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gao_GAO-05-189 | gao_GAO-05-189_0 | The requirements for the interfaces between DIMHRS (Personnel/Pay) and existing systems are not yet complete because DOD has not yet determined the extent to which legacy systems will be replaced and thus require modification in order to interact with the new system. Furthermore, DOD is still determining whether the data requirements provided to the contractor for system design are complete. Finally, about 77 percent of the detailed requirements are difficult to understand, based on our review of a random sample of the requirements documentation. The shortcomings in DOD’s efforts to effectively manage DIMHRS (Personnel/Pay) requirements are attributable to a number of causes, including the program’s overly schedule-driven approach and the difficulty of overcoming DOD’s long-standing cultural resistance to departmentwide solutions. Moreover, although DIMHRS (Personnel/Pay) is to be an integrated system, it is not being governed by integrated tools and approaches, such as an integrated program management structure, integrated DOD business enterprise architecture, and an integrated master plan/schedule. Furthermore, while DOD is appropriately attempting to maximize the use of COTS products in building DIMHRS (Personnel/Pay) and is following some best practices for developing COTS-based systems, others are not being followed. At a minimum, this should include ensuring that joint system requirements are complete and correct, and that they are acceptable to user organizations; establishing a DOD-wide integrated governance structure for DIMHRS (Personnel/Pay) (1) that vests an executive-level organization or entity representing the interests of all program stakeholders—including the Joint Requirements and Integration Office, the Joint Program Management Office, the services, and DFAS—with responsibility, accountability, and authority for the entire DIMHRS (Personnel/Pay) program and (2) that ensures that all stakeholder interests and positions are appropriately heard and considered during program reviews and before key program decisions; ensuring that the degree of consistency between DIMHRS (Personnel/Pay) and the evolving DOD-wide business enterprise architecture is continuously analyzed and that material inconsistencies between the two, both potential and actual, are disclosed at all program reviews and decision points and in program budget submissions, along with any associated system risks and steps to mitigate these risks; developing and implementing a DOD-wide, integrated master plan/schedule of activities that extends to all DOD program stakeholders; ensuring that all relevant acquisition management best practices associated with COTS-based systems are appropriately followed; and ensuring that an event-driven, risk-based approach that adequately considers factors other than the contract schedule continues to be used in managing DIMHRS (Personnel/Pay). This lack of resolution is important because not attempting to obtain some level of stakeholder acceptance of requirements increases the risk that the system will not adequately meet users’ needs, that users will not adopt the system, and that later system rework will be required to rectify this situation. In particular, DOD has begun taking steps to ensure that the system requirements and the system design are consistent with each other. However, DOD has not ensured that the detailed requirements are complete and has not obtained user acceptance of the detailed requirements. November 2004. These challenges increase the risk that the delivered system’s capabilities will not fully meet DOD’s needs. Furthermore, DOD’s program plans do not recognize the end-user organizations’ time and resource needs associated with integrating DIMHRS with their respective legacy systems, and JPMO is not actively managing these end- user operational changes. Our objectives were to determine 1. whether the Department of Defense (DOD) has effective management processes in place for managing the definition of the requirements for the Defense Integrated Military Human Resources System (DIMHRS (Personnel/Pay)) and 2. whether DOD has established an integrated program management structure for DIMHRS (Personnel/Pay) and is following effective processes for acquiring a system based on commercial software components. Furthermore, DOD’s comments contain no evidence to show that it has addressed the limitations in the requirements’ completeness and correctness that we cite in the report, such as those relating to the interface and data requirements, and they do not address the understandability issues we found relative to an estimated 77 percent of the detailed requirements. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Defense (DOD) has long-standing problems with its information technology (IT) systems supporting military personnel and pay. To address these problems, DOD initiated the Defense Integrated Military Human Resources System (DIMHRS) program, which is to provide a joint, integrated, standardized military personnel and pay system across all military components. In November 2004, DOD accepted the design for the first of three phases, DIMHRS (Personnel/Pay). GAO reviewed DOD's management of the requirements definition for the system as well as the program's management structure.
What GAO Found
DOD faces significant management challenges with DIMHRS, a major system acquisition program that is expected to lead to major changes in the processing of military personnel and pay. To its credit, DOD has begun taking steps to ensure that the requirements and the design for the first phase of the program are consistent with each other by tracing backward and forward between the detailed requirements and the system design, and it did obtain formal user acceptance of the DIMHRS (Personnel/Pay) high-level requirements. However, it has not obtained user acceptance of the detailed requirements. Furthermore, it has not ensured that the detailed requirements are complete and understandable. For example, requirements for the interfaces between DIMHRS (Personnel/Pay) and existing systems have not yet been fully defined because DOD has not yet determined how many legacy systems will be partially replaced and thus require modification. Furthermore, DOD is still determining whether the data requirements provided to the contractor for system design are complete. Finally, an estimated 77 percent of the detailed requirements are difficult to understand, based on GAO's review of a random sample of the requirements documentation. These challenges increase the risk that the delivered system capabilities will not fully meet the users' needs. Moreover, although DIMHRS (Personnel/Pay) is to be an integrated system, its development is not being governed by integrated tools and approaches, such as an integrated program management structure, enterprise architecture, and master schedule. Furthermore, while DOD is appropriately attempting to maximize the use of commercial, off-the shelf (COTS) products in building the new system, it has not adequately followed some important best practices associated with COTS-based system acquisitions. For example, DOD's program plan/schedule does not adequately recognize the needs of end-user organizations for the time and resources to integrate DIMHRS (Personnel/Pay) with their respective legacy systems and to prepare their workforces for the organizational changes that the system will introduce. DOD's requirements definition challenges and shortcomings in program governance can be attributed to a number of causes, including the program's overly schedule-driven approach and DOD's difficulty in overcoming its long-standing cultural resistance to departmentwide solutions. Unless these challenges are addressed, the risk is increased that the system will not provide expected capabilities and benefits on time and within budget. Given the limitations in some DOD components' ability to accurately pay military personnel, it is vital that these risks be addressed swiftly and effectively. |
gao_GAO-16-742 | gao_GAO-16-742_0 | In addition, Interior has missed opportunities to facilitate collaboration among the bureaus, and as a result, the bureaus have sometimes acted in a fragmented, overlapping, and potentially duplicative fashion to resolve similar hiring and retention challenges. Interior Has Taken Steps to Address Hiring and Retention Challenges but Has Not Evaluated the Effectiveness of Its Efforts
Since 2012, Interior has taken steps to address two underlying factors— lower salaries and a lengthier hiring process compared with the oil and gas industry—that have impeded its ability to hire and retain key oil and gas staff, but it has not evaluated the effectiveness of its efforts. Interior Has Missed Opportunities for Collaboration on Resolving Challenges in Hiring and Retaining Key Staff
Interior’s Office of Policy, Management and Budget has missed opportunities to facilitate collaboration across the three bureaus in addressing their shared challenges in hiring and retaining staff. Senior officials in Interior’s Office of Policy, Management and Budget did not identify any collaboration mechanisms that they used to bring the three bureaus together to discuss their shared human capital challenges. Interior Has Not Fully Evaluated Training Needs or Effectiveness, According to Officials, and Has Provided Limited Leadership in Facilitating the Bureaus’ Shared Use of Training Resources
Interior and its bureaus have trained key oil and gas staff without fully evaluating the bureaus’ staff training needs or the training’s effectiveness, according to officials, and Interior has provided limited leadership in facilitating the bureaus’ sharing of training resources. Further, Interior’s Office of Policy, Management and Budget has provided limited leadership in facilitating the sharing of training resources across the bureaus, appearing to miss opportunities that could improve the use of these resources. Further, BSEE’s training for inspectors does not include proficiency examinations or certifications, according to officials, as BLM’s training program does. Without evaluating its bureaus’ training efforts, Interior may not be able to ensure that its key oil and gas staff are being adequately trained to execute their oversight tasks, and it may not be spending training funds effectively and efficiently. In contrast, as of July 2016, BLM had 59 full-time staff in its National Training Center, and has the capacity to evaluate their training efforts, according to officials. Further, Interior continues to face a lengthy hiring process, according to officials. All three bureaus have adopted new human resources software that may provide them with better data to track their hiring process, and the bureaus have started to analyze these data to identify what steps are causing delays in the hiring process. None of the bureaus have consistently performed annual evaluations of their training needs for all key staff, and only one of the bureaus has developed technical competencies that are critical to successful performance by these staff, as directed by Interior’s Departmental Manual. Moreover, the Office of Policy, Management and Budget, which is responsible for managing Interior’s human resources and addressing cross-cutting issues, has not effectively facilitated collaboration among the bureaus in addressing their shared hiring, retention, and training challenges. Recommendations for Executive Action
To help ensure Interior can hire, retain, and train staff it needs to provide effective oversight of oil and gas activities on federal lands and waters, we recommend that the Secretary of the Interior take the following five actions: Direct the Assistant Secretary for Policy, Management and Budget to:
Regularly evaluate the effectiveness of its available incentives, such as special salary rates, the student loan repayment program, and other incentives in hiring and retaining key oil and gas staff. Evaluate the need for and viability of a certification program for BSEE inspectors. Interior provided written comments, in which it agreed with one of the five recommendations in the draft report, partially agreed with three others, and disagreed with the remaining recommendation. Appendix I: Statistical Methodology Used to Examine Main Factors Associated with the Retention of Federal Employees in Key Oil and Gas Positions
To examine the Department of the Interior (Interior) efforts to resolve its hiring and retention challenges for key oil and gas staff, we developed a statistical model to examine the main factors that would reduce the likelihood that federal employees in key positions—those that corresponded to the positions of key oil and gas staff at the Bureau of Land Management (BLM), the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE), and the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (BOEM) —would leave those positions. | Why GAO Did This Study
The explosion onboard the Deepwater Horizon drilling rig in April 2010 highlighted the importance of effective oversight of oil and gas activities, but Interior has faced challenges in hiring, retaining, and training staff responsible for such oversight. Since 2011, Interior's management of federal oil and gas resources has been on GAO's list of program areas that are at high risk, partly because of human capital challenges. In a February 2015 update to the list, GAO found that Interior had begun to address these challenges but needed to do more.
GAO was requested to review the status of Interior's human capital challenges. This report examines Interior's efforts to (1) resolve its hiring and retention challenges for key oil and gas staff and (2) address its training needs for such staff. GAO reviewed regulations, reports, and department documents; analyzed Interior and OPM information; and interviewed department officials.
What GAO Found
The Department of the Interior has taken steps to resolve its hiring and retention challenges for key staff engaged in oil and gas activities, but it has not evaluated the effectiveness of its efforts and has missed opportunities to collaborate within the department for resolving these challenges. Specifically, Interior has taken steps to address two underlying factors—lower salaries and a lengthier hiring process compared with industry—that impede its ability to hire and retain such staff. For example, in fiscal year 2012 Interior began using special salary rates to give higher pay to certain key staff in its bureaus that oversee oil and gas resources: the Bureau of Land Management (BLM), Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE), and Bureau of Ocean and Energy Management (BOEM). To bolster compensation further, some bureaus increased the number of staff receiving student loan repayments and other incentives. Officials said these efforts in fiscal year 2015 filled positions, but they had not evaluated the effectiveness of their efforts. As a result, Interior cannot determine how or whether it should alter its approach. Regarding the lengthy hiring process, the bureaus recently adopted new human resources software that may provide them with better data to track their hiring process. As the bureaus sought to improve hiring and retention, Interior's Office of Policy, Management and Budget—which is charged with managing human resources and addressing cross-cutting issues—missed opportunities to facilitate collaboration across the bureaus. For example, two bureaus used separate recruitment teams that did not collaborate. Senior officials in the office did not identify any collaboration mechanism that they used to bring the bureaus together to discuss shared challenges. Without such a mechanism, the bureaus may continue to address these challenges through fragmented and potentially duplicative efforts.
Interior has trained key oil and gas staff without fully evaluating the bureaus' staff training needs or the training's effectiveness, according to officials, and Interior has provided limited leadership in facilitating the bureaus' sharing of training resources. The Federal Workforce Flexibility Act of 2004 and Office of Personnel Management (OPM) regulations require agencies to evaluate their training efforts, but Interior's Office of Policy, Management and Budget has not performed these evaluations. In addition, none of the bureaus have evaluated training, according to officials, and only one developed technical competencies for staff as directed in Interior's Departmental Manual. Further, BSEE's training for inspectors does not include proficiency examinations or certifications, according to officials, although two oversight bodies recommended implementing a certification program in 2010. Interior has provided limited leadership in facilitating the sharing of training resources across the bureaus, appearing to miss opportunities that could improve the use of these resources. For example, BOEM does not have staff to develop curricula or evaluate training efforts and, as of July 2016, BSEE had 6 full-time staff in their training program, according to officials. These bureaus conduct limited evaluations. In contrast, BLM had 59 staff in its training program and has the capacity to evaluate their training efforts, according to officials. Without further evaluation and leadership, Interior may not be able to ensure key oil and gas staff are adequately trained for their oversight tasks, and the bureaus may miss opportunities to share resources.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is recommending that Interior evaluate the effectiveness of special salary rates and incentives, evaluate its bureaus' training programs, develop technical competencies for all key oil and gas staff, evaluate the need for a BSEE inspector certification program, and better facilitate collaboration across the bureaus. Interior agreed with one recommendation, partially agreed with 3 others, and disagreed with one recommendation. GAO continues to believe that the recommendations are valid, as discussed in the report. |
gao_GAO-09-437T | gao_GAO-09-437T_0 | Experiences from past disasters can provide states and local communities with potential good practices to consider. Create a Clear, Implementable, and Timely Recovery Plan
A recovery plan can provide state and local governments with a valuable tool to document and communicate recovery goals, decisions, and priorities—in effect, they can provide a roadmap for the recovery process. Build State and Local Capacity for Implementing Federal Disaster Programs
Given the lead role that state and local governments play in disaster recovery, their ability to act effectively directly affects recovery after a major disaster. In the past, affected jurisdictions have used loans from a variety of sources to enhance local financial capacity. Strengthen technical capacity. State and local governments face the challenge of implementing the wide range of federal disaster programs. Implement Strategies for Business Recovery
Business recovery is a key element of a community’s recovery after a major disaster. Provide technical assistance to help businesses adapt to postdisaster market conditions. Adopt a Comprehensive Approach to Combating Fraud, Waste, and Abuse
A persistent challenge facing government at all levels is the risk of fraud, waste, and abuse of funds targeted for disaster assistance. Both disaster victims and public funds are at risk. To help protect its residents from contractor fraud after the 1997 Red River flood, the City of Grand Forks established a required credentialing program for contractors. In an effort to minimize instances of contractor fraud after the 2008 Midwest floods, the City of Cedar Rapids, Iowa created a similar contractor certification program modeled after Grand Forks’ program. Challenges with FEMA’s Public Assistance Grant Program After the 2005 Gulf Coast Hurricanes Provide Potential Lessons
The Public Assistance grant program, administered by FEMA, is one of two key programs the federal government has used to provide federal rebuilding assistance to Gulf Coast states after the 2005 Gulf Coast hurricanes. These included using program flexibilities to rebuild to the postdisaster needs of grant applicants and determining the scope of projects. For example, some applicants in Louisiana told us of the need to repeatedly resubmit key project documents because of the lack of an effective system to share such documentation. To help the Department of Homeland Security improve the operation of the Public Assistance grant program and build on some of the actions it has taken, our December 2008 report contained a number of recommendations, including that FEMA improve collaboration and information sharing within the Public Assistance process by identifying and disseminating practices that facilitate more effective communication among federal, state, and local entities communicating and tracking project information. In commenting on a draft of our report, the department generally agreed with our recommendations and noted that FEMA is making efforts to improve collaboration and information sharing within the Public Assistance process. Conclusions
The insights and lessons gained from the recovery experiences of past major disasters provide a potentially valuable source to all levels of government as they seek to meet the many challenges and complexities of recovering from a major disaster. While there is no one right way for state and local jurisdictions to manage recovery, the practices I have presented today provide a basic set of considerations and approaches for communities recovering from Hurricanes Ike and Gustav as well as disasters yet to come. Our work on one key federal recovery program—FEMA’s Public Assistance grant program—has identified several specific actions that can be taken to address the operational challenges that the program faced in the wake of the 2005 hurricanes. Opportunities exist for the federal government to take steps in the future to continue to refine this program to better address these challenges that could be faced again by Gulf Coast states recovering from Hurricanes Ike and Gustav, and in advance of future disasters. | Why GAO Did This Study
Recovery from major disasters is a complex undertaking that involves the combined efforts of federal, state, and local government in order to succeed. While the federal government provides a significant amount of financial and technical assistance for recovery, state and local jurisdictions work closely with federal agencies to secure and make use of those resources. This testimony describes lessons and insights that GAO has identified from review of past disasters, which may be useful to inform recovery efforts in the wake of Hurricanes Ike and Gustav, as well as disasters yet to come. These lessons come from two reports GAO recently released last fall on disaster recovery. The first draws on the experiences of communities that have recovered from previous major disasters in order to help inform recovery efforts in the wake of Hurricanes Ike and Gustav as well as the 2008 Midwest floods. The second examines the implementation of the Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA) Public Assistance grant program and identifies several actions that the Department of Homeland Security can take to improve operations of that program. These include improving information sharing and enhancing continuity and communication. Commenting on a draft of that report, the department generally agreed with our recommendations. In doing this work, GAO interviewed federal, state, and local officials involved in recovery and reviewed relevant documents, data, and laws.
What GAO Found
Lessons from past disasters provide a potentially valuable source of information for all levels of government as they seek to meet the many challenges of recovering from a major disaster. For affected state and local jurisdictions, good practices to consider include the following: (1) Creating a clear, implementable, and timely recovery plan can provide communities with a road map for the recovery process. Just 2 months after the 1995 Kobe earthquake in Japan, the city created a recovery plan with these elements. (2) Providing financial and technical capacity facilitates jurisdictions' ability to implement federal disaster programs. For example, loans and technical assistance provided after past disasters helped communities better navigate the wide range of federal disaster programs. (3) Implementing business recovery strategies to minimize business relocations helps small businesses adapt to postdisaster market conditions. For example, to encourage businesses to remain in the city Grand Forks after the 1997 flood, the city forgave loans for businesses that stayed in the city. (4) Adopting a comprehensive approach toward combating fraud, waste, and abuse protects both disaster victims from contractor fraud and public funds from fraudulent applicants. Controls to combat such activities before, during, and after a disaster can deter such activities, including instances of contractor fraud. On the federal level, experiences with FEMA's Public Assistance grant program after the 2005 Gulf Coast hurricanes illustrated a variety of challenges in the day-to-day operation of the program that could be faced again by Gulf Coast states recoveringfrom Hurricanes Ike and Gustav or other disasters in the future. These include the following: (1) Challenges using program flexibilities to respond to the postdisaster needs of grant applicants and determining project scope. For example, applicants reported needing additional flexibility when rebuilding to address significant population changes after the storm. (2) Challenges in sharing information among federal, state, and local officials during project development that at times slowed the process. For example, some applicants in Louisiana told us of the need to repeatedly resubmit key project documents because of the lack of an effective system to share such documentation. Opportunities exist for the federal government to further refine FEMA's Public Assistance grant program to better address these and other challenges as recovery continues on the Gulf Coast and in advance of future disasters. |
gao_GAO-04-417 | gao_GAO-04-417_0 | Flood maps also provide the basis for setting insurance rates and identifying properties whose owners are required to purchase flood insurance. Map Modernization Intends to Use Advanced Technologies to Produce More Accurate and Accessible Digital Flood Maps
Through map modernization, FEMA intends to produce more accurate and accessible flood maps by using advanced technology to gather accurate data and make the resulting information available on the Internet. As a result, nearly 70 percent of the nation’s approximately 92,222 flood maps are more than 10 years old and many of these maps reflect inaccurate data, according to FEMA. In developing the new data system to update flood maps across the nation, FEMA’s intent is to develop and incorporate flood risk data that are of a level of specificity and accuracy commensurate with communities’ relative flood risks. According to FEMA, there is a direct relationship between the types, quantity, and detail of the data and analysis used for map development and the costs associated with obtaining and analyzing those data. FEMA has ranked all 3,146 counties from highest to lowest based on a number of factors, including, among other things, population, growth trends, housing units, flood insurance policies and claims, repetitive loss properties, and flood disasters. However, FEMA has not yet established standards on the appropriate data and level of analysis required to develop maps based on risk level. Without establishing standards for different categories of risk, FEMA cannot ensure that it uses the same level of data collection and analysis across all communities within the same risk category. FEMA intends to use these state business plans to help prioritize its continuing efforts to develop map modernization partners. FEMA has not yet developed a strategy for how to partner with communities that do not have the resources, capabilities, or motivation to initiate and sustain mapping activities. Such standards can also help FEMA to target its map modernization resources more efficiently by matching the level of data collection and analysis with the level of flood risk. Similarly, by developing strategies for partnering with state, and local flood management stakeholders with lower levels of capabilities and resources, FEMA will be better able to leverage available resources and identify the most effective approaches to engaging its partners in the remapping process. Recommendations
To help ensure that FEMA’s map modernization achieves the intended benefits of improved flood mitigation, increased flood insurance participation, and improved multi-hazard mitigation and risk management capabilities through the production of more accurate and accessible flood maps, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the Undersecretary of Emergency Preparedness and Response to take the following four actions: Develop and implement data standards that will enable FEMA, its contractor, and its state and local partners to identify and use consistent data collection and analysis methods for communities with similar risk. | Why GAO Did This Study
Flood maps identify areas at greatest risk of flooding and provide the foundation for the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) managed by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). The maps are used by (1) communities to establish minimum building standards designed to reduce the impact of flooding, (2) FEMA to set insurance rates, and (3) lenders to identify property owners who are required to purchase flood insurance. Nearly 70 percent of all flood maps are more than 10 years old, according to FEMA. In an effort to update its flood maps, FEMA is implementing a $1 billion, 5-year map modernization program. GAO was asked to review the progress of FEMA's map modernization program.
What GAO Found
Through its map modernization program, FEMA intends to use advanced technologies to produce more accurate and accessible digital flood maps available on the Internet. These maps are expected to improve community efforts to reduce the impact of floods, increase property owners' use of flood insurance, and improve community, state and federal efforts to reduce the risks of other natural and man-made hazards. In developing digital flood maps, FEMA plans to incorporate data that are of a level of specificity and accuracy commensurate with communities' relative flood risk. According to FEMA, there is a direct relationship between the types, quantity, and detail of the data and analysis used to develop maps and the costs of obtaining and analyzing those data. Although FEMA ranked the nation's 3,146 counties from highest to lowest risk, it has not yet established data standards that describe the appropriate level of detail, accuracy, and analysis required to develop digital maps based on risk level. Without such standards, FEMA cannot ensure that it uses the same level of data collection and analysis for all communities in the same risk category. Such standards can also help FEMA to target its map modernization resources more efficiently by matching the level of data collection and analysis with the level of flood risk. FEMA has developed partnerships with states and local entities that have begun mapping activities and has a strategy on how to best work with these entities. However, the overall effectiveness of FEMA's future partnering efforts is uncertain because FEMA has not yet developed a clear strategy for partnering with communities with less resources and little or no experience in flood mapping. By developing such a strategy, FEMA will be better able to identify and use the most effective approaches to engage all of its partners in map modernization. |
gao_GAO-09-882 | gao_GAO-09-882_0 | First, an identity thief may use a legitimate taxpayer’s identity to fraudulently file a tax return and claim a refund during the filing season. IRS’s Ability to Detect and Catalog Current Identity Theft Incidents Is Limited and the Amount That Goes Undetected Is Not Known
IRS began systemically cataloging data on identity theft incidents in January 2008, but limitations on the data mean that the data provides an incomplete picture of the amount of identity theft-related fraud occurring at IRS. One reason for this is that IRS does not investigate every case of potential employment fraud. According to CI data, in 2008, IRS stopped about 90 percent of suspected identity theft-related refunds it identified as shown in table 3. For the other 10 percent, a majority of the refunds were issued to suspected identity thieves before the legitimate taxpayer filed their return. It is only when IRS finds a duplicate tax return (a second return filed using the same name and SSN) that IRS has an indication of potential refund fraud. IRS Has Implemented New Initiatives in an Effort to Detect and Resolve Identity Theft Cases, but Not Enough Is Known about How Well the Initiatives Are Working
In 2008 and 2009, IRS implemented four initiatives to detect and resolve identify theft cases: identity theft account indicators, screening procedures for returns with indicators, the Identity Protection Specialized Unit (IPSU), and call centers with an identity theft telephone hotline. Furthermore, there have been some glitches with implementation. The presence of the indicator means that IRS was already working to resolve the taxpayer’s tax problems before the taxpayer contacted TAS. Privacy and Other Laws Limit IRS’s Coordination with Other Agencies on Identity Theft Cases
Section 6103 of the Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C.) IRS does not routinely accept this information because it does not meet IRS’s substantiation requirements. Second, IRS is expanding the identity theft initiatives for the 2010 filing season. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of this report were to (1) describe how much identity theft- related refund and employment fraud the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) faces and whether incidents of identity theft go undetected by IRS, (2) assess the actions IRS is taking to prevent and detect identity theft-related tax problems and to assist affected taxpayers, and (3) describe what IRS is doing to coordinate its identity theft-related efforts with other government and nongovernment entities. Additionally, we analyzed information from PIPDS on the number and characteristics of identity theft-related refund and employment fraud by cases and affected taxpayers, including the activity reporting the incident and the type of identity theft indicator placed on the taxpayer account. We reviewed the data and documents provided by IRS in conjunction with discussions with IRS officials in order to describe these new initiatives as well as to understand the extent to which IRS had performance measures to determine the effectiveness of the new initiatives. | Why GAO Did This Study
Identity thieves may use a taxpayer's name and social security number to fraudulently claim a refund or gain employment. This creates tax problems for the innocent taxpayer when the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) discovers a duplicate refund claim or unreported wage income. IRS is revising its strategy for preventing, detecting, and resolving identity theft-related tax problems. GAO was asked to (1) describe the extent of identity theft-related refund and employment fraud, (2) assess IRS's actions to prevent and resolve such problems, and (3) describe IRS's identity theft- related coordination with other agencies. GAO analyzed IRS data on identity theft cases, reviewed revisions to the Internal Revenue Manual and other agency documents, and interviewed IRS officials responsible for the new strategy
What GAO Found
IRS's ability to detect identity theft-related refund and employment fraud is limited, but by the end of 2008, IRS had cataloged over 50,000 incidents. According to IRS, about 90 percent of fraudulently claimed refunds were stopped in 2008 with about $15 million issued before IRS became aware of the fraud. IRS does not know the amount of refund or employment fraud that goes undetected. In 2008, IRS began implementing four new initiatives in an effort to better detect and resolve identity theft cases. These include an identity theft indicator that IRS places on victims' accounts so that IRS personnel can more easily recognize and assist the legitimate taxpayer in case of future account problems. The indicator further enables IRS to screen returns to prevent fraudulent refunds from being issued to identity thieves. IRS also decided to resolve legitimate taxpayers' identity theft problems using a decentralized process--the activity that discovers a problem has the responsibility to resolve it. For the 2010 filing season, IRS is considering whether to expand its screening; however, IRS does not know how well its current strategy is working. IRS said it will develop performance measures, but it is not known whether the measures will be suitable for determining the effectiveness of the new initiatives, such as the number of false positives and negatives in the screening process or the success of the decentralized resolution process. Nor is it known when the new measures will be implemented. Measuring effectiveness matters because there have been glitches in implementing the initiatives. IRS is working to correct some discrepancies in the screening process and a GAO analysis of IRS data showed that some fraudulent refunds were issued even though taxpayers had indicators on their accounts. IRS's coordination with other agencies is limited. Statutory Provisions protecting the privacy of tax data prohibit IRS from sharing taxpayer information with other agencies in many cases. Nor does IRS routinely receive identity theft case data because of concerns with substantiation. IRS has coordinated with other agencies on how to manage identity theft programs. |
gao_NSIAD-95-147 | gao_NSIAD-95-147_0 | In 1995, a number of bills were introduced that could affect the recovery of nonrecurring costs on military sales. The Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA) must approve all charges. DSAA estimated in February 1995 that collections during fiscal years 1995-99 could amount to $845 million. Some collections would continue based on deliveries to be made on current contracts. Waivers Constitute a Major Loss of Revenue
DOD waived $273 million in nonrecurring costs to NATO members and Japan in fiscal year 1994, about $92 million more than DOD collected in nonrecurring cost charges in the same year. First, we calculated the charges on four categories of weapons—projectiles, missiles, aircraft, and aircraft engines. The flat rate charges of 3 and 5 percent generally resulted in lower total charges for each category of weapon systems—in the aircraft category, the charge was considerably less at 3 percent—than the total pro rata charges. Flat rate charges of 8 and 10 percent in most cases resulted in comparable or considerably higher total charges than the current pro rata charges for the four categories of weapon systems. Thus, for a given flat rate of 3, 5, 8, or 10 percent, the difference between the flat rates and pro rata charges varies widely. In 1986, DOD opted to retain the pro rata calculation and stated that the Arms Export Control Act would need to be revised to permit the use of a flat rate fee. Opposing Views on Cost Recovery
Supporters and opponents of recovery of nonrecurring costs differ on its benefits and drawbacks. Some supporters believe that, from an economic standpoint, the United States should recover all its costs and not subsidize the weapons industry by forgoing recovery of a portion of its research and development investments. DOD officials stated that they believe the elimination of the recovery charge would not negatively affect national security interests and the elimination of the recovery charge would, overall, be beneficial to the United States. We pointed out that, among other things, (1) the United States has been the world’s leading defense exporter since 1990, with almost 50 percent of the global market; (2) based on orders placed but not yet filled, U.S. industry will likely remain strong in the world market, at least for the short term; and (3) the U.S. government already provides substantial financial and other support to the U.S. defense exporters. DOD indicated that (1) the Department fully supported the administration’s proposal to repeal the statutory requirement to recover nonrecurring costs on foreign military sales of major defense equipment, (2) a consistent policy for foreign military and direct commercial sales is essential, and (3) the current imbalance between the two types of sales should be eliminated. It should be pointed out that our review was not to assess the legislative proposals, but rather to focus primarily on the financial effects of using a flat rate instead of the current pro rata fees. Pro Rata and Flat Rate Charges
Table I.1: Pro Rata and Flat Rate Charges on Projectiles Nonrecurring pro rata charge (percent of acquisition cost)
Table I.2: Pro Rata and Flat Rate Charges on Missiles Nonrecurring pro rata charge (percent of acquisition cost)
Table I.3: Pro Rata and Flat Rate Charges on Aircraft Nonrecurring pro rata charge (percent of acquisition cost) (Table notes on next page)
Without two J-85 engines. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on military exports, focusing on: (1) the government's recovery of nonrecurring research and development costs on sales of major defense equipment; (2) the effect of charging a flat or standard rate rather than the current pro rata fee; and (3) views from supporters and opponents on the recovery of these costs.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) the Department of Defense recovered $181 million in nonrecurring costs on foreign military sales in fiscal year (FY) 1994 and estimated, based on historical trends, that collections could amount to $845 million between FY 1995 and 1999; (2) the Defense Security Assistance Agency waived almost $273 million in nonrecurring cost charges on sales to North Atlantic Treaty Organization countries and Japan in FY 1994; (3) the total value of waivers for FY 1991 through 1994 amounted to $773 million; (4) if the charge for nonrecurring costs is repealed, some collections would continue for a few more years as the charges are recovered on deliveries associated with prior years' sales; (5) if the legislative requirement to collect nonrecurring cost charges is not repealed, one alternative to the current pro rata charge is a flat rate charge, which would be easy to calculate and would not need to be periodically updated, as is the case in calculating a pro rata charge; (6) the effect of a flat rate varies depending on the way it is applied, in some cases the amount the U.S. government would collect on each unit sold would be less than the pro rate charge, in others it would be considerably more; (7) the total charges for each of four categories of 68 weapons systems (projectiles, missiles, aircraft, and aircraft engines) were generally lower than the current pro rata charges when using three and five percent flat rates but were comparable or higher for the most part when using eight and ten percent flat rates; (8) the differences between the pro rata charges and the flat rate charges for each of the 68 weapons systems varied widely for the same four flat rates and, for example, were considerably higher for some aircraft but lower for some missiles; (9) the average of the current pro rata charge on the acquisition cost of the 68 weapons systems was 5.18 percent; (10) supporters and opponents of recovery of nonrecurring costs differ on its benefits and drawbacks; (11) supporters, including some arms control advocates, believe that the charges serve national security interests by keeping weapons systems out of unstable regions of the world and the weapons industry should not be subsidized at taxpayers' expense; (12) opponents believe the charges adversely affect U.S. industry's competitiveness in the world market and could affect the U.S. economy in the long run; and (13) the United States has been the world's leading defense exporter since 1990, and based on orders received but not yet filled, the United States is likely to retain its first place position in the world market for at least the short term. |
gao_GAO-11-176 | gao_GAO-11-176_0 | Having developed informal processes over time, senior officials, and evaluation and program office staff have a common understanding of how they will develop, review, and select evaluations. In addition to consulting internal program staff, most of the agencies we examined consult external groups to obtain ideas for evaluation proposals. Generally, the agencies review and approve evaluation proposals in two steps. First, evaluation or program staff members develop ideas or brief concept papers for initial feedback from senior officials. Only CDC’s divisions hold formal, ranked competitions to review and select proposals. These plans align well with the American Evaluation Association’s (AEA) recommendation, made in a recent policy paper on federal government evaluation, that federal agencies prepare annual and multiyear evaluation plans to guide program decision-making and consult with the Congress and nonfederal stakeholders in defining program and policy objectives, critical operations, and definitions of success. Common Types of Criteria Agencies Use to Prioritize Evaluation Proposals
We found these mature agencies remarkably similar in the four general criteria they used for selecting evaluations to conduct during the next fiscal year: strategic priorities, program concerns, critical unanswered questions, and the feasibility of conducting a valid evaluation study. The first criterion, strategic priorities, represents major program or policy areas identified as a focus of concern and reflected in a new initiative or increased level of effort. Prioritization Depends on Funding Sources and Agency Circumstances
Although the agencies generally followed a similar process in developing their evaluation agendas, some agency characteristics or conditions appeared to influence their choices and may be important for other agencies to consider as they develop their own evaluation agendas. The four conditions we identified as strongly influencing the evaluation planning process were 1. the location of evaluation funding, whether with the program or 2. the scope of the evaluation unit’s responsibility within the agency; 3. how much the evaluators rely on program partners; and 4. the extent and form of congressional oversight over agency program evaluations. Where evaluation funds and authority are tied to the program, and funds are available, evaluation staff generally choose not which programs to evaluate but which research questions to answer. Being responsible for a wide range of analytic activities also influenced an evaluation office’s choice of evaluations. The evaluation offices in ACF, Education, and HUD all noted their responsibility to conduct congressionally mandated evaluation studies in describing the criteria they used in evaluation planning. However, developing a multiyear evaluation plan could help ensure that all an agency’s programs are examined over time. To produce an effective evaluation agenda, agencies may want to follow the general model we identified at the agencies we reviewed: professional evaluators lead an iterative process of identifying important policy and program management questions, vetting initial ideas with the evaluations’ intended users, and scrutinizing the proposed portfolio of studies for relevance and feasibility within available resources. To ensure that their evaluations provide the information necessary for effective management and legislative oversight, evaluation offices are likely to need to seek out in advance the interests and concerns of key program and congressional stakeholders, especially program partners, and discuss preliminary proposals with the intended users. Agency Comments
The Departments of Health and Human Services and Housing and Urban Development provided comments on a draft of this report, which are reprinted in appendixes I and II. This is consistent with our concluding observation that agencies may need to adapt the general model—including where to locate evaluation offices—to match their own organizational and financial circumstances. HUD agreed with our description of how it plans evaluations but was concerned that the report did not place enough emphasis on the appropriations process as a major influence on what projects it funds and when it can begin the contracting process. Education, HHS, and HUD also provided technical comments that were incorporated where appropriate throughout the text. Program Evaluation: A Variety of Rigorous Methods Can Help Identify Effective Interventions. | Why GAO Did This Study
Amid efforts to improve performance and constrain spending, federal agencies are being asked to expand the use of rigorous program evaluation in decision-making. In addition to performance data, indepth program evaluation studies are often needed for assessing program impact or designing improvements. Agencies can also use their evaluation resources to provide information needed for effective management and legislative oversight. GAO was asked to study federal agencies with mature evaluation capacity to examine (1) the criteria, policies, and procedures they use to determine programs to review, and (2) the influences on their choices. GAO reviewed agency materials and interviewed officials on evaluation planning in four agencies in three departments with extensive evaluation experience: Education, Health and Human Services (HHS), and Housing and Urban Development (HUD). HHS and HUD agreed with the description of how they plan evaluations. HHS noted that the optimal location of evaluation units will vary with the circumstances and purpose of evaluations. HUD felt the draft report did not emphasize enough the influence of the appropriations process. GAO has added text to note its influence on evaluation planning. Education provided technical comments.
What GAO Found
Although no agency GAO reviewed had a formal policy describing evaluation planning, all followed a generally similar model for developing and selecting evaluation proposals. Agencies usually planned an evaluation agenda over several months in the context of preparing spending plans for the coming fiscal year. Evaluation staff typically began by consulting with a variety of stakeholders to identify policy priorities and program concerns. Then with program office staff they identified the key questions and concerns and developed initial proposals. Generally, the agencies reviewed and selected proposals in two steps: develop ideas to obtain initial feedback from senior officials and develop full-scale evaluation proposals for review and approval. The four general criteria these mature agencies use to plan evaluations were remarkably similar: (1) strategic priorities representing major program or policy area concerns or new initiatives, (2) program-level problems or opportunities, (3) critical unanswered questions or evidence gaps, and (4) the feasibility of conducting a valid study. The agencies' procedures differed on some points. External parties' participation in evaluation planning may reflect these agencies' common reliance on nonfederal program partners. Only the offices GAO reviewed in HHS' Centers for Disease Control and Prevention held formal competitions to rank-order proposals before submitting them for approval; in other agencies, senior officials assessed proposals in a series of discussions. When evaluation authority and funds are tied to the program, evaluators generally choose not which programs to evaluate but which research questions to answer. Sometimes this resulted in a program's never being evaluated. Evaluation units at higher organizational levels conducted a wider range of analytic activities, consulted more formally with program offices, and had less control over approvals. The Congress influences an agency's program evaluation choices through legislating evaluation authority, mandating studies, making appropriations, and conducting oversight. GAO concludes that (1) all four criteria appear key to setting an effective evaluation agenda that provides credible, timely answers to important questions; (2) most agencies could probably apply the general model in which professional evaluators iteratively identify key questions in consultation with stakeholders and then scrutinize and vet research proposals; (3) agencies could adapt the model and decide where to locate evaluation units to meet their own organizational and financial circumstances and authorities; and (4) agencies' reaching out to key program and congressional stakeholders in advance of developing proposals could help ensure that their evaluations will be used effectively in management and legislative oversight.
What GAO Recommends
GAO makes no recommendations. |
gao_GAO-04-160 | gao_GAO-04-160_0 | FPC 65 also determined that COOP planning is based first on the identification of essential functions—that is, those functions that enable agencies to provide vital services, exercise civil authority, maintain safety, and sustain the economy during an emergency. Although FPC 65 gives no specific criteria for identifying essential functions, a logical starting point for this process would be to consider programs that had been previously identified as important. These agency-identified essential functions varied in number and scope. The number of functions identified in each plan ranged from 3 to 399. For example, a number of essential functions were of clear importance, such as “ensuring uninterrupted command, control, and leadership of the “protecting critical facilities, systems, equipment and records”; and “continuing to pay the government’s obligations.”
Other identified functions appeared vague or of questionable importance: “provide speeches and articles for the Secretary and Deputy Secretary”; “schedule all activities of the Secretary”; and “review fiscal and programmatic integrity and efficiency of Departmental activities.”
In contrast to the examples just given, agencies did not list among their essential functions 20 of the 38 “high-impact” programs identified during the Y2K effort at the agencies we reviewed. FEMA is developing a test and training program for COOP activities, but it has not yet conducted an interagency exercise to test the feasibility of these planned activities. However, none of these plans addressed all the guidance in FPC 65. Essential Functions
Although most agency plans identified at least one essential function, less than half the COOP plans fully addressed other FPC 65 guidance related to essential functions, such as prioritizing the functions or identifying interdependencies among them (see table 2). If alternate facilities are not provided or are inadequate, agency operations may not be able to continue in an emergency. In 1999, FEMA assessed compliance with the elements of FPC 65 through a self-reported survey of agency COOP officials, supplemented by interviews. Conclusions
While most of the federal agencies we reviewed had developed COOP plans, three agencies did not have documented plans as of October 2002. To ensure that agencies can continue operations in emergencies and are prepared for the governmentwide exercise planned for May 2004, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the Under Secretary for Emergency Preparedness and Response to take steps to ensure that agencies that do not have COOP plans develop them by May 1, 2004. We further recommend that the Secretary direct the Under Secretary to take steps to improve the oversight of COOP planning by ensuring that agencies correct the deficiencies in individual COOP plans identified here, as well as those identified in previous assessments, and conducting assessments of agency continuity plans that include independent verification of agency-provided information, as well as an assessment of the essential functions identified and their interdependencies with other activities. We also interviewed agency officials who were responsible for developing each of the 34 continuity of operations (COOP) plans (comprising the 20 plans for the largest civilian departments and agencies and the 14 plans covering components with high-impact programs); obtained and analyzed COOP guidance issued by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and documents describing its efforts to provide oversight and assessments of federal COOP planning efforts; and conducted interviews with FEMA officials to clarify the activities described in these documents. | Why GAO Did This Study
To ensure that essential government services are available in emergencies--such as terrorist attacks, severe weather, or building-level emergencies-- federal agencies are required to develop continuity of operations (COOP) plans. Responsibility for formulating guidance on these plans and for assessing executive branch COOP capabilities lies with the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), under the Department of Homeland Security. FEMA guidance, Federal Preparedness Circular (FPC) 65 (July 1999), provides elements of a viable COOP capability, including the requirement that agencies identify their essential functions. GAO was asked to determine the extent to which (1) major civilian executive branch agencies have identified their essential functions and (2) these agencies' COOP plans follow FEMA guidance.
What GAO Found
From an assessment of 34 COOP plans against FEMA guidance, GAO found that most agencies' plans identified at least one function as essential. However, the functions identified in each plan varied widely in number-- ranging from 3 to 399--and included functions that appeared to be of secondary importance, while at the same time omitting programs that had been previously defined as high-impact programs. (Examples of these highimpact programs are Medicare, food stamps, and border inspections.) For example, one department included "provide speeches and articles for the Secretary and Deputy Secretary," among its essential functions, but did not include 9 of 10 high-impact programs for which it is responsible. Several factors contributed to these shortcomings: FPC 65 did not provide specific criteria for identifying essential functions; FEMA did not review the essential functions identified when it assessed COOP planning; and it did not conduct tests or exercises to confirm that the essential functions were correctly identified. Unless agencies' essential functions are correctly and completely identified, their COOP plans may not effectively ensure that the most vital government services can be maintained in an emergency. Although all but three of the agencies reviewed had developed and documented some of the elements of a viable COOP plan, none of the agencies could demonstrate that they were following all the guidance in FPC 65. There is a wide variation in the number of agencies that addressed various elements identified in the guidance. A contributing cause for the deficiencies in agency COOP plans is the level of FEMA oversight. In 1999, FEMA conducted an assessment of agency compliance with FPC 65, but it has not conducted oversight that is sufficiently regular and extensive to ensure that agencies correct the deficiencies identified. Because the resulting COOP plans do not include all the elements of a viable plan as defined by FPC 65, agency efforts to provide services during an emergency could be impaired. |
gao_GAO-08-977 | gao_GAO-08-977_0 | DOE Reports That Most Federal Agencies Met Fiscal Year 2007 Energy Goals
According to draft data agencies provide to DOE, most of the 22 federal agencies reporting in fiscal year 2007 met the energy efficiency, greenhouse gas emission, and renewable energy goals. Some agencies used credits to meet the goals and would not have met the goals through reductions in energy intensity alone. The same renewable energy purchase and source energy credits that count toward the energy efficiency goal also count toward the greenhouse gas emissions goal. Assessing Progress Toward the Goals Over Time Is Problematic Due to Key Changes in the Goals and How Performance Is Measured
Determining the extent to which agencies have made progress toward the goals over time is problematic due to key changes in the goals—as specified in statute and executive order—and how performance is measured. Energy efficiency. Greenhouse gas emissions. Now, the greenhouse gas emissions direction is measured using energy intensity against a 2003 baseline. However, a reduction in energy intensity does not track directly with lower greenhouse gas emissions for two reasons. As past GAO work has shown, a decrease in this intensity-based measure may result in increased greenhouse gas emissions. Agencies’ Prospects for Meeting Energy Goals in the Future Depend on Addressing Four Challenges
The prospects for meeting the energy goals in the future for the agencies we reviewed depend largely on overcoming four key challenges. Finally, sites may lack staff dedicated to energy management, and also may find it difficult to retain staff with sufficient energy expertise; lack of expertise could make it difficult to undertake alternative financing projects. Federal officials are participating in energy-related training courses and undertaking initiatives to hire, support, and reward energy management personnel. However, we determined that the long-term energy plans for one or more of the six agencies lacked some of the following key elements for effective long-term energy planning: approaches or strategies for achieving long-term energy goals; strategies that linked energy goals and provide a framework for aligning agency activities, processes, and resources to attain the goals of the plan; identification of the required resources needed to achieve long-term energy goals; strategies that properly reflect and address external factors; and provisions for obtaining reliable performance data needed to set goals, evaluate results, and improve performance. Paying for this investment up front with appropriated funds may be difficult for agencies because energy projects compete with other budget priorities. Our June 2005 report also showed that agencies entering into these alternative finance contracts could not always verify whether energy savings were greater than project costs and may yield lower dollar savings than if timely, full, and upfront appropriations had been used. There is no consensus on a best measure at present; however, there are alternative measures that may better track agencies’ greenhouse gas emissions than the current measure based on energy intensity. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To determine the extent to which agencies met energy efficiency, greenhouse gas emission, and renewable energy goals, we analyzed data on agencies’ performance in meeting these goals using draft agency energy data, as of July 2008, for fiscal year 2007, which were reported by the agencies to the Department of Energy (DOE) for use in DOE’s Annual Report to Congress on Federal Government Energy Management and Conservation Programs. To assess the agencies’ progress in each of these areas in recent years, we reviewed energy efficiency, greenhouse gas emission, and renewable energy goals, as established in current and previous statute and executive orders—the Energy Policy Act of 2005, Executive Order 13123, and Executive Order 13423. To determine the extent to which the agencies are poised to meet future energy goals, we selected six agencies on the basis of several criteria, including the following: (1) energy consumed: of the agencies reporting energy data to DOE, these six agencies together accounted for nearly 94 percent of the energy consumed in standard buildings in fiscal year 2005; (2) level of investment in energy and utility savings performance contracts; (3) amount of renewable energy purchased, and self-generated; and (4) estimated carbon emissions. | Why GAO Did This Study
The federal government is the nation's single largest energy consumer, spending approximately $17 billion in fiscal year 2007. A number of statutes and executive orders have established and revised goals directing agencies to reduce energy consumption and greenhouse gas emissions--such as carbon dioxide, which results from combustion of fossil fuels and natural processes, among other things--and increase renewable energy use. GAO was asked to determine the extent to which (1) federal agencies met energy efficiency, greenhouse gas emission, and renewable energy goals in fiscal year 2007; (2) federal agencies have made progress in each of these areas in the recent past; and (3) six selected agencies are poised to meet energy goals into the future. For this review, GAO, among other things, conducted site visits for six agencies and reviewed the Department of Energy's (DOE) annual reports to Congress on federal energy management.
What GAO Found
Based on draft DOE data, most of the 22 agencies reporting to DOE for fiscal year 2007 met energy goals for energy efficiency, greenhouse gas emissions, and renewable energy. Specifically, all but one agency met the energy efficiency goal. Three of these agencies would not have met the goal through reductions in energy intensity--the amount of energy consumed per gross square foot--alone; they also used credits for the purchase of renewable energy or source energy to help meet the goal. Because the greenhouse gas emission goal is tied to the energy efficiency goal, the same number of agencies met the greenhouse gas emission goal, while 17 of the 22 agencies met the renewable energy goal. Determining the extent to which agencies have made progress over time toward the goals is problematic due to key changes in the goals--as specified in statute and executive order--and how progress is measured. For example, the energy efficiency goal changed the types of buildings included and the baseline year against which progress was measured. The greenhouse gas emissions goal also changed, from a measure of greenhouse gas emissions to a measure of energy intensity; this change makes it problematic to compare performance before and after the change. Moreover, GAO found that a goal based on energy intensity is not a good proxy for emissions because a reduction in energy intensity does not always result in lower greenhouse gas emissions. Although there is no consensus on a best measure at present, alternative measures are in use that may better track agencies' greenhouse gas emissions than the current measure based on energy intensity. Agencies' prospects for meeting energy goals into the future depend on overcoming four key challenges. First, the six agencies GAO reviewed--the departments of Defense (DOD), Energy (DOE), and Veterans Affairs (VA); the General Services Administration (GSA); the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA); and the U.S. Postal Service (USPS)--had long-term plans for achieving energy goals that lacked key elements, such as plans that outline agencies' strategies that are linked to goals and provide a framework for aligning activities, processes, and resources to attain the goals of the plan. Second, investment in energy projects competes with other budget priorities, causing agency officials to increasingly rely on alternative financing mechanisms--contracts with private companies that pay for energy improvements. However, as past GAO work has shown, agencies entering into these contracts could not always verify whether money saved from using less energy was greater than projected costs and may yield lower savings than if timely, full, and upfront appropriations had been used. Third, agencies face challenges in obtaining reliable energy consumption data but are taking steps to collect more reliable data. Finally, facilities may lack staff dedicated to energy management and may find it difficult to retain staff with sufficient energy expertise; however, agency officials are participating in training and implementing initiatives for energy management personnel. |
gao_GAO-01-746 | gao_GAO-01-746_0 | Small Businesses Continue to Win Construction Work
Our analysis of overall data on construction contract awards indicates that small businesses are continuing to win work and that their ability to compete is not being impaired. Since 1997, construction contract awards to small businesses have increased steadily in the face of a decline in overall construction awards. Officials analyzed these projects to assess whether the work could accommodate smaller contractors but concluded that only by having a single contractor build the entire project could the work be performed efficiently. In these cases, small businesses were able to participate. To assess the extent to which DOD's contracting officers had combined construction requirements, we reviewed the laws and implementing regulations defining contract bundling and reviewed large contracts for construction awarded at selected contracting offices. For these contracts, we reviewed contract documentation to determine whether requirements had been combined, the reasons cited for combining requirements, and the extent of small businesses' participation in competition for the contracts. We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense and the Acting Administrator of the Small Business Administration. | Why GAO Did This Study
Congress appropriates billions of dollars annually to construct buildings and other facilities for military training and operations. Small business have carried out a significant portion of this work. Congress and small business advocates, however, had become concerned that agencies were combining requirements into larger contracts that small businesses could not win. GAO examined the contract bundling of military construction requirements.
What GAO Found
GAO determined whether (1) overall data on construction contract awards to small businesses indicated that their ability to compete for contracts had been impaired and (2) selected Department of Defense (DOD) contracting offices had combined construction requirements in ways that hampered small businesses' ability to compete. Overall data on military construction contract awards to small businesses revealed that small businesses are generally continuing to win work and that their ability to compete is not being impaired. The Small Business Administration reviewed and approved of DOD's plan to determine whether the construction work being done could accommodate smaller contractors. Small businesses were able to compete for the remaining contracts. |
gao_GAO-12-837 | gao_GAO-12-837_0 | DHS Does Not Know Its Total Investment in R&D, and Policies and Guidance Could Help Define and Oversee R&D Efforts
DHS Does Not Know Its Total Investment in R&D
DHS does not know how much all of its components invest in R&D, making it difficult to oversee R&D efforts across the department. According to DHS budget officials, S&T, DNDO, and the Coast Guard are the only components that conduct R&D and, according to our analysis, they are the only components that report budget authority, obligations, or outlays for R&D activities to OMB as part of the budget process. However, we identified an additional $255 million in R&D obligations by other DHS components. Specifically:
S&T reported receiving $50 million in reimbursements from other DHS components, such as U.S. Our analysis identified that DHS components, outside of S&T, DNDO, and the Coast Guard, obligated $151 million to DOE national laboratories for R&D-related projects (44 percent of total DHS spending at the national laboratories in fiscal year 2011). As a result, it is difficult to identify the department’s total investment in R&D, which limits DHS’s ability to oversee components’ R&D efforts and align them with agencywide R&D goals and priorities. S&T Coordinates Some R&D at DHS, but DHS R&D Is Fragmented and Overlapping, Increasing the Risk of Unnecessary Duplication
S&T has coordinated R&D efforts across DHS to some extent, but the department’s R&D efforts are fragmented and overlapping, which increases the risk of unnecessary duplication. We identified 35 instances of overlap among contracts that DHS components awarded for R&D projects, but did not identify instances of duplication among these contracts. Additionally, DHS has not developed a policy defining who is responsible for coordinating R&D and what processes should be used to coordinate it, and S&T does not have mechanisms to track all R&D activities at DHS. Developing a policy defining the roles and responsibilities for coordinating R&D, and establishing coordination processes and a mechanism to track all R&D projects could help DHS mitigate existing fragmentation and overlap, and reduce the risk of unnecessary duplication. DHS R&D Is Fragmented and Overlapping, Increasing the Risk of Unnecessary Duplication
R&D at DHS is inherently fragmented because several components within DHS—S&T, the Coast Guard, and DNDO—were each given R&D responsibilities in law, and other DHS components may pursue and conduct their own R&D efforts as long as those activities are coordinated through S&T. S&T awarded four separate contracts to develop advanced algorithms for explosives detection, while TSA also awarded contracts to develop algorithms to evaluate images for explosives. However, other component officials we interviewed did not view S&T’s coordination practices as positively. Conclusions
Conducting R&D on technologies is a key component of DHS’s efforts to detect, prevent, and mitigate terrorist threats and is vital to enhancing the security of the nation. Multiple entities across DHS conduct various types of R&D in pursuit of their respective missions, but DHS does not have a department-wide policy defining R&D or guidance directing components how to report R&D activities and investments. Furthermore, DHS has taken some steps to coordinate R&D efforts across the department, but does not have a cohesive policy defining roles and responsibilities for coordinating R&D and mechanisms to track all DHS R&D projects. Such policies and guidance could be included as an update to the department’s existing acquisition directive and should include the following elements: a well-understood definition of R&D that provides reasonable assurance that reliable accounting and reporting of R&D resources and activities for internal and external use are achieved, a description of the department’s process and roles and responsibilities for overseeing and coordinating R&D investments and efforts, and a mechanism to track existing R&D projects and their associated costs across the department. How much does the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) invest in research and development (R&D) and to what extent does it have policies and guidance for defining R&D and overseeing R&D resources and efforts across the department? To determine how much DHS invests in R&D and the extent that it has policies and guidance for defining R&D and overseeing R&D resources and efforts across the department, we reviewed DHS’s budget and congressional budget justifications to identify R&D investments reported from fiscal years 2011 through 2013. To determine the extent that R&D is coordinated within DHS to prevent overlap, fragmentation, and unnecessary duplication, we
Reviewed component R&D plans and project documentation. | Why GAO Did This Study
Conducting R&D on technologies for detecting, preventing, and mitigating terrorist threats is vital to enhancing the security of the nation. Since its creation, DHS has spent billions of dollars researching and developing technologies used to support its missions including securing the border, detecting nuclear devices, and screening airline passengers and baggage for explosives, among others. Within DHS, S&T conducts R&D and is the component responsible for coordinating R&D across the department, but other components, such as the Coast Guard and DNDO, also conduct R&D to support their respective missions. GAO was asked to identify (1) how much DHS invests in R&D and the extent to which DHS has policies and guidance for defining R&D and overseeing R&D resources and efforts across the department, and (2) the extent to which R&D is coordinated within DHS to prevent overlap, fragmentation, or unnecessary duplication. GAO reviewed information on DHS R&D budgets, contracts, and DHS spending on R&D at DOE national laboratories for fiscal years 2010 through 2012. GAO also reviewed DHS R&D plans and project documentation, and interviewed DHS headquarters and component officials.
What GAO Found
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) does not know the total amount its components invest in research and development (R&D) and does not have policies and guidance for defining R&D and overseeing R&D resources across the department. According to DHS, its Science & Technology Directorate (S&T), Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO), and U. S. Coast Guard are the only components that conduct R&D and, according to GAOs analysis, these are the only components that report budget authority, obligations, or outlays for R&D activities to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) as part of the budget process. However, GAO identified an additional $255 million in R&D obligations by other DHS components. For example, S&T reported receiving $50 million in reimbursements from other DHS components to conduct R&D. Further, 10 components obligated $55 million for R&D contracts to third parties and $151 million to Department of Energy (DOE) national laboratories for R&D-related projects, but these were not reported as R&D to OMB. According to DHS, it is difficult to identify all R&D investments across the department because DHS does not have a department wide policy defining R&D or guidance directing components how to report all R&D spending and activities. As a result, it is difficult for DHS to oversee components R&D efforts and align them with agency wide R&D goals and priorities. Developing specific policies and guidance could assist DHS components in better understanding how to report R&D activities, and better position DHS to determine how much the agency invests in R&D to effectively oversee these investments.
S&T has taken some steps to coordinate R&D efforts across DHS, but the department's R&D efforts are fragmented and overlapping, which increases the risk of unnecessary duplication. R&D at DHS is inherently fragmented because S&T, the Coast Guard, and DNDO were each given R&D responsibilities in law, and other DHS components may pursue and conduct their own R&D efforts as long as those activities are coordinated through S&T. S&T uses various mechanisms to coordinate its R&D efforts including component liaisons, component R&D agreements, joint R&D strategies, and integrated R&D product teams composed of S&T and component officials. However, GAO identified 35 instances of overlap among contracts that DHS components awarded for R&D projects. For example, S&T and the Transportation Security Administration both awarded overlapping contracts to different vendors to develop advanced algorithms to detect the same type of explosive. While GAO did not identify instances of unnecessary duplication among these contracts, DHS has not developed a policy defining who is responsible for coordinating R&D and what processes should be used to coordinate it, and does not have mechanisms to track all R&D activities at DHS that could help prevent overlap, fragmentation, or unnecessary duplication. For example, S&T did not track homeland security-related R&D activities that DHS components contracted through DOE national laboratories from fiscal year 2010 through 2013; thus, it could not provide information on those contracts. Developing a policy defining the roles and responsibilities for coordinating R&D, and establishing coordination processes and a mechanism to track all R&D projects could help DHS mitigate existing fragmentation and overlap, and reduce the risk of unnecessary duplication.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DHS develop policies and guidance for defining, reporting and coordinating R&D activities across the department; and that DHS establish a mechanism to track R&D projects. DHS concurred with GAOs recommendations. |
gao_HEHS-98-130 | gao_HEHS-98-130_0 | Background
The rapid and widespread increase in the use of crack—a smokable form of cocaine—in the 1980s has frequently been referred to as a drug epidemic. The Alcohol, Drug Abuse, and Mental Health Services (ADMS) block grant program was also created in 1981 to provide funds to states for planning, establishing, and evaluating programs for the development of more effective prevention, treatment, and rehabilitation services. SAMHSA also assumed responsibility for overseeing state administration of the block grant programs. A description of the drug detection mechanisms NIDA sponsored follows. Three other metropolitan areas were later added. The National Prevalence of Crack Use in the General Population Was Not Known Until the Late 1980s
Although NIDA was aware of the rapid spread of crack use from CEWG reports starting in the mid-1980s, the national prevalence of crack use in the general household population was not measured until the late 1980s. Limitations in Data Sources Raised Concerns About the Adequacy of Information on the Crack Cocaine Crisis
In two congressional hearings held in July 1986, a number of concerns were raised about the data that had been collected through the NIDA-sponsored drug detection mechanisms. Federal Public Health Response to Crack Focused on Cocaine Research and Education, Funding, and Reestablishing a Service Focus
The federal public health response to crack in the 1980s primarily focused on cocaine in general instead of on crack specifically. The creation of ONDCP and organizational changes to HHS’ drug abuse agencies since the late 1980s were intended to strengthen the federal response to drug abuse problems. To coordinate the federal drug control effort, ONDCP was charged with developing an annual national drug control strategy. SAMHSA Was Created to Strengthen Drug Prevention and Treatment Services
SAMHSA was created to address concerns related to the availability and quality of drug prevention and treatment services. Despite Changes, Concerns Remain About Our Nation’s Ability to Detect and Respond to Emerging Drug Crises
Despite changes to federal drug detection mechanisms and congressional efforts to better position federal public health agencies to respond to emerging drug crises, concerns remain. Since ONDCP is responsible for developing and coordinating a national drug control strategy, it could take the lead in improving the nation’s drug data collection system and coordinating the development of a strategy to address future emerging drug use problems. Recommendations
To improve the nation’s drug use detection and response capability, we recommend that the Director of ONDCP implement any additional changes that would improve the completeness, accuracy, and overall usefulness of data generated by the nation’s drug data collection mechanisms; take action to further improve the federal drug data collection system by determining what data should be collected and developing a systematic approach for gathering, analyzing, and disseminating information; and develop a defined strategy for determining the timing, magnitude, and nature of actions needed to appropriately respond to potential drug crises or epidemics, taking into consideration that emerging drug problems surface as local phenomena. Executive Vice President and Medical Director Center on Addiction and Substance Abuse, Columbia University, and Professor of Psychiatry, Columbia University College of Physicians and Surgeons A. Thomas McLellan, Ph.D., Scientific Director DeltaMetrics in Association With Treatment Research Institute University of Pennsylvania Before convening the panel, we sent each panelist a discussion paper containing a brief description of the current array of detection mechanisms used by the public health service agencies and the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP); the legislative responsibilities of the National Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA), the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA), and ONDCP to address illicit drug use problems; and information these agencies gave us about how they implement their responsibilities and respond to changes in drug use patterns. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the efforts of the federal public health agencies to detect the spread of drug use in the United States and their ability to respond to potential drug crises, focusing on: (1) how the public health service agencies have detected and responded to the crack cocaine epidemic; (2) any changes made to improve the nation's drug detection and response capability; and (3) any remaining issues that could compromise the nation's ability to detect and respond to emerging drug problems.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) despite certain limitations in its sources of information, the National Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA) was able to track the use of a number of illicit drugs, including cocaine, during the late 1970s and early 1980s; (2) two drug detection mechanisms NIDA used as a part of that effort helped detect the emergence of crack--a smokable form of cocaine; (3) NIDA had become aware of the rapid spread of crack in 17 metropolitan areas by 1986, but the prevalence of crack use in the national household population was not known until the late 1980s; (4) federal public health agencies primarily directed their response efforts to the problem of cocaine and drug abuse in general, rather than to crack specifically; (5) the response, orchestrated largely by NIDA, focused primarily on drug abuse research and education; (6) the Alcohol, Drug Abuse, and Mental Health Administration provided funding to state and local entities for substance abuse prevention and treatment services through the federal block grant program during the 1980s; (7) following the height of the crack epidemic around 1985, concerns were raised in Congress about efforts to detect and respond to the problem--in particular about the timeliness and accuracy of drug use data, lack of data on certain populations and geographic areas, limited availability of certain treatment programs, limited monitoring of the block grant program, and lack of a coordinated national drug control strategy; (8) in response, the responsible federal agencies made changes to improve drug detection capability--changes that included adding new detection mechanisms; (9) also, to help strengthen the federal response to drug problems, Congress legislated changes in the organization of the Department of Health and Human Services' major drug control agencies: the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration was created as a separate agency to focus on prevention and treatment services, and, to emphasize its research focus, NIDA was moved to the National Institutes of Health; (10) in addition, Congress created the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) to develop a national drug control strategy and coordinate the national drug control effort; (11) despite these changes, concerns remain about the nation's ability to detect and respond to emerging drug problems; (12) ONDCP established a group to study the use of drug data that has recommended ways to improve the nation's drug data collection system; and (13) in addition, experts agree on the need for an overall strategy among key drug control agencies for managing emerging drug problems. |
gao_GAO-12-1041T | gao_GAO-12-1041T_0 | DHS Has Made Progress in Addressing Its Management Challenges, but Has Significant Work Ahead to Achieve High-Risk Outcomes
Since we designated the implementation and transformation of DHS as high risk in 2003, DHS has made progress addressing management challenges and senior department officials have demonstrated commitment and top leadership support for addressing the department’s management challenges. However, the department has significant work ahead to achieve positive outcomes in resolving high-risk issues. For example, DHS faces challenges in modernizing its financial systems, implementing acquisition management controls, and improving employee satisfaction survey results, among other things. As DHS continues to mature as an organization, it will be important for the department to continue to strengthen its management functions, since the effectiveness of these functions affects its ability to fulfill its homeland security and other missions. DHS has made progress in addressing its financial management and internal controls weaknesses, but has been unable to obtain an unqualified audit opinion on its financial statements since the department’s creation and faces challenges in modernizing its financial management systems. Acquisition management. DHS has made progress in the acquisition management area by enhancing the department’s ability to oversee major acquisition programs. Human capital management. Information technology management. Based on preliminary observations from our review of DHS’s major at-risk IT acquisitions we are performing for the committee, these improvements may be having a positive effect. For example, the department needs to: finalize the policies and procedures associated with its new tiered governance structure and continue to implement this structure, as we recommended in our July 2012 report; continue to implement its IT human capital plan, which DHS believed would take 18 months to fully implement as of June 2012; and continue its efforts to enhance IT security by, among other things, effectively addressing material weaknesses in financial systems security, developing a plan to track and promptly respond to known vulnerabilities, and implementing key security controls and activities. DHS has made progress in integrating its individual management functions across the department and its component agencies. Although these actions are important, DHS needs to continue to demonstrate sustainable progress in integrating its management functions within and across the department and its components and take additional actions to further and more effectively integrate the department. DHS strategy for addressing GAO’s high-risk designation. In January 2011, DHS issued an agencywide management integration strategy—the Integrated Strategy for High Risk Management—as we recommended in our March 2005 report on DHS’s management integration efforts. DHS’s most recent version of the strategy, issued in June 2012, greatly improved upon prior versions and addressed feedback we previously provided by, for example, identifying key measures and progress ratings for the 18 initiatives included in the strategy and the 31 outcomes.believe the June 2012 strategy, if implemented and sustained, provides a path for DHS to address our high-risk designation. DHS can further strengthen or clarify its Integrated Strategy for High Risk Management to better enable DHS, Congress, and GAO to assess the department’s progress in implementing its management initiatives by, among other things: determining the resource needs for all of the corrective actions in the strategy; communicating to senior leadership critical resource gaps across all initiatives; and identifying program and project risks in a supporting risk mitigation plan for all initiatives. We will continue to monitor, assess, and provide feedback on DHS’s implementation and transformation efforts through our ongoing and planned work, including the 2013 high-risk update that we expect to issue in January 2013. Key contributors for the previous work that this testimony is based on are listed within each individual product. Appendix I: Summary of Actions and Outcomes for Addressing the Implementing and Transforming the Department of Homeland Security High-Risk Area
Related GAO Reports
Homeland Security: DHS Requires More Disciplined Investment Management to Help Meet Mission Needs. Department of Homeland Security: Additional Actions Needed to Strengthen Strategic Planning and Management Functions. High-Risk Series: Strategic Human Capital Management. Washington, D.C.: November 2000. | Why GAO Did This Study
This testimony discusses the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) efforts to strengthen and integrate its management functions. DHS now has more than 200,000 employees and an annual budget of almost $60 billion, and its transformation is critical to achieving its homeland security and other missions. Since 2003, GAO has designated the implementation and transformation of DHS as high risk because DHS had to combine 22 agencies--several with major management challenges--into one department, and failure to effectively address DHS's management and mission risks could have serious consequences for our national and economic security. This high-risk area includes challenges in strengthening DHS's management functions--financial management, acquisition management, human capital, and information technology (IT)--the effect of those challenges on DHS's mission implementation, and challenges in integrating management functions within and across the department and its components. In November 2000, we published our criteria for removing areas from the high-risk list. This high-risk area includes challenges in strengthening DHS's management functions--financial management, acquisition management, human capital, and information technology (IT)--the effect of those challenges on DHS's mission implementation, and challenges in integrating management functions within and across the department and its components. Specifically, agencies must have (1) a demonstrated strong commitment and top leadership support to address the risks; (2) the capacity (that is, the people and other resources) to resolve the risks; (3) a corrective action plan that identifies the root causes, identifies effective solutions, and provides for substantially completing corrective measures in the near term, including but not limited to steps necessary to implement solutions we recommended; (4) a program instituted to monitor and independently validate the effectiveness and sustainability of corrective measures; and (5) the ability to demonstrate progress in implementing corrective measures. On the basis of our prior work, in a September 2010 letter to DHS, we identified, and DHS agreed to achieve, 31 actions and outcomes that are critical to addressing the challenges within the department's management areas and in integrating those functions across the department to address the high-risk designation. These key actions and outcomes include, among others, obtaining and then sustaining unqualified audit opinions for at least 2 consecutive years on the departmentwide financial statements; validating required acquisition documents in accordance with a department-approved, knowledge-based acquisition process; and demonstrating measurable progress in implementing its IT human capital plan and accomplishing defined outcomes. In January 2011, DHS issued its initial Integrated Strategy for High Risk Management, which included key management initiatives (e.g., financial management controls, IT program governance, and procurement staffing model) to address challenges and the outcomes we identified for each management area. DHS provided updates of its progress in implementing these initiatives in later versions of the strategy--June 2011, December 2011, and June 2012. Achieving and sustaining progress in these management areas would demonstrate the department's ability and ongoing commitment to addressing our five criteria for removing issues from the high-risk list. As requested, this testimony will discuss our observations, based on prior and ongoing work, on DHS's progress in achieving outcomes critical to addressing its high-risk designation for the implementation and transformation of the department.
