reported no intrusions into their data systems in recent years. Officials in two states did report other occasional security breaches that may have resulted in inappropriate exposure of personally identifiable information for small numbers of people in limited circumstances; for example, emails that included participant SSNs. Officials in all three states reported taking steps to limit and protect the participant information they collect, such as monitoring and controlling data access. |
gao_GAO-16-629 | gao_GAO-16-629_0 | According to USAID, as of February 2016, U.S. government assistance was reaching 4 million people inside Syria per month. Humanitarian assistance provided by the United States in response to the conflict in Syria is part of a broader international response. Three Factors Complicate the Delivery of Humanitarian Assistance to People inside Syria
Effective delivery of U.S. humanitarian assistance to people inside Syria is complicated by three related factors—a dangerous operating environment, access issues, and remote management of programs. U.S. Agencies Do Not Require Comprehensive Risk Assessments from Implementing Partners and Most Partners Have Not Assessed Risks of Fraud
State and USAID do not require implementing partners to conduct comprehensive risk assessments for humanitarian assistance delivered to people inside Syria, and while most partners assessed safety and security risks associated with such programs, most did not assess financial risks, such as the risk of fraud. U.S. Most Implementing Partners Have Identified and Assessed Safety and Security Risks to Effective Aid Delivery inside Syria, But Most Have Not Assessed Risk of Fraud
All of the implementing partners in our sample have policies, procedures, or guidance related to conducting risk assessment for their programs to provide humanitarian assistance into Syria, including safety and security checklists, risk registers, and other tools for conducting various types of risk assessments. Further, in May 2016, USAID OIG reported the identification of bid-rigging and multiple bribery and kickback schemes related to contracts to deliver humanitarian aid in Syria, investigations of which resulted in the suspension of 14 entities and individuals involved with aid programs from Turkey. Partners Have Implemented Controls for Delivering Humanitarian Assistance inside Syria, but U.S. To help address these issues, U.S. agencies have taken some steps to oversee partner programs; nevertheless, opportunities to assess and mitigate the potential impact of fraud risks remain. U.S. For instance, State officials in the region conduct quarterly meetings with partners and collect information on programmatic objectives and on partner programs. Further, in October 2015, USAID’s OFDA hired a third party monitoring organization to review its projects in Syria. Fraud Oversight Could Be Strengthened
Based on our analysis, USAID’s third party monitoring contract and supporting documentation contain guidelines for verifying the progress of activities in Syria; however, they do not clearly instruct field monitors to identify potential fraud risks as they conduct site assessments of projects in Syria. Given the opportunity for fraud that exists in humanitarian assistance programs, as well as the ongoing USAID OIG investigations, without instructions to specifically collect data on fraud and training to identify it, USAID may be missing an opportunity to assist in its activities to mitigate fraud risks and design appropriate controls. Conclusions
The ongoing conflict in Syria has created a complex humanitarian emergency. Ensure that field monitors in Syria are trained on assessing and identifying potential fraud risks. In this report we examine humanitarian assistance provided by the Department of State (State), the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and implementing partners to people inside Syria, including (1) factors affecting delivery of such assistance; (2) the extent to which State, USAID, and their partners have assessed risks to the programs; and (3) implementation of controls to mitigate identified risks and ensure appropriate financial oversight of humanitarian assistance projects. To determine the extent to which State, USAID, and their partners have assessed risks to the programs, we selected a nongeneralizable sample of 12 fiscal year 2015 State and USAID funding instruments, out of a total of 52 funding instruments, from 9 different implementing partners. | Why GAO Did This Study
The conflict in Syria has created a complex humanitarian challenge, with an estimated 13.5 million people inside Syria in need of assistance. In response, the United States has provided more than $5 billion since 2011 in humanitarian assistance, with about half supporting those inside Syria. Without an embassy in Syria, State and USAID oversee assistance remotely from neighboring countries.
In this report GAO examines humanitarian assistance provided by State, USAID, and their implementing partners to people inside Syria, including (1) factors affecting delivery of such assistance; (2) the extent to which State, USAID, and their partners have assessed risks to the programs; and (3) implementation of controls to mitigate identified risks and ensure appropriate financial oversight of humanitarian assistance. GAO selected a nongeneralizable sample of 12 funding instruments involving 9 implementing partners and analyzed the partners' risk assessments and control activities, interviewed relevant officials, and conducted fieldwork in Jordan, where several implementing partners are based.
What GAO Found
Delivery of U.S. humanitarian assistance to people inside Syria is complicated by three factors including a dangerous operating environment, access constraints, and remote management of programs. Active conflict creates a dangerous environment characterized by attacks on aid facilities and workers, and humanitarian organizations face difficulties accessing those in need. Additionally, U.S. agency officials must manage programs in Syria remotely, increasing risks to the program, including opportunities for fraud. Despite these challenges, according to the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), U.S. humanitarian assistance has reached 4 million people inside Syria per month.
The Department of State (State), USAID, and their implementing partners have assessed some types of risk to their programs inside Syria, but most partners have not assessed the risk of fraud. Of the 9 implementing partners in GAO's sample of funding instruments, most assessed risks related to safety and security, but only 4 of 9 assessed fraud risks. Such an assessment is important as USAID's Office of Inspector General (OIG) has uncovered multiple instances of fraud affecting U.S. programs delivering humanitarian assistance to Syria. In May 2016, USAID OIG reported that 1 of its active fraud investigations resulted in the suspension of 14 entities and individuals. Given the challenging environment in Syria, fraud risk assessments could help U.S. agencies better identify and address risks to help ensure aid reaches those in need.
Partners have implemented controls to mitigate certain risks, but U.S. agencies could improve financial oversight. For example, almost all partners in our sample have controls to mitigate safety risks and some use technology to monitor the transport of goods. Additionally, U.S. agencies have taken steps to oversee activities in Syria, such as quarterly meetings with partners and spot checks of partner warehouses. Further, in October 2015, USAID hired a third party monitor to improve oversight of its activities and help verify progress of its programs. However, the monitors' training curriculum lacks modules on identifying fraud risks. Without such training, monitors may overlook potential fraud risks and miss opportunities to collect data that could help USAID improve its financial oversight.
What GAO Recommends
To provide more complete information to assist oversight activities, State and USAID should require their implementing partners to conduct fraud risk assessments. In addition, USAID should ensure its field monitors are trained to identify potential fraud risks and collect information on them. State and USAID concurred with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-04-245 | gao_GAO-04-245_0 | In our 1999 report, we made four recommendations to help EOWS improve program monitoring and management. We found that EOWS lacked internal controls requiring significant program management decisions be documented. Our third recommendation was to develop criteria for determining when sites have become self- sustaining and when to reduce or withdraw program funding. We found that although self-sustainability is central to the program, no site’s funding had been reduced or withdrawn as a result of its efforts to become self- sustaining in the 9 years of the program’s existence. We found that EOWS’s performance indicators generally tracked activities rather than program results; therefore, EOWS was not able to measure the success of the program. Internal Controls Have Been Developed, but Challenges Remain
Although EOWS has developed internal controls intended to require that significant qualification and funding decisions be documented and readily available for review as we recommended in 1999, these policies and procedures are generally not being followed in the files we reviewed. However, before our review ended, EOWS provided further documentation that fully documented progress reports and site visits, which it acknowledges was not in the official grant files, and thus not readily available. However, it has still not fully developed criteria to determine when sites have become self-sustaining and when to reduce or withdraw Weed and Seed grant funds, as we recommended in 1999. At the time of our review, no site’s funding had been reduced or withdrawn because the site had achieved self-sustainability, even though EOWS has funded some sites since the early 1990s. However, none of the studies on developing additional performance measures had been completed at the time of our review, and it is too soon to tell whether the studies will produce outcome measures needed to adequately assess the Weed and Seed program. Recommendations for Executive Action
We recommend that the Attorney General of the United States require the Assistant Attorney General for OJP to ensure that the Executive Office for Weed and Seed fully implement the intent of our previous recommendations by taking the following four steps: maintain the documentation of the basis and rationale for qualification and funding decisions in appropriate grant files; retain progress reports and site visit reports in official grant files; clearly define criteria to assess when sites are self-sustaining and apply the criteria to sites when making further funding decisions; and develop outcome performance measures--or, where measuring outcome is, after careful consideration, deemed infeasible, intermediate measures--that can be used to adequately track progress toward program outcomes of the Weed and Seed program. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Weed and Seed program, within the Department of Justice's Office of Justice Programs (OJP), aims to prevent and reduce violent crime in targeted neighborhoods, but it cannot optimize its effectiveness without sound management practices. In 1999, GAO made four recommendations to the Executive Office for Weed and Seed (EOWS) to improve the program's management, including (1) developing adequate internal controls to fully document decisions, (2) improving program monitoring, (3) developing criteria for determining when sites have become self-sustaining and when to reduce or withdraw program funding, and (4) developing additional performance measures. GAO did this study to assess progress in implementing these recommendations.
What GAO Found
Despite some progress toward addressing GAO's recommendations aimed at improving program management, GAO's review shows that EOWS has not fully implemented the management improvement recommendations GAO made in 1999. First, although EOWS has revised its internal controls to require that significant qualification and funding decisions be documented and readily available in the central grant files for review, EOWS has not always ensured that its policies and procedures were followed, for the grant files GAO reviewed. Second, EOWS reported taking a number of actions intended to improve program monitoring, such as mandating the timely submission of progress reports and adequate recording of site visits as GAO recommended. Nonetheless, GAO found that while EOWS was able to provide such documentation before its review ended, documentation was not available in some of the central grant files GAO reviewed. Thus, the documentation was not readily available for external reviewers, as required by OJP policies and GAO's internal control standards. Third, GAO found that EOWS still lacks fully developed criteria to determine when sites become self-sustaining and when to reduce or withdraw Weed and Seed funds because of the level of sustainability, even though sustainability is a central goal of the program. At the time of GAO's review, no site's funding had been reduced or withdrawn because of sustainability during the 13 years of the program's existence. Fourth, EOWS has not developed outcome performance measures that can be used to adequately track progress toward program outcomes of the Weed and Seed program. While EOWS has initiated studies on how to develop performance measures, at the time of GAO's review, none of these studies had been completed. Without requirements to monitor improvements and assign accountability, progress will be difficult to achieve. |
gao_GAO-11-225 | gao_GAO-11-225_0 | Energy is needed to accomplish many of these activities. Comprehensive Data about the Energy Needed for the Urban Water Lifecycle Are Limited, However Energy Needs Are Influenced by Location-Specific Factors
Comprehensive data about the energy needed for each stage of the urban water lifecycle are limited, and few nationwide studies have been conducted on the amount of energy used to provide drinking water and wastewater treatment services to urban users. However, specialists with whom we spoke emphasized that the energy demands of the urban water lifecycle vary by location; therefore, consideration of location-specific and other factors is key to assessing the energy needs of the urban water lifecycle. These factors include the source and quality of the water, the topography of the area over which water is conveyed and the distance of conveyance, and the level and type of treatment required. In particular, according to several specialists, the EPRI studies are outdated. As a result, cities that rely on groundwater as the source for their drinking water, such as Memphis, generally use less energy for treatment than cities that rely on surface water, such as Washington, D.C. The type of treatment process used at drinking water and wastewater facilities also influences the energy demands of providing drinking water and wastewater services to urban users. Certain Technologies and Approaches Can Reduce Energy Use, but Barriers Could Impede Their Adoption
Specialists we spoke with and studies we reviewed identified a variety of technologies and approaches that can improve the energy efficiency of drinking water and wastewater processes associated with the urban water lifecycle, and determining the appropriate solution depends on the circumstances of a particular system. Replacing less efficient equipment with more energy-efficient equipment can reduce energy use. In addition, leak detection technologies can identify leaks throughout water systems, thereby reducing water loss and the related energy required to pump and treat that “lost” water. For example, San Diego is implementing advanced metering tools to better manage its system and to provide real-time information to customers regarding their water use in order to help them make choices that conserve water. Many specialists told us that, as a result, utilities may not be able to justify the costs necessary to install energy-efficient equipment. Agency Comments
We provided a draft of this report to the Departments of Defense, Energy, and the Interior and EPA for review and comment. DOE and EPA provided technical comments that we incorporated into the final report as appropriate. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives for this review were to describe what is known about (1) the energy needed for each stage of the urban water lifecycle, and (2) technologies and approaches that could lessen the energy needed for the urban water lifecycle, as well as any identified barriers that exist to their adoption. These specialists represented a variety of organizations, including drinki water and wastewater treatment facilities; state and local government offices responsible for water or energy; officials from the EPA; researc from some of the Department of Energy’s national laboratories, such as Sandia National Laboratory; university researchers; water and energy industry representatives from groups such as the American Water Works Association and the Water Research Foundation; and relevant nongovernmental organizations, such as the Pacific Institute, a nonpartisan research institute that works to advance environmental protection, economic development, and social equity. | Why GAO Did This Study
Providing drinking water and wastewater services are two key functions needed to support an urban lifestyle. To provide these services, energy is needed to extract, use, and treat water and wastewater. As the demand for water increases, the energy demands associated with providing water services are similarly expected to grow. GAO was asked to describe what is known about (1) the energy needed for the urban water lifecycle and (2) technologies and approaches that could lessen the energy needed for the lifecycle and barriers that exist to their adoption. To address these issues, GAO reviewed scientific studies, government-sponsored research, and other reports and interviewed specialists from a variety of organizations, including drinking water and wastewater utilities; federal, state, and local government offices responsible for water or energy; and relevant nonprofit groups, about the energy needed to move, use, and treat water. GAO also selected three cities--Memphis, Tennessee; San Diego, California; and Washington, D.C.--as illustrative case studies to help understand the energy demands of the lifecycle in different areas of the country. GAO is not making any recommendations in this report. A draft was provided to the Departments of Defense, Energy (DOE), and the Interior, and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). DOE and EPA provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate..
What GAO Found
Comprehensive data about the energy needed for each stage of the urban water lifecycle are limited. In particular, few nationwide studies have been conducted on the amount of energy used to provide drinking water and wastewater services, and these studies do not consider all stages of the lifecycle in their analysis. Specialists GAO spoke with emphasized that the energy demands of the urban water lifecycle vary by location. Considering location-specific and other key factors is necessary to assess energy needs. The specialists mentioned such factors as the topography of the area over which water is conveyed, the level and type of treatment provided, and the quality of the source water. For example, systems relying on groundwater as their source for drinking water generally use less energy than systems relying on surface water because groundwater usually contains fewer contaminants and, therefore, requires less treatment before distribution to customers. A variety of technologies and approaches can improve the energy efficiency of drinking water and wastewater processes, but barriers exist to their adoption. Installing more efficient equipment, adopting water conservation measures, and upgrading infrastructure are among some of the approaches that can decrease energy use, according to specialists GAO spoke with and studies GAO reviewed. For example, technologies to identify potential pipeline leaks throughout water systems can reduce water loss and the energy required to pump and treat that "lost" water. However, according to specialists, adoption of technologies and approaches to improve energy efficiency may be hindered by the costs of retrofitting plants with more energy-efficient equipment and competing priorities at treatment facilities, among other barriers. |
gao_GAO-06-92 | gao_GAO-06-92_0 | For example, during a recent 3-year period (January 2002—February 2005), 9 thefts involving state and local government storage facilities were reported. By comparison, during this same period, ATF received reports of 205 explosives thefts nationwide from all sources. Based on these findings, the actual number of thefts occurring at state and local government storage facilities nationwide could be more than the number identified by ATF data. Since January 2002, ATF has conducted 77 voluntary inspections at state and local storage facilities—34 inspections at facilities that ATF shares with state and local agencies and 43 inspections at other state and local facilities. ATF Does Not Collect Nationwide Information about State and Local Government Storage Facilities, but Does So for Licensed Private Sector Facilities
According to ATF officials, ATF does not collect nationwide information on the number and location of state and local government explosives storage facilities, nor does the agency know the types and amounts of explosives being stored in these facilities. As a result, no systematic information about these facilities is collected. By comparison, ATF collects a variety of information about private sector explosives storage facilities, primarily under its authority to issue explosives licenses. ATF also collects information about private sector storage facilities during mandatory licensee inspections. Because state and local government storage facilities are exempt from the licensing process described above, they are not required to submit licensing-related information about their storage facility to ATF and they are not subject to licensing-related mandatory ATF inspections. Although no electronic security is required under federal regulations, 4 of the 18 explosives storage facilities had either an alarm or a video monitoring system in place. These circumstances appeared to be related to storage safety issues, rather than storage security. Further, because ATF does not oversee state and local government storage facilities as part of the federal licensing process and ATF does not have any other statutory authority to conduct regulatory inspections of these facilities, ATF’s ability to monitor the potential vulnerability of these facilities to theft or assess the extent to which these facilities are in compliance with federal explosives storage regulations is limited. However, during the course of our audit work, we identified five incidents involving theft or missing explosives at state and local government facilities, one of which had not been reported to ATF. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
In reviewing the security of state and local government explosives storage facilities, we focused on the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives’ (ATF) role in overseeing and regulating these facilities, including the extent to which ATF’s licensing operations address state and local government facilities and what authority ATF has to enforce federal explosives law and regulations at state and local government facilities. State and Local Site Visits
To find out what selected states and localities are doing to ensure the safe and secure storage of explosives in state and local government facilities, we visited 14 state and local government entities that stored explosives, as shown in table 4 below. We also obtained data from ATF on incidents of explosive thefts and missing explosives at state and local government storage facilities. | Why GAO Did This Study
More than 5.5 billion pounds of explosives are used each year in the United States by private sector companies and government entities. The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) has authority to regulate explosives and to license privately owned explosives storage facilities. After the July 2004 theft of several hundred pounds of explosives from a state and local government storage facility, concerns arose about vulnerability to theft. GAO analyzed (1) the extent of explosives thefts from state and local government facilities, (2) ATF's authority to regulate and oversee state and local government explosives storage facilities, (3) the information ATF collects about state and local government storage facilities, and (4) security oversight measures in place at selected state and local government storage facilities.
What GAO Found
Judging from available ATF data, there have been few thefts of explosives from state and local government storage facilities. From January 2002 to February 2005, ATF received only 9 reports of thefts or missing explosives from state and local facilities, compared with a total of 205 explosives thefts reported nationwide during this same period. During the course of our audit, we found evidence of 5 thefts from state and local government facilities, 1 of which did not appear in ATF's national database on thefts and missing explosives. Thus, the actual number of thefts occurring at state and local storage facilities could be higher than that identified by ATF data. ATF has no authority to oversee or inspect all state and local government explosives storage facilities. State and local government agencies are not required to obtain a license from ATF to use and store explosives, and only licensees--such as private sector explosives storage facilities--are subject to mandatory oversight. As a result, ATF has no means to ensure that state and local government facilities are in compliance with federal regulations. While ATF does not collect nationwide information about state and local government explosives storage facilities, information about some of these facilities is collected--for example, when facility operators voluntarily request an ATF inspection. Since January 2002, ATF has conducted 77 voluntary inspections at state and local storage facilities and found no systemic violations. By comparison, all licensed private sector facilities must submit a variety of information about their facility--including location and security measures in place--to ATF during the licensing process. ATF also collects information about these facilities during mandatory inspections. At the 18 state and local government storage facilities we visited, a variety of security measures were in place, including locked gates, fencing, patrols, and in some cases, electronic surveillance. All the facilities' officials told GAO that they conducted routine inventories. But most were not required to be licensed or inspected by state or local regulatory agencies. We identified several instances of possible noncompliance with federal regulations, related primarily to storage safety issues rather than security. |
gao_GAO-08-322T | gao_GAO-08-322T_0 | At the present time, no federal department has a COO/CMO-type position with all these characteristics. Nevertheless, a number of criteria can be used to determine the type of COO/CMO position for an agency. These criteria are the agency’s history of organizational performance, such as the existence of long- standing management weaknesses and the failure rates of major projects or initiatives; degree of organizational change needed, such as the status of ongoing major transformational efforts and the challenge of reorganizing and integrating disparate organizational units or cultures; nature and complexity of mission, such as the range, risk, and scope of the agency’s mission; organizational size and structure, such as the number of employees, geographic dispersion of field offices, number of management layers, types of reporting relationships, and degree of centralization of decision making; and current leadership talent and focus, such as the extent of knowledge and the level of focus of the agency’s managers on management functions and change initiatives, and the number of political appointees in key positions. Based on these criteria, there could be several types of COO/CMO positions, including the following: The existing deputy position could carry out the integration and business transformation role. This type of COO/CMO might be appropriate in a relatively stable or small organization. A second deputy position could be created to bring strong focus to the integration and business transformation of the agency, while the other deputy position would be responsible for leading the operational policy and mission-related functions of the agency. For a large and complex organization undergoing a significant transformation to reform long- standing management problems, this might be the most appropriate type of COO/CMO. To address long-standing management and business transformation problems, we have long advocated that DOD and DHS could benefit from a senior-level COO/CMO position, with a term appointment of at least 5 to 7 years, and a performance agreement. In fact, consensus exists among GAO’s work and other studies (e.g. Strategies for Implementing COO/CMO Positions at Federal Agencies
Once the type of COO/CMO is determined, the following six key strategies can be useful in implementing COO/CMO positions in federal agencies, including making sure that the COO/CMO has a sufficiently high level of authority and continuity in the position: Define the specific roles and responsibilities of the COO/CMO position. agencies.) We are suggesting that Congress consider the criteria and strategies that I have discussed today as it continues to develop and review legislative proposals for the appropriate type of COO/CMO positions for all major federal agencies, recognizing that the implementation of any approach should be determined within the context of the specific facts and circumstances that relate to each agency. | Why GAO Did This Study
As agencies across the federal government embark on large-scale organizational change needed to address 21st century challenges, there is a compelling need for leadership to provide the continuing, focused attention essential to completing these multiyear business-related transformations. At the same time, many agencies are suffering from a range of long-standing management problems that are undermining their ability to accomplish their missions and achieve results. One proposed approach to address these challenges is to have COO/ CMO positions in federal agencies. This statement is mostly drawn from GAO's report released today (GAO-08-34) that discusses criteria that can be used to determine the type of COO/CMO that ought to be established in federal agencies and strategies for implementing these positions. To do this, GAO reviewed four organizations with COO/CMO-type positions and convened a forum. GAO also discusses previous GAO work on DOD and DHS. GAO's report recommends that the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), working with the President's Management Council use the identified criteria when assessing the type of COO/CMO positions appropriate for federal agencies and the strategies for implementing these positions. Also, GAO suggests that Congress consider these criteria and strategies as it develops and reviews legislative proposals for these positions.
What GAO Found
GAO has long advocated that the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) could benefit from a full-time and senior-level chief operating officer (COO)/chief management officer (CMO) position, with a term appointment of at least 5 to 7 years, and a performance agreement. In fact, every federal agency can benefit from a senior leader acting as a COO/CMO. While the type of COO/CMO may vary depending on the characteristics of the organization, a number of criteria can be used to determine the appropriate type of COO/CMO position in a federal agency. These criteria include the history of organizational performance, degree of organizational change needed, nature and complexity of mission, organizational size and structure, and current leadership talent and focus. For example, the existing deputy position could carry out the integration and business transformation role--this type of COO/CMO might be appropriate in a relatively stable or small organization. Or, a second deputy position could be created to bring strong focus to the integration and business transformation of the agency. This might be the most appropriate type of COO/CMO for a large and complex organization undergoing a significant transformation to reform long-standing management problems. GAO identified six key strategies that agencies can follow in implementing COO/CMO positions in federal agencies. However, the implementation of any one approach should be determined within the context of the agency's specific facts and circumstances. |
gao_GAO-11-79 | gao_GAO-11-79_0 | 1.) 3.) 4.) Many Multiemployer Plans Reported Large Funding Shortfalls during the Recent Economic Downturn
Although funded status was in a general decline since 2000, the economic recession that began in December 2007 had a negative impact on the funded status of multiemployer plans, according to a number of data sources. Annual actuarial certification data from IRS show that the proportion of multiemployer plans reporting in endangered or critical zone status rose significantly, from 23 percent of plans in 2008 to 68 percent of plans in 2009. Plans Face Long-standing Demographic Challenges and an Uncertain Future
Multiemployer plans continue to face demographic challenges that threaten their long-term financial outlook—including an aging workforce and few opportunities to attract new employers and workers into plans. PBGC Monitors the Health of Multiemployer Plans, but Does Not Assist Troubled Plans on an Ongoing Basis
Data That PBGC Uses Are Outdated
While PBGC officials told us that they could benefit from having more current data than are available on the Form 5500, they prefer using Form 5500 data on multiemployer plans because these older data are the most comprehensive, the agency’s monitoring system is designed for it, the data are audited, and most private plans are required by law to file the form on an annual basis. Like all multiemployer plans, the partitioned participants are subjected to ERISA’s multiemployer guaranteed benefit limits. Pension Structures in Other Countries Provide Multiemployer Plans with Options to Improve Funding
The private pension systems in the countries we studied—the Netherlands, Denmark, the United Kingdom, and Canada—support industrywide, employer-based pension plans that share some common attributes with U.S. multiemployer plan structure. Monitoring
These countries all monitored multiemployer plans for compliance and to determine plan funding and solvency risk. Some of the countries allow plans to increase contributions and reduce the rate of benefit accruals. Current Multiemployer Framework Faces Challenges in Assisting Plans in Need
The statutory and regulatory framework guiding multiemployer plans is not structured to assist troubled plans, limits the actions agencies can take, and promotes little interaction among federal agencies that bear joint responsibility for monitoring and assisting these plans and their participants. Through collective bargaining, employers and employees worked to maintain their pension benefits despite changing economic climates and financial challenges. In the short term, the majority of plans will have to make difficult decisions to improve their funding and protect against future declines. While some plans may be able to improve their funded status as the economy improves, plans in the worst condition may find that the current options of increasing employer contributions or reducing benefit accruals are insufficient to overcome the funding and demographic challenges they face. For these plans, the combination of the effects of the economic downturn, the decline in collective bargaining, the withdrawal of contributing employers, and an aging workforce has likely accelerated their path to insolvency. Without additional options to address their underfunding, or new employers joining the plans to replenish the contributions, many plans may find themselves at greater risk of insolvency and more likely to need PBGC financial assistance sooner rather than later. Such a situation would put additional stress on PBGC’s insurance program that, already in deficit, it can ill afford. For example, the countries that we studied had pension regulators that interacted with plans on a frequent basis, collected timely and detailed plan information, provided a range of tools to plans to address plan underfunding and made information on the funded status of plans available to the public. Matters for Congressional Consideration
To provide greater transparency of the current status of multiemployer plans, assist federal monitoring efforts, and help plans address their funding deficiencies, Congress should consider: consolidating the annual funding notices and the PPA notices of critical or endangered status to eliminate duplicative reporting requirements; and requiring IRS, EBSA, and PBGC to establish a shared database containing all information received from multiemployer plans. EBSA and PBGC also provided technical comments, which we incorporated in this report, as appropriate. (2) What steps does PBGC take to monitor the health of these plans? To identify what statutory and regulatory changes, if any, are needed to help plans continue to provide participants with the benefits due to them, we reviewed pension literature and interviewed a variety of experts on multiemployer plans, including officials from EBSA, IRS, and PBGC; pension experts; and practitioners representing a range of industries and plan sizes. | Why GAO Did This Study
Thirty years ago Congress enacted protections to ensure that participants in multiemployer pension plans received their promised benefits. These defined benefit plans are created by collective bargaining agreements covering more than one employer. Today, these plans provide pension coverage to over 10.4 million participants in approximately 1,500 multiemployer plans insured by the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC). In this report, GAO examines (1) the current status of nation's multiemployer plans; (2) steps PBGC takes to monitor the health of these plans; (3) the structure of multiemployer plans in other countries; and (4) statutory and regulatory changes that could help plans provide participants with the benefits they are due. To address these questions, GAO analyzed government and industry data and interviewed government officials, pension experts and plan practitioners in the United States, the Netherlands, Denmark, United Kingdom, and Canada.
