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gao_GAO-11-901SP | gao_GAO-11-901SP_0 | A Growing Number of Pension Plans Are Investing in Hedge Funds or Private Equity, but Such Investments Are Generally a Small Portion of Plan Assets
We reported in 2008 that DB plan investments in hedge funds and private equity have grown, but such investments are generally a small portion of plan assets. According to a Pensions & Investments survey, the percentage of large plans (as measured by total plan assets) investing in hedge funds grew from 11 percent in 2001 to 60 percent in 2010 (see fig. 1). Over the same time period, the percentage of large plans that invest in private equity grew at a much slower rate—71 percent to 92 percent—likely because of the fact that a much larger percentage of plans were already invested in private equity in 2001. The average allocation to hedge funds among plans with such investments was a little over 5 percent in 2010. Similarly, among plans with investments in private equity, the average allocation was a little over 9 percent. 2). 3). Survey data on plans with less than $200 million in assets are unavailable and, in the absence of this information, the extent to which these smaller plans invest in hedge funds and private equity is unclear. Hedge Fund and Private Equity Investments Pose Various Risks and Challenges for Plan Sponsors
Valuation Risk
One of the major challenges that both hedge fund and private equity investments pose to plan sponsors is uncertainty over the current value of the sponsors’ investment. Because many hedge funds may own thinly traded securities and derivatives whose valuation can be complex and subjective, a plan official may not be able to obtain timely information on the value of assets owned by a hedge fund. For example, both hedge fund and private equity managers may use leverage—that is, borrowed money or other techniques—to potentially increase an investment’s return without increasing the amount of capital invested. Leverage can magnify profits, but can also magnify losses to the fund if the market goes against the fund’s expectations. Lack of Liquidity
Hedge funds and private equity are also relatively illiquid investments— that is, investors generally cannot easily redeem their investments on demand. Operational Risk
We reported that pension plans investing in hedge funds are also exposed to operational risk—that is, the risk of investment loss because of inadequate or failed internal processes, people, and systems, or problems with external service providers. Plan Sponsors Take a Number of Steps to Address the Risks of Hedge Fund and Private Equity Investing
Pension plan officials we spoke with take a number of steps in an attempt to mitigate the risks and challenges of investing in hedge funds and private equity. First, plan sponsors noted the importance of making careful and deliberate fund selection when investing in hedge funds and private equity. They said in the case of hedge funds, such terms can include fee structure and conditions, degree of transparency, valuation procedures, redemption provisions, and degree of leverage employed. Due diligence and ongoing monitoring, beyond those required for traditional investments, are also important. The Federal Government Can Help Educate Plans on the Challenges of Investing in Hedge Funds
According to plan officials, regulators, and others, some pension plans— especially smaller plans—may find it particularly difficult to address the various demands of hedge fund investing. In light of these challenges, and as predecessors to this 2011 ERISA Advisory Council have concluded, the Department of Labor (Labor) can play a role in helping to ensure that plans fulfill their Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) fiduciary duties when investing in hedge funds and private equity. In 2008, we recommended that Labor provide guidance for qualified plans under ERISA on the unique challenges of investing in hedge funds and private equity and the steps plans should take to address these challenges. Although Labor generally agreed with our recommendation, the agency explained that the lack of uniformity among these investments could complicate the development of comprehensive guidance for plan fiduciaries. | Why GAO Did This Study
Millions of Americans rely on retirement savings plans for their financial well-being in retirement. Plan sponsors are increasingly investing in assets such as hedge funds (privately administered pooled investment vehicles that typically engage in active trading strategies) and private equity funds (privately managed investment pools that typically make long-term investments in private companies). Given ongoing market challenges, it is important that plan fiduciaries apply best practices, and choose wisely when investing plans assets to ensure that plans are adequately funded to meet future promised benefits. This statement addresses (1) what is known about the extent to which defined benefit plans have invested in hedge funds and private equity, (2) challenges that such plans face in investing in hedge funds and private equity, (3) steps that plan sponsors can take to address these challenges, and (4) the implications of these challenges for plan sponsors and the federal government.
What GAO Found
A growing number of private and public sector pension plans have invested in hedge funds and private equity, but such investments generally constitute a small share of total plan assets. According to a survey of large plans, the share of plans with investments in hedge funds grew from 11 percent in 2001 to 60 percent in 2010. Over the same time period, investments in private equity were more prevalent but grew more slowly--an increase from 71 percent of large plans in 2001 to 92 percent in 2010. Still, the average allocation of plan assets to hedge funds was a little over 5 percent, and the average allocation to private equity was a little over 9 percent. Available data also show that investments in hedge funds and private equity are more common among large pension plans, measured by assets under management, compared with midsize plans. Survey information on smaller plans is unavailable, so the extent to which these plans invest in hedge funds or private equity is unknown. Hedge funds and private equity investments pose a number of risks and challenges beyond those posed by traditional investments. For example, investors in hedge funds and private equity face uncertainty about the precise valuation of their investment. Hedge funds may, for example, own thinly traded assets whose valuation can be complex and subjective, making valuation difficult. Further, hedge funds and private equity funds may use considerable leverage--the use of borrowed money or other techniques--which can magnify profits, but can also magnify losses if the market goes against the fund's expectations. Also, both are illiquid investments--that is they cannot generally be redeemed on demand. Finally, investing in hedge funds can pose operational risks--that is, the risk of investment loss from inadequate or failed internal processes, people, and systems, or problems with external service providers rather than an unsuccessful investment strategy. Plan sponsors GAO spoke with address these challenges in a number of ways, such as through careful and deliberate fund selection, and negotiating key contract terms. For example, investors in both hedge funds and private equity funds may be able to negotiate fee structure and valuation procedures, and the degree of leverage employed. Also, plans address various concerns through due diligence and monitoring, such as careful review of investment, valuation, and risk management processes. The Department of Labor (Labor) has a role in helping to ensure that private plans fulfill their fiduciary duties, which includes educating employers and service providers about their fiduciary responsibilities under Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). According to plan officials, state and federal regulators, and others, some pension plans, such as smaller plans, may have particular difficulties in addressing the various demands of hedge fund and private equity investing. In light of this, in 2008, GAO recommended that Labor provide guidance on the challenges of investing in hedge funds and private equity and the steps plans should take to address these challenges. Labor generally agreed with our recommendation, but has yet to take action. The agency explained that the lack of uniformity among these investments could complicate the development of comprehensive guidance for plan fiduciaries. |
gao_GAO-17-711 | gao_GAO-17-711_0 | Selected Agencies Used Advertising and Public Relations Contracts and Public Affairs Employees Primarily to Inform and Educate the Public
Most Agency Spending Was Concentrated in a Few Contracts Supporting Major Agency Initiatives and Communication Support
At each of the agencies we reviewed, obligations were concentrated in a small number of advertising and public relations contracts. CFPB’s four largest advertising and public relations contracts represented nearly 70 percent of obligations for these contracts over fiscal years 2012 through 2016 ($22.6 million out of $32.8 million). Contract documentation linked the need for increasing general awareness of CFPB’s tools and resources to CFPB’s statutory responsibility to develop and implement initiatives intended to educate and empower consumers to make better financial decisions. This contract, and several others, supported the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP). According to FEMA officials, part of its role in administering the NFIP involves public communications and advertising to encourage people to buy flood insurance to better prepare themselves for disaster. FEMA’s other high-value contracts included ones for services promoting emergency preparedness, including those supporting the Ready campaign. NASA. This center provides support services across the agency, such as developing products that support the agency’s education and public outreach programs. USCIS. USCIS’ two largest advertising and public relations contracts represented just over 90 percent of obligations for these services over fiscal years 2012 through 2016 ($18.1 million out of $19.8 million).These two contracts supported planning and developing media and educational messaging tools for the E-Verify and Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements (SAVE) programs. Resources for Contracts and Public Affairs Employees Varied over Past Decade Due to Changes in Agency Activities and Increased Use of Digital Media
Obligations for Advertising and Public Relations Contracts Relatively Stable at NASA and USCIS, and Varied at CFPB and FEMA
The amounts the agencies we reviewed obligated to contracts coded as advertising or public relations services varied from year to year, though some agencies’ obligations were more stable. Public Affairs Employment Was Relatively Stable at NASA, but Increased at Other Agencies Largely Due to Operational Changes
Employment of public affairs employees at the agencies we reviewed increased over the past decade, but was relatively stable at NASA. CFPB, FEMA, and USCIS officials identified several factors that caused the increase in the number of public affairs staff they use, including changes in operations and staffing structure. They said they have found this staffing model to be effective. According to officials at the agencies we reviewed, the use of digital media has increased the reach of agency communications and changed the nature of these agencies’ interactions with the public. Selected Agencies Used Web-Based and Other Tools to Assess Activities Supported by Contracts and Public Affairs Employees
Selected Agencies Used Web-Based and Other Tools as Indicators of Performance
All of the agencies we reviewed identified performance indicators they use to assess the performance of outreach activities, including those supported by advertising and public relations contracts and public affairs staff. The following are examples of challenges officials at our case study agencies identified:
Lack of qualitative feedback: Officials at USCIS and CFPB told us that while they have access to several indicators related to performance of outreach (for example, number of visitors to a site or downloads of materials), these indicators are not the same as understanding whether and how information is being used. Selected agencies have taken steps to address these challenges. CFPB and DHS provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. NASA did not have comments. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to review (1) the activities that selected agencies conducted using advertising and public relations contracts and agency public affairs employees, and their purposes; (2) how the level of resources selected agencies devoted to these activities changed over the past decade and the factors that officials identified as affecting these changes; and (3) how selected agencies measured the results of these activities. The four selected agencies were the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Federal Emergency Management Agency, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services. | Why GAO Did This Study
Agencies communicate with the public regarding their functions, policies, and activities. In September 2016, GAO reported that the federal government spends about $1.5 billion per year on public relations activities, carried out through advertising and public relations contracts and by public affairs employees.
GAO was asked to describe the purposes and reported benefits of federal agencies' public relations investments. This report reviews (1) the activities selected agencies conducted using advertising and public relations contracts and public affairs employees, and their purposes; (2) how the level of resources the agencies devote to these activities has changed over the past decade and factors officials identified as affecting these changes; and (3) how the agencies measure results of these activities.
GAO selected four case study agencies—CFPB, FEMA, NASA, and USCIS—based on factors including obligations for advertising and public relations contracts, numbers of public affairs employees, and agency missions and public interactions. GAO reviewed documentation for contracts valued at or over $150,000 from fiscal years 2012 through 2016; examined staff position descriptions, performance information, and employment data; and interviewed officials at these agencies.
CFPB and the Department of Homeland Security provided technical comments on this report, which were incorporated as appropriate. NASA did not have comments.
What GAO Found
At the agencies GAO examined—the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), and U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS)—most of the advertising and public relations contracts GAO reviewed and public affairs staff responsibilities focused on informing and educating the public. These agencies' advertising and public relations contract obligations were concentrated in a small number of contracts that supported major agency initiatives and communications services. Specifically,
CFPB: The four largest contracts ($22.6 million out of $32.8 million) focused on increasing public awareness of CFPB's tools and resources related to its statutory responsibility to educate and empower consumers to make better financial decisions.
FEMA: The largest contract ($8.7 million out of $20.7 million) supported the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP). The agency's role in administering the program includes advertising to encourage people to buy flood insurance. Other high-value contracts promoted emergency preparedness, including the Ready campaign.
NASA: The two largest contracts ($7.6 million out of $17.1 million) supported NASA's Communications Support Services Center, which provides graphics and other services across the agency.
USCIS: The two largest contracts ($18.1 million out of $19.8 million) were for outreach for two immigration-related eligibility verification systems—E-Verify and Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements.
Over the past decade, changes in advertising and public relations contract obligations and public affairs employees varied at the selected agencies due to changes in agency activities and increased use of digital media. For example, contract obligations were relatively stable at NASA and USCIS. CFPB, on the other hand, saw an increase in obligations due to ramping up operations from 2011, when the agency began operations. Variances in FEMA's obligations stemmed primarily from fluctuations in NFIP contracts due to changing priorities. The number of public affairs employees generally increased at the selected agencies, but was relatively stable at NASA. These increases were due to changes in operations and staffing structure. For example, USCIS changed its staffing model to add more lower-level public affairs staff. Officials at three of the four agencies we reviewed noted an increased use of digital media for public outreach, though the effects on contract and staff resources have been mixed.
The agencies measured performance of their activities using web-based and other indicators, such as the number of website visits and length of time spent on a page, and reported using this information to inform decision making. However, agency officials identified challenges in measuring the performance of these activities, including a lack of qualitative data on whether and how information is being used. Selected agencies have taken some steps to address these challenges by, for example, administering surveys to obtain additional feedback. |
gao_PEMD-95-4 | gao_PEMD-95-4_0 | The report focuses on the most important predictors of occupant injury in a collision: crash type and crash severity, automobile size, safety belt use, and occupant age and gender. Objective, Scope, and Methodology
Objective
The objective of this report is to examine the independent effects of a number of factors—crash type, crash severity, automobile weight and size, safety belt use, and occupant age and gender—on the risk of injury in an automobile crash. First, some types of crashes are more severe than others. Most importantly, although increasing weight and wheelbase reduces the risk of driver injury in one-car nonrollover crashes and in collisions with other cars or light trucks, drivers in heavier cars were much more likely to be hospitalized or killed in one-car rollover crashes than were drivers of lighter automobiles. Multivehicle collisions are a greater source of injury for women than they are for men. Men drivers are involved in one-car crashes more often than women drivers. Factors Affecting Older Drivers
Crash Type. And safety belts are extraordinarily effective; alone, they are much more effective at reducing serious injuries than are air bags alone. As we demonstrated in chapter 2, compared to women and older drivers, not only are men drivers and younger drivers involved in more automobile crashes but also the crashes they are particularly likely to be involved in have comparatively severe consequences—that is, single-car crashes have much higher driver injury rates than multivehicle crashes. Compared to men and younger drivers, women and older drivers are involved in fewer automobile crashes, and the crashes they are involved in are, on the average, less severe, since they are less likely to be involved in single-car crashes than in multivehicle collisions. Current safety regulations and automobile safety designs emphasize protection in high-speed frontal collisions, and men drivers and younger drivers are more likely to be in single-car crashes, which disproportionately involve frontal impacts. Similarly, safety belts are more effective in frontal than in side impacts (for example, Evans, 1990), and because of this, safety belts have a somewhat greater benefit in single-car crashes than in collisions with cars and light trucks. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed highway safety, focusing on: (1) the most important predictors of injury in an automobile crash; (2) how the risk of injury in a crash is affected by the severity and type of crash, automobile size, safety belts and airbags, and the occupants' age and gender; and (3) areas for further reducing automobile occupants' crash injury risks.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) the most important determinants of driver injury in car crashes are speed at impact, the type of crash, safety belt use, driver age and gender, and automobile weight and size; (2) injury is more likely in high-speed crashes, one car crashes, frontal crashes, and rollovers; (3) occupants of heavier and larger cars are less likely to be injured, but those cars pose a greater danger to persons in multivehicle crashes; (4) heavier cars offer more protection in one-car nonrollover and multivehicle crashes, but occupants of these cars are subject to more injury in rollovers than are occupants of lighter cars; (5) although safety belts reduce injury risks overall, they are most effective in rollovers, single car crashes, and frontal crashes; (6) air bags are only effective in frontal crashes and are less effective than safety belts alone; (7) although they are involved in fewer crashes overall, female and older drivers are more often injured than male and younger drivers are in similar crashes; (8) safety belts are not as effective for women as they are for men; (9) female and older drivers are involved in more multivehicle crashes and male and younger drivers are involved in more single car crashes; (10) older drivers tend to be involved in more side impact crashes; and (11) the government and manufacturers are working to improve automobile safety for each category of driver. |
gao_NSIAD-95-28 | gao_NSIAD-95-28_0 | Looking for ways to offset significant defense budget reductions, the DOD Comptroller recommended that CIM implementation efforts in the logistics functional area focus on selecting standard, or “migrating,” information systems that could be used departmentwide. Joint Office Created to Improve DOD’s Materiel Management and Depot Maintenance
In November 1991, the PSA for logistics established the Joint Logistics System Center (JLSC) to achieve CIM goals for the materiel management and depot maintenance business areas. Yet, DOD continues to focus on information technology and migration systems. DOD Believes Migration Systems Are Critical to Business Process Improvement
In its Logistics CIM Migration Master Plan, DOD gives two reasons why the selection and implementation of migration systems are critical first steps toward business process improvement. First, they provide needed quick cost recoveries. Under this authority, JLSC is to identify funding that could be eliminated from a budget request for any information system development project that duplicates a project or operational system of another service. Impediments to Further Progress
Three critical impediments are jeopardizing JLSC’s ability to successfully implement its strategy for improving business practices. First, some DOD functional and technical managers have not fully accepted CIM. Second, DOD has not integrated its various CIM efforts, including those of JLSC. Third, program management authority is unclear because of confusing DOD guidance. These latest actions, we believe, are important steps toward resolving cross-functional issues. Recommendations to the Secretary of Defense
To overcome the fundamental weaknesses in the management of the CIM initiative and to further encourage cultural changes needed to support the new DOD business operations, we recommend that the Secretary take the following actions:
Revise the CIM management strategy to ensure that functional managers, particularly the service Chiefs of Staff and DLA Director, actively participate and lead efforts to reengineer DOD’s business processes under the CIM initiative. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Department of Defense's (DOD) implementation of its Corporate Information Management (CIM) initiative, focusing on: (1) DOD progress in improving the logistics functions and depot maintenance under the initiative; and (2) impediments to further progress in achieving CIM goals.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) CIM has had little effect on improving DOD materiel management and depot maintenance business practices; (2) DOD reengineering efforts have been delayed because the Joint Logistics Systems Center (JLSC) has been focusing on selecting standard logistics information systems that it believes are necessary in the reengineering process; (3) DOD believes that improving migration systems will generate quick cost savings that are needed to offset budget reductions; (4) the mandated 3-year milestone for implementing the migration systems may not allow enough time to ensure that the systems meet the services' and the Defense Logistics Agency's operational requirements; (5) JLSC has selected some migration systems, begun preliminary work on improving business processes, and reduced budget requests for redundant migration systems development projects; (6) impediments to CIM implementation include the reluctance of some DOD managers to accept CIM, DOD failure to integrate its CIM efforts, and confusing DOD guidance on CIM management authority; and (7) DOD has developed a strategic plan for improving business operations and clarifying authority over systems development, and a mechanism to handle cross-functional issues. |
gao_GAO-07-276 | gao_GAO-07-276_0 | Efforts to Identify and Address Past Drinking Water Contamination at Camp Lejeune Began in the 1980s and Continue with Long-Term Cleanup and Monitoring
Efforts to identify and address past drinking water contamination at Camp Lejeune began in the 1980s, when the Navy initiated water testing at Camp Lejeune. In 1984 and 1985, NACIP, a Navy environmental program, identified VOCs, including TCE and PCE, in 12 of the wells serving the Hadnot Point and Tarawa Terrace water systems. Upon investigating the contamination, DOD and North Carolina officials concluded that both on- and off-base sources were likely to have caused the contamination in the Hadnot Point and Tarawa Terrace water systems. Concerns about Possible Adverse Health Effects and Government Actions Related to the Past Contamination Have Led to Additional Activities
Concerns about possible adverse health effects and government actions related to the past drinking water contamination have led to additional activities, including health studies, claims against the federal government, and federal inquiries. The health assessment was followed by two studies, one of which was ongoing as of April 2007. Additionally, three federal inquiries into issues related to the drinking water contamination at Camp Lejeune have been conducted, one by a Marine Corps-chartered panel, one by the EPA OIG, and one by the EPA CID. An ATSDR official said the reanalysis may alter the study’s results. The study examines whether individuals born during 1968 through 1985 to mothers who were exposed to the contaminated drinking water at any time while they were pregnant and living at Camp Lejeune were more likely than those who were not exposed to have neural tube defects, oral cleft defects, or childhood hematopoietic cancers. Although ATSDR Did Not Always Receive Requested Funding and Experienced Delays in Receiving Information from DOD, Officials Said Their Work Has Not Been Significantly Delayed
Since ATSDR began its Camp Lejeune-related work in 1991, the agency did not always receive requested funding and experienced delays in receiving information from DOD entities. The panel focused its review on the 1980 to 1985 time period. Experts Convened by NAS Generally Agreed That Many Parameters of ATSDR’s Current Study Were Appropriate but Some Experts Suggested Potential Modifications to the Study
The seven members of an expert panel convened by the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) at our request generally agreed that specific parameters of ATSDR’s current study were appropriate, including the study population, the exposure time frame, and the selected health effects. The expert panel members had mixed opinions on ATSDR’s projected completion date. Agency Comments
DOD, EPA, and HHS provided technical comments on a draft of this report, which we incorporated where appropriate. Finally, the three members raised various other issues, such as compensation and health benefits for former residents and their families and the need for additional notification to be provided to former residents regarding the past drinking water contamination; however, these issues were beyond the scope of this report. To examine the activities undertaken by ATSDR to study potential health effects related to the drinking water contamination at Camp Lejeune, we reviewed the agency’s 1997 Public Health Assessment that evaluated the risks of adverse health effects from exposure to the contaminated drinking water, as well as released documents regarding ATSDR’s 1998 health study of the association between exposure to TCE and PCE in drinking water at Camp Lejeune and a variety of adverse pregnancy outcomes. To assess the design of the current study by ATSDR on the possible health effects associated with the contaminated drinking water at Camp Lejeune, including the study population, time frame, health effects, and completion date, we contracted with the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) to convene a 1-day meeting of scientific experts in the areas of drinking water contamination, hydrologic modeling, and reproductive health. An article was published in the base newspaper explaining that 10 wells that served the Tarawa Terrace and Hadnot Point water systems were removed from service because of contamination. 3. Appendix VII: Description of Current Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR) Health Study
ATSDR is conducting a study of the potential health effects of exposure while in utero and as infants up to 1 year of age to trichloroethylene (TCE) and tetrachloroethylene (PCE)—two volatile organic chemicals found in drinking water at Marine Corps Base Camp Lejeune in the 1980s. | Why GAO Did This Study
In the early 1980s, volatile organic compounds (VOCs) were discovered in some of the water systems serving housing areas on Marine Corps Base Camp Lejeune. Exposure to certain VOCs may cause adverse health effects, including cancer. In 1999, the Department of Health and Human Services' (HHS) Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR) began a study to examine whether individuals who were exposed in utero to the contaminated drinking water are more likely to have developed certain childhood cancers or birth defects. ATSDR has projected a December 2007 completion date for the study. The National Defense Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 2005 required GAO to report on past drinking water contamination and related health effects at Camp Lejeune. In this report GAO describes (1) efforts to identify and address the past contamination, (2) activities resulting from concerns about possible adverse health effects and government actions related to the past contamination, and (3) the design of the current ATSDR study, including the study's population, time frame, selected health effects, and the reasonableness of the projected completion date. GAO reviewed documents, interviewed officials and former residents, and contracted with the National Academy of Sciences to convene an expert panel to assess the design of the current ATSDR study.
What GAO Found
Efforts to identify and address the past drinking water contamination at Camp Lejeune began in the 1980s, when Navy water testing at Camp Lejeune detected VOCs in some base water systems. In 1982 and 1983, continued testing identified two VOCs--trichloroethylene (TCE), a metal degreaser, and tetrachloroethylene (PCE), a dry cleaning solvent--in two water systems that served base housing areas, Hadnot Point and Tarawa Terrace. In 1984 and 1985 a Navy environmental program identified VOCs, such as TCE and PCE, in some of the individual wells serving the Hadnot Point and Tarawa Terrace water systems. Ten wells were subsequently removed from service. Department of Defense (DOD) and North Carolina officials concluded that on- and off-base sources were likely to have caused the contamination. It has not been determined when contamination at Hadnot Point began. ATSDR has estimated that well contamination at Tarawa Terrace from an off-base dry cleaner began as early as 1957. Activities related to concerns about possible adverse health effects began in 1991, when ATSDR initiated a public health assessment evaluating the possible health risks from exposure to the contaminated drinking water. The health assessment was followed by two health studies, one of which is ongoing. While ATSDR did not always receive requested funding and experienced delays in receiving information from DOD for its Camp Lejeune-related work, ATSDR officials said this has not significantly delayed their work. Former residents and employees have filed about 750 claims against the federal government. Additionally, three federal inquiries into issues related to the contamination have been conducted--one by a Marine Corps-chartered panel and two by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Members of the expert panel that the National Academy of Sciences convened generally agreed that many parameters of ATSDR's current study are appropriate, including the study population, the exposure time frame, and the selected health effects. ATSDR's study is examining whether individuals who were exposed in utero to the contaminated drinking water at Camp Lejeune between 1968 and 1985 were more likely to have specific birth defects or childhood cancers than those not exposed. DOD, EPA, and HHS provided technical comments on a draft of this report, which GAO incorporated where appropriate. Three members of an ATSDR community assistance panel for Camp Lejeune provided oral comments on issues such as other VOCs that have been detected at Camp Lejeune, and compensation, health benefits, and additional notification for former residents. GAO focused its review on TCE and PCE because they were identified by ATSDR as the chemicals of primary concern. GAO's report notes that other VOCs were detected. GAO incorporated the panel members' comments where appropriate, but some issues were beyond the scope of this report. |
gao_GAO-07-1079T | gao_GAO-07-1079T_0 | To understand the long-term federal financial implications of Gulf Coast rebuilding it is helpful to view potential federal assistance within the context of overall estimates of the damages incurred by the region. For example, early damage estimates from the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) put capital losses from Hurricanes Katrina and Rita at a range of $70 billion to $130 billion while another estimate put losses solely from Hurricane Katrina—including capital losses—at more than $150 billion. Further, the state of Louisiana has estimated that the economic effect on its state alone could reach $200 billion. These estimates raise important questions regarding how much additional assistance may be needed to continue to help the Gulf Coast rebuild, and who should be responsible for providing the related resources. To respond to the Gulf Coast devastation, the federal government has already committed a historically high level of resources—more than $116 billion—through an array of grants, loan subsidies, and tax relief and incentives. A substantial portion of this assistance was directed to emergency assistance and meeting short-term needs arising from the hurricanes, such as relocation assistance, emergency housing, immediate levee repair, and debris removal efforts. Demand for Federal Rebuilding Resources Likely to Continue
Demands for additional federal resources to rebuild the Gulf Coast are likely to continue, despite the substantial federal funding provided to date. The bulk of federal rebuilding assistance provided to the Gulf Coast states funds two key programs—FEMA’s Public Assistance (PA) program and HUD’s Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) program. In addition to funding PA and CDBG, the federal government’s recovery and rebuilding assistance also includes payouts from the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) as well as funds for levee restoration and repair, coastal wetlands and barrier islands restoration, and benefits provided through Gulf Opportunity Zone (GO Zone) tax expenditures. Officials at the local, state, and federal level are involved in the PA process in a variety of ways. A smaller portion of PA program funds are going toward longer- term rebuilding activities than emergency work. 1.) Observations
Rebuilding efforts in the Gulf Coast continue amidst questions regarding the total cost of federal assistance, the extent to which federal funds will address the rebuilding demands of the region, and the many decisions left to be made by multiple levels of government. As states and localities continue to rebuild, there are difficult policy decisions that will confront Congress about the federal government’s continued contribution to the rebuilding effort and the role it might play over the long-term in an era of competing priorities. Our ongoing and preliminary work on Gulf Coast rebuilding suggests the following questions: How much could it ultimately cost to rebuild the Gulf Coast and how much of this cost should the federal government bear? How effective are current funding delivery mechanisms—such as PA and CDBG—and should they be modified or supplemented by other mechanisms? What options exist to effectively build in federal oversight to accompany the receipt of federal funds, particularly as federal funding has shifted from emergency response to rebuilding? How can the federal government further partner with state and local governments and the nonprofit and private sectors to leverage public investment in rebuilding? What are the “lessons learned” from the Gulf Coast hurricanes, and what changes need to be made to help ensure a more timely and effective rebuilding effort in the future? | Why GAO Did This Study
The devastation caused by the Gulf Coast hurricanes presents the nation with unprecedented challenges as well as opportunities to reexamine shared responsibility among all levels of government. All levels of government, together with the private and nonprofit sectors, will need to play a critical role in the process of choosing what, where, and how to rebuild. Agreeing on what the costs are, what federal funds have been provided, and who will bear the costs will be key to the overall rebuilding effort. This testimony (1) places federal assistance provided to date in the context of damage estimates for the Gulf Coast, and (2) discusses key federal programs that provide rebuilding assistance to the Gulf Coast states. In doing so, GAO highlights aspects of rebuilding likely to place continued demands on federal resources. GAO visited the Gulf Coast region, reviewed state and local documents, and interviewed federal, state, and local officials. GAO's ongoing work on these issues focuses on the use of federal rebuilding funds and administration of federal programs in the Gulf Coast region.
What GAO Found
To respond to the Gulf Coast devastation, the federal government has already committed a historically high level of resources--more than $116 billion--through an array of grants, loan subsidies, and tax relief and incentives. A substantial portion of this assistance was directed to emergency assistance and meeting short-term needs arising from the hurricanes, leaving a smaller portion for longer-term rebuilding. To understand the long-term financial implications of Gulf Coast rebuilding, it is helpful to view potential federal assistance within the context of overall estimates of the damages incurred by the region. Some estimates put capital losses at a range of $70 billion to more than $150 billion, while the state of Louisiana estimated that the economic effect on its state alone could reach $200 billion. These estimates raise questions regarding how much additional assistance may be needed to help the Gulf Coast continue to rebuild, and who should be responsible for providing the related resources. Demands for additional federal resources to rebuild the Gulf Coast are likely to continue. The bulk of federal rebuilding assistance provided to the Gulf Coast states funds two key programs--the Federal Emergency Management Agency's Public Assistance (PA) program and the Department of Housing and Urban Development's Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) program. In addition to funding PA and CDBG, the federal government's recovery and rebuilding assistance also includes payouts from the National Flood Insurance Program as well as funds for levee restoration and repair, coastal wetlands and barrier islands restoration, and benefits provided through Gulf Opportunity Zone tax expenditures. As states and localities continue to rebuild, there are difficult policy decisions that will confront Congress about the federal government's continued contribution to the rebuilding effort and the role it might play over the long-term in an era of competing priorities. GAO's ongoing and preliminary work on Gulf Coast rebuilding suggests the following questions: How much could it ultimately cost to rebuild the Gulf Coast and how much of this cost should the federal government bear? How effective are current funding delivery mechanisms--such as PA and CDBG--and should they be modified or supplemented by other mechanisms? What options exist to effectively build in federal oversight to accompany the receipt of federal funds, particularly as federal funding has shifted from emergency response to rebuilding? How can the federal government further partner with state and local governments and the nonprofit and private sectors to leverage public investment in rebuilding? What are the "lessons learned" from the Gulf Coast hurricanes, and what changes need to be made to help ensure a more timely and effective rebuilding effort in the future? |
gao_GAO-16-605 | gao_GAO-16-605_0 | By mitigating known information security weaknesses and ensuring that information security controls are consistently applied, FDIC could continue to reduce risks and better protect its sensitive financial information and resources from inadvertent or deliberate misuse, improper modification, unauthorized disclosure, or destruction. FDIC improved controls for identifying and authenticating the identity of users by implementing its policy on password controls over the Portfolio Investment Accounting (PORTIA) application. During 2015, FDIC improved controls for authorizing users’ access. Although FDIC strengthened authorization controls by implementing most of the unresolved recommendations, the corporation did not have an effective process for performing periodic reviews of user access rights for several systems supporting the corporation’s financial processing, consistently disable accounts belonging to users who had not accessed a financial system in a predefined period of time, consistently document that modifications to user access to systems had been authorized before making the changes, and identify authorization and recertification deficiencies during its oversight of an outsourced system. However, the corporation had not yet fully implemented procedures for applying patches, including critical patches, to remediate known vulnerabilities in third party software on systems supporting financial processing. Many Information Security Program Activities Were Implemented, but Further Improvements Are Needed
A key reason for the information security weaknesses in FDIC’s financial systems was that, although the corporation had a comprehensive framework for its information security program, some aspects were not fully implemented. FISMA requires each agency to develop, document, and implement an information security program that, among other things, includes periodic assessments of risk, including the magnitude of harm that could result from the unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification, or destruction of information and information systems that support the operations and assets of the organization; policies and procedures that are based on risk assessments, cost- effectively reduce information security risks to an acceptable level, and ensure that information security is addressed throughout the life cycle of each organizational information system; provide specialized training to personnel with significant security periodic testing and evaluation of the effectiveness of information security policies, procedures, practices, and security controls to be performed with a frequency depending on risk, but no less than annually; and a process for planning, implementing, evaluating, and documenting remedial actions to address any deficiencies in the information security policies, procedures, and practices of the organization. The corporation concurred with the recommendation. During 2015, FDIC had resolved 7 of the 16 previously- reported security weaknesses that were unresolved as of December 31, 2014. Specifically, the corporation did not (1) fully document and implement procedures for performing system access requests, assignments, and removal or (2) have a policy for monitoring critical security file changes. Given the role that information systems play in FDIC’s internal controls over financial reporting, it is important that the corporation address the remaining weaknesses in information security controls that we and the Office of Inspector General identified—both old and new—as part of its ongoing efforts to mitigate the risks from cyber attacks and to ensure the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of its financial and sensitive information. Although we do not consider these weaknesses individually or collectively to be either a material weakness or a significant deficiency for financial reporting purposes, the corporation will have limited assurance that its sensitive financial information and resources will be secure until these weaknesses have been mitigated. Appendix I: Objective, Scope, and Methodology
The objective of this information security review was to determine the effectiveness of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation’s (FDIC) controls in protecting the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of its financial systems and information. The review was conducted as part of our audit of the FDIC financial statements of the Deposit Insurance Fund and the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation Resolution Fund. | Why GAO Did This Study
FDIC has a demanding responsibility enforcing banking laws, regulating financial institutions, and protecting depositors. Because of FDIC's reliance on information systems, effective information security controls are essential to ensure that the corporation's systems and information are adequately protected from inadvertent or deliberate misuse, improper modification, unauthorized disclosure, or destruction.
As part of its audit of the 2015 financial statements of the Deposit Insurance Fund and the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation Resolution Fund administered by FDIC, GAO assessed the effectiveness of the corporation's controls in protecting the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of its financial systems and information. To do so, GAO examined security policies, procedures, reports, and other documents; tested controls over key financial applications; and interviewed FDIC personnel.
What GAO Found
The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) has implemented numerous information security controls intended to protect its key financial systems; however, weaknesses remain that place the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of financial systems and information at risk. During calendar year 2015, the corporation continued to devote attention to securing its financial information and systems that support its mission. Key among its actions were improving controls for identifying and authenticating the identity of users and improving controls for authorizing users' access. However, FDIC continues to have unremediated weaknesses. For example, the corporation (1) did not have an effective process for recertifying user access rights to several systems supporting the corporation's financial processing and (2) had not yet applied critical patches to mitigate known vulnerabilities in third party software on systems supporting financial processing.
Although the corporation had a comprehensive framework for its information security program, some aspects were not fully implemented. For example, the corporation did not (1) fully document and implement procedures for performing system access requests, assignments, and removal and (2) have a policy for monitoring critical file changes. In addition, FDIC had yet to fully address 9 previously-reported weaknesses that were unresolved as of December 31, 2014, as indicated in the following table.
While newly-identified weaknesses, along with those previously identified that remain uncorrected, are not individually or collectively a material weakness or a significant deficiency for financial reporting purposes, the corporation will have limited assurance that its sensitive financial information and resources will be secure until these weaknesses have been mitigated.
What GAO Recommends
In addition to the 9 prior recommendations that have not been fully addressed, GAO is making 2 recommendations to improve FDIC's implementation of its information security program. In a separate report with limited distribution, GAO is making 10 new recommendations to FDIC to address newly-identified weaknesses in access controls. FDIC concurred with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-06-369 | gao_GAO-06-369_0 | DOE and DOD Lack Clear OUO and FOUO Guidance in Key Aspects
Both DOE and DOD have established offices; designated staff; and promulgated policies, manuals, and guides to provide a framework for the OUO and FOUO programs. However, based on our assessment of the policies governing both DOE’s and DOD’s programs, their policies to assure that unclassified but sensitive information is appropriately identified and marked lack sufficient clarity in important areas that could allow for inconsistencies and errors. However, our analysis of DOD’s FOUO policies shows that it is unclear which DOD office is responsible for the FOUO program, and whether personnel designating a document as FOUO should note the FOIA exemption used as the basis for the designation on the document. Also, both DOE’s and DOD’s policies are unclear regarding at what point a document should be marked as OUO or FOUO, and what would be an inappropriate use of the OUO or FOUO designation. In our view, this lack of clarity exists in both DOE and DOD because the agencies have put greater emphasis on managing classified information, which is more sensitive than OUO or FOUO information. Both programs use the exemptions in FOIA for designating information in a document as OUO or FOUO. According to Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, agencies should have sufficient internal controls in place to mitigate risk and assure that employees are aware of what behavior is acceptable and what is unacceptable. However, while both DOE and DOD offer training to staff on managing OUO and FOUO information, neither agency requires any training of its employees before they are allowed to identify and mark information as OUO or FOUO, although some staff will eventually take OUO or FOUO training as part of other mandatory training. DOE and DOD officials told us that limited resources, and in the case of DOE, the newness of the program, have contributed to the lack of training requirements and oversight. Without oversight, neither DOE nor DOD can assure that staff are complying with agency policies. Conclusions
The lack of clear policies, effective training, and oversight in DOE’s and DOD’s OUO and FOUO programs could result in both over- and underprotection of unclassified yet sensitive government documents that may need to be limited from disclosure to the public or persons who do not need to know such information to perform their jobs to prevent potential harm to governmental, commercial, or private interests. Having clear policies and procedures in place, as discussed in Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, can mitigate the risk that programs could be mismanaged and can help DOE and DOD management assure that OUO or FOUO information is appropriately marked and handled. Recommendations for Executive Action
To assure that the guidance governing the FOUO program reflects the necessary internal controls for good program management, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following two actions: revise the regulations that currently provide guidance on the FOUO program to conform to the 1998 policy memo designating which office has responsibility for the FOUO program and revise any regulation governing the FOUO program to require that personnel designating a document as FOUO also mark the document with the FOIA exemption used to determine the information should be restricted. | Why GAO Did This Study
In the interest of national security and personal privacy and for other reasons, federal agencies place dissemination restrictions on information that is unclassified yet still sensitive. The Department of Energy (DOE) and the Department of Defense (DOD) have both issued policy guidance on how and when to protect sensitive information. DOE marks documents with this information as Official Use Only (OUO) while DOD uses the designation For Official Use Only (FOUO). GAO was asked to (1) identify and assess the policies, procedures, and criteria DOE and DOD employ to manage OUO and FOUO information and (2) determine the extent to which DOE's and DOD's training and oversight programs assure that information is identified, marked, and protected according to established criteria.
What GAO Found
Both DOE and DOD base their programs on the premise that information designated as OUO or FOUO must (1) have the potential to cause foreseeable harm to governmental, commercial, or private interests if disseminated to the public or persons who do not need the information to perform their jobs and (2) fall under at least one of eight Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) exemptions. According to GAO's Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, policies, procedures, techniques, and mechanisms should be in place to manage agency activities. However, while DOE and DOD have policies in place, our analysis of these policies showed a lack of clarity in key areas that could allow for inconsistencies and errors. For example, it is unclear which DOD office is responsible for the FOUO program, and whether personnel designating a document as FOUO should note the FOIA exemption used as the basis for the designation on the document. Also, both DOE's and DOD's policies are unclear regarding at what point a document should be marked as OUO or FOUO and what would be an inappropriate use of the OUO or FOUO designation. For example, OUO or FOUO designations should not be used to cover up agency mismanagement. In our view, this lack of clarity exists in both DOE and DOD because the agencies have put greater emphasis on managing classified information, which is more sensitive than OUO or FOUO. While both DOE and DOD offer training on their OUO and FOUO policies, neither DOE nor DOD has an agencywide requirement that employees be trained before they designate documents as OUO or FOUO. Moreover, neither agency conducts oversight to assure that information is appropriately identified and marked as OUO or FOUO. According to Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, training and oversight are important elements in creating a good internal control program. DOE and DOD officials told us that limited resources, and in the case of DOE, the newness of the program, have contributed to the lack of training requirements and oversight. Nonetheless, the lack of training requirements and oversight of the OUO and FOUO programs leave DOE and DOD officials unable to assure that OUO and FOUO documents are marked and handled in a manner consistent with agency policies and may result in inconsistencies and errors in the application of the programs. |
gao_GAO-05-155 | gao_GAO-05-155_0 | DOD’s Space S&T Strategy Addresses the Act’s Requirements
The act required DOD to develop a strategy for its space S&T efforts that identified short- and long-term space S&T goals; a process for achieving the goals, including an implementation plan; and a process for assessing progress made toward achieving the goals. The strategy, yet to be delivered to the Congress at the time of our review, met four of nine requirements, and plans are in place to meet the remaining five. However, since the strategy has only recently been issued, it is too early to assess whether the direction and processes outlined in the strategy will be effective in supporting and guiding future space S&T efforts. Details on both of these mechanisms are still being worked out, according to the developers of the strategy. Even though they all have ties to space, these organizations have different views as to what overall goals the space community should strive for and how they should be achieved. Additional Criteria Are Not Included in the Act That May Enhance the Strategy
In addition to the requirements specified by the act, we found that optimizing space S&T efforts also depends on whether (1) the strategy is clearly linked to other strategies and plans; (2) all DOD space S&T efforts are covered by the strategy; and (3) the strategy identifies metrics beyond TRLs that focus on success. Linkage to other strategies and plans is important to providing clear guidance to S&T laboratories and other organizations making investments since there are a number of DOD-wide “strategies” for S&T as well as a number of space-related higher level strategic plans as well as tactical plans relating to S&T. If DOD does not explicitly include acquisition programs in the space S&T strategy, it will not be able to ensure the S&T community has oversight over a considerable amount of ongoing technology development. Such metrics would help provide a foundation for assessing progress in achieving strategic goals. Moreover, the space S&T strategy itself merely lays out goals for workforce without identifying actions or resources needed to achieve those goals. Funding Process Encourages Technology Development to Occur within Acquisition Programs
We have previously reported that an S&T environment is more forgiving and less costly than a delivery-oriented acquisition program environment. Moreover, there are formidable barriers that stand in the way of achieving and measuring progress, including inadequate funding visibility, decreased testing resources, workforce deficiencies, and long-standing incentives that encourage technology development to take place within acquisition programs rather than the S&T community. By using the strategy as a tool for assessing and addressing these challenges, DOD can better position itself for achieving its goals and also strengthen the S&T base supporting space. Establish protocols and mechanisms for enhancing coordination and knowledge sharing between the DOD S&T community, acquisition programs involved in space, and DOD intelligence agencies. V for DOD’s comments.) Active research and development is initiated. Appendix IV: Organizations That Participated in Developing the Space Science and Technology Strategy
Appendix V: Comments from the Department of Defense | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Defense (DOD) is depending heavily on new space-based technologies to support and transform future military operations. Yet there are concerns that efforts to develop technologies for space systems are not tied to strategic goals for space and are not well planned or coordinated. In the National Defense Authorization Act for 2004, the Congress required DOD to develop a space science and technology (S&T) strategy that sets out goals and a process for achieving those goals. The Congress also required GAO to assess this strategy as well as the required coordination process.
What GAO Found
DOD's new strategy for space S&T met four of the nine requirements set out by the Congress and plans are in place to meet the remaining requirements. These included requirements for setting short- and long-term goals and a process for achieving those goals as well as requirements that focused on ensuring the strategy was developed with laboratories, research components, and other organizations involved in space S&T and ensuring the strategy would be reviewed by appropriate entities and revised periodically. In addition to meeting these requirements, GAO found that development of the strategy itself helped spur collaboration within the DOD space S&T community since it required diverse organizations to come together, share knowledge, and establish agreement on basic goals. Since the strategy has only recently been issued, it is too early to assess whether the direction and processes outlined in the strategy will be effective in supporting and guiding future space S&T efforts. Moreover, DOD officials are still working out the details of some implementation mechanisms. However, in order to better position DOD for successful implementation, GAO believes that the plan should contain stronger linkages to DOD's requirements setting process, identify additional measures for assessing progress in achieving strategic goals, and explicitly cover all efforts related to space S&T. Moreover, there are formidable barriers that stand in the way of optimizing DOD's investment in space S&T. DOD does not have complete visibility over all spending related to space S&T, including spending occurring within some S&T organizations and acquisition programs. Without a means to see where funding is being targeted, DOD may not be able to assure all spending on technology development is focused on achieving its goals. The S&T community itself may not have resources critical to achieving DOD's goals. In recent years, funding and opportunities for testing for the space S&T community have decreased. And, concerns have grown about the adequacy of the space S&T workforce. DOD acquisition programs continue to undertake technology development that should be occurring within an S&T environment, which is more forgiving and less costly than a delivery-oriented acquisition program environment. Until this is done, cost increases resulting from technology problems within acquisitions may keep resources away from the S&T community. By using the strategy as a tool for assessing and addressing these challenges, DOD can better position itself for achieving its goals and also strengthen the S&T base supporting space. |
gao_GAO-13-336 | gao_GAO-13-336_0 | Logistics Program Deficiencies in Previous Reports
In past reports, GAO and VHA identified major deficiencies related to VHA’s management of medical supply and equipment inventories and the standardization of such items. VAMCs and Networks We Visited Have Partially Complied with New VHA Requirements to Address Deficiencies in Its Logistics Program
To address deficiencies in its logistics program, VHA issued new requirements in 2011 mainly in three areas—management of medical supplies and equipment in VAMCs’ inventories, the standardization of these items, and the monitoring of VAMCs’ logistics programs. These requirements, some of which apply to VAMCs and some of which apply to networks, are designed to improve veterans’ safety and the cost-effective use of resources. We found that the five VAMCs we visited and their corresponding networks have partially complied with VHA’s new requirements, as of December 2012. None of the VAMCs We Visited Fully Complied with Requirements for Managing Inventories
None of the VAMCs we visited fully complied with all of VHA’s new requirements for managing inventories. One VAMC We Visited and Two Networks Have Fully Complied with VHA’s Standardization Requirements
One VAMC we visited and two networks fully complied with VHA’s new standardization requirements, and the remaining four VAMCs and three networks have partially complied. Four VAMCs We Visited and Three Networks Have Fully Complied with VHA’s Monitoring Requirements
Four of the five VAMCs we visited and three of the five corresponding networks had fully complied with the new monitoring requirements at the time of our visit. VHA Has Additional Efforts Underway to Further Improve Its Logistics Program, but They Face Uncertainty about Implementation
In addition to the new VAMC and network requirements, VHA has other efforts underway that—according to officials—will further improve the management and tracking of medical supplies and equipment in VAMC inventories and the standardization of such items across VHA. Specifically, VHA is (1) developing a new inventory management system that will replace VHA’s existing systems for managing medical supply and equipment inventories, (2) developing a system for electronically tracking the location of certain medical supplies and equipment in VAMCs, and (3) establishing a program executive office that will provide logistics support and manage the standardization of medical supplies and equipment VHA-wide. However, there are uncertainties related to implementation, funding, and operational issues that may impede their success, if not appropriately addressed. System interoperability issues. Officials told us that efforts to hire additional staff are currently on hold because VHA intends to evaluate the effectiveness of the new program executive office before committing additional resources to it. However, because VAMCs we visited and the associated networks have only partially complied with these requirements, the potential risks to patient safety and the inefficient use of resources remain. Recommendations for Executive Action
We recommend that the Secretary of Veterans Affairs direct the Under Secretary for Health to take the following actions: To assist VAMCs and networks in complying with VHA’s new logistics requirements, and thereby help ensure patient safety and the cost- effective use of resources, determine appropriate resource levels for VAMC logistics programs and provide training and best practices to VAMCs to help them ensure that logistics staff, rather than clinical department staff, manage all medical supplies; ensure that all items that VAMCs purchase are captured on their lists of approved medical supplies and RME; and enter all stock surgical and dental instruments into the appropriate reinforce through communication the requirement that VAMCs develop a formal process for reviewing and approving emergency purchases of medical supplies and RME, develop a systematic method using available VHA data to assist VAMCs in tracking compliance with national contracts and blanket purchase agreements, and issue guidance to VAMCs and networks regarding interpretation of the Management Quality Assurance Service checklist and reinforce through communication the requirement that VAMCs correct deficiencies within 90 days after they were identified or request an extension and that networks use the entire checklist when conducting their reviews of VAMC logistics programs and complete their review within the required time frame. With respect to its plans for addressing our recommendations, VA described specific actions that VHA, networks, and VAMCs plan to take to improve VAMCs’ and networks’ compliance with VHA’s logistics requirements. Therefore, we concluded that uncertainty existed with regard to the continued implementation of this office. | Why GAO Did This Study
VHAs logistics program is responsible for the management of medical supplies and equipment in VAMCs inventories and the standardization of such items throughout VHA. Previous reports have pointed to deficiencies in VHAs logistics program.
GAO assessed (1) the extent to which VAMCs and networks have complied with new VHA requirements to remedy known deficiencies in its logistics program and (2) VHAs progress in enhancing its logistics program. GAO reviewed documents and interviewed officials to identify new requirements affecting VHAs logistics program. GAO then visited a nongeneralizable sample of five VAMCs and verified the extent to which the VAMCs and corresponding networks, which oversee VAMCs, were complying with VHAs new requirements. GAO also reviewed documentation of VHAs plans for funding, implementing, and evaluating efforts it is undertaking to enhance its logistics program, examined the extent to which VHA was on track to execute those plans, and assessed VHAs efforts against criteria in GAOs standards for internal control in the federal government.
What GAO Found
To address deficiencies in its logistics program, the Veterans Health Administration (VHA) issued new requirements in 2011 regarding the management of medical supplies and equipment in Veterans Affairs medical centers (VAMC) inventories, the standardization of these items, and the monitoring of VAMCs logistics programs. These requirements, some of which apply to VAMCs and some of which apply to networks, are designed to improve veterans safety and the cost-effective use of resources. GAO found that the five VAMCs GAO visited and their corresponding networks have partially complied with VHAs new requirements. Specifically, as of December 2012,
none of the VAMCs GAO visited fully complied with all of VHAs new requirements for managing inventories;
one VAMC GAO visited and two networks fully complied with VHAs new standardization requirements, and the remaining four VAMCs and three networks partially complied; and
four of the five VAMCs GAO visited and three of the five corresponding networks fully complied with the new monitoring requirements.
Because VAMCs GAO visited and the associated networks have only partially complied with these requirements, potential risks to patient safety and the inefficient use of resources remain.
In addition to the new VAMC and network requirements, VHA has other efforts underway thataccording to officialswill further improve the management and tracking of medical supplies and equipment in VAMC inventories and the standardization of such items across VHA. However, there are substantive uncertainties relating to implementation, funding, and operational issues that may impede their success, if not appropriately addressed. Specifically:
VHA is piloting a new inventory management system that is intended to replace VHAs existing systems for managing medical supply and equipment inventories. However, VHA has not fully funded the pilot, staffing resources to implement it at VAMCs are limited, and VHA has yet to resolve technical issues to ensure that this new system can interface with legacy systems. Furthermore, VHA has yet to develop criteria and collect corresponding data to evaluate the performance of the pilot.
VHA is also implementing a system for electronically tracking the location of certain medical supplies and equipment in VAMCs. However, there are uncertainties with respect to interoperability issues with other inventory management systems and resources to implement the system.
Lastly, VHA is establishing a program executive office that will provide logistics support and manage the standardization of medical supplies and equipment VHA-wide. However, the office has not been fully staffed and uncertainty exists about its continued implementation, because VHA's efforts to hire additional staff are on hold pending its evaluation of the effectiveness of this office.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that VHA take steps to assist VAMCs and networks in complying with VHAs new logistics requirements and develop plans for implementing and evaluating the performance of its efforts to improve its logistics program, which address the concernssuch as system interoperability issuesGAO identified. VA concurred with GAOs recommendations and provided an action plan to address them. |
gao_GAO-12-510T | gao_GAO-12-510T_0 | Background
DOD’s MCRS-16, which was completed in February 2010, was to provide senior leaders with a detailed understanding of the range of mobility capabilities needed for possible future military operations and help leaders make investment decisions regarding mobility systems. MCRS-16 had several objectives, including to determine capability shortfalls (gaps) and excessesmobility force structure, provide a risk assessment, and identify the capabilities and requirements to support national strategy. DOD Did Not Clearly Identify Some Important Mobility Issues in the MCRS-16 and Its New Strategic Guidance Raises Questions
While the MCRS-16 included some useful information concerning air mobility systems, the report did not clearly meet two of its objectives because it did not provide decision makers with specific information concerning (1) shortfalls and excesses associated with the mobility force structure or (2) risks associated with shortfalls or excesses of its mobility capabilities. For each of the three cases of potential conflicts or natural disasters DOD used in the MCRS-16, the department identified the required capabilities for air mobility systems. Using DOD data from the MCRS-16, we were able to discern possible shortfalls or potential capacity that could be considered excess or used as an operational reserve even though the MCRS-16 report was ambiguous regarding whether actual shortfalls or excess capabilities existed (see figure). In our December 2010 report, we recommended that DOD explicitly identify the shortfalls and excesses in the mobility systems that DOD analyzed for the MCRS-16 and provide this additional analysis to DOD and congressional decision makers. Study Did Not Identify Associated Risks of Shortfalls or Excesses in Air Mobility Systems
The MCRS-16 also did not clearly achieve its study objective to provide Assessing risk related to shortfalls and excesses is risk assessments.important—the risk associated with shortfalls is that the mission might not be accomplished, while the risk associated with excesses is that resources may be expended unnecessarily on a mobility capability. DOD’s New Strategic Guidance May Affect Required Air Mobility Capabilities
In January 2012, DOD issued new strategic guidance, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense, that will help guide decisions regarding the size and shape of the force. However, the strategic guidance includes changes from previous strategy—for example, U.S. forces will no longer be sized to conduct large-scale, prolonged stability operations.past, DOD has translated strategic guidance into specific planning In the scenarios, which DOD has used in studies (such as the MCRS-16) to generate requirements that inform force structure decisions. Based on the new strategic guidance, the Air Force has proposed changes to the mobility air fleet, including the retirement or cancellation of procurement of 130 mobility aircraft. According to Air Force officials, the proposals ensure that the Air Force can deliver the capabilities required by the new strategic guidance and remain within funding levels. However, the Air Force’s February 2012 document that outlines its proposed aircraft retirements does not provide details of any analyses. Given the new strategic guidance—which articulates priorities for a 21st century defense—it is unclear the extent to which the requirements developed from the MCRS-16 are still relevant. Decision makers would benefit from a clear understanding from DOD of the basis for the proposed aircraft retirements and DOD’s ability to execute its new strategic guidance with its planned air mobility force structure. | Why GAO Did This Study
Over the past 30 years, the Department of Defense (DOD) has invested more than $140 billion in its airlift and tanker forces. In 2010, DOD published its Mobility Capabilities and Requirements Study 2016 (MCRS-16), which was intended to provide an understanding of the range of mobility capabilities needed for possible military operations. In January 2012, DOD issued new strategic guidance, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense , affecting force structure decisions. This testimony addresses GAOs previous findings on the MCRS-16 and air mobility issues to consider in light of DODs new strategic guidance.
GAOs December 2010 report on the MCRS-16 (GAO-11-82R) is based on analysis of DODs executive summary and classified report, and interviews with DOD officials.
What GAO Found
The Mobility Capabilities and Requirements Study 2016 (MCRS-16) provided some useful information concerning air mobility systemssuch as intratheater airlift, strategic airlift, and air refuelingbut several weaknesses in the study raised questions about its ability to fully inform decision makers. In particular, the MCRS-16 did not provide decision makers with recommendations concerning shortfalls and excesses in air mobility systems. In evaluating capabilities, the MCRS-16 used three cases that it developed of potential conflicts or natural disasters and identified the required capabilities for air mobility systems. Based on data in the MCRS-16, GAO was able to discern possible shortfalls or potential capacity that could be considered excess or an operational reserve, even though the MCRS-16 was ambiguous regarding whether actual shortfalls or excess capabilities exist. It also did not identify the risk associated with potential shortfalls or excesses. Identifying the risk associated with specific mobility systems could help with decisions to allocate resources.
The Department of Defense (DOD) issued new strategic guidance in January 2012, which is intended to help guide decisions regarding the size and shape of the force. In the past, DOD has translated strategic guidance into specific planning scenarios, which it used in studies (such as the MCRS-16) to generate requirements that inform force structure decisions. Based on the new strategic guidance, the Air Force has proposed reducing its mobility air fleet by 130 aircraft, which would leave 593 mobility aircraft in the airlift fleet. According to Air Force officials, the proposals will enable the Air Force to deliver the airlift capabilities required to implement the new strategic guidance and remain within funding levels. However, the Air Forces document that outlines its proposed aircraft retirements does not provide details of any analyses used to support the reductions. Given the new strategic guidance, it is unclear the extent to which the requirements developed from MCRS-16 are still relevant. In weighing the Air Forces proposal, decision makers would benefit from a clear understanding from DOD of the basis for the proposed aircraft retirements and DODs ability to execute its new strategic guidance with its planned air mobility force structure.
What GAO Recommends
GAO previously recommended that DOD clearly identify shortfalls and excesses in the mobility force structure and the associated risks. DOD did not concur with the recommendations, stating that the MCRS-16 identified shortfalls and excesses and included a risk assessment. GAO disagreed, noting for example, that DODs MCRS-16 study did not explicitly identify excess aircraft and did not include mobility system risk assessments when potential shortfalls existed. |
gao_GGD-98-54 | gao_GGD-98-54_0 | On May 15, 1997, Treasury submitted its modernization blueprint to the Congress. Investment Decision Management. First, IRS does not yet have detailed process definitions for any of the SLC phases. For instance, IRS has not clearly defined how requirements will be formulated and how they will be assessed and prioritized; how projects will be controlled and evaluated; what data will be required and what evaluation criteria will be used; how system designs will be assessed and how system developments and acquisitions will be managed; and how architectural compliance will be determined and enforced. Moreover, as discussed later in more detail, neither the CIO nor any other organizational entity has sufficient authority to implement SLC processes and enforce architectural compliance agencywide. Blueprint Products Are a Good Start but Are Incomplete or Insufficient
While the products constituting IRS’ May 15, 1997, modernization blueprint represent a good first step and a foundation upon which to build, none are complete. To IRS’ credit, some of these requirements provide for significant improvements in IRS’ financial management capabilities. Traceability is critical to ensuring that systems meet users needs. The architecture has other positive attributes. As a result, it is not yet known which of the system components will satisfy which of the requirements, or how it will do so. In particular, the CIO does not have budgetary and organizational authority over all IRS systems development, research and development, and maintenance activities. As a result, the components do not yet provide an adequate basis for effectively and efficiently developing or acquiring systems. However, the CIO does not have the authority needed to enforce the modernization blueprint (once it is completed) agencywide. Recommendations
To ensure that IRS develops a complete blueprint for modernizing its information systems, we recommend that the Commissioner of Internal Revenue require the IRS CIO to: complete the definition and implementation of all SLC processes, including processes for ensuring disciplined software development and acquisition and for validating SLC products; for each phase of the modernization, define business requirements and complete the architecture with sufficient detail and precision to build or acquire systems; formulate a sequencing plan that specifies (1) phase and release cost and schedule estimates, (2) projects that constitute the phases and releases, (3) project cost and schedule estimates, (4) project interdependencies, (5) the evolution of architectural subfunctions, and (6) the projects that replace legacy systems that are eliminated; and validate the business requirements, architecture, and sequencing plan using the completed and implemented SLC processes. IRS also agreed that (1) the blueprint is not yet complete and does not provide sufficient detail and precision for building or acquiring new systems and (2) the SLC needs to be completed and implemented as a precondition to completing and validating the blueprint as well as proceeding with the modernization. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Pursuant to congressional direction in the conference report accompanying the fiscal year 1997 Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 104-208), on May 15, 1997, IRS issued a blueprint for defining, directing, and controlling its modernization. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the modernization blueprint that the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) prepared pursuant to the conference report accompanying the fiscal year 1997 Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) IRS' May 15, 1997, modernization blueprint is a good first step and provides a solid foundation from which to determine precise business requirements, a complete target architecture, and a discipline set of processes and detailed plans for validating, implementing, and enforcing the architecture; (2) similarly, the blueprint's business requirements specify needed improvements in such areas as financial management, and the architecture and sequencing plan include several positive attributes, including traceability between business requirements and systems and high-level descriptions of data and security subarchitectures; (3) however, the blueprint is not yet complete and does not provide sufficient detail and precision for building or acquiring new systems; (4) in particular, IRS' systems life cycle (SLC) does not define in sufficient detail any of the SLC processes needed to manage technology investments; (5) as a result, IRS does not yet know: (a) how systems will actually be designed, developed, tested, or acquired; (b) how compliance with standards will be assessed and ensured; (c) how progress on projects will be determined; or (d) how key SLC products will be validated; (6) additionally, IRS plans for each of the three remaining blueprint components--business requirements, architecture, and sequencing plan--to include four levels of progressively greater detail; (7) as of May 15, 1997, IRS had completed the first two levels; (8) as a result, information that is critical to effective and efficient systems modernization is not yet known, essential decisions have not yet been made, and needed actions have not yet been taken; (9) IRS' Chief Information Officer (CIO) has acknowledged that essential elements are missing from the May 15, 1997, blueprint, and stated that he has begun addressing these voids; (10) however, even though IRS has given the CIO increased responsibility and accountability for managing and controlling systems development, acquisition, and maintenance, neither the CIO nor any other IRS organizational entity has budgetary and organizational authority over all IRS systems activities; and (11) as a result, it is unlikely that IRS will be able to institutionally implement and enforce its modernization blueprint once it is completed. |
gao_GAO-09-29 | gao_GAO-09-29_0 | The process requires event-driven decision making by high-ranking executives at a number of key points in an investment’s life cycle. Lack of Adherence to the Investment Review Process Led to Oversight Being Seldom Applied to Support Successful Acquisition Outcomes
DHS has not effectively implemented or adhered to its investment review process due to a lack of involvement by senior officials as well as limited resources and monitoring; consequently, DHS has not identified and addressed cost, schedule, and performance problems in many major investments. Poor implementation largely rests on DHS’s inability to ensure that the IRB and JRC effectively carried out their oversight responsibilities. Of 48 major investments requiring department-level review, 45 were not reviewed in accordance with the department’s investment review policy, and 18 were not reviewed at all. Moreover, when IRB meetings were held, DHS did not consistently enforce decisions that were reached because the department did not track whether components and offices took the actions required by the IRB. We found that two out of nine components do not have required component-level review processes to adequately manage their major investments. Most Major Investments Lacked Required Departmental Reviews and Many of Those Exceeded Cost Estimates
Of DHS’s 48 major investments requiring department-level review between fiscal year 2004 and the second quarter of fiscal year 2008, only three had all milestone and annual reviews. Fourteen of the investments that lacked appropriate review through IRB and JRC oversight experienced cost growth, schedule delays, and underperformance—some of which was substantial. This issue is long-standing. It also called for the investment to be reviewed annually. The assessment identified a range of systemic weaknesses in the implementation of its investment review process and in the process itself. DHS’s Investment Review and Budget Processes Are Not Integrated to Help Ensure That Major Investments Maximize Resources to Meet Mission Needs
DHS’s annual budget process for funding major investments has not been appropriately informed by the investment review process—largely because the IRB seldom conducts oversight reviews and when it has, the two processes have not been aligned to better ensure funding decisions fulfill mission needs. In addition, two-thirds of DHS major investments did not have required life-cycle cost estimates, which are essential to making informed budget and capital planning decisions. At the same time, DHS has not conducted regular reviews of its investment portfolios—broad categories of investments—to ensure effective performance and minimize unintended duplication of effort for proposed and ongoing investments. In July 2008, more than one-quarter of DHS’s major investments were designated by OMB as poorly planned and by DHS as poorly performing. DHS Budget Decisions for Major Investments Have Generally Not Been Informed by Mission Needs and Life-Cycle Cost Estimates
The DHS investment review process calls for IRB decisions and program guidance regarding new investments to be reflected to the extent possible in the budget. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
Our objectives were to: (1) evaluate DHS’s implementation of the investment review process, and (2) assess DHS’s integration of the investment review and budget processes to ensure major investments fulfill mission needs. In addition, we reviewed relevant GAO reports. Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security
Appendix III: Key Acquisition Documents by Major Investment
Mission needs statements, operational requirements documents, and acquisition program baselines establish capability gaps, requirements needed to address those gaps, and cost, schedule, and performance parameters, respectively. It will provide DHS with a common flexible suite of human resource business systems. | Why GAO Did This Study
In fiscal year 2007, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) obligated about $12 billion for acquisitions to support homeland security missions. DHS's major investments include Coast Guard ships and aircraft; border surveillance and screening equipment; nuclear detection equipment; and systems to track finances and human resources. In part to provide insight into the cost, schedule, and performance of these acquisitions, DHS established an investment review process in 2003. However, concerns have been raised about how well the process has been implemented--particularly for large investments. GAO was asked to (1) evaluate DHS's implementation of the investment review process, and (2) assess DHS's integration of the investment review and budget processes to ensure major investments fulfill mission needs. GAO reviewed relevant documents, including those for 57 DHS major investments (investments with a value of at least $50 million)--48 of which required department-level review through the second quarter of fiscal year 2008; and interviewed DHS headquarters and component officials.