What GAO Found
Since we designated the implementation and transformation of DHS as high risk in 2003, DHS has made progress addressing management challenges and senior department officials have demonstrated commitment and top leadership support for addressing the department's management challenges. However, the department has significant work ahead to achieve positive outcomes in resolving high-risk issues. For example, DHS faces challenges in modernizing its financial systems, implementing acquisition management controls, and improving employee satisfaction survey results, among other things. As DHS continues to mature as an organization, it will be important for the department to continue to strengthen its management functions, since the effectiveness of these functions affects its ability to fulfill its homeland security and other missions. |
gao_GAO-12-262 | gao_GAO-12-262_0 | Background
Tax expenditures are preferential provisions in the tax code, such as exemptions and exclusions from taxation, deductions, credits, deferral of tax liability, and preferential tax rates that result in forgone revenue for the federal government. GPRAMA amends the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993, Pub. Overlap Exists in the Design of Community Development Tax Expenditures
Multiple Tax Expenditures Fund Community Development Activities
For fiscal year 2010, we identified 23 tax expenditures that fund community development activities. For example, employers cannot double dip by claiming two employment tax credits for the same wages paid to an individual. Applicants may need to apply for tax expenditures and spending programs at multiple agencies to address the needs of a distressed area or finance a specific project. Limited Information and Measures Are Available to Assess the Performance of Community Development Tax Expenditures
Achieving results for the nation increasingly requires that federal agencies work together to identify ways to deliver results more efficiently and in a way that is consistent with limited budgetary resources. For tax credits, IRS has data on the numbers of taxpayers and aggregate amounts claimed, but data often do not tie use of the tax credits to specific communities. For those limited areas where OMB sets long-term, outcome-oriented, crosscutting priority goals for the federal government, a more coordinated and focused effort should ensue to identify, collect, and use the information needed to assess how well the government is achieving the goals and how those efforts can be improved. Whether or not OMB selects community development as a priority goal area, Congress also has the opportunity to urge more evaluation and focus Executive Branch efforts on addressing community development performance issues through oversight activities, such as hearings and formal and informal meetings with agency officials. Matters for Congressional Consideration
Congress may wish to use GPRAMA’s consultation process to provide guidance on whether community development should be among OMB’s long-term crosscutting priority goals as well as stress the need for evaluations whether or not community development is on the crosscutting priority list. Congress may also wish to focus attention on addressing community development tax expenditure performance issues through its oversight activities. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to (1) identify tax expenditures that promote community development, and areas of potential overlap and interactions among them; (2) assess data and performance measures available and used to assess performance for community development tax expenditures; and (3) determine what previous studies have found about the effectiveness of selected tax expenditures in promoting community development. To identify community development tax expenditures, we developed a list of community development activities based on various federal sources and compared these activities to the authorized uses of tax expenditures. Where specified in tax law and regulations, we also identified interactions and limits on using tax expenditures with other federal spending programs. Tax Expenditure Information and Performance Measures
To determine what data and performance measures are available and used to assess community development tax expenditures, we identified the data elements and types of information that IRS and federal agencies collect. For certain community development tax expenditures in our universe where other federal agencies help with administration—the New Markets Tax Credit, Empowerment Zone/Renewal Community tax incentives, and the rehabilitation tax credits—we reviewed prior GAO reports, and interviewed and collected information from the CDFI Fund, HUD, and NPS to identify their roles in helping administer the tax expenditures and any measures the agencies use to review tax expenditure performance. State and local entities also collect information on some of the tax expenditures included in our universe. Number 7. Involves administration by a federal agency outside IRS? Our work as of May 2011 suggested that the design of each of these 80 economic development programs appears to overlap with that of at least one other spending program in terms of the economic development activity that they are authorized to fund, as shown in table 12. Bibliography
To determine what is known about the effectiveness of selected community development tax expenditures, we conducted a literature review of studies that addressed the following tax expenditure provisions: (1) the Empowerment Zone/Renewal Community tax programs; (2) the New Markets Tax Credit program; (3) tax expenditures available for certain disaster areas; and (4) rehabilitation tax credits, including the 20 percent tax credit for preservation of historic structures and the 10 percent tax credit for the rehabilitation of structures (other than historic). 16096 (2010). May 2011. | Why GAO Did This Study
Tax expenditures—exclusions, credits, deductions, deferrals, and preferential tax rates—are one tool the government uses to promote community development. Multiple tax expenditures contribute to community development. GAO (1) identified community development tax expenditures and potential overlap and interactions among them; (2) assessed the data and performance measures available and used to assess their performance; and (3) determined what previous studies have found about selected tax expenditures’ performance. GAO identified community development activities using criteria based on various federal sources and compared them with authorized uses of tax expenditures. GAO reviewed agency documents and interviewed officials from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and five other agencies. GAO also reviewed empirical studies for selected tax expenditures, including the New Markets Tax Credit and Empowerment Zone program which expired in 2011.
What GAO Found
GAO identified 23 community development tax expenditures available in fiscal year 2010. For example, five ($1.5 billion) targeted economically distressed areas, and nine ($8.7 billion) supported specific activities such as rehabilitating structures for business use. The design of each community development tax expenditure appears to overlap with that of at least one other tax expenditure in terms of the areas or activities funded. Federal tax laws and regulations permit use of multiple tax expenditures or tax expenditures with other federal spending programs, but often with limits. For instance, employers cannot claim more than one employment tax credit for the same wages paid to an individual. Besides IRS, administering many community development tax expenditures involves other federal agencies as well as state and local governments. For example, the National Park Service oversees preservation standards for the 20 percent historic rehabilitation tax credit. Fragmented administration and program overlap can result in administrative burden, such as applications to multiple federal agencies to fund the needs of a distressed area or finance a specific.
Limited data and measures are available to assess community development tax expenditures’ performance. IRS only collects information needed to administer the tax code or otherwise required by law, and IRS data often do not identify the specific communities assisted. Other federal agencies helping administer community development tax expenditures also collect limited information on projects and associated outcomes. GAO has long recommended that the Executive Branch improve its ability to assess tax expenditures, but little progress has been made in developing an evaluation framework. Generally, neither these agencies, nor the Department of the Treasury or the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) have assessed or plan to assess community development tax expenditures individually or as part of a crosscutting review. The Government Performance and Results Act Modernization Act of 2010 (GPRAMA) calls for a more coordinated approach to focusing on results and improving performance. OMB is to select a limited number of long-term, outcome-oriented crosscutting priority goals and assess whether the relevant federal agencies and activities—including tax expenditures—are contributing to these goals. These assessments could help identify data needed to assess tax expenditures and generate evaluations of tax expenditures’ effect on community development. Through related GPRAMA consultations agencies are to have with Congress, Congress has a continuing opportunity to say whether it believes community development should be among the limited number of governmentwide goals. While community development was not on the interim priority list, Congress also can urge more evaluation and focus attention on community development performance issues through oversight activities.
In part due to data and methodological limitations, previous studies have not produced definitive results about the effectiveness of the New Markets Tax Credit, Empowerment Zone tax incentives, historic rehabilitation tax credits, and tax aid for certain disaster areas. A key methodological challenge is\ demonstrating a causal relationship between community development efforts and economic growth in a specific community. As a result, policymakers have limited information about the tax expenditures reviewed, including those that expired after 2011, and ways to increase effectiveness.
What GAO Recommends
Congress may wish to provide OMB guidance on whether community development should be among OMB’s long-term crosscutting priority goals, stress the need for evaluations, and focus attention on addressing community development tax expenditure performance issues through its oversight activities. Two agencies questioned the matters for congressional consideration or findings. GAO believes its analysis and matters remain valid as discussed in the report. |
gao_GAO-06-231 | gao_GAO-06-231_0 | Commerce Employs a Special Methodology to Calculate China AD Duties
The methodology that Commerce employs in NME cases differs from Commerce’s usual (market economy) approach in two key ways. India is the most commonly used surrogate for China. China Has Been the Most Frequent Target of U.S. Antidumping Orders
Over the last 25 years, Commerce has both considered and actually applied AD duties against China more often than against any other country. Taking all rates into consideration (including those calculated for individual companies, weighted averages of these rates, and country-wide rates applied to China) the average rate applied to Chinese companies in the 25 cases we examined was about 67 percent—over 20 percentage points higher than the average rate of 44 percent applied to market economy companies. Ceasing to Apply NME Methodology Would Have Mixed Results
In certain circumstances, Commerce may stop using its NME methodology in China cases—and thus begin applying its market economy methodology to determine AD duty rates against that country. Eliminating country-wide duty rates would likely reduce duty levels for Chinese companies that are not assigned individually determined rates. Individually determined rates would likely diverge into two distinct groups, with companies that do not cooperate in Commerce investigations receiving rates that are substantially higher than those assigned to companies that do cooperate. China has actively sought market economy status among its trading partners, and a number of them have designated China as a market economy. First, such a step would eliminate NME country-wide duty rates from China AD orders. Concluding Observations
On average, Commerce’s application of its NME methodology has produced AD duties on Chinese products that are substantially higher than those applied to the same products from market economy countries. The duty rates applied to companies that do not receive individual rates would likely decline. Nonetheless, while the NME methodology is applied, it appears that the actual trade impact of using this methodology will decline as the portion of total export trade conducted by Chinese companies assigned individual rates increases, and as the country- wide rates that largely account for the comparatively high average rates applied to China decline in importance. Overall, Commerce agreed with our findings, observing that the report provided timely and helpful information on the NME methodology and its application to China. In order to analyze the application of antidumping (AD) duties to China and compare duty rates applied to China with those applied to market economy countries (our second objective) and to evaluate the potential impact of ceasing to apply the nonmarket economy (NME) methodology to China (our third objective), we collected information from the Department of Commerce and the International Trade Commission, including notices of Commerce determinations appearing in the Federal Register. We used this information to construct a database on all U.S. GAO Comments
1. 2. | Why GAO Did This Study
U.S. companies adversely affected by unfair imports may seek a number of relief measures, including antidumping (AD) duties. The Department of Commerce (Commerce) classifies China as a nonmarket economy (NME) and uses a special methodology that is commonly believed to produce AD duty rates that are higher than those applied to market economies. Commerce may stop applying its NME methodology if it finds that China warrants designation as a market economy. In light of increased concern about China's trade practices, the conference report on fiscal year 2004 appropriations requested that GAO review efforts by U.S. government agencies responsible for ensuring free and fair trade with that country. In this report, the last in a series, GAO (1) explains the NME methodology, (2) analyzes AD duties applied to China and compares them with duties applied to market economies, and (3) explains circumstances in which the United States would stop applying its NME methodology to China and evaluates the potential impact of such a step. Commerce agreed with our findings, commenting that our report provides timely and helpful information on the NME methodology and its application to China.
What GAO Found
Commerce's methodology for calculating AD duties on nonmarket economy products differs from its market economy approach in that (1) since NME prices are unreliable, it uses price information from surrogate countries, like India, to construct the value of the imported products and (2) it limits eligibility for individual rates to companies that show their export activities are not subject to government control. Companies that do not meet the criteria or do not participate in Commerce investigations receive "country-wide" rates. China has been the most frequent target of U.S. AD actions. On 25 occasions, Commerce has applied duties to the same product from both China and one or more market economy. China (NME) duties were over 20 percentage points higher than those applied to market economies, on average. This is because average China country-wide rates were over 60 points higher than comparable market economy rates. Individual China company rates were similar to those assigned to market economy companies, on average. Commerce can declare China a market economy if the country meets certain criteria, thus ending the use of surrogate price information and country-wide rates in China AD actions. These changes would have a mixed impact. Duties would likely decline for Chinese companies not assigned individual rates. Individual company rates would likely diverge, with those that do not cooperate with Commerce receiving rates that are substantially higher than those that do cooperate. In any case, it appears that the actual trade impact of the NME methodology will decline as the portion of total export trade conducted by Chinese companies assigned individual rates increases and as the country-wide rates that largely account for the comparatively high average rates applied to China decline in importance. |
gao_GAO-06-397 | gao_GAO-06-397_0 | For Veterans, DOD Offers a Benefit for a Specific Period of Time and VA Offers Various Health Care Services
DOD offers an extended health care benefit to some OEF/OIF veterans for a specific period of time, and VA offers health care services that include specialized PTSD services. VA also offers health care services to OEF/OIF veterans following their discharge or release from active duty. DOD Offers Mental Health Benefits to OEF/OIF Veterans for 180 Days or More
Through TAMP, DOD provides health care benefits that allow some OEF/OIF veterans to obtain health care services, which include mental health services, for 180 days following discharge or release from active duty. In addition, OEF/OIF veterans may purchase DOD health care benefits through CHCBP for 18 months. Based on DOD Data, About 5 Percent of OEF/OIF Servicemembers May Have Been at Risk for Developing PTSD and Over 20 Percent Received Referrals
Using data provided by DOD from the DD 2796s, we found that about 5 percent of the OEF/OIF servicemembers in our review may have been at risk for developing PTSD, and over 20 percent received referrals for further mental health or combat/operational stress reaction evaluations. According to the clinical practice guideline jointly developed by VA and DOD, individuals who respond positively to three or four of the four PTSD screening questions may be at risk for developing PTSD. According to DOD officials, not all of the servicemembers with three or four positive responses to the PTSD screening questions need referrals for further evaluations. Conclusions
Many OEF/OIF servicemembers have engaged in the type of intense and prolonged combat that research has shown to be highly correlated with the risk for developing PTSD. Knowing the factors upon which DOD health care providers based their clinical judgments in issuing referrals could help explain variation in the referral rates and allow DOD to provide reasonable assurance that such judgments are being exercised appropriately. However, DOD has not identified the factors its health care providers used in determining why some servicemembers received referrals while other servicemembers with the same number of positive responses to the four PTSD screening questions did not. DOD’s plans to develop this information should lead to reasonable assurance that servicemembers who need referrals receive them. Rather, in this report we identify the health care services available to OEF/OIF servicemembers who have been discharged or released from active duty and focus on how decisions are made by DOD providers regarding referrals for servicemembers who may be at risk for PTSD. Further, we reviewed a retrospective study that found that those individuals who provided three or four positive responses to the four PTSD screening questions were highly likely to have been previously given a diagnosis of PTSD prior to the screening. To determine the number of OEF/OIF servicemembers who may be at risk for developing PTSD and were referred for further mental health evaluations, we asked AMSA to identify OEF/OIF servicemembers whose DD 2796 forms indicated that they were referred for further mental health or combat/operational stress reaction evaluations by a DOD health care provider. To examine whether DOD has reasonable assurance that OEF/OIF veterans who needed further mental health evaluations received referrals, we reviewed DOD’s policies and guidance, as well as policies and guidance for each of the military service branches (Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines). | Why GAO Did This Study
Many servicemembers supporting Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) have engaged in intense and prolonged combat, which research has shown to be strongly associated with the risk of developing post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). GAO, in response to the Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005, (1) describes DOD's extended health care benefit and VA's health care services for OEF/OIF veterans; (2) analyzes DOD data to determine the number of OEF/OIF servicemembers who may be at risk for PTSD and the number referred for further mental health evaluations; and (3) examines whether DOD can provide reasonable assurance that OEF/OIF servicemembers who need further mental health evaluations receive referrals.
What GAO Found
DOD offers an extended health care benefit to some OEF/OIF veterans for a specified time period, and VA offers health care services that include specialized PTSD services. DOD's benefit provides health care services, including mental health services, to some OEF/OIF veterans for 180 days following discharge or release from active duty. Additionally, some veterans may purchase extended benefits for up to 18 months. VA also offers health care services to OEF/OIF veterans following their discharge or release from active duty. VA offers health benefits for OEF/OIF veterans at no cost for 2 years following discharge or release from active duty. After their 2-year benefit expires, some OEF/OIF veterans may continue to receive care under VA's eligibility rules. Using data provided by DOD, GAO found that 9,145 or 5 percent of the 178,664 OEF/OIF servicemembers in its review may have been at risk for developing PTSD. DOD uses a questionnaire to identify those who may be at risk for developing PTSD after deployment. DOD providers interview servicemembers after they complete the questionnaire. A joint VA/DOD guideline states that servicemembers who respond positively to three or four of the questions may be at risk for PTSD. Further, we reviewed a retrospective study that found that those individuals who provided three or four positive responses to the four PTSD screening questions were highly likely to have been previously given a diagnosis of PTSD prior to the screening. Of the 5 percent who may have been at risk, GAO found that DOD providers referred 22 percent or 2,029 for further mental health evaluations. DOD cannot provide reasonable assurance that OEF/OIF servicemembers who need referrals receive them. According to DOD officials, not all of the servicemembers with three or four positive responses to the PTSD screening questions will need referrals for further mental health evaluations. DOD relies on providers' clinical judgment to decide who needs a referral. GAO found that DOD health care providers varied in the frequency with which they issued referrals to OEF/OIF servicemembers with three or more positive responses; the Army referred 23 percent, the Marines about 15 percent, the Navy 18 percent, and the Air Force about 23 percent. However, DOD did not identify the factors its providers used in determining which OEF/OIF servicemembers needed referrals. Knowing the factors upon which DOD health care providers based their clinical judgments in issuing referrals could help explain variation in the referral rates and allow DOD to provide reasonable assurance that such judgments are being exercised appropriately. |
gao_GAO-04-176T | gao_GAO-04-176T_0 | From less than $50 billion as of December 31, 2000, the total underfunding in single- employer plans grew to more than $400 billion as of December 31, 2002, and still exceeds $350 billion according to recent estimates by PBGC. The financial condition of the single-employer pension insurance program returned to an accumulated deficit in 2002 largely due to the termination, or expected termination, of several severely underfunded pension plans. Interest rates are a key assumption in calculating the present value of future pension benefits: while all sponsors calculate current liabilities using a rate based on the 30-year Treasury bond rate, ERISA requires sponsors of some underfunded plans to report plan termination liability information to PBGC. Strengthening Plan Funding Rules Can Help Sponsors Maintain Well-Funded Plans
Several types of reforms might be considered to improve the funding of defined-benefit pension plans. Some options for reform would directly address funding requirements and related rules. Defined-benefit pension plans may offer participants the option of receiving their benefit in a lump-sum payment. Other Reforms Might Enhance Sponsor Incentives to Maintain Plan Funding
In addition to direct changes to the funding rules, other reforms may result in improved plan funding by improving incentives for sponsors to maintain proper funding in their plans. These measures may prevent plans from terminating with severely underfunded balances, thus better protecting workers, retirees, and PBGC. ERISA could be amended to:
Require Greater Disclosure of Information on Plan Investments. Conclusion
Widespread underfunding in the defined-benefit pension system potentially threatens the retirement security of millions of American workers. The termination of severely underfunded plans can significantly reduce the benefits promised to workers and retirees. Such action would be aimed towards the improvement of the long-term funding status of plans and the accountability of plan sponsors, especially those that represent a clear risk to PBGC, plan participants, and their beneficiaries. Undoubtedly, unfavorable economic conditions have contributed to widespread underfunding and conspired to place well-meaning sponsors in very difficult positions to maintain their plans’ funding. Although comprehensive reform should include improving plan funding as the key vehicle to stabilize and enhance the long-term health of the defined-benefit system, Congress may seek to balance improvements in funding and accountability against the short-term needs of some sponsors who may have difficulty making contributions to their plans. It is important to keep in mind that the factors contributing to the deterioration of pension plan funding go beyond the effects of the recent economic downturn. The private defined-benefit pension system is at a crossroads, facing a threat of continued financial erosion and decline. | Why GAO Did This Study
Over the last few years, the total underfunding in the defined-benefit pension system has deteriorated to the point where the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC), the federal agency responsible for protecting private sector defined benefit plan benefits, estimates that total plan underfunding grew to more than $400 billion as of December 31, 2002, and still exceeded $350 billion as of September 4, 2003. PBGC itself faced an estimated $8.8 billion accumulated deficit as of August 31, 2003. Deficiencies in current funding and related regulations have contributed to several large plans recently terminating with severely underfunded pension plans. This testimony provides GAO's observations on a variety of regulatory and legislative reforms that aim to improve plan funding and better protect the benefits of millions of American workers and retirees while minimizing the burden to plan sponsors of maintaining defined-benefit plans.
What GAO Found
Recent terminations of severely underfunded pension plans suggest that current funding rules do not provide adequate mechanisms for maintaining adequate funding of pension plans. Funding inadequacies place the retirement security of millions of American workers and retirees, along with PBGC, at risk. While external factors, such as falling stock prices, low interest rates, and slow economic growth, have contributed to widespread pension underfunding, the defined-benefit system also faces structural problems that extend beyond cyclical economic conditions. Stagnant growth of the defined-benefit system, along with several large recent terminations of underfunded pension plans, has left PBGC in a precarious financial condition as the insurer of pension benefits. There are two general approaches to funding reform that may improve the funding of defined-benefit pension plans. The first approach would change the funding requirements directly. These measures could address reforms to the use of termination liability instead of current liability, additional funding requirements, and lump-sum distributions. The second, more indirect approach would seek to improve plan funding by providing better incentives for sponsors to keep their plans better funded. Options in this category could include requirements broadening the disclosure of plan investments and termination liability information to plan participants and their representatives. These reforms, as part of a comprehensive package, could increase the likelihood that workers and retirees receive promised benefits, while not creating an undue regulatory or financial burden on sponsors. Recent unfavorable economic conditions have contributed to widespread underfunding and conspired to place well-meaning plan sponsors in difficult positions. Although comprehensive reform should include improving plan funding as the key vehicle to stabilize the long-term health of the defined-benefit system, Congress may seek to balance improvements in funding and accountability against the short-term needs of some sponsors who may have difficulty making plan contributions. |
gao_GAO-15-733 | gao_GAO-15-733_0 | In contrast, unregulated transfers occur when parents intend to permanently transfer custody of their child to a new family without following these steps. While the adoption process can be different depending on the state and type of adoption, it typically consists of: a home study performed by a licensed professional to assess the suitability of the prospective parents, such as their health, finances, and criminal history; an immigration application and petition, in the case of an international pre-adoption training for prospective parents, either online or in- person, for a specified number of hours on topics such as the adoption process and issues related to attachment and bonding; final approval of the adoption by a court, either in the United States or the child’s country of origin; and post-placement or post-adoption services, in some cases, which can range from information and referral services and peer support groups to more intensive services for children with severe behavioral needs. For these adoptions, states set requirements for home studies, pre-adoption training, and post-adoption services. Families May Choose an Unregulated Child Custody Transfer Due to an Adoption in Crisis and Challenges Accessing Services
Families May Be Unprepared for the Challenges of Adopting Children with Special Needs, Particularly for International Adoptions
Families may choose an unregulated child custody transfer because they were not sufficiently prepared for the challenges they experienced in their adoption, according to many child welfare and adoption stakeholders we interviewed. About half of all states require agencies facilitating these adoptions to provide prospective parents with at least 27 hours of training, according to data obtained from HHS officials in May 2015. Similarly, families who adopted internationally may also be hesitant to reach out to their adoption agency. Little Is Known about the Prevalence of Unregulated Transfers
Unregulated Child Custody Transfers Are Difficult to Track
Because unregulated child custody transfers are an underground practice that happens outside the purview of the courts and the child welfare system, they are difficult to track, and no federal agency keeps statistics on their occurrence. Observations of Social Media Sites Found Families Seeking New Homes for Their Adopted Children
Our observations of forums on social media websites indicate that some parents have been using these venues to seek new homes for their children. Because we did not investigate these posts further and because discussions between online participants can be continued privately, we were unable to determine whether a child was actually transferred to another family. Selected States and Federal Agencies Have Taken Some Steps to Address Unregulated Transfers
Activity in the 15 States GAO Reviewed Mainly Involved Efforts to Deter Unregulated Transfers
We identified 15 states in which laws were enacted, proposed legislation was introduced, or recent changes had been made to child welfare programs that were intended to safeguard children who may be subject to unregulated transfers. Of these 15 states, 7 enacted legislation and 3 made changes to child welfare programs. The most common approaches were to criminalize unregulated transfers or actions that may lead to these transfers, and to restrict the advertising of children or potential homes for placement. As shown in table 5, the State Department established an interagency working group in October 2013 to develop a coordinated federal response to unregulated transfers. For example, it issued a memorandum in May 2014 to states that encouraged them to promote services to all adoptive families and outlined various sources of available federal funds. Federal officials said they will continue to examine ways to address unregulated transfers. The Departments of Health and Human Services, Homeland Security, and State provided technical comments that were incorporated, as appropriate. The Department of Justice had no comments. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
GAO examined (1) the reasons adoptive families consider unregulated child custody transfers, and services that exist to support these families before they take such an action; (2) what is known about the prevalence of these transfers; and (3) actions selected states and federal agencies have taken to help address such transfers. Specifically, we conducted interviews with 45 agencies and organizations, including officials from federal and selected state agencies, child welfare and adoption organizations, and adoption agencies, to acquire a range of perspectives on this topic; reviewed relevant federal laws and regulations, selected state laws, and federal and selected state policies; reviewed and analyzed documentation provided by officials we interviewed; conducted a search of related literature and reviewed relevant articles; and searched online forums on selected social media sites to find illustrative examples of families who may be considering unregulated transfers. Because children adopted domestically as infants and those in biological families may be less likely to have mental health issues due to trauma and institutionalization, and reports of unregulated transfers have primarily pertained to children adopted internationally or from foster care, our report focuses on international and foster care adoptions. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), and the Department of Justice (Justice). We asked officials in the 15 selected and identified states to confirm whether their state had enacted a law, introduced proposed legislation, or took other relevant activity as of July 2015. | Why GAO Did This Study
Parents have the legal responsibility to protect and care for their children. However, recent media reports have illuminated a practice involving unregulated custody transfers of adopted children. Commonly referred to as “rehoming,” this practice involves parents who turn to the internet or other unregulated networks to find a new home for their child. These media reports found instances in which adopted children were placed in dangerous situations where they were harmed by the adults who received them. GAO was asked to review issues related to unregulated transfers of adopted children.
GAO examined (1) the reasons adoptive families consider unregulated child custody transfers, and services that exist to support these families before they take such an action; (2) what is known about the prevalence of these transfers; and (3) actions selected states and federal agencies have taken to address such transfers. GAO reviewed relevant federal laws, regulations, and policies and selected state laws and proposed legislation. GAO also interviewed officials from federal agencies, 19 child welfare and adoption organizations, 15 adoption agencies, and 7 states selected primarily because of legislative activity on unregulated transfers. GAO also searched online activity on selected social media sites to find illustrative examples of families who may be considering unregulated transfers.
The Departments of Health and Human Services, Homeland Security, and State provided technical comments. The Department of Justice had no comments.
What GAO Found
Some adoptive families may consider giving their children to another family outside of the courts and child welfare system—an “unregulated child custody transfer”—because of a crisis within the adoptive family and difficulties accessing support services, according to officials GAO interviewed from selected states, child welfare and adoption organizations, and adoption agencies. Children adopted internationally or from foster care may need special care or counseling because of a history of institutionalization and trauma. Some parents, particularly those who adopted internationally, may not be prepared to deal with their adopted child's complex needs. Federal regulations require agencies facilitating international adoptions to provide parents with at least 10 hours of pre-adoption training. In contrast, about half of the states require agencies facilitating foster care adoptions to provide at least 27 hours of training, according to data obtained from Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) officials in May 2015. Many officials said adoptive parents may experience challenges finding mental health services for their families, such as therapists familiar with adoption issues. Many officials also said parents who adopt children with more severe needs may have difficulty finding and paying for intensive services such as residential treatment, which can cost thousands of dollars per month. Officials said these challenges may lead families to seek out unregulated transfers.
Little is known about the prevalence of unregulated transfers. Because they happen without any oversight, these transfers are difficult to track and no federal agency keeps statistics on their occurrence. GAO's observations of social media sites found that some parents have been using online forums to seek new homes for their adopted children. During a 15-month period, GAO identified 23 instances in which a parent posted that they were seeking a new family for their child. Because GAO did not investigate these posts and because discussions between online participants can be continued privately, GAO was unable to determine whether these participants intended to pursue a legal placement or an unregulated transfer, or whether such a transfer actually took place.
Selected states and federal agencies have taken some steps to address unregulated transfers. GAO identified at least 15 states in which there was legislative and other activity in recent years intended to address these transfers. Seven of the 15 states had enacted legislation and 3 made changes to state child welfare programs as of July 2015. The most common approaches were criminalizing unregulated transfers or actions that may lead to these transfers, and restricting the advertisement of children for placement. In addition, activity in several states involved improving post-adoption services, which many officials said was a key need for families who resort to unregulated transfers. However, federal officials and others said addressing service needs can be difficult and time-consuming, and funding for these services is limited. At the federal level, several agencies established an interagency working group on unregulated transfers in October 2013. Officials from the Department of State said they plan to revise international pre-adoption training requirements that may include an increased number of minimum hours. HHS issued a memorandum in May 2014 encouraging states to promote post-adoption services and to review their policies to address unregulated transfers. |
gao_GAO-07-320 | gao_GAO-07-320_0 | Hospitals Use Six Basic Steps to Collect and Submit Quality Data, Two of Which Involve Complex Abstraction by Hospital Staff
The case study hospitals we visited used six steps to collect and submit quality data, two of which involved complex abstraction—the process of reviewing and assessing all relevant pieces of information in a patient’s medical record to determine the appropriate value for each data element. Factors accounting for the complexity of the abstraction process included the content and organization of the medical record, the scope of information required for the data elements, and frequent changes by CMS in its data specifications. Due in part to these complexities, most of our case study hospitals relied on clinical staff to abstract the quality data. Increases in the number of required quality measures led to increased demands on clinical staff resources. However, all case study hospitals reported finding benefits in the quality data that helped to offset the demands placed on clinical staff. 1). Step 2: Locate information in the medical record—Steps 2 and 3 were in practice closely linked in our case study hospitals. Step 6: Supply copies of selected medical records—CMS has put in place a data validation process to ensure the accuracy of hospital quality data submissions. Based on those results, they provided feedback to individual clinicians and reports to hospital administrators and trustees. Existing IT Systems Can Help Hospitals Gather Some Quality Data but Are Far from Enabling Automated Abstraction
In the case studies, existing IT systems helped hospital abstractors to complete their work more quickly, but the limitations of those IT systems meant that trained staff still had to examine the entire patient medical record and manually abstract the quality data submitted to CMS. The challenges reported by hospital officials included having a mix of paper and electronic records, which required abstractors to check multiple places to get the needed information; the prevalence of unstructured data, which made locating the information time-consuming because it was not in a prescribed place in the record; and the presence of multiple IT systems that did not share data, which required abstractors to separately access each IT system for related pieces of information that were in different parts of the medical record. While hospital officials expected the scope and functionality of their IT systems to increase over time, they projected that this would occur incrementally over a period of years. The limitations that hospital officials reported in using existing IT systems to collect quality data stemmed from having a mix of paper and electronic systems; the prevalence of data recorded in IT systems as unstructured paragraphs of narrative or text, as opposed to discrete data fields reserved for specific pieces of information; and the inability of some IT systems to access related data stored on another IT system in the same hospital. CMS Sponsored Studies and Joined Broader HHS Initiatives to Promote Use of IT for Quality Data Collection and Submission, but HHS Lacks Detailed Plans, Milestones, and Time Frame
CMS has sponsored studies and joined HHS initiatives to examine and promote the current and potential use of hospital IT systems to facilitate the collection and submission of quality data, but HHS lacks detailed plans, including milestones and a time frame against which to track its progress. CMS has joined this broader effort by HHS, as well as the Quality Workgroup that AHIC created in August 2006 to specify how IT could capture, aggregate, and report inpatient and outpatient quality data. However, HHS has identified no detailed plans, milestones, or time frames for either its broad effort to encourage IT in health care nationwide or its specific objective to promote the use of health IT for quality data collection. CMS Has Joined HHS’s Efforts to Promote Greater Use of Health IT for Quality Data Collection and Submission, but HHS Lacks Detailed Plans, Milestones, and a Time Frame to Track Progress
CMS has joined efforts by HHS to promote greater use of health IT in general and, more recently, in facilitating the use of health IT for quality data collection and submission. 1. Appendix IV: Scope and Methodology
To examine how hospitals collect and submit quality data, and to determine the extent to which information technology (IT) facilitates those processes, we conducted case studies of eight individual acute care hospitals that collect and submit quality data to the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS). | Why GAO Did This Study
Hospitals submit data in electronic form on a series of quality measures to the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) and receive scores on their performance. Increasingly, the clinical information from which hospitals derive the quality data for CMS is stored in information technology (IT) systems. GAO was asked to examine (1) hospital processes to collect and submit quality data, (2) the extent to which IT facilitates hospitals' collection and submission of quality data, and (3) whether CMS has taken steps to promote the use of IT systems to facilitate the collection and submission of hospital quality data. GAO addressed these issues by conducting case studies of eight hospitals with varying levels of IT development and interviewing relevant officials at CMS and the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS).
What GAO Found
The eight case study hospitals used six steps to collect and submit quality data: (1) identify the patients, (2) locate information in their medical records, (3) determine appropriate values for the data elements, (4) transmit the quality data to CMS, (5) ensure that the quality data have been accepted by CMS, and (6) supply copies of selected medical records to CMS to validate the data. Several factors account for the complexity of abstracting all relevant information in a patient's medical record, including the content and organization of the medical record, the scope of information and the clinical judgment required for the data elements, and frequent changes by CMS in its data specifications. Due in part to these complexities, most of the case study hospitals relied on clinical staff to abstract the quality data. Increases in the number of quality measures required by CMS led to increased demands on clinical staff resources. Offsetting the demands placed on clinical staff were the benefits that case study hospitals reported finding in the quality data, such as providing feedback to clinicians and reports to hospital administrators. GAO's case studies showed that existing IT systems can help hospitals gather some quality data but are far from enabling hospitals to automate the abstraction process. IT systems helped hospital staff to abstract information from patients' medical records, in particular by improving accessibility to and legibility of the medical record. The limitations reported by officials in the case study hospitals included having a mix of paper and electronic records, which required staff to check multiple places to get the needed information; the prevalence of data recorded as unstructured narrative or text, which made locating the information time-consuming because it was not in a prescribed place in the record; and the inability of some IT systems to access related data stored in another IT system in the same hospital, which required staff to access each IT system separately to obtain related pieces of information. Hospital officials expected the scope and functionality of their IT systems to increase over time, but this process will occur over a period of years. CMS has sponsored studies and joined HHS initiatives to examine and promote the current and potential use of hospital IT systems to facilitate the collection and submission of quality data, but HHS lacks detailed plans, including milestones and a time frame against which to track its progress. CMS has joined efforts by HHS to promote the use of IT in health care, including a Quality Workgroup charged with specifying how IT could capture, aggregate, and report inpatient and outpatient quality data. HHS plans to expand the use of health IT for quality data collection and submission through contracts with nongovernmental entities that currently address the use of health IT for a range of other purposes. However, HHS has identified no detailed plans, milestones, or time frames for either its broad effort to encourage IT in health care nationwide or its specific objective to promote the use of health IT for quality data collection. |
gao_GAO-11-864T | gao_GAO-11-864T_0 | In fact, all of the DOD programs on GAO’s High-Risk List relate to business operations, including systems and processes related to management of contracts, finances, supply chain, and support infrastructure, as well as weapon systems acquisition. Long-standing and pervasive weaknesses in DOD’s financial management and related business processes and systems have (1) resulted in a lack of reliable information needed to make sound decisions and report on the financial status and cost of DOD activities to Congress and DOD decision makers; (2) adversely impacted its operational efficiency and mission performance in areas of major weapons system support and logistics; and (3) left the department vulnerable to fraud, waste, and abuse. Pervasive deficiencies in financial management processes, systems, and controls, and the resulting lack of data reliability, continue to impair management’s ability to assess the resources needed for DOD operations; track and control costs; ensure basic accountability; anticipate future costs; measure performance; maintain funds control; and reduce the risk of loss from fraud, waste, and abuse. DOD also requests billions of dollars each year to maintain its weapon systems, but it has limited ability to identify, aggregate, and use financial management information for managing and controlling operating and support costs. DOD’s Past Strategies for Improving Financial Management Were Ineffective but Recent Initiatives Are Encouraging
Over the years, DOD has initiated several broad-based reform efforts to address its long-standing financial management weaknesses. The DOD Comptroller directed the DOD components participating in the FIAR Plan—the departments of the Army, Navy, Air Force and the Defense Logistics Agency—to use a standard process and aggressively modify their activities to support and emphasize achievement of the priorities. In May 2010, DOD introduced a new phased approach that divides progress toward achieving financial statement auditability into five waves (or phases) of concerted improvement activities (see appendix I). Numerous Challenges Must Be Addressed in Order for DOD to Successfully Reform Financial Management
Improving the department’s financial management operations and thereby providing DOD management and the Congress more accurate and reliable information on the results of its business operations will not be an easy task. It is critical that the current initiatives being led by the DOD Deputy Chief Management Officer and the DOD Comptroller be continued and provided with sufficient resources and ongoing monitoring in the future. Absent continued momentum and necessary future investments, the current initiatives may falter, similar to previous efforts. Below are some of the key challenges that the department must address in order for the financial management operations of the department to improve to the point where DOD may be able to produce auditable financial statements. Committed and sustained leadership. Effective plan to correct internal control weaknesses. Competent financial management workforce. In developing the plan, the department identified financial management as one of its enterprisewide mission-critical occupations. Accountability and effective oversight. Well-defined enterprise architecture. For decades, DOD has been challenged in modernizing its timeworn business systems. DOD officials have said that successful implementation of ERPs is key to transforming the department’s business operations, including financial management, and in improving the department’s capability to provide DOD management and Congress with accurate and reliable information on the results of DOD’s operations. In addition, the DCMO and the DOD Comptroller have shown commitment and leadership in moving DOD’s financial management improvement efforts forward. GAO will continue to monitor the progress of and provide feedback on the status of DOD’s financial management improvement efforts. Appendix I: FIAR Plan Waves
The first three waves focus on achieving the DOD Comptroller’s interim budgetary and asset accountability priorities, while the remaining two waves are intended to complete actions needed to achieve full financial statement auditability. | Why GAO Did This Study
As one of the largest and most complex organizations in the world, the Department of Defense (DOD) faces many challenges in resolving serious problems in its financial management and related business operations and systems. DOD is required by various statutes to (1) improve its financial management processes, controls, and systems to ensure that complete, reliable, consistent, and timely information is prepared and responsive to the financial information needs of agency management and oversight bodies, and (2) produce audited financial statements. Over the years, DOD has initiated numerous efforts to improve the department's financial management operations and achieve an unqualified (clean) opinion on the reliability of its reported financial information. These efforts have fallen short of sustained improvement in financial management or financial statement auditability. The Panel requested that GAO provide its perspective on the status of DOD's financial management weaknesses and its efforts to resolve them; the challenges DOD continues to face in improving its financial management and operations; and the status of its efforts to implement automated business systems as a critical element of DOD's Financial Improvement and Audit Readiness strategy.
What GAO Found
DOD financial management has been on GAO's high-risk list since 1995 and, despite several reform initiatives, remains on the list today. Pervasive deficiencies in financial management processes, systems, and controls, and the resulting lack of data reliability, continue to impair management's ability to assess the resources needed for DOD operations; track and control costs; ensure basic accountability; anticipate future costs; measure performance; maintain funds control; and reduce the risk of loss from fraud, waste, and abuse. DOD spends billions of dollars each year to maintain key business operations intended to support the warfighter, including systems and processes related to the management of contracts, finances, supply chain, support infrastructure, and weapon systems acquisition. These operations are directly impacted by the problems in financial management. In addition, the long-standing financial management weaknesses have precluded DOD from being able to undergo the scrutiny of a financial statement audit. DOD's past strategies for improving financial management were ineffective, but recent initiatives are encouraging. In 2005, DOD issued its Financial Improvement and Audit Readiness (FIAR) Plan for improving financial management and reporting. In 2009, the DOD Comptroller directed that FIAR efforts focus on financial information in two priority areas: budget and mission-critical assets. The FIAR Plan also has a new phased approach that comprises five waves of concerted improvement activities. The first three waves focus on the two priority areas, and the last two on working toward full auditability. The plan is being implemented largely through the Army, Navy, and Air Force military departments and the Defense Logistics Agency, lending increased importance to the committed leadership in these components. Improving the department's financial management operations and thereby providing DOD management and Congress more accurate and reliable information on the results of its business operations will not be an easy task. It is critical that current initiatives related to improving the efficiency and effectiveness of financial management that have the support of the DOD's Deputy Chief Management Officer and Comptroller continue with sustained leadership and monitoring. Absent continued momentum and necessary future investments, current initiatives may falter. Below are some of the key challenges that DOD must address for its financial management to improve to the point where DOD is able to produce auditable financial statements: (1) committed and sustained leadership, (2) effective plan to correct internal control weaknesses, (3) competent financial management workforce, (4) accountability and effective oversight, (5) well-defined enterprise architecture, and (6) successful implementation of the enterprise resource planning systems. |
gao_GGD-98-117 | gao_GGD-98-117_0 | While the reasons for the decreases varied, one significant factor cited by FinCEN was that it assigned fewer staff to support these activities. According to the FinCEN official, although the agency’s overall staff levels have remained fairly constant over the years, many tactical staff have been reassigned to support FinCEN’s expanded mission, which includes (1) responsibility for promulgating BSA regulations and (2) a leadership role in international efforts to combat money laundering. Further, according to the federal and state officials we interviewed, the platform concept and Project Gateway are excellent tools for helping agencies combat money laundering and other financial crimes. The survey results indicated that FinCEN’s tactical products assisted law enforcement investigations in various ways. States’ Compliance With Controls Not Evaluated
FinCEN has not evaluated the states’ compliance with specified policies and procedures designed to control access to and use of information obtained through the Gateway system. Several Issues Must Still Be Resolved Before FinCEN Can Obtain Approval to Disseminate Form 8300 Information
Although IRS has taken measures to provide Form 8300 information to law enforcement agencies, several issues must still be resolved before FinCEN can obtain approval from IRS to directly disseminate this information or provide it to state and local agencies via Project Gateway. In a similar vein, while FinCEN had taken steps to inform the law enforcement community about its support, some federal law enforcement officials said they were not aware of the various products and services offered by FinCEN. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report focuses on the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network’s (FinCEN) products and services in support of law enforcement. Specifically, this report discusses (1) trends in the types and quantities of products and services provided by FinCEN to the law enforcement community; (2) the extent to which FinCEN’s products and services have been considered useful by the law enforcement community in identifying, developing, or prosecuting money laundering and other financial crime cases; (3) the extent to which FinCEN evaluates the states’ compliance with applicable controls over access to and use of information when state law enforcement officials directly access FinCEN’s resources; and (4) FinCEN’s efforts to obtain approval from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) to provide IRS Form 8300 information (Report of Cash Payments Over $10,000 Received in a Trade or Business) to the law enforcement community. To determine the trends in and usefulness of FinCEN’s products and services, we focused on five principal types of support provided by FinCEN: (1) tactical products in support of agencies’ ongoing investigations; (2) strategic products designed to address longer-term or more broadly scoped topics; (3) artificial intelligence products designed to provide investigative leads; (4) a “platform concept,” whereby federal agency officials can access databases and do their own research using FinCEN resources; and (5) “Project Gateway,” which provides state agencies with remote, on-line access to financial and some commercial data. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network's (FinCEN) products and services in support of law enforcement, focusing on: (1) trends in the types and quantities of products and services provided by FinCEN to the law enforcement community; (2) the extent to which FinCEN's products and services have been considered useful by the law enforcement community in identifying, developing, or prosecuting money laundering and other financial crime cases; (3) the extent to which FinCEN evaluates the states' compliance with applicable controls over access to and use of information when state law enforcement officials directly access FinCEN's resources; and (4) FinCEN's efforts to provide Internal Revenue Service (IRS) Form 8300 information to the law enforcement community.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) FinCEN has expanded the types of products and services it provides to the law enforcement community; (2) in recent years, FinCEN has issued fewer tactical, strategic, and artificial intelligence products and has encouraged, trained, and increasingly relied on federal agencies to use the platform concept and state and local agencies to use Project Gateway to support cases that do not require FinCEN's expertise; (3) according to FinCEN, one significant reason for the decrease in the number of products issued was that its staffing levels have remained fairly constant over the years, while its overall mission has expanded to include: (a) responsibility for promulgating Bank Secrecy Act regulations; and (b) a leadership role in international efforts to combat money laundering; (4) respondents to surveys indicated that FinCEN's tactical products have been useful and assisted law enforcement investigations in ways not previously identified; (5) officials that had requested few or no tactical products from FinCEN generally did not indicate dissatisfaction with it; (6) some respondents were not aware of the various products and services offered, and FinCEN has neither developed nor widely disseminated general criteria or guidelines on when law enforcement officials should request its support; (7) according to federal and state officials, the platform concept and Project Gateway are useful tools for helping agencies combat money laundering and other financial crimes; (8) FinCEN data show that an increasing number of federal, state, and local agencies are using these self-help mechanisms to support their investigations; (9) while Project Gateway is designed to enhance the capabilities of state and local law enforcement agencies, this technological advancement increases the potential risk that sensitive information could be inappropriately accessed, used, or disclosed; (10) although FinCEN has established policies and procedures designed to limit access to and use of information obtained through the Gateway system, it has not evaluated the states' compliance with these controls; (11) in an effort to enhance its investigative support, FinCEN is seeking IRS approval to provide IRS Form 8300 information to law enforcement officials; and (12) however, several issues must still be resolved before FinCEN can obtain approval from IRS to disseminate this information. |
gao_GAO-06-604T | gao_GAO-06-604T_0 | The services have committed a significant amount of equipment to these operations. Environment, Pace of Operations, and Operational Requirements Have Shaped Current Army and Marine Corps Equipping and Maintenance Strategies
In response to the harsh operating environments in Iraq and Afghanistan and the unanticipated and prolonged length and pace of sustained operations, the Army and Marine Corps have developed and implemented several initiatives to equip their forces and maintain extensive amounts of equipment in theater. Environment and High Operational Tempo Have Increased Wear and Tear on Equipment Above What Would Normally Be Expected
Environmental factors such as heat, sand, and dust have taken their tolls on major equipment items. In addition, as we have previously reported, the Army and Marine Corps are operating equipment at a pace well in excess of their normal peacetime levels, which is generating a large operational maintenance and replacement requirement that must be addressed when the units return to their home stations. The Marine Corps, like the Army, has directed that equipment necessary for OIF and OEF operations remain in theater. Initiatives to Develop More Extensive Maintenance Capacity in Theater
To address the effects of the harsh operating environments and the maintenance needs of rapidly deteriorating equipment that is being held in theater for extensive periods, the Army and Marine Corps have developed initiatives to increase the maintenance capacity in theater to be able to provide near-depot level repair capabilities. Equipment Maintenance Consequences and Issues Created By Army and Marine Corps Equipping and Maintenance Strategies
Although the Army and Marine Corps are reporting high rates of equipment readiness for combat units and have developed and implemented plans to increase the maintenance capabilities in theater, these actions have a wide range of consequences and issues. Most Equipment Not Receiving Depot-Level Repair
Many of the equipment items used in Southwest Asia are not receiving depot-level repair because they are being retained in theater or at home units and the Army has scaled back on the scope of work performed at the depots. As a result, the condition of equipment items in theater will likely continue to worsen and the equipment items will likely require more extensive repair or replacement when it eventually returns to home stations. A Number of Challenges Will Affect the Timing and Cost of Army and Marine Corps Equipment Reset
The Army and Marine Corps will face a number of ongoing and longer- term challenges that will affect the timing and cost of equipment reset. In addition, other issues such as the Army and Marine Corps efforts to modularize and transform their forces, respectively, the reconstitution and reset of prepositioned equipment, and the ongoing and longer-term efforts to replace equipment from the active, National Guard, and Reserve units, as well as the potential transfer of U.S. military equipment and potential for continuing logistical support to Iraqi Security Forces will also affect the timing and cost of reset. Furthermore, both the Army and Marine Corps will have to better align their funding and program strategies to sustain, modernize, or replace existing legacy equipment systems. Similarly, both services will need to face difficult choices for the many competing equipment programs. While the services are working to refine overall requirements, the total requirements and costs are unclear and raise a number of questions as to how the services will afford them. According to recent Army information, the Army’s requirement for equipment reset is more than $13 billion for fiscal year 2006. Until the services are able to firm up these requirements and cost estimates, neither the Secretary of Defense nor the Congress will be in a sound position to weigh the trade offs and risks. | Why GAO Did This Study
The United States is engaged in an unconventional war, not a war against military forces of one country, but an irregular war against terrorist cells with global networks. Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom are sustained military operations, which are taking a toll on the condition and readiness of military equipment that, in some cases, is more than 20 years old. The Army and Marine Corps will likely incur large expenditures in the future to reset (repair or replace) a significant amount of equipment when hostilities cease. The Army has requested about $13 billion in its fiscal year 2006 supplemental budget request for equipment reset. Today's testimony addresses (1) the environment, pace of operations, and operational requirements in Southwest Asia, and their affects on the Army's and Marine Corps's equipping and maintenance strategies; (2) equipment maintenance consequences created by these equipping and maintenance strategies; and (3) challenges affecting the timing and cost of Army and Marine Corps equipment reset. GAO's observations are based on equipment-related GAO reports issued in fiscal years 2004 through 2006, as well as ongoing related work.
What GAO Found
In response to the harsh operating environments in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the unanticipated and prolonged length and pace of sustained operations, the Army and Marine Corps have developed and implemented several initiatives to equip its forces and maintain the extensive amounts of equipment in theater. Environmental factors such as heat, sand, and dust have taken their toll on sensitive components. In addition, operating equipment at a pace well in excess of peacetime operations is generating a large operational maintenance and replacement requirement that must be addressed when units return to their home stations. To meet ongoing operational requirements, the Army and Marine Corps have developed pools of equipment in theater to expedite the replacement of equipment damaged during operations and directed that equipment necessary for OIF and OEF operations remain in theater. In response, the Army and Marine Corps have developed several initiatives to increase the maintenance capacity in theater to be able to provide near-depot level repair capabilities. Although the Army and Marine Corps are reporting high rates of equipment readiness and have developed and implemented plans to increase the maintenance capabilities in theater, these actions have a wide range of consequences. Many of the equipment items used in Southwest Asia are not receiving depot-level repair because equipment items are being retained in theater or at home units and the Army has scaled back on the scope of work performed at the depots. As a result, the condition of equipment items in theater will likely continue to worsen and the equipment items will likely require more extensive repair or replacement when they eventually return to home stations. The Army and Marine Corps will face a number of ongoing and long-term challenges that will affect the timing and cost of equipment reset, such as Army and Marine Corps transformation initiatives, reset of prepositioned equipment, efforts to replace equipment left overseas from the active, National Guard, and Reserve units, as well as the potential transfer of U.S. military equipment and the potential for continuing logistical support to Iraqi Security Forces. Also, both the Marine Corps and Army will have to better align their funding requests with the related program strategies to sustain, modernize, or replace existing legacy equipment systems. Finally, both services will have to make difficult choices and trade-offs when it comes to their many competing equipment programs. While the services are working to refine overall requirements, the total requirements and costs are unclear and raise a number of questions as to how the services will afford them. Until the services are able to firm up these requirements and cost estimates, neither the Secretary of Defense nor the Congress will be in a sound position to weigh the trade offs and risks. |
gao_GAO-14-690T | gao_GAO-14-690T_0 | Weaknesses in Implementation of NASA Export Control Procedures Create Export Control Vulnerabilities
We found weaknesses in the implementation of NASA’s export control policy and procedures concerning the CEA function and foreign national access procedures, which increase the risk of unauthorized access to export-controlled technology. Variations in CEA Position, Function, and Resources: NASA’s export control policy provides the CEA the responsibility to ensure compliance of all Center program activities with U.S. export control laws and regulations and states that the position should be “senior-level,” but does not define what “senior-level” means. At some centers where they were several levels removed from the Center Director, CEAs stated that this placement makes it difficult to maintain authority and visibility to staff, to communicate concerns to center management, and to obtain the resources necessary to carry out their export control responsibilities. However, NASA’s export control NPR does not discuss the allocation of resources for the export control function or for the CEA within the center, and, according to NASA headquarters’ export control officials, each Center Director has the discretion of how to allocate resources to the export control function. To address the variations in authority, placement, and resources of the CEAs, we recommended NASA establish guidance defining the appropriate level and placement for the CEA function and assess the CEA workload to determine appropriate resources needed at each Center. Weaknesses in Foreign National Access: Throughout fiscal year 2013 NASA centers and Headquarters approved over 11,000 foreign national visits for periods ranging from less than 30 days to greater than 6 months. However, we identified instances in which NASA security procedures for foreign national access were not followed, which were significant given the potential impact on national security or foreign policy from unauthorized access to NASA technologies. Specifically, at one center, export control officials’ statements and our review of documentation identified instances between March and July of 2013, where foreign nationals fulfilled the role of sponsors for other foreign nationals by identifying the access rights to NASA technology for themselves and other foreign nationals for one NASA program. We identified planned corrective actions at this and other Centers related to the management of foreign national access and, in our April report, we recommended that NASA develop plans with specific time frames to monitor these corrective actions to ensure their effectiveness. In particular, the lack of a comprehensive inventory of export-controlled technologies and not effectively utilizing available oversight tools limit their ability to identify and address risks. Lack of a Comprehensive Inventory of Export-Controlled Technologies: NASA headquarters export control officials and CEAs lack a comprehensive inventory of the types and location of export- controlled technologies at the centers, limiting their ability to identify internal and external risks to export control compliance. Assessing areas of vulnerability, including identifying and assessing export-controlled items, could better ensure that consistent procedures are practiced. Specifically, at this center, the counterintelligence office collaborated with the CEA to conduct a sensitive technology survey—designed to identify the most sensitive technologies at the center—to better manage risks by developing protective measures for these technologies in the areas of counterintelligence, information technology security, and export controls. Such approaches, implemented NASA-wide, could enable the agency to take a more risk-based approach to oversight by targeting existing resources to identify the most sensitive technologies and then ensure the location of such technologies are known and protected. The remaining two centers cited resource constraints, organizational priorities, and insufficient coordination with center management as barriers to implementing corrective actions and resolving recommendations. NASA headquarters’ export control officials stated that they agree with the issues raised by the CEAs but acknowledged that they have not fully addressed the CEA concerns from the most recent program review in March 2013 and have not developed specific plans to do so. As stated above, NASA concurred with all of our recommendations and stated that our findings and recommendations complement results from the recent reviews by the NASA’s Inspector General and the National Academy of Public Administration. Further, NASA stated in its response to each of these reviews that it plans to adopt a more comprehensive, risk-based approach to enhance its export control program. However, it will be important for NASA to be vigilant in assessing actions taken to help ensure effective implementation and to avoid a relapse into the former practices. | Why GAO Did This Study
NASA develops sophisticated technologies and shares them with its international partners and others. U.S. export control regulations require NASA to identify and protect its sensitive technology; NASA delegates implementation of export controls to its 10 research and space centers. Recent allegations of export control violations at two NASA centers have raised questions about NASA's ability to protect its sensitive technologies. GAO was asked to review NASA's export control program.
This report assessed (1) NASA's export control policies and how centers implement them, and (2) the extent to which NASA Headquarters and CEAs apply oversight of center compliance with its export control policies. To do this, GAO reviewed export control laws and regulations, NASA export control policies, and State and Commerce export control compliance guidance. GAO also reviewed NASA information on foreign national visits and technical papers and interviewed officials from NASA and its 10 centers as well as from other agencies.
What GAO Found
Weaknesses in the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) export control policy and implementation of foreign national access procedures at some centers increase the risk of unauthorized access to export-controlled technologies. NASA policies provide Center Directors wide latitude in implementing export controls at their centers. Federal internal control standards call for clearly defined areas of authority and establishment of appropriate lines of reporting. However, NASA procedures do not clearly define the level of center Export Administrator (CEA) authority and organizational placement, leaving it to the discretion of the Center Director. GAO found that 7 of the 10 CEAs are at least three levels removed from the Center Director. Three of these 7 stated that their placement detracted from their ability to implement export control policies by making it difficult to maintain visibility to staff, communicate concerns to the Center Director, and obtain resources; the other four did not express concerns about their placement. However, in a 2013 meeting of export control officials, the CEAs recommended placing the CEA function at the same organizational level at each center for uniformity, visibility, and authority. GAO identified and the NASA Inspector General also reported instances in which two centers did not comply with NASA policy on foreign national access to NASA technologies. For example, during a 4-month period in 2013, one center allowed foreign nationals on a major program to fulfill the role of sponsors for other foreign nationals, including determining access rights for themselves and others. Each instance risks damage to national security. Due to access concerns, the NASA Administrator restricted foreign national visits in March 2013, and directed each center to assess compliance with foreign national access and develop corrective plans. By June 2013, six centers identified corrective actions, but only two set time frames for completion and only one planned to assess the effectiveness of actions taken. Without plans and time frames to monitor corrective actions, it will be difficult for NASA to ensure that actions are effective.
NASA headquarters export control officials and CEAs lack a comprehensive inventory of the types and location of export-controlled technologies and NASA headquarters officials have not addressed deficiencies raised in oversight tools, limiting their ability to take a risk-based approach to compliance. Export compliance guidance from the regulatory agencies of State and Commerce states the importance of identifying controlled items and continuously assessing risks. NASA headquarters officials acknowledge the benefits of identifying controlled technologies, but stated that current practices, such as foreign national screening, are sufficient to manage risk and that they lack resources to do more. Recently identified deficiencies in foreign national visitor access discussed above suggest otherwise. Three CEAs have early efforts under way to better identify technologies which could help focus compliance on areas of greatest risk. For example, one CEA is working with NASA's Office of Protective Services Counterintelligence Division to identify the most sensitive technologies at the center to help tailor oversight efforts. Such approaches, implemented NASA-wide, could enable the agency to better target existing resources to protect sensitive technologies.
What GAO Recommends
In April 2014, GAO recommended that the NASA Administrator establish guidance to better define the CEA function, establish time frames to implement foreign national access corrective actions and assess results, and establish a more risk-based approach to oversight, among other actions. NASA concurred with all of our recommendations and provided information on actions taken or planned to address them. |
gao_GAO-13-646 | gao_GAO-13-646_0 | Since that time DOD has considered several courses of action for the permanent placement of the headquarters. Initially DOD’s goal was to locate AFRICOM headquarters in Africa, but that goal was later abandoned, in part because of what DOD described as significant projected costs and sensitivities on the part of African countries to having such a presence on the continent. Finally, in January 2013, the Secretary of Defense decided to keep AFRICOM’s headquarters in Stuttgart, Germany. The study, which presented the costs and benefits of maintaining AFRICOM’s headquarters in Stuttgart and of relocating it to the United States, stated that the AFRICOM commander had identified certain operational concerns as critical and that even though the operational risks could be mitigated, it was the AFRICOM commander’s professional judgment that the command would be less effective in the United States. In announcing the decision to keep AFRICOM’s headquarters in Stuttgart, the Secretary of Defense noted that the commander had judged that the headquarters would be more operationally effective from its current location, given shared resources with the U.S. European Command. In 2008, the Office of the Secretary of Defense’s Office of Program Assessment and Evaluation conducted an analysis that considered other locations in Europe as well as in the United States for the permanent location of AFRICOM headquarters. It also concluded that relocating the headquarters to the United States would result in significant savings for DOD. The purpose of the CAPE study was to present the strategic and operational impacts, as well as the costs and benefits, associated with moving AFRICOM headquarters from its current location to the United States. Relocating AFRICOM to the continental United States could create up to 4,300 additional jobs, with an annual impact on the local economy ranging from $350 million to $450 million. DOD’s Decision to Keep AFRICOM Headquarters in Stuttgart Is Not Supported by an Analysis That Balances Operational Costs and Benefits for a Full Range of Options
DOD’s decision to keep AFRICOM headquarters in Stuttgart was made following the issuance of CAPE’s 2012 study, although the extent to which DOD officials considered the study when making the decision is unclear. The decision, however, was not supported by a well-documented economic analysis that balances the operational and cost benefits for the options open to DOD. Specifically, the CAPE study does not conform with key principles GAO has derived from a variety of cost estimating, economic analysis, and budgeting guidance documents, in that (1) it is not well-documented, and (2) it does not fully explain why the operational benefits of keeping the headquarters in Stuttgart outweigh the benefit of potentially saving millions of dollars per year and bringing thousands of jobs to the United States. DOD’s Decision Did Not Fully Explain Why Having a Forward Presence Could Not Mitigate the Disadvantages of Having a U.S. Headquarters
In its 2012 study, DOD tasked CAPE with analyzing two options—keeping AFRICOM’s headquarters in Stuttgart or moving it to a generic location in one of the four U.S. time zones. Conclusions
DOD’s letter describing the January 2013 decision to maintain the command in Stuttgart was based on operational benefits that are not clearly laid out, and it is unclear how cost savings and economic benefits were considered in the decision. Until the costs and benefits of maintaining AFRICOM in Germany are specified and weighed against the costs and economic benefits of moving the command, the department may be missing an opportunity to accomplish its missions successfully at a significantly lower cost. Recommendation for Executive Action
To enable the department to meet its Africa-related missions at the least cost, GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense conduct a more comprehensive and well-documented analysis of options for the permanent placement of the headquarters for AFRICOM, including documentation as to whether the operational benefits of each option outweigh the costs. Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD stated that the 2012 CAPE study met the requirements of the House Armed Services Committee report accompanying the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012. DOD partially concurred with our recommendation. If any of these options require additional analysis of the location of AFRICOM headquarters, DOD said that it will conduct a comprehensive and well-documented analysis. We continue to believe that such an analysis is needed. | Why GAO Did This Study
A House Armed Services Committee report accompanying a bill for the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 mandated GAO to conduct an analysis of options for the permanent placement of AFRICOM headquarters. While GAO's work was ongoing, DOD announced its decision to keep AFRICOM's headquarters at its current location in Stuttgart, Germany. This report addresses the following questions: (1) What courses of action did DOD consider for the permanent placement of AFRICOM headquarters? and (2) To what extent was DOD's decision to keep AFRICOM headquarters in Stuttgart based on a well-documented analysis of the costs and benefits of the options available to DOD? To meet these objectives, GAO analyzed documents provided by and interviewed officials from the Office of the Secretary of Defense; the Joint Staff; and AFRICOM and other combatant commands.