What GAO Found
Most multiemployer plans report large funding shortfalls and face an uncertain future. U.S. multiemployer plans have not been fully funded in aggregate since 2000 and the recent economic recession had a severely negative impact on the funded status of multiemployer plans. Annual data from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) show that the proportion of multiemployer plans less than 80 percent funded rose from 23 percent of plans in 2008 to 68 percent of plans in 2009. While some plans may be able to improve their funded status as the economy improves, many plans will continue to face demographic challenges that threaten their long-term financial outlook--including an aging workforce and few opportunities to attract new employers and workers into plans. PBGC monitors the health of multiemployer plans, but can provide little assistance to troubled plans until they become insolvent, at which point PBGC provides loans to allow insolvent plans to continue paying participant benefits at the guaranteed level (currently $12,870 per year for 30 years of employment). PBGC receives more current information on plan status, but uses older plan data to determine which plans are at the greatest risk of insolvency, because these data are audited, comprehensive, and PBGC's monitoring system was designed for them. The private pension systems in the countries GAO studied face short-term and long-term challenges similar to those that U.S. multiemployer plans currently face, including plan funding deficiencies and an aging workforce. The plans in these countries are subject to a range of funding, reporting, and regulatory requirements that require plans to interact frequently with pension regulators. Multiemployer plans in these countries have a number of tools available to improve and maintain their funded status, such as increasing contributions and reducing the rate of benefit accruals. The statutory and regulatory framework for multiemployer plans is not structured to assist plans on an ongoing basis and promotes little interaction among the federal agencies responsible for monitoring and assisting plans and safeguarding participant benefits. The lack of timely and accurate information and interagency collaboration hampers efforts to monitor and assist plans, and to enforce plan requirements. The recent economic downturn revealed that these plans, like most pension plans, are vulnerable to rapid changes in their funded status. Plans in the worst condition may find that the options of increasing employer contributions or reducing benefits are insufficient to address their underfunding and demographic challenges. For these plans, the effects of the economic downturn, declines in collective bargaining, the withdrawal of contributing employers, and an aging workforce will likely increase their risk of insolvency. Without additional options to address plan underfunding or to attract new employers to contribute to plans, plans may be more likely to require financial assistance from PBGC. Additional claims would further strain PBGC's insurance program that, already in deficit, it can ill afford. GAO is asking Congress to consider ways to eliminate duplicative reporting requirements and establish a shared database. GAO is also recommending that PBGC, IRS, and Labor work together to improve data collection and monitoring efforts. In commenting on a draft of this report, the agencies generally agreed to improve their coordination efforts. |
gao_GAO-01-305 | gao_GAO-01-305_0 | Conclusions
No comprehensive source provided guidance to either Enforcement staff or the bureaus on the circumstances under which bureaus are required to interact with Enforcement. In addition, established documentation did not exist for 12 of the 29 circumstances under which the bureaus are required to interact with Enforcement, and when it did exist, the documentation was generally broad in nature and did not provide explicit information on the expected interaction between the bureaus and Enforcement. About one-half of the bureau officials we interviewed said that they were not aware of written requirements for their bureaus’ interactions with Enforcement or that they knew when to interact through such factors as their professional responsibility, experience, judgment, or common sense. An agency’s internal control needs to be clearly documented and that documentation should be readily available for examination. Without a clearly defined and documented set of policies and procedures covering operational and communications activities, Enforcement runs the risk of not being able to perform its functions and meet its goals efficiently. The implementation of the plan requires the oversight of the Department. Treasury’s Office of Enforcement coordinated and compiled Treasury’s MTW. | Why GAO Did This Study
This report discusses GAO's review of the Department of the Treasury's Office of Enforcement. The office was created to provide oversight, policy guidance, and support to Treasury's enforcement bureaus.
What GAO Found
GAO found that no comprehensive source provided guidance to either the office staff or to the bureaus on the circumstances under which bureaus are required to interact with the office. In addition, established documentation did not exist for 12 of the 29 circumstances under which the bureaus are required to interact with the office, and when it did exist, the documentation was generally broad in nature and did not provide explicit information on one-half of the expected interaction. About one-half of the bureau officials that GAO interviewed said that they were not aware of written requirements for their bureaus' interactions with the office or that they knew when to interact through such factors as their professional responsibility, experience, judgment, or common sense. An agency's internal control needs to be clearly documented and that documentation should be readily available for examination. Without a clearly defined and documented set of policies and procedures covering operational and communications activities, the office runs the risk of not being able to perform its functions and meet its goals efficiently. |
gao_GAO-04-846T | gao_GAO-04-846T_0 | In 1998, the U.S. and Egyptian governments agreed to reduce U.S. economic support from $815 million to $407 million per year in fiscal year 2009. CIP Assists Egypt’s Private Sector and Supplies Funds to the Egyptian Government
The CIP provides favorable financing to importers of U.S. goods and, through the loan repayments, supplies funds to the Egyptian government. From fiscal years 1999-2003, about 650 Egyptian firms used the CIP to import just over $1 billion in U.S. products from approximately 670 U.S exporters. In a 2003 USAID-sponsored survey, 66 percent of Egyptian importers surveyed said that they would have imported U.S. goods without the CIP. However, 49 percent of survey respondents said that the CIP helped increase their firm’s production capacity and 32 percent said that the program helped increase their firm’s employment levels. Although three-quarters of the U.S. exporters surveyed indicated that they would have exported goods to Egypt without the CIP, almost half said that the CIP helped their firm increase its exports to Egypt. Egyptian Government and USAID Jointly Determine Use of the Special Account
In an annual memorandum of understanding, USAID and Egypt’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs jointly determine how much of the local currency from the repayment of loans in the special account will support Egypt’s general and sector budgets and USAID’s activities. In addition, USAID used about 6 percent of CIP-generated funds in the special account for some of its operating expenses. Several Factors Limit CIP’s Ability to Strengthen Egypt’s Private Sector
Various factors have limited the CIP’s ability to foster a competitive private sector in Egypt. A second factor affecting the CIP’s ability to strengthen the private sector has been the perceived inconsistency in the government’s foreign exchange policy, according to several U.S. government studies and a senior Egyptian economist. In this context, the CIP can provide only limited relief to the country’s foreign currency needs. Because of experience with bad loans, the recent economic slowdown, and the resulting increased risk of nonrepayment, Egyptian banks are reluctant to finance entrepreneurial activity, according to the Economist Intelligence Unit. Finally, the CIP’s impact on the private sector has been constrained by Egypt’s large number of informal businesses, which the program is not designed to reach. For fiscal years 1999-2003, we analyzed (1) program participants’ use of the CIP and the Egyptian government and USAID’s use of program funds and (2) factors that have affected the CIP’s ability to foster a competitive private sector in Egypt. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Commodity Import Program (CIP), managed by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), is intended to foster a competitive private sector in Egypt, in addition to assisting U.S. exporters. The program also supports the government of Egypt and USAID activities and expenses in Egypt. Since 1992, Congress has appropriated at least $200 million per year for the CIP. In 1998, the United States negotiated a reduction in its economic assistance to Egypt, including the CIP, through fiscal year 2009. In this context, GAO was asked to discuss its ongoing analysis of (1) program participants' use of the CIP and the Egyptian government's and USAID's use of program funds and (2) factors that have affected the CIP's ability to foster a competitive private sector in Egypt. We received comments on a draft of this statement from USAID, which we incorporated where appropriate. In general, USAID agreed with our observations.
What GAO Found
The CIP provides loans to Egyptian importers of U.S. goods and, through loan repayments, supplies funds to the government of Egypt. During fiscal years 1999-2003, about 650 Egyptian firms used the CIP to import $1.1 billion in U.S. products from approximately 670 U.S exporters. In a 2003 USAID survey, about two-thirds of CIP importers said that they would have imported U.S. goods without the program, but half said that it helped increase their firm's production capacity and one-third said that it helped increase their firm's employment levels. The Egyptian government and USAID jointly determine the uses of the funds from loan repayments. In fiscal years 1999-2003, about three-quarters of these funds supported Egypt's general and sector budgets and about 15 percent supported USAIDadministered activities and operating expenses in Egypt. Despite the positive results reported by some CIP users, various factors have limited the program's ability to foster a competitive private sector in Egypt. According to the State Department, the slow pace of Egypt's economic reforms has created a climate not conducive to private enterprise. Further, according to several U.S. government studies, the Egyptian government's inconsistent foreign exchange policies have hampered firms' ability to do business in Egypt, limiting the extent to which the CIP can relieve the country's foreign currency needs. In addition, because of experience with bad loans, the recent economic slowdown, and the resulting increased risk of nonrepayment, bank officials told us that they are generally reluctant to provide loans to entrepreneurs. Finally, because the CIP is not designed to reach firms in Egypt's large informal economy, the program's ability to foster a competitive private sector is necessarily limited. |
gao_GAO-08-1058 | gao_GAO-08-1058_0 | In selecting which special measures to apply, the Secretary is required to consider four factors. Starting in 2006, Treasury changed its targeting procedures and, with Justice, established an interagency working group to discuss potential threats to the U.S. financial system at an earlier stage in the process. However, it is unclear whether the new procedures improved consultation because Treasury’s current process has not resulted in any new Section 311 findings since 2005. 2. 3. 5. 8. 10. To date, Treasury has issued findings of primary money laundering concern against three jurisdictions and eight financial institutions in eight countries. In all of the cases above, Treasury issued a designation of primary money laundering concern. If it determined that it had enough evidence to support a Section 311 finding, it published a proposed rule in the Federal Register identifying the institution as being of “primary money laundering concern.”
Treasury Process for Implementing Section 311 Was Consistent with Legal Requirements
Treasury’s process for implementing Section 311 was consistent with requirements set forth in the USA PATRIOT Act. Officials of two U.S. agencies expressed concerns about the amount of time they had for consulting with Treasury on Section 311 cases prior to issuing proposed rules. Before a proposed rule was issued for public comment, Treasury provided it to Justice and State for consultation, as required by the act. Treasury’s Process for Implementing Section 311 Followed Requirements of the Law but Took Years to Finalize Some Proposed Rules
It has sometimes taken Treasury years to finalize or withdraw a proposed Section 311 rule, though these delays are not inconsistent with requirements under the law. Treasury then determines whether to finalize or withdraw a proposed rule. Treasury views Section 311 actions as effective in achieving both goals because U.S. financial institutions respond immediately to proposed rules, and several foreign governments have strengthened their laws and regulations in response to proposed rules. Several U.S. government officials said that Section 311 was effective in achieving the first goal of isolating targeted financial institutions or jurisdictions from the U.S. financial system. Treasury officials said that it discussed Section 311 actions with foreign government representatives when appropriate and provided ample notice that a Section 311 action was forthcoming in some cases. Countries may be less likely to cooperate with the U.S. government on other sanctions or law enforcement matters if they feel that the United States is acting in an unreasonable or unsubstantiated manner regarding Section 311 or that the United States cannot articulate the standards used to reach such a decision. Conclusion
U.S. government officials consider Section 311 to be an effective tool in restricting access to the U.S. financial markets for financial institutions or jurisdictions that are of primary money laundering concern and in encouraging foreign governments to strengthen their anti-money laundering laws and regulations. Without written operational guidelines to clarify when to complete the Section 311 actions or clear lines of authority for which office is responsible for completing the action, Treasury has taken years to complete the Section 311 process for certain cases. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To examine the process U.S. agencies used to implement the USA PATRIOT Act Section 311 restrictions against targeted financial institutions and countries, we interviewed knowledgeable officials from the Treasury offices of Terrorist Financing and Financial Crimes (TFFC) and the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), as well as officials from State, Justice, and the U.S. Federal Reserve System who had been involved in the Section 311 process. 1. 3. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since September 11, 2001, the United States has established tools to address the threat to the U.S. financial system of money laundering and terrorist financing. One such tool is Section 311 of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, which authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury (Treasury) to prohibit U.S. financial institutions from maintaining certain accounts for foreign banks if they involve foreign jurisdictions or institutions found to be of primary money laundering concern. To make this finding, Treasury examines several factors and generally issues a proposed rule announcing its intent to apply Section 311 restrictions. GAO was asked to examine (1) the process used to implement Section 311 restrictions, (2) the process Treasury follows to finalize or withdraw a proposed rule, and (3) how Treasury assesses the impact of Section 311. GAO reviewed financial and investigative U.S. government documents and met with government officials and representatives of affected banks.
What GAO Found
Treasury's informal process to implement Section 311 was consistent with requirements in U.S. law. From 2002 to 2005, Treasury identified 11 cases--3 jurisdictions and 8 institutions--as being of primary money laundering concern and issued proposed rules for 10 of these cases. As required, Treasury consulted with the Departments of Justice and State prior to issuing the proposed rules. However, Justice and State officials said that it was difficult for them to effectively assess the evidence on some Section 311 cases because Treasury provided them limited time. In 2006, Treasury changed its process by forming an interagency working group to discuss potential threats to the U.S. financial system. But it is unclear if the new process addressed the agencies' concerns since Treasury has issued no Section 311 findings since 2005. Treasury determines whether to finalize or withdraw a proposed Section 311 rule by reviewing written comments and sometimes meeting with interested parties. The duration of a proposed rule is significant because U.S. financial institutions act immediately in response to its announcement. However, Treasury has taken years to complete this process in some cases. In April 2008, Treasury withdrew two of three notices--all open for between 3 and 5 years--after GAO discussed the cases with Treasury officials. Contributing to this lag was the absence of required timeframes for completing the action and of written guidance specifying a Treasury office to finalize the actions. Treasury views Section 311 as effective because it isolates target institutions from the U.S. financial system and encourages some foreign governments to strengthen their anti-money laundering authorities. However, some foreign government officials said that Section 311's implementation precluded their own enforcement or regulatory actions against targeted institutions as U.S. action was unilateral or provided too little information for them to act. Justice officials said that if Section 311's application is viewed as unsubstantiated, some countries may be less likely to cooperate with the U.S. government on other law enforcement matters or sanctions. Treasury officials recognized the concerns, but did not believe they diminished Section 311's effectiveness. |
gao_HEHS-95-220 | gao_HEHS-95-220_0 | The number of AFDC recipients who participate in JOBS is also constrained by state funding. Some officials explained that because of the level of matching funds, they must limit those who can participate in their JOBS programs to women with minimal child care needs or those who have made child care arrangements that are free. These barriers can delay AFDC recipients’ participation in the JOBS program. Inadequate Postwelfare Child Care Subsidies Challenge JOBS Participants’ Self-Sufficiency
Insufficient child care subsidies for the working poor affects JOBS participants’ and other welfare recipients’ ability to achieve self-sufficiency. As states move to expand work requirements, they may have to reconsider funding priorities and push to develop new sources of child care to meet the needs of welfare recipients and the working poor alike. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
To assist the Congress in its deliberations on welfare reform and child care, we examined (1) the extent to which child care needs of welfare recipients in JOBS are are currently being met, (2) whether any barriers exist to meeting the child care needs of JOBS participants, (3) the effect of child care subsidies on former welfare recipients’ move toward self-sufficiency, and (4) the potential implications of welfare reform for child care availability and continuity. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO examined the extent to which the child care needs of welfare recipients in the Job Opportunities and Basic Skills Training (JOBS) program are currently being met, focusing on: (1) whether any barriers exist to meeting JOBS participants' child care needs; (2) the effects of child care subsidies on former welfare recipients' move toward self- sufficiency; and (3) the potential implications of welfare reform for child care availability and continuity.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) JOBS serves only about 13 percent of adult welfare recipients partly because many JOBS programs meet statutory exemption provisions; (2) insufficient state funds limit the number of welfare recipients with child care needs that can participate in JOBS; (3) when child care funding is unavailable, states either exempt welfare recipients or limit participation to those with school-aged children or those who can find free child care; (4) shortages of certain kinds of child care and the lack of reliable transportation can delay some JOBS participants' training or work and affect their continued participation; (5) welfare recipients that have secured work often lose their child care subsidy due to insufficient state funds, affecting their ability to become self-sufficient and often causing them to quit work; and (6) as states move to expand work requirements, they may have to reconsider funding priorities and develop new sources of child care to meet the needs of welfare recipients and the working poor. |
gao_GAO-07-530T | gao_GAO-07-530T_0 | An Increasing Number of Employees Participate in Defined Contribution Plans, and This Trend Has Been Increasing Since the 1980s
The number of defined contribution plans has increased since 1985, while the number of defined benefit plans has declined dramatically. Based on industry estimates, equity funds accounted for nearly half of the 401(k) plan assets at the close of 2005. With the growth in 401(k) plans, more workers now bear greater responsibility for funding their retirement income. According to the most recent data from Labor, the majority of 401(k) plans are participant- directed, meaning that a participant makes investment decisions about his or her own retirement plan contributions. Fees are one of many factors—such as the historical performance and investment risk for each plan option—participants should consider when investing in a 401(k) plan because fees can significantly decrease retirement savings over the course of a career. Investment and Record-Keeping Fees Account for Most 401(K) Plan Fees, but Information on These Fees May Be Limited or Unavailable to Participants and Labor
Various fees are associated with 401(k) plans, but investment and record- keeping fees account for most 401(k) plan fees. However, inadequate disclosure and reporting requirements may leave participants and Labor without important information on these fees. The information on fees that plan sponsors are required to disclose to participants does not allow participants to easily compare the fees for the investment options in their 401(k) plan. In addition, Labor does not have the information it needs to oversee fees and identify questionable 401(k) business practices. Most 401(k) plan sponsors elect this protection and therefore must provide, among other information, a description of the investment risk and historical performance of each investment option available in the plan and any associated transaction fees for buying or selling shares in these options. Participants may not have a clear picture of the total fees they pay because plan sponsors provide this information in a piecemeal fashion. Furthermore, the documents that participants receive do not provide a simple way for participants to compare fees among the investment options in their 401(k) plan. As a result, participants may have more limited investment options and may pay higher fees for these options than they otherwise would. Labor Has Several Initiatives Under Way to Improve Information It Has on Fees and the Various Business Arrangements Among Service Providers
Labor officials told us about three initiatives currently under way to improve the disclosure of fee information by plan sponsors to participants and to avoid conflicts of interest: Labor is considering promulgating a rule regarding the fee information required to be furnished to participants in plans where sponsors have elected liability protection. To better enable the agency to effectively oversee 401(k) plan fees, we recommended that the Secretary of Labor should require plan sponsors to report a summary of all fees that are paid out of plan assets or by participants. With this shift, participants now bear more responsibility for ensuring they have adequate income in retirement, emphasizing the importance of having sufficient information to make informed 401(k) investment decisions. | Why GAO Did This Study
Over the past two decades there has been a noticeable shift in the types of plans employers are offering employees. Employers are increasingly moving away from traditional defined benefit plans to what has become the most dominant and fastest growing type of defined contribution plan, the 401(k). As more workers participate in 401(k) plans, they bear more of the responsibility for funding their retirement. Given the choices facing participants, specific information about the plan and plan options becomes more relevant than under defined benefit plans because participants are responsible for ensuring that they have adequate income at retirement. While information on historical performance and investment risk for each plan option are important for participants to understand, so too is information on fees because fees can significantly decrease participants' retirement savings over the course of a career. As a result of employees bearing more responsibility for funding their retirement under 401(k) plans, Congress asked us to talk about the prevalence of 401(k) plans today and to summarize our recent work on providing better information to 401(k) participants and the Department of Labor (Labor) on fees. GAO's remarks today will focus on (1) trends in the use of 401(k) plans, and (2) the types of fees associated with these plans.
What GAO Found
There are an increasing number of active participants in 401(k) plans than in other types of employer-sponsored pension plans, a trend that has accelerated since the 1980s. Now, 401(k) plans represent the majority of all private pension plans; they also service the most participants and hold the most assets. These plans offer a range of investment options, but equity funds--those that invest primarily in stocks--accounted for nearly half of 401(k) assets at the close of 2005. Most 401(k) plans are participant-directed, meaning that a participant is responsible for making the investment decisions about his or her own retirement plan contributions. Inadequate disclosure and reporting requirements may leave participants without a simple way to compare fees among plan investment options, and Labor without the information it needs to oversee fees and identify questionable 401(k) business practices. The Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974 requires 401(k) plan sponsors to disclose only limited information on fees. Participants must collect various documents over time and may be required to seek out some documents in order to get a clear picture of the total fees that they pay. Furthermore, the documents that participants receive do not provide a simple way to compare fees--along with risk and historical performance--among the investment options in their 401(k) plan. The information reported to Labor does not identify all fees charged to 401(k) plans and therefore has limited use for effectively overseeing fees and identifying undisclosed business arrangements among consultants or service providers. As a result, participants may have more limited investment options and pay higher fees for these options than they otherwise would. |
gao_GAO-07-1017T | gao_GAO-07-1017T_0 | Background
Over the past decade, the number of acres burned annually by wildland fires in the United States has substantially increased. Federal appropriations to prepare for and respond to wildland fires, including appropriations for fuel treatments, have almost tripled. Increases in the size and severity of wildland fires, and in the cost of preparing for and responding to them, have led federal agencies to fundamentally reexamine their approach to wildland fire management. In some cases, the agencies may simply monitor a fire, or take only limited suppression actions, to ensure that the fire continues to pose little threat to important resources, a practice known as “wildland fire use.”
Agencies Need a Cohesive Strategy to Address Wildland Fire Problems
Federal firefighting agencies need a cohesive strategy for reducing fuels and addressing wildland fire issues. Such a strategy should identify the available long-term options and associated funding for reducing excess vegetation and responding to wildland fires if the agencies and the Congress are to make informed decisions about an effective and affordable long-term approach for addressing problems that have been decades in the making. We first recommended in 1999 such a strategy be developed to address the problem of excess fuels and their potential to increase the severity of wildland fires and cost of suppression efforts. By 2005, the agencies had yet to develop such a strategy, and we reiterated the need for a cohesive strategy and broadened our recommendation’s focus to better address the interrelated nature of fuel reduction efforts and wildland fire response. The agencies said they would be unable to develop a cohesive strategy until they have completed certain key tasks. We therefore recommended that the agencies develop a tactical plan outlining these tasks and the time frames needed for completing each task and a cohesive strategy. Lack of Clear Goals or a Strategy Hinders Federal Agencies’ Efforts to Contain Wildland Fire Costs
As we testified before the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources in January 2007, the steps the Forest Service and Interior agencies have taken to date to contain wildland fire costs lack several key elements fundamental to sound program management, such as clearly defining cost-containment goals, developing a strategy for achieving those goals, and measuring progress toward achieving them. For cost-containment efforts to be effective, the agencies need to integrate cost-containment goals with the other goals of the wildland fire program— such as protecting life, property, and resources. Our forthcoming report on federal agencies’ efforts to contain wildland fire costs includes more- detailed findings and recommendations to the agencies to improve the management of their cost-containment efforts; this report is expected to be released at a hearing before the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources scheduled for June 26, 2007. To make informed decisions about an effective and affordable long-term approach to addressing wildland fire problems, the agencies need to develop a cohesive strategy that identifies the available long-term options and associated funding for reducing excess vegetation and responding to wildland fires. Moreover, because cost-containment goals should be considered in relation to other wildland fire program goals— such as protecting life, resources, and property—the agencies must integrate cost-containment goals within the overall cohesive strategy for responding to wildland fires that we have consistently recommended. | Why GAO Did This Study
Increasing wildland fire threats to communities and ecosystems, combined with rising costs of addressing those threats--trends that GAO and others have reported on for many years--have not abated. On average, the acreage burned annually by wildland fires from 2000 to 2005 was 70 percent greater than the acreage burned annually during the 1990s. Annual appropriations to prepare for and respond to wildland fires have also increased substantially over the past decade, totaling about $3 billion in recent years. The Forest Service within the Department of Agriculture and four agencies within the Department of the Interior (Interior) are responsible for responding to wildland fires on federal lands. This testimony summarizes several key actions that federal agencies need to complete or take to strengthen their management of the wildland fire program, including the need to (1) develop a long-term, cohesive strategy to reduce fuels and address wildland fire problems and (2) improve the management of their efforts to contain the costs of preparing for and responding to wildland fires. The testimony is based on several previous GAO reports and testimonies addressing wildland fire issues.
What GAO Found
The Forest Service and Interior agencies need to complete several actions to strengthen their overall management of the wildland fire program. First, because a substantial investment and decades of work will be required to address wildland fire problems that have been decades in the making, the agencies need a cohesive strategy that addresses the full range of wildland fire management activities. Such a strategy should identify the available long-term options and associated funding for reducing excess vegetation and responding to wildland fires if the agencies and the Congress are to make informed decisions about an effective and affordable long-term approach for addressing wildland fire problems. GAO first recommended in 1999 that such a strategy be developed to address the problem of excess fuels and their potential to increase the severity of wildland fires and cost of suppression efforts. By 2005, the agencies had yet to develop such a strategy, and GAO reiterated the need for a cohesive strategy and broadened the recommendation's focus to better address the interrelated nature of fuel reduction efforts and wildland fire response. Further, because the agencies said they would be unable to develop a cohesive strategy until they have completed certain key tasks, GAO recommended that the agencies develop a tactical plan outlining these tasks and the time frames needed for completing each task and a cohesive strategy. Although the agencies concurred with GAO's recommendations, as of April 2007, they had yet to develop a tactical plan. Second, as GAO testified before the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources in January 2007, the steps the Forest Service and Interior agencies have taken to date to contain wildland fire costs lack several key elements fundamental to sound program management, such as clearly defining cost-containment goals, developing a strategy for achieving those goals, and measuring progress toward achieving them. For cost-containment efforts to be effective, the agencies need to integrate cost-containment goals with the other goals of the wildland fire program--such as protecting life, resources, and property--and to recognize that trade-offs will be needed to meet desired goals within the context of fiscal constraints. Further, because cost-containment goals need to be considered in relation to other wildland fire program goals, it is important that the agencies integrate cost-containment goals within an overall cohesive strategy. GAO's forthcoming report on federal agencies' efforts to contain wildland fire costs includes more-detailed findings and recommendations to the agencies to improve the management of their cost-containment efforts; this report is expected to be released at a Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources hearing scheduled for June 26, 2007. |
gao_GAO-16-226 | gao_GAO-16-226_0 | We noted that service officials and male servicemembers at several military installations gave us examples of recent incidents involving both hazing and sexual assault. DOD and the Coast Guard Have Issued Policies to Address Hazing but They Do Not Know the Extent to Which the Policies Have Been Implemented and Servicemembers Need Clarification on the Policies
Each of the military services has issued policies to address hazing incidents among servicemembers consistent with DOD’s 1997 hazing policy. The Coast Guard’s hazing instruction permits command-authorized rituals, customs, and rites of passage that are not cruel or abusive, and requires commanders to ensure that these events do not include hazing. DOD and the Coast Guard Do Not Know the Extent to Which Their Hazing Policies Have Been Implemented
DOD and the Coast Guard do not know the extent to which hazing policies have been implemented because—with the exception of policy compliance inspections conducted by the Marine Corps—DOD, the military services and the Coast Guard do not conduct oversight by regularly monitoring the implementation of their hazing policies. Although most service policies designated implementation responsibilities, DOD, the military services, and the Coast Guard generally do not know the extent or consistency with which their policies have been implemented because— with the exception of the inspections conducted by the Marine Corps— they have not instituted headquarters-level mechanisms to regularly monitor policy implementation, such as by collecting local command data on hazing policy implementation or conducting site inspections to determine the extent to which the policies have been implemented, among other things. These inspections do not necessarily cover all aspects of hazing policy implementation. DOD and the Coast Guard Have Limited Visibility Over Hazing Incidents
DOD and the Coast Guard Do Not Have Complete and Consistent Data on Reported Hazing Incidents
The Army, the Navy, and the Marine Corps track data on reported incidents of hazing. For example, until October 2015 the Army only collected data on cases investigated by criminal investigators and military police, whereas the Navy collected data on all substantiated hazing incidents reported to commanders, and the Marine Corps collected data on both substantiated and unsubstantiated incidents. In the absence of DOD guidance, the Air Force has taken an ad hoc approach to compiling relevant information to respond to requests for data on hazing incidents, and in the absence of Coast Guard guidance on tracking hazing incidents, the Coast Guard has also taken an ad hoc approach to compiling hazing data. DOD and the Coast Guard Do Not Know the Extent of Hazing In Their Organizations
To date, DOD and the Coast Guard do not know the extent of hazing in their organizations because they have not conducted an evaluation of the prevalence of hazing. In contrast to the limited data on reports of hazing incidents, information on the prevalence of hazing would help DOD and the Coast Guard to understand the extent of hazing beyond those incidents that are reported. The prevalence of hazing could be estimated based on survey responses, as DOD does in the case of sexual assault. However, as previously noted, the data that are currently collected on hazing incidents are neither complete or consistent, and data obtained through other sources, such as surveys, suggest that hazing may be more widespread in the military services and the Coast Guard than the current numbers of reports indicate. Table 2 shows the statements in the organizational climate surveys about hazing and demeaning behaviors. These surveys do not measure the prevalence of hazing. Despite these limitations, analysis of these data yields insight into perceptions of hazing within and across the services. Conclusions
Incidents of hazing in DOD and the Coast Guard can have effects that extend beyond their victims and perpetrators, undermining unit cohesion and potentially reducing operational effectiveness as a consequence. To promote greater consistency in and visibility over the military services’ collection of data on reported hazing incidents and the methods used to track them, direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, in coordination with the Secretaries of the military departments, to issue DOD-level guidance on the prevention of hazing that specifies data collection and tracking requirements, including the scope of data to be collected and maintained by the military services on reported incidents of hazing; a standard list of data elements that each service should collect on reported hazing incidents; and definitions of the data elements to be collected to help ensure that incidents are tracked consistently within and across the services. Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
We provided a draft of this report to DOD and DHS for review and comment. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To determine the extent to which the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Coast Guard have developed and implemented policies to address hazing incidents, we reviewed DOD’s 1997 hazing memorandum, its December 2015 updated hazing and bullying policy memorandum, and the hazing policies of each military service and the Coast Guard. 1. | Why GAO Did This Study
Initiations and rites of passage can instill esprit de corps and loyalty and are included in many traditions throughout DOD and the Coast Guard. However, at times these, and more ad hoc activities, have included cruel or abusive behavior that can undermine unit cohesion and operational effectiveness.