What GAO Found
While DHS's investment review process calls for executive decision making at key points in an investment's life cycle--including program authorization--the process has not provided the oversight needed to identify and address cost, schedule, and performance problems in its major investments. Poor implementation of the process is evidenced by the number of investments that did not adhere to the department's investment review policy--of DHS's 48 major investments requiring milestone and annual reviews, 45 were not assessed in accordance with this policy. At least 14 of these investments have reported cost growth, schedule slips, or performance shortfalls. Poor implementation is largely the result of DHS's failure to ensure that its Investment Review Board (IRB) and Joint Requirements Council (JRC)--the department's major acquisition decision-making bodies--effectively carried out their oversight responsibilities and had the resources to do so. Regardless, when oversight boards met, DHS could not enforce IRB and JRC decisions because it did not track whether components took actions called for in these decisions. In addition, many major investments lacked basic acquisition documents necessary to inform the investment review process, such as program baselines, and two out of nine components--which manage a total of 8 major investments--do not have required component-level processes in place. DHS has begun several efforts to address these shortcomings, including issuing an interim directive, to improve the investment review process. The investment review framework also integrates the budget process; however, budget decisions have been made in the absence of required oversight reviews and, as a result, DHS cannot ensure that annual funding decisions for its major investments make the best use of resources and address mission needs. GAO found almost a third of DHS's major investments received funding without having validated mission needs and requirements--which confirm a need is justified--and two-thirds did not have required life- cycle cost estimates. At the same time, DHS has not conducted regular reviews of its investment portfolios--broad categories of investments that are linked by similar missions--to ensure effective performance and minimize unintended duplication of effort for investments. Without validated requirements, life-cycle cost estimates, and regular portfolio reviews, DHS cannot ensure that its investment decisions are appropriate and will ultimately address capability gaps. In July 2008, 15 of the 57 DHS major investments reviewed by GAO were designated by the Office of Management and Budget as poorly planned and by DHS as poorly performing. |
gao_GAO-16-151 | gao_GAO-16-151_0 | Figure 3 shows that a key indicator of taxpayer service, the level of service (LOS)—defined as the percentage of people who want to speak with an IRS assistor who were able to reach one—declined to about 38 percent in fiscal year 2015. Additionally, average wait times have almost tripled from about 11 minutes to more than 30 minutes since fiscal year 2010. IRS agreed with this recommendation, but as of October 2015, had yet to implement it. We also found that IRS’s taxpayer authentication tools have limitations. IRS Does Not Have Adequate Controls to Ensure Assistors Consistently Send Accurate Correspondence to Taxpayers
Since fiscal year 2010, IRS assistors achieved customer accuracy scores of 85 percent or higher when working correspondence cases. However, Treasury does not include correspondence overage rates as a performance measure in its performance plan or annual financial report, inhibiting its efforts to create a complete set of customer service performance metrics for IRS. IRS has not yet developed a telephone measure benchmarked to the best in business or customer expectations. Without defining a comprehensive strategy with specific goals for customer service tied to the best in business and customer expectations, Treasury and IRS are not effectively conveying to Congress the types and levels of customer service expected by taxpayers and the capabilities and resources IRS requires to achieve those levels. In spite of these challenges, IRS officials and tax preparation industry stakeholders reported relatively few problems processing returns, which IRS attributed primarily to significant advance planning. Matter for Congressional Consideration
To improve taxpayer service amid declining budgets and increased responsibilities, Congress should consider requiring the Secretary of the Treasury to develop a comprehensive customer service strategy in consultation with the Commissioner of Internal Revenue that (1) determines appropriate telephone and correspondence levels of service, based on service provided by the best in business and customer expectations; and (2) thoroughly assesses which services IRS can shift to self-service options. Periodically conduct performance evaluations of IRS return processing operations to identify inefficiencies. Treasury neither agreed nor disagreed with our recommendation to update the Department’s performance plan to include correspondence overage rates as a part of Treasury’s goals. Regarding our recommendation to set up a control in IRS systems to require assistors to send required correspondence before closing a case, IRS stated that it would analyze its options for bolstering controls to address correspondence concerns. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives in this report were to 1. assess how well the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) provided customer service compared to its performance in prior years and identify opportunities for IRS to streamline services, 2. assess how well IRS processed individual income tax returns compared to its performance in prior years and identify opportunities for IRS to streamline processing, and 3. determine what resources IRS realized from implementing service initiatives and describe IRS's progress toward implementing our prior filing season-related recommendations. To answer the first and second objectives, we obtained and analyzed IRS documents and data, including performance, budget, and workload data for return processing and taxpayer services, and used this information to compare IRS’s performance in 2015 to prior years (2010 through 2014) to identify trends and anomalies; identified federal standards for evaluating customer service, such as the Government Performance and Results Act Modernization Act and executive orders, presidential memorandums and Office of Management and Budget guidance to strengthen customer service, and compared Department of the Treasury and IRS actions to those standards; visited IRS facilities in Austin to observe return processing and assistors handling correspondence, and the Joint Operations Center (which manages IRS’s telephone operations) in Atlanta to observe assistors answering taxpayer calls and correspondence; interviewed officials from IRS’s Wage and Investment division (which is responsible for managing filing season operations) and external stakeholders, including tax administration experts from major tax preparation and software firms who interact with IRS on key aspects of the filing season, to obtain contextual information about IRS’s performance; interviewed officials from the Department of the Treasury and IRS to discuss goals and strategies to improve taxpayer services and steps they have taken to measure performance in delivering such services; conducted 10 discussion groups with IRS frontline staff and managers located at five IRS campuses. 6. | Why GAO Did This Study
During tax filing season, IRS processes tax returns, issues refunds, and provides telephone, correspondence, online, and face-to-face services. GAO has reported that in recent years IRS has absorbed significant budget cuts and struggled to provide quality service. GAO was asked to report on the results of IRS's performance during the 2015 filing season. For this report, GAO assessed IRS's taxpayer service and individual income tax return processing. GAO also identified opportunities to streamline services and processes, among other issues.
GAO analyzed IRS documents and data, and observed operations at IRS processing and telephone sites. GAO compared IRS performance to prior years and its actions to federal standards for evaluating performance. GAO also interviewed IRS officials and external stakeholders, and conducted discussion groups with IRS frontline staff and managers.
What GAO Found
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) provided the lowest level of telephone service during fiscal year 2015 compared to prior years, with only 38 percent of callers who wanted to speak with an IRS assistor able to reach one. This lower level of service occurred despite lower demand from callers seeking live assistance, which has fallen by 6 percent since 2010 to about 51 million callers in 2015. Over the same period, average wait times have almost tripled to over 30 minutes. IRS also struggled to answer correspondence in a timely manner and assistors increasingly either failed to send required correspondence to taxpayers or included inaccurate information in correspondence sent. IRS has taken steps to remind assistors to send correspondence, but does not have adequate controls to ensure that they send accurate correspondence before closing cases. GAO also found that the Department of the Treasury (Treasury) does not include correspondence performance goals in its performance plan, and therefore, does not have a complete set of measures to assess performance. The decline in service has coincided with a 10 percent reduction in IRS's annual appropriations, as well as resource allocation decisions by IRS to meet statutory responsibilities, such as implementing tax law changes and supporting information technology infrastructure.
More importantly, GAO found that Treasury and IRS have neither developed nor have any plans to develop a comprehensive customer service strategy to define appropriate service levels and benchmark to the best in business or customer expectations as GAO has previously recommended. Without such a strategy, Treasury and IRS can neither measure nor effectively communicate to Congress the types and levels of customer service taxpayers should expect, and the resources needed to reach those levels. Similarly, while IRS officials and stakeholders reported few problems with processing individual tax returns, GAO identified some inefficiencies related to tax processing, such as premature correspondence with taxpayers and inadequate training for frontline staff. These inefficiencies warrant further evaluation to determine if additional improvements are needed.
What GAO Recommends
Congress should consider requiring Treasury to develop a comprehensive customer service strategy in consultation with IRS. Treasury should update its performance plan to include goals for correspondence. IRS should assess the feasibility of a control to require assistors to send out required correspondence and evaluate return processing operations to identify inefficiencies.
Treasury neither agreed nor disagreed with GAO's recommendation to update its performance plan but said it would coordinate with IRS. IRS agreed with GAO's two other recommendations. |
gao_GAO-03-310 | gao_GAO-03-310_0 | Achieving Sustainable Solvency
The use of our criteria to evaluate approaches to Social Security reform highlights the trade-offs that exist between efforts to achieve solvency for the OASDI trust funds and efforts to maintain adequate retirement income for current and future beneficiaries. Our analysis of Model 2 shows that: Median monthly benefits (the Social Security defined benefit plus the benefit from the individual account) for those choosing individual accounts are always higher, despite a benefit offset, than for those who do not choose the account, and this gap grows over time. For the lowest quintile of beneficiaries, median monthly benefits with universal participation in the accounts tend to be higher than the benefits received under the benefit reduction benchmark, likely due to the enhanced benefit for full-time “minimum wage” workers. This pattern becomes more pronounced over time. Regardless of whether an account is chosen, under Model 2 many people could receive monthly benefits that are higher than the benefit reduction benchmark. However, a minority could fare worse. Some people could also receive a benefit greater than under the tax increase benchmark although a majority could fare worse. Monthly benefits for those choosing individual accounts will be sensitive to the actual rates of return earned by those accounts. The primary risk is that a significant funding gap exists between currently scheduled and funded benefits which, although it will not occur for a number of years, is significant and will grow over time. Finally, any Social Security reform proposal must also be looked at in the context of the nation’s overall long-range fiscal imbalances. As our long- term budget simulations show, difficult choices will be required of policymakers to reconcile a large and growing gap between projected revenues and spending resulting primarily from known demographic trends and rising health care costs. Briefing focuses on Model 2, with results for Model 3 presented in The Commission’s models include a voluntary individual account option. If participation were universal, transfers would be needed for about three decades. Sustainable solvency also includes assessing the effects of proposed program changes on the federal budget and on the economy. Reforms that reduce pressures on the federal budget and reduce the size of the economy that will be absorbed in the future by the Social Security system can lead to sustainable solvency. This criterion evaluates the balance struck between the twin goals of income adequacy (level and certainty of benefits) and individual equity (rates of return on individual contributions). To what extent does the proposal: Change scheduled benefits for current and future retirees? However, benefit levels received without accounts fall below the benefit reduction benchmark over time. Model inputs Social Security spending (OASDI) Medicare spending (HI and SMI)
Nonfederal saving (percent of GDP): gross saving of the private sector and state and local government sector Net foreign investment (percent of GDP)
Assumptions 2001 Social Security Trustees’ intermediate projections 2001 Medicare Trustees’ intermediate assumption that per enrollee Medicare spending grows with GDP per capita plus 1 percentage point CBO’s July 2002 long-term assumption that per enrollee Medicaid spending grows with GDP per capita plus 1 percentage point CBO’s August 2002 baseline through 2012; thereafter increases at the rate of economic growth (i.e., remains constant as a share of GDP) CBO’s August 2002 baseline through 2012, adjusted for the 2001 Social Security Trustees’ inflation assumptions; thereafter increases at the rate of economic growth CBO’s August 2002 baseline through 2012; thereafter remains constant at 20.5 percent of GDP (CBO’s projection in 2012) Increases gradually over the first 10 years to 17.5 percent of GDP (the average nonfederal saving rate from 1992-2001)
Inflation (GDP price index and CPI) Interest rate (average on the national debt)
Balancing Adequacy and Equity - Benchmarks
– The tax increase (maintain benefits) benchmark – increases the
payroll tax once and immediately by the amount of the OASDI actuarial deficit as a percent of payroll so that benefits received under the current system can continue to be paid throughout the projection period. Over the long term, however, greater individual account participation would reduce the government’s cash requirements. by Cohort Compared to Benefit Reduction Benchmark, Varying Real
Benefits by Cohort Compared to Tax Increase Benchmark, Varying Real Rates of Return by Plus 1 and Minus 1 Percent
Overview of Model 3 Disabled Worker Quintile
Median monthly benefits are maintained above the benefit reduction benchmark for the lowest quintile regardless of participation in individual accounts likely due to the enhanced benefit for full-time “minimum wage” workers (see Figure A-13). | Why GAO Did This Study
Social Security is an important social insurance program affecting virtually every American family. It represents a foundation of the nation's retirement income system and provides millions of Americans with disability insurance and survivors' benefits. Over the long term, as the baby boom generation retires, Social Security's financing shortfall presents a major solvency and sustainability challenge. Numerous reform proposals have been put forward in recent years, and in December 2001 a commission appointed by the President presented three possible reform models. Senator Breaux, Chairman of the Senate Special Committee on Aging, asked GAO to use its analytic framework to evaluate the Commission's models. This framework consists of three criteria: (1) the extent to which a proposal achieves sustainable solvency and how it would affect the economy and the federal budget; (2) the balance struck between the twin goals of income adequacy and individual equity; and (3) how readily such changes could be implemented, administered, and explained to the public.
What GAO Found
Applying GAO's criteria to the Commission models highlights key options and trade-offs between efforts to achieve sustainable solvency and maintain adequate retirement income for current and future beneficiaries. For example, the Commission's Model 2 proposal reduces Social Security's defined benefit from currently scheduled levels through various formula changes, provides enhanced benefits for low-wage workers and spousal survivors, and adds a voluntary individual account option in exchange for a benefit reduction. Model 2 would provide for sustainable solvency and reduce the shares of the federal budget and the economy devoted to Social Security compared to currently scheduled benefits (tax increase benchmark) regardless of how many individuals selected accounts. However, with universal account participation, general revenue funding would be needed for about 3 decades. GAO's analysis of benefit adequacy and equity issues relating to Model 2 found that (1) across cohorts, median monthly benefits for those choosing accounts are always higher, despite a benefit offset, than for those who do not; this gap grows over time. In addition, benefits assuming universal account participation are higher than payment of a defined benefit generally corresponding to an amount payable from future Social Security trust fund revenues (benefit reduction benchmark). However, benefits received by those without accounts fall below the benchmark over time. (2) for the lowest quintile, median monthly benefits with universal participation in the accounts tend to be higher than GAO's benefit reduction benchmark, likely due to the enhanced benefit for full-time "minimum wage" workers. This pattern becomes more pronounced across the cohorts analyzed. (3) regardless of whether an account is chosen, many people could receive monthly benefits under Model 2 that are higher than the benefit reduction benchmark. However, a minority could fare worse. Some people could also receive a benefit greater than under the tax increase benchmark although a majority could fare worse. Benefits for those choosing individual accounts will be sensitive to the actual rates of return earned by those accounts. Adding individual accounts would require new administrative structures, adding complexity and cost. Public education will be key to help beneficiaries make sound decisions about account participation, investment diversification, and risk. Finally, any Social Security reform proposal must also be looked at in the context of both the program and the long-term budget outlook. A funding gap exists between promised and funded Social Security benefits which, although it will not occur for a number of years, is significant and will grow over time. In addition, GAO's long-term budget simulations show, difficult choices will be required to reconcile a large and growing gap between projected revenues and spending resulting primarily from known demographic trends and rising health care costs. |
gao_T-HEHS-98-194 | gao_T-HEHS-98-194_0 | VA’s federal role was expanded in 1924 to include a safety net function partly because of declining use by veterans with service-connected disabilities and limited public and private insurance coverage available to veterans with lower incomes. The nation’s veteran population is expected to decline significantly in the future. This year, VA expects to receive over $19 billion from several sources to operate its health care system. VA’s Ongoing Systemwide Transformation
VA has made progress in transforming its health care delivery system away from its previous focus on inpatient care to an emphasis on outpatient care. Challenges VA Faces as Its Role Evolves
With its transformation to a more competitive health care system, VA faces difficult decisions concerning its existing infrastructure, as well as other management and implementation challenges. How well VA deals with these challenges will in large part determine how successful it will be in maintaining or increasing the number of veterans served. The condition of these buildings varies greatly. Ironically, some of the hospitals, which VA has recently spent millions of dollars to construct or renovate, are underutilized, while many other hospitals need expensive renovations in order to serve veterans in a manner comparable to private sector providers. Challenges Complicating Infrastructure Decisions
VA’s decisions regarding its infrastructure are complicated by several other challenges, including ongoing transformations of VA’s affiliations with medical schools, medical research activities, and DOD medical contingency activities. VA’s inpatient population provides an important focus for educational and research activities. These include (1) designing a strategy, including marketing materials, for informing veterans of VA’s newly transformed system, (2) establishing a system for enrolling new users, and (3) creating integrated networks of VA and non-VA providers to serve veterans. These challenges include (1) deciding when, where, and what health care services to purchase; (2) developing contract specifications for health care purchases that include not only the types of care to be provided but also administrative requirements such as periodic reporting, utilization management, eligibility verification, and care coordination with VA’s direct care providers; and (3) administering contracts and monitoring contractor performance. In addition, our past work has also highlighted significant shortfalls in other areas, which VA is currently addressing. As difficult as VA’s currently envisioned transformation will be, the challenges will be even greater if, as some have suggested, VA’s patient base is expanded to further enhance its competitiveness by including veterans’ spouses and dependents and active duty military members and their spouses and dependents. Expanding VA’s competitive role may also pose significant risks to veterans and other health care providers. VA Health Care: Status of Efforts to Improve Efficiency and Access (GAO/HEHS-98-48, Feb. 6, 1998). Department of Veterans Affairs: Programmatic and Management Challenges Facing the Department (GAO/T-HEHS-97-97, Mar. 8, 1996). VA Health Care: Challenges and Options for the Future (GAO/T-HEHS-95-147, May 9, 1995). | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed the future health care role of the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), focusing on: (1) how VA's system transformation is progressing and what challenges VA faces as its role evolves; and (2) the relationship between VA's health care role and that of other public and private health benefits programs, including the effects changes in those programs could have on VA health care.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) VA has made progress in transforming its health care system to compete more effectively with health care providers in order to become veterans' provider of choice; (2) these initiatives have enabled VA to avoid over $1 billion in unnecessary expenses--savings that have provided critical financing needed to further improve the system's overall accessibility and quality of care; (3) in addition, the networks are planning to develop and implement additional efficiency initiatives over the next 5 years; (4) but VA faces several challenges before completing its transformation; (5) of these, VA's decisions concerning existing infrastructure may be the most significant and contentious; (6) VA continues to serve veterans in other locations, using aged and deteriorating buildings that will require billions of additional dollars to renovate or replace; (7) VA's decisions to consolidate inpatient medical care at fewer locations are complicated by such challenges as VA's longstanding relationships with universities' medical schools for education and research, and with the Department of Defense for contingency medical support; (8) in GAO's view, VA's future success in fulfilling its health care role, as envisioned by recent eligibility reforms, depends in large part on its ability to transform its current delivery infrastructure into an integrated system of VA and private-sector providers, which may be more attractive to new users, especially those already insured, who could provide VA with an additional source of revenue; (9) VA's strategy also suggests that it will ultimately purchase much more health care from private-sector providers than it does now and deliver care using its existing infrastructure only in those geographic areas where a private-sector alternative is not reasonably available or where VA is the acknowledged leader; (10) VA's success also will depend on its ability to overcome several management and implementation challenges; (11) if, as some have suggested, VA's competitive role is expanded to include not only the current veteran population but also veterans' spouses and dependents, the challenges facing VA will be even greater; (12) it is essential that VA address these infrastructure and other management challenges; (13) if VA is ultimately unable to overcome these challenges, it is conceivable that VA could have to limit enrollment among lower-income veterans; and (14) this could include those with the greatest need, because they have no other health care alternatives. |
gao_GAO-02-598T | gao_GAO-02-598T_0 | The only independent agency asked to provide information to OMB was the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). The PRA made several changes in federal paperwork reduction requirements. During fiscal year 2001 alone, the governmentwide estimate increased by nearly 290 million hours—the largest 1-year increase since the PRA was amended and recodified in 1995. The reasons behind some of these changes are clear. Because IRS attributed most of the increase in its burden-hour estimate during fiscal year 2001 to program changes, and because most of the program changes during that period were made at the agency’s initiative, IRS cannot claim (as it has in the past) that statutory changes primarily caused the increase in its burden-hour estimates. Many of the 402 violations that occurred during fiscal year 2001 were new and had been resolved by the end of the fiscal year. Just three of the collections (two from USDA and one from VA) accounted for more than $1 billion in estimated opportunity costs. The desk officers could also use the database to identify information collection authorizations that are about to expire, and therefore perhaps prevent violations of the act. | Why GAO Did This Study
This testimony discusses the implementation of the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 and information collection authorizations from the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) that either expired or were otherwise inconsistent with the act.
What GAO Found
GAO found that federal paperwork rose by 290 million burden hours during fiscal year 2001--the largest one-year increase since the act was amended and recodified in 1995. This occurred largely because the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) increased its paperwork estimate by about 250 million burden hours during the year. Most of the paperwork increase at IRS resulted from changes made by the agency--not because of new statutes. Federal agencies providing information to OMB identified more than 400 violations of the act during fiscal year 2001. Some of these violations have been going on for years, and they collectively represent substantial opportunity costs. |
gao_NSIAD-96-53 | gao_NSIAD-96-53_0 | The low volume of military electronics purchases does not provide sufficient economic incentives for commercial manufacturers. Pilot officials currently estimate that producing the modules commercially will save about 40 percent compared to the F-22 program cost estimates. Expected Benefits Extend Beyond Pilot
The most important benefit foreseen from the pilot is not from lower costs for the specific pilot components, but from future electronics procurement. In turn, wider participation by commercial entities in military production may reduce military-unique production costs. Unless waivers or workarounds are granted for many of these government-unique requirements, the pilot will be limited in demonstrating the benefits of commercial practices, including the savings associated with high-volume material purchases. While analyzing the differences in requirements, pilot officials found that barriers to commercial production are not created by the Air Force alone. Integrated Production Pilot Has Not Benefited From Acquisition Reform
Although DOD has actively proposed and implemented acquisition reform measures, key reform efforts have not helped move the pilot forward. Accordingly, we recommend that the Air Force, in consultation with TRW, identify those government-unique requirements that prevent the pilot from demonstrating that military items can be produced at equal or better quality on commercial production lines at substantially lower prices and then seek Secretary of Defense waivers. DOD indicated that (1) providing a waiver for the pilot would not necessarily accomplish the project’s objective of demonstrating the feasibility of building military products on commercial lines in the future and (2) designating this pilot as a DOD acquisition pilot would be contrary to one of the TRW pilot’s objectives, which is to identify barriers and then develop and demonstrate business practices to nullify those barriers. GAO Comments
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO provided information on the Department of Defense's (DOD) Military Products from Commercial Lines Pilot Program, focusing on the: (1) program's potential for achieving benefits sought from acquisition reform; and (2) barriers to achieving these benefits.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) the pilot program has demonstrated that redesigning military components for commercial production appears technically feasible; (2) pilot program officials believe that if the use of commercial practices and policies is permitted, military production costs could be reduced by an average of 40 percent and the Air Force's requirements for the F-22 could be met; (3) other expected benefits from the pilot program include accelerated assembly, a more technically advanced and lighter weight product, and valuable lessons learned for future large electronic procurements; (4) for the pilot program to be successful and to encourage commercial participation, significant differences in commercial and military business practices have to be overcome; (5) although the pilot program has been successful in identifying government-unique requirements that present barriers to the most efficient use of commercial production lines, acquisition reform measures have not removed these barriers; (6) DOD must also overcome an acquisition culture that has historically resisted change and does not provide sufficient incentives for acquiring products from commercial producers; and (7) unless waivers are granted for many of the defense-unique requirements or workarounds, the pilot program will be limited in demonstrating that military items can be produced commercially at substantially lower prices. |
gao_GGD-97-27 | gao_GGD-97-27_0 | More recently, in November 1995, we testified that the process for funding new courthouse projects lacked—and could benefit from—a comprehensive capital investment plan that articulates a rationale or justification for projects and presents projects in a long-term strategic context.Furthermore, during the last 6 years, we have reported that Congress lacks quality information to assess the merits of individual projects, understand the rationale for project priorities, and justify funding decisions. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to determine whether the judiciary’s 5-year plan (1) reflects the judiciary’s most urgent courthouse construction needs and (2) provides information needed by decisionmakers to evaluate the relative merits of project proposals. In making this assessment, we relied primarily on the urgency scores the judiciary developed for projects in the plan, its methodology for assessing project urgency, and AOC data related to urgency for projects that were not included in the plan. To determine whether the plan contains the most urgently needed projects, we developed minimum urgency scores for 80 locations that were not in the plan but, according to AOC, also need new courthouse projects. Also, as mentioned before, the judiciary’s intent in developing the plan was to communicate its urgent courthouse construction needs. The official said that the judiciary is aware of the conditions in Los Angeles and that the project was left out of the 5-year plan until some key planning decisions are made by GSA and the judiciary. Table 2 shows these projects and their urgency scores. As previously mentioned, the plan places heavy emphasis on projects that were already in the GSA pipeline. While we believe that pipeline projects should compete for funding, we also believe that the plan should make a convincing argument as to why these projects should be funded first. However, it did not assess other projects that, our work showed, have higher urgency scores than several of the projects in the plan. Related to not justifying its priorities, the plan and its related material lack specificity about conditions that exist at each location—information that would help decisionmakers better understand priorities. We recognize that the plan is transitional and that it will evolve. This plan and its related material do not alert Congress, an important stakeholder, that the projects do not reflect all the judiciary’s most urgent needs nor do they explain that pipeline projects with high funding priority do not always have the highest urgency scores. U.S. General Accounting Office P.O. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the General Services Administration (GSA) and the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts' (AOC) 5-year courthouse construction plan, focusing on whether the 5-year plan: (1) reflects the judiciary's most urgent courthouse construction needs; and (2) provides information needed by decisionmakers to evaluate the relative merit of project proposals.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) while the judiciary has developed a methodology for assessing project urgency and a 5-year construction plan to communicate its urgent courthouse construction needs, GAO's analysis suggests that the 5-year plan does not reflect all of the judiciary's most urgent courthouse construction needs; (2) in preparing the 5-year plan, the judiciary developed urgency scores for 45 projects; (3) it did not develop urgency scores for other locations that according to AOC also need new courthouses; (4) GAO's analysis of available data on conditions at the 80 other locations showed that 30 of them likely would receive an urgency score higher than some projects in the plan; (5) for projects that are in the plan, high urgency scores did not always lead to high funding priority; (6) AOC officials said that this was a transitional plan in that it placed heavy emphasis in assigning funding priorities on the projects already in the GSA pipeline rather than solely on project urgency; (7) GAO's work also showed that the judiciary's plan and related material do not present competing projects in a long-term strategic context or articulate a rationale or justification for proposed projects and their relative priority; (8) they do not contain project-specific information on the conditions that exist at each location that would help decisionmakers compare the merits of individual projects, better understand the rationale for funding priorities, and justify funding decisions; and (9) GAO recognizes that the plan is transitional and that it is reasonable for pipeline projects to receive priority consideration for funding, but the plan and related material should make a convincing argument as to why they should be funded before others that have higher urgency scores. |
gao_HEHS-98-116 | gao_HEHS-98-116_0 | 1.) Since the first community-based outpatient clinic was established by VHA’s Amarillo Medical Center in 1994, VHA has approved a total of 198 community-based clinics. In addition, VHA provided guidance to networks for developing proposals—which were to provide more details than the original white papers—and implemented a process to help networks develop more consistent and thorough proposals, in accordance with VHA’s guidelines. Toward this end, VHA stated that it is desirable that a community-based clinic be located generally within 30 minutes’ travel time from a veteran’s home. Business Plans Document Time Frames for Establishing New Community-Based Clinics
In our prior work, we concluded that networks were not planning new community-based clinics on a strategic basis and that an overall plan was not available to permit an assessment of network activities from a systemwide perspective. This goal, however, focuses on outputs—the number of clinics—rather than on the desired outcome of increasing the percentage of current users having reasonable geographic access to primary care. As a result, networks’ planning efforts focus on the number of community-based clinics to be established and do not address the extent to which new clinics will achieve equity of access for current users among networks or enroll new users in accordance with statutory priorities. Consequently, we remain concerned about how effectively these clinics are used to equalize veterans’ access to VHA primary care within and among networks. This is attributable primarily to the additional clinics that the networks plan to establish over the next 5 years. Our assessment of network business plans and proposals for the 133 clinics suggests that the result of network planning will be to improve access for thousands of lower priority new users in 1998 and 1999, while thousands of higher priority current users may wait until 2000 or beyond for improved access. Network Oversight of Clinic Operations Varies Widely
Networks included a description of their evaluation plans in their clinic proposals, as VHA guidelines require. In addition, few have been implemented, primarily because most clinics have operated less than 6 months. VHA’s August 1996 guidelines added a requirement that networks develop evaluation plans for each new clinic proposed. Five networks reported that they did not have a common set of criteria. Networks Have Performed Few Clinic Evaluations
Our assessment of the evaluations performed to date shows that clinic evaluations do not adequately address VHA’s intent that clinics be evaluated to show how they are achieving the network’s purposes, goals, and objectives. Additional VHA guidance and other VHA assistance in developing networks’ 1999 business plans could result in a more consistent and thorough strategy for using clinics to equalize veterans’ geographic access to VHA primary care systemwide. Require networks to include in their business plans the percentage of (1) current users, by priority status, who have reasonable access; (2) the remaining current users (without reasonable access), by priority status, who are targeted to receive improved access through the establishment of community clinics by 2002; and (3) current users, by priority status, who will not have reasonable access by 2002. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on the Veterans Health Administration's (VHA) use of community-based clinics to improve veterans' access to primary care, focusing on: (1) VHA's planning process for new community-based clinics; (2) networks' implementation of VHA's planning guidelines; and (3) VHA and network oversight of clinic operations.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) VHA has strengthened the process that networks are to use when establishing new community-based clinics, thereby addressing several of GAO's recommendations; (2) VHA provided more detailed guidance, including a 30-minute travel standard and an expectation that clinics be established primarily to benefit current users rather than attract new users; (3) VHA developed a more structured planning process, including the development of network business plans covering a 5-year period, and established a task force in accordance with VHA's guidelines; (4) VHA's long-range goal is to increase the number of community-based clinics; (5) to that end, VHA has approved 198 clinics, and network business plans show that 402 additional clinics are to be established between 1998 and 2002; (6) the plans, however, do not address the percentage of current users who have reasonable access, or what percentage of those without reasonable access are targeted to receive enhanced access through the establishment of new clinics; (7) as a result, VHA's network business plans cannot be used to determine on a systemwide basis how well networks are using clinics to equalize veterans' access to primary care; (8) based on the limited information that networks can provide, it appears that the geographic accessibility of VHA primary care currently varies widely among networks and that while networks' efforts should reduce this variation, thousands of the VHA's 3.4 million current users will likely continue to have inequitable access for many years; (9) moreover, it appears that networks are planning to improve access for thousands of lower priority new users over the next two years, while thousands of higher priority current users are waiting considerably longer periods of time for reasonable access; (10) networks, which have primary responsibility for monitoring community-based clinic performance, have developed evaluation plans for proposed clinics, as VHA requires; (11) to date, few clinics have operated for more than 12 months; (12) as a result, most evaluation plans have not been implemented; and (13) network evaluation plans, however, vary widely, with few containing a common set of criteria or indicators that appear necessary to effectively assess clinic evaluations to monitor performance within or among networks. |
gao_GAO-08-774 | gao_GAO-08-774_0 | The Department of Labor’s Role
Labor’s Employee Benefits Security Administration (EBSA) is the primary agency responsible for protecting private pension plan participants and beneficiaries from the misuse or theft of their pension assets by enforcing ERISA, which defines and sets certain standards for employee benefit plans sponsored by private sector employers. EBSA oversees 401(k) plans because they are considered employee benefit plans under ERISA. Sponsors Determine a Number of Common Plan Features, and Their Decisions about Investment Features Have Important Fiduciary Implications
Although, when determining a number of common, noninvestment features and other plan characteristics, plan sponsors are frequently acting as settlors, their decisions about investment features have important fiduciary implications. Industry research finds that most 401(k) plans offer a number of common noninvestment features such as employer contributions and loan programs. However, when a sponsor makes decisions about investment features—like selecting the menu of investment options—it acts as a fiduciary and is subject to fiduciary obligations under ERISA. While sponsors must act prudently and solely in the interest of participants and beneficiaries when acting as a fiduciary for investment functions, they have considerable latitude in selecting fund options, such as the number and types of options. Besides ERISA and its regulations, various other factors affect a sponsor when it makes investment decisions regarding the selection of the investment menu, including the size of the plan and the role of external advisers and providers. Plan Sponsors Can Face Challenges in Fulfilling Their Fiduciary Obligations When Business Arrangements Are Unclear or Undisclosed
Plan sponsors face challenges in fulfilling their obligations when fiduciary roles are not clearly defined or when sponsors lack important information about arrangements between service providers. Fiduciary roles that are not clearly defined between the sponsor and other plan fiduciaries can lead to gaps in plan oversight. Sponsors also have fiduciary obligations when they select and monitor one or multiple service providers. To fulfill these obligations, Labor’s guidance indicates that sponsors should obtain information about service providers’ compensation arrangements and potential conflicts of interest that could affect the service provider’s performance. For example, several industry professionals noted situations when sponsors assumed they had delegated fiduciary investment advice for the selection and monitoring of investment funds to a service provider, but the service provider did not acknowledge that fiduciary role. Various Ways to Improve Fiduciary Oversight Have Been Proposed
Labor officials and various industry practitioners have proposed new ways to improve fiduciary oversight. Labor Monitors Sponsors’ Operation of 401(k) Plans and Has Made Progress on Recent Regulatory Initiatives
Labor takes various actions to monitor sponsors’ fiduciary oversight of 401(k) plans and has made some progress on its regulatory initiatives. Labor investigates reports of questionable 401(k) plan practices, collects information from plan sponsors, and conducts outreach to educate plan sponsors about their responsibilities. Labor is also pursuing several initiatives to improve disclosures provided to participants, plan sponsors and fiduciaries, government agencies and the public. Recently, Labor issued proposed regulations to clarify the information that service providers must disclose to plan sponsors. In our previous reports, we asked Congress to consider amending ERISA to (1) explicitly require 401(k) service providers to disclose to plan sponsors the compensation they receive from other service providers and (2) give Labor authority to recover plan losses against certain types of service providers, even if they are not currently considered fiduciaries to that plan under ERISA. To determine the actions that Labor takes to ensure that sponsors are fulfilling their fiduciary obligations and the progress Labor has made on its regulatory initiatives, we reviewed ERISA and Labor’s regulations to clearly define Labor’s authority to oversee the conduct of 401(k) plan sponsors in fulfilling their key fiduciary obligations. | Why GAO Did This Study
American workers increasingly rely on 401(k) plans for their retirement security, and sponsors of 401(k) plans--typically employers--have critical obligations under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). When acting as fiduciaries, they must act prudently and solely in the interest of plan participants and beneficiaries. The Department of Labor (Labor) is responsible for protecting private pension plan participants and beneficiaries by enforcing ERISA. GAO examined: (1) common 401(k) plan features, which typically have important fiduciary implications, and factors affecting these decisions; (2) challenges sponsors face in fulfilling their fiduciary obligations when overseeing plan operations; and (3) actions Labor takes to ensure that sponsors fulfill their fiduciary obligations, and the progress Labor has made on its regulatory initiatives. To address these objectives, GAO administered a survey asking sponsors how they select plan features and oversee operations, reviewed industry research, conducted interviews, and reviewed related documents.
What GAO Found
Plan sponsors commonly select certain noninvestment and investment features, and their decisions about which investment features to select generally have important fiduciary implications. According to industry research, most 401(k) plans offer a number of common features, such as employer contributions and loans for employees. Some of these decisions seldom involve fiduciary obligations set by ERISA because they are mainly business decisions related to establishing the plan. However, a sponsor's decisions about investment features, like the menu of investment options, entail important fiduciary obligations under ERISA. ERISA and its regulations stipulate certain requirements for these investment decisions, like offering diversified funds and prudently selecting and monitoring investment options. Various other factors also affect a sponsor's menu decisions, including the size of the plan and the role of external advisers and other providers. Plan sponsors face challenges in fulfilling their obligations when fiduciary roles are not clearly defined or when sponsors lack important information about arrangements between service providers. Fiduciary roles that are not clearly defined can lead to gaps in plan oversight. For example, several industry professionals noted situations when sponsors assumed they had delegated fiduciary investment advice for the selection and monitoring of investment funds to a service provider, but the service provider did not acknowledge that fiduciary role. Sponsors also have fiduciary obligations when selecting and monitoring one or more service providers. To fulfill these obligations, Labor's guidance indicates that sponsors should obtain information about service providers' compensation arrangements and potential conflicts of interest that could affect the service provider's performance. Labor and various industry practitioners have proposed new ways to improve fiduciary oversight that may address some of the challenges of unclear fiduciary roles and providers' arrangements. Labor takes various actions to monitor sponsors' fiduciary oversight of 401(k) plans and has made some progress on its regulatory initiatives. Labor's actions include investigating reports of questionable 401(k) plan practices, collecting information from plan sponsors, and conducting outreach to educate plan sponsors about their responsibilities. Labor is also proceeding with several initiatives to improve disclosures to participants, plan sponsors, government agencies and the public. For example, Labor recently published a proposed rule on the information that service providers must disclose to plan sponsors but is trying to resolve several questions before issuing a final rule. In addition, certain matters that GAO has asked Congress to consider would help Labor in its efforts to improve sponsors' fiduciary oversight. We previously suggested that Congress amend ERISA to (1) explicitly require 401(k) service providers to disclose to plan sponsors the compensation they receive from other service providers and (2) give Labor authority to recover plan losses against certain types of service providers even if they are not currently considered fiduciaries under ERISA. |
gao_GAO-06-475 | gao_GAO-06-475_0 | To assess what controls TSA put in place to help ensure uniform and timely review of air carrier requests to deploy electric stun devices on board commercial aircraft, we reviewed TSA’s handling of these requests and compared this process to our Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government. Although various federal and other organizations have reviewed the health effects that electric stun devices have on individuals, studies have not been conducted in an in- flight environment. NIJ concluded that the use of these devices in accordance with appropriate policies and training may be an effective means for flight deck crews to thwart an attack. Similarly, in a report to Congress issued in May 2003, TSA generally concurred with NIJ’s conclusion and further concluded that commercial aviation security may be enhanced through deployment of these devices. However, some susceptible populations such as the elderly and those who have a sustained history of alcohol and illicit drug use may be at greater risk for negative outcomes. Federal Reviews Conclude Electric Stun Devices May Enhance Commercial Aviation Security, but Supporting Analysis Is Limited
In its April 2002 report, NIJ concluded that electric stun devices, used in accordance with appropriate policies and training, may have the potential to allow flight deck crews to thwart an attack while an aircraft is in flight—i.e. However, the report did not include any empirical testing of electric stun devices in an aircraft setting to demonstrate how they would enhance security. TSA Has Not Established Internal Controls to Help Ensure Uniform and Timely Review Regarding Requests for Use of Electric Stun Devices
TSA has not established processes and procedures for reviewing requests from air carriers to deploy electric stun devices on board their aircraft that include (1) well defined key areas of authority and responsibility, (2) clearly communicated information regarding decision-making criteria to TSA decision makers and their external stakeholders, and (3) a records system to account for handling of requests and supporting documentation—three key internal controls called for by the Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government. Specifically, without a well-defined organizational area or individual with responsibility for receiving and reviewing requests, TSA cannot be a responsive and effective partner with private sector air carriers. Without established and clearly communicated information regarding decision-making criteria, within TSA and for its external stakeholders, TSA lacks reasonable assurance that its decision making will be uniform, consistent, and compatible with its mission. Recommendations for Executive Action
In order to help ensure TSA’s review and approval process for the use of any less-than-lethal weapons, including electric stun devices, is responsive, uniform, accountable, consistently applied and serves the public interest, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the Assistant Secretary, Transportation Security Administration, to take the following two actions, should commercial air carrier interest in deploying these devices resume: Ensure that there is sufficiently reliable research supporting the use of less-than-lethal devices being requested that, at a minimum, address the appropriateness of their usage in the unique aircraft environment, including passenger safety, how the use of these devices would enhance security, and the effects of these devices on the safe operation of the aircraft. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has authority to approve air carrier requests to deploy less-than-lethal weapons, including electric stun devices, onboard commercial aircraft to thwart an attack. Since the terrorist attacks of 2001, one air carrier received approval to deploy electric stun devices. To address concerns regarding reports of injuries after the use of these devices and to ensure that the impacts of these devices onboard aircraft have been fully evaluated, this report answers the following: (1) What analyses has the federal government conducted to assess the safety and effectiveness of these devices onboard commercial aircraft? (2) What controls does TSA have in place to help ensure uniform and timely review of air carrier requests to deploy these devices onboard commercial aircraft?
What GAO Found
The Transportation Security Administration and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) have conducted reviews addressing the effect of electric stun devices on aircraft. Plus, various federal as well as other organizations examined the health effects that electric stun devices have on individuals. But, no studies of health effects have been conducted in an in-flight environment. Moreover, according to NIJ, although electric stun devices have been used successfully many times to subdue suspects, certain compromised populations, such as the elderly and those with a history drug and alcohol abuse, may be at risk for negative outcomes. In April 2002, NIJ concluded that the use of electric stun devices in accordance with appropriate policies and training may be an effective means for flight deck crews to thwart an attack but should not be deployed without further testing. Similarly, in a 2003 report to Congress, TSA generally concurred with NIJ's conclusions. But, neither review included in-flight testing or empirical testing of these devices that would demonstrate that they would enhance security. TSA's position is that empirical data, particularly in an aircraft environment, is necessary to determine if these devices can be used safely and effectively. TSA lacks key internal controls, to help ensure uniformity in decision making and a transparent process to review requests to deploy electric stun devices onboard commercial aircraft. Specifically, TSA (1) lacks a well-defined organizational area with responsibility to receive and review requests, (2) has not established formal criteria for decision making to approve requests and has not communicated criteria to external stakeholders, and (3) maintained little documentation of its decision making and activities to account for its handling of past requests. Without clearly defined approval criteria and a point of contact, TSA cannot reasonably assure that its decision making is uniform and consistent, nor can it provide a transparent request and approval process for air carriers. |
gao_GAO-04-1013T | gao_GAO-04-1013T_0 | Either the claimant or insurer can appeal this decision. As a result of the September 11 terrorist attacks, Congress appropriated $175 million in federal funds to assist the New York State Workers’ Compensation Board with the resulting workers’ compensation claims. Specifically, the law provided the funds in three earmarked portions: $125 million “for payment to the New York State Workers’ Compensation Review (sic) Board, for the processing of claims related to the terrorist attacks”; $25 million “for payment to the New York State Uninsured Employers Fund, for reimbursement of claims related to the terrorist attacks”; and $25 million “for payment to the New York State Uninsured Employers Fund, for reimbursement of claims related to the first response emergency services personnel who were injured, were disabled, or died due to the terrorist attacks.” The legislation provided no further explanation regarding the use of the federal funds. The grant agreement’s statement of work, prepared by the Board, set out three broad categories of activities to be carried out: (1) administration, (2) mitigation—efforts to help mitigate the effects of future disasters, and (3) claims reimbursements to the Uninsured Employers Fund; requested flexibility to “transfer funds amongst the three pools of money,” that is, the $125 million and the two $25 million portions; and listed the Board’s intention “to use a portion of the disaster funds to assist other entities by creating a contingency account within [the Board’s] funding structure that will allow the State to respond effectively to any unexpected needs as they arise, both in administrative and in mitigation efforts.”
The following timeline summarizes the flow of federal funds to the Board: Early January 2002: Congress appropriated $175 million to DOL for the New York State Workers’ Compensation Board. The Board Used $49 Million for Benefits and Mitigation Efforts
As of June 30, 2004, of the $175 million in federal funds to help pay expenses related to the September 11 attacks and recovery, the New York State Workers’ Compensation Board had used about $49 million. The Board also had used about $4.4 million on mitigation efforts to prepare for responding to any future terrorist attacks. However, the Board had used funds from the UEF to pay these benefits and was first trying to recoup these funds from the uninsured employers before drawing upon federal funds to reimburse for any unrecovered expense. We are continuing to gather information about whether these reimbursements were authorized in the grant agreement’s statement of work and whether the $125 million appropriation earmarked for “the processing of claims” was available for reimbursements of benefits paid. For example, the Board paid for new tape and disk backup systems, new off-site storage contracts, and new image storage systems to ensure viability of Board data and operations. The Board Had Not Used any of the $25 Million Available for Workers with Uninsured Employers
The Board had not used any of the $25 million federal funds available to reimburse the UEF for benefits the UEF paid to workers with uninsured employers (or their survivors). The Board Had Used Some of the $25 Million Available for Volunteers
The Board had used about $456,000 of the $25 million available to reimburse the UEF for benefits the UEF paid to volunteers (or their survivors) who were injured or killed as a result of the September 11 attacks. For the subset of claims associated with workers whose employers were uninsured, the Board had resolved 89 percent. In addition to the September 11 claims for workers’ compensation, the Board had resolved 31 percent of the volunteer claims received and 69 percent of these claims were pending. Ninety Percent of September 11 Claims for Workers’ Compensation Had Been Resolved
As of mid-2004, most September 11–related workers’ compensation claims had been resolved, that is, the Board had resolved all the issues that it could with the information available at that point. Specifically, 90 percent of the 10,182 claims received by the Board had been resolved. For 42 percent of claims received, the Board had determined that a link had been established between the September 11 disaster and the resulting death, injury, or illness and benefits had been paid or were in the process of being paid. According to Board officials, a high portion of the volunteer claims were pending because (1) sufficient medical evidence had not been provided to establish the link between the September 11 volunteer activities and the death, injury, or illness and (2) claimants had not pursued their case after filing. | Why GAO Did This Study
In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, Congress appropriated $175 million for the New York State Workers' Compensation Board (the Board) to assist with the resulting workers' compensation claims. These claims were filed by workers or volunteers (or survivors) who were injured, became ill, or died as a result of the attacks and the recovery efforts. Specifically, Congress provided federal funds to the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) for the Board in three earmarked portions: $125 million for processing of claims, and $25 million each to reimburse the state Uninsured Employers Fund (UEF) for benefits paid (1) for workers associated with uninsured employers and (2) for volunteers. DOL transferred the funds to the Board using a grant agreement. This testimony looks at the Board's use of the $175 million in federal funds and the status of September 11 workers' compensation claims. The testimony addresses: (1) how the federal funds have been used and (2) how many applications for compensation have been received and their status. In addition, we are continuing to gather information about whether the grant agreement and the appropriation act are consistent with the Board's use of the funds.
What GAO Found
As of June 30, 2004, of the $175 million in federal funds appropriated to help pay workers' compensation expenses related to the September 11 attacks and recovery, the New York State Workers' Compensation Board had used about $49 million. From the $125 million portion available for processing of claims, the Board had used about $44 million to reimburse two state entities--the New York State Crime Victims Board and the New York State Insurance Fund--for benefits those entities had paid to September 11 victims (or survivors). In addition, the Board had used about $4.4 million of the $125 million to prepare for responding to any future terrorist attacks. For example, the Board paid for new computer backup systems and new off-site storage contracts to ensure access to claims data in case of a disaster. At the time of our review, the Board had not yet used any of the $25 million that is available to reimburse the UEF for benefits the UEF paid to workers associated with uninsured employers (or survivors). However, the Board had used funds from the UEF to pay these benefits and was first trying to recoup these funds from the uninsured employers before drawing upon federal funds to reimburse for any unrecovered expense. Finally, the Board had used about $456,000 of the $25 million that is available to reimburse the UEF for benefits the UEF paid to volunteers (or survivors). The Board indicated that, as of mid-2004, it had received 10,182 claims for workers' compensation and 588 volunteer claims related to the September 11 attacks and recovery. Ninety percent of the workers' compensation claims had been resolved, that is, the Board had resolved all the issues that it could with the information available at that point. The remaining 10 percent of claims were pending, as the Board was waiting for additional information from claimants (such as medical evidence), hearings were yet to be held, or claimants had not pursued their case after initial filing. The Board officials noted that the status of claims was fluid: a resolved claim could change to pending if more information becomes available and the Board reopens the case. In addition, we were unable to report approval and denial rates of claims because, according to Board officials, the Board's core mission is to process individual claims and not track outcomes of claims decisions. For 52 percent of workers' compensation claims received, (1) a link had been established between the September 11 disaster and the resulting death, injury, or illness and benefits had been paid or were in the process of being paid, or (2) this link had been established but the Board had not authorized paying benefits. Of the 10,182 workers' compensation claims, 133 were associated with workers whose employers were uninsured. The Board had resolved 89 percent of these 133 claims. Of the 588 volunteer claims received, the Board had resolved 31 percent and 69 percent were pending. According to the Board, many of the volunteer claims were pending because the claimants were not actively pursuing their claims. |
gao_GAO-17-71 | gao_GAO-17-71_0 | All of the project’s elements and major subsystems were within weeks of becoming the project’s critical path—the schedule with the least amount of reserve—for the overall project. We further found that JWST continued to meet its cost commitments, but that larger than planned workforce levels, particularly with the observatory contractor, posed a threat to meeting cost commitments. NASA has generally agreed and taken steps to implement a number of our recommendations; however, there are three recommendations that NASA has not fully implemented that could still benefit the JWST project. JWST Is Maintaining Schedule Commitment with Significant Integration and Test Efforts Underway
The project has completed most of its major hardware deliveries including the telescope, instrument module, and the majority of the spacecraft. Two of five planned integration efforts are complete and two more are currently underway. As we have previously reported, integration and testing is the phase where problems are most likely to be found and schedules tend to slip. Project Has Consumed Schedule Reserve to Mitigate Technical Issues with Critical Integration Work Still Ahead
The project has consumed 8 of 14 total months of its overall schedule reserve to address technical challenges across elements and major subsystems. Almost 3 months of this reserve have been consumed within the past year. The remaining 6 months of reserve is more than required by Goddard Space Flight Center, as determined by project officials, and on track with the project’s more conservative internal plan—which was set above the Goddard standard at the replan in 2011. Complexity of JWST Underscores Integration and Test Risks
JWST is one of the most technologically complex science projects NASA has undertaken. As integration and testing moves forward, the project will need to be able to reduce a significant amount of risk and address technical challenges in a timely manner to stay on schedule. The project maintains a list of risks—currently with 73 items—that need to be tested and mitigated to an acceptable level in the remaining 2 years before launch. Many of these risks relate to the project’s numerous deployments or single point failures. Thus, going forward, technical issues encountered during integration and test are more likely to require critical path schedule reserves to address, as has recently been observed in the OTIS integration and test effort. Though the project spent $42.8 million more than planned for fiscal year 2016, project officials managed JWST within its allocated budget for the fifth consecutive year since the 2011 replan. For the past 32 months, Northrop Grumman’s actual workforce has exceeded its projections and is not expected to fall to under 300 full-time equivalents until the spring of 2017. However, in July 2016, Northrop Grumman submitted its first cost overrun proposal to NASA since the replan in 2011. Jet Propulsion Laboratory: In fiscal year 2016, the laboratory overran its cost for work related to JWST and the project used budget reserves to cover additional costs. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to assess the extent to which the James Webb Space Telescope (JWST) project is (1) managing technological issues and development challenges to maintain its committed schedule and (2) meeting its committed cost levels and managing its workforce plans. To assess the extent to which the JWST project is managing technological issues and development challenges to maintain its committed schedule, we reviewed project and contractor schedule documentation, and held interviews with program, project, and contractor officials on the progress made and challenges faced building and integrating the different components of the observatory. | Why GAO Did This Study
JWST is one of NASA's most complex and expensive projects, at an anticipated cost of $8.8 billion. Now in the midst of significant integration and testing that will last the 2 remaining years until the planned October 2018 launch date, the JWST project will need to continue to address many challenges and identify problems, some likely to be revealed during its rigorous testing. The continued success of JWST hinges on NASA's ability to anticipate, identify, and respond to these challenges in a timely and cost-effective manner to meet its commitments.
Conference Report No. 112-284, accompanying the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2012, included a provision for GAO to assess the project annually and report on its progress. This is the fifth such report. This report assesses the extent to which JWST is (1) managing technological and developmental challenges to meet its schedule commitments, and (2) meeting its committed cost levels and managing its workforce plans. To conduct this work, GAO reviewed monthly JWST reports, reviewed relevant policies, conducted independent analysis of NASA and contractor data, and interviewed NASA and contractor officials.
What GAO Found
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) James Webb Space Telescope (JWST) project is still operating within its committed schedule while in its riskiest phase of development, integration and test. Most hardware deliveries and two of five major integration and test efforts have been completed. Two other integration and test efforts are underway, with the final effort to begin in fall 2017. JWST used about 3 months of schedule reserve since GAO's last report in December 2015. For example, the project used one month of schedule reserve to address delays in integrating the Optical Telescope Element and the Integrated Science Instrument module, due to the complexity of this effort. The project's remaining 6 months of reserve is more than required by Goddard Space Flight Center requirements, as determined by project officials. The figure below shows JWST's elements and major subsystems, the schedule reserve remaining for each, and the critical path—the schedule with the least amount of reserve.
JWST is one of NASA's most technologically complex science projects and has numerous risks and single points of failure, which need to be tested and understood before launch. The project also faces a number of risks related to the observatory software. Looking ahead, the project will likely need to consume more reserves for its complex integration and test efforts.
JWST is meeting its cost commitments despite technical and workforce challenges. Although the project used $42.8 million more than planned for fiscal year 2016, it is maintaining spending within the levels dictated by the 2011 replan. NASA continues to emphasize that maintaining schedule is the priority, which resulted in the use of the fiscal year 2016 cost reserves to meet technical challenges. Also, as GAO previously found in December 2015, the observatory contractor has continued to maintain a larger workforce for longer than planned in order to address technical issues. For example, in 2016, the observatory contractor averaged 165 full-time equivalents more than projected to address technical issues while minimizing the impact on schedule. The contractor submitted a proposal to NASA this summer to cover cost overruns, which was the first such proposal since the replan in 2011.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is not making recommendations in this report. GAO has made recommendations in previous reports, to which NASA has generally agreed and taken steps to implement. There are three recommendations that NASA has not fully implemented that could still benefit the JWST project. |
gao_GAO-02-537T | gao_GAO-02-537T_0 | Long-Standing Financial Management Problems and Attempts at Reform
History is a good teacher. The problems with the department’s financial management operations date back decades, and previous attempts at reform have largely proven unsuccessful. The department continues to rely on a far-flung, complex network of finance, logistics, personnel, acquisition, and other management information systems— 80 percent of which are not under the control of the DOD Comptroller—to gather the financial data needed to support day-to-day management decisionmaking. This network was not designed to be, but rather has evolved into, the overly complex and error-prone operation that exists today, including (1) little standardization across DOD components, (2) multiple systems performing the same tasks, (3) the same data stored in multiple systems, (4) manual data entry into multiple systems, and (5) a large number of data translations and interfaces that combine to exacerbate problems with data integrity. Defense Business Operations Fund. Actions on many of the key areas central to successfully achieving desired financial management and related business process transformation goals —particularly those that rely on longer term systems improvements—will take a number of years to fully implement. | What GAO Found
Financial management problems at the Department of Defense (DOD) are complex, long-standing, and deeply rooted throughout its business operations. DOD's financial management deficiencies represent the single largest obstacle to achieving an unqualified opinion on the U.S. government's consolidated financial statements. So far, none of the military services or major DOD components have passed the test of an independent financial audit because of pervasive weaknesses in financial management systems, operations, and controls. These problems go back decades, and earlier attempts at reform have been unsuccessful. DOD continues to rely on a far-flung, complex network of finance, logistics, personnel, acquisition, and other management information systems for financial data to support day-to-day management and decision-making. This network has evolved into an overly complex and error-prone operation with (1) little standardization across DOD components; (2) multiple systems performing the same tasks; (3) the same data stored in multiple systems; (4) manual data entry into multiple systems; and (5) a large number of data translations and interfaces, which combine to exacerbate problems with data integrity. Many of the elements that are crucial to financial management reform and business process transformation--particularly those that rely on long-term systems improvements--will take years to fully implement. |
gao_GAO-16-504T | gao_GAO-16-504T_0 | Selected Tribes and Providers Identified Opportunities and Barriers Related to Increasing High- Speed Internet Access
Tribal officials we interviewed for our January 2016 report said they place a high priority on institutional and personal Internet access because of the numerous benefits, including the following:
Economic Development: Officials from most tribes said high-speed Internet is essential for economic development such as finding employment or establishing online businesses. Tribal officials and providers we interviewed also cited limited financial resources as a barrier to high-speed Internet access. About half of the tribes we interviewed told us that a lack of tribal members with sufficient bureaucratic and technical expertise was a common barrier to increasing high-speed Internet access on tribal lands. Interrelated Federal Programs Promoting High-Speed Internet Access on Tribal Lands Are Not Always Well Coordinated
FCC and USDA High- Speed Internet Programs are Interrelated
In January 2016, we found that FCC and USDA implement mutually supportive, interrelated high-speed Internet access programs that offer funding to either tribal entities or service providers to achieve the goal of increased access. Tribal officials we interviewed said that both FCC’s and USDA’s programs were important for the expansion of high-speed Internet service on their lands. Our body of work has shown that interagency coordination can help agencies with interrelated programs ensure efficient use of resources and effective programs. FCC and USDA independently conduct outreach and training efforts for related programs promoting Internet access. The two agencies could have planned a joint training event in the Pacific Northwest Region—each contributing to the cost of the event—that would have reduced the cost burdens for tribes. To this end, we recommended in January 2016 that FCC develop joint outreach and training efforts with USDA whenever feasible to help improve Internet availability and adoption on tribal lands. Federal Government is Gathering Data, but FCC Lacks Performance Goals and Measures for the Internet on Tribal Lands
The Federal Government is Gathering Data on Internet Availability and Adoption in Households on Tribal Lands
FCC defines Internet availability as the presence of Internet service in an area, and Internet adoption as the number of people in the area subscribing to Internet service. The National Broadband Map is currently the best tool for setting goals and measuring progress toward increasing the availability of high-speed Internet on tribal lands. To improve performance management, we recommended in our January 2016 report that FCC develop performance goals and measures using, for example, data from the National Broadband Map, to track progress on achieving its strategic goal of making broadband internet available to households on tribal lands, and FCC agreed with our recommendation. Data Collected Does Not Allow FCC to Measure Outcomes of its E-rate Program for Tribal Institutions
Although Census is gathering baseline information on household Internet adoption, and the National Broadband Map provides data on high-speed Internet availability across the country, we found that FCC lacks the specific information it needs to measure the outcomes of its E-rate program at tribal schools and libraries. However, FCC has not set any quantifiable goals and performance measures for its E-rate efforts to extend high-speed Internet in schools and libraries nationwide or on tribal lands. To address these concerns, in January 2016, we recommended that FCC: improve the reliability of data related to institutions receiving E-rate funding by defining “tribal” on the program application. FCC agreed with our recommendation and intends to provide guidance to applicants in fiscal year 2017. develop performance goals and measures to track progress on achieving its strategic objective of ensuring that all tribal schools and libraries have affordable access to modern broadband technologies. | Why GAO Did This Study
High-speed Internet service is viewed as a critical component of the nation's infrastructure and an economic driver, particularly to remote tribal communities. This testimony examines: (1) perspectives of tribes and providers on high-speed Internet access and barriers to increasing this access; (2) the level of interrelation and coordination between federal programs that promote high-speed Internet access on tribal lands; and (3) existing data and performance measures related to high-speed Internet on tribal lands. This statement is based on GAO's January 2016 report (GAO-16-222). For this report, GAO visited or interviewed officials from a non-generalizable sample of 21 tribal entities and 6 service providers. GAO also reviewed FCC and USDA fiscal year 2010 through 2014 program data, funding, and materials and interviewed federal officials.
What GAO Found
In January 2016, GAO found that, although all 21 tribes GAO interviewed have some access to high-speed Internet, barriers to increasing access remain. Tribal officials and Internet providers said that high poverty rates among tribes and the high costs of connecting remote tribal villages to core Internet networks limit high-speed Internet availability and access. About half of the tribes GAO interviewed also said that the lack of sufficient administrative and technical expertise among tribal members limits their efforts to increase high-speed Internet access.
The Federal Communications Commission's (FCC) Universal Service Fund subsidy programs and the U.S. Department of Agriculture's (USDA) Rural Utilities Service grant programs are interrelated. The programs seek to increase high-speed Internet access in underserved areas, including tribal lands. GAO's previous work on overlap, duplication, and fragmentation has shown that interagency coordination on interrelated programs can help ensure efficient use of resources and effective programs. However, FCC and USDA do not coordinate to develop joint outreach and training, which could result in inefficient use of federal resources and missed opportunities for resource leveraging. For example, USDA and FCC held separate training events in the Pacific Northwest Region in 2015 when a joint event could have saved limited training funds and reduced costs.
FCC has placed special emphasis on improving Internet access on tribal lands following the issuance of the National Broadband Plan in 2010, which called for greater efforts to make broadband available on tribal lands. However, FCC has not developed performance goals and measures for improving high-speed Internet availability to households on tribal lands. FCC could establish baseline measures to track its progress by using, for example, the National Broadband Map which includes data on Internet availability on tribal lands. FCC also lacks both reliable data on high-speed Internet access and performance goals and measures for high-speed Internet access by tribal institutions—such as schools and libraries. Specifically, FCC's E-rate program provides funds to ensure that schools and libraries have affordable access to modern broadband technologies, but FCC has neither defined “tribal” on its E-rate application nor set any performance goals for the program's impact on tribal institutions. Without these goals and measures FCC cannot assess the impact of its efforts.