What GAO Found
The Department of Defense (DOD) has considered several courses of action for the placement of the headquarters for U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) but decided in early 2013 to keep it in Germany. When AFRICOM was created in 2007, DOD temporarily located its headquarters in Stuttgart, Germany, with the intent of selecting a permanent location at a later date. DOD's initial goal was to locate the headquarters in Africa, but this was later abandoned in part because of significant projected costs and sensitivities on the part of African countries. Subsequently, in 2008, DOD conducted an analysis that found that several locations in Europe and the United States would be operationally feasible and less expensive than keeping the headquarters in Stuttgart. A final decision, however, was deferred until 2012, when the Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation office completed its analysis. Subsequent to this analysis, in January 2013, the Secretary of Defense decided to keep AFRICOM's headquarters in Stuttgart. In announcing the decision, the Secretary noted that keeping AFRICOM in Germany would cost more than moving it to the United States but the commander had judged it would be more operationally effective from its current location, given shared resources with the U.S. European Command.
GAO's review of DOD's decision to keep AFRICOM headquarters in Germany found that it was not supported by a comprehensive and well-documented analysis that balanced the operational and cost benefits of the options available to DOD. The 2012 study that accompanied the decision does not fully meet key principles for an economic analysis. For example, the study is not well-documented and does not fully explain the decisions that were made. Although details supporting DOD's cost estimates were not well-documented, the analysis indicated that moving the headquarters to the United States would accrue savings of $60 million to $70 million per year. The 2012 study also estimated that relocating the headquarters to the United States could create up to 4,300 additional jobs, with an annual impact on the local economy ranging from $350 million to $450 million, but it is not clear how this factored into DOD's decision. Beyond costs and economic benefits, the study lists several factors to be considered when determining where to place a headquarters. It ranks two of these factors--access to the area of responsibility and to service components--as critical. However, little support exists showing how the factors were weighted relative to each other. Moreover, the study describes how a small, forward-deployed headquarters element such as the ones employed by other U.S.-based combatant commands might mitigate operational concerns, but the study is silent about why this mitigation plan was not deemed a satisfactory option. In discussions with GAO, officials from the Central and Southern Commands stated that they had successfully overcome negative effects of having a headquarters in the United States by maintaining a forward presence in their theaters. In sum, neither the analysis nor the letter announcing the decision to retain AFRICOM headquarters in Stuttgart explains why these operational factors outweighed the cost savings and economic benefits associated with moving the headquarters to the United States. Until the costs and benefits of maintaining AFRICOM in Germany are specified and weighed against the costs and benefits of relocating the command, the department may be missing an opportunity to accomplish its missions successfully at a lower cost.
What GAO Recommends
To meet operational needs at lower costs, GAO recommends that DOD conduct a more comprehensive and well-documented analysis of options for the permanent placement of the headquarters for AFRICOM, including documentation on whether the operational benefits of each option outweigh the costs. DOD partially concurred with GAOs recommendation, stating that the decision was based primarily on military judgment but that it will perform additional analysis of the location of the headquarters if the Secretary deems it necessary. GAO continues to believe such analysis is needed. |
gao_GAO-14-189 | gao_GAO-14-189_0 | Because of this requirement, these officials are authorized to fly on military aircraft for unofficial travel. Figure 1 show examples of these aircraft. 2). Number and Cost of Special Air Missions Have Increased Over 5 Years
From fiscal year 2008 through fiscal year 2012, the 89th Airlift Wing flew a total of 2,513 special air missions—522 special air missions during fiscal year 2012, a 13-percent increase over the 463 missions that it flew during fiscal year 2008. The cost of special air missions ranged from about $17 million in fiscal year 2008 to about $26 million in fiscal year 2012, and the fees paid for secure communication services ranged from about $4 million in fiscal year 2008 to $7 million in fiscal year 2012. The federal agencies with the largest number of special air missions were DOD (1,928 missions) and the Department of State (220 missions), as shown in figure 4. Members of Congress had the next highest number of missions with 133 missions. Agencies Followed Guidance for Special Air Missions, but DOD Does Not Identify and Track Reimbursements for Each Mission
DOD and other federal agencies followed DOD guidance on the high- priority movement of senior federal government officials on military aircraft. This guidance addresses the request, approval, prioritization, scheduling—and in DOD’s case—reimbursement from non-DOD agencies for special air missions. However, DOD does not identify and track whether it was reimbursed for each special air mission. However, internal control standards emphasize the importance of activities, such as documenting transactions, to help ensure that management directives are carried out— in this case, that each special air mission was reimbursed when required. Agencies Follow Guidance for Special Air Missions
DOD established processes governing the use of military aircraft by senior federal government officials from DOD, other executive branch agencies, the White House, and Congress, including a process for collecting reimbursements when required. DOD Does Not Identify and Track Reimbursements for Each Special Air Mission
We determined that traveling agencies should have reimbursed DOD approximately $5 million for 180 (about 9 percent) of the 2,050 special air missions flown during fiscal years 2009 through 2012. However, without a process to identify and track the costs and applicable agency reimbursements on a mission-by-mission basis, and DOD is unable to document whether it was paid for all required reimbursements. Recommendation for Executive Action
To ensure that federal agencies fully reimburse DOD for special air missions when required to do so, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) and Chief Financial Officer to revise guidance and require that DOD organizations develop and implement a process that identifies and tracks each special air mission, such as tracking by mission number or another unique identifier, from billing through reimbursement for all applicable costs. We continue to believe that DOD should use the unique identifiers that it assigns to each special air mission to track each mission throughout the billing and reimbursement process to better ensure that DOD is fully reimbursed, as appropriate, for each mission. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To determine the extent to which senior federal government officials have used military aircraft and the costs associated with this travel, we obtained and analyzed information from the 89th Airlift Wing regarding special air missions during fiscal years 2008 through 2012 for executive branch agencies and Congress. We compared the organizations’ guidance and the Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government to the request, approval, scheduling, and reimbursement processes adopted by the 89th Airlift Wing, Air Force’s Office of Special Air Missions, Air Force’s Air Mobility Command, DFAS, and the White House Military Office to determine whether the processes were in accordance with the guidance and internal control standards. This review does not include travel by the President, Vice President, First Lady, and Second Lady. | Why GAO Did This Study
Senior federal government officials—including high-ranking DOD officials, cabinet members, and members of Congress—are required or authorized to fly on military aircraft. This high-priority movement of senior government officials, known as special air missions, is accomplished with a fleet of 15 aircraft assigned to the Air Force's 89th Airlift Wing, located at Joint Base Andrews, Maryland. Both the Office of Management and Budget and DOD issued guidance on the management and use of these aircraft.
GAO was requested to examine government officials' use of military aircraft and the regulations and policies that govern such travel. GAO examined the extent to which (1) senior federal government officials have used military aircraft and the costs associated with this travel, and (2) agencies have followed guidance governing the use of military aircraft by senior federal government officials. GAO reviewed relevant legislation and guidance, DOD's processes, and special air mission data from fiscal years 2008 through 2012. This review does not include air travel by the President, Vice President, First Lady, and Second Lady.
What GAO Found
The Air Force's 89th Airlift Wing flew 2,513 special air missions for senior federal government officials during fiscal years 2008 through 2012, with the number of missions increasing by 13 percent from 463 missions in fiscal year 2008 to 522 missions in fiscal year 2012. The cost of special air missions ranged from about $17 million in fiscal year 2008 to about $26 million in fiscal year 2012, and the fees paid for secure communication services ranged from about $4 million in fiscal year 2008 to $7 million in fiscal year 2012. The federal agencies with the greatest number of special air missions were the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Department of State. Members of Congress had the next highest number of missions. Collectively, these agencies and Congress constituted about 91 percent of all special air missions flown by the 89th Airlift Wing.
DOD and other federal agencies followed DOD guidance on the high-priority movement of senior federal government officials on military aircraft, but DOD does not identify and track reimbursements for each mission. This guidance addresses the request, approval, prioritization, scheduling, and reimbursement from non-DOD agencies for special air missions. Federal internal control standards emphasize the importance of internal control activities, such as documenting transactions and events, to help ensure that management's directives are carried out. However, DOD does not identify and track whether it was reimbursed for each special air mission. GAO determined that traveling agencies should have reimbursed DOD approximately $5 million for 180 special air missions flown during fiscal years 2009 through 2012. However, GAO found that DOD was unable to document reimbursement for 16 of the 180 special air missions. Specifically, 2 of the 16 missions were not billed to the proper agency in fiscal year 2010. DOD officials stated that the remaining 14 missions were properly billed, but officials could not document reimbursement. DOD officials told GAO that they do not routinely identify and track reimbursements for each mission and that DOD's guidance does not specifically require organizations to identify and track each special air mission throughout the billing and reimbursement process, such as tracking by mission number or another unique identifier. This is partly because agencies at times make one payment to DOD for multiple missions. However, without a process to identify and track each special air mission for reimbursement, DOD cannot ensure that it has been fully reimbursed as required by DOD guidance.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOD ensure federal agencies fully reimburse for special air missions when required by developing a process to identify and track each mission, such as by mission number or another unique identifier, from billing through reimbursement for all applicable costs. In written comments on a draft of the report, DOD concurred with the recommendation. |
gao_GAO-16-118 | gao_GAO-16-118_0 | In March 2015, NNSA issued a new unclassified strategic plan for NNSA efforts to address future nuclear proliferation and terrorism threats for fiscal years 2016 to 2020 in response to an August 2014 interim report by the Secretary of Energy Advisory Board Task Force on Nuclear Nonproliferation. The DOE Secretary agreed with this recommendation and asked NNSA to begin drafting such a report. NNSA used these methods throughout the OTH initiative process to identify and assess future threats, and they included a literature review, structured interviews and workshops, and a peer review of OTH findings by external subject matter experts. This NIS specific phase of OTH work included the use of several established methods consistent with those in GAO- developed guidance, including a literature review encompassing several dozen U.S. government documents and other publications, two workshops, and structured interviews with participants from the U.S. government, nongovernmental organizations, and industry. The Way NNSA Implemented Established Methods Had Several Limitations
Through reviews of NNSA documentation and interviews with NNSA officials, we identified several limitations in the way NNSA implemented the established methods it used (i.e., the literature review, structured interviews, and peer review by external subject matter experts) through the OTH initiative to identify and assess future proliferation-related threats and trends, which raise concerns about the quality and usefulness of the analyses produced through the process. We found, based on our interviews with NNSA officials, that the OTH structured interview process conducted in the first OTH phase had limitations including the following:
According to NNSA officials, NNSA did not document the rationale for selecting individuals to be interviewed to show that the people selected as data sources provided a balanced range of views, were sufficiently knowledgeable, and that their opinions may be considered candid and accurate, consistent with common methodological practice. According to NNSA officials, NNSA did not have detailed records or analyses of these interviews, although this is called for by established methods and common methodological practices. We have found that such practices also help ensure the reliability and validity of the information being collected. According to NNSA officials, NNSA did not document the results of the peer review process, such as through a summary document or record of analysis, consistent with established peer review standards that state the importance of receiving written comments from all peer reviewers and producing a record of these comments. Taken together, the limitations we found in the OTH process raise concerns about the quality of the analyses produced and about the usefulness of the OTH initiative—as it has been implemented so far—as a DNN planning tool. It Is Not Clear How Recent NNSA Nonproliferation Organization and Planning Decisions Were Informed by the Over the Horizon Initiative
The OTH initiative was intended to help inform DNN management in its decisions about the future DNN organization and resources needed to address future threats, but it is not clear how information generated by the OTH initiative informed the January 2015 DNN reorganization. According to NNSA officials, the OTH initiative is in the process of being integrated into a new DNN strategic planning and integration function that will be led out of the office of the DNN Deputy Administrator, and which will manage integration of OTH studies into strategic planning documents, such as future versions of the NNSA strategic plan to reduce global nuclear threats. In January 2015, NNSA reorganized the DNN programs into a new program office structure by consolidating the previous five DNN program offices into four offices. NNSA officials in the DNN Deputy Administrator’s office also stated that there were other drivers behind the reorganization, and that it was not solely a threat-based reorganization. The Extent to Which OTH Threat Assessments Informed DOE’s and NNSA’s Plan for Countering Nuclear Threats Is Unclear
The OTH initiative was established to institutionalize long-term DNN planning and inform development of DNN strategic plans. Conclusions
DNN programs remain critical to addressing the serious threats associated with the proliferation of nuclear and radiological weapons. Recommendation for Executive Action
To ensure that any future NNSA effort—through the OTH initiative or another process—to assess proliferation threats and the implications for DNN produces high-quality information, we recommend that the NNSA Administrator better implement established methods, including literature reviews, structured interviews, and peer reviews. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to (1) describe how the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) assessed potential future proliferation threats through its “Over the Horizon” (OTH) initiative and assess the limitations, if any, in the process used by the initiative and (2) examine the extent to which NNSA used information about the potential future proliferation threats assessed through the OTH initiative in DNN organization and planning decisions. In addition, we reviewed the March 2015 NNSA strategic plan and draft classified appendix describing the planned activities of DNN and other NNSA programs to prevent, counter, and respond to nuclear terrorism and proliferation threats over the next 5 years, and we interviewed NNSA officials about the plan and the extent to which it was informed by information generated through the OTH initiative. 1. 2. 3. | Why GAO Did This Study
The threat posed by the proliferation of nuclear and radiological weapons remains one of the most pressing U.S. national security challenges, and these threats are evolving. Information produced by the OTH initiative about future proliferation threats is intended to support long-term DNN planning and other DNN management decisions.
The Joint Explanatory Statement Accompanying the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014 includes a provision for GAO to assess NNSA's nuclear nonproliferation programs. This report (1) describes how NNSA assessed potential proliferation threats through its OTH initiative and assesses the limitations, if any, in the process used by the initiative and (2) examines the extent to which NNSA used information about the potential threats assessed through the OTH initiative in DNN organization and planning decisions.
GAO analyzed NNSA documentation on the OTH initiative and NNSA planning documents. GAO also interviewed DOE and NNSA officials, DOE national laboratory representatives, and external subject matter experts and external validators in peer review groups involved in OTH activities.
What GAO Found
The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)—a semiautonomous agency within the Department of Energy (DOE)—has used a variety of established methods in its “Over the Horizon” (OTH) initiative to assess potential proliferation threats, but the implementation of these methods had several limitations. NNSA used established methods in its OTH initiative, including: (1) a literature review of studies on proliferation threats; (2) structured interviews with participants from the U.S. government, nongovernmental organizations, and industry; and (3) a peer review of OTH findings by external subject matter experts. Although NNSA used established methods, the way NNSA implemented them had several limitations. For example, NNSA officials did not document the rationale for selecting individuals for structured interviews to show that those selected provided a balanced range of views and were sufficiently knowledgeable. NNSA officials also did not have detailed records or analyses of these interviews. Established methods and common methodological practices call for structured interviews to be documented and analyzed. GAO has found that such practices help ensure the reliability and validity of the information collected. Another limitation was that the peer review was not conducted in a way consistent with established standards. For example, NNSA officials did not document the results of the peer review, as called for by established peer review standards, and some reviewers told GAO that it was unclear how their comments had been incorporated into a 2012 OTH report. These limitations raise concerns about the quality of the analyses produced, and about the usefulness of the OTH initiative, as it has been implemented so far, as a planning tool in NNSA's Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation (DNN).
It is unclear how information generated by the OTH initiative informed recent organization and planning decisions in the DNN office, even though NNSA established the initiative partly to support decision making on such matters. For instance, in January 2015, NNSA reorganized DNN programs by consolidating five DNN program offices into four offices. The extent to which the OTH initiative informed the reorganization is unclear because NNSA officials could not provide documentation or examples of links between OTH findings and elements of the reorganization. Instead, NNSA officials told GAO that the OTH initiative was one of several sources that informed the reorganization and that there were other reasons for it, including consolidating similar functions to achieve efficiencies. In addition, in March 2015, NNSA issued an unclassified strategic plan that was presented as defining and describing NNSA program missions—including DNN programs—to prevent, counter, and respond to future nuclear proliferation and terrorism threats. However, the extent to which the OTH initiative informed the plan was unclear because the plan and the OTH initiative covered different time frames, and because the plan and a draft classified appendix contained conflicting information about the role of the initiative in the plan's development. GAO is not making a recommendation on these matters because NNSA is creating a new strategic planning function that will oversee the OTH process and manage integration of OTH and other long-range studies into future versions of the NNSA strategic plan on nuclear threats.
What GAO Recommends
In conducting any future proliferation threat assessments, through the OTH initiative or another process, NNSA should better implement established methods, including literature reviews, structured interviews, and peer reviews. NNSA agreed with this recommendation and is taking action to address it. |
gao_NSIAD-98-108 | gao_NSIAD-98-108_0 | What Is the Mission of the Current and Planned Fleet? The current C-130 fleet is comprised of 12 different variants and the missions vary with each variant. While most of the current fleet is comprised of combat delivery aircraft, many of the C-130 variants perform specialized missions. At the time of our review, peacetime and wartime requirements for the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve combat delivery aircraft inventory totaled 264 aircraft. Requirements for the Guard and Reserves’ C-130 combat delivery aircraft are established in the Air Force’s C-130 MSP, which was delivered to Congress in 1997. What Is the C-130 Procurement History in the Guard and Reserve Units? For the past 21 years, with the exception of five aircraft, Congress has directed the procurement of C-130s for the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve units. According to C-130 program officials, the Air Force has not requested these aircraft because aircraft in those units have many years of service life remaining. What Are Air Force Plans for Retiring Excess C-130s in the MSP? About 50 C-130 aircraft were identified in the Air Force MSP as excess over requirements. Thirty of these were in the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve units and the remaining were in the active duty force. Reductions in the Air National Guard were expected to be 24 aircraft (from 190 to 166 aircraft) and the Air Force Reserve Command units were to be reduced by 6 aircraft (from 104 to 98 aircraft). According to Air Force officials, these reductions were not made. Is the Air Force Process for Retiring C-130 Aircraft When Replacement Aircraft Become Available Effective? Although the Air Force has a process governing the retirement of its aircraft, it has not been able to implement the process effectively. As a result, some C-130 aircraft have been retired with substantial service life remaining and/or shortly after the aircraft had been modified. As of March 1998, the Air Force had not decided how many C-130Js will be required. Accordingly, the Air Force has only been requesting one or two C-130Js per year since 1996 for the active force. As previously shown in figure 1, the remaining J acquisitions were congressionally directed buys for the Guard and Reserve. Regarding alternatives to the J, we were told that alternatives have been evaluated and rejected in the past. What Is the C-130J Logistics Support Funding Shortfall? Air Force C-130 officials stated that funding shortfalls for the C-130 fleet have historically been a problem, primarily because Congress has added C-130 aircraft to their budget without providing the needed funding for logistics support. Scope and Methodology
To accomplish our objectives, we interviewed a number of officials within the Office of the Secretary of Defense; the Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Office of the Secretary of the Air Force; the Air Mobility Command, Scott Air Force Base, Illinois; the Air Combat Command, Langley Air Force Base, Virginia; the Air Force Materiel Command, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio; the Air Education and Training Center, Little Rock Air Force Base, Arkansas; Air National Guard Headquarters, Washington, D.C.; Air National Guard Readiness Center, Andrews Air Force Base, Maryland; Air National Guard, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania; the Air Force Reserve Command, Robins Air Force Base, Georgia; the Warner-Robins Air Logistics Center, Robins Air Force Base, Georgia; Air Force Reserve Components in Baltimore and Minneapolis; Lockheed Martin, Arlington, Virginia; Air Force Audit Agency; the National Science Foundation, Virginia; and the Defense Contract Management Command, Marietta, Georgia. To determine the Air Force requirement/justification for the C-130J aircraft and whether or not alternatives to buying the new J model were considered, we reviewed the C-130J Operational Requirement Document; the Single Acquisition Management Plan and other applicable program documentation; Senate Report 104-267, which required the Secretary of Defense to report by March 1997 on the benefits of remanufacturing the C-130 fleet and the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology’s April 29, 1997, letter to congressional defense committees on this subject; Wright-Patterson Air Force Base’s assessment of an unsolicited proposal to remanufacture the C-130 fleet; and data provided by Air Force headquarters regarding the requirement for the program. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Air Force's C-130 program, focusing on: (1) the mission of the current and planned C-130 fleet; (2) the C-130 requirements for the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve; (3) the C-130 procurement history in the Guard and Reserve units; (4) the Air Force's plans for retiring excess C-130s in the Mastering Station Plan (MSP); (5) whether the Air Force's process for retiring C-130 aircraft when replacement aircraft become available is effective; (6) what the Air Force C-130J requirement is and what other alternatives were considered; and (7) the C-130J logistics support funding shortfall.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the current C-130 fleet is comprised of 12 different variants and the missions vary with each variant; (2) while most of the current fleet is comprised of combat delivery aircraft, many of the C-130 variants perform specialized missions; (3) at the time of GAO's review, peacetime and wartime requirements for the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve combat delivery aircraft totalled 264 aircraft; (4) requirements for the Guard and Reserves' C-130 combat delivery aircraft are established in the Air Force's C-130 MSP, which was delivered to Congress in 1997; (5) for the past 21 years with the exception of five aircraft, Congress has directed the procurement of C-130s for the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve units; (6) according to C-130 program officials, the Air Force has not requested these aircraft because aircraft in those units have many years of service life remaining; (7) about 50 C-130 aircraft were identified in the Air Force MSP as excess over requirements; (8) thirty of these were in the Air National Guard and the Air Force Reserve units and the remaining were in the active duty force; (9) reductions in the Air National Guard were expected to be 24 aircraft and the Air Force Reserve Command units were to be reduced by 6 aircraft; (10) according to Air Force officials, these reductions were not made; (11) although the Air Force has a process for governing the retirement of its aircraft, it has not been able to implement the process effectively; (12) as a result, some C-130 aircraft have been retired with substantial service life remaining and shortly after the aircraft had been modified; (13) as of March 1998, the Air Force had not decided how many C-130Js will be required; (14) the Air Force has been requesting one or two C-130Js per year since 1996 for the active force; (15) the remaining J acquisitions were congressionally-directed buys for the Guard and Reserve; (16) regarding alternatives to the J, GAO was told that alternatives have been evaluated and rejected in the past; and (17) Air Force C-130 officials stated that funding shortfalls for the C-130 fleet have historically been a problem, primarily because Congress has added C-130 aircraft to their budget without providing the needed funding for logistics support. |
gao_T-GGD-98-88 | gao_T-GGD-98-88_0 | As agreed, my comments today are primarily based on our body of work since 1990 on veterans’ hiring preference and work we did on reductions-in-force (RIF) at selected military installations and at the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) that occurred in 1991 and 1995, respectively.As requested, we also are providing certain statistics on the percentage of preference-eligible veterans among new federal career employees and in the existing federal workforce from 1990 through 1997. preference-eligible veterans than those without the names of preference-eligible veterans at the top. In three RIFs conducted at military installations in fiscal year 1991, our review showed that those without veterans’ preference were much more likely to have lost their jobs than were preference-eligible veterans. Similarly, during an October 1995 RIF at the USGS, those employees without veterans’ preference were much more likely to have lost their jobs than employees with such preference. At that point, hiring officials returned unused hiring certificates that were headed by the names of preference-eligible veterans more often than they did those headed by the names of individuals lacking such preference. Veterans were properly placed on all but 1 of the 1,136 certificates that we reviewed from OPM and executive agencies. likely to be affected in some manner during the RIF—reassigned, moved to a lower graded position, or laid off—as were employees without veterans’ preference. In summary, Mr. Chairman, preference-eligible veterans remain a larger portion of the federal workforce than veterans overall in the general civilian workforce. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed the work its done on veterans' hiring preference and on reductions-in-force (RIF) at selected military installations and at the United States Geological Survey (USGS).
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) preference-eligible veterans represent a larger portion of the federal workforce than veterans do of the civilian workforce; (2) from 1993 through 1997, veterans with preference represented about 21 percent of all new career appointments to federal service; (3) the assignment of veterans' preference and the placement of veterans on federal hiring certificates were properly done in nearly all cases GAO reviewed from July 1990 through June 1991; (4) however, hiring officials more frequently returned unused those certificates headed by the names of preference-eligible veterans than those without the names of preference-eligible veterans at the top; (5) in the three RIFs conducted at military installations in fiscal year 1991, GAO's review showed that those without veterans' preference were much more likely to have lost their jobs than were preference-eligible veterans; (6) similarly, during an October 1995 RIF at the USGS, those employees without veterans' preference were much more likely to have lost their jobs than employees with such preference; (7) GAO found that during USGS's 1995 RIF, as required by law and Office of Personnel Management Regulations, employees with veterans' preference were consistently given higher retention standing than competing employees without such preference; and (8) GAO also found that preference-eligible veterans were just as likely to be affected in some manner during the RIF as were employees without veterans' preference. |
gao_NSIAD-99-26 | gao_NSIAD-99-26_0 | Further, the contract contained an aggressive production schedule that did not take into account the contractor’s inexperience. Army Did Not Execute a Low-Risk Acquisition Strategy
The Army used a streamlined acquisition strategy to reduce the time required to develop and field FMTV trucks. Contractor Inexperience Contributed to Delays
The contractor, which was inexperienced in truck production, had difficulties in both establishing a production line and producing trucks that would pass test requirements. As a result, the contractor was late in delivering trucks for testing. The trucks that were produced could not meet FMTV technical and operational requirements. Accordingly, for fiscal year 1996, the Army only requested $39.7 million for FMTV termination costs rather than the $384 million needed to complete the final year of the contract. Since this was not enough to fully fund the final year of the contract, the Army and the contractor agreed to extend the FMTV production contract 2 years, ending in December 1998. The truck was less than 3 years old and was among those stored at the plant awaiting modification. The Army also agreed to pay a portion of the cost of correcting the corrosion problems in the remaining 40 areas because the contractor maintained that the test specified in the contract indicated the effects of 15 years of corrosion even though the contract only required trucks with 10 years of corrosion protection. The contractor produced 2,491 trucks after McLaughlin improved its procedures to address corrosion problems found on the first 4,955 trucks and before trucks with galvanized steel cabs were produced. The Army changed its plans to terminate the final year of the 5-year FMTV production contract when the Congress provided additional funding to continue the program. When the Army found that the first 4,955 trucks produced did not meet the corrosion protection requirements, the contractor agreed to repair the corroded trucks, provide a 10-year corrosion warranty on those trucks, and make changes in its production process and procedures to correct the corrosion problem. However, the Army and the contractor ultimately concluded that galvanized steel cabs may be needed to fully meet the truck’s 10-year corrosion prevention requirement. The contract was subsequently modified to require the galvanized steel cabs. The Army did not test or require the contractor to provide a corrosion warranty on the 2,491 trucks produced prior to the switch to galvanized steel. Scope and Methodology
To determine the contractor’s delay in delivering acceptable FMTV trucks, including the Army’s decision to restructure the current contract and the Army’s handling of corrosion problems, we interviewed Defense, Army, and contractor officials and reviewed various FMTV program documents, including the acquisition strategy and plan, the production contract, budget documents, selected acquisition reports, and the production contract’s source selection board evaluation. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Army's Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles (FMTV) program, focusing on: (1) the causes and effects of the contractor's delays in delivering acceptable trucks; and (2) the Army's actions to mitigate corrosion problems on FMTV trucks.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) a combination of factors caused lengthy delays in delivering FMTV trucks; (2) the Army did not execute a low-risk acquisition strategy; (3) the contract contained an aggressive schedule for truck production considering the contractor's inexperience; (4) the inexperienced contractor had difficulty in both establishing a production line and producing trucks that could meet qualification and operational testing requirements; (5) despite the difficulties, the Army allowed production to continue and increase during testing; (6) as a result, many trucks were produced that required modification or repair; (7) because of production problems and competing funding requirements, the Army decided in 1994 to terminate the final year of the original 5-year FMTV production contract; (8) the Army requested only enough funding for fiscal year 1996 to terminate the program; (9) Congress, not wanting a break in the program, provided additional funding for that year, but not enough to fully fund the production quantities called for in the contract; (10) the Army and the contractor agreed to extend the contract and spread the final year's quantities over 3 years; (11) the Army determined that the first 4,955 trucks produced did not meet the FMTV's corrosion protection requirements; (12) corrosion was found on the cabs of trucks less than 3 years old that were still awaiting modification at the contractor's plant; (13) rather than making the contractor replace all the 4,955 truck cabs at a cost of $31 million, the Army accepted the contractor's proposal to repair the corrosion damage and to provide a 10-year warranty, not to exceed $10 million, against any future corrosion; (14) the Army also subjected one of the 4,955 trucks to a contract-specified corrosion test; (15) it failed with corrosion being detected in 60 areas; (16) following these events, the Army and the contractor agreed on modified production procedures to address the corrosion problem on subsequently produced trucks; (17) however, the Army and the contractor ultimately concluded that galvanized steel cabs may be required to meet the 10-year corrosion prevention requirement and the contract was modified to require galvanized steel cabs; (18) the contract's final 3,751 trucks were produced with galvanized steel cabs; (19) the Army agreed to pay up to $7 million for the galvanized steel cabs and other corrosion improvements; and (20) the Army did not test or require the contractor to provide a corrosion warranty on the 2,491 trucks produced prior to the switch to galvanized steel cabs. |
gao_GAO-04-188 | gao_GAO-04-188_0 | Background
The Army continues to transform its forces toward its goal to be more strategically responsive and to dominate across the full spectrum of military operations — from small-scale contingencies to a major theater war. The Army conducted the evaluation from April through May 2003. The Army and OSD Met the Requirements of the Act to Assess the Stryker Brigade
The Army and OSD met the requirements of the fiscal year 2002 National Defense Authorization Act to, respectively, plan and conduct an operational evaluation of the Stryker brigade and certify the evaluation results. The Army met the requirements by (1) obtaining approval of the evaluation plan by the Department of Defense Director of Operational Test and Evaluation, (2) deploying the brigade to the evaluation site, and (3) conducting combat missions across the full spectrum of potential threats. The act also made additional vehicle procurement and brigade deployment contingent upon a certification that the brigade’s design is operationally effective and operationally suitable. On August 19, 2003, the Acting Secretary of the Army forwarded a memorandum requesting that the Secretary of Defense submit to Congress the operational evaluation report prepared by the Army following the evaluation and certify that the results of the evaluation indicate that the Third Brigade, Second Infantry Division’s design is operationally effective and operationally suitable. The Army has deployed the first Stryker brigade to Iraq. The report was submitted to the Commanding General, U.S. Forces Command, who endorsed the report’s findings. Although the I Corps commander assessed the brigade’s design as operationally both effective and suitable, the operational evaluation report noted that the Stryker brigade experienced difficulties in demonstrating some of the key operational capabilities, which were primarily attributed to an accelerated fielding schedule and a lack of adequate training time. Stryker Brigade Demonstrated Both Strengths and Weaknesses during the Operational Evaluation
Based on our observations of the brigade’s performance at the two combat training centers and our analysis of data collected during the evaluation, the brigade performed as designed but did not consistently demonstrate its capabilities, indicating both strengths and weaknesses. The operational evaluation also demonstrated weaknesses in the areas of staff planning, usage of digital systems, sustainment of the brigade, and established company-level combat procedures. Civilian contractors were also used ineffectively to support the units. The Army concluded that the issues were largely training related, but it also identified a few as design or equipment related. Although the Army developed, and is implementing, a plan that will mitigate most of the identified issues, the Army’s immediate focus was to resolve those training and equipment issues that affected the brigade’s ability to deploy to Iraq. The brigade’s performance indicates that the issues and weaknesses are being mitigated. However, the Army is not fully addressing the potential brigade design and the brigade equipment issues identified from the operational evaluation, which were not included in the predeployment training, although the issues have implications for future brigades. By completing the evaluation and certifying the design, the Army and OSD met the requirements of the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2002. Recommendations for Executive Action
To assist the Stryker Brigade Combat Teams’ transformation efforts, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Army to develop a plan that completes the mitigation efforts on those issues not addressed prior to deploying the brigade and apply, as applicable, adjustments made to the training, design, and equipment of the brigade to future Stryker brigades. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Army continues to transform units, known as Stryker brigades, into lighter, rapidly deployable, and more capable forces. Because Stryker brigades are an entirely new design, the fiscal year 2002 National Defense Authorization Act required the Army to conduct an evaluation of the design, to include deployment of the brigade and execution of combat missions across the full spectrum of potential threats. The act also required the Secretary of Defense to certify that the evaluation results indicate the design is both operationally effective and suitable. As one in a series of reviews of Army transformation, GAO monitored the evaluation to assess (1) whether the Army and the Secretary of Defense met legislative requirements, (2) how the Army evaluated both the operational effectiveness and suitability of the brigade's design, (3) what the brigade's performance was during the evaluation, and (4) how the Army plans to mitigate issues identified during the evaluation.
What GAO Found
The Army and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) met the legislative requirements of the fiscal year 2002 National Defense Authorization Act. The Army developed a plan for conducting an operational evaluation of the first Stryker brigade; obtained the plan's approval from the Department of Defense Director of Operational Test and Evaluation; and from April through May 2003, the brigade deployed to the evaluation sites and conducted combat missions across the full spectrum of potential threats--from major theater of war to security and stability operations. In September 2003, OSD certified to Congress that the brigade design is both operationally effective and suitable. The Army has deployed the first Stryker brigade to Iraq. The Army developed an evaluation plan and established a control cell that used independent evaluators to monitor and collect data on the brigade's performance. The cell compiled and analyzed the data and submitted a report to the I Corps commander, who declared the design as operationally effective and operationally suitable. The commander noted that performance difficulties were due to an accelerated fielding schedule and inadequate training time. The U.S. Forces Command endorsed the report. GAO determined, based on its observations and analyses, that the brigade's performance showed strengths and weaknesses. The brigade could perform as designed but did not consistently demonstrate its capabilities. The brigade's strengths were its ability to conduct combat missions, including deployment using different transportation modes and the ability to use the Stryker vehicle's speed and agility. The weaknesses related to staff planning, digital system usage, sustainment, and executing company-level combat missions. Contractors were also used ineffectively. GAO concluded that the primary cause of the weaknesses was insufficient training proficiency. The Army is implementing a plan to mitigate most operational evaluation issues. The Army concluded that the issues were largely training related, although some were related to design or equipment. The brigade, in preparation for deployment to Iraq, conducted additional training to address the issues the Army and GAO identified. The brigade's training performance indicates that these issues are being mitigated. The Army is addressing the training and equipment issues for the first Stryker brigade; however, it has deferred some critical issues that have implications for future brigades. |
gao_GAO-09-292 | gao_GAO-09-292_0 | Consistent with this recommendation and as required by law, TSA has undertaken to develop a program—Secure Flight—to assume from air carriers the function of watch-list matching. TSA Has Completed Key Activities Associated with Implementing Secure Flight, but Additional Actions Are Needed to Mitigate Risks
In a January 2009 briefing to congressional staff, we reported that TSA had not demonstrated Secure Flight’s operational readiness and that the agency had generally not achieved 5 of the 10 statutory conditions (Conditions 3, 5, 6, 8, 10), although DHS asserted that it had satisfied all 10 conditions. TSA has generally achieved this condition. Separate from the efficacy and accuracy of Secure Flight search tools, a security concern exists. TSA has generally achieved this condition. Conclusions
TSA has made significant progress in developing the Secure Flight program, and the activities completed to date, as well planned, reduce the risks associated with implementing the program. Recommendations for Executive Action
We are recommending that the Secretary of Homeland Security take the following two actions:
To mitigate future risks of performance shortfalls and strengthen management of the Secure Flight program moving forward, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the Assistant Secretary for the Transportation Security Administration to periodically assess the performance of the Secure Flight system’s matching capabilities and results to determine whether the system is accurately matching watch-listed individuals while minimizing the number of false positives—consistent with the goals of the program; document how this assessment will be conducted and how its results will be measured; and use these results to determine whether the system settings should be modified. Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
We provided a draft of this report to DHS for review and comment on March 20, 2009. The fifth recommendation was related to Condition 9 (CAPPS rules), which is not related to the Secure Flight program. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Objectives
In accordance with section 513 of the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2008, our objective was to assess the extent to which the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) met the requirements of 10 statutory conditions related to the development and implementation of the Secure Flight program and the associated risks of any shortfalls in meeting the requirements. Pursuant to the act, after the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) certified that it had satisfied all 10 conditions—which it did on September 24, 2008—we were required to report within 90 days on whether the 10 conditions had been successfully met. Scope and Methodology
Our overall methodology included (1) identifying key activities related to each condition; (2) identifying federal guidance and related best practices, if applicable, that are relevant to successfully meeting each condition (e.g., GAO’s Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government); (3) analyzing whether TSA has demonstrated through verifiable analysis and documentation, as well as oral explanation, that the guidance has been followed and best practices have been met; and (4) assessing the risks associated with not fully following applicable guidance and meeting best practices. Based on our assessment, we categorized each condition as generally achieved, conditionally achieved, or generally not achieved. Because we concluded that TSA had not successfully met all 10 conditions, we conducted additional work from January through April 2009, the results of which are also included in this report. | Why GAO Did This Study
To enhance aviation security, the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Transportation Security Administration (TSA) developed a program--known as Secure Flight--to assume from air carriers the function of matching passenger information against terrorist watch-list records. In accordance with a mandate in the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2008, GAO's objective was to assess the extent to which TSA met the requirements of 10 statutory conditions related to the development of the Secure Flight program. GAO is required to review the program until all 10 conditions are met. In September 2008, DHS certified that it had satisfied all 10 conditions. To address this objective, GAO (1) identified key activities related to each of the 10 conditions; (2) identified federal guidance and best practices that are relevant to successfully meeting each condition; (3) analyzed whether TSA had demonstrated, through program documentation and oral explanation, that the guidance was followed and best practices were met; and (4) assessed the risks associated with not fully following applicable guidance and meeting best practices.
What GAO Found
As of April 2009, TSA had generally achieved 9 of the 10 statutory conditions related to the development of the Secure Flight program and had conditionally achieved 1 condition (TSA had defined plans, but had not completed all activities for this condition). Also, TSA's actions completed and those planned have reduced the risks associated with implementing the program. Although DHS asserted that TSA had satisfied all 10 conditions in September 2008, GAO completed its initial assessment in January 2009 and found that TSA had not demonstrated Secure Flight's operational readiness and that the agency had generally not achieved 5 of the 10 statutory conditions. Consistent with the statutory mandate, GAO continued to review the program and, in March 2009, provided a draft of this report to DHS for comment. In the draft report, GAO noted that TSA had made significant progress and had generally achieved 6 statutory conditions, conditionally achieved 3 conditions, and had generally not achieved 1 condition. After receiving the draft report, TSA took additional actions and provided GAO with documentation to demonstrate progress related to 4 conditions. Thus, GAO revised its assessment in this report. Related to the condition that addresses the efficacy and accuracy of search tools, TSA had not yet developed plans to periodically assess the performance of the Secure Flight system's name-matching capabilities, which would help ensure that the system is working as intended. GAO will continue to review the Secure Flight program until all 10 conditions are generally achieved. |
gao_GGD-98-93 | gao_GGD-98-93_0 | These personnelists were in the federal Personnel Management and Industrial Relations occupational group—GS-200s—that NPR specifically targeted for reduction. Agencies’ Activities to Restructure Personnel Offices
The four departments we reviewed generally approached the restructuring of their personnel offices with the intent of achieving staff reductions. Although all four departments reduced the number of personnelists they employed by 14 percent or more, the personnel servicing ratio for three of the four departments did not change as much. In contrast to the large reductions in the number of personnelists, however, the personnel servicing ratios for the departments, except for DOI, did not change as substantially from September 1993 to September 1997 because of downsizing in other parts of the agencies. In addition to reducing personnel staff, each department also downsized other parts of its workforce. As of late 1997, the departments were behind their original milestones for implementing the new personnel and payroll systems. Departments Recognized Need for More Performance Measures to Better Assess the Results of Personnel Operations
The four departments we reviewed had only limited measures in place to assess the performance of personnel offices and operations but were developing further measures. Another issue is the lack of a common framework in which to (1) compare the service quality of personnel and payroll services that franchise and other federal agencies will provide to agencies seeking services and (2) permit the efficient exchange of automated personnel data between agencies and service providers. Common Format to Facilitate Data Exchanges Was Being Developed
Department and agency officials we interviewed said it would be useful as well to have a standard technical format for data that agencies are likely to exchange with service providers. OPM has tasked the Council with developing a set of core data elements and requirements for personnel information systems in recognition of the need to develop a governmentwide strategy for using automation technology. Upgrading system technology was a primary element of the restructuring plans because the departments planned to increase operating efficiencies and improve services by automating paper-based personnel processes. Our third objective was to identify issues agencies may commonly encounter when, in restructuring their personnel operations, they consider purchasing automated personnel and/or payroll services from another agency or the private sector. In addressing our first objective further, we interviewed personnel officials of the four departments and the selected component agencies to obtain information on (1) when restructuring began, (2) the rationale for restructuring, (3) the plans developed for restructuring, (4) the activities undertaken to restructure, and (5) the status of implementation. To address our second objective (i.e., to ascertain whether performance measures are in place to gauge the results of the restructuring efforts), we discussed with responsible officials whether the departments and agencies had developed or were developing performance measures, whether the measures were “benchmarked” against leading organizations, and whether the performance measures were linked to the mission of the department or agency. Finally, to address our third objective (i.e., to identify issues agencies encountered as they purchased automated personnel and payroll services from another agency or the private sector), we interviewed officials from the departments and component agencies who were involved in the development and/or purchase of new technology (hardware and software) for personnel and/or payroll operations. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO reviewed the effects of reductions in personnel positions at the Departments of Agriculture (USDA), Health and Human Services (HHS), the Interior (DOI), and Veteran Affairs (VA), focusing on: (1) the activities the agencies have undertaken in restructuring personnel offices and operations; (2) what performance measures are in place to gauge results of the restructuring efforts; and (3) issues agencies may commonly encounter when, in restructuring their personnel operations, they consider outsourcing automated personnel or payroll services to another agency or the private sector.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) although the focus of agencies' restructuring efforts differed across the four departments, their streamlining plans included reducing the number of employees working in personnel operations and automating paper-based personnel processes to improve the responsiveness and quality of personnel-related services; (2) the reduction in the number of personnelists at the four departments ranged from 14 to 41 percent between September 1993 and September 1997; (3) even with reductions of this magnitude, the personnel servicing ratios for three departments did not change substantially; (4) the departments sought to boost the efficiency of their personnel offices by automating their largely paper-based operations; (5) to achieve this increase in efficiency, the departments generally planned to have new equipment and software in place before staff reductions were made; (6) however, that did not occur, and the departments fell behind their original milestones for implementing new personnel and payroll systems while initial personnel staff reductions occurred; (7) according to personnel officials, the four departments had few measures in place to gauge the results of their personnel operations before restructuring; (8) however, officials in all four departments recognized the need for measurement, were developing performance measures to assess future efforts, and, in some cases, were seeking to more fully assess current costs and performance to identify specific targets for improvement; (9) in addition to providing personnel services to their component agencies, the four departments were developing or purchasing automated personnel systems with the intention of selling payroll or other key personnel services to other agencies; (10) agency officials suggested that a framework was needed with which agencies could obtain information on the personnel services offered by other federal agencies, the cost of those services, and their performance characteristics, including service-level standards; (11) agency officials also suggested the need for a standard technical format and a core set of requirements for personnel data that agencies are likely to exchange with each other; and (12) since April 1997, the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) has rechartered the mission of the Federal Personnel Automation Council and tasked it to develop a set of core data elements and requirements for personnel information systems. |
gao_HEHS-98-102 | gao_HEHS-98-102_0 | Claims Do Not Adequately Identify Products Billed to Medicare
HCFA does not know specifically what Medicare is paying for when its contractors process claims for DME. Without more specific product identifiers on Medicare claims, HCFA cannot systematically determine if the fee schedule allowances are appropriate. Without product-specific identifiers on Medicare claims forms, HCFA cannot effectively review the mix of products billed under a HCPCS code to (1) identify the need to regroup similar products under existing or new billing codes, (2) adjust the code descriptions and the guidance to suppliers advising them which HCPCS codes to bill, (3) identify claims billed under inappropriate HCPCS codes, and (4) adjust the fee schedule allowance for a HCPCS code so that it reflects the costs of the products covered by the code. Section 4316 of the BBA amended the Medicare law to permit HCFA to use a streamlined process to adjust fee schedule allowances up or down by as much as 15 percent in one year. This new authority can help HCFA bring the historical, charge-based fees into line with marketplace prices, but some obstacles remain: (1) HCFA and its contractors do not have sufficient current product or pricing data on the thousands of items covered by the DME fee schedule and (2) the fee schedule reimburses large suppliers who buy at volume discounts the same fee schedule allowances as individuals who buy single items at retail prices. Medicare Fees Are Often out of Line With Current Prices
Since the current Medicare fee schedule is based on supplier charges that Medicare allowed in 1986 and 1987, some Medicare fees have little correlation with today’s market prices for medical equipment and supplies. Although the BBA gives HCFA greater flexibility to more quickly adjust Medicare fee schedule allowances, some underlying problems need to be resolved for HCFA to most effectively use its new authority. Current HCPCS Billing Codes
Our report states that HCFA does not know specifically what products Medicare is paying for because the same HCPCS code can be used for a broad range of product types, quality, and market prices. We also reviewed Medicare payments for selected off-the-shelf orthotic devices. We also reviewed the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) Office of the Inspector General (OIG) and GAO reports on billing practices and payment policies for orthotic devices. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed Medicare's payments for commonly purchased, off-the-shelf durable medical equipment (DME), focusing on the need to: (1) better identify products billed to Medicare; and (2) bring Medicare fees more in line with current marketplace prices.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) there are two underlying problems with Medicare's DME payment system; (2) the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) does not know specifically what products Medicare is paying for when its contractors process claims for DME; (3) the only product identifiers on the claims are the HCFA billing codes that cover a broad range of product types, quality, and market prices; (4) without more specific product identifiers on Medicare claims, HCFA cannot routinely determine what products are being billed under each billing code, which products should be grouped together under the same billing code, or whether the Medicare payment for all the products grouped under a billing code is reasonable; (5) the health care industry is increasingly using bar-coded, product-specific identifiers for medical products, but HCFA does not have any plans to require these identifiers on Medicare claims; (6) the second underlying problem with Medicare's DME payment system is that the fee schedule allowances for DME are often out of line with current market prices; (7) most Medicare fees are based on historical supplier charges updated using the consumer price index; (8) the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 (BBA) gave the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) the authority to use a streamlined inherent reasonableness review process to adjust Medicare fees by as much as 15 percent in one year; (9) this streamlined authority should help HCFA bring the historical, charge-based fees into line with marketplace prices, but some obstacles remain; (10) HCFA and its contractors do not have sufficient, current product and pricing data for the thousands of DME items covered by Medicare; (11) another obstacle to appropriate reimbursement is that the fee schedule allowances are the same for individuals and for large institutional suppliers, even though large suppliers buy at substantial discounts; and (12) although the BBA gives HHS the authority to more quickly adjust fees, addressing these underlying problems may require additional statutory authority. |
gao_RCED-95-62 | gao_RCED-95-62_0 | The Coast Guard Does Not Have Effective Inventory Controls
The Coast Guard does not have the organizational structure or computer systems necessary to effectively manage its parts and supplies inventory for its cutters. As a result, the Coast Guard does not know the value, type, quantity, and condition of many of the spare and repair parts in the overall inventory. Management Structure Results in Poor Inventory Distribution
The Coast Guard’s fragmented management structure also limits the agency’s ability to determine whether cutters have a shortage or an excess of parts and whether the parts are readily available when needed. Although we agree with the plan’s direction, we found that some initiatives are already behind schedule, increasing the potential for delays in the Coast Guard’s long-term efforts to centrally manage its inventories by fiscal year 2002. Although Coast Guard officials contend that the agency’s lack of information on parts and supplies has not significantly affected the Coast Guard’s mission, it has resulted in inefficient management of resources. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The former Chairman, Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, asked us to examine the Coast Guard’s inventory management system to identify any wasteful or inefficient practices that should be changed. First, does the Coast Guard have the systems needed to effectively manage its inventory of spare and repair parts and supplies? Second, if not, what initiatives does the Coast Guard have under way to improve its inventory management? | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Coast Guard's inventory management system for its fleet of 240 cutters to identify any wasteful or inefficient practices that should be changed, focusing on: (1) whether the Coast Guard has the systems it needs to effectively manage its inventory of spare and repair parts and supplies; and (2) initiatives the Coast Guard has under way to improve its inventory management.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) the Coast Guard does not have the organizational structure or computer systems necessary to effectively manage its inventory for supporting cutters; (2) the Coast Guard does not know the value, type, quantity, and condition of many of the spare and repair parts in its inventory and cannot determine whether cutters have a shortage or an excess of parts, or whether the parts are readily available; (3) Coast Guard officials believe that the lack of inventory management information has not seriously affected the Coast Guard's ability to carry out its missions, although they acknowledge that it has resulted in costly purchases and excess inventory; (4) the Coast Guard plans to take actions to improve its inventory control problems by fiscal year 2002; and (5) some of the Coast Guard's initiatives are already behind schedule, delaying both its short-term actions and its long-term inventory management efforts. |
gao_GAO-04-830 | gao_GAO-04-830_0 | Dissemination of government information. Government Printing and Dissemination Changes Are Forcing GPO’s Transformation
As in private industry, printing and dissemination in the federal government are being heavily affected by the changing technological environment. In addition, federal agencies are publishing more items directly to the Web—without creating paper documents at all—and are able to print and disseminate information without using GPO services. Similarly, individuals are downloading documents from government Web sites, such as GPO Access, rather than purchasing paper copies of government documents, thus reducing document sales. 2.) To assist in that process, our expert panel developed a series of options for GPO to consider in its planning. Briefly, the panel suggested that GPO develop a business plan to focus its mission on information dissemination as its primary goal, rather than printing; demonstrate to its customers—including agencies and the public—the value it can provide; improve and extend partnerships with agencies to help establish itself as an information disseminator; and ensure that its internal operations—including technology, how it conducts business with its customers, management information systems, and training—are adequate for efficient and effective management of core business functions and for service to its customers. Disseminating government information to the public. GPO has applied some key practices as part of its transformation effort, such as involving top leadership and strategically communicating with employees and other stakeholders. 4.) On April 28, 2004, the Public Printer made his most clear and direct statement of his vision for GPO thus far, stating that GPO has “begun to develop a new vision for the GPO: an agency whose primary mission will be to capture digitally, organize, maintain, authenticate, distribute, and provide permanent public access to the information products and services of the federal government.” GPO’s strategic plan has the potential to unite employees around the new mission and determine what they need to do to help GPO transform and achieve success in the new environment. Focus on a key set of principles and priorities at the outset of the transformation. Dedicate an implementation team to manage the transformation process. Involve employees to obtain their ideas and gain their ownership for the transformation. GPO leadership has articulated a vision to transform GPO into a world- class organization and has taken some initial steps toward this objective, most notably with respect to human capital management. However, because significant change efforts are difficult and take a long time, continued leadership attention is needed. GPO’s Human Capital Office is using our October 2003 report as GPO’s roadmap for transforming its human capital management and is actively implementing the recommendations we made. This model allows an organization to effectively choose, monitor, and evaluate projects. results. 1. 3. emphasize training on the usefulness and understanding of financial information to nonfinancial managers who are critical to GPO’s business operations; ensure that planned GPO and CFO efforts and goals in redefining the role of finance, providing information to decision makers, and building a team that delivers results receive the full and consistent support of GPO’s top management; ensure that management is receiving the financial information needed to manage day-to-day operations and track progress against transformation goals; and recognize the importance of financial management and reporting in strategic plans for transformation. Change is not optional for GPO—it is required, and it is driven by declines in GPO’s printing volumes, printing revenues, and document sales. One of these practices, related to ensuring that top management drives the transformation, has already been fully applied by GPO’s leadership. | Why GAO Did This Study
The transformation of the Government Printing Office (GPO) is under way. This report captures the results of our efforts over the past year to assess and help strengthen GPO's transformation and strategic planning efforts. It is the final part of GAO's response to both a mandate requiring GAO to examine the current state of printing and dissemination of public government information and a congressional request that we conduct a general management review of GPO focusing on that GPO's transformation and management.
What GAO Found
Federal government printing and dissemination are changing due to the underlying changes to the technological environment. The Public Printer and his leadership team understand the effects of this technological change on GPO and have begun an ambitious effort to transform GPO and reexamine its mission. Federal agencies are publishing more documents directly to the Web and are doing more of their printing and dissemination of information without using GPO services. At the same time, the public is obtaining government information from government Web sites such as GPO Access rather than purchasing paper copies. As a result, GPO has seen declines in its printing volumes, printing revenues, and document sales. To assist in the transformation process under way at GPO, GAO convened a panel of printing and information dissemination experts, who developed a series of options for GPO to consider in its strategic planning. The panel suggested that GPO (1) develop a business plan to focus its mission on information dissemination as its primary goal, rather than printing; (2) demonstrate to its customers the value it can provide; (3) improve and extend partnerships with agencies to help establish itself as an information disseminator; and (4) ensure that its internal operations are adequate for efficient and effective management of core business functions and for service to its customers. GPO can also use other key practices that GAO identified to help agencies successfully transform, such as involving employees to obtain their ideas and gain their ownership for the transformation. GPO fully applied one of these practices, related to ensuring that top management drives the transformation, and has partially implemented each of the remaining eight practices. To fully implement the remaining practices, GPO needs to take actions including establishing its mission and strategic goals and developing a documented plan for its transformation. GPO has taken some initial steps to adopt the best practices of other public and private sector organizations, most notably with respect to human capital management. GPO is actively implementing the recommendations GAO made in October 2003. For example, GPO reorganized the human capital office into customer-focused teams devoted to meeting the human capital needs of GPO's operating units. Continued leadership attention is needed to build on the initial progress made in information technology and financial management. For example, GPO should implement an information technology investment management process to help management choose, monitor, and evaluate projects, and GPO should train its line managers to effectively use financial data. |
gao_GAO-06-428T | gao_GAO-06-428T_0 | Security, Measurement, and Sustainability Challenges in Rebuilding and Stabilizing Iraq
The United States faces three key challenges in stabilizing and rebuilding Iraq. First, the unstable security environment and the continuing strength of the insurgency have made it difficult for the United States to transfer security responsibilities to Iraqi forces and to engage in rebuilding efforts. Second, inadequate performance data and measures make it difficult to determine the overall progress and impact of U.S. reconstruction efforts. Third, the U.S. reconstruction program has encountered difficulties with Iraq’s inability to sustain new and rehabilitated infrastructure projects and to address maintenance needs in the water, sanitation, and electricity sectors. U.S. agencies are working to develop better performance data and plans for sustaining rehabilitated infrastructure. Strength of the Insurgency Has Made It Difficult to Transfer Security Responsibilities to Iraqi Forces and Engage in Rebuilding Efforts
Over the past 2½ years, significant increases in attacks against the coalition and coalition partners have made it difficult to transfer security responsibilities to Iraqi forces and to engage in rebuilding efforts in Iraq. Security Situation and Management Issues Have Affected Rebuilding Efforts
The security situation in Iraq has affected the cost and schedule of reconstruction efforts. In January 2006, State reported that direct and indirect security costs represent 16 to 22 percent of the overall cost of major infrastructure reconstruction projects. Limited Performance Data and Measures and Inadequate Reporting Present Difficulties in Determining Progress and Impact of Rebuilding Effort
State has set broad goals for providing essential services, and the U.S. program has undertaken many rebuilding activities in Iraq. In September 2005, we recommended that the Secretary of State address this issue of measuring progress and impact in the water and sanitation sector. Iraq Faces Challenges in Financing Future Needs
As the new Iraqi government forms, it must plan to secure the financial resources it will need to continue the reconstruction and stabilization efforts begun by the United States and international community. However, Iraq’s needs are greater than originally anticipated due to severely degraded infrastructure, post-conflict looting and sabotage, and additional security costs. The United States has borne the primary financial responsibility for rebuilding and stabilizing Iraq; however, its commitments are largely obligated and remaining commitments and future contributions are not finalized. Further, U.S. appropriations were never intended to meet all Iraqi needs. Finally, Iraq’s ability to contribute financially to its additional rebuilding and stabilization needs is dependent upon the new government’s efforts to increase revenues obtained from crude oil exports, reduce energy and food subsidies, control government operating expenses, provide for a growing security force, and repay external debt and war reparations. Iraqi Needs May be Greater Than Originally Anticipated
Initial assessments of Iraq’s needs through 2007 by the U.N., World Bank, and the CPA estimated that the reconstruction of Iraq would require about $56 billion. International donors have provided a lesser amount of funding for reconstruction and development activities. Measuring the outcomes of U.S. efforts is important to ensure that the U.S. dollars spent are making a difference in the daily lives of the Iraqi people. In addition, the United States must ensure that the billions of dollars it has already invested in Iraq’s infrastructure are not wasted. This will not be easy, but it is necessary for the Iraqi government to begin to contribute to its own rebuilding and stabilization efforts and to encourage investment by the international community and private sector. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. | Why GAO Did This Study
The United States, along with coalition partners and various international organizations, has undertaken a challenging and costly effort to stabilize and rebuild Iraq following multiple wars and decades of neglect by the former regime. This enormous effort is taking place in an unstable security environment, concurrent with Iraqi efforts to transition to its first permanent government. The United States' goal is to help the Iraqi government develop a democratic, stable, and prosperous country, at peace with itself and its neighbors, a partner in the war against terrorism, enjoying the benefits of a free society and a market economy. In this testimony, GAO discusses the challenges (1) that the United States faces in its rebuilding and stabilization efforts and (2) that the Iraqi government faces in financing future requirements. This statement is based on four reports GAO has issued to the Congress since July 2005 and recent trips to Iraq. Since July 2005, we have issued reports on (1) the status of funding and reconstruction efforts in Iraq, focusing on the progress achieved and challenges faced in rebuilding Iraq's infrastructure; (2) U.S. reconstruction efforts in the water and sanitation sector; (3) U.S. assistance for the January 2005 Iraqi elections; and (4) U.S. efforts to stabilize the security situation in Iraq (a classified report).
What GAO Found
The United States faces three key challenges in rebuilding and stabilizing Iraq. First, the security environment and the continuing strength of the insurgency have made it difficult for the United States to transfer security responsibilities to Iraqi forces and progressively draw down U.S. forces. The security situation in Iraq has deteriorated since June 2003, with significant increases in attacks against Iraqi and coalition forces. In addition, the security situation has affected the cost and schedule of rebuilding efforts. The State Department has reported that security costs represent 16 to 22 percent of the overall costs of major infrastructure projects. Second, inadequate performance data and measures make it difficult to determine the overall progress and impact of U.S. reconstruction efforts. The United States has set broad goals for providing essential services in Iraq, but limited performance measures present challenges in determining the overall impact of U.S. projects. Third, the U.S. reconstruction program has encountered difficulties with Iraq's inability to sustain new and rehabilitated infrastructure projects and to address basic maintenance needs in the water, sanitation, and electricity sectors. U.S. agencies are working to develop better performance data and plans for sustaining rehabilitated infrastructure. As the new Iraqi government forms, it must plan to secure the financial resources it will need to continue the reconstruction and stabilization efforts begun by the United States and international community. Iraq will likely need more than the $56 billion that the World Bank, United Nations, and CPA estimated it would require for reconstruction and stabilization efforts from 2004 to 2007. More severely degraded infrastructure, post-2003 conflict looting and sabotage, and additional security costs have added to the country's basic reconstruction needs. However, it is unclear how Iraq will finance these additional requirements. While the United States has borne the primary financial responsibility for rebuilding and stabilizing Iraq, its commitments are largely obligated and future commitments are not finalized. Further, U.S. appropriations were never intended to meet all Iraqi needs. In addition, international donors have mostly committed loans that the government of Iraq is just beginning to tap. Iraq's ability to financially contribute to its own rebuilding and stabilization efforts will depend on the new government's efforts to increase revenues obtained from crude oil exports, reduce energy and food subsidies, control government operating expenses, provide for a growing security force, and repay $84 billion in external debt and war reparations. |
gao_GGD-96-129B | gao_GGD-96-129B_0 | To address his questions and related concerns, our objectives were to (1) determine the historical and current basis for restricting the private delivery of letters, including the Service’s efforts to administer and enforce the restrictions; (2) document changes in private sector capacity for letter delivery since 1970, including specific letter mail services for which the Service competes; and (3) estimate the possible financial effects on how the Service’s revenues, costs, and postage rates might change if current restrictions on private delivery of letters were to be changed. 19 (1970). To estimate the effects of mail volume losses on the Service’s revenues, costs, and postage rates, we used estimated mail volumes and other data that the Postal Service and Postal Rate Commission used in a recent rate case (Docket No. Responding to pressures to allow more private letter delivery, the Service suspended portions of the Statutes and has virtually stopped enforcing them. The complaint did not result in suspension. In 1979, the Postal Service suspended the Statutes for extremely urgent letters (39 C.F.R. Private Mail Delivery Capacity Has Grown Substantially Since 1971
In 1971, the Postal Service faced little competition for delivery of letter mail. This growth was attributable primarily to increases in mail volumes and revenues for those mail classes largely protected by the Statutes, First-Class and third-class. Estimated Financial Effects of Changing the Private Express Statutes Vary Among Mail Classes
Primarily on the basis of (1) existing private mail delivery capacity, (2) private firms’ actions and stated interests regarding expansion of mail delivery services, and (3) interviews with mailers, we determined that a greater percentage of Priority Mail volumes than other classes of letter mail would be at immediate risk if the Private Express Statutes were to be relaxed or repealed. Collectively, AMMA and DMA members generate the vast majority of advertising mail volume. 4.5.) 4.6.) As previously stated, the Service has lost most of its share of the expedited mail and package markets despite recent increases in Priority Mail and fourth-class mail volumes. Various Factors Limit the Service’s Competitiveness
The Postal Service recognizes that despite its efforts to become more competitive, it is constrained by various laws and regulations that limit its ability to compete successfully with private sector firms. Some Other Countries Have Narrowed Their Letter Mail Monopolies as Part of Overall Postal Reform
Many postal administrations around the world have mail monopolies to help meet universal letter delivery and other public service obligations, much like the U.S. Postal Service’s mail revenues are subject to the Private Express Statutes and implementing Service regulations. To that end, Member States shall take steps to ensure that the density of the points of contact, and of the points where mail is collected, take account of the needs of users.”
The directive defines universal service as including “every working day, and not less than five days a week save in exceptional circumstances or geographical conditions: one collection from the clearance points, one door-to-door delivery for every natural or legal person.”
“To the extent necessary to ensure the maintenance of the universal service, the services which may be reserved to the universal service provider(s) in each Member State are the collection, sorting, transport, and delivery of items of domestic [as opposed to international] correspondence whose price is less than five times the public tariff for an item of correspondence in the first weight step, provided that they weigh less than 350 grammes ...”
The European Commission has told us “It is important to note that the draft directive does not oblige member states to maintain any monopoly in their postal sector, but allows them to do so within the limits of the reserved services set out in the draft directive, to the extent necessary to ensure the maintenance of the universal service.”
