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gao_RCED-97-2 | gao_RCED-97-2_0 | The remaining 134 had no accidents. Nevertheless, they theorized that new airlines may encounter more incidents because their fleets expanded faster than their organizational ability to absorb the growth, train their staff, and maintain their fleets. Long-Standing Problems Limit Effectiveness of FAA’s Inspection Program
To do its job effectively, and because its resources are limited, FAA must target its inspectors to the areas of greatest risk. Our analysis of new airlines over a 5-year period shows that, on average, they experienced higher rates of incidents and FAA-initiated enforcement actions than established airlines, particularly during their early years of operations. FAA’s policies that were in effect during the period of our review did not call for new airlines to be monitored any differently from established airlines, and actual inspection rates varied widely among new airlines—some airlines with high incident and enforcement action rates were being inspected less frequently than airlines with few or no such problems. We believe that these initiatives have the potential to significantly improve FAA’s inspection program, but only if they are effectively implemented. Recommendations
We recommend that the Secretary of Transportation instruct the Administrator of FAA to (1) closely monitor the performance of new airlines, particularly during the early years of operations, and conduct increased and/or comprehensive inspections of those new airlines that experience elevated rates of safety-related problems; (2) evaluate the impact of recent budget reductions on FAA’s critical safety-related functions, including—but not limited to—inspector training, and report the results to the Congress through the appropriations process; and (3) study the feasibility of developing measurable criteria for what constitutes aviation safety, including those airline-specific safety-related performance measures that could be published for use by the traveling public. To address this issue, we focused on three questions: Did new airlines perform differently from established airlines during the 5-year period between January 1, 1990, and December 31, 1994, with regard to accidents, incidents, and enforcement actions? At what frequency does FAA inspect new airlines compared with established airlines? We have long reported on problems with the data in FAA’s safety inspection management system. Aviation Safety: FAA’s Efforts to Improve Oversight of Foreign Carriers (GAO/T-RCED-95-33, Oct. 4, 1994). Aviation Safety: FAA Needs to More Aggressively Manage Its Inspection Program (GAO/T-RCED-92-25, Feb. 6, 1992). | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the safety performance of new airlines having 5 or fewer years of operating experience, focusing on: (1) the frequency with which the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) inspects new airlines compared with its inspections of established airlines; and (2) FAA efforts to correct long-standing problems that limit the effectiveness of its safety inspection program.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) although data regarding airline accidents and FAA incident and enforcement actions require cautious interpretation, it appeared that, for the review period of 1990 through 1994, new airlines had higher rates of accidents, incidents, and FAA enforcement actions than established airlines during their early years of operations; (2) FAA officials theorized that new airlines may experience more incidents because their fleets expand faster than their ability to absorb growth, train staff, and maintain fleets; (3) FAA national inspection guidelines that were in effect during the review period did not target new airlines for increased surveillance; (4) no clear pattern in the inspection rates distinguished airlines with relatively high rates of incidents and enforcement actions from those that had few or no problems; (5) FAA aviation safety inspection program shortcomings include insufficient inspector training, inadequate aviation safety databases, and the need to improve the oversight of aging aircraft; (6) FAA actions to better target its inspection resources to areas with the greatest safety risks remain incomplete; and (7) initiatives to accelerate the hiring of safety inspectors, strengthen FAA data collection and tracking systems, review FAA inspection operations, and conduct a safety review have the potential to significantly improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the FAA safety inspection program. |
gao_GAO-04-515 | gao_GAO-04-515_0 | If Energy determines that the worker was not employed by one of its facilities or did not have an illness that could be caused by exposure to toxic substances, the agency finds the claimant ineligible. Energy Has Processed Few Cases, and Insufficient Strategic Planning and Data Collection Complicate Program Management
As of December 31, 2003, Energy had completely processed about 6 percent of the more than 23,000 cases that had been filed, and the majority of all cases filed were associated with facilities in 9 states. Energy had begun processing on nearly 35 percent of cases, but processing had not begun on nearly 60 percent of the cases. The assessment of Energy’s achievement of case processing goals is complicated by systems limitations. Further, these limitations make it difficult to assess achievement of goals related to program objectives, such as the quality of the assistance given to claimants in filing for state workers’ compensation. A Shortage of Qualified Physicians to Issue Determinations Delays Filing of Workers’ Compensation Claims and Claimants May Receive Inadequate Information to Prepare Them to Pursue These Claims
Energy was slow in implementing its initial case processing operation, but it is now processing enough cases so that there is a backlog of cases awaiting physician panel review. Claimants have experienced lengthy delays in receiving the determinations they need to file workers’ compensation claims and have received little information about claims status as well as what they can expect from this process. Energy has taken some steps intended to reduce the backlog of cases. While Workers’ Compensation Claims for a Majority of Cases Are Not Likely to Be Contested, Actual Compensation Is Not Certain
Our analysis shows that a majority of cases associated with Energy facilities in 9 states that account for more than three-quarters of all Subtitle D cases filed are not likely to be contested. However, the remaining 20 percent of cases lack willing payers and are likely to be contested. These percentages provide an order of magnitude estimate of the extent to which claimants will have willing payers and are not a prediction of actual benefit outcomes for claimants. Another 25 percent of the cases, while not technically having a willing payer, have workers’ compensation coverage provided by an insurer that has stated that it will not contest these claims and is currently processing several workers’ compensation claims without contesting them. Because of data limitations, these percentages provide an order of magnitude estimate of the extent to which claimants will have willing payers. These estimates could change as better data become available or as circumstances change, such as new contractors taking over at individual facilities. Several Issues Could Be Considered in Evaluating Options for Improving the Likelihood of Willing Payers
Various options are available to improve payment outcomes for the cases that receive a positive determination from Energy, but lack willing payers under the current program. In particular, the cost implications of these options for the federal government should be carefully considered in the context of the current and projected federal fiscal environment. Table 2 arrays the relevant issues to provide a framework for evaluating the range of options in a logical sequence. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve Energy’s effectiveness in assisting Subtitle D claimants in obtaining compensation for occupational illnesses, we recommend that the Secretary of Energy: in order to reduce the backlog of cases waiting for review by a physician panel, take additional steps to expedite the processing of claims though its physician panels and focus its efforts on initiatives designed to allow the panels to function more efficiently. To determine the extent to which Energy policies and procedures help employees file timely claims for state workers’ compensation benefits, we reviewed Energy’s regulations, policies, procedures, and communications with claimants. To estimate the number of claims for which there will not be willing payers of workers’ compensation benefits, we reviewed the provisions of workers’ compensation programs in the 9 states that account for more than three-quarters of the cases filed. | Why GAO Did This Study
Subtitle D of the Energy Employees Occupational Illness Compensation Program Act of 2000 allows the Department of Energy (Energy) to help its contractors' employees file state workers' compensation claims for illnesses determined by a panel of physicians to be caused by exposure to toxic substances while employed at an Energy facility. Congress mandated that GAO study the effectiveness of the benefit program under Subtitle D. GAO focused on four key areas: (1) the number, status, and characteristics of claims filed with Energy; (2) the extent to which Energy policies and procedures help employees file timely claims for these state benefits; (3) the extent to which there will be a "willing payer" of workers' compensation benefits, that is, an insurer that--by order from or agreement with Energy--will not contest these claims; and (4) a framework that could be used for evaluating possible options for changing the program.
What GAO Found
During the first 2 1/2 years of the program, ending December 31, 2003, Energy had completely processed about 6 percent of the more than 23,000 cases that had been filed. Energy had begun processing nearly 35 percent of the cases, but processing had not yet begun on nearly 60 percent of the cases. Further, insufficient strategic planning and systems limitations complicate the assessment of Energy's achievement of goals related to case processing, as well as goals related to program objectives, such as the quality of the assistance provided to claimants in filing for state workers' compensation. While Energy got off to a slow start in processing cases, it is now processing enough cases that there is a backlog of cases waiting for review by a physician panel. Energy has taken some steps intended to reduce this backlog, such as reducing the number of physicians needed for some panels. Nonetheless, a shortage of qualified physicians continues to constrain the agency's capacity to decide cases more quickly. Consequently, claimants will likely continue to experience lengthy delays in receiving the determinations they need to file workers' compensation claims. In the meantime, Energy has not kept claimants sufficiently informed about the delays in the processing of their claims as well as what claimants can expect as they proceed with state workers' compensation claims. GAO estimates that more than half of the cases associated with Energy facilities in 9 states that account for more than three-quarters of all Subtitle D cases filed are likely to have a willing payer of benefits. Another quarter of the cases in these 9 states, while not technically having a willing payer, have workers' compensation coverage provided by an insurer that has stated that it will not contest these claims. However, the remaining 20 percent of the cases in these 9 states lack willing payers and are likely to be contested. This has created concerns about program equity in that many of these cases may be less likely to receive compensation. Because of data limitations, these percentages provide an order of magnitude estimate of the extent to which claimants will have willing payers. These estimates could change as better data become available or as circumstances change, such as new contractors taking over at individual facilities. The estimates are not a prediction of actual benefit outcomes for claimants. Various options are available to improve payment outcomes for the cases that receive a positive physician panel determination, but lack willing payers. While not recommending any particular option, GAO provides a framework that includes a range of issues to help the Congress assess options if it chooses to change the current program. One of these issues in particular--the federal cost implications--should be carefully considered in the context of the current and projected federal fiscal environment. |
gao_GAO-02-433 | gao_GAO-02-433_0 | Background
To enable the Department of Defense (DOD) to close unneeded bases and realign others, the Congress enacted base realignment and closure (BRAC) legislation that instituted base closure rounds in 1988, 1991, 1993, and 1995. As a result of these actions, DOD estimates that it has reduced its domestic infrastructure by about 20 percent and saved billions of dollars in the process. BRAC Net Savings Are Substantial but Imprecise
Through fiscal year 2001, financial data show that DOD generated an estimated $16.7 billion in net BRAC savings from the four rounds, an increase of $2.5 billion from its fiscal year 1999 estimate, and expects additional annual recurring savings of $6.6 billion beginning in fiscal year 2002, an increase of $1 billion. Transfer of Unneeded BRAC Property Is Less Than Half Completed
Although DOD has plans to transfer nearly all of its unneeded BRAC property, as of September 30, 2001, it had actually transferred less than half of the 518,500 acres designated for federal or nonfederal reuse. A primary advantage of using the early transfer authority is that it makes property available to the future user as soon as possible, thus allowing environmental cleanup and redevelopment activities to proceed concurrently. Most Communities Are Continuing to Recover from the Economic Impact of BRAC
While some communities surrounding closed bases are faring better than others, our analyses of key economic indicators and visits to select communities show that most are continuing to recover over time from the initial economic impact of base closures. Although optimistic about the continued economic recovery of their communities, some local officials were concerned that the recent downturn in the national economy could hinder continued economic recovery. Appendix VI provides additional detail on the average annual real per capita income growth rates for the 62 communities. We also recommend that the secretary of defense encourage the secretaries of the military services to work with communities impacted by the base closure process to expand the use of the early transfer authority in those cases where the department can accelerate the transfer of unneeded former base property and/or save money. The other eight locations had unemployment rates greater than the U.S. rate. | What GAO Found
Through military base realignment and closures rounds in 1988, 1991, 1993, and 1995, the Pentagon significantly reduced its domestic infrastructure and freed up needed dollars for high-priority programs. By the end of last round in fiscal year 2001, the Department of Defense (DOD) had closed or realigned hundreds of bases, generated savings, and transferred unneeded property to other users. The communities surrounding the former bases continue to recover economically from the closures. Congress recently authorized another round of base realignments and closures beginning in 2005. DOD has saved $16.7 billion through fiscal year 2001, and expects to save $6.6 billion in annually in future years. Although DOD plans to transfer nearly all of the 518,500 acres of unneeded base property to federal and nonfederal users, it has completed only some of the transfers. Environmental cleanup is the primary impediment to conveying the remaining property titles. The military services are using early transfer authority and leasing to make property available for reuse sooner. Although successful redevelopment of base property plays a key role in the economic recovery of neighboring communities, broader regional economic growth also is important to the process. Two economic indicators--the unemployment rate and average annual real capita income growth rate--show that most communities are doing well compared with average U.S. rates, despite delays in the transfer or reuse of former base property. But questions remain about some communities' ability to sustain their economic recovery over time, particularly in light of the recent downturn in the national economy. |
gao_GAO-04-1008 | gao_GAO-04-1008_0 | HHS’ Financial System Implementation Effort
In June 2001, the Secretary of HHS directed the department to establish a unified accounting system that, when fully implemented, would replace five outdated accounting systems. HHS Has Not Effectively Implemented Key Processes Necessary to Reduce Risks to Acceptable Levels
We found that HHS has not implemented effective disciplined processes in several key process areas that have been shown to form the foundation for project success or failure including requirements management, testing, project management and oversight, and risk management. Requirements were not traceable. This leaves HHS with little time to address any defects identified during the system testing process and to ensure that the corrective actions taken to address the defects do not introduce new defects. However, we have reported—and HHS has acknowledged—weaknesses in IT investment management, enterprise architecture, and information security. HHS’ Enterprise IT Management Processes Also Add Risk for UFMS
In addition to weaknesses in disciplined processes in the development of UFMS, weaknesses in the HHS’ IT management processes also increase the risks associated with UFMS. HHS is modifying its IT investment management policies, developing an enterprise architecture, and responding to security weaknesses with several ongoing activities, but these changes may not be implemented in time to compensate for the increased risks. It is essential that an agency take the necessary steps to ensure that it has the human capital capacity to design, implement, and operate a financial management system. HHS has taken first steps to address three of the five key principles identified in our report on strategic workforce planning. Without assurances that it is moving ahead with a solid foundation and a fully developed and strongly administered plan for bringing the entire UFMS project under the disciplined processes of requirements management, testing, risk management, and the use of quantitative measures to manage the project, HHS risks not achieving its goal of a common accounting system that produces data for management decision making and financial reporting and risks perpetuating its long-standing accounting system weaknesses with substantial workarounds to address any needed capabilities that have not been built into the system. Before proceeding with further implementation of UFMS after deployment at CDC, we recommend that the Secretary of Health and Human Services direct the Assistant Secretary for Budget, Technology, and Finance to require that the UFMS program staff take the following 14 actions: Develop and effectively implement a plan on how HHS will implement the disciplined processes necessary to reduce the risks associated with this effort to acceptable levels. Develop a concept of operations in accordance with recognized industry standards such as those promulgated by IEEE. This shortage of staff resources led to several key deliverables being significantly behind schedule. HHS will need to ensure effective information security controls departmentwide for UFMS operations. Through early recognition and resolution of the weaknesses identified, HHS can optimize its opportunities to reduce the risks that UFMS will not fully meet one or more of its cost, schedule, and performance objectives. Staff contacts and other key contributors to this report are listed in appendix V.