What GAO Recommends
In January 2016, GAO recommended that FCC take the following actions in tribal areas: (1) develop joint training and outreach with USDA; (2) develop performance goals and measures for improving broadband availability to households; (3) develop performance goals and measures for improving broadband availability to schools and libraries; and (4) improve the reliability of FCC data related to institutions that receive E-rate funding by defining “tribal” on the program application. FCC agreed with the recommendations. |
gao_GAO-10-248 | gao_GAO-10-248_0 | Special Report 260 recommended that the program address the following four research goals: safety—to prevent or reduce the severity of highway crashes through more accurate knowledge of driver behavior and other crash factors; renewal—to develop a consistent and systematic approach to performing highway rehabilitation that is rapid, causes minimum disruption, and produces long-lived (durable) transportation facilities, such as roadways and bridges; reliability—to provide highway users with improved travel time reliability (more consistent travel times between locations) by preventing and reducing the impact of relatively unpredictable events, such as traffic accidents, work zones, special events, and weather; and capacity—to develop approaches and tools for systematically integrating environmental, economic, and community requirements into the decision- making processes for planning and designing projects to increase highway capacity. SHRP 2 Research Projects Were Selected Based on Expert Input and Program Funding and Time Frames
The SHRP 2 oversight committee funded research projects for the program based on the recommendations of its TCCs, which considered the input of other experts and factors such as available program funds and time frames. The first major modification occurred in 2006, when, as discussed, considerably less funding and time were provided for the program’s completion than had been assumed by the parties involved in the development of the detailed research plans in 2003. The second major modification occurred in 2008, when about $20 million in additional program funding became available because of the passage of the SAFETEA-LU Technical Corrections Act. On both occasions, the SHRP 2 oversight committee relied on the input of experts to select projects for funding. The SHRP 2 Oversight Committee Allocated about $123 Million for 85 Projects: 63 Are Completed or Ongoing and 22 Are Planned
As of December 31, 2009, the SHRP 2 oversight committee had allocated approximately $123 million (about 72 percent) of the roughly $171 million available to fund projects related to highway safety, renewal, reliability, and capacity. Of the 85 projects selected for funding, 11 were completed, 52 were ongoing, and 22 were expected to begin in the future. SHRP 2 staff expect all of the projects will be completed by 2013. The outcomes of the projects are expected to vary, ranging from the (1) production of data sets and related analyses to (2) development of improved technologies, procedures, guidelines, and techniques for advancing the goals of each of the four research areas. Special Report 260 recommended different percentages of funding for each of the four research areas, ranging from 15 percent to 40 percent of available funding. As shown in table 4, the oversight committee closely followed the relative funding distributions recommended in this report. Because of Funding and Time Constraints, 50 of the 106 Projects Identified in 2003 Were Eliminated Entirely, while Many of the Remaining 56 Projects Had Portions of Their Planned Research Eliminated
As a result of SHRP 2’s reprioritization process, 50 of the 106 projects identified in 2003 were eliminated entirely, and many of the remaining 56 projects that either evolved into, or were merged with, one or more SHRP 2 projects had one or more aspects of their research eliminated from funding. Thus, the eliminated research typically was for, among other activities, (1) translating research results into products (i.e., research applications), (2) training and dissemination of the research findings (i.e., technology transfer), and (3) providing technical support for implementing research products and technologies and for demonstrating new technologies (i.e., research implementation). According to SHRP 2 staff, they are hopeful that other researchers will develop projects for implementing some of SHRP 2’s research after the program’s completion. DOT and TRB provided technical clarifications, which we incorporated, as appropriate. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To address our three reporting objectives, we reviewed the legislative requirements, goals, and objectives for the Second Strategic Highway Research Program (SHRP 2), including the Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century; the Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users (SAFETEA-LU); and the SAFETEA-LU Technical Corrections Act of 2008. In addition, we reviewed and analyzed literature, studies, and reports related to the research program. To address our third objective (i.e., determining what, if any, planned research was eliminated from the program), we compared program documentation related to the currently funded projects with the four research areas identified in Special Report 260 and the projects identified in the 2003 research plans. Table 6 provides information on the safety projects identified in 2003 and how they were reprioritized for funding. | Why GAO Did This Study
The 2005 Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users authorized the Department of Transportation to establish a highway research program to address future challenges facing the U.S. highway system. In 2006, the Second Strategic Highway Research Program was established to conduct research in four areas--safety, renewal, reliability, and capacity. The Transportation Research Board manages this program in cooperation with the Federal Highway Administration and others. The legislation also required GAO to review the program no later than 3 years after the first research contracts were awarded. This report provides information about the process for selecting the program's projects for funding, the projects' status, and what, if any, research was eliminated because of funding and time constraints. To address our objectives, GAO reviewed the program's authorizing legislation, analyzed studies and reports related to the program and its projects, and interviewed officials from relevant transportation agencies and organizations. GAO is not making recommendations in this report. The Department of Transportation and the Transportation Research Board reviewed a draft of this report and provided technical clarifications, which we incorporated, as appropriate.
What GAO Found
The program's oversight committee funded research projects based on the recommendations of its four technical coordinating committees of experts (one for each of the four research areas), which considered the input of other experts and factors, such as available program funds and time frames. Prior to the program's establishment, detailed research plans were developed by panels of experts in 2003 that identified 106 possible research projects. However, these research plans were significantly modified on two occasions--in 2006, when less funding and time were provided for completing the program than had been assumed in 2003, and in 2008, when about $20 million in additional program funding became available. On both occasions, the program's oversight committee relied on experts to prioritize and recommend projects for funding. As a result of this process, 56 of the 106 projects either evolved into, or were partially merged with, one or more of the currently funded projects, while 50 projects were eliminated entirely. As of December 31, 2009, the program's oversight committee had allocated about $123 million of the approximately $171 million available to fund 85 projects in the four research areas of highway safety (40 percent), renewal (26 percent), reliability (16 percent), and capacity (17 percent). These funding allocations closely followed the overall funding percentages recommended by the Transportation Research Board in 2001. Of the 85 funded projects, 11 were completed, 52 were ongoing, 22 were anticipated, and all of the projects were expected to be completed by 2013. The outcomes are expected to vary by research area, ranging from useful data sets and related analyses to improved technologies, guidelines, and techniques for advancing the goals of each research area. Among other outcomes, the program staff expects: (1) the safety research will produce the largest, most comprehensive database on driver behavior available to date and, thus, provide the foundation for significant improvements in highway safety; (2) the renewal research will produce a variety of tools and techniques to promote rapid and durable highway renewal; (3) the reliability research will develop methods to provide highway users with relatively more consistent travel times between locations; and (4) the capacity research will provide strategies for better decision making in highway planning processes to increase the capacity of U.S. highways. Because of funding and time constraints, 50 of the 106 research projects identified in 2003 were eliminated entirely from funding, while many of the remaining 56 projects had one or more portions of their planned research eliminated. Overall, most of the funded projects are for applied research, but many of the implementation-related activities identified in 2003 were eliminated. While activities to (1) translate research results into products, (2) train and disseminate research findings, and (3) provide technical support for implementing the research are often needed to widely implement research results, program staff are hopeful that other researchers will initiate some of the eliminated research activities after the program's completion. |
gao_GGD-96-176 | gao_GGD-96-176_0 | To determine the extent of information available concerning the number and outcomes of abuse allegations received and investigated by IRS, OIG, and DOJ, we interviewed officials from the respective organizations and reviewed documentation relative to their information systems. We were told that the information systems maintained by these organizations do not include specific data elements for alleged taxpayer abuse. We cannot determine the adequacy of these controls because IRS officials have not yet established a capability to capture management information, which is needed to ensure that abuse is identified and addressed and to prevent its recurrence. Such a system has the potential to greatly improve IRS’ controls to protect against taxpayer abuse and better ensure that taxpayers are treated properly. Extent of Taxpayer Abuse Not Distinguishable in IRS, OIG, and DOJ Information Systems
It is not possible to readily determine the extent to which allegations of taxpayer abuse are received and investigated from the information systems maintained by IRS, OIG, and DOJ. The Role of the Treasury OIG in Investigating Taxpayer Abuse Allegations
OIG is responsible for investigating allegations of misconduct and waste, fraud, and abuse involving senior IRS officials, GS-15s and above, as well as IRS Inspection employees. OIG officials are to assess the adequacy of IRS’ actions in response to OIG investigations and referrals as follows: (1) IRS is required to make written responses on actions taken within 90 days and 120 days, respectively, on OIG investigative reports of completed investigations and OIG referrals for investigations or management action; (2) OIG investigators are to assess the adequacy of IRS’ responses before closing the OIG case; and (3) OIG Office of Oversight is to assess the overall effectiveness of IRS Inspection capabilities and systems through periodic operational reviews. IRS has recently established a definition for “taxpayer complaints” and is now committed to establishing a complaints tracking process. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO examined the: (1) adequacy of the Internal Revenue Service's (IRS) controls to protect against abuse of taxpayers; (2) extent of information available concerning abuse allegations received and investigated by IRS, the Department of the Treasury Office of the Inspector General (OIG), and the Department of Justice (DOJ); and (3) OIG role in investigating abuse allegations.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) the adequacy of IRS controls against taxpayer abuse is uncertain because IRS does not have the capability to capture management information on taxpayer abuse; (2) IRS is establishing a tracking system to handle taxpayer complaints and reviewing its management information systems to determine the best way to capture relevant information for the complaint system; (3) the tracking system will enable IRS to better identify instances of taxpayer abuse and ensure that actions are taken to prevent their recurrence; (4) IRS is improving controls over its employees' access to computerized taxpayer accounts, establishing an expedited appeals process for some collection actions, and classifying recurring taxpayer problems by major issues; (5) it is not possible to determine the extent to which allegations of taxpayer abuse are received and investigated, since IRS, OIG, and DOJ information systems do not include specific data elements on taxpayer abuse; (6) OIG has increased the number of investigations involving senior IRS employees' alleged misconduct, fraud, and abuse; (7) OIG refers most of these allegations to IRS for investigation and administrative action; and (8) IRS is taking a considerable amount of time to respond to OIG investigations and referrals regarding senior IRS officials' disciplinary actions. |
gao_GGD-00-39 | gao_GGD-00-39_0 | To provide information on whether the Border Patrol Academy has kept pace with increased hiring and has the capacity to meet the basic training needs associated with future growth, we visited the Border Patrol Academy and FLETC in Glynco, Georgia, and the Border Patrol’s temporary training facility in Charleston, South Carolina. INS Did Not Meet Its Fiscal Year 1999 Border Patrol Hiring Goal
INS was able to increase the onboard strength of the Border Patrol by more than 1,000 agents in the first 2 years of its 5-year hiring goal, but in the third year (fiscal year 1999) it was only able to increase its onboard strength by 369 agents. This resulted in a net shortfall of 594 agents for the 3-year period ending September 30, 1999. During fiscal year 1997, the first year of its goal to increase the Border Patrol’s onboard strength by 1,000 agents, INS actually hired 1,726 agents, which resulted in a net increase of 1,002 agents. INS Is Taking Steps to Address Recruiting and Hiring Problems
To improve its ability to identify and recruit applicants, INS has redirected $2.2 million to enhance its recruiting and hiring initiatives and said it is prepared to redirect additional funds, if needed. Since April 1999, INS has been asking applicants their reasons for declining offers to join the Border Patrol. However, INS does not have plans to collect data on why it is losing applicants at other stages later in the hiring process. For example, between fiscal years 1994 and 1998, the percentage of agents stationed along the southwest border with 2 years of experience or less almost tripled, from 14 percent to 39 percent, and the percentage of agents with 3 years of experience or less more than doubled, from 26 percent to 54 percent. For example, in Arizona’s Tucson sector, which experienced the greatest increase, the ratio of nonsupervisory agents to each supervisory agent rose from 8 to 1 in fiscal year 1994 to about 11 to 1 in fiscal year 1998. As of October 1999, the Academy was planning to train about 1,900 new agents in fiscal year 2000, although it may revise this estimate as the year progresses depending on the number of agents INS is able to hire.According to a Border Patrol official, this training projection should allow the Academy to train new agents hired in fiscal year 2000, any additional agents who must be hired to replace those who leave the Border Patrol during that year, and about 600 agents who must be hired if INS is to make up for the fiscal year 1999 hiring shortfall. In addition to surveying those applicants who do not show up for the written test and collecting information from those who decline a job offer, INS could find it informative and cost-effective to learn why some applicants drop out at other stages later in the hiring process. For example, INS could survey applicants, or a sample of applicants, who voluntarily withdraw from the process after passing the interview or the background investigation. INS’ Recruiting Efforts and Hiring Process
This appendix provides an overview of INS’ recruitment program, a summary of difficulties INS has faced in trying to meet its hiring goals, and a summary of new initiatives INS is implementing to improve its ability to recruit and hire agents. INS relies on an outside contractor for applicants’ medical examinations. The survey of applicants who do not report for testing will ask for the applicants’ reasons for not reporting. Table III.3 shows changes in the level of experience of agents assigned to the southwest border. Average Number of Agents Per Supervisor Increased
As a result of the increased hiring of Border Patrol agents, the ratio of nonsupervisory agents (GS-5 through GS-11) to one GS-12 supervisory agent increased across the Border Patrol—from 7 to 1 in fiscal year 1994 to 8 to 1 in fiscal year 1998. Map of Border Patrol Sectors Along the Southwest Border
New Border Patrol agents are sent to the Border Patrol Academy for a 19- week basic training program within days of reporting for duty at their assigned sectors. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on Border Patrol hiring, focusing on: (1) the Immigration and Naturalization Service's (INS) ability to meet its 5-year goal to increase the Border Patrol's onboard strength by 1,000 agents each year from fiscal years (FY) 1997 through 2001; (2) INS' efforts to improve its recruiting efforts and hiring process; (3) changes in the years of experience and level of supervision of Border Patrol agents during INS' increased hiring; and (4) the ability of INS' basic training program to support the pace at which Border Patrol agents have been hired, including whether the Border Patrol Academy anticipates having the capacity to meet future growth.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) INS' recruitment program yielded a net increase of 1,002 Border Patrol agents in FY 1997 and a net increase of 1,035 agents in FY 1998 after accounting for attrition; (2) although INS succeeded in increasing the Border Patrol's onboard strength by 1,000 agents each year, it saw a net increase of only 369 agents in FY 1999 because it was unable to recruit enough qualified applicants and retain them through the hiring process; (3) for the 3-year period ending September 30, 1999, INS experienced a net hiring shortfall of 594 agents; (4) INS has had difficulties attracting and retaining qualified applicants; (5) few individuals who apply to the Border Patrol successfully complete the application process; (6) some fail to pass the rigorous entry examination, medical examination, or background investigation, while others withdraw from the process; (7) in FY 1999, failure and drop-out rates were higher than in the past; (8) to address its hiring problems, INS has redirected $2.2 million to enhance its recruitment program, which includes: (a) initiatives to increase Border Patrol agents' involvement in recruitment and fine-tuning INS' hiring process; (b) surveying applicants for reasons why they register for the written examination but do not report for testing to find out their reasons for not reporting, as well as those who do report for testing for their views on the initial part of the hiring process; and (c) asking applicants their reasons for declining Border Patrol job offers; (9) however, INS does not have plans to survey applicants who voluntarily withdraw at other stages later in the process; (10) as hiring has increased, the average experience level of Border Patrol agents has declined agencywide, as well as along the southwest border; (11) the percentage of agents along the southwest border with 2 years of experience or less almost tripled--from 14 percent to 39 percent--between FY 1994 and FY 1998; (12) during the same period, 7 southwest border sectors experienced some increase in the average number of nonsupervisory agents assigned to each supervisory agent; (13) the Tucson sector experienced the greatest increase, with its ratio of nonsupervisory agents to one supervisory agent rising from 8 to 1 in FY 1994 to about 11 to 1 in FY 1998; and (14) by relying on a temporary training facility in Charleston, South Carolina since 1996, the Border Patrol Academy has been able to provide newly hired agents with required training and, according to a Border Patrol official, is prepared to meet the training needs associated with future growth. |
gao_GAO-14-14 | gao_GAO-14-14_0 | However, downsizing initiatives in the 1990s reduced GSA’s in-house capacity to acquire leases, and in 1997 GSA began to sign contracts with private broker firms to assist with its leasing portfolio. In 2012, GSA officials attempted to determine if brokers negotiated lower rental rates than in-house staff using data from fiscal years 2011 and 2012. In April 2013, GSA began requiring regional officials to use different market rental-rate data, which they expect will allow them to better compare the rental rates achieved by brokers to market rates in the future. For all broker projects greater than 10,000 square feet, regional officials are to obtain an in-house research report at the beginning of the leasing process referred to as “Bullseye.” A Bullseye report is specifically tailored for each lease transaction and includes market information, analysis, and insight regarding the local submarket. According to GSA officials, this new reporting will improve their comparison of rental rates negotiated by brokers to market rental rates but will probably still not allow them to definitively determine whether brokers are negotiating better deals than in-house staff. GSA officials stated that they believe NBC provides the greatest value with large complex leases in large metropolitan areas, where brokers have a strong commission incentive. Cost Savings from Using the NBC Program Are Unclear
The two goals GSA uses to evaluate the NBC program are not closely linked to the anticipated cost savings used to justify the program. However, GSA lacks data on whether using brokers results in cost savings. Second, under NBC2, GSA awards tasks to brokers based on price and performance data. Incorporating new approaches and strategies, such as examining alternatives to the current commission and rent structure and developing new methods for evaluating broker performance. All Brokers and Several GSA Regions Report That Changes to Performance Evaluation Are Needed
Officials in 7 of the 11 GSA regions expressed dissatisfaction with the current broker performance-evaluation system. GSA regional officials and brokers also suggested using region-specific broker performance-evaluation data to award tasks. Most GSA Regions Suggested More Flexibility in Using Brokers
Officials in the majority of regional offices (8 of the 11) suggested that greater flexibility in applying the NBC program would allow them to make better use of the brokers. Regional officials described a preferred “menu of services” that would allow them to use the brokers more selectively for the specific tasks where GSA wants assistance as opposed to working with the broker throughout the entire lease procurement. Conclusion
GSA’s goals and metrics for evaluating the NBC program have not been linked to the cost savings in rental rates GSA anticipated when proposing the program. As a result, GSA does not have a means of evaluating and reporting on this aspect of the program and the value of the NBC program in terms of cost savings continue to be unclear. Clarifying its goals for the program and linking them to cost savings would also serve as a way to be transparent to the Congress and other stakeholders about the purpose of the program and how GSA plans to monitor and achieve the program’s goals. Such transparency is especially important given that GSA is planning to seek a third generation of broker contracts in fiscal year 2015. Recommendation for Executive Action
To promote transparency and fully reflect the expectations GSA used to justify the NBC program, we recommend that the Administrator of GSA ensure the program’s goals are linked to cost savings achieved through the use of NBC brokers and develop and implement a means of evaluating and reporting results. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to examine (1) the General Services Administration’s (GSA) National Broker Contract (NBC) program goals and the extent to which they are being realized; and (2) the changes GSA has made to the program and what challenges and suggestions for improvement, if any, key stakeholders identified. We interviewed officials from all 11 GSA regions and representatives from all four broker firms currently on contract about the use and perceived benefits of the program. We asked officials to identify challenges and suggestions that could help improve the program. | Why GAO Did This Study
For fiscal year 2013, GSA expected to lease approximately 197 million square feet at a cost of about $5.2 billion. Since 2005, GSA has acquired some leased space using its NBC program to enlist commercial real estate brokerage firms to negotiate with building owners on behalf of the government. In 2012, GSA relied on this contract to replace approximately 33 percent of its expiring leases.
GAO was asked to review GSA's NBC program. This report examines (1) NBC's program goals and the extent to which they are being realized and (2) the changes GSA has made to the program and what challenges and suggestions for improvement, if any, key stakeholders identified. GAO reviewed NBC contract documentation, agency documents, relevant legislation and regulations, and available data on leasing tasks assigned to brokers. GAO interviewed officials from GSA headquarters, all 11 GSA regions, and representatives of all 4 brokers currently participating in the program.
What GAO Found
While the General Services Administration (GSA) has used the National Broker Contract (NBC) program to assist with the agency's lease portfolio, it is unclear whether the program has resulted in the rental rate cost savings that GSA anticipated when proposing the program. GSA officials have stated that brokers should be able to obtain lower rental rates than in-house staff because brokers have greater market expertise and in addition are able to credit a portion of the broker's commission to the rental rate. In 2012, when GSA attempted to compare rental rates negotiated by brokers with those negotiated by in-house staff, the agency not only found little difference between the two, but also stated that the data were insufficient to conduct a meaningful comparison. In April 2013, GSA began requiring the use of a different market rent data report --"Bullseye"-- which includes market information, analysis, and insight regarding the local submarket. Officials said this new data would improve their ability to compare rental rates negotiated by brokers to market rental rates, but will likely not allow officials to determine whether brokers are negotiating better deals than in-house staff. Beginning in fiscal year 2013, GSA also deemphasized previous annual goals for broker use and began identifying and assigning leases to brokers based on where agency officials believe the brokers provide the greatest value.
GSA's goals and metrics for evaluating the NBC program have not been linked to the anticipated cost savings in rental rates. As a result, GSA has no means of evaluating and reporting on this aspect of the program and the value of the NBC program in terms of cost savings continues to be unclear. Clarifying goals and linking them to cost savings would also serve as a way to be transparent with Congress and other stakeholders about the program's purpose and how GSA plans to monitor and achieve its objectives. Clear, linked goals are especially important given that GSA is planning to seek a third generation of broker contracts in 2015.
Officials from all 11 GSA regional offices and representatives from all 4 broker firms identified challenges and made suggestions to improve the program. Two areas frequently cited are: the broker evaluation process and greater flexibility using brokers.
Broker evaluation process : Both GSA regional officials and brokers expressed dissatisfaction with the current broker performance evaluation system and brokers suggested additional guidance and training would help. Both groups also suggested that GSA officials be allowed to use region-specific performance evaluation data to award tasks.
Greater flexibility using brokers : Regional officials suggested that greater flexibility in applying the NBC program would allow them to make better use of brokers. Regional officials described a preferred "menu of services" that would allow them to use the brokers more selectively for the specific tasks where GSA wants assistance as opposed to working with the broker throughout the entire lease procurement.
GSA has begun identifying potential changes to the structure and administration of the NBC program as the agency develops a strategy for the third generation of NBCs. For example, officials told GAO they are examining alternatives to the current commission and rent structure.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that GSA ensure the program's goals are linked to cost savings achieved through the use of NBC brokers, and develop and implement a means of evaluating and reporting results. GSA concurred with the recommendation. |
gao_GAO-05-749T | gao_GAO-05-749T_0 | In January 2003, we designated modernizing VA’s disability programs, along with other federal disability programs, as high-risk. Problems in Claims Processing Continue
VA continues to experience problems processing veterans' disability compensation and pension claims. These include large numbers of pending claims and lengthy processing times. While VA made progress in fiscal years 2002 and 2003 in reducing the size and age of its inventory of pending claims, it has lost some ground since the end of fiscal year 2003. As shown in figure 1, pending claims increased by about one-third from the end of fiscal year 2003 to the end of March 2005, from about 254,000 to about 340,000. VA also faces continuing questions about its ability to ensure that veterans receive consistent decisions—that is, comparable decisions on benefit entitlement and rating percentage—regardless of the regional offices making the decisions. The issue of decision-making consistency across VA is not new. We concluded that VA needed to systematically assess decision-making consistency to provide a foundation for identifying acceptable levels of variation and to reduce variations found to be unacceptable. Again, in November 2004, we highlighted the need for VA to develop plans for studying consistency issues. Reacting to these media reports, in December 2004, the Secretary instructed the Inspector General to determine why average payments per veteran vary widely from state to state. Factors That May Impede VA’s Ability to Improve Claims Processing Performance
Several factors may impede VA’s ability to make, and sustain, significant improvements in its claims processing performance. Laws, Court Decisions, and Filing Behavior of Veterans Impact Workload and Performance
Recent history has shown that VA’s workload and performance is affected by several factors, including the impacts of laws and court decisions expanding veterans’ benefit entitlement and clarifying VA’s duty to assist veterans in the claims process, and the filing behavior of veterans. These factors have affected the number of claims VA received and decided. Ability to Improve Productivity May Affect Future Performance Improvements
In November 2004, we reported that to achieve its claims processing performance goals in the face of increasing workloads and decreased staffing levels, VA would have to rely on productivity improvements. Veterans’ Benefits: Improvements Needed in the Reporting and Use of Data on the Accuracy of Disability Claims Decisions. Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of Veterans Affairs. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Chairman, Committee on Veterans' Affairs, U.S. Senate, asked GAO to testify on the current state of VA's disability claims process and factors that may impede VA's ability to improve performance. For years, the claims process has been the subject of concern and attention within VA and by the Congress and veterans service organizations. Many of their concerns have focused on long waits for decisions, large claims backlogs, and the accuracy of decisions. Our work and recent media reports of significant discrepancies in average disability payments from state to state have also highlighted concerns over the consistency of decision-making within VA. In January 2003, GAO designated federal disability programs, including VA's compensation and pension programs, as a high-risk area because of continuing challenges to improving the timeliness and consistency of its disability decisions, and the need to modernize programs.
What GAO Found
The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) continues to experience problems processing veterans' disability compensation and pension claims. These include large numbers of pending claims and lengthy processing times. While VA made progress in fiscal years 2002 and 2003 in reducing the size and age of its inventory of pending claims, it has lost some ground since the end of fiscal year 2003. For example, pending claims increased by about one-third from the end of fiscal year 2003 to the end of March 2005. Meanwhile, VA faces continuing questions about its ability to ensure that veterans get consistent decisions across its 57 regional offices. GAO has highlighted the need for VA to study the consistency of decisions made by different regional offices, identify acceptable levels of decision-making variation, and reduce variations found to be unacceptable. Also, reacting to media reports of wide variations in average disability benefit payments from state to state, the Secretary of Veterans Affairs instructed VA's Inspector General in December 2004 to determine why these variations were occurring. Several factors may impede VA's ability to make significant improvements in its disability claims processing performance. Recent history has shown that VA's workload and performance is affected by factors such as the impacts of laws and court decisions affecting veterans' benefit entitlement and the claims process, and the filing behavior of veterans. These factors have affected the number of claims VA received and decided. Also, to achieve its claims processing performance goals in the face of increasing workloads without significant staffing increases, VA would have to rely on productivity improvements. GAO believes that fundamental reform might be necessary to achieve more dramatic gains in performance. |
gao_PEMD-95-12 | gao_PEMD-95-12_0 | Counseling for nonprescription products is infrequent and sometimes inappropriate, and they argue that this would not change with the establishment of an intermediate class of drugs. 4. How does access to nonprescription drugs vary between the study countries and the United States? How do pharmacists ensure the proper use of nonprescription drugs? What is the U.S. experience with dispensing drugs without a physician’s prescription but only by pharmacists? (2) The experiences of other countries and the European Union with a pharmacist or pharmacy class, including its use to move a drug to a general sale class, its usefulness in preventing drug abuse, and its effect on drug expenditures. Literature Review
We conducted computerized literature searches on the following topics: (1) drug distribution systems in the study countries, (2) the behavior of pharmacists, (3) the classification of the 14 drugs, (4) the advantages and disadvantages of an intermediate class of drugs, and (5) assessments of the health and economic effects of different drug distribution systems. What conclusions can be drawn from studies or reports on the development, operation, and consequences of different drug distribution systems? 3. 6. 7. Similarly, no studies have attempted to link the type of drug distribution system in a country to the frequency of adverse drug reactions or have attempted to relate different drug distribution systems to the quality of health care. As table 2.1 shows, the two-tier system in the United States is unique. However, the European Union has decided not to impose a particular drug distribution system on the member countries. The difference would be that a prescription would not be required. An assessment of the relative openness of the current drug distribution system in the United States compared to the other countries studied depends on one’s definition of “access.” If access is defined by the availability of drugs for general sale, the United States appears to have the most open system, since more of the 14 drugs are available for sale outside pharmacies than in any of the other countries. 5. There are no national counseling requirements in Canada. Thus, the experiences of the 10 other countries do not allow us to assess the benefits from or costs of requiring pharmacists to report adverse drug reactions. Under the law, pharmacists are not required to perform the prescribing role. These countries restrict the sale of at least some nonprescription drugs to pharmacies or personal sale by a pharmacist. However, it should also be clear that there is no evidence that systems that do this are necessarily inferior to drug distribution systems that allow some or all nonprescription drugs to be sold outside pharmacies. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the creation of a drug class that would be available only through pharmacies, but would not require a physician's prescription, focusing on: (1) studies and reports on the development, operation, and consequences of different drug distribution systems; (2) the drug distribution systems in 10 selected countries; (3) how access to nonprescription drugs varies between the selected countries and the United States; (4) how pharmacists ensure the proper use of nonprescription drugs; and (5) the U.S. experience with pharmacists dispensing drugs without a prescription.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) available evidence shows that there are no major benefits from establishing a class of pharmacist-controlled nonprescription drugs; (2) studies have not attempted to link different drug distribution systems with differences between the countries' health care costs, adverse drug reactions, and quality of care; (3) the two-tier system in the United States is unique, since all other countries have at least one intermediate class of drugs; (4) although all 10 countries restrict some or all sales of nonprescription drugs, they do not use the pharmacy or pharmacist drug class to assess the drugs' suitability for sale outside of pharmacies; (5) the European Union has decided not to impose any particular drug distribution system on its members, since no system has proved to be superior; (6) there is no clear pattern of increased or decreased access to nonprescription drugs where an intermediate class of drugs exists; (7) the countries' safeguards to prevent drug misuse and abuse are easily circumvented and pharmacist counseling is infrequent and incomplete; (8) pharmacists are rarely required to keep records on drug use and none are required to report adverse reactions; and (9) Florida's unsuccessful experience with a similar class of drugs was due to pharmacists' failure to regularly prescribe these drugs, give patients adequate counseling, or follow recordkeeping requirements. |
gao_GAO-15-197 | gao_GAO-15-197_0 | According to Treasury, its decision to exit a program depends on various circumstances, including market conditions and other factors outside the government’s control. Treasury Continues to Exit Nonhousing Programs as Opportunities Exist
As of September 30, 2014, Treasury had completed the wind down of four of nine TARP nonhousing programs that were once active. CPP Continues to Wind Down, with Repayments and Income Exceeding Original Investments
Treasury continues to wind down CPP, the largest TARP investment program, which was designed to provide capital investments to viable financial institutions, and thus far, repayments and income have exceeded the total amount of original outlays. As of September 30, 2014, the government had recovered $68.9 billion (86.3 percent) of the funds disbursed through the program, and expects AIFP to have a lifetime cost of $12.2 billion. Treasury Has Disbursed Just over One-Third of Its TARP Housing Program Funds
As of September 30, 2014, Treasury had disbursed $13.7 billion (36 percent) of the $38.5 billion in TARP funds that had been allocated to support housing programs. The number of new HAMP permanent modifications added on a quarterly basis rose slightly in early 2013 but has declined in 2014, falling to 29,000 in the third quarter, the lowest level since the program’s inception. Treasury has taken steps to help more borrowers, including by extending the deadline for HAMP applications for a third time. As we have reported, according to Treasury, the decline in HAMP modifications is a reflection of the shrinking pool of HAMP-eligible mortgages, as evidenced in the declining number of 60-day-plus delinquencies reported by the industry. Second, in September 2014 Treasury, in conjunction with HUD and the Ad Council, launched a new series of public service advertisements (PSA) to raise awareness of the free government resources available through MHA to assist struggling homeowners in avoiding foreclosure. Agency Comments
We provided a draft of this report to Treasury for review and comment. Treasury also provided technical comments that we have incorporated as appropriate. To assess the condition and status of all the nonhousing-related programs initiated under TARP, we collected and analyzed data about program utilization and assets held, as applicable, focusing primarily on financial information that we had audited in the Office of Financial Stability’s (OFS) financial statements, as of September 30, 2014. Further, we reviewed the Department of the Treasury’s (Treasury) documentation such as press releases and reports on TARP programs and costs. We also interviewed officials from Treasury. Capital Purchase Program: Status of the Program and Financial Health of Remaining Participants. Troubled Asset Relief Program: Treasury Actions Needed to Make the Home Affordable Modification Program More Transparent and Accountable. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (EESA) authorized Treasury to create TARP, designed to restore liquidity and stability to the financial system and to preserve homeownership by assisting borrowers struggling to make their mortgage payments. Congress reduced the initial authorized amount of $700 billion to $475 billion as part of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. EESA also required that GAO report every 60 days on TARP activities in the financial and mortgage sectors. This report provides an update on the condition of all TARP programs—nonhousing and housing—as of September 30, 2014.
To conduct this work, GAO analyzed audited financial data for various TARP programs; reviewed documentation such as press releases, and agency reports on TARP programs; and interviewed Treasury officials.
GAO provided a draft of this report to Treasury. Treasury generally concurred with GAO's findings and provided technical comments, which GAO has incorporated, as appropriate.
GAO makes no recommendations in this report.
What GAO Found
The Department of the Treasury (Treasury) continues to wind down Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) nonhousing programs that were designed to support financial and automotive markets (see figure). As of September 30, 2014, Treasury had exited four of the nine nonhousing programs that were once active, and was managing assets totaling $2.9 billion under those remaining. Some programs have yielded returns that exceed the original investment. For example, as of September 30, 2014, repayments and income from participants in the Capital Purchase Program, which provided capital to over 700 financial institutions, had exceeded original investments. In contrast, as of the same date Treasury had recouped 86 percent of its expenditures and incurred an estimated lifetime cost of $12.2 billion for the Automotive Industry Finance Program, which invested in major domestic automakers to prevent a significant industry disruption. Treasury's decision to fully exit a program depends on various factors, including the participating institutions' health and market conditions.
TARP-funded housing programs, which focus on preventing avoidable foreclosures, are ongoing. As of September 30, 2014, Treasury had disbursed $13.7 billion (36 percent) of the $38.5 billion in TARP housing funds (see figure). The number of new Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP) permanent modifications added on a monthly basis rose in early 2013 but fell in 2014 to the lowest level since the program's inception. According to Treasury, this decline is attributable in part to the shrinking pool of eligible mortgages, as evidenced in the declining number of 60-day-plus delinquencies reported by the industry. Treasury has taken steps to help more borrowers, including by extending the deadline for program applications for a third time until at least 2016. Also, Treasury launched a new series of public service advertisements that were distributed through a donated media campaign. |
gao_GAO-16-815T | gao_GAO-16-815T_0 | SSA relies on its IT resources to support the administration of its programs and related activities. SSA’s acting commissioner has stated that the agency’s aging IT infrastructure is not sustainable because it is increasingly difficult and expensive to maintain. Accordingly, the agency has requested $300 million in its fiscal year 2017 budget to be spread over 4 years to modernize its IT environment. SSA Has Faced Long-Standing Challenges in IT Management and Modernization Efforts
We have issued previous reports highlighting various challenges in SSA’s management of its IT. Overall, these reports identified weaknesses in, among other areas, system development practices, IT governance, requirements management, and strategic planning. Our reports, collectively, stressed the need for the agency to strengthen its IT management controls. In previously reporting on SSA’s implementation of a new electronic disability system, we noted that the agency had proceeded without (1) conducting testing that was adequate to evaluate the performance of all system components collectively and (2) evidence that it had consistently applied established procedures to guide the system’s development. SSA agreed with these recommendations and, in September 2013, took actions to address them. In an examination of the agency’s IT modernization approach, we pointed out that the approach lacked key practices to effectively guide its efforts. Specifically, SSA did not have an updated IT strategic plan to guide its modernization efforts and its enterprise architecture lacked important content that would have allowed the agency to more effectively plan its investments. Beyond the challenges identified in the aforementioned reports, our recent report on federal agencies’ IT legacy systems highlighted the increasing costs that agencies, including SSA, may be faced with as they continue to operate and maintain at-risk legacy systems. Key Practices Are Essential for Managing Successful Modernizations
Our prior work has shown that effectively managing IT needs depends on federal departments and agencies, including SSA, having key processes in place. Toward this end, we have identified and reported on a set of essential and complementary management disciplines that provide a sound foundation to support IT modernization efforts. These include the following:
Strategic planning: Strategic planning defines what an organization seeks to accomplish and identifies the strategies it will use to achieve desired results. Agencies can maximize the value of these investments and minimize the risks of acquisitions by having an effective and efficient IT investment management and governance process, which would include instituting an investment board, selecting investments that meet business needs, providing investment oversight, and capturing investment information. These practices include defining the requirements that address the needs of the system users, managing project risk to identify potential problems before they occur, reliably estimating cost to help managers evaluate affordability and performance against a project’s plans, and developing an integrated and reliable master schedule that defines when and how long work will occur and how each activity is related to the others, among other actions. Information security and privacy: Effective security for federal IT systems and data is essential to prevent data tampering, disruptions in critical operations, fraud, and inappropriate disclosure of sensitive information, including personal information entrusted to the government by members of the American public. Service management: Agencies should develop and implement a process for ensuring that IT services, such as server management and desktop support, are aligned with and actively support the business needs of the organization. Leadership: Effective leadership, such as that of a CIO, can drive change, provide oversight, and ensure accountability for results. In conclusion, given SSA’s longstanding challenges with IT management and modernization efforts, it will be important for the agency to implement a clearly established, rigorous, and disciplined approach for its current efforts to manage and modernize its aging IT systems. Without doing so, such challenges could continue to be an impediment to the agency achieving the more modernized IT environment that it needs. | Why GAO Did This Study
SSA delivers services that touch the lives of almost every American, and the agency relies heavily on IT resources to do so. Its computerized information systems support a range of activities—from processing Disability Insurance and Supplemental Security Income payments, to calculating and withholding Medicare premiums, and issuing Social Security numbers and cards. For fiscal year 2015, the agency reported spending approximately $1.3 billion on hardware and software, computer maintenance, and contractor support, among other things. SSA's IT infrastructure is aging and, thus, increasingly difficult and expensive to maintain. In its fiscal year 2017 budget, the agency has requested $300 million, to be spread over 4 years, to modernize its IT environment.
This statement summarizes challenges that SSA has previously encountered in managing and modernizing its IT, as described in prior GAO reports. It also highlights selected best practices that GAO identified as essential to effectively planning and managing IT modernization efforts.
What GAO Found
GAO's reports have highlighted various challenges in the Social Security Administration's (SSA) information technology (IT) planning and management. Overall, these reports identified weaknesses in, among other areas, system development practices, IT governance, requirements management, and strategic planning. The reports, collectively, stressed the need for the agency to strengthen its IT management controls. In previously reporting on SSA's implementation of a new electronic disability system in March 2004, GAO noted that the agency had proceeded without (1) conducting testing that was adequate to evaluate the performance of all system components collectively and (2) evidence that it had consistently applied established procedures to guide the system's development. Additionally, GAO's April 2012 review of the agency's IT modernization approach pointed out that SSA did not have an updated IT strategic plan to guide its efforts and its enterprise architecture lacked important content that would have allowed the agency to more effectively plan its investments. Beyond the challenges identified in these previous reports, GAO's May 2016 report on federal agencies' IT legacy systems highlighted the increasing costs that agencies, including SSA, may be faced with as they continue to operate and maintain at-risk legacy systems.
Prior GAO work has shown that effectively managing IT needs depends on federal departments and agencies, including SSA, having key processes in place. Toward this end, GAO has identified and reported on a set of essential and complementary management disciplines that provide a sound foundation for IT management. Among these practices are:
Strategic planning to define what an organization seeks to accomplish and identify the strategies it will use to achieve desired results.
IT investment management that includes instituting an investment board, selecting investments that meet business needs, providing investment oversight, and capturing investment information.
Systems development and acquisition that includes defining requirements, managing project risk, reliably estimating cost, and developing an integrated and reliable master schedule, among other actions.
Information security and privacy which are essential for preventing data tampering, disruptions in operations, fraud, and inappropriate disclosure of sensitive information.
Service management for ensuring that IT services, such as server management and desktop support, are aligned with and actively support the business needs of the organization.
Leadership for driving change, providing oversight, and ensuring accountability for results.
Given the longstanding challenges with IT management and modernization efforts, it is important for SSA to implement a clearly established, rigorous, and disciplined approach for its current efforts to modernize its aging IT systems. Without doing so, challenges like those that the agency experienced with its past initiatives could continue to be an impediment to the agency in achieving the more modernized IT environment that is necessary to support its service-delivery mission.
What GAO Recommends
GAO has made numerous recommendations to SSA to mitigate challenges in planning for and managing its IT. Among other things, GAO has recommended strengthening the roles and responsibilities of the agency's investment board, improving post-implementation reviews, and establishing an enterprise architecture to effectively guide modernization activities. The agency has taken a number of actions intended to address them. |
gao_GAO-05-130 | gao_GAO-05-130_0 | 1-800-MEDICARE Provided Accurate Information for Less Than Two-thirds of the Calls We Placed
The 1-800-MEDICARE help line provided accurate answers to 61 percent of the 420 calls we made. Overall, 29 percent of our calls were answered inaccurately. We found instances when CSRs did not seem to access scripts when responding to calls. For example, when responding to our calls concerning the prescription drug discount card question, 2 CSRs indicated that they were not able to inform the caller about which card had the lowest drug prices—even though 53 other CSRs successfully used a script and a Web- based tool to answer this question. Ten Percent of Calls Were Not Answered, Often When Calls Were Transferred to Other Contractors’ Help Lines
We did not receive answers to our questions for 10 percent (42) of the 420 calls we placed at the time we originally called. The training for newly hired CSRs includes instruction on accessing and using scripts, customer service etiquette, and information about the Medicare program. Most of the training consists of 2 weeks of classroom instruction. After completing their initial instruction, CMS requires the new CSRs to score at least 90 percent on a written exam and successfully complete a call handling simulation exercise before they answer calls on the help line without supervision. As a result, the monitoring does not assess how accurately CSRs as a group answer particular questions, which could help CMS target additional training efforts. Two smaller evaluation efforts did focus on specific questions answered inaccurately, and these targeted monitoring efforts provided information that CMS used to improve CSR training and the scripts used on the help line. CMS’s Primary Contractor Monitors Performance of Individual CSRs
At the time of our review, CMS had delegated most of the responsibility for monitoring the accuracy of the 1-800-MEDICARE help line to the primary contractor, while maintaining oversight by reviewing the primary contractor’s results. The study helped CMS identify questions that the CSRs were answering less accurately. As a result of this study, CMS improved its scripts and related training. However, the written exam that newly hired CSRs must pass and the continuing training quizzes do not measure the ability to use information in scripts to provide accurate and complete answers on the help line. Recommendations
In order to improve the accuracy of responses made on the 1-800- MEDICARE help line and callers’ ability to have their questions answered, we recommend that the CMS Administrator take four actions: Assess the current scripts for the most commonly asked questions to ensure that they are understandable to CSRs and potential callers and if not, revise them as needed and pretest new and revised scripts to ensure that CSRs can effectively use them to accurately answer callers’ questions. This is the same tool CSRs used to answer our questions. She is not enrolled in Medicaid. | Why GAO Did This Study
In March 1999, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) implemented a telephone help line--1-800-MEDICARE--to provide information about program eligibility, enrollment, and benefits. The Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003 (MMA) directed GAO to examine several issues related to this 24-hour help line and the customer service representatives (CSRs) who staff it. In this report, GAO evaluated (1) the accuracy of the information the help line provides, (2) the training given to CSRs, and (3) CMS's efforts to monitor the accuracy of information provided through the help line.
What GAO Found
The 1-800-MEDICARE help line provided accurate answers to 61 percent of the 420 calls we made and inaccurate answers to 29 percent. We were not able to obtain any answers for the remaining 10 percent of our calls at the time we placed them. Most of these calls were not answered because they were transferred to other contractors responsible for processing Medicare claims that were not open for business at the time we called or these calls were inadvertently disconnected. To facilitate accurate responses, the 1-800-MEDICARE help line provides CSRs with written answers--called "scripts"--that CSRs use during a call. When CSRs provided inaccurate information, it was largely because they did not seem to access and effectively use a script that answered our questions. CMS and its contractor do not routinely pretest the scripts to ensure that they are understandable to CSRs or potential callers. The training for CSRs meets CMS's requirements, but it is not sufficient to ensure that CSRs are able to answer questions accurately on the help line. Before handling calls, CSRs must complete about 2 weeks of classroom training; accurately answer two simulated calls consecutively out of six; and score at least 90 percent on a written exam. In addition, all CSRs receive ongoing training. However, the results from our calls indicate that the testing and simulated call answering did not sufficiently measure whether CSRs were prepared to answer questions accurately. CMS delegates most accuracy monitoring to one of its contractors and reviews the results. The bulk of the monitoring focuses on how accurately individual CSRs answer questions. However, this monitoring does not systematically track questions answered inaccurately by CSRs as a group, which could help target training and script improvement. Through two smaller studies that measured how accurately specific questions were answered, CMS was able to identify areas to improve scripts and training. |
gao_T-RCED-97-90 | gao_T-RCED-97-90_0 | Aviation Safety
The Commission made 14 recommendations in the general area of aviation safety. Foremost among these is establishing a national goal to reduce the fatal accident rate by 80 percent within 10 years. However, we believe that, as FAA tries to fundamentally reinvent itself as the Commission contemplates through some of its recommendations, FAA and the aviation industry will be challenged in three areas: (1) FAA’s organizational culture and resource management, (2) FAA’s partnerships with the airline industry, and (3) the costs of and sources of funding to implement the recommendations. Recognizing that new technology, such as satellite-based navigation and new computers in ATC facilities and in aircraft cockpits, offers tremendous advances in safety, efficiency, and cost-effectiveness for users of the ATC system and for FAA, the Commission recommended accelerating the deployment of this new technology. The Commission’s goal is commendable, but given FAA’s past problems in developing new ATC technology and the technical challenges that lie ahead, there is little evidence that this goal can be achieved. We agree with the Commission’s recommendations to integrate the airports’ capacity needs into the ATC modernization effort and to enhance the accuracy, availability, and reliability of the Global Positioning System. However, we have two concerns about accelerating the entire modernization effort that focus on the complexities of the technology and the integrity of FAA’s acquisition process. The Commission strongly presented aviation security as a national security priority and recommended that the federal government commit greater resources to improving it. We found, however, that in the past FAA has had difficulty in meeting some of the time frames for implementing the safety improvements recommended by GAO and the Department of Transportation (DOT) Inspector General. To improve aviation security, the Congress, the administration, and the aviation industry need to agree on what to do and who will pay for it—and then to take action. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed recommendations contained in the recently released report of the White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security, focusing on the implementation issues relating to three areas addressed by the Commission: (1) aviation safety; (2) air traffic control (ATC) modernization; and (3) aviation security.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) foremost among the Commission's 14 recommendations for aviation safety is establishing a national goal to reduce the fatal accident rate by 80 percent within 10 years; (2) however, GAO believes that, as the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) tries to fundamentally reinvent itself as the Commission contemplates through some of its recommendations, FAA and the aviation industry will be challenged by: (a) FAA's organizational culture and resource management; (b) FAA's partnerships with the airline industry; and (c) the costs of and sources of funding to implement the recommendations; (3) recognizing that new technology offers tremendous advances in safety, efficiency, and cost-effectiveness for users of the ATC system and for FAA, the Commission recommended accelerating FAA's deployment of new technology, but given FAA's past problems in developing new ATC technology and the technical challenges that lie ahead, there is little evidence that this goal can be achieved; (4) GAO agrees with the Commission's recommendations to integrate the airports' capacity needs into the ATC modernization effort and to enhance the accuracy, availability, and reliability of the Global Positioning System; however, GAO has two concerns about accelerating the entire modernization effort that focus on the complexities of the technology and the integrity of FAA's acquisition process; (5) the Commission strongly presented aviation security as a national security priority and recommended that the federal government commit greater resources to improving it; (6) in the past, FAA has had difficulty in meeting some of the time frames for implementing safety and security improvement recommendations; and (7) to improve aviation security, the Congress, the administration, and the aviation industry need to agree on what to do and who will pay for it, and then take action. |
gao_GAO-13-284T | gao_GAO-13-284T_0 | Transmission pipelines carry these products, sometimes over hundreds of miles, to communities and large-volume users, such as factories. PHMSA has estimated there are more than 400,000 miles of hazardous liquid and natural gas transmission pipelines across the United States. According to PHMSA, industry, and state officials, responding to either a hazardous liquid or natural gas pipeline incident typically includes detecting that an incident has occurred, coordinating with emergency responders, and shutting down the affected pipeline segment. Officials from PHMSA and state pipeline safety offices perform relatively minor roles during an incident, as they rely on operators and emergency responders to take actions to mitigate the consequences of such events. Incident Response Time Depends on Multiple Variables, Including the Use of Automated Valves
Multiple variables—some controllable by transmission pipeline operators—can influence the ability of operators to respond quickly to an incident, according to PHMSA officials, pipeline safety officials, and industry stakeholders and operators. Ensuring a quick response is important because according to pipeline operators and industry stakeholders, reducing the amount of time it takes to respond to an incident can reduce the amount of property and environmental damage stemming from an incident and, in some cases, the number of fatalities and injuries. As noted, one variable that influences operators’ response times to incidents is the type of valve installed on the pipeline. These sources indicated that the location of the valve, existing shutdown capabilities, proximity of personnel to the valve’s location, the likelihood of an ignition, type of product being transported, operating pressure, topography, and pipeline diameter, among other factors, all play a role in determining the extent to which an automated valve would be advantageous. Operators we met with are using a variety of methods for determining whether to install automated valves that consider—on a case-by-case basis—whether these valves will improve response time, the potential for accidental closure, and monetary costs. Other hazardous liquid pipeline operators said they used computer-based spill modeling to determine whether the amount of product release would be significantly reduced by installing an automated valve. Defining performance measures and targets for incident response can be challenging, but one possible way for PHMSA to move toward a more quantifiable, performance-based approach would be to develop strategies to improve incident response based on nationwide data. For example, performing an analysis of nationwide incident data—similar to PHMSA’s current analyses of fatality and injury data—could help PHMSA determine response times for different types of pipelines (based on characteristics such as location, operating pressure, and diameter); identify trends; and develop strategies to improve incident response. However, we found that PHMSA does not have the reliable nationwide data on incident response time data it would need to conduct such analyses. Specifically, the response time data PHMSA currently collects are unreliable for two reasons: (1) operators are not required to fill out certain time-related fields in the PHMSA incident-reporting form and (2) when operators do provide these data, they are interpreting the intended content of the data fields in different ways. Our report recommended that PHMSA improve incident response data and use these data to evaluate whether to implement a performance-based framework for incident response times. PHMSA agreed to consider this recommendation. For example, many of the operators we spoke with were unaware of existing PHMSA enforcement and inspection guidance that could be useful for operators in determining whether to install automated valves on transmission pipelines. In addition, while PHMSA inspectors see examples of how operators make decisions to install automated valves during integrity management inspections, they do not formally collect this information or share it with other operators. Given the variety of risk- based methods for making decisions about automated valves across the operators we spoke with, we believe that both operators and inspectors would benefit from exposure to some of the methods used by other operators to make decisions on whether to install automated valves. Our report recommended that PHMSA share guidance and information on operators’ decision-making approaches to assist operators with these determinations. Appendix I: Summary of Recent GAO Reports on Gathering Pipelines and Low-stress Transmission Pipelines
GAO recently issued two reports related to the safety of certain types of pipelines. While the consequences of a low-stress transmission pipeline failure are generally not severe because these pipelines are more likely to leak than rupture, the point at which a gas pipeline fails by rupture is uncertain and depends on a number of factors in addition to pressure, such as the size or type of defect and the materials used to conduct the pipeline. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pipelines are a relatively safe means of transporting natural gas and hazardous liquids; however, catastrophic incidents can and do occur. Such an incident occurred on December 11, 2012, near Sissonville, West Virginia, when a rupture of a natural gas transmission pipeline destroyed or damaged 9 homes and badly damaged a section of Interstate 77. Large-diameter transmission pipelines such as these that carry products over long distances from processing facilities to communities and large-volume users make up more than 400,000 miles of the 2.5 million mile natural gas and hazardous liquid pipeline network in the United States. The Department of Transportation's (DOT) Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), working in conjunction with state pipeline safety offices, oversees this network, which transports about 65 percent of the energy we consume.
The best way to ensure the safety of pipelines, and their surrounding communities, is to minimize the possibility of an incident occurring. PHMSA's regulations require pipeline operators to take appropriate preventive measures such as corrosion control and periodic assessments of pipeline integrity. To mitigate the consequences if an incident occurs, operators are also required to develop leak detection and emergency response plans. One mitigation measure operators can take is to install automated valves that, in the event of an incident, close automatically or can be closed remotely by operators in a control room. Such valves have been the topic of several National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) recommendations since 1971 and a PHMSA report issued in October 2012.
As mandated in the Pipeline Safety, Regulatory Certainty, and Job Creation Act of 2011, we issued a January 2013 report on the ability of transmission pipeline operators to respond to a hazardous liquid or natural gas release from an existing pipeline segment. This statement is based on this report and addresses (1) variables that influence the ability of transmission pipeline operators to respond to incidents and (2) opportunities to improve these operators' responses to incidents. This statement also provides information from two other recent GAO reports on pipeline safety.
What GAO Found
Numerous variables--some of which are under operators' control--influence the ability of transmission pipeline operators to respond to incidents. For example, the location of response personnel and the use of manual or automated valves can affect the amount of time it takes for operators to respond to incidents. However, because the advantages and disadvantages of installing an automated valve are closely related to the specifics of the valve's location, it is appropriate that operators decide whether to install automated valves on a case-by-case basis. Several operators we spoke with have developed approaches to evaluate the advantages and disadvantages of installing automated valves, such as using spill-modeling software to estimate the potential amount of product released and extent of damage that would occur in the event of an incident.
One method PHMSA could use to improve operator response to incidents is to develop a performance-based approach for incident response times. While defining performance measures and targets for incident response can be challenging, PHMSA could move toward a performance-based approach by evaluating nationwide data to determine response times for different types of pipeline (based on location, operating pressure, and pipeline diameter, among other factors). First, though, PHMSA must improve the data it collects on incident response times. These data are not reliable because operators are not required to fill out certain time-related fields in the reporting form and because operators told us they interpret these data fields in different ways. Furthermore, while PHMSA conducts a variety of information-sharing activities, the agency does not formally collect or share evaluation approaches used by operators to decide whether to install automated valves, and not all operators we spoke with were aware of existing PHMSA guidance designed to assist operators in making these decisions. We recommended that PHMSA should: (1) improve incident response data and use those data to explore the feasibility of developing a performance-based approach for improving operators' responses to pipeline incidents and (2) assist operators in deciding whether to install automated valves by formally collecting and sharing evaluation approaches and ensuring operators are aware of existing guidance. PHMSA agreed to consider these recommendations. |
gao_GAO-10-367 | gao_GAO-10-367_0 | GWACs provide a broad range of information technology goods and services and resources for agency activities. With Insufficient and Unreliable Data and Limited Governmentwide Policy, Agencies’ Use of Interagency and Enterprisewide Contracts May Result in Inefficient Contracting
Interagency and enterprisewide contracts should provide an advantage to the government in buying billions of dollars worth of goods and services, yet OMB and agencies cannot be sure they are leveraging this buying power because they lack the necessary comprehensive, reliable data to effectively manage and oversee these contracts. Both government contracting officials and representatives of vendors expressed concerns about this condition. GSA’s Efforts to Determine Whether It Obtains the Best Prices on MAS Contracts Is Hindered by the Limited Application of Selected Pricing Tools
GSA’s MAS program is the largest government interagency contracting program, with approximately 17,000 of the 19,000 contracts involved in the federal supply schedules program, but GSA’s limited application of selected pricing tools hinders its ability to determine whether it obtains the best MAS contract prices. The first is the goal that GSA obtain the best prices for MAS contracts that vendors offer their most favored customers. An advisory panel established by GSA has made recommendations that could result in changes to the program’s pricing controls and tools but concerns remain that these changes could adversely affect GSA’s ability to negotiate best prices. This provision provides price protection for the government following contract award if a vendor lowers its prices to commercial customers during the contract period. However, GSA uses these tools primarily for a small number of larger dollar value contracts, thus limiting its ability to evaluate the effectiveness of the regulatory pricing controls and obtain the best prices under MAS contracts. As a result, the GSA Inspector General has identified almost $4 billion in potential cost avoidance through pre-award audits from fiscal years 2004 through 2008. The MAS Program Office, established in 2008 to manage strategic and policy issues, lacks direct oversight authority for the MAS program, as GSA has dispersed responsibility for the management of individual contract schedules among nine different acquisition centers under three business portfolios. For example, MAS performance measures are inconsistent across the GSA organizations that manage MAS contracts, including inconsistent emphasis on pricing, which limits GSA’s ability to have a program wide perspective on its operations. Program stakeholders also expressed concerns regarding the lack of MAS program data. Limitations in Assessment Tools That Focus on Internal Operations and MAS Customers Also Hinder Effective Program Management
In addition to a lack of data and a decentralized management structure, shortcomings in assessment tools also create MAS program management challenges. Recommendations for Executive Action
To provide better transparency and a coordinated approach in awarding MACs and enterprisewide contracts, we recommend that the Director of the Office of Management and Budget direct the Administrator of the Office of Federal Procurement Policy to take the following five actions in conjunction with the agencies’ senior procurement executives: Survey departments and agencies to update the 2006 Office of Federal Procurement Policy Interagency Contracting Data Collection Initiative to identify the universe of MACs and enterprisewide contracts in use throughout federal departments and agencies and assess their utility for maximizing procurement resources across agencies; Ensure that departments and agencies use the survey data to accurately record these contracts in FPDS-NG; Establish a policy and procedural framework in conjunction with agencies for establishing, approving, and reporting on new MACs and enterprisewide contracts on an ongoing basis; the framework should stress the need for a consistent approach to leveraging the government’s buying power across departments and agencies while continuing to use their statutory authorities for buying goods and services; Assess the feasibility of establishing and maintaining a centralized database, which could provide sufficient information on GWACs, MACs, and enterprisewide contracts, for contracting officers to conduct market research and make informed decisions on the availability of existing contracts to meet the agencies’ requirements; and As part of developing the pending FAR rule to implement the 2009 National Defense Authorization Act, ensure that departments and agencies complete a comprehensive business case analysis as described by the SARA panel, and include a requirement to address potential duplication with existing contracts, before new MACs and enterprisewide contracts are established. To strengthen GSA MAS program pricing and management, we recommend that the Administrator of the General Services Administration take the following eight actions: In coordination with the GSA Inspector General, target the use of pre- award audits to cover more contracts that meet the audit threshold; Fully implement the process that has been initiated to ensure that vendors that meet the pre-negotiation clearance panel threshold receive a panel review; When considering the MAS Advisory Panel recommendations to clarify the price objective and eliminate the price reduction clause, ensure that any alternative means to negotiate and determine best prices are validated and in place before eliminating these pricing provisions, Collect transactional data on MAS orders and prices paid, possibly through the expanded use of existing electronic tools or through a pilot data collection initiative for selected MAS schedules and make the information available to MAS contract negotiators and customer agencies, Establish more consistent performance measures across the MAS program, including measures for pricing; Take steps to increase the MAS customer survey response rate by using a methodologically sound means to identify bona fide program users and employing survey techniques that produce meaningful and actionable information that can lead to program improvements; Clarify and strengthen the MAS program office’s charter and authority so that it has clear roles and responsibilities to consistently implement guidance, policies, and best practices across GSA’s acquisition centers including policies and practices related to the above recommendations; and Report GSA’s plans to address these recommendations to the Administrator of the Office of Federal Procurement Policy. To conduct this review we selected agencies that established or used the MAS, governmentwide acquisition contract (GWAC), multiagency contract (MAC) or enterprisewide contract programs. | Why GAO Did This Study
Agencies can use several different types of contracts to leverage the government's buying power for goods and services. These include interagency contracts--where one agency uses another's contract for its own needs--such as the General Services Administration (GSA) and the Department of Veterans Affairs multiple award schedule (MAS) contracts, multiagency contracts (MAC) for a wide range of goods and services, and governmentwide acquisition contracts (GWAC) for information technology. Agencies spent at least $60 billion in fiscal year 2008 through these contracts and similar single-agency enterprisewide contracts. However, concerns exist about duplication, oversight, and a lack of information on these contracts, and pricing and management of the MAS program. GAO was asked to assess the reasons for establishing and the policies to manage these contracts; the effectiveness of GSA tools for obtaining best MAS contract prices; and GSA's management of the MAS program. To do this, GAO reviewed statutes, regulations, policies, contract documentation and data, and interviewed officials from OMB and six agencies.
What GAO Found
GWACs, MACs--two types of interagency contracts--and enterprisewide contracts should provide an advantage to the government in buying billions of dollars worth of goods and services. However, data are lacking and there is limited governmentwide policy to effectively leverage, manage, and oversee these contracts. The total number of MACs and enterprisewide contracts is unknown, and existing data are not sufficiently reliable to identify them. In addition, GWACs are the only interagency contracts requiring OMB approval. Agencies GAO reviewed followed statutes, acquisition regulations, and internal policies to establish and use MACs and enterprisewide contracts. Avoiding fees associated with using other agencies' contracts and more control over procurements are some of the reasons agencies cited for establishing MACs and enterprisewide contracts. However, many of the same contractors provided similar products and services on multiple contracts--a condition that increases costs to both the vendor and the government and misses opportunities to leverage the government's buying power. Recent legislation and OMB's Office of Federal Procurement Policy initiatives are expected to strengthen management of MACs, but no such initiatives exist for enterprisewide contracts. GSA's MAS program--the largest interagency contracting program--uses several tools and controls to obtain best prices, but the limited application of certain tools hinders its ability to determine whether it achieves this goal. GSA has established two regulatory pricing controls for MAS contracts: seek the best prices vendors provide to their most favored customers; and a price reduction clause that provides the government a lower price if a vendor lowers the price for similarly situated commercial customers. GSA uses other pricing tools--e.g., pre-award contract audits by its Inspector General and Procurement Management Reviews--on a limited basis. For example, the Inspector General performs pre-award audits on a small sample of MAS contracts annually, but has identified contract cost avoidance of almost $4 billion in recent years. In 2008, GSA established a MAS advisory panel that recommended changes to the pricing controls noted above; concerns remain that such changes could adversely affect GSA's ability to negotiate best prices. A lack of data, decentralized management, and limitations in assessment tools create challenges for GSA in managing the MAS program. The agency lacks data about customer agencies' use of the program, limiting its ability to determine how well the program meets customers' needs. The MAS program office lacks direct program oversight, as GSA has dispersed authority for managing MAS among nine acquisition centers under three business portfolios. Program stakeholders have identified concerns that this structure has impaired consistent policy implementation. Shortcomings in assessment tools also result in management challenges. For example, performance measures are inconsistent, including inconsistent emphasis on pricing. GSA's customer satisfaction survey has such a low response rate that its utility for evaluating program performance is limited. |
gao_GAO-10-67 | gao_GAO-10-67_0 | C-130 avionics modernization quantities were also cut more than half and the schedule was delayed due to cost increases. Additional costs and changes in the force structure for the C-5 and C-17 are possible pending decisions on future modifications and retirements of older C-5s. Strategic Airlift Gap Has Been Addressed, but a Potential Tactical Airlift Gap for Moving Medium Weight Equipment and Other Questions Have Not Been Resolved
Additional funds provided by Congress for C-17 procurement more than offset the strategic airlift gaps associated with reduced C-5 modernization plans. However, there is a potential future gap in tactical airlift capabilities for transporting medium weight Army equipment that cannot fit on C-130 aircraft. The JFTL is envisioned to eventually replace the C-130H and perform this and other roles, but will not be available for 15 years or more under the current acquisition strategy. While the various mobility studies acknowledge the C-17s’ significant dual role, they did not comprehensively evaluate an expanded future use of the C-17 for the transport of medium weight equipment and how this could affect the force structure, the C-17s’ service life, and when to shut down the C-17 production line. Two studies reached somewhat different conclusions about the cost effectiveness of using C- 130Js and C-27Js for this mission. DOD’s recently established portfolio management structure is supposed to provide a useful forum to address the broad range of airlift investment decisions. However, efforts so far have been primarily focused on new programs rather than addressing gaps and redundancies across the current portfolio, as well as making other airlift decisions, such as when and how many C-5s to retire or the appropriate mix of C-130s and C-27Js needed to perform Army missions. Mix of C-130s and C-27Js Needed to Support Army Missions Has Not Been Determined
Questions remain about the number of C-130s and C-27Js needed to support Army direct support missions. Officials stated that to date, the logistics portfolio managers have not provided input to recent or upcoming airlift decisions related to the appropriate mix of strategic and tactical airlifters, changes in modernization programs, C-5 retirements, C-17 production shutdown, and changes in the Air Force’s roles and missions for airlift. This would also include identifying alternatives for using existing common user aircraft to meet service-specific missions and considering new roles and missions for the Air Force; the Office of the Secretary of Defense (Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation) and Commander, U.S. Transportation Command to develop a specific airlift plan that would identify when C-5s will be retired and identify the total number of additional C-17s, if any, that would be needed to replace C-5s or perform tactical heavy lift missions until the time the JFTL is fielded; the Commander, Air Mobility Command, to determine the appropriate mix of C-27Js and C-130s that are needed to meet Army time-sensitive, mission- critical requirements and common user pool requirements; the Air Force and Army to reach agreement on plans detailing how Army time-sensitive, mission-critical requirements will be addressed and prioritized against other Air Force priorities; and the joint Air Force and Army program office to develop a plan to follow an evolutionary approach for developing the JFTL based on DOD acquisition policy that includes selecting mature technologies, normally developing increments in less than 5 years, and fully funding each increment. In 2007, over 20 percent of the C-17 missions were for tactical missions and this could grow given that it is the only aircraft that is capable of moving certain types of equipment within a theater of operations that are too large or bulky for the C-130. DOD initially expected to spend about $12 billion on the C-5 AMP and RERP efforts. C-130s also have the capability to augment strategic airlift forces, as well as support humanitarian, peacekeeping, and disaster relief operations. As part of this restructuring, program quantities were reduced by about 50 percent, from 78 to 38 aircraft. With DOD’s decision to procure fewer aircraft, it is unclear whether Alenia will proceed with construction of the facility. GAO Observations
A potential capability gap exists in the department’s ability to airlift medium-weight vehicles to access-challenged areas within a theater of operations using dedicated tactical airlifters. C-17 aircraft have been employed to transport medium weight vehicles in theater, but cannot access austere, short, or unimproved landing areas. | Why GAO Did This Study
Department of Defense (DOD) used nearly 700 aircraft, as well as commercial and leased aircraft, to carry about 3 million troops and 800,000 tons of cargo in support of wartime, peacetime, and humanitarian efforts in 2008. C-5s and C-17s move troops and cargo internationally (strategic airlift) and C-130s are the primary aircraft that moves them within a theater of operation (tactical airlift). Over the next 4 years, DOD plans to spend about $12 billion to modernize and procure airlifters and is currently studying how many it needs. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) was asked to (1) identify the status of DOD's modernization and acquisition efforts and (2) determine how well DOD is addressing any capability gaps and redundancies. In conducting this work, GAO identified the cost, schedule, and performance of airlift programs, as well as DOD's plan for addressing gaps and redundancies. GAO also discussed mobility study efforts with DOD, Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA), and RAND Coporation officials.