Congress included a provision in statute for GAO to report on DOD, including each of the military services, and Coast Guard policies to prevent, and efforts to track, incidents of hazing. This report addresses the extent to which DOD and the Coast Guard, which falls under the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), have (1) developed and implemented policies to address incidents of hazing, and (2) visibility over hazing incidents involving servicemembers. GAO reviewed hazing policies; assessed data on hazing incidents and requirements for and methods used to track them; assessed the results of organizational climate surveys that included questions on hazing; conducted focus groups with servicemembers during site visits to two installations selected based on available hazing and sexual assault data, among other factors; and interviewed cognizant officials.
What GAO Found
The Department of Defense (DOD), including each of the military services, and the Coast Guard have issued policies to address hazing, but generally do not know the extent to which their policies have been implemented. The military services' and Coast Guard's policies define hazing similarly to DOD and include servicemember training requirements. The military service and Coast Guard policies also contain guidance, such as responsibilities for policy implementation and direction on avoiding hazing in service customs and traditions, beyond what is included in DOD's policy. However, DOD and the Coast Guard generally do not know the extent to which their policies have been implemented because most of the services and the Coast Guard have not conducted oversight through regular monitoring of policy implementation. The Marine Corps conducts inspections of command hazing policy on issues such as providing servicemembers with information on the hazing policy and complying with hazing incident reporting requirements. While these inspections provide Marine Corps headquarters officials with some information they can use to conduct oversight of hazing policy implementation, they do not necessarily cover all aspects of hazing policy implementation. Without routinely monitoring policy implementation, DOD, the Coast Guard, and the military services may not have the accountability needed to help ensure efforts to address hazing are implemented consistently.
DOD and the Coast Guard have limited visibility over hazing incidents involving servicemembers. Specifically, the Army, the Navy, and the Marine Corps track data on reported incidents of hazing, but the data are not complete and consistent due to varying tracking methods that do not always include all reported incidents. For example, until October 2015, the Army only tracked cases investigated by criminal investigators or military police, while the Navy required reports on substantiated hazing cases and the Marine Corps required reports on both substantiated and unsubstantiated cases. The Air Force and Coast Guard do not require the collection of hazing incident data, and instead have taken an ad hoc approach to compiling relevant information to respond to requests for such data. In the absence of guidance on hazing data collection, DOD and the Coast Guard do not have an accurate picture of reported hazing incidents across the services. In addition, DOD and the Coast Guard have not evaluated the prevalence of hazing. An evaluation of prevalence would provide information on the extent of hazing beyond the limited data on reported incidents, and could be estimated based on survey responses, as DOD does in the case of sexual assault. Service officials said that currently, reported hazing incidents are the primary indicator of the extent of hazing. However, data obtained through other sources suggest that hazing may be more widespread in DOD and the Coast Guard than the current reported numbers. For example, GAO analysis of organizational climate survey results from 2014 for the military services and the Coast Guard found that about 12 percent of respondents in the junior enlisted ranks indicated their belief that such incidents occur in their units. Although these results do not measure the prevalence of hazing incidents, they yield insights into servicemember perceptions of hazing, and suggest that an evaluation of the extent of hazing is warranted. Without evaluating the prevalence of hazing within their organizations, DOD and the Coast Guard will be limited in their ability to effectively target their efforts to address hazing.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is making 12 recommendations, among them that DOD and the Coast Guard regularly monitor policy implementation, issue guidance on the collection and tracking of hazing incident data, and evaluate the prevalence of hazing. DOD and DHS concurred with all of GAO's recommendations and have begun taking actions to address them. |
gao_GAO-16-281 | gao_GAO-16-281_0 | Background
This section presents information on roles and responsibilities of EPA and states in the UIC class II program, information on UIC class II inspection and enforcement processes, information collected from state and EPA- managed programs, and activities to oversee state and EPA-managed programs. The Program Reporting guidance directs these programs to report data on inspections, violations, and enforcement actions. EPA’s minimum annual inspection goals are specified at the well level (e.g., 100 percent of wells associated with emergency responses). Under federal standards for internal control, managers need to compare actual performance to planned or expected results and analyze significant differences. However, our review of data collected by EPA on significant violations demonstrated that EPA’s ability to take action may be limited by incomplete and inconsistent enforcement data reported by state and EPA-managed programs. Specifically, our analysis of 93 significant violations for fiscal years 2008 thru 2013 for the seven state and EPA- managed programs we reviewed found that there were 29 that were not resolved within 90 days of operator notification and for which formal action had not been taken within that time. EPA headquarters officials told us they are aware that the information reported by states and EPA regions is not complete or consistent, but they have not clarified, in guidance or otherwise, what information should be reported. EPA Has Not Consistently Conducted Oversight Activities Necessary to Assess Whether Programs Are Protecting Underground Sources of Drinking Water
EPA has not consistently conducted three oversight activities necessary to assess whether state and EPA-managed programs are protecting underground sources of drinking water, as required by regulations and specified in guidance: (1) incorporation of state program requirements, or changes to state program requirements, into federal regulations; (2) the final review and recordkeeping for all aquifer exemption applications it approves; and (3) annual on-site program evaluations. According to the Program Oversight guidance, annual on-site evaluations of state programs should also include a review of permitting and inspection files or activities to assess whether the state program is protecting underground sources of drinking water. Without conducting such an analysis, EPA will not be able to identify the human capital and other resources it needs to carry out its oversight of state and EPA-managed programs and help ensure that they are effective at protecting underground sources of drinking water. However, the findings in our June 2014 report, our findings on inspection and enforcement information and oversight activities in this report, and the recent decision that California’s program was not complying with state and EPA requirements illustrate that EPA does not have the information, or consistently conduct the oversight activities, needed to assess state and EPA-managed class II programs to help ensure that they protect underground sources of drinking water. Until EPA requires and collects well-specific data on inspections from state and EPA-managed programs, including when wells were inspected, the types of inspections conducted at each well, and the results of those inspections, the agency does not have the well-specific information to assess whether the programs are meeting annual inspection goals to protect underground sources of drinking water. Until it clarifies guidance on what data should be reported on the 7520-4 form, EPA does not have reasonable assurance that state and EPA-managed programs report complete and consistent information on unresolved significant violations or that it has the information needed to assess whether it must take enforcement action, as required under the act, to protect underground sources of drinking water. Finally, although EPA headquarters officials said they do not have the resources necessary to conduct the oversight activities needed to assess whether state and EPA-managed programs comply with applicable requirements, the agency has not conducted a workforce analysis to identify the resources, including human capital resources, the agency needs to oversee state and EPA-managed programs. In a series of letters from July 2014 through July 2015, EPA Region 9 and the Division reached agreement on a plan to improve California’s UIC class II program. Appendix III: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report examines the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) Underground Injection Control (UIC) class II program to determine the extent to which EPA has collected the inspection and enforcement information needed, and conducted the oversight activities necessary, to assess that state and EPA-managed programs are protecting underground sources of drinking water. Specifically, we selected a nongeneralizable sample of eight states with class II programs. Other programs we reviewed do not set specific annual goals for individual types of well inspections. According to EPA and state officials, the enforcement process generally begins when program officials notify a well operator that the well is in violation of applicable requirements. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since the early 2000s, increased oil and gas production has resulted in an increase in wastewater that must be managed properly. The majority of wastewater from oil and gas production is injected into underground wells known as class II wells. These wells are regulated to protect drinking water sources under EPA's UIC class II well program and approved state class II programs. EPA oversees state programs, and EPA regions manage programs in states without approval.
GAO was asked to review EPA's oversight of programs' inspection and enforcement information and activities. This report examines the extent to which EPA has collected inspection and enforcement information and conducted oversight activities needed to assess that class II programs protect underground sources of drinking water. GAO reviewed federal and state laws and regulations and EPA guidance and analyzed a nongeneralizable sample of significant violations. GAO interviewed EPA and state officials from programs in a nongeneralizable sample of eight states selected based on shale oil and gas regions, among other factors.
What GAO Found
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has not collected specific inspection and complete or consistent enforcement information, or consistently conducted oversight activities, to assess whether state and EPA-managed Underground Injection Control (UIC) class II programs are protecting underground sources of drinking water. EPA guidance calls for states and EPA regions to report certain information and for EPA to assess whether programs are effectively protecting underground sources of drinking water, but the agency does not. Specifically:
EPA annually collects summary data from state and EPA-managed programs on the types of inspections they conduct. However, these data are not specific enough to determine the number of different types of inspections that states and EPA regions are to conduct to meet their annual goals. Such goals are specified at the well level (e.g., to inspect 100 percent of wells associated with emergency responses). Under federal internal control standards, managers are to compare actual performance to planned or expected results and analyze significant differences. Without well-specific data on inspections, EPA cannot assess whether state and EPA-managed programs are meeting annual inspection goals.
EPA collects information on unresolved significant violations of state and EPA-managed programs to determine if the agency needs to take action to enforce applicable program requirements. However, GAO's analysis of a nongeneralizable sample of 93 significant violations for fiscal years 2008 through 2013 found that state and EPA-managed programs did not report data on such violations completely or consistently. For example, of 29 such violations that had not been enforced after 90 days as required, programs reported 7 to EPA. According to EPA and state officials, the cause was inconsistent interpretations of EPA's reporting guidance. EPA officials said they are aware that the data reported on such violations are not complete or consistent, but the agency has not clarified in guidance what data programs should report. Until it does so, EPA does not have reasonable assurance that it has the data needed to assess if it must take enforcement action.
EPA has not consistently conducted oversight activities necessary to assess whether state and EPA-managed programs are protecting underground sources of drinking water. For example, GAO found in June 2014 that EPA does not consistently conduct oversight activities, such as annual on-site program evaluations. According to EPA guidance, such evaluations should include a review of permitting and inspection files or activities to assess whether the state is protecting underground water. In California, for example, EPA did not regularly review permitting, and in July 2014, after a state review of permitting, EPA determined that the program was out of compliance with state and EPA requirements. EPA officials said that they have few resources to oversee UIC class II programs, but EPA has not conducted a workforce analysis consistent with GAO's work on strategic human capital management to identify the resources needed for such oversight. Without conducting such an analysis, EPA will not be able identify the human capital or other resources needed to carry out oversight of the UIC class II programs to help ensure that they protect underground sources of drinking water.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that, among other things, EPA require programs to report well-specific inspections data, clarify guidance on enforcement data reporting, and analyze the resources needed to oversee programs. EPA generally agreed with GAO's findings, but does not plan to require well-specific data and analyze needed resources. GAO continues to believe that EPA should take both actions to better assess if programs protect underground sources of drinking water. |
gao_GAO-08-515T | gao_GAO-08-515T_0 | Most SARA Panel Recommendations Are Consistent with GAO’s Past Work
The 89 recommendations in the panel report are largely consistent with our past work and recommendations. Our work is generally consistent with the panel’s recommendations, and we have issued numerous products that address the importance of a robust requirements definition process and the need for competition. Accordingly, the panel made numerous recommendations to improve the use of interagency contracts with the intent of enhancing competition, lowering prices, improving the expertise of the acquisition workforce, and improving guidance for choosing the most appropriate interagency contract for procurements. The panel made recommendations to change the guidance to contracting officers for awarding contracts to small businesses. OFPP has taken the position that all but one of the recommendations requires legislation to implement. While our work on small business has addressed a number of policy issues, we have not made recommendations for statutory and regulatory changes when arguments for such changes are based on value judgments, such as those related to setting small business contracting goals. The panel reported that, in some cases, contractors are solely or predominantly responsible for the performance of mission-critical functions that were traditionally performed by government employees, such as acquisition program management and procurement, policy analysis, and quality assurance. Further, the panel noted that this development has created issues with respect to the proper roles of, and relationships between, federal employees and contractor employees in the “blended” workforce. Moreover, according to the panel, as the federal workforce shrinks, there is a need to ensure that agencies have sufficient in-house expertise and experience to perform inherently governmental functions by being in a position to make critical decisions on policy and program management issues and to manage the performance of contractors. As early as 1994, we reported that the usefulness of federal procurement data for conducting procurement policy analysis was limited. OFPP Plans to Address Most SARA Panel Recommendations
OFPP representatives told us the office agrees with almost all of the 89 panel recommendations and has already acted on some, while potential actions are pending on others. Although OFPP has taken some steps to track the progress of selected recommendations, it does not have an overall strategy or plan to gauge the successes and shortcomings in how the panel’s recommendations are implemented and how they improve federal acquisitions. Table 1 shows how OFPP expected the 89 recommendations to be implemented. Conclusions and Recommendation
In closing, the SARA Panel, like GAO, has made numerous recommendations to improve federal government acquisition—from encouraging competition and adopting commercial practices to improving the accuracy and usefulness of procurement data. To do this, we recommended in our recent report that OFPP work with the chief acquisition officers and senior procurement officials across all the federal agencies to lay out a strategy or plan that includes milestones and reporting requirements that OFPP could use to establish accountability, exercise oversight, and gauge the progress and results of implementing the recommendations. | Why GAO Did This Study
A growing portion of federal spending is related to buying services such as administrative, management, and information technology support. Services accounted for about 60 percent of total fiscal year 2006 procurement dollars. The Services Acquisition Reform Act (SARA) of 2003 established an Acquisition Advisory Panel to make recommendations for improving acquisition practices. In January 2007, the panel proposed 89 recommendations to improve federal acquisition practices. GAO was asked to testify on how the panel recommendations compare to GAO's past work and identify how the Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP) expects the recommendations to be addressed. This statement is based on GAO's analysis of the advisory panel's report. GAO's analysis is included in its December 2007 report titled, Federal Acquisition: Oversight Plan Needed to Help Implement Acquisition Advisory Panel Recommendation, (GAO-08-160).
What GAO Found
The SARA Panel, like GAO, has made numerous recommendations to improve federal government acquisition--from encouraging competition and adopting commercial practices to improving the accuracy and usefulness of procurement data. The recommendations in the SARA Panel report are largely consistent with GAO's past work and recommendations. The panel and GAO have both pointed out the importance of a robust requirements definition process and the need for competition; the need to establish clear performance requirements, measurable performance standards, and a quality assurance plan to improve the use of performance-based contracting; the risks inherent in the use of interagency contracts because of their rapid growth and their improper management; stresses on the federal acquisition workforce and the need for a strategy to assess these workforce needs; concerns about the role of contractors engaged in managing acquisition and procurement activities performed by government employees and the proper roles of federal employees and contractor employees in a "blended" workforce; and the adverse effects of inaccurate and incomplete federal procurement data, such as not providing a sound basis for conducting procurement analyses. The panel also made recommendations that would change the guidance for awarding contracts to small businesses. While GAO's work has addressed some small business policy issues, GAO has not made recommendations that would change the guidance to be used for awarding contracts to small businesses. OFPP representatives told GAO that OFPP agrees with almost all of the panel recommendations and expected that most of the 89 panel recommendations would be implemented through one of the following means: congressional actions; changes to the Federal Acquisition Regulation; OFPP actions, such as issuing new or revised policy; and federal agency actions. OFPP has already acted on some SARA recommendations, while other actions are pending or under consideration. Milestones and reporting requirements are in place to help OFPP gauge the implementation status of some recommendations but not for others. Moreover, OFPP does not have a strategy or plan to allow it to exercise oversight and establish accountability for implementing all of the panel's recommendations and to gauge their effect on federal acquisitions. |
gao_GAO-13-121 | gao_GAO-13-121_0 | 1).Interior was also required to enroll into a region every Alaska Native alive when the Settlement Act was enacted on December 18, 1971, generally according to residence. Each region in the 1970s established a regional corporation as directed by the Settlement Act, and the Alaska Natives enrolled into the region became its shareholders. The Corporations Have Adopted a Variety of Governance Practices
Incorporated under Alaska state law, regional corporations share fundamental characteristics, although they have chosen a variety of governance practices. Like any other Alaska corporation, the regional corporations are subject to the state’s corporate laws, with a few limited exceptions, and are run by a board of directors elected by shareholders. The Corporations Are Subject to Some Federal and State Financial Reporting Requirements and Limited State Oversight
The regional corporations are subject to some financial reporting requirements under federal and state law, although oversight of the reporting is limited. The Settlement Act generally exempts the corporations from complying with federal securities laws while requiring them to annually transmit a report to their shareholders that contains “substantially all the information” required to be included in an SEC registrant’s annual report to shareholders. The act does not provide a federal role for monitoring the corporations’ compliance with this requirement, and the state’s oversight is generally limited to enforcement of state securities laws and proxy regulations. Monetary Benefits
The 12 regional corporations provide a variety of monetary benefits to their shareholders and others, including dividends, elder benefits, scholarships, memorial benefits, shareholders’ equity, and charitable donations, as follows:
Dividends. Nonmonetary benefits offered by the regional corporations—often in partnership with village corporations, tribal organizations, and nonprofit organizations within the region—include employment opportunities; cultural preservation; land management; economic development; and advocacy on behalf of Alaska Natives and their communities. We identified questions regarding the ambiguity of existing federal financial reporting requirements for the corporations, the role of the federal government in maintaining the corporations’ solvency, and the implications of defining who is eligible to be a shareholder—this last question specifically for the corporations and their shareholders to consider. Should the “Substantially All” Federal Reporting Requirement Be Clarified and Overseen? What Is the Appropriate Role of the Federal Government in Maintaining the Solvency of Alaska Native Corporations? Who Should Be a Shareholder? In addition, amendments to the Settlement Act allowed the corporations’ shareholders to vote to amend the articles of incorporation to authorize the issuance of shares to Alaska Natives born after December 18, 1971, or to descendants of Alaska Natives; to eligible Alaska Natives who missed enrollment; or to Alaska Native shareholders who are 65 years old or older. In evaluating the decision whether to offer new shares in the corporation to more people, the corporations and their shareholders face a number of considerations and potential future challenges, including the following:
Reduced dividends. Our report notes, however, that because the “substantially all” reporting requirement in the Settlement Act, as amended, is not defined or overseen, it is not clear what information must be included in the regional corporations’ annual reports to shareholders. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report examines (1) governance practices of the regional Alaska Native corporations, (2) requirements for and oversight of the corporations’ financial reporting practices, (3) benefits provided by the corporations to their shareholders and other Alaska Natives, and (4) questions to consider for the future. To examine the governance practices of the regional Alaska Native corporations, we reviewed the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, as amended; the Alaska Corporations Code; other relevant federal and state laws and regulations; the regional corporations’ articles of incorporation, bylaws, and corporate proxy statements provided to shareholders during 2011 (the most recent year for which consistent information was available across the corporations); and other documentation from the corporations on their board composition and operations, executive and board compensation, board elections, and methods for involving shareholders. Finally, on the basis of our analysis of federal and state laws and regulations; interviews with federal and state officials, regional corporation officials, and shareholders; and past congressional actions and bills addressing Alaska Native corporation issues, we developed questions that may warrant consideration and discussion by the federal government, the state, the regional corporations, shareholders, or a combination of these entities. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 1971, the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act was enacted to resolve long-standing aboriginal land claims and to foster economic development for Alaska Natives. This federal law directed that corporations be created under Alaska state law, which were to be the vehicles for distributing the settlement. As directed by the act, 12 for-profit regional corporations were established, representing geographical regions in the state. Later, a 13th regional corporation was formed to represent Alaska Natives residing outside of Alaska. Eligible Alaska Native applicants who were alive on December 18, 1971, became shareholders in the corporations. The Settlement Act, as amended, authorizes the corporations to provide benefits to shareholders and to other Alaska Natives.
GAO was asked to review these corporations. This report examines (1) governance practices of the regional Alaska Native corporations, (2) requirements for and oversight of the corporations' financial reporting practices, (3) benefits provided by the corporations to their shareholders and other Alaska Natives, and (4) questions to consider for the future. GAO reviewed relevant federal and state laws and regulations, as well as the corporations' annual reports, proxy materials, and other documents. GAO interviewed representatives from each of the 13 regional corporations and visited seven of the Alaskan regions.
What GAO Found
Incorporated under Alaska state law, regional Alaska Native corporations share fundamental characteristics, although they have chosen a variety of governance practices. Like other Alaska corporations, the regional corporations are subject to the state's corporate laws (with limited exceptions) and are run by an elected board of directors. Nevertheless, each regional corporation has chosen its own organization and governance approach in terms of board operations, executive and board compensation, board elections, and shareholder involvement.
Alaska Native corporations are subject to some financial reporting requirements under federal and state law, but oversight of the reporting is limited. The Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act generally exempts the corporations from complying with federal securities laws while requiring them to annually provide a report to their shareholders that contains "substantially all the information" required to be included in an annual report to shareholders by U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission registrants. The Settlement Act does not provide for a federal role to monitor the corporations' compliance with this requirement, and oversight by the state of Alaska is generally limited to enforcement of state securities laws and proxy regulations.
GAO found that the corporations provide a wide variety of monetary and nonmonetary benefits to their shareholders and other Alaska Natives. Monetary benefits include shareholder dividends, elder benefits, scholarships, memorial benefits, shareholders' equity, and charitable donations. Nonmonetary benefits-- often offered in partnership with village corporations, tribal organizations, and nonprofit organizations within the region--include employment opportunities, cultural preservation, land management, economic development, and advocacy on behalf of Alaska Natives and their communities.
During this review, GAO identified three questions regarding the ambiguity of existing federal financial reporting requirements, the role of the federal government in maintaining the corporations' solvency, and the implications of defining who is eligible to be a shareholder. These questions may warrant consideration and discussion by the federal government, the state, the regional corporations, shareholders, or a combination of these entities.
Should the "substantially all" federal reporting requirement be clarified and overseen? GAO was unable to determine whether the corporations are meeting the "substantially all" requirement in the Settlement Act because the phrase is not defined.
What is the appropriate role of the federal government in maintaining the solvency of Alaska Native corporations? The federal government has intervened in the past to help maintain the financial solvency of the corporations. The 13th Regional Corporation has been insolvent since 2007.
Who should be a shareholder? As authorized by amendments to the Settlement Act, shareholders of 5 of the 13 regional corporations have voted to issue shares to Alaska Natives born after December 18, 1971, who meet certain criteria. In deciding to offer new shares to more people, corporations and shareholders face a number of considerations such as, potential effects on dividends and shareholder involvement.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is making no recommendations in this report. Responses provided on behalf of the corporations made several points about their financial reporting and operations that are more fully discussed in the report. |
gao_GAO-06-864T | gao_GAO-06-864T_0 | In its rebaselining effort, this and other aspects of Secure Flight are currently being reviewed, and policy decisions regarding the operations of the program have not been finalized. TSA officials acknowledged that they had not followed a disciplined life cycle approach in developing Secure Flight, but stated that in moving forward, they would follow TSA’s standard development process. Further, TSA had proceeded with Secure Flight development without an effective program management plan that contained up-to-date program schedules and cost estimates. Prior to TSA’s rebaselining effort of Secure Flight, several oversight reviews of the program had been conducted that raised questions about program management, including the lack of fully defined requirements. TSA has taken actions that recognize the need to instill more rigor and discipline into the development and management of Secure Flight, and suspended its development efforts while it rebaselines the program. Although TSA officials stated that they will use a disciplined life cycle approach when moving forward with the rebaselined program, officials have not identified when their rebaselining effort will be completed. TSA Had Made Progress in Coordinating with Critical Stakeholders, but More Work Remains
As we testified in February 2006, TSA had taken steps to collaborate with Secure Flight stakeholders—CBP, TSC, and domestic air carriers—whose participation is essential to ensuring that passenger and terrorist watch list data are collected and transmitted for Secure Flight operations, but additional information and testing are needed to enable stakeholders to provide the necessary support for the program. All key program stakeholders we interviewed stated that additional information was needed before they could finalize their plans to support Secure Flight operations. Key Factors That Could Influence the Effectiveness of Secure Flight Remain to Be Finalized or Resolved
As of February 2006, several activities were under way, or were about to be decided, that would affect Secure Flight’s effectiveness. For example, TSA had tested name-matching technologies to determine what type of passenger data would be needed to match against terrorist watch list data. Prior to its rebaselining effort, we further reported that TSA had not made key policy decisions for determining the passenger information that air carriers would be required to collect, the name-matching technologies that would be used to vet passenger names against terrorist watch list data, and thresholds that would be set to determine the relative volume of passengers who are to be identified as potential matches against the database. Because Secure Flight’s system development documentation did not fully address how passenger privacy protections were to be met, it was not possible to assess potential system impacts on individual privacy protections, as of February 2006. Prior to the rebaselining effort, TSA was in the process of developing but had not issued the systems-of-records notice required by the Privacy Act, or the privacy impact assessment required by the E-Government Act, that would describe how TSA will protect passenger data once Secure Flight becomes operational. When we reported on Secure Flight in March 2005, TSA had committed to take action on our recommendations to manage the risks associated with developing and implementing Secure Flight, including finalizing the concept of operations, system requirements, and test plans; completing formal agreements with CBP and air carriers to obtain passenger data; developing life cycle cost estimates and a comprehensive set of critical performance measures; issuing new privacy notices; and putting a redress process in place. We support these efforts and believe that proceeding with operational testing and completing other key program activities should not be pursued until TSA demonstrates that it has put in place a more disciplined life cycle process as part of its rebaselining effort. Appendix I: Related GAO Products
Aviation Security: Significant Management Challenges May Adversely Affect Implementation of the Transportation Security Administration’s Secure Flight Program. TSA’s Modifications to Rules for Prescreening Passengers. Measures for Testing the Impact of Using Commercial Data for the Secure Flight Program. We also interviewed representatives from the U.S. Customs and Border Protection and Terrorist Screening Center to obtain information about stakeholder coordination. | Why GAO Did This Study
After the events of September 11, 2001, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) assumed the function of passenger prescreening--or the matching of passenger information against terrorist watch lists to identify persons who should undergo additional security scrutiny--for domestic flights, which is currently performed by the air carriers. To do so, TSA has been developing Secure Flight. This testimony covers TSA's progress and challenges in (1) developing, managing, and overseeing Secure Flight; (2) coordinating with key stakeholders critical to program operations; (3) addressing key factors that will impact system effectiveness; and (4) minimizing impacts on passenger privacy and protecting passenger rights.
What GAO Found
For over 3 years, TSA has faced challenges in developing and implementing the Secure Flight program, and in early 2006, it suspended Secure Flight's development to reassess, or rebaseline, the program. TSA's rebaselining effort is currently under way, and final decisions regarding the future direction of the program have not been made. In our most recent report and testimony, we noted that TSA had made some progress in developing and testing the Secure Flight program, but had not followed a disciplined life cycle approach to manage systems development or fully defined system requirements. We also reported that TSA was proceeding to develop Secure Flight without a program management plan containing program schedule and cost estimates. Oversight reviews of the program had also raised questions about program management. Secure Flight officials stated that as they move forward with the rebaselined program, they will be following a more rigorous and disciplined life cycle process for Secure Flight. We support TSA's rebaselining effort, and believe that the agency should not move forward with the program until it has demonstrated that a disciplined life cycle process is being followed. We also reported that TSA had taken steps to collaborate with Secure Flight stakeholders whose participation is essential to ensuring that passenger and terrorist watch list data are collected and transmitted to support Secure Flight. However, key program stakeholders--including the U.S. Customs and Border Protection, the Terrorist Screening Center, and air carriers--stated that they needed more definitive information about system requirements from TSA to plan for their support of the program. In addition, we reported that several activities that will affect Secure Flight's effectiveness were under way or had not yet been decided. For example, TSA conducted name-matching tests that compared passenger and terrorist screening database information to determine what type of passenger data would be needed for Secure Flight's purposes. However, TSA had not yet made key policy decisions that could significantly impact program operations, including what passenger data it would require air carriers to provide and the name-matching technologies it would use. Further, Secure Flight's system development documentation did not fully identify how passenger privacy protections were to be met, and TSA had not issued the privacy notices that described how it would protect passenger data once Secure Flight became operational. As a result, it was not possible to assess how TSA is addressing privacy concerns. Secure Flight officials stated that they plan to address privacy issues and finalize its redress polices in conjunction with rebaselining the program. |
gao_GAO-05-381 | gao_GAO-05-381_0 | Transformation of DOD’s business systems and operations is critical to the department providing Congress and DOD management with accurate and timely information for use in the decision-making process. DOD’s fiscal year 2005 budget request for its business systems was $13.3 billion, which on its face is about $6 billion, or 29 percent, less than its fiscal year 2004 budget request. In some cases, we found that the reclassification appeared reasonable. DOD Reports Significant Increase in the Number of Existing Business Systems
The department’s reported number of business systems continues to fluctuate, and DOD does not yet have reasonable assurance that the currently reported number of business systems is complete. As of February 2005, DOD reported that its business systems inventory consisted of 4,150 systems, which is an increase of approximately 1,900 reported business systems since April 2003. The table shows the stovepiped, duplicative nature of DOD’s business systems. In this regard, based upon data reported to us by the military services and DOD components, obligations totaling about $243 million were made for systems modernizations in fiscal year 2004 that were not referred to the DOD Comptroller for the required review. In an attempt to substantiate that financial system improvements with over $1 million in obligations were reviewed by the DOD Comptroller, as provided for in the fiscal year 2003 act, we requested that DOD activities provide us with a list of obligations (by system) greater than $1 million for modernizations for fiscal year 2004. Although the requirements of the fiscal year 2005 defense authorization act establish a management structure, each of the military services has established its own business systems investment review process. Since April 2003, the reported inventory has increased by about 1,900 systems. Given these circumstances, the department has made limited progress in achieving effective management control and accountability over the billions of dollars invested annually in its business systems. By doing less, DOD will continue to waste billions of dollars by perpetuating today’s legacy business systems environment. We recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct that the DOD CIO, in consultation with the domains, review the 56 systems reclassified from business systems to national security systems to determine how these should be properly reported in the fiscal year 2007 IT budget request; Defense Business Systems Management Committee work with the domain investment review boards to review the reported BMMP business systems inventory so systems are defined in accordance with the definition specified in the fiscal year 2005 defense authorization act; Defense Business Systems Management Committee develop a comprehensive plan that addresses implementation of our previous recommendations related to the BEA and the control and accountability over business systems investments (at a minimum, the plan should assign responsibility and estimated time frames for completion); and comprehensive plan we recommend above be incorporated into the department’s second annual report due March 15, 2006, to the defense congressional committees, as required by the fiscal year 2005 defense authorization act, to help facilitate congressional oversight. We also reviewed and analyzed the DOD budget request for fiscal year 2004 to identify the business systems investments that could be subject to the requirements of the Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003, which requires the DOD Comptroller to review all financial system improvements with obligations exceeding $1 million and determine whether each improvement is in accordance with criteria specified in the act. | Why GAO Did This Study
Despite its significant investment in business systems, the Department of Defense (DOD) continues to have long-standing financial and business management problems that preclude the department from producing reliable and timely information for making decisions and for accurately reporting on its billions of dollars of assets. GAO was asked to (1) identify DOD's fiscal year 2005 estimated funding for its business systems and (2) determine whether DOD has effective control and accountability over its business systems modernization investments.