Scope and Methodology
Our review of the Department of Health and Human Services’ (HHS) ongoing effort to develop and implement a unified accounting system focused on one of the three concurrent but separate projects: the ongoing implementation of the Unified Financial Management System (UFMS) at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), the Food and Drug Administration and HHS’ Program Support Center (PSC). To assess information technology (IT) management practices, we reviewed prior GAO reports on governmentwide investment management and enterprise architecture. | Why GAO Did This Study
In June 2001, the Secretary of HHS directed the department to establish a unified accounting system that, when fully implemented, would replace five outdated accounting systems. GAO was asked to review HHS' ongoing effort to develop and implement the Unified Financial Management System (UFMS) and to focus on whether the agency has (1) effectively implemented disciplined processes; (2) implemented effective information technology (IT) investment management, enterprise architecture, and information security management; and (3) taken actions to ensure that the agency has the human capital needed to successfully design, implement, and operate UFMS.
What GAO Found
HHS has not followed key disciplined processes necessary to reduce the risks associated with implementing UFMS to acceptable levels. While development of a core financial system can never be risk free, effective implementation of disciplined processes can reduce those risks to acceptable levels. The problems that have been identified in such key areas as requirements management, including developing a concept of operations, testing, data conversion, systems interfaces, and risk management, compounded by incomplete IT management practices, information security weaknesses, and problematic human capital practices, significantly increase the risks that UFMS will not fully meet one or more of its cost, schedule, and performance objectives. With initial deployment of UFMS at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) scheduled for October 2004, HHS has not developed sufficient quantitative measures for determining the impact of the many process weaknesses identified by GAO and others to evaluate its project efforts. Without well-defined requirements that are traceable from origin to implementation, HHS cannot be assured that the system will provide the functionality needed and that testing will identify significant defects in a timely manner prior to rollout when they are less costly to correct. The agency has not developed the necessary framework for testing requirements, and its schedule leaves little time for correcting process weaknesses and identified defects. HHS has focused on meeting its predetermined milestones in the project schedule to the detriment of disciplined processes. If HHS continues on this path, it risks not achieving its goal of a common accounting system that produces data for management decision making and financial reporting and risks perpetuating its long-standing accounting system weaknesses with substantial workarounds to address needed capabilities that have not been built into the system. Accordingly, GAO believes these issues need to be addressed prior to deployment at CDC. Beyond the risks associated with this specific system development, HHS has departmental weaknesses in IT investment management, enterprise architecture, and information security. Because of the risks related to operating UFMS in an environment with flawed information security controls, HHS needs to take action to ensure that UFMS benefits from strong information security controls. HHS is modifying its IT investment management policies, developing an enterprise architecture, and responding to security weaknesses with several ongoing activities, but substantial progress in these areas is needed to prevent increased risks to cost, schedule, and performance objectives for UFMS. In human capital, many positions were not filled as planned and strategic workforce planning was not timely. HHS has taken the first steps to address these issues; however, ongoing staff shortages have played a role in several key deliverables being significantly behind schedule. |
gao_GAO-03-512 | gao_GAO-03-512_0 | Section 202 Is an Important Source of Housing for Elderly Households with Very Low Incomes
Section 202 is the only federal housing program that targets all of its rental units to very low income elderly households. Even with the program’s exclusive focus on the very low income elderly, Section 202 has reached only a small share of eligible households. Other federal programs that develop rental housing generally target different income levels, serve other populations in addition to the elderly (including families with children and people with disabilities) and do not require housing providers to offer supportive services for the elderly. Insufficient Capital Advances Caused Some Sponsors to Seek Other Funding
Although HUD policy intends for capital advances to fund the cost of constructing a modestly designed project, capital advances have not always been sufficient to cover these expenses. HUD field staff, project sponsors, and consultants reported that program limits on capital advances often kept projects from meeting HUD’s time guideline for approving projects for construction. 8). Conclusions
The housing affordability problems of very low income elderly renter households—although they represent a small share of all elderly households—are particularly acute. These households represent one of the more vulnerable populations in the nation given their small incomes and need for supportive services. Recommendations
To reduce the time required for projects to receive approval to start construction, we recommend that the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development direct the Assistant Secretary for Housing to (1) evaluate the effectiveness of the current methods for calculating capital advances and (2) make any necessary changes to these methods, based on this evaluation, so that capital advances adequately cover the development costs of Section 202 projects consistent with HUD’s project design and cost standards. Scope and Methodology
We conducted this review to address: (1) the role of the Section 202 program in meeting the housing needs of elderly renter households with very low incomes, (2) the extent to which Section 202 projects meet the Department of Housing and Urban Development’s (HUD) time guidelines for project processing, and (3) the factors that keep Section 202 projects from meeting HUD’s time guidelines for project processing. About 3.7 million (± 208,000) elderly renter households have very low incomes. HOME Investment Partnerships provides formula-based grants to states and localities to build, acquire, or rehabilitate affordable rental housing or provide tenant-based rental assistance. a. | Why GAO Did This Study
According to the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), the most widespread and urgent housing problem facing elderly households is affordability. About 3.3 million elderly renter households in the United States have very low incomes (50 percent or less of median area income). The Section 202 Supportive Housing for the Elderly Program provides capital advances (grants) to nonprofit organizations to develop affordable rental housing exclusively for these households. GAO was asked to determine the role of the Section 202 program in addressing the need for affordable elderly housing and the factors affecting the timeliness of approving and constructing new projects.
What GAO Found
HUD's Section 202 program provides a valuable housing resource for very low income elderly households. Although they represent a small share of all elderly households, very low income elderly renters have acute housing affordability problems because of their limited income and the need for supportive services. The Section 202 program, which offers about 260,000 rental units nationwide and ensures that residents receive rental assistance and access to services that promote independent living, is the only federal program devoted exclusively to providing this type of housing. However, even with the program's exclusive focus, Section 202 has reached only about an estimated 8 percent of very low income elderly households. About three-quarters of Section 202 projects in GAO's analysis did not meet HUD's time guideline for gaining approval to start construction. These delays held up the delivery of housing assistance to needy elderly households by nearly a year compared with projects that met HUD's guideline. Several factors contributed to these delays, in particular capital advances that were not sufficient to cover development costs. Project sponsors reported that insufficient capital advances often forced them to spend time seeking additional funds from HUD and other sources. Although HUD's policy is to provide sufficient funding to cover the cost of constructing a modestly designed project, HUD has acknowledged that its capital advances for the Section 202 program sometimes fall short. Other factors affecting the timeliness of the approval process include inadequate training and guidance for field staff responsible for the approval process, inexperienced project sponsors, and local zoning and permit requirements. |
gao_GAO-04-850 | gao_GAO-04-850_0 | Traditional validation surveys provide the basis for assessing the effectiveness of JCAHO’s hospital accreditation process in detecting deficiencies in Medicare COPs, which JCAHO- accredited hospitals are treated as meeting. JCAHO’s Pre-2004 Hospital Accreditation Process Often Did Not Detect Serious Deficiencies Found by State Survey Agencies
JCAHO’s pre-2004 hospital accreditation process often did not identify either hospitals with serious deficiencies or the individual serious deficiencies found by state survey agencies through CMS’s validation program. In a sample of 500 JCAHO-accredited hospitals, state agency validation surveys conducted in fiscal years 2000 through 2002 identified 31 percent (157 hospitals) with serious deficiencies; of these, JCAHO did not identify 78 percent (123 hospitals) as having serious deficiencies. However, in its comparison to determine disparity between the two surveys, CMS does consider whether it is reasonable to conclude that the deficiencies found by state survey agencies existed at the time JCAHO surveyed the hospital. The number of serious deficiencies found by CMS’s validation program represents 2 percent of the 11,000 Medicare COPs surveyed by state agencies in the sample and were found in 157 hospitals. Serious deficiencies in the COP on physical environment compromise patient safety and health. Potential of JCAHO’s New Hospital Accreditation Process Is Unknown, and Testing Was Limited
The potential of JCAHO’s new hospital accreditation process to improve the identification of serious deficiencies is unknown because it is too soon after its January 2004 implementation for a meaningful evaluation; in addition, JCAHO’s testing of the new process was limited. While unannounced surveys, which are planned for implementation in 2006, have the potential to improve the detection of serious deficiencies, other features of the new process that JCAHO did not test before implementation may have limitations that could affect the potential of the new process to identify problems with patient care. However, periodic performance reviews may not necessarily improve the detection of deficiencies. The hospitals participating in the pilot test were not randomly selected by JCAHO. During the pilot test, an observer from JCAHO’s central office accompanied each surveyor, and the knowledge that they were being observed may have influenced the surveyors’ actions. CMS Oversight Authority of JCAHO Is Limited
Because of JCAHO’s unique legal status, CMS’s oversight of JCAHO’s hospital accreditation program is limited in two major ways: Unlike other accreditation programs with deeming authority, JCAHO does not have to reapply to CMS to reauthorize its deeming authority, and CMS cannot take action to address performance problems with JCAHO’s hospital accreditation program. Recommendations for Executive Action
To strengthen the ability of CMS to identify and report to Congress on JCAHO’s ability to ensure that the hospitals it accredits protect the safety and health of patients through compliance with the Medicare COPs, we recommend that the Administrator of CMS take the following three actions: modify the method used to measure the rate of disparity between validation survey findings and accreditation program findings to provide a reasonable assurance that Medicare COPs are being met and consider whether additional measures are needed to accurately reflect an accreditation program’s ability to detect deficiencies in Medicare COPs; provide in the annual report to Congress an estimate, based on the validation survey sample, of the performance of all JCAHO-accredited hospitals, including the limitations and protocols for these estimates based on generally accepted sampling and statistical methodologies; and develop a written protocol for these calculations; and annually conduct traditional validation surveys on a sample of JCAHO- accredited hospitals that is equal to at least 5 percent of all JCAHO- accredited hospitals. Rather, we focused our evaluation on how well JCAHO’s hospital accreditation program ensures hospitals’ compliance with Medicare participation requirements. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
We examined the extent to which JCAHO’s pre-2004 survey process identified hospitals with deficiencies and individual deficiencies in Medicare COPs that were identified by state survey agencies. | Why GAO Did This Study
Hospitals accredited by the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO) are considered in compliance with Medicare participation requirements. GAO examined the extent to which JCAHO's pre-2004 hospital accreditation process identified hospitals not complying with Medicare requirements, the potential of JCAHO's new process for improving the detection of deficiencies in Medicare requirements, and the effectiveness of CMS's oversight of JCAHO's hospital accreditation program. GAO analyzed CMS data on hospitals state surveyors found to have deficiencies in Medicare requirements that JCAHO surveyors did not detect, analyzed CMS's measure of JCAHO's ability to detect noncompliance with Medicare requirements, and interviewed JCAHO officials.
What GAO Found
JCAHO's pre-2004 hospital accreditation process did not identify most of the hospitals found by state survey agencies in CMS's annual validation survey sample to have deficiencies in Medicare requirements. In comparing the results of the two surveys, CMS considered whether it was reasonable to conclude that the deficiencies found by state survey agencies existed at the time JCAHO surveyed the hospital. In a sample of 500 JCAHO-accredited hospitals, state agency validation surveys conducted in fiscal years 2000 through 2002 identified 31 percent (157 hospitals) with deficiencies in Medicare requirements. Of these 157 hospitals, JCAHO did not identify 78 percent (123 hospitals) as having deficiencies in Medicare requirements. For the same validation survey sample, JCAHO also did not identify the majority--about 69 percent--of deficiencies in Medicare requirements found by state agencies. Importantly, the number of deficiencies found by validation surveys represents 2 percent of the 11,000 Medicare requirements surveyed by state agencies in the sample during this time period. At the same time, a single deficiency in a Medicare requirement can limit the hospital's capability to provide adequate care and ensure patient safety and health. Inadequacies in nursing practices or deficiencies in a hospital's physical environment, which includes fire safety, are examples of deficiencies in Medicare requirements that could endanger multiple patients. The potential of JCAHO's new hospital accreditation process to improve the detection of deficiencies in Medicare requirements is unknown because the process was just implemented in January 2004. JCAHO plans to move from using announced to unannounced surveys in 2006, which would afford JCAHO the opportunity to observe hospitals' operations when the hospitals have not prepared in advance to be surveyed. In addition, the pilot test of the new accreditation process was of limited value in predicting whether it will be an improvement over the pre-2004 process in detecting deficiencies. Limitations in the pilot test included that hospitals were not randomly selected to participate; that observers from JCAHO accompanied each surveyor, thus possibly affecting surveyors' actions; and that JCAHO evaluated the results instead of an independent entity. CMS has limited oversight authority over JCAHO's hospital accreditation program because the program's unique legal status effectively prevents CMS from taking actions that it has the authority to take with other health care accreditation programs to ensure satisfactory performance. For example, requiring JCAHO's hospital accreditation program to submit to a direct review process or placing the program on probation while monitoring its performance. Further, CMS relies on a measure to evaluate how well JCAHO's hospital accreditation program detects deficiencies in Medicare requirements that provides limited information and can mask problems with program performance, uses statistical methods that are insufficient to assess JCAHO's performance, and has reduced the number of validation surveys it conducts. |
gao_GAO-03-1091 | gao_GAO-03-1091_0 | Most of the Reviewed Overall, we found that 10 of the 15 evaluations that we reviewed could not NIJ Outcome Evaluations Could Not Produce Sufficiently Sound Information on Program Outcomes
produce sufficiently sound information about program outcomes. Six evaluations began with sufficiently sound designs, but encountered implementation problems that would render their results inconclusive. An additional 4 studies had serious methodological problems that from the start limited their ability to produce reliable and valid results. Five studies appeared to be methodologically rigorous in both their design and implementation. Funding for these methodologically sound studies totaled about $7.5 million, or nearly 50 percent of the approximately $15.4 million spent on the studies we reviewed. Funding for these studies with implementation problems totaled about $3.3 million, or about 21 percent of the approximately $15.4 million spent on the studies we reviewed. Funding for these studies that began with serious methodological problems totaled about $4.7 million, or about 30 percent of the approximately $15.4 million spent on the studies we reviewed. These 3 studies totaled about $3.7 million. However, DOJ program administrators told us that they found some of the process and implementation findings from the completed studies to be useful. We recognize that it is very difficult to design and execute outcome evaluations that produce meaningful and definitive results. However, it is too soon to tell whether and to what extent these efforts will lead to NIJ funding more rigorous effectiveness evaluations, and result in NIJ obtaining evaluative information that can better assist policy makers in making decisions about criminal justice funding priorities. We are reporting on (1) the methodological quality of a sample of completed and ongoing NIJ outcome evaluation grants and (2) the usefulness of the evaluations in producing information on program outcomes. Our review covered outcome evaluation grants managed by NIJ from 1992 through 2002. Because of our interest in the effectiveness of criminal justice programs, we limited our review of the usefulness of NIJ outcome evaluations to evaluations of DOJ programs, or evaluations funded by DOJ program offices, and did not examine the 3 other completed NIJ outcome evaluations that focused on programs funded by agencies other than DOJ. These were to be obtained from official agency records. Assessment of evaluation The study has several limitations. | Why GAO Did This Study
Policy makers need valid, reliable, and timely information on the outcomes of criminal justice programs to help them decide how to set criminal justice funding priorities. In view of previously reported problems with selected outcome evaluations managed by the National Institute of Justice (NIJ), GAO assessed the methodological quality of a sample of completed and ongoing NIJ outcome evaluation grants.