What GAO Found
DOD has recently revamped airlift investments due to modernization cost increases and requirement changes. For strategic airlift, the number of C-5s that will be fully modernized were cut in half because of substantial reengining cost increases and C-17 quantities were increased from 180 to 213 aircraft. These twin changes resulted in a net cost increase of about$3 billion. Additional costs and force structure changes are possible pending decisions on C-5 retirements, other modifications, the potential need for more C-17s to meet tactical airlift needs, and the planned shutdown of C-17 production. For tactical airlift, substantial cost increases for modernizing C-130 avionics tripled unit costs, delayed its schedule, and resulted in almost 60 percent fewer aircraft being modernized. There have been large increases in the C-130J quantity to replace older C-130s, but modest increases in unit costs. The joint Army-Air Force C-27J program was recently transferred to the Air Force and quantities were cut from 78 to 38 aircraft, with an uncertain effect on the Army's airlift missions. The Army and Air Force must also resolve fundamental differences in operating requirements and employment strategy for the Joint Future Theater Lift (JFTL). DOD appears to have addressed its strategic airlift gap, but there is a potential future tactical airlift gap for moving medium weight equipment. Also, questions regarding how the Air Force will meet the Army's direct support mission have not been resolved. DOD is using $5.5 billion appropriated by Congress to procure 23 additional C-17s, which DOD officials believe more than offsets the strategic airlift gap associated with the restructured C-5 modernization program. However, there is a potential gap in the tactical airlift of medium weight loads beyond the capability of the C-130s. The C-17 is the only aircraft capable of moving this type of Army equipment within a theater of operation, although not to austere, short, or unimproved landing areas. The JFTL is envisioned to provide this capability, but will not be available for 15 years or more under the current acquisition strategy. While the various mobility studies acknowledge the C-17's significant dual role, they did not comprehensively evaluate the expanded use of the C-17 to transport medium weight equipment in theater and how this could impact the force structure, the C-17's service life, and decisions related to when to shut down the production line. In addition, questions remain about the number of C-130s and C-27Js needed to fulfill Army direct support missions. Two studies reached somewhat different conclusions about the cost effectiveness of using C-130Js and C-27Js for this mission. The Air Force and Army have not completed a plan for meeting Army direct support requirements, which could affect future decisions on both the C-27J and the C-130J. DOD's recently established portfolio management structure is supposed to provide a useful forum to address the broad range of airlift investment decisions. However, efforts so far have primarily focused on new programs rather than addressing gaps and making other airlift decisions such as when and how many C-5s to retire or the appropriate mix of C-130s and C-27Js needed to perform Army missions. |
gao_GAO-07-368 | gao_GAO-07-368_0 | To execute its mission responsibilities, FBI relies extensively on information technology. Certain Controls over FBI’s Network Were Ineffective
Weaknesses existed in certain access controls and other controls intended to protect the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the law enforcement and investigative information transmitted by a critical internal network. FBI used various devices to secure its network; however, it did not consistently configure network devices and services to prevent unauthorized access to, and ensure the integrity of, the network. FBI established the Enterprise Security Operations Center (ESOC) to monitor and protect the bureau’s information systems from external attacks and insider misuse, and to serve as the central point of contact for near real-time security monitoring. The bureau’s patch management for the network was ineffective. Information Security Program
Weaknesses in access controls and patch management existed, in part, because FBI had not yet effectively or fully implemented key security activities associated with its agencywide information security program for the critical internal network reviewed. Although FBI has developed an information security program, shortcomings exist with certain key elements. FISMA requires agencies to implement an agencywide information security program that includes periodic assessments of the risk and the magnitude of harm that could result from the unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification, or destruction of information and information systems; policies and procedures that (1) are based on risk assessments, (2) cost- effectively reduce risks, (3) ensure that information security is addressed throughout the life cycle of each system, and (4) ensure compliance with applicable requirements; plans for providing adequate information security for networks, facilities, security awareness training to inform personnel—including contractors and other users of information systems—of information security risks and of their responsibilities in complying with agency policies and procedures; at least annual testing and evaluation of the effectiveness of information security policies, procedures, and practices relating to management, operational, and technical controls of every major information system that is identified in the agencies’ inventories; a process for planning, implementing, evaluating, and documenting remedial action to address any deficiencies in their information security policies, procedures, or practices; and plans and procedures to ensure continuity of operations for information systems that support the operations and assets of the agency. However, FBI did not fully or effectively implement many of these activities for the critical internal network reviewed. Risk Assessments
Identifying and assessing information security risks are essential steps in determining what controls are required. These weaknesses leave the bureau vulnerable to insider threats. Correct identified weaknesses in a timely manner. Other shortcomings included an incomplete security plan, incomplete specialized training, insufficient testing, untimely remediation of weaknesses and inadequate service continuity planning. Although positive efforts have been made, until FBI fully and effectively implements key activities of the information security program associated with its network, security controls will likely remain inadequate or inconsistently applied, and the bureau will have limited assurance that sensitive data will be adequately protected against unauthorized disclosure or modification, or that network services will not be interrupted. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) relies on a critical network to electronically communicate, capture, exchange, and access law enforcement and investigative information. Misuse or interruption of this critical network, or disclosure of the information traversing it, would impair FBI's ability to fulfill its missions. Effective information security controls are essential for ensuring that information technology resources and information are adequately protected from inadvertent or deliberate misuse, fraudulent use, disclosure, modification, or destruction. GAO was asked to assess information security controls for one of FBI's critical networks. To assess controls, GAO conducted a vulnerability assessment of the internal network and evaluated the bureau's information security program associated with the network operating environment. This report summarizes weaknesses in information security controls in one of FBI's critical networks.
What GAO Found
Certain information security controls over the critical internal network reviewed were ineffective in protecting the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of information and information resources. Specifically, FBI did not consistently (1) configure network devices and services to prevent unauthorized insider access and ensure system integrity; (2) identify and authenticate users to prevent unauthorized access; (3) enforce the principle of least privilege to ensure that authorized access was necessary and appropriate; (4) apply strong encryption techniques to protect sensitive data on its networks; (5) log, audit, or monitor security-related events; (6) protect the physical security of its network; and (7) patch key servers and workstations in a timely manner. Taken collectively, these weaknesses place sensitive information transmitted on the network at risk of unauthorized disclosure or modification, and could result in a disruption of service, increasing the bureau's vulnerability to insider threats. These weaknesses existed, in part, because FBI had not fully implemented key information security program activities for the critical network reviewed. FBI has developed an agencywide information security program, which includes an organization to monitor and protect the bureau's information systems from external attacks and insider misuse and to serve as the central focal point of contact for near-real-time security monitoring. However, shortcomings exist with certain program elements for the network, including an outdated risk assessment, incomplete security plan, incomplete specialized security training, insufficient testing, untimely remediation of weaknesses, and inadequate service continuity planning. Without a fully implemented program, certain security controls will likely remain inadequate or inconsistently applied. |
gao_GAO-14-12 | gao_GAO-14-12_0 | All of the agencies in our review determined their reported savings by identifying activities that were under way or planned at the time the June In particular, the requirements of the 2010 memorandum was issued.memorandum and subsequent guidance issued by OMB specified that agencies were to report savings from ongoing and planned activities. Agencies Lacked Clear Standards for Reporting Reliable and Transparent Cost Savings
Guidance Was Unclear on the Types of Savings that Could be Reported, and Agencies Reported Savings Differently
The guidance OMB provided to agencies for implementing the requirements of the June 2010 memorandum was unclear and lacked reporting standards. Although some agency officials in our review told us that the guidance was not clear on what could be considered a savings, all of the agencies in our review reported savings from cost avoidance measures, as previously discussed. For disposals in the year 2010, for example, some agencies reported 1 year of operations and maintenance savings in the year in which the disposal occurred, whereas other agencies reported up to 3 years of operations and maintenance savings for disposals occurring in 2010 (see table 4). Similarly, GSA reported savings from property exchanges under space management, while State reported this type of savings under innovation. Despite this, we found instances in which some agencies did not deduct costs in their reported savings, for example:
State and DHS did not deduct costs associated with disposals in their reported savings.with the approximately $114 million in disposal savings reported over the 2010-to-2012 time period were about $4 million. DOE deducted the costs associated with some of its reported disposal savings, but did not do so if the disposals were carried out by its Office of Environmental Management. However, GSA retained ownership of the city’s site in 2013 and the city will retain ownership of the GSA property after the construction of the new courthouse is completed, which has yet to be determined. USDA reported rent savings from office closures, some of which did not occur until fiscal year 2013. In addition, OMB did not include detailed information about the types of savings agencies reported in response to the memorandum on Performance.gov. Recommendation for Executive Action
To improve future real property cost-savings initiatives and promote reliability and transparency, we recommend that the Director of OMB, in collaboration with FRPC agencies, develop clear and specific standards for: identifying and reporting savings that help ensure common understanding of the various types of cost savings; consistently reporting across categories and agencies; and sufficiently documenting, validating, and reviewing results. OMB generally agreed with our recommendation. Specifically, OMB stated that the June 2010 memorandum had positive effects on federal real-property management, and acknowledged that there are opportunities to improve future cost- savings efforts, as identified in our report. Our objectives were to (1) describe the cost savings agencies reported in response to the June 2010 presidential memorandum and how those savings were identified by selected agencies and (2) determine the extent that selected agencies’ reporting of savings was reliable and transparent and how, if at all, the reporting of real property cost savings could be improved. To describe the cost savings agencies reported in response to the June 2010 memorandum and how those savings were identified by selected agencies, we reviewed and analyzed information on the administration’s Performance.gov website, including agencies’ individual cost savings targets, the total amount of savings reported by the agencies at the end of fiscal year 2012, and the amount of savings reported across the four categories—disposals, space management, sustainability, and innovation—established by OMB. We also obtained and analyzed documentation on the cost savings reported by six civilian agencies: the General Services Administration and the Departments of Agriculture, Energy, Homeland Security, Justice, and State. We selected the six agencies because they had the largest cost savings targets for civilian agencies, collectively accounting for about 75 percent of the $3 billion savings goal; reported a variety of cost savings measures to achieve their savings target; and had a range of property types in their real property portfolios. To determine the extent that selected agencies’ reporting of savings was reliable and transparent and to identify how, if at all, reporting of real property cost savings could be improved, we reviewed the agencies’ reported cost savings against key factors identified in our data-reliability and cost-estimating guidance.reported by the six agencies in our review to determine whether similar types of savings were consistently reported, met the requirements set In particular, we analyzed the savings forth by the memorandum, and were well-documented. | Why GAO Did This Study
In June 2010, the President issued a memorandum directing federal agencies to achieve $3 billion in real property cost savings by the end of fiscal year 2012 through a number of methods, including disposal of excess property, energy efficiency improvements, and other space consolidation efforts.
GAO was asked to review the cost savings agencies reported in response to the memorandum. This report (1) describes the cost savings agencies reported in response to the June 2010 presidential memorandum and how those savings were identified by selected agencies and (2) determines the extent that selected agencies' reporting of savings was reliable and transparent, and how, if at all, reporting of real property cost savings could be improved. GAO reviewed OMB guidance for implementing the memorandum, reviewed the cost savings agencies reported on the administration's Performance.gov website, and obtained documentation from and interviewed officials from six agencies and OMB staff about the agencies' reported cost savings. GAO selected the agencies based on their overall cost-savings targets and the types of savings measures implemented, among other things.
What GAO Found
Agencies reported real property cost savings of $3.8 billion in response to the June 2010 presidential memorandum from disposal, space management, sustainability, and innovation activities. Space management savings, defined by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) as those savings resulting from, among other things, consolidations or the elimination of lease arrangements that were not cost effective, accounted for the largest portion of savings reported by all agencies, and for about 70 percent of the savings reported by the six agencies GAO reviewed--the General Services Administration (GSA) and the Departments of Agriculture (USDA), Energy (DOE), Homeland Security (DHS), Justice (DOJ), and State (State). The requirements of the memorandum, as well as agencies' individual savings targets and the time frame for reporting savings, led the selected agencies to primarily report savings from activities that were planned or under way at the time the memorandum was issued.
GAO's review of the six selected agencies identified several problems that affect the reliability and transparency of the reporting of cost savings in response to the June 2010 memorandum. In particular, the memorandum and subsequent guidance issued by OMB were not clear on the types of savings that could be reported, particularly because the term "cost savings" was not clearly defined. For example, officials from several agencies GAO reviewed said the guidance was unclear about whether savings from cost avoidance measures could be reported. In addition, the agencies interpreted the guidance differently and, in some cases, did not follow the guidance, practices that led to inconsistent reporting, for example:
Agencies made different assumptions in reporting disposal savings: Two agencies reported one year of avoided operations and maintenance savings for the year in which the disposal occurred, while three agencies reported up to 3 years of savings depending on when disposals occurred during the 3-year period.
Some agencies did not deduct costs associated with their disposals: State and DHS did not deduct the costs associated with their reported disposal savings. DOE deducted costs for some of its reported disposals savings, but did not deduct costs for disposals carried out by its Office of Environmental Management.
Some agencies reported savings outside the time frame of the memorandum: GSA reported savings from a property exchange, but retained ownership of the site in 2013, after the deadline, fiscal 2012's end. USDA reported savings from office closures that occurred in fiscal year 2013.
Finally, OMB did not require agencies to provide detailed documentation of their reported savings or include specific information about agencies' reported savings on Performance.gov, limiting transparency. Agency officials stated that the memorandum broadened their understanding of real property cost-savings opportunities. However, establishing clearer standards for identifying and reporting savings would improve the reliability and transparency of the reporting of cost savings and help decision-makers better understand the potential savings of future initiatives to improve federal real-property management.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the Director of OMB establish clear and specific standards to help ensure reliability and transparency in the reporting of future real-property cost savings. OMB generally agreed with GAO's recommendation. |
gao_GAO-10-55 | gao_GAO-10-55_0 | Most space systems consist of satellites, ground control systems, and user terminals, though some space systems only require ground control systems to provide capability to users. Of the eight major space system acquisitions, five ground control system efforts are optimally aligned to deliver capability with their companion satellites, while three are not optimally aligned. Alignment of Ground Control Systems and Satellites
Ground systems deployment for three of DOD’s major space system acquisitions is lagging behind delivery of satellites. In some of these instances, schedule slips in satellite development allowed more time for ground control system development. Alignment of User Terminals
Five of the eight major space systems we reviewed had user terminals scheduled to be delivered and become operational after, and in some cases long after, their associated space systems achieved initial capability. Implications on Warfighters and the Testing Community
When space capabilities are not delivered in a coordinated manner or are partially delivered, the warfighter will either not have certain capabilities available when expected or may have to develop short-term solutions while waiting for the expected capability. Acquisition and Other Problems Contribute to a Lack of Space System Component Alignment
Though there are inherent difficulties in aligning delivery of satellites, ground control systems, and user terminals, the lack of synchronization between segments of space acquisition programs is largely the result of the same core issues that hamper acquisition in general—requirements instability, funding instability, insufficient technology maturity, underestimation of complexity, and poor contractor oversight, among other issues. This means that software development for ground control systems is oftentimes the higher risk. For example, when the GPS IIF satellite program encountered development problems, the program shifted funds set aside for the GPS ground control system to address the satellite problems, causing a delay in the delivery of some ground control capabilities. Thus, user terminal programs need to have timely funding and be well-coordinated. A January 2001 study by DOD’s U.S. Space Commission noted that when satellites and ground control systems are funded in one budget and user terminals in another, the result can be a lack of synchronization in the acquisition of satellites and their associated user terminals because of this decentralized arrangement. Officials from a third program, AEHF, agreed that space system synchronization challenges often result from the way the military services are organized to manage the various space system components. Efforts Are Being Made to Achieve Better Alignment of Satellite, Ground Control System, and User Terminal Deliveries, but They Are Limited by Lack of Guidance and Cost Data
There are efforts in place focused specifically at better aligning delivery of satellite, ground system, and user terminals as well as reducing the kinds of acquisition problems that contribute to delays that make alignment difficult. Moreover, improvements are likely to be hampered by a lack of guidance to help plan for and coordinate the development of satellite and ground systems and a lack of transparency into the costs of ground control systems and user terminals. In addition, the Air Force is attempting to mitigate some of the contributing factors that create synchronization issues by separating the acquisition of satellites and their ground control systems, intending to ensure that ground systems receive increased oversight. Officials also indicated that when programs use the same contractor to develop both the satellite and ground control systems, the government can be beholden to the single contractor to deliver some capability, even if contractor performance falls below expectations. As a result, it can be difficult to identify, track, and report separate cost information for satellites and ground control systems. Opportunities Exist to Enhance the Capabilities of Satellite Ground Systems
DOD has typically developed and operated its ground systems in a stovepiped manner. Recommendations for Executive Action
To help DOD space systems provide more capability to the warfighter through better synchronization and increased commonality, and to provide increased insight into the costs associated with ground assets, we are making five recommendations to the Secretary of Defense. This can also negatively affect the warfighter. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Defense (DOD) expects to spend more than $50 billion to develop and procure eight major space systems. Typically, the systems have two main components: satellites and ground control systems. Some also have a third component--user terminals--that can allow access from remote locations. If the delivery of these three components is not synchronized, there can be delays in providing full capabilities to the warfighter, and satellites on orbit can remain underutilized for years. Given preliminary indication of uncoordinated deployment, GAO was asked to examine (1) the extent to which satellite, ground control, and user terminal deployments are aligned; (2) the reasons deployments have not always been well coordinated; (3) actions being taken to enhance coordination; and (4) whether enhancements to ground systems could optimize the government's investment. To accomplish this, GAO analyzed plans for all major DOD satellite acquisitions and interviewed key officials.
What GAO Found
Satellites, ground control systems, and user terminals in most of DOD's major space system acquisitions are not optimally aligned, leading to underutilized satellites and limited capability provided to the warfighter. Of the eight major space system acquisitions we studied, three systems anticipated that their satellites will be launched well before their associated ground control systems are fully capable of operating on-orbit capabilities. Furthermore, for five of the eight major space systems GAO reviewed, user terminals were to become operational after their associated satellites reach initial capability--in some cases, years after. When the deployments of satellites, ground control systems, and user terminals are not well synchronized, problems arise that can affect both the warfighter and the space systems themselves. When capabilities are delayed because of lack of alignment between satellite and ground control systems or user terminals, the warfighter may develop short-term solutions, often at diminished capability and added cost. In addition, according to DOD testing officials, when the deployment of space system components is not properly timed, components may be ready for system testing at different times. This means that the space system may not be tested as a whole, connected system. DOD has inherent challenges in aligning its satellite and ground control systems. However, long-standing acquisition problems, a tendency to shift funds from ground control system development to satellite development when satellite development problems arise and the underestimation of software complexity on several major space systems have exacerbated the problem. The primary cause for user terminals not being well synchronized with their associated space systems is that user terminal development programs are typically managed by different military acquisition organizations than those managing the satellites and ground control systems. DOD does have several efforts in place to help achieve better synchronization. The Air Force has also made some attempts to improve acquisition management and increase oversight of contractors by separating the acquisition of satellites and their ground control systems. However, the outcomes of these efforts are still pending. Moreover, there is a lack of guidance needed to help plan for and coordinate the development of satellite and ground systems and a lack of transparency into costs for ground control systems and user terminals. DOD representatives in the satellite acquisition community agree that opportunities exist for DOD to transition to a more common type of architecture for satellite ground control systems in order to achieve additional efficiencies, capabilities, and a higher degree of information sharing among space systems, ultimately resulting in increased capability to the warfighter. All of the officials GAO spoke with agreed that ground control systems can be developed to provide data and information to other systems, and expect the same in return, to potentially enhance the flow and timeliness of information and better exploit satellite capabilities. |
gao_GAO-04-636T | gao_GAO-04-636T_0 | Also, the Coast Guard operates a fleet of more than 200 cutters and patrol boats, about 1,600 smaller boats, and almost 200 aircraft—mainly helicopters. Resource Hours Have Changed Substantially for Many Programs, While Performance Results Have Largely Remained Stable
Total Coast Guard resource hours devoted to its various programs have increased by 39 percent since the September 11 terrorist attacks. Of the various programs, the ports, waterways, and coastal security program saw by far the largest increase—more than 1,200 percent. Homeland security programs have been more likely to see increases in hours, while non- homeland security programs have been more likely to see decreases. For that program, resources increased and performance results improved. These efficiencies were of four main types—improved technology, improved tactics, stronger partnerships, and improved intelligence. Without a clear understanding of this linkage or a timeframe to ensure that it gets completed, the agency is at risk of misdirecting resources and missing further opportunities to increase productivity and efficiency to ensure the best use of its funds. Reliability and Cost Issues Associated with Key Deepwater Assets Heighten Program Funding and Management Challenges
Under the Deepwater program, the Coast Guard’s legacy assets are expected to remain in service until they are replaced or modernized through the Deepwater acquisition program. Coast Guard Is Facing Serious Challenges to Keep the Program on Schedule and within Budget Projections
The Coast Guard’s Deepwater program—which uses a unique contracting approach requiring steady funding over 20 years—is facing serious challenges to keep the program on schedule and within budget estimates. As a result, available future funding may have to be used, in part, to address critical maintenance needs of the legacy Deepwater assets, diverting funds otherwise intended for future Deepwater replacements and upgrades. Due to revised homeland security requirements, some redesign of the national security cutter has occurred. Increased Management and Oversight Attention Needed to Successfully Complete the Deepwater Program
While expeditiously completing the Deepwater program is important to the ability of the Coast Guard to effectively fulfill its responsibilities in the future, the agency must also be diligent in managing the contract, and ensuring necessary competition among contractors to prevent additional cost increases in the program. Almost 2 years after the contract was awarded for implementation of the Deepwater program, the key components needed to manage the program and oversee the system integrator’s performance have not been effectively implemented in the following areas: The effectiveness of the Integrated Project Teams—established as the main tool for managing the program and overseeing the contractor— has been weakened due to changing membership, understaffing, insufficient training, lack of authority for decision making, and inadequate communication among members. The Coast Guard’s “hands-off” approach in this area raises questions about whether the government will be able to control costs in the Deepwater program. The HH-65 is the Coast Guard’s mainstay helicopter, serving such missions as search and rescue, drug and migrant interdiction, and homeland security. To address these problems, the Coast Guard plans to take action along two tracks. Overview of Fiscal Year 2005 Budget and Funding for Several Areas of Particular Congressional Interest
The President’s fiscal year budget request for the Coast Guard of nearly $7.5 billion represents an increase of about $534 million, or about 8 percent in nominal dollars over the enacted budget for fiscal year 2004. It includes almost $5.2 billion in operating expenses and $943 million for its capital acquisition budget. The most significant new initiative at $102 million would be used to implement the Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA) of 2002. An additional $2.2 million is being requested to fund a new initiative for increasing maritime domain awareness—another homeland security function. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To determine the most recent trends in both resource usage and performance results for the Coast Guard’s homeland security and non- homeland security programs and the implication of these trends for Coast Guard management and accountability, we summarized findings from a recent GAO report. To determine the challenges the agency faces as it proceeds with its program to modernize its Deepwater cutters and aircraft, we summarized briefings prepared in 2004 by the Coast Guard for the Congress and for internal use on the Deepwater program and the HH-65 helicopters. To give an overview of the President’s fiscal year 2005 budget request for the Coast Guard, focusing on several areas of particular congressional interest, we obtained information on the average workweek of personnel at the Coast Guard’s multi-mission stations and interviewed Coast Guard headquarters staff to determine how the fiscal year 2005 budget will address MTSA implementation, Rescue 21, and multi-mission stations. | Why GAO Did This Study
As the lead federal agency for maritime homeland security within the Department of Homeland Security, the Coast Guard is facing extraordinary, heightened responsibilities to protect America's ports, waterways, and waterside facilities from terrorist attacks. At the same time, the Coast Guard remains responsible for many other programs important to the nation's interests, such as conducting search and rescue and protecting important fishing grounds. Its expanded responsibilities come at a time when budget resources are increasingly constrained, making prioritization among competing agencies and programs an even more critical factor in congressional decision-making. This testimony specifically addresses (1) the most recent trends in both resource usage and performance results for the Coast Guard's homeland security and non-homeland security programs; (2) challenges the agency faces as it proceeds with its Deepwater acquisition program to replace or modernize its key legacy cutters and aircraft; and (3) an overview of the President's fiscal year 2005 budget request for the Coast Guard, focusing on several areas of particular congressional interest.
What GAO Found
Resource usage for Coast Guard assets--its cutters, boats, and aircraft-- was up almost 40 percent from the pre-September 11th baseline. Homeland security programs, such as the ports, waterways, and coastal security program, have been more likely to see increases in usage, while nonhomeland security programs, such as living marine resources, remain below pre-September 11th levels. Although resource usage changed substantially for many of these programs, performance results generally improved or remained largely the same. The stable or improved performance results were attributed mainly to operational efficiencies (e.g., improved technology, improved tactics, stronger partnerships, and improved intelligence). However, the Coast Guard has limited data and no systematic approach to explain or account for the effects of these factors. Without such an approach and supporting data to link its resources and performance results, the agency may be missing further opportunities to increase productivity and efficiency to ensure best use of its funds. Some of the Coast Guard's legacy Deepwater cutters, patrol boats, and aircraft are increasingly unreliable and costly to maintain, and timely and effective implementation of the agency's ongoing Deepwater acquisition program to modernize these assets is crucial in order to reverse this trend. However, the Coast Guard faces serious challenges to keep the Deepwater program on schedule and within planned budget estimates. We estimate that to return the program to its original 20-year completion schedule will cost about $2.2 billion more than the Coast Guard estimated when the program was implemented in 2002. Also, available program funding, which has been less than the Coast Guard planned, may have to be used, in part, to address critical maintenance needs of the legacy assets, diverting funds otherwise intended for future Deepwater replacements and upgrades. Moreover, recent GAO work raised serious concerns about the management and oversight of the program, including the quality of the Coast Guard's assessment of the program contractor's performance and the uncertainty as to whether the Coast Guard would be able to effectively control costs. The President's fiscal year 2005 budget request of about $7.5 billion for the Coast Guard represents about an 8 percent increase over last year. It includes $5.2 billion in operating expenses and $943 million for its capital acquisition budget. Most of the new initiatives outlined in its operating expense budget are targeted for homeland security initiatives, including $102 million for implementation of the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002. Aside from the new initiatives, two other efforts in the budget request may require further attention. The Coast Guard's multi-mission stations are still experiencing a heavy workload for station personnel because of increased homeland security responsibilities. Also, the Coast Guard's Rescue 21 program, which will replace the Coast Guard's current antiquated communication system, faces possible delays because of software system development problems. |
gao_GAO-07-687T | gao_GAO-07-687T_0 | In the same month, contaminated letters laced with Bacillus anthracis, or anthrax spores, were sent through the mail to Senators Thomas Daschle and Patrick Leahy. Major Findings
Sampling Strategy
The federal agencies primarily used a targeted strategy—they collected samples from specific areas considered more likely to be contaminated, based on judgments. This would give agencies and the public greater confidence in negative test results than was associated with the sampling strategy used in 2001. The results of the CDC, EPA, and USPS testing in 286 postal facilities were largely negative. Conclusions
The agencies that sampled postal facilities in 2001—USPS, CDC, and EPA—did not use validated sample collection and analysis methods to perform their tests. Recommendations for Executive Action
Given the lack of validated methods for detecting anthrax contamination in facilities, we recommended in our 2005 report that the Secretary of Homeland Security develop a coordinated approach to (1) improve the overall process for detecting anthrax and (2) increase confidence in negative test results generated by that process. After we issued our 2005 report, it became evident that there was uncertainty over which agency would take the lead role in improving the overall process for detecting anthrax and how studies were to be funded. On the basis of these uncertainties, we recommended in our May 9, 2006, testimony that DHS’s approach to validating the overall process should start with a strategic plan that includes a road map outlining how individual agencies efforts would lead to the validation of the individual activities as well as the overall process, noting that such a plan would assist DHS in monitoring progress and measuring agency performance toward improving the detection of anthrax and other prioritized threat agents. On May 19, 2006, DHS officials stated that while they concurred with the recommendations from our report and accepted the overall responsibility to ensure the methods will be validated, they stated that “there are legal limitations in DHS authority to direct the activities of other agencies.” They said that while they take a lead role in coordinating the meetings and in bringing people from different agencies together, they cannot guarantee that the overall process of sampling will be validated because different agencies have responsibility for different aspects of validation, and DHS’s control over other agencies actions and budgets is ultimately limited. Also, since validation would require a sustained effort over a long period, DHS noted that it could not mandate commitment of other agencies’ funds, over which it has no control. DHS officials told us in July 2006 that they recognize that DHS is the principal agency responsible for coordinating the federal response and they would work with a good faith effort toward developing a strategy for validation studies and a road map by the end of calendar year 2006 outlining how individual agencies’ efforts would lead to the validation of the overall sampling process. Until responsibility is accepted for ensuring that sampling activities will be validated, the fate of the validation process will remain uncertain. Without validation, if another anthrax attack were to occur tomorrow, federal civilian agencies would not be able to conclude with any given level of statistical confidence, in cases of negative results, that a building is free of contamination. | Why GAO Did This Study
In September and October 2001, contaminated letters laced with Bacillus anthracis were sent through the mail to two U.S. senators and members of the media. Postal facilities in New Jersey, Washington, D.C., and elsewhere became heavily contaminated. The anthrax incidents highlighted major gaps in civilian preparedness to detect anthrax contamination in buildings. GAO was asked to describe and assess federal agencies' activities to detect anthrax in postal facilities, assess the results of agencies' testing, and assess whether agencies' detection activities were validated.
What GAO Found
Federal agencies conducted several sampling activities, including developing a sampling strategy and collecting, transporting, extracting, and analyzing samples. They primarily collected samples from specific areas, such as mail processing areas, using their judgment about where anthrax would most likely be found--that is, targeted sampling. The agencies did not use probability sampling, which would have allowed agencies to determine, with some defined level of confidence, when all results are negative, whether a building is contaminated. The results of the agencies' testing in 286 postal facilities were largely negative--no anthrax was detected. However, agencies did not use validated sample collection and analytical methods. Thus, there can be little confidence in negative results. With a validated process, agencies and the public could be reasonably confident that any test results generated by that process would be reliable. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is the principal agency responsible for coordinating the federal response. Thus, in its 2005 report, GAO recommended that the Secretary of Homeland Security develop a coordinated approach to improve the overall process for detecting anthrax and increase confidence in negative test results generated by that process. DHS stated that while it has overall responsibility for coordinating the federal response during future biological attacks, other agencies have the lead responsibility for validation. Therefore, uncertainty over which agency would take the lead role--that is, who is in charge--in improving the overall process for detecting anthrax, including validation of the methods, continued after GAO issued its report. On the basis of these uncertainties, GAO recommended in its May 9, 2006, testimony that DHS's approach to validating the overall process start with a strategic plan that would include a road map outlining how individual agencies' efforts would lead to the validation of the individual activities as well as the overall process, noting that such a plan would assist DHS in monitoring progress and measuring agency performance toward improving the detection of anthrax and other prioritized threat agents. While DHS generally agreed with these recommendations, it stated that it cannot ensure validation studies would be done, since "there are legal limitations in DHS authority to direct the activities of other agencies." Also, since validation would require a sustained effort over a long period, DHS noted that it could not mandate commitment of other agencies' funds, over which it has no control. Until responsibility is accepted for ensuring that sampling activities will be validated, the fate of the validation process will remain uncertain. Without validation, if another anthrax attack were to occur tomorrow, federal civilian agencies would not be able to conclude with any given level of statistical confidence, in cases of negative results, that a building is free of contamination. |
gao_GAO-06-333T | gao_GAO-06-333T_0 | Background
VA has provided nursing home care to veterans for over 40 years. The Veterans Millennium Health Care and Benefits Act (Millennium Act) made important changes in VA’s nursing home program. VA pays a portion of the cost to treat veterans who seek care in state veterans’ nursing homes. Reported Overall Nursing Home Expenditures Increased, with VA- Operated Nursing Homes Continuing to Account for Almost Three-Quarters of Expenditures
VA’s reported overall nursing home care expenditures increased from $2.3 billion to almost $3.2 billion from fiscal year 2003 through fiscal year 2005. VA officials attributed the expenditure increase from fiscal year 2003 to fiscal year 2005, in part, to a change in the cost accounting system used to develop expenditure totals for each nursing home setting. Based on VA’s reported nursing home care expenditures, VA-operated nursing homes continued to account for about three-quarters of VA’s overall nursing home care expenditures in fiscal year 2005, as they did in fiscal year 2003. In fiscal year 2005, 77 percent of nursing home care expenditures were accounted for by VA-operated nursing homes, compared to 73 percent in 2003. From fiscal year 2003 to fiscal year 2005, the percentage of overall expenditures for state veterans’ nursing homes and community nursing homes declined. The percentage of overall expenditures for state veterans’ nursing homes declined during this period because expenditures in VA-operated nursing homes increased more rapidly than expenditures for state veterans’ nursing homes. Overall Patient Workload Increased Slightly, with State Veterans’ Nursing Homes Continuing to Account for about Half of VA’s Overall Patient Workload
VA’s overall patient workload in all three nursing home settings, as measured by average daily census, increased to an average of 34,375 patients per day by fiscal year 2005, 3.5 percent above the fiscal year 2003 workload. From fiscal year 2003 through fiscal year 2005, average daily patient workload in the nursing homes VA operated declined by 215, whereas workload in community nursing homes increased by 221 and workload in state veterans’ nursing homes increased by 1,155. The percentage of workload provided in state veterans’ nursing homes continued to account for about half of VA’s overall patient workload, increasing from 50 percent in fiscal year 2003 to 52 percent in fiscal year 2005. In contrast, the percentage of patient workload provided in VA- operated nursing homes declined. The percentage provided in community nursing homes stayed the same. In fiscal year 2005, state veterans’ nursing homes accounted for over half of VA’s overall workload, and they accounted for 12 percent of overall expenditures for patient care. VA Faces Two Key Challenges in Planning for Nursing Home Care
VA faces two key challenges in planning for the provision of nursing home care. The first challenge is estimating who will seek care from VA and what their nursing home care needs will be. To do this, VA will need to estimate the number of veterans that will be eligible for nursing home care based on the Millennium Act and VA policy or that will be able to receive such care on a discretionary basis, based on available resources. Moreover, VA will need to estimate the extent to which these veterans will be seeking care for short-stay postacute needs or long-stay chronic needs. VA has begun to collect and report eligibility data on veterans receiving care in VA community nursing homes. A second key challenge VA faces is determining whether it will maintain or increase the proportion of nursing home care demand it meets in each of the three nursing home settings or whether veterans will need to rely more on other non-VA nursing home care providers that are funded by other programs, such as Medicaid and Medicare. Department of Veterans Affairs: Key Management Challenges in Health and Disability Programs. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) operates a nursing home program that provides or pays for veterans' care in three nursing home settings: VA-operated nursing homes, community nursing homes, and state veterans' nursing homes. In addition, veterans needing nursing home care may also receive it from non-VA providers that are not funded by VA. VA is faced with a large elderly veteran population, many of whom may be in need of nursing home care. In 2004, 38 percent of the nation's veteran population was over the age of 65, compared with 12 percent of the general population. The Veterans Millennium Health Care and Benefits Act (Millennium Act) of 1999 and VA policy require that VA provide nursing home care to certain veterans. This statement focuses on VA's nursing home program and trends in nursing home expenditures, trends in the number of patients served, or "patient workload," and key challenges VA faces in planning for nursing home care for veterans. To examine these trends, GAO updated information from prior work with spending and patient workload data for fiscal year 2005 that VA provided. In a November 2004 report, GAO presented spending and patient workload data through fiscal year 2003. GAO discussed the updated information with VA and incorporated comments as appropriate.
What GAO Found
VA's reported overall nursing home care expenditures in its three settings increased from $2.3 billion to almost $3.2 billion from fiscal year 2003 through fiscal year 2005. VA officials attributed the expenditure increase from fiscal year 2003 to fiscal year 2005, in part, to a change in the cost accounting system used to develop expenditure totals for each nursing home setting. Based on VA's reported expenditures, VA-operated nursing homes continued to account for about three-quarters of VA's overall nursing home care expenditures in fiscal year 2005, as they did in fiscal year 2003. In fiscal year 2005, 77 percent of nursing home care expenditures were accounted for by VA-operated nursing homes, compared to 73 percent in 2003. VA spent the remainder on state veterans' nursing homes and community nursing homes. From fiscal year 2003 through fiscal year 2005, the percentage of overall expenditures for state veterans' nursing homes declined from 15 to 12 percent and the percentage of overall expenditures for community nursing homes declined from 12 to 11 percent. VA's overall patient workload in nursing homes increased to an average of 34,375 patients per day by fiscal year 2005, 3.5 percent above the fiscal year 2003 workload. State veterans' nursing homes accounted for over half of VA's patient workload in fiscal year 2005. The workload percent is higher than the 12 percent expenditure in state veterans' nursing homes partly because VA pays on average about one-third of the costs for care veterans receive in state veterans' nursing homes, compared to the full cost in other settings. From fiscal year 2003 through fiscal year 2005, the percentage of workload provided in state veterans' nursing homes increased from 50 to 52 percent. In contrast, the percentage of patient workload provided in VA-operated nursing homes declined from 37 to 35 percent. The percentage of workload in community nursing homes stayed the same at 13 percent. VA faces two key challenges in planning for the provision of nursing home care. The first challenge is estimating who will seek care from VA and what their nursing home care needs will be. This includes estimating the number of veterans that will be eligible for nursing home care, based on law and VA policy, and the extent to which these veterans will be seeking care for short-stay postacute needs or long-stay chronic needs. A second key challenge VA faces is determining whether it will maintain or increase the proportion of nursing home care demand it meets in each of the three nursing home settings or whether veterans will need to rely more on other non-VA nursing home care providers that are funded by other programs, such as Medicaid and Medicare. |
gao_GAO-03-314 | gao_GAO-03-314_0 | Scope and Methodology
To assess IRS’s performance in the five key filing season activities covered by this report, we reviewed and analyzed IRS documents and data, including workload and performance data; interviewed IRS officials about current operations, performance relative to 2001 performance and 2002 goals, and significant factors and initiatives that affected performance; observed operations at three of the eight processing centers operated by IRS’s Wage and Investment Operating Division (W&I) and four of IRS’s approximately 470 walk-in locations; observed a leadership conference and program review at one analyzed information posted to IRS’s Web site, specifically assessing the ease of finding information on the site (i.e., navigation) and the accuracy and currency of data on the site (i.e., content); reviewed information from private firms that assessed various aspects of IRS's Web site; reviewed information from and interviewed representatives of various private organizations that prepare tax returns and participated in IRS and other conferences about their views on IRS’s 2002 operations and performance; and reviewed related congressional testimony and work performed by the Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration (TIGTA). Background
IRS’s filing season activities encompass two critical areas—returns processing and taxpayer assistance. late-May Deadline for issuing refunds on timely filed returns without paying interest. IRS also took steps to obtain additional information on impediments to electronic filing. Telephone Service Improved Compared with Last Year
IRS’s performance measures showed that (1) telephone service was more accessible and accurate during the 2002 filing season than it was in 2001and (2) IRS met most of its 2002 performance goals. Although the sites’ control over these measures may be limited, they are an important component of any assessment of IRS’s telephone performance because they measure a key aspect of the customer experience—how long callers wait to speak to an assistor. However, the extent and timing of the workload changes are not clear, and field assistance does not have comprehensive plans that clearly relate that workload to resource needs. Number of Taxpayers Assisted Declined, but Field Assistance Staffing Has Increased
As shown in figure 5, the number of taxpayers assisted at IRS walk-in sites declined for the third consecutive filing season—from 6.1 million in 1999 to 4.9 million in 2002—a drop of about 20 percent. Conclusions
Generally, during the 2002 filing season, IRS processed returns and issued refunds smoothly, and the quality of assistance provided to taxpayers improved. In light of this performance, IRS should be commended for the various efforts it took to prepare for and improve performance during the filing season. IRS’s improved performance can be traced to its use of and emphasis on performance measures, illustrating the importance of good measures that effectively assess performance and enable improvements to be quantified. | Why GAO Did This Study
The tax filing season is when millions of taxpayers file their returns and seek assistance by calling or visiting IRS's offices or Web site. Because of the large number of returns and critical nature of IRS's filing season activities, GAO was asked to assess IRS's 2002 filing season performance in processing tax returns and refunds and providing timely and accurate assistance to taxpayers.
What GAO Found
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) processed returns and issued refunds smoothly and the quality of assistance provided to taxpayers improved in the 2002 filing season. In light of this, IRS should be commended for the various efforts it took to prepare for the 2002 filing season and improve performance. Still, opportunities exist for IRS to further improve aspects of its performance and some of its performance measures. In 2002, IRS's performance included issuing almost all refunds on time, providing more accurate telephone service than in 2001, and meeting many of its 2002 performance goals in all areas. IRS also began measuring the accuracy of assistance at its walk-in sites to obtain better performance data. In addition, IRS's redesigned Web site was easier to access and more user friendly. IRS's improved performance can be traced to its use of performance measures, which are part of its strategy to improve returns processing and taxpayer assistance as shown below. However, GAO identified opportunities for IRS to make further improvements. For example, IRS's suite of telephone measures lacks an indicator of how long callers wait to speak to an assistor--a key aspect of assistance that provides useful information for decision making by external stakeholders. Although not a primary focus of this report, GAO also found that IRS lacked comprehensive plans related to the extent and timing of anticipated workload and staffing changes at its walk-in sites. |
gao_GAO-01-848 | gao_GAO-01-848_0 | Conclusion
While the federal government has accepted responsibility for the Cerro Grande fire and enacted legislation to expeditiously compensate those injured by the fire, it is incumbent on FEMA as the administering agency to establish an effective system of internal control to safeguard the funds appropriated for the Cerro Grande program. The CGFAA lays a framework to establish such accountability by requiring FEMA to determine that victims’ injuries and losses occurred as a result of the fire and to determine the amount of allowed compensation. FEMA has established a process to review all claims submitted. However, this process as currently implemented does not provide adequate assurance that only valid claims were paid or that the amounts paid were reasonable because there is insufficient documentation of the steps taken to determine the validity and reasonableness of the claim amounts. In addition, certain OCGFC policies and procedures for paying claims have either not yet been developed or have not been formally and centrally documented. Appendix I: Comments From the Federal Emergency Management Agency | What GAO Found
While the federal government has accepted responsibility for the Cerro Grande fire and enacted the Cerro Grande Fire Assistance Act (CGFAA) to expeditiously compensate those injured by the fire, it is incumbent on the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) as the administering agency to establish an effective system of internal control to safeguard the funds appropriated for the Cerro Grande program. The act lays a framework to establish such accountability by requiring FEMA to determine that victims' injuries and losses occurred as result of the fire and to determine the amount of allowed compensation. FEMA has established a process to review all claims submitted. However, this process as currently implemented does not provide adequate assurance that only valid claims were paid or that the amounts paid were reasonable because there is insufficient documentation of the steps taken to determine the validity and reasonableness of the claim amounts. In addition, policies and procedures for paying claims have either not yet been developed or have not been formally and centrally documented. |
gao_GAO-02-507T | gao_GAO-02-507T_0 | Background
OJP, the grant making arm of the Department of Justice (DOJ), provides grants to various organizations, including state and local governments, universities, and private foundations, that are intended to develop the nation’s capacity to prevent and control crime, administer justice, and assist crime victims. OJP bureaus and program offices award two types of grants: formula and discretionary. OJP’s Efforts to Resolve Continuing Grant Monitoring Problems
The monitoring of grant activities is a key management tool to help ensure that funds awarded to grantees are being properly spent. Over the last few years, we and others, including OJP, have identified various grant monitoring problems among OJP’s bureaus and offices. OJP has begun to work with its bureaus and offices to address these problems, but it is too early to tell whether its efforts will be enough to resolve many of the issues identified. | What GAO Found
The Office of Justice Programs (OJP) provides grants to state and local governments, universities, and private foundations to help prevent and control crime, administer justice, and assist crime victims. OJP bureaus and program offices award both formula and discretionary grants. The monitoring of grant activities is a key management tool to ensure that funds awarded to grantees are being properly spent. In recent years, GAO and others, including OJP, have identified various grant monitoring problems among OJP's bureaus and offices. OJP has begun to work with its bureaus and offices to address these problems, but it is too early to tell whether its efforts will resolve the issues identified. |
gao_GAO-15-834T | gao_GAO-15-834T_0 | Regulatory Guidance Is a Tool for Agency Communication
One of the main purposes of guidance is to explain and help regulated parties comply with agency regulations. As shown in figure 1, guidance may explain how agencies plan to interpret regulations. Even though not legally binding, guidance documents can have a significant effect on regulated entities and the public, both because of agencies’ reliance on large volumes of guidance documents and because the guidance can prompt changes in the behavior of regulated parties and the general public. OMB defines “significant guidance documents” as guidance with a broad and substantial impact on regulated entities. Agencies Issued a Wide Variety of Guidance Serving Multiple Purposes
Agencies Used Many Terms for Non-significant Guidance
The selected components we reviewed differed in both the terminology they used for their external non-significant guidance documents and in the amounts of non-significant guidance they issued. The components issued varying amounts of guidance ranging from 10 to more than 100 documents issued by a component in a single year. Agencies Issued Non- significant Guidance Serving Multiple Purposes
Agencies have used guidance for multiple purposes, including explaining or interpreting regulations, clarifying policies in response to questions or compliance findings, disseminating suggested practices or leadership priorities, and providing grant administration information. Agencies Weighed Various Factors When Choosing Whether to Issue a Regulation or Guidance
Officials considered a number of factors before deciding whether to issue guidance or undertake rulemaking. Among these factors, a key criterion was whether officials intended for the document to be binding (in which case they issued a regulation). Agencies Can Ensure More Effective Guidance Processes through Consistent Adherence with OMB Requirements and Stronger Internal Controls
Agencies Did Not Always Adhere to OMB Requirements for Significant Guidance
We found that agencies did not always adhere to OMB requirements for significant guidance. Education and USDA had written procedures for the approval of significant guidance as directed by OMB. We found that Education, USDA, and DOL consistently applied OMB’s public access and feedback requirements for significant guidance, while HHS did not. However, the departments and components typically had not documented their processes for internal review of guidance documents. To improve agencies’ guidance processes, we recommended that the Secretaries of USDA, HHS, DOL, and Education strengthen their components’ application of internal controls by adopting, as appropriate, practices developed by other departments and components, such as assessment of risk; written procedures and tools to promote the consistent implementation and communication of management directives; and ongoing monitoring efforts to ensure that guidance is being issued appropriately and has the intended effect. USDA, Education, HHS, and DOL generally agreed with the recommendations. Only 6 of the 25 components we reviewed had written procedures for the entire guidance production process, and several of these components highlighted benefits of these procedures for their guidance processes. Officials from all components could describe standard review practices to provide management the opportunity to comment and ensure that its comments were addressed by program staff. Most component officials told us that they conferred with other affected components or federal departments to ensure consistency during the development of guidance. Regularly Evaluate Whether Issued Guidance is Effective and Up to Date
Nearly half of the components we reviewed did not regularly evaluate whether issued guidance was effective and up to date. 2. Processes should be established to collect feedback on both the substance and clarity of guidance, to communicate this feedback to the appropriate officials, and to maintain applicable feedback to inform future guidance and revisions of guidance. | Why GAO Did This Study
Regulatory guidance is an important tool agencies use to communicate timely information about regulatory and grant programs to regulated parties, grantees, and the public. Guidance provides agencies flexibility to articulate their interpretations of regulations, clarify policies, and address new issues more quickly than may be possible using rulemaking. The potential effects of guidance and risks of legal challenges underscore the need for consistent processes for the development, review, dissemination, and evaluation of guidance.
This statement discusses four key questions addressed in GAO's April 2015 report on regulatory guidance: (1) what it is; (2) how agencies use it; (3) how agencies decide whether to use guidance or undertake rulemaking; and (4) steps agencies can take to ensure more effective guidance processes. To conduct that work, GAO reviewed relevant requirements, written procedures, guidance, and websites, and interviewed agency officials.
What GAO Found
What is regulatory guidance? One of the main purposes of guidance is to explain and help regulated parties comply with agencies' regulations. Even though not legally binding, guidance documents can have a significant effect on regulated entities and the public, both because of agencies' reliance on large volumes of guidance documents and because the guidance can prompt changes in the behavior of regulated parties and the general public.
How do agencies use regulatory guidance? The four departments GAO reviewed—Agriculture (USDA), Education (Education), Health and Human Services (HHS), and Labor (DOL)—and the 25 components engaged in regulatory or grant making activities in these departments used guidance for multiple purposes, such as clarifying or interpreting regulations and providing grant administration information. Agencies used many terms for guidance and agency components issued varying amounts of guidance, ranging from about 10 to more than 100 guidance documents each year. Departments typically identified few of their guidance documents as “significant,” generally defined by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) as guidance with a broad and substantial impact on regulated entities.
How do agencies determine whether to issue guidance or undertake rulemaking? According to officials, agencies considered a number of factors when deciding whether to issue a regulation or guidance. However, the key criterion in making the choice was whether they intended the document to be binding; in such cases agencies proceeded with regulation.
How can agencies ensure more effective guidance processes that adhere to applicable criteria? All four departments we studied identified standard practices to follow when developing guidance but could also strengthen their internal controls for issuing guidance.
Agencies addressed OMB's requirements for significant guidance to varying degrees. Education and USDA had written departmental procedures for approval as required by OMB. DOL's procedures were not available to staff and required updating. HHS had no written procedures. In addition, USDA, DOL, and Education consistently applied OMB's public access and feedback requirements for significant guidance, while HHS did not.
In the absence of specific government standards for non-significant guidance—the majority of issued guidance—the application of internal controls is particularly important. The 25 components GAO reviewed addressed some control standards more regularly than others. For example, few components had written procedures to ensure consistent application of guidance processes. However, all components could describe standard review practices and most used tools to document management approval of guidance. Not all components conferred with external nonfederal stakeholders when developing guidance. Finally, nearly half of the components GAO reviewed did not regularly evaluate whether issued guidance was effective and up to date.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is making no new recommendations in this statement. In the April 2015 report, GAO recommended steps to ensure consistent application of OMB requirements for significant guidance and to strengthen internal controls in guidance production processes. The agencies generally agreed with the recommendations. |
gao_GAO-08-917T | gao_GAO-08-917T_0 | The audits generally fall into three categories— preliminary, targeted, and comprehensive—and are distinguished by the level of detail and analysis required. AOC Has Made Some Progress toward Implementing GAO’s Recommendations on Energy Audits and Implementing Projects that Decrease Emissions
AOC has made some progress toward implementing the two recommendations in our April 2007 report. Additionally, AOC has contracted with a private firm to conduct a preliminary energy audit of the Senate Office Buildings that could prove useful in identifying opportunities for more comprehensive and targeted evaluations. However, AOC’s prioritized list does not provide information on the energy intensity of each building, an explanation of its prioritization scheme, or cost estimates. Furthermore, AOC has not developed a schedule for routinely conducting audits as we recommended in our April 2007 report. We believe that developing a more detailed schedule for future audits along with an explanation of its prioritization scheme and cost estimates would assist the Congress in its appropriations decisions and facilitate the completion of additional audits. Second, AOC can do more to fully address the second recommendation in our April 2007 report that it implement selected projects as part of an overall plan to reduce emissions that considers cost-effectiveness, the extent to which the projects reduce emissions, and funding options. In recent years, AOC has undertaken numerous projects throughout the Capitol Hill Complex to reduce energy use and related emissions, but these projects were not identified through the process we recommended. According to AOC, these efforts have already decreased the energy intensity throughout the Capitol Hill Complex. As AOC moves forward with identifying and selecting projects that could decrease energy use and related emissions, it could further respond to our recommendation by developing a plan that identifies the potential benefits and costs of each option based on the results of energy audits. Efforts to Further Reduce Energy Consumption May Prove More Cost- Effective Than Other Measures in Decreasing Emissions
The Senate has three primary options for decreasing greenhouse gas emissions and related environmental impacts associated with its operations. These include (1) implementing additional projects to decrease the demand for electricity and steam derived from fossil fuel; (2) adjusting the Capitol Power Plant’s fuel mix to rely more heavily on natural gas, which produces smaller quantities of greenhouse gas emissions for each unit of energy input than the coal and oil also burned in the plant; and (3) purchasing renewable electricity or carbon offsets from external providers. Each option involves economic and environmental tradeoffs and the first option is likely to be the most cost-effective because the projects could lead to recurring cost savings through reductions in energy expenditures. In pursuing energy audits, AOC faces a significant challenge collecting reliable data on the baseline level of energy use within each Senate office building. First, while AOC has meters that track electricity use in each building, the meters that track the steam and chilled water used by each building no longer work or provide unreliable data. AOC officials said that they have purchased but not installed new meters to track the use of chilled water and are evaluating options for acquiring new steam meters. Such submetering would further assist in targeting aspects of the Senate buildings’ operations that consume relatively high quantities of energy. AOC said that it plans to install submeters for electricity, chilled water, and steam by February 2009. Thus, fuel switching may prove less cost-effective than decreasing the demand for energy. Finally, a third option for the Senate to decrease greenhouse gas emissions and related environmental impacts includes purchasing electricity that is derived from renewable sources and paying external parties for carbon offsets. | Why GAO Did This Study
In April 2007, GAO reported that 96 percent of the greenhouse gas emissions from the Capitol Hill Complex facilities--managed by the Architect of the Capitol (AOC)--resulted from electricity use throughout the complex and combustion of fossil fuels in the Capitol Power Plant. The report concluded that AOC and other legislative branch agencies could benefit from conducting energy audits to identify projects that would reduce greenhouse gas emissions. GAO also recommended that AOC and the other agencies establish a schedule for conducting these audits and implement selected projects as part of an overall plan that considers cost-effectiveness, the extent to which the projects reduce emissions, and funding options. AOC and the other agencies agreed with our recommendations. This statement focuses on (1) the status of AOC's efforts to implement the recommendations in our April 2007 report and (2) opportunities for the Senate to decrease greenhouse gas emissions and associated environmental impacts. The statement is based on GAO's prior work, analysis of AOC documents, and discussions with AOC management.
What GAO Found
AOC has made some progress toward implementing the recommendations in GAO's April 2007 report, but opportunities remain. For example, AOC has prioritized a list of Capitol Hill buildings that need energy audits but has not developed a schedule for conducting the audits that explains the prioritization scheme or provides information on the anticipated costs. AOC prioritized the order of energy audits based on each building's energy use and has begun conducting the first of the audits. In addition, AOC has contracted with a private firm to conduct preliminary audits of the Senate office buildings that could lead to more targeted audits and eventually identify cost-effective projects that would decrease energy use and related greenhouse gas emissions. We believe that developing a more detailed schedule for future audits that includes an explanation of the prioritization scheme and cost estimates would assist the Congress in its appropriations decisions and facilitate the completion of additional audits. With respect to our recommendation that AOC implement selected projects as part of an overall plan to reduce emissions, AOC has implemented projects to reduce energy use and related emissions, but the projects were not identified through the processes we recommended. AOC could more fully respond to our recommendation by first completing the energy audits and then evaluating the cost-effectiveness and relative merits of projects that could further decrease the demand for energy. The Senate's options for decreasing the greenhouse gas emissions and related environmental impacts associated with its operations fall into three main categories--implementing projects to decrease the demand for electricity and steam derived from fossil fuels, adjusting the Capitol Power Plant's fuel mix, and purchasing carbon offsets or renewable electricity from external providers. Of these options, efforts to decrease the demand for energy could lead to recurring cost savings through reductions in energy expenditures while the other options may prove less cost-effective and involve recurring expenses. However, a key challenge in identifying energy-saving opportunities results from limited data on the baseline level of energy use within each Senate building. Specifically, the meters for steam and chilled water no longer function or do not provide reliable data. In addition, the buildings are not equipped with submeters for electricity that, if installed, could enhance efforts to identify sections of the buildings that consume relatively high levels of energy. AOC has purchased but not installed new chilled water meters, is evaluating options for acquiring new steam meters, and plans to install submeters by February 2009. |
gao_GAO-12-59 | gao_GAO-12-59_0 | The Department of the Treasury’s Earned Value Management Guide provides guidance for implementing EVM on major IRS projects. We recommended that if IRS updated the cost estimate, it should follow best practices from our cost guide. IRDM’s 2011 Cost Estimate Does Not Meet Best Practices for Reliability and Does Not Fully Support the Program’s Budget
IRDM’s Fiscal Year 2012 and Projected Budget Requests Are Not Supported by a Reliable Cost Estimate
According to best practices established by our cost guide, a cost estimate We should be comprehensive, well documented, accurate, and credible.assessed the 2011 cost estimate against cost estimation best practices because IRS told us the estimate was used to support its budget requests for fiscal year 2012 and beyond. The estimate minimally meets best practices for a well documented cost estimate, as shown in figure 2. The cost estimate documentation says that the labor cost justification was captured in the resource loaded project schedules, but we found that these schedules only justified about 6 out of the 86 requested full-time equivalent (FTE) staff for IRDM. In addition, IRS did not perform a sensitivity analysis. IRS officials said current IRS policy does not require projects to routinely re-estimate project cost. EPO officials said they did not work with the IRDM team to maintain an updated SCBE because the team did not seek their assistance. Using a cost estimate that lacks sufficient rigor—such as a preliminary cost estimate, instead of an SCBE—could lead to budget requests that do not accurately reflect program funding needs. Unreliable EVM Data Raise Additional Concerns about IRDM Cost Estimate
IRS provided EVM data in the 2011 IRDM cost estimate to justify its budget requests, but we found that the program’s EVM data are not reliable in any of the areas we reviewed. Because IRDM’s 2011 cost estimate is based on unreliable EVM data, it does not provide adequate support for IRDM’s budget requests. Until IRS addresses deficiencies in its EVM data, it cannot provide reliable cost estimate updates for IRDM. Using qualified staff, conduct surveillance on the EVM system. Conclusions
The 2011 IRDM cost estimate does not fully meet best practices for a reliable estimate. Improve the reliability of IRDM’s EVM data, specifically: address WBS issues by developing an EVM baseline for IRDM that reflects the same WBS as the detailed schedule and IRDM cost estimate; address sequencing issues and enable the development of a time- phased budget baseline by creating a single integrated master schedule for IRDM that is properly sequenced and resource- loaded so that effective and meaningful EVM data can be obtained to better manage the program; conduct an independent baseline validation for the IRDM EVM baseline; and conduct independent surveillance of EVM systems to ensure that data are reliable. IRS agreed with one of our four recommendations, partially agreed with another, and disagreed with two. While IRS’s comment letter did not address the recommendation, the Director of Risk Management in MITS’s Strategy and Planning Office told us the agency agrees with the recommendation to require certain IT project managers to consult with EPO about updating cost estimates, documenting decisions not to update cost estimates, and placing data from updated cost estimates in a repository. To assess the extent to which IRS’s practices for capturing IRDM’s actual costs and comparing them to estimated costs, or EVM, generate reliable performance data, we compared the EVM data for IRDM and IRS’s process for maintaining the data to the high-level EVM data reliability tasks outlined in our cost guide. Appendix II: Assessment of MITS’s Current IRDM Cost Estimate
The following table outlines our assessment of the extent to which the Internal Revenue Service’s (IRS) 2011 Information Reporting and Document Matching (IRDM) program cost estimate meets best practices, depicted in figures 1-4. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) began developing the Information Reporting and Document Matching (IRDM) program in fiscal year 2009 to enhance IRSs ability to automatically compare different sources of tax information and thus improve its capacity to identify and address taxpayer noncompliance. GAOs May 2011 report recommended that IRS follow best practices from the GAOs Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide if IRS updated the cost estimate for building IRDM systems. IRS provided a new cost estimate for IRDM in August 2011. In this report, GAO assessed the extent to which (1) the IRDM funding request is supported by a reliable cost estimate and, if not reliably supported, why not; and (2) IRSs practices for capturing data on IRDMs actual costs and comparing them to estimated costsknown as earned value management (EVM)generate reliable performance data. GAO compared IRSs 2011 IRDM cost estimate to criteria in GAOs cost guide and analyzed IRDMs earned value management data.
What GAO Found
The 2011 Information Reporting and Document Matching (IRDM) cost estimate, used to justify the programs projected budgets of $115 million for fiscal years 2012 through 2016, generally does not meet best practices for reliability. The cost estimate did not fully meet any of the four best practices for a reliable cost estimate.
For example, the cost estimate minimally meets best practices for a well documented estimate because the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) did not provide detailed support for staff resources, and the cost estimate documentation only justified about 6 out of the 86 requested full time equivalent staff for IRDM, among other things. If documentation does not provide source data or cannotexplain the calculations underlying the cost elements, the estimates credibility may suffer. Although IRS has an independent office of cost estimators that can develop and update cost estimates using cost modeling software that generally follows GAOs best practices, this office did not develop the 2011 IRDM cost estimate. IRS policy does not require project teams to work with the office to update cost estimates. Additionally, IRSs cost estimation guidance for project managers is inconsistent regarding how cost estimates should be related to a budget, an inconsistency that could lead to budget requests that do not accurately estimate program funding needs.
The IRDM programs earned value management (EVM) data did not meet data reliability criteria in the areas GAO reviewed. For example, the IRDM project schedule was not properly sequencedmeaning activities were not properly linked in the order in which they are to be carried out. In addition, surveillance was not conducted on IRDMs EVM system, as required by the Office of Management and Budget and the Department of the Treasury. Surveillance involves having qualified staff review an EVM system. Because IRDMs 2011 cost estimate is based on unreliable EVM data, it does not provide adequate support for IRDMs budget requests. Until IRS addresses deficiencies in the EVM data, it cannot provide a reliable cost estimate for IRDM.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that IRS ensure that IRDM has a reliable cost estimate, require certain project teams to work with its Estimation Program Office, improve cost estimation guidance, and improve the reliability of IRDMs EVM data. IRS agreed with one, partially agreed with one, and disagreed with two of GAOs recommendations. GAO generally disagrees with IRSs concerns, and still believes the recommendations have merit. |
gao_GAO-17-26 | gao_GAO-17-26_0 | In that report, we did not make recommendations with regard to the potential impacts of drawdowns on readiness and budgets. The President Has Authorized 13 Drawdowns since 2011 to Provide Security Assistance and Build Foreign Partner Capacity
Since fiscal year 2011, the President has authorized 13 drawdowns to provide security assistance and build foreign partner capacity to France, Iraq, Syria, Ukraine, and West and Central Africa (see fig. According to State and DOD data, the total value of articles and services authorized for these drawdowns for fiscal years 2011 through 2015 was $321.5 million. The drawdowns of articles and services were under Sections 506(a)(1) and 552(c)(2) of the Foreign Assistance Act. State and DOD Implemented Some but Not All Steps for Planning and Executing Drawdowns
State and DOD implemented some but not all steps in their stated processes for planning and implementing drawdowns authorized from fiscal years 2011 through 2015, but the military departments did not conduct required impact assessments. However, the Army and Air Force—which provided 96 percent of the dollar amount of all articles and services for drawdowns authorized from fiscal years 2011 through 2015—did not assess the impact of drawdowns on readiness and budgets as required by the guidance. State Implemented Steps in the Drawdown Planning Process
On the basis of available documentation and interviews with officials, we found that State had implemented three steps in the drawdown planning process for which it was responsible (see fig. In the first step of the process, State, working with DOD and other agencies, agrees to use drawdown authorities in response to an international crisis. For example, DSCA officials said they work with the military departments and other DOD entities to determine what specific assistance the military departments will provide and which military department will provide it. In the absence of impact assessments, DOD is not in a position to identify and, if needed, mitigate potential negative impacts on military readiness that could result from providing the defense articles and services under consideration for inclusion in a drawdown package. Recommendations for Executive Action
To implement DOD guidance requiring the military departments to prepare readiness and O&M budget impact assessments during drawdown planning, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following two actions:
Direct the Secretaries of the military departments to develop guidance that assigns responsibility for the preparation of impact assessments and includes direction on how such assessments should be conducted as part of drawdown planning. Direct the Director, DSCA, to develop an internal control mechanism to determine whether the military departments have completed the required impact assessments before moving forward with drawdown planning and execution. | Why GAO Did This Study
The President has special legal authorities that allow him to direct the “drawdown” of defense articles and services to provide assistance in response to an international crisis. Examples of this aid include deliveries of vehicles, food, and medical equipment, and the use of military airlift, among other articles and services. The President may authorize up to $325 million each year in drawdowns under three authorities in the Foreign Assistance Act.