What GAO Found
DOD's business and financial management weaknesses have resulted in billions of dollars wasted annually in a time of increasing fiscal constraint. These weaknesses continue despite DOD requesting over $13 billion in fiscal year 2005--about $6 billion less than in fiscal year 2004--to operate, maintain, and modernize its existing duplicative business systems. The difference is more a reclassification of systems rather than an actual spending reduction. Some of the reclassifications appeared reasonable and others were questionable due to inconsistent information. At the same time, DOD reported an increase in the number of business systems to 4,150 as of February 2005--an increase of about 1,900 systems since April 2003. The duplicative and stovepiped nature of DOD's systems environment is illustrated by the numerous systems in the same business area. For example, DOD reported that it has over 2,000 logistics systems--an increase of approximately 255 percent since April 2003. DOD still does not have an effective departmentwide management structure for controlling business systems investments. Furthermore, DOD is not in compliance with the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003, which requires the DOD Comptroller to determine that system improvements with obligations exceeding $1 million meet the criteria specified in the act. Based on limited information provided by DOD, system improvements totaling about $243 million of obligations over $1 million were not reviewed by the DOD Comptroller in fiscal year 2004. Cumulatively, based upon DOD's reported data, system improvements totaling about $651 million of obligations over $1 million were not reviewed by the DOD Comptroller before obligations were made since passage of the 2003 act. The 2005 defense authorization act directed that DOD put in place a management structure to improve the control and accountability over business systems investments by placing more responsibility with the domains. At the same time, each military service has its own investment review process. Absent an integrated management structure that clearly defines the relationship of the domains and the military services, DOD will be at risk that the parochialism contributing to the current problems will continue. |
gao_GAO-12-254T | gao_GAO-12-254T_0 | Coast Guard Is Identifying Arctic Requirements, but Funding Is Uncertain
Coast Guard’s Efforts to Identify Arctic Requirements
The Coast Guard has taken a variety of actions to identify its Arctic requirements. Through routine mission operations, the Coast Guard has been able to collect useful information on the capability of its existing assets to operate in cold climates, strategies for overcoming logistical challenges presented by long-distance responses to incidents, and the resources needed to respond to an oil spill in a remote and cold location, among other things. The seasonal (March-November) biweekly Arctic overflights were initiated in October 2007 to increase the agency’s maritime domain awareness, test personnel and equipment capabilities in the Arctic, and inform the Coast Guard’s Arctic requirements, among other things. High Latitude Study Identifies Arctic Requirements
The Coast Guard’s primary analytical effort to identify and report on Arctic requirements, the High Latitude Study (the Study), identifies the Coast Guard’s responsibilities in the Polar regions, discusses the nature of the activities it must perform over the next 30 years, and concludes with a high-level summary of the Coast Guard’s material and nonmaterial needs to meet the requirements. Specifically, the Study identifies the Coast Guard’s current capability gaps in the Arctic and assesses the degree to which these gaps will impact future missions. In addition to these capabilities, the Study compares six different options—identified as Arctic force mixes—to a baseline representing the Coast Guard’s current Arctic assets. Given current budget uncertainty and the Coast Guard’s recent acquisition priorities, it may be a significant challenge for the Coast Guard to acquire the assets that the Study recommends. Coast Guard Continues to Face Challenges Related to Icebreakers
The most significant issue facing the Coast Guard’s icebreaker fleet is the growing obsolescence of these vessels and the resulting capability gap caused by their increasingly limited operations. Since then, at least three reports have further identified the Coast Guard’s challenges to meeting its current and future icebreaking mission requirements in the Arctic with its existing polar icebreaker fleet, as well as the challenges it faces to acquire new icebreakers. Coast Guard Coordinates with Numerous Stakeholders on Arctic Operations
The Coast Guard continues to coordinate with various stakeholders on Arctic operations and policy, including foreign, state, and local governments, Alaskan Native governments and interest groups, and the private sector. In response to these concerns, in 2010 we recommended that the Commandant of the Coast Guard ensure that the agency communicates with these stakeholders on the process and progress of its Arctic planning efforts. The Coast Guard agreed with our recommendation and is in the process of taking corrective action. The Coast Guard also coordinates with federal agencies, such as the NSF, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), and DOD, and is involved with several interagency coordination efforts that address aspects of key practices we have previously identified to help enhance and sustain collaboration among federal agencies. Since our September 2010 report, the Coast Guard has partnered with DOD on another interagency coordination effort, the Capabilities Assessment Working Group. DHS and DOD established the working group in May 2011 to identify shared Arctic capability gaps as well as opportunities and approaches to overcome them, to include making recommendations for near-term investments. The establishment of the working group helps to ensure that collaboration between the Coast Guard and DOD is taking place to address near-term capabilities in support of current planning and operations; however, upon the completion of the report in January 2012, the working group is expected to be dissolved. Coast Guard Budget Limitations
The Coast Guard faces overall budget uncertainty, and it may be a significant challenge for the Coast Guard to obtain Arctic capable resources, including icebreakers. This means that it is unlikely that the Coast Guard will be able to expand the U.S. icebreaker fleet to meet its statutory requirements as identified the Commandant of by the High Latitude Study. In addition to the Coast Guard budget analysis included in the Recapitalization report, all three reports reviewed alternative financing options, including the potential for leasing icebreakers, or funding icebreakers through the National Science Foundation (NSF) or the Department of Defense (DOD). This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. | Why GAO Did This Study
The gradual retreat of polar sea ice, combined with an expected increase in human activity--shipping traffic, oil and gas exploration, and tourism in the Arctic region--has increased the strategic interest that the United States and other nations have in the Arctic. As a result, the U.S. Coast Guard, within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), has responsibilities in the Arctic, which are expected to increase. This testimony provides an update of: (1) the extent to which the Coast Guard has taken actions to identify requirements for future Arctic operations; (2) issues related to the U.S. icebreaking fleet; and (3) the extent to which the Coast Guard is coordinating with stakeholders on Arctic issues. This statement is based on GAO-10-870 , issued in September 2010, and includes selected updates. For the selected updates, GAO analyzed Coast Guard, Department of Defense (DOD,) and other related documents on Arctic operations and capabilities. GAO also interviewed Coast Guard and DOD officials about efforts to identify Arctic requirements and coordinate with stakeholders.
What GAO Found
The Coast Guard has taken a variety of actions--from routine operations to a major analysis of mission needs in the polar regions--to identify its Arctic requirements. The routine operations have helped the Coast Guard to collect useful information on the capability of its existing assets to operate in cold climates and strategies for overcoming logistical challenges presented by long-distance responses to incidents, among other things. Other operational actions intended to help identify Arctic requirements include the establishment of temporary, seasonal operating locations in the Arctic and seasonal biweekly Arctic overflights, which have helped the Coast Guard to identify performance requirements and test personnel and equipment capabilities in the Arctic. The Coast Guard's primary analytical effort to identify Arctic requirements is the High Latitude Study, a multivolume analysis that is intended to, in part, identify the Coast Guard's current Arctic capability gaps and assess the degree to which these gaps will impact future missions. This study also identifies potential solutions to these gaps and compares six different options--identified as Arctic force mixes--to a baseline representing the Coast Guard's current Arctic assets. However, given current budget uncertainty and the Coast Guard's recent acquisition priorities, it may be a significant challenge for the agency to acquire the assets that the High Latitude Study recommends. The most significant issue facing the Coast Guard's icebreaker fleet is the growing obsolescence of these vessels and the resulting capability gap caused by their increasingly limited operations. In 2010, Coast Guard officials reported challenges fulfilling the agency's statutory icebreaking mission. Since then, at least three reports--by the DHS Inspector General and Coast Guard contractors--have further identified the Coast Guard's challenges to meeting its current and future icebreaking mission requirements in the Arctic with its existing polar icebreaker fleet. Prior GAO work and these reports also identify budgetary challenges the agency faces in acquiring new icebreakers. Given these issues and the current budgetary climate, it is unlikely that the Coast Guard will be able to fund the acquisition of new icebreakers through its own budget, or through alternative financing options. Thus, it is unlikely that the Coast Guard will be able to expand the U.S. icebreaker fleet to meet its statutory requirements, and it may be a significant challenge for it to just maintain its existing level of icebreaking capabilities due to its aging fleet. In 2010, GAO reported the Coast Guard coordinates with various stakeholders on Arctic operations and policy, including foreign, state, and local governments, Alaskan Native governments and interest groups, and the private sector. GAO also reported that the Coast Guard coordinates with federal agencies, such as the National Science Foundation, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, and DOD. More recently, the Coast Guard has partnered with DOD through the Capabilities Assessment Working Group--an interagency coordination group established in May 2011--to identify shared Arctic capability gaps as well as opportunities and approaches to overcome them, to include making recommendations for near-term investments. The establishment of this group helps to ensure collaboration between the Coast Guard and DOD addresses near-term capabilities in support of current planning and operations.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is not making new recommendations in this statement. GAO previously recommended that the Coast Guard communicate with key stakeholders on the process and progress of its Arctic planning efforts. DHS concurred with this recommendation and is in the process of taking corrective action. |
gao_GAO-09-99 | gao_GAO-09-99_0 | U.S. Agencies Take Various Approaches to Meet Legal Requirements for Reviewing World Bank Group Proposals Likely to Impact the Environment
Treasury addresses Pelosi Amendment requirements for assessing World Bank Group projects by conducting reviews that focus on procedural requirements such as whether the project’s environmental assessment is made publicly available by the project sponsor 120 days before the World Bank Group’s board vote date. Treasury also engages in required interagency consultations by leading a weekly interagency working group. The agencies learn about many such projects through regular interaction with nongovernmental organizations. Officials from participating agencies we met with stated that because of the volume of proposals to review and the short time span in which to discuss them, they rely on Treasury to identify in the meeting agenda proposals that it believes to be of concern, to facilitate the discussion. However, Treasury has not routinely done so. U.S. Government Ability to Identify Environmental Concerns Is Limited, and World Bank Group Projects with Potentially Significant Adverse Impacts Proceed with or without U.S. Government Support
Time constraints limit the U.S. government’s ability to identify the environmental and social concerns associated with World Bank Group projects before the World Bank Group board votes on them, and projects with potentially significant adverse impacts proceed with or without U.S. government support. By the time a project is ready for board vote, it is often in its final design stage or, in some cases, already under construction, which limits U.S. agencies’ ability to identify ways to mitigate environmental and social issues associated with the project. Furthermore, the World Bank Group consistently approves projects with potentially significant adverse impacts without U.S. government support; between January 2004 and April 2008, all 34 of the projects the U.S. Executive Director did not support because they did not meet the Pelosi Amendment requirements were still approved by the World Bank Group’s Board of Directors and moved forward. In addition, the U.S. government occasionally supports projects with significant environmental impacts, due to competing priorities and a belief that potential impacts can be mitigated. The U.S. Government’s Ability to Identify Environmental and Social Issues Associated with Most World Bank Group Projects Is Limited by Review Time Frames
Officials from agencies that participate in the interagency working group told us that they usually do not have sufficient time to identify environmental and social issues associated with projects in the few weeks encompassing the World Bank Group’s notification of a proposed project scheduled for a vote, the working group meeting at which the project could be discussed, and the date the board votes on the project. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to assess (1) how U.S. agencies implement their legislative requirements to review the potential environmental and social concerns associated with proposed World Bank Group projects, and (2) agencies’ ability to identify and address these concerns. To assess how U.S. agencies implement their legislative requirements, we reviewed environmental legislation, including: Title XIII of the International Financial Institutions Act of 1977, as amended; the procedures for the environmental review of proposed projects of multilateral development banks in 31 C.F.R. GAO Comments
1. 3. | Why GAO Did This Study
The World Bank Group lends about $40 billion annually to developing countries. Critics have claimed that some projects have harmed the environment and the local population. Title XIII of the International Financial Institutions Act of 1977 outlines in part the U.S. government's requirements for reviewing potential environmental and social impacts of proposed multilateral development bank projects. GAO was asked to assess the U.S. government's international environmental oversight efforts by examining (1) how U.S. agencies implement legislative requirements to review the potential environmental concerns associated with proposed World Bank Group projects, and (2) agencies' ability to identify and address these concerns. GAO reviewed Title XIII, World Bank Group reports, and U.S. agency documents and met with representatives from U.S. government agencies, the World Bank Group, and nongovernmental organizations.
What GAO Found
U.S. agencies take various approaches to meet legal requirements for reviewing World Bank Group proposals likely to have significant adverse environmental impacts. The Treasury Department (Treasury), which leads these efforts, generally focuses on fulfilling the law's largely procedural requirements, such as ensuring that the project's environmental assessment is made publicly available by the project sponsor 120 days before it is voted on by the Group's board. The reviews usually occur from 1 to 3 weeks prior to such a vote. Treasury also engages in required consultations by leading a weekly interagency working group. Some participants stated that, because of limited time and the volume of proposals, they rely on Treasury to identify proposals of concern to facilitate the discussions. However, Treasury has not routinely done so. For a selected few projects, Treasury and the U.S. Agency for International Development analyze in more depth a proposal's potential environmental and social impacts. Both agencies learn about many such projects through regular interaction with nongovernmental organizations. Time constraints limit the U.S. government's ability to identify environmental and social concerns associated with World Bank Group projects before a vote on the proposal, and projects with potentially significant adverse impacts proceed with or without U.S. government support. The compressed review time frame makes it difficult for U.S. officials to examine proposal documentation and solicit information from knowledgeable parties. In addition, by the time of the vote, a project is often already in its final design stage or even under construction, which limits U.S. agencies' ability to identify ways to mitigate the concerns. Furthermore, proposals with potentially significant adverse impacts proceed with or without U.S. government support. The board consistently approves proposals that lack U.S. support; between January 2004 and May 2008, all 34 of the proposals the United States did not support because they did not meet legislative requirements were still approved by the board. Finally, the U.S. government occasionally supports proposals with significant environmental impacts, due to competing priorities, including economic and other considerations. |
gao_GAO-03-134 | gao_GAO-03-134_0 | Background
The federal government began with a public debt of about $78 million in 1789. Subsection (k) of 5 U.S.C. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
develop a chronology of significant events related to the debt issuance suspension periods during April 2002 and May/June 2002, analyze the financial aspects of Treasury’s actions taken during the 2002 debt issuance suspension periods and assess the legal basis of these actions, and analyze the impact of the policies and procedures used by Treasury to manage the debt during the 2002 debt issuance suspension periods. Actions Related to the Civil Service Fund
During the second 2002 debt issuance suspension period, the Secretary of the Treasury redeemed Treasury securities held by the Civil Service fund earlier than normal and suspended the investment of Civil Service fund receipts. On May 16, 2002, Treasury redeemed about $4 billion of the Civil Service fund’s Treasury securities using this authority. Each day from April 4 to April 16, 2002, and from May 16 to June 28, 2002, Treasury determined the amount of funds that the G-Fund would be allowed to invest in Treasury securities and, when necessary, suspended some investments and reinvestments of the G-Fund receipts and maturing securities that would have caused the debt ceiling to be exceeded. Documented Policies and Procedures Needed during a Debt Issuance Suspension Period
The basic actions taken during the 2002 and the 1995/1996 debt issuance suspension periods were similar–-G-Fund and Civil Service fund receipts were not invested and Civil Service fund securities were redeemed earlier than needed to pay fund benefits and expenses. Our review disclosed some cases in which the lack of documented policies and procedures contributed to some confusion and errors that had to be corrected, as necessary. Although some of the stated policies and procedures Treasury used to implement the actions it took on the Civil Service fund during the second 2002 debt issuance suspension period differed from those used in the 1995/1996 debt issuance suspension period, they were adequate to ensure that the Civil Service fund did not incur any losses after the debt issuance suspension period had ended and Treasury was able to take the necessary restoration actions. Debt Ceiling Options. | Why GAO Did This Study
In connection with fulfilling our requirement to audit the financial statements of the U.S. government, we audit the Schedules of Federal Debt Managed by the Bureau of the Public Debt, which includes testing compliance with the debt ceiling. To assist us in this testing and because of the nature of and sensitivity towards actions taken during a debt issuance suspension period, we (1) developed a chronology of significant events, (2) analyzed the financial aspects of Treasury's actions taken during the debt issuance suspension periods and assessed the legal basis of these actions, and (3) analyzed the impact of the policies and procedures used by Treasury to manage the debt during the debt issuance suspension periods.
What GAO Found
In April and May 2002, the Department of the Treasury announced two debt issuance suspension periods because certain receipts could not be invested without exceeding the statutory debt ceiling of $5.95 trillion. The first debt issuance suspension period occurred from April 4 to April 16, 2002, and involved use of the Government Securities Investments Fund (G-Fund). The second debt issuance suspension period occurred from May 16 to June 28, 2002, and involved the use of the Civil Service Retirement and Disability Trust Fund (Civil Service fund) and the G-Fund. During both debt issuance suspension periods, Treasury suspended some investments and reinvestments of the G-Fund's receipts and maturing securities. During the second debt issuance suspension period, Treasury also took the following actions related to the Civil Service fund: (1) it redeemed about $4 billion in Treasury securities held by the Civil Service fund before they were needed to pay benefits and expenses, and (2) it suspended the investment of about $2 billion of trust fund receipts. These actions were consistent with legal authorities provided to the Secretary of the Treasury. Although the actions that are allowed during a debt issuance suspension period are well defined in law, the policies and procedures needed to implement such actions are not documented, Our review disclosed some cases where the lack of documented policies and procedures contributed to confusion and errors that had to be corrected. |
gao_GAO-05-793 | gao_GAO-05-793_0 | State, DOD, and Justice Provide Assistance to Security Forces in the Philippines, Indonesia, and Thailand
State, DOD, and Justice allocated a total of approximately $265.7 million to train and equip security forces in the Philippines, Thailand, and Indonesia in fiscal years 2001 to 2004. Weak Management Controls on U.S. Assistance to Foreign Security Forces Allowed Violations of State’s Policy on Human Rights Restrictions to Occur
We found no evidence that the three posts we visited vetted an estimated 6,935 law enforcement officials trained with State assistance between fiscal years 2001 and 2004. The trainees included 32 Indonesian police from a notorious special-forces police unit that was prohibited from receiving U.S. training funds under State policy because of the unit’s prior human rights abuses. We found better evidence of vetting in DOD-implemented training programs. Laws and State Policy Restrict U.S. Assistance to Foreign Security Forces
Each of the annual Foreign Operations Appropriations Acts since 1998 has included a provision, commonly referred to as the “Leahy Amendment,” that restricts the provision of assistance appropriated in these acts to any foreign security unit for which State has determined there is credible evidence that the unit has committed gross violations of human rights, unless certain conditions have been met. State Issued New Guidance to Improve Vetting Practices in February 2005
State issued new guidance in February 2005 intended to improve the efficiency of the human rights vetting process. U.S. Government Lacks an Integrated National Security Assistance Strategy Covering All U.S. Training and Assistance Provided to Foreign Security Forces
The U.S. government lacks a clear and coherent multiyear national security assistance strategy, making it difficult to assess progress in achieving stated U.S. foreign policy goals, such as stemming terrorism, promoting regional stability, and demonstrating respect for human rights. The strategy does not, however, identify how resources will be allocated to accomplish objectives, how programs will be combined at the country level to achieve objectives, or how security assistance programs will be coordinated with other U.S. government agencies. For example, DOD’s annual country-specific security assistance plans for the Philippines, Indonesia, and Thailand meet some objectives of the act because they are consistent with the National Security Strategy of the United States, include some discussion of DOD-implemented assistance to foreign security forces and how the assistance will be combined and contribute to achieving certain “end states.” Similarly, DOD’s Theater Security Cooperation Plans (TSCP) are prepared by DOD’s unified commands and include regional security assistance and other activities for the current year, plus the next 2 fiscal years. As a result, State and Congress will be deprived of an important source of information for making future resource allocations and program decisions. The documents, which State identified as representing a national security assistance strategy, met only two of nine objectives that the law urged State to address in crafting this strategy. We found the data sufficiently reliable for representing the nature and extent of program funding. GAO Comments
1. 3. 4. | Why GAO Did This Study
The executive branch has bolstered assistance to the Philippines, Indonesia, and Thailand to contribute to U.S. foreign policy and security goals. To further human rights goals, Congress restricts certain security assistance funds from being provided to any units of foreign security forces when credible evidence exists that units have committed gross violations of human rights. GAO (1) describes the nature and extent of U.S. assistance to foreign security forces in the Philippines, Indonesia, and Thailand, (2) assesses the controls used to achieve compliance with human rights restrictions on U.S. funding to foreign security forces in these countries, and (3) assesses the U.S. government's national security assistance strategy.
What GAO Found
The United States allocated about $265.7 million in assistance from fiscal years 2001 to 2004 to equip and train security forces in the Philippines, Thailand, and Indonesia. U.S. law restricts the provision of funds to units of foreign security forces when the Department of State has credible evidence that the unit has committed gross violations of human rights. Agency guidance extends these restrictions to individuals of foreign security forces and requires posts to establish procedures to vet candidates for U.S. sponsored training for possible violations. However, we found no evidence that U.S. officials vetted an estimated 6,900 foreign security trainees--about 4,000 Indonesian, 1,200 Filipino, and 1,700 Thai police--trained by Justice with State law enforcement assistance between fiscal years 2001 through 2004. These candidates included a total of 32 Indonesian individuals trained over time from a notorious special-forces police unit previously prohibited under State policy from receiving U.S. training funds because of the unit's prior human rights abuses. We found better evidence of vetting in training programs managed by DOD. State issued new guidance in February 2005 intended to improve the human rights vetting process and establish a database of human rights abuse allegations. State has not produced a clear and coherent national security assistance strategy that meets objectives that Congress urged State to address in 2000 legislation. As a result, State and Congress may be deprived of the information needed to make future decisions about these programs. State's 2003 strategy met only two of nine objectives in the law. Among other shortfalls, the strategy did not identify how programs would be combined at the country level to achieve objectives or be coordinated with other U.S. government agencies. Several State and DOD planning documents, while not collectively providing a complete national security assistance strategy, address some of the legislation's objectives. |
gao_GAO-14-583 | gao_GAO-14-583_0 | In order to participate in the program, communities must adopt and agree to enforce floodplain management regulations to reduce future flood damage. Elevation. Areas where flood risk is possible but undetermined are designated as D zones. Effects of NFIP Building Requirements Varied for Farmers in Selected Communities, but Additional Guidance May Help Those Adversely Affected
Based on interviews with floodplain management officials, farmers, and others in selected communities, the effects of NFIP’s building requirements for agricultural structures have generally varied. To comply with these requirements, new or substantially improved nonresidential structures in high-risk areas must be elevated or dry flood-proofed. However, the agency acknowledged that the methods included in the guidance do not cover all of the different types of agricultural structures located in vast flood plains with deep flood depths and may not reflect the changes in the size and scale of farm operations in recent years. We selected eight geographically diverse locations in SFHA riverine floodplains in California, Louisiana, North Carolina, and North Dakota that supported crops or livestock requiring onsite agricultural structures.Representatives from FEMA, USDA, and national floodplain management and farm organizations told us that they were unaware of any farmers in these states or others that faced negative effects on their operations from the NFIP building requirements (e.g., elevation, dry flood-proofing, or wet flood-proofing for certain nonresidential structures). Correspondingly, 12 farmers in the communities we selected concurred with these views and generally told us that they had not been adversely affected by NFIP building requirements. Local floodplain managers from the selected communities in Louisiana, North Carolina, and North Dakota told us farmers in their communities typically needed to raise building foundations by just a few feet (which they were generally able to do by adding fill dirt) to meet the BFE requirements for structures built inside SFHAs. However, in both Sutter and Yolo Counties in California, the flood depths were relatively deeper (up to 15 feet in some areas). According to state and local floodplain managers and farmers we spoke with, farmers in Sutter and Yolo Counties who were subject to the NFIP building requirements were also facing challenges flood-proofing their new or substantially expanded agricultural structures to comply with NFIP building requirements. Realizing the need to provide alternative methods to meet building requirements after a catastrophic flood in the Midwest in 1993, in the same year, FEMA issued guidance that allowed certain structures that cannot be elevated or dry flood-proofed to be wet flood- proofed, allowing water to flow through a building while minimizing damage to the structure and its contents.may not be viable for certain agricultural structures. The absence of current guidance on alternative methods has led some farmers to “work around” the building requirements. Options to Address Concerns about NFIP Requirements in Agricultural and Rural Areas Involve Trade- Offs and Risks
Local floodplain managers, farmers and lenders identified several options to help farmers located in SFHAs manage NFIP requirements for building new or substantially improved structures and lowering the cost of NFIP insurance. However, FEMA officials, experts from national floodplain management and city and regional planning organizations, and academics told us that many of these options carried risks and may run counter to the NFIP objectives. The farmers have said that they would be willing to assume all risks and opt out of federal disaster relief if they could expand and construct buildings without being required to follow NFIP building requirements. Further, experts we spoke to indicated that such an exemption could set a precedent, leading others to ask for similar exemptions. FEMA officials shared these views, adding that FEMA had no legal authority to allow farmers or any other specific population group to opt out of disaster relief. Exempting structures may defeat this goal and encourage farmers to build noncompliant structures in high-risk areas that may inadvertently cause damage to nearby communities, according to officials. Recommendation for Executive Action
As FEMA determines the scope of its efforts to revise its existing guidance, we recommend that the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) direct the Administrator of FEMA to update existing guidance to include additional information on and options for mitigating the risk of flood damage to agricultural structures to reflect recent farming developments and structural needs in vast and deep floodplains. In its comments, DHS concurred with our recommendation to update existing guidance to include additional information on and options for mitigating the risk of flood damage to agricultural structures to reflect recent farming developments and structural needs in vast, deep floodplains. | Why GAO Did This Study
NFIP helps protect property in high-risk floodplains by, among other things, requiring communities that participate in the program to adopt floodplain management regulations, including building requirements for new or substantially improved structures such as elevating, dry flood-proofing, or wet flood-proofing structures.
GAO was asked to evaluate the possible effects of NFIP, including its building requirements, on farmers in riverine areas that have a high risk of flooding. This report examines, among other things, the effects of building requirements on farmers in high-risk areas and options that could help address any challenges farmers face. To do this work, GAO analyzed laws, regulations, and FEMA policy and claims data; interviewed 12 state and local floodplain managers, 24 farmers, and 6 lenders in 8 selected communities in California, Louisiana, North Carolina, and North Dakota (selection based on geographic diversity, presence of high-risk flood areas, and type of farming that required on-site structures); and interviewed flood management and planning experts and FEMA officials.