What GAO Found
From 1992 through 2002, NIJ managed 96 evaluation studies that sought to measure the outcomes of criminal justice programs. Spending on these evaluations totaled about $37 million. Our methodological review of 15 of the 96 studies, totaling about $15 million and covering a broad range of criminal justice issues, showed that sufficiently sound information about program effects could not be obtained from 10 of the 15. Five studies, totaling about $7.5 million (or 48 percent of the funds spent on the studies we reviewed), appeared to be methodologically rigorous in both design and implementation, enabling meaningful conclusions to be drawn about program effects. Six studies, totaling about $3.3 million (or 21 percent of the funds spent on the studies we reviewed), began with sound designs but encountered implementation problems that would render their results inconclusive. An additional 4 studies, totaling about $4.7 million (or 30 percent of the funds spent on the studies we reviewed), had serious methodological limitations that from the start limited their ability to produce reliable and valid results. Although results from 5 completed studies were inconclusive, DOJ program administrators said that they found some of the process and implementation findings from them to be useful. We recognize that optimal conditions for the scientific study of complex social programs almost never exist, making it difficult to design and execute outcome evaluations that produce definitive results. However, the methodological adequacy of NIJ studies can be improved, and NIJ has taken several steps--including the formation of an evaluation division and funding feasibility studies--in this direction. It is too soon to tell whether these changes will lead to evaluations that will better inform policy makers about the effectiveness of criminal justice programs. |
gao_RCED-00-111 | gao_RCED-00-111_0 | 1.) 2.) Specifically, they asked us to determine (1) to what extent addressing the safety problems selected by the Safer Skies initiative will help reduce the fatal accident rate; (2) what progress the initiative has made in identifying and implementing interventions to address each of these safety problems; (3) what progress the Safer Skies initiative has made in assessing the effectiveness of those interventions; and (4) how FAA is coordinating the Safer Skies initiative with other safety activities conducted throughout the agency, in partnership with the aviation industry, and by other federal agencies. In general aviation, the initiative will address six problems that appear to be among the most common causes of fatal accidents for this type of operation, according to available accident data. The goal in general aviation is to reduce the number of fatal accidents to 350 in 2007, which represents about a 20-percent reduction. Finally, the initiative addressed four problems in cabin safety. To date, safety improvement efforts by FAA and the Safer Skies initiative have focused on past accidents and incidents, which may not be entirely predictive of future ones. The Safer Skies Initiative Addresses Major Safety Problems in Commercial Aviation
The Safer Skies initiative plans to address six safety problems that accounted for 79 percent of the fatal accidents in commercial aviation in 1988-97. 3.) 4.) The Safer Skies Initiative Adopted a Goal of Reducing Fatal Accidents in General Aviation to 350 in 2007
Although both the White House and congressional commissions on aviation safety called for an 80-percent reduction in the nation’s fatal accident rate, FAA and the Safer Skies initiative applied this goal only to commercial aviation and adopted a less aggressive accident reduction goal for general aviation. The Safer Skies Initiative Has Made Progress in Selecting and Implementing Interventions
Joint FAA and industry teams have started work on 13 of the 16 problems being addressed by the initiative. Table 7 shows the status of the work on each of the 12 safety problems to be addressed in commercial and general aviation as of April 1, 2000. Many of the safety problems that the initiative addresses are long-standing ones that have been studied extensively in the past. The Safer Skies Initiative Has Not Yet Developed Performance Measures to Evaluate the Effectiveness of Most Interventions
Of the five Safer Skies teams that have begun implementing interventions, only one has developed a performance measure to evaluate whether the interventions it has selected are helping to reduce the safety problems that cause fatal accidents and are worth what they cost. However, our review identified three coordination problems that could undermine the implementation and evaluation of Safer Skies interventions. First, although FAA officials have repeatedly committed to funding interventions agreed upon by all parties working on the initiative, skepticism still exists among some participants as to whether this commitment can or will be honored. It also remains unclear what process will be used, if funding is limited, to reprioritize available resources to ensure funding for interventions that emerge later but have greater potential for reducing the fatal accident rate. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) Safer Skies Initiative, focusing on: (1) to what extent addressing the safety problems to be addressed by the initiative will help reduce the fatal accident rate; (2) what progress the initiative has made in identifying and implementing interventions to address each of these safety problems; (3) what progress has been made in assessing the effectiveness of those interventions; and (4) how FAA is coordinating the Safer Skies initiative with other safety activities conducted throughout the agency, in partnership with the aviation industry, and by other federal agencies.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the Safer Skies initiative addresses the safety problems that have contributed to fatal accidents in the past, and in conjunction with other safety problems, it can be expected to reduce the fatal accident rate and thus enhance the safety of the nation's air passengers; (2) in commercial aviation, the initiative addresses safety problems that accounted for over three-quarters of the fatal accidents in those operations in 1988-1997; (3) in general aviation, the Safer Skies initiative plans to address safety problems that appear to be the most common causes of fatal accidents; (4) the initiative has adopted a less aggressive goal in general aviation of reducing the number of fatal accidents to 350 in 2007, which represents about a 20-percent reduction; (5) the initiative addressed four safety problems in cabin safety; (6) to date, safety improvement efforts by FAA and the initiative have focused on reducing the causes of past accidents and incidents, which may not be entirely predictive of future ones; (7) as of April 1, 2000, Safer Skies teams had started work on 13 of the 16 safety problems and had begun implementing interventions for 5 of these--2 in commercial aviation and 3 in cabin safety; (8) since most of the interventions developed under the Safer Skies initiative are in early implementation stages, little progress has been made in evaluating their effectiveness; (9) of the five Safer Skies teams that have begun implementing interventions, only one has developed a performance measure to evaluate whether the interventions it has selected are helping to reduce the safety problems that cause fatal accidents and are worth what they cost; (10) FAA has coordinated extensively with aviation experts from industry, other federal government agencies, and its own staff, but GAO's review identified three coordination problems that could undermine the implementation and evaluation of Safer Skies' interventions; (11) although FAA officials have repeatedly committed to funding interventions agreed upon by all parties, skepticism still exists among some participants as to whether this commitment can or will be honored; (12) furthermore, if funding is limited, it remains unclear what process will be used to reprioritize available resources to ensure funding for interventions that emerge later but have greater potential for reducing the fatal accident rate; and (13) the Safer Skies initiative, FAA, and the Department of Transportation (DOT) have not agreed on how they will measure progress in achieving the accident reduction goal for commercial aviation. |
gao_GAO-08-551T | gao_GAO-08-551T_0 | Background
In August 2004, the President issued HSPD-12, which directed the Department of Commerce to develop a new standard for secure and reliable forms of ID for federal employees and contractors to enable a common standard across the federal government by February 27, 2005. DOD Personnel Security Clearance Program Has Been Designated as a GAO High-Risk Area
Military servicemembers, federal workers, and industry personnel must obtain security clearances to gain access to classified information. While the eight agencies we reviewed had generally taken steps to complete background checks on most of their employees and contractors and establish basic infrastructure, such as purchasing card readers, none of the agencies met OMB’s goal of issuing PIV cards by October 27, 2007, to all employees and contractor personnel who had been with the agency for 15 years or less. In addition, for the limited number of cards that had been issued, agencies generally had not been using the electronic authentication capabilities on the cards. Until OMB revises its approach to focus on the full use of card capabilities, HSPD-12’s objective of increasing the quality and security of ID and credentialing practices across the federal government may not be fully achieved. OMB’s Focus on Near-Term Card Issuance Hindered Progress in Achieving the HSPD-12 Objectives
A key contributing factor to why agencies had made limited progress is that OMB—which is tasked with ensuring that federal agencies implement HSPD-12—had emphasized the issuance of the cards, rather than the full use of the cards’ capabilities. Furthermore, despite the cost of the cards and associated infrastructure, OMB had not treated the implementation of HSPD-12 as a major new investment and had not ensured that agencies have guidance to ensure consistent and appropriate implementation of electronic authentication capabilities across agencies. While OMB had established milestones for near-term card issuance, it had not established milestones to require agencies to develop detailed plans for making the best use of the electronic authentication capabilities of PIV cards. Long-standing Challenges Exist in DOD’s Personnel Security Clearance Program
In our previous reports, we have also documented a variety of problems present in DOD’s personnel security clearance program. Some of the problems that we noted in our 2007 high-risk report included delays in processing clearance applications and problems with incomplete investigative and adjudicative reports to determine clearance eligibility. Delays in the clearance process continue to increase costs and risk to national security, such as when new industry employees are not able to begin work promptly and employees with outdated clearances have access to classified documents. While DOD continues to face challenges in timeliness and quality in the personnel security clearance process, high-level governmentwide attention has been focused on improving the security clearance process. As we noted in February 2008, delays in the security clearance process continue to increase costs and risk to national security. DOD and the Rest of the Government Provide Limited Information on How to Ensure the Quality of Clearance Products and Procedures As we reported in February 2008, DOD and the rest of the federal government provide limited information to one another on how they individually ensure the quality of clearance products and procedures. However, the DOD report did not include any of those measures. In closing, OMB, GSA, and NIST have made significant progress in laying the foundation for implementation of HSPD-12. | Why GAO Did This Study
In an effort to increase the quality and security of federal identification (ID) practices, the President issued Homeland Security Presidential Directive 12 (HSPD-12) in August 2004. This directive requires the establishment of a governmentwide standard for secure and reliable forms of ID. GAO was asked to testify on its report, being released today, assessing the progress selected agencies have made in implementing HSPD-12. For this report, GAO selected eight agencies with a range of experience in implementing ID systems and analyzed actions these agencies had taken. GAO was also asked to summarize challenges in the DOD personnel security clearance process. This overview is based on past work including reviews of clearance-related documents. Military servicemembers, federal workers, and industry personnel must obtain security clearances to gain access to classified information. Long-standing delays in processing applications for these clearances led GAO to designate the Department of Defense's (DOD) program as a high-risk area in 2005. In its report on HSPD-12, GAO made recommendations to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), to, among other things, set realistic milestones for implementing the electronic authentication capabilities. GAO has also made recommendations to OMB and DOD to improve the security clearance process.
What GAO Found
Much work had been accomplished to lay the foundations for implementation of HSPD-12--a major governmentwide undertaking. However, none of the eight agencies GAO reviewed--the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Homeland Security, Housing and Urban Development, the Interior, and Labor; the Nuclear Regulatory Commission; and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration--met OMB's goal of issuing ID cards by October 27, 2007, to all employees and contractor personnel who had been with the agency for 15 years or less. In addition, for the limited number of cards that had been issued, most agencies had not been using the electronic authentication capabilities on the cards and had not developed implementation plans for those capabilities. A key contributing factor for this limited progress is that OMB had emphasized issuance of the cards, rather than full use of the cards' capabilities. Furthermore, agencies anticipated having to make substantial financial investments to implement HSPD-12, since ID cards are considerably more expensive than traditional ID cards. However, OMB had not considered HSPD-12 implementation to be a major new investment and thus had not required agencies to prepare detailed plans regarding how, when, and the extent to which they would implement the electronic authentication mechanisms available through the cards. Until OMB revises its approach to focus on the full use of the capabilities of the new ID cards, HSPD-12's objectives of increasing the quality and security of ID and credentialing practices across the federal government may not be fully achieved. Regarding personnel security clearances, GAO's past reports have documented problems in DOD's program including delays in processing clearance applications and problems with the quality of clearance related reports. Delays in the clearance process continue to increase costs and risk to national security, such as when new DOD industry employees are not able to begin work promptly and employees with outdated clearances have access to classified documents. Moreover, DOD and the rest of the federal government provide limited information to one another on how they individually ensure the quality of clearance products and procedures. While DOD continues to face challenges in timeliness and quality in the personnel security clearance process, high-level government attention has been focused on improving the clearance process. |
gao_GAO-16-438 | gao_GAO-16-438_0 | Section 5 Pilot Requirements for Pilot to Simplify Federal Award Reporting
The DATA Act also requires that OMB, or an agency it designates, establish a pilot program to facilitate the development of recommendations to (1) standardize reporting elements across the federal government, (2) eliminate unnecessary duplication in financial reporting, and (3) reduce compliance costs for recipients of federal awards. Establish well-defined, appropriate, clear, and measurable objectives. OMB launched a number of pilot-related initiatives in May 2015 and expects to continue activities until at least May 2017. The Grants Portion of Section 5 Pilot Is Generally On Track to Meet DATA Act Requirements but the Procurement Portion Is Not
The Design of the Grants Portion of the Pilot Is Generally On Track to Meet DATA Act Requirements
If HHS effectively implements its stated plans for the grants portion of the Section 5 Pilot, it is likely that the grants portion of the pilot will comply with the act. The Design of the Procurement Portion May Not Contribute to Pilot’s Ability to Meet DATA Act Requirements
We have concerns about the extent that the design of the procurement portion of the pilot reflects the requirements specified in the DATA Act. OFPP and GSA do not yet have a detailed plan for selecting participants that will result in a diverse group of recipients with awards from multiple programs and agencies. OFPP staff stated that they also intend to select participants for testing their prototype system using a nongeneralizable sample of contractor data reported through the Federal Procurement Data System-Next Generation. However, they did not provide us with specific information on how they would ensure that the sample met all requirements under the act, nor did they provide a detailed, documented sampling plan equivalent to the grants portion of the pilot. Design of Grants Portion of the Pilot Partially Adheres to Leading Practices While Design of the Procurement Portion Does Not
We assessed the designs of the grants and procurement portions of the pilot against leading practices that we identified from our prior work and other sources. DATA Act Grants Test Models Under the Office of Management and Budget’s (OMB) direction, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) intends to develop recommendations for reducing grantee reporting burden by testing different areas. Specifically, five of the six test models include either no or few specifics about how any observed reduction in burden could be generalizable beyond the context of the pilot. Design of the Procurement Portion of the Pilot Is Generally Not Meeting Leading Practices
Based on our review of the working draft plan for the procurement portion of the pilot dated November 2015, related documents, and interviews with cognizant staff, we found that the design did not reflect leading practices for pilot design. The draft plan we reviewed did not include detailed information on the methodology, strategy, or types of data planned to be collected. The draft procurement plan does not indicate how data will be evaluated to track program performance, how final results will be evaluated, or conclusions drawn. To help ensure and more clearly convey how the procurement portion of the pilot will contribute to meeting the Section 5 Pilot design requirements, we recommend that the Director of OMB determine and clearly document (1) how it will collect certified payroll data over a 12-month reporting cycle, (2) ensure the diversity of pilot participants, and (3) how the inclusion of federal contracts will contribute to an aggregate amount of $1 billion to $2 billion. OMB and HHS did not offer a view on our recommendations. GSA did not have any comments. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This review (1) describes the administration’s approach to the Section 5 Pilot; (2) assesses whether current activities and plans will likely allow the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and its partners to meet requirements and time frames established under the Section 5 Pilot; and (3) evaluates the extent to which the design for the pilot is consistent with leading practices. HHS officials told us that they have updated that plan. | Why GAO Did This Study
The DATA Act directs OMB or a designated federal agency to establish a pilot program to develop recommendations for simplifying federal award reporting for grants and contracts. The grants portion will test six ways to reduce recipient reporting burden while the procurement portion will initially focus on centralizing contractor reporting of certified payroll. The act requires GAO to review DATA Act implementation as it proceeds.