A House Armed Services Committee report accompanying a bill for the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 included a provision for GAO to review drawdown authorities. This report (1) describes the use of drawdown authorities to provide security assistance and build partner capacity and (2) evaluates the extent to which State and DOD followed their stated processes for planning and implementing drawdowns. GAO reviewed guidance and documents relevant to drawdowns, analyzed drawdown data from fiscal years 2011 through 2015, and interviewed State and DOD officials.
What GAO Found
In fiscal years 2011 through 2015, the President authorized 13 drawdowns to provide security assistance and build foreign partner capacity to France, Iraq, Syria, Libya, Ukraine, and countries in West and Central Africa (see fig.). According to Department of Defense (DOD) and Department of State (State) data, the total value of articles and services authorized for these drawdowns was $321.5 million.
State and DOD implemented some, but not all, steps in their stated processes for planning and implementing drawdowns, but the military departments did not conduct required impact assessments. State implemented three steps in the process for which it was responsible, such as preparing justification packages for planned drawdowns. DOD implemented some parts of its stated process. For example, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), which is the lead DOD entity for drawdowns, worked with the military departments to identify resources for the drawdowns from fiscal years 2011 through 2015. However, the Army and Air Force—which together delivered about 96 percent of the dollar amount of drawdown aid during that time—did not conduct required impact assessments. Specifically, the two military departments had not assessed the potential impact of drawdowns on military readiness and budgets during drawdown planning, as required by DOD guidance. Neither of the military departments has assigned responsibility for conducting the assessments, and DSCA did not determine whether the assessments had been completed. Without these assessments, DOD is not in a position to identify and, if needed, mitigate potential negative impacts of a drawdown on military readiness.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that (1) the Secretaries of the military departments develop guidance that assigns responsibility for the preparation of impact assessments, and (2) the Director, DSCA, develop an internal control mechanism to determine whether the military departments have completed the required impact assessments before moving forward with drawdown planning and execution. DOD concurred with each of GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-16-166 | gao_GAO-16-166_0 | Annual appropriations. Fees, donations, and other funding sources. The Federal Lands Recreation Enhancement Act (FLREA) authorizes the Park Service to collect and use recreation fees, including entrance fees and amenity fees for certain equipment and services, such as campgrounds. Donations. Park Service’s Total Funding Did Not Keep Pace with Inflation for Fiscal Years 2005 through 2014, Even with Increases in Fees and Donations
According to our analysis of OMB MAX data, total funding for the Park Service increased in nominal dollars from $2.7 billion in fiscal year 2005 to $3.1 billion in fiscal year 2014 (15 percent), as shown in table 1. For fiscal years 2005 through 2014, the largest component of funding for the Park Service was its annual appropriations, which comprised 88 percent of its total funding on average, with fees, donations, and other funding sources comprising the remaining 12 percent. Even after adjusting for inflation, funding from these sources increased by 39 percent during this period. Revenues from Recreation Fees Grew 26 Percent, and a Small Number of Parks Account for a Large Proportion of These Fees
According to our analysis of Park Service data, revenues from recreation fees increased from about $148 million to about $186 million (26 percent) during the period we examined, as shown in figure 4. Revenues from recreation fees are comprised largely of entrance fees and amenity fees for equipment, services, and facilities, such as campsites. 6), ranging from $19.5 million in fiscal year 2011 to $94.7 million in fiscal year 2014. Park Service Has Initiatives Under Way to Increase Revenues from Fees and Donations, but Certain Factors Complicate These Efforts
The Park Service has efforts under way to increase revenues from recreation and commercial service fees along with philanthropic donations. As a result, Park Service officials told us that increasing revenues from franchise fees can be challenging. The Park Service’s efforts to increase revenues from commercial service fees also have been affected by limited competition for some concessions contracts. Fundraising. Public Outreach. Several Factors Hamper the Park Service’s Ability to Increase Donations
According to Park Service officials, several factors hamper the agency’s ability to increase philanthropic donations. One factor they cited is the types of projects that need funding are not always attractive to donors. Our past work on federal user fees has highlighted the importance of regularly reviewing these fees. However, unlike the annual interagency pass, FLREA does not permit Park Service or the other agencies that charge recreation fees to increase the price of the senior pass. Without the authority to adjust the price of the senior pass, the Park Service is limited in its ability to increase revenue from this recreation fee. Without guidance to periodically review fees and direct the park units to provide information on deviations from the fee schedule, the Park Service may not ensure that its entrance fees are set at a reasonable level and may be missing opportunities to more effectively manage its fees. Fish and Wildlife Service, and the U.S. Forest Service—to adjust the price of a lifetime senior pass. Recommendations for Executive Action
To help improve its management of recreation fees, we recommend that the Secretary of the Interior direct the Director of the Park Service to take the following two actions: revise its guidance on recreation fees so that the agency periodically reviews its entrance fees to determine whether the fees are reasonable, and direct that park units provide information to headquarters on why they are choosing to not increase entrance fees or increase them by an amount less than the fee schedule. In addition, beginning in 2016, Interior indicated the Park Service will require park units to provide information on their decisions to not increase entrance fees. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to examine (1) general trends in funding for the National Park Service (Park Service) for fiscal years 2005 through 2014; (2) the trends in the Park Service’s revenues from recreation and commercial service fees and donations from philanthropic sources for fiscal years 2005 through 2014; and (3) the Park Service’s efforts to increase fee revenues and donations, and factors, if any, that may affect these efforts. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Park Service manages 409 park units that cover 84 million acres. Park Service funding is generally composed of annual appropriations along with revenues from recreation fees, commercial service fees, and philanthropic donations. GAO was asked to review the Park Service's collection of these fees and donations.
This report examines the Park Service's (1) overall funding trends for fiscal years 2005 through 2014; (2) trends in revenues from fees and donations; and (3) efforts to increase revenues and donations, and factors that affected these efforts. To conduct this work, GAO analyzed budget data for fiscal years 2005 through 2014 on the Park Service's overall funding and fee revenue and donations. GAO also reviewed laws, examined Park Service reports, and interviewed agency officials and stakeholders, such as nonprofit partners and concessioners.
What GAO Found
The National Park Service's (Park Service) total funding did not keep pace with inflation for fiscal years 2005 through 2014, even as fees and donations increased. Total funding increased in nominal dollars from $2.7 billion to $3.1 billion (15 percent) during this period, but declined by 3 percent after adjusting for inflation. Annual appropriations, which comprised about 88 percent of total funding on average, declined 8 percent after adjusting for inflation. Fees, donations, and other funding sources, which accounted for the remainder, increased 39 percent after adjusting for inflation.
Revenues from fees and donations grew for fiscal years 2005 through 2014 to varying degrees. Specifically, revenues from recreation fees, which include entrance and amenity fees for facilities such as campsites, increased from about $148 million to $186 million (26 percent). Revenues from fees from concessions operations, which comprise the vast majority of commercial service fees, nearly tripled from almost $29 million to $85 million. Meanwhile, cash donations from philanthropic sources fluctuated, ranging from $19.5 million in fiscal year 2011 to $94.7 million in fiscal year 2014.
The Park Service has efforts under way to increase revenues from fees and donations, but certain factors limit these efforts. For recreation fees, the Park Service updated its fee schedule, and several park units increased entrance and amenity fees. However, the Federal Lands Recreation Enhancement Act (FLREA) does not give the Park Service and other agencies that charge recreation fees the authority to adjust the price of a lifetime senior pass, which has been $10 since 1993. GAO's guide on user fees states that federal agencies should regularly review fees and make changes if warranted. Without the authority to modify the price of the senior pass, the Park Service is limited in its ability to increase revenue from this fee. In addition, Park Service guidance on recreation fees directs the agency to ensure its fees are set at a reasonable level, but does not call for periodic reviews of these fees, and the agency has no plans to do so. The agency also does not require park units to provide information on decisions to not change their fees or deviate from the fee schedule because decisions about raising fees are left to the park units. As a result, the Park Service is missing opportunities to ensure that its entrance fees are reasonable. To increase commercial service revenues, the Park Service increased minimum franchise fees that concessioners pay, and some park units have developed leasing programs. Several factors, such as limited competition for some concessions contracts, complicate efforts to increase these fees. For philanthropic donations, the Park Service has launched fundraising and public outreach campaigns in conjunction with its centennial anniversary in 2016 and has modified fundraising policies to increase donation opportunities. According to agency officials, several factors hamper the agency's ability to increase donations, such as projects that need funding are not always attractive to donors.
What GAO Recommends
Congress should consider amending FLREA so that the federal agencies that charge recreation fees can determine whether to adjust the price of a senior pass. GAO also recommends that the Department of the Interior direct the Park Service to revise its guidance to periodically review entrance fees and direct park units to provide information on their decisions to not increase fees. Interior concurred with the recommendations. |
gao_GAO-10-547T | gao_GAO-10-547T_0 | SARA also required the Secretary of Defense to carry out the Defense Environmental Restoration Program (DERP). Funding Levels and Cleanup Status for Active and BRAC Sites and FUDS
DOD uses the same method to propose funding for cleanup at active and BRAC sites and FUDS; and cleanup funding is based on DERP goals and is generally proportional to the number of sites in each of these categories. Specifically, officials in the Military Departments, Defense Agencies, and FUDS program who are responsible for environmental restoration at the sites under their jurisdiction formulate cleanup budget proposals based on instructions in DOD’s financial management regulation and DERP environmental restoration performance goals. DOD’s DERP goals include reducing risk to human health and the environment, preparing BRAC properties to be environmentally suitable for transfer, having final remedies in place and completing response actions, and fulfilling other established milestones to demonstrate progress toward meeting program performance goals. For sites included under the first four BRAC rounds, the goal is to reach the RIP/RC milestone at IRP sites by 2015 and at MMRP sites by 2009. For sites included under the 2005 BRAC round, the goal is to reach the RIP/RC milestone at IRP sites by 2014 and at MMRP sites by 2017. DOD’s military components plan cleanup actions that are required to meet these goals at the installation or site level. DOD requires the components to assess their inventory of BRAC and other sites by relative risk to help make informed decisions about which sites to clean up first. Using these relative risk categories, as well as other factors such as stakeholder interest and mission needs, the components set more specific cleanup targets each fiscal year to demonstrate progress and prepare a budget to achieve those goals and targets. DOD data show that, in applying the broad restoration goals, performance goals, and targets, cleanup funding is generally proportional to the number of sites in the active, BRAC, and FUDS site categories. As the table indicates, the total number of BRAC sites requiring cleanup is about 17 percent of the total number of defense sites, while the $440.2 million obligated to address BRAC sites in fiscal year 2008 is equivalent to about 25 percent of the total funds obligated for cleaning up all defense waste sites. Challenges to DOD’s Environmental Cleanup Efforts
Our past work has also identified a number of challenges to DOD’s efforts in undertaking environmental cleanup activities at defense sites, including BRAC sites. For example, we have reported the following: DOD’s preliminary cost estimates for environmental cleanup at specific sites may not reflect the full cost of cleanup. However, we have reported that three key factors can lead to delays in the cleanup and transfer of sites. These factors are (1) technological constraints that limit DOD’s ability to accurately identify, detect, and clean up unexploded ordnance from a particular site, (2) prolonged negotiations between environmental regulators and DOD about the extent to which DOD’s actions are in compliance with environmental regulations and laws, and (3) the discovery of previously undetected environmental contamination that can result in the need for further cleanup, cost increases, and delays in property transfer. Addressing this challenge, however, is critical because environmental cleanup has historically been a key impediment to the expeditious transfer of unneeded property to other federal and nonfederal parties who can put the property to new uses. | Why GAO Did This Study
Under the Defense Environmental Restoration Program (DERP), the Department of Defense (DOD) is responsible for cleaning up about 5,400 sites on military bases that have been closed under the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) process, as well as 21,500 sites on active bases and over 4,700 formerly used defense sites (FUDS), properties that DOD owned or controlled and transferred to other parties prior to October 1986. The cleanup of contaminants, such as hazardous chemicals or unexploded ordnance, at BRAC bases has been an impediment to the timely transfer of these properties to parties who can put them to new uses. The goals of DERP include (1) reducing risk to human health and the environment (2) preparing BRAC properties to be environmentally suitable for transfer (3) having final remedies in place and completing response actions and (4) fulfilling other established milestones to demonstrate progress toward meeting program performance goals. This testimony is based on prior work and discusses information on (1) how DOD allocates cleanup funding at all sites with defense waste and (2) BRAC cleanup status. It also summarizes other key issues that GAO has identified in the past that can impact DOD's environmental cleanup efforts.
What GAO Found
DOD uses the same method to propose funding for cleanup at FUDS, active sites, and BRAC sites; cleanup funding is based on DERP goals and is generally proportional to the number of sites in each of these categories. Officials in the Military Departments, Defense Agencies, and FUDS program, who are responsible for executing the environmental restoration activities at their respective sites, formulate cleanup budget proposals using the instructions in DOD's financial management regulation and DERP environmental restoration performance goals. DERP's goals include target dates for reaching the remedy-in-place or response complete (RIP/RC) milestone. For example, for sites included under the first four BRAC rounds, the goal is to reach the RIP/RC milestone at sites with hazardous substances released before October 1986 by 2015 and for sites in the 2005 BRAC round by 2014. DOD's military components plan cleanup actions that are required to meet DERP goals at the installation or site level. DOD requires the components to assess their inventory of BRAC and other sites by relative risk to help make informed decisions about which sites to clean up first. Using these relative risk categories, as well as other factors, the components set more specific restoration targets each fiscal year to demonstrate progress and prepare a budget to achieve those goals and targets. DOD data show that, in applying the goals, and targets, cleanup funding has generally been proportional to the number of sites in the FUDS, active, and BRAC site categories. For example, the total number of BRAC sites requiring cleanup is about 17 percent of the total number of defense sites requiring cleanup, while the $440.2 million obligated to address BRAC sites in fiscal year 2008 is equivalent to about 25 percent of the total funds obligated for this purpose for all defense waste sites. GAO's past work has also shown that DOD's preliminary cost estimates for cleanup generally tend to rise significantly as more information becomes known about the level of contamination at a specific site. In addition, three factors can lead to delays in cleanup. They are (1) technological constraints that limit DOD's ability to detect and cleanup certain kinds of hazards, (2) prolonged negotiations with environmental regulators on the extent to which DOD's actions are in compliance with regulations and laws, and (3) the discovery of previously unknown hazards that can require additional cleanup, increase costs, and delay transfer of the property. |
gao_GAO-02-465 | gao_GAO-02-465_0 | Background
DOE laboratories have primarily used the following types of agreements to transfer technology to U.S. businesses and other organizations: CRADAs: A DOE laboratory and its nonfederal partner(s) agree that their scientists will collaborate on a research project of mutual interest and consistent with the laboratory’s mission. However, the DOE laboratory cannot provide funding to the partner(s). DOE Laboratories Have Substantially Reduced Technology Transfer Activities Not Fully Funded by Nonfederal Partners
The 12 DOE laboratories surveyed have substantially reduced their participation in CRADAs and technical assistance to small businesses in recent years, primarily because DOE research program funding has not replaced dedicated funding for technology partnerships. Subsequently, the National Competitiveness Technology Transfer Act of 1989 added technology transfer as a mission of the DOE laboratories. Managers at DOE Laboratories Cited Barriers to Technology Transfer Activities
According to DOE laboratory managers, the most important barrier to effective technology transfer was the lack of dedicated DOE funding for technology partnerships, including funding targeted at small businesses. Alternatively, CRADA partners— particularly small businesses—are unwilling or unable to fund all of the research costs. Lack of Commitment for Technology Partnerships
Managers at 10 of the 12 DOE laboratories cited the lack of a high-level, effective advocate for technology partnerships in DOE headquarters as an important barrier that has constrained their technology transfer activities. | What GAO Found
Since 1980 Congress has passed laws to facilitate the transfer of technology from federal laboratories to U.S. businesses. In particular, the National Competitiveness Technology Transfer Act of 1989 authorized federal laboratories operated by contractors, including the Department of Energy's (DOE) national laboratories, to enter into cooperative research and development agreements (CRADA). Under a CRADA, the partner and DOE laboratory agree to jointly conduct research and typically share the research costs. By fiscal year 1992, DOE's national laboratories were among the leading federal laboratories participating in CRADAs. Recently however, the 12 laboratories that DOE surveyed have substantially reduced their CRADA partnerships and their technical assistance to small businesses. Instead, the laboratories have increasingly transferred technology through agreements that did not involve collaborative research and were funded by a business or other nonfederal entity. Managers at most of the laboratories say the lack of dedicated funding for technology for transfer to technology partnerships, including funding targeted to small businesses, is the most important barrier to their technology transfer activities. Managers at most laboratories said that DOE's lack of a high-level, effective advocate for technology transfer and DOE's lack of commitment to technology partnerships were important barriers. Several managers also said that requirements, such as DOE's advance payment clause, were often financially burdensome for small businesses. |
gao_GAO-12-56 | gao_GAO-12-56_0 | Background
IRFs generally do not receive appropriations directly. Key Operating Principles Provide a Framework for Effective WCF Management
We identified four key operating principles that offer a framework to effectively manage WCFs. As previously discussed, to identify key principles, we reviewed governmentwide guidance on business operating principles, internal controls, managerial cost accounting, and performance management. Commerce Departmental, Census, and OMB staff generally found the principles to be reasonable. 1. However, while the Commerce Departmental WCF handbook includes the roles and responsibilities of many key personnel and review groups involved with fund management, it leaves out information on the cross- departmental role of the Commerce CFO Council, which is comprised of the CFOs from each of Commerce’s bureaus and has an important role regarding increases or changes to the WCF. This limits the usefulness of the guidance for bureau staff, customers, and other stakeholders. Principle 2: Ensure Self-sufficiency by Recovering the Agency’s Actual Costs
Commerce Has a Transparent Process for Ensuring Recovery of Actual Costs
According to service providers and customers, the rate-setting processes for the Commerce Departmental WCF are transparent, clearly coordinated, and designed to recover annual actual costs. Census customers we spoke with had mixed responses about how M&A costs are determined. Both Commerce and Census Have a Management Review Process, but Census’ Process Could Be Improved
Both Commerce and Census WCFs have a management review process that examines how rates are set. However, the level of transparency differs between the two organizations. Census provides a fragmented and limited description of how it sets rates and there is no formal process to communicate with customers. Principle 3: Measure Performance
Both WCFs Could Benefit from Performance Measures to Assess Operational Effectiveness
OEB has processes in place that help it manage the operations of the Commerce Departmental WCF. Opportunities Exist for Management to Potentially Consolidate WCF Services
Although the Commerce Departmental and Census WCFs are intended to achieve economies of scale by supporting services and projects that are performed more advantageously when centralized, both WCFs support similar M&A services that could potentially be supported by one WCF. Principle 4: Build in Flexibility to Obtain Customer Input and Meet Customer Needs
Both WCFs Regularly Obtain Customer Input and Allow Some Flexibility to Adjust to Customer Needs, but Challenges Exist
In general, customers we interviewed said they had regular and ongoing interactions with fund managers or service providers. When the needs of customers exceed the capacity of the Commerce Departmental WCF, the department and the customer enter into a memorandum of understanding (MOU), outside of the standard suite of services offered through the WCF. Census uses its operating reserve to maintain price stability for customers throughout the decennial cycle. Conclusions
WCFs provide agencies with an opportunity to operate more efficiently by consolidating services and creating incentives for customers and managers to exercise cost control and economic restraint. Additionally, Census does not have a process to facilitate coordination among key WCF personnel to ensure appropriate tracking of funds. Recommendations for Executive Action
We make seven recommendations to the Secretary of Commerce. 2. Establish performance measures to assess performance of WCF operations, such as billing error rates, and determine what additional measures would be helpful to improve WCF management. Develop guidance that clarifies and consolidates existing WCF policies to include: a. roles and responsibilities of key personnel responsible for WCF management, and b. a process to coordinate information managed by disparate divisions to provide an overarching view of the WCF and ensure the appropriate tracking of funds. Include a more detailed explanation in WCF guidance on the rate- setting process for all components of the fund, such as an explanation of how rates are determined and costs distributed, and establish a formal process similar to the Departmental WCF’s process to communicate with customers. In his letter that is reprinted in appendix II, the Secretary agreed with our findings and recommendations and has directed the managers of both the Commerce Departmental WCF and the Census Bureau WCF to begin implementing our recommendations. Appendix I: Expanded Version of WCF Key Operating Principles
WCF Key Operating Principles
Principle Clearly delineate roles and responsibilities Appropriate delineation of roles and responsibilities promotes a clear understanding of who will be held accountable for specific tasks or duties, such as authorizing and reviewing transactions, implementing controls over WCF management, and helping ensure that related responsibilities are coordinated. | Why GAO Did This Study
Agencies can improve their efficiency through the use of shared services, which are often financed through intragovernmental revolving funds (IRF). GAO was asked to (1) identify key operating principles the Commerce Departmental and Census Bureau Working Capital Funds (WCF), which are one type of IRF, should follow to ensure appropriate tracking and use of federal funds and (2) evaluate how departmental and Census policies and procedures for managing these WCFs reflect these principles. GAO identified four key operating principles based on a review of governmentwide guidance on business principles, internal controls, managerial cost accounting, and performance management. GAO also discussed the reasonableness of the principles with staff of the two WCFs and the Office of Management and Budget; these staff generally found the principles to be reasonable. GAO reviewed WCF authorizing legislation and statutory authorities, analyzed agency policies and data, and interviewed agency officials.
What GAO Found
Four key operating principles offer a framework for effective WCF management: (1) Clearly delineate roles and responsibilities; (2) Ensure self-sufficiency by recovering the agency's actual costs; (3) Measure performance; (4) Build in flexibility to obtain customer input and meet customer needs Commerce and Census guidance do not identify the roles and responsibilities of all key WCF personnel. While all involved had a clear informal understanding of who is responsible for managing the Departmental WCF, Commerce's guidance does not discuss its CFO Council--an entity with an important role related to WCF increases and changes. Census lacks a process to coordinate and consolidate information managed by disparate divisions and ensure appropriate tracking of funds. There are also opportunities for the agencies to achieve greater management efficiencies by consolidating certain WCF services. Commerce has a transparent process to ensure recovery of actual costs. However, Census' process could be more transparent. The Commerce Departmental WCF's rate setting and review processes are clearly described, coordinated, and designed to recover actual annual costs. Entities such as the Commerce CFO Council and algorithm review group help to facilitate shared understanding among fund managers, customers, and service providers. Census has a fragmented and limited description of its processes and lacks a formal process to communicate with customers. Census customers GAO spoke with had a mixed understanding about how certain WCF costs are determined, limiting their ability to make appeals and suggest improvements. Both WCFs could benefit from performance measures that assess operational effectiveness. Commerce and Census have identified performance measures related to organizational strategic goals. However, neither has established WCF operational performance measures such as responsiveness to customer inquiries and billing error rates. Moreover, both WCFs support similar management and administrative services that could potentially be consolidated. Both WCFs obtain customer input and have flexibility to adjust to customer needs, but challenges exist. In general, customers GAO interviewed said they had regular and ongoing discussions with fund managers or service providers. At Commerce, its CFO Council and WCF managers periodically assess and shift resources to address changes in customer needs and prioritize requests for services. However, the statutory cap on one bureau's payments into the WCF limits the level of services that can be provided to all Commerce bureaus. To provide services beyond the capacity of the WCF, Commerce enters into a memorandum of understanding with specific customers. The Census WCF's ability to build and maintain an operating reserve helps to provide price stability for customers throughout the decennial census cycle when the costs of management and administrative services supported through the WCF fluctuate dramatically. Similar to Commerce, Census has the flexibility to provide additional services by billing customers directly.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is making seven recommendations to improve the management of the two WCFs, including updating and consolidating WCF guidance, establishing a process to measure WCF performance, and examining opportunities to consolidate certain WCF services. The Commerce Secretary agreed with all of our findings and recommendations and has directed managers of both the departmental WCF and the Census WCF to begin implementing GAO's recommendations. |
gao_T-RCED-99-101 | gao_T-RCED-99-101_0 | Demonstration Program Successful in Raising Revenue, but Improvements Can Be Made
The demonstration program affords opportunities to collect new and increased fees to the major agencies that provide the public with recreational opportunities on federal land—the Park Service, Bureau of Land Management, and Fish and Wildlife Service (all within the Department of the Interior), and the Forest Service (within the Department of Agriculture). Now, I would like to discuss several areas in which we think improvements can be made to the demonstration program. Demonstration sites may be reluctant to coordinate fees partly because the program’s incentives are geared towards increasing their revenues. This is a significant and sensitive issue that involves balancing important features of the program. In contrast, the projects being done by the other three agencies—the Bureau of Land Management, the Fish and Wildlife Service, and the Forest Service—have not had these additional levels of scrutiny. Capacity of the Agency to Handle Large Volume of Projects Limits Spending
Another factor limiting the pace of the Park Service’s spending relative to the other agencies in the program has been the agency’s ability to handle the large volume of projects that are now in the pipeline. Impact of the Fee Program on Park Service Maintenance Needs
Given the substantial increase in funding that the Park Service will receive under the demonstration fee program, now more than ever the agency will have to be accountable for demonstrating its accomplishments in improving the maintenance of Park Service facilities with these additional resources. Nonetheless, the Park Service still does not have accurate information on its maintenance needs. However, this is just a first step. The Congress has attempted to help the Park Service address its deferred maintenance and other program needs in recent years by providing additional appropriations and revenue from the recreational fee program. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed the National Park Service's Recreational Fee Demonstration Program, focusing on the: (1) rate at which the Park Service spends revenue collected under the program in comparison with the Fish and Wildlife Service, the Bureau of Land Management, and the Forest Service; and (2) impact of the fee program on the Park Service's maintenance needs.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the overall message about the demonstration program is positive; (2) the program is providing hundreds of millions of dollars to improve visitor services and address the backlogs of unmet needs in the four land management agencies; (3) in addition, those who pay the fees generally support the program, and it has not appeared to have adversely affected visitation rates; (4) nonetheless, it is appropriate to focus on several areas in which changes or improvements may be needed; (5) specifically, these issues include the need for greater coordination of fees by the agencies, greater innovation, and flexibility in revenue distribution; (6) these issues are important because the demonstration program is still at a stage where experimentation is encouraged; (7) most of GAO's observations relate to doing just that--experimenting more to determine what works best; (8) regarding the Park Service, GAO found that the agency's spending of demonstration program revenue has lagged substantially behind the other three agencies in the first 2 years of the program; (9) this has been due primarily to the larger number and scale of Park Service projects and additional scrutiny these projects are receiving within the agency and the Department of the Interior; (10) further, the Park Service has not yet developed accurate and reliable information on its total deferred maintenance needs; and (11) until this is done, determining the impact that the revenue from the fee program is having on these needs is not possible. |
gao_GAO-07-170 | gao_GAO-07-170_0 | The United States Pursues Energy Cooperation through International Energy Forums Designed to Meet Specific Cooperative Needs
The United States pursues energy cooperation through international energy forums that meet specific cooperative purposes. These forums range from formal institutions with binding obligations to regional associations to more informal gatherings designed to facilitate a frank exchange of information. Emerging Energy Market Issues Include Tight Markets, Growing Role of National Oil Companies, and Increased Importance of Reliable Market Information
Three key energy market issues that are important for U.S. efforts in international energy cooperation in the oil and natural gas sectors are: a tight energy market, growing market participation of national oil companies, and increased importance of reliable energy market information. Growing Market Participation of National Oil Companies Has Led to Concerns
In an energy market characterized by relatively high oil prices and increasing energy demand, the growing participation and market influence of national oil and gas companies—which are majority owned by national governments—from both energy consuming and producing countries has contributed to limited access to oil and natural gas resources in some producing countries. Forum efforts are also constrained by limitations in membership, consensus- based decision making, and voluntary participation. However, within these constraints, the United States has tried to mitigate energy market imbalances through efforts such as promoting emergency preparedness and outreach to developing countries. This generally means that forums focus on noncontroversial issues, like energy efficiency and technology, according to U.S. officials. Additionally, U.S. support for forum efforts has not benefited from consistent use of EIA expertise, and the United States has not provided timely data submissions to the IEA. International forums can serve another critical role by improving energy demand and supply statistics to facilitate investment planning. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
To determine how the U.S. government participates in international energy cooperation forums, we reviewed: (1) the key international energy forums in which the U.S. pursues energy cooperation, (2) the key emerging energy market issues that are important for international energy cooperation, and (3) how the United States is addressing these issues through its participation in these forums. Our review focused mainly on the following key international energy cooperation forums: the International Energy Agency (IEA), the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Energy Working Group, the North American Energy Working Group (NAEWG), and the International Energy Forum (IEF). 1. 2. | Why GAO Did This Study
Rising oil prices, resulting from growth in energy consumption by rapidly developing Asian nations and by most industrialized nations, have increased concern about competition over oil and natural gas resources. In particular, Congress expressed interest in how the United States participates in energy cooperation through international forums. GAO was asked to review: (1) what are the key international energy forums in which the United States pursues energy cooperation, (2) what are some of the key emerging energy market issues that are important for international energy cooperation, and (3) how is the United States addressing these issues through its participation in these forums. GAO's work is based on contacts with agency officials and energy experts and review of documents.
What GAO Found
The United States pursues energy cooperation through several international energy forums designed to meet specific cooperative needs. They include a formal institution with binding petroleum reserve obligations, regional associations, and informal gatherings designed to facilitate information exchange. Major forums include the International Energy Agency (IEA), the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Energy Working Group, the North American Energy Working Group, and the International Energy Forum. GAO identified three energy market issues that are important for U.S. efforts in international energy cooperation. First, a tighter energy market with higher, more volatile, prices has developed. This is due to (1) an unanticipated rise in energy demand and (2) constrained supply due to less spare crude oil production capacity and increased political frictions in certain supplier countries. Second, market participation of national oil and gas companies, which are majority owned by governments, has led to limitations on access to resources. Third, more reliable energy market information is needed to facilitate market stability and plan investment. The U.S. government has addressed these issues through its participation in international energy cooperation forums; however, the nature of the forums can limit their impact. Forums have restricted membership, consensus-based agendas and decisions, and voluntary participation. They generally focus on noncontroversial issues such as energy efficiency and technology. Within these constraints, the United States has tried to mitigate effects of tight markets by supporting emergency preparedness. It has not directly addressed the impact of national oil companies, but it has pursued related areas. It has sought to improve energy information, but Energy Information Administration (EIA) statistical expertise has not been consistently leveraged for purposes beyond data exchange, and U.S. data submissions to the IEA have not been timely. |
gao_GAO-06-125 | gao_GAO-06-125_0 | This initiative is an essential element of the Department of the Navy’s Human Capital Strategy, which was announced in June 2004. These limitations could have adversely impacted the results of the review. We have shown that when the reserve force can successfully meet deployment and operational requirements, it can generally perform missions at a lower cost than the active force because active units have all full-time personnel assigned whereas reserve units have mostly part-time personnel assigned.By identifying capability gaps in the active force as the primary criterion for determining the required reserve manpower, the Navy failed to assess whether the lower cost reserve force could be used to meet capabilities currently provided by the active force. Additionally, our prior work has shown that decisions about the manpower needed to perform government functions should be driven by valid and reliable data.However, in its briefing to the Chief of Naval Operations, the Fleet Forces Command acknowledged that many of these critical mission documents were outdated. Zero-Based Review Results Would Change the Mix of Active and Reserve Forces, Reduce Manpower Costs, and Change Some Command and Control Responsibilities
Implementation of the Navy’s zero-based review’s recommendations will change the mix of active and reserve forces by decreasing the number of reserve personnel and increasing the number of active and civilian personnel. The zero-based review’s recommendations will also have the active force assume greater command and control responsibility over the reserve force. As indicated in table 1, the Chief of Naval Operations approved a net reduction of over 16,000 reserve positions, a net increase of about 880 positions in the active force, and a net increase of 450 civilian personnel positions. At the activities we visited, we found that the reasons for these recommended changes in manpower varied. Manpower Changes Would Result in Some Cost Savings
The Fleet Forces Command initially estimated that implementing the manpower changes recommended by the zero-based review would save approximately $283.5 million annually. For example, the Commander, Navy Reserve Force, will now report to the Commander, Fleet Forces Command, for the training and readiness of the reserve force. This realignment of responsibility is consistent with the Chief of Naval Operations’ objective to create a more integrated total force. Furthermore, using outdated mission documents as a baseline for determining manpower requirements substantially reduced assurance that the Navy activities started with the best data for making quality manpower assessments. Recommendations for To assist the Navy in meeting its human capital strategy goals and ensure Executive Action that ongoing and future Navy active and reserve manpower requirement assessments result in the most cost-effective force, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Navy to take the following two actions: develop and implement guidance to ensure that (1) ongoing and future workforce reviews include cost analyses to determine the most cost effective mix of active and reserve manpower and (2) the methodology for and results of cost analyses are documented and allocate the required resources to maintain current Navy mission documents that would provide a valid baseline for ongoing and future workforce reviews. To determine how the recommendations from the zero-based review will affect the reserve’s manpower, funding, and command and control relationships with the active force, we obtained and analyzed the justification packages submitted by the 10 Navy activities, the recommended changes in the number of required reserve manpower and the cost factors used to calculate manpower savings as well as the corresponding projected funding requirements for reserve manpower. As a result, the activity needed fewer personnel. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 2004, the Navy completed a study of how many selected reserve personnel are needed to support the active force in meeting current and future mission requirements. The Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for 2005 mandated that GAO assess several aspects of the Navy's study. This report addresses (1) the criteria and process the Navy used to conduct the review and what limitations affected the Navy's analyses and implementation plan; and (2) how the recommendations from the review will affect the reserve's personnel, funding, and command and control relationship with the active force.
What GAO Found
In conducting its review of Selected Reserve personnel requirements, the Navy established criteria and followed a structured process, but GAO noted two limitations that could have potentially affected the quality of the results. The Navy did not analyze the most cost-effective mix of active and reserve personnel and in some cases used outdated mission documents as the baseline for analysis. The Department of Defense personnel directive states that missions should be accomplished using the least costly mix of personnel. In addition, GAO's prior work has shown that when reserve forces can successfully meet deployment and operational requirements, they can perform missions for less cost than active forces, and that decisions about the number of personnel needed to perform government functions should be driven by valid and reliable data. The 10 activities' justification packages GAO reviewed did not indicate if or how commanders evaluated the cost-effectiveness of using active or reserve personnel. A key reason why cost-effectiveness was not evaluated is that the Fleet Forces Command provided no guidance requiring that such an analysis be conducted or submitted as part of the activities' justification packages. Additionally, because the Navy had not devoted the resources to update some of its baseline mission documents prior to the start of the review, some of the activities' analyses did not start with the best possible data, which may have resulted in inaccuracies in their determinations about capabilities and personnel requirements. Including cost-effectiveness in the criteria for the zero-based review and documenting such analyses, as well as ensuring data accuracy, could have better demonstrated a sound basis for the recommended personnel changes and, in some cases, may have led to different recommendations. The review's recommendations will result in a change in the force mix, some cost savings, and the active force assuming greater command and control over reserve forces. The Chief of Naval Operations approved personnel changes that would result in a net reduction of over 16,000 reserve positions, a net increase of about 880 positions in the active force, and a net increase of about 450 civilian personnel positions. The reasons for these recommended changes varied by activity. The Fleet Forces Command also initially estimated that the Navy could save approximately $283.5 million annually by implementing the personnel recommendations, although this estimate is changing as some activities reexamine their personnel requirements using more recent data. In addition to total force personnel changes, the active force is assuming greater command and control responsibility for the reserve force. For example, the active force is now responsible for the training and readiness of the reserve forces and is receiving their status reports. This realignment of responsibility is consistent with the Chief of Naval Operation's expectations for creating a more integrated total force. |
gao_GAO-11-684 | gao_GAO-11-684_0 | DOD partially agreed with the recommendations. According to the act, DOD is required to develop a business enterprise architecture and an enterprise transition plan for implementing the architecture, identify each business system proposed for funding in DOD’s fiscal year budget submissions, delegate the responsibility for business systems to designated approval authorities within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, require each approval authority to establish investment review structures and processes, and effective October 1, 2005, not obligate appropriated funds for a defense business system modernization with a total cost of more than $1 million unless the approval authority certifies that the business system modernization meets several conditions. Recent GAO Reviews of DOD’s Business Systems Modernization
Between 2005 and 2008, we reported that DOD had taken steps to comply with key requirements of the Fiscal Year 2005 NDAA relative to architecture development, transition plan development, budgetary disclosure, and investment review, and to satisfy relevant systems modernization management guidance; however, each report also concluded that much remained to be accomplished relative to the act’s requirements and relevant guidance. DOD agreed with our recommendations. Collectively, these steps address several statutory provisions and best practices concerning the business enterprise architecture, transition plan, budgetary disclosure, and investment review of systems costing in excess of $1 million. For example, while all three have or are in the process of establishing an executive committee with responsibility and accountability for the department’s enterprise architecture, none have fully developed an enterprise architecture methodology or have a well-defined business enterprise architecture and transition plan to guide and constrain business transformation initiatives. However, each has yet to address key elements, including developing the architecture content, in order to advance to a level that can be considered fully mature. According to DOD officials, the lack of progress in addressing key management elements has been due to the uncertainty and pending decisions surrounding the roles and responsibilities of key organizations and senior leadership positions. Air Force officials attributed the state of its enterprise architecture program in part to the lack of resources. DOD Has Continued to Establish Effective Investment Management Processes, but Has Yet to Fully Define Many Key Processes and Associated Policies and Procedures
Since we reported in 2009, DOD has continued to make progress in establishing the kind of investment management processes and associated key practices (i.e., policies and procedures) called for in the act and our ITIM framework as being integral to effective IT investment management. Specifically, with regard to the nine Stage 2 practices, DOD enterprise, Air Force, and Navy, as shown in table 6, have yet to fully define five key practices (or 56 percent of the practices), and Army has yet to do so for seven (or 78 percent) of the practices. They also acknowledged that Army is missing certain documented project-level and portfolio-level management policies and procedures. More specifically, we previously reported that DOD had not been performing this step and made recommendations that they do so. For the investments under review, DOD largely followed its oversight process but did not perform an important validation activity. Specifically, while DOD continues to release updates to its corporate enterprise architecture, the architecture has yet to be federated through development of aligned subordinate architectures for each of the military departments. In this regard, each of the military departments has made progress in managing its respective architecture program, but there are still limitations in the scope and completeness, as well as the immaturity of the military department architecture programs, including the completeness of their own transition plans. Accordingly, it is essential that DOD resolve these matters expeditiously, as doing so is on the department’s critical path for fully establishing the full range of institutional management controls needed to address its business systems modernization high-risk area. Recommendation for Executive Action
Because we have existing recommendations that address the institutional management control weaknesses discussed in this report, we are making no further recommendations in these areas. Appendix I: Objective, Scope, and Methodology
As agreed with congressional defense committees, our objective was to assess the actions by the Department of Defense (DOD) to comply with provisions of section 332 of the Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005. Our methodology relative to each of these four provisions is as follows: To address the architecture and transition plan provision, we focused on the progress the departments of the Air Force, Army, and Navy have made in developing their respective parts of the federated DOD business enterprise architecture. | Why GAO Did This Study
For decades, the Department of Defense (DOD) has been challenged in modernizing its timeworn business systems. Since 1995, GAO has designated DOD's business systems modernization program as high risk. Between 2001 and 2005, GAO reported that the modernization program had spent hundreds of millions of dollars on an enterprise architecture and investment management structures that had limited value. Accordingly, GAO made explicit architecture and investment management-related recommendations. Congress included provisions in the Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 that were consistent with GAO's recommendations and required GAO to assess DOD's actions to comply with these provisions. To do so, GAO reviewed documents and interviewed military officials on the progress the military departments have made relative to developing their respective parts of the federated business enterprise architecture and establishing investment management structures and processes.
What GAO Found
DOD continues to take steps to comply with the act's provisions and to satisfy relevant system modernization management guidance. Collectively, these steps address several statutory provisions and best practices concerning the business enterprise architecture, budgetary disclosure, and review of systems costing in excess of $1 million. However, long-standing challenges that GAO previously identified remain to be addressed in order for DOD to be in compliance with guidance and the act. In particular, (1) While DOD continues to release updates to its enterprise architecture, the architecture has yet to be augmented by a coherent family of component architectures. In this regard, each of the military departments has made progress in managing its respective enterprise architecture program since GAO last reported in 2008. However, each has yet to address key elements, including developing the architecture content, to advance to a level that could be considered mature. For example, while each department has established or is in the process of establishing an executive committee with responsibility and accountability for the enterprise architecture, none has fully developed an enterprise architecture methodology or a well-defined business enterprise architecture and transition plan to guide and constrain business transformation initiatives. (2) DOD continues to establish investment management processes, but neither DOD-level organizations nor the military departments have defined the full range of project-level and portfolio-based IT investment management policies and procedures that are necessary to meet the investment selection and control provisions of the Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996. Specifically, with regard to project-level practices, DOD enterprise, Air Force, and Navy have yet to fully define 56 percent of the practices, and Army has yet to do so for 78 percent of the practices. With regard to the portfolio-level practices, DOD enterprise, Air Force, and Navy have yet to fully define 80 percent and Army has yet to do so for any of the practices. In addition, while DOD largely followed its certification and oversight processes, key steps were not performed. For example, as part of the certification process, DOD performed three process assessments specified in DOD guidance, such as assessing investment alignment with the architecture, but did not validate the results of the assessment, thus increasing the risk that certification decisionmaking was based on inaccurate and unreliable information. It is essential that DOD address GAO's existing recommendations aimed at addressing these long-standing challenges, as doing so is critical to the department's ability to establish the full range of institutional management controls needed to address its business systems modernization high-risk program. Department officials attributed the state of progress in part to the uncertainty and pending decisions surrounding the roles and responsibilities of key organizations and senior leadership positions as well as the lack of resources (i.e., people and funding). Because GAO has existing recommendations that address the long-standing challenges discussed in this report, it is making no further recommendations in these areas.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is recommending that DOD complete the implementation of the reorganization of key organizations. DOD agreed with GAO's recommendation. |
gao_HEHS-95-177 | gao_HEHS-95-177_0 | While OFCCP monitors the employment practices of federal contractors, OFCCP is actually one of several federal agencies responsible for enforcing equal opportunity laws and regulations. OFCCP’s Enforcement Strategy Focuses on Compliance Reviews
In carrying out its mission and responsibilities, OFCCP focuses most of its resources on compliance reviews (see fig. 1). Regardless of the exact nature of the violation, OFCCP’s policy is to work with the contractor to resolve the case rather than to impose sanctions, such as canceling the federal contract. As part of the desk audit, compliance officers compare the representation of women and individual minority groups in the contractor’s workforce with that of the workforces of similar federal contractors in the area, and examine the contractor’s affirmative action plan. 2). Complaint Investigations and Compliance Support Also Provided
Enforcement resources not devoted to compliance reviews are used for complaint investigations and other support activities. OFCCP dedicates about 11 percent of its enforcement hours to investigating specific complaints of employment discrimination. By fiscal year 1994, OFCCP’s budget had decreased by 9 percent in real dollars (see table 2). 3). During this time the number of completed compliance reviews decreased by 33 percent, from 6,232 to 4,179. Because OFCCP aggregates data pertaining to all minority groups in a company during its initial selection stages, rather than focusing on data pertaining to each minority group separately, it could overlook companies that discriminate against one or more particular minority groups. In completing these comparisons, OFCCP combines the data pertaining to all minorities because, according to OFCCP officials, the aggregated data provide a large enough number of observations for a statistically valid analysis. While this imbalance in the racial composition of the contractor’s workforce indicates that the contractor may be discriminating against African Americans, under OFCCP’s current practice of aggregating the data, the contractor may not be identified for a compliance review. Address Correction Requested | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on the Department of Labor's Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs' (OFCCP) oversight of federal contractors' equal employment opportunity (EEO) practices, focusing on: (1) OFCCP fulfillment of its mission and responsibilities; (2) changes in OFCCP resources in recent years; and (3) whether the OFCCP selection procedure for contractor reviews could mask discrimination against specific minority groups.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) OFCCP uses compliance reviews which compare the racial and gender composition of the contractor's workforce with those of similar federal contractors to ensure that federal contractors use nondiscriminatory employment practices; (2) when OFCCP identifies EEO violations during its compliance reviews, it resolves the violations by working with the contractors rather than imposing sanctions on the contractors; (3) OFCCP recommends enforcement proceedings only if the contractor does not correct its EEO violation; (4) OFCCP uses 11 percent and 10 percent, respectively, of its enforcement resources for complaint investigations and compliance support; (5) from 1989 to 1994, OFCCP financial and staff resources decreased 9 percent and 15 percent, respectively, and the number of compliance reviews completed decreased by 33 percent; (6) although OFCCP aggregates data on all minority employees in a given contractor's workforce during the initial selection stage of compliance reviews, it may overlook a contractor's discriminatory practices against one or more particular minority groups; and (7) OFCCP uses aggregate data to identify contractors for compliance reviews because the data produce a large enough number of observations for a statistically valid analysis. |
gao_GAO-14-745 | gao_GAO-14-745_0 | Background
GFOs are officers in the four ranks of brigadier general and above (for the Navy, rear admiral and above). GFO Population Growth Was Generally Consistent with the Growth in Statutory Limits but Was Higher Than Enlisted Personnel Growth, and DOD Has Not Updated GFO Requirements since 2003
The GFO population has experienced higher rates of growth than the enlisted population since fiscal year 2001, but DOD has not comprehensively updated GFO requirements since 2003 to reflect changes in the active duty force. In addition, growth varied across all of the active duty military personnel populations (i.e., GFOs, non-GFO officers, and enlisted personnel), with the most growth experienced by non-GFO officers—officers at or below the rank of colonel/captain. DOD officials stated that there continues to be a need for more GFOs than are authorized by Congress, but added that the department has not comprehensively updated GFO requirements since 2003 or advocated for increased GFO statutory limits because of the recent fiscal constraints faced by the department. 1). Also, 10 U.S.C. Department of Defense, General and Flag Officer Efficiencies Study Group (2011). 2). DOD officials stated that during military drawdowns, population decreases in the officer population tend to lag behind those of the enlisted population and attributed this to the greater flexibility that military planners have to decrease the enlisted population by rotating them out of the active duty force, while officers tend to remain in theater to manage the drawdown effort. Without conducting a comprehensive update of DOD’s GFO requirements—to include identifying, assessing, and validating positions that the department believes should be filled by GFOs; defining the circumstances under which subsequent updates should occur; and assessing whether GFO statutory limits are sufficient to meet GFO requirements—it will be difficult for DOD to ensure that the GFO corps is properly sized and structured. The Full Cost of Active Duty GFOs Is Unknown; Trends in Available Costs Varied
The full cost to DOD for active duty GFOs from fiscal years 2001 through 2013 is unknown because complete cost data for GFOs and their aides were not available. Data for compensation and housing were fully available, and trends for those costs varied from fiscal years 2001 through 2013. Our work found that data availability was affected by reporting practices, retention policies, inconsistent definitions for certain cost elements, and reliability factors. By defining in guidance the officer aide position and GFO and associated aide costs, DOD will be in a better position to help ensure that a consistent approach is employed when estimating GFO and associated aide costs, better account for the full costs of GFOs, and improve its ability to make sound workforce allocation decisions. Availability of GFO and Aide Cost Data Varied
The full cost to DOD for GFOs from fiscal years 2001 through 2013 is unknown because complete cost data for GFOs and their aides were not available. For example, complete cost data related to GFO commercial travel and per diem expenditures were available from the Defense Travel System for fiscal years 2009 through 2013. Cost data needed to calculate enlisted and officer aide compensation costs were also partially complete. As a result, the military services were not able to provide consistent data for these personnel. Some GFO cost data were not readily available or were determined to be unreliable—such as cost data related to GFO travel on military and government flights and cost data associated with providing personal security details to GFOs. Per capita costs grew from $228,129 to $268,187 (18 percent). Trends in Other GFO Costs Varied
Trends in other complete or partially complete GFO costs—such as housing, travel and per diem, and official representation—varied from fiscal years 2001 through 2013. DOD partially concurred with the first recommendation to conduct a comprehensive update for GFO requirements and define the circumstances under which periodic updates should occur. We continue to believe that defining the position of officer aide and requiring the military departments to report on the number of personnel assigned to these positions would improve the availability of cost information associated with the GFO population. However, DOD did not concur with the modified recommendation. As stated in the report, certain costs associated with GFOs—such as security details and officer aides—were unavailable because the cost elements were not defined. To assess what is known about the costs associated with the active duty GFO population and their aides and any trends in such costs from fiscal years 2001 through 2013, including trends in GFO compensation relative to that of other active duty personnel, we identified the relevant DOD, component, and service offices responsible for managing active duty GFOs and enlisted and officer aides, along with related military personnel and operations and maintenance costs, such as compensation, housing, and travel; met with officials at these offices to determine the extent to which data were available; obtained and assessed the reliability of available data; and analyzed available data, when possible. GFO health care. | Why GAO Did This Study
GFOs are the elite leaders of the U.S. military. In August 2013 Congress raised questions about costs associated with GFOs as the size of the military forces decreases.
GAO was mandated to assess the trends in costs of the active duty GFO population from FY 2001 through FY 2013. This report (1) identifies changes in the population and statutory limits for active duty GFOs relative to other active duty personnel, and the extent to which DOD updated GFO requirements, and (2) assesses what is known about the costs associated with active duty GFOs and their aides and trends in such costs, including trends in GFO compensation costs relative to those of other active duty personnel from FY 2001 through FY 2013. GAO assessed the availability of cost data and analyzed available active duty military personnel population and cost data, including costs for compensation, housing and travel for FY 2001 through FY 2013, using FY 2013 dollars. GAO also met with DOD officials.
What GAO Found
The general and flag officer (GFO) population (i.e., officers ranked at or above brigadier general or rear admiral) experienced higher rates of growth than the enlisted population since fiscal year (FY) 2001. The Department of Defense (DOD) has not comprehensively updated GFO requirements—the number of GFOs needed to fill positions—since 2003 to reflect changes in the active duty force nor has DOD defined circumstances under which such an update should occur. GFO population growth was generally consistent with the growth in GFO statutory limits. From FY 2001 through FY 2013 growth was not evenly distributed across all military ranks. For example, the GFO and non-GFO officer populations grew from 871 to 943 (8 percent) and from 216,140 to 237,586 (10 percent), respectively, while the enlisted population decreased from 1,155,344 to 1,131,281 (2 percent). DOD officials attributed these differences to the greater flexibility that military planners have to decrease the enlisted population. DOD guidance requires military personnel requirements to be periodically evaluated. DOD conducted a comprehensive update of GFO requirements in 2003 and concluded that the department needed more GFOs than were authorized by Congress. However, DOD officials said that they have not comprehensively updated the requirements since 2003 or advocated for an increase of GFOs because of fiscal constraints. Nevertheless, without periodically conducting a comprehensive update of DOD's GFO requirements, and defining when such an update should occur, it will be difficult for DOD to help ensure that the GFO population is properly sized and structured to meet its assigned missions.
The full cost to DOD for GFOs from FY 2001 through FY 2013 is unknown because complete cost data for GFOs and their aides were not available and trends in available cost data varied. Certain cost data were fully available and complete for FY 2001 through FY 2013, while other cost data were either partially complete or unavailable because of reporting practices, retention policies, inconsistent definitions, and reliability factors. Also, the position of officer aide is not defined in departmental guidance and as a result all military services were not able to consistently track the number of personnel in these positions. Cost data related to GFO compensation and housing were readily available, and trends for these costs varied, with compensation increasing by 38 percent and housing decreasing by 67 percent from FY 2001 through FY 2013. Measured on a per capita basis, compensation costs grew by 18 percent for GFOs, 19 percent for non-GFO officers, and 32 percent for enlisted personnel over the same time frame. GAO assessed GFO commercial travel and per diem and GFO health care costs as partially complete because data were not available for FY 2001 through FY 2013. For the years in which complete data were available, travel and per diem costs increased by 4 percent from FY 2009 through FY 2013 and health care costs grew by 77 percent from FY 2003 through FY 2013. Other cost data, including data for GFO travel on military and government flights, GFO personal security details, and certain enlisted and officer aide costs, were not readily available or GAO determined them to be unreliable because of concerns regarding completeness or accuracy. By defining the officer aide position and GFO and associated aide costs, DOD will be able to better account for the full costs of GFOs and improve its ability to make sound workforce allocation decisions.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOD update GFO requirements and define circumstances for doing so, improve information related to GFO aides, and define costs associated with GFOs. DOD partially concurred with the recommendations on updating requirements and improving information on GFO aides, and did not concur with defining costs associated with GFOs, citing among other reasons, a need for flexibility and the adequacy of existing information. GAO continues to believe the recommendations are valid, as discussed in the report. |
gao_GAO-01-873 | gao_GAO-01-873_0 | The new capital structure has the potential to address the risks associated with advances and mortgage acquisitions, because of greater capital permanence, leverage capital requirements, and the development of risk- based capital standards. Conclusions
The FHLBank System is currently establishing a new capital structure that, if properly implemented, is likely to be an improvement over the historic structure. Capital will become more permanent and new risk-based and leverage capital requirements will also be implemented. Based on activity to date, direct acquisition appears to provide regional diversification of mortgage acquisitions and incentives to member institutions for sound mortgage underwriting and servicing through the sharing of credit risks. However, risks could be affected if changes are made in the level of mortgage acquisition activity and in the risk-sharing agreements that are currently present between the FHLBanks and their member institutions. Such changes might also increase the importance of risk-based capital requirements compared to FHFB leverage requirements. Going forward, risks in the FHLBank System will increase due to expanded collateral provisions in GLBA and direct mortgage acquisition activity. Effective mitigation of that risk will depend on risk management by the FHLBanks, the adequacy of the capital structure, and oversight by FHFB. In addition to the FHLBanks, the acquisition activity could also generate additional risks for the enterprises. Although currently the FHLBank System and the enterprises primarily engage in different business activities, these differences may decrease if direct mortgage acquisition activity grows dramatically. Having one housing GSE regulator for safety and soundness and mission compliance would provide greater independence and objectivity, greater prominence, improved ability to assess the competitive impact of new initiatives on all housing GSEs, and improved ability to ensure consistency of regulation of GSEs that operate in similar markets. | What GAO Found
The Federal Home Loan Bank (FHLBank) System is establishing a new capital structure that, if properly implemented, is likely to be an improvement over the historic structure. Capital will become more permanent, and new risk-based and leverage capital requirements will also be implemented. The new capital structure has the potential to address the risks associated with advances as well as the direct acquisition of mortgages. However, it is too early to assess the overall adequacy of the structure. So far, direct acquisition appears to provide regional diversification of mortgage acquisitions and incentives to member institutions for sound mortgage underwriting and servicing through the sharing of credit risks. However, risks could be affected if changes are made in the level of mortgage acquisition activity and in the risk-sharing agreements between the FHLBanks and their member institutions. Such changes might also increase the importance of risk-based capital requirements compared to the leverage requirements of the Federal Housing Finance Board (FHFB). Risks in the FHLBank System will increase because of expanded collateral provisions in the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act and direct mortgage acquisition activity. Mitigation of that risk will depend on risk management by the FHLBanks, the adequacy of capital structure, and oversight by FHFB. In addition to the FHLBanks, the acquisition activity could also generate additional risks for the enterprises. Although the FHLBank System and the enterprises primarily engage in different business activities, these differences may decrease if direct mortgage acquisition activity grows dramatically. Having one housing government sponsored enterprise (GSE) regulator for safety and soundness and mission compliance would provide greater independence and objectivity, greater prominence, improved ability to assess the competitive impact of new initiatives on all housing GSEs, and improved ability to ensure consistency of regulation of GSEs that operate in similar markets. |
gao_GAO-10-843 | gao_GAO-10-843_0 | Among other support and services, NWS provides four meteorologists at each of FAA’s 21 en route centers to provide on-site aviation weather services. NWS and FAA Officials Agreed to Improve Services, but This Agreement Is Not Fully Defined
After developing and shelving four different proposals for restructuring the center weather service units over the last 5 years, NWS and FAA have reached agreement on how to improve aviation weather services. Specifically, FAA proposed and NWS agreed to continue the current center weather service units at each of the 21 en route centers through September 2011 and to take immediate steps to improve aviation weather services by (1) having the service units provide forecasts at 10 key FAA terminal radar approach control facilities and (2) providing around-the- clock coverage at all of the en route centers by having the local weather forecast office support the en route centers when the center weather service units are closed for the night—a practice that currently is used at selected en route centers. In addition, the agencies agreed to establish a joint team to baseline current capabilities and develop firm requirements for NWS products and services supporting FAA’s air traffic flow management out through 2015. As a result, it is not clear what will happen to the 21 service units after September 2011, when the immediate improvements in services will be in place, whether there are any costs associated with these steps, whether the benefits outweigh the costs, and who will pay for them. Until this agreement is further defined in writing and formalized between the two agencies, the risks remain that the agencies will misjudge their responsibilities and not fulfill their agreements. Over the past year, NWS has made progress in identifying performance measures, tracking performance on selected measures, and reporting on the selected measures; however, the agency is not yet tracking or reporting on all applicable performance measures. NWS has started tracking performance for three of the seven measures and is partially tracking a fourth. In addition, until NWS regularly reports on its performance, the agencies lack the information they need to determine what is working well and what needs to be improved. NWS and FAA Have Not Fully Addressed Key Challenges
In September 2009, we identified three challenges that FAA and NWS faced in modifying the current aviation weather structure: (1) achieving interagency collaboration, (2) defining requirements, (3) aligning changes with the Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen)—a long- term initiative to increase the efficiency of the national airspace system. The agencies have taken initial steps to collaborate, refine requirements, and look for ways to align their plans with NextGen, but they have not yet fully addressed the challenges. Until these fundamental challenges are addressed, the agencies are unlikely to achieve significant improvements in the aviation weather services provided at en route centers. In July 2010, the two agencies agreed to establish a joint team to develop firm requirements for NWS products and services supporting FAA’s air traffic flow management out to 2015, including those provided by the center weather service units. While this is an important step, significant work remains to be done to revise these requirements. Until NWS has a solid understanding of the current level of performance, it will be limited in its ability to evaluate what progress has been made and whether or not it is achieving its goals. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve the aviation weather products and services provided at FAA’s en route centers, we are making three recommendations to the Secretaries of Commerce and Transportation. Specifically, we recommend that the Secretaries direct the NWS and FAA Administrators to define, document, and sign the agencies’ recent agreements on (1) the locations of the center weather service units, (2) immediate improvements in aviation weather services and operating hours, and (3) the development of an implementation plan for improvements through 2015; ensure that NWS regularly tracks progress, documents performance baselines, and reports on its format consistency, forecast accuracy, and training performance measures; and ensure that NWS develops a reliable customer satisfaction baseline by refining the questions used during annual evaluations, so that comparable information is collected from year to year, and revising the scoring process to ensure that scores accurately reflect each center’s performance. The agency agreed with our recommendations and identified plans to implement selected parts of the recommendations. The Department of Transportation’s Director of Audit Relations provided comments on a draft of this report via e-mail. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to (1) determine the status of the agencies’ efforts to restructure aviation weather services and products, (2) assess the agencies’ progress in establishing performance baselines in order to measure the effect of any changes, and (3) evaluate plans to address key challenges. | Why GAO Did This Study
The National Weather Service's (NWS) weather products are a vital component of the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) air traffic control system. In addition to providing aviation weather products developed at its own facilities, NWS also provides on-site staff at each of FAA's en route centers--the facilities that control high-altitude flight outside the airport tower and terminal areas. NWS's on-site staff is called a center weather service unit. For several years, NWS and FAA have been exploring options for improving the aviation weather services provided at en route centers. GAO agreed to (1) determine the status of the agencies' efforts to restructure aviation weather services, (2) assess the agencies' progress in establishing performance baselines in order to measure the effect of any changes, and (3) evaluate plans to address key challenges. To do so, GAO evaluated agency progress and plans and compared agency efforts with leading practices.
What GAO Found
After developing and shelving four proposals for restructuring the center weather service units over the last 5 years, in July 2010, senior NWS and FAA officials agreed to continue the current center weather service units at each of the 21 en route centers through September 2011 and to take immediate steps to improve aviation weather services by (1) having the service units provide forecasts for 10 key FAA terminal radar facilities and (2) having nearby weather forecast offices support FAA's en route centers when the service units are closed for the night. In addition, the agencies agreed to establish a joint team to baseline current capabilities and develop firm requirements for aviation weather services supporting air traffic flow management. While this agreement is important, the details have not been fully defined. Thus, it is not yet clear what will happen to the 21 service units after September 2011, when the immediate improvements in services will be in place, whether there are any costs associated with these steps, and who will pay for them. Until the two agencies further define their plans, the risk remains that the agencies will misjudge their responsibilities and not fulfill their agreements. FAA and NWS have made progress in identifying performance measures for the weather service units located at FAA en route centers, and NWS is beginning to track its service units' performance. However, NWS has not yet tracked, established baselines for, and reported to FAA on all applicable performance measures. Specifically, of seven possible performance measures, NWS is tracking performance for three of the measures and partially tracking a fourth measure. Of these four measures, the agency has established a sound baseline and reported on two of these measures and has made partial progress on two others. The agency is not tracking performance, documenting baselines, or reporting on three of the measures because it has not yet determined how to track them. Without an understanding of the current level of performance of the identified measures, the agencies will be limited in their ability to evaluate what progress has been made. In addition, until NWS regularly reports on its performance, the agencies lack the information they need to determine what is working well and what needs to be improved. In September 2009, GAO identified three challenges in modifying NWS's aviation weather services provided at FAA's en route centers: achieving interagency collaboration, defining requirements, and aligning changes with the Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen)--a long-term initiative to increase the efficiency of the national airspace system. The agencies have not yet fully addressed these challenges. Specifically, while senior agency officials recently agreed on how to proceed, work remains to be done to refine requirements, develop and execute an implementation plan, and to ensure that improvements are aligned with the long-term vision for NextGen. Until these fundamental challenges are addressed, the agencies are unlikely to achieve significant improvements in the aviation weather services provided at en route centers.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the Departments of Commerce and Transportation define their agreements, refine performance management processes, and address key challenges. In commenting on a draft of this report, Commerce agreed with GAO's recommendations and identified plans to address them; Transportation agreed to consider the recommendations. |
gao_GAO-10-579 | gao_GAO-10-579_0 | VA Ended the Outpatient Scheduling System Project without Delivering Expected Capabilities and Has Begun a New Initiative
After spending an estimated $127 million over 9 years (from fiscal years 2001 through 2009) on its outpatient scheduling system project, VA has not yet implemented any of the system’s expected capabilities. According to the department, of the total amount, $62 million was expended for, among other things, project planning, management support, a development environment, and equipment. In addition, the department paid an estimated $65 million to SwRI to develop the replacement scheduling application. However, VA and SwRI were not able to resolve a large number of system defects, and the department terminated the contract in February 2009. Subsequently, the department determined that the application was not viable (i.e., did not meet its needs), and officially ended the Scheduling Replacement Project on September 30, 2009. The department began a new initiative on October 1, 2009, which it refers to as HealtheVet Scheduling. However, the Scheduling Replacement Project had weaknesses in these areas that, if not addressed, could derail the department’s current attempt to deliver a new scheduling system. As a result, VA increased the risk that it was not selecting a contractor that would provide the best approach. VA Did Not Ensure Requirements Were Complete and Sufficiently Detailed to Guide Development of the Scheduling System
According to recognized guidance, using disciplined processes for defining and managing requirements can help reduce the risks of developing a system that does not meet user needs, cannot be adequately tested, and does not perform or function as intended. In discussing this matter, the former program manager stated that the Scheduling Replacement Project complied with the department’s EVM policies, but noted that the department performed EVM for the scheduling project only to fulfill the OMB requirement and that the data were not used as the basis for decision making because doing so was not a part of the department’s culture. However, while the department had established a process for managing risks to the scheduling project, it did not have a comprehensive list of risks because it did not take key project risks into account. That review identified issues, including significant critical defects in the application and a lapse in a contract to resolve defects. Impact of Scheduling Replacement Project Failure on HealtheVet Program is Uncertain
While the Scheduling Replacement Project was one of many components of VA’s HealtheVet initiative, the impact of the project’s termination on the initiative is currently unclear. According to officials in VA’s Office of Information and Technology, the department plans to document the interdependencies, project milestones, and deliverables in an integrated master schedule as part of a project management plan that is expected to be completed by June 2010. Finally, while the scheduling system project was to result in the first component of VA’s larger HealtheVet initiative to modernize the department’s health information system, the specific impact of the project’s failure on this initiative is unclear because HealtheVet plans have not been completed. Recommendations for Executive Action
To enhance VA’s effort to successfully fulfill its forthcoming plans for the outpatient scheduling system replacement project and the HealtheVet program, we recommend that the Secretary of Veterans Affairs direct the CIO to make certain the following six actions are taken: Ensure acquisition plans document how competition will be sought, promoted, and sustained or identify the basis of authority for not using full and open competition. Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
The VA Chief of Staff provided written comments on a draft of this report. In its comments, the department generally agreed with our conclusions, concurred with five of our six recommendations, and described actions to address them. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of our study were to (1) determine the status of the Scheduling Replacement Project, (2) determine the effectiveness of the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) management and oversight of the project, and (3) assess the impact of the project on VA’s overall implementation of its health information system modernization initiative— HealtheVet. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) provides medical care, disability compensation, and vocational rehabilitation to veterans. The Veterans Health Administration (VHA)--a component of VA--provides care to over 5 million patients in more than 1,500 facilities. VHA relies on an outpatient scheduling system that is over 25 years old. In 2000, VHA began the Scheduling Replacement Project to modernize this system as part of a larger departmentwide modernization effort called HealtheVet. However, in February 2009, VA terminated a key contract supporting the project. GAO was asked to (1) determine the status of the Scheduling Replacement Project, (2) determine the effectiveness of VA's management and oversight of the project, and (3) assess the impact of the project on VA's overall implementation of its HealtheVet initiative. To do so, GAO reviewed project documentation and interviewed VA and contractor officials.