The draft directive also provides that “direct mail” (mass advertising and marketing mail) and inbound international mail can also be reserved to the postal monopoly, “wherever their reservation is necessary for the financial equilibrium of the universal service provider(s)”, until December 31, 2000, at which time those services must be opened to competition unless the European Commission decides (by June 30, 1998) that the continuation of the monopoly in those areas is justified beyond that date. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the restrictions in federal, civil, and criminal law on private letter delivery, focusing on: (1) the Postal Service's experience in administering and enforcing the private express statutes since 1970; (2) the growth and development of private message and package delivery companies since 1970; (3) the possible effects of changing private letter delivery restrictions on the Service's mail volume, revenues, costs, and postal rates; and (4) other countries' postal reform efforts, particularly regarding private letter delivery.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) supporters believe that the private express statutes are necessary to protect the Postal Service's revenue base and to ensure that the Service provides universal service and meets other public service obligations; (2) private carriers have challenged the assumption that a monopoly results in lower postage rates and less service disruption; (3) because of outside pressure, the Service has suspended the statutes for extremely urgent letters and has stopped direct enforcement of the statutes due to the difficulty in enforcing the statutes; (4) in 1971, the Service faced little competition, but by 1994, the Service had only a 16 percent share of the expedited mail and package delivery market; (5) the Service's volume and revenues for protected mail classes has increased since 1970, but volumes and revenues for classes subject to competition have shown little growth; (6) despite the rapid increase in alternative mail delivery systems since 1970, the Service delivers the vast majority of advertising and periodicals; (7) if the statutes are changed or repealed, the Service's loss of volumes and revenues would vary among mail classes, but Priority Mail would be at the greatest risk; (8) postage rates would be affected by the loss of first-class mail, but the effects of statutory changes on the Postal Service's mail volumes are difficult to estimate; (9) the Service has taken actions to become more competitive, but various laws and regulations limits its competitiveness; and (10) some other countries have narrowed their letter mail monopolies as part of their overall postal reform efforts and have given their postal administrations greater flexibility in providing universal mail service. |
gao_GAO-03-910 | gao_GAO-03-910_0 | USPTO will also examine patent applications to, among other things, determine whether the claimed invention is “new and nonobvious.” USPTO provides information about the U.S. patent system to independent inventors that are considering whether to obtain a U.S. patent, but it does not provide any information about foreign patent systems. These applications must conform to the patent laws and requirements in the countries where protection is desired. Factors they identified include costs, benefits, location of foreign markets and manufacturing sites, and foreign patent laws and enforcement, among others. Small Businesses Should Identify and Assess Long- Term Costs
Most of the experts said that it is important for small business owners to understand the full “cradle-to-grave” costs of holding and enforcing foreign patents and weigh whether such an investment is appropriate for their company. Among the small businesses we surveyed, foreign patent costs were a significant factor in, and often the biggest impediment to, their decisions to patent abroad. Small Businesses Need to Understand Foreign Patent Laws and International Treaties
In addition to commercial concerns, the nature of foreign patent laws and systems is also important in selecting foreign patent locations, many experts said. The availability or nature of patent protection – Some technologies or processes that can be patented in the United States, such as business methods and certain software processes or biotechnology inventions, cannot be patented elsewhere. Experts Identify Key Steps for Small Businesses to Improve Their Foreign Patent Efforts
Given the challenges that small businesses face in acquiring foreign patents and the limited resources (including time) that some small businesses have, we asked the patent law experts to identify and rank various steps that these businesses could take to improve their foreign patent efforts. First, the experts were unanimous in stressing the importance of not divulging information about an invention before filing for U.S. patent protection. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
After we issued a July 2002 report on foreign patent impediments that small businesses face, the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Small Business and Entrepreneurship and the Chairman of the House Committee on Small Business asked us to (1) identify the factors that patent law experts believe small businesses should consider as they decide whether to seek patent protection abroad and provide information on how small businesses viewed these factors and (2) identify the steps that small businesses should take to improve their foreign patent efforts, according to our survey of patent law experts. One panelist suggested it may be worthwhile to patent an invention in countries where companies do not intend to develop or produce their product just to prevent their competitors from doing so. | Why GAO Did This Study
Small businesses, which are important to the U.S. economy for their roles in job creation and technological development, must be able to protect and profit from their innovations. One way to protect their innovations on a global basis is to obtain U.S. and foreign patents. These businesses, however, face numerous impediments when trying to patent their goods or processes abroad. These impediments, which GAO identified in a July 2002 report, include high costs, limited resources, and limited knowledge among small businesses about foreign patent laws and systems. Because of concern that small businesses, particularly high technology firms, were not obtaining patent protection abroad and thus were losing potential sales in foreign markets, GAO was asked to (1) identify the factors that patent law experts believe small businesses should consider as they decide whether to seek patent protection abroad and provide information on how small businesses viewed these factors and (2) identify the steps that small businesses should take to improve their foreign patent efforts, according to our survey of patent law experts.
What GAO Found
According to the expert panel of patent law attorneys that GAO surveyed, small businesses that are considering whether to seek patent protection abroad should identify and assess the full "cradle-to-grave" costs of acquiring, maintaining, and enforcing foreign patents. Other considerations should include the locations where small businesses intend to sell or manufacture their invention and whether the range of benefits obtained from foreign patents, such as increased sales or higher company value, is sufficient to justify their cost. Furthermore, small businesses should try to understand foreign patent laws and systems and the quality of foreign patent enforcement, the expert panelists said. The small businesses that GAO surveyed agreed that foreign patent costs, benefits, and potential locations were important factors in their decisions to patent abroad. However, some small businesses did not properly evaluate long-term costs and could not determine whether foreign patent benefits outweighed the costs. The most important step that small businesses could take to improve their foreign patent efforts, according to GAO's survey of patent law experts, is to avoid disclosing information publicly about an invention before filing a U.S. patent application. The United States permits such disclosure, but doing so can invalidate an applicant's right to patent protection abroad. The second most important step is to be aware of filing deadlines, which are specified in foreign laws and international patent treaties. Other important steps included integrating foreign patents into long-range business planning and seeking patents in countries where meaningful protection is available and a return on investment is likely. |
gao_GAO-10-380 | gao_GAO-10-380_0 | Considerable Work Remains at Most Nonfederal NPL Sites with Unacceptable or Unknown Human Exposure, and Some Site Cleanups Have Not Been Funded at the Most Efficient Level
At over 60 percent of the 75 nonfederal NPL sites with unacceptable human exposure, all or more than half of the work remains to complete remedial construction, as is the case with over 60 percent of the 164 nonfederal NPL sites with unknown human exposure, according to EPA regional officials’ responses to our survey. Some Sites Have Not Been Funded at the Most Time and Cost Efficient Levels, According to EPA Officials
From the inception of the Superfund program through the end of fiscal year 2009, EPA expended a total of $3 billion in constant 2009 dollars on the 75 sites with unacceptable exposure; however, in managing limited resources, EPA regional officials noted that some of these sites did not receive funding to clean up the sites in the most time and cost efficient manner. Furthermore, according to EPA officials, experience has shown that EPA’s actual costs are almost always higher than its cost estimates. Estimated Costs for Conducting Future Remedial Actions Exceed Past Funding Levels
EPA’s annual costs to conduct remedial construction in the most efficient manner at nonfederal NPL sites for fiscal years 2010 through 2014 may range from $335 million to $681 million, according to EPA regional officials’ estimates (see table 1). From fiscal years 2000 to 2009, EPA allocated $220 million to $267 million in annual funding for remedial actions. EPA Allocates Remedial Program Funding Separately for Preconstruction Activities and Remedial Actions, and Limited Funding Has Caused Delays at Some Sites
EPA headquarters allocates funds to the regions for preconstruction activities—remedial investigations, feasibility studies, and remedial design activities—which the regions then distribute among sites. For remedial action funding, headquarters works with the regions to allocate funds to sites. In addition to annual funding, EPA’s Superfund program received $600 million in Recovery Act funds in fiscal year 2009 and allocated $582 million for remedial cleanup activities. However, neither EPA regional officials nor state officials were able to provide cost estimates for many of the sites they expect will be added to the NPL. EPA and State Officials Expect an Increase in the Number of Sites Listed over the Next 5 Years
EPA regional officials estimate that from 101 to 125 sites—an average of 20 to 25 sites per year—will be added to the NPL over the next 5 years. This is higher than the 79 sites—an average of about 16 sites per year— added from fiscal years 2005 to 2009. In addition to the number of sites that could be listed, the number of sites eligible for the NPL could increase if EPA begins to assess, as a part of its listing process, the risk of vapor intrusion caused by subsurface hazardous substances that have migrated via the air into homes and commercial properties. Although sites with vapor intrusion can pose considerable human health risks, EPA’s HRS—the mechanism used to identify sites that qualify for NPL listing—does not currently recognize these risks; therefore, unless a site with vapor intrusion is listed on some other basis— such as groundwater contamination, EPA cannot clean up the site using remedial program funding. Second, EPA recognized our report’s finding that regional cost estimates are likely understated, since the estimates do not include funding for sites where a responsible party is currently funding remedial construction but may be unable to do so in the future. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This appendix provides information on the scope of work and the methodology used to determine (1) the cleanup and funding status at currently listed nonfederal National Priorities List (NPL) sites with unacceptable or unknown human exposure; (2) what is known about the future costs to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to complete remedial actions at nonfederal NPL sites that are not construction complete; (3) the process EPA uses to allocate remedial program funding; and (4) how many sites EPA and selected state officials expect will be added to the NPL over the next 5 years, and what they expect the future costs of cleaning up those sites will be. 1. 2. | Why GAO Did This Study
At the end of fiscal year 2009, the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) National Priorities List (NPL) included 1,111 of the most seriously contaminated nonfederal hazardous waste sites. Of these sites, EPA had identified 75 with unacceptable human exposure, 164 with unknown exposure, and 872 with controlled exposure that may need additional cleanup work. EPA may fund remedial actions--long-term cleanup--from its trust fund, and compel responsible parties to perform or reimburse costs of the cleanup. GAO was asked to determine (1) the cleanup and funding status at currently listed nonfederal NPL sites with unacceptable or unknown human exposure; (2) what is known about EPA's future cleanup costs at nonfederal NPL sites; (3) EPA's process for allocating remedial program funding; and (4) how many NPL sites some state and EPA officials expect to be added in the next 5 years, and their expected cleanup costs. GAO analyzed Superfund program data, surveyed and interviewed EPA officials, and interviewed state officials.
What GAO Found
At over 60 percent of the 239 nonfederal NPL sites with unacceptable or unknown human exposure, all or more than half of the work remains to complete the remedial construction phase of cleanup, according to EPA regional officials. By the end of fiscal year 2009, EPA had expended $3 billion on the 75 sites with unacceptable human exposure and $1.2 billion on the 164 sites with unknown exposure. Despite the relatively high level of expenditures at sites with unacceptable exposure, EPA officials told GAO that, in managing limited resources, some sites have not received sufficient funding for construction to be conducted in the most time and cost efficient manner. EPA's future costs to conduct remedial construction at nonfederal NPL sites will likely exceed recent funding levels. EPA officials estimate that EPA's costs will be from $335 to $681 million each year for fiscal years 2010 to 2014, which exceed the $220 to $267 million EPA allocated annually for remedial actions from fiscal years 2000 to 2009. In addition, these cost estimates are likely understated, since they do not include costs for sites that are early in the cleanup process or for sites where a responsible party is currently funding remedial construction but may be unable to do so in the future. Also, according to EPA officials, EPA's actual costs are often higher than its estimates because contamination is often greater than expected. EPA allocates funds separately for preconstruction activities--such as remedial investigation and remedial design--and remedial actions. EPA headquarters allocates funds for preconstruction activities to the regions for them to distribute among sites. For remedial actions, headquarters works in consultation with the regions to allocate funds to sites. EPA officials told GAO that EPA prioritized sites to receive the $582 million in American Recovery and Reinvestment Act funds in a manner similar to the way EPA prioritizes sites for remedial actions. Limited funding has delayed preconstruction activities and remedial actions at some sites, according to EPA officials. EPA regional officials estimated that from 101 to 125 sites--about 20 to 25 sites per year--will be added to the NPL over the next 5 years, which is higher than the average of about 16 sites per year listed for fiscal years 2005 to 2009. Most of the 10 states' officials GAO interviewed also expect an increase in the number of sites listed from their states. However, neither EPA regional officials nor state officials were able to provide cost estimates for cleaning up many of the sites. In addition, the number of sites eligible for listing could increase if EPA decides to assess the relative risk of vapor intrusion--contaminated air that seeps into buildings from underground sources--a pathway of concern among EPA regional officials and state officials interviewed. Although sites with vapor intrusion can pose considerable human health risks, EPA's Hazard Ranking System--the mechanism used to identify sites that qualify for NPL listing--does not recognize these risks; therefore, unless a site with vapor intrusion is listed on some other basis, EPA cannot clean up the site through its remedial program. |
gao_GAO-14-641 | gao_GAO-14-641_0 | Selected States Employed a Range of Tools to Detect Fraud, but Conducted Investigations with Limited Staff and Pursued Cases with Mixed Success
The 11 states we reviewed employed a range of detection tools, but experienced mixed success in combating SNAP fraud. Specifically, all 11 states that we reviewed had fraud hotlines or websites, and all matched information about SNAP applicants and recipients against various data sources to detect those potentially improperly receiving benefits, as FNS recommended or required. Most of the Selected States Reported Difficulty Conducting Fraud Investigations Due to Limited Staff and Growing Numbers of Recipients, but Some Leveraged Additional Resources
The size and organization of the investigative units differed among the 11 states we reviewed, with wide variation in the number of staff available to investigate potential SNAP recipient fraud. In light of their increased SNAP caseload, some officials suggested changing the incentive structure to help states address the costs of investigating potential SNAP fraud. Our testing found the recommended e-commerce monitoring tool less effective than manual searches in detecting postings indicative of potential trafficking, and we found the tool for monitoring social media to be impractical for states due to the volume of irrelevant data. In 2014, FNS finalized a rule that requires states to monitor replacement card data and send notices to those SNAP households requesting excessive replacement cards, defined as at least four cards in a 12-month period. SNAP benefits are allotted on a monthly basis, and a recipient who is selling the benefits on their EBT card and then requesting a replacement card would generally have only one opportunity per month to do so. As a result, additional replacement card requests in the same benefit period may not indicate increased risk of trafficking. FNS Increased Its Oversight of State Anti-Fraud Activities but Lacks Reliable Data on These Efforts
FNS has recently issued regulations and guidance and conducted a national review of state anti-fraud activities as part of its increased oversight. Despite these efforts, FNS does not have consistent and reliable data on state anti-fraud activities, primarily because its guidance to the states on what data to report is unclear. Partially in response to public concerns, the Secretary for Food, Nutrition, and Consumer Services asked states to renew their efforts to combat SNAP recipient fraud, and since then FNS promulgated new regulations and provided additional guidance to direct states in these efforts. Among other topics, these studies are to explore strategies for improving fraud detection. Specifically, in fiscal year 2009, one state had about 40,000 recipient households, but reported about 50,000 investigations. For example, even though GAO has found preventative efforts to be the most efficient and effective means to address fraud and may stop ineligible people from receiving benefits that may not be fully recovered, state officials said the current fraud-related incentive is focused on collecting overpayments. Recommendations for Executive Action
The Secretary of Agriculture should direct the Administrator of FNS to take the following four actions:
Explore ways that federal financial incentives can better support cost- effective state anti-fraud activities;
Establish additional guidance to help states analyze SNAP transaction data to better identify SNAP recipient households receiving replacement cards that are potentially engaging in trafficking, and assess whether the use of replacement card benefit periods may better focus this analysis on high-risk households potentially engaged in trafficking;
Reassess the effectiveness of the current guidance and tools recommended to states for monitoring e-commerce and social media websites, and use this information to enhance the effectiveness of the current guidance and tools; and
Take steps, such as guidance and training, to enhance the consistency of what states report on their anti-fraud activities. FNS also reported that its commissioned studies will help inform its efforts to assist states in developing better recipient fraud detection tools, including potentially issuing new related guidance. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope and Methodology
The objectives of this report were to review the following: (1) how selected state agencies combat SNAP recipient fraud; (2) the effectiveness of certain fraud detection tools recommended to states, including benefit card replacement data and e-commerce and social media website monitoring; and (3) FNS’s oversight of state anti-fraud efforts. We then obtained fiscal year 2012 transaction data from FNS for those households that received excessive replacement cards. Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program: Payment Errors and Trafficking Have Declines, but Challenges Remain. | Why GAO Did This Study
In fiscal year 2013, SNAP, the nation's largest nutrition support program, provided about 47 million people with $76 billion in benefits. Fraud, including trafficking—the misuse of program benefits to obtain non-food items—has been a long-standing concern, and technology has provided additional opportunities to commit and combat such activities. State agencies are responsible for addressing SNAP recipient fraud under the guidance and monitoring of FNS. GAO was asked to review state and federal efforts to combat SNAP recipient fraud.
GAO reviewed: (1) how selected state agencies combat SNAP recipient fraud; (2) the effectiveness of certain state fraud detection tools; and (3) how FNS oversees state anti-fraud efforts. GAO reviewed relevant federal laws, regulations, guidance, and documents; interviewed officials in 11 states; interviewed federal officials; tested fraud detection tools using fiscal year 2012 program data; and monitored websites for potential trafficking online. Although results are not generalizable to all states, the 11 states, selected based on various criteria including the size of their SNAP recipient household population and their payment error rates, served about a third of SNAP recipient households.
What GAO Found
The 11 states GAO reviewed employed a range of detection tools, but experienced mixed success investigating and pursuing cases to combat potential Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) recipient fraud. States reported using detection tools required or recommended by the Food and Nutrition Service (FNS), such as matching recipient data against prisoner and death files. However, most of selected states reported difficulties in conducting fraud investigations due to either reduced or maintained staff levels while SNAP recipient numbers greatly increased from fiscal year 2009 through 2013. Some state officials suggested changing the financial incentives structure to help support the costs of investigating potential SNAP fraud. For example, investigative agencies are not rewarded for cost-effective, anti-fraud efforts which prevent ineligible people from receiving benefits at all.
GAO found limitations to the effectiveness of recommended replacement card data and website monitoring tools for fraud detection. FNS requires states to monitor SNAP households that request at least four cards per year, but selected states reported limited success detecting fraud this way. GAO's analysis found potential trafficking in 73 percent of households reviewed by focusing on SNAP households requesting cards in at least four monthly benefit periods. Benefits are allotted monthly, and a recipient selling their benefits and then requesting a new card would generally have one opportunity per month to do so. As a result, additional card requests in the same benefit period may not indicate increased risk of trafficking. Additionally, GAO found the FNS recommended e-commerce website monitoring tool to be less effective than manual searches in detecting posts indicative of SNAP trafficking. GAO found the recommended tool for monitoring social media to be impractical due to the volume of irrelevant data.
FNS has increased its oversight of state anti-fraud activity in recent years by issuing new regulations and guidance, conducting state audits, and commissioning studies on recipient fraud since fiscal year 2011. Despite these efforts, FNS does not have consistent and reliable data on states' anti-fraud activities because its reporting guidance lacks specificity. For example, the guidance from FNS did not define the kinds of activities that should be counted as investigations, resulting in data that were not comparable across states. Additional oversight efforts, such as providing guidance to states for reporting consistent data, could improve FNS's ability to monitor states and obtain information about more efficient and effective ways to combat recipient fraud.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends, among other things, that FNS reassess current financial incentives and detection tools and issue guidance to help states better detect fraud and report on their anti-fraud efforts. Agency officials agreed with our recommendations. |
gao_GAO-09-815 | gao_GAO-09-815_0 | Of this amount, IRS estimates that $68 billion is caused by sole proprietors underreporting their net business income, which can stem from either understated receipts or overstated expenses. Most Sole Proprietors with Losses Deducted Them against Other Categories of Income
As shown in figure 4, of the 5.4 million sole proprietors with losses in 2006, 92 percent deducted all of their reported losses from other categories of income, while 5 percent were unable to deduct any of the losses. In terms of aggregate dollars, based on NRP results, about $15 billion of the $28 billion in losses reported in 2001, or about 53 percent, were noncompliant. IRS’s Examination Program and AUR Are Able to Address Only a Small Portion of Sole Proprietor Expense Noncompliance
During fiscal year 2008, IRS used about 2.8 million staff hours to examine sole proprietor returns, about 23 percent of all revenue agent direct examination time. One major reason that little information reporting on sole proprietor expenses exists is because of the difficulty of identifying third-party payees upon whom a reporting requirement could be enforced without undue burden on both the third parties and IRS. A rule limiting deductions for sole proprietor losses would also reduce IRS’s costs. A rule could limit the ability to deduct sole proprietor losses deductions from other, non-sole proprietor income. Further, while 53 percent of the dollars of sole proprietor losses in 2001 were noncompliant, 55 percent of the dollars that would have been affected by a $3,000 limit were noncompliant losses. A significant proportion of sole proprietors who reported losses could avail themselves of a carry forward or back rule, but analysis of IRS data showed that these sole proprietors were not less likely to be noncompliant. Without adding this code to RGS, IRS cannot use the NRP sample to estimate the extent of noncompliance with the activities not engaged in for profit and the extent to which such improper losses contribute to noncompliant sole proprietor losses. Conclusions
The large number of relatively small sole proprietorships limits IRS’s opportunity to ensure their compliance through its regular compliance programs. IRS’s Enforcement Programs
We used several data sources to analyze the extent to which IRS’s enforcement programs address the types of sole proprietor noncompliance found by IRS’s most recent research. Losses have been limited for several reasons, including preventing tax avoidance, reducing noncompliance, restricting deductibility of losses against other sources of income to reduce tax shelters, and disallowing personal expenses or losses that are not related to the production of income (such as activities not engaged in for profit or the loss of value on the disposition of personal property, including residences). Several current tax rules limit losses to increase equity and reduce tax shelters and noncompliance. | Why GAO Did This Study
Sole proprietors, who own unincorporated businesses by themselves, underreported their net income by 57 percent or $68 billion for 2001, according to the Internal Revenue Service's (IRS) most recent estimate. The underreporting includes both understated receipts and overstated expenses and may result in losses that can be deducted against income from other sources, such as wages. GAO was asked to (1) describe sole proprietor losses and the extent to which the losses are noncompliant, (2) assess how well IRS addresses the noncompliance, and (3) identify any options to better limit noncompliant losses. To meet its objectives, GAO analyzed IRS research databases, case files, and examination results data and met with IRS officials.
What GAO Found
About 5.4 million or 25 percent of all sole proprietors reported losses in 2006. Ninety-five percent of these loss filers deducted some or all of their losses against other income, deducting a total of $40 billion. According to IRS estimates last made for 2001, 70 percent of the sole proprietor tax returns reporting losses had losses that were either fully or partially noncompliant. About 53 percent of aggregate dollar losses reported in 2001 were noncompliant. This noncompliance would correspond to billions of dollars of lost tax revenue. IRS's compliance programs address only a small portion of sole proprietor expense noncompliance. Despite investing nearly a quarter of all revenue agent time in 2008, IRS was able to examine (audit) about 1 percent of estimated noncompliant sole proprietors. These exams are costly and yielded less revenue than exams of other categories of taxpayers, in part because sole proprietorships are small in terms of receipts. Another enforcement program that primarily uses third-party information to electronically verify compliance is not effective because little expense information is reported by third parties. One approach for limiting sole proprietor loss noncompliance would impose a rule that limits losses that could be deducted from other income. The tax code has a number of such limitations. A loss limitation could reduce noncompliant losses but would also limit the ability of sole proprietors to claim legitimate losses. Another approach would improve IRS's estimates of the extent to which activities not engaged in for profit, such as hobbies, are contributing to noncompliant sole proprietor losses. Expenses associated with these activities are not deductible, but IRS's research on the causes of sole proprietor noncompliance has not used available data to estimate the extent of this type of noncompliance. Without such an estimate, IRS could be missing an opportunity to reduce noncompliant sole proprietor losses. |
gao_GAO-03-1035T | gao_GAO-03-1035T_0 | When workers pay social security taxes, they earn coverage credits, and 40 credits—equal to at least 10 years of work— entitle them to social security benefits when they reach retirement age. First, they eliminate dual social security coverage and taxes that multinational employers and employees encounter when they operate and their workers temporarily reside and work for the corporation, usually no more than 5 years, in a foreign country with its own social security program. SSA officials told us that the process used to develop the proposed totalization agreement with Mexico was the same as for prior agreements with other countries. The process—which is not specified by law or outlined in written policies and procedures—is informal, and the steps SSA takes when entering into agreements are neither transparent nor well-documented. During their visit, these officials told us that they toured social security facilities, observed how Mexico’s automated social security systems functioned, and identified the type of data maintained on Mexican workers. Moreover, SSA did not document its efforts or perform any additional analyses then, or at a later time, to assess the integrity of Mexico’s social security data and the controls over that data. Totalization Agreements Will Increase Benefit Payments to Mexican Citizens
A totalization agreement with Mexico will increase the number of Mexican citizens who will be paid U.S. social security benefits in two ways. This would be the case for a totalization agreement with Mexico if it follows the same pattern as all prior totalization agreements. In addition, more family members of covered workers will qualify for dependent and survivor benefits. Totalization agreements generally override Social Security Act provisions that prohibit benefit payments to noncitizens’ dependents and survivors who reside outside the United States for more than 6 months, unless they can prove that they lived in the United States for 5 years in a close family relationship with the covered worker. In March 2003, the Office of the Chief Actuary (OCACT) estimated that the cost of the Mexican agreement would be $78 million in the first year and would grow $650 million (in constant 2002 dollars) in 2050. SSA’s actuarial cost estimate assumes the initial number of newly eligible Mexican beneficiaries was equivalent to the 50,000 beneficiaries living in Mexico today and would grow sixfold over time. However, this proxy figure is not directly related to the estimated millions of current and former unauthorized workers and their family members from Mexico and appears small in comparison to those estimates. Estimated Cost of Mexican Agreement Is Highly Uncertain
Limited data about unauthorized workers make any estimate of the expected costs of a Mexican totalization agreement highly uncertain. Estimates of the number of unauthorized Mexican immigrants living in the United States vary. First, the use of the 50,000 fully insured beneficiaries receiving benefits in Mexico as a proxy for individuals who might initially benefit from an agreement, does not directly consider the estimated millions of unauthorized Mexican immigrants in the United States and Mexico who are not fully insured and might receive totalized benefits. The cost estimate also inherently assumes that the behavior of Mexican citizens would not change after a totalization agreement goes into effect. Under totalization, unauthorized workers could have an additional incentive to enter the United States to work and to maintain the appropriate documentation necessary to claim their earnings under a false identity. OCACT has estimated that the agreement would not generate a measurable impact on the long-range actuarial balance. However, a subsequent sensitivity analysis performed at our request shows that a measurable impact on the long-range actuarial balance of the trust funds will occur if the baseline figure is underestimated by more than 25 percent—just 13,000 additional beneficiaries above the estimated 50,000 new beneficiaries. Our analysis of past actuarial estimates of expected beneficiaries under totalization agreements shows that exceeding the 25 percent threshold has not been unusual, even in agreements where uncertainty about the number of unauthorized workers is substantially less. However, it is important to note that the number of estimated beneficiaries for prior agreements is substantially smaller than for the proposed Mexican agreement. | Why GAO Did This Study
Totalization agreements foster international commerce and protect benefits for persons who have worked in foreign countries. They eliminate dual social security taxes that multinational employers and their employees pay when they operate and reside in countries with parallel social security systems and fill gaps in benefit protection for persons who have worked in different countries. Because Mexicans are believed to represent a large share of the millions of unauthorized workers present in the United States, a totalization agreement with Mexico has raised concerns that they would become newly eligible for social security benefits. To shed light on the possible impacts, this testimony (1) describes the Social Security Administration's (SSA) processes for developing the agreement with Mexico, (2) explains how the agreement might affect the payment of benefits to Mexican citizens, and (3) assesses the cost estimate for such an agreement.
What GAO Found
SSA has no written policies or procedures it follows when entering into totalization agreements, and the actions it took to assess the integrity and compatibility of Mexico's social security system were limited and neither transparent nor well-documented. SSA followed the same procedures for the proposed Mexican agreement that it used in all prior agreements. SSA officials told GAO that they briefly toured Mexican facilities, observed how its automated systems functioned, and identified the type of data maintained on Mexican workers. However, SSA provided no information showing that it assessed the reliability of Mexican earnings data and the internal controls used to ensure the integrity of information that SSA will rely on to pay social security benefits. The proposed agreement will likely increase the number of unauthorized Mexican workers and family members eligible for social security benefits. Mexican workers who ordinarily could not receive social security retirement benefits because they lack the required 40 coverage credits for U.S. earnings could qualify for partial Social Security benefits with as few as 6 coverage credits. In addition, under the proposed agreement, more family members of covered Mexican workers would become newly entitled because the agreements usually waive rules that prevent payments to noncitizens' dependents and survivors living outside the United States. The cost of such an agreement is highly uncertain. In March 2003, the Office of the Chief Actuary estimated that the cost of the Mexican agreement would be $78 million in the first year and would grow to $650 million (in constant 2002 dollars) by 2050. The actuarial cost estimate assumes the initial number of newly eligible Mexican beneficiaries is equivalent to the 50,000 beneficiaries living in Mexico today and would grow sixfold over time. However, this proxy figure does not directly consider the estimated millions of current and former unauthorized workers and family members from Mexico and appears small in comparison with those estimates. The estimate also inherently assumes that the behavior of Mexican citizens would not change and does not recognize that an agreement could create an additional incentive for unauthorized workers to enter the United States to work and maintain documentation to claim their earnings under a false identity. Although the actuarial estimate indicates that the agreement would not generate a measurable long-term impact on the actuarial balance of the trust funds, a subsequent sensitivity analysis performed at GAO's request shows that a measurable impact would occur with an increase of more than 25 percent in the estimate of initial, new beneficiaries. For prior agreements, error rates associated with estimating the expected number of new beneficiaries have frequently exceeded 25 percent, even in cases where uncertainties about the number of unauthorized workers were less prevalent. Because of the significant number of unauthorized Mexican workers in the United States, the estimated cost of the proposed totalization agreement is even more uncertain than in prior agreements. |
gao_GGD-00-40 | gao_GGD-00-40_0 | In addition, State clearly signaled changes in U.S. policy on issues related to UPU reform. State officials said that the United States presented a different view and approach to the UPU with respect to raising issues of UPU reform that gave impetus to the UPU’s decision to establish a process to consider reform issues. Several options exist for the Department of State to develop a more structured and open process for obtaining stakeholder input, including ensuring better and more advance notification of public meetings and more advance distribution of materials prior to these meetings. Representatives of federal and nonfederal organizations in the U.S. delegation to the UPU Congress said that staff turnover, combined with the limited time available before the UPU Congress, affected State’s ability to fully understand the implications associated with various UPU policy issues, as well as to fully understand how to build support for U.S. policies in the UPU. Conclusions
The Department of State faced difficult challenges in its first year of implementing its new responsibilities for U.S. policy concerning UPU- related matters—challenges that were posed by the compressed timeframe, the need to learn about many complex international postal issues, and the need to work with diverse stakeholders. State’s performance in implementing its new responsibilities was uneven in that we found strengths in some areas and opportunities for improvement in others. The Department of State made progress in providing stakeholders and the public with relevant information and giving them an opportunity to offer input. State took steps to consult with interested parties and the public and to coordinate with USPS, other federal agencies, and other nongovernmental stakeholders involved in UPU matters through their inclusion in the U.S. delegation to the UPU Congress. Stakeholders said that State was receptive to input and evenhanded in its consideration of views. Some stakeholders raised concerns about the potential burden of a formalized process, such as FACA, as well as whether such a process would be beneficial. In our view, providing sufficient institutional continuity and expertise will be essential if State intends to play a leadership role in handling complex UPU issues and dealing with domestic and international stakeholders. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed how the Department of State has implemented its new responsibilities for U.S. policy regarding U.S. participation in the Universal Postal Union (UPU).
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) State faced difficult challenges in assuming its new UPU-related responsibilities less than a year before the UPU Congress met in August and September 1999 to update binding agreements governing international postal service; (2) State's performance in implementing these new responsibilities was uneven in that GAO found strengths in some areas and opportunities for improvement in other areas; (3) State made progress in its first year in providing stakeholders and the general public with relevant information on UPU matters and giving them an opportunity to offer input into U.S. policy concerning the UPU; (4) State coordinated with the United States Postal Service, other federal agencies, and other nongovernmental stakeholders that were involved in UPU matters and included some of these stakeholders in the U.S. delegation to the UPU Congress; (5) stakeholders said that State was receptive to input and evenhanded in its consideration of views; (6) in addition, State clearly signaled changes to U.S. policy on issues related to UPU reform; (7) State officials said that the United States presented a different view and approach to the UPU with respect to raising issues of UPU reform that gave impetus to the UPU's decision to establish a process to consider reform issues; (8) several options exist for State to develop a more structured and open process for obtaining stakeholder input including ensuring better and more advance notification of public meetings and more advance distribution of materials prior to these meetings; (9) some stakeholders have raised concerns about the potential burden on State of using a formalized process to handle UPU-related responsibilities as well as whether such a process would be beneficial; (10) in this regard, 10 of 19 federal agencies that accounted for 90 percent of the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA) committees have reported that FACA requirements are more useful than burdensome; (11) representatives of federal and nonfederal organizations in the U.S. delegation to the UPU Congress said that staff turnover, combined with the limited time available before the UPU Congress, affected State's ability to fully understand the implications associated with various complex UPU policy issues; and (12) providing sufficient institutional continuity and expertise will be essential if State intends to play a leadership role in handling complex UPU issues and dealing with domestic and international stakeholders. |
gao_GAO-07-863 | gao_GAO-07-863_0 | Climate change will also cause biological changes, such as increases in insect and disease infestations, shifts in species distribution and abundance, and changes in the timing of natural events (referred to as phenological changes), among others. Some of these changes are already occurring. These challenges include (1) the lack of priority given to addressing the effects of climate change within their agencies, (2) limited guidance from headquarters about whether or how to address the effects of climate change in management actions and planning efforts, and (3) insufficient site-specific information to plan for and manage the effects of climate change on the federal resources they oversee. Resource managers in all of the workshop groups agreed that they have a wide range of responsibilities and that, because none of the agencies have designated climate change as a priority, the managers focus first on near- term activities that they are specifically required to undertake, leaving less time and resources for longer-term issues such as climate change. Limited Guidance Constrains Resource Managers’ Efforts to Plan for and Manage Potential Climate Change Effects
Resource managers have limited guidance from their agencies about whether or how to address the effects of climate change in management actions and planning efforts, according to agency headquarters officials and resource managers from our workshop and case studies. Under these circumstances, resource managers are uncertain about what actions, if any, they should take with regard to addressing or preparing for the effects of climate change. Interior issued an order in 2001 directing its agencies, including BLM, FWS, and NPS, to consider and analyze, among other things, potential climate change effects in management plans and activities developed for public lands. He said that BLM is establishing policy and technical committees to address necessary actions and develop guidance to address climate change in agency management practices. Headquarters officials at FWS and NPS said that, although they have not developed specific guidance, they operate in a manner consistent with Interior’s 2001 order in their general planning activities. However, National Marine Sanctuary Program headquarters officials said that the agency is establishing a working group to determine what actions it should and can afford to take to address the effects of climate change. FS headquarters officials said that, although they have not provided specific guidance on addressing the effects of climate change, the agency’s planning process is designed to identify emerging issues, such as climate change, and respond in ways to promote the sustainability of the nation’s land and water resources. Without these models, they said that most of their options for dealing with climate change are limited to reacting to already-observed effects on their units, making it difficult to plan for future changes. Resource managers at the workshop said that they generally lack detailed inventories and monitoring systems to provide an adequate baseline understanding of the plant and animal species that currently exist on the resources they manage. However, federal resource management agencies have not yet made climate change a high priority. Fish and Wildlife Service, North Carolina Billy Causey, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Florida Brian Czech, U.S. For example, the Bureau of Land Management (BLM), Forest Service (FS), U.S. In this report, we use the term “federal resources” to refer to federal lands managed by BLM, FS, FWS, and NPS, and to national marine sanctuaries and one marine national monument managed by NOAA; the term “ecosystem” to refer to a system of interacting living organisms together with their physical environment; the term “resource managers” to refer to individuals who manage federal resources; the term “physical effects” to refer to observable changes in the physical condition of some part of a natural system, including, among others, extreme weather events—that is, weather events that are rare at a particular place (this may vary from place to place); the term “biological effects” to refer to changes in the interaction among organisms living in a given ecosystem; and the phrase “economic and social goods and services” to refer to economic resources, such as revenue-producing industries, including forestry and fishing, among others, and social or cultural resources, such as recreational activities, scenic views, and historical artifacts, among others. Climate Change and Federal Lands Workshop Proceedings, November 2 and 3, 2006
Background
This appendix summarizes the results of an expert workshop convened by GAO, in collaboration with the National Academies’ Board on Atmospheric Sciences and Climate, on November 2 and 3, 2006, to solicit experts’ views on (1) the potential vulnerabilities of four ecosystem types—coasts and oceans, forests, fresh waters, and grasslands and shrublands—to climate change and (2) the challenges to and approaches for addressing climate change on federally managed lands and waters associated with these four ecosystem types. There are rapidly developing models to project sea level rise. | Why GAO Did This Study
Climate change has implications for the vast land and water resources managed by the Bureau of Land Management (BLM), Forest Service (FS), U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), and National Park Service (NPS). These resources generally occur within four ecosystem types: coasts and oceans, forests, fresh waters, and grasslands and shrublands. GAO obtained experts' views on (1) the effects of climate change on federal resources and (2) the challenges managers face in addressing climate change effects on these resources. GAO held a workshop with the National Academies in which 54 scientists, economists, and federal resource managers participated, and conducted 4 case studies.
What GAO Found
According to experts at the GAO workshop, federal land and water resources are vulnerable to a wide range of effects from climate change, some of which are already occurring. These effects include, among others, (1) physical effects, such as droughts, floods, glacial melting, and sea level rise; (2) biological effects, such as increases in insect and disease infestations, shifts in species distribution, and changes in the timing of natural events; and (3) economic and social effects, such as adverse impacts on tourism, infrastructure, fishing, and other resource uses. Experts at the GAO workshop also identified several challenges that resource managers face in addressing the observed and potential effects of climate change in their management and planning efforts. In particular, BLM, FS, FWS, NOAA, and NPS have not made climate change a priority, and the agencies' strategic plans do not specifically address climate change. Resource managers focus first on near-term, required activities, leaving less time for addressing longer-term issues such as climate change. In addition, resource managers have limited guidance about whether or how to address climate change and, therefore, are uncertain about what actions, if any, they should take. In general, resource managers lack specific guidance for incorporating climate change into their management actions and planning efforts. Without such guidance, their ability to address climate change and effectively manage resources is constrained. While a broad order developed in January 2001 directed BLM, FWS, and NPS to consider and analyze potential climate change effects in their management plans and activities, the agencies have not yet provided specific direction to managers on how they are to implement the order. A BLM official stated at an April 2007 hearing that BLM is establishing policy and technical committees to address necessary actions and develop guidance to address climate change in agency management practices. FWS and NPS officials said that their agencies have not developed specific guidance but believe that they are operating in a manner consistent with the 2001 order. While NOAA and FS have not provided specific guidance to their resource managers, NOAA officials said that the agency is establishing a working group to determine what actions to take to address climate change effects. FS officials said that FS planning processes are designed to identify and respond to emerging issues such as climate change. Finally, resource managers do not have sufficient site-specific information to plan for and manage the effects of climate change on the federal resources they manage. In particular, the managers lack computational models for local projections of expected changes and detailed inventories and monitoring systems for an adequate baseline understanding of existing local species. Without such information, managers are limited to reacting to already-observed climate change effects on their units, which makes it difficult to plan for future changes. |
gao_HEHS-95-42 | gao_HEHS-95-42_0 | The federal government has also acted on behalf of charter schools. Growth in Charter Schools Reflects Diverse National Reform Movement
As of January 1995, nine states had approved 134 charter schools with diverse instructional and operating characteristics. State laws influence charter schools’ autonomy by how they provide for their (1) legal status, (2) approval, (3) funding, and (4) exemption from rules. Will it encourage charter schools to have more traditional instructional programs? School districts are considered LEAs for the purposes of federal program administration; they receive allocations of federal funds from their states and are held legally responsible for meeting program requirements. However, an important issue is whether some charter schools—those with legal independence—can be considered LEAs. Title I and special education programs illustrate challenges posed by charter schools to federal education program administration. Whether charter schools can be held accountable for student performance depends in part on how well student performance is assessed and reported. The challenges charter schools pose for federal program administration concern their status as single schools operating as LEAs. (a) FINDINGS.--The Congress finds that (1) enhancement of parent and student choices among public schools can assist in promoting comprehensive educational reform and give more students the opportunity to learn to challenging State content standards and challenging State student performance standards, if sufficiently diverse and high-quality choices, and genuine opportunities to take advantage of such choices, are available to all students; (2) useful examples of such choices can come from States and communities that experiment with methods of offering teachers and other educators, parents, and other members of the public the opportunity to design and implement new public schools and to transform existing public schools; (3) charter schools are a mechanism for testing a variety of educational approaches and should, therefore, be exempted from restrictive rules and regulations if the leadership of such schools commits to attaining specific and ambitious educational results for educationally disadvantaged students consistent with challenging State content standards and challenging State student performance standards for all students; (4) charter schools, as such schools have been implemented in a few States, can embody the necessary mixture of enhanced choice, exemption from restrictive regulations, and a focus on learning gains; (5) charter schools, including charter schools that are schools-within-schools, can help reduce school size, which reduction can have a significant effect on student achievement; (6) the Federal Government should test, evaluate, and disseminate information on a variety of charter schools models in order to help demonstrate the benefits of this promising education reform; and (7) there is a strong documented need for cash flow assistance to charter schools that are starting up, because State and local operating revenue streams are not immediately available. ADMINISTRATION. Address Correction Requested | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on the growth of charter schools, focusing on: (1) the number of charter schools that have been approved under state laws; (2) the characteristics of charter schools' instructional programs; (3) whether charter schools operate autonomously and are held accountable for student performance; and (4) the challenges charter schools pose for federal education programs.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) 9 states have approved 134 charter schools developed by teachers, school administrators, parents, and private corporations; (2) as charter schools increase in number, so do their diversity and innovation; (3) charter school instructional programs focus on multiage classes and often teach subjects within a common theme; (4) some charter schools specialize in certain subjects, while other charter schools target specific student populations; (5) charter schools' autonomy varies among the states based on their legal status, approval, funding, and exemption from rules; (6) charter schools vary in how they measure student performance and it is too soon to determine whether these schools will meet their student performance objectives; (7) the major challenge for federal program administration is determining whether those charter schools that are legally independent of their school districts can be considered local education agencies (LEA) for program administration purposes; and (8) although states have taken different approaches to address charter schools' status as LEA, further clarification is needed on how charter schools can be treated for federal program administration and whether these schools are eligible for educational funds. |
gao_GAO-09-361T | gao_GAO-09-361T_0 | Coordination and Evaluation of RD&T Activities Help Promote Efficient and Effective Use of Federal Research Funds
Coordinating and evaluating research are important elements in ensuring federal dollars are used efficiently and effectively. RITA is responsible for coordinating and reviewing the DOT operating administrations’ RD&T activities so that (1) no unnecessary duplication takes place and (2) the activities have been evaluated in accordance with best practices. The committee recommended establishing a formal process to coordinate research across agencies. While this recommendation is focused on cross-agency research, the goals—enhancing collaboration, ensuring that questions are explored, and reducing inefficiencies—are important and applicable within agencies as well. In addition, the committee noted that evaluating research against established performance measures in agency strategic plans, developing measures that are appropriate for the type of research being developed, and using expert reviews aid in assessing the quality of the research. Such choices are even more important in today’s climate of expected trillion-dollar deficits. RITA Has Made Progress in Improving Its Coordination, Review, and Performance Measurement of DOT’s RD&T Programs
In 2006, we made seven recommendations to enhance RITA’s ability to manage and ensure the effectiveness of RD&T activities, including developing strategies for coordinating and reviewing RD&T activities and developing performance goals and measures. (See table 1.) RITA has implemented five of our recommendations and is making progress on implementing the remaining two. According to a RITA official, results of these reviews have identified several areas for cross-modal collaboration, including climate change, freight capacity, security, alternative energy technologies, and advanced materials and sensors. RITA also developed a strategy to ensure that the results of all DOT’s research activities are evaluated according to established best practices. Establishing RD&T project databases. Communicating evaluation efforts. Secondly, RITA developed a summary of the results of its fiscal year 2005 and 2006 research program reviews, and a schedule of RITA’s planned fiscal year 2007 reviews, and included it in DOT’s “Research, Development and Technology Annual Funding Fiscal Years 2006-2008, A Report to Congress.” This report also includes summaries of research program evaluations conducted by modal research advisory committees, the Transportation Research Board, and key modal stakeholders in fiscal years 2006 and 2007. RITA Has Not Yet Developed an Overall Implementing Strategy, Evaluation Plan, or Performance Measures
Establishing performance goals. In 2006, we found that RITA lacked performance goals and an implementing strategy and evaluation plan to delineate how the activities and results of its coordination, facilitation, and review practices will further DOT’s mission and ensure the effectiveness of the department’s RD&T investment. Linking performance goals with the planning and budget process, such as DOT’s annual budget process, can also help RITA determine where to target its resources to improve performance. According to RITA officials, RITA has partially implemented our recommendation that it do so. Once representatives from each operating administration have had the chance to share information, RITA officials will then look for commonalities and determine whether any of the measures could be adopted for the department’s RD&T activities. We will continue to monitor RITA’s performance in implementing our recommendations. | Why GAO Did This Study
Research, development, and technology (RD&T) activities are vital to meeting the Department of Transportation's (DOT) priorities, such as increasing safety, enhancing mobility, and supporting the nation's economic growth. In fiscal year 2008, the department's RD&T budget totaled over $1.1 billion, primarily for highway and aviation projects. Over the years, concerns have been raised about DOT's capabilities to improve RD&T coordination and evaluation efforts across the agency. In 2004, Congress created DOT's Research and Innovative Technology Administration (RITA) to coordinate and review the department's RD&T programs and activities for the purposes of reducing research duplication, enhancing opportunities for joint efforts, and ensuring RD&T activities are meeting goals. In 2006 GAO reported that RITA had made progress toward these ends, but needed to do more. GAO's testimony focuses on (1) the importance of coordinating and evaluating RD&T activities and (2) RITA's progress in implementing GAO's 2006 recommendations. GAO's statement is based on its 2006 report, a review of best practices for coordination and evaluation, and follow-up discussions with RITA officials on actions to implement GAO's recommendations. GAO did not assess whether RITA's actions have improved the effectiveness of the department's RD&T investment.
What GAO Found
Coordinating and evaluating research are important elements in ensuring that federal dollars are used efficiently and effectively. Coordinating research enhances collaboration, ensures that questions are explored, and reduces inefficiencies, such as from duplication of research. Evaluating research activities entails comparing research with established performance measures in agency strategic plans and using expert reviews to assess the quality of the research. With DOT's large RD&T budget--over $1.1 billion--coordination and evaluation are critical to making cost-effective investment choices in today's climate of expected trillion-dollar deficits. RITA has fully implemented five recommendations that GAO made in 2006 aimed at enhancing RITA's ability to manage and determine the effectiveness of RD&T activities, and partially implemented the remaining two. (See table below.) Regarding implemented recommendations, most notably, RITA has implemented a strategy to coordinate RD&T activities and look for areas where joint efforts would be appropriate. Results of its coordination efforts have identified a number of areas for cross-modal collaboration, including the areas of climate change and freight capacity. RITA has also developed a strategy to ensure that the results of DOT's research activities are evaluated against best practices, using governmentwide guidance and external stakeholder reviews. Regarding partially implemented recommendations, RITA has not yet developed an overall strategy, evaluation plan, or performance measures that delineate how its activities ensure the effectiveness of the department's RD&T investment. However, it has developed a process for doing so. In this regard, RITA plans to use an existing departmentwide strategic planning and budget process and collaborative meetings to develop an overall strategy and performance measures. RITA officials expect that it will fully implement activities related to this recommendation by 2012. GAO will continue to monitor RITA's activities. |
gao_GAO-04-887T | gao_GAO-04-887T_0 | As a result, FAA will likely need to hire thousands of air traffic controllers in the next decade. FAA has reported similar projections of a wave of air traffic controller retirements, and in a 2004 report, the Inspector General also reported on the coming wave, citing FAA’s estimate that nearly 7,100 controllers could leave the agency by 2012. In addition, we found that by 2011, about 68 percent of the current controllers would be eligible to retire. FAA regional officials, who are responsible for ensuring that FAA’s air traffic facilities are adequately staffed, were particularly concerned about FAA’s general hiring practice. Training challenges include the limited capacity at the training center in Oklahoma City and at the air traffic control facilities. Our 2002 report recommended that FAA develop a comprehensive workforce plan for controllers to deal with these challenges, but FAA has not finalized a plan and its recent actions call into question whether it will have adequate strategies to address these challenges. Moreover, since hiring those controllers at the end of the year to reach a level of 15,635, FAA has lost nearly 400 controllers and has hired only 1 new controller through May of this year. Its fiscal year 2005 budget proposal does not request any funding to hire additional controllers to address the wave of retirements. Challenges Will Also Affect the Ability of the Controller Workforce to Meet Future Changes in the Airline Industry and Use of Airspace
There are also challenges in the broader context of the air traffic control system that will affect the ability of the air traffic controller workforce to meet future changes in the airline industry and use of airspace. Challenges include the need for FAA to (1) overcome significant and longstanding management problems it has had with acquiring new systems to modernize the air traffic control system intended to facilitate the safe and efficient movement of air traffic by controllers and (2) adjust to shifts in the use of airspace, including increases in the use of smaller aircraft and changes in air traffic patterns around the country. For example, our past work on the Standard Terminal Automation Replacement System (STARS)—the workstations used by controllers near airports to sequence and control air traffic—highlights the importance of controller involvement in the development, deployment, and refinement of air traffic control systems. Today these challenges continue to underscore the need for action in developing strategies that take into account (1) the expected timing and location of anticipated retirements, (2) the length of the hiring and training processes, (3) limitations on training capacities, and (4) changes in the airline industry and use of airspace that may affect the air traffic controller workforce in coming years. Without focused and timely action on all of these fronts, the gap created by the expected bow wave of controller retirements could reduce the effectiveness of the air traffic control workforce to meet its mission just as increased activity in the skies makes its effectiveness more critical than ever to the safety of our airways. | Why GAO Did This Study
In the summer of 2000, the air traffic control system lacked the capacity to handle demand efficiently, and flight delays produced near-gridlock conditions at several U.S. airports. A combination of factors, including the crises instigated by the events of 9/11, temporarily reduced air traffic, but air traffic is now back to near pre-9/11 levels. The ability of the air traffic control system to handle expected traffic in coming years may depend in part on the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) effectiveness in planning for a long-expected wave of air traffic controller retirements. GAO's testimony focuses on (1) the magnitude and timing of the pending wave of air traffic controller retirements, (2) the challenges FAA faces in ensuring that well-qualified air traffic controllers are ready to step into the gap created by the expected large number of retirements, and (3) challenges that will affect the ability of the air traffic controller workforce to meet future changes in the airline industry and use of airspace. GAO's statement is based on past reports on the air traffic controller workforce, including GAO's 2002 report that surveyed controllers and analyzed controller workforce data. GAO has updated this work through interviews with and the collection of data from key stakeholders in the aviation community. This work was performed in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
What GAO Found
FAA faces a bow wave of thousands of air traffic controller retirements over the coming decade. GAO's 2002 report warned that almost half of the controller workforce (about 7,000 controllers) would retire over the next 10 years and about 93 percent of controller supervisors would be eligible to retire by the end of 2011. In addition, GAO's analysis showed that retirements could increase dramatically at the busiest air traffic control facilities. FAA and the Department of Transportation's Inspector General have also reported that a surge in controller retirements is on the way. FAA faces numerous hiring and training challenges to ensuring that wellqualified controllers are ready to fill the gap created by the expected retirements. For example, it can take 2-4 years or more to certify new controllers, and FAA's training facility and air traffic control facilities, where years of on-the-job training occur, have limited capacity. While FAA must make hiring decisions from a long-term perspective, it has generally hired replacements only after a current controller leaves. In 2002, GAO recommended that FAA develop a comprehensive workforce plan to deal with these challenges. However, FAA has not finalized a plan, and its recent actions call into question whether it has adequate strategies to address these challenges. For example, since the beginning of this year, FAA lost nearly 400 controllers and has hired only 1 new controller. Its fiscal year 2005 budget proposal does not request any funding to hire additional controllers. Challenges will also affect the ability of the air traffic controller workforce to meet future changes in the airline industry and use of airspace. Challenges include the need for FAA to overcome management problems with acquiring systems to modernize the air traffic control system and to adjust to shifts in the use of airspace, including increases in the use of smaller aircraft and changes in air traffic patterns around the country. |
gao_T-HEHS-99-108 | gao_T-HEHS-99-108_0 | MCOs Must Inform Beneficiaries of Their Appeal Rights
Medicare beneficiaries enrolled in a managed care plan have the right to appeal if their plan’s MCO refuses to provide health services or pay for services already obtained. If an MCO denies a beneficiary’s request for services—such as skilled nursing care or a referral to a specialist—it must issue a written notice that explains the reason for the denial and the beneficiary’s appeal rights. The documents we examined were used by MCOs to inform prospective enrollees and members about covered services, fees, and restrictions. Although HCFA had reviewed and approved the documents, some incorrectly described plan benefit packages. Some MCOs provided beneficiaries with detailed benefit information only after they had enrolled in a plan. In contrast, each MCO that participates in FEHBP is required to distribute a single, comprehensive booklet that describes its benefit package using a standard format and standard terminology. We also found serious problems with plan information regarding coverage for outpatient prescription drugs—a benefit that attracts many beneficiaries to Medicare managed care plans. However, we found that some MCOs distributed outdated literature without the required addendum and that when MCOs included the addendum, it often did not clearly indicate that the addendum superseded the information contained in other documents. Some MCOs Did Not Provide Complete Benefit Information
provided general descriptions of their plans’ ambulance coverage but did not explain the extent of the coverage. Furthermore, an MCO is not required to provide beneficiaries with copies of its Medicare contract. 2.) Denial Notices Are Sometimes Incomplete, Never Issued, or Do Not Indicate Specific Reasons for the Denial
studies by the OIG, using different methodologies, provide additional evidence that beneficiaries are not always informed of their appeal rights.In one study, the OIG surveyed beneficiaries who were enrolled or had recently disenrolled from a managed care plan. Weaknesses in HCFA’s Review Processes and Requirements Allowed Problems in Plan Materials to Go Uncorrected
Although HCFA reviews and approves all materials that MCOs distribute to beneficiaries, weaknesses in the agency’s review practices and information standards allowed the plan information problems we observed to go uncorrected. Finally, HCFA has not used its authority to require that MCOs use a common format and terminology to describe their plans’ benefit packages. Consequently, although the plans had similar benefit restrictions, the MCOs that were required to disclose the plan restrictions appeared to offer less generous benefits than the other MCOs’ plans. HCFA Has Begun Efforts to Correct Problems and Shortcomings in Plan Information
HCFA is moving to address some of the problems and systemwide shortcomings we identified during our recent reviews. Otherwise, full implementation could be delayed. Conclusions
As the Medicare+Choice program grows and more health plan options become available, the need for reliable, complete, and useful information will increase. We also found that some MCOs did a poor job informing beneficiaries about their appeal rights and the appeals process. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed the: (1) accuracy, completeness, and usefulness of the information Medicare managed care organizations (MCO) distribute about their plans' benefit packages; (2) extent to which MCOs inform beneficiaries of their plan appeal rights and the appeals process; and (3) Health Care Financing Administration's (HCFA) review, approval, and oversight of the plan information that MCOs distribute.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) it found problems with the benefit information distributed by all of the 16 MCOs it reviewed; (2) although HCFA had reviewed and approved all of the information GAO examined, some MCOs misstated the coverage they were required by Medicare or their contracts to offer; (3) one MCO advertised a substantially less generous prescription drug benefit than it had specified in its Medicare contract; (4) some MCOs provided complete benefit information only after a beneficiary enrolled; (5) others never provided full descriptions of benefits and restrictions; (6) as GAO has reported previously, it is difficult to compare available options using literature provided to beneficiaries because MCOs use different formats and terminology to describe the benefit packages being offered; (7) the variation in Medicare plan literature contrasts sharply with the uniformity of plan information distributed by MCOs that participate in the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program (FEHBP); (8) MCOs participating in FEHBP are required to provide prospective enrollees with a single, comprehensive, and comparable brochure to facilitate informed choice; (9) in GAO's study of the appeals process, GAO found that when MCOs deny plan services or payment, they do not always inform beneficiaries of their appeal rights; (10) sometimes MCOs issue denial notices that do not contain all the information that HCFA requires; (11) GAO also found that some MCOs delay issuing denial notices until the day before discontinuing services, such as skilled nursing care; (12) this delay can increase a beneficiary's potential financial liability should the beneficiary appeal the plan's decision and lose; (13) many of the information problems GAO identified regarding plan benefit packages and beneficiaries' appeal rights went uncorrected because of shortcomings in HCFA's review practices; (14) in addition, HCFA has not exercised its authority to require MCOs to distribute plan information that is more complete, timely, and comparable; (15) agency officials recognize many of the shortcomings GAO identified and are beginning efforts to address them; and (16) however, GAO believes that the agency could do more. |
gao_GAO-04-878 | gao_GAO-04-878_0 | TANF Recipients with Impairments Are Encouraged to Apply to SSI; Impact on SSI Caseload Growth Is Inconclusive
Estimates from our nationwide survey of county TANF offices indicated that almost all offices reported that they refer at least some recipients with impairments to apply for SSI. Nearly All County TANF Offices Refer Recipients with Impairments to Apply for SSI, but the Level of Encouragement Varies
Based on estimates from our survey, 97 percent of all counties refer at least some of their adult TANF recipients with impairments to SSA to apply for SSI. About 61 percent reported that they will also assist a recipient in completing the SSI application, and about 74 percent reported that they follow up to ensure the application process is complete. Findings About How SSI Caseload Growth Has Been Affected by Referred TANF Recipients with Impairments Are Inconclusive due to Data Limitations
Since county TANF offices refer individuals with impairments to SSI, these referrals will have some effect on the SSI caseload. In addition to SSA not knowing the magnitude of the effect that TANF referrals have had on SSI caseload growth, TANF officials we interviewed stated that they generally do not have historical data on SSI referrals, approvals, and denials. Reasons for this low service utilization may include exemptions from the work requirements and an insufficient number of job training or related services. A Broad Range of Services Are Offered to Recipients Awaiting SSI Determinations, but Utilization Is Low
Even though about 51 percent of county TANF offices do not require adult TANF recipients awaiting SSI determinations to participate in any type of job services, education services, work experience programs, or other employment services, 83 percent of county TANF offices reported that they are still willing to provide work-related or support services to this population. While the low utilization of services may be due to exemptions from the work requirements, service availability may also be an issue. Some state and county TANF officials we interviewed also believe that one of the main reasons why there is low utilization of services is recipients’ fear of jeopardizing their SSI applications. Estimates from our survey also showed that two frequently reported forms of interaction between county TANF offices and SSA include having a contact at SSA with whom to discuss cases and following up with SSA regarding applications for SSI. Although TANF offices reported an interest in developing a close working relationship with SSA, based on their interactions with SSA, some state and county TANF officials believed that they had to take the lead in developing these relationships. However, about 27 percent of county TANF offices reported that they were discouraged in their attempts to establish a relationship with SSA because the local SSA field office told the TANF office that SSA did not have the time or the interest. He further explained that TANF case managers can explain the benefits and provide assistance to the TANF recipient applying for SSI. Further, in all of the states we visited, TANF offices reported working with other agencies, such as the Department of Education and the Department of Labor, to help TANF recipients with impairments find work. Conclusions
With the new emphasis on work and self-sufficiency taken by TANF and SSI, and the overlap in the populations served by both programs, opportunities exist to improve the way these two programs interact in order to help individuals with impairments become more self-sufficient. Recommendations
To help individuals with impairments become more self-sufficient and to address the gap in continuous work services between the TANF and SSI programs, we are recommending that SSA, as part of a new demonstration project, work with TANF offices to develop screening tools, assessments, or other data that would identify those TANF recipients with impairments who while potentially eligible for SSI may also be capable of working. Appendix I: Scope and Methods
To determine the extent that Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) recipients with impairments are encouraged to apply for Supplemental Security Income (SSI), whether work requirements are imposed, the range of services provided during the period of SSI eligibility determination, and the extent that interactions exist between the SSI and TANF programs, we conducted a nationally representative survey of 600 county TANF administrators from October 14, 2003, through February 20, 2004. | Why GAO Did This Study
The nation's social welfare system has been transformed into a system emphasizing work and personal responsibility, primarily through the creation of the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) block grant. The Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program has expanded policies to help recipients improve self-sufficiency. Given that SSA data indicate an overlap in the populations served by TANF and SSI, and the changes in both programs, this report examines (1) the extent that TANF recipients with impairments are encouraged to apply for SSI and what is known about how SSI caseload growth has been affected by such TANF cases, (2) the extent that work requirements are imposed on TANF recipients applying for SSI, and the range of services provided to such recipients, and (3) the extent that interactions exist between the SSI and TANF programs to assist individuals capable of working to obtain employment.
What GAO Found
In our nationwide survey of county TANF offices, we found that nearly all offices reported that they refer recipients with impairments to SSI, but the level of encouragement to apply for SSI varies. While almost all of the county TANF offices stated that they advise such recipients with impairments to apply for SSI, 74 percent also follow up to ensure the application process is complete, and 61 percent assist recipients in completing the application. Because TANF offices are referring individuals with impairments to SSI, these referrals will have some effect on the SSI caseload. However, due to data limitations, the magnitude of the effect these referrals have on SSI caseload growth is uncertain. While SSA can identify whether SSI recipients have income from other sources, it cannot easily determine whether this income comes from TANF or some other assistance based on need. In addition, past research has not found conclusive evidence regarding the impact that TANF referrals have on SSI caseload growth. Estimates from our survey found that although some TANF offices impose work requirements on individuals with impairments, about 86 percent of all offices reported that they either sometimes or always exempt adult TANF recipients awaiting SSI determinations from the work requirements. One key reason for not imposing work requirements on these recipients is the existence of state and county TANF policies and practices that allow such exemptions. Nevertheless, county TANF offices, for the most part, are willing to offer noncash services, such as transportation and job training, to adult recipients with impairments who have applied for SSI. However, many recipients do not use these services. This low utilization may be related to exempting individuals from the work requirement, but it may also be due to the recipients' fear of jeopardizing their SSI applications. Another reason for the low utilization of services is that many services are not necessarily available; budgetary constraints have limited the services that some TANF offices are able to offer recipients with impairments. Many county TANF offices' interactions with SSA include either having a contact at SSA to discuss cases or following up with SSA regarding applications for SSI. Interactions that help individuals with impairments increase their self-sufficiency are even more limited. In all the states we visited, we found that such interactions generally existed between TANF agencies and other agencies (such as the Departments of Labor or Education). In addition, 95 percent of county TANF offices reported that their interactions with SSA could be improved. State and county TANF officials feel they have to take the lead in developing and maintaining the interaction with SSA. One SSA headquarters official stated that SSA has no formal policy regarding outreach to TANF offices but would consider a partnership provided there is some benefit for SSA. Still, about 27 percent of county TANF offices reported that they were discouraged in their attempts to establish a relationship with SSA because staff at the local SSA field office told them that they did not have the time or the interest. |
gao_HEHS-96-112 | gao_HEHS-96-112_0 | Under the procedures that VA established to process undiagnosed illness claims, veterans submit completed claim forms to a VA regional office (VARO). Under the regulation, veterans must provide objective indications of a chronic disability. In the final rule, VA explained that nonmedical indicators of a disabling illness include but are not limited to such circumstances or events as (1) time lost from work; (2) evidence that a veteran has sought medical treatment for his or her symptoms; and (3) evidence affirming changes in the veteran’s appearance, physical abilities, or mental or emotional attitude. The denied claims that we reviewed contained primarily service medical records and VA medical examinations. VA has developed a letter that clearly states the types of medical and nonmedical evidence that can be used to support these claims. According to VA, most claims are denied because the claimed disability did not become manifest on active duty in the Persian Gulf or during the 2-year presumptive period. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the procedures the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) uses to process Persian Gulf War undiagnosed illness claims.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) before VA will provide benefits, veterans must provide it with evidence of a chronic disability and verifiable evidence of time lost from work, prior medical treatment, or changes in appearance, physical abilities, or psychological condition; (2) both denied and approved claims consist primarily of service medical records and VA medical examinations, but approved claims usually include an independent medical history and sometimes include nonmedical evidence; (3) denied claims lacked sufficient evidence because of poor VA procedures and veterans' failure to collect relevant information; and (4) while VA reports that most denied claims were denied because the alleged disability did not become evident during active duty or the subsequent 2-year presumptive period, it stated in denial letters to veterans that their claims lacked sufficient evidence. |
gao_GAO-16-38 | gao_GAO-16-38_0 | Background
Preparedness Grant Management
FEMA preparedness grant management is composed of different financial and programmatic management functions. Specifically, the NIC is to coordinate with state and local stakeholders to develop national standards, guidelines, and protocols for incident management. The NAC advises the FEMA Administrator on all aspects of emergency management, and incorporates state, local, and tribal governments; nonprofit; and private sector input in the development and revision of the National Preparedness Goal, the National Preparedness System, the National Incident Management System, and other related plans and strategies. GPD Lacks a Plan to Address Long- standing Challenges in Coordinating Preparedness Grants between FEMA Headquarters and Regions
Past Assessments Supported Moving Grant Management Functions to the Regions to Address Oversight and Coordination Problems, but FEMA Decided Not to Change Its Approach
Currently FEMA uses a hybrid management model for preparedness grant programs, with shared responsibilities between headquarters and the regions. We also found challenges in the coordination of site visits. For example, in 2009, NAPA identified regional challenges associated with assessment activities including grant monitoring, noting that FEMA regional and headquarters units “need to reduce burden on states and ensure assessments-requirements are coordinated among FEMA divisions and the federal sector” and that new documents from FEMA headquarters “typically have a short review and comment period, and adherence is often required prior to finalization.” Similarly, the May 2010 RIG Task Force Report noted that “the timeliness of communication and information distribution with the grantee community needs to be improved” and the need to “formally establish regional liaisons to support the consistent prioritization of communication within GPD and with grantees.”