This report (1) describes OMB's approach to the DATA Act pilot requirements, (2) assesses whether current plans and activities will likely allow OMB and its partners to meet the requirements under the act, and (3) evaluates the extent to which designs for the grants and procurement portions of the pilot are consistent with leading practices. GAO reviewed available pilot documentation; assessed them against leading practices for pilot design; and interviewed staff at OMB, HHS, and GSA, as well as groups representing recipients of federal grants and contracts. GAO will conduct a follow-on review focused on OMB's implementation of its pilot designs.
What GAO Found
As required by the Digital Accountability and Transparency Act of 2014 (DATA Act), the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) is conducting a pilot program, known as the Section 5 Pilot, aimed at developing recommendations for reducing recipient reporting burden for grantees and contractors. OMB partnered with the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) to design and implement the grants portion of the pilot, and with the General Services Administration (GSA) to implement the procurement portion. OMB launched the Section 5 Pilot in May 2015 and expects to continue pilot-related activities until at least May 2017.
If implemented according to HHS's proposed plan, the grants portion of the pilot will likely meet the requirements established under the act. In contrast, GAO has concerns with how the procurement portion of the pilot will contribute to the Section 5 Pilot's design requirements. For example, OMB has not fully described how it will select pilot participants that will result in a diverse group of contractors as required by the act. OMB staff stated that they intend to select participants for testing the procurement pilot by using a nongeneralizable sample of contractor data, but they have not provided a detailed, documented sampling plan.
The design of the grants portion of the pilot partially adhered to leading practices. Although five out of the six grants test models had clear and measurable objectives, only one had specific details about how potential findings could be scalable to be generalizable beyond the context of the pilot. HHS officials said they have updated their plan to address these concerns but that plan was not provided in time to allow GAO to analyze it for this review.
The design of the procurement portion of the pilot did not reflect leading practices. For example, the plan did not include specific information on the methodology, strategy, or types of data to be collected. Further, the plan we reviewed did not address the extent to which the proposed pilot approach would be scalable to produce recommendations that could be applied government-wide. The design also did not indicate how data will be evaluated to draw conclusions. Finally, while OMB has solicited general comments related to contractor reporting pain points, it has not released specific details on the design to stakeholders despite their repeated requests for that information.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that OMB (1) clearly document how the procurement portion of the pilot will contribute to the design requirements under the DATA Act and (2) ensure that the design of the procurement portion of the pilot reflects leading practices. OMB, HHS, and GSA did not comment on our recommendations. GAO incorporated technical comments from OMB and HHS where appropriate. |
gao_GAO-07-989T | gao_GAO-07-989T_0 | Other differences are relevant to consideration of the workforce attachment policies of our study countries. Countries Have Various Policies and Practices That May Help Some Women and Low-Wage/Low- Skilled Workers Enter and Remain in the Labor Force
Governments and employers in the countries we studied developed a variety of laws, government policies, and formal and informal practices, including periods of paid leave (such as maternity, paternity, or parental leave), flexible work schedules, child care, and training that may help women and low-wage/low-skilled workers enter and remain in the labor force. In addition to family leave for parents, countries provide other types of leave, and have established workplace flexibility arrangements for workers. All of the countries also subsidize child care for some working parents through a variety of means, such as direct benefits to parents for child care and tax credits. Last, governments and employers have a range of training and apprenticeship programs to help unemployed people find jobs and to help those already in the workforce advance in their careers. For example, in Denmark, employed women with a work history of at least 120 hours in the 13 weeks prior to the leave are allowed 18 weeks of paid maternity leave. In some countries, though, all parents are entitled to take family leave. In Canada, the government provides direct financial support of $100 a month to eligible parents for each child under 6. The percentage of GDP that each country spends on training programs varies. Women are also more likely to enter and remain in the workforce if they have paid family leave, although the length of leave affects their employment. An extensive review of available research by the European Commission shows mixed results in whether training helps the unemployed get jobs. Some training initiatives have shown promise but have not been formally evaluated. In general, researchers and officials reported that it is difficult to determine the effects of a policy for a variety of reasons. Child Care and Paid Family Leave Are Associated With an Increase in Labor Force Participation
Readily available child care, especially when it is subsidized and regulated with quality standards such as a high staff-to-child ratio and a high proportion of certified staff, appears to increase women’s participation in the labor force by helping them balance work and family responsibilities, according to research from several cross-national studies. While Several Factors Affect Uptake, Employees’ Use of Workplace Benefits Can Have Implications for Employers and Employees
The experiences of the countries we reviewed have shown that characteristics of policies, such as the level of payment during leave, can affect whether an employee uses various workplace benefits. For example, the province of Saskatchewan in Canada provides 12 days of unpaid leave per year, but low-wage workers cannot always afford to take it. Employer views and employee perceptions can also directly affect an employee’s use of workplace benefits. Since employers tend to target their training to higher skilled and full-time workers, employees who opt to work part- time may have fewer opportunities for on-the-job training that could help them advance, according to university researchers in the Netherlands. Employees’ use of workplace benefits can create management challenges for their employers. In addition, some part-time jobs have no career advancement opportunities and limited access to other benefits, such as payment during leave and training. While other countries have a broader range of workforce benefits and flexibility and training initiatives, little is known about the effects of these strategies. Related GAO Products:
Women and Low-Skilled Workers: Other Countries’ Policies and Practices That May Help These Workers Enter and Remain in the Labor Force. GAO-07-817. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. | Why GAO Did This Study
Increasing retirements and declining fertility rates, among other factors, could affect the labor force growth in many developed countries. To maintain the size and productivity of the labor force, many governments and employers have introduced strategies to keep workers who face greater challenges in maintaining jobs and incomes, such as women and low-skilled workers, in the workforce. This testimony discusses our work on (1) describing the policies and practices implemented in other developed countries that may help women and low-wage/low-skilled workers enter and remain in the labor force, (2) examining the change in the targeted groups' employment following the implementation of the policies and practices, and (3) identifying the factors that affect employees' use of workplace benefits and the resulting workplace implications. The testimony is based on a report we are issuing today (GAO-07-817). For that report, we conducted an extensive review of workforce flexibility and training strategies in a range of developed countries and site visits to selected countries. Our reviews were limited to materials available in English. We identified relevant national policies in the U.S., but did not determine whether other countries' strategies could be implemented here. The report made no recommendations. The Department of Labor provided technical comments; the Department of State had no comments on the draft report.
What GAO Found
Governments and employers developed a variety of laws, government policies, and formal and informal practices, including periods of leave, flexible work schedules, child care, and training. Each of the countries we reviewed provides some form of family leave, such as maternity, paternity, or parental leave, that attempts to balance the needs of employers and employees and, often, attempts to help women and low-wage/low-skilled workers enter and remain in the workforce. In Denmark, employed women with a work history of at least 120 hours in the 13 weeks prior to the leave are allowed 18 weeks of paid maternity leave. In addition to family leave for parents, countries provide other types of leave, and have established workplace flexibility arrangements for workers. U.S. federal law allows for unpaid leave under certain circumstances. All of the countries we reviewed, including the United States, also subsidize child care for some working parents through a variety of means, such as direct benefits to parents for child care or tax credits. For example, in Canada, the government provides direct financial support of $100 a month per child, to eligible parents for each child under 6. Last, governments and employers have a range of training and apprenticeship programs to help unemployed people find jobs and to help those already in the workforce advance in their careers. Although research shows that benefits such as parental leave are associated with increased employment, research on training programs is mixed. Leave reduces the amount of time that mothers spend out of the labor force. Cross-national studies show that child care--particularly when it is subsidized and regulated with quality standards--is positively related to women's employment. Available research on training in some of the countries we reviewed shows mixed results in helping the unemployed get jobs. Some local initiatives have shown promise, but evaluations of some specific practices have not been conducted. Some country officials said it is difficult to attribute effects to a specific policy because the policies are either new or because they codified long-standing practices. While policies do appear to affect workforce participation, many factors can affect the uptake of workplace benefits, and employees' use of these benefits can have implications for employers and employees. For example, employees' use of workplace benefits can create management challenges for their employers. Additionally, employees are more likely to take family leave if they feel that their employer is supportive. However, while a Canadian province provides 12 days of unpaid leave to deal with emergencies or sickness, low-wage workers cannot always afford to take it. Similarly, the uptake of available benefits can also have larger implications for an employee's career. Some part-time jobs have no career advancement opportunities and limited access to other benefits. Since employers tend to target their training to higher-skilled and full-time workers, employees who opt to work part-time may have fewer opportunities for on-the-job training that could help them advance, according to researchers in the Netherlands. |
gao_AIMD-97-134 | gao_AIMD-97-134_0 | The Acting Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) provided written comments, which are discussed in the “Agency Comments” section and reprinted in appendix I.
Stabilized Rates Should Allow Recovery of Costs Over the Long Term
The concept of a stabilized rate is a viable method to use for pricing goods and services sold to FMS customers. Omission of these costs resulted in estimated underbillings of more than $40.5 million since fiscal year 1992. With the exception of retirement benefit costs for civilian employees, which is discussed below, we found that all of the key cost elements to recover full cost from FMS customers are now included in the stabilized price. Civilian Pension and Postretirement Health Benefit Costs Were Not Included in Supply Prices
The costs not charged by the WCF supply activities, which were responsible for about $1.5 billion (75 percent) of the WCFs annual sales to FMS customers, consisted of a portion of the government’s share of the full cost for pension and postretirement health benefit costs for civilian personnel who worked on FMS cases. In discussing this matter with DOD Comptroller officials, they acknowledged that civilian retirement benefits were a cost to the government which should be included in the stabilized rate and charged to FMS customers. They told us they are planning to revise their policy so that this cost will be included in the prices charged FMS customers beginning no later than fiscal year 1998. Also, we have issued numerous reports over the years that have (1) identified tens of millions of dollars of undercharges related to the costs for goods and services provided to FMS customers and (2) recommended that DOD retroactively collect the underbillings. Conclusions
DOD’s stabilized rate policy, if applied properly, should allow WCF activities to recover the full cost of their operations over the long term. Defense’s Planned Implementation of the $77 Billion Defense Business Operations Fund (GAO/T-AFMD-91-5, April 30, 1991). | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Department of Defense's (DOD) use of stabilized rates for charging foreign military sales (FMS) customers for goods and services sold through DOD's Defense Business Operations Fund (DBOF), focusing on whether: (1) there is a dollar difference in pricing goods and services at full cost compared to the stabilized rate; and (2) DOD's current practice of billing foreign customers at the stabilized rate is consistent with the full cost requirements of the Arms Export Control Act of 1976.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) DOD's stabilized rate generally is designed to recover full costs from DOD and FMS customers over the long term; (2) the concept of applying the stabilized rate is a viable method to recover the cost of goods and services from these customers; (3) GAO's analysis of cost elements in the stabilized rates showed that generally, the stabilized rate included the cost elements necessary to recover full cost; (4) however, GAO did identify two cost elements--pension and postretirement health benefits--related to retirement benefit costs of civilian personnel working on FMS cases, that were not included in the stabilized rates; (5) GAO estimates that Working Capital Fund (WCF) supply activities undercharged FMS customers at least $40.5 million during fiscal years (FY) 1992 through 1996 and will undercharge millions more in FY 1997; (5) GAO discussed this matter with DOD officials and they agreed that not all civilian retirement benefit labor costs were included in the rates that activities were charging FMS customers; and (6) they now plan to revise their policy to require that this cost be included in the prices charged FMS customers. |
gao_GAO-06-788 | gao_GAO-06-788_0 | NSVI Retains Original Desired End-State, but Changing Assumptions and Circumstances Make it Unclear How It Will Achieve These Objectives
The NSVI, issued by the NSC in November 2005, incorporates the same desired end-state for U.S. operations in Iraq that first was established by the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) in 2003: a peaceful, united, stable, secure Iraq, well integrated into the international community, and a full partner in the global war on terrorism. First, the original plan assumed a permissive security environment that never materialized. Second, the CPA assumed that U.S. funded reconstruction activities would help restore Iraq’s essential services to prewar levels but has failed to achieve these goals. As a result, it is unclear how the United States will achieve its desired end-state in Iraq given these changes in assumptions and circumstances. Expected Level of Iraq and International Community Financial Support for Iraq’s Developmental Needs Have Not Yet Been Met
From the outset of the reconstruction and stabilization effort, the U.S. strategy assumed that the Iraqis and the international community would help finance Iraq’s developmental needs. However, these expectations have not yet been met, and Iraq’s estimated future reconstruction needs vastly exceed what has been offered to date. While the NSVI does not identify the magnitude of additional financing needed, it acknowledges that there is “room for the international community to do more.”