What GAO Found
After spending an estimated $127 million over 9 years on its outpatient scheduling system project, VA has not implemented any of the planned system's capabilities and is essentially starting over. Of the total amount, $62 million was expended for, among other things, project planning, management support, a development environment, and equipment. In addition, the department paid an estimated $65 million to the contractor selected to develop the replacement scheduling application. However, the application software had a large number of defects that VA and the contractor could not resolve. As a result, the department terminated the contract, determined that the system could not be deployed, and officially ended the Scheduling Replacement Project on September 30, 2009. VA began a new initiative that it refers to as HealtheVet Scheduling on October 1, 2009. As of April 2010, the department's efforts on this new initiative had largely consisted of evaluating whether to buy or custom build a new scheduling application. VA's efforts to successfully complete the Scheduling Replacement Project were hindered by weaknesses in several key project management disciplines and a lack of effective oversight that, if not addressed, could undermine the department's second effort to replace its scheduling system: (1) VA did not adequately plan its acquisition of the scheduling application and did not obtain the benefits of competition. (2) VA did not ensure requirements were complete and sufficiently detailed to guide development of the scheduling system. (3) VA performed system tests concurrently, increasing the risk that the system would not perform as intended, and did not always follow its own guidance, leading to software passing through the testing process with unaddressed critical defects. (4) VA's project progress and status reports were not reliable, and included data that provided inconsistent views of project performance. (5) VA did not effectively identify, mitigate, and communicate project risks due to, among other things, staff members' reluctance to raise issues to the department's leadership. (6) VA's various oversight boards had responsibility for overseeing the Scheduling Replacement Project; however, they did not take corrective actions despite the department becoming aware of significant issues. The impact of the scheduling project on the HealtheVet initiative cannot yet be determined because VA has not developed a comprehensive plan for HealtheVet that, among other things, documents the dependencies among the projects that comprise the initiative. VA officials stated that the department plans to document the interdependencies, project milestones, and deliverables in an integrated master schedule as part of a project management plan that is expected to be completed by June 2010. In the absence of such a plan, the impact of the scheduling project's failure on the HealtheVet program is uncertain. Secretary of Veterans Affairs direct the Chief Information Officer to take six actions to improve key processes, including acquisition management, system testing, and progress reporting, which are essential to the department's second outpatient scheduling system effort. In written comments on a draft of this report, VA generally concurred with GAO's recommendations and described actions to address them. |
gao_GAO-08-248T | gao_GAO-08-248T_0 | About One-Fourth of Public Employees Are Not Covered by Social Security
About one-fourth of public employees do not pay Social Security taxes on the earnings from their government jobs. Initially, public employers could opt in and out of the Social Security program under these provisions. Current Provisions Seek Fairness but Pose Administrative Challenges
Even though noncovered employees may have many years of earnings on which they do not pay Social Security taxes, they can still be eligible for Social Security benefits based on their spouses’ or their own earnings in covered employment. To address the fairness issues that arise with noncovered public employees, the Congress has enacted two provisions: (1) the Government Pension Offset (GPO) regarding spouse and survivor benefits, and (2) the Windfall Elimination Provision (WEP) regarding retired worker benefits. The resulting disparity in the application of these two provisions is yet another source of unfairness in the calculation of Social Security benefits for public employees. Provisions Cause Confusion and Frustration
The GPO and the WEP have been a continuing source of confusion and frustration for the more than 7.3 million government workers affected. Critics of the measures contend that the provisions are basically inaccurate and often unfair. Some Social Security Proposals Would Affect Public Employees
In recent years, various proposals to change Social Security have been offered that would affect public employees. According to Social Security actuaries’ 2005 estimate, requiring all newly hired state and local government employees to begin paying into the system would reduce the 75-year actuarial deficit by about 11 percent. There is an element of unfairness in a situation where practically all contribute to Social Security, while a few benefit both directly and indirectly but are excused from contributing to the program.”
Another advantage of mandatory Social Security coverage is that it could improve benefits for the affected workers, but it could also increase pension costs for state and local governments. Also, the GPO and the WEP would no longer apply and so could be phased out over time. Conclusions
In conclusion, there are no easy answers to the difficulties of equalizing Social Security’s treatment of covered and noncovered workers. Mandating universal coverage would promise eventual elimination of the GPO and the WEP, but at potentially significant cost to affected state and local governments, and even so, the GPO and the WEP would continue to apply for many years to come unless they were repealed. As long as the GPO and the WEP remain in effect, it will be important to administer the provisions as effectively and equitably as possible. SSA has found it difficult to administer these provisions because they depend on complete and accurate reporting of government pension income, which is not currently available. Social Security: Coverage of Public Employees and Implications for Reform. Social Security: Implications of Extending Mandatory Coverage to State and Local Employees. | Why GAO Did This Study
Social Security covers about 96 percent of all U.S. workers; the vast majority of the remaining 4 percent are public employees. Although these noncovered workers do not pay Social Security taxes on their government earnings, they may still be eligible for Social Security benefits through their spouses' or their own earnings from other covered employment. Social Security has provisions--the Government Pension Offset (GPO) and the Windfall Elimination Provision (WEP)--that attempt to take noncovered employment into account when calculating the Social Security benefits for public employees. However, these provisions have been difficult to administer and critics contend that the provisions themselves are often unfair. The Committee asked GAO to discuss the issues regarding the coverage of public employees under Social Security, the provisions to take noncovered employment into account, and the proposals to modify those provisions.
What GAO Found
There are no easy answers to the difficulties of equalizing Social Security's treatment of covered workers and noncovered public employees. About one-fourth of public employees--primarily state and local government workers--are not covered by Social Security and do not pay Social Security taxes on their government earnings. Nevertheless, these workers may still be eligible for Social Security benefits through their spouses' or their own earnings from other covered employment. To address concerns with how noncovered workers are treated compared with covered workers, Social Security has provisions in place to take noncovered employment into account and reduce Social Security benefits for public employees. To be administered fairly and accurately, both these provisions require complete and accurate reporting of government pension income, which is not currently available. The resulting disparity in the application of the provisions is a continuing source of confusion and frustration for affected workers. Thus, various changes that would affect the GPO and WEP provisions have been proposed, such as: eliminate the GPO and WEP provisions. This would simplify administration and avoid concerns about unfair treatment among public employees. However, any reductions in the GPO or the WEP would widen Social Security's financial gap and would raise concerns about unfair treatment of public employees compared with other workers. Extend mandatory coverage. If all newly hired state and local government employees who are not currently covered were to become covered, the need for the GPO and WEP could be phased out over time. In 2005, Social Security actuaries estimated that mandating coverage for these employees would reduce the 75-year actuarial deficit by about 11 percent. While mandatory coverage could enhance retirement benefits for the affected workers, it could also result in significant costs to the affected state and local governments. As long as the GPO and the WEP remain in effect, it will be important to administer the provisions effectively and equitably based on accurate and complete information on both covered and noncovered employment. |
gao_GAO-10-1063T | gao_GAO-10-1063T_0 | FEMA, which is within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), is responsible for the oversight and management of NFIP. NFIP’s Financial Challenges Have Increased the Federal Government’s and U.S. Taxpayers’ Financial Exposure from Flood Losses
By design, NFIP is not an actuarially sound program, in part because it does not operate like many private insurance companies. As of August 2010, NFIP owed approximately $18.8 billion to Treasury, primarily as a result of loans that the program received to pay claims from the 2005 hurricane season. For example, FEMA cannot deny insurance on the basis of frequent losses. For example, as we have pointed out in previous reports, NFIP provides subsidized and grandfathered rates that do not reflect the full risk of potential flood losses to some property owners, operates in part with unreliable and incomplete data on flood risks that make it difficult to set accurate rates, and has not been able to overcome the challenge of repetitive loss properties. Not accurately reflecting the actual risk of flooding increases the risk that full-risk premiums may not be sufficient to cover future losses and add to concerns about NFIP’s financial stability. Despite Its Financial Challenges, NFIP Has Experienced Some Positive Developments
According to FEMA, expanded marketing efforts through its FloodSmart campaign have contributed to an increase in NFIP policies. This increase, combined with a relatively low loss experience in recent years, has enabled FEMA to make nearly $600 million in payments to Treasury with no additional borrowing since March 2009. While these are all encouraging developments, FEMA is still unlikely to ever pay off its current $18.8 billion debt. FEMA’s Operational and Management Issues May Further Limit Progress in Achieving NFIP Goals
We have identified a number of operational issues that affect NFIP, including weaknesses in FEMA’s oversight of WYO insurers, and shortcomings in its oversight of other contractors, as well as new issues from ongoing work. For example, we found that FEMA does not systematically consider actual flood insurance expense information when determining the amount it pays WYO insurers for selling and servicing flood insurance policies and adjusting claims. FEMA’s Oversight of Non- WYO Contractor Activities Is Also Lacking
Also in a previous report, we pointed out that FEMA lacked records of monitoring activities for other contractors, inconsistently followed its procedures for monitoring these contractors, and did not coordinate contract monitoring responsibilities for the two major contracts we reviewed. FEMA Continues to Lack an Effective System to Manage Flood Insurance Policy and Claims Data
To manage the flood policy and claims information that it obtains from insurance companies, NFIP’s Bureau and Statistical Agent (BSA) relies on a flood insurance management system from the 1980s that is difficult and costly to sustain and that does not adequately support NFIP’s mission needs. As part of our ongoing review of FEMA’s management of NFIP, we found that despite having invested roughly $40 million over 7 years, FEMA has yet to implement NextGen. Addressing NFIP’s Challenges Would Require Actions from FEMA and Congress
To address the challenges NFIP faces, FEMA would have to address its own operational and management challenges. For example, if Congress wants to structure NFIP as an insurance company and limit borrowing from Treasury in future high- or catastrophic loss years, NFIP would have to build a capital surplus fund. Premium Rates Could Be Made More Reflective of Flood Risk
Making premium rates more reflective of flood risk would require actions by FEMA and Congress. However, these options involve trade-offs. However, one option to maintain the subsidies but improve NFIP’s financial stability would be to rate all policies at the full-risk rate and to appropriate subsidies for qualified policyholders. FEMA Could Take Further Actions to Help Address Operational and Management Challenges
Over the last several years we have made many recommendations for actions that FEMA could take to improve its management of NFIP. For example, we have recommended that FEMA: Address challenges to oversight of the WYO program, specifically the lack of transparency of and accountability for the payments FEMA makes to WYO insurers, by determining in advance the amounts built into the payment rates for estimated expenses and profit, annually analyzing the amounts of actual expenses and profit in relation to the estimated amounts used in setting payment rates, and by immediately reassessing the practice of paying WYO insurers an additional 1 percent of written premiums for operating expenses. Take steps to better oversee WYO insurers and ensure that they are in compliance with statutory requirements for NFIP and that taxpayers’ funds are spent appropriately by consistently following the Financial Control Plan and ensuring that each component is implemented; ensuring that any revised Financial Control Plan covers oversight of all functions of participating WYO insurers, including customer service and litigation expenses; systematically tracking insurance companies’ compliance with and performance under each component of the Financial Control Plan; and ensuring centralized access to all audits, reviews, and data analyses performed for each WYO insurer under the Financial Control Plan. Closing Comments
FEMA faces a number of ongoing challenges in managing and administering NFIP that, if not addressed, will continue to work against improving the program’s long-term financial condition. As we noted when placing NFIP on the high-risk list in 2006, comprehensive reform will likely be needed to address the financial challenges facing the program. This statement was prepared under the direction of Patrick Ward. Federal Emergency Management Agency: Ongoing Challenges Facing the National Flood Insurance Program. | Why GAO Did This Study
The National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP), established in 1968, provides policyholders with insurance coverage for flood damage. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) within the Department of Homeland Security is responsible for managing NFIP. Unprecedented losses from the 2005 hurricane season and NFIP's periodic need to borrow from the U.S. Treasury to pay flood insurance claims have raised concerns about the program's long-term financial solvency. Because of these concerns and NFIP's operational issues, NFIP has been on GAO's high-risk list since March 2006. As of August 2010, NFIP's debt to Treasury stood at $18.8 billion. This testimony discusses (1) NFIP's financial challenges, (2) FEMA's operational and management challenges, and (3) actions needed to address these challenges. In preparing this statement, GAO relied on its past work on NFIP and GAO's ongoing review of FEMA's management of NFIP, particularly data management and contractor oversight issues.
What GAO Found
While Congress and FEMA intended that NFIP be funded with premiums collected from policyholders rather than with tax dollars, the program is, by design, not actuarially sound. NFIP cannot do some of the things that private insurers do to manage their risks. For example, NFIP is not structured to build a capital surplus, is likely unable to purchase reinsurance to cover catastrophic losses, cannot reject high-risk applicants, and is subject to statutory limits on rate increases. In addition, its premium rates do not reflect actual flood risk. For example, nearly one in four property owners pay subsidized rates, "full-risk" rates may not reflect the full risk of flooding, and NFIP allows "grandfathered" rates that allow some property owners to continue paying rates that do not reflect reassessments of their properties' flood risk. Further, NFIP cannot deny insurance on the basis of frequent losses and thus provides policies for repetitive loss properties, which represent only 1 percent of policies but account for 25 to 30 percent of claims. NFIP's financial condition has improved slightly due to an increase in the number of policyholders and moderate flood losses, and since March 2009, FEMA has taken some encouraging steps toward improving its financial position, including making $600 million in payments to Treasury without increasing its borrowings. However, it is unlikely to pay off its full $18.8 billion debt, especially if it faces catastrophic loss years. Operational and management issues may also limit efforts to address NFIP's financial challenges and meet program goals. Payments to write-your-own (WYO) insurers, which are key to NFIP operations, represent one-third to two-thirds of the premiums collected. But FEMA does not systematically consider actual flood insurance expense information when calculating these payments and has not aligned its WYO bonus structure with NFIP goals or implemented all of its financial controls for the WYO program. GAO also found that FEMA did not consistently follow its procedures for monitoring non-WYO contractors or coordinate contract monitoring responsibilities among departments on some contracts. Some contract monitoring records were missing, and no system was in place that would allow departments to share information on contractor deficiencies. In ongoing GAO work examining FEMA's management of NFIP, some similar issues are emerging. For example, FEMA still lacks an effective system to manage flood insurance policy and claims data, despite investing roughly 7 years and $40 million on a new system whose development has been halted. However, FEMA has begun to acknowledge its management challenges and develop a plan of action. Addressing the financial challenges facing NFIP would likely require actions by both FEMA and Congress that involve trade-offs, and the challenges could be difficult to remedy. For example, reducing subsidies could increase collected premiums but reduce program participation. At the same time, FEMA must address its operational and management issues. GAO has recommended a number of actions that FEMA could take to improve NFIP operations, and ongoing work will likely identify additional issues. In past work, GAO recommended, among other things, that FEMA take steps to help ensure that premium rates are more reflective of flood risks; strengthen its oversight of NFIP and insurance companies responsible for selling and servicing flood policies; and strengthen its internal controls and data quality. |
gao_GAO-14-809T | gao_GAO-14-809T_0 | We found that while views varied among market participants with whom we spoke, many believed that recent regulatory reforms have reduced but not eliminated the likelihood the federal government would prevent the failure of one of the largest bank holding companies. Credit rating agencies and large investors cited the new Orderly Liquidation Authority, which gives the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation new authority to resolve large financial firms outside of the bankruptcy process, as a key factor influencing their views. While several large investors viewed the resolution process as credible, others cited potential challenges, such as the risk that multiple failures of large firms could destabilize markets. Remaining market expectations of government support can benefit large bank holding companies to the extent that these expectations affect decisions by investors, counterparties, and customers of these firms. Analysis of Funding Cost Differences between Large and Small Banks
We analyzed the relationship between a bank holding company’s size and its funding costs, taking into account a broad set of other factors that can influence funding costs. To inform this analysis and to understand the breadth of methodological approaches and results, we reviewed selected studies that estimated funding cost differences between large and small financial institutions that could be associated with the perception that some institutions are too big to fail. Studies we reviewed generally found that the largest financial institutions had lower funding costs during the 2007-2009 financial crisis but that the difference between the funding costs of the largest and smaller institutions has since declined. However, these empirical analyses contain a number of limitations that could reduce their validity or applicability to U.S. bank holding companies. For example, some studies used credit ratings, which provide only an indirect measure of funding costs. Our analysis, which addresses some limitations of these studies, suggests that large bank holding companies had lower funding costs than smaller ones during the financial crisis but provides mixed evidence of such advantages in recent years. However, most models suggest that such advantages may have declined or reversed. These models estimate the relationship between bank holding companies’ bond funding costs and their size, while also controlling for other drivers of bond funding costs, such as bank holding company credit risk. Key features of our approach include the following:
U.S. bank holding companies. To better understand the relationship between bank holding company funding costs and size in the context of the U.S. economic and regulatory environment, we only analyzed U.S. bank holding companies. We used bond yield spreads—the difference between the yield or rate of return on a bond and the yield on a Treasury bond of comparable maturity—as our measure of bank holding company funding costs because they are a direct measure of what investors charge bank holding companies to borrow money and because they are sensitive to credit risk and hence expected government support. Furthermore, as we have noted, many market participants we spoke with believe that recent regulatory reforms have reduced but not eliminated the perception of “too big to fail” and both they and Treasury officials indicated that additional steps were required to address “too big to fail.”As discussed, changes over time in our estimates of the relationship between bond funding costs and size may reflect changes in one or more components of investors’ beliefs about government support—such as their views on the likelihood that a bank holding company will fail and the likelihood it will be rescued if it fails—but we cannot precisely identify the influence of each factor with certainty. | Why GAO Did This Study
This testimony summarizes the information contained in GAO's Month Year report, entitled Large Bank Holding Companies: Expectations of Government Support, GAO-14-621 .
What GAO Found
While views varied among market participants with whom GAO spoke, many believed that recent regulatory reforms have reduced but not eliminated the likelihood the federal government would prevent the failure of one of the largest bank holding companies. Recent reforms provide regulators with new authority to resolve a large failing bank holding company in an orderly process and require the largest bank holding companies to meet stricter capital and other standards, increasing costs and reducing risks for these firms. In response to reforms, two of three major rating agencies reduced or removed the assumed government support they incorporated into some large bank holding companies’ overall credit ratings. Credit rating agencies and large investors cited the new Orderly Liquidation Authority as a key factor influencing their views. While several large investors viewed the resolution process as credible, others cited potential challenges, such as the risk that multiple failures of large firms could destabilize markets. Remaining market expectations of government support can benefit large bank holding companies if they affect investors’ and customers’ decisions.
GAO analyzed the relationship between a bank holding company’s size and its funding costs, taking into account a broad set of other factors that can influence funding costs. To inform this analysis and to understand the breadth of methodological approaches and results, GAO reviewed selected studies that estimated funding cost differences between large and small financial institutions that could be associated with the perception that some institutions are too big to fail. Studies GAO reviewed generally found that the largest financial institutions had lower funding costs during the 2007-2009 financial crisis but that the difference between the funding costs of the largest and smaller institutions has since declined. However, these empirical analyses contain a number of limitations that could reduce their validity or applicability to U.S. bank holding companies. For example, some studies used credit ratings which provide only an indirect measure of funding costs.
GAO’s analysis, which addresses some limitations of these studies, suggests that large bank holding companies had lower funding costs than smaller ones during the financial crisis but provides mixed evidence of such advantages in recent years. However, most models suggest that such advantages may have declined or reversed. GAO developed a series of statistical models that estimate the relationship between bank holding companies’ bond funding costs and their size or systemic importance, controlling for other drivers of bond funding costs, such as bank holding company credit risk. Key features of GAO’s approach include the following:
• U.S. Bank Holding Companies: The models focused on U.S. bank holding companies to better understand the relationship between funding costs and size in the context of the U.S. economic and regulatory environment.
• Bond Funding Costs: The models used bond yield spreads—the difference between the yield or rate of return on a bond and the yield on a Treasury bond of comparable maturity—to measure funding costs because they are a risk-sensitive measure of what investors charge bank holding companies to borrow. |
gao_GAO-06-495 | gao_GAO-06-495_0 | In addition, Internet resellers also offered to sell information in various ways, from packaged information, such as various information that would be collected through a background check or a search of a person’s criminal records to single types of information, such as a credit score. As shown in table 3, individuals, businesses, and attorneys were the most frequently identified clients. For the financial institution clients, resellers mostly identified banks. Most of these resellers obtained their information from public or nonpublic sources or a combination of both sources. However, in one case we received unexpected and unrequested information. We received one full nine-digit SSN and four truncated SSNs. We also found a wide range of the costs for information services when we tried to purchase SSNs. All resellers that provided truncated SSNs showed the first five digits and masked the last four digits. One consumer reporting agency we spoke to told us that it truncates the SSN by masking the first five digits on reports it provides directly to consumers, by displaying only the last four digits. According to SSA officials, the law does not address the use of the number by private and public sector entities. Therefore, we could not determine if FCRA, GLBA, and DPPA were applicable to the majority of resellers we reviewed. We also found 5 out of the 154 Internet resellers referenced state laws on their Web sites. Matter for Congressional Consideration
Since there is no consistently practiced method for truncating SSNs, and no federal agency has the authority to regulate how SSNs should be truncated, Congress may wish to consider enacting standards for truncating SSNs or delegating authority to SSA or some other governmental entity to issue standards for truncating SSNs. To describe the types of readily identifiable Internet resellers that have SSN-related services and characteristics of their businesses, we developed a Web-based data collection instrument (DCI) for GAO analysts to document selected information contained on the Internet resellers’ Web sites. Our analyses found 154 Internet resellers with SSN-related services. The criteria we used to select the resellers for our attempted purchases included the following (1) the Web site advertised the sale of an SSN without the customer’s having to provide the SSN of the subject of our inquiry, (2) the Web site advertised the sale of an SSN to the general public, and (3) the transaction could be made online through the Internet reseller’s Web site using a credit card. To determine the applicability of federal privacy laws to Internet resellers, we reviewed federal laws and the resellers’ Web sites for information about the resellers’ type of entity and sources of information. Although Internet resellers generally did not provide information about the entity and sources of information, they generally cited, and we recorded, whether they stated adherence to any federal privacy laws. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO previously reported on how large information resellers like consumer reporting agencies obtain and use Social Security numbers (SSNs). Less is known about information resellers that offer services to the general public over the Internet. Because these resellers provide access to personal information, SSNs could be obtained over the Internet. GAO was asked to examine (1) the types of readily identifiable Internet resellers that have SSN-related services and characteristics of their businesses, (2) the extent to which these resellers sell SSNs, and (3) the applicability of federal privacy laws to Internet resellers.
What GAO Found
We found 154 Internet information resellers with SSN-related services. Most of these resellers offered a range of personal information, such as dates of birth, drivers' license information, and telephone records. Many offered this information in packages, such as background checks and criminal checks. Most resellers also frequently identified individuals, businesses, attorneys, and financial institutions as their typical clients, and public or nonpublic sources, or both as their sources of information. In attempting to purchase SSNs from 21 of the 53 resellers advertising the sale of such information, we received 1 full SSN, 4 truncated SSNs displaying only the first five digits, and no SSNs from the remaining 16. In one case, we also received additional unrequested personal information including truncated SSNs of the search subject's neighbors. We also found that some other entities truncate SSNs by displaying the last four digits. According to experts we spoke to, there are few federal laws and no specific industry standards on whether to display the first five or last four digits of the SSN, and SSA officials told us the agency does not have the authority to regulate how other public or private entities use SSNs, including how they are truncated. We could not determine if federal privacy laws were applicable to the Internet resellers because such laws depend on the type of entity and the source of information, and most of the resellers' Web sites did not include this information. However, these laws could apply to resellers; 4 of the resellers we examined had Web sites identifying the type of entity they were. About one-half of the resellers cited adherence to one or more federal privacy laws and a few referenced state laws. |
gao_GAO-01-971 | gao_GAO-01-971_0 | To enable DOD to close unneeded bases and realign others, Congress enacted base closure and realignment (BRAC) legislation that instituted base closure rounds in 1988, 1991, 1993, and 1995. BRAC has afforded DOD the opportunity to reduce its infrastructure and free funds for high priority programs such as weapons modernization and force readiness. In preparing the estimates, DOD guidance to the military services and defense agencies states that the estimates are to be based on the best projection of what savings will actually accrue from approved realignments and closures. DOD now estimates a net savings of about $15.5 billion through fiscal year 2001, an increase of $1.3 billion from the previously reported $14.2 billion. Overall, DOD has reduced its cost estimates from fiscal year 1999 to fiscal year 2001 for implementing BRAC by about $723 million and increased its savings estimates by about $610 million, resulting in a net savings increase of $1.3 billion. Table 1 summarizes the cumulative cost and savings estimates through fiscal year 2001 for the four BRAC rounds as reflected in DOD's fiscal years 1999 and 2001 BRAC budget requests and documentation, along with associated changes in the various costs and savings categories. In addition to the estimates shown in table 1, DOD now reports annual estimated recurring savings of $6.1 billion beyond fiscal year 2001, an increase from approximately $5.6 billion that DOD reported in fiscal year 1999. Our analysis of the data shows that most, or about $313 million, of the environmental cost reduction occurred in the Navy BRAC account. Observations on Basis and Precision of BRAC Cost and Savings Estimates
Our prior work, along with work by others including the Congressional Budget Office, the DOD Inspector General, and the Army Audit Agency, has shown that BRAC savings are real and substantial, and are related to cost reductions in key operational areas as a result of BRAC actions. Nevertheless, we and others have consistently expressed the view that these factors are not significant enough to outweigh the fact that substantial savings are being generated from the closure process. In reports issued in November and December 1998, we concluded that, while closure and realignment savings for the four BRAC rounds would be substantial after initial costs were recouped, the estimates were imprecise. | Why GAO Did This Study
Through four rounds of base closures and realignments between 1988 and 1995, the Department of Defense (DOD) expected to reduce its domestic infrastructure and provide needed dollars for high priority programs, such as weapons modernization. Although DOD projects it will realize significant recurring savings from the closures and realignments, Congress continues to raise questions about how much, if any, money has been saved through the base closure process. Two GAO reports issued in late 1998 concluded that net savings from the four closure rounds were substantial but that the cost and savings estimates used to calculate the net savings were imprecise. This report reviews (1) the basis for DOD's recent increase in net savings projected to be realized from the closure process and (2) GAO's previous observations on the basis for savings from base closure and realignment actions and the precision of the cost and savings estimates.
What GAO Found
DOD's fiscal year 2001 budget request and documentation show that it now expects net savings of about $15.5 billion through fiscal year 2001 and about $6.1 billion in annual recurring savings thereafter, an increase from the $14.2 billion and about $5.6 billion, respectively, DOD reported in fiscal year 1999. GAO's analysis of the data showed that the net savings increase through fiscal year 2001 was due primarily to an overall reduction of about $723 million in reported costs and an increase of about $610 million in expected savings resulting from the closures. The net savings for the four rounds of base closures and realignments are substantial and are related to decreased funding requirements in specific operational areas. Reviews by the Congressional Budget Office, the DOD Inspector General, and the Army Audit Agency have affirmed that net savings are substantial after initial investment costs are recouped. However, those same reviews also showed that the estimates are imprecise and should be viewed as a rough approximation of the likely savings. |
gao_GAO-16-727 | gao_GAO-16-727_0 | Background
The United States has made commitments related to its procurement market under the WTO’s GPA, in its various forms, and through FTAs negotiated with other countries. Almost all of the FTAs that the United States has in force include provisions covering government procurement, and most contain a separate government procurement chapter that, like the GPA, contains market access commitments that include coverage schedules and threshold amounts for procurement activities to which the agreement applies. Selected International Government Procurement Agreements Generally Contain Similar Provisions
Our review of government procurement commitments in agreements between the United States and selected trading partners found that, in general, the text in these agreements contained similar provisions. We also found that some differences exist, for example because later agreements have reflected new technology. 1). For the GPAs, this reflects another of the six fundamental WTO principles, “nondiscrimination.” The text of each of these agreements contains versions of the following provision, taken here from the 1994 GPA: “With respect to all laws, regulations, procedures and practices regarding government procurement covered by this Agreement, each Party shall provide immediately and unconditionally to the products, services and suppliers of other Parties offering products or services of the Parties, treatment no less favourable than that accorded to domestic products, services and suppliers; and that accorded to products, services and suppliers of any other Party.” While there are some differences, this type of provision in each of the selected agreements speaks to a party treating the suppliers and goods of another party no less favorably than it treats domestic suppliers and goods. GPA and FTA parties do not open their entire procurement markets to foreign competition. These market access commitments identify the procuring entities covered by the agreements at the central and subcentral government levels and, in some agreements, by what is termed “other entities,” such as utilities. According to USTR officials, all parties in the agreements we reviewed, including the United States, have certain procurements that they deem sensitive and do not want to open to foreign suppliers, including for social, policy, or national security reasons. These officials stated that, for example, the United States specifies exclusions that include set-asides for small or minority businesses, and trading partners often exclude defense, agriculture, military support, and motor vehicles from their market access commitments. As for central government entity coverage for the U.S.’s trading partners in the agreements we reviewed, the top five GPA parties with the largest procurement markets (the EU, South Korea, Canada, Norway, and Japan) can cover executive, judicial, and legislative central government entities in their coverage schedules for the revised GPA. (See fig. 2.) Other countries give U.S. suppliers access to their subcentral government procurement as well. The United States covers the same 10 other government entities under the 1994 GPA and in the revised GPA; while under the FTAs we reviewed, the United States only covers some of these entities. Agency Comments
We provided a draft of this report to the USTR and the Department of Commerce for comment. We focused on the five largest procurement markets of parties to the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA) and the five largest procurement markets among active U.S. free trade agreement (FTA) partners since 1994. This scope encompasses six agreements: the 1994 GPA, the revised GPA, and four U.S. FTAs (the North American Free Trade Agreement , the South Korea-FTA, the Colombia-FTA, and the Australia-FTA). We also identified market access commitments of selected U.S. trading partners in these agreements. | Why GAO Did This Study
The United States and other countries have made commitments under the WTO's GPA and FTAs that open their government procurement to foreign suppliers. Under these commitments, parties agree to a procedural framework for government procurement with provisions on issues such as transparency and nondiscrimination. These commitments have potentially opened an estimated $4.4 trillion government procurement market to international firms, providing numerous new opportunities for American businesses in foreign markets and for foreign businesses to compete for U.S. government contracts.
As part of your larger request for information on U.S. participation in international procurement agreements, GAO reviewed commitments made by the United States and trading partners in selected international procurement agreements. This report provides information on (1) the provisions and (2) the market access schedules of the selected international procurement agreements. GAO reviewed the provisions and market access schedules across six agreements involving the largest government procurement markets to identify common features and variations. The agreements are the 1994 GPA and the 2014 revised GPA, NAFTA, the South Korea-FTA, the Colombia-FTA, and the Australia-FTA. GAO analyzed WTO and U.S. documents pertaining to the GPA and U.S. FTAs and interviewed USTR and the Department of Commerce agency officials in Washington, D.C.
What GAO Found
GAO found that the World Trade Organization's (WTO) Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA) and selected U.S. free trade agreements' (FTA) government procurement chapters that GAO reviewed generally have similarities in text, and commitments, potentially because parties negotiated multiple agreements concurrently (see fig.). Each of the agreements outlines the general method for conducting government procurement, including provisions relating to transparency, procurement procedures, and criteria for procurement decisions. However, differences exist, partially because later agreements reflect new technology.
The 2014 revised GPA generally provides more comprehensive market access than the selected FTAs GAO reviewed. Partners define the degree to which they will open their procurement markets to suppliers from other countries, known as their market access commitments. These commitments outline the entities covered by the agreements, for example, at the central and subcentral government levels (for the United States, these include agencies of the federal government and states), and for what some agreements term “other entities” (which, for the United States, includes utilities). The United States covers 85 central government entities under the revised GPA, but only 53 entities under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Similarly, the United States covers 37 states under its GPA commitments and from no states to 30 in the FTAs GAO reviewed. While all the top five GPA parties GAO reviewed cover some subcentral government entities, Canada, Mexico, and South Korea do not have a subcentral government entity coverage schedule in their FTA commitments. According to the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR), parties have certain procurements that they deem sensitive and do not want to open to foreign suppliers, including for social or policy reason. In the agreements GAO reviewed, the U.S.'s trading partners often exclude agriculture, military support, and motor vehicles from their market access commitments.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is not making recommendations in this report. |
gao_GAO-07-560 | gao_GAO-07-560_0 | 3). 4). Multiple Challenges Hinder the Efficiency of U.S. Food Aid Programs
Multiple challenges reduce the efficiency of U.S. food aid programs, including logistical constraints that impede food aid delivery and reduce the amount and quality of food provided as well as inefficiencies inherent in the current practice of using food aid to generate cash resources to fund development projects. For all food aid programs, rising transportation and business costs have contributed to a 52 percent decline in average tonnage delivered over the last 5 years. U.S. agencies and stakeholders do not coordinate adequately to respond to food and delivery problems when they arise. While Agencies Have Taken Steps to Improve Efficiency, Related Long- term Costs and Benefits Have Not Yet Been Measured
To improve timeliness in food aid delivery, USAID has been prepositioning commodities in two locations and KCCO is implementing a new transportation bid process. Without such data, the agencies’ ability to adequately monitor the degree to which revenues cover costs is impeded. These include challenging operating environments in recipient countries, insufficient coordination among stakeholders and use of noncomparable assessment methods, difficulties in identifying vulnerable groups (such as chronic versus transitory food-insecure populations) and understanding the causes of food insecurity, and resource constraints that adversely affect the quality of assessments and quantity of food and other assistance. Despite these concerns, USAID and USDA do not sufficiently monitor food aid programs, particularly in recipient countries, as they have limited staff and competing priorities and face legal restrictions on the use of food aid resources. Impediments to Improving Nutritional Quality Reduce the Benefits of Food Aid
Some impediments to improving nutritional quality further reduce the effectiveness of food aid. U.S. As a result, agencies may not be accomplishing their goal of getting the right food to the right people at the right time. Finally, U.S. agencies’ lack of sufficient monitoring leaves U.S. food aid programs vulnerable to wasting increasingly limited resources, not putting them to their most effective use, or not reaching the most vulnerable populations on a timely basis. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve the efficiency of U.S. food aid—in terms of its amount, timeliness, and quality—we recommend that the Administrator of USAID and the Secretaries of Agriculture and Transportation take the following five actions: improve food aid logistical planning through cost-benefit analysis of (1) supply-management options, such as long-term transportation agreements, and (2) prepositioning, including consideration of alternative methods, such as those used by WFP; work together and with stakeholders to modernize ocean transportation and contracting practices to include, to the extent possible, commercial principles of shared risks, streamlined administration, and expedited payment and claims resolution; seek to minimize the cost impact of cargo preference regulations on food aid transportation expenditures by updating implementation and reimbursement methodologies to account for new supply practices, such as prepositioning, and potential costs associated with older vessels or limited foreign-flag participation; establish a coordinated system for tracking and resolving food quality develop an information collection system to track monetization transactions. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to examine some key challenges to the (1) efficiency of U.S. food aid programs and (2) effective use of U.S. food aid. To examine key challenges to the efficiency of the delivery of U.S. food aid programs, we analyzed (1) food aid procurement and ocean transportation data provided by the Kansas City Commodity Office (KCCO) and (2) total food aid budget and monetization cost data provided by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), and the World Food Program (WFP). 3. 4. 2. 4. Foreign Assistance: Inadequate Accountability for U.S. | Why GAO Did This Study
The United States is the largest global food aid donor, accounting for over half of all food aid supplies to alleviate hunger and support development. Since 2002, Congress has appropriated an average of $2 billion per year for U.S. food aid programs, which delivered an average of 4 million metric tons of food commodities per year. Despite growing demand for food aid, rising business and transportation costs have contributed to a 52 percent decline in average tonnage delivered over the last 5 years. These costs represent 65 percent of total emergency food aid, highlighting the need to maximize its efficiency and effectiveness. Based on analysis of agency documents, interviews with experts and practitioners, and fieldwork, this report examines some key challenges to the (1) efficiency of U.S. food aid programs and (2) effective use of U.S. food aid.
What GAO Found
Multiple challenges hinder the efficiency of U.S. food aid programs by reducing the amount, timeliness, and quality of food provided. Specific factors that cause inefficiencies include (1) funding and planning processes that increase delivery costs and lengthen time frames; (2) ocean transportation and contracting practices that create high levels of risk for ocean carriers, resulting in increased rates; (3) legal requirements that result in awarding of food aid contracts to more expensive service providers; and (4) inadequate coordination between U.S. agencies and food aid stakeholders to track and respond to food and delivery problems. U.S. agencies have taken some steps to address timeliness concerns. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) has been stocking or prepositioning food commodities domestically and abroad, and the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) has implemented a new transportation bid process, but the long-term cost effectiveness of these initiatives has not yet been measured. In addition, the current practice of using food aid to generate cash for development projects--monetization--is an inherently inefficient use of resources. Furthermore, since U.S. agencies do not collect monetization revenue data electronically, they are unable to adequately monitor the degree to which revenues cover costs. Numerous challenges limit the effective use of U.S. food aid. Factors contributing to limitations in targeting the most vulnerable populations include (1) challenging operating environments in recipient countries; (2) insufficient coordination among key stakeholders, resulting in disparate estimates of food needs; (3) difficulty in identifying vulnerable groups and causes of their food insecurity; and (4) resource constraints on conducting reliable assessments and providing food and other assistance. Further, some impediments to improving the nutritional quality of U.S. food aid may reduce the benefits of food aid to recipients. Finally, U.S. agencies do not adequately monitor food aid programs due to limited staff, competing priorities, and restrictions on the use of food aid resources. As a result, these programs are vulnerable to not getting the right food to the right people at the right time. |
gao_GAO-05-366 | gao_GAO-05-366_0 | Fewer Than Half of All IRF Medicare Patients in 2003 Were Admitted for Conditions on List in Rule, and Few IRFs Were Able to Meet a 75 Percent Threshold
Fewer than half of all IRF Medicare patients in fiscal year 2003 were admitted for conditions on the list in the 75 percent rule. The largest group of patients admitted for orthopedic conditions not on the list were admitted for joint replacements that did not meet the list’s specific criteria for joint replacement. Relatively few of these patients had comorbid conditions that suggested a possible need for the intensive level of rehabilitation provided in IRFs. Additionally, we found that based on the fiscal year 2003 data few IRFs were able to meet a 75 percent threshold. Medicare Patients Admitted to IRFs in 2003 Had Variety of Conditions
Medicare patients were admitted to IRFs in fiscal year 2003 with a variety of conditions, as defined by the impairment group codes we analyzed. 2.) IRFs Vary in the Criteria Used to Assess Patients for Admission, and CMS Does Not Routinely Review IRFs’ Admission Decisions
The criteria IRFs used to assess patients for admission varied by facility, and CMS has not routinely reviewed IRFs’ admission decisions. In particular, IRFs used a range of criteria in making admission decisions, including patient characteristics such as function, in addition to condition. Experts Differed on Adding Conditions to List in Rule but Agreed That Condition Alone Does Not Provide Sufficient Criteria
The experts IOM convened and other experts we interviewed differed on whether conditions should be added to the list in the 75 percent rule but agreed that condition alone does not provide sufficient criteria to identify the types of patients appropriate for IRFs. They reported that the evidence on the benefits of IRF services— particularly for certain orthopedic conditions—is variable, and they called for further research. Other experts did not agree on whether conditions, including a broader category of joint replacements, should be added to the list. Experts IOM Convened Questioned Evidence for Adding Conditions to List in Rule, Finding Evidence for Certain Orthopedic Conditions Particularly Weak, and Called for More Research
The experts IOM convened generally questioned the strength of the evidence for the conditions suggested for addition to the list in the rule. Experts Contended That Functional Status, in Addition to Condition, Should Be Used to Identify Appropriate Types of Patients for Intensive Inpatient Rehabilitation
The experts IOM convened contended that condition alone was insufficient for identifying which patients, or types of patients, required the level of services available in an IRF and generally agreed that functional status should also be used. In addition to the experts convened by IOM, other experts we interviewed also said that condition alone was insufficient because having a condition on the list in the rule does not automatically indicate the need for intensive inpatient rehabilitation (e.g., even though stroke is on the list, only a subgroup of stroke patients require IRF services) and having a condition not on the list does not necessarily mean the patient does not need IRF services (e.g., although there is no cardiac condition on the list, a subgroup of cardiac patients need the level of services of an IRF). The names of other staff members who made contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: List of Conditions in CMS’s 75 Percent Rule
A facility may be classified as an IRF if it can show that, during a 12-month period at least 75 percent of all its patients, including its Medicare patients, required intensive rehabilitation services for the treatment of one or more of the following conditions: 1. 3. 6. 13. We conducted our analyses on Medicare patients only because CMS records contained data on the largest number of IRFs and the majority of patients in IRFs are covered by Medicare. | Why GAO Did This Study
Medicare classifies inpatient rehabilitation facilities (IRF) using the "75 percent rule." If a facility can show that during 1 year at least 75 percent of its patients required intensive rehabilitation for 1 of 13 specified conditions, it may be classified as an IRF and paid at a higher rate than is paid for less intensive rehabilitation in other settings. Medicare payments to IRFs have grown steadily over the past decade. In this report, GAO (1) identifies the conditions--on and off the list--that IRF Medicare patients have and the number of IRFs that meet a 75 percent threshold, (2) describes IRF admission criteria and Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) review of admissions, and (3) evaluates use of a list of conditions in the rule. GAO analyzed data on Medicare patients (the majority of patients in IRFs) admitted to IRFs in FY 2003, spoke to IRF medical directors, and had the Institute of Medicine (IOM) convene a meeting of experts.
What GAO Found
In fiscal year 2003, fewer than half of all IRF Medicare patients were admitted for having a condition on the list in the 75 percent rule, and few IRFs admitted at least 75 percent of their patients for one of those conditions. The largest group of patients had orthopedic conditions, not all of which were on the list in the rule, which had been suspended in 2002. Almost half of all patients with conditions not on the list were admitted for orthopedic conditions, and among those the largest group was joint replacement patients. Although some joint replacement patients may need admission to an IRF, GAO's analysis showed that few of these patients had comorbidities that suggested a possible need for the IRF level of services. Additionally, GAO found that only 6 percent of IRFs in fiscal year 2003 were able to meet a 75 percent threshold. IRFs varied in the criteria used to assess patients for admission, and CMS has not routinely reviewed IRF admission decisions. IRF officials reported that the criteria they used to make admission decisions included patient characteristics such as function, as well as condition. CMS, working through its fiscal intermediaries, has not routinely reviewed IRF admission decisions. The experts IOM convened and other clinical and nonclinical experts GAO interviewed differed on whether conditions should be added to the list in the 75 percent rule but agreed that condition alone does not provide sufficient criteria to identify the types of patients appropriate for IRFs. The experts IOM convened questioned the strength of the evidence for adding conditions to the list, finding the evidence for certain orthopedic conditions particularly weak, and they called for further research to identify the types of patients that need inpatient rehabilitation and to understand the effectiveness of IRFs. Other experts did not agree on whether conditions, including a broader category of joint replacements, should be added to the list. Experts, including those IOM convened, generally agreed that condition alone is insufficient for identifying appropriate types of patients for inpatient rehabilitation, since within any condition only a subgroup of patients require the level of services of an IRF, and contended that functional status should also be considered. |
gao_GAO-06-265 | gao_GAO-06-265_0 | Assign responsibility for the administration and management of the program to DANTES. The 3,875 Troops Documented as Recent Hires Have Contributed to Diversity in the Teaching Workforce, but Participation Has Recently Decreased and Is Geographically Concentrated
The 3,875 troops who were documented as having been hired through the program between the enactment of NCLBA in 2002 and June 30, 2005—the close of the 2004-2005 school year—contributed to gender and racial diversity in the teaching workforce. However, participation has recently decreased and hiring has been geographically concentrated. Over 80 percent of Troops teachers are male and over 25 percent are African- American—characteristics that differ from the new teacher population at large. According to state placement personnel in these and other states, the number and presence of military bases and military personnel in these locations also affect participation. Table 3 illustrates additional demographic characteristics of Troops-to-Teachers participants. Most Funded Teachers Have Been Recruited and Retained by Districts Designated as High- Need, and about One- Third Reported Teaching in Priority Subject Areas Most Funded Teachers
Most teachers receiving financial assistance through the program between the enactment of NCLBA and June 30, 2005, found employment in high- need districts, and about 90 percent of those first funded continued teaching in such districts their second year. About one-third of the troops hired during this period reported teaching in the priority areas of math, science, special education, or vocational education, and based on reported data, 37 percent of hires reported teaching at the secondary school level. Worked in Schools Serving Large Percentages of Children Who Qualify for Federal Assistance
Most teachers receiving financial assistance through the program during this period found employment in schools designated as high-need. Of teachers funded through either a bonus or a stipend between the enactment of NCLBA and June 30, 2002, and who subsequently found employment in high-need districts, 90 percent continued teaching in a high-need district in their second year, and over 75 percent of this original group taught in a high-need district for a third year. Education Has Taken Steps to Improve Program Management but Has Not Effectively Coordinated Program Administration with Related Initiatives
Education has taken some steps to improve program management, but coordination with related teacher recruitment activities is lacking. Although Education better defined high-need districts, it has not assessed the data it uses to make high-need school determinations. Since 2001, Education has had four different individuals responsible for the Troops-to-Teachers program. | Why GAO Did This Study
With the 2002 enactment of the No Child Left Behind Act (NCLBA), GAO was mandated to review the Troops-to-Teachers program, which provides financial assistance and counseling to help military personnel obtain their teacher licenses, especially in priority subject areas, such as math and science, and find employment in high-need districts and schools, as well as public charter schools. The U.S. Department of Education oversees the program, which received nearly $15 million in fiscal year 2004. This report identifies (1) the number and characteristics of program participants and factors affecting participation; (2) the recruitment and retention of participants in high-need districts and priority subject areas; and (3) the steps Education has taken to facilitate program management.
What GAO Found
The 3,875 troops who were documented as having been hired through the program between the enactment of NCLBA in 2002 and June 30, 2005--the close of the 2004-2005 school year--contributed to gender and racial diversity in the teaching workforce. Over 80 percent of Troops teachers are male and over 25 percent are African American--characteristics that differ from the new teacher population overall. However, participation has recently decreased and hiring has been geographically concentrated. The majority of the program's teachers hired from school years 2001-2002 through 2004-2005 were employed in seven states. Most teachers receiving financial assistance through the program between the enactment of NCLBA and June 30, 2005, were placed in districts designated as high-need on the basis of serving children who qualify for federal assistance. About 90 percent of these funded participants continued teaching in high-need districts during their second year, and over 75 percent of the original group taught in high-need districts for a third year. About one-third of Troops hired during this period reported teaching in the priority areas of math, science, special education, or vocational education. Education has taken some steps to improve program management, but has not effectively coordinated resources with another teacher recruitment program also targeting military personnel. While Education has developed a draft work plan for Troops-to-Teachers and improved the definition of a high-need district for eligibility purposes, it has not assessed the data it uses to make high-need school determinations. Further, it disbanded a teacher policy group that once provided a forum for department managers to discuss recruitment and retention initiatives. |
gao_GAO-16-651T | gao_GAO-16-651T_0 | The continued deterioration in USPS’s financial condition is due primarily to two factors. USPS reported that the most significant factor contributing to the decline in First-Class Mail volume is the continued migration toward electronic communication and transaction alternatives—a migration USPS expects to continue for the foreseeable future. USPS reported that its key operating expenses grew in fiscal year 2015—notably salary increases for unionized employees, as well as additional work hours, in part due to a 14.1 percent growth in shipping and packages, which are more labor intensive to process. Compensation and benefits comprise close to 80 percent of total USPS expenses. At the end of fiscal year 2015, USPS’s $125 billion in unfunded liabilities and outstanding debt represented a $7.4 billion increase from the previous year. USPS Will Remain Unlikely to Fully Make Required Retiree Health and Pension Payments
USPS will remain unlikely to fully make its required retiree health and pension payments in the near future. Beginning in fiscal year 2017, USPS’s payments will be restructured as it will no longer be required to make fixed prefunding payments, but will be required to start making annual payments based on actuarial determinations of the following component costs: a 40-year amortization schedule to address the unfunded liabilities for postal retiree health benefits, the “normal costs” of retiree health benefits for current employees, and a 27-year amortization schedule to address the unfunded liabilities for postal pension benefits under the Civil Service Retirement System (CSRS) (see table 2 in app. As table 1 below shows, in fiscal year 2017, USPS will be required to make an estimated total of $11.3 billion in payments for retiree health and pension benefits under CSRS and FERS—about $4.6 billion more than what USPS paid in fiscal year 2015 for these benefit programs. In addition to declining mail volumes and increased expenses, USPS’s ability to make its required payments for these retirement programs will be further challenged due to:
Expiration of a temporary rate surcharge: USPS has reported that additional revenue generated by a 4.3 percent “exigent” surcharge that began in January 2014 generated $4.6 billion in additional revenue, including $1.1 billion in fiscal year 2016, $2.1 billion in fiscal year 2015, and $1.4 billion in fiscal year 2014. No new major cost-savings initiatives planned. Large unfunded liabilities for postal retiree health and pension benefits— which were $78.9 billion at the end of fiscal year 2015—may ultimately place taxpayers, USPS employees, retirees and their beneficiaries, and USPS itself at risk. As we have previously reported, funded benefits protect the future viability of an enterprise such as USPS by not saddling it with bills after employees have retired. Further, since USPS retirees participate in the same health and pension benefit programs as other federal retirees, if USPS ultimately does not adequately fund these benefits and if Congress wants these benefits to be maintained at current levels, funding from the U.S. Treasury, and hence the taxpayer, would be needed to continue the benefit levels. This increases the risk that taxpayers may ultimately be called on to fund these benefits.” Alternatively, unfunded benefits could lead to pressure for reductions in benefits or in pay. Congress Faces Difficult Choices to Address USPS’s Financial Condition
USPS’s financial situation leaves Congress with difficult choices and trade-offs to achieve the broad-based restructuring that will be necessary for USPS to become financially sustainable. USPS’s ability to make its required retiree health and pension payments requires a decrease in expenses or increase in revenues, or both. The level of postal services and the affordability of those services: USPS’s growing financial difficulties combined with vast changes in how people communicate provide Congress with an opportunity to consider what postal services will be needed in the 21st century. Compensation and benefits in an environment of revenue pressures: Key compensation and benefits costs have increased and continue to increase for USPS employees, while demand for USPS’s main revenue source, mail and First-Class Mail in particular, has declined and continues to decline. USPS’s dual role of providing affordable universal service while remaining self-financing: As an independent establishment of the executive branch, USPS has long been expected to provide affordable, quality, and universal delivery service to all parts of the country while remaining self-financing. The status quo is not sustainable. Appendix I: U.S. | Why GAO Did This Study
USPS is a critical part of the nation's communication and commerce, delivering 154 billion pieces of mail in fiscal year 2015 to 155 million delivery points. However, USPS's mission of providing prompt, reliable and efficient universal services to the public at risk due to its poor financial condition. USPS's net loss was $5.1 billion in fiscal year 2015, its ninth consecutive year of net losses. At the end of fiscal year 2015, USPS had $125 billion in unfunded liabilities, mostly for retiree health and pensions, and debt—an amount equal to 182 percent of USPS's revenues.
In July 2009, GAO added USPS's financial condition to its list of high-risk areas needing attention by Congress and the executive branch. USPS's financial condition remains on GAO's high-risk list. In previous reports, GAO has included strategies and options for USPS to generate revenue, reduce costs, increase the efficiency of its delivery operations, and restructure the funding of USPS pension and retiree health benefits. GAO has also previously reported that Congress and USPS need to reach agreement on a comprehensive package of actions to improve USPS's financial viability.
This testimony discusses (1) factors affecting USPS's deteriorating financial condition, (2) USPS's ability to make required retiree health and pension payments, and (3) choices Congress faces to address USPS's financial challenges. This testimony is based primarily on GAO's work over the past 5 years that examined USPS's financial condition—including its liabilities—and updated USPS financial information for fiscal year 2015 and 2016.
What GAO Found
The U.S. Postal Service's (USPS) financial condition continues to deteriorate as a result of trends including:
Declining mail volume : First-Class Mail—USPS's most profitable product—continues to decline in volume as communications and payments migrate to electronic alternatives. USPS expects this decline to continue for the foreseeable future.
Growing expenses: Key USPS expenses continue to grow, such as salary increases and work hours due in part to growth in shipping and packages, which are more labor-intensive. Compensation and benefits comprise close to 80 percent of USPS's expenses.
USPS's financial condition makes it unlikely it will be able to fully make its required retiree health and pension payments in the near future. In fiscal year 2015, while USPS was required to make $12.6 billion in retiree health and pension payments, it made $6.7 billion in payments mainly due to not making a required retiree health payment of $5.7 billion. USPS's required payments will be restructured in fiscal year 2017, with estimated payments totaling $11.3 billion—$4.6 billion more than what USPS paid in fiscal year 2015. USPS's ability to make these required payments will be further challenged due to:
Expiration of a temporary rate surcharge: This surcharge on most postal rates effective January 2014, which had generated $4.6 billion in additional revenues, expired April 2016.
No new major cost savings initiatives planned.
Large unfunded liabilities for postal retiree health and pension benefits—which were $78.9 billion at the end of fiscal year 2015—may ultimately place taxpayers, USPS employees, retirees, and their beneficiaries, and USPS itself at risk. As we have previously reported, funded benefits protect the future viability of an enterprise such as USPS by not saddling it with bills after employees have retired. Further, since USPS retirees participate in the same health and pension benefit programs as other federal retirees, if USPS ultimately does not adequately fund these benefits, and if Congress wants these benefits to be maintained at current levels, funding from the U.S. Treasury, and hence the taxpayer, would be needed to continue the benefit levels. Alternatively, unfunded benefits could lead to pressure for reductions in benefits or in pay.
Congress faces difficult choices and tradeoffs to address USPS's financial challenges. The status quo is not sustainable. Considerations for Congress include the (1) level of postal services provided to the public and the affordability of those services, (2) compensation and benefits for USPS employees and retirees in an environment of revenue pressures, and (3) tension between USPS's dual roles as an independent establishment of the executive branch required to provide universal delivery service and as a self-financing entity operating in a business like manner. |
gao_GGD-00-52 | gao_GGD-00-52_0 | Finally, the reports should also relate performance measurement information to program evaluation findings, in order to give a clear picture of an agency’s performance and its efforts at improvement. In our assessments of annual performance plans, we identified challenges that will affect agencies’ abilities to reliably report on the achievement of program goals and, in cases where goals are not met, either identify opportunities for improvement or whether goals need to be adjusted. This information is also helpful to congressional and other decisionmakers in assessing the degree to which strategies are appropriate and reasonable. Without such a discussion, decisionmakers will have difficulty determining the implications for assessing the subsequent achievement of performance goals that agencies include in their performance reports. Agencies Face Limitations in Producing Credible Performance Data
In order to successfully measure and report progress toward intended results, agencies need to build the capacity to gather and use performance information. However, our work over the past several years has identified limitations in agencies’ abilities to produce credible performance data. Specifically, those limitations relate to program design issues that may make it difficult to collect timely and consistent national data, the relatively limited level of agencies’ program evaluation capabilities, and long-standing weaknesses in agencies’ financial management capabilities. Education is one of many agencies where the interest in having enough information for accountability and federal program management continually competes with the aim of providing local agencies with the flexibility needed to implement their programs on the basis of their local needs. Performance Reports Provide Opportunities to Show Progress in Addressing Data Credibility Issues
Agencies’ March 2000 performance reports will provide them with an opportunity to show the progress they have made in addressing data credibility issues. In our report on reasonable approaches to verify and validate performance information, we identified a wide range of possible approaches that can be organized into four general strategies, as follows:
Management can seek to improve the quality of performance data by fostering an organizational commitment and capacity for data quality. These approaches can help agencies improve the quality, usefulness, and credibility of performance information. The Results Act requires agencies to describe in their annual performance plans how they will verify and validate the performance information that will be collected. Including such information in performance reports can be equally important in helping to assure report users of the quality of the performance data. Discussing data credibility and related issues in performance reports can provide important contextual information to Congress and agencies to help them address the weaknesses in this area. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO identified some of the challenges agencies face in producing credible performance information and how those challenges may affect performance reporting, focusing on: (1) whether the weaknesses identified in agencies' performance plans imply challenges for the performance reports; (2) some of the challenges agencies face in producing credible performance data; and (3) how performance reports can be used to address data credibility issues.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) it appears unlikely that agencies consistently will have for their first performance reports the reliable performance information needed to assess whether performance goals are being met or specifically how performance can be improved; (2) over the past several years GAO has identified limitations in agencies' abilities to produce credible data and identify performance improvement opportunities; (3) these limitations are substantial, long-standing, and will not be quickly or easily resolved; (4) they are likely to be reflected in agencies' initial performance reports as they have been in the performance plans to date; (5) in administering programs that are a joint responsibility with state and local governments, Congress and the executive branch continually balance the competing objectives of collecting uniform program information to assess performance with giving states and localities the flexibility needed to effectively implement intergovernmental programs; (6) the relatively limited level of agencies' program evaluation capabilities suggests that many agencies are not well positioned to undertake necessary evaluations; (7) program evaluations are important to providing information on the extent to which an agency's efforts contributed to results and to highlight opportunities to improve those results; (8) long-standing weaknesses in agencies' financial management capabilities make it difficult for decisionmakers to effectively assess and improve many programs' financial performance; (9) in order to help agency managers select appropriate techniques for assessing, documenting, and improving the quality of their performance data, some agencies proposed or adopted reasonable approaches to verify and validate performance information; (10) these approaches include senior management actions, agencywide efforts, and specific program manager and technical staff activities, which could be used, where appropriate, to improve the quality, usefulness, and credibility of performance information; (11) performance reports provide agencies with an opportunity to show the progress made in addressing data credibility issues; (12) the Government Performance and Results Act requires agencies to describe in their annual performance plans how they will verify and validate the performance information that will be collected; and (13) including information in performance reports describing the quality of the reported performance data and the implications of missing data can be equally important and can provide key contextual information to Congress and other users of the performance reports. |
gao_GAO-03-1042T | gao_GAO-03-1042T_0 | Under DSHEA, manufacturers are responsible for ensuring the safety of dietary supplements they sell. FDA has received reports of adverse events associated with dietary supplements containing ephedra, including heart attack, stroke, seizure, psychosis, and death, that are consistent with the scientific literature. The American Medical Association and the American Heart Association have urged FDA to ban the sale of dietary supplements containing ephedra. Adverse Event Reports Have Led FDA to Conclude That Dietary Supplements Containing Ephedra Pose a Significant Public Health Hazard
Using the adverse event reports it has received and evidence from the scientific literature, FDA has concluded that dietary supplements containing ephedra pose a “significant public health hazard.” FDA and others have received thousands of reports of adverse events among users of dietary supplements containing ephedra, more than for any other dietary supplement ingredient. From February 22, 1993, through July 14, 2003, FDA received 2,277 reports of adverse events associated with dietary supplements containing ephedra, which was 15 times more reports than it received for the next most commonly reported herbal dietary supplement, St. John’s wort. Metabolife International Call Records Contain Reports of Adverse Events That Are Consistent with the Types of Adverse Events Reported to FDA
The types of adverse events that we identified in the Metabolife International call records are consistent with the types of adverse events reported to FDA and with the documented physiological effects of ephedra. Metabolife International Call Records Contained Reports of Thousands of Adverse Events, Some of Which Were Serious, among Consumers of Metabolife 356
As we reported in March 2003, we identified 14,684 call records that contained at least one report of an adverse event among consumers of Metabolife 356. Within the call records, we identified 92 reports of heart attack, stroke, seizure, and death (see table 1). Our count of reports of these serious adverse events was similar to that of other reviews of the Metabolife International call records, including counts by Metabolife International and its consultants. Serious Adverse Events Were Reported among Consumers Who Used Metabolife 356 within Recommended Guidelines
Within the subset of Metabolife International call records that contained information on how the product was used by the consumer, most of the reported serious adverse events occurred among consumers who reported using the product within the guidelines on the Metabolife 356 label—that is, who reported that they did not take more of the product or take it for a longer period than recommended. FDA Has Taken Some Actions to Oversee Dietary Supplements Containing Ephedra
As part of its oversight of dietary supplements, FDA has taken some actions specifically focused on dietary supplements containing ephedra. FDA has issued warnings that focus on improper product labeling, issued warnings to consumers, and issued a proposed rule in 1997 that, among other things, would require a health warning on the label of dietary supplements containing ephedra and prohibit a dietary supplement from containing both ephedra and a stimulant. In the interim, FDA has taken action to regulate certain drugs that contain ephedrine, the active ingredient in ephedra. There currently is no similar rule prohibiting the marketing of dietary supplements containing ephedra in combination with analgesics or stimulants, such as caffeine. In fact, many dietary supplements with ephedra, such as Metabolife 356, also include caffeine. The proposed rule contains a provision that would prohibit dietary supplements from containing both ephedra and other stimulants. On July 14, 2003, FDA reported to us that the agency is in the process of reviewing the comments and has not reached a decision regarding further action. | Why GAO Did This Study
Dietary supplements containing ephedra have been associated with serious health-related adverse events, including heart attacks, strokes, seizures, and deaths. The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) regulates dietary supplements under the Dietary Supplement Health and Education Act of 1994 (DSHEA). Reports of adverse events have been received by FDA and others, including Metabolife International, the manufacturer of a dietary supplement containing ephedra, Metabolife 356. Because of concerns surrounding the safety of dietary supplements containing ephedra, GAO was asked to discuss and update some of the findings from its prior work on ephedra, including its examination of Metabolife International's records of health-related calls from consumers of Metabolife 356. Specifically, GAO examined (1) FDA's analysis of the adverse event reports it received for dietary supplements containing ephedra, (2) how the adverse events reported in the health-related call records collected by Metabolife International illustrate the health risks of dietary supplements containing ephedra, and (3) FDA's actions in the oversight of dietary supplements containing ephedra.