We found that these issues related to coordinating guidance provided by headquarters officials to state officials continue to create challenges. However, FEMA has not developed a plan with time frames, goals, metrics, or milestones for how and when it will address long-standing coordination challenges associated with the existing hybrid grants management model identified in previous FEMA assessments and in our review. Although states generally report high levels of NIMS implementation in their URTs, officials from all four FEMA regional offices we spoke with and from 9 of the 10 states we spoke with said that the NIMS self- assessments are perfunctory and do not necessarily measure whether, or how well, NIMS is being implemented. NIC officials said they do not verify the self-reported NIMS implementation information that states submit because of the scope and breadth of the information. Some FEMA Regions Do Not Routinely Meet with RACs to Collaborate on Emergency Preparedness
Although the RAC charters adopted by each of the 10 regions require that their RACs meet twice annually, some RACs have not met routinely in recent years to collaborate with FEMA regional officials to provide advice and input from regional stakeholders. FEMA Regional Offices Are Responsive to RAC Suggestions but Do Not Regularly Provide Feedback on Their Recommendations
RAC members who responded to our survey generally indicated that FEMA regions were responsive to their suggestions. However, they did not identify any additional subsequent actions they had taken to implement the plan. Regarding oversight of FEMA’s efforts to implement the national system for managing incidents, there are opportunities to access more sophisticated and comprehensive information using FEMA regional staff to better assess NIMS implementation. DHS concurred with four of our recommendations and did not concur with one. Specifically, DHS stated that FEMA does not agree that the “best way to assess how well NIMS has been implemented is by assessing states’ performance in preparedness exercises and real-world events.” As noted in the report, most all of the officials we spoke with believed that the current method of determining NIMS implementation—states self- certification via the URT—was not an effective method of determining NIMS implementation, and officials in all of the FEMA regions and 8 of the states we interviewed said that looking at how effectively a jurisdiction responds during an exercise or real world event is the best way to assess NIMS implementation. The Act established the Program, among other things, as a means for FEMA to test and evaluate NIMS implementation efforts. If implemented as planned, these actions should help address the intent of the recommendation to update RAC members on the status of its recommendations to FEMA. Other major contributors to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of this study were to assess the extent to which the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) headquarters and regional offices have (1) addressed grant management coordination challenges between headquarters and the regions; (2) established a comprehensive system to assess National Incident Management System (NIMS) implementation; and (3) collaborated with Regional Advisory Council (RAC) members. We also reviewed prior GAO reports on regional preparedness, grant management, and consolidation of management functions. To address the third objective, we interviewed FEMA headquarters and regional office officials and analyzed FEMA and Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office of Inspector General (OIG) reports with information and findings relevant to RACs. | Why GAO Did This Study
DHS's FEMA is responsible for coordinating with state, local, and tribal governments to prepare for disasters. Specifically, FEMA provides preparedness grants to states and localities, and works to implement the National Incident Management System nationwide, among other things.
GAO was asked to review FEMA's efforts to enhance coordination for regional preparedness. This report addresses the extent to which FEMA and regional offices have (1) addressed preparedness grant management coordination challenges, (2) established a system to assess NIMS implementation, and (3) collaborated with RAC stakeholders. GAO analyzed FEMA documentation on grant management, NIMS evaluation, and RACs. GAO surveyed RAC members, visited 4 regional offices selected for their geographic representation, spoke with state emergency management officials from 10 states, and interviewed FEMA officials. The site visits cannot be generalized but provided insights.
What GAO Found
GAO found that the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) has taken some steps, but has not fully addressed, preparedness grant management coordination challenges between headquarters and its regions. For several preparedness grant programs, FEMA headquarters and regions share management and monitoring responsibilities. Assessments by FEMA and others since 2009 have recommended that FEMA regions manage and monitor preparedness grants to avoid confusion and duplication and strengthen coordination with state and local grantees. However, in 2012 FEMA changed course and decided to continue sharing grant management between headquarters and regions. Since then, FEMA officials said they are taking steps to address coordination challenges that exist in this structure. However, GAO found that challenges continue to exist. For example, states and FEMA regional officials told GAO that FEMA headquarters and regions did not always coordinate monitoring visits and provided inconsistent guidance to grantees. Further, while FEMA officials identified some steps to address the challenges, FEMA lacks a plan with time frames and goals for addressing them. Doing so will better enable FEMA to effectively address the long-standing challenges in managing preparedness grants.
FEMA uses states' self-assessments to determine if states have implemented the National Incident Management System (NIMS), as required, but does not assess NIMS implementation using the results of preparedness exercises. NIMS is a comprehensive, national approach to incident management and provides a framework to enable all levels of government and the private sector to work together to prepare for, prevent, respond to, and recover from incidents. Although states generally report high levels of NIMS implementation, officials from all four FEMA regional offices and 9 of 10 states GAO spoke with said that the NIMS self-assessments are perfunctory and do not measure whether, or how well, NIMS is being implemented. FEMA officials said they do not verify states' self-reported NIMS implementation information because of the scope and breadth of the information. All of the FEMA regions and 8 states said the best way to assess NIMS implementation is to review states' performance in after-action reports following exercises and real-world events. However FEMA officials do not review these reports to assess NIMS implementation. Doing so could allow FEMA to better assess NIMS implementation and identify areas for improvement.
All 10 FEMA regions established Regional Advisory Councils (RAC) to provide advice on emergency management issues specific to the region, and about 90 percent of RAC members reported in a GAO survey that meetings are useful for collaborating with their FEMA regional office. However, some regions do not routinely meet with their RACs, and some do not consistently report back to RAC members on the status of their recommendations to FEMA. By more routinely obtaining input from RAC members and by providing timely feedback on recommendations, FEMA regional offices could better ensure they are coordinating with key stakeholders and identifying areas for strengthening preparedness.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommended, among other things, that FEMA develop a plan for addressing long-standing coordination challenges with grant management, review after action reports to assess NIMS implementation, and improve coordination with RACs. Although DHS did not concur with the grants management recommendation, GAO continues to believe challenges documented in the report support the recommendation. DHS concurred with the other 4 recommendations and described the actions they planned to take in response. |
gao_GAO-13-721 | gao_GAO-13-721_0 | Bottom lines containing fuel are referred to as “wetlines.”
Wetline Incidents and Reporting
Wetline incidents result from collisions involving tank trucks that lead to the release of flammable liquid from wetlines. PHMSA is responsible for regulating the safe and secure transportation of hazardous materials to reduce the risks to people and the environment. PHMSA’s Incident Data Cannot Be Used to Reliably Identify Wetline Incidents, Although Efforts to Improve Data Quality Have Been Implemented
PHMSA’s incident data do not reliably capture the risks and consequences of wetline incidents because these incidents are not specifically identified in its database, and PHMSA’s incident data also contain inaccuracies. Consequently, to identify wetline incidents, PHMSA officials must review carrier-reported narratives and other information, a review that is resource-intensive. Moreover, this review may not result in an accurate accounting of the number and consequences of wetline incidents because the information does not always clearly indicate whether the incident is wetline-related and because of inaccuracies and omissions in the data. PHMSA has made efforts to improve its data, such as implementing quality checks, but this does not affect how wetline incidents are reported, and errors remain. Other narratives did not indicate a collision resulting in a flammable liquid release. Some stakeholders’ concerns with the wetline purging system apply to other options as well, such as concerns about the safety of retrofitting cargo tank trucks. PHMSA Analyzed Costs and Benefits for a Proposed Wetlines Rule, but Uncertainties Limit the Usefulness of the Analysis
PHMSA Proposed a Rule to Address Wetline Safety Risks and Analyzed Associated Costs and Benefits
In January 2011, PHMSA issued a notice of proposed rulemaking to prohibit the transport of flammable liquid in the bottom lines of cargo tank trucks unless the vehicle is equipped with bottom damage protection devices, along with an analysis of the proposal’s costs and benefits. We also found uncertainty in PHMSA’s data and assumptions related to benefits:
Fatalities. Questions over PHMSA’s wetline fatality analysis have been raised before. However, PHMSA did not account for this uncertainty in a sensitivity analysis. Without adjusting its cost-benefit analysis to account for the uncertainties due to the limited market for the purging system and limitations with PHMSA’s incident data, the consequences of wetline incidents remain unclear and the costs and benefits of wetline regulation may not be accurately calculated in PHMSA’s regulatory analysis. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve the reliability of data used to identify wetline incidents, we recommend that the Secretary of Transportation direct the Administrator of PHMSA to take the following two actions:
Revise incident reporting to better capture wetline incidents and their consequences, such as by requiring specific reporting of wetline incidents by modifying the reporting form to include a specific indicator of such incidents, and adjusting the incident reporting form to indicate whether there are minimal costs versus no costs when costs are below the $500 reporting threshold. The department did not agree or disagree with our recommendations, but provided technical comments that we incorporated as appropriate. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Objectives
This report discusses (1) the extent that the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration’s (PHMSA) data can be used to reliably identify wetline safety risks, (2) options for addressing wetline safety risks, and (3) how well PHMSA has assessed the costs and benefits of addressing these risks through regulation. We reviewed documents on and interviewed PHMSA officials about the agency’s prior and ongoing efforts to improve the quality of its hazmat incident data.focuses specifically on the issue of wetlines, we did not assess PHMSA’s progress in improving its hazardous materials incident data in general. | Why GAO Did This Study
Cargo tank trucks deliver gasoline and other flammable liquids daily for consumer use. Trucks are loaded and unloaded through external bottom lines that, after loading, may contain up to 50 gallons of liquid and are known as "wetlines." Concerns have been raised about the safety of wetlines, since a collision may rupture them, releasing flammable liquid and possibly causing fatalities and property damage. PHMSA is responsible for regulating the safe transportation of hazardous materials and has proposed rules prohibiting the transport of flammable liquids in wetlines.
In 2012, The Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act required GAO to examine this issue. This report discusses (1) the extent that PHMSA's data reliably identify wetline safety risks, (2) options for addressing wetline safety risks, and (3) how well PHMSA has assessed the costs and benefits of addressing these risks through regulation. GAO analyzed PHMSA's wetline incident data for 1999 to 2011, reviewed PHMSA's regulatory cost-benefit analyses, and interviewed agency officials and industry and safety stakeholders.
What GAO Found
The Department of Transportation's (DOT) Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration's (PHMSA) incident data cannot be used to reliably identify risks from incidents involving collisions with and spills from tank trucks' bottom lines ("wetlines") because the incidents are not specifically identified in PHMSA's database and the data contain inaccuracies. PHMSA requires carriers to report hazardous material incidents, but the reporting form does not specifically capture wetline incidents. PHMSA officials identify wetline incidents through a resource-intensive process of reviewing carrier-reported incident narratives and other information. However, GAO found that the narratives do not always clearly indicate whether an incident is wetline related and that information about the consequences of incidents, including fatalities, is not always accurate. PHMSA has made efforts to improve its data, such as adding quality checks, but this has not affected how wetline incidents are reported, and inaccuracies remain.
One technology to purge liquid from wetlines exists, but use of this system is limited, and industry and safety stakeholders expressed concerns about it, such as concerns about the safety of retrofitting existing trucks with the device and its cost. Although other options have been proposed to address wetline risks, none has been pursued, and there are concerns about their safety and feasibility as well. For example, wetlines could be drained at loading terminals, but this creates issues over storing the drained fuel and whether it could be resold.
PHMSA analyzed the costs and benefits of its proposed 2011 rule to prohibit transportation of flammable liquids in unprotected wetlines, but did not account for uncertainties in its analytical assumptions and limitations in the underlying incident data. For example, PHMSA's analysis overstated the number of fatalities the proposed rule would prevent when considering actual past incidents. Furthermore, PHMSA based its cost analysis on the assumption that carriers would install a certain type of wetline purging system, but its limited adoption makes that cost uncertain. Federal guidance recommends that agencies account for uncertainty in regulatory analysis, such as limitations in PHMSA's data and uncertainty in its assumptions. Without having done so, PHMSA's analysis may not accurately represent the costs and benefits of its proposed rule.
What GAO Recommends
DOT should improve its wetline incident data by requiring carriers to specifically report wetline incidents and by improving its information on incident consequences. DOT should also address uncertainty in the assumptions and data underlying its regulatory cost-benefit analysis. DOT did not agree or disagree with the recommendations, but provided technical comments. |
gao_GAO-17-656 | gao_GAO-17-656_0 | In providing these services, connected vehicles generate, transmit, and receive various types of data, such as a car’s location. The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) within DOT is responsible for vehicle safety. Selected Automakers Reported Using Collected Data Primarily to Provide Services to Consumers and for Research and Development
According to the 13 selected automakers that offer connected vehicles, they currently use data collected from connected vehicles to provide connected vehicle services, and some use the data for research and development and marketing. Selected Automakers Reported Sharing Data on a Limited Basis
All 13 selected automakers that offer connected vehicles said they typically do not share collected data with unaffiliated third parties. Automakers reported obtaining consent before collecting data from vehicles, but they offered few options besides opting in and opting out of sharing data. Transparency: All 13 selected automakers’ written privacy notices were readily accessible from their public websites, but based on our analysis, none of the notices was clearly written. Focused Data Use: Most selected automakers reported limiting their data collection, use, retention and sharing, but their policies varied. Most written notices did not clearly identify data sharing and use practices. Selected Experts Had Concerns about Connected Vehicle Data Privacy and Automakers’ Privacy Efforts
Selected Experts Generally Agreed Broader Privacy Concerns Applied to Connected Vehicle Data
In interviewing selected experts on privacy issues related to connected vehicle data, we presented the experts with general privacy concerns about the commercial collection and use of data that we had identified from our and other federal agencies’ reports and interviews with organizations that advocate the protection of the privacy of consumers’ data and asked the experts if these issues applied to data collected through connected vehicles. FTC and NHTSA Have Efforts Related to Data Privacy Under Way, but NHTSA’s Role Is Unclear
FTC and NHTSA Have Efforts and Guidance Related to Protecting Data Privacy
While no federal law expressly confers broad privacy protections for consumers’ data and no single federal agency oversees data privacy issues, the FTC Act gives FTC the authority to bring actions against companies or individuals that engage in unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce. NHTSA, according to agency officials, has broad authority over the safety of passenger vehicles and may issue voluntary guidance or mandate standards through a rulemaking process to address safety, but it does not have the authority to regulate consumer privacy as it relates to motor vehicles or motor vehicle data. The guidance, among other things, outlined a set of privacy principles and recommended that automakers manufacturing automated vehicle technologies adopt these or similar principles. However, NHTSA has not clearly defined and communicated its roles and responsibilities related to the privacy of connected vehicle data to stakeholders. One automaker also questioned whether NHTSA was coordinating on data privacy issues with other relevant federal agencies. NHTSA officials acknowledged that some stakeholders may be uncertain whether and, if so, to what extent it has authority to address any privacy issues with respect to motor vehicles. DOT concurred with our recommendation to define, document, and externally communicate the agency’s roles and responsibilities in relation to connected vehicle data privacy. The Departments of Commerce and Justice and the Federal Communications Commission reviewed our report, but did not have any comments. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report addresses the following objectives: (1) the types of data collected by connected vehicles and transmitted to automakers and how, if at all, selected automakers use and share these data, (2) the extent to which selected automakers’ privacy policies for connected vehicles align with leading practices, (3) selected experts’ views on privacy issues related to the commercial use of data collected by connected vehicles, and (4) federal roles and efforts related to the privacy of data collected by connected vehicles. We asked each of the 13 automakers that offer connected vehicles a set of additional questions to clarify its use and sharing of data and its privacy practices. To determine the extent to which automakers’ privacy policies reflect these leading practices, we analyzed selected automakers’ written privacy notices through a document review and reported privacy practices related to connected vehicles based on automakers’ responses to semi-structured interview questions. While many of these automakers offer several brands, one automaker had different written privacy notices for its three vehicle brands sold in the U.S. As such, we analyzed a total of 15 sets of privacy policies (their written notices and reported privacy practices). Because of DOT’s role in overseeing motor vehicles, we compared DOT’s efforts to reevaluate and define key agency roles and responsibilities as new vehicle technologies emerge with pertinent Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government and practices identified in our prior work on agency collaboration. | Why GAO Did This Study
The prevalence of connected vehicles—those with technology that wirelessly transmits and receives data—has raised questions about how the collection, use, and sharing of these data affect consumer privacy.
GAO was asked to review consumer privacy issues related to connected vehicles. This report: (1) examines the types, use, and sharing of data collected by connected vehicles; (2) determines the extent to which selected automakers' privacy policies for these data align with leading practices; and (3) evaluates related federal roles and efforts, among other objectives. GAO interviewed relevant industry associations, organizations that work on consumer privacy issues, and a non-generalizable sample of 16 automakers selected based on their U.S. passenger vehicle sales. In addition, GAO analyzed selected automakers' privacy policies (written notices and reported practices) against a set of leading privacy practices determined to be relevant to connected vehicles. To identify these practices, GAO reviewed a variety of privacy frameworks developed by federal agencies and others. GAO reviewed relevant federal statutes, regulations, and reports, and interviewed agency officials, including those from DOT, the Department of Commerce, and FTC.
What GAO Found
Thirteen of the 16 selected automakers in GAO's review offer connected vehicles, and those 13 reported collecting, using, and sharing data from connected vehicles, such as data on a car's location and its operations (e.g., tire pressure). All 13 automakers described doing so on a relatively limited basis. For example, they reported using data to provide requested services to consumers and for research and development. None of the 13 reported sharing or selling data that could be linked to a consumer for unaffiliated third parties' use. However, as connected vehicles become more commonplace, the extent of data collection, use, and sharing will likely grow.
Automakers have taken steps, including signing onto a set of privacy principles, to address privacy issues. In comparing selected automakers' reported privacy policies to leading privacy practices, GAO found that these automakers' policies at least partially reflected each of the leading privacy practices, for example:
Transparency : All 13 selected automakers' written privacy notices were easily accessible, but none was written clearly.
Focused data use : Most selected automakers reported limiting their data collection, use, and sharing, but their written notices did not clearly identify data sharing and use practices.
Individual control : All 13 selected automakers reported obtaining explicit consumer consent before collecting data, but offered few options besides opting out of all connected vehicle services to consumers who did not want to share their data.
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the Department of Transportation's (DOT) National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) are primarily responsible for protecting consumers and ensuring passenger vehicles' safety, respectively. FTC has the authority to protect consumer privacy and has issued reports and guidance and conducted workshops on the topic generally as well as on connected vehicles specifically. NHTSA has broad authority over the safety of passenger vehicles and considers the privacy effects and implications of its regulations and guidance. FTC and NHTSA have coordinated on privacy issues related to connected vehicles. However, NHTSA has not clearly defined its roles and responsibilities as they relate to the privacy of vehicle data. In response to emerging vehicle technologies, NHTSA included privacy requirements in a related rulemaking and included privacy expectations in voluntary guidance. Because of these actions, selected automakers and others said NHTSA's role in data privacy was unclear. NHTSA officials acknowledged that some stakeholders may be uncertain about its authority to address privacy issues. Federal standards for internal control require, among other things, that agencies define and communicate key roles and responsibilities. By clearly defining, documenting, and communicating NHTSA's roles and responsibilities in vehicle data privacy, NHTSA would be better positioned to coordinate with other federal agencies and to effectively oversee emerging vehicle technologies.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that NHTSA define, document, and externally communicate its roles and responsibilities related to the privacy of data generated by and collected from vehicles. NHTSA concurred with our recommendation. |
gao_NSIAD-97-4 | gao_NSIAD-97-4_0 | Background
Commerce is responsible for licensing exports of U.S. dual-use items—items with both military and commercial applications—and helps enforce controls over them. The Shanghai facility is responsible for final assembly of the aircraft. The machine tools McDonnell Douglas exported to China had been used at a U.S. government-owned plant to produce parts for the B-1 bomber, C-17 military transport aircraft, and the Peacekeeper missile. During this review process, DOD officials raised several questions about the justification for the export. Their concerns primarily focused on (1) whether the stated end-use on the license applications justified the export; (2) the legitimacy of the CATIC Machining Center, the stated end user of the equipment; and (3) the quantity and capabilities of the machine tools. Prior to approving the licenses, the reviewing agencies added numerous conditions to mitigate the risks identified. Applications Went Through Interagency Review Process
Commerce, State, Energy, DOD, and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency officials recognized the risk of diversion, considered it in their deliberations, and added conditions to the licenses to minimize this risk. After some of the machine tools were diverted to a Chinese military facility not involved in the Trunkliner program, McDonnell Douglas submitted license applications to Commerce to maintain the equipment at this facility to manufacture parts for trainer aircraft and motorcycles. Specifically, the license conditions required that the machine tools be stored in one location until the CATIC Machining Center was constructed; restricted the use of the equipment to Trunkliner-related production; required assurances from CATIC that the equipment would be used as required metering devices to record equipment usage and the installation of password protection on some equipment; and included various reporting requirements, such as quarterly inspection reports by McDonnell Douglas, that were designed to monitor the equipment and detect unauthorized use. Machine Tools Were Diverted to a Chinese Military Facility Contrary to License Conditions
The machine tools were shipped to three locations contrary to the license conditions and CATIC’s assurances regarding end use. In a letter to McDonnell Douglas, Commerce indicated that the movement of the equipment to Nanchang and partial installation of the stretch press was a “direct violation of the conditions under which the equipment was originally authorized for export to China.”
Under the terms of the export licenses and CATIC’s written assurance, the machine tools were only to be used to manufacture commercial parts for the Trunkliner and other McDonnell Douglas commercial aircraft. Commerce also suspended four licenses for the equipment that had not yet been shipped to China. Commerce Began Investigation 6 Months After the Reported Diversion
Commerce’s Office of Export Enforcement, which is responsible for investigating export control violations, did not formally investigate the machine tool diversion until 6 months after McDonnell Douglas reported the incident. The U.S. Customs Service and the Office of Export Enforcement are now conducting an investigation under the direction of the Department of Justice. Later, it subsequently approved relocating the equipment to the Shanghai aviation facility with similar conditions. 2. 3. 5. 7. 8. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 4. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the circumstances surrounding the export of machine tools by the McDonnell Douglas Corporation to the China National Aero-Technology Import and Export Corporation (CATIC), focusing on: (1) the military and civil applications of the equipment and whether these military applications are important to China's military modernization plans; (2) the process for approving the licenses and how the process addressed the risks associated with this export; and (3) whether export control license conditions were violated and, if so, how the U.S. government responded.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) the machine tools exported by McDonnell Douglas to China have military and commercial applications; (2) these machine tools had been used in the United States to produce parts for military systems but were exported to manufacture parts for commercial passenger aircraft; (3) China needs machine tools to upgrade both its military and commercial aircraft production capabilities; (4) after a lengthy interagency review, the Department of Commerce approved the license applications with numerous conditions designed to mitigate the risk of diversion; (5) during the review period, concerns were raised about the need for the equipment to support Chinese aircraft production, the reliability of the end user, and the capabilities of the equipment being exported; (6) senior officials at Commerce, the Departments of State, Energy, and Defense, and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency agreed on the final decision to approve these applications; (7) some of these U.S. exported machine tools were subsequently diverted to a Chinese facility engaged in military production; (8) this diversion was contrary to key conditions in the licenses that required equipment to be used for the Trunkliner program and be stored in one location until the CATIC Machining Center was built; (9) six weeks after the reported diversion, Commerce suspended licenses for four machine tools not yet shipped to China; (10) Commerce subsequently denied McDonnell Douglas's request to allow the diverted machine tools to remain in the unauthorized location for use in civilian production; (11) Commerce approved the transfer of the machine tools to the Shanghai aviation facility, which is responsible for final assembly of Trunkliner aircraft; (12) the diverted equipment was relocated to Shanghai before it could be misused; (13) some of the amended license conditions apply only after the equipment is installed, which has not yet occurred; (14) Commerce's enforcement office did not formally investigate the export control violations until 6 months after they were first reported; and (15) the U.S. Customs Service and Commerce's enforcement office are now conducting a criminal investigation under the direction of the Department of Justice. |
gao_GAO-09-479T | gao_GAO-09-479T_0 | JPDO and ATO Have Issued Key NextGen Plans, and FAA Has Made Some Progress in Developing and Demonstrating NextGen Technologies
Since 2003, JPDO and ATO have made progress in planning for and implementing NextGen. According to ATO, it and JPDO have worked to align and ensure linkages between these planning documents. The current version of the NextGen Implementation Plan, released in January 2009, focuses on the midterm (2012 though 2018) implementation of NextGen capabilities. Recent versions of NextGen planning documents have partially addressed some of these concerns, but industry stakeholders continue to express frustration that the planning documents lack any specific timelines or commitments. Beyond these planning efforts, FAA has continued to move forward in planning and conducting demonstrations of some key NextGen technologies. Industry Stakeholders Seek More Rapid Midterm Implementation of Existing Capabilities, but Progress Depends Both on Airlines’ Investments and on FAA’s Validation, Certification, and Rulemaking
To help address current congestion and delays, many stakeholders have suggested that FAA focus on maximizing what can be done with existing, proven capabilities and existing infrastructure. In part to help accelerate the implementation of existing capabilities in the midterm—including technologies that are part of NextGen’s five transformational programs such as ADS-B—FAA has created a NextGen Midterm Implementation Task Force through RTCA. A member of the task force indicated that it will be identifying a handful of capabilities that can be implemented in the midterm and prioritizing them according to their relative net benefits. Current plans call for the task force to provide final conclusions and recommendations to FAA in August 2009. These could include mandated deadlines or operational preferences—such as preferred airspace, routings, or runway access. We and others have previously expressed concerns about the time and human resources required for these efforts and have identified them as a significant risk to the timely and cost- effective implementation of NextGen. Resolving NextGen Management Issues, Involving Stakeholders, and Acquiring Expertise Will Be Critical to NextGen’s Success
We have previously reported on stakeholders’ concerns about the fragmented management structure for NextGen and resulting lack of clear accountability for NextGen’s implementation, as well as concerns about JPDO’s and FAA’s efforts to fully involve stakeholders and acquire needed expertise. Resolving these issues will be critical to advancing both the implementation of capabilities in the midterm and the full transformation to NextGen in the long term. FAA has said that it and JPDO are working with the Department to clarify roles and responsibilities in executing the executive order. We maintain that input from current air traffic controllers with recent experience controlling aircraft, who will be responsible for managing traffic in the NextGen environment, and from current technicians, who will maintain NextGen equipment, is important when considering human factors and safety issues. FAA will also need technical skills, such as systems engineering and contract management expertise, to implement NextGen. According to an FAA official, FAA plans to fill a total of 378 NextGen positions in fiscal years 2009 and 2010. Addressing Ongoing Research and Development, Facility, and Infrastructure Challenges Will Be Critical for NextGen’s Implementation Going Forward
A number of other challenges affect FAA’s ability to move forward with NextGen’s implementation, such as addressing ongoing research and development needs, reconfiguring and maintaining existing facilities, and enhancing the physical capacity of airports. Prioritizing the research and development needed for NextGen is also important to avoid gaps and delays. FAA faces an immediate task to maintain and repair existing facilities so that the current ATC system continues to operate safely and reliably. Planning infrastructure projects to increase capacity, such as building additional runways, can be a lengthy process, and will require substantial advance planning and safety and cost analyses. Joint Planning and Development Office: Progress and Key Issues in Planning the Transition to the Next Generation Air Transportation System. | Why GAO Did This Study
To prepare for forecasted air traffic growth, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), including its Joint Planning and Development Office (JPDO) and Air Traffic Organization (ATO), is planning for and implementing the Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen) in partnership with other federal agencies and the aviation industry. NextGen will transform the current radar-based air traffic control system into a more automated, aircraft-centered, satellite-based system. GAO's previous work has identified issues related to the usefulness of NextGen planning documents, FAA's organizational structure to manage the transition to NextGen, and FAA's workforce to oversee and implement NextGen. Recently, the focus of NextGen planning and implementation has shifted to capabilities that can be achieved in the midterm, defined as 2012 through 2018. GAO's testimony focuses on (1) JPDO's and ATO's progress in planning and implementing NextGen, (2) ongoing efforts to implement midterm capabilities to address capacity constraints and delays, (3) the potential impact on NextGen of organizational changes and human capital issues, and (4) research and development and facilities maintenance and reconfiguration challenges going forward. GAO's testimony updates prior GAO work with FAA data and interviews with agency and union officials and industry stakeholders, including airline, aircraft, and avionics manufacturer representatives.
What GAO Found
JPDO and ATO have made progress in planning for and developing NextGen. JPDO has continued to update its basic planning documents, and in January 2009, ATO released the current version of its NextGen Implementation Plan, which focuses on the midterm implementation of capabilities. Recent versions of NextGen planning documents have partially addressed some of GAO's concerns about their usefulness, but industry stakeholders continue to express frustration that the documents lack any specific timelines or commitments. In addition to these planning efforts, FAA has continued to plan and conduct several demonstrations of some key NextGen technologies. To help address current congestion and delays, industry stakeholders have frequently suggested that FAA focus on maximizing what can be done with existing, proven capabilities and existing infrastructure. Partly to help accelerate the implementation of capabilities in the midterm, FAA has created a NextGen Midterm Implementation Task Force, which is to report its recommendations to FAA in August 2009. The task force plans to identify and prioritize capabilities that can be implemented in the midterm and potentially be deployed regionally to address key bottlenecks. Essential to the mid- and long-term success of these efforts is persuading the airlines to make costly investments in NextGen equipment--a step they are reluctant to take without clearly demonstrated benefits. Incentives that could encourage such investments include operational preferences--such as preferred airspace, routings, or runway access--and equipment investment tax credits. FAA will also have to validate, certify, and issue rules for these capabilities. Recent changes in the management structure for NextGen, though designed to address industry stakeholders' and others' concerns about fragmentation of authority and lack of accountability, have not fully addressed these issues and have raised further questions about parties' roles and responsibilities. Additionally, human capital issues remain to be resolved, including the degree to which key stakeholders, such as controllers and technicians, are involved in NextGen efforts and whether FAA is able to acquire the systems engineering, contract management, leadership, and other skills needed for NextGen. FAA plans to fill 378 NextGen positions in fiscal years 2009 and 2010. Going forward, FAA faces challenges in addressing ongoing research needs, reconfiguring and maintaining existing facilities, and enhancing the physical capacity of airports. For NextGen, research on the environmental impact of aviation, human factors, and weather will be critical. Air traffic facilities will also have to be reconfigured to support NextGen, and existing facilities require maintenance to ensure safety and reliability. FAA is currently reviewing its facility needs.Finally, even with the efficiencies anticipated from implementing NextGen, FAA has determined that it will need additional airport and runway capacity. Efforts to develop new infrastructure will require significant advance planning and cost and safety analyses. |
gao_GAO-16-644 | gao_GAO-16-644_0 | Specifically, each of the military services either over- or underestimated actual obligations for fuel consumption spending when compared to their budget estimates. Military Services’ Reported Actual Spending on Fuel Consumption Decreased from Fiscal Years 2012 through 2015 but Differed from Budget Estimates
In fiscal years 2012 through 2015, the military services’ reported a decrease in total obligations for fuel consumption spending from a high of about $13 billion in fiscal year 2012 to a low of about $10.1 billion in fiscal year 2015. DOD Does Not Fully Reconcile Differences in Reported Fuel Consumption Spending and Does Not Include Certain Fuel Consumption Data in Annual Budget Requests
DOD takes some steps to report fuel consumption data in annual budget estimates, but it does not fully reconcile differences between the military services’ reported actual fuel consumption spending and DLA’s reported fuel sales and does not include certain data that the Congress could use to evaluate the military services’ funding requests for fuel. For each budget request, DOD validates the military services’ fuel consumption data by reviewing the military services’ fuel consumption estimates to ensure that the estimates align with DOD’s overall funding priorities, among other steps. For example, in the President’s budget request for fiscal year 2016 that was submitted to Congress in February 2015, DOD reported that the Navy’s actual obligations for fuel consumption spending in fiscal year 2014 were about $2.7 billion less than what DLA’s fuel sales data show was sold to the Navy in that year. Fuel Volume Data and O&M Base Obligations Are Not Included in Budget Requests
We also found, however, that DOD’s annual budget requests do not provide information in two areas that could be used by Congress to evaluate the military services’ funding requests for fuel. Unless DOD reports more complete information on its actual and estimated fuel consumption, Congress will not have full visibility over the amount of fuel volume the military services require on an annual basis for their activities, or trends in the military services’ spending for non-war-related fuel consumption, which has varied considerably from budget estimates. Having an approach to reconcile differences would provide DOD with a means to understand any discrepancies in its fuel consumption data and determine whether any actions are needed to better assess the accuracy of the military services’ actual fuel consumption spending that it reports to Congress in annual budget requests. Recommendations for Executive Action
In order to improve the accuracy of the information included in the O&M budget justification material submitted to Congress and provide complete information to review the military services’ fuel consumption spending requests, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), in consultation with the military services and DLA, to take the following two actions:
Develop an approach to reconcile data on fuel consumption reported by the military services and fuel sales to the military services reported by DLA and take any appropriate corrective actions to improve the accuracy of actual fuel consumption spending data, and
Report complete fuel consumption information to Congress, to include actual and estimated fuel volume and actual O&M base obligations for fuel consumption spending separate from O&M OCO obligations. DOD concurred with the first recommendation that it develop an approach to reconcile the military services’ and DLA fuel consumption data. DOD did not concur with the second recommendation that it report more complete fuel consumption information to Congress. DOD also stated that manually identifying these data would be extremely labor intensive. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to (1) describe the military services’ reported actual spending on fuel consumption compared to their budget estimates since 2012 and factors that were reported to have contributed to any differences; (2) assess the steps the Department of Defense (DOD) takes to report accurate and complete fuel consumption data in its annual budget requests; and (3) evaluate the extent to which DOD’s approach for determining the fiscal year 2017 standard price charged to fuel customers is consistent with federal budget guidance and leading practices for a credible and well-documented cost estimate. | Why GAO Did This Study
DOD and the military services estimate total funding needs for fuel in annual budget requests by using planned consumption (measured in barrels of fuel) and a standard price per barrel set by DOD.
Senate Report 114-49, accompanying a bill for the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2016, included a provision for GAO to review DOD's approach to estimating fuel consumption. Among other objectives, this report (1) describes the military services' reported actual spending on fuel consumption compared to their budget estimates since 2012, and factors that were reported to have contributed to any differences, and (2) assesses the steps DOD takes to report accurate and complete fuel consumption data in annual budget requests. GAO analyzed DOD budget documents, including military service and DLA fuel data for fiscal years 2012 through 2015 and interviewed DOD officials responsible for preparing fuel consumption budget materials.
What GAO Found
The military services' total obligations for fuel consumption spending decreased from a high of about $13 billion in fiscal year 2012 to a low of about $10.1 billion in fiscal year 2015 but differed from budget estimates, which officials largely attributed to changes in operations and training that affected fuel consumption. Specifically, each of the military services either over- or underestimated its actual fuel consumption spending when compared to budget estimates (see figure).
Military Services' Reported Actual Versus Estimated Fuel Consumption Spending, Fiscal Years 2012 through 2015
The Department of Defense (DOD) takes some steps to report fuel consumption data in annual budget requests, but it does not fully reconcile differences in the military services' reported actual fuel consumption data and does not include some fuel consumption data. For each budget request, DOD validates the military services' fuel consumption data by ensuring that the budget estimates align with DOD's funding priorities, among other steps. However, GAO's analysis found differences between the military services' reported fuel consumption spending and Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) data on fuel sales to them. For example, DOD reported that the Navy's actual obligations for fuel consumption spending in fiscal year 2014 were about $2.7 billion less than what DLA's fuel sales data show was sold. DOD had not established an approach to reconcile such differences. Having an approach to reconcile differences would provide DOD with a means to determine if any actions are needed to better assess the accuracy of the military services' reported fuel consumption data. Further, GAO's analysis found that DOD's budget requests for fuel did not include details in two areas that could be used by Congress to evaluate funding requests for fuel. First, the budget requests excluded fuel volume data that were collected during the budget development process. Fuel volume data would provide another measure of fuel consumption to justify DOD's funding requests. Second, the requests did not separate actual fuel consumption spending for day-to-day activities, such as training, from war-related spending, which has varied considerably from budget estimates. Without additional data in these two areas, Congress does not have full visibility over the amount of fuel volume the military services require for their activities or trends in fuel consumption spending for non-war-related purposes.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOD (1) develop an approach to reconcile the military services' and DLA fuel consumption data and (2) report more complete fuel consumption data to Congress. DOD concurred with the first recommendation and did not concur with the second recommendation, stating that providing additional fuel consumption information could be useful, but doing so would be difficult and labor intensive. GAO believes the recommendation remains valid to ensure that Congress has information to assess trends in fuel consumption, as discussed in the report. |
gao_GAO-14-417T | gao_GAO-14-417T_0 | Medicare Modernization Act Reformed the Way CMS Contracts with Organizations to Process and Pay FFS Claims
From its inception, the process for selecting Medicare claims administration contractors was stipulated by Congress and differed from the process for awarding most other federal contracts in that, among other things, the Medicare contractors were not selected through a competitive process. CMS implemented the MMA contracting reform requirements by shifting claims administration tasks from 51 legacy contracts to new entities called Medicare Administrative Contractors (MACs). In the new contracting environment, MACs are responsible for a variety of claims administration functions, most of which were previously performed by the legacy contractors. Since the original implementation, CMS chose to consolidate the 15 A/B MACs into 10 jurisdictions and is in the process of that consolidation. While CMS has relied on contractors to conduct claims administration functions since Medicare’s inception and has worked to consolidate these contracts, the agency has been granted additional statutory authority in recent years to award new types of contracts to conduct specialized tasks within the Medicare program. In 2003, the MMA directed CMS to develop a demonstration project testing the use of contractors to conduct recovery audits in Medicare.known as recovery auditors, conduct data analysis and review claims that have been paid to identify improper payments. Private Plans Administer Benefits for Beneficiaries Enrolled in Medicare Advantage, But CMS has an Important Administrative and Oversight Role
Unlike Medicare FFS, in which contractors process and pay claims, in Medicare Part C, CMS contracts with private organizations, known as Medicare Advantage organizations (MAOs), to offer MA health plans and provide covered health care services to enrolled beneficiaries. CMS pays MAOs a pre-determined, fixed monthly payment for each Medicare beneficiary enrolled in one of the MAO’s health plans. MA plans must provide coverage for all services covered under Medicare FFS, except hospice care, and may also provide additional coverage not available under Medicare FFS. Substantial changes in the law regarding contract requirements and other parameters of the program—including payment rates—have contributed to fluctuations in the number of contracts and enrolled beneficiaries over the years. By 1979, the government had 33 contracts with organizations offering private plans. The accuracy of this adjustment was criticized by us and other researchers. These changes to the program included new types of plans that could be offered, the standards applied to the contracts, beneficiary enrollment rules, and payment rules. For example, from 1999 through 2003, the number of Medicare contracts with private plans fell from 309 to 154. While contract requirements for MAOs and parameters of the program are largely derived from statute, CMS has responsibility to implement the program and ensure compliance with these requirements. The audits typically involve a combination of desk reviews of documents submitted by MA plans, and at CMS’s discretion, site visits. Private Plans Also Administer Prescription Drug Coverage Under Part D
Whereas MA offers beneficiaries an alternative way to access their Part A and B benefits, Part D is structured to provide benefits only through private organizations under contract to Medicare. Under the Part D program, which began providing benefits on January 1, 2006, CMS contracts with private organizations called plan sponsors.sponsors offer outpatient prescription drug coverage either through stand- alone prescription drug plans for those in original FFS Medicare, or through MA prescription drug plans for beneficiaries enrolled in MA. Through the Part D contracts, plan sponsors offer prescription drug plans Part D plan which may have different beneficiary cost-sharing arrangements (such as copayments and deductibles) and charge different monthly premiums. The Part D program also relies on sponsors to generate prescription drug savings, in part, through their ability to negotiate price concessions, such as rebates and discounts, with entities such as drug manufacturers, pharmacy benefit managers, and pharmacies. While CMS contracts with plan sponsors to offer the Part D benefit, the agency has an oversight role. Given that final payments to plan sponsors are based, in part, on the price concessions that plan sponsors have negotiated, CMS is responsible for ensuring that data plan sponsors submit on price concessions are accurate. use of generic drugs, and higher-than-expected rebates from pharmaceutical manufacturers to the prescription drug plans. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since the enactment of Medicare in 1965, contractors have played a vital role in the administration of the program. The original FFS program was designed so that the federal government contracted with health insurers or similar private organizations experienced in handling physician and hospital claims to process and pay Medicare claims rather than having the federal government do so. CMS now also contracts with private organizations that provide covered services under the MA program and the Part D prescription drug program.
This statement provides an overview of the manner in which CMS has contracted with private organizations to administer benefits in (1) original FFS Medicare, (2) MA, and (3) the Part D prescription drug program. It is based primarily on products that GAO has issued regarding CMS contracting with claims administration contractors to administer the FFS program, and with other private organizations as part of MA and the Part D prescription drug benefit programs. These products were issued from November 1989 through January 2014 using a variety of methodologies, including reviews of relevant laws, policies, and procedures; data analysis; and interviews with contractors, stakeholders, and CMS officials. We have supplemented information from our prior products with publicly-available data on Medicare private plan contracts and enrollment, CMS-issued guidance for Medicare private plans, and a review of relevant literature. GAO has made numerous recommendations to CMS in these previous products and is not making any new recommendations at this time.
What GAO Found
The Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003 (MMA) reformed the way the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), the agency that administers Medicare, contracts with claims administration contractors. From its inception, the process for selecting Medicare fee-for-service (FFS) claims administration contractors was stipulated by Congress and differed from most other federal contracts in that, among other things, the Medicare contracts were not awarded through a competitive process. The MMA repealed limitations on the types of contractors CMS could use and required that CMS use competitive procedures to select new contracting entities to process medical claims and provide incentives for contractors to provide quality services. CMS has implemented the MMA contracting reform requirements by shifting and consolidating all claims administration tasks to new entities called Medicare Administrative Contractors. CMS is currently in the process of further consolidating these contracts. The agency also uses other contractors to review claims to ensure payments are proper and investigate potential fraud.
CMS contracts with private organizations to administer benefits under Medicare Advantage (MA), but has an important administrative and oversight role. MA is the private plan alternative to FFS and differs from FFS in that CMS contracts with private entities, known as Medicare Advantage organizations (MAOs), to provide covered health care services to beneficiaries who enroll. MAOs are paid a predetermined monthly amount for each beneficiary enrolled in one of their health plans and must provide coverage for all FFS services (except hospice care), but may also provide additional coverage. The government first began contracting with private plans in 1973. Several laws since then have changed how the MAOs are paid and the types of plans that can participate. While contract requirements for MAOs and parameters of the program are largely derived from statute, CMS has responsibility to implement the program and ensure compliance with these requirements.
CMS also contracts with private organizations, called plan sponsors, to provide the outpatient prescription drug benefit under Part D. Through the Part D contracts, plan sponsors offer prescription drug plans which may have different beneficiary cost-sharing arrangements (such as copayments and deductibles) and charge different monthly premiums. The Part D program relies on sponsors to generate prescription drug savings through negotiating price concessions with entities such as drug manufacturers, pharmacy benefit managers, and pharmacies, and managing beneficiary use. While CMS contracts with plan sponsors to provide the Part D benefit, the agency has oversight responsibilities. For instance, CMS is responsible for making accurate payments to plan sponsors and ensuring the accuracy of information submitted by plan sponsors to the beneficiary-focused Medicare Plan Finder website. Medicare actuaries have attributed lower-than-projected expenditures in Part D to a combination of factors, including lower-than-projected Part D enrollment, slower growth of drug prices in recent years, greater use of generic drugs, and higher-than-expected rebates from pharmaceutical manufacturers to the prescription drug plans. |
gao_GAO-15-67 | gao_GAO-15-67_0 | These regulators issued the final regulations to implement the Basel III-based capital standards in the United States. U.S. Basel III Capital Requirements May Have a Limited Effect on Capital in the Short Term but Are Expected to Increase Compliance Costs
The vast majority of banks and bank holding companies already would likely be able to meet the new minimum capital requirements and capital conservation buffer at the fully phased-in levels required by 2019. We estimated that as of first quarter 2014 more than 90 percent of bank holding companies currently meet the new requirements and that those with insufficient capital would need to raise about $4 billion to 5 billion in capital to cover the capital shortfall and meet the requirements. Some Market Participants Generally Expect U.S. Capital Requirements to Increase Compliance Costs but Have a Limited Effect on the Cost and Availability of Credit
Although their views are not indicative of the banking industry as a whole, bank officials we interviewed generally expected that they would be able to meet new capital requirements, their compliance costs would increase, and effects of the requirements on credit would not be large. According to officials from all eight community banks we interviewed, they did not anticipate any difficulties in meeting the U.S. Basel III capital requirements but expect to incur additional compliance costs. Specifically, officials from two community banks said that they expected the capital regulations to improve the safety and soundness of the banking system, but three community banks questioned the appropriateness of the regulations for small banks. At the same time, there are limitations to full harmonization. As was the case with the implementation of Basel II, some market participants or observers have raised concerns about regulatory differences in the implementation of Basel III between jurisdictions and their possible competitive effects. In addition to the risk-based capital standards, the Basel Committee monitors implementation of the additional loss absorbency requirements for G-SIBs and domestic systemically important banks, liquidity coverage Basel Committee members generally reported ratio, and leverage ratio.that they have not yet adopted regulations to implement these requirements. The Basel Committee’s assessments of Basel III implementation found that the jurisdictions reviewed to date have adopted rules generally consistent with the Basel III standards but identified some inconsistencies in regulator-approved bank models across countries. According to the Basel Committee, public confidence in prudential ratios, resiliency of banks, and a level regulatory playing field for internationally active banks cannot be achieved without consistency in the adoption and implementation of the Basel standards. Foreign banking organizations. The Basel capital standards have no legal force; rather, the Basel Committee members developed and agreed to the standards, with the expectation that each member will implement them. This enhanced ratio raised the standards above the Basel III minimum standards. Basel Committee and other studies indicated that U.S. banks tended to be subject to higher risk weights than EU banks, in part due to their use of the Basel I and Basel II frameworks, respectively. While differences exist in the implementation of Basel III between jurisdictions, the extent to which these differences collectively will affect competition among internationally active banks is unclear. In addition to regulatory capital requirements, other factors can affect the competitive position of internationally active banks, such as differences in accounting treatment, cost of capital, tax rules, and other regulations from one country to another. Agency Comments
We provided a draft of this report to FDIC, Federal Reserve, and OCC for their review and comment. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report examines how (1) U.S. Basel III capital may affect U.S. banking organizations, including smaller banking organizations, and (2) implementation of Basel III’s capital and other standards by different jurisdictions may affect the ability of U.S. banking organizations to compete internationally. To determine the extent to which jurisdictional differences in implementation of Basel III’s standards may affect how various U.S. banking organizations compete, we judgmentally selected and interviewed 10 global systemically important banks (G-SIBs) operating in the United States, European Union, and Japan to obtain their views on the competitive differences resulting from implementation of the Basel III framework across jurisdictions. Appendix II: GAO Analyses of Basel III Minimum Capital Ratios, Capital Shortfall, and Funding Costs
To assess how the U.S. Basel III capital regulation may impact U.S. banking organizations, including smaller organizations, we used data from the Consolidated Financial Statements for Holding Companies— Form FR Y-9C (Y-9Cs) and from the Consolidated Reports of Condition and Income (Call Reports) as of March 31, 2014, to estimate (1) the number of bank holding companies and depository institutions with capital ratios that are greater than or equal to Basel III minimum capital ratios; (2) the amount of capital bank holding companies and depository institutions would need to take actions to meet the U.S. Basel III minimum capital requirements; and (3) the change in funding costs for bank holding companies and depository institutions associated with the amount of capital they would need to meet the minimum capital standards. | Why GAO Did This Study
The 2007-2009 financial crisis revealed that many U.S. and international banks lacked capital of sufficient quality and quantity to absorb substantial losses. In 2010, the Basel Committee (the global standard-setter for prudential bank regulation) issued the Basel III framework—comprehensive reforms to strengthen global capital and liquidity standards with the goal of promoting a more resilient banking sector. In 2013, federal banking regulators adopted regulations to implement the Basel III-based capital standards in the United States, which generally apply to U.S. bank holding companies and banks and are being phased in through 2019. Some market participants have raised questions about the potential negative impact of the regulations on U.S. banks, including on their lending and competitiveness.
This report examines how (1) the U.S. Basel III regulations may affect U.S. banks, including smaller ones, and (2) implementation of Basel III by different countries and other jurisdictions may affect U.S. banking organizations' international competitiveness. To address the objectives, GAO analyzed data from financial filings; conducted legal and economic analysis; reviewed empirical studies, federal regulations, and agency documents; and interviewed regulators, U.S. and foreign banks, and industry associations.
GAO makes no recommendations in this report. GAO provided a draft of this report to the banking regulators for their review and comment and received technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate.
What GAO Found
Although the U.S. Basel III capital requirements may increase compliance costs, they likely will have a modest impact on lending activity as most banks may not need to raise additional capital to meet the minimum requirements. GAO's analyses of financial data for the first quarter of 2014 indicate the vast majority of bank holding companies and banks currently meet the new minimum capital ratios and capital conservation buffer (an additional capital requirement) at the fully phased-in levels required by 2019. GAO estimated that less than 10 percent of the bank holding companies collectively would need to raise less than $5 billion in total additional capital to cover the capital shortfall. Banks with a shortfall tended to be small, with less than $1 billion in assets. The empirical research GAO reviewed suggests that higher regulatory capital requirements will have a modest effect on the cost and availability of credit. Similarly, GAO's economic analysis indicates that raising the additional capital would lead to a modest decline in lending and a modest increase in loan rates. According to officials from the eight community banks GAO interviewed, they do not anticipate any difficulties meeting the capital requirements but expect to incur additional compliance costs. Officials from the 10 global systemically important banks that GAO interviewed said they have been incurring significant costs to comply with the new requirements, but three said that U.S. minimum capital ratios for Basel III tend not to be the binding capital constraint. Most of these bank officials said they expect the requirements to improve the resilience of the banking system.
Jurisdictional differences in the implementation of the Basel III capital standards have arisen, but their competitive effect on internationally active banks is unclear. Basel III serves, in part, to limit competitive disparities due to differences in capital standards, but there are limitations to full harmonization. For example, the Basel capital standards have no legal force; rather, members of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (Basel Committee) developed and agreed to the standards, with the expectation that each member will implement them. Thus, jurisdictions may adopt requirements more or less stringent than the minimum standards. Almost all Basel Committee members report having adopted rules to implement the Basel III capital requirements. To help promote a level regulatory playing field, the Basel Committee began conducting reviews in 2012 to assess whether each member's implementation meets the Basel III minimum standards and whether implementation produced consistent outcomes across jurisdictions. These reviews found the rules of the seven members it assessed to date to be generally compliant. However, the Basel Committee's other reviews identified some inconsistencies in how banks across different jurisdictions calculated their risk-weighted assets. As was the case with Basel II implementation, some banks and others are concerned about jurisdictional differences in the implementation of Basel III and their effect on competition. For example, some jurisdictions are subjecting certain of their banks to capital or leverage requirements above the Basel III minimums or exempting banks from certain capital requirements. Because Basel III's implementation is ongoing, the extent to which the differences collectively will affect competition among internationally active banks is unclear. In addition, other factors can affect the competitive position of internationally active banks, such as differences in accounting treatment, cost of capital, and tax rules across jurisdictions. |
gao_GAO-06-724 | gao_GAO-06-724_0 | Under this program, CDC makes grants to states to provide mammography services to medically underserved women, especially those with low incomes and without health insurance coverage. Facility Closures Outpaced Openings, with Financial Considerations Most Often Cited as Reason for Closure
From October 2001 to October 2004, certified mammography facility closures outpaced openings, and financial considerations were most often cited as the reason for facility closures. According to FDA data, the number of certified mammography facilities nationwide decreased by 6 percent, from 9,306 to 8,768, from October 1, 2001, to October 1, 2004. During this period, 1,290 certified mammography facilities closed, while 752 facilities received 6-month provisional certificates to begin providing services, resulting in a net decrease of 538 facilities, including a net decrease of 87 mobile mammography facilities, which may serve multiple locations. For certified mammography facilities that had been accredited by ACR and that closed from October 1, 2001, to October 1, 2004, facility officials most often reported financial considerations as the reason for closure. Although Key Capacity Elements Have Decreased and Use of Mammography Services Has Increased, Current Nationwide Capacity Is Adequate
Although key elements that make up mammography capacity have decreased and the use of mammography services has increased—largely because of the increase in the population of women age 40 and older—we found that current nationwide capacity is adequate. Our estimates of current capacity found that the number of mammograms performed by U.S. machines was substantially lower than the number that could be performed. Most of the experts we interviewed told us that current overall capacity is likely adequate, but all of the experts expressed concern that the numbers of radiologic technologists and radiologists entering the mammography field might not be adequate to serve the increasing population of women age 40 and older. Loss or Absence of Mammography Machines May Have Resulted in Access Problems in Certain Locations
The loss or absence of mammography machines in certain locations may have resulted in access problems consisting of lengthy travel distances or considerable wait times to obtain mammography services, including problems for women who are medically underserved. During the 3-year period, 117 counties lost more than 25 percent of their machines. While the majority of officials we interviewed told us that the loss of machines in counties in their states had not resulted in access problems, some officials told us that the loss or absence of machines in certain counties had resulted in lengthy travel distances to obtain services or had resulted in significant wait times for services. The majority of officials we interviewed about the effects of the loss or absence of machines told us that machine losses had not resulted in access problems because women were able to obtain mammography services at other facilities. Access problems for these women are of particular concern because they have lower-than-average mammography screening rates. We incorporated FDA’s comments as appropriate. To examine changes in the nation’s capacity for and use of mammography services in recent years and the adequacy of current capacity, we analyzed data from FDA’s Mammography Program Reporting and Information System database on the total numbers of certified facilities, machines, radiologic technologists who perform mammography, and physicians who interpret mammograms as of October 1, 2001, and October 1, 2004. To determine the adequacy of current capacity, we obtained estimates from mammography experts of the amount of time it takes to perform a screening mammogram, and we used those estimates and FDA data on the number of machines available in 2003 to calculate the number of screening mammograms that potentially could have been performed in 2003. For our third step, to provide additional information on the effects of facility closures on access for medically underserved women, we interviewed state officials who direct CDC’s National Breast and Cervical Cancer Early Detection Program and officials of community health centers. | Why GAO Did This Study
Mammography, an X-ray procedure that can detect small breast tumors, is an important tool for detecting breast cancer at an early stage and, when coupled with appropriate treatment, can reduce breast cancer deaths. In 2002, GAO reported in Mammography: Capacity Generally Exists to Deliver Services (GAO-02-532) that the capacity to provide mammography services was generally adequate, but that the number of mammography facilities had decreased by 5 percent from 1998 to 2001 and that about one-fourth of counties had no machines. GAO was asked to update its information on facility closures and mammography service capacity. The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) regulates mammography quality and maintains a database on mammography facilities and other capacity elements. GAO reviewed FDA data on facility closures and examined reasons for closures in recent years. GAO analyzed changes in the nation's capacity for and use of mammography services using FDA capacity data and National Center for Health Statistics data on service use. GAO also interviewed state and local officials about the effects of the loss or absence of mammography machines on access, including access for medically underserved women, such as those who are poor or uninsured.
What GAO Found
Closures of certified mammography facilities outpaced openings during a recent 3-year period, and financial considerations were most often cited as the reason for facility closures. FDA data show that from October 1, 2001, to October 1, 2004, the number of mammography facilities nationwide decreased from 9,306 to 8,768. During this period, 1,290 facilities closed and 752 began providing services, resulting in a net loss of 538 facilities, or 6 percent. Mammography facility officials most often cited financial considerations as the reason their facility closed. Experts said that another factor that could affect closures is difficulty recruiting and retaining radiologic technologists who perform mammography and physicians who interpret mammograms. Although key elements that make up mammography capacity have decreased and the use of screening mammography has grown, current nationwide capacity is adequate. The numbers of mammography facilities, machines, radiologic technologists, and interpreting physicians decreased from 2001 to 2004. From 2000 to 2003, the estimated number of women who received a screening mammogram increased, mostly because of population growth. Based on GAO's calculation that the estimated number of mammograms performed in the United States in 2003 was substantially lower than the number that could have been performed, GAO found that current capacity is adequate. Most of the experts GAO interviewed believe the nation's current overall capacity is likely adequate, but all of the experts expressed concern that the flow of personnel into the field may be insufficient to serve the growing number of women needing screening. This potential development could result in access problems in the future. The loss or absence of machines in certain locations may have resulted in access problems, including problems for women who are medically underserved, such as those who have a low income or lack health insurance. About one-fourth of counties had no mammography machines in 2004. The majority of officials GAO interviewed about access in their states, including access in 18 of the 117 counties that had lost over 25 percent of their machines from 2001 to 2004, said that machine losses had not resulted in access problems because women were able to obtain services at other facilities. However, some officials told GAO that the loss or absence of machines in certain counties resulted in access problems consisting of lengthy wait times or travel distances to obtain services. Lengthy travel distances may especially pose an access barrier for medically underserved women. Access problems for these women are of concern because uninsured and poor women have lower-than-average screening mammography rates. In commenting on a draft of this report, FDA provided additional details and clarification regarding aspects of its regulation of mammography, which GAO incorporated as appropriate. |
gao_GAO-12-915 | gao_GAO-12-915_0 | Such a plan is instrumental in helping agencies coordinate and guide improvement efforts. We also testified on significant risks facing the 2010 census. At a cost of about $13 billion, 2010 was the costliest decennial census in history. developing systems necessary for the 2020 Decennial Census to help avoid a repeat of the cost and performance issues that occurred during the 2010 Decennial Census. Census Bureau Has Not Finalized Its Investment Management Plan
The bureau has developed a new investment management plan, called the Enterprise Investment Management Plan, which is to apply to all investments, including IT investments. Census Bureau Has Created a New System Development Methodology, but It Does Not Address Modifications Needed for Newer Models of Software Development
In February 2012, the bureau’s IT and 2020 Census Directorates, with the assistance of a contractor, developed a new system development life- cycle methodology to improve the bureau’s ability to develop IT systems and to address our prior 2005 recommendation to strengthen bureau- wide system development and management processes. The guide does not have guidance on how to adapt the process and related work products to alternate development models. By utilizing overlapping requirements development and management processes without a specified time frame for when these processes will be integrated, the bureau is increasing the risk that IT investments, particularly those intended for the 2020 Decennial Census, will face cost overruns, schedule slippages, and performance shortfalls. Until the bureau establishes and implements a consistent requirements development and management process across the bureau that has clear guidance for developing requirements at the strategic mission, business, and project levels and is integrated with its new system development methodology, it will not have assurance that requirements for IT systems intended for the 2020 Decennial Census will be effectively developed or managed. Census Bureau Has Not Finalized Plans for Implementing Investment Management and System Development Processes across the Bureau
While the bureau has drafted a new investment management plan, and system development methodology, including requirements development and management processes, key activities for effectively implementing these processes across the bureau remain to be undertaken. As we noted in 2005, the bureau’s lack of a consistent bureau-wide approach for IT investment management contributed to the bureau not effectively and efficiently managing multimillion dollar investments, including taking consistent and appropriate action when cost, schedule, or performance expectations were not being met. According to the bureau’s timeline for 2020 Decennial Census planning, it will begin operational development and system testing starting in fiscal year 2015. Census Bureau Does Not Have Bureau- wide Workforce Planning Practices for IT Staff
Over the past year, the Census Bureau has taken limited steps to develop IT human capital practices, including identifying critical IT occupations and select competencies and conducting an inventory of these competencies among its IT staff in June 2011. Effective IT workforce planning efforts are critical to ensuring the bureau has the appropriate workforce in place to achieve its mission and strategic goals, particularly in regards to the 2020 Decennial Census. While the bureau has begun to improve its IT human capital practices including conducting an inventory of select IT competencies, many key workforce planning practices remain to be put in place, including conducting gap analyses and integrating IT workforce planning bureau-wide. Recommendations for Executive Action
To strengthen and improve the bureau’s new investment management, system development, and IT workforce management processes, we recommend that the Acting Secretary of Commerce direct the Under Secretary for Economic Affairs who oversees the Economics and Statistics Administration, as well as the Acting Director of the U.S. Census Bureau, take eight actions to address weaknesses in the following IT management areas:
Establish guidelines for the frequency and membership of bureau investment review boards and thresholds for these boards to escalate cost or schedule variance issues to higher-level boards. Establish a process for directorates to coordinate on IT workforce planning, including: (1) aligning IT workforce planning with strategic planning and budget formulation; (2) involving appropriate stakeholders and staff from each directorate; (3) identifying critical occupations, skills, and competencies, and analyzing workforce gaps; (4) developing strategies to address IT workforce gaps; (5) building capacity to address workforce gaps; and (6) monitoring and evaluating IT workforce planning efforts across the bureau, and ensure this process is implemented across the bureau. In its comments, the department stated that the Census Bureau concurred with our eight recommendations and outlined steps it was taking to implement the recommendations. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to evaluate the (1) effectiveness of the Census Bureau’s policies, procedures, and processes for managing information technology (IT) investments and system development and (2) the Census Bureau’s development of effective practices for acquiring and maintaining IT human capital skills. | Why GAO Did This Study
The 2010 Decennial Census, at a cost of approximately $13 billion, was the most expensive headcount in our nations history. Prior to the 2010 Decennial Census, the Census Bureau experienced significant challenges in managing its information systems leading to cost overruns and performance shortfalls which increased the cost of the 2010 census by almost $3 billion. Given the bureaus extensive use of IT in collecting, analyzing, and distributing information, GAO was asked to determine to what extent the bureau has developed (1) effective policies, procedures, and processes for managing IT investments and system development; and (2) effective practices for acquiring and maintaining IT human capital skills. To address these objectives, GAO identified leading practices in these areas, reviewed bureau policies and procedures to determine whether they followed these practices, and interviewed bureau officials.
What GAO Found
The U.S. Census Bureau (Census Bureau) has drafted a new investment management plan, system development methodology, and requirements development and management processes to improve its ability to manage information technology (IT) investments and system development, but additional work is needed to ensure these processes are effective and successfully implemented across the bureau. GAO and others have identified the importance of implementing critical processes within an agency to allow it to select, control, and evaluate its IT investments and effectively manage system development. The bureau has developed a new draft investment management plan which contains policies and guidance for managing IT projects; however, the plan does not explain when investments with cost or schedule variances should be escalated to higher-level boards for review, or when managers should provide updated investment information to a planned bureau-wide tracking tool. The bureau has also developed a new system development methodology guide, but the guide has critical gaps. For example, although there are five development process models allowed, including the traditional sequential approach and newer more iterative approaches, the guide does not explain how to adapt processes and related work products for newer iterative approaches. Furthermore, while the bureau has developed new draft requirements development and management processes for system development within individual bureau directorates, it has not established a consistent process bureau-wide as GAO recommended in 2005. Lack of a consistent bureau-wide process contributed to significant cost and performance issues in the 2010 Decennial Census. Although the bureau plans to begin operational development for the 2020 Decennial Census in fiscal year 2015, it has not finalized plans for implementing its new investment management and system development processes across the bureau. Until the bureau takes additional action to finalize and implement consistent, bureau-wide processes, it faces the risk that IT governance issues that adversely affected the 2010 Decennial Census will also impact the 2020 Decennial Census.
The bureau has begun to take steps to improve its IT workforce planning; however, many key practices consistent with principles for effective workforce planning remain to be put in place. In particular, there is no bureau-wide coordination of these workforce planning efforts. Each directorate is responsible for its own IT workforce planning and the bureau has not established any efforts to coordinate activities among directorates. While the bureau identified mission critical IT occupations and began an assessment of select mission critical competencies in June 2011, it does not plan to perform a bureau-wide IT competency assessment until the fall of 2012. Until bureau-wide IT workforce planning processes are established and the bureau develops specific plans to conduct an IT skills inventory and gap analysis, the bureau faces the risk that the appropriate IT workforce will not be in place to effectively develop and manage multimillion dollar investments in information systems and technology that will be needed for the 2020 Decennial Census.
What GAO Recommends
To strengthen and improve the Census Bureaus management of IT, GAO recommends that the Acting Secretary of Commerce take eight actions, including improvements to guidance for its planned IT investment process, a consistent requirements development and management process, an implementation plan and time frames for its investment management process and system development methodology, and coordination of IT workforce planning efforts. In written comments, the Acting Secretary concurred with our recommendations and described steps the bureau was taking to implement them. |
gao_GAO-04-929 | gao_GAO-04-929_0 | In fiscal year 2003, SSA paid about $70 billion to 7.5 million disabled workers, their spouses, and dependents, with average monthly cash benefits of about $723 per beneficiary. In addition, staff—particularly in SSA field offices—are also required to balance numerous competing workloads, including processing initial claims, serving individuals who walk into the field office without an appointment, meeting with beneficiaries who have requested an appointment, and processing a “special disability workload.”
Overpayments in the DI Program Are Substantial and Have Increased in Recent Years
DI overpayment detections increased from about $772 million to about $990 million between fiscal years 1999 and 2003. These overpayments included a substantial amount due to beneficiaries who worked and earned more than SGA. These overpayments also contributed to mounting financial losses in the DI program. On the basis of data in a recent study from SSA, we calculated that overpayments attributable to work and earnings averaged about 31 percent of all DI overpayments annually between 1999 and 2002. These officials agreed that the estimate is generally accurate based on limited available data, but likely understates the true extent of the problem. Total DI overpayment debt increased from about $1.9 billion in 1999 to nearly $3 billion in 2003. Lack of Timely Data on Beneficiary Earnings and Other Vulnerabilities Impede SSA’s Ability to Detect and Prevent DI Overpayments
SSA’s ability to detect and prevent earnings-related overpayments is hindered by a lack of timely wage data, inefficient processes for conducting work CDRs, and potentially inaccurate management information. Weaknesses in SSA’s Management Information Hinder Its Ability to Effectively Monitor Work CDR’s
Our review suggests that SSA relies on potentially inaccurate data to manage its work CDR workload. Identified Vulnerabilities Contribute to Some Large Overpayments
The vulnerabilities we identified have likely contributed to old work CDR cases and large earnings-related overpayments in the DI program. Some of these cases were as much as 7 years old and involved large overpayments. Conclusions
We recognize that ensuring program integrity while focusing on the important goal of returning individuals with disabilities to work presents challenges for SSA. The new automated system that SSA is developing may help the agency address some of the weaknesses we identified, but it is too early to determine how effective it will be. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
This appendix provides additional details about our analysis of the Disability Insurance (DI) program’s work continuing disability review (work CDR) process, including potential weaknesses in the Social Security Administration’s (SSA) existing procedures and policies. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Social Security Administration's (SSA) Disability Insurance (DI) program is one of the nation's largest cash assistance programs for disabled workers. In fiscal year 2003, the DI program provided about $70 billion in financial assistance to approximately 7.5 million disabled workers, their spouses, and dependent children. This program has grown in recent years and is poised to grow further as the baby boom generation ages. The Senate Committee on Finance asked GAO to (1) determine the amount of overpayments in the DI program, particularly those attributable to earnings or work activity, and (2) identify any vulnerabilities in SSA's processes and policies for verifying earnings that may contribute to work-related overpayments.