The NSVI and Its Supporting Documents Do Not Address All the Characteristics of an Effective National Strategy, thus Limiting Its Usefulness as a Planning Tool
The NSVI aims to improve U.S. strategic planning for Iraq; however, the NSVI and its supporting documents are incomplete because they do not fully address the six desirable characteristics of effective national strategies that GAO has identified through its prior work. The strategy identifies U.S. involvement in Iraq as a vital national interest, identifies the risks and threats facing coalition forces, and discusses overarching U.S. political, security, and economic objectives. The strategy neither identifies the current and future costs of implementing the strategy, nor does it identify the sources of funding (U.S. government, international donors, or Iraqi government) needed to achieve U.S. political, security, and economic objectives in Iraq. It does not address the extent to which the Iraqi government will contribute financially to its own rebuilding effort. For instance, the NSVI and supporting documents identify the need to integrate the efforts of the coalition, the Iraqi government, and other nations but do not discuss how the U.S. goals and objectives are integrated with the strategies, goals, and objectives of the international donors and the Iraqi government. The dispersion of information across the NSVI and seven supporting documents further limits the strategy’s usefulness as a tool for planning and reporting on the costs, progress, and results of the U.S. mission in Iraq. In addition, this report is available on GAO’s Web site at http://www.gao.gov. Specifically, we (1) assess the evolution of the U.S. national strategy for Iraq in response to changing political, security and economic circumstances and (2) evaluate whether the November 2005 National Strategy for Victory in Iraq (NSVI) and its supporting documents include the desirable characteristics of an effective national strategy. In this report, the NSVI and its supporting documents are referred to as the U.S. strategy for Iraq. | Why GAO Did This Study
According to the National Strategy for Victory in Iraq (NSVI) issued by the National Security Council (NSC), prevailing in Iraq is a vital U.S. interest because it will help win the war on terror and make America safer, stronger, and more certain of its future. This report (1) assesses the evolving U.S. national strategy for Iraq and (2) evaluates whether the NSVI and its supporting documents address the desirable characteristics of an effective national strategy developed by GAO in previous work. In this report, the NSVI and supporting documents are collectively referred to as the U.S. strategy for Iraq.
What GAO Found
The November 2005 National Strategy for Victory in Iraq and supporting documents incorporate the same desired end-state for U.S. stabilization and reconstruction operations that were first established by the coalition in 2003: a peaceful, united, stable, and secure Iraq, well integrated into the international community, and a full partner in the global war on terrorism. However, it is unclear how the United States will achieve its desired end-state in Iraq given the significant changes in the assumptions underlying the U.S. strategy. The original plan assumed a permissive security environment. However, an increasingly lethal insurgency undermined the development of effective Iraqi government institutions and delayed plans for an early transfer of security responsibilities to the Iraqis. The plan also assumed that U.S. reconstruction funds would help restore Iraq's essential services to prewar levels, but Iraq's capacity to maintain, sustain, and manage its rebuilt infrastructure is still being developed. Finally, the plan assumed that the Iraqi government and the international community would help finance Iraq's development needs, but Iraq has limited resources to contribute to its own reconstruction, and Iraq's estimated future needs vastly exceed what has been offered by the international community to date. The NSVI is an improvement over previous planning efforts. However, the NSVI and its supporting documents are incomplete because they do not fully address all the desirable characteristics of an effective national strategy. On one hand, the strategy's purpose and scope is clear because it identifies U.S. involvement in Iraq as a vital national interest and central front in the war on terror. The strategy also generally addresses the threats and risks facing the coalition forces and provides a comprehensive description of the desired U.S. political, security, and economic objectives in Iraq. On the other hand, the strategy falls short in three key areas. First, it only partially identifies the current and future costs of U.S. involvement in Iraq, including the costs of maintaining U.S. military operations, building Iraqi government capacity at the provincial and national level, and rebuilding critical infrastructure. Second, it only partially identifies which U.S. agencies implement key aspects of the strategy or resolve conflicts among the many implementing agencies. Third, it neither fully addresses how U.S. goals and objectives will be integrated with those of the Iraqi government and the international community, nor does it detail the Iraqi government's anticipated contribution to its future security and reconstruction needs. In addition, the elements of the strategy are dispersed among the NSVI and seven supporting documents, further limiting its usefulness as a planning and oversight tool. |
gao_GAO-03-585 | gao_GAO-03-585_0 | The two types of nonprofit partners discussed in this report are cooperating associations and friends groups. In addition, cooperating associations and friends groups have accumulated funds and other assets—such as land, buildings, and equipment—worth more than $200 million that could become available for future park donations. Revenue-Generating Activities of Cooperating Associations Sometimes Compete with Those of Park Concessioners
The primary revenue-generating activities of cooperating associations are selling educational materials in park bookstores and providing educational services to park visitors. In contrast, friends groups generally do not compete with concessioners because they rely primarily on donations and membership dues to generate revenue. This situation has contributed to conflict between the concessioner and park management. Third, cooperating associations return a higher percentage of their sales and service revenue to the parks compared to for-profit businesses, giving park managers a financial incentive to expand association operations. However, these plans are rarely developed or used. Park Service Cannot Hold Local Park Managers Accountable for Meeting Contribution Goals
The Park Service does not have an effective process for holding local park managers accountable for meeting nonprofit contribution goals, even though one of the agency’s strategic goals is to increase the amount of contributions it receives from nonprofit organizations. Conclusions
Between 1997 and 2001 cooperating associations substantially increased their financial support to parks. Recommendations for Executive Action
In order to (1) minimize conflicts among the Park Service, cooperating associations, and concessioners, (2) better ensure that decisions about providing commercial sales and services are made more consistently and that logical criteria are followed, (3) provide a predictable commercial environment in the parks, and (4) enhance public accountability for its decisions, we recommend that the Secretary of the Interior require the Director of the National Park Service to revise its policy regarding Commercial Services Plans so that all parks offering visitor sales and services are required to develop these plans and ensure that Commercial Services Plans include (1) an explanation of the roles and responsibilities of both concessioners and cooperating associations in providing visitor sales and services in a park unit and (2) rationale for decisions that specify associations or other nonprofits will provide new visitor sales or services and that do not afford concessioners and other local, for-profit businesses an opportunity to compete. To identify the revenue-generating activities of nonprofits in the parks, and factors that contribute to cooperating association and concessioner competition and conflicts, and to assess how park managers are held accountable for meeting park service goals for nonprofit contributions, we (1) reviewed Park Service documents, plans, and policies; (2) obtained information from each of the Park Service’s seven regional offices; and (3) met with National Park Service officials, the Association of Partners For Public Lands the National Park Foundation, the National Park Hospitality Association, and the Friends Alliance. | Why GAO Did This Study
Two types of nonprofit organizations, cooperating associations and friends groups, provide substantial support to the national parks. GAO was asked to report on (1) the number of park units supported by nonprofits and the amount of their contributions, (2) the revenue-generating activities of nonprofits and how they compete with park concessioners, (3) factors that contribute to competition between nonprofits and for-profit concessioners, and (4) how park managers are held accountable for meeting goals for nonprofit financial support.
What GAO Found
Cooperating associations and friends groups help support 347 (90 percent) of our national parks. Their contributions totaled over $200 million from 1997-2001 and were an important supplement to federal appropriations. These organizations also have additional assets totaling about $200 million, which could become available for future donation to the parks. The primary revenue-generating activities of cooperating associations are selling educational materials in park bookstores and providing educational services to park visitors. In contrast, friends groups generally rely on donations and membership dues to generate revenue. Accordingly, only cooperating associations directly compete with concessioners or other local for-profit businesses. In some parks, the sales and services provided by cooperating associations have caused conflicts between park management, the associations, and concessioners. There are three major factors that contribute to conflicts between associations and concessioners: (1) Park Service policies encourage an expanding reliance on nonprofit organizations; (2) the broad discretion local park managers have in deciding the role and scope of association activities has permitted expanded sales and service activities by cooperating associations; and (3) the agency has a financial incentive to use cooperating associations because they provide a higher return on sales revenue. To minimize conflicts and better ensure that park managers consistently apply agency policies in making decisions about whether and how to use cooperating associations and concessioners, Park Service guidelines call for individual park managers to develop "Commercial Services Plans." However, these plans are rarely developed or used. In addition, even though one of the agency's key goals is to increase its reliance on partnerships with nonprofit organizations, the Park Service does not have a process for holding local park managers accountable for meeting contribution goals. |
gao_GAO-06-257T | gao_GAO-06-257T_0 | Our nation is on an unsustainable fiscal path. Further, current military operations, such as those in Afghanistan and Iraq, consume a large share of DOD resources and are causing faster wear on existing weapons. Refurbishment or replacement sooner than planned is putting further pressure on DOD’s investment accounts. At the same time DOD is facing these problems, programs are commanding larger budgets. DOD is undertaking new efforts that are expected to be the most expensive and complex ever and on which DOD is heavily relying to fundamentally transform military operations. If these megasystems are managed with traditional margins of error, the financial consequences can be dire, especially in light of a constrained discretionary budget. DOD knows what to do to improve acquisitions but finds it difficult to apply the controls or assign the accountability necessary for successful outcomes. Achieving a high level of technology maturity at the start of system development is an important indicator of whether this match has been made. Effective controls help decision makers gauge progress in meeting cost, schedule, and performance goals and ensure that managers will (1) conduct activities to capture relevant product development knowledge, (2) provide evidence that knowledge was captured, and (3) hold decision reviews to determine that appropriate knowledge was captured to move to the next phase. Our work has shown that DOD’s requirements process generates more demand for new programs than fiscal resources can support. DOD compounds the problem by approving so many highly complex and interdependent programs. Once too many programs are approved to start, the budgeting process exacerbates problems. Because programs are funded annually and department wide, cross-portfolio priorities have not been established, competition for funding continues over time, forcing programs to view success as the ability to secure the next funding increment rather than delivering capabilities when and as promised. GAO itself has issued hundreds of reports. The key recommendations we have made have been focused on the product development process: constraining individual program requirements by working within available resources and by leveraging systems engineering; establishing clear business cases for each individual investment; enabling science and technology organizations to shoulder the ensuring that the workforce is capable of managing requirements trades, source selection, and knowledge-based acquisition strategies; and establishing and enforcing controls to ensure that appropriate knowledge is captured and used at critical junctures before moving programs forward and investing more money. As we conduct this work, we will be asking who is currently accountable for acquisition decisions; who should be held accountable; how much deviation from the original business case is allowed before the entire program investment is reconsidered; and what is the penalty when investments do not result in meeting promised warfighter needs? Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Major Weapon Programs. Defense Acquisitions: DOD’s Revised Policy Emphasizes Best Practices, but More Controls Are Needed. Best Practices: Better Management of Technology Development Can Improve Weapon System Outcomes. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Defense (DOD) is shepherding a portfolio of major weapon systems valued at about $1.3 trillion. How DOD is managing this investment has been a matter of concern for some time. Since 1990, GAO has designated DOD's weapon system acquisitions as a high-risk area for fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement. DOD has experienced cost overruns, missed deadlines, performance shortfalls, and persistent management problems. In light of the serious budget pressures facing the nation, such problems are especially troubling. GAO has issued hundreds of reports addressing broad-based issues, such as best practices, as well as reports focusing on individual acquisitions. These reports have included many recommendations. Congress asked GAO to testify on possible problems with and improvements to defense acquisition policy. In doing so, we highlight the risks of conducting business as usual and identify some of the solutions we have found in successful acquisition programs and organizations.