What GAO Found
FDA has used the adverse event reports it has received to conclude that dietary supplements containing ephedra pose a significant public health hazard. Since February 1993, FDA has received 2,277 reports of adverse events associated with dietary supplements containing ephedra, 15 times more reports than it has received for the next most commonly reported herbal dietary supplement. The types of adverse events that GAO identified in the health-related call records from Metabolife International were consistent with the types of adverse events reported to FDA and with the documented physiological effects of ephedra. Although call records contained limited information for most of the reports, GAO identified 14,684 call records that had reports of at least one adverse event among consumers of Metabolife 356. GAO's count of 92 serious events--heart attacks, strokes, seizures, and deaths--was similar to that of other reviews of the call records, including counts by Metabolife International and its consultants. Many of the serious events were reported among relatively young consumers--more than one-third concerned consumers who reported an age under 30. In addition, for call records containing information on the amount of product consumed or length of product use, GAO found that most of the reported serious adverse events occurred among consumers who followed the usage guidelines on the Metabolife 356 label. As part of its oversight of dietary supplements, FDA has taken some actions specifically focused on dietary supplements containing ephedra. FDA has issued warnings that focus on improper labeling, issued warnings to consumers, and issued a proposed rule in 1997 that, among other things, would require a health warning on the label of dietary supplements containing ephedra and prohibit a dietary supplement from containing both ephedra and a stimulant. FDA subsequently banned the sale of certain classes of over-the-counter drugs containing ephedrine and related alkaloids--the active ingredient in ephedra--in combination with an analgesic or stimulant. As the 1997 proposed rule has not been finalized, there is no rule prohibiting the marketing of dietary supplements with similar ingredients, and many dietary supplements with ephedra, such as Metabolife 356, also include caffeine or other stimulants. To receive comments on new evidence, FDA recently reopened the comment period for the proposed rule, and FDA reported to GAO that the agency is in the process of reviewing comments it has received and has not reached a decision regarding further action. |
gao_GAO-14-486 | gao_GAO-14-486_0 | Overview of DOD’s BEA
DOD’s BEA is intended to serve as a blueprint for the department’s business transformation efforts. However, the department still faces challenges in complying with key parts of the act and managing its business systems. Without continued progress in improving its investment management approach, DOD will be challenged in its ability to manage the billions of dollars invested annually in modernizing its business system investments. While officials from the Office of the DCMO stated that different systems are reviewed with different levels of scrutiny based on various factors, those factors are not documented in existing guidance. Until DOD ensures that investments are reviewed at an appropriate level based on defined criteria, the DBC is at an increased risk of failing to identify and address important issues associated with large-scale and costly systems. For fiscal year 2014, the department certified and approved most of its business systems investments. In addition, it has made significant improvements to the data used to manage information about these investments. They also stated that extensive manual cleanup efforts had been ongoing since the beginning of the investment review process. Enterprise Transition Plan Content Has Been Improved and Is Consistent with Portfolio- Based Investment Management Approach
The act calls for the development of an ETP that implements the BEA and covers all defense business systems and includes a listing of the (1) new systems that are expected to be needed to complete the target defense business systems computing environment, along with each system’s performance measures, financial resource needs, and risks or challenges to integration into the BEA; (2) legacy systems that will be phased out of the defense business systems computing environment within 3 years, together with the schedule for terminating those legacy systems; and (3) existing systems that are part of the target defense business systems computing environment, as well as a strategy for making the modifications to those systems that will be needed to ensure that such systems comply with the defense BEA, including time-phased milestones, performance measures, and financial resource needs. Recommendations for Executive Action
We are recommending that the Secretary of Defense direct the appropriate DOD management entity to take the following three actions to help ensure that the department’s business systems modernization program is fully compliant with the act and is more effectively implemented:
Define by when and how the department plans to align its business system certification and approval process with its Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution process. In its comments, the department concurred with two recommendations and partially concurred with one recommendation. The department partially concurred with our second recommendation, to define criteria for reviewing defense business systems at an appropriate level in the department, in support of the certification and approval process. Appendix I: Objective, Scope, and Methodology
Our objective was to assess the actions taken by the Department of Defense (DOD) to comply with section 332 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 as amended. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO designated DOD's multibillion-dollar business systems modernization program as high risk in 1995, and since then has provided a series of recommendations aimed at strengthening DOD's institutional approach to modernizing its business systems investments. Section 332 of the Fiscal Year 2005 NDAA requires the department to take specific actions relative to its modernization efforts and GAO to assess actions taken by DOD to comply with section 332 of the act. In evaluating DOD's compliance, GAO analyzed, among other things, investment management policies and procedures, certification actions for business system investments, and the latest versions of the department's business enterprise architecture and enterprise transition plan.
What GAO Found
The Department of Defense (DOD) has developed a portfolio-based investment management process for its defense business systems, certified and approved a majority of its defense business systems, made key improvements to the data used to manage its business investments, and updated its transition plan to assist its efforts in complying with key provisions of section 332 of the Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 (NDAA or “the act”), as amended (10 U.S.C. § 2222). However, the department continues to face challenges in fully complying with the act's requirements, modernizing its business systems environment, and addressing GAO's prior recommendations (see table).
Department officials cited various reasons for the shortfalls noted above. For example, they stated that aligning the investment review process with the budgeting process takes time to coordinate. They also noted that different systems are reviewed with different levels of scrutiny based on various factors, but those factors are not documented in existing guidance. Continued progress in improving its investment management approach will allow DOD to more effectively manage the billions of dollars the department invests annually in modernizing its business systems.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is making three recommendations to help improve the department's business system investment management process and business enterprise architecture. DOD concurred with two recommendations and partially concurred with the third—to define criteria for reviewing business systems at appropriate levels in the department. In particular, DOD noted that systems are reviewed within components before being reviewed by the executive-level investment review board. However, until DOD ensures that investments are reviewed at an appropriate level based on defined criteria such as cost, scope, complexity, and risk, the department is at an increased risk of failing to identify and address important issues associated with large-scale and costly systems. |
gao_GAO-11-152 | gao_GAO-11-152_0 | Key job classifications are those determined necessary for one or more of the four construction types. Recent Efforts to Improve Data Collection and Processing Have Not Yet Addressed Key Issues with Survey Quality
Labor’s Changes to Survey Data Collection and Processing May Not Achieve Expected Results
Labor has taken several steps over the last few years to address issues with its Davis-Bacon wage surveys, including completing a number of open surveys and changing how it collects and processes some survey data in its efforts to improve timeliness and accuracy. We found some surveys initiated under the new process are behind schedule and some published wage rates are based on outdated data. Labor cannot determine whether its Davis-Bacon survey results are representative of prevailing wage rates because it does not currently calculate response rates or conduct a nonresponse analysis. This standard can be met using data from a single county, multiple counties within a state, or statewide. Utility of County Focus
Although its regulations state the county will normally be the civil subdivision for which a prevailing wage is determined, Labor is often unable to issue wage rates for job classifications at the county level because it does not collect enough data to meet its current sufficiency standard of wage information on at least three workers from two employers. In our review of the four surveys, we found one-quarter of the final wage rates for key job classifications were based on wages reported for six or fewer workers (see fig. Little Incentive to Participate and Lack of Transparency Remain Key Issues for Stakeholders
Many Stakeholders Reported Contractors Lack Incentive to Participate in Davis-Bacon Surveys
In our interviews with stakeholders about additional issues with Labor’s wage determination process, they provided several reasons why contractors have little or no incentive to participate in the Davis-Bacon wage survey. Second, 16 stakeholders said contractors either may not understand the purpose of the survey or do not see the point in responding because they believe the prevailing wages issued by Labor are inaccurate. Stakeholders Reported Survey Form Was Generally Easy to Understand, but Most Forms Reviewed Had Errors
While 19 of the 27 contractors and interested parties we interviewed said the wage survey form, which Labor officials said was last updated in 2004, is generally easy to understand, some identified challenges in completing specific sections. Labor’s regulatory goal to issue wage rates at the county level may also limit its ability to improve survey representativeness and timeliness. To improve the transparency of wage determinations while maintaining the confidentiality of specific survey respondents, we recommend that the Secretary of Labor direct the Wage and Hour Division to publicly provide additional information on the data used to calculate its Davis-Bacon wage rates, such as the number and wages of workers included in each wage rate calculation, and to clearly communicate the meaning of various dates and codes used in wage determinations in the same place the prevailing wage rates are posted. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our review examined (1) the extent to which the Department of Labor (Labor) has addressed concerns regarding the quality of the Davis-Bacon wage determination process and (2) the additional issues identified by stakeholders regarding the wage determination process. To address these objectives, we reviewed key documents, including past GAO and Department of Labor Office of Inspector General (OIG) reviews of the program, agency documents on recent changes to the wage survey process, and relevant federal laws and regulations; interviewed agency officials and representatives from organizations with whom the agency contracts some aspects of the survey process; analyzed (1) data from Labor’s Automated Survey Data System (ASDS), Wage Determination Generation System (WDGS), and the Davis-Bacon survey schedule Web site (http://www.dol.gov/whd/programs/ dbra/schedule.htm); (2) reports produced by Labor’s contracted accounting firm for on-site verification of submitted payroll records; and (3) Labor’s conformance logs for fiscal years 2007 through 2009; conducted site visits to three of Labor’s five regional offices that conduct Davis-Bacon wage surveys, as well as to the Construction Industry Research and Policy Center (CIRPC), which is contracted to assist Labor with the wage survey process; interviewed approximately 30 stakeholders, including representatives from academia, contractor associations, and unions, as well as individual contractors and performed a content analysis of their comments; and attended a Labor prevailing wage conference. GAO did not verify whether all procedures were followed in all cases. | Why GAO Did This Study
Procedures for determining Davis-Bacon prevailing wage rates, which must be paid to workers on certain federally funded construction projects, and their vulnerability to the use of inaccurate data have long been an issue for Congress, employers, and workers. In this report, GAO examined (1) the extent to which the Department of Labor (Labor) has addressed concerns regarding the quality of the Davis-Bacon wage determination process, and (2) additional issues identified by stakeholders regarding the wage determination process. GAO interviewed Labor officials, representatives from contractor associations and unions, contractors, and researchers; conducted site visits to three Labor regional offices; and analyzed data from Labor's wage survey database.
What GAO Found
Recent efforts to improve the Davis-Bacon wage survey have not addressed key issues with timeliness, representativeness, and the utility of using the county as the basis for the wage calculation. Labor has made some data collection and processing changes; however, we found some surveys initiated under the new processes were behind Labor's processing schedule. Labor did not consult survey design experts, and some criticisms of the survey and wage determination process have not been addressed, including the representativeness and sufficiency of the data collected. For example, Labor cannot determine whether its wage determinations accurately reflect prevailing wages because it does not currently calculate response rates or analyze survey nonrespondents. And, while Labor is required by law to issue wage rates by the "civil subdivision of the state," the goal to issue them at the county level is often not met because of insufficient survey response. In the published results for the four surveys in our review, Labor issued about 11 percent of wage rates for key job classifications (types of workers needed for one or more of Labor's construction types) using data from a single county. The rest were issued at the multi-county or state level. Over one-quarter of the wage rates were based on six or fewer workers. Little incentive to participate in Labor's Davis-Bacon wage surveys and a lack of transparency in the survey process remain key issues for stakeholders. Stakeholders said contractors may not participate because they lack resources, may not understand the purpose of the survey, or may not see the point in responding because they believe the prevailing wages issued by Labor are inaccurate. While most stakeholders said the survey form was generally easy to understand, some identified challenges with completing specific sections. Our review of reports by Labor's contracted auditor for four published surveys found most survey forms verified against payroll data had errors in areas such as number of employees and hourly and fringe benefit rates. Both contractor association and union officials said addressing a lack of transparency in how the published wage rates are set could result in a better understanding of the process and greater participation in the survey. GAO suggests Congress consider amending its requirement that Labor issue wage rates by civil subdivision to allow more flexibility. To improve the quality and timeliness of the Davis-Bacon wage surveys, GAO recommends Labor obtain objective expert advice on its survey design and methodology. GAO also recommends Labor take steps to improve the transparency of its wage determinations. Labor agreed with the second recommendation, but said obtaining expert survey advice may be premature given ongoing changes. We believe obtaining expert advice is critical for improving the quality of wage determinations. |
gao_GAO-02-585 | gao_GAO-02-585_0 | The second provision requires states to file a TPR with the courts if (1) an infant has been abandoned; (2) the parent committed any of the felonies listed in the fast track provision; or (3) the child has been in foster care for 15 of the most recent 22 months. ASFA also contained other provisions to help states focus on the length of time children were remaining in care. Projects generally are to last no more than 5 years. Limited Data are Available to Measure Changes in the Outcomes and Characteristics of Children Since ASFA
The number of annual adoptions has increased since the implementation of ASFA; however, data limitations restrict comparative analysis of other outcomes and characteristics of children in foster care. The amount of time children spend in foster care varies from state to state. Although Little Data are Available on Key ASFA Permanency Provisions, Some States Describe Circumstances That Limit Broader Use of These Provisions
While few states were able to provide data on the numbers of children affected by ASFA’s fast track and 15 of 22 provisions, some reported on circumstances that make it difficult to use these provisions for more children. Officials in Massachusetts expressed similar concerns about court delays experienced in the state when parents appeal a court decision to terminate their parental rights. New ASFA Adoption- Related Funds Most Commonly Used to Recruit Adoptive Families and Provide Post Adoption Services
States reported in our survey that they most commonly used their adoption incentive payments and PSSF adoption promotion and support services funds to recruit adoptive parents and to provide post adoption services. Both independently and through demonstration waivers approved by HHS,states are using a variety of practices to address barriers relating to the courts, recruiting adoptive families for children with special needs, placing children in permanent homes in other jurisdictions, and the availability of needed services. In addition to the activities described above, some demonstration waivers are testing different approaches to finding permanent homes for children in foster care. Foster Care: States’ Early Experiences Implementing the Adoption and Safe Families Act. Permanency Hearings for Foster Children. | What GAO Found
In response to concerns about the length of time children were spending in foster care, Congress enacted the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 (ASFA). The act contained two key provisions intended to help states more quickly move the more than 800,000 children estimated to be in foster care each year to safe and permanent homes. One of these provisions, referred to as "fast track," allows states to bypass efforts to reunify families in certain egregious situations. The other provision, informally called "15 of 22," requires states to file a petition to terminate parental rights when a child has been in foster care for 15 of the most recent 22 months. Although the number of adoptions has increased by 57 percent since the act was enacted, changes in other foster care outcomes and the characteristics of children in foster care cannot be identified due to the lack of comparable pre- and post-ASFA data. Although data on states' use of the act's two key performance provisions are limited, some states described circumstances that hinder their use. Survey data suggest that a few states used the fast track provision infrequently. In general, states are most frequently using the new adoption-related funds provided by the act to recruit adoptive parents and provide post adoption services. The states involved in the survey are addressing long-standing barriers to achieving permanency for foster children such as court delays and insufficient court resources, difficulties in recruiting adoptive families for children with special needs, obstacles and delays in placing children in permanent homes in other jurisdictions, and poor access to some services families need to reunify with their children. States are testing different approaches, but the data are limited on the effectiveness of these practices. |
gao_GAO-11-205 | gao_GAO-11-205_0 | VA’s Office of Budget is responsible for overseeing the budget formulation process for the department as a whole on behalf of the Secretary and submitting VA’s budget request for OMB’s review and consideration in developing the President’s Budget. VA uses other methods to develop nearly all of the remaining portions of its health care budget estimate for long-term care and other services as well as proposed initiatives. VA Uses a Projection Model to Develop Most of Its Health Care Budget Estimate to Meet Expected Demand
VA uses what is known as the Enrollee Health Care Projection Model (EHCPM)—a model developed in partnership with VA’s actuarial consultant—to estimate the amount of resources VA will need to meet the expected demand for most of the health care services VA provides. These services accounted for 83 percent of VA’s health care budget estimate for fiscal 2011. VA used the EHCPM to estimate the resources needed for fiscal year 2011 for 61 health care services, which VA grouped into seven service types (see app. The EHCPM’s estimates are based on three basic components: the projected number of veterans who will be enrolled in VA health care, the projected utilization of VA’s health care services—that is, the quantity of health care services enrollees are expected to use—and the projected unit cost of providing these services. Each component is subject to a number of complex adjustments to account for the characteristics of VA health care and the veterans who access VA’s health care services. For example, in 2009, VA used data from fiscal year 2008 to develop its health care budget estimate for the fiscal year 2011 request, including the advance appropriations request for fiscal year 2012. To project the utilization or the quantity of VA’s health care services veterans will use and the unit costs of VA’s health care services, VA groups these services into two major categories in the EHCPM: (1) those services that VA provides in a manner comparable to other providers, whose services are paid for by Medicare and private health insurers; and (2) those services that are unique to or are provided in a different manner by VA. For example, VA provides services, such as emergency room visits and physician office visits, in a manner comparable to other providers. For example, these adjustments take into account enrollees’ age, gender, priority level, and geographic location. VA Uses Other Methods to Develop Portions of Its Health Care Budget Estimate Related to Long- term Care and Other Services
VA uses methods other than the EHCPM to develop estimates of the amount of resources needed for long-term care and other services. VHA’s Office of Finance coordinates the development of the estimates for these services, which accounted for 16 percent of VA’s health care budget estimate for fiscal year 2011. For fiscal year 2011, health-care-related initiatives made up 1 percent of VA’s health care budget estimate. VA’s Health Care Budget Estimate Informs the Decision- making Process for the President’s Budget Request
VA’s health care budget estimate prepared by VHA is reviewed at successively higher levels. Within the agency, the Secretary of VA reviews the health care budget estimate in the context of departmentwide priorities, including trade-offs between health care and other services. OMB considers VA’s budget submission in light of presidential priorities and needs governmentwide. The budget estimate for health care services is presented in different ways for review and decision making. Congress funds VA health care services in three appropriations accounts. VA may appeal the decision before OMB finalizes the President’s budget request. VA and OMB provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Veterans Affairs and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, and appropriate congressional committees. | Why GAO Did This Study
Funding for the Department of Veterans Affairs' (VA) health care is determined by Congress in the annual appropriations process. Prior to this process, VA develops a budget estimate of the resources needed to provide health care services to eligible veterans. The Veterans Health Care Budget Reform and Transparency Act of 2009 requires GAO to assess whether the funding requested for VA health care in the President's budget requests submitted to Congress in 2011, 2012, and 2013 is consistent with VA's estimates of the resources needed to provide health care services. In anticipation of these future studies, GAO was asked to obtain information on how VA prepares its health care budget estimate. In this report, GAO describes (1) how VA develops its health care budget estimate, and (2) how VA's health care budget estimate is used in the President's budget request to Congress. To conduct this work, GAO reviewed VA documents on the methods, data, and assumptions used to develop VA's health care budget estimate that informed the President's budget request for fiscal year 2011 and request for advance appropriations for fiscal year 2012. GAO also interviewed VA officials responsible for developing this estimate and staff from the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), which is responsible for overseeing the development and implementation of the federal budget.
What GAO Found
VA uses what is known as the Enrollee Health Care Projection Model (EHCPM) to develop most of its health care budget estimate and uses other methods for the remainder. Specifically, VA used the EHCPM to estimate the resources needed to meet expected demand for 61 health care services that accounted for 83 percent of VA's health care budget estimate for fiscal year 2011 and similarly for fiscal year 2012. The EHCPM's estimates for these services are based on three basic components: projected enrollment in VA health care, projected use of VA's health care services, and projected costs of providing these services. To make these projections, the EHCPM uses data on the use and cost of these services that reflect data from VA, Medicare, and private health insurers. The EHCPM makes a number of complex adjustments to the data to account for characteristics of VA health care and the veterans who access VA's health care services. For example, these adjustments take into account veterans' age, gender, geographic location, and reliance on VA health care services compared with other sources, such as health care services paid for by Medicare or private health insurers. VA uses other methods to develop nearly all of the remaining portion of its budget estimate for long-term care and other services, as well as initiatives proposed by the Secretary of VA or the President. Long-term care and other services accounted for 16 percent and initiatives accounted for 1 percent of VA's health care budget estimate for fiscal year 2011 and similarly for fiscal year 2012. VA's health care budget estimate is reviewed at successively higher levels. Within the agency, the Secretary of VA reviews the health care budget estimate in the context of departmentwide priorities, including trade-offs between health care and other services. The budget estimate is presented in different ways, including the appropriations accounts structure used by Congress for decision making. OMB considers VA's budget submission in light of presidential priorities and needs governmentwide. VA can appeal decisions before OMB finalizes the President's budget request to Congress. VA and OMB provided technical comments, which GAO incorporated as appropriate. |
gao_GAO-01-1027 | gao_GAO-01-1027_0 | Introduction
In December 1994, the heads of state and government of the 34 democratic countries in the Western Hemisphere agreed at the first Summit of the Americas in Miami, Florida, to conclude negotiations to create a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) no later than 2005. The ministers directed negotiating groups to initiate negotiations on market access schedules no later than May 15, 2002. Rules are also being developed on four other trade topics, which are addressed in chapter 3, including intellectual property rights (IPR); dispute settlement; subsidies, antidumping, and countervailing duties; and competition policy. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives for this report were to describe (1) the progress made to date and the issues that remain in negotiating greater market opening among FTAA countries, (2) the progress made to date and the issues that remain in developing other rules and institutional provisions for an eventual FTAA agreement, (3) the significant crosscutting themes affecting the FTAA negotiations and how have they been addressed to date, and (4) the potential effects of a completed FTAA on U.S. trade and investment with other Western Hemisphere countries. FTAA Efforts to Open Hemispheric Markets
The five FTAA groups charged with negotiating market-opening opportunities—market access, agriculture, services, investment, and government procurement—have drafted rules and are now developing the databases and methods that they will use to schedule the reduction and elimination of trade barriers among FTAA participants. Among other things, ministers instructed the group to develop recommendations on the modalities for tariff negotiations by April 1, 2002, in order to begin these negotiations by May 15, 2002; accelerate the process of identifying nontariff measures so as to have, by April 2002, a preliminary inventory of such measures; submit recommendations on the scope and methodology for eliminating export subsidies affecting trade in agricultural products in the hemisphere by April 1, 2002; make recommendations on the types of measures and a methodology to develop disciplines on the treatment of all other practices that distort trade in agricultural products by April 1, 2002; establish a notification and counter-notification for SPS measures by April 2002 and develop mechanisms to facilitate the full implementation of the WTO SPS agreement; and submit a new version of the draft text by August 2002. Given these domestic regulations, free market access may be hard to define. But the United States does not have agreements with countries such as Brazil, the largest Latin American nation. Negotiating groups have prepared draft chapters on their respective topics. All negotiating group texts contain proposals on technical assistance or treatment for smaller economies. Civil Society
Theme, Importance, and Mandate
The views of civil society groups (nongovernmental groups representing business, labor, environment, and other interests) will likely affect the level of U.S. public support for the FTAA. However, some U.S. import-competing industries, such as textiles, apparel, and certain agricultural goods, have traditionally received higher levels of protection. An FTAA agreement, however, would cover much more than merchandise trade. Exporters and Increased Competition in Some Protected U.S. Sectors
Over the past decade, FTAA countries have pursued the liberalization and integration of their economies through a wide variety of interregional free trade and customs union agreements. These changes have lowered barriers to U.S. exports, but tariffs and other barriers still remain relatively high on many U.S. exports. | What GAO Found
The 34 democratic countries of the Western Hemisphere pledged in December 1994 to form Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) no later than 2005. The FTAA agreement would eliminate tariffs and create common trade and investment rules among the 34 democratic nations of the Western Hemisphere. When completed, the FTAA agreement will cover about 800 million people, more than $11 trillion in production, and $3.4 trillion in world trade. The five FTAA negotiating groups pursuing liberalization of trade and investment--market access, agriculture, investment, services, and government procurement--have submitted initial proposals and agreed on a date to begin market access negotiations, but the groups face short-term and long-term issues. In the short-term, these groups must resolve several practical issues in order to begin negotiations on market access schedules no later than May 15, 2002, and to narrow differences and prepare revised trade rule chapters by August 2002. Over the long-term, these market-opening groups face fundamental questions about how much and how fast to liberalize. Narrowing outstanding differences may be difficult for the four other negotiating groups, which have made initial proposals on rules governing intellectual property; subsidies, antidumping, and countervailing duties; competition policy; and dispute settlement. Some groups face fundamental differences. Other negotiating groups have reached agreement on basic principles but disagree on key details. Two of the three crosscutting themes--smaller economies and civil society--have proven controversial. Because the FTAA's smaller economies are concerned about their capacity to implement such a vast agreement and its potential economic effects on their countries, they have been seeking assurances of technical assistance and other special treatment. The FTAA process has been viewed as not sufficiently open to the public, and past efforts to include nongovernmental interests, such as business, labor, the environment, and academia, have been widely seen as ineffective. Some steps have been taken to address these concerns, and other steps are being considered. As a comprehensive agreement, the FTAA could have wide-ranging effects on U.S. trade and investment with other Western Hemisphere countries. The elimination of tariff and nontariff barriers would improve U.S. market access; put U.S. exporters on an equal footing with competitors in FTAA markets; and expand trade, particularly in highly protected sectors such as agriculture. On the other hand, some protected U.S. sectors, including textiles, apparel, and agriculture, may face increased import competition and declining production if barriers were lowered. |
gao_T-RCED-98-31 | gao_T-RCED-98-31_0 | In addition, the five goals in the September plan—which are to (1) increase opportunities for small business success, (2) transform SBA into a 21st century, leading edge financial institution, (3) help businesses and families recover from disasters, (4) lead small business participation in welfare-to-work, and (5) serve as the voice of America’s small businesses—are, as a group, more clearly linked to SBA’s statutory mission than the goals in the March version of the plan. In general, the September plan does a better job of recognizing that SBA’s success in achieving certain goals and objectives in its plan is dependent on the actions of others. Performance measures are directly linked to 11 of the 14 performance objectives in the plan. SBA’s Strategic Plan Can Be Further Improved
While SBA’s September 30, 1997, strategic plan is an improvement over the March 1997 version that we reviewed, we believe that further revisions to the plan as SBA continues to implement the Results Act and build on current efforts would enable SBA’s plan to better meet the purposes of the Results Act. As noted earlier, while the five goals in the September plan are more clearly linked to SBA’s statutory mission, the relationship of one goal—leading small businesses’ participation in the welfare-to-work effort—to SBA’s mission is unclear. The Results Act requires that strategic plans include a schedule of future program evaluations. However, with the exception of the “interagency coordination” factor, the plan does not link these factors to particular goals or describe how each could affect achievement of the plan’s goals and objectives. The added section also discusses how SBA’s programs and activities interact with other federal agencies’ programs and activities. Unlike the March version that we reviewed, SBA’s September plan includes, as appendices, separate strategic plans for SBA’s Office of Inspector General (IG) and Office of Advocacy. Generally, the goals and objectives in the IG and Advocacy plans appear consistent with, and may contribute to the achievement of, the goals and objectives in SBA’s plan, but the relationship is not explicit. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed the September 30, 1997 strategic plan developed by the Small Business Administration (SBA), pursuant to the Government Performance and Results Act.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) SBA's plan represents an improvement over its March 1997 version; (2) the plan contains the six elements required by the Results Act; (3) the strategic goals, as a group, are more clearly linked to SBA's mission and are more amenable to measurement; (4) the strategies and performance measures are more clearly linked to the objectives that they are intended to achieve and measure; (5) other improvements in the plan encompass a mission statement that now includes the disaster loan program for families and more accurately reflects SBA's statutory authorities and a better recognition that SBA's success in achieving certain goals and objectives in the plan is dependent on the actions of others; (6) an additional section discusses how SBA's programs and activities interact with those of other federal agencies; (7) the plan could be further improved to better meet the purposes of the Results Act; (8) the relationship of one of the plan's goals, leading small business participation in the welfare-to-work effort, to SBA's mission is unclear; (9) the plan does not discuss the human, capital, and other resources needed by SBA to carry out the strategies identified in the plan; (10) the plan does not include comprehensive schedules of future program evaluations for major SBA programs; (11) the plan does not consistently link identified external factors to the particular goal or goals they could affect or describe how how each factor could affect the achievement of the goal; (12) in a departure from its March version, SBA's plan includes as appendices separate strategic plans for SBA's Office of Inspector General and Office of Advocacy; and (13) the relationship between the goals and objectives in the plans included in the appendices and those in SBA's plan is not explicit. |
gao_GAO-09-70 | gao_GAO-09-70_0 | Fees increased by a weighted average of 86 percent per application, based on the fee review completed by USCIS in February 2007. Costing Methodology Did Not Consistently Adhere to Federal Accounting Standards and Principles and Other Guidance
Although the July 2007 fee increases met management’s objective to set fees at a level to recover USCIS’s estimated costs of immigration application processing and adjudication services, the costing methodology USCIS used to develop the fees for each application type did not consistently adhere to federal accounting standards and principles and other guidance. While federal accounting standards allow flexibility for agencies to develop managerial cost accounting practices that are suited to their specific needs and operating environments, they also provide certain specific guidance based on sound cost accounting concepts. USCIS’s methodology was not consistent with federal accounting standards and principles and other guidance in the following aspects: (1) unreimbursed costs paid by other federal entities on behalf of USCIS were not included in USCIS’s estimates of total costs, (2) key assumptions and methods used for allocation of costs to activities and types of applications were not sufficiently justified, (3) assumptions about staff time spent on various activities were not supported by documented rationale or analysis, (4) the cost of premium processing services was not determined, and (5) documentation of the processes and procedures was not sufficient to ensure consistent and accurate implementation of the methodology. Because of these inconsistencies, USCIS cannot support the reasonableness of the cost assignments to the various application types. In other words, costs should be included regardless of which agency pays them. In large part, it consisted of allocating costs on a prorated basis. USCIS did not prepare and document analyses to justify its assumptions that prorated allocations provided a reasonable distribution of those costs. Of the $924 million of overhead costs, $732 million—31 percent of the total $2.329 billion cost—was allocated to field offices based on the number of FTEs assigned to each field office. This approach did not consider USCIS’s approximately 6,100 contract workers and used only approximately 7,900 FTEs of the total federal FTEs of about 10,400 as the basis for distributing overhead costs. For example, documentation of the multistep process USCIS used to allocate overhead costs to activities did not include the percentages used to make these allocations. Accountability Mechanisms Are in Place to Track Use of Fees, and USCIS Is Taking Steps to Strengthen Control over Collections
USCIS has put accountability mechanisms in place to help ensure that it is using regular application fee collections and premium processing fee collections as it intended, and it is taking steps to improve internal control over collection of fees. USCIS reported that it has taken some actions to strengthen service center controls in the short term, and that it is in the process of moving all preadjudication application processing and fee receipt functions from the service centers and field offices to lockbox facilities to further strengthen control over collections. Expenditures for USCIS’s business transformation program, to make long- term improvements to its business processes and technology, come from premium processing fees. USCIS plans to use the entire amount of premium processing fees it received in fiscal year 2008— almost $163 million—for its transformation program. Although controls are in place, USCIS has identified through its monitoring procedures some weaknesses at one of its service centers. Recommendations for Executive Action
To help make USCIS’s costing methodology used for determining application fees consistent with federal accounting standards and principles and to strengthen the reliability of the cost assignments used to set fees, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the Director of USCIS to take the following four actions: identify the full cost of application processing services whether paid directly by USCIS or by other federal entities for USCIS’s benefit, such as the costs of lockbox services paid by Treasury’s FMS and certain retirement benefits to be paid to USCIS retirees by OPM; consider the full costs to the government when USCIS next reviews and sets application fees and document the rationale for decisions made about including or excluding any types of costs in the fee determination process; determine the costs of providing premium processing services to identify the extent to which the $1,000 premium processing fee would cover associated expedited processing costs and infrastructure improvements; and document the processes and procedures of the costing methodology in sufficient detail so that the specific procedures used and the data sources and cost assignment methods employed for each step in the process can be understood and replicated. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) is responsible for granting or denying immigration benefits to individuals. USCIS charges fees for the millions of immigration applications it receives each year to fund the cost of processing and adjudicating them. In February 2007, USCIS completed a study to determine the full costs of its operations and the level at which application fees should be set to recover those costs. USCIS's new fee schedule increased application fees by a weighted average of 86 percent. Almost 96 percent of USCIS's fiscal year 2008 budget of $2.6 billion was expected to have come from fees. GAO was asked to review the methodology USCIS used in its fee review and controls in place over collection and use of fees. In this report, GAO addresses the consistency of the methodology with federal accounting standards and principles and other guidance, including whether key assumptions and methods were sufficiently justified and documented. The report also addresses internal controls USCIS has in place over the collection and use of fees.
What GAO Found
In 2007, USCIS completed a fee review in which USCIS estimated the costs of its immigration application processing and adjudication services and, in accordance with management's objective, set the fees at a level to recover those costs. The methodology USCIS used in its review, however, did not consistently adhere to federal accounting standards and principles and other guidance. While federal accounting standards allow flexibility for agencies to develop managerial cost accounting practices that are suited to their needs, they also provide certain specific guidance based on sound cost accounting concepts. USCIS's methodology, for example, did not include the costs paid by other federal entities on behalf of USCIS. Federal standards and guidance also call for documentation that is sufficient to allow an understanding of and provide justification for the cost assignment processes and data used. USCIS did not adequately document the detailed processes used or sufficiently justify assumptions used in allocating costs to various activities on a prorated basis. As a result, USCIS could not show that its methods provided a reasonable distribution of the costs to the various types of applications. For instance, USCIS allocated $732 million of overhead costs (or 31 percent of total costs)--including information technology operations and maintenance--to offices based on the number of staff full-time equivalents (FTE) in each office. However, USCIS's documentation did not sufficiently justify (1) why cost allocation was used instead of other possible methods or (2) why it did not include about 6,100 contract workers and used only approximately 7,900 FTEs of the total federal FTEs of about 10,400 as the basis for allocation. USCIS also did not adequately justify the equal assignment of activity costs representing 51 percent of total costs to each application type. While such pro rata assignment of costs may be a reasonable method in some circumstances, USCIS did not document its justification for the assumptions made when deciding which costs to allocate on a prorated basis and how those costs should be allocated. Because of these inconsistencies with federal accounting standards and principles and other guidance, USCIS cannot support the reasonableness of cost assignments to the various application types. USCIS has implemented accountability mechanisms to track the use of both regular application fees as well as premium processing fees intended for specific projects. USCIS plans to use its premium processing fee collections to fund its transformation program to make long-term improvements to its business processes and technology. Through its monitoring of fee collection procedures, USCIS has identified some weaknesses at one of its service centers. It has taken actions to strengthen service center controls in the short term, and it is moving all fee receipt functions and the application processing done in preparation for adjudication to lockbox facilities to further strengthen control over collections. |
gao_GAO-04-1006 | gao_GAO-04-1006_0 | The U.S. Government’s Approach to Recovering Foreign Regimes’ Assets Varies Depending on the Goals Pursued
The U.S. government’s approach to recovering assets of foreign regimes varies depending on the U.S. foreign policy and national security goals pursued. Assets can be located throughout the international financial system; identifying their location requires the cooperation of U.S. and foreign financial institutions. Agencies Are Involved in Targeting Assets of an Increasingly Greater Number of Foreign Regime Entities
The Departments of Justice, State, and the Treasury, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the National Security Council have been key actors in foreign regime asset recovery. The mandate of OFAC, the administrator and enforcer of U.S. economic sanctions programs, is to require all U.S. persons, including financial institutions, to freeze targeted assets located in the United States or under the control of a U.S. person outside of the United States. U.S. Government Agencies and Financial Institutions Face a Number of Challenges in Recovering Foreign Regimes’ Assets
U.S. government agencies and financial institutions involved in recovering foreign regimes’ assets face a number of challenges. Third, OFAC’s ability to monitor financial institutions’ compliance with its regulations is limited because it does not have supervisory authority over financial institutions and relies on financial regulators to monitor financial institutions’ OFAC compliance programs. Target Information Needed to Locate and Freeze Financial Assets Is Not Always Readily Available
Law enforcement and intelligence agencies do not always have accurate and complete information, such as the spelling of names, addresses, and dates of birth, to provide to OFAC for distribution to U.S. financial institutions and other countries’ to assist in their efforts to locate assets of targeted foreign regimes. Domestic Laws of Foreign Countries Sometimes Prohibit Freezing and Transferring Assets Located in U.S. Financial Institutions Overseas
The laws of some foreign countries where branches of U.S. financial institutions are located prohibit freezing of targeted assets under U.S. unilateral sanctions. According to OFAC, in these instances and depending on the circumstances, (1) the United States works diplomatically to encourage the foreign governments to allow U.S. financial institutions to comply with OFAC regulations to freeze and, in some cases, transfer the assets; or (2) OFAC issues a license authorizing the financial institution to comply with local law. When a transaction processed through an institution is determined to be a “true hit” against the SDN list, it must, according to law, be blocked. Mechanisms the United States Has Used to Recover Iraqi Assets Could Be Applicable in Future Efforts
The United States has invoked domestic legal authorities and international obligations and used coordinating bodies in its recent efforts to recover Iraqi assets; some of these mechanisms could be applicable to future efforts. Some mechanisms initially developed to combat money laundering and terrorist financing also have applicability to foreign regime asset recovery. The executive order allowed the United States to vest about $1.9 billion of frozen Iraqi assets and transfer them to the appropriate authorities for use in Iraq. However, for a variety of reasons, implementation of the resolution has not yet resulted in the transfer of all frozen assets back to Iraq. Treasury officials stated that other USA PATRIOT Act provisions could facilitate asset recovery efforts in the future. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of our report were to (1) describe the approach the U.S. government uses to recover foreign regimes’ financial assets, (2) examine the challenges the United States faces in recovering foreign regimes’ assets, and (3) examine the mechanisms the United States has used to recover Iraqi assets and their applicability to future efforts. | Why GAO Did This Study
For many years, the United States has used economic sanctions, including the freezing of foreign regimes' assets, when such regimes have been determined to be a threat to the nation. In light of recent efforts to "recover"--or target, identify, freeze, and transfer--Iraqi assets, GAO was asked to examine overall U.S. efforts to recover foreign regimes' assets. This report (1) describes the approach the U.S. government uses to recover foreign regimes' assets, (2) examines the challenges the United States faces in recovering foreign regimes' assets, and (3) examines the mechanisms the United States has used to recover Iraqi assets and their applicability to future efforts.
What GAO Found
The approach the U.S. government takes to recover foreign regimes' assets varies depending on the foreign policy and national security goals pursued. Treasury officials stated that the goal of economic sanctions is to freeze assets of a sanctioned jurisdiction or targeted designee and prohibit U.S. persons from dealing with them. In certain cases, once the foreign policy goals of the sanctions are met, the assets are returned to a country. The Departments of Justice, State, and the Treasury, as well as intelligence and law enforcement agencies, work together in the targeting process. Identifying the location of financial assets throughout the international financial system requires the cooperation of U.S. and foreign financial institutions. The United States has procedures to freeze assets of targeted regimes located in the United States or under the control of U.S. persons. Pursuant to executive orders issued by the President under various authorities, Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) issues regulations that can require assets to be frozen and transactions to be blocked and administers sanctions programs. U.S. government agencies and financial institutions involved in recovering targeted regimes' assets face a number of challenges. First, U.S. agencies may not be able to readily obtain accurate and complete information on targeted entities, such as the spelling of names, addresses, and dates of birth. Financial institutions can also lack complete identifying information on their clients. Second, the laws of some foreign governments complicate the ability of overseas branches of U.S. financial institutions to comply with OFAC regulations. In these situations, the U.S. government encourages the relevant foreign governments to allow U.S. financial institutions to freeze or transfer assets in a manner consistent with U.S. law or Treasury issues a license to allow U.S. financial institutions to comply with local laws. Third, OFAC's ability to monitor financial institutions' compliance with its regulations is limited because it relies on financial regulators to monitor financial institutions' OFAC compliance programs. The United States has used a variety of legal authorities and coordinating bodies in its recent effort to recover Iraqi assets; some of these mechanisms could be applied to future efforts. The USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 allowed the United States to take ownership of $1.9 billion of Iraqi assets and transfer them for use in Iraq reconstruction efforts. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1483 has resulted in the transfer of about $847 million in frozen Iraqi assets to a fund for Iraq. However, factors that include existing claims against the assets and other countries' laws have slowed the transfer of an additional $2.9 billion held in other countries. In addition, some mechanisms developed to combat money laundering and terrorist financing might be applicable to recovering foreign regimes' assets. Although the U.S. government has used various legal authorities and coordinating bodies to recover foreign regimes' assets, it has yet to compile lessons learned from past efforts that could guide future efforts. |
gao_GAO-11-6 | gao_GAO-11-6_0 | Specifically, the schedule did not sufficiently comply with seven of nine key practices that relevant guidance states are important to having a reliable schedule. DHS Has Largely Defined but Has Not Effectively Implemented the Full Range of Needed Contractor Management and Oversight Controls
Federal regulations and relevant guidance recognize effective contractor management and oversight as a key acquisition management discipline. To DHS’s credit, it has largely defined key practices aimed at employing each of these contractor management and oversight controls. Moreover, it has implemented some of them, such as training key contractor management and oversight officials and holding management reviews with the prime contractor. Reasons for these weaknesses include limitations in the defined verification and acceptance deliverable process and a SPO decision to exclude some deliverables from the process, and insufficient time to review technical review documentation. Further, while the SPO has followed key aspects of this process, it has not effectively documented its review of certain deliverables and has not effectively communicated to the prime contractor the basis for rejecting all deliverables. To its credit, CBP has defined policies and procedures for verifying and accepting SBInet deliverables. To its credit, DHS has defined a process for conducting technical reviews, but it has not effectively implemented it. In particular, the SPO did not ensure that all key documentation was reviewed and relevant criteria were satisfied before concluding key technical reviews. Concluding technical reviews without adequate justification has resulted in schedule delays and costly rework. Reasons cited by program officials for these weaknesses include the instability in the scope of the work to be performed, an unexpected temporary stop in Block 1 design and deployment work when SBInet funding was redirected, and the contractor’s use of estimated, rather than actual, costs for subcon work, which are subsequently adjusted when actual costs are rec Without effectively implementing EVM, DHS has not been positioned to identify potential cost and schedule problems early, and thus has not bee able to take timely actions to correct problems and avoid program schedule delays and cost increases. Program Office Has Not Established Timely Performance Baselines
According to relevant guidance, the performance measurement baseline, which is the foundation of an EVM system and the estimated cumulative value of planned work, serves as the value against which performance is measured for the life of the program or task order. Program officials attribute these limitations in establishing comprehensive baselines to instability in the nature of the work to be performed and the prime contractor’s method for determining subcontractor performance. Most significantly, DHS did not adequately document deliverable reviews and communicate the basis for rejecting certain deliverables in writing to the contractor, which contributed to deliverables that did not live up to expectations and necessitated rework and caused later problems. Notwithstanding of a number of contractor management and oversight definition and implementation efforts that DHS executed well, such as defining key processes and practices and training key staff, these above-cited weaknesses collectively mean that DHS’s management and oversight of its prime contractor has been a major contributor to the SBInet program’s well-chronicled history of not delivering promised system capabilities on time and on budget. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve DHS management and oversight of the SBInet prime contractor, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the Commissioner of the U.S. Customs and Border Protection to have the SBI Executive Director, in collaboration with the SBInet Program Director, take the following four actions: Revise and implement, as applicable, contractor deliverable review processes and practices to ensure that (1) contractor deliverables are thoroughly reviewed and are not constrained by late contractor deliverables and imposed milestones, (2) the reviews are sufficiently documented, and (3) the acceptance or the rejection of each contractor deliverable is communicated in writing to the contractor, to include explicit explanations of the basis for any rejections. The department stated that it took exception to our finding that it did not ensure performance measurement baselines were validated in a timely manner, and said that it was not accurate to conclude that the lack of validated baselines precluded the program office from identifying cost and schedule problems and taking corrective action. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to determine the extent to which the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) (1) has defined and implemented effective controls for managing and overseeing the Secure Border Initiative Network (SBInet) prime contractor and (2) is effectively monitoring the prime contractor’s progress in meeting cost and schedule expectations. To determine the extent to which DHS is effectively monitoring the prime contractor’s progress in meeting cost and schedule expectations, we focused on the program’s implementation of earned value management (EVM) because it was the tool used to monitor the contractor’s cost and schedule performance. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Secure Border Initiative Network (SBInet) is to place surveillance systems along our nation's borders and provide Border Patrol command centers with the imagery and related tools and information needed to detect breaches and make agent deployment decisions. To deliver SBInet, DHS has relied heavily on its prime contractor. Because of the importance of effective contractor management and oversight to SBInet, GAO was asked to determine the extent to which DHS (1) defined and implemented effective controls for managing and overseeing the prime contractor and (2) effectively monitored the contractor's progress in meeting cost and schedule expectations. To do this, GAO analyzed key program documentation against relevant guidance and best practices, and interviewed program officials.
What GAO Found
DHS has largely defined but has not adequately implemented the full range of controls that is reflected in relevant guidance and related best practices and is needed to effectively manage and oversee its SBInet prime contractor. To the department's credit, it has defined a number of key policies and procedures for verifying and accepting contract deliverables and conducting technical reviews, such as the criteria that need to be met before commencing and concluding a critical design review. Moreover, it has implemented some of these defined practices, such as those associated with training key contractor management and oversight officials. However, DHS has not effectively implemented other controls. For example, it has not adequately documented its review of contract deliverables and communicated to the prime contractor the basis for rejecting certain deliverables. Further, it has not ensured that key documentation satisfied relevant criteria before concluding key technical reviews. These weaknesses can be attributed in part to limitations in the defined verification and acceptance deliverable process, a program office decision to exclude certain deliverables from the process, and insufficient time to review technical review documentation. All told, DHS has not effectively managed and overseen its SBInet prime contractor, thus resulting in costly rework and contributing to SBInet's well-chronicled history of not delivering promised capabilities and benefits on time and within budget. DHS has not effectively monitored the SBInet prime contractor's progress in meeting cost and schedule expectations. While DHS has used earned value management (EVM), which is a proven management approach for understanding program status and identifying early warning signs of impending schedule delays and cost overruns, it has not ensured that its contractor has effectively implemented EVM. In particular, DHS has not ensured that validated performance baselines (the estimated value of planned work against which performance is measured) were timely, complete, and accurate. For example, the contractor was allowed to perform work on task orders for several months without a validated baseline in place. Further, not all work to be performed was included in the baselines that were eventually established, and the schedules for completing this work did not substantially comply with six of the eight key practices that relevant guidance states are important to having a reliable schedule. Also, DHS regularly received incomplete and anomalous EVM data from the prime contractor, which it had to rely on to measure progress and project the time and cost to complete the program. As a result, DHS has not been able to gain meaningful and proactive insight into potential cost and schedule performance shortfalls, and thus take corrective actions to avoid shortfalls in the future. Program officials attributed these weaknesses in part to the instability in the scope of the work to be performed, and the contractor's use of estimated, rather than actual, costs for subcontractor work and the subsequent adjustments that are made when actual costs are received. This inability has contributed to the program's failure to live up to expectations and to it costing more and taking longer than was necessary.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is making recommendations to DHS aimed at revising and implementing policies and procedures related to contractor deliverables and technical reviews, and improving EVM baselines and data. DHS agreed with GAO's recommendations and described actions to address them, but took exception with selected findings and conclusions regarding EVM implementation. GAO stands by these findings and conclusions for reasons discussed in the report. |
gao_GAO-15-178 | gao_GAO-15-178_0 | Among other things, HFIAA contained the following with respect to insurance: created a premium surcharge that would be deposited in the reserve fund (generally, a $25 surcharge for primary residences and a $250 surcharge for others); restored grandfathered rates removed by the Biggert-Waters Act, effective retroactive to the Biggert-Waters Act’s enactment on July 6, 2012; did not affect the schedule for phasing out subsidized policies for properties such as secondary residences, businesses, and severe repetitive loss properties (rates would continue to increase at 25 percent a year); reinstated subsidized rates for properties that were purchased after or not insured as of July 6, 2012, that had been removed by the Biggert- Waters Act, but required that FEMA increase premium rates on these and many other types of subsidized policies by at least 5 percent up to the caps established by HFIAA for all policies annually; limited average increases for a risk class to 15 percent and individual policy increases to 18 percent; and required FEMA to issue refunds directly to those who paid NFIP premiums under the Biggert-Waters Act in excess of rates set under HFIAA. FEMA is required to provide TMAC’s review report to Congress. FEMA Has Prioritized, Tracked, and Communicated Its Implementation of the Biggert-Waters Act, as Amended by HFIAA
To manage its implementation of changes required by the Biggert-Waters Act and HFIAA, FEMA has: established implementation of the changes as a strategic objective in its 2014-2018 strategic plan; ranked the implementation of HFIAA requirements in terms of priority; established mechanisms for coordinating internally on prioritizing and tracking its implementation efforts; and communicated regularly with external stakeholders. This priority is consistent with the intent of HFIAA, which sought to address affordability concerns by postponing or repealing some Biggert-Waters Act requirements, including provisions that phased out some discounted premiums (subsidized and grandfathered rates). FEMA has established an integration team to oversee its implementation efforts and created regularly updated tracking documents and indicators to prioritize and track implementation. Steps that FEMA has taken to manage its implementation of the Biggert- Waters Act, as amended by HFIAA, are consistent with relevant federal internal control standards. FEMA Faces Challenges in Implementing the Biggert-Waters Act and HFIAA Requirements
FEMA officials and representatives of flood insurance organizations we interviewed cited a number of challenges related to FEMA’s implementation of the required changes, including the complexity of the legislation and timing of the enactment of HFIAA, resource constraints, and the competing program goals of financial solvency and affordability. The implementation of key Biggert-Waters Act and HFIAA mapping requirements must be coordinated with an expert council that was recently established in July 2014 and held its first meeting in September 2014. In February and September 2015, the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) is to deliver two reports that identify approaches for an NFIP affordability framework and nationwide affordability study, respectively. FEMA Has Made Some Insurance-Related Changes but Lacks the Data Needed for Full Implementation
FEMA considered that it had fully met requirements for completing close to half of the Biggert-Waters Act sections (16 of 34) and about one-third of the HFIAA sections (8 of 26) as of December 2014. Mapping-Related Notifications and Appeals
FEMA has made progress in providing mapping-related notifications and is clarifying the appeals reimbursement HFIAA requires. FEMA has executed almost all mitigation assistance requirements under the Biggert-Waters Act. FEMA actuaries also told us that they were considering methods for providing access to policyholders for any property-level data that were available. Affordability Studies
FEMA has taken some action on the affordability studies required by the Biggert-Waters Act and HFIAA, but data challenges have delayed progress. As discussed earlier, FEMA currently cannot distinguish among nonresidential structures, such as businesses and nonprofits. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives in this report were to describe (1) the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) management of the implementation of the Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2012 (Biggert-Waters Act) and Homeowner Flood Insurance Affordability Act of 2014 (HFIAA) and associated challenges and (2) the status of FEMA’s implementation of selected requirements, including whether the agency has met required time frames and established goals. We interviewed FEMA officials responsible for implementing the Biggert-Waters Act, as amended by HFIAA, and representatives from the same 10 organizations discussed above to obtain their perspectives on FEMA’s implementation efforts. We conducted additional interviews with FEMA officials and reviewed FEMA documentation on the status of these selected requirements. Appendix II: Selected Requirements from the Biggert-Waters Act and Homeowner Flood Insurance Affordability Act (HFIAA)
Appendix II: Selected Requirements from the Biggert-Waters Act and Homeowner Flood Insurance Affordability Act (HFIAA)
The following table contains selected requirements from the Biggert- Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act (Biggert-Waters Act) and the Homeowner Flood Insurance Affordability Act (HFIAA) that the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is required to implement. | Why GAO Did This Study
NFIP, which is administered by FEMA, has faced significant financial and management challenges over the years. The Biggert-Waters Act, enacted in July 2012, instituted provisions to help strengthen NFIP's future financial solvency and administrative efficiency. For example, it required FEMA to phase out almost all discounted insurance premiums and establish a reserve fund. As implementation proceeded, however, affected communities raised concerns about some Biggert-Waters Act requirements. HFIAA was enacted in March 2014 and sought to address affordability concerns by repealing or altering some Biggert-Waters Act requirements. GAO was asked to examine the status of FEMA's implementation of the requirements established by the Biggert-Waters Act, as amended by HFIAA.
This report describes (1) FEMA's management of the acts' implementation and associated challenges and (2) the status of FEMA's implementation of selected requirements from the acts. GAO analyzed the Biggert-Waters Act and HFIAA; reviewed FEMA information on the prioritization and tracking of implementation efforts in relation to relevant internal control standards; and reviewed data and documentation on FEMA's status in implementing the Biggert-Waters Act, as amended by HFIAA, in relation to established time frames. Finally, GAO interviewed FEMA officials and representatives from 10 organizations with flood insurance expertise who were selected based on experience and type of organization.
What GAO Found
The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) has established some practices for managing its implementation of required changes under the Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act (Biggert-Waters Act), as amended by the Homeowner Flood Insurance Affordability Act (HFIAA). Consistent with related federal internal control standards, FEMA has collaborated with stakeholders on prioritizing legislative requirements and developed methods to track the status of its implementation efforts. For example, FEMA formed a team of key staff to oversee these efforts and monitor progress through a tracking document that is updated regularly. However, FEMA and representatives of organizations with flood insurance expertise cited a number of challenges that FEMA faces in implementing the new requirements, including resource issues, the complexity of the legislation, and the need to balance the National Flood Insurance Program's (NFIP) financial solvency and affordability goals.
FEMA estimated that it had met requirements to complete almost half of Biggert-Waters Act sections and about one-third of HFIAA sections as of December 2014, and was taking action on others, including required studies. For example,
FEMA prioritized and implemented important HFIAA rate changes that repealed some Biggert-Waters Act rate increases and also initiated refunds to policyholders. However, data limitations have delayed implementation of some other requirements. For example, FEMA is required to make rate changes for business properties. Currently, FEMA cannot distinguish among nonresidential property policies for businesses, nonprofits, and others. FEMA anticipates collecting more specific data in late 2015 that will allow it to make the required adjustments.
As required by the Biggert-Waters Act, FEMA established the Technical Mapping Advisory Council (TMAC), which held its first meeting in September 2014, and anticipates implementing additional Biggert-Waters Act mapping requirements over the next several years.
FEMA reported that it had almost fully implemented Biggert-Waters Act mitigation assistance requirements and had begun researching alternative mitigation methods, as required by HFIAA.
FEMA had also begun implementing outreach and affordability requirements, including establishing an interim Office of the Flood Insurance Advocate.
FEMA also made progress in providing mapping-related notifications to Congress. FEMA is considering methods for providing access to any available property-level data to policyholders that would help clearly communicate flood risk. FEMA has taken some action on an affordability study that the two laws require, but data challenges have delayed progress. The study is required to analyze the impact of eliminating all discounted NFIP premiums (such as subsidized premiums), but FEMA cannot identify all properties that are receiving the discounts. In February and September 2015, the National Academy of Sciences is to deliver two reports that identify approaches for an NFIP affordability framework and nationwide affordability study, respectively. |
gao_GAO-15-488 | gao_GAO-15-488_0 | Some enlisted pay grades have two ranks. DOD’s Policies and Procedures for On- Base Services and Programs Establish Access Requirements for All Servicemembers, Including Junior Enlisted; Implementation Is Influenced by Budget and Utilization Rates at Selected Installations
DOD has policies and procedures at multiple levels—DOD, the military services, and selected installations we visited—that govern servicemember access to on-base services and programs, which includes access for junior enlisted servicemembers. In most cases, the policies we analyzed referenced either the entire enlisted population or the entire installation’s population, and did not distinguish between specific groups—including, for instance, rank or gender, among other things. For example, Defense Health Agency policy regarding health care includes provisions for all active-duty servicemembers, of which junior enlisted servicemembers are a subset, as part of a priority system for access to care. DOD and the military service data-collection mechanisms and resultant data—including surveys, utilization rates of services, and other means of providing feedback—do not fully capture potential access issues associated with on-base services and programs, including those identified in our discussion groups. Those areas include: (1) dining facilities, (2) medical care, and (3) transportation. For example, 6 of the 11 junior enlisted and 5 of the 6 senior enlisted discussion groups reported having problems with or knowledge of problems with scheduling medical appointments in a timely manner. With regard to on-base services and programs, we found that the 2012, 2009, and 2007 Status of Forces Surveys of Active Duty Members asked servicemembers about their satisfaction with the (1) hours of operation of the exchange; (2) convenience of locations of the exchange; (3) availability of medical and dental care; (4) ability to get medical and dental care appointments; (5) waiting time in the clinic; and (6) convenience of locations of medical facilities, but did not include similar questions regarding satisfaction with on-base MWR programs or dining facilities. However, these surveys also did not ask about servicemembers’ access to on-base services or programs. In addition, participants in 9 of 17 discussion groups—6 junior enlisted discussion groups and 3 senior enlisted discussion groups—stated that they believe information is not reaching installation leadership or that feedback provided through other mechanisms, such as the Interactive Customer Evaluation tool, may be ignored or not received by leadership. Further, according to DOD officials, access to on-base services and programs is not believed to be a widespread problem that warrants a department-wide response. Military service officials stated that the questions related to satisfaction with the services and programs used on existing surveys and other data-collection mechanisms are sufficient to obtain needed data and information on any potential access issues. However, although the efforts of these boards and any resultant action may benefit junior enlisted servicemembers through their efforts to address issues for all servicemembers, the focus of these boards is broader than identifying or addressing issues specific to junior enlisted servicemembers. Further, without reviewing existing methods of information sharing on initiatives and other good practices identified at all levels of the department, to include efforts to identify and address junior enlisted access issues and share this information at all levels, the department is missing opportunities to gain valuable information about this population that could, in part, further efforts to provide a quality of life to its servicemembers that encourages them to continue their service and contribute to DOD’s goal of a trained and ready force. Recommendations for Executive Action
To help ensure that junior enlisted servicemembers who need and rely on the services and programs provided on military installations have access when needed and that departmental leadership has visibility over issues affecting this population, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness in collaboration with the Secretaries of the military services and other defense agency leaders to take the following two actions: review current data-collection mechanisms and consider appropriate additions and revisions to help ensure that specific information on junior enlisted servicemember access to on-base services and programs is collected, available, and disseminated to relevant decision makers, and have decision makers take appropriate action on the basis of that information; and review existing methods of information sharing on initiatives and other good practices identified within and across the department, the military services, and individual installations and consider adding mechanisms to better leverage those existing methods—such as the Common Services Task Force—to help ensure that issues associated with junior enlisted servicemember access are identified and, to the extent possible, addressed, and that such information is shared at all levels of the department. DOD’s comments are reprinted in appendix III. To evaluate the extent to which DOD and the military services collect and share information and data on junior enlisted servicemember access to on-base services and programs, we analyzed the most recent DOD, service, and selected installation-level data-collection mechanisms, such as surveys and other feedback mechanisms, to identify questions and information related to the use of, access to, and satisfaction with services and programs on military installations, specifically focusing on questions related to access to on-base services and programs and whether they were targeted to the junior enlisted populations. | Why GAO Did This Study
Junior enlisted servicemembers constitute more than half of DOD's enlisted force. To sustain the force and help ensure continued growth in all ranks, DOD provides a wide array of services and programs on its military bases, including dining facilities; fitness centers; and medical clinics. Senate Report 113-176 included a provision for GAO to review junior enlisted servicemember access to services and programs on military bases.
This report evaluates (1) the extent to which DOD's policies and procedures for on-base services and programs consider access by junior enlisted and what factors influence their implementation; and (2) the extent to which DOD and the military services collect and share information and data on junior enlisted access to on-base services to identify any potential access issues. GAO evaluated DOD, military service, and base policies and data-collection tools; conducted 17 nongeneralizable discussion groups with junior and senior enlisted servicemembers randomly selected at four bases identified to represent a range of size and locations; and interviewed officials from OSD, the services, and four bases.
What GAO Found
Department of Defense (DOD) policies and procedures at multiple levels—the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the military services, and four bases GAO visited—govern on-base services and programs and establish access for all servicemembers, including junior enlisted, who are in the early stages of their military career and in the first four of nine pay grades of the military compensation system. Further, implementation is influenced by several factors. GAO found that policies referenced the entire active-duty, enlisted, or base populations, and did not distinguish between specific groups—such as by pay grade or rank. For example, Defense Health Agency policy regarding medical care includes provisions for all active-duty servicemembers, of which junior enlisted servicemembers are a subset, as part of a priority system for access to medical care. Further, at four bases GAO visited, implementation of policies and procedures was influenced by factors such as available budgetary resources and low usage of services or programs. Base officials stated that budget cuts and sequestration diminished their ability to provide services and programs at a level that met current needs of all servicemembers.
DOD's efforts to collect data on on-base services and programs do not address junior enlisted servicemember access issues, including those identified in GAO-led discussion groups. Further, DOD has mechanisms for sharing information across the department on initiatives and other good practices, but these also do not focus on junior enlisted servicemember access issues. In all 17 discussion groups, participants provided comments—positive and negative—on access to the following: (1) dining facilities, (2) medical care, and (3) transportation. For example, 6 of 11 junior enlisted discussion groups reported having problems scheduling medical appointments in a timely manner. However, GAO found that formal data-collection mechanisms used by DOD, the military services, and four bases—including surveys, utilization rate data, and town halls—did not fully capture potential access issues related to these type of concerns because they did not include (1) direct questions on access to all services and programs, (2) opportunities to follow up on reasons for dissatisfaction, or (3) options for open-ended responses. For example, DOD's Status of Forces Survey of Active Duty Members asks about satisfaction with hours of operation of the commissary, but does not ask about satisfaction with or access to most other services and programs. According to participants in 9 of 17 discussion groups, feedback from informal mechanisms, such as discussions with supervisors where access may be discussed, may not be relayed to decision makers or acted upon once received. Finally, DOD's information-sharing methods include a number of policy boards with representatives from the services, but the efforts are broader than identifying or addressing issues specific to junior enlisted servicemembers. DOD officials stated that they believe access is not a widespread problem and satisfaction questions and other efforts are sufficient to obtain needed data on access. Without reviewing and considering existing data-collection and information-sharing mechanisms and taking action, DOD is missing opportunities to enhance its efforts to provide services and programs that encourage retention and contribute to DOD's goal of a trained and ready force.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOD (1) review data collection mechanisms and consider revisions related to junior enlisted access to services, and take action as needed based on the information, and (2) review existing methods of information sharing and consider adding mechanisms to increase visibility over junior enlisted personnel's access to services. DOD concurred with both recommendations. |
gao_GAO-12-73 | gao_GAO-12-73_0 | About 51 percent of the land in the Arizona border region is managed by the federal government, primarily by the Forest Service within the Department of Agriculture, four agencies within the Department of the Interior—the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), Bureau of Land Management (BLM), Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), and National Park Service (NPS)—and the Department of Defense (DOD). Number, Cause, Size, and Location of Wildland Fires in the Arizona Border Region
From 2006 through 2010, at least 2,467 wildland fires occurred in the Arizona border region. Most of these fires were caused by human activity, burned less than 1 acre each, and were ignited on federal or tribal land. 2). Of the 2,467 wildland fires included in our review, the majority of the fires—1,553, or 63 percent—were ignited on federal or tribal lands. Fire suppression costs. Impacts on ranching operations. Impacts on tourism. According to our analysis of federal emergency treatment plans and discussions with federal agency and tribal officials, the most common environmental effects of wildland fire in the region are expansion of nonnative plant species, degraded endangered species habitat, and soil erosion. Federal Agencies Did Not Conduct Investigations of All Human-Caused Wildland Fires and Thus Cannot Determine the Number Ignited by Illegal Border Crossers
The frequency with which illegal border crossers have caused wildland fires on federal lands in the Arizona border region is not fully known, in part because federal land management agencies did not conduct investigations of all human-caused wildland fires that occurred on their lands as called for by interagency policy. Federal Fire Investigators Identified Illegal Border Crossers as a Suspected Cause of Ignition in 30 of the 77 Fires They Investigated
Based on our review of agency investigation reports, illegal border crossers were a suspected cause of ignition for 30 of the 77 investigated wildland fires, or about 39 percent. Without Comprehensive Fire Investigation Results, Federal Agencies Lack Key Data Needed to Target Their Fire Prevention Efforts
Without complete data on the cause of wildland fires on the lands that they manage, federal agencies are hampered in their ability to target their efforts and resources at preventing future wildland fires. The Presence of Illegal Border Crossers Has Complicated Fire Suppression Activities, and Agencies’ Responses May Not Fully Address the Issue
The presence of illegal border crossers has increased the complexity of fire suppression activities in the border region, according to federal agency officials, because it can endanger firefighters’ safety, complicate the use of radio communications, and limit the use of certain types of fire suppression activities. Firefighters may be distracted by the presence of illegal border crossers. Agencies Have Taken Steps to Mitigate Threats to Firefighters in the Arizona Border Region but Do Not Have a Formal Risk-Based Approach for Using Their Resources
The Forest Service has taken a number of actions to mitigate the threats to firefighters’ safety in the Arizona border region—which other agencies have generally followed. 1. However, such an approach has not been developed or implemented for the Arizona border region. Recommendations for Executive Action
We recommend that the following five actions be taken: To ensure agencies have the data needed to identify wildland fire prevention activities and to ensure resources are effectively targeted, the Secretaries of Agriculture and the Interior should direct the Chief of the Forest Service, the Directors of the Bureau of Land Management, Fish and Wildlife Service, and National Park Service, and the Assistant Secretary for Indian Affairs to take the following actions: (1) re-examine the policy that all human-caused wildland fires be investigated; (2) once the agencies have determined the appropriate level of investigations, develop a strategy for determining which fires to investigate, including specific criteria to help select and prioritize those fire incidents that should be investigated; and (3) develop a systematic process to use the information identified in the investigations to better target fire prevention activities and resources. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
The objectives of our review were to determine (1) the number, cause, size, and location of wildland fires in Arizona that occurred within 100 miles of the U.S.-Mexico border from 2006 through 2010; (2) economic and environmental effects of significant human-caused wildland fires (i.e., those fires that burned 10 or more acres); (3) the extent to which federal agencies determined that illegal border crossers were the ignition source of fires on federal lands; and (4) ways, if any, in which the presence of illegal border crossers has affected fire suppression activities in the Arizona border region. Finally, we visited the region and discussed with federal, tribal, and state officials, as well as private industry representatives and private citizens in the ranching community, the economic and environmental damage that has occurred as a result of human-caused wildland fires. Because of extensive resource commitments on the part of the agencies in response to the severe 2011 wildland fire season in Arizona and the amount of resources needed to provide us with investigation reports, we limited our request to investigation reports for human-caused wildland fires burning at least 1 acre, which cumulatively comprised more than 99 percent of the acreage burned by human-caused wildland fires in the region from 2006 through 2010. | Why GAO Did This Study
Wildland fires can result from both natural and human causes. Human-caused wildland fires are of particular concern in Arizona--especially within 100 miles of the U.S.-Mexico border because this is a primary area of entry for illegal border crossers and GAO has previously reported that illegal border crossers have been suspected of igniting wildland fires. Over half of the land in the Arizona border region is managed by the federal government--primarily by the Department of Agriculture's Forest Service and four agencies within the Department of the Interior. These agencies collaborate with state, tribal, and local entities to respond to wildland fires. GAO was asked to examine, for the region, the (1) number, cause, size, and location of wildland fires from 2006 through 2010; (2) economic and environmental effects of human-caused wildland fires burning 10 or more acres; (3) extent to which illegal border crossers were the ignition source of wildland fires on federal lands; and (4) ways in which the presence of illegal border crossers has affected fire suppression activities. GAO reviewed interagency policies and procedures; analyzed wildland fire data; and interviewed federal, tribal, state, and local officials, as well as private citizens..