What GAO Found
The effects of the National Flood Insurance Program's (NFIP) building requirements for elevating or flood-proofing agricultural structures in high-risk areas varied across selected communities, according to interviews GAO conducted with floodplain managers and farmers. Specifically:
Floodplain managers and 12 farmers in selected rural communities with whom GAO spoke in Louisiana, North Carolina, and North Dakota generally were not concerned about these requirements. Most of these farmers told GAO that they had land outside the high-risk areas where they could build or expand their structures, or they could elevate their structures relatively easily.
Floodplain managers in selected California communities told GAO that farmers in their communities had been adversely affected by the building requirements. They said that most farm land was in high-risk areas and elevation of structures would be difficult and costly—due to the relatively deep flood depths, structures would be required to be elevated up to 15 feet to comply with the building requirements. They also indicated that some structures were difficult to make watertight below the projected flood level (dry flood-proofing).
According to a California floodplain manager and several farmers with whom GAO spoke, the farmers who were adversely affected by the building requirements have had to work around outdated Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) guidance that does not fully address the challenges of vast and relatively deep floodplains or reflect industry changes. For example, the 1993 guidance from FEMA allowed an alternative flood-proofing technique (wet flood-proofing) that permits water to flow through certain agricultural structures in expansive high-risk areas. However, farmers in the California communities told GAO this was not a viable option because pests might enter openings and contaminate crops stored inside. FEMA typically updates guidance as needed but acknowledged the need for additional guidance that covers all of the different types of agricultural structures and reflects recent developments in the size and scale of farm operations, including supporting structures that were expensive to build and replace. Additional and more comprehensive guidance would allow FEMA to better respond to recent developments and structural needs in vast and deep floodplains.
Some local floodplain managers, farmers, and lenders from the selected communities identified options to help farmers manage the challenges of building or expanding agricultural structures in high-risk areas, but many of the options would entail certain risks and may run counter to the objectives of NFIP. For example, one commonly cited option calls for exempting agricultural structures from building requirements, with farmers assuming all of the flood risk and opting out of federal disaster relief. Both FEMA and the experts noted such an exemption could set a precedent, leading others to ask for similar exemptions. Further, FEMA officials stated that the agency had no legal authority to allow farmers or any other group to opt out of disaster relief.
What GAO Recommends
The Administrator of FEMA should update existing guidance on mitigating the risk of flood damage to agricultural structures to include additional information that reflects recent farming developments and structural needs in vast and deep floodplains. FEMA agreed with the recommendation. |
gao_GAO-16-511 | gao_GAO-16-511_0 | Application rationalization is the process of streamlining the portfolio to improve efficiency, reduce complexity and redundancy, and lower the cost of ownership. Twenty had partially complete inventories and two did not have any inventory. Specifically,
4 agencies fully met all four practices;
9 agencies fully met three practices and 8 of these partially met the
6 agencies fully met two practices and 5 of these partially met the
2 agencies fully met one practice and partially met the three others,
3 agencies did not fully meet any practice. OMB’s requirement for agencies to complete an IT asset inventory by the end of May 2016 greatly contributed to most of the agencies including business systems and enterprise IT systems for all of their organizational components and specifying key attributes for them. Those agencies that did not fully address these practices provided various reasons for not doing so. Not accounting for them may result in missed opportunities to identify savings and efficiencies. It is also inconsistent with OMB guidance for implementing FITARA which requires that CIOs have increased visibility into all IT resources. In addition, the lack of a comprehensive inventory presents a security risk. Each of the six selected agencies relied on their investment management processes and, in some cases, supplemental processes to rationalize their applications to varying degrees. However, five of the six agencies acknowledged that their processes did not always allow for collecting or reviewing the information needed to effectively rationalize all their applications. The sixth agency, NSF, stated its processes allow it to effectively rationalize its applications, but we found supporting documentation to be incomplete. Only one agency, NASA, had plans to address shortcomings. Conclusions
While it is encouraging that 13 of the 24 CFO Act agencies fully met at least three of the four practices for establishing a complete software application inventory, most could improve their software applications inventories—albeit to varying degrees—by taking steps to fully meet the practices we identified as being either partially met or not met. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve federal agencies’ efforts to rationalize their portfolio of applications, we are recommending that: the heads of the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Education, Energy, Health and Human Services, Housing and Urban Development, the Interior, Labor, State, Transportation, the Treasury, and Veterans Affairs; and heads of the Environmental Protection Agency; National Aeronautics and Space Administration; National Science Foundation; Nuclear Regulatory Commission; Office of Personnel Management; Small Business Administration; Social Security Administration; and U.S. Agency for International Development direct their CIOs and other responsible officials to improve their inventories by taking steps to fully address the practices we identified as being partially met or not met; and the Secretaries of Defense, Homeland Security, the Interior, and Labor; and the Director of the National Science Foundation to direct the CIOs and other responsible officials to modify existing investment management processes to address applications more completely. Specifically, the Secretary of Defense should direct the responsible official to modify the department’s existing processes to collect and review cost, technical, and business information for the enterprise and business IT systems within the Enterprise Information Environment Mission Area applications which are currently not reviewed as part of the department’s process for business systems; the Secretary of Homeland Security should direct the department’s CIO to identify one high-cost function it could collect detailed cost, technical, and business information for and modify existing processes to collect and review this information; the Secretary of the Interior should direct the department’s CIO to document and implement a plan for establishing policy that would define a standard analytical technique for rationalizing the investment portfolio; the Secretary of Labor should direct the department’s CIO to consider a segmented approach to further rationalize and identify a function for which it would modify existing processes to collect and review application-specific cost, technical, and business value information; and the Director of the National Science Foundation should direct the CIO to consistently document evaluations for all applications and report cost information for them in the roadmap or other documentation. In written comments, the Department of Defense disagreed with both of our recommendations to the department. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to determine (1) whether agencies have established complete application inventories and (2) to what extent selected agencies have developed and implemented processes for rationalizing their portfolio of applications. For the first objective, we reviewed the 24 major agencies covered by the Chief Financial Officers (CFO) Act of 1990. To be considered complete, we determined an inventory should: include business systems and enterprise IT systems, as defined by OMB; include these systems from all organizational components; specify basic attributes, namely, application name, description, owner, and function supported; and be regularly updated with quality controls in place to ensure the reliability of the information collected. We selected the agencies based on three factors: whether they had an application rationalization process; in our initial set of structured questions to agencies, we asked whether they had a plan or process for rationalizing applications and selected those that reported having one; the size of the agency based on fiscal year 2015 IT spending; we selected two large agencies (i.e., with spending equal to or greater than $3 billion), two medium agencies (i.e., with spending between $1 billion and $3 billion), and two small agencies (i.e., with spending of less than $1 billion) for a full range of IT spending; and if they were known for effectively rationalizing their applications based on OMB observations and our research on IT acquisition reform recognizing agencies for their application rationalization efforts. | Why GAO Did This Study
The federal government is expected to spend more than $90 billion on IT in fiscal year 2017. This includes a variety of software applications supporting agencies' enterprise needs. Since 2013, OMB has advocated the use of application rationalization. This is a process by which an agency streamlines its portfolio of software applications with the goal of improving efficiency, reducing complexity and redundancy, and lowering the cost of ownership.
GAO's objectives were to determine (1) whether agencies have established complete application inventories and (2) to what extent selected agencies have developed and implemented processes for rationalizing their portfolio of applications. To do this, GAO assessed the inventories of the 24 CFO Act agencies against four key practices and selected six agencies—the Departments of Defense, Homeland Security, the Interior, Labor, and NASA and NSF—due to their IT spending, among other factors, to determine whether they had processes addressing applications.
What GAO Found
Most of the 24 Chief Financial Officers (CFO) Act of 1990 agencies in the review fully met at least three of the four practices GAO identified to determine if agencies had complete software application inventories. To be considered complete, an inventory should (1) include business and enterprise information technology (IT) systems as defined by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB); (2) include these systems from all organizational components; (3) specify application name, description, owner, and function supported; and (4) be regularly updated. Of the 24 agencies, 4 (the Departments of Defense, Homeland Security, and Justice, and the General Services Administration) fully met all four practices, 9 fully met three practices, 6 fully met two practices, 2 fully met one practice, and 3 did not fully meet any practice (see figure).
A January 2016 OMB requirement to complete an IT asset inventory by the end of May 2016 contributed to most of the agencies fully meeting the first three practices. Agencies that did not fully address these practices stated, among other things, their focus on major and high risk investments as a reason for not having complete inventories. However, not accounting for all applications may result in missed opportunities to identify savings and efficiencies. It is also inconsistent with OMB guidance regarding implementation of IT acquisition reform law, referred to as the Federal Information Technology Acquisition Reform Act, which requires that Chief Information Officers at covered agencies have increased visibility into all IT resources. Not accounting for all applications also presents a security risk since agencies can only secure assets if they are aware of them.
Each of the six selected agencies relied on their investment management processes and, in some cases, supplemental processes to rationalize their applications to varying degrees. However, five of the six agencies acknowledged that their processes did not always allow for collecting or reviewing the information needed to effectively rationalize all their applications. The sixth agency, the National Science Foundation (NSF), stated its processes allow it to effectively rationalize its applications, but agency documentation supporting this assertion was incomplete. Only one agency—the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)—had plans to address shortcomings. Taking action to address identified weaknesses with agencies' existing processes for rationalizing applications would assist with identifying additional opportunities to reduce duplication and achieve savings.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is recommending that 20 agencies improve their inventories and five of the selected agencies take actions to improve their processes to rationalize their applications more completely. The Department of Defense disagreed with both recommendations made to it. After reviewing additional evidence, GAO removed the recommendation associated with improving the inventory but maintained the other. The other agencies agreed to or had no comments on the draft report. |
gao_GAO-10-905 | gao_GAO-10-905_0 | As discussed in this report, for example, HUD has issued guidance recommending that grantees update their AIs every 3 to 5 years. We also (1) did not receive AIs from 25 grantees despite repeated requests that they provide them, which suggests that, in some cases, grantees may not maintain the documents as is required; and (2) several grantees provided documents with their status as AIs not clear due to their brevity and lack of content. Further, we found that current AIs generally contained several basic elements suggested in HUD’s guidance, such as demographic data and analysis, and recommendations to overcome identified impediments. However, a significant majority of the current AIs did not identify time frames for implementing the recommendations or contain the signatures of top elected officials as is also suggested in HUD’s guidance. An Estimated 29 Percent of AIs Are Outdated and Thus May Not Provide a Reliable Basis for Identifying and Mitigating Current Impediments to Fair Housing
We estimate that while 64 percent of all grantees have current AIs, 29 percent may be outdated having been prepared in 2004 or earlier (including 11 percent from the 1990s), and the date for 6 percent could not be determined (fig. HUD’s 2009 internal study on AI conformance also concluded that many grantees’ AIs were outdated. In sum, our findings that many AIs are outdated, may not be prepared as required, or lack time frames and signatures, together with the findings of HUD’s study, raise significant questions as to whether the AI is effectively serving as a tool to help ensure that all grantees are committed to identifying and overcoming potential impediments to fair housing choice as required by statutes governing the CDBG and HOME programs and HUD regulations. For example, we found that HUD officials rarely request grantees’ AIs during on-site monitoring reviews or receive complaints from the public about such documents, which means that the department often has minimal information about the status of grantees’ AIs in terms of their timeliness and content. Recognizing the limitations in its AI requirements and oversight and enforcement approaches, in 2009, HUD initiated a process to update relevant regulations, but it is not clear what issues any revised regulatory requirements will address or when they will be completed. In the absence of a department-wide initiative to strengthen AI requirements and oversight and enforcement, many grantees may place a low priority on ensuring that their AIs serve as effective planning tools. HUD Regulations Do Not Establish Standards for the Timeliness of AIs or their Format, and Grantees Are Not Required to Submit Them for the Department’s Review
As discussed previously, HUD’s regulatory requirements pertaining to AIs are limited. On-site monitoring reviews to assess grantee compliance with HUD requirements, which can include reviews of AFFH documentation, such as AIs. Conclusions
While HUD regulations have required the preparation of AIs for many years, whether they serve as an effective tool for grantees that receive federal funds through the CDBG and other programs to identify and address impediments to fair housing within their jurisdictions is unclear. Specifically, grantees are not required through regulation to update their AIs periodically, include certain information, follow a specific format in preparing AIs, or submit them to HUD for review. In its written comments, HUD highlighted its recent actions to affirmatively further fair housing. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of our report are to (1) assesses both the conformance of Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) and HOME Investment Partnerships Program (HOME) grantees’ Analysis of Impediments (AI) with Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) guidance pertaining to their timeliness and content as well as the AIs’ potential usefulness as fair housing planning tools and (2) identify factors that may help explain any potential weaknesses in grantees AIs, particularly factors related to HUD’s regulatory requirements and oversight and enforcement approaches. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to the Fair Housing Act, Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) regulations require grantees, such as cities, that receive federal funds through the Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) and HOME Investment Partnerships Program (HOME) to further fair housing opportunities. In particular, grantees are required to prepare planning documents known as Analyses of Impediments (AI), which are to identify impediments to fair housing (such as restrictive zoning or segregated housing) and actions to overcome them. HUD has oversight responsibility for AIs. This report (1) assesses both the conformance of CDBG and HOME grantees AIs' with HUD guidance pertaining to their timeliness and content and their potential usefulness as planning tools and (2) identifies factors in HUD's requirements and oversight that may help explain any AI weaknesses. GAO requested AIs from a representative sample of the nearly 1,200 grantees, compared the 441 AIs received (95 percent response based on final sample of 466) with HUD guidance and conducted work at HUD headquarters and 10 offices nationwide.
What GAO Found
On the basis of the 441 AIs reviewed, GAO estimates that 29 percent of all CDBG and HOME grantees' AIs were prepared in 2004 or earlier, including 11 percent from the 1990s, and thus may be outdated. HUD guidance recommends that grantees update their AIs at least every 5 years. GAO also did not receive AIs from 25 grantees, suggesting that, in some cases, the required documents may not be maintained, and several grantees provided documents that did not appear to be AIs because of their brevity and lack of content. GAO reviewed 60 of the current AIs (those dating from 2005 through 2010) and found that most of these documents included several key elements in the format suggested in HUD's guidance, such as the identification of impediments to fair housing and recommendations to overcome them. (See table below for common impediments identified in 30 of these 60 current AIs.) However, the vast majority of these 60 AIs did not include time frames for implementing their recommendations or the signatures of top elected officials, as HUD guidance recommends, raising questions about the AI's usefulness as a planning document. As a result, it is unclear whether the AI is an effective tool for grantees that receive federal CDBG and HOME funds to identify and address impediments to fair housing. HUD's limited regulatory requirements and oversight may help explain why many AIs are outdated or have other weaknesses. Specifically, HUD regulations do not establish requirements for updating AIs or their format, and grantees are not required to submit AIs to the department for review. A 2009 HUD internal study on AIs, department officials, and GAO's work at 10 offices identified critical deficiencies in these requirements. For example, HUD officials rarely request grantees' AIs during on-site reviews to assess their compliance with overall CDBG and HOME program requirements, limiting the department's capacity to assess AIs' timeliness and content. While HUD initiated a process to revise its AI regulatory requirements in 2009, what the rule will entail or when it will be completed is not clear. In the absence of a department-wide initiative to enhance AI requirements and oversight, many grantees may place a low priority on ensuring that their AIs serve as effective fair housing planning tools.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that, through regulation, HUD require grantees to update their AIs periodically, follow a specific format, and submit them for review. HUD neither agreed nor disagreed with the recommendations but noted recent efforts to improve compliance and oversight. |
gao_GAO-09-380T | gao_GAO-09-380T_0 | Establishing a Comprehensive U.S. Strategy Is an Essential First Step in Planning for Future Military Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan
We have identified several key elements of an effective national strategy that should be considered by the new administration in developing national strategies for Iraq and Afghanistan to guide the way forward. First, our work shows that new strategies for both countries should reflect a comprehensive governmentwide approach and clearly delineate U.S. government roles, responsibilities, and coordination mechanisms. Regarding Iraq, one major issue that will need to be addressed is to determine to what extent a drawdown of U. S. forces will be determined based on the achievement of goals or conditions in light of the specific time frames for withdrawal included in the November 2008 SOFA between Iraq and the United States that took effect in January 2009. Furthermore, as the administration develops strategies for both countries and plans to adjust force levels, it will need to closely examine the availability of resources, given the heavy commitment of U.S. forces to ongoing operations over the past several years. Third, in light of future demands on the federal budget, attention will be needed to ensure that U.S. efforts are executed in a manner that maximizes the use of available resources and includes mechanisms for oversight. Clearly, strong oversight on the part of the Congress and senior decision makers within DOD will also be a critical element to protecting the taxpayers’ interest and resources. Operational Factors Should Be Considered in Developing Plans to Draw Down U.S. Based on discussions with DOD officials and an analysis of planning efforts, we found that the effectiveness and efficiency of DOD’s redeployment efforts from Iraq will depend on the extent to which it develops plans that address several issues such as the following: Although the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) has designated an executive agent to coordinate the retrograde of materiel and equipment from the Iraqi theater of operations, no unified structure exists to coordinate the teams and units engaged in efforts to manage and execute the return of materiel and equipment. The pace at which units can be redeployed and equipment and materiel returned to the United States from Iraq will be governed by the capacity of facilities in neighboring countries as well as restrictions on the use of those facilities. Several Operational Concerns Need to Be Considered as DOD Refines Its Strategy and Plans for Afghanistan
Based on our work examining current and past military operations, there are several operational issues that must be considered as the United States refines its strategy and plans for using military forces in Afghanistan. We have identified several issues in the following five key areas that warrant consideration by DOD planners as they develop strategies and plans for these operations: availability of forces, training of personnel, availability of equipment, transportation of equipment and personnel, and management and oversight of contractors. As of December 1, 2008, more than 180,000 service members were deployed in the two countries. There are also limited maintenance facilities in Afghanistan. In addition to ground equipment, DOD will need to assess its requirements for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities to support increased force levels in Afghanistan, given its current allocation of assets to support ongoing operations in Iraq. Furthermore, DOD is still in the process of developing metrics to measure the performance of these assets. Given these challenges, we have concerns that lessons learned from the experience of using contractors to support forces deployed in Iraq may not be shared with forces deploying to Afghanistan and many of the contractor-related issues in Iraq may therefore recur in Afghanistan. Afghanistan presents its own unique transportation and security concerns that will need to be factored into how contractors will be able to support the increased number of U.S. forces and, potentially, bases in Afghanistan. Drawdown will increase demands on contractors and contract oversight personnel in Iraq: As noted above, the United States is planning for the drawdown of its forces in Iraq. As the United States develops a strategy for Iraq and Afghanistan, and related plans for adjusting force levels, we believe that increased awareness of significant challenges may improve their ability to successfully develop and execute a strategy. | Why GAO Did This Study
The United States is in the process of developing its strategy for operations in Afghanistan, as well as for the drawdown and continued operations of forces in Iraq. As of December 2008, approximately 32,500 U.S. troops were deployed in Afghanistan. Moreover, DOD may add an additional 30,000 troops in Afghanistan. Since 2001, the war in Afghanistan changed from a violent struggle against al Qaeda and its Taliban supporters to a multi-faceted counterinsurgency effort. As of December 2008, U.S. troops in Iraq numbered approximately 148,500. DOD also had about 162,400 contractors in Iraq as of mid-2008. Today's testimony addresses (1) key observations regarding the development of U.S. strategy in Iraq and Afghanistan; (2) factors that should be considered as the United States refines its strategy for Iraq and plans to draw down forces; and (3) factors that should be considered as the United States develops a strategy for Afghanistan and plans for increasing forces. This statement is based on GAO reports and testimonies on Iraq and Afghanistan.
What GAO Found
Lessons learned from GAO's past work indicate that U.S. strategy for Iraq and Afghanistan should reflect a governmentwide approach and contain a number of key elements, including clear roles, responsibilities, and coordination mechanisms among government agencies, as well as specific goals, performance measures, and time frames that take into account available resources. Given the heavy commitment of U.S. forces to ongoing operations over the past several years, the availability of forces, equipment, and infrastructure will need to be closely examined in developing plans to reposture military forces. Finally, in light of future demands on the federal budget, attention will be needed to ensure that U.S. plans are developed and executed in an efficient and cost-effective manner. Clearly, strong oversight by the Congress and senior decision makers will be needed to minimize past problems such as contract mismanagement and insufficient attention to overseeing contractors. In refining its strategy and plans for the drawdown of forces in Iraq, senior leaders will need to consider several operational factors. For example, DOD will need to develop plans to efficiently and effectively relocate thousands of personnel and billions of dollars worth of equipment out of Iraq; close hundreds of facilities; and determine the role of contractors. Furthermore, the capacity of facilities in Kuwait and other neighboring countries may limit the speed at which equipment and materiel can be moved out of Iraq. With regard to Afghanistan, DOD will likely face an array of potential challenges related to people, equipment and infrastructure. For example, the availability and training of personnel will be critical considerations as the force is already significantly stressed from ongoing operations and current training capacity has been primarily focused on operations in Iraq. Additionally, the availability of equipment may be limited because the Army and Marine Corps have already deployed much of their equipment to Iraq and much of the prepositioned assets also have been withdrawn to support ongoing operations. Similarly, DOD will need to assess its requirements for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities given its current allocation of these assets to support ongoing operations in Iraq. Further, the ability to transport personnel and equipment into Afghanistan will be challenged by the limited infrastructure and topography of Afghanistan. Moreover, the extent to which contractors will be used to support deployed U.S. forces must be considered as well as how oversight of these contractors will be ensured. Given all of these factors, sound planning based on a well-developed strategy is critical to ensure lessons learned over the years from Iraq are incorporated in Afghanistan and that competing resources are prioritized effectively between both operations. |
gao_GAO-02-148T | gao_GAO-02-148T_0 | students and tourists), and naturalization. To assist agencies in developing, maintaining, and implementing enterprise architectures, we collaborated with the Chief Information Officers Council to develop a practical guide for enterprise architecture management. INS Has Taken Steps to Improve IT Investment Management But Effective Processes and Practices Have Yet To Be Implemented
In December 2000 we reported that while INS had some investment control elements, it nevertheless lacked the full set of foundational investment management processes and practices needed to effectively control its ongoing IT projects and ensure that it was meeting cost, schedule, and performance commitments and contributing to measurable mission performance and accountability goals. | Why GAO Did This Study
Information technology (IT) management process controls are predictors of organizational success in developing, acquiring, implementing, operating, and maintaining IT systems and related infrastructure.
What GAO Found
GAO found that the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) has not implemented practices associated with effective IT investment and enterprise architecture management. Furthermore, these investments are not aligned with an agencywide blueprint that defines the agency's future operational and technological plans. INS does not know whether its ongoing investments are meeting their cost, schedule, and performance commitments. |
gao_GAO-06-733 | gao_GAO-06-733_0 | Some USPS Delivery Standards Are Not Useful and Transparent and Do Not Reflect Current Mail Operations
Some USPS standards for timely mail delivery are inadequate because of limited usefulness and transparency. Outdated standards are unsuitable as benchmarks for setting realistic expectations for timely mail delivery, measuring delivery performance, or improving service, oversight, and accountability. This limited scope of measurement was not disclosed on USPS’s Web site. Two key impediments involve limitations in technology, which limited USPS’s ability to track mail from entry to delivery; and limited mailer participation in providing information needed to facilitate performance measurements, which limited the representativeness of the performance data collected. In addition, data quality deficiencies and cost concerns have impeded progress. USPS Plans to Improve Service Performance, But Not to Implement Representative Measures of Delivery Performance Across All Product Lines
Although USPS plans to improve its service performance, it has no current plans to implement additional representative measures of delivery performance. USPS management commitment and more effective collaboration with mailers will be critical for resolving impediments to delivery performance measurement and reporting. Recommendations for Executive Action
To facilitate greater progress in developing complete delivery performance information, we recommend that the Postmaster General take the following four actions: 1. modernize delivery standards for all major types of mail so that they reflect USPS operations and can be used as benchmarks for understanding and measuring delivery performance; 2. provide a clear commitment in USPS’s Comprehensive Statement on Postal Operations to develop a complete set of delivery performance measures for each major type of mail that is representative of overall delivery performance; 3. implement representative delivery performance measures for all major types of mail by providing more effective collaboration with mailers and others to ensure effective working relationships, follow-through, accountability, and results; and 4. improve the transparency of delivery performance standards, measures, and results by publicly disclosing more information, including in its Comprehensive Statement on Postal Operations and other annual performance reports to Congress, as well as providing easily accessible information on its Web site. Without sufficient transparency, oversight and accountability are limited. We agree with USPS’s focus on improving service and holding its managers accountable for results. However, USPS has not yet achieved its aim of a “balanced scorecard” for delivery performance because its delivery performance measures cover less than one-fifth of mail volume, and these measures do not cover Standard Mail, bulk First-Class Mail, Periodicals, and most Package Services mail. Our draft report also stated that delivery standards are outdated for several types of mail, including Standard Mail, some Periodicals, and most Package Services, because they have not been updated in many years to reflect significant changes in the way mail is prepared and delivered. Postal Service (USPS) has established, (2) the delivery performance information on the timely delivery of mail that USPS measures and reports, and (3) the progress USPS has made in improving its delivery performance information. | Why GAO Did This Study
U.S. Postal Service (USPS) delivery performance standards and results, which are central to its mission of providing universal postal service, have been a long-standing concern for mailers and Congress. Standards are essential to set realistic expectations for delivery performance and organize activities accordingly. Timely and reliable reporting of results is essential for management, over-sight, and accountability purposes. GAO was asked to assess (1) USPS's delivery performance standards for timely mail delivery, (2) delivery performance information that USPS collects and reports on timely mail delivery, and (3) progress made to improve delivery performance information.
What GAO Found
USPS has delivery standards for its major types of mail, but some have not been updated in a number of years to reflect changes in how mail is prepared and delivered. These outdated standards are unsuitable as benchmarks for setting realistic expectations for timely mail delivery, measuring delivery performance, or improving service, oversight, and accountability. USPS plans corrective action to update some standards. Also, some delivery standards are not easily accessible, which impedes mailers from obtaining information to make informed decisions. USPS does not measure and report its delivery performance for most types of mail. Therefore, transparency with regard to its overall performance in timely mail delivery is limited. Representative measures cover less than one-fifth of mail volume and do not include Standard Mail, bulk First-Class Mail, Periodicals, and most Package Services. Despite recent disclosures on its Web site, USPS's reporting is more limited than the scope of measurement. Without sufficient transparency, it is difficult for USPS and its customers to identify and address delivery problems, and for Congress, the Postal Rate Commission, and others to hold management accountable for results and conduct independent oversight. Progress to improve delivery performance information has been slow and inadequate despite numerous USPS and mailer efforts. Some impediments to progress include USPS's lack of continued management commitment and follow through on recommendations made by joint USPS/mailer committees, as well as technology limitations, data quality deficiencies, limited mailer participation in providing needed performance data, and costs. Although USPS has initiatives to improve service and better track mail through its mail processing system, USPS has no current plans to implement and report on additional representative measures of delivery performance. USPS's leadership and effective collaboration with mailers is critical to implementing a complete set of delivery performance measures. |
gao_GAO-09-599 | gao_GAO-09-599_0 | 1). Although both USPS and mailers could benefit from the program, implementing the program will require both parties to make considerable changes to their systems and processes. 2). Service performance measurement capability. Implementation of Intelligent Mail Involves Many Changes for Mailers and USPS
According to USPS, Intelligent Mail is the most complex project it has undertaken. First, USPS’s approach to developing and managing the program has not followed certain key program management practices to reduce risks and mailers have raised questions about whether USPS and mailers will be able to meet schedule and program objectives. Second, USPS has said that Intelligent Mail success is dependent on mailer participation in the Full Service option, but it is uncertain whether pricing and other incentives will encourage mailers to participate to the extent anticipated. If these risks are not addressed, they could limit USPS’s ability to fully achieve the program’s benefits. USPS also lacks program cost information associated with Intelligent Mail, including a baseline and mechanism to track and measure actual savings. USPS has developed a process to identify and address technical risks related to, for example, integrating the Intelligent Mail system with existing USPS systems, but it has not developed a more strategic-level risk mitigation plan that discusses how it will address the key risk areas that could impact the program as a whole, such as lower- than-anticipated mailer participation, resource limitations or schedule delays. Financial Incentives May Not Be Sufficient to Encourage Mailers to Participate in Full Service
Another risk to the success of the Intelligent Mail program is that mailers may not choose to participate in Intelligent Mail. Recommendations for Executive Action
To help ensure that USPS addresses these risks to the successful implementation of Intelligent Mail, we recommend that the Postmaster General take the following three actions: (1) develop a comprehensive Intelligent Mail strategic plan that defines all planned phases and their associated functions and systems and includes program goals and measures of success; (2) develop cost and savings information for the activities that can be attributed to the Intelligent Mail program, including the baseline and metrics to be used to track cost savings achieved; and (3) develop a plan that addresses how USPS will mitigate program-level risks, including the implications of lower-than-anticipated customer adoption of the Full Service Intelligent Mail option, resource limitations, and schedule delays. However, USPS also acknowledges that the risk associated with low mailer adoption is a valid program-level concern. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
This report addresses (1) what the Intelligent Mail program is and the status of the U.S. Postal Service’s (USPS) implementation efforts and (2) the key risks to implementing Intelligent Mail and how USPS has addressed them. Appendix II: Significant Dates in the Intelligent Mail Program, 2001 to 2011
A report issued by the Mailing Industry Task Force, led by chief executives from 11 industry-leading
companies and the Deputy Postmaster General of USPS, recommended Intelligent Mail as a way to respond to customer’s needs USPS established Intelligent Mail and Address Quality organization to identify and shepherd efforts to develop USPS published Intelligent Mail Corporate Plan, which established the vision of the program USPS finalized the format for the Intelligent Mail barcode USPS permitted mailers to begin using the Intelligent Mail barcode on letter mail Postal Accountability and Enhancement Act signed into law, requiring USPS to report on its service USPS announced that Intelligent Mail program will be fully operational for all commercial mailers by 2009 USPS published new specifications for the Intelligent Mail barcode In Federal Register Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, USPS proposed to require mailers that get automation prices to use Intelligent Mail starting January 2009 In Federal Register Proposed Rule, USPS revised standards and proposed that mailers will be eligible to use Intelligent Mail and receive incentives for using Full Service starting May 2009 The USPS Board of Governors approved funding to create an infrastructure that will facilitate Intelligent Mail implementation In Federal Register Final Rule, USPS announced that it will allow POSTNET barcodes until May 2011 and that it will start offering Intelligent Mail Basic and Full Service in May 2009 USPS announced price incentives for Intelligent Mail Full Service USPS will make Intelligent Mail available for mailers to start implementing and testing their systems Price incentives for Full Service mailers will go into effect and USPS plans to add other program functions All mailers who get price incentives for using barcodes will be required to use Intelligent Mail barcodes Pub. | Why GAO Did This Study
Over 80 percent of the approximately 200 billion mail pieces processed and delivered by the U.S. Postal Service (USPS) last year was sent by commercial mailers that barcode, sort, or transport mail to get lower postage rates. Starting in May 2009, USPS will encourage these mailers to use new barcodes that have increased capabilities as part of Intelligent Mail, a new program. According to USPS, Intelligent Mail is the most complex change it has ever undertaken. GAO was asked to describe (1) the Intelligent Mail program and the status of implementation efforts and (2) the key risks to implementing Intelligent Mail and how USPS is addressing these risks. GAO reviewed USPS and regulatory documents, public comments, and interviewed USPS officials, mailers, and mailer representatives involved in developing this program.