What GAO Found
Overpayment detections in the DI program increased from $772 million in fiscal year 1999 to about $990 million in 2003. The true extent of overpayments resulting from earnings that exceed agency guidelines is currently unknown. Based on available data from SSA, GAO found that about 31 percent of all DI overpayments are attributable to DI beneficiaries who worked and earned more than allowed. Moreover, GAO found that these overpayments contributed to mounting financial losses in the program. From 1999 to 2003, total overpayment debt increased from about $1.9 billion to nearly $3 billion. Three basic weaknesses impede SSA's ability to prevent and detect earnings-related overpayments. First, the agency lacks timely data on beneficiaries' earnings and work activity. Second, SSA uses inefficient processes to perform work continuing disability reviews (work CDRs). Third, the agency relies on potentially inaccurate management information to effectively monitor and oversee some parts of this workload. These weaknesses contributed to some work CDR cases GAO identified that were as much as 7 years old, resulting in potential and established overpayments as large as $105,000 per beneficiary. In addition, GAO found that SSA relies on potentially inaccurate management information to administer its work CDR workload. SSA is developing new automated systems that may potentially address some of these problems and could help the agency balance the important goals of encouraging individuals with disabilities return to work, while also ensuring program integrity. However, it is too early to determine how effective such systems will be. |
gao_GAO-04-723 | gao_GAO-04-723_0 | In addition, states offer various services to other low-income families not receiving welfare, including child care and employment and training services. States’ Efforts To Manage Improper Payments Are Uneven
Almost all states we surveyed and visited reported taking some steps to assess whether their TANF and CCDF programs were at risk for improper payments or to measure the extent of improper payments. In addition, while the states reported they have various strategies and tools in place to help prevent and detect improper payments, these efforts were also uneven. While states reported performing some risk assessment activities, these activities did not appear to be uniformly comprehensive in their coverage of all types of program payments. The level of sophistication of data sharing practices varied in the states we visited. These mechanisms, however, do not capture information on the various strategies and tools that states have in place for managing improper payments. In the absence of such information, HHS cannot adequately determine if the TANF and CCDF programs are susceptible to significant improper payments, as required by the Improper Payments Act. As a result, HHS recently started several projects to collect information from selected states. HHS Monitoring Activities Do Not Provide Information That HHS Needs to Adequately Assess the Risk of Improper Payments
HHS is required to annually review the TANF and CCDF programs to determine if they are susceptible to significant improper payments. However, HHS projects do not provide mechanisms to gather information on state control activities on a recurring basis. The absence of such mechanisms hinders HHS’s ability to adequately assess the risk of improper payments and assist states in managing improper payments in these multi-billion dollar programs on an ongoing basis. Given the dollar magnitude of these programs—about $34 billion in federal and state funds—and the nature of their activities, we know that potential risks exist. We also know—based on our review of the 16 states--that states have some prevention and detection tools in place and at least some understanding of the extent of program risks, although some unevenness exists among states and between the TANF and CCDF programs in these areas. Recommendations for Executive Action
To better assist states in managing improper payments in the TANF and CCDF programs and comply with the Improper Payments Act, we recommend that the Secretary of Health and Human Services direct the Assistant Secretary of ACF to take the following four actions: Develop mechanisms to gather information on a recurring basis from all states on their internal control systems for measuring and minimizing improper payments. In recommending these approaches, we recognize that HHS may determine that it needs legislative action to direct states to provide the information. It also stated, however, that it believed that the assessment of risk called for under the Improper Payments Act must be made within the statutory framework of the TANF program, which places constraints on ACF to regulate state TANF programs. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
We designed our study to provide information on (1) what selected states have done to manage improper payments in the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) and Child Care and Development Fund (CCDF) programs, and (2) what the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) has done to assess risk and assist states in managing improper payments in these programs. | Why GAO Did This Study
Minimizing improper payments is important given the dollar magnitude of the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) and Child Care and Development Fund (CCDF) programs--about $34 billion in federal and state funds expended annually. These block grants support millions of low-income families with cash assistance, child care, and other services aimed at reducing their dependence on the government. At the federal level, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) oversees TANF and CCDF. Within states, many public and private entities administer these programs and share responsibility for financial integrity. GAO looked at (1) what selected states have done to manage improper payments in TANF and CCDF and (2) what HHS has done to assess risk and assist states in managing improper payments in these programs. To address these questions, GAO judgmentally selected states that varied in geographic location and program size. GAO used a survey to collect consistent information from 11 states and visited 5 states.
What GAO Found
The 16 states in GAO's review reported using various strategies and tools to manage improper payments, but their efforts were uneven. Almost all the states in the review reported that they performed some activities to assess whether their programs were at risk of improper payments. These activities, however, did not always cover all payments that could be at risk, focusing, for instance, on cash welfare payments but not on payments for services, which were more than half of all TANF payments in certain states. As a result, the assessments do not provide a comprehensive picture of the level of risk in these state programs, which would be useful to HHS as it takes steps to address requirements under the Improper Payments Act. States also reported using a variety of prevention and detection tools to protect against improper payments, but states reported fewer tools in place for CCDF than for TANF, particularly in the area of data sharing to verify eligibility. Although the states in GAO's review recognized the importance of addressing improper payments, they cited competing demands for staff attention and resource limitations that constrained their efforts. While addressing improper payments does involve costs, comprehensively assessing risks can help focus prevention and detection efforts on areas at greatest risk. HHS reported using information from its monitoring activities, including single audits and state financial expenditure reporting to determine if the TANF and CCDF programs are at risk of improper payments. We found however, that these activities do not capture information about the various strategies and tools that states have in place for managing improper payments, such as those we observed in our review. In the absence of such information, HHS cannot determine if the TANF and CCDF programs are susceptible to significant improper payments, as required under the Improper Payments Act. HHS officials acknowledged that they needed more information to be in a position to carry out their responsibilities under the act and therefore recently initiated several projects to gain a better understanding of state control activities. However, HHS's projects do not provide mechanisms to gather information on a recurring basis. The absence of such mechanisms hinders HHS's ability to adequately assess the risk of improper payments and assist states in managing improper payments in these multibillion dollar programs on an ongoing basis. Given the statutory framework of the TANF program, GAO recognizes that HHS may determine that it needs legislative action to direct states to provide the information it needs to take this approach. |
gao_GAO-14-382T | gao_GAO-14-382T_0 | Background
Over the last decade, DOD has been managing many challenging space systems acquisitions. DOD has generally concurred with our recommendations, and has undertaken a number of actions to establish a better foundation for acquisition success. The Current Status and Cost of Space Systems Acquisitions
Most of DOD’s major satellite programs are in mature phases of acquisition, and some of the significant problems of past years, such as cost and schedule growth, are not currently as prevalent. While many programs have overcome past problems, some of the major space programs have encountered significant challenges in the last year and some delays in development and production. For example:
The Air Force’s Space Fence program office is developing a large ground-based radar that is expected to improve on the performance of and replace the Air Force Space Surveillance System, which became operational in 1961 and was recently shut down. In April 2013, DOD proposed canceling the Missile Defense Agency’s Precision Tracking Space System (PTSS) because of concerns with the program’s high-risk acquisition strategy and long-term affordability. PTSS was intended to be a satellite system equipped with infrared sensors that would track ballistic missiles through their emitted heat. Recent Actions DOD Believes Will Improve Space System Acquisition Processes, and Continuing Barriers to Program Oversight and Management
We have reported in the past that DOD and Congress are taking steps to reform and improve the defense acquisition system, and in the past year additional actions have been taken towards these goals. With this update, DOD hoped to create an acquisition policy environment that will achieve greater efficiency and productivity in defense spending. GAO has not assessed the potential effects of this change. A second change made this year, according to Air Force officials, is the requirement that DOD programs, including space programs, undergo independent development testing. In addition, DOD is adopting new practices to reduce fragmentation of its satellite ground control systems, which adds oversight to a major development decision. We have reported in the past that fragmented leadership and lack of a single authority in overseeing the acquisition of space programs have created challenges for optimally Past studies acquiring, developing, and deploying new space systems.and reviews have found that responsibilities for acquiring space systems are diffused across various DOD organizations, even though many of the larger programs, such as the Global Positioning System and those to acquire imagery and environmental satellites, are integral to the execution of multiple agencies’ missions. A program management challenge that GAO has identified, which stems from a lack of oversight, is that DOD has not optimally aligned the development of its satellites with associated components, including ground control system and user terminal acquisitions. Synchronization of space system components will be an important issue for DOD in considering disaggregating space architectures, as the potential for larger numbers and novel configurations of satellites and ground systems will likely require the components to be synchronized to allow them to work together in the most effective way possible. As mentioned earlier, DOD is taking steps in response to improvements mandated by the Congress. For example, budget authority for user terminals, ground systems, and satellites is spread throughout the military services, and no one is in charge of synchronizing all of the system components, making it difficult to optimally line up programs’ deliveries. DOD Is Considering and Adopting Significant Changes to Space Systems Acquisitions
Fiscal pressures, past development problems, and concerns about the resiliency of satellites have spurred DOD to consider significant changes in the way it acquires and launches national security satellites. For example, a single launch failure, on-orbit anomaly, or adversary attack on a large multi-mission satellite could result in the loss of billions of dollars of investment and a significant loss of capability. To build consensus in the department, and to conduct a more rigorous analysis of options, DOD is currently in the process of conducting additional studies that will consider future architectures. Recent and Upcoming Changes to the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle Program
DOD has made some changes to the way it buys launch services from its sole-source provider, and plans to allow other companies to compete with that provider for launch services in the near future. With the recent development of new domestic launch vehicles that can meet at least some EELV mission requirements, DOD plans to make available for competition up to 14 launches in fiscal years 2015-2017. Based on our discussions with DOD officials, they plan to use a best value approach for this competition, in which price is not the only consideration. Related GAO Products
Introducing Competition into National Security Space Launch Acquisitions. Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle: DOD Needs to Ensure New Acquisition Strategy Is Based on Sufficient Information. GAO-11-21. Space Acquisitions: DOD Needs to Take More Action to Address Unrealistic Initial Cost Estimates of Space Systems. | Why GAO Did This Study
Each year, DOD spends billions of dollars to acquire space-based capabilities that support military and other government operations. The majority of DOD's space programs were beset by significant cost and schedule growth problems during their development. Most programs are now in production, however, and acquisition problems are not as widespread and significant as they were several years ago. In prior years, GAO has identified a number of actions DOD is taking to improve management and oversight of space program acquisitions. Facing constrained budgets and concerns about the resiliency of its satellites, DOD is considering potential changes to how it acquires space systems.
This testimony focuses on (1) the current status and cost of major DOD space systems acquisitions, (2) recent actions taken to further improve space systems acquisitions, and (3) potential impacts of the direction DOD is taking on upcoming changes to the acquisition of DOD space systems. This testimony is based on previously issued GAO products, ongoing GAO work on disaggregated architectures, interviews with DOD officials, and an analysis of DOD funding estimates from fiscal years 2013 through 2018.
What GAO Found
Most of the Department of Defense's (DOD) major satellite acquisition programs are in later stages of acquisition, with the initial satellites having been designed, produced, and launched into orbit while additional satellites of the same design are being produced. A few other major space programs, however, have recently experienced setbacks. For example: the Missile Defense Agency's Precision Tracking Space System, which was intended to be a satellite system to track ballistic missiles, has been cancelled due to technical, programmatic and affordability concerns; the Air Force's Space Fence program, which is developing a ground-based radar to track Earth-orbiting objects, continues to experience delays in entering development; and the first launch of the new Global Positioning System satellites has been delayed by 21 months.
Congress and DOD continue to take steps they believe will improve oversight and management of space systems acquisitions. In the past year, for example, DOD has updated its major acquisition policy with the goal of improving efficiency and productivity in defense spending. Among other things, the policy change adds a requirement for independent development testing for DOD acquisition programs, which officials believe will provide an independent voice on programs' development. However, DOD still faces significant oversight and management challenges, including (1) leadership of a space community that is comprised of a wide variety of users and stakeholders with diverse interests and (2) alignment of the delivery of satellites with corresponding ground systems and user terminals. For instance, in some cases, gaps in delivery can add up to years, meaning that a satellite is launched but not effectively used for years until ground systems become available. One reason DOD has been unable to align the delivery of space system components is because budgeting authority for the components is spread across the military services.
While most DOD major space system acquisitions have overcome development challenges and are currently being produced and launched, past problems involving large, complicated systems, coupled with the recent fiscal climate of reduced funds, has led DOD to consider efforts that could signal significant changes to the way it acquires and conducts space activities. DOD is considering moving away from its current approach in satellite development—building small numbers of large satellites over a decade or more that meet the needs of many missions and users—toward a more disaggregated architecture involving less complex, smaller, and more numerous satellites. GAO has found that DOD does not yet have sufficient information to make decisions on whether to disaggregate, but it is in the process of gathering that information. In addition, in response to predictions of dramatic increases to the price of launching its satellites, coupled with restrained budgets, DOD has made changes to the way it procures launch vehicles, and is moving forward with plans to allow competition for launch services—a significant shift from past ways of doing business. According to the Air Force, other recent steps in launch acquisitions, including gaining significant insight into launch services cost drivers, have enabled it to achieve significant savings.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is not making recommendations in this testimony. However, in previous reports, GAO has generally recommended that DOD adopt best practices for developing space systems. DOD has agreed and is in the process of implementing such practices. |
gao_GAO-02-357 | gao_GAO-02-357_0 | Specifically, we agreed to determine the nature and extent of dismantlement, removal, and restoration requirements for existing oil industry activities on state-owned land on Alaska’s North Slope, including how these requirements compare to those of other oil-producing states; whether any cost estimates exist for the dismantlement and removal of the infrastructure and for the restoration of North Slope state-owned land; what financial assurances the state of Alaska has that funds will be available to cover the eventual dismantlement, removal, and restoration costs and how these assurances compare to those of other oil-producing states; and the nature and extent of dismantlement, removal, and restoration requirements and financial assurances governing future oil industry activities on federal lands located on the North Slope and how these compare with requirements and financial assurances in other related industries, such as mining and nuclear power. Current DR&R Requirements for Existing Oil Production Are Very General
The state of Alaska’s dismantlement, removal, and restoration requirements, which apply to almost all existing oil production on the North Slope, offer no specifics on what infrastructure must be removed or to what condition lands used for oil industry activities must be restored. A comparison of Alaska’s DR&R requirements to those of nine other oil-producing states reveals a spectrum of requirements; some states have general requirements like Alaska’s, while other states have more explicit requirements that create a fixed obligation to fully restore the land according to specific standards. In addition, the state of Alaska has not developed a land use plan for the North Slope or identified the condition to which the state would like its lands returned after oil production ceases. | Why GAO Did This Study
This report discusses the nature and extent of dismantlement, removal, and restoration requirements for oil industry activities that are occurring on both federal and state lands located on the North Slope of the state of Alaska.
What GAO Found
The state of Alaska, which owns the lands where most of the North Slope's current oil production occurs, has adopted general dismantlement, removal, and restoration requirements that contain no specific stipulations on what infrastructure must be removed or to what condition the lands used for oil industry activities must be restored once production ceases. Alaska's requirements are similar to those of some states but less explicit than those of other states, which create a fixed obligation to fully restore the land according to specific requirements. Until the state of Alaska defines the condition in which it would like its lands returned, there is no way to accurately estimate the cost of dismantling and removing the infrastructure and restoring the disturbed land on Alaska's North Slope. Existing financial assurances, such as bonding requirements, ensure the availability of only a small portion of the funds that are likely to be needed to dismantle and remove the infrastructure used for oil industry activities and to restore state-owned lands. Current dismantlement, removal, and restoration requirements and financial assurances for federal lands on the North Slope vary by agency, but are generally insufficient to ensure that any federal lands disturbed by oil industry activities will be restored. |
gao_GAO-16-222 | gao_GAO-16-222_0 | The USDA’s Rural Utilities Service (RUS) and FCC are responsible for several programs designed to improve the nation’s telecommunications infrastructure. The Recovery Act also directed FCC to develop a national broadband plan to ensure every American had access to high- speed Internet service. Tribal lands located far from urban areas may not have middle-mile infrastructure necessary for high- speed Internet deployment to their lands. About Half of Tribes Reported That They Lack the Capacity to Apply for Federal funds or Design High-Speed Internet Networks
About half of the tribes we interviewed told us that a lack of tribal members with sufficient bureaucratic and technical expertise is a barrier to increasing high-speed Internet access on tribal lands. FCC has not set a date for the awarding of these funds. The Community Connect Program provides grants to rural communities to provide high-speed Internet service to unserved areas. Our body of work has shown that interagency coordination can help agencies with interrelated programs ensure efficient use of resources and effective programs. This could result in an inefficient use of limited federal resources and missed opportunities for resource leveraging between the two agencies and cost-savings to the tribes attending training events. FCC Has Not Established Performance Goals and Measures for Internet Availability to or Adoption in Households on Tribal Lands
FCC has made an important distinction between Internet availability and Internet adoption. Further, FCC’s subsidy programs also seek to increase high- speed Internet access on tribal lands, but the E-rate program lacks reliable data specific to institutions on tribal lands as well as goals and performance measures to track the outcomes of efforts on tribal lands. Not defining “tribal” in the E-rate application makes it difficult to measure the program’s impact on tribal lands as not all E-rate recipients serving these areas self-identify as tribal. Without such information, it will be difficult for FCC to determine the extent to which FCC is achieving its goals. Recommendations for Executive Action
To help improve and measure the availability and adoption of high-speed Internet on tribal lands, we recommend that the Chairman of the Federal Communications Commission take the following four actions:
Develop joint outreach and training efforts with USDA whenever feasible to help improve Internet availability and adoption on tribal lands;
Develop performance goals and measures using, for example, data supporting the National Broadband Map, to track progress on achieving its strategic objective of making broadband Internet available to households on tribal lands; Improve the reliability of FCC data related institutions that receive E- Rate funding by defining “tribal” on the program application; and
Develop performance goals and measures to track progress on achieving its strategic objective of ensuring that all tribal schools and libraries have affordable access to modern broadband technologies. Regarding our recommendation to develop performance goals and measures to track tribal schools and libraries access to broadband, FCC said that its goal is to provide all schools and libraries with broadband Internet, including tribal schools and libraries and that its efforts will substantially improve the accessibility of modern broadband technologies for tribal schools and libraries. This report examines (1) perspectives of selected tribes and providers on the importance of Internet access for tribes and any barriers to increasing access to Internet on tribal lands; (2) the level of interrelation and coordination between federal programs at FCC and USDA that promote high-speed Internet access on tribal lands; and (3) existing data and FCC performance goals and measures related to access to Internet service on tribal lands and for tribal institutions. To determine the level of interrelation and coordination between federal programs at FCC and USDA that promote high-speed Internet access on tribal lands, we reviewed FCC and USDA program guidance materials and program funding for fiscal years 2010 through 2014, interviewed FCC and USDA officials, and interviewed tribal officials from the selected 21 tribal governments or Alaska Native regions and 6 service providers about the federal government programs in which they participated. | Why GAO Did This Study
High-speed Internet service is viewed as a critical component of the nation's infrastructure and an economic driver, particularly to remote tribal communities. However, in 2015, FCC reported that the lack of service in tribal areas presents impediments. GAO was asked to review the status of high-speed Internet on tribal lands. The report examines (1) perspectives of tribes and providers on high-speed Internet access and barriers to increasing this access; (2) the level of interrelation and coordination between federal programs that promote high-speed Internet access on tribal lands; and (3) existing data and performance measures related to high-speed Internet on tribal lands. GAO visited or interviewed officials from a non-generalizable sample of 21 tribal entities and 6 service providers selected to provide diversity in size, location, and poverty levels. GAO also reviewed FCC and USDA fiscal year 2010 through 2014 program data, funding, and materials and interviewed federal officials.
What GAO Found
Although all 21 tribes GAO interviewed have some access to high-speed Internet, tribes and providers GAO interviewed cited barriers to increasing access. For example, high poverty rates and the high costs of connecting remote tribal villages to core Internet networks—called middle-mile infrastructure—limit high-speed Internet availability and adoption on tribal lands (see fig.). About half of the tribes GAO interviewed also said that the lack of sufficient administrative and technical expertise among tribal members limits their efforts to increase high-speed Internet access.
The Federal Communications Commission's (FCC) Universal Service Fund subsidy programs and the U.S. Department of Agriculture's (USDA) Rural Utilities Service grant programs are interrelated in that they seek to increase high-speed Internet access in underserved areas, including tribal lands. GAO's previous work on overlap, duplication, and fragmentation has shown that interagency coordination on interrelated programs can help ensure efficient use of resources and effective programs. However, FCC and USDA do not coordinate to develop joint outreach and training. This could result in an inefficient use of federal resources and missed opportunities for resource leveraging between FCC and USDA.
FCC has placed special emphasis on improving Internet access on tribal lands following the issuance of the National Broadband Plan, which called for greater efforts to make broadband available on tribal lands. However, FCC has not developed performance goals and measures for improving high-speed Internet availability to households on tribal lands. Without these goals and measures FCC cannot assess the impact of its efforts. The National Broadband Map includes data on Internet availability on tribal lands that could allow FCC to establish baseline measures for Internet availability on tribal lands. Further, FCC also lacks performance goals and measures for tribal institutions—such as schools and libraries. Specifically, FCC's E-rate program provides funds to ensure that schools and libraries have affordable access to modern broadband technologies, but FCC has not set any performance goals for the program's impact on tribal institutions. Nor has FCC defined “tribal” on the E-rate application. Without such information, it will be difficult to accurately track progress in making broadband available in tribal institutions.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that FCC (1) develop joint training and outreach with USDA; (2) develop performance goals and measures for tribal areas for improving broadband availability to households; (3) develop performance goals and measures for improving broadband availability to tribal schools and libraries; and (4) improve the reliability of FCC data related to institutions that receive E-rate funding by defining “tribal” on the program application. FCC agreed with the recommendations. |
gao_GAO-02-60 | gao_GAO-02-60_0 | Worker Safety and Pending Enforcement Are Key Factors Influencing Participation
Industry associations as well as participating employers identified the opportunity to improve workplace safety and health and to prepare for or preempt an OSHA inspection as two incentives for participation in the Consultation Program. For example: Maine’s promotion program. Funding Allocation Process Does Little to Encourage Goal Achievement
OSHA’s process for allocating federal funds to state consultation programs does not encourage these programs to make effective use of these funds. Recommendations for Executive Action
To strengthen OSHA’s ability to assess the Consultation Program’s progress toward key agency goals, we recommend that the Secretary of Labor direct the Assistant Secretary for Occupational Safety and Health to require state consultation programs to collect and forward to OSHA data on injuries and illnesses from employers participating in the Consultation Program at some period after the consultation is completed for use in analyzing whether there is a relationship between participation in the program and reductions in workplace injuries and illnesses and review reporting requirements with an eye toward eliminating indicators that no longer reflect the program while adding new ones that do. 1. 2. | Why GAO Did This Study
Several factors affect employers' decisions to participate in the Occupational Safety and Health Administration's (OSHA) consultation program. GAO surveyed industry associations, employee representatives, and participating employers and found that the two main incentives for program participation are (1) making the employer's workplace safer and reducing worker injury and illness by promoting workplace safety and health and (2) preparing the employer's workplace for an OSHA inspection.
What GAO Found
The measurement system OSHA uses lacks enough data to separate the program outcomes from the outcomes of OSHA's other efforts to reduce workplace injuries and illnesses. OSHA's process for allocating funds to the state consultation programs plays no role in encouraging participating states to achieve agency goals. |
gao_RCED-98-150 | gao_RCED-98-150_0 | In addition, the current reporting practices of the agencies do not allow the wetlands-related accomplishments of the agencies to be determined. However, as of June 10, 1998, strategies had not yet been developed to address the other actions planned by the administration to improve wetlands data. Each inventory uses the wetlands data it collects to produce estimates of the nation’s remaining wetlands acreage and the rate of wetlands gains and losses. Officials from each of the agencies responsible for the inventories have questioned the estimates made by the other, and officials from the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) have expressed concern about the estimates of both inventories. Past Efforts Have Not Solved Wetlands Data Problems, but New Efforts Are Under Way
Since 1989, at least five interagency groups, established to better coordinate federal wetlands programs, have attempted to improve wetlands data. As a result, the progress made toward achieving the goal of no net loss of the nation’s remaining wetlands, the administration’s new goal of gaining 100,000 acres of wetlands each year beginning in the year 2005, or the contributions made by the agencies in achieving these goals cannot be measured. In addition, while we report that the wetlands acreage estimates produced by FWS and NRCS are not completely consistent, we also acknowledge that both have reported that the rate of wetlands losses has declined. In fiscal years 1990 through 1997, the administration spent about $90,000 (in constant 1997 dollars) and no identified full-time-equivalent staff-years on wetlands-related activities. About $834,000 and six full-time-equivalent staff-years were associated with these wetlands-related activities in fiscal year 1997. Not only do we point out that 6 of the 36 agencies are the primary agencies involved in and responsible for implementing wetlands-related programs, but we state that these 6 agencies account for more than 70 percent of the funding and 65 percent of the staffing associated with such activities. 2. 3. 4. 5. Details of how the other actions will be accomplished have not been developed. Action Plan: Developing a Unified Wetlands Status and Trends Report
Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Concerned about the lack of consolidated information on the federal commitment to wetlands, you asked us to (1) develop an inventory of the federal agencies involved in wetlands-related activities and the funding and staffing associated with their activities during fiscal years 1990 through 1997 and (2) determine if the wetlands data reported by these agencies are consistent and reliable. In most of these instances, the agencies provided estimates of funding and staffing associated with their efforts. To determine the consistency and reliability of wetlands acreage data reported by the agencies, we interviewed officials and obtained and reviewed documentation on two federal resource inventories—the National Wetlands Inventory and the National Resources Inventory maintained by Interior’s Fish and Wildlife Service and Agriculture’s Natural Resources Conservation Service, respectively. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO: (1) developed an inventory of the federal agencies involved in wetlands-related activities and the funding and staffing associated with their activities during fiscal years (FY) 1990 through 1997; and (2) determined if the data on wetlands acreage reported by these agencies are consistent and reliable.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) at least 36 agencies conducted wetlands-related activities during FY 1990 through FY 1997; (2) the total funding associated each year with the agencies' efforts ranged from about $508 million in FY 1990 to about $787 million in FY 1997; (3) staffing associated with the agencies' activities during this period ranged from about 3,271 full-time-equivalent staff-years in FY 1993 to about 4,308 full-time-equivalent staff-years in FY 1997; (4) six agencies were primarily involved in and responsible for implementing wetlands-related programs; (5) these six agencies accounted for more than 70 percent of the funding and 65 percent of the staffing associated each year with such activities; (6) the consistency and reliability of wetlands acreage data reported by the federal agencies are questionable; (7) the Fish and Wildlife Service and the Natural Resources Conservation Service maintain resource inventories that provide estimates of the nation's remaining wetlands acreage, annual rates of wetlands gains and losses, and the primary cause(s) for losses; (8) although both inventories have reported that the rate of wetlands loss has declined, the inventories' estimates are not completely consistent; (9) a single set of wetlands acreage numbers that could be used to evaluate the progress made in achieving the goal of no net loss of the nation's remaining wetlands is not available; (10) officials from each of the agencies have questioned the estimates made by the other, and the Environmental Protection Agency has expressed concern about both inventories; (11) the agencies' current reporting practices do not permit the actual accomplishments of the agencies to be determined; (12) since 1989, several interagency groups have attempted to improve wetlands data; (13) because their efforts have not resolved these problems, the administration recently announced new efforts to improve wetlands data; (14) in May 1998, the administration issued a plan to accomplish a key action--the development of a single wetlands status and trends report; and (15) as of June 10, 1998, details have not yet been developed on how the other actions announced by the administration will be accomplished. |
gao_GAO-10-181T | gao_GAO-10-181T_0 | Since then, the influx of large plan terminations has continued. For example, in August 2009, PBGC assumed responsibility for six Delphi pension plans, covering about 70,000 workers and retirees, and underfunded by a total of about $7.0 billion. PBGC’s Benefit Determination Process Generally Takes about 3 Years to Complete
Our review of plans terminated and trusteed between fiscal years 2000 and 2008 found that PBGC completed most participants’ benefit determinations in less than 3 years, but required more time—up to 9 years—to process determinations for complex plans, plans with missing data, and plans with large numbers of participants. As some pension advocacy groups and union representatives have noted, long delays and uncertainty over final benefit amounts make it difficult for workers to plan for retirement, and especially for retirees who have come to depend on a certain level of monthly income. The key points of contact with workers and retirees that occur during this process are described in detail below. Initial Notification
PBGC’s first communication with participants is generally a letter informing them that their pension plan has been terminated and that PBGC has become the plan trustee. However, some participants may have their benefits reduced to comply with certain limits, specified under ERISA and related regulations. 2). Finalized Benefit Amounts Once the benefit determination process is complete, PBGC notifies each participant of the final benefit amount with a “benefit determination letter.” From the time of its initial contact with plan participants until the benefit determination process is complete, PBGC generally does not communicate with participants. PBGC’s Recoupment Process Affects Only a Small Percentage of Terminated Plan Participants
The vast majority of participants in terminated plans are not affected by overpayments or PBGC’s recoupment process. Overpayments can occur for two basic reasons: (1) there is a period of time when the retiree’s estimated benefit has not yet been reduced to reflect applicable limits; and (2) the retiree’s estimated benefit is adjusted to reflect applicable limits, but the estimate is still greater than the benefit amount that is ultimately determined to be correct. The amount of the benefit reduction for recoupment of the overpayment is $38 per month, to be paid until 6/1/2020. It can still come as a shock when—perhaps years later—they receive a final benefit determination letter with this news. Their frustration may be compounded if they fail to understand the explanations provided in the benefit determination letters. Conclusions and Recommendations
To address the concerns of workers and retirees in terminated plans who stand to lose as much as one-half or more of their long-anticipated retirement income, and who will likely have to make painful financial adjustments, PBGC needs a more strategic approach for processing complex plans prone to delays and overpayments. | Why GAO Did This Study
Under the single-employer insurance program, the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) may become the trustee of underfunded plans that are terminated and assume responsibility for paying benefits to participants as they become due, up to certain legal limits. From its inception in 1974 through the end of fiscal year 2008, PBGC has terminated and trusteed a total of 3,860 single-employer plans covering some 1.2 million workers and retirees. Since 2008, the economic downturn has brought a new influx of pension plan terminations to PBGC, and more are expected to follow. The committee asked GAO to discuss our recent work on PBGC. Specifically, this testimony describes: (1) PBGC's process for determining the amount of benefits to be paid; and (2) PBGC's recoupment process when the estimated benefit provided is too high and a retiree receives an overpayment that must be repaid. To address these objectives, GAO relied primarily on a recent report titled Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation: More Strategic Approach Needed for Processing Complex Plans Prone to Delays and Overpayments ( GAO-09-716 , Aug. 2009). In that report, GAO made numerous recommendations. PBGC generally agreed and is taking steps to address the concerns raised. No new recommendations are being made in this testimony.
What GAO Found
Most participants must wait about 3 years for PBGC to complete the benefit determination process and provide their finalized benefit amounts, but the vast majority are not affected by overpayments or the recoupment process. Nevertheless, long delays and uncertainty over final benefit amounts make it difficult for workers to plan for retirement, and for retirees who may have come to depend on a certain level of monthly income. During the benefit determination process, key points of contact with workers and retirees include: (1) Initial notification: PBGC's first communication with participants is generally a letter informing them that their pension plan has been terminated and that PBGC has become the plan trustee. (2) Estimated benefits: For retirees, PBGC continues payments after plan termination, but adjusts the amounts to reflect limits set by law. These payments are based on estimates, so overpayments can occur. (3) Finalized benefit amounts: Once the benefit determination process is complete, PBGC notifies each participant of the final benefit amount through a "benefit determination letter." A small percentage of participants have incurred overpayments to be repaid through the recoupment process. But for those affected, the news can still come as a shock, especially when several years have elapsed since their benefits were reduced to comply with legal limits. Their frustration may be compounded if they cannot understand the explanations provided by PBGC. As the influx of large, complex plan terminations continues, improvements in PBGC's processes are urgently needed. |
gao_GAO-10-70 | gao_GAO-10-70_0 | Weaknesses in CMS Survey Process Contributed to Understatement, but Long-Term Effect of New Survey Methodology Is Not Yet Known
Over a third of both surveyors and state agency directors responding to our questionnaire identified weaknesses in the federal government’s nursing home survey process that contributed to the understatement of deficiencies. One such weakness identified by both surveyors and directors was the number of survey tasks that need to be completed. Forty percent of surveyors and 58 percent of state agency directors reported that additional training on how to apply CMS guidance was needed. State agency directors and surveyors indicated that CMS’s written guidance for certain federal nursing home quality standards could be improved and that revised investigative protocols were helpful. Since the evaluation did not find improved accuracy, CMS concluded that non-QIS factors, including survey guidance clarification and surveyor training and supervision, would help improve survey accuracy. Workforce Shortages Sometimes Contributed to Understatement
Although a small percentage of state agency directors reported that workforce shortages always or frequently contributed to the understatement of nursing home deficiencies in their states, 36 percent indicated that workforce shortages sometimes contributed to understatement (see table 4). On average, 30 percent of surveyors had less than 2 years’ experience (see table 5); however the percentage of inexperienced surveyors ranged from 10 to 82 percent across states who reported this information. In addition, 46 percent of state agency directors reported that time pressures always, frequently, or sometimes contributed to understatement in their states. Initial Surveyor Training. About 29 percent of surveyors in high-understatement states reported that initial training was not sufficient to cite appropriate scope and severity levels, compared with 16 percent of surveyors in low-understatement states (see table 7). Ongoing Training. Supervisory Reviews Often Focused on Higher-Level Deficiencies
According to state agency directors’ responses to our questionnaire, states generally focused supervisory review on surveys with higher-level deficiencies, rather than on the surveys with deficiencies at the potential for more than minimal-harm level (D through F)—the deficiencies most likely to be understated. Survey methodology weaknesses. State Agency Practices and External Pressure May Compromise Survey Accuracy and Lead to Understatement in a Few States
Nursing home surveyors and state agency directors in a minority of states told us that in isolated cases issues such as a state agency practice of noncitation, external pressure from the nursing home industry, and an unbalanced IDR process may have led to the understatement of deficiencies. Surveyors Reported Noncitation Practices in a Small Number of States
Approximately 20 percent of surveyors nationwide and over 40 percent of surveyors in five states reported that their state agency had at least one of the following noncitation practices: (1) not citing certain deficiencies, (2) not citing deficiencies above a certain scope and severity level, and (3) allowing nursing homes to correct deficiencies without receiving a citation (see fig. Concerns about CMS’s Survey Process. For example, surveyors who reported that survey teams had too many new surveyors, more often also reported either frequent changes to or removals of deficiencies during supervisory reviews—indicating that states with inexperienced workforces may rely more heavily on supervisory reviews. In a few states, noncitation practices, challenging relationships with the industry or legislators, or unbalanced IDR processes—those that surveyors regard as favoring nursing home operators over resident welfare—may have had a negative effect on survey quality and resulted in the citation of fewer nursing home deficiencies than was warranted. Twelve state agency directors reported on our questionnaire experiencing some kind of external pressure. However, our May 2008 report noted several improvements CMS had made since fiscal years 2002 and 2003 in federal comparative surveys intended to make them more comparable to the state surveys they are assessing; these improvement include; (1) reducing the time between the state and federal surveys to ensure that they more accurately capture the conditions at the time of the state survey, (2) including at least half of the residents from state survey investigative samples to allow for a more clear- cut determination of whether the state survey should have cited a deficiency, and (3) using the same number of federal surveyors as the corresponding state survey, again to more closely mirror the conditions under which the state survey was conducted. (For response rates by state, see table 9.) GAO-10-37R. | Why GAO Did This Study
Under contract with the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), states conduct surveys at nursing homes to help ensure compliance with federal quality standards. Over the past decade, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) has reported on inconsistencies in states' assessment of nursing homes' quality of care, including understatement--that is, when state surveys fail to cite serious deficiencies or cite them at too low a level. In 2008, GAO reported that 9 states had high and 10 had low understatement based on CMS data for fiscal years 2002 through 2007. This report examines the effect on nursing home deficiency understatement of CMS's survey process, workforce shortages and training, supervisory reviews of surveys, and state agency practices. GAO primarily collected data through two Web-based questionnaires sent to all eligible nursing home surveyors and state agency directors, achieving 61 and 98 percent response rates, respectively.
What GAO Found
A substantial percentage of both state surveyors and directors identified general weaknesses in the nursing home survey process, that is, the survey methodology and guidance on identifying deficiencies. On the questionnaires, 46 percent of surveyors and 36 percent of directors reported that weaknesses in the traditional survey methodology, such as too many survey tasks, contributed to understatement. Limited experience with a new data-driven survey methodology indicated possible improvements in consistency; however, an independent evaluation led CMS to conclude that other tools, such as survey guidance clarification and surveyor training and supervision, would help improve survey accuracy. According to questionnaire responses, workforce shortages and greater use of surveyors with less than 2 years' experience sometimes contributed to understatement. Nearly three-quarters of directors reported that they always or frequently experienced a workforce shortage, while nearly two-thirds reported that surveyor inexperience always, frequently, or sometimes led to understatement. Substantial percentages of directors and surveyors indicated that inadequate training may compromise survey accuracy and lead to understatement. According to about 29 percent of surveyors in 9 high understatement states compared to 16 percent of surveyors in 10 low understatement states, initial surveyor training was not sufficient to cite appropriate scope and severity--a skill critical in preventing understatement. Furthermore, over half of directors identified the need for ongoing training for experienced surveyors on both this skill and on documenting deficiencies, a critical skill to substantiate citations. CMS provides little guidance to states on supervisory review processes. In general, directors reported on our questionnaire that supervisory reviews occurred more often on surveys with higher-level rather than on those with lower-level deficiencies, which were the most frequently understated. Surveyors who reported that survey teams had too many new surveyors also reported frequent changes to or removal of deficiencies, indicating heavier reliance on supervisory reviews by states with inexperienced surveyors. Surveyors and directors in a few states informed us that, in isolated cases, state agency practices or external pressure from stakeholders, such as the nursing home industry, may have led to understatement. Forty percent of surveyors in five states and four directors reported that their state had at least one practice not to cite certain deficiencies. Additionally, over 40 percent of surveyors in four states reported that their states' informal dispute resolution processes favored concerns of nursing home operators over resident welfare. Furthermore, directors from seven states reported that pressure from the industry or legislators may have compromised the nursing home survey process, and two directors reported that CMS's support is needed to deal with such pressure. If surveyors perceive that certain deficiencies may not be consistently upheld or enforced, they may choose not to cite them. |
gao_NSIAD-99-124 | gao_NSIAD-99-124_0 | Conclusions
The Air Force met the requirements of applicable laws and regulations in the competition for depot maintenance work at the Sacramento ALC. We concluded that (1) the C-5 competition procedures provided an equal opportunity for public and private offerors to compete without regard to where the work could be performed; (2) the procedures did not appear to deviate in any material respect from the applicable laws or the FAR; and (3) based on Air Force assumptions and conditions at the time of award, the award resulted in the lowest total cost to the government. Legal Review of Competition for Sacramento Air Logistics Center Workloads
On March 20, 1998, the Department of the Air Force, Sacramento ALC at McClellan Air Force Base, California issued requests for proposal (RFP) No. 2469a and all applicable laws and regulations, (2) appropriate consideration was given to factors other than cost in the selection, and (3) the award resulted in the lowest total cost to the DOD for the performance of the workloads. Based on our review of the procedures the Air Force used to conduct the Sacramento competition in context of the concerns that were raised by the competitor, we found no basis to conclude that (1) the procedures did not provide a substantially equal opportunity for the offerors to compete without regard to performance location, (2) appropriate consideration was not given to factors other than cost in the selection, and (3) the procedures used in selecting the successful offeror deviated in any material respect from the applicable laws and regulations. Compliance With Other Applicable Provisions of 10 U.S.C. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO reviewed the Air Force's selection of a source of repair for depot maintenance work at the closing Sacramento Air Logistics Center (ALC), focusing on whether the: (1) Air Force's procedures for conducting the Sacramento competition provided substantially equal opportunity for the public and private offerors to compete for the work without regard to performance location; (2) procedures for conducting the competition were in compliance with 10 U.S.C. 2469a and other applicable laws and regulations; (3) appropriate consideration was given to factors other than cost; and (4) award resulted in the lowest total cost to the Department of Defense (DOD) for performance of the work.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the Air Force's competition for work at the Sacramento ALC showed that: (a) the competition procedures provided an equal opportunity for public and private competitors without regard to where the work could be performed; (b) the procedures did not appear to deviate in any material respect from applicable laws and regulations; (c) the Air Force appropriately considered factors other than cost in the selection; and (d) within the framework set forth for the competition, the award resulted in the lowest total cost to DOD for performance of the work; and (2) GAO also identified several issues that may be useful for the Air Force to consider in future competitions. |
gao_GAO-04-655 | gao_GAO-04-655_0 | In many cases, both courts and federal agencies have responsibilities for protecting incapacitated elderly people, as shown in figure 1. State Laws Require Courts to Oversee Guardianships, but Jurisdictional Issues Complicate Oversight
State laws provide for court appointment and oversight of guardianships. 2.) Some states are reluctant to recognize guardianships originating in other states, leading to jurisdictional complications. In each state, most courts responding to our survey required all guardians to submit time and expense records to support petitions for compensation, but other courts in each state only require these reports for some guardians. Most Courts Surveyed Do Not Track the Number of Active Guardianships
In each state surveyed, some information needed for effective oversight of guardianships, such as the number of people with guardians, was generally not available. State Courts and Federal Representative Payee Programs Serve Many of the Same Incapacitated Elderly People, but Collaborate Little in Oversight Efforts
Federal agencies and state courts’ representative payee programs collaborate little to protect incapacitated people and prevent misuse of federal benefits. Some state courts and federal agencies share certain information on a case-by-case basis. Insufficient interagency coordination may also leave incapacitated elderly people more vulnerable to abuse or neglect. 3.) Not only is it likely that the lack of coordination limits the protection of incapacitated people and their federal benefits, it may also result in increased federal expenditures. To facilitate state efforts to improve oversight of guardianships and to aid guardians in the fulfillment of their responsibilities, the Department of Health and Human Services should work with national organizations involved in guardianship programs, such as the those represented on the National Guardianship Network, to provide support and leadership to the states for cost-effective pilot and demonstration projects to: develop cost-effective approaches for compiling, on a continuing basis, consistent national data concerning guardianships to aid in the management of programs for protecting incapacitated adults, such as the age of the incapacitated person, the type of guardian appointed, etc; study options for compiling data from federal agencies and state agencies, such as Adult Protective Services agencies, concerning the incidence of elder abuse in cases in which the victim had granted someone the durable power of attorney or had been assigned a fiduciary, such as a guardian or representative payee, and in cases in which the victim did not have a fiduciary; and review state policies and procedures concerning interstate transfer and recognition of guardianship appointments to facilitate efficient and cost-effective solutions for interstate jurisdictional issues. To determine what state courts do to ensure that guardians fulfill their responsibilities, we studied both states’ laws concerning guardianship and court practices, particularly those concerning court oversight of guardians. To determine what guardianship programs recognized as exemplary do to ensure that guardians fulfill their responsibilities we visited 4 courts to study their procedures. The four courts we selected were each identified as exemplary by two or more members of the network. Information in financial reports is verified. | Why GAO Did This Study
As people age, some become incapable of managing their personal and financial affairs. To protect these people, state laws provide for court appointment of guardians to act on their behalf. In many cases federal programs provide these incapacitated people financial benefits. GAO was asked to examine: (1) what state courts do to ensure that guardians fulfill their responsibilities, (2) what guardianship programs recognized as exemplary do to ensure that guardians fulfill their responsibilities, and (3) how state courts and federal agencies work together to protect incapacitated elderly people.
What GAO Found
All states have laws requiring courts to oversee guardianships, but court implementation varies. Most require guardians to submit periodic reports, but do not specify court review of these reports. Interstate jurisdictional issues sometimes arise when states do not recognize guardianships originating in other states. Most courts responding to our survey did not track the number of active guardianships, and few indicated the number of incapacitated elderly people under guardianship. Four courts recognized by members of the National Guardianship Network as having exemplary guardianship programs devote staff to strong programs for guardianship training and oversight. Three of these courts offer training to guardians even though state law does not require it. Three also have programs in which volunteers or social work student interns visit people under guardianship and report on their condition. Although state courts and federal agencies are responsible for protecting many of the same incapacitated elderly people, they generally work together only on a case-by-case basis. Some courts send notices of guardianship to the Department of Veterans Affairs and the Social Security Administration, but generally coordination among federal agencies and courts is not systematic. Federal agencies and courts do not systematically notify other agencies or courts when they identify someone as incapacitated, or when they discover that a guardian or a representative payee is abusing the incapacitated person. This lack of coordination may leave incapacitated people without the protection of responsible guardians and representative payees. |
gao_GAO-04-451 | gao_GAO-04-451_0 | At the agency level, the heads of procurement departments are responsible for implementing the small business programs at their agencies, including achieving program goals. Almost All of the OSDBU Directors Viewed Most Section 15(k) Functions as Duties of Their Offices
Almost all of the 24 OSDBU directors that we surveyed reported that they viewed most of the functions outlined in section 15(k) of the Small Business Act as current duties of their offices. At least 19 OSDBU directors, or almost 80 percent, said that they viewed five of the eight functions identified in 15(k) as their duties, and a smaller majority (13 to 17) saw the remaining three functions as their responsibilities (fig. 1). Some directors did not view all of the functions as their responsibilities, but in follow-up interviews these directors provided explanations for their responses. The Extent to Which OSDBU Directors Carried Out Some Section 15(k) Functions Varied
We asked OSDBU directors about the extent to which they carried out several of the section 15(k) functions. Four OSDBU directors (the Department of Education, Army, Navy, and the Office of Personnel Management (OPM)) indicated that they did not view facilitating small business participation as subcontractors to bundled contracts as a duty of their offices. The OSDBU directors at Army and Navy stated that their roles were primarily developing policy, and that small business specialists generally carry out this function. Most Directors Saw Outreach to Small Businesses as a Function of Their OSDBU
Nearly all (21) of the OSDBU directors saw hosting conferences for small businesses as one of their responsibilities, and 20 had hosted such an event in the last 2 years. However, more than half viewed three issues—lack of influence in the procurement process, limited budgetary resources, and lack of adequate staffing—as challenges to at least some extent. How long have you been Director of the Office of Small and Disadvantaged Business Utilization (OSDBU)? Is conducting meetings with small business trade associations and/or prime contractors currently a role or function of your OSDBU? For example, responsibilities for monitoring agency processes in areas other than those relating to small business. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Small Business Act is one of several laws designed to enhance the participation of small and disadvantaged businesses in federal procurement--a market that reached more than $200 billion in fiscal year 2002. Section 15(k) of the act requires that all federal agencies with procurement powers establish an Office of Small and Disadvantaged Business Utilization (OSDBU) and specifies eight functions that OSDBU directors are responsible for carrying out in their roles as advocates for small businesses. GAO surveyed OSDBU directors at 24 agencies to obtain information on the extent to which the respondents (1) viewed the functions listed in section 15(k) as functions of their offices, (2) viewed other potential activities as OSDBU duties, and (3) saw potential challenges to carrying out their functions.
What GAO Found
At least 19 OSDBU directors, or almost 80 percent, said that they viewed five of the eight functions identified in section 15(k) as their duties. A smaller majority of OSDBU directors (from 13 to 17) viewed the remaining three functions as responsibilities of their offices. However, the extent to which respondents said they carried out these functions varied. Directors who did not view all of the functions as responsibilities of their offices provided explanations. For example, the OSDBU directors at the Departments of the Army and the Navy explained that their role is one of developing policy for small business programs at their agencies. Most of the OSDBU directors responded that they also viewed functions other than those listed in section 15(k) as their responsibilities. These functions included outreach activities, such as holding meetings and hosting conferences for small businesses and trade associations, and reviewing plans for how prime contractors would use small businesses as subcontractors. A much smaller number of respondents reported that they viewed participating in their agencies' procurement process as one of their duties. While most OSDBU directors reported experiencing few challenges in carrying out their responsibilities, some reported challenges in three areas--lack of influence in the procurement process, limited budgetary resources, and lack of adequate staffing levels. |
gao_GAO-16-272T | gao_GAO-16-272T_0 | GAO’s Work Has Contributed to Significant Financial and Other Benefits, but Further Opportunities Exist to Save Money and Improve Government
Our work routinely leads to recommendations for improving efficiency and effectiveness across the federal government’s programs, resulting in measurable savings and improvements. Since fiscal year 2003, our work has resulted in over ½ trillion dollars in financial benefits and about 17,000 program and operational benefits that helped to improve public services and promote sound management throughout government. Management of the audited agencies has discretion on whether to implement our recommendations, and executive branch agencies have implemented an average of about 80 percent of our recommendations, as reported in our performance and accountability reports for fiscal years 2010 through 2015 (see table 1). Since fiscal year 2010, our work has resulted in over $330 billion in financial benefits and over 8,000 program and operational benefits that helped to change laws, improve public services, and promote sound management throughout government. The following examples illustrate the wide-ranging benefits from our work in several categories, including (1) identifying cost savings and revenue opportunities to help to avoid sequestration; (2) identifying legislative solutions; (3) achieving financial, program, and operational benefits; (4) helping Congress oversee key programs; (5) addressing high-risk areas; and (6) reducing fragmentation, overlap, and duplication in government programs. For example, key decisions adopted by Congress in the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2013 were linked to our work and helped Congress achieve about $23 billion in savings and revenue enhancements to avoid sequestration in fiscal years 2014 and 2015, such as improving the cost-effectiveness of filling the Strategic Petroleum Reserve, estimated by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) to save $3.2 billion from 2014 to 2023; increasing aviation security fees to cover 43 percent of aviation security costs in 2014, estimated by CBO to save $12.6 billion from 2014 through 2023; expanding the risk-based element of the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation’s premium rate structure, estimated by CBO to increase revenues and offset direct spending by $7.9 billion from 2014 through 2023 limiting the amount of compensation contractors working on a federal contract can charge to the government to $487,000 annually, a decrease from the previous cap of $952,308; and improving the collection of unemployment insurance overpayment by $159 million and reducing improper payments to inmates for disaster relief and other assistance resulting in savings of $80 million from 2014 through 2023, according to CBO. Achieving Financial, Program, and Operational Benefits
In fiscal year 2015, our work yielded $74.7 billion in financial accomplishments—a return of about $134 for every dollar invested in us. This progress has been possible through the concerted actions and efforts of Congress and the leadership and staff in executive branch agencies and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). Solving these high-risk problems has the potential to save billions of dollars, improve service to the public, and strengthen the performance and accountability of the U.S. government. As of November 12, 2015, about 4,800 of our recommendations to the executive branch agencies and OMB remain open across the federal government. DOD’s portfolio of major defense acquisition programs, which has been on our High-Risk List since 1990, consists of 78 programs with an estimated cost of $1.4 trillion. Accordingly, we recommended that DOD conduct a comprehensive affordability analysis of the F-35 program’s procurement plan that reflects various assumptions about future technical progress and funding availability. DOD agreed with our recommendation, although it maintains it accomplishes this through its annual budget process. However, without a more thorough analysis of possible future scenarios, DOD may not be able to accurately account for the future technical and funding uncertainty it faces, and thus may not fully understand the affordability implications of increasing F-35 procurement funding at the planned rates. For example, in January 2012, we recommended that the Centers’ for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) take steps to improve the accuracy of the adjustment made for differences in diagnostic coding practices between Medicare Advantage (MA) and Medicare Fee-For-Service. For example, CMS could better account for additional beneficiary characteristics, such as sex and residential location, and use more current and refined data in determining MA payments. We made our recommendation because we found that shortcomings in CMS’s adjustment resulted in excess payments to MA plans totaling an estimated $3.2 billion to $5.1 billion over a 3-year period from 2010 through 2012. GAO Uses Various Mechanisms to Encourage Implementation of Its Recommendations
We focus attention on following up on our recommendations to help ensure that they are implemented effectively and in a timely manner. In addition to these processes, our high-risk and fragmentation, overlap, and duplication work and efforts on priority recommendations highlight critical unimplemented recommendations that we believe warrant attention by agencies and Congress. We sent letters to the heads of key departments and agencies identifying these high priority recommendations and urging the agency head to continue to provide attention to these issues. Working with Congress to address recommendations. These strategies include incorporating our recommendations into legislation. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO’s mission is to support Congress in meeting its constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance and ensure the accountability of the federal government for the benefit of the American people. GAO provides nonpartisan, objective, and reliable information to Congress, executive branch agencies, and the public. To help Congress and the government, GAO recommends solutions across the broad spectrum of federal responsibilities to foster efficiency and effectiveness in federal programs and address high risks, management issues, and other challenges.
GAO’s work supports a broad range of interests throughout Congress. In fiscal year 2015, GAO received requests for work from 97 percent of the standing committees of Congress and 66 percent of their subcommittees.
Since fiscal year 2003, GAO’s work has resulted in over ½ trillion dollars in financial benefits and about 17,000 program and operational benefits that helped to improve public services and promote sound management throughout government. Executive branch cooperation and congressional oversight have been, and will continue to be, critical in helping realize the benefits of GAO’s recommendations.
This statement discusses (1) the status of GAO’s recommendations, including key outcomes and open issues and (2) mechanisms for focusing attention on implementing GAO’s open recommendations. It is based on GAO’s prior work spanning the federal government, including high-risk areas and ways to address fragmentation, overlap, and duplication.
What GAO Found
GAO's work routinely generates recommendations for improving the efficiency and effectiveness of government programs, resulting in measurable improvements. Since fiscal year 2010, GAO's work has resulted in over $330 billion in financial benefits and over 8,000 program and operational benefits. In fiscal year 2015 alone, GAO's work yielded $74.7 billion in financial accomplishments—a return of about $134 for every dollar invested in GAO. Other wide-ranging benefits include helping to avoid sequestration and identifying legislative solutions to federal performance and management issues. GAO has made an average of 1,800 recommendations a year with an average of about 80 percent implemented between fiscal years 2010 and 2015.
As of November 12, 2015, about 4,800 of GAO's recommendations to executive branch agencies and the Office of Management and Budget remain open across the federal government. If implemented, they could result in significant benefits, such as increased savings, better services to the public, and improved federal programs. A couple of examples to illustrate this potential follow:
Department of Defense (DOD) Weapon Systems Acquisition: On GAO's High Risk List since 1990, GAO's work has identified several opportunities for DOD to maximize its use of taxpayer dollars by improving its acquisition process. For example, given DOD's plans to increase F-35 funding by billions of dollars over the next 5 years, GAO recommended that DOD conduct a comprehensive affordability analysis of the program's procurement plan. DOD maintains that it accomplishes this through its annual budget process; however, without a more thorough and complete analysis, DOD may not fully understand the affordability implications of increasing funding at the planned rates.
Medicare Program Payment Policy: On GAO's High Risk List since 1990 due in part to its complexity and susceptibility to mismanagement, GAO has made many recommendations to improve Medicare, including improving the accuracy of the adjustment made for differences in diagnostic coding practices between Medicare Advantage (MA) and Medicare Fee-For-Service. For example, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid (CMS) could better account for additional beneficiary characteristics, such as residential location, and use more current and refined data in determining MA payments. GAO made this recommendation because of shortcomings in CMS's adjustment, which resulted in excess payments to MA plans totaling an estimated $3.2 billion to $5.1 billion over a 3-year period from 2010 through 2012.
GAO continuously engages with executive branch agencies to ensure recommendations are implemented. For example, GAO regularly follows up with agencies on its recommendations and posts their status online. This year GAO sent letters to the heads of key executive branch agencies identifying unimplemented recommendations that warrant priority attention. GAO's high risk and fragmentation, overlap, and duplication work also highlights critical open recommendations for executive branch agencies and Congress. In addition, GAO works with Congress to further progress on recommendations, including incorporating GAO work into legislation. |
gao_GAO-13-695T | gao_GAO-13-695T_0 | TWIC Reader Pilot Results Are Not Sufficiently Complete, Accurate, and Reliable for Informing Congress and the TWIC Card Reader Rule
Our review of the pilot test identified several challenges related to pilot planning, data collection, and reporting, which affected the completeness, accuracy, and reliability of the results. Pilot documentation did not contain complete TWIC reader and access control system characteristics. 8. Reporting
As required by the SAFE Port Act and the Coast Guard Authorization Act of 2010, DHS’s report to Congress on the TWIC reader pilot presented several findings with respect to technical and operational aspects of implementing TWIC technologies in the maritime environment. Key contributors for the previous work that this testimony is based on are listed within each individual product. | Why GAO Did This Study
This testimony discusses GAO's recent work examining the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC) program. Ports, waterways, and vessels handle billions of dollars in cargo annually, and an attack on our nation's maritime transportation system could have serious consequences. Maritime workers, including longshoremen, mechanics, truck drivers, and merchant mariners, access secure areas of the nation's estimated 16,400 maritime-related transportation facilities and vessels, such as cargo container and cruise ship terminals, each day while performing their jobs.
What GAO Found
This statement today highlights the key findings of GAO's May 8, 2013, report on the TWIC program, which addressed the extent to which the results from the TWIC reader pilot were sufficiently complete, accurate, and reliable for informing Congress and the TWIC card reader rule. |
gao_GAO-17-210 | gao_GAO-17-210_0 | NPAC program areas. NNSA Does Not Consistently Track and Document the Full Extent of Nonproliferation Technology Advancement, Transition, and Deployment
The full extent to which research and technology development projects managed by NNSA’s DNN R&D and NPAC programs have resulted in advanced, transitioned, or deployed technologies is unclear because NNSA does not consistently track and document all of these project outcomes. However, the DNN R&D program, which is by far the larger program, does not consistently track and document projects that result in technologies being transitioned or deployed. NNSA officials acknowledged that the DNN R&D program does not use the WebPMIS system, or otherwise collect and maintain information, to track and document whether its projects result in technologies that have been transitioned to or deployed by end users. Selected Projects Resulted in Advanced, Transitioned, and Deployed Technologies
By gathering information from various sources about our sample of 91 selected DNN research and technology development projects, we were able to determine that some projects resulted in technologies being advanced, transitioned, or deployed, or that they resulted in more than one of these outcomes. Of those 88 projects, we found that 33 also resulted in the advanced technology being transitioned to users outside of the project team for further development or deployment. Clarity Limitations May Hinder Users’ Ability to Interpret DNN’s Publicly Reported Performance Measures
NNSA reports publicly on the DNN R&D and NPAC programs’ performance using measures published in DOE’s annual budget requests, in response to requirements in GPRAMA; however, limitations with the clarity of the DNN R&D program’s measures may make it difficult for users, such as Congress, to understand the targets that NNSA has established for its research and technology development programs, as well as how NNSA has measured performance against these targets. Better Documentation Could Enhance NNSA’s Assessment of Project Performance
NNSA assesses the performance of the DNN R&D and NPAC programs’ projects by reviewing project documentation and communicating with project managers, but improvements in NNSA’s final project documentation could enhance assessment of project performance. To assess project performance, NNSA officials said that both programs track progress during the project by communicating with project managers at the national laboratories and by reviewing documents, such as quarterly project reports, that provide information on project performance. However, the officials said that the final reports do not document their assessment of project performance against the baseline targets established in the initial project plans. They also said that there is no common template for final project reports. We confirmed this in our review of several final project reports. NNSA officials provided several reasons why they do not document their assessment of project performance against baseline targets or use a common template for final project reports. Documenting assessments that compare final project performance results against baseline targets for scope of work and completion date—whether through a common template for final project reports or by other means—could enhance NNSA’s ability to manage its programs in accordance with these standards. We continue to believe that it is important for NNSA to implement our December 2011 recommendation that NNSA clarify the DNN R&D program’s publicly reported performance measures, so that Congress and other users of these measures have a sufficient understanding of DNN programs’ status and progress. In NNSA’s written comments, which are summarized below and reproduced in appendix V, NNSA neither agreed nor disagreed with our first recommendation and partially agreed with our second recommendation; however, NNSA stated that it plans to take actions in response to both recommendations. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope and Methodology
This report (1) evaluates the extent to which projects managed by the National Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA) research and technology development programs have resulted in advanced, transitioned, or deployed nonproliferation technologies, (2) evaluates how NNSA measures the performance of its research and technology development programs and projects, and (3) describes how programs in NNSA’s Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation (DNN) decide which research and technology development projects to pursue. To determine the extent to which NNSA’s research and technology development programs have resulted in advanced, transitioned, or deployed nonproliferation technologies, we selected a nongeneralizable sample from research and technology development projects undertaken between fiscal years 2012 and 2015 by the two DNN programs responsible for such projects: the Office of DNN Research and Development (DNN R&D) and the Office of Nonproliferation and Arms Control (NPAC). | Why GAO Did This Study
Nuclear proliferation is a national security threat. DNN's two research and technology development programs develop technical solutions to prevent nuclear proliferation. From fiscal years 2012 through 2015, these programs obligated over $1.1 billion on 511 projects. The DNN R&D program obligated over $1 billion of this amount.
A House report included a provision for GAO to review the programs. This report evaluates, among other objectives, (1) the extent to which projects managed by NNSA's research and technology development programs resulted in advanced, transitioned, or deployed nonproliferation technologies and (2) how NNSA measures the performance of its research and technology development programs and projects.
GAO reviewed documents on a non-generalizable sample of 91 research and technology development projects, selected from all program areas to include projects with the largest amount of funding and to capture a broad range of the programs' technical functions. GAO also reviewed DNN's program objectives and publicly reported performance measures and interviewed NNSA officials and technology users at other agencies.
What GAO Found
The full extent to which research and technology development projects managed by two programs in the National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation (DNN) have resulted in advanced (progressed technologies or science supporting them), transitioned (provided to users for further development or deployment), or deployed (used in the field) technologies is unclear because NNSA does not consistently track and document all of these outcomes. Specifically, the DNN Research and Development (DNN R&D) and Nonproliferation and Arms Control (NPAC) programs track and document technology advancements resulting from their projects, such as in project reports. However, NNSA officials acknowledged that DNN R&D—by far the larger program—does not consistently track and document whether its projects result in technologies transitioned to or deployed by end users. In contrast, the NPAC program tracks and documents these project outcomes. By not consistently tracking and documenting technology transition and deployment outcomes, NNSA is unable to demonstrate the full results of its projects. GAO gathered information from various sources on a sample of 91 projects. Of these, 88 projects advanced technologies by, for example, building instrument hardware or developing models for data analysis; the other 3 did not advance technologies but assessed potential applications of existing technologies. Among the 88 projects that advanced technologies, 33 also resulted in technologies being transitioned, including software used to analyze nuclear detonations. Finally, of these 33 projects, 17 also resulted in deployed technologies, including an enrichment monitoring tool used in Iran and space-based nuclear detonation sensors. Reasons that some technologies in the sample did not move beyond the advancement or transition stage included that the technology needed further development or evaluation before being used.