What GAO Found
DOD is facing a cascading number of problems in managing its acquisitions. Cost increases incurred while developing new weapon systems mean DOD cannot produce as many of those weapons as intended nor can it be relied on to deliver to the warfighter when promised. Military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq are consuming a large share of DOD resources and causing the department to invest more money sooner than expected to replace or fix existing weapons. Meanwhile, DOD is intent on transforming military operations and has its eye on multiple megasystems that are expected to be the most expensive and complex ever. These costly conditions are running head-on into the nation's unsustainable fiscal path. DOD knows what to do to achieve more successful outcomes but finds it difficult to apply the necessary discipline and controls or assign much-needed accountability. DOD has written into policy an approach that emphasizes attaining a certain level of knowledge at critical junctures before managers agree to invest more money in the next phase of weapon system development. This knowledge-based approach results in evolutionary--that is, incremental, manageable, predictable--development and inserts several controls to help managers gauge progress in meeting cost, schedule, and performance goals. But DOD is not employing the knowledge-based approach, discipline is lacking, and business cases are weak. Persistent practices show a decided lack of restraint. DOD's requirements process generates more demand for new programs than fiscal resources can support. DOD compounds the problem by approving so many highly complex and interdependent programs. Once too many programs are approved to start, the budgeting process exacerbates problems. Because programs are funded annually and departmentwide, cross-portfolio priorities have not been established, competition for funding continues over time, forcing programs to view success as the ability to secure the next funding increment rather than delivering capabilities when and as promised. Improving this condition requires discipline in the requirements and budgetary processes. Determining who should be held accountable for deviations and what penalties are needed is crucial. If DOD cannot discipline itself now to execute programs within fiscal realities, then draconian, budget-driven decisions may have to be made later. |
gao_RCED-99-139 | gao_RCED-99-139_0 | Most Superfund Spending Is for Support Activities
The share of total Superfund expenditures for contractor cleanup work declined from about 48 percent in fiscal year 1996 to about 42 percent in fiscal year 1998. 1.) Expenditure Mix Varies Among Regions and Headquarters Units
Over the 3-year period of our analysis, the mix of spending for contractor cleanup work, site-specific support, and non-site-specific support varied substantially among EPA’s regions and headquarters units. 2.) However, our analysis also identified substantial variation among the regions in the mix of their expenditures. Site-specific support spending ranged from a low of 12 percent in EPA’s New York region to a high of 29 percent in EPA’s Kansas City region. Three of the more than 100 categories accounted for over 60 percent of all Superfund support costs (both site-specific and non-site-specific). EPA’s non-site-specific spending was more concentrated in these three administrative categories than its site-specific spending. For the three regions, most of the non-site-specific spending was on personnel items—such as management, administrative, and secretarial support—and general support activities, such as financial management, facility management, public affairs, and contract management. The Office of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance had non-site-specific expenditures for items such as overall program direction; policy development; and budgetary, financial and administrative support. The Director of the Superfund office responsible for resources and information management provided a summary of the activities EPA undertakes to manage Superfund spending, including: monitoring whether regions and units obligate funds at the expected rate and in accordance with the agency’s operating plan; conducting midyear reviews that focus on program accomplishments, contracts and grants, and resources management; reviewing contract management issues in all regions on a 3-year cycle; and monitoring inactive contracts to identify and deobligate funds that are no longer needed. Recommendation
In order to better identify opportunities for potential cost savings, we recommend that the Administrator, EPA, require the Assistant Administrator for Solid Waste and Emergency Response to expand the monitoring of Superfund expenditures to regularly analyze the breakdown of expenditures in terms of contractor cleanup work, site-specific spending, and non-site-specific spending. In a letter from EPA’s Acting Assistant Administrator for Solid Waste and Emergency Response, EPA disagreed with our characterization that EPA’s activities fall into three groups—contractor cleanup costs, site-specific support, and non-site-specific support—and stated that this division gives the erroneous impression that site-specific and non-site-specific support do not contribute substantially to the achievement of cleanups. The purpose of our analyses was to disaggregate Superfund expenditures to provide more detailed information on the specific functions served by this spending. To determine what activities were carried out with EPA’s cleanup support spending, particularly its non-site-specific spending, we used the IFMS information. To ascertain how EPA monitors and analyzes its regions’ and headquarters units’ spending of Superfund resources, particularly for contractor cleanup work, site-specific support, and non-site-specific support, we met with EPA headquarters officials. Additional copies are $2 each. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) Superfund Program expenditures, focusing on: (1) the relative shares of Superfund expenditures for contractor cleanup work, site-specific support, and non-site-specific support; (2) the activities carried out with the EPA's cleanup support spending, particularly its non-site-specific spending; and (3) EPA's efforts to monitor and analyze how its regions and headquarters units spend Superfund resources, particularly the distribution of expenditures among contractor cleanup work, site-specific support, and non-site-specific support.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) over the last 3 years, the share of total Superfund expenditures for contractor cleanup work was about 45 percent in fiscal year 1998; (2) over this period, expenditures for non-site-specific support were about 38 percent, whereas those for site-specific support were about 17 percent; (3) however, GAO found substantial variation among EPA's regions in the shares of their expenditures devoted to each of these cost categories; (4) for example, spending for non-site-specific support ranged from a low of 14 percent in EPA's Boston region to 30 percent in EPA's San Francisco region; (5) EPA spends its support funds predominately on administrative activities; (6) although EPA classifies its Superfund expenditures into over 100 separate activity categories, GAO found that over 60 percent of all Superfund support expenditures (both site-specific and non-site-specific) were accounted for by three activities--general support and management, general enforcement support, and remedial support and management; (7) moreover, almost 80 percent of EPA's non-site-specific spending was concentrated on these three administrative activities; (8) for the three regions that GAO reviewed in detail, these non-site-specific expenditures were primarily personnel expenses for activities such as management, administrative and secretarial support, financial management, public affairs, and contract management; (9) for the three headquarters units that GAO reviewed in detail, this spending was on items such as rent, information management, facilities operations and maintenance, program and policy development, and budgetary, financial, and administrative support; (10) EPA monitors the Superfund spending of its regions and headquarters units in several ways, including tracking whether funds are obligated at the expected rate and in compliance with the approved operating plan, and monitoring program accomplishments; (11) however, EPA does not monitor or analyze the expenditures of its regions and units in terms of the relative shares of contractor cleanup costs, site-specific support costs, and non-site-specific support costs; and (12) conducting such analyses would provide EPA with an additional tool to identify potential cost savings in Superfund spending. |
gao_GAO-06-67 | gao_GAO-06-67_0 | All Programs Responded to OMB’s Recommendations, but Only Half Completed Evaluations
About half of the programs we reviewed (11 of the 20) had completed an evaluation by June 2005—2 years after the fiscal year 2004 PART reviews and recommendations were published. Four evaluations were in progress, while 3 were still in the planning stage. Measurement Challenges Delayed Evaluation Starts
To evaluate program effectiveness, agencies needed to identify appropriate measures of the outcomes they intended to achieve and credible data sources for those measures. Some agency officials thought that evaluations should not be conducted for all programs but should be targeted instead to areas of uncertainty. However, officials in all four agencies indicated that the visibility of a PART recommendation and associated OMB pressure brought management attention, and sometimes funds, to getting the evaluations done. Centralization helped the agencies to leverage their evaluation expertise throughout the agency and helped them prioritize spending on the evaluations they considered most important. Where OMB and Program Managers Do Not Share Expectations, Evaluations May Not Meet OMB Needs
Because the OMB evaluation recommendations were fairly general, agencies had flexibility in interpreting the information OMB expected and the evaluations to fund. Some program managers disagreed with OMB on the scope and purpose of their evaluations, their quality, and the usefulness of evaluations conducted by independent third parties. Program managers concerned about an increased focus on process said that they were more interested in learning how to improve program performance than in meeting an OMB checklist. Since a few programs did not discuss their evaluation plans with OMB, it is not certain whether OMB will accept their ongoing evaluations. In reviewing the vaccination program, OMB did not accept the several research and evaluation studies offered, since they did not meet all key dimensions of “scope.” OMB acknowledged that the program had conducted several management evaluations to see whether the program could be improved but found their coverage narrow and concluded “there have previously been no comprehensive evaluations looking at how well the program is structured/managed to achieve its overall goals.” OMB also did not accept an external Institute of Medicine evaluation of how the government could improve its ability to increase immunization rates because the evaluation report had not looked at the effectiveness of the individual federal vaccine programs or how this program complemented the other related programs. Conclusions
The PART review process has stimulated agencies to increase their evaluation capacity and available information on program results. Agencies are likely to design evaluations to meet their own needs—that is, in-depth analyses that inform program improvement. If OMB wants evaluations with a broader scope, such as information that helps determine a program’s relevance or value, it will need to take steps to shape both evaluation design and execution. Because agency evaluation resources tend to be limited, they are most usefully focused on illuminating important areas of uncertainty. While regular performance reporting is key to good program management and oversight, requiring all federal programs to conduct frequent evaluation studies is likely to result in many superficial reviews that will have little utility and that will overwhelm agency evaluation capacity. Recommendations for Executive Action
In light of our findings and conclusions in this report, we are making the following recommendations to OMB reiterating and expanding on recommendations in our previous report: OMB should encourage agencies to discuss their plans for program evaluations—especially those in response to an OMB recommendation— with OMB and with congressional and other program stakeholders to ensure that their findings will be timely, relevant, and credible and that they will be used to inform policy and management decisions. Department of Health and Human Services Agency Reports
317 Immunization Program: RTI International. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) designed the Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART) as a diagnostic tool to draw on program performance and evaluation information for forming conclusions about program benefits and recommending adjustments to improve results. To assess progress in improving the evidence base for PART assessments, GAO was requested to examine (1) agencies' progress in responding to OMB's recommendations to evaluate programs, (2) factors facilitating or impeding agencies' progress, and (3) whether agencies' evaluations appear to be designed to yield the information on program results that OMB expects.
What GAO Found
GAO examined agency progress on 20 of the 40 evaluations OMB recommended in its PART reviews at four federal agencies: the Department of Energy, Department of Health and Human Services, Department of Labor, and Small Business Administration. About half the programs GAO reviewed had completed an evaluation in the 2 years since those PART reviews were published; 4 more were in progress and 3 were still being planned. Program restructuring canceled plans for the remaining 2 evaluations. Several agencies struggled to identify appropriate outcome measures and credible data sources before they could evaluate program effectiveness. Evaluation typically competed with other program activities for funds, so managers may be reluctant to reallocate funds to evaluation. Some agency officials thought that evaluations should be targeted to areas of policy significance or uncertainty. However, all four agencies indicated that the visibility of an OMB recommendation brought agency management attention--and sometimes funds--to get the evaluations done. Moreover, by coordinating their evaluation activities, agencies met these challenges by leveraging their evaluation expertise and strategically prioritizing their evaluation resources to the studies that they considered most important. Because the OMB recommendations were fairly general, agencies had flexibility in interpreting the kind of information OMB expected. Some program managers disagreed with OMB on the purpose of their evaluations, their quality, and the usefulness of "independent" evaluations by third parties unfamiliar with their programs. Agency officials concerned about an increased focus on process said that they were more interested in learning how to improve program results than in meeting an OMB checklist. Since a few programs did not discuss their evaluation plans with OMB, it is not certain whether OMB will find their ongoing evaluations useful during the programs' next PART review. GAO concludes that the PART review process stimulated agencies to increase their evaluation capacity and available information on program results. Further, agencies are likely to design evaluations to meet their own needs--that is, in-depth analyses that inform program improvement. If OMB wants evaluations with a broader scope, such as information that helps determine a program's relevance or value, it will need to take steps to shape both evaluation design and execution. Finally, because agency evaluation resources tend to be limited, they are most usefully focused on important areas of uncertainty. Regular performance reporting is key to good management, but requiring all federal programs to conduct frequent evaluation studies is likely to result in superficial reviews of little utility and to overwhelm agency evaluation capacity. |
gao_GAO-13-676 | gao_GAO-13-676_0 | NOAA Has Made Progress on JPSS Development, but Continues to Face Challenges in Completing S-NPP Products, Revising the Program’s Scope, and Meeting Schedules
NOAA has made progress towards JPSS program objectives of sustaining the continuity of NOAA’s polar-orbiting satellite capabilities through the S-NPP, JPSS-1, and JPSS-2 satellites by (1) delivering S-NPP data to weather forecasters and (2) by completing significant instrument and spacecraft development for the JPSS-1 satellite. However, the program is behind schedule in validating the readiness of S-NPP products and has experienced delays on the ground system schedules for the JPSS-1 satellite. Until it addresses challenges in product and ground system development, the program office may continue to experience delays in delivering actionable S-NPP data to users and in meeting program development schedules. Further, while the program is reporting a 70 percent confidence level in the JPSS-1 launch date, its analysis is likely to be overly optimistic because it was not conducted with an integrated schedule and included a component schedule with weaknesses. The JPSS Program Has Not Yet Established a Complete Integrated Master Schedule
According to our guidance on best practices in scheduling, the success of a program depends in part on having an integrated and reliable master schedule that defines when and how long work will occur and how each activity is related to the others. However, significant weaknesses exist in the program’s schedule. Specifically, about one-third of the schedule is missing logical relationships called dependencies that are needed to depict the sequence in which activities occur. This plan identifies alternatives for mitigating the risk of a 14- to 18-month gap in the afternoon orbit beginning in March 2016, between the current polar satellite and the JPSS-1 satellite. Until NOAA establishes a comprehensive contingency plan that integrates its strategies and addresses the elements identified above to improve its plans, it may not be sufficiently prepared to mitigate potential gaps in polar satellite coverage. Also, the agency does not track the usage of its satellite products or obtain feedback on them, which limits the program’s ability to ensure that satellite products are useful. Until the program office develops a complete integrated schedule and addresses weaknesses in component schedules, it will lack the information needed to effectively monitor development progress and ensure the planned JPSS-1 launch date. While NOAA plans to add alternatives to its mitigation plan by fall 2013, it does not yet have plans to add the other key components. Recommendations for Executive Action
Given the importance of having reliable schedules for managing JPSS satellite launch dates and the significance of polar-orbiting satellite data to weather forecasts, we recommend that the Secretary of Commerce direct the Administrator of NOAA to track the extent to which key groups of satellite data users are using S-NPP and JPSS products, and obtain feedback on these products; establish a complete JPSS program integrated master schedule that includes a logically linked sequence of activities; address the shortfalls in the ground system and spacecraft component schedules outlined in this report; after completing the integrated master schedule and addressing shortfalls in component schedules, update the joint cost and schedule confidence level for JPSS-1, if warranted and justified; establish a comprehensive contingency plan for potential satellite data gaps in the polar orbit that is consistent with contingency planning best practices identified in this report. NOAA concurred with all five of our recommendations and identified steps that it is taking to implement them. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to (1) evaluate the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s (NOAA) progress in meeting the Joint Polar Satellite System (JPSS) program’s objectives of sustaining the continuity of NOAA’s polar-orbiting satellite system through the Suomi National Polar-orbiting Partnership (S-NPP) and JPSS satellites, (2) evaluate the quality of the JPSS program schedule, and (3) assess NOAA's plans to address potential gaps in polar satellite data. To assess plans to address potential gaps in polar satellite data, we reviewed NOAA’s October 2012 polar satellite gap mitigation plan and a subsequent technical assessment as well as NOAA’s plans for implementing recommendations from the assessment. However, the contractor did not have a baseline schedule document. | Why GAO Did This Study
NOAA established the JPSS program in 2010 to replace aging polar satellites and provide critical environmental data used in forecasting weather and measuring variations in climate. However, program officials anticipate a gap in satellite data between the time that the S-NPP satellite reaches the end of its life and the JPSS-1 satellite becomes operational. Given the criticality of satellite data to weather forecasts, the likelihood of a significant satellite data gap, and the potential impact of a gap on the health and safety of the U.S. population and economy, GAO added this issue to its High Risk List in 2013.
GAO was asked to review the JPSS program because of the importance of polar satellite data. GAO's objectives were to (1) evaluate NOAA's progress in sustaining the continuity of NOAA's polar-orbiting satellite system through S-NPP and JPSS satellites; (2) evaluate the quality of NOAA's program schedule; and (3) assess NOAA's plans to address potential gaps in polar satellite data. To do so, GAO analyzed program management status reports, milestone reviews, and schedule data; examined polar gap contingency plans; and interviewed agency and contractor officials.
What GAO Found
The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) has made noteworthy progress on the Joint Polar Satellite System (JPSS) program by delivering data from its first satellite--the Suomi National Polar-orbiting Partnership (S-NPP)--to weather forecasters, completing significant instrument development for the next satellite (called JPSS-1), and reducing the program's life cycle cost estimate from $12.9 billion to $11.3 billion by refocusing on weather products. However, key challenges remain. Specifically, S-NPP has not yet achieved full operational capability because the program is behind schedule in validating the readiness of satellite products. Also, the program does not track whether key users are using its products or if the products meet the users' needs. In addition, issues with the JPSS ground system schedules have delayed the delivery of key system capabilities. Until the program addresses these challenges, it may continue to experience delays in delivering actionable S-NPP data to system users and in meeting JPSS-1 development schedules.