What GAO Found
From 2006 through 2010, at least 2,467 wildland fires occurred in the Arizona border region. Of this number, 2,126, or about 86 percent, were caused by human activity. The majority of these fires--1,364--burned less than 1 acre each. About 63 percent or 1,553 of the 2,467 fires were ignited on federally managed land or tribal land. Human-caused wildland fires that burned 10 or more acres had a number of economic and environmental impacts on the Arizona border region, but these impacts cannot be fully quantified because comprehensive data are not available. Specifically, these fires resulted in (1) over $35 million in fire suppression costs by federal and state agencies, (2) destruction of property, (3) impacts on ranching operations, and (4) impacts on tourism. Similarly, these fires had several environmental impacts, such as the expansion of nonnative plant species, degraded endangered species habitat, and soil erosion. However, the full economic and environmental impacts cannot be determined because complete information about these impacts is not available. The total number of fires ignited by illegal border crossers on federal lands in the Arizona border region is not fully known, in part because federal land management agencies have not conducted investigations of all human-caused wildland fires that occurred on these lands, as called for by agency policy, and the agencies do not have a strategy for selecting fires they do investigate. Of the 422 human-caused wildland fires that occurred on Forest Service, Interior, or tribal lands and burned at least 1 acre from 2006 through 2010, only 77 were investigated. According to land management agency officials, the lack of trained fire investigators was the primary reason for the limited number of investigations. Of the investigations conducted, 30 identified illegal border crossers as a suspected source of ignition. Agency policy notes that identifying trends in fire causes is critical to the success of fire prevention programs, but without better data on the specific ignition sources of human-caused wildland fires in the region, the agencies are hampered in their ability to target their efforts to prevent future wildland fires. The presence of illegal border crossers has complicated fire suppression activities in the Arizona border region. According to agency officials, the presence of illegal border crossers has increased concerns about firefighter safety and, in some instances, has required firefighters to change or limit the tactics they use in suppressing fires. For example, the presence of illegal border crossers has limited firefighting activities at night and complicated the use of aerial firefighting methods. The agencies have taken some steps to mitigate the risks to firefighters by, for example, using law enforcement to provide security. However, none of the agencies have developed or implemented a risk-based approach for addressing these challenges. Consequently, law enforcement resources are routinely dispatched to all fires regardless of the risk, which may prevent the agencies from using their limited resources most efficiently. Moreover, while the Forest Service has developed a formal policy for addressing the risks to firefighters in the region, the other agencies have neither formally adopted this policy nor developed their own.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends, among other things, that the agencies develop strategies for selecting fires to investigate and establish a risk-based approach for utilizing law enforcement resources. In their comments on a draft of this report, the Forest Service and the Department of the Interior generally agreed with these recommendations. |
gao_GAO-08-1015T | gao_GAO-08-1015T_0 | While the state plans we reviewed indicated general compliance with SAFETEA-LU’s requirements for preparing strategic highway safety plans, states do not yet have the crash data analysis systems needed to identify and select possible safety improvements as set forth in SAFETEA-LU. Our review of 25 state strategic highway safety plans and six site visits indicated that, to varying degrees, states lack key components of crash data analysis systems: All 50 states maintain data on the crashes that occur on all public roadways in the state, but in the 25 states we reviewed, the information on crash locations was typically not in a geographic format (GIS or GPS) suitable for mapping. Until states have obtained the necessary data and software, they cannot conduct the kind of data analysis specified by SAFETEA-LU—namely, identifying and ranking hazardous locations on all public roads, determining appropriate remedies, and estimating project costs. This kind of analysis is also necessary to generate 5 percent reports that fully meet the requirements for these reports set forth in SAFETEA-LU, including requirements for information on remedies and costs. Many of the 5 percent reports we reviewed lack this required information. FHWA Assisted States in Preparing Strategic Highway Safety Plans, but Has Not Set Deadlines to Obtain All Needed Data
FHWA provided guidance and technical assistance to states in preparing strategic highway safety plans, and FHWA division officials participated in each state’s planning process. FHWA’s guidance included memorandums describing new HSIP program procedures and a reference guide on strategic planning. FHWA set August 31, 2009, as a deadline for states to develop the crash location data needed to map crashes on all public roads. In its guidance on the 5 percent report, FHWA gave states leeway in interpreting the act’s requirements and did not specify a methodology. It Is Too Soon to Evaluate Results of States’ Efforts Since SAFETEA-LU, but Preliminary Evidence Raises Questions about whether Certain Program Provisions Are Aligned with States’ Safety Priorities
As previously noted, federal and state officials told us that the strategic highway safety planning process improved collaboration and safety planning, but it is too early to evaluate the results of states’ efforts to carry out HSIP since SAFETEA-LU’s enactment, especially the results of infrastructure projects identified through the strategic highway safety planning process. First, states have generally not taken advantage of HSIP’s flexible funding provision, which allows them to use HSIP funding for noninfrastructure projects. Second, the rail-highway crossing set-aside may target a low-priority type of project for some states, although other states continue to emphasize this area. Few States Used HSIP Flexible Funding Provision for Behavioral and Emergency Medical Services Projects
States made limited use of the HSIP flexible funding provision that allows them to transfer up to 10 percent of their HSIP funds to behavioral and emergency medical services projects if they have adopted a strategic highway safety plan and certified that they have met all their safety infrastructure needs. As noted earlier, states designate their top safety priorities as emphasis areas in their strategic highway safety plans and identify their most hazardous locations in their 5 percent reports. FHWA Office of Safety officials agreed that the program’s funding, which accounts for approximately 17 percent of HSIP authorizations, was high based on the number of fatalities that occur at rail-highway crossings. States Are in the Early Stages of Implementing the High-Risk Rural Road Program, and Data Limitations May Be Slowing Implementation
Many states are still in the early stages of implementing the set-aside program for high-risk rural roads and have yet to obligate significant funds for projects, and data limitations may be hindering their ability to target program funds to eligible projects. Limited data on rural roads—including data on crash locations and local roadway characteristics—may be hindering the program’s implementation by making it difficult for some states to identify roads that conform to the definition of high-risk rural roads in SAFETEA-LU. | Why GAO Did This Study
About 43,000 traffic fatalities occur annually, and another 290,000 people are seriously injured on the nation's roads. To reduce these numbers, the Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users (SAFETEA-LU) nearly doubled funding for the Federal Highway Administration's (FHWA) Highway Safety Improvement Program (HSIP), authorizing $5.1 billion for 2006 through 2009. SAFETEA-LU also added requirements for states to develop strategic highway safety plans that cover all aspects of highway safety, including infrastructure, behavioral (education and enforcement), and emergency medical services projects; develop crash data analysis systems; and publicly report on the top 5 percent of hazardous locations on all their public roads. SAFETEA-LU also set aside funds for a legacy rail-highway crossing program and a new high-risk rural road program. This testimony provides preliminary information on the implementation of HSIP since SAFETEA-LU. It is based on ongoing work that addresses (1) states' implementation of HSIP following SAFETEA-LU, (2) FHWA's guidance and assistance for states, and (3) results of HSIP to date, including for the two set-aside programs. To conduct this study, GAO visited 6 states, judgmentally selected based on highway safety attributes, analyzed plans and reports from these 6 states and 19 randomly selected states, and interviewed FHWA and state safety officials.
What GAO Found
All states submitted strategic highway safety plans and reports listing the top 5 percent of their hazardous locations, according to FHWA. The 25 state plans GAO reviewed generally cover all aspects of highway safety, but the 25 states have not fully developed the required crash data analysis systems. FHWA and state safety officials cited the collaboration that occurred among safety stakeholders in developing the plans as a positive influence on state safety planning. Many of the 25 states lacked key components of crash data analysis systems, including crash location data, roadway characteristics data, and software for analyzing the data. As a result, most states cannot identify and rank hazardous locations on all public roads, determine appropriate remedies, and estimate costs, as required by SAFETEA-LU, and their 5 percent reports often lack required information on remedies and costs. FHWA provided written guidance and training to assist the states, especially in preparing their strategic highway safety plans, and participated in every state's strategic safety planning process. However, FHWA has not required states to submit schedules for obtaining complete roadway characteristics data, and because states lack complete data, FHWA's guidance on the 5 percent reports did not specify a methodology. As a result, states' 5 percent reports vary widely, raising questions about how this report can be used. It is too soon to evaluate the results of HSIP as carried out under SAFETEA-LU because states need more time to identify, implement, and evaluate projects they have undertaken since adopting their strategic highway safety plans. However, preliminary evidence indicates that some HSIP provisions may not be aligned with states' safety priorities. First, most states have not taken advantage of a new spending provision that allows states to use some HSIP funds for behavioral or emergency medical services projects, partly because a certification requirement--that all state highway safety infrastructure needs have been met--may make them reluctant to do so. Second, the rail-highway crossing set-aside program does not target the top safety priorities of some states. Lastly, states are still in the early stages of implementing the high-risk rural road set-aside program, and data limitations may make it difficult for some of them to identify qualifying projects, especially for locally owned rural roads. FHWA agreed with GAO's findings. |
gao_GAO-16-121T | gao_GAO-16-121T_0 | Legislative Challenges to Transporting Spent Nuclear Fuel
As we previously reported, DOE does not have clear legislative authority for either consolidated interim storage or for permanent disposal at a site other than Yucca Mountain and, as such, there is no facility to which DOE can transport commercial spent nuclear fuel. Without clear authority, DOE cannot make the transportation decisions necessary regarding commercial spent nuclear fuel. NRC’s guidelines on spent nuclear fuel dry storage limit spent nuclear fuel temperature to 752 degrees Fahrenheit (400 degrees Celsius). Societal Challenges to Transporting Spent Nuclear Fuel
As we found in October 2014, public acceptance is key to any aspect of a spent nuclear fuel management and disposition program, including transportation. Specifically, unless and until there is a broad understanding of the issues associated with management of spent nuclear fuel, specific stakeholders and the general public may be unlikely to support any spent nuclear fuel program. In particular, a program that has not yet been developed or for which a site has not been identified may have challenges in obtaining public acceptance. Moreover, we reported in April 2011 and October 2014 that any spent nuclear fuel management program is going to take decades to develop and to implement and that maintaining public acceptance over that length of time will face significant challenges. Of particular concern is having to transport spent In October 2014, we reported that according to experts and stakeholders, social media has been used effectively to provide information to the public through coordinated outreach efforts by organizations with an interest in spent nuclear fuel policy. Some of these organizations oppose DOE’s strategy and the information they distribute reflects their agendas. In contrast, we reported that DOE had no coordinated outreach strategy, including social media. We recommended that DOE develop and implement a coordinate outreach strategy for providing information to specific stakeholders and the general public on federal activities related to managing spent nuclear fuel—which would include transportation planning. DOE generally agreed with our recommendation. | Why GAO Did This Study
Spent nuclear fuel—the used fuel removed from commercial nuclear power reactors—is an extremely harmful substance if not managed properly. The nation's inventory of spent nuclear fuel has grown to about 72,000 metric tons currently stored at 75 sites in 33 states, primarily where it was generated.
Under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, DOE was to investigate Yucca Mountain, a site about 100 miles northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada, for the disposal of spent nuclear fuel. DOE terminated its work at Yucca Mountain in 2010 and now plans to transport the spent nuclear fuel to interim storage sites beginning in 2021 and 2024, then to a permanent disposal site by 2048. Transportation of spent nuclear fuel is a major element of any policy adopted to manage and dispose of spent nuclear fuel.
This testimony discusses three key challenges related to transporting spent nuclear fuel: legislative, technical, and societal. It is based on reports GAO issued from November 2009 to October 2014.
What GAO Found
Based on its prior work, GAO found three key challenges related to the transportation of spent nuclear fuel: legislative, technical, and societal.
Societal challenges . As GAO reported in October 2014, public acceptance is key for any aspect of a spent nuclear fuel management and disposition program—including transporting it—and maintaining that acceptance over the decades needed to implement a spent fuel management program is challenging. In that regard, GAO reported that in order for stakeholders and the general public to support any spent nuclear fuel program—particularly one for which a site has not been identified—there must be a broad understanding of the issues associated with management of spent nuclear fuel. Also, GAO found that some organizations that oppose DOE have effectively used social media to promote their agendas to the public, but that DOE had no coordinated outreach strategy, including social media. GAO recommended that DOE develop and implement a coordinated outreach strategy for providing information to the public on their spent nuclear fuel program. DOE generally agreed with GAO's recommendation.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is making no new recommendations. |
gao_GAO-07-196T | gao_GAO-07-196T_0 | Generally, the formation documents, or articles, must give the company’s name, an address where official notices can be sent, share information (for corporations), and the names and signatures of the persons incorporating. 1). 2). Two states require some information on officers on company formation documents, and 10 require some information on directors. Third-party agents we spoke with generally said that beyond contact information for billing the company and for forwarding legal and tax documents, they collect only the information states require for company formation documents or periodic reports. A few agents said that even when they collected information on company ownership and management, they might not keep records of it, in part because company documents filed with the state are part of the public record. Nearly all of the states reported that they review filings for the required information, fees, and availability of the proposed company name. However, law enforcement officials told us that information they had seen suggested that U.S. shell companies were increasingly being used for illicit activities. In some cases, the actual owners may include their personal information on official documents. This case was not prosecuted because investigators could not identify critical ownership information. More Company Ownership Information Could Be Useful to Law Enforcement, but Concerns Exist about Collecting It
States and agents recognized the positive impacts of collecting ownership information when companies are formed. However, state officials and agents we surveyed and interviewed indicated that collecting and verifying ownership information could have negative effects. These could include: Increased time, costs, and workloads for state offices and agents: Many states reported that the time needed to review and approve company formations would increase and said that states would incur costs for modifying forms and data systems. Lost state revenue: Some state officials and others we interviewed felt that if all state information requirements were not uniform, the states with the most stringent requirements could lose business to other states or even countries, reducing state revenues. Finally, as noted, some states do not require periodic reports, and law enforcement officials noted that a shell company being used for illicit purposes might not file required periodic reports in any case. Also, according to industry experts, LLCs usually prepare and maintain operating agreements as well. However, accessing these lists may be problematic, and the documents themselves might not be accurate and might not reveal the true beneficial owners of a company. Concluding Remarks
In preparing our April 2006 report, we encountered a variety of legitimate concerns about the merits of collecting ownership information on companies formed in the United States. On the one hand, federal law enforcement agencies were concerned about the existing lack of information, because criminals can easily use shell companies to mask the identities of those engaged in illegal activities. From a law enforcement perspective, having more information on company ownership would make using shell companies for illicit activities harder, give investigators more information to use in pursuing the actual owners, and could improve the integrity of the company formation process in the United States. | Why GAO Did This Study
Companies, which are the basis of most commercial activities in market-based economies, may be used for illicit as well as legitimate purposes. Because companies can be used to hide activities such as money laundering, some states have been criticized for requiring too little information about companies when they are formed, especially concerning owners. This testimony draws on GAO's April 2006 report Company Formations: Minimal Ownership Information Is Collected and Available (GAO-06-376), which addressed (1) the information states and other parties collect on companies, (2) law enforcement concerns about the role of companies in illicit activities and the information available on owners, and (3) the implications of collecting more ownership information. GAO surveyed all 50 states and the District of Columbia, reviewed state laws, and interviewed a variety of industry, law enforcement, and other government officials.
What GAO Found
Most states do not require ownership information at the time a company is formed or on the annual and biennial reports most corporations and limited liability companies (LLC) must file. Four of the 50 states and the District of Columbia require some information on members (owners) of LLCs. Some states require companies to list information on directors, officers, or managers, but these persons are not always owners. Nearly all states screen company filings for statutorily required information such as the company's name and an address where official notices can be sent, but no states verify the identities of company officials. Third-party agents may submit formation documents for a company but usually collect only billing and statutorily required information and rarely verify it. Federal law enforcement officials are concerned that criminals are increasingly using U.S. "shell" companies--companies with generally no operations--to conceal their identities and illicit activities. Though the magnitude of the problem is hard to measure, officials said that such companies are increasingly involved in criminal investigations at home and abroad. The information states collect on companies has been helpful in some cases, as names on the documents can generate additional leads. But some officials said that available information was limited and that they had closed cases because the owners of a company under investigation could not be identified. State officials and agents said that collecting company ownership information could be problematic. Some noted that collecting such information could increase the cost and time involved in approving company formations. A few states and agents said that they might lose business to other states, countries, or agents that had less stringent requirements. Finally, officials and agents were concerned about compromising individuals' privacy, as information on company filings that had historically been protected would become part of the public record. |
gao_GAO-03-540T | gao_GAO-03-540T_0 | While major airlines often do not serve small communities directly, many have agreements with smaller regional airlines to provide air service to small communities. The federal government has assisted in developing air service both through the EAS program, which subsidizes air service to eligible communities and the Pilot Program, which provided grants to foster effective approaches to improving air service to small communities. Local and State Air Service Improvement Efforts Fall Into Three Main Categories, but Financial Assistance Has Proven Most Effective
Our recent review of nearly 100 small community air service improvement efforts undertaken by states, local governments, or airports showed that communities attempted three main categories of efforts (see Table 1): studies, like those used by communities in Texas and New Mexico, to determine the potential demand for new or enhanced air service; marketing, like Paducah, Kentucky’s, “Buy Local, Fly Local” advertising campaign, used to educate the public about the air service available or Olympia, Washington’s, presentations to airlines to inform them about the potential for new or expanded service opportunities; and financial incentives, such as the “travel bank” program implemented by Eugene, Oregon, in which local businesses pledged future travel funds to encourage an airline to provide new or additional service. Financial incentives can attract new or enhanced air service to a community, but incentives do not guarantee that the service will be sustained when the incentives end. Two Federal Programs Which Aid Small Communities Face Budgetary Pressures and Questions About Their Effectiveness
The two major federal efforts to help small communities attract or retain air service are the EAS program and the Pilot Program. Two key factors will likely continue to increase EAS program costs in the future. First, more communities may require subsidized service. Demand Is Heavy for Pilot Program Funds but It Is Too Early to Assess Program Effectiveness
In its first year of operation, small communities demonstrated an extraordinary demand for air service development funds. Implications for Future Federal Efforts to Assist Small Communities
As air service to small communities becomes increasingly limited and as the national economy continues to struggle, questions about the efficacy of those programs highlight issues regarding the type and extent of federal assistance for small community air service. Reauthorization provides an opportunity for the Congress to clarify the federal strategy for assisting small communities with commercial air service. What role should state and local governments play in helping small communities secure air service? Options to Enhance the Long-term Viability of the Essential Air Service Program. Commercial Aviation: Air Service Trends at Small Communities Since October 2000. Aviation Competition: Challenges in Enhancing Competition in Dominated Markets. | Why GAO Did This Study
Small communities have long faced challenges in obtaining or retaining the commercial air service they desire. These challenges are increasing as many U.S. airlines try to stem unprecedented financial losses through numerous cost-cutting measures, including reducing or eliminating service in some markets, often small communities. Congress will be considering whether to reauthorize its federal assistance programs for small communities. GAO was asked to describe the kinds of efforts that states and local communities have taken to enhance air service at small communities; federal programs for enhancing air service to small communities; and issues regarding the type and extent of federal assistance to enhance air service to small communities.
What GAO Found
Small communities have taken a variety of steps to try to obtain or improve air service, such as marketing to increase passengers' demand for local service or offering financial incentives to airlines to attract new or enhanced service. At communities GAO studied in depth, financial incentives were most effective in attracting new service. However, the additional service often ceased when incentives ended. The two key federal programs to help small communities with air service face increasing budgetary pressures and questions about their effectiveness. Demand for these programs is heavy and may increase as airlines reduce service to communities. The Essential Air Service program subsidizes carriers that provide air service to eligible small communities. However, program costs have tripled since 1995, and fewer passengers use the subsidized local service. Most choose to drive to their destination or to fly to and from another nearby airport with more service or lower fares. The Small Community Air Service Development Pilot Program, in its first year of operation, provided $20 million in grants to help small communities enhance service. Most programs funded appear similar to those undertaken by communities and may not result in sustainable service enhancements. Questions about the efficacy of these programs highlight issues regarding the type and extent of federal assistance for small community air service. Reauthorization provides an opportunity for the Congress to clarify the federal strategy for assisting small communities with air service. |
gao_GAO-16-625 | gao_GAO-16-625_0 | Among other things, the title IV-E program requires that states and tribes: make reasonable efforts, consistent with the health and safety of the child, to preserve and reunify families (1) prior to a child’s placement in foster care, to prevent the need for removing the child; and (2) to make it possible for the child to safely return home; prepare a written case plan for each child receiving foster care maintenance payments and ensure periodic court or administrative review of each such case; and, regularly hold a permanency hearing to determine the case goal for the child (to be held at least every 12 months) and make reasonable efforts to finalize the case goal—reunification, adoption, legal guardianship, placement with a fit and willing relative, or, where appropriate, another planned permanent living arrangement. Tribes that receive title IV-B funding and operate foster care programs must also comply with certain title IV-E requirements, including those related to case goals. The Preventing Sex Trafficking and Strengthening Families Act, enacted in 2014, restricted the use of APPLA as a case goal to children age 16 and older, although it delayed implementation for children in foster care under the responsibility of an Indian tribe. Data Show That the Use of APPLA Was Lower for Indian Children than Non- Indian Children and Children in Both Groups Had A Similar Number of Foster Care Placements
A Lower Percentage of Indian Children Had APPLA as a Case Goal Compared to Non-Indians, though a Higher Percentage of Indians Were Younger than 16
Available data from HHS show that a lower percentage of Indian children were assigned APPLA as a case goal at the end of fiscal year 2014 compared to non-Indian children. According to AFCARS data, about 6.1 percent of Indian children were assigned APPLA as a case goal (approximately 1,200 children) compared to 8.3 percent of non-Indian children (approximately 33,000 children). Indian and Non-Indian Children with APPLA as a Case Goal Had a Similar Number of Placements while in Foster Care, but a Lower Percentage of Indian Children Were Placed in Institutional Care
On average, Indian and non-Indian children with APPLA as a case goal moved among foster care homes about the same number of times (see table 3). Most Selected Tribes Did Not Anticipate Challenges Implementing APPLA Changes, yet Some Reported Other Challenges in Establishing Permanency
Most Selected Tribes We Interviewed Did Not Anticipate Challenges in Limiting APPLA to Older Children and Reported Using APPLA Infrequently
Most tribal officials we interviewed reported that they did not anticipate challenges associated with limiting the use of the APPLA case goal to children aged 16 and older. However, these tribes told us that they assign APPLA rarely and only after determining that other case goals, such as reunification, adoption, or guardianship—which are required to be considered before APPLA is used—were not possible or appropriate. These tribal officials told us that APPLA is sometimes used for children who are placed in therapeutic foster homes where they receive specialized care. Of these tribes, two reported using the APPLA case goal extensively for children in tribal foster care. The tribal official we spoke with said that when the APPLA restriction takes effect, they will have to pursue guardianships for children younger than 16 who had previously been assigned an APPLA case goal. HHS Has Provided Information and Some Assistance to Tribes on APPLA and on Establishing Permanent Homes, but Tribes Reported Low Participation in GAP
HHS has provided information and some assistance to tribes on implementing the change to APPLA, including policy guidance and technical assistance through HHS regional offices, and some support for establishing permanency for children in tribal foster care. Officials from 5 tribes reported that because GAP was not included as an option in their title IV-E tribal-state agreements, families with guardianship arrangements do not receive GAP payments. As part of its overarching goal to support underserved and underrepresented populations, ACF’s 2015-2016 strategic plan includes a goal for working with tribes to increase their capacity to promote child safety, permanency, and well-being. However, most tribes we interviewed were not participating in the program. Recommendation for Executive Action
To help improve tribes’ ability to maintain safe, stable, and permanent care for children, the Secretary of Health and Human Services should direct the Children’s Bureau to explore the reasons for low tribal participation and identify actions to increase this participation in the title IV-E Guardianship Assistance Program. Through such discussions, HHS could identify ways that regional office staff might help state agencies resolve any challenges to GAP participation that tribes experience at the state level. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report examines: (1) what available data show about Indian children in foster care compared to all other children in foster care; (2) the extent to which selected tribal child welfare agencies face challenges in addressing recent changes to APPLA and in establishing permanent homes for children in tribal foster care; and (3) the extent to which HHS has assisted tribal child welfare agencies in implementing the APPLA change and addressing any challenges to establishing permanent homes. Because the fiscal year 2014 AFCARS dataset does not have a measure for the APPLA case goal, we used long-term foster care and emancipation as proxy measures for APPLA. Data for certain other children under the care and custody of tribal child welfare agencies are not submitted into AFCARS. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Preventing Sex Trafficking and Strengthening Families Act, enacted in 2014, limited the use of APPLA as a case goal to children aged 16 and older. The Act made this provision effective 3 years after enactment for children under tribal responsibility. Some experts raised concerns that tribes may use the APPLA case goal to retain tribal connections for hard-to-place children, such as younger children with special needs. GAO was asked to explore tribes' views on these matters.
This report examines: (1) data comparing Indian and non-Indian children in foster care; (2) challenges selected tribal child welfare agencies may face in addressing changes to APPLA and establishing permanent homes for children in tribal foster care; and (3) HHS assistance to tribes in implementing the APPLA change and addressing any challenges to establishing permanent homes. GAO reviewed relevant federal laws, regulations, and HHS guidance; analyzed HHS's fiscal year 2014 data on child welfare agencies' foster care case plans; and interviewed officials from 36 tribes that receive federal child welfare funding from six states with high numbers of tribes receiving this funding. GAO also interviewed HHS officials and officials at six state child welfare agencies.
What GAO Found
To receive federal child welfare funding, state and tribal child welfare agencies must comply with certain requirements, including developing a permanency plan for the child that identifies how the child will exit the foster care system to a permanent home (“case goal”). If other case goals, such as reunifying with parents, adoption, or guardianship are not possible or appropriate, a child may be assigned “another planned permanent living arrangement” (APPLA) as a case goal. Unlike other case goals, children assigned an APPLA case goal are normally expected to remain in foster care until they reach adulthood, which could result in young children remaining in foster care for many years. Because available foster care data do not include a measure for the APPLA case goal, GAO used long-term foster care and emancipation as proxy measures for this case goal. These data show that in 2014 about 6.1 percent of Indian children had APPLA as a case goal, compared to 8.3 percent of non-Indian children. Of the approximately 1,200 Indian children who were assigned an APPLA case goal, 41 percent were younger than 16, while of the approximately 33,000 non-Indian children with this case goal, 23 percent were younger than 16. These data also show, on average, that Indian and non-Indian children with APPLA as a case goal moved among foster homes about the same number of times.
Most tribal officials GAO interviewed reported that they did not anticipate challenges in implementing the limitation on the use of APPLA to children age 16 and older, but many reported other challenges to establishing permanent homes for children in tribal foster care. Some organizations expressed the view that the APPLA age restriction would compel tribes to pursue other arrangements with non-Indian homes if they could not allow a child to remain in foster care with an Indian family. However, tribal officials GAO interviewed said that they rarely use APPLA and instead pursue reunification with family members or other case goals, such as guardianship. At the same time, tribal officials reported challenges with licensing foster family homes and resource constraints that may make establishing permanent homes—including guardianships—difficult.
The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) has provided information on APPLA through a listserv and information memoranda and some assistance to tribes in establishing permanent homes for children in foster care. However, many tribes GAO interviewed indicated that they were not receiving Guardianship Assistance Program funds under title IV-E of the Social Security Act which provide support for children exiting foster care to relative guardianships. Guardianship can be a useful alternative to APPLA when reunification and adoption are not viable options. Of the 36 tribes that GAO contacted, 14 reported that they did not participate in the program because it was not included in their title IV-E tribal-state agreements or the tribe faced challenges at the state level, among other reasons. One of HHS's strategic goals is to work with tribes to increase their capacity to promote child safety, permanent homes, and well-being. By taking actions to support tribes' participation in the Guardianship Assistance Program, HHS could help them receive funds to help establish permanent homes for children in tribal foster care, including those who might be affected by the APPLA change.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that HHS explore the reasons for low tribal participation in the federal guardianship program and identify actions to increase tribal participation. HHS agreed with our recommendation. |
gao_GAO-16-242 | gao_GAO-16-242_0 | The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, as amended (ERISA), directs the Secretary of Labor to “maintain an ongoing program of outreach to the public designed to effectively promote retirement income savings by the public.” With regard to replacement rates specifically, ERISA also directs the Secretary of Labor to establish a website that includes a “means for individuals to calculate their estimated retirement savings needs, based on their retirement income goal as a percentage of their preretirement income.”
Mid-Career Households Spent More than Older Households, and Spending Patterns Varied by Expenditure and Income Level
Older Households Spent about 20 Percent Less than Mid-Career Households in 2013
Based on our analysis of 2013 CE data, mid-career households had one of the highest spending levels, while older households generally spent less. More specifically, in 2013, mid-career households—those aged 45- 49—spent an estimated average of about $58,500, while young retiree households—those aged 65-69— spent about $46,800, or 20 percent less overall (see fig. Such fluctuations in spending have implications for the resources households will need to maintain their standard of living. Housing Was the Top Expense Regardless of Age, and Older Households Spent More Out-of-Pocket on Health Care
While the share of spending was relatively consistent across age groups in some categories, there were larger variations by age for other categories. More specifically, the difference in average total spending for low-income households between the mid-career and young retiree age groups was not statistically significant, while the difference across these same age groups was over $20,000 for the highest income quartile. Spending, Household Characteristics, and Earnings Are Key Factors Used by Researchers and Financial Professionals to Develop Target Replacement Rates
Changes in Spending Are Important to Account for When Deciding How Much Income Should Be Replaced in Retirement
We found that accounting for how a household’s spending may change in retirement is an important step in determining a target replacement rate— that is, a recommendation for how much pre-retirement income an individual or household needs to replace in retirement. For example, retirees may be in a lower tax bracket after retirement. Two options cited by the articles and reports in our review are final average earnings and average earnings over the course of a career. Some Financial Professionals Recommend Target Replacement Rates While Others Question Their Usefulness
Six of 14 (or 43 percent) of the service providers, consultants, and financial planners who responded to our questionnaire recommend a target replacement rate to plan participants or clients. With regard to target replacement rates, we found some online tools that used target replacement rates in calculations did not permit users to adjust the value of the rate. Among EBSA’s retirement planning publications is one that is intended to help younger workers understand how much they need to save for retirement. Without the ability to adjust the replacement rate used in the tools, workers may over- or under-estimate how much they need to save for retirement. Also, we found no discussion in the EBSA materials about how much the replacement rate provided might need to be adjusted for the examples of circumstances that might affect an individual’s desired replacement rate. Additionally, DOL’s tools do not provide flexibility to allow a user to customize or compare rates. Recommendations for Executive Action
To help workers make appropriate adjustments to the replacement rates used in calculating their specific retirement income needs, the Secretary of Labor should take the following two actions: Include in its retirement planning tools information about examples of individual circumstances that research has shown to result in higher or lower income replacement needs (e.g., household characteristics and income level) and guidance on the direction and magnitude of the changes attributable to such circumstances as well as those due to particular lifestyle choices. In its written comments, DOL generally agreed with our findings and recommendations. To address our recommendations for providing more information on using replacement rates and modifying tools to allow for more flexibility, EBSA plans to make two changes by June 2017. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
To analyze consumption in retirement and how target replacement rates are defined and used to assess retirement readiness, we examined (1) whether and how spending patterns have varied by age; (2) the key factors used to develop target replacement rates for how much income workers need to replace in retirement; and (3) the usefulness of information on replacement rates provided to workers by the Department of Labor. This was the most recently available data at the time of our review. The survey data are collected for the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) by the U.S. Census Bureau. To determine which firms to contact, we relied on suggestions from several researchers and actuaries who have studied replacement rates. Appendix IV: Other Factors That Could Inform Target Replacement Rates
We identified four factors from the articles and reports we reviewed in addition to spending, household characteristics, and pre-retirement earnings that raised important considerations for developing the underlying assumptions behind a target replacement rate. Further, LTC service rates can be expensive. What Workers Need to Know about Social Security as They Plan for Retirement. Replacement Rates for Retirees: What Makes Sense for Planning and Evaluation? | Why GAO Did This Study
Part of DOL's mission is to promote the retirement security of America's workers, a goal that has become increasingly challenging. One tool for assessing the adequacy of retirement income is the replacement rate. However, recommendations for the replacement rate that a household should target vary widely, in part because of the diverse underlying assumptions used to develop the rates. GAO was asked to review what consumption in retirement looks like and how target replacement rates are developed.
GAO examined (1) whether and how spending patterns vary by age, (2) key factors used to develop target replacement rates, and (3) the usefulness of information on such rates provided by DOL. GAO analyzed data from the BLS's 2013 Consumer Expenditure Survey, the most recent available; analyzed 59 articles and reports that discussed how to develop, calculate, or evaluate replacement rates; collected non-generalizable information from 14 retirement services firms and financial planners recommended by researchers and actuaries who have studied replacement rates; and reviewed DOL materials and interviewed officials.
What GAO Found
Household spending patterns varied by age, with mid-career households (those aged 45-49) spending more than older households. For example, according to 2013 survey data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), mid-career households spent an estimated average of around $58,500, while young retiree households (those aged 65-69) spent about 20 percent less. While the share of spending was consistent for some categories, other categories had larger variations across age groups. For example, housing expenses comprised the largest share of spending regardless of age, while older households spent more out of pocket on health care than mid-career households. Spending was less variable across age for low-income households compared to other households. For example, there was not a significant difference in average spending between mid-career and young retiree households in the lowest income quartile, compared to an approximately $20,000 difference for the highest income quartile. These variations in spending patterns have implications for the resources households need to maintain their standard of living in retirement.
Researchers and financial industry professionals develop target replacement rates—the percentage of income to aim for in retirement— based on certain key factors, including spending, household characteristics, and pre-retirement earnings. GAO's analysis of the literature found that calculating an appropriate replacement rate can be complex. For example, there is debate over whether households that have raised children should target a lower replacement rate than households that have not. In addition, a worker's pre-retirement earnings could be defined as earnings at the end of the worker's career or as average earnings over the course of the career. Despite these complicated considerations, target replacement rates cited in the articles and reports GAO reviewed typically range between 70 and 85 percent. Some financial industry professionals told GAO that they develop customized targets that take into account workers' assets and expected spending, while others questioned the usefulness of replacement rates.
The information and tools on replacement rates that the Department of Labor (DOL) provides may be too limited to help workers understand how to use such rates for retirement planning. DOL's Employee Benefits Security Administration's (EBSA) website provides information and tools to help American workers better plan for retirement, including a tool to help workers calculate their retirement income needs as a percentage of preretirement income. While EBSA's materials note that a target replacement rate can vary based on individual circumstances, they do not include specific examples of demographic groups that research indicates can result in higher or lower income replacement needs, or how much a replacement rate might need to be adjusted for those groups or for other individual circumstances. Without additional information, workers may not understand how to adjust target replacement rates when planning for retirement. Further, EBSA's worksheet and online tool for calculating how much to save use a default replacement rate with no opportunity for a user to adjust the rate based on individual circumstances. Without the ability to adjust the replacement rates used in planning tools, workers may over- or under-estimate how much they need to save for retirement.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOL provide additional examples and guidance on using a replacement rate for estimating retirement savings needs in its planning tools, and modify the planning tools so the rate can be adjusted. DOL generally agreed with our recommendations and plans to add information and provide options for adjusting replacement rates in its planning tools by June 2017. |
gao_GAO-07-725T | gao_GAO-07-725T_0 | Past Work Showed that Smithsonian’s Aging Facilities and Systems Threaten Collections
In our 2005 report, we found that facilities-related problems at the Smithsonian had resulted in a few building closures and access restrictions and some cases of damage to the collections. For example, the 1881 Arts and Industries Building on the National Mall was closed to the public in 2004 for an indefinite period, pending repair of its weakened roof panels, renovation of its interior (which had been damaged by water intrusion), and replacement of aging systems such as heating and cooling. Currently, this building remains closed. These problems were indicative of a broad decline in the Smithsonian’s aging facilities and systems that posed a serious long-term threat to the collections. We also found that the Smithsonian had taken steps to maximize the effectiveness of its resources for facilities. Preliminary Data Show that the Smithsonian’s Estimated Costs for Facilities Projects through Fiscal Year 2013 Have Increased Since 2005
Preliminary results from our ongoing work show that as of March 30, 2007, the Smithsonian estimates it will need about $2.5 billion for revitalization, construction, and maintenance projects identified from fiscal year 2005 through fiscal year 2013, an increase of about $200 million from its 2005 estimate of about $2.3 billion for the same time period. As a result, we recommended that the Secretary of the Smithsonian establish a process for exploring options for funding its facilities needs and engaging the key stakeholders—the Smithsonian Board of Regents, the Administration, and Congress—in the development and implementation of a strategic funding plan to address the revitalization, construction, and maintenance projects identified by the Smithsonian. The Smithsonian Has Taken Some Steps to Address Our Recommendation to Develop and Implement a Funding Strategy
Smithsonian officials told us during our current review that the Smithsonian Board of Regents —the Smithsonian’s governing body, which is comprised of both private citizens and members of all three branches of the federal government—has taken some steps to address our recommendation. According to Smithsonian officials, after considering these nine proposed options, the ad-hoc committee decided to request an increase in the Smithsonian’s annual federal appropriations, specifically deciding to request an additional $100 million over the Smithsonian’s current appropriation annually for 10 years, starting in fiscal year 2008, to reach a total of an additional $1 billion. The President’s fiscal year 2008 budget proposal, published in February 2007, proposed an increase of about $44 million over the Smithsonian’s fiscal year 2007 appropriation. However, funds in the salaries and expenses category also support many other activities, such as research, collections, and exhibitions, and it is not clear how much of the $35 million increase the Smithsonian would use for facilities maintenance. Absent significant changes in the Smithsonian’s funding strategy or significant increases in funding from Congress, the Smithsonian faces greater risk to its facilities and collections over time. Our work is based on our past report on the Smithsonian’s facilities management and funding, our review of Smithsonian documents, and interviews with Smithsonian officials. We are continuing to evaluate the Smithsonian’s efforts to strategically manage, fund, and secure its real property. We expect to report on these issues later this year. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Smithsonian Institution (Smithsonian) is the world's largest museum complex and research organization. The age of the Smithsonian's structures, past inattention to maintenance needs, and high visitation levels have left its facilities in need of revitalization and repair. This testimony discusses our prior work on some effects of the condition of the Smithsonian's facilities and whether the Smithsonian has taken steps to maximize facility resources. It also discusses the current estimated costs of the Smithsonian's needed facilities projects. In addition, it describes preliminary results of GAO's ongoing work on the extent to which the Smithsonian developed and implemented strategies to fund these projects, as GAO recommended in prior work. The work for this testimony is based on GAO's 2005 report, Smithsonian Institution: Facilities Management Reorganization Is Progressing, but Funding Remains a Challenge; GAO's review of Smithsonian documents and other pertinent information; and interviews with Smithsonian officials.
What GAO Found
In 2005, GAO reported that facilities-related problems at the Smithsonian had resulted in a few building closures and posed a serious long-term threat to the collections. For example, the 1881 Arts and Industries Building on the National Mall was closed to the public in 2004 for an indefinite period over concern about its deteriorating roof structure. Currently, this building remains closed. GAO also found that the Smithsonian had taken steps to maximize the effectiveness of its existing resources for facilities. Preliminary results of GAO's ongoing work indicate that as of March 30, 2007, the Smithsonian estimated it would need about $2.5 billion for its revitalization, construction, and maintenance projects from fiscal year 2005 through fiscal year 2013, up from an estimate of $2.3 billion in 2005. In 2005, GAO recommended that the Smithsonian develop and implement a strategic funding plan to address its facilities needs. The Smithsonian Board of Regents--the Smithsonian's governing body--has taken some steps to address GAO's recommendation regarding a strategic funding plan. The board created an ad-hoc committee, which, after reviewing nine options, such as establishing a special exhibition fee, decided to request an additional $100 million annually in federal funds for facilities for the next 10 years, for a total of an additional $1 billion. The President's fiscal year 2008 budget proposal, however, proposes an increase of about $44 million over the Smithsonian's fiscal year 2007 appropriation. It is not clear how much of this proposed increase would be used to support facilities, and how Congress will respond to the President's budget request. Absent significant changes in the Smithsonian's funding strategy or significant increases in funding from Congress, the Smithsonian faces greater risk to its facilities and collections over time. GAO is continuing to evaluate the Smithsonian's efforts to strategically manage, fund, and secure its real property. We expect to publish a report on these issues later this year. |
gao_GAO-07-824T | gao_GAO-07-824T_0 | If these Medicare beneficiaries did not sign up for a Part D plan on their own, they have no drug coverage until they are enrolled in a PDP by CMS. Another way individuals become dually eligible is when Medicaid beneficiaries subsequently become eligible for Medicare by reaching 65 years of age or by completing the 24-month disability waiting period. CMS’s Enrollment Process Takes Time and Can Create Difficulties for Some Dual-Eligible Beneficiaries
Given the number of entities, information systems, and administrative steps involved, it takes a minimum of 5 weeks for CMS to identify and enroll a new dual-eligible beneficiary in a PDP. As a result, two out of three new dual-eligible beneficiaries—generally those who are Medicare eligible and then become Medicaid eligible—may experience difficulties obtaining their prescription drugs under Part D during this interval. For other new dual-eligible beneficiaries—those switching from Medicaid to Medicare drug coverage—CMS instituted a prospective enrollment process in late 2006 that enrolls these individuals before their date of Medicare eligibility and offers a seamless transition to Part D coverage. During this interval, pharmacies may not have up-to- date PDP enrollment information on new dual-eligible individuals. This may result in beneficiaries having difficulty obtaining Part D-covered drugs at their pharmacies. CMS has developed some contingency measures to help individuals like Mr. Smith during the processing interval. However, we found that these measures have not always worked effectively. CMS Made Drug Coverage Retroactive, but Did Not Inform Beneficiaries of Their Right to Reimbursement
For the majority of new dual-eligible beneficiaries, CMS requires PDPs to provide drug coverage retroactively, typically by several months. However, we found that CMS did not fully implement or monitor the impact of this policy. CMS made the effective date of Part D drug coverage for Medicare beneficiaries who become Medicaid eligible coincide with the effective date of their Medicaid eligibility. Under this policy, Part D coverage for these beneficiaries is effective the first day of the month that Medicaid eligibility is effective, which generally occurs 3 months prior to the date an individual’s Medicaid application was submitted to the state, if the individual was eligible for Medicaid during this time. Medicare makes payments to the PDPs for providing drug coverage retroactively. While dual-eligible beneficiaries were entitled to reimbursement by their PDPs in 2006, neither CMS nor PDPs notified dual- eligible beneficiaries of this right. Given the vulnerability of this population, it seems unlikely that many dual-eligible beneficiaries would have contacted their PDPs for reimbursement if they were not clearly informed of their right to do so and given information about how to file for reimbursement, neither would they likely have retained proof of their drug expenditures. In addition, CMS’s incomplete implementation of its retroactive coverage policy in 2006 means that CMS paid PDPs millions of dollars for coverage during periods for which dual-eligible beneficiaries may not have sought reimbursement for their drug costs. As of March 2007, CMS has modified its letters to dual- eligible beneficiaries to include language informing them of their right to reimbursement for drug costs incurred during retroactive coverage periods and required PDP sponsors to do the same. | Why GAO Did This Study
Under the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003 (MMA), dual-eligible beneficiaries--individuals with both Medicare and Medicaid coverage--have their drug costs covered under Medicare Part D rather than under state Medicaid programs. The MMA requires the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) to enroll these beneficiaries in a Medicare prescription drug plan (PDP) if they do not select a plan on their own. CMS enrolled about 5.5 million dual-eligible beneficiaries in late 2005 and about 634,000 beneficiaries who became dually eligible during 2006. GAO was asked to testify on (1) CMS's process for enrolling new dual-eligible beneficiaries into PDPs and its effect on access to drugs and (2) how CMS set the effective coverage date for certain dual-eligible beneficiaries and its implementation of this policy. This testimony is based on a GAO report that is being released today, Medicare Part D: Challenges in Enrolling New Dual-Eligible Beneficiaries (GAO-07-272).
What GAO Found
CMS's process for enrolling new dual-eligible beneficiaries who have not yet signed up for a PDP involves many parties, information systems and administrative steps, and takes a minimum of 5 weeks to complete. For about two-thirds of these individuals--generally Medicare beneficiaries who subsequently qualify for Medicaid--pharmacies may not have up-to-date PDP enrollment information needed to bill PDPs appropriately until the beneficiaries' data are completely processed. As a result, these beneficiaries may have difficulty obtaining their Part D-covered prescription drugs during this interval. CMS has created contingency measures to help individuals obtain their new Medicare benefit, but these measures have not always worked effectively. For the other one-third of new dual-eligible beneficiaries--Medicaid enrollees who become Medicare-eligible because of age or disability--CMS eliminated the impact of processing time by enrolling them in PDPs just prior to their attaining Medicare eligibility. This prospective enrollment, implemented in late 2006, offers these dual-eligible beneficiaries a seamless transition to Medicare Part D coverage. CMS set the effective Part D coverage date for Medicare-eligible beneficiaries who subsequently become eligible for Medicaid to coincide with the date their Medicaid coverage becomes effective. Under this policy, which was designed to provide drug coverage for dual-eligible beneficiaries as soon as they attain dual-eligible status, the start of their Part D coverage can extend retroactively for several months before the date beneficiaries are notified of their PDP enrollment. GAO found that CMS did not fully implement or monitor the impact of this policy. Although beneficiaries are entitled to reimbursement for covered drug costs incurred during this retroactive period, CMS did not begin informing them of this right until March 2007. Given their vulnerability, it is unlikely that these beneficiaries would have sought reimbursement or retained proof of their drug purchases if they were not informed of their right to do so. Also, CMS made monthly payments to PDPs for providing drug coverage during retroactive periods, but did not monitor PDPs' reimbursements to beneficiaries during that time period. GAO estimated that in 2006, Medicare paid PDPs millions of dollars for coverage during periods for which dual-eligible beneficiaries may not have sought reimbursement for their drug costs. |
gao_GAO-04-678 | gao_GAO-04-678_0 | DOD has reported that countries hostile to the United States are focusing resources on developing information warfare strategies. DOD information system security requirements focus on operational software threats, rather than potential threats posed by software developers. While recent DOD initiatives could increase DOD’s focus on software security, efforts to date have not translated into greater knowledge for program managers about foreign software development activities. DOD Acquisition Policy Allows Discretion in Managing Foreign Software Suppliers
DOD acquisition policy allows program managers discretion in managing foreign suppliers used for software development. These procedures are intended to mitigate system vulnerabilities from operational threats, such as external hacking and unauthorized access to information systems. However, they do not apply to internal threats that could affect the integrity of the software, such as the insertion of malicious code during software development. Program Officials Generally Did Not Manage Risks from Foreign-Developed Software
While DOD initiatives have begun to recognize potential risks from foreign software suppliers, this is not always the case within the weapon programs where software is developed or acquired. Program officials for most of the systems we reviewed did not make foreign involvement in software development a specific element of their risk identification and mitigation efforts. As a result, program officials’ knowledge of the foreign-developed software included in their weapon systems varied. In addition, risk mitigation efforts emphasized program level risks, such as meeting program cost and schedule goals, instead of software security risks. Further, program managers often delegated risk mitigation and source selection to their prime contractors who tended to be concerned with software functionality and quality assurance, rather than specifically addressing software development risks associated with foreign suppliers. For 11 of the 16 systems, program managers have not identified foreign supplier involvement in software development as a significant risk to the security of their weapon systems. As the amount of software on weapon systems increases, it becomes more difficult and costly to test every line of code. Further, DOD cannot afford to monitor all worldwide software development facilities or provide clearances for all potential software developers, especially for COTS software. Unless this is done early in the software acquisition process, it cannot be included as part of software source selection and risk mitigation decisions and could result in increased cost and less effective security measures if risks have to be addressed later in the acquisition process. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To determine how the Department of Defense (DOD) measures the extent of foreign involvement in software development in weapon systems and how risks associated with using foreign suppliers for software development are measured and mitigated, we reviewed relevant DOD guidance, policies, regulations, and procedures. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Defense (DOD) is increasingly reliant on software and information systems for its weapon capabilities, and DOD prime contractors are subcontracting more of their software development. The increased reliance on software and a greater number of suppliers results in more opportunities to exploit vulnerabilities in defense software. In addition, DOD has reported that countries hostile to the United States are focusing resources on information warfare strategies. Therefore, software security, including the need for protection of software code from malicious activity, is an area of concern for many DOD programs. GAO was asked to examine DOD's efforts to (1) identify software development suppliers and (2) manage risks related to foreign involvement in software development on weapon systems.
What GAO Found
DOD acquisition and software security policies do not fully address the risk of using foreign suppliers to develop weapon system software. The current acquisition guidance allows program officials discretion in managing foreign involvement in software development, without requiring them to identify and mitigate such risks. Moreover, other policies intended to mitigate information system vulnerabilities focus mostly on operational software security threats, such as external hacking and unauthorized access to information systems, but not on insider threats, such as the insertion of malicious code by software developers. Recent DOD initiatives may provide greater focus on these risks, but to date have not been adopted as practice within DOD. While DOD has begun to recognize potential risks from foreign software content, this is not always the case within the weapon programs where software is developed or acquired. Program officials for the systems in this review did not make foreign involvement in software development a specific element of their risk identification and mitigation efforts. As a result, program officials' knowledge of the foreign developed software included in their weapon systems varied. In addition, risk mitigation efforts emphasized program level risks, such as meeting program cost and schedule goals, instead of software security risks. Further, program officials often delegated risk mitigation and source selection to contractors who are primarily concerned with software functionality and quality assurance, rather than specifically addressing software security for development risks associated with foreign suppliers. Unless program officials provide specific guidance, contractors may favor business considerations over potential software development security risks associated with using foreign suppliers. As the amount of software on weapon systems increases, it becomes more difficult and costly to test every line of code. Further, DOD cannot afford to monitor all worldwide software development facilities or provide clearances for all potential software developers. Therefore, the program manager must know more about who is developing software and where early in the software acquisition process, so that it can be included as part of software source selection and risk mitigation decisions. |
gao_GAO-15-743T | gao_GAO-15-743T_0 | Interior Uses a Multistep Review Process to Help Ensure that Tribal- State Compacts Comply with IGRA and Has Approved Most Compacts
In our June 2015 report, we found that Interior uses a multistep review process to help ensure that tribal-state compacts, and any compact amendments, comply with IGRA, other federal laws not related to jurisdiction over gaming on Indian lands, and the trust obligation of the United States to Indians. From 1998 through fiscal year 2014, Interior reviewed and approved most of the 516 compacts and compact amendments that states and tribes submitted. Interior did not approve or disapprove 60 of the 516 compacts submitted by tribes and states within the 45-day review period. States and Selected Tribes Regulate Indian Gaming Based on Compacts and Tribal Ordinances, Depending on Gaming Class
As we found in our June 2015 report, the roles of states and tribes in regulating Indian gaming are established in two key documents: (1) compacts for class III gaming and (2) tribal gaming ordinances for both class II and class III gaming. IGRA allows states and tribes to agree on how each party will regulate class III gaming, and we found that regulatory roles vary among the 24 states that have class III Indian gaming operations. These states monitor gaming operations at least weekly, with most having a daily on-site presence. Eight percent (32 of 406) of class III Indian gaming operations are located in these states, and the operations accounted for about 4 percent of gross Indian gaming revenue in fiscal year 2013. Tribes take on the primary day-to-day role of regulating Indian gaming. The tribes’ regulatory agencies were similar in their approaches to regulating their gaming operations. The Commission Has Limited Authority for Class III Gaming, but It Provides Some Services, as Requested, Using Standards Last Updated in 2006
In our June 2015 report, a key difference we found between class II and class III gaming is that IGRA authorizes the Commission to issue and enforce minimum internal controls standards for class II gaming but not for class III gaming. States involved in the regulation of Indian gaming are also impacted by the Commission’s proposal to draft updated guidance and withdraw its 2006 regulations; however, the Commission’s plans for obtaining state input on this proposal are unclear. Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government call for management to ensure that there are adequate means of communicating with, and obtaining information from, external stakeholders that may have a significant impact on the agency achieving its goals. According to a Commission official, the Commission is considering conducting outreach to the states on its proposal but did not have any specific plan for doing so. The Commission Performs Various Activities to Help Ensure Tribes’ Compliance with IGRA and Commission Regulations, but the Effectiveness of Some Activities Is Unclear
Commission’s Monitoring Activities
To help ensure compliance with IGRA and Commission regulations, the Commission conducts a broad array of monitoring activities—such as reviewing independent audit reports submitted annually by tribes, conducting site visits to tribal gaming operations to examine compliance with applicable Commission regulations, and assessing tribes’ compliance with minimum internal control standards as part of Commission-led audits. However, the effectiveness of the Commission’s training and technical assistance efforts remains unclear. In addition, they do not correlate such compliance with the Commission’s training and technical assistance efforts. Additional outcome-oriented performance measures would enable the Commission to better assess the effectiveness of its training and technical assistance efforts and its ACE initiative. In our June 2015 report,recommended that the Commission review and revise, as needed, its performance measures to include additional outcome-oriented measures. Without guidance or documented procedures to inform its staff about how to complete letters of concern or maintain documentation tracking tribal actions, the Commission cannot ensure consistency in the letters that it sends to tribes, and it may be difficult to measure the effectiveness of the letters in encouraging tribal actions to address potential issues. As a result of these findings, we recommended and in its comment letter the Commission in our June 2015 report,generally agreed, that the Commission should develop documented procedures and guidance for letters of concern to (1) clearly identify letters of concern as such and to specify the type of information to be contained in them, such as time periods for a response; and (2) maintain and track tribes’ responses to the Commission on potential compliance issues. | Why GAO Did This Study
Over the past 25 years, Indian gaming has become a significant source of revenue for many tribes, reaching $28 billion in fiscal year 2013. IGRA, the primary federal statute governing Indian gaming, provides a statutory basis for the regulation of Indian gaming. Tribes, states, Interior, and the Commission have varying roles in Indian gaming.
This testimony highlights the key findings of GAO's June 2015 report ( GAO-15-355 ). Accordingly, it addresses (1) Interior's review process to help ensure that tribal-state compacts comply with IGRA; (2) how states and selected tribes regulate Indian gaming; (3) the Commission's authority to regulate Indian gaming; and (4) the Commission's efforts to ensure tribes' compliance with IGRA and Commission regulations. For the June 2015 report, GAO analyzed compacts and Commission data on training, compliance, and enforcement; and interviewed officials from Interior, the Commission, states with Indian gaming, and 12 tribes in six states GAO visited based on geography and gaming revenues generated.
What GAO Found
In its June 2015 report, GAO found that the Department of the Interior (Interior) has a multistep review process to help ensure that compacts—agreements between a tribe and state that govern the conduct of the tribe's class III (or casino) gaming—comply with the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA). From 1998 through fiscal year 2014, Interior approved 78 percent of compacts; Interior did not act to approve or disapprove 12 percent; and the other 10 percent were disapproved, withdrawn, or returned.
GAO also found that states and selected tribes regulate Indian gaming in accordance with their roles and responsibilities established in tribal-state compacts for class III gaming, and tribal gaming ordinances, which provide the general framework for day-to-day regulation of class II (or bingo) and class III gaming. In addition, the 24 states with class III Indian gaming operations vary in their approaches for regulating Indian gaming, from active (e.g., daily or weekly on-site monitoring) to limited (e.g., no regular monitoring). Further, all 12 selected tribes GAO visited had regulatory agencies responsible for the day-to-day operation of their gaming operations.
In GAO's June 2015 report, GAO found that the National Indian Gaming Commission (Commission)—an independent agency within Interior created by IGRA—has authority to regulate class II gaming, but not class III gaming, by issuing and enforcing gaming standards. The Commission is considering issuing guidance with class III standards that may be used voluntarily by tribes and has held consultation meetings to obtain tribal input. However, in June 2015, GAO found the Commission does not have a clear plan for conducting outreach to affected states on its proposal. Federal internal control standards call for managers to obtain information from external stakeholders that may have a significant impact on the agency achieving its goals. Along with tribes, state input could aid the Commission in making an informed decision.
Even with differences in its authority for class II and class III gaming, GAO found that the Commission helps ensure that tribes comply with IGRA and applicable federal and tribal regulations through various activities, including monitoring gaming operations during site visits to Indian gaming operations and Commission-led audits. In addition, since 2011, the Commission has emphasized efforts that encourage voluntary compliance with regulations, including providing training and technical assistance and alerting tribes of potential compliance issues using letters of concern. However, the effectiveness of these two approaches is unclear. GAO found in June 2015 that the Commission had a limited number of performance measures that assess outcomes achieved. With such additional measures, the Commission would be better positioned to assess the effectiveness of its training and technical assistance. Further, GAO found the Commission does not have documented procedures, consistent with federal internal control standards, about how to complete or track letters of concern to help ensure their effectiveness in encouraging tribal actions to address identified potential compliance issues. Without documented procedures, the Commission cannot ensure consistency or effectiveness of the letters it sends.
What GAO Recommends
In its June 2015 report, GAO recommended that the Commission: (1) obtain input from states on its plans to issue guidance on class III minimum internal control standards; (2) review and revise, as needed, its performance measures to better assess its training and technical assistance efforts; and (3) develop documented procedures and guidance to improve the use of letters of concern. The Commission generally agreed with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-12-384 | gao_GAO-12-384_0 | Background
Federal agencies are generally required to use full and open competition to award contracts, with certain exceptions. Competition Rates for Non-R&D Services Substantially Higher Than for Products with Little Change over Time
In fiscal year 2011, the competition rate for dollars obligated across DOD on contracts and task orders for non-R&D services was substantially higher than the competition rate for products—78 percent compared to 41 percent. R&D services had a competition rate of 59 percent. According to a DOD procurement policy official, the Air Force competition advocate is assessing the reasons for lower competition rates. While the assisting agencies had varying competition rates, their average competition rate was slightly higher than that of DOD’s contracting offices—81 percent compared to 78 percent. In addition, based on our prior work, a variety of factors can affect competition, including reliance on contractor expertise and data rights, the influence of program offices on the acquisition process, and unanticipated events such as bid protests. Majority of DOD Non-R&D Services Noncompetitive Obligations Were Coded under “Only One Responsible Source”
In fiscal year 2011, the majority of DOD’s non-R&D services obligations under noncompetitive contracts and task orders not coded as subject to fair opportunity were coded under the competition exception “only one responsible source” in FPDS-NG. Noncompetitive obligations categorized as “authorized by statute” include contracts that are authorized or required to be made through another agency or from a specified source, including awards under the HUBZone Act of 1997, the Veterans Benefit Act of 2003, and the Small Business Administration’s 8(a) business development program. Despite these actions, we identified additional opportunities to increase competition and we recommended that OMB take several actions—including emphasizing the role of program officials in influencing competition, taking steps to better understand the circumstances leading to only one offer on competitive contracts, and examining how competition advocates are appointed. Specifically, in November 2010 DOD issued a memorandum that requires contracting officers to provide additional time for contractors to respond to solicitations when only one offer is received, if less than 30 days was provided for the receipt of proposals under the original solicitation. The fiscal year 2012 goal for DOD overall (60 percent) is lower than the fiscal year 2011 goal (62.8 percent). Agency Comments
We provided a draft of this report to DOD and the department responded that it had no comments. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives for this review were to examine (1) how competition for non-research and development (R&D) services compares to competition for products, and trends in competition for non-R&D services at the Department of Defense (DOD); (2) the reasons for noncompetitive contracts and task orders for services; and (3) steps DOD has taken to increase competition for services. To address these objectives, we identified through the Federal Procurement Data System-Next Generation (FPDS-NG) DOD obligations under competitive and noncompetitive contracts in fiscal years 2007 through 2011, the most recent data available when we conducted our review. We focused our review on non-research and development (R&D) services to concentrate our analysis on contracts not related to development of weapons systems, but conducted limited analysis to understand competition rates for R&D services as compared to non-R&D services and to products, in fiscal year 2011. In addition, we reviewed previous GAO reports, Office of Management and Budget and DOD policies and guidance, and DOD competition reports for fiscal years 2009 and 2010 to identify reasons for not competing contracts as well as actions that have been taken to improve competition at DOD. Effective competition—a subset of overall competition which DOD defines as competed actions that received more than one offer in response to a solicitation—rates also varied across the major components (52 percent at the Air Force to 82 percent at other defense agencies). | Why GAO Did This Study
Competition is a critical tool for achieving the best return on investment for taxpayers. In fiscal year 2011, the Department of Defense (DOD) obligated about $375 billion through contracts; more than half that amount was for services. Agencies are required to award contracts on the basis of full and open competition, but are permitted to award noncompetitive contracts in certain situations.
The Senate Armed Services Committee report on the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 directed GAO to report on competition for DOD contracts and task orders for services. GAO examined (1) how competition rates for services compare to competition rates for products and trends in competition for services, (2) the reasons for noncompetitive contracts and task orders for services, and (3) steps DOD has taken to increase competition.
GAO reviewed federal procurement data for 2007 through 2011 and a non-generalizable sample of 111 justifications for noncompetitive awards, which were from different DOD components and for different types of services. GAO defines competition rates as the dollars obligated under competitive contracts and task orders as a percentage of all obligations. GAO focused on non-research and development (R&D) services to concentrate analysis on contracts not related to development of weapons systems. GAO reviewed DOD policies and competition reports, and prior GAO reports.
GAO is not making any new recommendations. DOD responded to a draft of this report with no comments.
What GAO Found
In fiscal year 2011, the competition rate for DODs non-R&D services was almost twice the competition rate as that of products, and almost 20 percent higher than that of R&D services.
From fiscal year 2007 through 2011, competition rates for non-R&D services have been nearly 80 percent and have not changed significantly across DOD, but have declined at the Air Force, dropping from 75 percent to 59 percent. According to a DOD procurement policy official, the Air Force competition advocate is assessing the reasons for lower competition rates. When non-DOD agencies procured non-R&D services on behalf of DOD in fiscal year 2011, their average competition rate was 81 percent, slightly higher than the average rate of 78 percent for DODs own contracting offices.
The majority of DOD noncompetitive obligations for non-R&D services in fiscal year 2011 were due to the contractor being the only responsible source for the procurement. The second most cited exception was authorized by statute, for example, awards under the Small Business Administrations 8(a) business development program. Based on prior GAO work, a variety of factors can affect competition, including reliance on contractor expertise and data rights, the influence of program offices, and unanticipated events such as bid protests. GAO analysis of the justifications for noncompetitive contracts identified examples of these factors affecting competition for DOD procurements in fiscal year 2011.
Since 2009, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and DOD have undertaken initiatives related to competition, including actions to address some opportunities GAO previously identified. DOD has taken steps aimed at increasing competition, in particular effective competition which DOD defines as situations where more than one offer is received in response to a competitive solicitation. For instance, DOD has implemented requirements to provide additional response time to solicitations when only one offer is received for a solicitation that initially provided less than 30 days for receipt of proposals. Outside of recent efforts to increase competition, OMB and DOD have additional opportunities to address prior GAO recommendationssuch as promoting the role of program officials in influencing competition and better understanding the circumstances leading to only one offer on competitive contracts. |
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