Limitations with the clarity of the DNN R&D program's publicly reported performance measures make them difficult to interpret, potentially hindering users' ability to determine the program's progress; better documentation of project performance against baseline targets may enhance NNSA's performance assessments. The DNN R&D program's performance measures have clarity limitations because they do not, for example, define measurement criteria or provide context justifying how the program determined that it met its performance targets; this may cause external users of the measures, including Congress, to have difficulty interpreting NNSA's assessment of performance. In a December 2011 report, GAO recommended that NNSA clarify its publicly reported measures for DNN's R&D program. GAO continues to believe that NNSA should do so. Regarding project-level performance, NNSA uses project plans to establish baseline targets for projects' scope and completion date, and tracks progress by communicating with project managers and reviewing documents such as quarterly and final project reports. However, NNSA officials said that final project reports do not document their assessment of performance against baseline targets and that there is no common template for final project reports, which GAO confirmed in a review of several final project reports. Documenting such assessments could enhance NNSA's ability to assess project performance against goals, consistent with federal internal control standards.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that NNSA consistently track and document results of DNN R&D projects and document assessments of final project results against baseline performance targets. NNSA neither agreed nor disagreed with the first recommendation and partially agreed with the second, but agreed to take actions in response to both recommendations. |
gao_GAO-17-542 | gao_GAO-17-542_0 | DOD Has Participation Data, but Has Not Developed Performance Measures or Clarified Roles and Responsibilities to Help Ensure Effective Program Implementation
DOD has data on participation in and costs of the Armed Forces Sports Program, but has not taken steps, including developing performance measures and clarifying roles and responsibilities, that are needed to help ensure that the program is implemented effectively. Servicemember Participation
In analyzing the number of servicemembers participating in the program, we found that servicemember participation changed from 968 servicemembers in fiscal year 2012 to 848 servicemembers in fiscal year 2016. Table 4 breaks out these data for each year from fiscal years 2012 through 2016. Program costs ranged from about $2.1 million to about $2.8 million from fiscal years 2014 through 2016. While these data provide important context about the program’s size and reach, they are outputs and do not constitute performance measures because they do not exhibit several of the key attributes previously discussed. While the Sports Council Secretariat’s data included the “actual” number of program participants, they did not identify projected performance targets that would enable program officials to determine how far they have progressed toward a desired outcome or end state. Specifically, officials cited the program’s emphasis on a higher level of physical fitness than is otherwise required by the services as contributing to individual servicemember readiness, and involvement in national and international sports championships as aiding recruiting efforts because it showcases some of the unique opportunities open to those in the services. However, outside of participation and cost data and some anecdotal examples, officials did not have specific measures for or data on the Armed Forces Sports Program’s contribution to the services’ readiness, recruiting, and retention efforts. Third, while DOD has program participation data, it does not track baseline and trend data in order to assess the program’s performance and progress over time. DOD’s Implementation of Armed Forces Sports Program’s Roles and Responsibilities Differs from Those Currently Defined in Policy
The roles and responsibilities that are currently being implemented for the Armed Forces Sports Program differ from the program’s roles and responsibilities specified in DOD policy. DOD Instruction 1330.04 and the Armed Forces Sports Council’s standard operating procedures specify that the Armed Forces Sports Program includes training or national qualifying events in preparation for participation in International Military Sports Council events, the Pan American Games, the Olympic Games, the Paralympic Games, and other international competitions. While this is how the program is defined in key program documents, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Sports Council Secretariat, and service officials stated that all responsibilities, including costs, associated with servicemember participation in the Pan American, Olympic, and Paralympic Games are, in practice, handled by the services. The Office of the Secretary of Defense and Sports Council Secretariat officials stated they plan to review DOD Instruction 1330.04 and make necessary updates but did not indicate what specific changes would be made to clarify the program’s roles and responsibilities. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve the management of the Armed Forces Sports Program and better determine whether the program is achieving its desired results, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness to develop and implement performance measures for the Armed Forces Sports Program that measure the desired outcomes for the program and, at a minimum, demonstrate linkage to the program’s goals or mission, have a measurable target, and include a baseline that can be used to demonstrate program performance. DOD concurred with our recommendation to develop and implement performance measures for the Armed Forces Sports Program that measure the desired outcomes for the program and, at a minimum, demonstrate linkage to the program’s goals or mission, have a measurable target, and include a baseline that can be used to demonstrate program performance but also noted potential limitations on establishing measures. However, DOD stated that there are limitations on establishing metrics for several of the program’s objectives, such as goodwill and positive image, which are challenging to measure. The time frame of the participant and cost data that we obtained differs because DOD officials stated that fiscal year 2014 was the most recent year that cost data were available from all the services. | Why GAO Did This Study
For nearly a century, the U.S. Armed Forces (i.e., the Army, the Navy, the Marine Corps, the Air Force, and the Coast Guard) have organized and participated in international and national sporting competitions in part because of the intended benefits for servicemember morale and the unique opportunity that participation provides to foster diplomatic relations.
House Report 114-537 accompanying a bill for the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 included a provision for GAO to review the Armed Forces Sports Program and its impact on the military services' readiness. This report assesses the effectiveness of DOD's implementation of the Armed Forces Sports Program. GAO analyzed participation data for fiscal years 2012 through 2016 and cost data for fiscal years 2014 through 2016, compared DOD data with attributes of successful performance measures, compared roles and responsibilities specified in policy with those being implemented, and interviewed DOD officials.
What GAO Found
The Department of Defense (DOD) has data on participation in and costs of the Armed Forces Sports Program, but has not taken steps, including developing performance measures and clarifying roles and responsibilities that are needed to help ensure the program is implemented effectively. DOD officials stated that they use sport and competition participation data to measure the performance and effectiveness of the program. According to these data, servicemember participation changed from 968 servicemembers in fiscal year 2012 to 848 servicemembers in fiscal year 2016, and program costs ranged from about $2.1 million to about $2.8 million in fiscal years 2014 through 2016. While these data provide important context about the program's size and reach, they do not exhibit several key attributes, such as linkage, a measurable target, and baseline and trend data that GAO has found are key to successfully measuring a program's performance.
First, these data do not exhibit linkage because no relationship has been established to show how the number of servicemember participants contribute to achievement of the program's objectives, such as promoting goodwill among and a positive image of the U.S. Armed Forces through sports.
Second, these data were not associated with a measurable target that would enable program officials to determine how far the program has progressed toward a desired outcome or end state.
for measures that are able to assess the program's performance and progress over time.
Without performance measures that demonstrate these attributes, DOD will be unable to effectively demonstrate that it is achieving the intended benefits of the program, such as improving readiness, recruitment, and retention as well as promoting the goodwill of the U.S. Armed Forces. Officials cited the program as aiding recruiting because it showcased unique opportunities open to those in the U.S. Armed Forces. However, outside of participation and cost data and some anecdotal examples, officials did not have specific measures for or data on the Armed Forces Sports Program's contribution to the services' readiness, recruiting, and retention efforts.
The roles and responsibilities that are currently being implemented for the program differ from the program's roles and responsibilities specified in DOD policy. DOD Instruction 1330.04 specifies that the program includes training or national qualifying events in preparation for participation in International Military Sports Council events, the Pan American Games, the Olympic Games, the Paralympic Games, and other international competitions. While this is how the program is defined in key program documents, DOD officials stated that all responsibilities, including costs, associated with servicemember participation in the Pan American, Olympic, and Paralympic Games are handled by the services. DOD officials stated that they plan to review DOD Instruction 1330.04 and make necessary updates, but have not yet determined what specific changes would be made to clarify the program's roles and responsibilities.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOD develop and implement performance measures for the Armed Forces Sports Program that, at a minimum, demonstrate linkage to the program's goals or mission, have a measurable target, and include a baseline that can be used to demonstrate program performance. DOD concurred with the recommendation, noting potential limitations on establishing measures. GAO acknowledges these limitations, but continues to believe that measures are important to evaluating the program's effectiveness. |
gao_GAO-14-220 | gao_GAO-14-220_0 | DOD and Education officials have a history of collaborating on education issues for children of military families. The act also requires that OMB—with agencies—develop annual federal government performance plans to, among other things, define the level of performance to be achieved toward the cross-agency priority goals. Approaches for Ensuring Accountability from Select Interagency Groups
Key Considerations for Implementing Interagency Collaborative Mechanisms Accountability Is there a way to track and monitor progress? Agency Comments
We provided a draft of this report for review and comment to the heads of the nine key agencies that participated in the four interagency groups that we reviewed for this study. The objectives of this report are to examine how select interagency groups (such as task forces, working groups, councils, and committees): 1) defined their missions and desired outcomes; 2) measured performance and ensured accountability 3) established leadership approaches; and 4) used resources, such as funding, staff and technology. We organized the challenges that these reports identified into the key issues from our 2012 report and found that the most common challenges that interagency groups experienced fell under the key features of:
Outcomes
Accountability
Leadership
Resources To identify implementation approaches that agencies have used to address or avoid these challenges, we identified a limited number of interagency groups from our prior work that have addressed or avoided one or more of these challenges. Based on a review of our prior work, we identified potential interagency groups that exhibited some of the practices to enhance and sustain collaboration. We selected panelists that were recipients of the Presidential Distinguished Rank Award in 2011 or 2012 and that had experience leading or participating in interagency groups. If more than one group had used the approach and found it to be effective, we included it in our list. | Why GAO Did This Study
Many of the meaningful results that the federal government seeks to achieve require the coordinated efforts of more than one federal agency, level of government, or sector. The GPRA Modernization Act of 2010 (GPRAMA) takes a more crosscutting and integrated approach to improving government performance. GPRAMA requires that GAO periodically review implementation of the law. As a part of a series of reports responding to this requirement, GAO assessed how interagency groups addressed the central collaboration challenges identified in its prior work of 1) defining outcomes; 2) measuring performance and ensuring accountability; 3) establishing leadership approaches; and 4) using resources, such as funding, staff, and technology.
GAO selected four interagency groups that met its key practices for enhancing and sustaining collaboration to learn about the approaches they used and found to be successful. These groups addressed issues of homelessness, reentry of former inmates into society, rental housing policy, and the education of military dependent students. To identify successful approaches, GAO reviewed agency documents, and interviewed agency officials that participated in these groups. Additionally, GAO convened recipients of the Presidential Distinguished Rank Award, who had experience with interagency collaboration. GAO is not making any recommendations in this report. GAO shared a draft of this report with key agencies that participated in the interagency groups GAO reviewed. The agencies either had no comments or provided technical comments, which GAO incorporated as appropriate.
What GAO Found
The interagency groups GAO selected and expert practitioners—including those who received the Presidential Distinguished Rank Award—have used a range of approaches to address some of the key considerations for implementing interagency collaborative mechanisms, related to defining outcomes; measuring performance and ensuring accountability; establishing leadership approaches; and using resources, such as funding, staff, and technology. |
gao_T-RCED-96-26 | gao_T-RCED-96-26_0 | FAA concurred with the need for this comprehensive strategy and planned to complete it by the end of 1995. In the wake of these findings, FAA has revised its program to train inspectors by (1) developing a process to assess training needs for its inspector workforce, (2) attempting to identify those inspections that require aircraft-specific training and limiting this training to the number of inspectors needed to perform these inspections, and (3) decreasing the requirements for recurrent flight training for some of its inspectors. The inspectors said that the assessment process does not fully address their advanced training needs and that some inspectors were performing inspections for which they have not received training. Funding for Technical Training Has Decreased Significantly
Between fiscal years 1993 and 1996, decreases in FAA’s overall budget have significantly reduced the funding available for technical training. FAA’s overall training budget has decreased 42 percent from $147 million to $85 million. Related GAO Products
Aviation Safety: Data Problems Threaten FAA Strides on Safety Analysis System (GAO/AIMD-95-27, Feb. 8, 1995). Aviation Safety: Problems Persist in FAA’s Inspection Program (GAO/RCED-92-14, Nov. 20, 1991). | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) safety inspection program.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) in 1991, FAA created its Safety Performance Analysis System (SPAS) to focus its inspection resources on the pilots, aircraft, and facilities that pose the greatest risk; (2) poor data quality jeopardizes the success of SPAS; (3) FAA officials have not fully responded to prior recommendations of adopting a strategy to improve data quality by the end of 1995; (4) FAA inspectors have performed inspections without the appropriate or up-to-date credentials; (5) FAA has had trouble training its inspectors because it does not offer the necessary courses and has limited aircraft-specific training and decreased the frequency of inspector flight training; (6) between fiscal year (FY) 1993 and FY 1996, funding for technical training decreased 42 percent; and (7) FAA expects a $20-million shortfall for technical training it identified as essential for FY 1996. |
gao_GAO-17-74 | gao_GAO-17-74_0 | As we said earlier, for more than 4 decades, we have reported on the fragmented nature of federal food safety oversight. When we added the federal oversight of food safety to our list of high-risk areas in January 2007, we found that a challenge for the 21st century was to find a way for federal agencies with food safety responsibilities to integrate the myriad food safety programs and strategically manage their portfolios to promote the safety and integrity of the nation’s food supply. HHS and USDA Have Taken Some Actions Since 2014 to Address Fragmentation, but USDA and OMB Have Not Fully Addressed the Need for Government-Wide Planning
HHS and USDA have taken some actions since 2014 to address fragmentation in the federal food safety oversight system, and OMB has focused on implementing FSMA, but USDA’s and OMB’s actions have not fully addressed our two recommendations for government-wide planning. Since 2014, HHS and USDA have continued and expanded collaboration on specific food safety issues, and HHS has updated its strategic plan to address interagency coordination on food safety. Food Safety and Other Experts Suggested That a National Strategy Is Needed to Improve the Federal Food Safety Oversight System
Food safety and government performance experts identified the development and implementation of a national strategy for food safety as a first step toward improving the federal food safety oversight system. Experts Agreed That There Is a Compelling Need to Develop a National Food Safety Strategy and Identified Its Key Elements
The 19 experts attending our 2-day meeting agreed that there is a compelling need to develop a national strategy to provide a framework for strengthening the federal food safety oversight system and addressing fragmentation. Purpose: The starting point for developing a national strategy includes defining the problem, developing a mission statement, and identifying goals. The leadership should reside at the highest level of the administration and needs to have authority to implement the national strategy and be accountable for its progress. Resources: The national strategy should identify staffing and funding requirements and the sources of funding for implementing the strategy. Monitoring: The national strategy should establish milestones that specify time frames, baselines, and metrics to monitor progress. The national strategy should be sufficiently flexible to incorporate changes identified through monitoring and evaluation of progress. Actions: In addition to long-term actions, the national strategy should include short-term actions, such as improving training for food safety officials, to gain traction on improving the food safety system. Actions should focus on preventing, rather than reacting to, outbreaks of foodborne illnesses. Although the experts did not specify which entity should lead the national strategy, past efforts to develop high-level strategic planning for food safety have depended on leadership from entities within the Executive Office of the President (EOP), such as the Domestic Policy Council (DPC), the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP), and OMB. A National Strategy Could Provide a Framework for Addressing Our Recommendation for a Government-Wide Plan, Our Matters for Congress to Consider for Leadership and Planning, and Criteria for Removing Federal Food Safety Oversight from Our High-Risk List
Developing a national strategy for food safety oversight, as suggested by the experts, could provide a framework for addressing our March 2011 recommendation for a government-wide plan and our December 2014 matters for congressional consideration for leadership and government- wide planning. These elements are consistent with characteristics that we have identified as desirable in a national strategy. Recommendation for Executive Action
To guide the nation’s efforts to improve the federal food safety oversight system and address ongoing fragmentation, we recommend that the appropriate entities within the EOP, in consultation with relevant federal agencies and other stakeholders, develop a national strategy that states the purpose of the strategy, establishes high-level sustained leadership, identifies resource requirements, monitors progress, and identifies short- and long-term actions to improve the food safety oversight system. USDA disagreed with the need for a national strategy but cited factors to consider should changes be proposed. To guide the nation’s efforts to improve the federal food safety oversight system and address ongoing fragmentation, we recommended that the appropriate entities within the EOP, in consultation with relevant federal agencies and other stakeholders, develop a national strategy that states the purpose of the strategy, established high-level sustained leadership, identifies resource requirements, monitors progress, and identifies short- and long-term actions to improve the food safety oversight system. | Why GAO Did This Study
Although the U.S. food supply is generally considered safe, foodborne illness remains a common, costly, yet largely preventable public health problem. The safety and quality of food involves 16 federal agencies. For more than 4 decades, GAO has reported on the fragmented federal food safety oversight system. Because of potential risks to the economy and to public health and safety, food safety has remained on GAO's list of high-risk areas since 2007.
GAO was asked to examine efforts toward and options for addressing fragmentation in the federal food safety oversight system. This report (1) describes the actions HHS, USDA, and OMB have taken since 2014 to address fragmentation and evaluates the extent to which these agencies have addressed two prior GAO recommendations for government-wide planning and (2) assesses actions that food safety and other experts suggest are needed to improve the federal food safety oversight system. GAO convened an expert meeting, reviewed agency documents, and interviewed agency officials.
What GAO Found
Since 2014, the Department of Health and Human Services' (HHS) Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and the U.S. Department of Agriculture's (USDA) Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS), the federal agencies with primary responsibility for food safety oversight, have taken some actions to address fragmentation in the federal food safety oversight system, and HHS has updated its strategic plan to address interagency coordination on food safety. However, USDA has not yet fully implemented GAO's December 2014 recommendation that it describe interagency collaboration on food safety in its strategic and performance planning documents. In addition, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has not addressed GAO's March 2011 recommendation to develop a government-wide plan for the federal food safety oversight system.
At a 2-day meeting GAO hosted in June 2016, 19 food safety and other experts agreed that there is a compelling need to develop a national strategy to address ongoing fragmentation and improve the federal food safety oversight system. This is consistent with a prior GAO finding that complex interagency and intergovernmental efforts can benefit from developing a national strategy. The experts identified the following key elements of such a strategy:
Purpose: The starting point for a national strategy includes defining the problem, developing a mission statement, and identifying goals.
Leadership: The national strategy should establish sustained leadership at the highest level of the administration with authority to implement the strategy and be accountable for its progress. The strategy also needs to identify roles and responsibilities and involve all stakeholders.
Resources: The national strategy should identify staffing and funding requirements and the sources of funding for its implementation.
Monitoring: The national strategy should establish milestones that specify time frames, baselines, and metrics to monitor progress. The strategy should be sufficiently flexible to incorporate changes identified through monitoring and evaluation of progress.
Actions: In addition to long-term actions, the national strategy should include short-term actions to gain traction in improving the food safety system. Actions should focus on preventing, rather than reacting to, outbreaks of foodborne illnesses.
These elements are consistent with characteristics GAO has previously identified as desirable in national strategies. Past efforts to develop high-level strategic planning for food safety have depended on leadership from the Executive Office of the President (EOP). By developing a national strategy to guide the federal food safety oversight system and address ongoing fragmentation, the EOP, in consultation with relevant federal agencies and other stakeholders, could provide a framework for making organizational and resource decisions. Among other things, such a strategy also could provide a framework for addressing GAO's recommendation for a government-wide plan and for removing food safety oversight from GAO's High-Risk List.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the appropriate entities within the EOP, in consultation with stakeholders, develop a national strategy to guide the federal food safety oversight system and address ongoing fragmentation. HHS, OMB, and the Domestic Policy Council did not comment on the recommendation. USDA disagreed with the need for a national strategy but cited factors to consider should changes be proposed. GAO believes the recommendation should be implemented. |
gao_GAO-12-579T | gao_GAO-12-579T_0 | IT Supply Chain Presents Numerous Information Security Risks to Federal Agencies
Reliance on a global supply chain introduces multiple risks to federal information systems and underscores the importance of threat assessments and risk mitigation. Supply chain threats are present at various phases of a system’s development life cycle. Key threats that could create an unacceptable risk to federal agencies include the following: installation of hardware or software containing malicious logic, which is hardware, firmware, or software that is intentionally included or inserted in a system for a harmful purpose; installation of counterfeit hardware or software, which is hardware or software containing non-genuine component parts or code; failure or disruption in the production or distribution of critical products resulting from manmade or natural causes; reliance on a malicious or unqualified service provider for the performance of technical services; and installation of hardware or software that contains unintentional vulnerabilities, such as defects in code that can be exploited. Such threats can have a range of impacts, including allowing attackers to take control of systems and read, modify, or delete sensitive information; decreasing the reliability of IT equipment; decreasing the availability of material needed to develop systems; or allowing remote attackers to cause a denial of service, among other things. Threat actors can introduce these threats into federal information systems by exploiting vulnerabilities that could exist at multiple points in the global supply chain. Examples of types of vulnerabilities that could be exploited include acquisition of IT products or parts from sources other than the original manufacturer or authorized reseller, such as independent distributors, brokers, or on the gray market; applying untested updates and software patches to information acquiring equipment, software, or services from suppliers without understanding their past performance or corporate structure; and using delivery or storage mechanisms that are not secure. If a threat actor exploits an existing vulnerability, it could lead to the loss of the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of the system and associated information. Three National Security-Related Agencies Have Not Fully Addressed IT Supply Chain Risk
Although the four agencies in our review—the Departments of Energy, Homeland Security (DHS), Justice, and Defense—have acknowledged the risks presented by supply chain vulnerabilities, they varied in the extent to which they have addressed these risks by (1) defining supply chain protection measures for department information systems, (2) developing implementing procedures for these measures, and (3) establishing capabilities for monitoring compliance with and the effectiveness of such measures. Because it had not defined these measures or associated implementing procedures, the department was also not in a position to monitor compliance or effectiveness. By contrast, the Department of Defense has made more progress. Specifically, the department’s supply chain risk management efforts began in 2003 and include a policy requiring supply chain risk to be addressed early and across a system’s entire life cycle and calling for an incremental implementation of supply chain risk management through a series of pilot projects; a requirement that every acquisition program submit and update a “program protection plan” that is to, among other things, help manage risks from supply chain exploits or design vulnerabilities; procedures for implementing supply chain protection measures, such as an implementation guide describing 32 specific measures for enhancing supply chain protection and procedures for program protection plans identifying ways in which programs should manage supply chain risk; and a monitoring mechanism to determine the status and effectiveness of supply chain protection pilot projects, as well as monitoring compliance with and effectiveness of program protection policies and procedures for several acquisition programs. Three National Security-Related Departments Need to Take Action to Better Address IT Supply Chain Risks
To assist the three national security-related agencies in better addressing IT supply chain-related security risks for their departmental information systems, we made several recommendations to the Secretaries of Energy and Homeland Security and the Attorney General. Justice concurred with the recommendations. Until these agencies develop comprehensive policies, procedures, and monitoring capabilities, increased risk exists that they will be vulnerable to IT supply chain threats. | Why GAO Did This Study
Information technology (IT) systems and the products and services that support them are essential to the operations of the federal government. These products and services are delivered through a complex global supply chain, and the exploitation of vulnerabilities in the IT supply chain is an emerging threat. Federal law requires establishment of information security programs, and implementing standards and guidelines provide for managing supply chain risk.
GAO was asked to testify on its recently issued report that, among other things, identified key risks associated with the supply chains used by federal agencies to procure IT equipment, software, and services, and assessed the extent to which four national security-related agencies have addressed such risks. In producing that report, GAO analyzed federal acquisition and information security laws, regulations, standards, and guidelines; examined departmental policies and procedures; and interviewed officials from four national security-related departments, the intelligence community, and nonfederal entities.
What GAO Found
Reliance on a global supply chain introduces multiple risks to federal information systems and underscores the importance of threat assessments and mitigation. Supply chain threats are present at various phases of a systems development life cycle and could create an unacceptable risk to federal agencies. Key supply chain-related threats include
installation of intentionally harmful hardware or software (i.e., containing malicious logic);
installation of counterfeit hardware or software;
failure or disruption in the production or distribution of critical products;
reliance on malicious or unqualified service providers for the performance of technical services; and
installation of hardware or software containing unintentional vulnerabilities, such as defective code.
These threats can have a range of impacts, including allowing attackers to take control of systems or decreasing the availability of critical materials needed to develop systems. These threats can be introduced by exploiting vulnerabilities that could exist at multiple points in the supply chain. Examples of such vulnerabilities include acquisition of products or parts from unauthorized distributors; application of untested updates and software patches; acquisition of equipment, software, or services from suppliers without knowledge of their past performance or corporate structure; and use of insecure delivery or storage mechanisms. These vulnerabilities could by exploited by malicious actors, leading to the loss of the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of federal systems and the information they contain.
The four national security-related agencies in GAOs reviewthe Departments of Energy, Homeland Security, Justice, and Defensevaried in the extent to which they have addressed supply chain risks. Specifically, Energy and Homeland Security had not yet defined supply chain protection measures for department information systems and are not in a position to develop implementing procedures and monitoring capabilities. Justice has defined supply chain protection measures but has not developed implementation procedures or monitoring capabilities. Until these agencies develop comprehensive policies, procedures, and monitoring capabilities, increased risk exists that they will be vulnerable to IT supply chain threats. By contrast, the Department of Defense has made greater progress: it has defined supply chain protection measures and implementing procedures and initiated efforts to monitor compliance and effectiveness. In addition, various interagency efforts are under way to address supply chain risks affecting federal IT.
What GAO Recommends
In its report, GAO recommended that the Departments of Energy, Homeland Security, and Justice take steps, as needed, to develop and document policies, procedures, and monitoring capabilities that address IT supply chain risk. In commenting on a draft of the report, the departments generally concurred with the recommendations. |
gao_GAO-07-611 | gao_GAO-07-611_0 | Background
The Federal Employees’ Retirement System Act of 1986 (FERSA) created TSP to provide options for retirement planning and encourage personal retirement savings among the federal workforce. As of February 2007, TSP held approximately $210 billion in retirement assets for 3.7 million current and former federal employees and their families. Congress created FRTIB and has the ability to change the structure for overseeing FRTIB. Congress requires FRTIB to submit its budget and to have an independent financial audit each year, performed under contract by a public accounting firm. DOL is not required to submit its audit reports directly to Congress, and Congress has not asked DOL to share its audit findings on a regular basis through hearings or meetings with committee staff. We recommended that Congress consider amending FERSA to require DOL to establish a formal process by which the Secretary of Labor can report to Congress areas of critical concern about the actions of the Executive Director and Board members, but no changes have yet been made. TSP’s Fiduciaries Have Similar Duties to Those of Private Plan Fiduciaries, but TSP Board Members and the Executive Director Have Special Liability Protections
FRTIB’s fiduciary duties are similar to those of private sector plan fiduciaries, and FRTIB has adopted various policies and practices to fulfill these responsibilities, but unlike private plan fiduciaries, Board members and the Executive Director have special liability protections. TSP’s authorizing statute, FERSA, and ERISA set the overarching requirements for fiduciaries to act prudently and solely in the interest of plan participants and beneficiaries. While the guidance is not specifically designed for TSP, FRTIB has implemented policies and practices for several of the areas in DOL’s guidance. TSP Fiduciaries Have Limited Discretion over Investment Policy Compared to Fiduciaries of Private Plans
The Board has less discretion than private sector plan sponsors in setting investment policy because the investment options available to TSP participants are largely outlined in law, whereas private sector plan sponsors are responsible for choosing which investment options to offer participants. FRTIB may select the particular indexes for the funds to follow as well as review the investment options and suggest additional funds. FRTIB and Other Federal Agencies Have Responsibility for Educating Participants on Retirement Issues, and Responsibilities Vary for Private and State and Local Government Employee Plans
FRTIB, OPM, and staff of employing federal agencies have responsibility for educating TSP participants about their retirement plan and other retirement issues, and responsibilities vary for private and state and local government employee plans. Private Plan Sponsors Are Responsible for Informing Participants about Their Plans, and Responsibilities Vary for State and Local Government Employee Plan Sponsors
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) requires plan sponsors to give plan participants in writing the information they need to know about their retirement benefit plans, including plan rules, financial information, and documents on the operation and management of the plan. All of the officials we spoke with provide some type of general retirement information or non-plan-specific information to participants, such as retirement calculators. Conclusion
Through FERSA, Congress established FRTIB to administer TSP and charged DOL with establishing a program to carry out audits to determine the level of TSP compliance with FERSA requirements. As the size and complexity of TSP have grown, an appropriate level of oversight of FRTIB is critical to ensuring that federal workers’ retirement savings are properly managed. Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
We provided a draft of this report to the Federal Retirement Thrift Investment Board (FRTIB), the Department of Labor (DOL), and the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) for review and comment. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Thrift Savings Plan (TSP), a retirement savings and investment plan for federal workers, held approximately $210 billion in retirement assets for 3.7 million participants, as of February 2007. TSP is managed by the Federal Retirement Thrift Investment Board (FRTIB). In light of questions about TSP oversight, we examined (1) the current structure for overseeing FRTIB, (2) how the statutorily defined fiduciary responsibilities of FRTIB compare to the responsibilities of private plan sponsors and how FRTIB fulfills its responsibilities, (3) how FRTIB's investment policies differ from those of private plan sponsors, and (4) FRTIB's statutory responsibilities to educate plan participants about TSP and other retirement issues and how these responsibilities compare with those of private and state and local government employee plan sponsors.
What GAO Found
The Department of Labor (DOL) and Congress oversee FRTIB. In accordance with the law establishing TSP, DOL conducts regular audits to determine the level of compliance with laws and regulations as well as to ensure the efficiency and effectiveness of operations. Congress requires FRTIB to submit its annual budget and other reports, and to undergo an independent financial audit. However, Congress has not held regular FRTIB oversight hearings. Also, DOL does not submit its audit reports directly to Congress, and has not yet been provided with a mechanism to communicate issues of critical concern to Congress. FRTIB's fiduciary duties are similar to those of fiduciaries of private sector plans. To act prudently and solely in the interest of plan participants, FRTIB has implemented policies and practices in several of the areas mentioned in DOL's guidance for private sector plans. However, unlike the law governing private plans, the Federal Employees' Retirement System Act of 1986 (FERSA)--the law that governs the administration of TSP--contains special liability protections for Board members and the Executive Director. FRTIB has less discretion than private sector plan sponsors in setting investment policy because the investment options available to TSP participants are largely outlined in law, whereas private sector plan sponsors are responsible for choosing which investment options to offer participants. TSP's authorizing statute specifies the number and types of funds available to participants, and requires that some of these funds track indexes, which are broad, diversified market indicators. FRTIB chooses the particular indexes for the funds to track, reviews the investment options, and suggests additional funds. Changing TSP investment options requires legislation. FRTIB and the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) are responsible for educating participants about TSP and general retirement issues, while the private and state and local government employee plan sponsors that we interviewed are governed by different rules. By statute, FRTIB is charged with developing educational materials for participants about TSP-specific issues. FRTIB also assists OPM, which is required to provide general retirement education to federal employees and train retirement counselors at federal agencies to provide information to federal employees. Private plan sponsors as well as the state and local government employee plan sponsors that we spoke with are responsible for educating participants about their plans, but often supply general retirement information as well. As the size and complexity of TSP have grown, an appropriate level of oversight of FRTIB is critical to ensuring that federal workers' retirement savings are properly managed. GAO previously recommended that Congress consider amending FERSA to require DOL to establish a formal process by which the Secretary of Labor can report to Congress issues of critical concern about actions of the Executive Director and Board members. |
gao_GAO-13-835 | gao_GAO-13-835_0 | Management reviews the templates and identifies a preliminary list of approved initiatives. process. IRS Significantly Improved Its PPACA Cost Estimate, but Did Not Publicly Report Investment Information for the Fiscal Year 2014 Budget Request
Updated PPACA Cost Estimate Shows Significant Progress, but a Few Areas for Improvement Remain
In December 2012, IRS updated the PPACA cost estimate as part of its on-going practice to refine the cost estimate and address our prior recommendation. Unlike previous versions, the updated cost estimate shows significant progress, as it reflects the full- cycle cost of the program, which will total $1.89 billion from fiscal year 2010 through 2026. Third, IRS did not obtain a second cost estimate. IRS Did Not Report PPACA Investment Information on the OMB Dashboard Website
Although the IT systems used to implement PPACA (which IRS refers to as the ACA IT investment) meet the Department of Treasury’s (Treasury) definition of a major investment, IRS reported the investment as a non- major investment in fiscal year 2014. According to agency officials, IRS did not have time to prepare the information that is typically reported for major investments in the President’s fiscal year 2014 budget request. IRS Expanded Information Reported on Its Major IT Investments in the Fiscal Year 2014 Budget Justification, but Additional Information Would Be Useful
In the fiscal year 2014 budget justification, IRS included new, useful information on its major IT investments that was not included in prior budget justifications, such as life-cycle costs, projected useful life of the current asset, anticipated benefits, and how performance will be measured. Likewise, the decision maker would see that the fiscal year 2014 budget justification shows the estimated life-cycle costs for MeF to be $575 million, however, to know how much has been obligated for the investment from the start date through fiscal year 2012—$304 million— the decision maker would have to access the Exhibit 300 and calculate the amount of funding obligated across prior fiscal years. IRS officials said they can consolidate this information for ease of review. Three of the implemented recommendations resulted in additional information in the budget request, such as actual ROI and linking funding requests for new initiatives to strategic goals and objectives. We also identified some other actions that could improve the budget request and aid Congress in decision making, including (1) improving the accuracy and credibility of the PPACA cost estimate in future updates because it provides the basis for informed investment decision making, realistic budget formulation, and accountability for results, (2) ensuring the ACA IT investment is publicly reported to increase transparency and (3) reporting consolidated information on major IT investments to make the information more accessible. Improve the accuracy and credibility of future updates to the PPACA cost estimate by taking the following actions to more closely follow best practices outlined in the GAO Cost Guide:
Use earned value management to capture actual costs and use them as a basis for future updates. IRS agreed with the majority of the actions associated with our fourth recommendation on improving the accuracy and credibility of future updates of the PPACA cost estimate. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
We were asked to review the President’s fiscal year 2014 budget request for the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). The objectives of this report were to (1) describe IRS’s capacity to report fiscal year 2012 obligations and full-time equivalent (FTE) data for program activities, organizational entities, and other efforts of interest; (2) assess IRS’s process and the type of information used to prioritize and select new program initiatives; (3) describe proposed base budget savings; (4) describe IRS’s new projected return on investment (ROI) methodologies; (5) evaluate steps IRS took to improve the cost estimate for the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) in accordance with GAO’s Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide and determine the extent to which IRS is transparently reporting on the Affordable Care Act (ACA) information technology (IT) investment; (6) summarize IRS’s major IT investments and assess the type of information available in the congressional justification; and (7) describe IRS’s progress in implementing our prior budget-related recommendations. Documents included guidance from the IRS Corporate Budget Office and pre- selection templates submitted for review by the taxpayer services and enforcement business units to senior leadership between November 2011 and May 2012. We analyzed these submissions for completeness against criteria for budget formulation outlined in OMB Circulars A-94. | Why GAO Did This Study
The financing of the federal government depends largely on IRS's ability to administer the tax laws, which includes providing service to taxpayers and enforcing the law to ensure everyone pays the taxes they owe. For fiscal year 2014, the President requested $12.9 billion for IRS, an increase of 9 percent over fiscal year 2012 actual levels.
Because of the size of IRS's budget and the importance of its programs, GAO was asked to review the fiscal year 2014 budget request. In April and May 2013, GAO reported preliminary observations on IRS's budget. Among other things, this report assesses how IRS prioritizes new initiatives; steps IRS has taken to improve the PPACA cost estimate and the reporting transparency of the related IT investment; and the type of information available in the budget justification about major IT systems. To address these objectives, GAO reviewed the fiscal year 2014 budget justification, compared the updated PPACA cost estimate to GAO's Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide, and interviewed IRS Corporate Budget officials.
What GAO Found
For the fiscal year 2014 budget formulation process, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) implemented a new process that uses templates to help screen, prioritize, and select new initiatives before detailed business cases are developed to support funding requests. The template information that GAO reviewed varied in detail and scope; for some, IRS guidance may have contributed to incomplete submissions to senior leadership. According to Office of Management and Budget Circular A-94, in order to evaluate and compare funding initiatives, decision-makers need to be aware of benefits, costs, and strategies related to achieving program goals. By improving guidance on the type of data to include, IRS could help ensure the templates are fully completed.
IRS significantly improved its Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) cost estimate. In particular, the December 2012 estimate is more comprehensive, reflecting the full life-cycle cost of the program--estimated at $1.89 billion for fiscal year 2010 through 2026. A few areas of improvement remain, primarily regarding the accuracy and credibility of the cost estimate. For example, IRS showed how the December 2012 estimate differed from the previous estimate, but did not explain the factors that resulted in the variances. In addition, IRS did not obtain a second cost estimate that could be used to assess the reasonableness of the $1.89 billion estimated program costs.
Although the information technology (IT) systems for PPACA met dollar thresholds (as outlined in the Department of Treasury's guidance) as a major investment for public reporting, IRS did not report this as such. Officials told GAO they did not have time to prepare the information for the fiscal year 2014 budget justification, but plan to do so for fiscal year 2015. Until IRS publicly reports the IT systems for PPACA as a major investment, transparency about these systems' implementation and administration is limited.
Although IRS included new and useful information on its major IT investments in the budget justification (such as life-cycle costs) other important information (such as the start date and percent of life-cycle costs obligated) is reported elsewhere or must be calculated. IRS officials said they could consolidate this information for ease of review. Consolidating key budget and performance data would ensure Congress has comprehensive, easily accessible information on major IT investments to guide decisions.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that IRS improve budget formulation guidance for new initiatives; improve the accuracy and credibility of future updates to the PPACA cost estimate as well as report the related IT investment publicly; and consolidate major IT investment reporting. IRS agreed with three of GAO's four recommendations and agreed with the majority of the actions associated with improving the accuracy and credibility of the PPACA cost estimate. |
gao_GAO-03-1093 | gao_GAO-03-1093_0 | Businesses in other OECD countries are also concerned that disclosure requirements, which the United States proposed in OECD negotiations, will make sensitive business information public. Other OECD members have made similar revisions. Most OECD members are now following similar basic procedures for reviewing sensitive projects. Differences Exist in OECD Members’ Specific Environmental Guidelines
Despite the commonalities among OECD members’ environmental impact review systems, differences exist in how ECAs review potential projects and report on projects they undertake. However, some ECAs have taken steps to include considerations for social impacts in their environmental standards. Near-Term Changes to Common Approaches May Be Limited
Any revisions or enhancements to the Common Approaches during 2003 may be limited because of the nature of the OECD negotiating process and the resistance of many members to some of the more controversial aspects of environmental guidelines. The United States is therefore unlikely to fully achieve its original negotiating objectives, although most OECD members would like the United States to accept the Common Approaches as a formal OECD agreement. At the negotiations’ outset, many ECG members did not have environmental guidelines and were reticent to negotiate on unfamiliar technical issues. Limited Evidence of Economic Impact, but Assessment Difficult for Several Reasons
There is limited evidence that Ex-Im Bank’s environmental guidelines have affected U.S. exports, although the complexity of potential effects and the lack of information make identifying and quantifying impacts difficult. The evidence we reviewed indicates that any impacts are likely to be concentrated in certain areas, especially the energy sector. The majority of projects authorized by Ex-Im Bank do not require significant environmental review, and most projects in the full environmental review category are in the energy sector. This is because medium- and short-term transactions are generally not subject to either screening or review. Some businesses are also concerned about other aspects associated with the environmental review process. In response, we assessed (1) the achievements of the Common Approaches and the remaining differences among the members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), (2) the prospects for further advancement on common environmental guidelines for export credit agencies, and (3) the impact that environmental guidelines for export credit agencies may have on U.S. exports. Departments of the Treasury and State and the Export-Import Bank. With the United States declining to accept the Common Approaches in November 2001, 28 ECG members agreed to voluntarily adhere to the Common Approaches. | Why GAO Did This Study
Export credit agencies (ECA) are responsible for providing billions of dollars worth of support for large-scale industrial projects annually, but until recently most ECAs did not formally review the environmental impacts of these projects. The United States, whose Export-Import Bank began using environmental guidelines in 1995, pushed for negotiations on common ECA environmental guidelines at the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). The OECD negotiations halted in 2001 because the United States believed that the results, called the Common Approaches, were insufficient. The remaining OECD members then pledged to voluntarily implement the Common Approaches. In response to congressional interest in ECA environmental guidelines, GAO assessed (1) the level of convergence among OECD members and the prospects for further advancement and (2) what impacts such guidelines may have on U.S. exports.
What GAO Found
Since OECD negotiations began, members have made progress in developing environmental guidelines for their ECAs and are moving toward common environmental review practices. However, important differences remain. Having agreed to voluntarily implement the Common Approaches beginning in 2002, many OECD members adopted similar basic procedures for reviewing sensitive projects. However, OECD members' guidelines and practices differ in areas where the United States believes it has among the more advanced policies, including which technical standards ECAs use to review projects and the extent to which environmental impact information is publicly disclosed. Although OECD members are considering revising the Common Approaches in 2003, the United States is unlikely to achieve all of its original negotiating objectives because of the desire by some OECD members to gain more experience with the guidelines before renegotiating them and the reluctance of other members to take any steps that might be perceived as having a negative effect on the competitiveness of their exporters. There is limited evidence that the Export-Import Bank's environmental guidelines have affected U.S. exports, although the complexity of potential effects and the lack of information make identifying and quantifying impacts difficult. The evidence GAO reviewed indicates that impacts are likely to be concentrated in the energy sector. Most Export-Import Bank transactions do not require an environmental review because they are either short-term transactions, are in certain excluded sectors, or are not considered environmentally sensitive. Finally, while some businesses are more concerned about the impacts of environmental guidelines than others, their specific concerns are largely anecdotal and difficult to confirm. |
gao_GAO-10-296 | gao_GAO-10-296_0 | As an SSA, DHS has direct responsibility for leading, integrating, and coordinating efforts of sector partners to protect 11 CIKR sectors. DHS Has Incorporated Changes into the 2009 NIPP that Reflect Stakeholder Input and Sectors’ Experience Protecting Critical Infrastructure and an Increased Emphasis on Risk Management
DHS incorporated changes in the 2009 NIPP—including a greater emphasis on CIKR regional planning and updates to DHS’s overall risk management framework—that NIPP PMO officials said are based on stakeholder input and sectors’ experiences performing critical infrastructure protection. DHS discussed the need for regional coordination in the 2006 NIPP and encouraged stakeholders to address CIKR protection across sectors within and across geographic regions. By contrast, the 2009 NIPP called for regional coordination through the formation of a consortium of representatives from multiple regional organizations. Tier 1 or Tier 2 assets are those that if destroyed or disrupted could cause significant casualties, major economic losses, or widespread and long-term disruptions to national well-being and governance capacity. DHS also provided a detailed discussion of risk management methodologies in the 2009 NIPP, as compared to the 2006 NIPP. Whereas the 2006 NIPP listed the baseline criteria—minimum requirements—for conducting risk analyses to ensure they are credible and comparable, the 2009 NIPP includes the use of a common risk assessment approach, including the core criteria—updated requirements—for threat, vulnerability, and consequence analyses designed to allow the comparison of risk across sectors. The 2009 NIPP also highlights DHS’s role in a 15-nation effort specific to cyber security. DHS Guidance Calls for SSAs to Develop Plans and Reports That Consider Specific Issues in the 2009 NIPP
Following the publication of the 2009 NIPP, DHS issued guidance to the SSAs designed to make them aware of the changes to the NIPP and to discuss the issues DHS believed SSAs should consider for increased attention when developing their SSPs and SARs. Fourteen of 18 SSA representatives generally described the process they plan to use to incorporate these changes, which for the most part mirrored DHS’s process for revising the NIPP. DHS Increased Its Emphasis on Resiliency in the 2009 NIPP and Directed SSAs to Address Resiliency in Their Sector Plans
Although DHS revised the NIPP to increase the use of the term resilience and to highlight it as an important concept paired with protection, the 2009 NIPP uses much of the same language as the 2006 NIPP to describe resiliency concepts and strategies. More importantly, whereas the 2006 NIPP primarily treated resiliency as a subset of protection, the 2009 NIPP generally referred to resiliency alongside protection. For example, whereas the Managing Risk chapter of the 2006 NIPP has a section entitled “Characteristics of Effective Protection Programs,” the same chapter in the 2009 NIPP has a section entitled, “Characteristics of Effective Protection Programs and Resiliency Strategies.”
In addition, in contrast to the 2006 NIPP, the 2009 NIPP referred to resiliency alongside protection in the introductory section of the document. Whereas the introduction to the 2006 NIPP states that it “…provides the mechanisms for…enhancing information-sharing mechanisms and protective measures within and across CI/KR sectors…,” the introduction to the 2009 NIPP states that it “…provides the mechanisms for…enhancing information-sharing mechanisms and protection and resiliency within and across CIKR sectors.” Also, in comparison to the 2006 NIPP, the 2009 version of the NIPP discusses resiliency more often in the “Authorities, Roles and Responsibilities” chapter of the document. NIPP PMO officials told us that changes related to resiliency in the 2009 NIPP were not intended to represent a major shift in policy; rather they were intended to increase attention to and raise awareness about resiliency as it applies within individual sectors. For example, in the 2009 guidance set forth in Chapter 5, SSAs are advised that in sectors for which infrastructure resiliency is as or more important than physical security or hardening, their SSA chapter on “Protection Program Implementation” should focus on describing the resiliency measures and strategies being used by the sector. Agency Comments
We requested comments on a draft of this report from the Secretary of Homeland Security. DHS said that the more explicit emphasis on resilience in the 2009 NIPP is expected to encourage more system-based sector and cross-sector activities that address a broader spectrum of risks. Appendix II: Discussions of Resiliency in 2007 Sector-specific Plans
This appendix discusses how the Sector-specific Agencies (SSAs) addressed resiliency in their 2007 Sector-specific Plans (SSPs) and how the SSAs will address resiliency in their 2010 SSPs. Since the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) does not expect these plans to be released until 2010, we contacted representatives of the 18 SSAs to gather information on their plans to adhere to DHS’s revised SSP guidance. | Why GAO Did This Study
According to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), there are thousands of facilities in the United States that if destroyed by a disaster could cause casualties, economic losses, or disruptions to national security. The Homeland Security Act of 2002 gave DHS responsibility for leading and coordinating the nation's effort to protect critical infrastructure and key resources (CIKR). Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7 (HSPD-7) defined responsibilities for DHS and certain federal agencies--known as sector-specific agencies (SSAs)--that represent 18 industry sectors, such as energy. In accordance with the Homeland Security Act and HSPD-7, DHS issued the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) in June 2006 to provide the approach for integrating the nation's CIKR. GAO was asked to study DHS's January 2009 revisions to the NIPP in light of a debate over whether DHS has emphasized protection--to deter threats, mitigate vulnerabilities, or minimize the consequences of disasters---rather than resilience---to resist, absorb, or successfully adapt, respond to, or recover from disasters. This report discusses (1) how the 2009 NIPP changed compared to the 2006 NIPP and (2) how DHS and SSAs addressed resiliency as part of their planning efforts. GAO compared the 2006 and 2009 NIPPs, analyzed documents, including NIPP Implementation Guides and sector- specific plans, and interviewed DHS and SSA officials from all 18 sectors about their process to identify potential revisions to the NIPP and address resiliency.
What GAO Found
Compared to the 2006 NIPP, DHS's 2009 update to the NIPP incorporated various changes, including a greater emphasis on regional CIKR protection planning and updates to DHS's overall risk management framework, such as instructions for sectors to develop metrics to gauge how well programs reduced the risk to their sector. For example, in the 2006 NIPP, DHS encouraged stakeholders to address CIKR across sectors within and across geographic regions; by contrast, the 2009 NIPP called for regional coordination through the formation of a consortium of representatives from multiple regional organizations. DHS also enhanced its discussion of risk management methodologies in the 2009 NIPP. The 2006 NIPP listed the minimum requirements for conducting risk analyses, while the 2009 NIPP includes the use of a common risk assessment approach, including the core criteria for these analyses to allow the comparison of risk across sectors. DHS officials said that the changes highlighted in the 2009 NIPP were the result of knowledge gained and issues raised during discussions with partners and outside organizations like GAO. DHS has also issued guidance for SSAs to consider revisions to the NIPP when updating their sector-specific plans (SSPs). Fourteen of 18 SSA representatives that responded to our query said they used a process similar to DHS's to incorporate NIPP changes into their SSPs. They reported that they intend to discuss the expectations for the SSP with DHS, draft the SSP based on their knowledge of their sectors, and obtain input and feedback from stakeholders. DHS increased its emphasis on resiliency in the 2009 NIPP by discussing it with the same level of importance as protection. While the 2009 NIPP uses much of the same language as the 2006 NIPP to describe resiliency, the 2006 NIPP primarily treated resiliency as a subset of protection while the 2009 NIPP generally referred to resiliency alongside protection. For example, while the Managing Risk chapter of the 2006 NIPP has a section entitled "Characteristics of Effective Protection Programs," the same chapter in the 2009 NIPP has a section entitled, "Characteristics of Effective Protection Programs and Resiliency Strategies." DHS officials stated that these changes are not a major shift in policy; rather they are intended to raise awareness about resiliency as it applies within individual sectors. Furthermore, they stated that there is a greater emphasis on resilience in the 2009 NIPP to encourage more sector and cross-sector activities to address a broader spectrum of risks, such as cyber security. DHS officials also used guidance to encourage SSAs to devote more attention to resiliency. For example, in the 2009 guidance, SSAs are advised that in sectors where infrastructure resiliency is as or more important than physical security, they should focus on describing the resiliency measures and strategies being used by the sector. The 2010 updates to the SSPs are due to be released by DHS in mid-2010 and all sector representatives who responded to our questions said they will address the issue as is appropriate for their sectors. In commenting on a draft of this report, DHS reiterated its process for updating the NIPP and its views on resiliency. |
gao_GAO-13-433T | gao_GAO-13-433T_0 | Medicare Program
Background
In 2012, the Medicare program covered more than 49 million elderly and disabled beneficiaries at an estimated cost of $555 billion, and reported improper payments estimated to be more than $44 billion. The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), which administers Medicare for the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), is responsible for implementing payment methods that encourage efficient service delivery, managing Medicare to provide efficient and cost-effective services to beneficiaries, safeguarding the program from loss, and overseeing patient safety and care. Like health care spending in general, Medicare spending has grown faster than growth in the economy for many years. In the coming years, continued growth in the number of Medicare beneficiaries and program spending will create increasing challenges for the federal government. Why Medicare is High Risk
GAO designated Medicare as a high-risk area in 1990 because of its complexity and susceptibility to improper payments, which, added to its size, have led to serious management challenges. Medicare spending must be held much more firmly in check to sustain the program over the long term, while continuing to ensure that beneficiaries have access to appropriate health care. To help do so, GAO has identified opportunities to make Medicare payment methods more efficient and cost-effective. In addition, the size of the program makes it important for CMS to manage program functions more effectively and better oversee the program’s integrity and quality of patient care. What Remains to Be Done
CMS has not met GAO’s criteria to have the Medicare program removed from the High-Risk List. For example, although CMS has made progress in measuring and reducing improper payment rates in different parts of the program, it has yet to demonstrate sustained progress in lowering the rates. Because the size of Medicare relative to other programs leads to aggregate improper payments that are extremely large, continuing to reduce improper payments in this program should remain a priority for CMS. Further, CMS should complete some actions required by PPACA that were designed to improve the integrity of the program, such as determining which providers must post surety bonds to help in recovering payments for fraudulent billing, using fingerprint screening for high-risk providers, issuing a final regulation that requires providers to disclose additional information, and establishing core elements for provider compliance programs. Medicaid Program
Background
The Medicaid program is a federal and state program that covered acute health care, long-term care, and other services for about 70 million low- income people in fiscal year 2011; it is one of the largest sources of funding for medical and health-related services for America’s most vulnerable populations. Medicaid consists of more than 50 distinct state- based programs. The federal government matches state expenditures for most Medicaid services using the Federal Medical Assistance Percentage, a statutory formula based in part on each state’s per capita income. Medicaid is a significant expenditure for the federal government and the states, with total expenditures of $436 billion in 2011. CMS is responsible for overseeing the program at the federal level, while states administer their respective programs’ day-to-day operations. Why Medicaid is High Risk
GAO designated Medicaid as a high-risk program because of its size, growth, diversity of programs, and concerns about the adequacy of fiscal oversight, which is necessary to prevent inappropriate program spending. Both Congress and the administration have demonstrated commitment and leadership to making Medicaid fiscal and program integrity a priority. What Remains to Be Done
Congress, HHS, and CMS have taken steps to improve the fiscal integrity of Medicaid, and CMS has implemented certain GAO recommendations, such as improving the information collected on certain supplemental payments and issuing guidance to states to better prevent payment of improper claims. However, more federal oversight of Medicaid’s fiscal and program integrity is needed. If you or your staff have any questions about this testimony, please contact Kathleen King at 202-512-7114 or [email protected] or Carolyn Yocom at 202-512-7114 or [email protected]. | Why GAO Did This Study
This testimony discusses GAO's recent work on Medicare and Medicaid. Since 1990, GAO has regularly reported on programs as part of our high-risk series, which focuses on government operations that we have identified as high risk due to their greater vulnerability to fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement or their need to address economy, efficiency, or effectiveness challenges. GAO's high-risk series has brought much-needed focus to problems impeding effective government and costing billions of dollars each year. These remarks on Medicare and Medicaid are drawn from GAO's 2013 high-risk update.
Medicare Program : In 2012, the Medicare program covered more than 49 million elderly and disabled beneficiaries at an estimated cost of $555 billion, and reported improper payments estimated to be more than $44 billion. The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), which administers Medicare for the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), is responsible for implementing payment methods that encourage efficient service delivery, managing Medicare to provide efficient and cost-effective services to beneficiaries, safeguarding the program from loss, and overseeing patient safety and care. Like health care spending in general, Medicare spending has grown faster than growth in the economy for many years. In the coming years, continued growth in the number of Medicare beneficiaries and program spending will create increasing challenges for the federal government.
GAO designated Medicare as a high-risk area in 1990 because of its complexity and susceptibility to improper payments, which, added to its size, have led to serious management challenges. Medicare spending must be held much more firmly in check to sustain the program over the long term, while continuing to ensure that beneficiaries have access to appropriate health care. To help do so, GAO has identified opportunities to make Medicare payment methods more efficient and cost-effective. In addition, the size of the program makes it important for CMS to manage program functions more effectively and better oversee the program's integrity and quality of patient care.
Medicaid Program : The Medicaid program is a federal and state program that covered acute health care, long-term care, and other services for about 70 million low-income people in fiscal year 2011; it is one of the largest sources of funding for medical and health-related services for America's most vulnerable populations. Medicaid consists of more than 50 distinct state-based programs. The federal government matches state expenditures for most Medicaid services using the Federal Medical Assistance Percentage, a statutory formula based in part on each state's per capita income. Medicaid is a significant expenditure for the federal government and the states, with total expenditures of $436 billion in 2011. CMS is responsible for overseeing the program at the federal level, while states administer their respective programs' day-to-day operations.
GAO designated Medicaid as a high-risk program because of its size, growth, diversity of programs, and concerns about the adequacy of fiscal oversight, which is necessary to prevent inappropriate program spending. Both Congress and the administration have demonstrated commitment and leadership to making Medicaid fiscal and program integrity a priority.
Kathleen King at 202-512-7114 or [email protected] or Carolyn Yocom at 202-512-7114 or [email protected] .
What GAO Found
Medicare Program : CMS has not met GAO's criteria to have the Medicare program removed from the High-Risk List. For example, although CMS has made progress in measuring and reducing improper payment rates in different parts of the program, it has yet to demonstrate sustained progress in lowering the rates. Because the size of Medicare relative to other programs leads to aggregate improper payments that are extremely large, continuing to reduce improper payments in this program should remain a priority for CMS. Further, CMS should complete some actions required by the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) that were designed to improve the integrity of the program, such as determining which providers must post surety bonds to help in recovering payments for fraudulent billing, using fingerprint screening for high-risk providers, issuing a final regulation that requires providers to disclose additional information, and establishing core elements for provider compliance programs.
Medicaid Program : Congress, HHS, and CMS have taken steps to improve the fiscal integrity of Medicaid, and CMS has implemented certain GAO recommendations, such as improving the information collected on certain supplemental payments and issuing guidance to states to better prevent payment of improper claims. However, more federal oversight of Medicaid's fiscal and program integrity is needed. |
gao_AIMD-98-274 | gao_AIMD-98-274_0 | No one individual should control all key aspects of a transaction or event without appropriate compensating controls. For the two fraud cases, the primary internal control weakness was the lack of segregation of duties. In each case, the individuals committing the fraud had authority or capability to perform functions that should have been segregated. The Staff Sergeant, who was Chief of Material in the Accounting Branch, had broad access to the automated vendor payment system, which allowed him to enter contract information, including contract numbers, delivery orders, modifications, and obligations as well as invoice and receiving report information and remittance addresses. Inadequate Access Controls Leave Payment System Vulnerable to Unauthorized Use
The lack of segregation of duties with respect to the level of access to the vendor payment system held by the Staff Sergeant that allowed him to embezzle funds remains widespread. Payments made after the required payment date must include interest. The practice of creating invoices for contractors provides an opportunity for DFAS and Air Force employees to create false invoices. Unable to Determine Whether Goods and Services Were Received Due to Inadequate Contract Management
We were also unable to determine whether the Air Force received the goods and services paid for under the two contracts because, in addition to missing records, a number of improper and questionable procedures were followed for receipt and control of equipment and services paid for under the contracts. Conclusions
Internal control weaknesses that contributed to past fraud in the Air Force’s vendor payment process continue. Moreover, the Air Force’s vendor payment system is vulnerable to unauthorized users due to weaknesses in operating computer system and local network security. To help ensure that vendor payments are proper and that they comply with Prompt Payment Act time frames, we recommend that the DFAS Director ensure that (1) the date that invoices are received and the date that goods and services are received are properly documented and (2) invoices are tracked from receipt through disbursement of funds. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
In accordance with your request, our objectives were to (1) identify internal control weaknesses that contributed to Bolling AFB, Castle AFB, and the DFAS Dayton fraud, (2) provide our observations on whether the same or similar internal control weaknesses at the locations covered by our review continue to leave the Air Force vulnerable to fraud, and (3) to the extent possible, reconstruct the history of the two contracts associated with the Bolling AFB fraud to determine whether the government received the goods and services paid for under the contracts. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed two specific cases of fraud involving Air Force vendor payments, focusing on: (1) internal control weaknesses that contributed to the two fraud cases; (2) observations on whether the same or similar internal control weaknesses continue to leave the Air Force vulnerable to fraud or improper payments; and (3) reconstructing the history of the two contracts associated with the Bolling Air Force Base (AFB) fraud to determine whether the government received the goods and services paid for under the contracts.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the two cases of fraud resulted from a weak internal control environment; (2) the lack of segregation of duties and other control weaknesses created an environment where employees were given broad authority and the capability, without compensating controls, to perform functions that should have been performed by separate individuals under proper supervision; (3) similar internal control weaknesses continue to leave Air Force funds vulnerable to fraudulent or improper vendor payments; (4) for example, as of mid-June 1998, over 1,800 Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) and Air Force employees had a level of access to the vendor payment system that allowed them to enter contract information, including the contract number, delivery orders, modifications, and obligations, as well as invoice and receiving report information and remittance addresses; (5) no one individual should control all key aspects of a transaction or event without appropriate compensating controls; (6) this level of access allows these employees to submit all the information necessary to create fraudulent and improper payments; (7) in addition, the automated vendor payment system is vulnerable to penetration by unauthorized users due to weaknesses in computer security, including inadequate password controls; (8) further, DFAS lacked procedures to ensure that the date that invoices were received for payment and the date that goods and services were received were properly documented; (9) these are critical dates for ensuring proper vendor payments and compliance with the Prompt Payment Act, which requires that payments made after the due date include interest; (10) missing records, another indicator of a weak internal control environment, prevented GAO from reconstructing the complete history of the two Air Force contracts associated with the Bolling AFB fraud; and (11) GAO was also unable to determine whether the Air Force received the goods and services paid for under these contracts because, in addition to missing records, a number of improper procedures were followed for receipt and control of equipment and services paid for under the contracts. |
gao_GAO-01-481T | gao_GAO-01-481T_0 | Concluding Observations
A variety of approaches have been proposed to increase private and public coverage among uninsured individuals. The success of these proposals in doing so for these diverse populations will depend on several key factors. The impact of tax subsidies on promoting private health insurance will depend on whether the subsidies reduce premiums enough to induce uninsured low-income individuals to purchase health insurance and on whether these subsidies can be made available at the time the person needs to pay premiums. The effectiveness of public program expansions will depend on states’ ability and willingness to utilize any new flexibility to cover uninsured residents as well as develop effective outreach to enroll the targeted populations. While crowd-out is a concern with any of the approaches, private or public, some degree of public funds going to those currently with private health insurance may be inevitable to provide stable health coverage for some of the currently 42 million uninsured. | What GAO Found
Various approaches have been proposed to increase private and public health care coverage of uninsured persons. The success of these proposals will depend on several key factors. The impact of tax subsidies on promoting private health insurance will depend on whether the subsidies reduce premiums enough to induce uninsured low-income individuals to buy health insurance and on whether these subsidies can be made available at the time the person needs to pay premiums. The effectiveness of public program expansions will depend on states' ability and willingness to use any new flexibility to cover uninsured residents as well as develop effective outreach to enroll the targeted populations. Although crowd-out is a concern with any of the approaches, some degree of public funds going to those currently with private health insurance may be inevitable to provide stable health coverage for some of the 42 million uninsured Americans. |
gao_GAO-09-104 | gao_GAO-09-104_0 | 2.) 3.) Using the standards and targets, CMS evaluates the contractor’s performance three times a year. While generally meeting the required standards for the three access-related performance metrics, the 1-800- MEDICARE contractor consistently met the target for only one of the three access-related performance indicators we analyzed. 4.) The 1-800-MEDICARE contractor met its unhandled CSR call rate standard, keeping the number of unhandled calls within the required standards, in 11 of the 13 months we analyzed and, because of a waiver granted by CMS, was considered by the agency to have met the standard in 12 of 13 months. 5.) Three of the indicators are particularly related to callers’ telephone access: (1) the average amount of time CSRs spend assisting callers, referred to as average handle time; (2) agent occupancy—the percentage of CSRs answering calls; and (3) forecasting of call volume going to CSRs. 6.) Efforts to Provide LEP Callers Access to 1-800-MEDICARE Have Led to Shorter Wait Times for Spanish-speaking Callers, on Average, but Are Not Consistent with All LEP Plan Elements
CMS has made efforts to provide LEP callers with access to services through 1-800-MEDICARE by requiring the contractor to provide services in either English or Spanish and to provide interpretation services for callers speaking other languages. Officials from the Office of Beneficiary Services (OBIS)—the CMS office with primary responsibility for 1-800-MEDICARE—said they were not aware of the HHS LEP Plan when awarding and assigning the current 1-800- MEDICARE contract and CMS has not identified an office responsible for acting as a point of contact for its management of the LEP Plan. Nonetheless, steps CMS has taken to provide services to LEP callers are consistent with some elements of the HHS LEP Plan adopted by the agency without modification, such as the element related to oral language assistance, but not others, such as the Plan’s element for assessing quality and accessibility, which identifies the need for complaint mechanisms for language issues. Spanish-speaking callers who speak with bilingual CSRs frequently experienced shorter average monthly wait times to reach a CSR than their English-speaking counterparts. Without an office or official responsible for management of the Plan, staff lack a source of guidance that could assist them in taking steps consistent with the Plan to provide services to people with LEP. CMS Uses Common Management Practices to Oversee Callers’ Access to Services and to Accurate Information from 1-800- MEDICARE
CMS uses all six of the management practices we identified as commonly used by contact centers to oversee 1-800-MEDICARE callers’ access to services and to accurate information. These practices are addressed in the current 1-800-MEDICARE contract and reflected in CMS’s ongoing oversight of the help line. Clearly defining performance metrics and indicators. Customer satisfaction surveys. Ensuring accurate information. Evaluating CSR interaction with callers. Capacity planning. Validation of contractor reports. Conclusions
To date, the current 1-800-MEDICARE contractor has met most of CMS’s performance standards and some of the performance targets designed to ensure callers’ access to services from the help line. These written materials may include paper and electronic documents such as publications, notices, correspondence, web sites and signs.” “Each agency, program, and activity of HHS will have in place specific written policies and procedures related to each of the plan elements and designated staff who will be responsible for implementing activities related to these policies.” “Each agency, program, and activity of HHS will proactively inform LEP customers of the availability of free language assistance services through both oral and written notice, in his or her primary language.” “Each agency, program, and activity of HHS will train front-line and managerial staff on the policies and procedures of its language assistance activities.” “Each agency, program, and activity of HHS will institute procedures to assess the accessibility and quality of language assistance activities for LEP customers.”
Appendix II: Average Caller Wait Time by Type and Complexity of Call and Language of Caller, September 2007 through July 2008
This appendix provides more detailed information on the average wait times experienced by callers depending on the type of inquiry—general Medicare and claims—and complexity of their call or the language in which they need assistance for the period September 2007 through July 2008 of the current contract. Federal Contact Centers: Mechanisms for Sharing Metrics and Oversight Practices along with Improved Data Needed. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) is responsible for providing beneficiaries timely and accurate information about Medicare. Receiving nearly 30 million calls in 2007, 1-800-MEDICARE, operated by a contractor, is the most common way members of the public get program information. The help line provides services both to English-speaking and limited English proficiency (LEP) callers. In this report, GAO describes (1) the extent to which access performance standards and targets have been met by the current contractor, (2) the efforts by CMS to provide LEP callers access to help line services and wait times experienced by these callers, and (3) CMS's oversight of callers' access to 1-800-MEDICARE and the information's accuracy. To conduct this work, GAO reviewed documents and analyzed help line data through July 2008. In addition, GAO interviewed agency staff, industry experts, and officials at four federal agencies with high call volume contact centers.