What GAO Found
The Intelligent Mail program is a USPS effort to encourage commercial mailers to use standardized barcodes that will improve the ability to track mail. The program is centered on a new barcode that can uniquely identify a mail piece. While Intelligent Mail could provide benefits to both mailers and USPS, it will also require both to make significant changes to their processes and information systems. USPS expects to be prepared to begin implementation in May 2009. After that, USPS will phase in price incentives and other functions in November 2009 and will require mailers to use the new barcode by May 2011 to qualify for lower postage rates. Successful implementation of Intelligent Mail faces two key risks--(1) USPS's management approach and (2) mailers may not choose to participate in the program--which if not addressed, could limit achieving Intelligent Mail benefits. USPS has taken some steps to address these risks, such as a phased approach. However, USPS has not followed some key program management practices to reduce risks, raising questions about whether USPS and mailers will be able to meet schedule and program objectives. For example, USPS (1) lacks a comprehensive strategy, including all planned phases and the specific functions and systems to be implemented in each phase; goals and measures of success; and a risk mitigation plan to address the risks that could impact the Intelligent Mail program as a whole; and (2) lacks information on costs and savings attributable to the Intelligent Mail program, including a baseline and mechanism to track and measure actual savings, which are needed to measure program performance. The second risk is that program success is dependent on mailer participation, and it is uncertain whether pricing and other incentives will encourage mailers to participate to the extent anticipated. Some mailers have said they find the pricing incentives insufficient to recover their investment in the program. The Postal Regulatory Commission has also noted that uncertainty may lead mailers to delay adoption. Low mailer adoption could affect USPS's ability to report representative delivery service results, as required to comply with service performance reporting requirements, but USPS has not said how it would address this risk. |
gao_HEHS-98-69 | gao_HEHS-98-69_0 | Lessons learned from the experience of large purchasers may be applicable to the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA), the nation’s single largest payer for health care. Need to Monitor Quality of Care
With increased use of managed care, public and private purchasers must consider strategies to monitor plans and ensure the quality of the care they provide. Specifically, we agreed to describe (1) how large purchasers use quality-related data to seek or promote better quality of care and (2) lessons that can be learned from their experiences for HCFA in administering the Medicare program. After applying financial penalties, one purchaser said it achieved improvements in employee satisfaction. They use the data to select plans, monitor changes in performance over time, and establish benchmarks and minimum standards. As a result, HCFA will now begin to look more like purchasers that enroll most of their employees in managed care and those that provide comparative information on health plans to their employees as well as use quality-related data to prompt health plans to improve their performance. The experiences of purchasers we visited have implications for HCFA in three ways: (1) educating beneficiaries as to the meaning of quality-related measures when providing comparative information on health plan quality; (2) interacting with health plans to take action, either through a collaborative- or a compliance-oriented approach, when problems with health plan performance are surfaced by quality-related data; and (3) continually looking for additional opportunities to make use of quality-related data. The structure of the Medicare program, unlike private sector care, is determined by law and regulation. — Ensure provider choice and access. — Improve health plan quality and service. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO determined how large purchasers use quality-related data to seek or promote better quality of care and lessons that can be learned from their experiences for the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA).
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) after collecting and making use of quality-related data, the purchasers GAO studied reported that in addition to cost savings, they saw improvements in access to care and health plan services, as well as in employee satisfaction with health plan performance; (2) they realized such improvement by identifying opportunities to use quality-related data in selecting health plans, monitoring health plan performance, developing quality improvement initiatives with plans and taking other actions, and providing information on health plans to their employees; (3) while HCFA is a unique purchaser of managed care--by virtue of the size of the Medicare program and the freedom of choice provided to beneficiaries--a number of private purchasers' quality of care strategies could be relevant to HCFA's administration of the Medicare program; and (4) major lessons from large purchasers' experiences relate to the importance of: (a) educating employees as to the meaning of quality-related measures when providing comparative information on health plan quality; (b) using collaborative- and compliance-oriented approaches to achieve improvements in plan performance; and (c) continually looking for additional opportunities to make use of quality-related data, such as developing standards and benchmarks for plan performance. |
gao_HEHS-98-52 | gao_HEHS-98-52_0 | States Made Larger DSH Payments to State Psychiatric Hospitals Than to Other Hospitals
Medicaid DSH payments in 1996 to state psychiatric hospitals in the six states were generally far larger than those to other types of hospitals. The Balanced Budget Act of 1997 should reduce the DSH payments to state psychiatric hospitals from 1996 levels in some of our study states, because it limits the proportion of a state’s DSH spending that may be paid to state psychiatric hospitals. Four of the six states in our study made DSH payments to state psychiatric hospitals that were larger on average than payments to any other type of hospital. In Michigan and Texas, payments to state psychiatric hospitals were on average less than to other state-owned hospitals. To determine whether the large DSH payments were a function of hospital size, we compared the average DSH payment per bed day for each type of hospital in the six study states. For five states, this ratio was greater for state psychiatric hospitals—and for other state-owned hospitals in one state—than for other types of hospitals, indicating that the difference in average DSH payments between groups does not result from differing hospital size. For example, Kansas state psychiatric hospitals received more than $150 in DSH for each bed day, while private hospitals received about $5, and average DSH payments per bed day to other state-owned hospitals and local public hospitals were about $19 and $11, respectively. States Paid State Psychiatric Hospitals and Other State-Owned Hospitals a Higher Proportion of Maximum Allowable DSH Payments
State psychiatric hospitals generally received DSH payments at or near the maximum allowed by Medicaid rules, while other hospitals often received payments that were well below their maximums. Local public hospitals and private hospitals generally received DSH payments at rates that were a smaller proportion of the maximum allowable. In some cases, the proportions were much smaller, as for local public hospitals in Kansas, which received only 8 percent of the maximum the state could have paid them. In addition, officials from North Carolina told us that local public hospitals returned the majority of their DSH payments to the state. Conclusions
In state fiscal year 1996, state psychiatric hospitals in the six states we reviewed received between 20 and 89 percent of total Medicaid DSH payments, even though state psychiatric hospitals represented a much smaller portion of the number of hospitals in the states and even though state psychiatric hospitals often had lower Medicaid utilization rates than other hospitals. In each of the six states, payments to state psychiatric hospitals covered more than 90 percent of the maximum allowable payment to state psychiatric hospitals. They pointed out that although DSH payments to IMDs enable the states to obtain federal matching funds to indirectly cover the costs of services provided to patients in IMDs that Medicaid cannot pay for directly, this is within the rules of the Medicaid program. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed Medicaid disproportionate share hospital (DSH) program payments to state psychiatric institutions, focusing on: (1) how the amount of DSH payments to state psychiatric hospitals compares with DSH payments made to other types of hospitals; (2) how the proportion of Medicaid beneficiaries in state psychiatric hospitals compares with the proportion in other state hospitals; and (3) what proportion of the maximum allowable DSH payment states paid state psychiatric hospitals compared with the proportion of the maximum allowable paid to other types of hospitals.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) Medicaid DSH payments to state psychiatric hospitals were far larger on average than payments made to other types of local public and private hospitals in states GAO contacted, enabling the states to obtain federal matching funds to indirectly cover costs of services provided to patients in institutions for mental diseases (IMD) that Medicaid cannot pay for directly; (2) overall, DSH payments to state psychiatric hospitals averaged about $29 million per hospital compared with $1.75 million for private hospitals; (3) in four of the six states, the average DSH payments to state psychiatric hospitals were also much larger than those to other state-owned hospitals; (4) in the two other states, DSH payments to the other state-owned hospitals were larger than payments to state psychiatric hospitals; (5) in all but one state, the average DSH payment per bed day was also much higher for state psychiatric hospitals than for other types of hospitals, indicating that the large DSH payments were not simply a function of hospital size; (6) the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 limits the proportion of a state's DSH payment that can be paid to IMDs, which should reduce such payments to state psychiatric hospitals in at least some cases; (7) state psychiatric hospitals receiving DSH payments in five of the six states GAO reviewed often served smaller proportions of Medicaid patients than other state-owned, local public, and private hospitals; (8) for example, the 1996 average Medicaid utilization rate at Texas state psychiatric hospitals was about 3 percent, while the average rate at other types of hospitals was much higher, up to 37 percent at local public hospitals; (9) however, in one state, the state psychiatric hospital served a higher proportion of Medicaid patients than other hospitals receiving DSH payments; (10) the states in GAO's review allocated DSH funds to state psychiatric hospitals at or near the maximum allowed by Medicaid rules and made DSH payments to other hospitals that were far below their limits; (11) each of the six states made 1996 DSH payments to its state psychiatric hospitals at more than 90 percent of the maximum allowable amount, and four of the six states paid these hospitals the maximum allowed; (12) other types of hospitals often received much less; and (13) for example, local public hospitals in Kansas as well as private hospitals in Michigan and North Carolina all received, on average, less than 10 percent of their allowed maximum. |
gao_GAO-08-1140T | gao_GAO-08-1140T_0 | The Employment and Training Administration (ETA) oversees the High Growth, Community Based, and WIRED grant initiatives. Grants Are Intended to Change the Workforce System, but Labor Will Be Challenged to Evaluate Their Impact
According to Labor officials, the grant initiatives are designed to change the focus of the public workforce system to emphasize the employment and training needs of high-growth, high-demand industries, but Labor will be challenged in assessing their impact. We recommended that Labor take steps to ensure that it could, but its response to our recommendation suggests that conditions remain much as they were when we did our audit work. From 2001 through 2007, Labor awarded 349 grants totaling almost $900 million for these initiatives (see table 1). However, the strategic plan includes performance goals only for the Community Based initiative. High Growth and WIRED—the two initiatives where Labor spent the most money⎯are mentioned in the strategic plan, but not specifically linked to a performance goal; therefore, it is unclear what criteria Labor will use to evaluate their effectiveness. In addition, it may lack data that will allow it to compare outcomes for individuals served by grant-funded programs with those served by employment and training programs offered through the one-stop system. The Initial Noncompetitive Process Was Not Adequately Documented and Did Not Include Key Players
While Labor now awards grants under all three grant initiatives competitively, initially almost all High Growth grants were awarded without competition. In response to recommendations we made in our May 2008 report, Labor said it had modified its noncompetitive process so it now includes documentation of statutory program requirements. We have not evaluated the sufficiency of the modified forms for ensuring statutory compliance. Another issue with the process was that meetings Labor held to identify workforce solutions did not include most of the state and local workforce investment boards. All Three Types of Grants Are Now Awarded Competitively, but the Vast Majority of High Growth Grants Were Awarded Without Competition
The Community Based and the WIRED grants have always been awarded through a competitive process but, until 2005, Labor did not award High Growth grants competitively even though federal law and Labor’s internal procedures recommend competition. Labor Did Not Document the Criteria for Selecting Noncompetitive High Growth Grants or Whether They Met Labor’s Internal Requirements or Requirements of the Law
Because the initial High Growth process was noncompetitive, documenting the decision steps was all the more important to ensure transparency. Labor Uses a Risk- Based Monitoring Approach for High Growth and Community Based Grants and Has Documented Steps for Monitoring WIRED Grants
For all three grant initiatives, Labor has a process to resolve findings found in single audits, collects quarterly performance information, and provides technical assistance as a part of monitoring. When we conducted our audit work, there was no risk-based monitoring approach for WIRED. In response to our recommendation, Labor has documented steps it has taken to put a monitoring approach in place for WIRED grants. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since 2001, Labor has spent nearly $900 million on the High Growth Job Training Initiative (High Growth), Community-Based Job Training Initiative (Community Based), and the Workforce Innovation in Regional Economic Development (WIRED). This testimony addresses 1) the intent of the grant initiatives and the extent to which Labor will be able to assess their effects; (2) the extent to which the process used competition, was adequately documented, and included key players; and (3) what Labor is doing to monitor individual grantee compliance with grant requirements. This testimony is based on GAO's May 2008 report (GAO-08-486) and additional information provided by the agency in response to the report's recommendations. For that report, GAO reviewed Labor's strategic plan, documents related to evaluations of the initiatives, internal procedures for awarding grants, relevant laws, and monitoring procedures, and conducted interviews.
What GAO Found
According to Labor officials, the grant initiatives were designed to shift the focus of the public workforce system toward the training and employment needs of high-growth, in-demand industries, but Labor will be challenged to assess their impact. Under the initiatives, Labor awarded 349 grants totaling almost $900 million to foster this change. However, the grant initiatives were not fully integrated into Labor's strategic plan or overall research agenda, so it is unclear what criteria Labor will use to evaluate their effectiveness. Labor lacks data that will allow it to compare outcomes for grant-funded services with those of other federally funded employment and training services. GAO recommended that Labor take steps to ensure that it could evaluate the initiatives' impact, but its response to our recommendation suggests that conditions remain much as they were when GAO did its audit work. While grants under all three initiatives are now awarded competitively, the initial noncompetitive process for High Growth grants was not adequately documented. Community Based and WIRED grants have always been awarded competitively, but more than 80 percent of High Growth grants were awarded without competition. Labor could not document criteria used to select the noncompetitive High Growth grants or whether these grants met internal or statutory requirements. In response to the report recommendation, Labor modified review forms used in its noncompetitive process to include documentation of statutory requirements; however, GAO has not evaluated the sufficiency of these changes. Another issue related to the process was that meetings Labor held to identify solutions for industry workforce challenges did not include the vast majority of local workforce investment boards. Labor provides some monitoring for grantees under all three initiatives and uses a risk-based monitoring approach for the High Growth and Community Based grants. However, when GAO conducted its audit work there was no risk-based monitoring approach for WIRED, and therefore recommended that Labor establish one. In response to the report recommendation, Labor documented steps it has taken to put a monitoring approach in place for WIRED grants. GAO has not reviewed the sufficiency of these steps. |
gao_GAO-14-314 | gao_GAO-14-314_0 | At that time, we recommended that DOD develop an EPAA life-cycle cost estimate which would allow the department to assess whether its plans were affordable. DOD Met EPAA Phase One Deployment Time Frame, but Its Warfighter Acceptance Process Does Not Fully Identify and Plan to Resolve Implementation Issues
DOD met the presidentially announced time frame to deploy EPAA Phase One capabilities to Europe when DOD positioned EPAA elements in the region, and MDA declared EPAA Phase One architecture to be technically capable in December 2011. However, DOD experienced implementation issues deploying BMD capabilities in Europe, such as incomplete construction of infrastructure, including housing and dining facilities, for soldiers arriving at the EPAA forward- based radar site and incomplete implementing arrangements defining how DOD would operate with allies when certain BMD elements arrived in the host country. Without taking steps to resolve implementation issues prior to deployment, DOD risks encountering similar challenges as it deploys additional BMD capabilities to Europe. The criteria used during the warfighter acceptance process focuses primarily on areas such as effectiveness, suitability, and interoperability. DOD’s Warfighter Acceptance Process Did Not Fully Identify and Resolve Warfighter Implementation Issues before Deploying BMD Elements
As discussed above, DOD used its warfighter acceptance process to assess BMD elements dedicated to Phase One of EPAA. However, though the goal of the warfighter acceptance process is, in essence, to ensure that capabilities can be used as intended when they are delivered, this process did not explicitly require the combatant commands, the services, and MDA to comprehensively identify and develop plans for resolving various implementation issues prior to deploying these and other supporting elements to Europe. As a result, DOD will likely continue to face implementation issues unless a more holistic, integrated view is taken to identify and plan to resolve these issues before BMD capabilities are deployed in Europe, which may result in less-efficient BMD operations. DOD Lacks a Complete Understanding of the Long-Term Operating and Support Costs for BMD Elements in Europe
DOD has estimated the long-term operating and support costs for some, but not all, BMD elements in Europe. Initial estimates indicate that these costs could total several billion dollars over the elements’ lifetime, but these estimates do not provide a complete picture of the likely costs. DOD Has Not Developed a Comprehensive Joint Estimate of Operating and Support Costs for Aegis Ashore
MDA and the Navy have not developed a comprehensive, joint estimate of the operating and support costs for the two European Aegis Ashore sites over their expected 25-year life span, and it is unclear when such an estimate will be completed. Although MDA and the Navy have not developed a comprehensive joint estimate, they have individually begun to identify some costs. Specifically, cost estimates can assist decision makers in budget development and are necessary for evaluating resource requirements at key decision points and effectively allocating resources. In addition, Office of Management and Budget guidance containing principles for capital asset acquisitions emphasizes that government agencies should understand all costs in advance of proposing acquisitions in the budget, and notes that agencies should plan for operations and maintenance of capital assets. To identify resources needed to support its plans for providing BMD capabilities in Europe and to support budget development, direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics to require and set a deadline for the following three actions: completing a business-case analysis for the forward-based radar to support a decision on the long-term support strategy, and updating the joint MDA and Army estimate for long-term operating and support costs after a decision on the support strategy is made; completing a business-case analysis for THAAD to support a decision on the long-term support strategy, and updating the joint MDA and Army long-term operating and support cost estimate after this and other key program decisions, such as where the THAAD batteries are likely to be forward-stationed, are made; and completing a joint MDA and Navy estimate of the long-term operating and support costs for the Aegis Ashore two sites, and updating the estimates after key program decisions are made. In its comments, DOD partially agreed with one recommendation and agreed with three other recommendations. DOD partially agreed with our recommendation that U.S. Strategic Command, in consultation with U.S. European Command and the services, identify and develop a plan to resolve implementation issues prior to deploying and operating future BMD capabilities in Europe. To assess the extent to which DOD has identified and planned to resolve implementation issues before deploying ballistic missile defense (BMD) capabilities to Europe, we reviewed the U.S. Strategic Command document titled Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) Warfighter Capability Acceptance. We spoke to senior-level officials from the Army, Navy, Air Force, U.S. Strategic Command, U.S. European Command, U.S. Army Europe, U.S. Navy Europe, U.S. Air Forces Europe, Joint Staff, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) about their participation in the acceptance process, including the selection of acceptance criteria to assess EPAA Phase One BMD elements, identification and resolution of implementation issues prior to accepting EPAA BMD elements, and any planned adjustments to the existing process. To assess the extent to which DOD has estimated the long-term costs to operate and support BMD elements in Europe, we first reviewed agreements and their annexes between MDA and the Army and between MDA and the Navy regarding how these organizations are to work together to manage the BMD elements, including information on how they are to jointly develop cost estimates. Defense Acquisitions: Status of Ballistic Missile Defense Program in 2004. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since 2002, DOD has spent over $98 billion developing a ballistic missile defense system to protect the United States, U.S. forces, and allies against inbound threat missiles. In December 2011, DOD deployed the initial phase of a revised approach for Europe, with increased capabilities to be deployed in later phases. GAO has reported on potential risks to DOD's implementation caused by the lack of a coordinated management approach and an absence of life-cycle cost estimates. Given DOD's BMD investment and revised approach, GAO was asked to review EPAA's implementation. GAO evaluated the extent to which DOD (1) identified and planned to resolve implementation issues before deploying BMD capabilities to Europe; and (2) estimated the long-term costs to operate and support BMD elements in Europe. GAO reviewed DOD instructions, manuals, and other documents on the acceptance process and the status of operating and support cost estimates that have been developed to-date, and interviewed cognizant officials.
What GAO Found
The Department of Defense (DOD) met the presidentially announced time frame to deploy initial ballistic missile defense (BMD) capabilities in Europe under the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) but did not fully identify and plan to resolve implementation issues before deployment. As a result, DOD experienced implementation issues, such as incomplete construction of housing facilities for soldiers arriving at the EPAA radar site in Turkey and incomplete implementing arrangements defining how to operate with allies when certain BMD elements arrived in the host country. U.S. Strategic Command, in coordination with other combatant commands, developed criteria to assess whether a BMD capability is ready for operational use to ensure that BMD capabilities can be used as intended when they are delivered. However, the assessment criteria used during this process focused on effectiveness, suitability, and interoperability areas—such as whether BMD elements can work together to track ballistic missile threats—and did not explicitly require DOD to comprehensively identify and plan to resolve implementation issues prior to deploying these capabilities. DOD plans to continue to use its existing process to accept BMD capabilities planned for Europe in the future. Without identifying and planning to resolve implementation issues before deployment, DOD risks continuing to encounter implementation issues after it deploys additional BMD capabilities in Europe, which may lead to significant delays and inefficiencies.
DOD has estimated the long-term operating and support cost estimates for some but not all BMD elements in Europe, and existing estimates could change. Specifically, initial estimates indicate these costs could total several billion dollars over the elements' lifetime, but key decisions that have not been made are likely to change these estimates. Also, DOD has not developed a comprehensive estimate for a key element—Aegis Ashore. In prior work developing cost-estimating best practices, GAO concluded that cost estimates can assist decision makers in budget development and are necessary for evaluating resource requirements at key decision points and effectively allocating resources. Office of Management and Budget guidance also emphasizes that agencies should plan for operations and maintenance of capital assets. In 2012, the Army and the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) estimated the lifetime operating and support costs for two BMD elements, a forward-based radar and terminal high-altitude air defense batteries. However, DOD has not completed business-case analyses for them, which would underpin a decision on long-term support strategies, and has not decided where to station the terminal-defense battery. In addition, MDA and the Navy have separately begun to identify some costs but have not developed a comprehensive joint estimate of lifetime operating and support costs for the two planned Aegis Ashore sites. Although MDA and the services agreed to jointly develop estimates of lifetime operating and support costs, there is no explicit requirement to complete business-case analyses to support a decision on long-term product support, and jointly develop cost estimates, before deploying BMD elements in Europe. However, without completed business-case analyses and up-to-date operating and support cost estimates, DOD and decision makers are limited in their ability to develop sound budgets and identify the resources needed over the long term to operate and support BMD elements in Europe.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOD identify and plan to resolve implementation issues prior to deploying and operating BMD elements and require and set a deadline for completing business-case analyses and joint cost estimates for all BMD elements in Europe. DOD agreed with three recommendations and partially agreed with one, expressing concern about the proper entities for resolving implementation issues. GAO believes that the recommendation can be implemented through collaboration as discussed further in this report. |
gao_GAO-07-985T | gao_GAO-07-985T_0 | We have testified that such SES and senior-level employee performance-based pay systems serve as an important step for agencies in creating alignment or “line of sight” between executives’ performance and organizational results. VA’s SES Performance Appraisal Process
VA requires that each SES member have an executive performance plan or contract in place for the appraisal year. According to VA’s policy, the plan must reflect measures that balance organizational results with customer satisfaction, employee perspectives, and other appropriate measures. VA uses four PRBs to review and prepare recommendations on SES member ratings, awards, and pay adjustments: Veterans Affairs, Veterans Health Administration, Veterans Benefits Administration, and Office of Inspector General. The Secretary appoints members of three of the four PRBs on an annual basis; members of the Office of Inspector General PRB are appointed by the VA Inspector General. According to a VA official in the Office of Human Resources and Administration, appointments are made on basis of the position held, and consideration is given to those positions where the holder would have knowledge about the broadest group of executives. VA’s PRBs vary in size, composition, and number of SES members considered for bonuses. Under VA’s policy, each PRB develops its own operating procedures for reviewing ratings and preparing recommendations. While federal law and OPM regulations permit career SES members rated fully successful or higher to be awarded bonuses, VA’s policy calls for bonuses to generally be awarded to only those rated outstanding or excellent and who have demonstrated significant individual and organizational achievements during the appraisal period. In 2005, according to OPM’s Report on Senior Executive Pay for Performance for Fiscal Year 2005, the most recent report available, VA awarded higher average bonuses to its career SES than any other cabinet- level department. OPM data show that six other cabinet-level departments awarded bonuses to a higher percentage of their career SES members. OPM’s and OMB’s Roles in the VA Certification Process
Both OPM and OMB play a role in the review of agency’s senior performance appraisal systems and have jointly developed certification criteria. Specifically, to qualify for the use of SES pay flexibilities, OPM and OMB evaluate agencies’ senior performance appraisal systems against nine certification criteria. VA received provisional certification for each of the years 2004 through 2006. In 2006, the letter from OPM to VA discussing its decision to grant the VA provisional certification rather than full certification, OPM stated that while the VA “system met certification criteria, clear alignment and measurable results must be evident in all plans across the entire agency.” In addition, OPM said that it expected to see “well over 50 percent of an executive’s performance plan focused on business results” and that VA “needs to ensure its 2007 executive performance plans weight business results appropriately.” VA officials told us that the 2007 submission is in draft and they expect to submit it to OPM by the June 30, 2007, deadline. Our preliminary review of VA’s requirements for performance plans contained in its 2006 submission and 2007 draft submission show that VA made changes to the policy requirements for its performance plans to reflect a greater emphasis on measurable results. VA has achieved provisional certification of its SES performance management system for 2004 through 2006. | Why GAO Did This Study
Key practices of effective performance management for the Senior Executive Service (SES) include the linkage or "line of sight" between individual performance and organizational success, the importance of linking pay to individual and organizational performance, and the need to make meaningful distinctions in performance. GAO identified certain principles for executive pay plans that should be considered to attract and retain the quality and quantity of executive leadership necessary to address 21st century challenges, including that they be sensitive to hiring and retention trends; reflect knowledge, skills, and contributions; and be competitive. This testimony focuses on the Department of Veterans Affairs' (VA) process for awarding bonuses to SES members, the amount and percentage of bonuses awarded for fiscal years 2004 through 2006 based on data reported by VA, and the Office of Personnel Management's (OPM) and the Office of Management and Budget's (OMB) roles in certifying federal agencies SES performance appraisal systems. GAO analyzed VA's policies and procedures for awarding bonuses and data provided by VA on the amount and percentages of bonuses and interviewed knowledgeable VA officials. Information on OPM's and OMB's certification process was based on our 2007 report on OPM's capacity to lead and implement reform
What GAO Found
VA requires that each senior executive have an executive performance plan or contract in place for the appraisal year that reflects measures that balance organization results with customer satisfaction, employee perspectives, and other appropriate measures. VA uses four performance review boards (PRB) to review and make recommendations on SES ratings, awards, and pay adjustments based on these performance plans. VA's Secretary appoints members of three of the four boards on the basis of the position held within the agency, and consideration is given to those positions where the holder would have knowledge about the broadest group of executives. Members of the fourth board are appointed by VA's Inspector General. VA's PRBs vary in size, composition, and number of SES members considered for bonuses, and each PRB, within the scope of VA's policies, develops its own procedures and criteria for making bonus recommendations. According to VA policy, bonuses are generally awarded only to those rated outstanding or excellent and who have demonstrated significant individual and organizational achievements during the appraisal period. According to data reported by OPM, in fiscal year 2005, VA awarded higher bonus amounts to its career SES than any other cabinet-level department; however, according to OPM's data, six other cabinet-level departments awarded bonuses to a higher percentage of their career SES. OPM and OMB evaluate agencies' SES performance appraisal systems against nine certification criteria jointly developed by the two agencies and determine that agencies merit full, provisional, or no certification. VA has been granted provisional certification in each of the years 2004 through 2006. Our review of VA's requirements for SES performance plans as represented in both its 2006 submission and 2007 draft submission to OPM show that VA made changes to the requirements for its performance plans to reflect greater emphasis on measurable results. |
gao_GAO-13-358 | gao_GAO-13-358_0 | DOD Paid a Higher Average Direct Purchase Price Than VA across the Entire Sample but Paid Less Than VA for Brand- Name Drugs
DOD paid a higher average unit price than VA across the entire sample of 83 drugs and for the subset of generic drugs, but paid a lower average price than VA for the subset of brand-name drugs. Specifically, DOD’s average unit price for the entire sample was 31.8 percent higher than VA’s average price, and DOD’s average unit price for the subset of 40 generic drugs was 66.6 percent higher than VA’s average price. However, VA’s average unit price for the subset of 43 brand-name drugs was 136.9 percent higher than DOD’s average price. 1.) These results were consistent with each agency obtaining better prices on the type of drugs that made up the majority of its utilization: generic drugs accounted for the majority (83 percent) of VA’s utilization of drugs in the sample for the first quarter of 2012, and brand-name drugs accounted for the majority (54 percent) of DOD’s utilization of the sample drugs during the same period. DOD officials told us that in certain circumstances they are able to obtain competitive prices for brand-name drugs—even below the prices for generic equivalents—and therefore will often preferentially purchase brand-name drugs. Specifically, DOD paid a higher price for 32 of the 40 generic drugs in our sample, while VA paid a higher average price for the remaining 8 generic drugs. Concluding Observations
DOD and VA face continued challenges in controlling drug costs. Our findings suggest that there may be opportunities for savings with directly purchased drugs. DOD and VA paid different prices for the drugs in our sample; for 11 of the 83 drugs, one agency paid at least 100 percent more than the other agency. While the prescription drug market is complex and there are many factors affecting the prices DOD and VA are able to obtain for directly purchased drugs, differences in prices paid for specific drugs may provide insights into opportunities for each agency to obtain additional savings on at least some of the drugs they purchase. DOD generally agreed with our methodology and findings. DOD also described additional factors beyond those mentioned in our findings that may contribute to differences in prices paid by DOD and VA.