A program's success depends in part on having an integrated master schedule that defines when and how long work will occur and how activities are related to each other; however, the JPSS program office does not yet have a complete integrated master schedule and weaknesses exist in component schedules. Specifically, the program established an integrated master schedule in June 2013 and is reporting a 70 percent confidence level in the JPSS-1 launch date. However, about one-third of the program schedule is missing information needed to establish the sequence in which activities occur. In addition, selected component schedules supporting the JPSS-1 satellite have weaknesses including schedule constraints that have not been justified. Until the program completes its integrated schedule and addresses weaknesses in component schedules, it will lack the information needed to effectively monitor development progress and have less assurance of meeting the planned JPSS-1 launch date.
While NOAA developed a mitigation plan to address a potential 14 to 18 month gap in afternoon polar satellite data in October 2012 and subsequently identified additional alternatives for addressing potential gaps, it has not yet established a comprehensive contingency plan. Specifically, NOAA has not yet revised its mitigation plan to include the new alternatives, and the plan lacks several key elements, such as triggers for when to take key actions and detailed procedures for implementing them. Until NOAA establishes a comprehensive plan, it may not be sufficiently prepared to mitigate anticipated gaps in polar satellite coverage.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is recommending NOAA develop a mechanism to track the usage of its satellite products, establish a complete integrated master schedule, address weaknesses in component schedules, and address shortfalls in polar satellite gap contingency plans. NOAA concurred with GAO's recommendations and identified steps it is taking to implement them. |
gao_GAO-11-631 | gao_GAO-11-631_0 | DOD’s Contracted Bonus Amounts Were 58 Percent Less in 2010 than in 2008, Its Peak Year
DOD contracted $1.2 billion in fiscal year 2010 for enlistment and reenlistment bonuses, an amount that was 58 percent less than the $2.8 billion contracted in fiscal year 2008, its peak year. For the services, total contracted bonus amounts peaked in fiscal years 2008 or 2009 and then decreased. Specifically, for fiscal years 2006 through 2009, total contracted amounts for bonuses rose for the Air Force and the Marine Corps and declined thereafter by 16 percent and 64 percent, respectively. With the exception of the Army, the services contracted more on their reenlistment bonus programs than on their enlistment bonus programs. Of the $11 billion in contracted bonuses by all the services, $4.5 billion, or 40 percent, was for enlistment bonuses, and $6.6 billion, or 60 percent, was for reenlistment bonuses. However, in fiscal years 2009 and 2010, the Navy’s average per-person enlistment bonus amounts were higher than those of all the other services. For example, in fiscal year 2010, the Navy’s average enlistment bonus was $23,957, while the Army’s was $5,969. With respect to reenlistment bonuses, the Air Force’s average per-person bonus amount was higher than those of the other services from fiscal years 2006 through 2008. The Services Have Processes for Identifying Occupations That Are Hard to Fill but Not for Identifying the Most Cost-Effective Bonus Amounts
The services have processes in place that include the analysis of data on how difficult it is to retain and recruit particular occupations and the subjective judgment of personnel who are involved in managing these occupations. DOD guidance allows the military departments the flexibility to offer a bonus to any occupation that meets certain criteria, such as being hard to fill or retain, and they may adjust bonuses as market conditions change. However, although much research has been conducted on bonuses’ effects on enlistment and retention, DOD does not know whether the services have been paying more than necessary to meet their recruiting and retention goals. While efforts to develop ways to assess the cost-effectiveness of bonuses have been made by some research organizations and have generated interest at the individual service level, OSD has not coordinated research in this area. Without such information- sharing, the services may not be able to fully take advantage of existing and emerging methodologies for assessing cost-effectiveness, share lessons learned, and ultimately obtain critical information needed to know whether they are getting the best return on their bonus investments. DOD Is in the Process of Increasing Its Flexibility in Managing Special and Incentive Pays but Lacks Baseline Measures to Assess Outcomes
DOD has begun to increase its flexibility in managing special and incentive pays, as authorized by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008. In our review of 15 special and incentive pays, 6 are currently entitlement pays and accounted for $3.9 billion, or 29 percent, of the $13.6 billion expended on the 15 special and incentive pays from fiscal years 2006 through 2010. As a result, DOD may not be positioned to monitor the implementation of this consolidation to determine whether it is in fact resulting in greater flexibility and more precise targeting of resources and what impact the consolidation is having on DOD’s budget. The Army, and the other services to some extent, demonstrated that they can use bonuses flexibly in response to changing market conditions, but they still do not know whether they are paying more than they need to pay to attract and retain enlisted personnel. As the consolidation of the special and incentive pay programs is completed over the next 7 years and the instructions directing the services on how to administer the new programs are revised, monitor the implementation of this consolidation to determine whether it is in fact resulting in greater flexibility and more precise targeting of resources and what impact the consolidation is having on DOD’s budget. Agency Comments
In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with both our recommendations. To conduct our work, we analyzed service data on enlistment and reenlistment bonuses, reviewed Department of Defense (DOD) and service regulations related to the use of bonuses and special and incentive pays; interviewed DOD and service officials on the processes and methodological tools in place to identify occupations eligible for bonuses and steps taken to assess the effectiveness of their bonus programs; observed two services’ meetings that are convened to determine which occupations should be eligible for bonuses; interviewed researchers knowledgeable about literature on bonus effectiveness; and reviewed selected studies on this subject. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Senate report to accompany the 2011 Defense authorization bill directed GAO to assess the Department of Defense's (DOD) use of cash incentives to recruit and retain highly qualified individuals for service in the armed forces. This report (1) identifies recent trends in DOD's use of enlistment and reenlistment bonuses, (2) assesses the extent to which the services have processes to determine which occupational specialties require bonuses and whether bonus amounts are optimally set, and (3) determines how much flexibility DOD has in managing selected special and incentive pays for officer and enlisted personnel. GAO analyzed service data on bonuses and special and incentive pays, reviewed relevant guidance and other documentation from DOD and the services, interviewed DOD and service officials, and observed two working groups that were determining bonus amounts.
What GAO Found
DOD engaged in enlistment and reenlistment contracts for bonuses to servicemembers that totaled $1.2 billion in fiscal year 2010, down 58 percent from fiscal year 2008. Contracted amounts peaked in the Army and the Navy in fiscal year 2008 and declined thereafter; amounts peaked for the Marine Corps and the Air Force in fiscal year 2009 and then declined. From fiscal years 2006 through 2010, the services contracted a total of $11 billion for bonuses, with the Army accounting for 52 percent, the Navy, 24 percent, the Marine Corps, 16 percent, and the Air Force, 9 percent. About $4.5 billion of the $11 billion was contracted for enlistment bonuses and $6.6 billion for reenlistment bonuses. With the exception of the Army, the amounts the services contracted were higher for reenlistment than enlistment bonuses during this time period. For example, the Army's average enlistment bonus was higher than that of the other services in fiscal years 2006 through 2008, while the Navy's was highest in fiscal years 2009 and 2010. On the other hand, the Army's average reenlistment bonus was smaller than those of the other services during this period. The services have processes that include the analysis of data on how difficult it is to recruit and retain particular occupations and use these processes to adjust bonuses, but they do not know whether they are paying more than they need to for these purposes. DOD guidance allows the departments to offer a bonus to any occupation that they have difficulty recruiting or retaining, thereby allowing them to adjust their policies to changing market conditions. However, though much research has been conducted on bonuses' effects on enlistment and retention, DOD does not know whether the bonus amounts the services offer are optimal. Efforts to develop ways to assess the cost-effectiveness of bonuses have been made by some research organizations and have generated interest at the individual service level, but there has been no coordinated DOD-wide work to facilitate information-sharing among the services on this issue. Without such information-sharing, the services may not be able to fully take advantage of existing and emerging methodologies for assessing whether they are getting the best return on their bonus investments. DOD has begun to increase its flexibility in managing special and incentive pays while consolidating them into eight categories. GAO reviewed 15 of DOD's more than 60 special and incentive pays and found that during fiscal years 2006 through 2010, it spent $13.6 billion on those pays and that for about 30 percent of that amount, DOD was unable to adjust numbers of recipients or amounts based on market conditions because they had not yet been consolidated and were established in legislation. DOD's consolidation of special and incentive pays will allow the services more flexibility in managing them. However, at present, DOD has not established metrics that will enable it to determine whether this consolidation is resulting in greater flexibility as it transitions to the new categories by fiscal year 2014. As a result, DOD may not be positioned to measure future progress in meeting the intended goal of the consolidation, which is to give the services more flexibility.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOD (1) coordinate with the services to facilitate discussions on conducting research, as appropriate, to determine optimal bonus amounts and (2) monitor the implementation of its consolidation of special and incentive pays to determine whether it is resulting in greater flexibility and what impact the consolidation is having on DOD's budget. In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with both recommendations. |
gao_GAO-01-682 | gao_GAO-01-682_0 | Conclusions
DOD’s management of SPS is a lesson in how not to justify, make, and monitor the implementation of IT investment decisions. Specifically, DOD has not (1) ensured that accountability and responsibility for measuring progress against commitments are clearly understood, performed, and reported, (2) demonstrated, on the basis of reliable data and credible analysis, that the proposed system solution will produce economic benefits commensurate with costs before investing in it, (3) used data on progress against project cost, schedule, and performance commitments throughout a project’s life cycle to make investment decisions, and (4) divided this large project into a series of incremental investment decisions to spread the risks over smaller, more manageable components. Currently, DOD is not effectively performing any of these basic tenets of effective investment management on SPS, and, as a result, DOD lacks the basic information needed to make informed decisions about how to proceed with the project. Nevertheless, DOD continues to push forward in acquiring and deploying additional versions of SPS. Continuing with this approach to investment management introduces considerable risk. 3. Initial Implementation of the Standard Procurement System, Office of the Inspector General, Department of Defense (Report No. | Why GAO Did This Study
This report reviews the Department of Defense's (DOD) ability to contract for goods and services by acquiring and implementing a standard procurement system (SPS).
What GAO Found
DOD's management of SPS is a lesson in how not to justify, make, and monitor the implementation of information technology investment decisions. Specifically, DOD has not (1) ensured that accountability and responsibility for measuring progress against commitments are clearly understood, performed, and reported; (2) demonstrated, on the basis of reliable data and credible analysis, that the proposed system solution will produce economic benefits commensurate with costs; (3) used data on progress against project cost, schedule, and performance commitments throughout a project's life cycle to make investment decisions; and (4) divided this large project into a series of incremental investment decisions to spread the risks over smaller, more manageable components. Because it has yet to effectively apply any of these basic tenets of effective investment management to SPS, DOD lacks the basic information needed to make informed decisions on how to proceed with the project. Nevertheless, DOD continues to push forward in acquiring and deploying additional versions of SPS. Continuing this approach involves considerable risk. GAO summarized this report in testimony before Congress; see DOD's Standard Procurement System: Continued Investment Has Yet to Be Justified, by Joel C. Willemssen, Managing Director for Information Technology Issues, before the Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs, and International Relations, House Committee on Government Reform. GAO-02-392T , Feb. 3 (13 pages). |
gao_GAO-10-921T | gao_GAO-10-921T_0 | Counternarcotics- Related Programs Have Had Mixed Results in Meeting Supply Reduction and Interdiction Goals
Our work in Afghanistan, Colombia, and the transit zone has shown that the United States and its partner nations have partially met established targets for reducing the supply of illicit drugs. Most programs designed to reduce cultivation, production, and trafficking of drugs have missed their performance targets. Plan Colombia Partially Met Six-Year Drug Supply Reduction Goals and Recent Data Suggest More Improvements Have Been Made
In 2008, we reported that Plan Colombia’s goal of reducing the cultivation and production of illegal drugs by 50 percent in 6 years was partially achieved. Other factors, such as dry weather conditions, may be contributing to these decreases in potential cocaine production. Cocaine Interdiction Programs in the Transit Zone Has Fallen Short of Targets
According to ONDCP data, the United States has fallen slightly short of its cocaine interdiction targets each year since the targets were established in 2007. Several Factors Have Limited the Effectiveness of U.S. Programs
A number of factors to counternarcotics-related programs have limited the effectiveness of U.S. counternarcotic efforts. These factors include a lack of planning by U.S. agencies to sustain some U.S.-funded programs over the longer term, limited cooperation from partner nations, and the adaptability of drug producers and traffickers. Agencies to Sustain Some Programs
U.S. agencies had not developed plans for how to sustain some programs, particularly those programs providing assets, such as boats, to partner nations to conduct interdiction efforts. Corruption has also hampered Dominican Republic-based, money- laundering investigations, according to DEA. In production countries, such as Colombia, drug producers also proved to be highly adaptive. Counternarcotics Initiatives Have Been Closely Aligned with Broad U.S. Foreign Policy Objectives
U.S. counternarcotics programs have been closely aligned with the achievement of other U.S. foreign policy goals. Many counternarcotics-related programs involve supporting democracy and the rule of law in partner nations, which is itself a U.S. foreign policy objective worldwide. Support for legal institutions, such as courts, attorneys general, and law enforcement organizations, in drug source and transit countries is not only an important part of the U.S. counternarcotic strategy but also advance State’s strategic objectives relating to democracy and governance. Judging the Effectiveness of Some Counternarcotics- Related Programs is Difficult
In many of our reviews of international counternarcotic-related programs, we found that determining program effectiveness has been challenging. Existing Performance Measures and Results Reporting Are Often Not Useful for Assessing Progress in Achieving Program Goals
The Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 requires federal agencies to develop performance measures to assess progress in achieving their goals and to communicate their results to the Congress. Alternative Development Performance Measures in Colombia Do Not Capture Programs’ Effect on Drug Supply
For Plan Colombia, several programs we reviewed were focused on root causes of the drug problem and their impact on drug activity was difficult to assess. However, these indicators have not been consistent over time or among countries. In our 2008 report on U.S. assistance to transit zone countries, we recommended that the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense (1) develop a plan to ensure that partner nations in the transit zone could effectively operate and maintain all counternarcotics assets that the United States had provided, including boats and other vehicles and equipment, for their remaining useful life and (2) ensure that, before providing a counternarcotics asset to a partner nation, agencies determined the total operations and maintenance cost over its useful life and, with the recipient nation, develop a plan for funding this cost. Improved performance measures. Related GAO Products
Drug Control: Long-Standing Problems Hinder U.S. International Efforts. Drug Control: Assets DOD Contributes to Reducing the Illegal Drug Supply Have Declined. Drug Control: Coca Cultivation and Eradication Estimates in Colombia. Agencies Need More Detailed Plans for Reducing Assistance. | Why GAO Did This Study
The overall goal of the U.S. National Drug Control Strategy, prepared by the White House Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), is to reduce illicit drug use in the United States. GAO has issued more than 20 products since 2000 examining U.S.-funded international programs aimed at reducing the supply of drugs. These programs have been implemented primarily in drug source countries, such as Colombia and Afghanistan as well drug transit countries, such as Mexico, Guatemala, and Venezuela. They have included interdiction of maritime drug shipments on the high seas, support for foreign military and civilian institutions engaged in drug eradication, detection, and interdiction; and rule of law assistance aimed at helping foreign legal institutions investigate and prosecute drug trafficking, money laundering, and other drug-related crimes.