What GAO Found
The 1-800-MEDICARE contractor met most standards and some targets for the required telephone performance metrics and indicators CMS designed to ensure callers' access--from July 2007 through July 2008. The 1-800-MEDICARE contractor's performance met the standard for each of the three access-related metrics--the average amount of time callers wait to reach customer service representatives (CSR), the percent of unhandled calls, such as abandoned calls, and the percent of calls transferred among CSRs--in 10 of 13 months analyzed. Because of waivers granted by CMS, the contractor was considered by the agency to have met the standards in 12 of 13 months. During that time, the contractor met the target for only one of three access-related indicators--the percent of CSRs answering calls. Other indicators were the average amount of time needed to respond to callers' inquiries and the accuracy of CSR call volume forecasting. CMS's efforts to provide LEP callers with access have led to shorter average wait times for Spanish-speaking callers, but are not consistent with all elements of the HHS LEP Plan. CMS requires its help line contractor to provide services to Spanish-speaking callers by employing bilingual CSRs and to provide interpretation services for other LEP callers, which the contractor does by using telephone interpreters. In 20 of the 32 months reviewed, Spanish-speaking callers waited less time, on average, to reach a CSR than English-speaking callers. CMS officials with primary responsibility for 1-800-MEDICARE said they were not aware of the LEP Plan when awarding the current contract, and CMS has not identified an office responsible for acting as a point of contact for management of the LEP Plan. Without a responsible office or official, an internal control for federal agencies, CMS staff lack a source of guidance to assist them in taking steps consistent with the LEP Plan when considering the needs of people with LEP. However, CMS has taken steps consistent with some elements of the agency's adopted LEP Plan, such as the element related to oral language assistance, but not others, such as the element identifying the need for complaint mechanisms for language issues. To oversee 1-800-MEDICARE callers' access to services and accurate information, CMS uses all six commonly used contact center management practices. Based on GAO's review of the literature and interviews with federal agencies and industry experts, these management practices are: (1) clearly defining performance metrics, (2) performing accurate capacity planning, (3) conducting customer satisfaction surveys, (4) ensuring information for CSRs to reference is accurate, (5) evaluating CSRs' interaction with callers, and (6) validating contact center performance reports. These practices are addressed in the current 1-800-MEDICARE contract and reflected in CMS's ongoing contract oversight. |
gao_T-GGD-99-185 | gao_T-GGD-99-185_0 | LSC’s Clarified Reporting Guidance Resulted in Program Changes, but Some Requirements Remain Unclear to Many Grantees
LSC issued a new, 1999 CSR Handbook and distributed other written communications intended to clarify reporting requirements to its grantees. The 1999 handbook, which replaced the 1993 edition, instituted changes to some of LSC’s reporting requirements and provided more detailed information on other requirements. In responding to a GAO telephone survey, most grantees indicated that the new guidance helped clarify LSC’s reporting requirements, and virtually all of them indicated that they had or planned to make program changes as a result of the requirements. Many grantees, however, identified areas of case reporting that remained unclear to them. LSC Issued New CSR Guidance
The 1999 CSR Handbook included changes to (1) procedures for timely closing of cases; (2) procedures for management review of case service reports; (3) procedures for ensuring single recording of cases; (4) requirements to report LSC-eligible cases, regardless of funding source; and (5) requirements for reporting cases involving private attorneys separately. The two changes pertained to timely closing of cases and management review of case service reports. Grantee Directors Reported That They Are Implementing Changes to Comply With Reporting Requirements
Based on our survey of executive directors of 79 grantees, we estimate that over 90 percent of grantee executive directors viewed the changes in the 1999 CSR Handbook as being clear overall, and virtually all of them indicated that they planned to or had made at least one change to their program operations as a result of the revised case reporting requirements. Most Grantees Certified the Accuracy of Their 1998 CSR Data, but Questions About Data Accuracy and Interpretation Remain
LSC sought to determine the accuracy of grantees’ case data by requiring that grantees complete self-inspections of their open and closed caseload data for 1998. LSC Grantees Conducted Self-Inspections of 1998 CSR Data
On May 14, 1999, LSC issued a memo to all grantees instructing them to complete a self-inspection procedure by July 1, 1999. As of August 26, 1999, LSC documents indicated that 199 of 261 grantees (76 percent) reported substantially correct CSR data to LSC. The remaining 62 grantees (24 percent) did not certify to LSC that their CSR data were substantially correct. Self-Inspection Results Raised Concerns
Our review raised some concerns about LSC’s interpretation of the self- inspection results and about the accuracy of the data provided to LSC by grantees. We do not believe that LSC’s actions, to date, have been sufficient to fully resolve the case reporting problems that occurred in 1997. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed the two reviews that it has completed pertaining to case service reporting (CSR) by the Legal Services Corporation (LSC), focusing on: (1) what efforts LSC and its grantees have made to correct case reporting problems; and (2) whether these efforts are likely to resolve the case reporting problems that occurred in 1997.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) LSC issued a new, 1999 CSR Handbook and distributed other written communications intended to clarify reporting requirements to its grantees; (2) the 1999 Handbook, which replaced the 1993 edition, instituted changes to some of LSC's reporting requirements and provided more detailed information on other requirements; (3) in responding to a GAO telephone survey, most grantees indicated that the new guidance helped clarify LSC's reporting requirements, and virtually all of them indicated that they had or planned to make program changes as a result of the requirements; (4) many grantees, however, identified areas of case reporting that remained unclear to them; (5) the 1999 CSR Handbook included changes to: (a) procedures for timely closing of cases; (b) procedures for management review of case service reports; (c) procedures for ensuring single recording of cases; (d) requirements to report LSC-eligible cases, regardless of funding source; and (e) requirements for reporting cases involving private attorneys separately; (6) based on GAO's survey of executive directors of 79 grantees, GAO estimates that over 90 percent of grantee executive directors viewed the changes in the 1999 CSR Handbook as being clear overall, and virtually all of them indicated that they planned to or had made at least one change to their program operations as a result of the revised case reporting requirements; (7) although most of the grantee executive directors reported that the new LSC guidance helped clarify requirements, many of them also indicated that they were still unclear about certain requirements and that additional clarification was needed; (8) LSC sought to determine the accuracy of grantees' case data by requiring that grantees complete self-inspections of their open and closed caseload data for 1998; (9) on May 14, 1999, LSC issued a memo to all grantees instructing them to complete a self-inspection procedure by July 1, 1999; (10) according to LSC officials, about three-fourths of the grantees certified the accuracy of their 1998 case data; (11) as of August 26, 1999, LSC documents indicated that 199 of 261 grantees reported substantially correct CSR data to LSC; (12) the remaining 62 grantees did not certify to LSC that their CSR data were substantially correct; and (13) GAO's review raised some concerns about LSC's interpretation of the self-inspection results and about the accuracy of the data provided to LSC by grantees. |
gao_GAO-13-376 | gao_GAO-13-376_0 | In 1996, FCC responded to the rising number of mobile telephone subscribers and the resulting increase in wireless 911 calls by adopting rules for wireless E911 that established a two-phase implementation approach for the wireless carriers and set deadlines for wireless carriers regarding their part in E911 deployment.months of a request from a PSAP, wireless carriers be prepared to provide the PSAP with the wireless phone number of the caller and the location of the cell site receiving the 911 call (Phase I information); and (2) by October 2001, or within 6 months of receiving a request from a PSAP, wireless carriers be prepared to provide the PSAP with the geographic coordinates of the caller’s location with greater precision, FCC required that (1) by April 1998, or within 6 generally within 50 to 300 meters (Phase II information). States Have Made Significant Progress Implementing Wireless E911
Although states faced challenges and delays in the past, they have made significant progress implementing wireless E911. According to NENA data as of March 2013, 98 percent of PSAPs are capable of receiving Phase I location information and 97 percent have implemented Phase II for at least one wireless carrier. According to NENA data, 142 U.S. counties (representing roughly 3 percent of the U.S. population) do not have some level of wireless E911 service. According to federal and association officials, these areas are primarily rural or tribal counties that face special challenges implementing wireless E911 service. According to FCC’s Reporting, Some States Have Used 911 Funds for Other Purposes, but FCC’s Reporting Could Be More Useful
State Methods for Collecting 911 Funds
As we reported in 2006, all 50 states and the District of Columbia collect—or have authorized local entities to collect—funds for 911. However, six states— Arizona, Georgia, Illinois, Maine, New York, and Rhode Island—reported using almost $77 million of funds collected for E911 implementation for other purposes in 2011, as detailed below.funds for these purposes. Arizona also transferred 911 funds to its general fund in 2009 and 2010. Specifically, in its approach, FCC (1) uses only open-ended questions to solicit information from states, (2) lacks written guidelines for interpreting states’ responses and ensuring that results can be reproduced, and (3) does not describe the methodology used to analyze the information in states’ reports. Moreover, in the National Broadband Plan, FCC noted many of the existing state and federal regulations governing 911 were written before the technological capabilities of NG911 existed and For example, have therefore hampered the implementation of NG911.state, association, and industry officials have expressed concern about uncertainty regarding liability protection related to NG911. FCC also released a 5- point plan, based on recommendations made in the National Broadband Plan, to encourage NG911 implementation and to help states address some of the technology, regulatory, and funding challenges to implementation. Key elements of FCC’s 5-point plan include:
Develop location accuracy mechanisms for NG911. Enable consumers to send text, photos, and videos to PSAPs. Facilitate completing and implementing NG911 technical standards. Develop a governance framework for NG911. As required by the Next Generation 911 Advancement Act of 2012, FCC released a report in March 2013 with detailed recommendations to Congress to create a new legal and regulatory framework for transitioning from legacy 911 to NG911 networks. Develop a funding model for NG911. The report provided 24 specific recommendations to Congress and others, such as state and local public safety authorities, to address the challenges of implementing NG911. Furthermore, FCC is missing an opportunity to provide more detailed aggregated information in its reports—such as amounts of fees, services covered, and total amount of funds collected—that would be helpful to decision makers. Recommendation for Executive Action
We recommend that the Chairman of FCC follow best practices for data collection and analysis to improve FCC’s current method of collecting and reporting information on states’ use of 911 funds, by, for example, using closed-ended questions when possible, developing written internal guidance for analyzing data, and fully describing the methodology for its report. In response, FCC concurred with our recommendation to improve its current method of collecting and reporting information on states’ use of 911 funds. This report presents information on (1) the progress that has been made in implementing wireless Enhanced 911 (E911) in the last decade, (2) the extent to which states are collecting and using 911 funds for 911 purposes and the usefulness of FCC’s reporting about this issue, and (3) challenges to implementing NG911 services and federal efforts to facilitate its deployment. We interviewed officials from the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) regarding states’ collection and use of E911 funds and the progress made in deploying wireless E911 and NG911 throughout the country. To determine the extent to which states are collecting and using E911 revenues for E911 purposes and the usefulness of FCC’s reporting about this issue, we obtained FCC’s 2010 through 2012 annual reports on state collection and distribution of 911 and E911 fees and charges as well as states’ responses to FCC’s information-collecting effort upon which the FCC’s annual reports are based.information that the states provided to the information FCC reported. | Why GAO Did This Study
Wireless E911 service refers to the capability of 911 call takers to automatically receive location information from 911 callers using mobile phones. The current E911 system is not designed to accommodate emergency communications from the range of new technologies in common use today that support text, data, and video. Although deploying wireless E911 and NG911 is the responsibility of state and local governments, FCC is required by law to report annually on the funds states collect to provide 911 services such as E911. The Next Generation 911 Advancement Act of 2012 required GAO to review states collection and use of 911 funds. In this report, GAO presents information on (1) progress implementing wireless E911 in the last decade, (2) states collection and use of 911 funds and the usefulness of FCCs reporting on this issue, and (3) challenges to implementing NG911 services and federal efforts to facilitate its deployment. GAO reviewed FCCs annual reports, states responses to FCCs information-collecting efforts, and documents from FCC and DOT regarding E911 and NG911. GAO reviewed best practices for collecting and analyzing data and interviewed federal and state officials and other stakeholders.
What GAO Found
Although states faced challenges and delays in the past, states have made significant progress implementing wireless Enhanced 911 (E911) since 2003. Wireless E911 deployment usually proceeds through two phases: Phase I provides general caller location information by identifying the cell tower or cell site that is receiving the wireless call; Phase II provides more precise caller-location information, usually within 50 to 300 meters. Currently, according to the National Emergency Number Association (NENA), nearly 98 percent of 911 call centers, known as Public Safety Answering Points (PSAPs), are capable of receiving Phase I location information, and 97 percent have implemented Phase II for at least one wireless carrier. This represents a significant improvement since 2003 when implementation of Phase I was 65 percent and Phase II was 18 percent. According to NENA's current data, 142 U.S. counties (representing roughly 3 percent of the U.S. population) do not have some level of wireless E911 service. The areas that lack wireless E911 are primarily rural and tribal areas that face special implementation challenges, according to federal and association officials.
According to data collected by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), all 50 states and the District of Columbia reported collecting--or authorizing local entities to collect--funds for wireless E911 implementation, and most states reported using these funds for their intended purpose. Six states--Arizona, Georgia, Illinois, Maine, New York, and Rhode Island--reported using a total of almost $77 million of funds collected for 911 implementation for other purposes (e.g., transferring 911 funds to the general fund) in 2011. Using funds in this way is permissible by state law in these states, but it creates the risk of undermining the credibility of 911 fees in those states. The manner in which FCC collects and reports information on state 911 funds limits the usefulness of its annual report. In particular, contrary to best practices for collecting and analyzing data, FCC uses only open-ended questions to solicit information from states, lacks written guidelines for interpreting states' responses and ensuring that results can be reproduced, and does not describe the methodology used to analyze the data it collects. As a result, FCC is missing an opportunity to analyze trends and to provide more detailed aggregated information that would be useful to decision makers.
Next Generation (NG911) will enable the public to reach PSAPs through voice and data, such as text messages, but stakeholders have identified a variety of technical, regulatory, and funding challenges to implementing it. For example, many of the existing state and federal regulations governing 911 were written before the technological capabilities of NG911 existed. The federal government is taking steps to help states address challenges. In particular, the Department of Transportation (DOT) has focused on research through the NG911 Initiative, and FCC released a 5-point plan to encourage NG911 implementation. FCC's plan includes (1) developing location accuracy mechanisms for NG911; (2) enabling consumers to send text, photos, and videos to PSAPs; (3) facilitating the completion and implementation of NG911 technical standards; (4) developing a governance framework for NG911; and (5) developing a funding model for NG911. FCC also released a report in March 2013 that detailed specific recommendations to Congress for a legal and regulatory framework for NG911.
What GAO Recommends
FCC should follow best practices for data collection and analysis to improve its current method of collecting and reporting information on state 911 funds. In response, FCC concurred with GAO's recommendation and agreed to take action to address it. |
gao_GAO-02-550T | gao_GAO-02-550T_0 | While only the federal government is empowered to wage war and regulate interstate commerce, state and local governments have historically assumed primary responsibility for managing emergencies through police, firefighters, and emergency medical personnel. One of the areas that the Office of Homeland Security will be reviewing is the coordination among federal agencies and programs. Second, the lack of leadership has resulted in the federal government’s development of programs to assist state and local governments that were similar and potentially duplicative. The Office of Homeland Security announced the new warning system on March 12, 2002. In addition, the capability of state and local governments to respond to catastrophic terrorist attacks is uncertain. Regulations
Federal, state, and local governments share authority for setting standards through regulations in several areas, including infrastructure and programs vital to preparedness (for example, transportation systems, water systems, public health). Involving all levels of government and the private sector in developing key aspects of a national strategy that I have discussed today—a definition and clarification of the appropriate roles and responsibilities, an establishment of goals and performance measures, and a selection of appropriate tools— is essential to the successful formulation of the national preparedness strategy and ultimately to preparing and defending our nation from terrorist attacks. Homeland Security: A Risk Management Approach Can Guide Preparedness Efforts. Homeland Security: A Framework for Addressing the Nation’s Issues. GAO-NSIAD-99-3. Washington, D.C.: September 11, 2000. | What GAO Found
Federal, state, and local governments share responsibility for terrorist attacks. However, local government, including police and fire departments, emergency medical personnel, and public health agencies, is typically the first responder to an incident. The federal government historically has provided leadership, training, and funding assistance. In the aftermath of September 11, for instance, one-quarter of the $40 billion Emergency Response Fund was earmarked for homeland security, including enhancing state and local government preparedness. Because the national security threat is diffuse and the challenge is highly intergovernmental, national policymakers must formulate strategies with a firm understanding of the interests, capacity, and challenges facing those governments. The development of a national strategy will improve national preparedness and enhance partnerships between federal, state, and local governments. The creation of the Office of Homeland Security is an important and potentially significant first step. The Office of Homeland Security's strategic plan should (1) define and clarify the appropriate roles and responsibilities of federal, state, and local entities; (2) establish goals and performance measures to guide the nation's preparedness efforts; and (3) carefully choose the most appropriate tools of government to implement the national strategy and achieve national goals. |
gao_GAO-04-1005 | gao_GAO-04-1005_0 | Accordingly, DOD has called more than 335,000 reservists to active duty since September 11, 2001. Similarities between the systems include a minimum of 20 years of service for vesting and eligibility for retirement benefits, a calculation of retirement pay at 2.5 percent of basic pay for every creditable year served, and an opportunity to participate in the federal government’s Thrift Savings Plan. An eligible active duty military member receives an immediate annuity upon retirement that is based on pay rates in effect on the date of retirement. Retired reservists who remain subject to recall receive an annuity that is based on pay rates in effect when they reach age 60, and, accordingly, the retirement is calculated at these higher pay rates. The Extent to Which Changes Are Warranted to the Reserve Retirement System Is Unknown
Current available data do not provide DOD with the information it needs to determine what changes, if any, to the reserve retirement system are warranted. In addition, it has not established thresholds or targets for attrition attributable to retirement. Without thresholds or targets, it is not possible to assess the extent to which DOD is retaining the desired numbers of senior military members or the extent to which retirement provisions influence decisions to leave or stay in the reserves. Nevertheless, our analysis of various DOD data for selected periods of time when reservists were called to active duty to support military operations reveals that the overall composition of the reserve force by years of service, age, and pay grade has remained relatively even and that DOD has not experienced significant declines in any of these variables. DOD has, however, identified certain high-demand occupational specialties where retention rates have decreased. While these cases do not necessarily suggest that uniform retirement reform is required, they do suggest that targeted corrective actions of some sort may be needed. As a result, retention rates may be artificially high. First, the estimated cost of lowering the age of receipt, from age 60 to as low as 53 with limitations—or, in some cases, lower—will be significant, given that all reservists who qualify for retirement—and not simply the minority of reservists who have deployed to recent contingency operations—would be covered under this change. Considering the fact that military basic pay will continue to grow and health care costs will continue to rise, the longer-term cost will continue to be significant. Many of these reservists are not likely to be the beneficiaries of a reduction in the age of receipt of annuity, given that only one in four reservists currently stays in the reserves long enough to become eligible for retirement. Finally, DOD has not yet studied changes to the reserve retirement system in the context of the total force, even though these changes could have unintended consequences on DOD’s active duty forces. Recommendations for Executive Action
We recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, in concert with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, to take the following four actions: 1. specify desired metrics for measuring the retention or attrition rates of senior officer and enlisted reserve component personnel who are approaching retirement eligibility and, therefore, are most likely to be affected by changes to DOD’s reserve component retirement system; 2. determine if gaps exist between the desired and actual rates of 3. identify changes, if any, to the current reserve component retirement system that would address these gaps, to the extent that they exist; and 4. evaluate any changes to the reserve component retirement system and their associated long-term costs in the context of the total force. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since September 11, 2001, National Guard and Reserve personnel have served, and will continue to serve, a critical role in the Global War on Terrorism. As a consequence, Congress has focused attention on the fair treatment of reservists and directed GAO to review, among other things, the Department of Defense's (DOD) reserve retirement system. Currently, five legislative proposals exist that would lower the age when eligible reservists can receive their annuities. GAO assessed (1) DOD's reserve retirement system as compared to certain aspects of the active duty retirement system, (2) the extent to which DOD data suggest that changes to the reserve retirement system may be warranted, and (3) the potential costs and effects of the five legislative proposals.
What GAO Found
The active duty and reserve component retirement systems require 20 years of service for vesting, provide annuities that are based on 2.5 percent of basic pay for every creditable year served, and offer options to participate in the government's Thrift Savings Plan. Active duty members receive an immediate annuity upon retirement based on pay rates in effect on the date of retirement. Eligible reservists must wait until their 60th birthday to receive an annuity. The annuity of retired reservists who remain subject to recall is based on pay rates in effect when they reach their 60th birthday. Current data do not provide DOD with the information it needs to determine what changes, if any, to the reserve retirement system are needed. DOD has not established thresholds for attrition attributable to retirement and, without thresholds, it is not possible to assess the extent to which DOD is retaining the desired numbers of senior reservists or the extent to which retirement benefits influence decisions to leave or stay in the reserves. Nevertheless, GAO's analysis of DOD data for selected periods when reservists were deployed shows that the overall makeup of the reserve force by years of service, age, and pay grade has remained relatively even and that overall reserve retention rates, to date, have remained relatively stable. DOD has, however, identified certain high-demand occupational specialties, such as military police, where retention rates have decreased. While these cases do not necessarily suggest that uniform retirement reform is required, they do suggest that targeted corrective actions of some sort may be needed. The estimated cost of lowering the age of receipt, coupled with an associated increase in retiree health care costs, is significant and considering the fact that military basic pay will continue to grow and health care costs will continue to rise, the longer-term cost will be significant. Importantly, all reservists--not just the minority of reservists who have deployed to recent operations--would be covered under this change. In addition, reservists who are experiencing increased deployments may not be the beneficiaries of a reduction in the age of receipt, given that only one in four reservists currently stays in the reserves long enough to retire. Finally, DOD has not studied changes to the reserve retirement system in the context of the total force. Changes, if not evaluated from a total force perspective, could result in a significant increased cost with little or no benefit and may produce unintended consequences on DOD's active duty forces. |
gao_GAO-12-722 | gao_GAO-12-722_0 | Background
WHO Structure and Governance
WHO was established in 1948 as the directing and coordinating authority on global health within the UN system. In May 2012, member states approved components of WHO’s reform agenda, encompassing three broad areas—priority setting, governance, and management reforms— that generally align with challenges identified by stakeholders. According to WHO officials, member state representatives, and other stakeholders, some of the challenges facing WHO include (1) its lack of clear organizational priorities; (2) lack of predictable and flexible financing; and (3) highly decentralized organizational structure. In developing its reform agenda, WHO consulted with member states, employees, and other parties to gather their views and feedback. In addition, WHO has commissioned three ongoing evaluations to provide input into the reform process. The first stage of one of the planned evaluations, conducted by WHO’s External Auditor and completed in March 2012, concluded that WHO’s reform proposals are generally comprehensive in addressing WHO challenges raised by member states and other stakeholders.continues to consult with member states on priority-setting and governance proposals, which may require extensive deliberation and consensus from member states. In November 2011, the WHO Executive Board approved WHO’s management reform proposals in several areas, and requested further development of proposals in other areas. In May 2012, WHO developed a high-level implementation and monitoring framework that includes reform objectives, selected reform activities, 1- year and 3-year milestones, and intended results. Certain factors could impede WHO’s ability to successfully implement its reform proposals, including the availability of sufficient financial and technical resources and the extent of support from internal and external stakeholders. According to WHO, the provision of stronger and more effective support to countries is a key outcome of its management reforms. The United States Has Provided Input into WHO’s Reform Agenda, Particularly in Transparency and Accountability Proposals, but State’s Tool for Monitoring Progress Could be Enhanced
The United States has provided input into WHO’s reform agenda, particularly in the areas of transparency and accountability, but State’s tool to assess the progress of management reforms could be enhanced. On consultations on governance, the U.S. delegation has commented on a range of proposals put forth by WHO, including those on engagement with other global health stakeholders. The United States Has Provided Input on WHO Consultations on Priority- Setting and Governance
In priority-setting consultations, the U.S. delegation has advocated for WHO to maintain its focus on normative functions such as setting standards and guidelines, as well as other areas such as health security and communicable diseases. The United States Has Supported a Management Reform Agenda for Greater Transparency and Accountability, but State’s Tool to Assess Progress in These Areas Could be Enhanced
The United States has supported an agenda for greater transparency and accountability for WHO management reforms. The U.S. delegation has taken steps to advocate for a number of reforms to improve WHO’s internal and external oversight mechanisms. UNTAI is a useful tool for guiding U.S. priorities and engagement on certain management issues. State officials also noted that the process of reviewing the UNTAI reports in Washington helps to minimize errors, omissions, and inconsistencies, but that this process does not fully mitigate risks to data reliability. State’s UNTAI assessment is a useful tool for shaping U.S. engagement with WHO and monitoring WHO progress in implementing certain management reforms related to UNTAI goals and benchmarks. However, there are weaknesses in the UNTAI assessment tool that generate concerns over the reliability of the information generated in these assessments, including the ambiguous rationale for State’s scores in particular areas and the lack of clarity in the definitions of certain benchmarks. Recommendation for Executive Action
To improve U.S. assessment of WHO reform, we recommend that the Secretary of State enhance its guidance on completing State’s assessment tool for monitoring WHO’s progress in implementing transparency and accountability reforms by including, for example, a requirement to collect and submit supporting documentation with completed assessments. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
This report examines (1) the steps the World Health Organization (WHO) has taken to develop and implement a reform agenda that aligns with the challenges identified by the organization, its member states, and other stakeholders; and (2) the input the United States has provided to WHO reforms. | Why GAO Did This Study
WHO is the directing and coordinating authority for global health within the United Nations (UN) system. In 2012, member states approved a reform agenda addressing three areas: (1) priority-setting, to refocus its efforts and establish a process to determine priorities; (2) governance, to improve the effectiveness of its governing bodies and strengthen engagement with other stakeholders; and (3) management, including human resources, results-based planning, and accountability. The United States is a key participant in WHO's governing bodies and the largest donor, contributing about $219 million, or 22 percent, to WHO's assessed budget for 2010 and 2011, and more than $475 million, or about 16 percent, to WHO's voluntary budget. As the largest financial contributor to the UN, the United States has advocated for comprehensive management reform throughout the UN system, including WHO. This report examines (1) the steps WHO has taken to develop and implement a reform agenda that aligns with the challenges identified by stakeholders and (2) the input the United States has provided to WHO reforms. GAO analyzed WHO and U.S. government documents and interviewed officials and stakeholders in Washington, D.C., and Geneva, Switzerland.
What GAO Found
In May 2012, 194 member states approved components of the World Health Organization's (WHO) reform agenda, encompassing three broad areas--priority-setting, governance, and management reforms--that generally address the challenges identified by stakeholders. According to WHO officials, member state representatives, and other stakeholders, some of the challenges facing WHO include its (1) lack of clear organizational priorities; (2) lack of predictable and flexible financing; and (3) highly decentralized organizational structure. In developing its reform agenda, WHO consulted with member states, employees, and other parties to gather their views and feedback. In addition, WHO has commissioned three ongoing evaluations to provide input into the reform process. The first stage of one of the planned evaluations was conducted by WHO's External Auditor, which concluded in March 2012 that WHO's reform proposals are comprehensive in addressing challenges faced by the organization. WHO continues to consult with member states on priority-setting and governance proposals, which generally require extensive deliberation and consensus from member states. In November 2011, the WHO Executive Board approved WHO's management reform proposals in several areas, and requested further development of proposals in other areas. In May 2012, WHO developed a high-level implementation and monitoring framework that includes reform objectives, selected activities, 1-year and 3-year milestones, and intended impacts. Certain factors could impede WHO's ability to successfully implement its reform proposals, including the availability of sufficient financial and technical resources and the level of sustained support from internal and external stakeholders.
The United States has provided input into WHO's reform agenda, particularly in the areas of transparency and accountability, but the Department of State's (State) tool for assessing progress in the area of management reform could be enhanced. On priority-setting, the United States has advocated for WHO to maintain its focus on certain functions such as setting regulations and standards for international health. In consultations on governance, the U.S. delegation to WHO has commented on a range of proposals WHO has put forth, including those on engagement with other global health stakeholders. On management reforms, the United States has supported an agenda for greater transparency and accountability. The U.S. delegation has advocated for a number of reforms to improve WHO's internal and external oversight mechanisms and supported reforms in budgeting, planning, and human resources. Additionally, State has established an assessment tool to measure progress on transparency and accountability mechanisms, which is a useful tool for guiding U.S. priorities and engagement with WHO, and could be helpful for monitoring WHO's progress in implementing certain management reforms. However, we found weaknesses in State's assessment tool, including an unclear basis for State's determinations on certain elements in its assessment of WHO, as well as a lack of clarity in the definitions used in the assessment. According to State officials, State provides guidance to officials completing these assessments but acknowledged that the process does not fully mitigate risks to data reliability.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the Secretary of State enhance State's guidance on completing its assessment tool for monitoring WHO's progress in implementing transparency and accountability reforms. State generally concurred with GAO's recommendation. |
gao_GAO-09-1011T | gao_GAO-09-1011T_0 | Adoption of Key Management Practices Promoted Greater Use of Performance Information at CMS
In 2000, significantly fewer managers at CMS—then known as the Health Care Financing Administration—reported using performance information for various management decisions, as compared to their counterparts in the rest of government. Between our 2000 and 2007 surveys, however, CMS showed one of the largest average increases in the percentage of managers who reported using performance information for certain decisions. Our analysis of CMS survey results, management interviews, and agency policies, performance reports, and other relevant documents indicated that the adoption of key management practices contributed to this improvement. 2). 3). Developing Analytic Capacity to Use Performance Information
Our survey results and interviews with several CMS officials indicate that the agency also took steps to develop their staff’s capacity to use performance information, such as investing in improved data systems and offering increased training opportunities on a range of topics related to performance planning and management. FEMA and Interior Were Hindered in Using Performance Information for Decision Making by Weak or Inconsistent Application of Key Management Practices
Just as the adoption of key management practices can facilitate greater use of information and a greater focus on results, the absence of these practices can hinder widespread use. Fewer managers at FEMA and Interior reported making extensive use of performance information for decision making compared to managers at other agencies. Survey results, interviews with senior level-officials and regional and program managers, and a review of policies and other documents related to performance planning and management at both agencies showed that inconsistent use of these practices contributed to this condition. Despite the challenges facing FEMA and Interior, we also observed various initiatives and program areas within the agencies where leaders were committed to increasing the use of performance information; and were demonstrating that commitment by communicating the importance of using data to identify and solve problems, involving their managers in efforts to develop useful measures, and connecting individual performance with organizational results. Our report contains recommendations to the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) for FEMA and the Secretary of the Interior, designed to build upon the positive practices we identified within these agencies. Finally, to FEMA, Interior, and NPS, we made recommendations intended to improve the visibility of agency leadership’s commitment to using performance information in decision making. Both DHS and Interior generally agreed with these recommendations. Building an Enduring Results-Oriented and Collaborative Culture Requires Demonstrated Leadership Commitment from the President and Congress
As we have noted in the past, the President and Congress both have unique and critical roles to play in demonstrating their commitment to improving federal agency performance results. Both OMB and Congress can send strong messages to agencies that results matter by articulating expectations for individual agency performance and following up to ensure that performance goals are achieved. At the same time, they also need to address performance problems in the areas of government that require the concerted efforts of multiple agencies and programs. The President and OMB Can Promote Greater Use of Performance Information Governmentwide
The President can send a signal to federal managers that using performance information is critical for achieving results and maximizing the return on federal funds invested by selecting and focusing his attention on achieving certain critical goals, such as creating or retaining jobs through investments under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009. In addition to the annual performance plan, a governmentwide strategic plan could identify long-term goals and strategies to address issues that cut across federal agencies. Appendix I: Agency Ranking Based on 2007 Survey Results on Use of Performance Information
Rank
National Aeronautics and Space Administration Department of Housing and Urban Development Department of the Treasury (excluding Internal Revenue Service)
Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services United States Agency for International Development Department of Agriculture (excluding Forest Service)
Department of Homeland Security (excluding Federal Emergency Management Agency)
Department of Transportation (excluding Federal Aviation Administration)
Department of Health and Human Services (excluding Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services)
This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since 1997, periodic GAO surveys indicate that overall, federal managers have more performance information available, but have not made greater use of this information for decision making. To understand the barriers and opportunities for more widespread use, GAO was asked to (1) examine key management practices in an agency in which managers' reported use of performance information has improved; (2) look at agencies with relatively low use of performance information and the factors that contribute to this condition; and (3) review the role the President and Congress can play in promoting a results-oriented and collaborative culture in the federal government. This testimony is primarily based on GAO's report, Results-Oriented Management: Strengthening Key Practices at FEMA and Interior Could Promote Greater Use of Performance Information, which is being released today. In this report, GAO made recommendations to the Departments of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Interior for improvements to key management practices to promote greater use of performance information at FEMA, the National Park Service, Bureau of Reclamation, as well as at Interior. Both DHS and Interior generally agreed with these recommendations. The testimony also draws from GAO's extensive prior work on the use of performance information and results-oriented management.
What GAO Found
GAO's prior work identified key management practices that can promote the use of performance information for decision making to improve results, including: demonstrating leadership commitment; aligning agency, program, and individual performance goals; improving the usefulness of performance information; building analytic capacity; and communicating performance information frequently and effectively. The experience of the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) illustrates how strengthening these practices can help an agency increase its use of performance information. According to GAO's most recent 2007 survey of federal managers, the percentage of CMS managers reporting use of performance information for various management decisions increased by nearly 21 percentage points since 2000--one of the largest improvements among the agencies surveyed. CMS officials attributed this positive change to a number of the key practices, such as the agency's leaders communicating their commitment to using performance information to drive decision making. Conversely, the experiences of the Department of the Interior (Interior) and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) within the Department of Homeland Security indicated that the absence of such commitment can discourage managers and their staff from using performance information. According to GAO's 2007 survey, Interior and FEMA ranked 27 and 28, respectively, out of 29 agencies in their reported use of performance information for various management functions. Based on further survey data analysis, reviews of planning, policy, and performance documents, and management interviews, GAO found that inconsistent application of key practices at FEMA and Interior--such as routine communication of how performance information influences decision making--contributed to their relatively low survey scores. While both FEMA and Interior have taken some promising steps to make their performance information both useful and used, these initiatives have thus far been limited. The President and Congress also have unique and critical roles to play by driving improved federal agency performance. By focusing attention on certain high-level goals and tracking agency performance, the President and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) can send a message that using performance information is critical for achieving results and maximizing the return on federal funds invested. Through its oversight, Congress can also signal to agencies that results matter by articulating performance expectations for areas of concern and following up to ensure that performance goals are achieved. The President and Congress can also play a role in improving government performance in areas that require the concerted efforts of multiple agencies and programs to address, such as preparing for and responding to a pandemic influenza. A governmentwide strategic plan could support collaborative efforts by identifying long-term goals and the strategies needed to address crosscutting issues. |
gao_NSIAD-98-72 | gao_NSIAD-98-72_0 | The C-5 aircraft depot maintenance workload was the first of such competitions. C-5 Competition Placed No Limitation on Performance Location
The Air Force’s procedures provided an equal opportunity for public and private offerors to compete for the C-5 workload without regard to where the work could be performed. Review Results
Based on our review of the C-5 competition, we found no basis to conclude that procedures used in selecting the successful offeror deviated in any material respect from the applicable laws or relevant provisions of the FAR. Review Results
Our review of the proposal cost evaluation and adjustments showed that the award resulted in the lowest cost to the government given Air Force assumptions and conditions at the time of award. Fourth, within 60 days of its enactment, the 1998 Defense Authorization Act requires us to review the C-5 aircraft workload competition and subsequent award to the Warner Robins Air Logistics Center and report to Congress on whether (1) the procedures used provided an equal opportunity for offerors to compete without regard to performance location, (2) are in compliance with applicable law and the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), and (3) whether the award results in the lowest total cost to DOD. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO reviewed the Air Force's solicitation and selection of a source for C-5 aircraft depot maintenance, focusing on whether the: (1) procedures used to conduct the C-5 competition provided substantially equal opportunity for the public and private offerors to compete for the workload without regard to work performance location; (2) procedures complied with the requirements of all applicable provisions of law and the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR); and (3) C-5 award results in the lowest total cost to the Department of Defense for performance of the workload.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that its assessment to the issues required under the 1998 Defense Authorization Act relating to the C-5 aircraft competition concluded that: (a) the C-5 competition procedures provided an equal opportunity for public and private offerors to compete without regard to where work could be performed; (b) the procedures did not appear to deviate in any material respect from the applicable laws or the FAR; and (c) based on Air Force assumptions and conditions at the time of award, the award resulted in the lowest total cost to the government. |
gao_GAO-16-171T | gao_GAO-16-171T_0 | Shortcomings in BIA’s Management and a Variety of Other Factors Have Hindered Indian Energy Development
Factors, such as shortcomings in BIA’s management and additional factors generally outside of BIA’s management responsibilities—such as a complex regulatory framework, tribes’ limited capital and infrastructure, and varied tribal capacity—have hindered Indian energy development. First, BIA does not have the data it needs to verify ownership of some oil and gas resources, easily identify resources available for lease, or easily identify where leases are in effect, inconsistent with Interior’s Secretarial Order 3215, which calls for the agency to maintain a system of records that identifies the location and value of Indian resources and allows for resource owners to obtain information regarding their assets in a timely manner. In its written comments on our report, Interior did not concur with our recommendation. However, in an August 2015 letter to GAO after the report was issued, Interior stated that it agrees this is an urgent need and reported it has taken steps to enter into an agreement with BLM to identify survey-related products and services needed to identify and address realty and boundary issues. To improve BIA’s efforts to verify ownership in a timely manner and identify resources available for development, we recommended in our June 2015 report that Interior direct BIA to take steps to complete GIS mapping capabilities. Interior stated in its August 2015 letter to GAO that a national dataset composed of all Indian land tracts and boundaries with visualization functionality is expected to be completed within 4 years, depending on budget and resource availability. Second, BIA’s review and approval is required throughout the development process, including the approval of leases, ROW agreements, and appraisals, but BIA does not have a documented process or the data needed to track its review and response times. Specifically, in 2014, the Acting Chairman for the Southern Ute Indian Tribe testified before this committee that BIA’s review of some of its energy-related documents took as long as 8 years. In the meantime, the tribe estimates it lost more than $95 million in revenues it could have earned from tribal permitting fees, oil and gas severance taxes, and royalties. To address this shortcoming, we recommended in our June 2015 report that Interior direct BIA to develop a documented process to track its review and response times and enhance data collection efforts to ensure that the agency has the data needed to track its review and response times. In its August 2015 letter to GAO, Interior stated it will try to implement a tracking and monitoring effort by the end of fiscal year 2017 for oil and gas leases on Indian lands. The agency did not indicate if it intends to improve the transparency of its review and approval process for other energy-related documents, such as ROW agreements and surface leases—some of which were under review for multiple years. Third, some BIA regional and agency offices do not have staff with the skills needed to effectively evaluate energy-related documents or adequate staff resources, according to a few stakeholders we interviewed and some of the literature we reviewed. According to stakeholders we interviewed and literature we reviewed, additional factors, generally outside of BIA’s management responsibilities, have also hindered Indian energy development, including a complex regulatory framework consisting of multiple jurisdictions that can involve significantly more steps than the development of private and state resources, increase development costs, and add to the timeline for development; fractionated, or highly divided, land and mineral ownership interests; tribes’ limited access to initial capital to start projects and limited opportunities to take advantage of federal tax credits; dual taxation of resources by states and tribes that does not occur on private, state, or federally owned resources; perceived or real concerns about the political stability and capacity of some tribal governments; and limited access to infrastructure, such as transmission lines needed to carry power generated from renewable sources to market and transportation linkages to transport oil and gas resources to processing facilities. According to officials from one tribe we interviewed, the tribe has repeatedly asked Interior for additional guidance on the activities that would be considered inherently federal functions under the regulations. According to the tribal officials, without additional guidance on inherently federal functions, tribes considering a TERA do not know what activities the tribe would be assuming or what efforts may be necessary to build the capacity needed to assume those activities. We recommended in our June 2015 report that Interior provide additional energy development-specific guidance on provisions of TERA regulations that tribes have identified as unclear. Interior agreed with the recommendation and stated it is considering further guidance but did not provide additional details regarding issuance of the guidance. In addition, the costs associated with assuming activities currently conducted by federal agencies and a complex application process were identified by literature we reviewed and stakeholders we interviewed as other factors that have deterred any tribe from entering into a TERA with Interior. | Why GAO Did This Study
Indian energy resources hold significant potential for development, but according to a 2014 Interior document, these resources are underdeveloped relative to surrounding non-Indian resources. Development of Indian energy resources is a complex process that may involve federal, tribal, and state agencies. Interior's BIA has primary authority for managing Indian energy development and generally holds final decision-making authority for leases and other permits required for development.
The Energy Policy Act of 2005 provided the opportunity for interested tribes to pursue TERAs—agreements between a tribe and Interior that allow the tribe to enter into energy leases and agreements without review and approval by Interior. However, no tribe has entered into a TERA.
This testimony highlights the key findings of GAO's June 2015 report (GAO-15-502). It focuses on factors that have (1) hindered Indian energy development and (2) deterred tribes from pursuing TERAs. For the June 2015 report, GAO analyzed federal data; reviewed federal, academic, and other literature; and interviewed tribal, federal and industry stakeholders.
What GAO Found
In its June 2015 report, GAO found that Bureau of Indian Affairs' (BIA) management shortcomings and other factors—such as a complex regulatory framework, limited capital and infrastructure, and varied tribal capacity—have hindered Indian energy development. Specifically, BIA's management has the following shortcomings:
BIA does not have the data it needs to verify ownership of some Indian oil and gas resources, easily identify resources available for lease, or identify where leases are in effect, as called for in Secretarial Order 3215. GAO recommended that Interior direct BIA to identify land survey needs and enhance mapping capabilities. In response, Interior stated it will develop a data collection tool to identify the extent of the survey needs in fiscal year 2016, and enhance mapping capabilities by developing a national dataset composed of all Indian land tracts and boundaries in the next 4 years.
BIA's review and approval is required throughout the development process, but BIA does not have a documented process or the data needed to track its review and response times, as called for in implementation guidance for Executive Order 13604. According to a tribal official, BIA's review of some of its energy-related documents, which can include leases, right-of-way agreements, and appraisals, took as long as 8 years. In the meantime, the tribe estimates it lost more than $95 million in revenues it could have earned from tribal permitting fees, oil and gas severance taxes, and royalties. GAO recommended that Interior direct BIA to develop a documented process to track its review and response times. In response, Interior stated it will try to implement a tracking and monitoring mechanism by the end of fiscal year 2017 for oil and gas leases. However, it did not indicate whether it intends to track and monitor the review of other energy-related documents that must be approved before development can occur. Without comprehensive tracking and monitoring of its review process, it cannot ensure that documents are moving forward in a timely manner, and lengthy review times may continue to contribute to lost revenue and missed development opportunities.
Some BIA regional and agency offices do not have staff with the skills needed to effectively evaluate energy-related documents or adequate staff resources. GAO is conducting ongoing work on this issue.
GAO also found in its June 2015 report that a variety of factors have deterred tribes from seeking tribal energy resource agreements (TERA). These factors include uncertainty about some TERA regulations, costs associated with assuming activities historically conducted by federal agencies, and a complex application process. For instance, one tribe asked Interior for additional guidance on the activities that would be considered inherently federal functions—a provision included in Interior's regulations implementing TERA. Interior did not provide the clarification requested. Therefore, the tribe had no way of knowing what efforts may be necessary to build the capacity needed to assume those activities. GAO recommended that Interior provide clarifying guidance. In response, Interior officials stated that the agency is considering further guidance, but it did not provide a timeframe for issuance.
What GAO Recommends
In its June 2015 report, GAO recommended that Interior take steps to address data limitations, track its review process, and provide clarifying guidance. In an August 2015 letter to GAO after the issuance of the report, Interior generally agreed with the recommendations and identified some steps it intends to take to implement them. |
gao_GAO-08-747 | gao_GAO-08-747_0 | Second, NRC published Appendix R, which requires nuclear units operating prior to January 1, 1979 (called “pre-1979 units”), to implement design features—such as fire walls, fire wraps, and automatic fire detection and suppression systems—to protect a redundant system of electrical cables and equipment necessary to safely shut down a nuclear unit during a fire. 2. 3. In part to simplify the licensing of nuclear units that have many exemptions, NRC recently began encouraging units to transition to a more risk-informed approach to nuclear safety in general. According to NRC, Recent Fires at U.S. Commercial Nuclear Units Have Had Limited Safety Significance
NRC officials told us that none of the 125 fires at 54 sites that nuclear unit operators reported from January 1995 to December 2007 has posed significant risk to a commercial unit’s ability to safely shut down. As shown in the table 1, the primary reported causes of these fires were electrical fires. NRC’s data on the location and circumstances surrounding fire events was consistent with the statements of unit officials whom we contacted at selected nuclear units. NRC Has Not Resolved Long- standing Issues Affecting Industry’s Compliance with NRC’s Fire Regulations
NRC has not fully resolved several long-standing issues that affect the commercial nuclear industry’s compliance with existing NRC fire regulations. These issues include (1) nuclear units’ use of operator manual actions; (2) nuclear units’ long-term use of interim compensatory measures; (3) uncertainties regarding the effectiveness of fire wraps for protecting electrical cables necessary for the safe shutdown of a nuclear unit; and (4) the regulatory treatment of fire-induced multiple spurious actuations of equipment that could prevent the safe shutdown of a nuclear unit. As of April, 2008, NRC has no firm plans for resolving this problem. NRC Lacks a Comprehensive Database to Track Nuclear Units’ Use of Operator Manual Actions, Interim Compensatory Measures, and Exemptions
NRC has no comprehensive database of the operator manual actions or interim compensatory measures implemented at nuclear units since its regulations were first promulgated in 1981, in addition to the hundreds of related licensing exemptions. Furthermore, the shortage of skilled personnel and concerns about the potential cost of conducting risk analyses could slow the transition process and limit the number of units that ultimately make the transition to the new approach. Industry and Academic Experts Expressed Concern about Probabilistic Risk Assessments That Would Be Used under the Risk- Informed Approach
According to industry officials and academic experts we consulted, the results of a probabilistic risk assessment used in the risk-informed approach could help units direct safety resources to areas where risk from accidents could be minimized or where the risk of damage to the core or a unit’s safe shutdown capability is highest; however, officials also noted that the absence of significant fire events since the 1975 Browns Ferry fire limits the relevant data on fire events at nuclear units. NRC and industry officials stated that they expected that newer units and units with relatively few exemptions from existing regulations would be less likely to transition to the new approach, while those with older licenses and extensive exemptions would make the transition. Compounding these issues, NRC has no central database of exemptions, operator manual actions, and extended interim compensatory measures. According to NRC, nuclear fire safety can be considered to be degraded when reliance on passive measures is supplanted by manual actions or compensatory measures. To examine the status of the nuclear industry’s implementation of the risk- informed approach to fire safety advocated by NRC, we met with and reviewed documents provided by officials from NRC, industry, and public interest groups, as well as academic officials with research experience in fire safety and risk analysis. Major Management Challenges and Performance Risks: Nuclear Regulatory Commission. | Why GAO Did This Study
After a 1975 fire at the Browns Ferry nuclear plant in Alabama threatened the unit's ability to shut down safely, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued prescriptive fire safety rules for commercial nuclear units. However, nuclear units with different designs and different ages have had difficulty meeting these rules and have sought exemptions to them. In 2004, NRC began to encourage the nation's 104 nuclear units to transition to a less prescriptive, risk-informed approach that will analyze the fire risks of individual nuclear units. GAO was asked to examine (1) the number and causes of fire incidents at nuclear units since 1995, (2) compliance with NRC fire safety regulations, and (3) the transition to the new approach. GAO visited 10 of the 65 nuclear sites nationwide, reviewed NRC reports and related documentation about fire events at nuclear units, and interviewed NRC and industry officials to examine compliance with existing fire protection rules and the transition to the new approach.
What GAO Found
According to NRC, all 125 fires at 54 of the nation's 65 nuclear sites from January 1995 through December 2007 were classified as being of limited safety significance. According to NRC, many of these fires were in areas that do not affect shutdown operations or occurred during refueling outages, when nuclear units are already shut down. NRC's characterization of the location, significance, and circumstances of those fire events was consistent with records GAO reviewed and statements of utility and industry officials GAO contacted. NRC has not resolved several long-standing issues that affect the nuclear industry's compliance with existing NRC fire regulations, and NRC lacks a comprehensive database on the status of compliance. These long-standing issues include (1) nuclear units' reliance on manual actions by unit workers to ensure fire safety (for example, a unit worker manually turns a valve to operate a water pump) rather than "passive" measures, such as fire barriers and automatic fire detection and suppression; (2) workers' use of "interim compensatory measures" (primarily fire watches) to ensure fire safety for extended periods of time, rather than making repairs; (3) uncertainty regarding the effectiveness of fire wraps used to protect electrical cables necessary for the safe shutdown of a nuclear unit; and (4) mitigating the impacts of short circuits that can cause simultaneous, or near-simultaneous, malfunctions of safety-related equipment (called "multiple spurious actuations") and hence complicate the safe shutdown of nuclear units. Compounding these issues is that NRC has no centralized database on the use of exemptions from regulations, manual actions, or compensatory measures used for long periods of time that would facilitate the study of compliance trends or help NRC's field inspectors in examining unit compliance. Primarily to simplify units' complex licensing, NRC is encouraging nuclear units to transition to a risk-informed approach. As of April 2008, some 46 units had stated they would adopt the new approach. However, the transition effort faces significant human capital, cost, and methodological challenges. According to NRC, as well as academics and the nuclear industry, a lack of people with fire modeling, risk assessment, and plant-specific expertise could slow the transition process. They also expressed concern about the potentially high costs of the new approach relative to uncertain benefits. For example, according to nuclear unit officials, the costs to perform the necessary fire analyses and risk assessments could be millions of dollars per unit. Units, they said, may also need to make costly new modifications as a result of these analyses. |
gao_GAO-03-604 | gao_GAO-03-604_0 | In addition, the percentage of separations accounted for by retirements increased from about a third in fiscal year 1997, to about 40 percent in fiscal year 1998, peaked at about 55 percent in fiscal year 1999, declined to almost 40 percent in fiscal year 2000, and returned to about a third in fiscal year 2001. Region X Made Temporary Changes to the Informal Stage of the EEO Process
Region X made changes to its informal EEO process in fiscal years 1999 and 2001. For fiscal years 1997 and 1998, current and former Region X EEO counselors described an informal process that mirrored the federal sector complaint process outlined in EEOC’s guidance. In fiscal year 1999, Region X made changes to this process, under which EEO counselors were no longer allowed to talk with managers but were required to submit questions in writing to managers about what had transpired between employees and managers. In addition, managers were encouraged to routinely have an attorney from OGC review their written responses before these responses were provided to the EEO counselors. Region X Employees about EEO
To gain an understanding of how familiar the Region’s employees are with the EEO process, their willingness to participate in it, and their views on the work environment, we surveyed all of the Region’s employees on the EEO process and EEO environment in the Region and achieved a 75 percent response rate. According to the results of our survey, most Region X employees are familiar with the EEO process, with almost two- thirds of Region X employees reporting having received or having seen within the last 2 years written materials about the federal government’s EEO regulations and written materials describing how to contact regional EEO counselors. Conclusions
Our analysis showed no statistically significant differences for most of the personnel actions we reviewed. However, these changes were counter to the spirit of the regulations and the related guidance, which emphasize the informal nature of precomplaint counseling and informal resolution. In doing our work at Region X, we found that although SSA had issued EEO handbooks in November 1995 for managers and supervisors as well as employees, the handbooks do not contain agency-specific procedures on how EEO counselors are to process complaints of discrimination. Without agency-specific procedures for EEO counselors to process complaints of discrimination, counselors in different components could use different procedures, with the result that employees are not treated consistently. In addition, a sizeable portion of respondents to our survey—about 40 percent—indicated they were unwilling to become or uncertain about becoming involved with the processes established for handling EEO complaints. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
As agreed, our objectives were to (1) provide information on the composition of Region X’s workforce by EEO group (race/ethnicity and gender) for fiscal years 1997 through 2001 overall and for personnel actions such as promotions, awards, and adverse actions; (2) describe the EEO complaint process and any changes to it in the Region for the 5-year period; (3) assess whether the Region’s EEO complaint process is consistent with federal regulations and related guidance; and (4) assess the familiarity with the EEO process of the Region’s employees and their attitude toward it. When asked about their willingness, if they believed that they had been discriminated against, to either contact Region X’s CREO to participate in counseling or to contact the Office of Civil Rights and Equal Opportunity (OCREO) in Baltimore to file a formal EEO complaint, almost half of respondents indicated that they would be generally or very willing to participate in counseling or to file a formal EEO complaint. SSA Region X? American Indian/Alaska Native 2. | Why GAO Did This Study
Employees at the Social Security Administration's (SSA) Region X--which covers Alaska, Idaho, Oregon, and Washington--expressed concern about the Region's equal employment opportunity (EEO) process for employment discrimination complaints. GAO was asked to (1) provide information for fiscal years 1997 through 2001 on the composition of the Region X workforce and for personnel actions such as promotions, awards, and adverse actions by EEO group; (2) describe the EEO complaint process in Region X and any changes to it; (3) assess whether the Region's process is consistent with federal regulations and related guidance; and (4) assess the familiarity with the EEO process of the Region's employees and their attitude toward it.
What GAO Found
In a geographic area where minorities represent a small portion of the civilian workforce (about 13.5 percent), Region X generally had a higher percentage of each minority group, except for American Indian and Alaska Natives. Moreover, the percentage of minority employees in Region X had increased from about 19 percent in fiscal year 1997 to about 27 percent in fiscal year 2001. Women represented a much higher proportion of SSA's workforce than of the civilian workforce. Differences among racial/ethnic and gender groups for most of the personnel actions reviewed were not statistically significant. For fiscal years 1997 and 1998, current and former Region X EEO counselors described a process that mirrored the informal stage of the required federal sector complaint process. In fiscal year 1999, Region X changed its EEO process, so that EEO counselors were no longer allowed to talk with managers but were required to submit their questions in writing. In addition, managers were encouraged to routinely have an attorney from the Office of the General Counsel (OGC) review their written responses before these responses were provided to the EEO counselors. After the changes were in place for about a year, SSA headquarters officials held discussions with Region X officials to explain that having written inquiries and OGC involved in the informal EEO process was not consistent with the intent of resolving issues informally. Beginning early in fiscal year 2001, neither written EEO counselor queries to managers nor OGC involvement was required in the informal process. Region X's former use of written queries and OGC involvement were counter to the spirit of EEO regulations and their related guidance, which emphasize the informal nature of precomplaint counseling. In doing its work at Region X, GAO found that SSA had issued EEO handbooks for managers and employees, but the handbooks do not contain agency-specific procedures on how EEO counselors are to process complaints of discrimination. Agency-specific procedures are required by EEO regulations. Absent such procedures, components of an agency can use different procedures, as illustrated by Region X, resulting in employees across the country being treated differently. To gain an understanding of how familiar the Region's employees are with the EEO process and their willingness to participate in it, GAO surveyed all of the Region's employees. Most Region X employees reported having received or seen within the last 2 years written materials about EEO regulations and how to contact regional EEO counselors. Also, almost half the employees reported a willingness to participate in counseling or to file a formal EEO complaint if they believed they had been discriminated against. However, a sizeable portion of employees--about 40 percent--reported being unwilling or uncertain about becoming involved with the processes established for handling EEO complaints. |
gao_GAO-12-54 | gao_GAO-12-54_0 | OMB exercises four key authorities that contribute to the efficiency of the federal statistical system: In this regard, OMB
Oversight and approval of information collections: OMB generally must approve information collections that are to be administered to 10 or more people. Agencies use the system to submit information collection requests. The elements of PRA most directly related to our review were identifying duplication and soliciting external input on proposed collections. not include detailed explanations were generally for information collections that had unique scopes or other characteristics that made them unlikely to duplicate existing information. In addition, interagency committees present information about their work at statistical seminars. Membership in the committees is made up almost exclusively of representatives from the 13 principal statistical agencies, so most agencies are not directly involved in committee activities. It makes sense that agencies that have statistics as their primary focus are the most- heavily involved, but those agencies for which statistics is a supporting function to their primary mission, and possibly academics and the broader public, could benefit from greater access to information and products related to the committees’ work and priorities. Administrative Data Could Help Improve Federal Surveys, but Continued Progress Is Needed on Access and Quality Issues
Administrative Data Have Greater Potential to Supplement, Rather than Replace, Federal Surveys
Administrative data, typically collected to administer a program or business, are a growing source of information on individuals and households. According to the Census Bureau, the amount of administrative data held by private companies exceeds the amount held by the government. Supplementing surveys’ sample frames: Using administrative data to supplement surveys’ sample frames—the sources from which a survey’s sample is drawn—can create efficiencies, reduce costs, and enhance the quality of surveys. Comparing data to improve survey accuracy and design: By comparing survey data to similar administrative datasets and identifying reasons for any discrepancies that may exist, agencies can improve the quality of survey data. Quality of data: Agency officials and experts identified reasons why the quality of administrative data can vary, which can affect their potential use with survey data. Agencies and interagency committees have been taking numerous actions to address these constraints. Similar to the checklist that FCSM is developing for agencies to use in evaluating data quality, the framework could include a template outlining a list of key questions for all agencies involved in the proposed data sharing, including federal and state agencies that hold data, to address issues such as: (1) the steps to take to ensure data reliability; (2) any statutory limitations on planned uses of the data (including confidentiality protections); (3) whether consent has already been obtained for additional use of the data, or how it will be obtained; and (4) methods to fully account for the costs associated with obtaining and using the data. Uses of ACS That Require Design and Methodology Changes Have Limited Potential
Agencies and others identified three uses of ACS data and resources that, while offering potential benefits to other surveys, face such constraints that more widespread use is likely not possible under current ACS design. While the ACS currently does not include supplements, doing so could enable surveys to leverage the resources of the ACS. Supplementing the guidance could increase agencies’ awareness of these options, in particular those that were cited less frequently. Though agencies and interagency committees are working to create tools to facilitate parts of this process, more-comprehensive and centralized guidance for agencies to follow when negotiating and making decisions regarding data-sharing opportunities could help facilitate the process. Recommendations for Executive Action
In order to maintain progress in maximizing the efficiency of existing data sources, we recommend that the Director of OMB, in consultation with the Chief Statistician, work with the ICSP to take the following four actions: To improve the broader efficiency of the federal statistical system and improve communication among agencies and others, when OMB next updates guidance on agency survey and statistical information collection and dissemination methods, include additional details on actions agencies can take to meet requirements to identify duplication, to consult with persons outside of the agency, and address other requirements as appropriate; and create new methods or enhance existing methods to improve the dissemination of information and resources produced by interagency statistical committees. To increase the reliability of the information presented on the Reginfo.gov website and in OMB’s internal system, implement quality-control procedures designed to identify and remedy any differences between cost and burden information provided on the website and in the related supporting statement documentation that underlies this information. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
The objectives of this report were to (1) review the ways in which the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and agencies identify opportunities for improvement and increased efficiency of selected information collections; (2) evaluate opportunities and constraints for the statistical agencies to use administrative data in conjunction with selected surveys; and (3) evaluate ways in which American Community Survey (ACS) data and resources can be used in selected surveys, and the associated benefits and constraints. | Why GAO Did This Study
As demand for more and better information increases, rising costs and other challenges require that the federal statistical system identify efficiencies. To explore opportunities to improve cost-effectiveness, GAO was asked to (1) review how the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and agencies improve information collections, (2) evaluate opportunities and constraints for agencies to use administrative data (information collected as part of the administration of a program or held by private companies) with surveys, and (3) assess the benefits and constraints of surveys making greater use of the Census Bureau’s American Community Survey (ACS) data and resources. GAO focused on collections administered to households and individuals, analyzed statutory and agency documents, did five case studies of surveys, reviewed documentation of representative samples of active surveys, and interviewed agency officials and experts.
What GAO Found
The Office of Management and Budget (OMB), agencies, and interagency statistical committees have distinct roles in identifying opportunities to improve federal information collection efforts. OMB exercises several authorities that promote the system’s efficiency, including overseeing and approving agency information collections. The website Reginfo.gov provides the public with information, such as cost and burden, on collections that OMB reviews, though GAO’s review identified some discrepancies in selected items. OMB periodically issues guidance to agencies on complying with federal requirements for information collections, but this guidance generally does not prescribe specific actions to take. GAO’s analysis of agencies’ documentation of active surveys indicated that 77 percent included detailed descriptions of efforts to identify duplication, while those that did not tended to be for collections that are unlikely to duplicate existing information; and 75 percent reported actions beyond those required by statute to solicit external input. OMB, through enhanced guidance, could promote additional awareness of options agencies can take to identify duplication and solicit input. Interagency committees, which primarily draw members from the 13 agencies that have statistics as their primary focus, are particularly important in helping ensure collaboration. The committees have numerous projects underway aimed at addressing key challenges facing the statistical system. However, mechanisms for disseminating information about their work are not comprehensive or up-to-date. Though member agencies are the most-likely customers of the committees’ products, making information about committee work and priorities more accessible could benefit other agencies, academics, and the general public. It could also benefit committee members by providing a central repository for information.
Administrative data have greater potential to supplement rather than replace survey data. Agencies currently combine the two data sources in four key ways to cost-effectively increase efficiency and quality. Specifically, agencies use administrative data to: (1) link to survey data to create new data products; (2) supplement surveys’ sample frames; (3) compare to survey data to improve accuracy and design of surveys; and (4) combine with survey data to create, or model, estimates. However, expanding the use of administrative data faces key constraints related to the access and quality of the data. While agencies and committees are taking steps to address these constraints and facilitate the process through which agencies work together to share data, individual tools may not be sufficient. A more-comprehensive framework for use by all agencies involved in data-sharing decisions that includes key questions to consider when evaluating potential use of administrative data could make the decision process more consistent and transparent.
ACS, an ongoing monthly survey that provides information about the nation’s communities, offers agencies important opportunities to increase the efficiency and reduce the costs of their surveys, but its current design limits the extent to which agencies can utilize some of these opportunities. Uses that do not affect ACS design or the survey’s respondents, such as using ACS estimates to inform survey design or evaluate other surveys’ results, have widespread potential. However, more-intensive uses, such as adding content or supplemental surveys to the ACS, currently have limited potential.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that OMB take several actions to improve the broader efficiency of the federal statistical system, including implementing additional quality-control procedures for selected website data, enhancing awareness of ways to meet information collection requirements, better disseminating information on interagency committees, and developing comprehensive guidance for agencies to use when considering data sharing. OMB generally agreed with all of GAO’s recommendations. |
gao_GAO-06-220T | gao_GAO-06-220T_0 | States have their own chartering requirements. Rationale for the Historical Tax Exemption of Credit Unions
The tax-exempt status of credit unions originally was predicated on the similarity of credit unions and mutual financial institutions; however, while Congress did not always cite its reasons for continuing this exemption, recent legislation mentions the cooperative structure and service to persons of modest means as reasons for reaffirming their exempt status. While the act’s legislative history contains extensive discussion of the reasons why the tax-exempt status of the other mutual institutions was revoked, it is silent regarding why the tax exempt status of credit unions was not also revoked. In response, opponents of the taxation of credit unions have argued that credit unions remain distinct organizationally and operationally from other financial institutions, providing their membership with services they would not receive from other institutions. In 1984, the Department of the Treasury (Treasury) report to the President included a proposal to repeal the tax exemption of credit unions, which also argued that the exemption gave credit unions a competitive advantage over other financial institutions and its repeal would “eliminate the incentive for credit unions to retain, rather than distribute, current earnings.” In 1985, the Reagan administration proposed taxing credit unions with more than $5 million in gross assets, but would have maintained the exemption on credit unions with less than $5 million of gross assets, since it was reasoned that taxing small credit unions would significantly increase the administrative burden for a relatively small revenue increase. They question both the extent to which credit unions serve people of modest means and pass on their tax subsidy to members. Estimates of the Potential Tax Revenues from Taxing Corporations Vary Widely Based on the Source and Underlying Assumptions
Governmental entities have attempted to estimate the potential revenue to the federal government from repealing the tax exemption that ranged from $1.2 billion to $1.6 billion on an annualized basis. Historical Distinctions between Credit Unions and Other Depository Institutions Have Continued to Blur
Since 1992, credit unions have become less distinct from other depository institutions of similar size, particularly in terms of the products and services offered by larger credit unions. Although credit unions are on average much smaller than banks, larger credit unions and banks of comparable size tend to offer the same products and services (see fig. 3). Limited Comprehensive Data Are Available to Evaluate Income of Credit Union Members
While it has been generally accepted that credit unions historically have emphasized service to people with modest means; currently, there are no comprehensive data on the income characteristics of credit union members, particularly those who actually receive loans and other services. Federal Reserve Board Data Suggest That Credit Unions Serve a Slightly Lower Proportion of Low- and Moderate-Income Households Than Do Banks
Our prior work, which included an analysis of data from the Federal Reserve Board’s 2001 SCF, suggested that credit unions overall served a lower percentage of households of modest means (low- and moderate- income households combined) than banks. Credit Unions Lack Transparency on Executive Compensation and Larger Credit Unions Do Not Have to Report on Effectiveness of Internal Controls
Most credit unions are not subject to IRS and other federal reporting requirements that would disclose information such as executive compensation and assessments of internal controls for financial reporting—information that can enhance public confidence in tax-exempt entities. But, unlike banks and thrifts, these credit unions are not required to report on the effectiveness of their internal controls for financial reporting. | Why GAO Did This Study
Unlike other depository institutions, credit unions are exempt from federal corporate income taxes. Recent legislative and regulatory changes to credit union membership restrictions and allowable products and services have blurred some of the historical distinctions between credit unions and other depository institutions. As a result, some observers have raised questions about whether tax exemption provides credit unions with an advantage over other depository institutions and whether the original basis for tax exemption is still valid. As part of its continuing oversight of the tax-exempt sector, the House Committee on Ways and Means asked GAO to address (1) the historical basis for the tax-exempt status of credit unions; (2) the arguments for and against taxation, including estimates of potential revenue from eliminating the exemption; (3) the extent to which credit unions offer services distinct from those offered by banks of comparable size, and serve low-and moderate-income individuals; and (4) the extent to which credit unions are required to report information on executive compensation and assessments of their internal controls.
What GAO Found
Congress originally granted tax-exempt status to credit unions in 1937 because of their similarity to other mutually owned financial institutions that were tax-exempt at that time. While the other institutions lost their exemption in the Revenue Act of 1951, credit unions specifically remained exempted. The act's legislative history is silent regarding why the tax-exempt status of credit unions was not revoked. More recently, the Credit Union Membership Access Act of 1998 indicates that credit unions continue to be exempt because of their cooperative, not-for-profit structure, which is distinct from other depository institutions, and because credit unions historically have emphasized serving people of modest means. Arguments for taxing credit unions center on creating a "level playing field" since credit unions now compete more directly with banks. Proponents also point to associated potential revenues, with federal estimates ranging from $1.2 billion to $1.6 billion per year. Opponents of taxation argue that credit unions remain distinct--organizationally and operationally--from other financial institutions and taxation would impair their capital levels. Prior GAO work has found that relatively large credit unions offer many of the same services that same-sized banks offer, while smaller credit unions tend to provide more basic financial services. Limited comprehensive data exist on the income of credit union members. GAO's assessment of Federal Reserve data suggested that credit unions served a slightly lower proportion of low- and moderate-income households than banks, but the lack of comprehensive data prevents definitive conclusions. Most credit unions are not subject to reporting requirements that provide information on executive compensation or internal controls. Specifically, federal credit unions are not required to file the Internal Revenue Service form that most other tax-exempt entities must file and some states allow credit unions to file on a group basis. Further, credit unions are not subject to internal control reporting requirements applicable to banks and thrifts, an item we identified for Congressional action in 2003. |
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