VA expressed concerns with the content of the report and suggested additional analyses. While we agree that such analyses could be useful, the scope of our work was targeted to a comparison of prices paid by each agency for a sample of high-utilization and high-expenditure drugs and was not intended to capture all factors that can affect pharmaceutical spending. Further, our report acknowledges the limitations involved with estimating potential cost savings in this complex area. Nonetheless, we maintain that comparing unit prices paid for selected generic and brand-name drugs by different federal agencies has value in identifying specific drugs with price differences that may warrant further consideration for potential savings. DOD and VA also provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. We obtained prime vendor data for the first calendar quarter of 2012 for drugs dispensed to DOD and VA beneficiaries through the agencies’ own medical facilities and mail order pharmacies. After accounting for drugs that were in both the high-expenditure group and the high-utilization group, the final sample contained 43 brand-name drugs and 40 generic drugs and accounted for 37.0 percent of DOD utilization, 31.7 percent of DOD expenditures, 27.7 percent of VA utilization, and 34.8 percent of VA expenditures for directly purchased prescription drugs in the first calendar quarter of 2012. After selecting the sample, we calculated average unit prices paid by DOD and VA for all individual drugs by dividing total expenditures by total utilization for each drug. In order to maintain the confidentiality of drug prices, in each case we converted from absolute prices to relative prices by assigning 100.0 to the lowest price and determining the higher price as a percentage above the lowest price. We compared the average unit prices obtained by DOD and VA for each drug to the Federal Supply Schedule (FSS) and Big Four prices available to these agencies. We interviewed DOD and VA officials about drug purchasing approaches they use and factors affecting the prices they are able to obtain. Appendix II: Relative Prices Paid by DOD and VA for the 83 Drugs in the Direct Purchase Sample
Figure 3 shows the 55 drugs (out of 83 drugs in our sample) for which the Department of Defense (DOD) paid a higher average unit price than the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) and the percentage by which the DOD price exceeded the VA price. Prescription Drugs: Overview of Approaches to Control Prescription Drug Spending in Federal Programs. Private Payers and Federal Programs. | Why GAO Did This Study
In fiscal year 2012, DOD and VA spent a combined $11.8 billion to purchase drugs on behalf of about 18.5 million beneficiaries. Both agencies purchase drugs directly from manufacturers via prime vendors--intermediaries that provide the drugs at a discount off the lowest price that would otherwise be available. The agencies dispense these drugs to beneficiaries through their medical facilities and pharmacies, including their mail order pharmacies.
GAO was asked to compare prices paid for prescription drugs across federal programs. This report describes direct purchase prices paid by DOD and VA for a sample of prescription drugs. GAO will compare drug prices paid using other approaches and by other federal programs in future work. Using prime vendor data provided by these agencies for the first quarter of 2012, GAO selected a sample of high-utilization and high-expenditure drugs important to both DOD and VA and compared average unit prices paid by these agencies for those drugs. The sample contained 43 brand-name and 40 generic drugs and accounted for 37 percent of DOD utilization, 32 percent of DOD expenditures, 28 percent of VA utilization, and 35 percent of VA expenditures for directly purchased drugs in that quarter. GAO calculated average unit prices by dividing total expenditures by total utilization for each drug, the entire sample, and the subsets of brand-name and generic drugs. GAO also compared DOD and VA average unit prices to the FSS and Big Four prices for each drug. GAO interviewed DOD and VA officials about their drug purchasing approaches and factors affecting the prices they are able to obtain.
What GAO Found
When GAO compared prices paid by the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) for a sample of 83 drugs purchased in the first calendar quarter of 2012, DOD's average unit price for the entire sample was 31.8 percent ($0.11 per unit) higher than VA's average price, and DOD's average unit price for the subset of 40 generic drugs was 66.6 percent ($0.04 per unit) higher than VA's average price. However, VA's average unit price for the subset of 43 brand-name drugs was 136.9 percent ($1.01 per unit) higher than DOD's average price. These results were consistent with each agency obtaining better prices on the type of drugs that made up the majority of its utilization: generic drugs accounted for 83 percent of VA's utilization of the sample drugs and brand-name drugs accounted for 54 percent of DOD's utilization of the sample drugs. DOD officials told GAO that in certain circumstances they are able to obtain competitive prices for brand-name drugs--even below the prices for generic equivalents--and therefore will often preferentially purchase brand-name drugs.
At the individual drug level, DOD paid higher average unit prices than VA for 32 of the 40 generic drugs and for 23 of the 43 brand-name drugs in the sample, while VA paid higher average unit prices for the remaining 8 generic drugs and 20 brand-name drugs. In nearly every case, substantially higher prices paid by one agency were correlated with substantially lower utilization by that agency. Specifically, for 10 of the 11 drugs for which one agency paid more than 100 percent above the price paid by the other agency, the agency that paid a substantially higher price also had substantially lower utilization. However, even when one agency paid a substantially higher price than the other, in all 11 cases both agencies paid less than the highest of the Federal Supply Schedule (FSS) prices available to all direct federal purchasers or the Big Four prices available to the four largest government purchasers. Additionally, in most cases (9 out of 11 drugs) both agencies paid less than the lowest of these prices. The lower prices obtained by one agency may be due to factors such as differences in the agencies' formulary design and prescription practices, price and rebate negotiations with manufacturers that may not be available more broadly to the other agency, and differences in utilization practices between the agencies based on differences in their beneficiary populations.
DOD and VA face continued challenges in controlling drug costs. While the prescription drug market is complex and there are many factors affecting the prices DOD and VA are able to obtain for directly purchased drugs, differences in prices paid for specific drugs may provide insights into opportunities for each agency to obtain additional savings on at least some of the drugs they purchase.
In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD generally agreed with GAO's findings and described additional factors that may contribute to differences in prices paid by DOD and VA. VA expressed concerns with the content of the report. VA suggested additional analyses and highlighted the impact of program design on each agency's use of prescription drugs. GAO maintains that its analyses have value in identifying opportunities for savings and the report acknowledges the limitations involved with estimating potential cost savings in this complex area. DOD and VA also provided technical comments that GAO incorporated as appropriate. |
gao_GAO-02-45 | gao_GAO-02-45_0 | HUD Has Made Progress Toward Improving Accountability and Control of Its Programs, but Weaknesses Persist
Increasing accountability in HUD’s programs was a primary goal of the 2020 Management Reform Plan, but the goal has not yet been fully met. HUD’s numerous actions to improve accountability included developing a strategic planning process, enhancing its monitoring ability, improving information and financial management systems, improving contracting procedures, and creating new centralized entities, specifically an enforcement authority. Staffing and Training- Related Problems Remain At HUD
Although HUD’s actions were intended to improve overall operations, HUD continues to face problems associated with its efforts to refocus and retrain its staff. These challenges cut across HUD’s programs and its efforts to consolidate and streamline its operations, improve accountability and control of its programs, and refocus and retrain its staff. Successfully addressing these challenges in the areas of human capital, information and financial management systems, and acquisition management will determine whether HUD can sustain the progress of its management reform efforts and make progress toward its goal of becoming a high-performing organization. HUD would also continue downsizing by consolidating and streamlining operations. Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of Housing and Urban Development (GAO-01-248, Jan. 2001). | Why GAO Did This Study
In 1997, the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) began a management reform effort, called the 2020 Management Reform Plan, to resolve its management and operational problems.
What GAO Found
GAO found that HUD has had some successes in implementing the management reforms, but challenges remain. Some initiatives, such as consolidating and streamlining operations, were achieved relatively quickly and are producing results. Other efforts, such as improving the efficiency of those operations and improving accountability, have been hampered by inefficient distribution of workload and other problems. HUD has made some progress toward improving accountability and control of its programs. Specifically, HUD developed a strategic planning process; enhanced monitoring tools; improved some aspects of its information and financial management systems; improved contracting procedures; and established centralized entities, such as an enforcement authority, to follow up on problem properties. HUD's efforts to refocus and retrain its staff have been somewhat successful. HUD faces several challenges in its efforts to consolidate and streamline its operations, improve accountability and control of its programs, and refocus and retrain its staff. Successfully addressing these challenges in the areas of human capital, information and financial management systems, and acquisition management will determine whether HUD can sustain the progress of its management reform efforts and become a high-performing organization. |
gao_GAO-08-672 | gao_GAO-08-672_0 | The Maritime Security Working Group, working on behalf of the Maritime Security Policy Coordination Committee, is currently responsible for monitoring and assessing implementation of actions related to the supporting plans. The National Strategy for Maritime Security and Its Eight Supporting Implementation Plans Address or Partially Address All of the Desirable Characteristics of a National Strategy
Of the six desirable characteristics of an effective national strategy that GAO identified in 2004, the National Strategy for Maritime Security and its eight supporting implementation plans together address four and partially address two. Maritime Security Working Group Reports that the Implementation of Supporting Plans Varies
Documents provided to us by the Maritime Security Working Group indicate that the implementation of the supporting plans varies and the working group reported one plan had been completed, another has reached the assessment phase, a third has reached the execution phase, and the other five plans remain primarily in the planning phase. The working group identified 76 actions across the various supporting plans and has monitored the implementation status of these actions. The working group reported that, as of November 2007, six of these actions were completed and 70 were ongoing. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope and Methodology
Our first objective was to assess the extent to which the National Strategy for Maritime Security and its supporting implementation plans contain the elements identified as desirable characteristics of an effective national strategy. However, we believe it is proper to include the eight supporting plans in our analysis of the National Strategy for Maritime Security because Homeland Security Presidential Directive-13 (HSPD-13) directed that this strategy and its supporting plans be produced together. Our second objective was to determine the reported status of the implementation of these plans. | Why GAO Did This Study
The safety and economic security of the United States depends on the secure use of the world's seaports and waterways. Homeland Security Presidential Directive-13 (HSPD-13, also referred to as National Security Presidential Directive-41) directs the coordination of U.S. maritime security policy through the creation of a National Strategy for Maritime Security and supporting implementation plans. GAO was asked to evaluate this strategy and its eight supporting plans. This report discusses: (1) the extent to which the strategy and its supporting plans contain desirable characteristics of an effective national strategy, and (2) the reported status of the implementation of these plans. To conduct this work, GAO evaluated the National Strategy for Maritime Security and its supporting plans against the desirable characteristics of an effective national strategy that GAO identified in February 2004, reviewed HSPD-13 and supporting plans, and reviewed documents on the status of the plans' implementation.
What GAO Found
Of the six desirable characteristics of an effective national strategy that GAO identified in 2004, the National Strategy for Maritime Security and its eight supporting implementation plans address four and partially address the remaining two. Documents provided by the Maritime Security Working Group--an interagency body responsible for monitoring and assessing the implementation of the maritime strategy--indicate that the implementation status of the eight supporting plans varies. For example, as of November 2007, implementation of one plan had been completed, while another has reached the assessment phase (e.g., lessons learned and best practices), and a third has reached the execution phase (e.g., exercises and operations). The other five plans remain primarily in the planning phase. The working group is monitoring the implementation of 76 actions across the plans, and reported 6 of these are completed and 70 are ongoing. |
gao_GAO-07-578 | gao_GAO-07-578_0 | DOD plans significant investments in airborne ISR systems. For example, between fiscal years 2007 and 2013, DOD plans to invest $28.8 billion in the 20 systems we reviewed. Some ISR Development Programs Have Experienced Problems That Have Led to Cost Growth, Delays, and Additional Investments in Legacy Systems
Nearly all of the 13 airborne ISR programs in development that we reviewed have experienced some cost or schedule growth. Cost and schedule growth in these programs is largely the result of a poor business case or acquisition strategy that failed to capture sufficient knowledge about the product technologies and design before committing to the development and demonstration of a new system. These additional investments, totaling about $900 million, represent opportunity costs that could have been used for other needs within DOD. Development costs alone have increased over 260 percent. Collaboration Slow to Occur on Warrior and Predator
Despite similarities in the Predator and Warrior programs, the Air Force and Army have repeatedly resisted collaboration. Others still choose a stovepiped approach to provide a unique system for the specific military service’s needs. DOD suggests that the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) has been implemented to identify joint warfighting capabilities. This difference emphasizes the need for a single point for ISR investment decisions within OSD. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report examines the Department of Defense (DOD) development and acquisition of airborne intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) systems. The primary focus of this work is to identify practices and policies that lead to successful fielding of weapon systems to the warfighter at the right time and for the right price. Specifically, our objectives were to (1) evaluate various ISR platforms for potential synergies and assess their cost and schedule status and the impact of any increases or delays on legacy systems and (2) evaluate the effectiveness of ISR investment decisions. We selected 20 major airborne ISR programs in technology or systems development, already fielded but undergoing significant upgrade, or operating in the field but due to be replaced by a system in development and one space-based program in technology development. Appendix II: System Descriptions
The Army is planning to develop the Aerial Common Sensor (ACS) as an airborne ISR and target acquisition system and is designing it to provide timely intelligence data on threat forces to the land component commander. As part of this system of systems, the Fire Scout is designed to support air-ground operations and reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition missions. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Defense (DOD) is experiencing a growing demand for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets to provide vital information in support of military operations. Over the next 7 years, DOD plans to invest over $28 billion in existing and new airborne ISR acquisition systems. This represents a marked increase over prior ISR investments. Given the significant investments, GAO was asked to (1) evaluate various ISR platforms for potential synergies and assess their cost and schedule status and the impact of any increases or delays on legacy systems and (2) assess the effectiveness of ISR investment decisions. To assess cost and schedule status, we reviewed programmatic and budget documentation. To evaluate investment decisions, we collected information on system capability, mission, and concept of operation and analyzed the data for similarities.
What GAO Found
DOD plans to invest over $28 billion over the next 7 years to develop, procure, and modernize 20 major airborne intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance systems. Nearly all of the systems in development have experienced cost growth or schedule delays. These problems have delayed the fielding of a warfighting capability and have resulted in program restructuring, cancellation, or unplanned investments in older legacy ISR systems. For example, problems in developing the Aerial Common Sensor affected three legacy programs, increasing their collective budgets by 185 percent, or nearly $900 million. In many cases, GAO found that the newer ISR programs lacked a solid business case or a knowledge-based acquisition strategy before entering the development process. A good business case requires the manager to match the system requirements with mature technologies and a system design that can be built. This requires sufficient knowledge about the system gained through basic system engineering concepts and practices. Although it fights jointly, DOD does not always procure new systems jointly. Instead, each service typically develops and procures systems independently. Opportunities exist for different services to collaborate on the development of similar weapon systems as a means for creating a more efficient and affordable way of providing new capabilities to the warfighter. GAO identified development programs where program managers and services are working together to gain these efficiencies and other programs that have less collaborative efforts and could lead to more costly stovepiped solutions. For example, the Navy and Army have collaborated successfully on the Fire Scout, but in contrast, the Air Force and Army have not been as collaborative on the Predator and Warrior systems, as they each currently plan unique solutions to their similar needs. |
gao_GAO-06-298 | gao_GAO-06-298_0 | Further, in September 2004, the Assistant Secretary of State for Administration sent a memorandum to all State executive directors emphasizing “that it is wrong to authorize premium-class travel on a blanket basis” and “that a separate justification for premium-class travel is required for each trip.” Federal and State travel regulations authorize premium-class accommodation when at least one of the following conditions exists: no space is available in coach-class accommodations, regularly scheduled flights provide only premium-class an employee with a disability or special need requires premium-class security issues or exceptional circumstances, travel lasts in excess of 14 hours without a rest stop, foreign-carrier coach-class air accommodations are inadequate, overall cost savings, such as when a premium-class ticket is less expensive than a coach-class ticket or in consideration of other economic factors, transportation costs are paid in full through agency acceptance of payment from a nonfederal source, or required because of agency mission (e.g., courier). Ineffective Controls over Authorization and Justification of Premium-Class Travel Led to Wasted Taxpayer Dollars
Premium-class travel accounted for almost half of travel expenditures charged to State’s over 260 centrally billed accounts during most of fiscal years 2003 and 2004, including domestic and overseas operations, and this trend continued for fiscal year 2005. As shown in figure 2, premium- class travel represents about 19 percent of the tickets issued, and State’s and other foreign affairs agencies’ spending on premium-class travel represented about 49 percent of the $286 million spent on airfare charged to the centrally billed accounts during the period April 2003 through September 2004. State told us that at some overseas posts travelers purchase airline tickets using Government Travel Requests (GTR) and purchase orders. Specifically, 39 percent of the premium-class airline tickets charged to State’s centrally billed account from April 2003 through September 2004 were not properly authorized. Lack of Oversight and Controls Led to Other Breakdowns
Ineffective oversight and breakdowns in controls also led to problems with State’s other centrally billed travel activities. For example, although federal agencies are entitled to recover payments made to airlines for tickets that they ordered but did not use, State and other foreign affairs agencies paid for about $6 million in airline tickets that were not used and not processed for refund. State was unaware of this problem before our audit because it did not monitor employees’ adherence to travel regulations and did not have a systematic process in place for TMCs to identify and process unused tickets. State also failed to reconcile or dispute over $420,000 of unauthorized and potentially fraudulent charges before paying its account. Instead of disputing these charges with Citibank, State simply deducted the amounts from its credit card bill. Thus, State earned only $700,000 out of a possible $2.8 million in rebates that could have been earned if State disputed unauthorized charges and paid the bill in accordance with the terms of the contract with Citibank. Since these tickets were not used, they resulted in waste and increased costs to taxpayers. Improved management and oversight of the State department’s centrally billed travel program would save taxpayers tens of millions of dollars annually. On the basis of our statistical sample, 67 percent of premium-class travel was not properly authorized, justified, or both. Specifically we evaluated the effectiveness of State’s internal controls over (1) the authorization and justification of premium-class tickets charged to State’s centrally billed travel accounts and (2) monitoring unused tickets, reconciling monthly statements, and maximizing performance rebates. | Why GAO Did This Study
The relative size of the Department of State's (State) travel program and continuing concerns about fraud, waste, and abuse in government travel card programs led to this request to audit State's centrally billed travel accounts. GAO was asked to evaluate the effectiveness of internal controls over (1) the authorization and justification of premium-class tickets charged to the centrally billed account and (2) monitoring of unused tickets, reconciling monthly statements, and maximizing performance rebates.
What GAO Found
Breakdowns in key internal controls, a weak control environment, and ineffective oversight of State's centrally billed travel accounts resulted in taxpayers paying tens of millions of dollars for unauthorized and improper premium-class travel and unused airline tickets. State's over 260 centrally billed accounts are used by State and other foreign affairs agencies to purchase transportation services, such as airline and train tickets. GAO found that between April 2003 and September 2004 State's centrally billed accounts were used to purchase over 32,000 premium-class tickets costing almost $140 million. Premium-class travel--primarily business-class airline tickets--represented about 19 percent of the tickets issued but about 49 percent of the $286 million spent on airline tickets with State's centrally billed account travel cards. GAO determined that this trend continued for fiscal year 2005. GAO found that 67 percent of this premium-class travel was not properly authorized, justified, or both. Because premium-class tickets typically cost substantially more than coach tickets, improper premium-class travel represents a waste of tax dollars. Most of these blanket premium-class travel authorizations were signed by subordinates who told us they couldn't challenge the use of premium-class travel by senior executives. Ineffective oversight and control breakdowns also contributed to problems with monitoring unused tickets, reconciling monthly statements, and maximizing performance rebates. Although federal agencies are authorized to recover payments made to airlines for tickets that they ordered but did not use, State failed to do so and paid for about $6 million for airline tickets that were not used or processed for refund. State was unaware of this problem before our review because it neither monitored travelers' adherence to travel regulations nor systematically identified and processed all unused tickets. State also failed to reconcile or dispute over $420,000 of unauthorized charges before paying its monthly bank invoice and instead deducted the amounts from its bill. Because these amounts were not properly disputed under the contract terms, State underpaid its monthly bills and was thus frequently delinquent. Handling questionable charges in this ad hoc manner sharply reduced State's eligible rebates. Overall, State earned only $700,000 out of a possible $2.8 million in rebates that could have been earned if it had properly disputed unauthorized charges and paid the bill in accordance with the contract. |
gao_GAO-09-829 | gao_GAO-09-829_0 | More than 90 percent of the $29 billion in federal outlays has been provided through the increased Federal Medical Assistance Percentage (FMAP) grant awards and the State Fiscal Stabilization Fund administered by the Department of Education. Together, these nine programs are estimated to account for approximately 87 percent of federal Recovery Act outlays to state and localities in fiscal year 2009. With regard to the states’ receipt of the increased FMAP, all 16 states and the District had drawn down increased FMAP grant awards totaling just over $15.0 billion for the period of October 1, 2008 through June 29, 2009 which amounted to 86 percent of funds available. Most commonly, states reported that they are using or planning to use freed-up funds to cover their increased Medicaid caseload, to maintain current benefits and eligibility levels, and to help finance their respective state budgets. Several states noted that given the poor economic climate in their respective states, these funds were critical in their efforts to maintain Medicaid coverage at current levels. As of June 25, 2009, $15.9 billion of the funds had been obligated for over 5,000 projects nationwide, and $9.2 billion had been obligated for nearly 2,600 projects in the 16 states and the District that are the focus of our review. Almost half of Recovery Act highway obligations have been for pavement improvements. Many state officials told us they selected a large percentage of resurfacing and other pavement improvement projects because they did not require extensive environmental clearances, were quick to design, could be quickly obligated and bid, could employ people quickly, and could be completed within 3 years. Specifically, a March fact sheet, the Secretary’s April letter to Governors, and program guidance issued in April and May mention that the purposes of the SFSF include helping stabilize state and local budgets, avoiding reductions in education and other essential services, and ensuring LEAs and public IHEs have resources to “avert cuts and retain teachers and professors.” The documents also link educational progress to economic recovery and growth and identify four principles to guide the distribution and use of Recovery Act funds: (1) spend funds quickly to retain and create jobs; (2) improve student achievement through school improvement and reform; (3) ensure transparency, public reporting, and accountability; and (4) invest one-time Recovery Act funds thoughtfully to avoid unsustainable continuing commitments after the funding expires, known as the “funding cliff.”
After meeting assurances to maintain state support for education at least at fiscal year 2006 levels, states are required to use the education stabilization fund to restore state support to the greater of fiscal year 2008 or 2009 levels for elementary and secondary education, public IHEs, and, if applicable, early childhood education programs. As of June 30, 2009, of the 16 states and the District of Columbia covered by our review, only Texas had not submitted an SFSF application. Pennsylvania recently submitted an application but had not yet received funding. The remaining 14 states and the District of Columbia had submitted applications and Education had made available to them a total of about $17 billion in initial funding. Officials in one state and one district said that local officials are fearful of missteps with the funds. Single Audit Reporting Will Not Facilitate Timely Reporting of Recovery Program Findings and Risks
The Single Audit reporting deadline is too late to provide audit results in time for the audited entity to take action on deficiencies noted in Recovery Act programs. Efforts to Assess Impact of Recovery Act Spending
Under the Recovery Act, direct recipients of Recovery Act funds, including states and localities, are expected to report quarterly on a number of measures, including the use of funds and an estimate of the number of jobs created and the number of jobs retained. OMB’s June 22, 2009, Guidance Provides More Detail on the Recipient Reporting Process, Clarifies Some Requirements, and Establishes a Central Reporting Framework
In response to requests for more guidance on the recipient reporting process and required data, OMB, after soliciting responses from an array of stakeholders, issued additional implementing guidance for recipient reporting on June 22, 2009. However, we remain concerned that OMB’s planned actions would not achieve the level of accountability needed to effectively respond to Recovery Act risks and does not provide for timely reporting on internal controls for Recovery Act programs. The first of these reports is due on October 10, 2009. We are sending copies of this report to the Office of Management and Budget and the Department of Transportation, as well as sections of the report to officials of the 16 states and the District covered in our review. As a result, our objectives for this report were to assess (1) selected states’ and localities’ uses of and planning for Recovery Act funds, (2) the approaches taken by the selected states and localities to ensure accountability for Recovery Act funds, and (3) states’ plans to evaluate the impact of the Recovery Act funds they have received to date. We spoke with individuals from the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) regarding their oversight and guidance to states, their FMAP grant awards, and funds drawn down by states. | Why GAO Did This Study
This report, the second in response to a mandate under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (Recovery Act), addresses the following objectives: (1) selected states' and localities' uses of Recovery Act funds, (2) the approaches taken by the selected states and localities to ensure accountability for Recovery Act funds, and (3) states' plans to evaluate the impact of the Recovery Act funds they received. GAO's work for this report is focused on 16 states and certain localities in those jurisdictions as well as the District of Columbia--representing about 65 percent of the U.S. population and two-thirds of the intergovernmental federal assistance available. GAO collected documents and interviewed state and local officials. GAO analyzed federal agency guidance and spoke with Office of Management and Budget (OMB) officials and with relevant program officials at the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), and the U.S. Departments of Education, Energy, Housing and Urban Development (HUD), Justice, Labor, and Transportation (DOT).
What GAO Found
Across the United States, as of June 19, 2009, Treasury had outlayed about $29 billion of the estimated $49 billion in Recovery Act funds projected for use in states and localities in fiscal year 2009. More than 90 percent of the $29 billion in federal outlays has been provided through the increased Medicaid Federal Medical Assistance Percentage (FMAP) and the State Fiscal Stabilization Fund (SFSF) administered by the Department of Education. GAO's work focused on nine federal programs that are estimated to account for approximately 87 percent of federal Recovery Act outlays in fiscal year 2009 for programs administered by states and localities. Increased Medicaid FMAP Funding All 16 states and the District have drawn down increased Medicaid FMAP grant awards of just over $15 billion for October 1, 2008, through June 29, 2009, which amounted to almost 86 percent of funds available. Medicaid enrollment increased for most of the selected states and the District, and several states noted that the increased FMAP funds were critical in their efforts to maintain coverage at current levels. States and the District reported they are planning to use the increased federal funds to cover their increased Medicaid caseload and to maintain current benefits and eligibility levels. Due to the increased federal share of Medicaid funding, most state officials also said they would use freed-up state funds to help cope with fiscal stresses. Highway Infrastructure Investment As of June 25, DOT had obligated about $9.2 billion for almost 2,600 highway infrastructure and other eligible projects in the 16 states and the District and had reimbursed about $96.4 million. Across the nation, almost half of the obligations have been for pavement improvement projects because they did not require extensive environmental clearances, were quick to design, obligate and bid on, could employ people quickly, and could be completed within 3 years. State Fiscal Stabilization Fund As of June 30, 2009, of the 16 states and the District, only Texas had not submitted an SFSF application. Pennsylvania recently submitted an application but had not yet received funding. The remaining 14 states and the District had been awarded a total of about $17 billion in initial funding from Education--of which about $4.3 billion has been drawn down. School districts said that they would use SFSF funds to maintain current levels of education funding, particularly for retaining staff and current education programs. They also said that SFSF funds would help offset state budget cuts. Accountability States have implemented various internal control programs; however, federal Single Audit guidance and reporting does not fully address Recovery Act risk. The Single Audit reporting deadline is too late to provide audit results in time for the audited entity to take action on deficiencies noted in Recovery Act programs. Moreover, current guidance does not achieve the level of accountability needed to effectively respond to Recovery Act risks. Finally, state auditors need additional flexibility and funding to undertake the added Single Audit responsibilities under the Recovery Act. Impact Direct recipients of Recovery Act funds, including states and localities, are expected to report quarterly on a number of measures, including the use of funds and estimates of the number of jobs created and the number of jobs retained. The first of these reports is due in October 2009. OMB--in consultation with a broad range of stakeholders--issued additional implementing guidance for recipient reporting on June 22, 2009, that clarifies some requirements and establishes a central reporting framework. |
gao_AIMD-95-226 | gao_AIMD-95-226_0 | Accountability for Financial Management
The Single Audit Act of 1984 provides an important tool for ensuring that states are promoting financial accountability for block grant programs. The single audit assesses the financial integrity and internal control of the entities receiving block grant funds and implementing programs. There is no easy way to resolve this tension; rather, a continuum of trade-offs between federal objectives and state flexibility will be required. Furthermore, this approach is fraught with technical problems and could engender conflict between the federal government and the states. Under a results-oriented approach, federal policymakers would specify national goals and objectives in block grant statutes, enact a process for establishing them, or adopt some combination of the two. This will not be easy. Implications of State Involvement and Spending on Block Grant Accountability
Federal officials need to be aware of existing fiscal and programmatic state and local commitments when designing federal block grant accountability provisions. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on the issues involved in designing accountability provisions for block grants.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) building accountability into the newly proposed block grant approach is an important and difficult task, requiring trade-offs between federal and state control over program finances, activities, and administration; (2) well designed accountability provisions will help clarify the financial and programmatic relationship between the federal government and the states and is important in sustaining the maturity of the block grant approach; (3) the financial accountability provisions implemented through single audits provide a foundation for ensuring that states apply the appropriate financial management and internal controls; (4) developing and implementing guidelines for comparable data will not be easy under the results-oriented approach that states use in achieving their program objectives; and (5) it is important for federal policymakers to be aware of existing state spending and programmatic commitments in block-granted areas. |
gao_T-AIMD-99-186 | gao_T-AIMD-99-186_0 | Currently, Customs is well over 2 years behind its original NCAP schedule. Customs Has Been Developing ACE Without a Complete Enterprise Systems Architecture
At the time of our review, Customs was not building ACE within the context of an enterprise systems architecture, or “blueprint” of its agencywide future systems environment. In response, Customs developed and published an architecture in July and August 1997. We reviewed this architecture and reported in May 1998 that it was not effective because it was neither complete nor enforced. In response, Customs agreed to develop a complete architecture and establish a process to ensure compliance. Customs reports that its architecture will be completed in May 1999. First, Customs did not identify and evaluate a full range of alternatives to its defined ACE solution before commencing development activities. Second, Customs did not develop a reliable life cycle cost estimate for the approach it selected. Third, Customs is not making its investment decisions incrementally as required by the Clinger-Cohen Act and OMB. Although Customs has decided to implement ACE as a series of 21 increments, it is not justifying investing in each increment on the basis of defined costs and benefits and a positive return on investment for each increment. Customs lacks the capability to effectively develop or acquire ACE software. Further, we reported that Customs lacked a software process improvement program to effectively address these and other software process weaknesses. Customs Has Initiated Actions to Implement Our Recommendations for Strengthening ACE Management
To address ACE management weaknesses, we recommended that Customs analyze alternative approaches to satisfying its import automation needs, including addressing the ITDS/ACE relationship; invest in its defined ACE solution incrementally, meaning for each system increment (1) rigorously estimate and analyze costs and benefits, (2) require a favorable return-on-investment and compliance with Customs’ enterprise systems architecture, and (3) validate actual costs and benefits once an increment is piloted, compare actuals to estimates, use the results in deciding on future increments, and report the results to congressional authorizers and appropriators; establish an effective software process improvement program and correct the software process weaknesses identified in our report, thereby bringing ACE software process maturity to a least an SEI level 2; and require at least SEI level 2 processes of all ACE software contractors. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed the weaknesses of the Customs Service's Automated Commercial Environment (ACE) project.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) Customs is well over 2 years behind its original National Customs Automation Program prototype schedule; (2) Customs was not building ACE within the context of an enterprise systems architecture, or blueprint of its agencywide future systems environment; (3) Customs developed and published an architecture in July and August 1997; (4) GAO reviewed this architecture and reported in May 1998 that it was not effective because it was neither complete nor enforced; (5) in response, Customs agreed to develop a complete architecture and establish a process to ensure compliance; (6) Customs reports that its architecture will be completed in May 1999; (7) Customs did not identify and evaluate a full range of alternatives to its defined ACE solution before commencing development activities; (8) Customs did not develop a reliable life cycle cost estimate for the approach it selected; (9) Customs is not making investment decisions incrementally as required by the Clinger-Cohen Act and the Office of Management and Budget; (10) although Customs has decided to implement ACE as a series of 21 increments, it is not justifying investing in each increment on the basis of defined costs and benefits and a positive return on investment for each increment; (11) Customs lacks the capability to effectively develop or acquire ACE software; and (12) Customs lacked a software process improvement program to effectively address these and other software process weaknesses. |
gao_GAO-08-223 | gao_GAO-08-223_0 | The excess of actuarial accrued liabilities over the actuarial value of assets is referred to as the “unfunded actuarial accrued liability” or “unfunded liability.” Under accounting standards, such information is disclosed in financial statements. Oversight of State and Local Retiree Benefits
The federal government has an interest in the funded status of state and local government retiree pensions and health care, even though it has not imposed the same funding and reporting requirements as it has on private sector pension plans. To help clarify, we found that three measures are key to understanding pension plans’ funded status. Comparing this amount to the amount governments actually contribute indicates how well governments are keeping up with yearly funding needs. In addition, governments have been reporting these funded status measures for pensions for years. However, the new accounting rules will also call on governments to report the funded status of retiree health benefits in a similar manner, even though many have not made any contributions to build assets to cover liabilities. The funded ratio indicates the extent to which a plan has enough funds set aside to pay accrued benefits. Unfunded liabilities will eventually require the government employer to increase revenue, reduce benefits or other government spending, or do some combination of these. Nevertheless, we found that unfunded liabilities do not necessarily imply that pension benefits are at risk in the near term. Current funds and new contributions may be sufficient to pay benefits for several years, even when funded ratios are relatively low. Most Public Pensions Have Assets to Pay Benefits over Several Decades, Though Contributions Vary, While Unfunded Liabilities for Retiree Health Are Significant
More than half of public pension plans reported that they have put enough assets aside in advance to pay for benefits over the next several decades, while governments providing retiree health benefits generally have significant unfunded liabilities. Our analysis of the PFS data on 65 self-reported state and local government pension plans showed that 38 (58 percent) had a funded ratio of 80 percent or more, while 27 had a funded ratio of less than 80 percent. Some Pension Sponsors Do Not Contribute Enough to Improve Funding Status
A number of governments reported not contributing enough to keep up with yearly costs. Unfunded Retiree Health Liabilities Are Large for Many State and Local Governments
Our review of studies estimating the total retiree health benefits for all state and local governments showed that liabilities are between $600 billion and $1.6 trillion. Others may have large unfunded liabilities. Compared to the future payments for pension benefits, payments for health care benefits are significantly more unpredictable. However, the new GASB accounting standards will require state and local governments to report their funding status on an accrual basis. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of this report were to examine 1) the key measures of the funded status of retiree benefits and 2) the current funded status of state and local pension and retiree health benefits. Limitations of this study include: includes states only in the analysis, not local jurisdictions; assumes that those government entities for which Cato was able to find estimates of future retiree health benefit obligations were representative of governments overall in terms of age distribution and funding levels; does not consider the variation in actuarial assumptions and methods between the different plans; it is not clear how many employees were covered by the sample because there were so many localities; and figures on the percentage of employees covered by health care plans in state and local government jurisdictions may not be precise. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pension and other retiree benefits for state and local government employees represent liabilities for state and local governments and ultimately a burden for state and local taxpayers. Since 1986, accounting standards have required state and local governments to report their unfunded pension liabilities. Recently, however, standards changed and now call for governments also to report retiree health liabilities. The extent of these liabilities nationwide is not yet known, but some predict they will be very large, possibly exceeding a trillion dollars in present value terms. The federal government has an interest in assuring that all Americans have a secure retirement, as reflected in the federal tax deferral for contributions to both public and private pension plans. Consequently, the GAO was asked to examine: 1) the key measures of the funded status of retiree benefits and 2) the current funded status of retiree benefits. GAO analyzed data on public pensions, reviewed current literature, and interviewed a range of experts on public retiree benefits, actuarial science, and accounting.
What GAO Found
Three key measures help to understand different aspects of the funded status of state and local government pension and other retiree benefits. First, governments' annual contributions indicate the extent to which governments are keeping up with the benefits as they are accumulating. Second, the funded ratio indicates the percentage of actuarially accrued benefit liabilities covered by the actuarial value of assets. Third, unfunded actuarial accrued liabilities indicate the excess, if any, of liabilities over assets in dollars. Governments have been reporting these three measures for pensions for years, but new accounting standards will also require governments to report the same for retiree health benefits. Because a variety of methods and actuarial assumptions are used to calculate the funded status, different plans cannot be easily compared. Currently, most state and local government pension plans have enough invested resources set aside to keep up with the benefits they are scheduled to pay over the next several decades, but governments offering retiree health benefits generally have large unfunded liabilities. Many experts consider a funded ratio of about 80 percent or better to be sound for government pensions. We found that 58 percent of 65 large pension plans were funded to that level in 2006, a decrease since 2000. Low funded ratios would eventually require the government employer to improve funding, for example, by reducing benefits or by increasing contributions. However, pension benefits are generally not at risk in the near term because current assets and new contributions may be sufficient to pay benefits for several years. Still, many governments have often contributed less than the amount needed to improve or maintain funded ratios. Low contributions raise concerns about the future funded status. For retiree health benefits, studies estimate that the total unfunded actuarial accrued liability for state and local governments lies between $600 billion and $1.6 trillion in present value terms. The unfunded liabilities are large because governments typically have not set aside any funds for the future payment of retiree health benefits as they have for pensions. |
gao_NSIAD-96-176 | gao_NSIAD-96-176_0 | It would not be fair to put them through this process to reach projections that are not hard and fast.”
Personnel Reductions in Recent Years
Through fiscal year 1995, NASA reduced its previously planned fiscal year 2000 FTE goal by over 3,000 FTEs, and it was planning to increase the aggregate reduction to about 4,000 FTEs in 1996. Future Personnel Reductions May Require Involuntary Separations
As previously noted, buyouts accounted for about two-thirds of the employees leaving NASA in fiscal years 1994 and 1995. One of NASA’s major concerns is ensuring a proper skill mix throughout the agency. Currently, NASA’s strategy to deal with this concern is to rely on normal attrition, limited hiring focused on the most critical areas, and redeploying employees. Unknown Personnel Impacts of Management and Operational Changes
NASA’s efforts to meet its planned FTE level while avoiding involuntary separations will be affected by the results of several management and operational changes, including the shifting of program management from headquarters to field centers and the use of a single prime contractor for managing the space shuttle at Kennedy Space Center. Further Efforts to Establish Space Science Institutes Discontinued
During the course of the ZBR, the concept of institutes was identified as a potentially beneficial approach to maintain or improve the quality of national science in the face of organizational streamlining. Without such legislation, NASA officials believe that the number of employees voluntarily leaving NASA would likely be negligible. Comments From the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
The first copy of each GAO report and testimony is free. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO examined the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) efforts to downsize its staff.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) NASA has reduced its fiscal year (FY) 2000 full-time equivalent (FTE) goal by more than 3,000 personnel; (2) NASA has provided eligible employees with voluntary separation incentive payments in exchange for their voluntary retirement or resignation; (3) two-thirds of the employees that left NASA in 1994 and 1995 took buyouts; (4) NASA will not be able to reduce its personnel levels by FY 2000 without invoking involuntarily separation measures; (5) NASA is relying on normal attrition, limited hiring, and redeployment to ensure a proper mix of skills throughout the agency; (6) NASA is shifting its program management control from headquarters to field centers and is using a single prime contractor to manage its space shuttle program at Kennedy Space Center; and (7) NASA would like to develop space science institutes to improve the quality of its science programs, but these efforts have been largely abandoned due to concerns regarding the transfer of NASA employees to institute positions. |
gao_RCED-99-95 | gao_RCED-99-95_0 | Are NRC’s processes focused on safety? Competition Presents a Challenge for NRC
Commercial nuclear power plants will continue to generate electricity for some time in the future. As the electric utility industry is restructured, operating and maintenance costs will affect the competitiveness of nuclear power plants. Competition challenges NRC to ensure that utilities do not compromise safety through cost-cutting measures. NRC Has Not Resolved Many Issues Needed to Implement a Risk-Informed Regulatory Approach
NRC staff estimate that it could take 4 to 8 years to implement a risk-informed regulatory approach and are working to resolve many issues to ensure that the new approach does not endanger public health and safety. Although NRC has issued guidance for utilities to use risk assessments to meet regulatory requirements for specific activities and has undertaken many activities to implement a risk-informed approach, more is needed to ensure that utilities have current and accurate documentation on the design of each plant and its structures, systems, and components and safety analysis reports that reflect changes to the design and other analyses conducted after NRC issued the plant’s operating license; ensure that utilities make changes to their plants on the basis of complete and accurate design and safety analysis information; determine whether and what aspects of NRC’s regulations should be develop standards on the scope and detail of the risk assessments needed for utilities to determine that changes to their plants’ design will not negatively affect safety; and determine the willingness of utilities to adopt a risk-informed approach. Yet neither NRC nor the industry has a standard that defines the quality, scope, or adequacy of risk assessments. As part of its risk-informed initiatives, in January 1999, NRC proposed a new process to assess overall plant safety using industrywide and plant-specific safety thresholds and performance indicators. Under this approach, it plans to begin pilot testing the use of risk-informed performance indicators at 13 plants in June 1999, fully implement the process by January 2000, and complete an evaluation and propose any adjustments or modifications needed by June 2001. According to NRC staff, they met with various stakeholders in December 1998 and February 1999 to discuss issues related to the enforcement program. NEI has proposed a revised enforcement process. Recommendation
To help ensure the safe operation of plants and the continued protection of public health and safety in a competitive environment, we recommend that the Commissioners of NRC direct the staff to develop a comprehensive strategy that includes but is not limited to objectives, goals, activities, and time frames for the transition to risk-informed regulation; specifies how the Commission expects to define the scope and implementation of risk-informed regulation; and identifies the manner in which it expects to continue the free exchange of operational information necessary to improve the quality and reliability of risk assessments. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission also commented that the report raises issues that it, the nuclear industry, and other stakeholders are addressing. 1. 2. What is the status of NRC’s efforts to apply a risk-informed regulatory approach to two of its oversight programs—plant safety assessments and enforcement? | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO examined various issues related to the safe operation of commercial nuclear power plants, focusing on: (1) some of the challenges that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and the nuclear power industry could experience in a competitive environment; (2) issues that NRC needs to resolve to implement a risk-informed regulatory approach; and (3) the status of NRC's efforts to apply a risk-informed regulatory approach to two of its oversight programs--plant safety assessments and enforcement.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) Congress and the public need confidence in NRC's ability to ensure that the nuclear industry performs to the highest safety standards; (2) as the electric utility industry is restructured, operating and maintenance costs will affect the competitiveness of nuclear power plants; (3) competition challenges NRC to ensure that safety margins are not compromised by utilities' cost-cutting measures and that the decisions utilities make in response to economic considerations are not detrimental to public health and safety; (4) NRC has not developed a comprehensive strategy that could move its regulation of the safety of nuclear plants from its traditional approach to an approach that considers risk information; (5) in addition, NRC has not resolved certain basic issues; (6) some utilities do not have current and accurate design information for their nuclear power plants, which is needed for a risk-informed approach; (7) neither NRC nor the nuclear utility industry has standards that define the quality or adequacy of the risk assessments that utilities use to identify and measure risks to public health and the environment; (8) furthermore, NRC has not determined the willingness of utilities to adopt a risk-informed approach; (9) according to NRC staff, they are aware of these and other issues and have undertaken activities to resolve them; (10) in January 1999, NRC released for comment a proposed risk-informed process to assess the overall safety of nuclear power plants; (11) this process would establish industrywide and plant-specific safety thresholds and indicators to help NRC assess plant safety; (12) NRC expects to phase in the new process over the next 2 years and evaluate it by June 2001, at which time NRC plans to propose any adjustments or modifications needed; (13) in addition, NRC has been examining its enforcement program to make it consistent with, among other things, the proposed process for assessing plant safety; (14) the nuclear industry and public interest groups have criticized the enforcement program as subjective; and (15) in the spring of 1999, NRC staff expect to provide the Commission with recommendations for revising the enforcement program. |
gao_GAO-12-549 | gao_GAO-12-549_0 | Fewer Small Employers Claimed the Credit Than Were Thought to Be Eligible Because of Factors Such as Credit Size and Complexity
Actual Credit Claims Were Much Lower Than Initial Rough Eligibility Estimates
Fewer small employers claimed the credit for tax year 2010 than were thought to be eligible based on rough estimates of eligible employers made by government agencies and small business groups. The average credit amount claimed was about $2,700. Selected estimates, made by government agencies and small business groups, of employers eligible for the credit range from around 1.4 million to 4 million. Of the approximately 170,300 small employers making claims for tax year 2010, 142,200—83 percent—could not use the full credit percentage. 3.) Furthermore, the small employers do not likely view the credit as a big enough incentive to begin offering health insurance and to make a credit claim, according to employer representatives, tax preparers, and insurance brokers we met with. In addition, the surveys did not cover tax-exempt entities. IRS does not know whether its outreach efforts actually increased awareness of the credit or were otherwise cost-effective. Addressing Factors and Expanding Credit Use May Require Substantive Design Changes
Given that most small employers do not offer insurance and what we heard about the size of the credit not being big enough to incentivize offering health insurance,credit use without changing the credit’s eligibility. SB/SE’s examination instructions address all of the credit’s requirements for small businesses to claim the credit except that they do not include specific instructions for examiners on determining eligibility of claimants with non-U.S. addresses. Further, TEGE instructions for some of the credit’s requirements have less detail compared to SB/SE’s instructions. However, without criteria to assess the results in concert with these risks and resources, IRS is less able to ensure that examination resources target errors with the credit, rather than examining compliant claimants. IRS officials said they do not plan to use data from examinations of other tax provisions to benchmark measures— such as the no-change rate or length of time an examination is open— because results would not be comparable. To answer research questions about the credits potential outcomes shown in figure 5, the following are examples of data that might be needed: number of small, low-wage employers offering health insurance, before and after the credit was available; number of employees at small, low-wage employers, who have or could obtain health insurance through their employers; and amount of annual health insurance premium costs for small, low-wage employers before and after the credit. Policymakers’ conclusions about the questions to be answered by any evaluations of the credit’s effects would determine the type of data that would need to be collected. 2. Related to the above analysis of examination results on the credit, identify the types of errors with the credit that could be addressed with alternative approaches, such as soft notices. IRS generally agreed with all four of our recommendations. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To assess the extent to which the Small Employer Health Insurance Tax Credit (referred to in this report as the credit) is being claimed, we obtained and analyzed Internal Revenue Service (IRS) data on the claims on Form 8941 for tax year 2010. To identify any factors limiting credit claims, we interviewed groups representing employers, tax preparers and insurance brokers and to assess how these factors could be addressed, we analyzed our interview results as well as relevant documents. To assess how fully IRS is ensuring that the tax credit is correctly claimed by eligible employers, we reviewed IRS’s compliance plan and filters and instructions for IRS staff conducting examinations, and compared these documents with compliance practices used for prior tax provisions and found in IRS strategic objectives. Appendix II: State Average Premiums for Small Group Markets for 2010 and 2011
The Small Employer Health Insurance Tax Credit is based on a percentage of the lesser of (1) the premiums paid by the eligible small employer for employees during the taxable year and (2) the amount of premiums the employer would have paid if each employee were enrolled in a plan with a premium equal to the average premium for the small group market in the state (or in an area in the state) in which the employer is offering health insurance. | Why GAO Did This Study
Many small employers do not offer health insurance. The Small Employer Health Insurance Tax Credit was established to help eligible small employersbusinesses or tax-exempt entitiesprovide health insurance for employees. The base of the credit is premiums paid or the average premium for an employers state if premiums paid were higher. In 2010, for small businesses, the credit was 35 percent of the base unless the business had more than 10 FTE employees or paid average annual wages over $25,000.
GAO was asked to examine (1) the extent to which the credit is claimed and any factors that limit claims, including how they can be addressed; (2) how fully IRS is ensuring that the credit is correctly claimed; and (3) what data are needed to evaluate the effects of the credit.
GAO compared IRS data on credit claims with estimates of eligible employers, interviewed various credit stakeholders and IRS officials as well as academicians on evaluation, compared IRS credit compliance documents with the rules and practices used for prior tax provisions and IRS strategic objectives, and reviewed literature and data.
What GAO Found
Fewer small employers claimed the Small Employer Health Insurance Tax Credit in tax year 2010 than were estimated to be eligible. While 170,300 small employers claimed it, estimates of the eligible pool by government agencies and small business advocacy groups ranged from 1.4 million to 4 million. The cost of credits claimed was $468 million. Most claims were limited to partial rather than full percentage credits (35 percent for small businesses) because of the average wage or full-time equivalent (FTE) requirements. 28,100 employers claimed the full credit percentage. In addition, 30 percent of claims had the base premium limited by the state premium average.
One factor limiting the credits use is that most very small employers, 83 percent by one estimate, do not offer health insurance. According to employer representatives, tax preparers, and insurance brokers that GAO met with, the credit was not large enough to incentivize employers to begin offering insurance. Complex rules on FTEs and average wages also limited use. In addition, tax preparer groups GAO met with generally said the time needed to calculate the credit deterred claims. Options to address these factors, such as expanded eligibility requirements, have trade-offs, including less precise targeting of employers and higher costs to the Federal government.
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) incorporated practices used successfully for prior tax provisions and from IRS strategic objectives into its compliance efforts for the credit. However, the instructions provided to its examiners (1) do not address the credits eligibility requirements for employers with non-U.S. addresses and (2) have less detail for reviewing the eligibility of tax-exempt entities health insurance plans compared to those for reviewing small business plans. These omissions may cause examiners to overlook or inconsistently treat possible noncompliance. Further, IRS does not systematically analyze examination results to understand the types of errors and whether examinations are the best way to correct each type. As a result, IRS is less able to ensure that resources target errors with the credit rather than compliant claimants.
Currently available data on health insurance that could be used to evaluate the effects of the credit do not match the credits eligibility requirements, such as information to convert data on number of employees to FTEs. Additional data that would need to be collected depend on the questions policymakers would want answered and the costs of collecting such data.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that IRS (1) improve instructions to examiners working on cases on the credit and (2) analyze results from examinations of credit claimants and use those results to identify and address any errors through alternative approaches. IRS agreed with GAOs recommendations. |
gao_GAO-04-885 | gao_GAO-04-885_0 | Of the approximately 24,000 September 11 disaster loan applications, SBA approved about 11,000, totaling $1.1 billion. The SBA Disaster Loan Program’s Policies and Procedures Are Consistent with the Law and the Program’s Overall Mission
SBA’s policies and procedures for providing EIDLs are consistent with the Small Business Act. The act addresses some loan terms, such as length of maturity, but it does not specify underwriting criteria for SBA to follow. However, SBA’s regulations do contain underwriting requirements such as assessing an applicant’s ability to repay the loan, credit history, and the availability of collateral, as well as other requirements. The Small Business Act Provides Little Specific Guidance on How SBA Should Manage Its Disaster Loan Program, Particularly in Providing EIDLs
The law provides for SBA to make loans to small business concerns that have suffered a substantial economic injury as a result of a covered disaster, provided that SBA finds that an applicant is not able to obtain credit elsewhere. SBA’s Underwriting Criteria Followed Program Guidelines and Best Practices and Were Similar to Those of Nonprofits Offering Disaster Loans
SBA’s underwriting policies and criteria for September 11 EIDLs generally followed established guidelines, even with the exceptions that were made for this disaster, and were similar to those of selected nonprofits in New York City. Small businesses that were eligible to apply for SBA loans were expected to meet standard requirements for documentation, creditworthiness, repayment ability, collateral, and appropriate character, as determined by SBA. As we reported previously, modifications to SBA’s Disaster Loan Program were made to address the unusual circumstances surrounding the September 11 disaster and to respond to the concerns of affected small businesses. However, the changes that were made were to eligibility and terms, not to loan underwriting criteria. SBA’s Program Policies Were Generally Consistent with Good Lending Practices
SBA’s guidelines for its Disaster Loan Program generally coincide with best practices published by lending industry experts and guidance issued by federal regulators. Nonprofit Lenders in New York City Had Similar Requirements for Disaster Loans
Three nonprofits in New York City that made September 11 disaster loans had requirements similar to SBA’s, but the programs had some additional flexibility to address the needs of their small business constituents (fig. Our review of a small random sample of approved loans also indicated that SBA followed its policies and procedures in granting loans. SBA Followed Its Procedures for Processing Declined and Withdrawn Loan Applications
In our review of declined and withdrawn loan files, we found that SBA followed its policies and procedures for conducting supervisory reviews of loan decisions and notifying applicants of the decisions and that the agency generally processed applications in a timely manner. 3). To determine whether SBA correctly applied its policies in the disposition of September 11 EIDL applications, we reviewed a representative random sample of declined and withdrawn September 11 EIDL application files across all disaster area offices, and a small sample of loan application files for approved September 11 EIDLs. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Small Business Administration (SBA) played a key role in assisting small businesses affected by the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks by providing over $1 billion in disaster loans to businesses that sustained physical damage or economic injury. Small businesses in the immediate areas of the attacks and others nationwide that suffered related economic injury were eligible to apply for disaster loans. SBA declined or withdrew about half of these loan applications. SBA's disaster loans are direct federal government loans provided at a subsidized interest rate. In response to concerns that more small businesses impacted by September 11 could have benefited from SBA's disaster loans, GAO conducted a review of its Disaster Loan Program. Specifically, GAO addressed the following questions: (1) Are the disaster program policies consistent with the law and the overall mission of SBA's Disaster Loan Program? (2) What were SBA's underwriting policies and criteria for September 11 Economic Injury Disaster Loans (EIDL) and how did they compare with those applied by nonprofit lenders that were active in New York City after September 11? (3) Did SBA correctly apply its policies and procedures in its disposition of September 11 EIDLs?
What GAO Found
SBA's policies and procedures for providing EIDLs are consistent with the Small Business Act: applicants must have suffered substantial economic injury as a result of a declared disaster, and SBA must determine that they are not able to obtain credit elsewhere. The act addresses some loan terms, such as length of maturity, but it does not specify underwriting criteria for SBA to follow. However, SBA's regulations contain underwriting criteria such as assessing an applicant's ability to repay the loan and obtaining collateral. SBA's underwriting requirements for September 11 EIDLs generally followed program guidelines and were similar to those of selected nonprofit organizations in New York City. Small businesses that were eligible to apply for SBA assistance were expected to meet standard requirements for documentation, creditworthiness, repayment ability, collateral, and character. These requirements are generally consistent with best practices published by lending industry experts and guidance issued by federal regulators. Changes made to address the unusual circumstances of the September 11 disaster were to eligibility and loan terms and not to loan underwriting criteria. The three nonprofit organizations in New York City that made September 11 disaster loans had requirements similar to SBA, but the nonprofits had some additional flexibility to address the needs of their small business constituents. GAO found that SBA followed its policies and procedures in making decisions for September 11 EIDLs. All of the files in our random, representative sample of declined or withdrawn applications contained documentation and analysis to support the SBA's determination. GAO's review of this sample also indicated that SBA followed its procedures for processing applications--such as supervisory review and notifying applicants of its decision and their right to have the application reconsidered. GAO's review of a small sample of approved loans also indicated that SBA followed its policies and procedures. |
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