What GAO Found
GAO's work on U.S.-funded international counternarcotics-related programswork has centered on four major topics: (1) Counternarcotics-related programs have had mixed results. In Afghanistan, Colombia, and drug transit countries, the United States and partner nations have only partially met established targets for reducing the drug supply. In Afghanistan, opium poppy eradication efforts have consistently fallen short of targets. Plan Colombia has met its goals for reducing opium and heroin but not coca crops, although recent data suggest that U.S.-supported crop eradication efforts over time may have caused a significant decline in potential cocaine production. Data also indicate an increase in coca cultivation in Peru and Bolivia that may eventually offset these declines. Interdiction programs have missed their performance targets each year since goals were established in 2007. (2) Several factors have limited program effectiveness. Various factors have hindered these programs' ability to reduce the supply of illegal drugs. In some cases, we found that U.S. agencies had not planned for the sustainment of programs, particularly those providing interdiction boats in transit countries. External factors include limited cooperation from partner nations due to corruption or lack of political support, and the highly adaptive nature of drug producers and traffickers. (3) Counternarcotics-related programs often advance broader foreign policy objectives. The value of these programs cannot be assessed based only on their impact on the drug supply. Many have supported other U.S. foreign policy objectives relating to security and stabilization, counterinsurgency, and strengthening democracy and governance. For example, in Afghanistan, the United States has combined counternarcotics efforts with military operations to combat insurgents as well as drug traffickers. U.S. support for Plan Colombia has significantly strengthened Colombia's security environment, which may eventually make counterdrug programs, such as alternative agricultural development, more effective. In several cases, U.S. rule of law assistance, such as supporting courts, prosecutors, and law enforcement organizations, has furthered both democracy-building and counterdrug objectives. (4) Judging the effectiveness of some programs is difficult. U.S. agencies often lack reliable performance measurement and results reporting needed to assess all the impacts of counterdrug programs. In Afghanistan, opium eradication measures alone were insufficient for a comprehensive assessment of U.S. efforts. Also, the State Department has not regularly reported outcome-related information for over half of its programs in major drug transit countries. Furthermore, DOD's counternarcotics-related measures were generally not useful for assessing program effectiveness or making management decisions.
What GAO Recommends
GAO has made recommendations to the Departments of Defense (DOD) and State and other agencies to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of U.S. counternarcotics- related programs. In particular, GAO has recommended that these agencies develop plans to sustain these programs. GAO has also recommended that they improve performance measurement and results reporting to assess program impacts and to aid in decision making. Agencies have efforts under way to implement some of these recommendations. |
gao_GAO-04-684 | gao_GAO-04-684_0 | About a quarter of assisted living residents need help with three or more ADLs. State Efforts to Enhance Consumer Information on Facility Options
Given the wide diversity among assisted living facilities in the services they offer and the populations they are prepared to serve, prospective assisted living residents can have difficulty finding an appropriate—let alone the most appropriate—facility to meet their individual needs. Initiatives such as the Florida “Find-a-Facility” Web site and the Texas standardized disclosure statement help consumers make better choices by providing them the information they need in an easier-to-absorb format. To make appropriate choices among the wide range of facility options available in the market, consumers need to learn about facility services, costs, and policies that impact residents. Moreover, they need this information to be not only complete and accurate, but also presented in a timely way and in a form that they can understand. Specifically, the report found that facilities’ written materials often did not contain key information, such as a description of services not covered or available at the facility, the staff’s qualifications and training, circumstances under which costs might change, assistance residents would receive with medication administration, facility practices in assessing needs, or criteria for discharging residents if their health changes. Our expert interviews and the studies we reviewed identified information about staffing levels and qualifications, costs and potential cost increases, and facility policies regarding discharge criteria as critical to informed decision making. Under these circumstances, consumers often do not know what questions to ask or how to assess and compare the responses that they receive in order to identify the facility that can best meet their individual needs. While a number of other states have developed similar forms—particularly for specialized dementia units—Texas is notable for having been among the first to develop a standardized disclosure statement for all assisted living facilities, and to include detailed information on staffing levels. State Efforts to Facilitate Provider Compliance with Licensing Requirements
Assisted living providers may fall short of meeting state licensing standards in part because they lack a full understanding of what the standards require and how to meet them. The experience of Washington State, which for 2 ½ years employed a staff of consultants to advise and train assisted living providers, shows the potential benefits of licensing assistance programs in improved provider compliance and resident outcomes, as well as the challenge of sustaining them over time. These activities continued for 2 ½ years until, in the midst of a state budget crisis, the state stopped funding the program. The second evaluation occurred 2 years later. State Efforts to Strengthen Residents’ Complaint Procedures
Some assisted living residents have difficulty pursuing complaints with their providers, particularly in cases involving an involuntary discharge. Georgia has established a spectrum of procedural remedies specifically for assisted living residents that appear to strengthen their bargaining position vis-a-vis providers. Among the avenues for residents to seek redress of their complaints is through the long-term care ombudsmen program in each state. In fact, providers and residents may remain unaware of their existence, until the advocates have reason to bring these remedies to their attention in the course of resolving disputes. This working relationship has helped give the ombudsman more leverage when dealing with providers. The state and provider representatives we spoke with agreed that having a separate assisted living ombudsman program led its staff to become increasingly knowledgeable about assisted living and the particular problems that arise within it. We interviewed officials or individuals associated with the following entities: Florida Department of Elder Affairs Florida Assisted Living Affiliation Senior Resource Alliance (Florida) Texas Department of Human Services Texas Assisted Living Association Texas Assisted Living Advisory Committee Washington Department of Social and Health Services Washington Health Care Association Washington Long-term Care Ombudsman Program Georgia Long-Term Care Ombudsman Program Georgia Legal Aid Program Senior Citizens Law Project (Georgia) Assisted Living Association of Georgia Massachusetts Executive Office of Elder Affairs Massachusetts Assisted Living Facilities Association Alice Mahar Dupler, Neva L Crogan, and Robert Short, “Pathways to quality improvement for boarding homes: A Washington state model,” Journal of Nursing Care Quality; Jul 2001; 15(4), 1-7. | Why GAO Did This Study
Assisted living facilities provide help with activities of daily living in a residential setting for individuals who cannot live independently but do not require 24-hour skilled nursing care. In 2002, over 36,000 assisted living facilities served approximately 900,000 residents. The states establish and enforce licensing standards for these institutions. Because states have taken widely differing approaches to regulating and supporting assisted living, they can potentially learn from each other's experiences as they consider changes to their own policies. GAO was asked to review challenges faced by consumers and providers of assisted living and seek out notable state initiatives addressing those challenges in three selected areas: (1) disclosure of full and accurate information to consumers, (2) state assistance to providers to meet licensing requirements, and (3) procedures for addressing residents' complaints. We identified specific examples of individual programs in Florida, Texas, Washington, Georgia, and Massachusetts that highlighted different approaches in these three areas, which other states might wish to consider emulating.
What GAO Found
Consumers faced with choosing an assisted living facility often do not have key information they need in order to identify the one most likely to meet their individual needs. Such information includes staffing levels and qualifications, costs and potential cost increases, and the circumstances that could lead to involuntary discharge from the facility. Initiatives in Florida and Texas have made critical data for consumer selection among facilities more readily available. Florida has created a Web site that enables consumers to learn about all of the facilities in their vicinity and identifies those providing the services the consumers are seeking at a specified price range. Texas has mandated a standardized disclosure statement for assisted living facilities, giving consumers concise and consistent data that facilitates comparisons across providers regarding services, charges, and policies. Assisted living facilities are more likely to meet and maintain licensing standards if they can obtain help in interpreting those standards and in determining what concrete changes they need to make to satisfy them. Washington State established a staff of quality consultants to provide such training and advice to assisted living providers on a voluntary basis. Evaluations of the program 6 months after its start and 2 years later documented improvements in provider compliance as well as resident health and safety. However, a statewide budget crisis led to a decision to stop funding the program, in order to maintain traditional licensing enforcement functions. Assisted living residents sometimes need help to pursue any complaints that they may have with their providers, especially when faced with an involuntary discharge. Long-term care ombudsmen are available in all states, but nursing home residents claim most of their attention. Georgia has legislated an extensive array of procedural remedies specifically for assisted living residents that provide them multiple means for seeking redress of their complaints. The existence of these remedies also strengthens the position of residents in the informal negotiations through which most such disputes are resolved in practice. Massachusetts has created a small staff of ombudsmen dedicated exclusively to serving assisted living residents. This allows them to specialize in addressing the particular problems that arise in assisted living facilities. |
gao_GAO-06-565 | gao_GAO-06-565_0 | To compete for SBIR awards, firms must meet size, ownership, and other eligibility criteria. Key Characteristics of NIH’s and DoD’s SBIR Awards for Fiscal Years 2001 through 2004
During fiscal years 2001 - 2004, NIH and DoD made a total of 16,019 SBIR awards valued at $5.3 billion. Characteristics of NIH and DoD SBIR Awards Made to Firms that Had Received Venture Capital Investment
Firms that had received venture capital investment received a relatively small percentage of the NIH and DoD SBIR awards, although they received a somewhat larger percentage of awards from NIH than DoD. Few Awards above the Guidelines Were Made to Firms That Had Received Venture Capital Investment Although These Firms Tend to Receive Larger Awards
While about half of NIH awards and 12 percent of DoD awards were above the guidelines, less than 20 percent of such awards at NIH and about 8 percent at DoD went to firms that had received venture capital investment. A similar relationship existed for DoD’s phase I awards but not for its phase II awards. Number and Value of NIH and DoD SBIR Awards That Were above the Guidelines
From fiscal years 2001 through 2004, 2,674 of the 5,061 SBIR awards made by NIH exceeded the guidelines. These awards totaled about $1.4 billion and accounted for 70 percent of NIH’s SBIR dollars. Extent to Which NIH and DoD SBIR Awards above the Guidelines Were Made to Firms That Had Received Venture Capital Investment
At both NIH and DoD, most of the awards that exceeded the guidelines went to firms that had not received venture capital investment. Specifically, firms that had received venture capital were twice as likely as firms that had not received such investment to receive phase II awards from NIH greater than $1 million, which accounted for about 37 percent of NIH’s phase II dollars; these firms were about six times more likely to receive phase II awards greater than $2.5 million, which accounted for about 7 percent of the phase II dollars. For example, over the 4-year period, the number of awards that DoD made to firms that had received venture capital investment increased by 167 percent, compared to a 65 percent increase in awards to firms that had not. For example, at DoD, the total number of applications in fiscal years 2001 and 2002 was 22,139 and the total number of applications received in fiscal years 2003 and 2004 was 33,922. NIH, DoD, and SBA Focus Largely on Select Eligibility Criteria and Collect Limited Data on SBIR Awardees
NIH, DoD and SBA focus primarily on criteria relating to ownership, for- profit status, and the number of employees to determine a firm’s eligibility for the SBIR program and take steps to verify eligibility information provided by applicants. When NIH or DoD officials are unable to ensure the accuracy of an applicant’s information, they refer the matter to SBA. Each agency limits its data collection efforts largely to information about the SBIR award itself, such as award size and location of the principal investigator, and does not collect information on certain characteristics of the firms receiving the awards, such as the presence of venture capital investment. Although agencies rely largely on applicants to self-certify that they meet the SBIR program’s eligibility criteria, both NIH and DoD make additional efforts to ensure the accuracy of the information provided by applicants prior to making an award. NIH only provided technical comments that we have incorporated, as appropriate. Moreover, DoD did not find the results of our analysis surprising in light of differences in markets for SBIR projects supported by NIH and DoD. SBA noted in its comments that while the information in the report may be useful, it could be misconstrued as suggesting a link between the presence of venture capital investment and SBIR ownership criteria when such a link does not exist. Scope and Methodology
In conducting our work, we interviewed officials at the National Institutes of Health (NIH), the Department of Defense (DoD), and the Small Business Administration (SBA) about their procedures in place, and any changes that occurred during the time period of our review—fiscal years 2001 through 2004. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) program is a three phase program that increases the use of small businesses to meet federal research needs and encourages commercialization of this research. Venture capital is one source of funding to help commercialize SBIR projects. To receive an award firms must meet ownership and other criteria and awards may exceed dollar guidelines. In 2002, the Small Business Administration (SBA) clarified that majority owners of firms that receive awards must be individuals rather than corporations. Since 2002, controversy has arisen over the extent to which venture capital firms may own SBIR firms. GAO was asked to provide information on SBIR for fiscal years 2001 - 2004. For NIH and DOD, we determined the (1) number and characteristics of awards, (2) number and characteristics of awards above the guidelines, (3) changes in award characteristics after 2002, and (4) factors agencies consider, and data they collect on, SBIR awards. NIH, DOD, and SBA provided technical comments that were incorporated, as appropriate. DOD said our findings were not surprising in light of differences in the markets for SBIR projects. SBA said our findings, though useful, may be misconstrued as suggesting a link between venture capital investment and SBIR eligibility, when no such link exists.
What GAO Found
During fiscal years 2001-2004, the National Institutes of Health (NIH) and Department of Defense (DOD) made 16,019 SBIR awards valued at $5.3 billion. GAO identified the following characteristics of these awards: (1) most were concentrated in a few states; (2) a few agency component made most of the awards; (3) award amounts ranged from well below the guidelines to significantly above; (4) few awards were made to firms that had received venture capital investment, NIH made more than DOD; and (5) firms that received DOD SBIR awards were relatively small-sized. Overall, from fiscal year 2001 through 2004, about half of NIH awards and 12 percent of DOD awards exceeded the guidelines, and most went to firms that had not received venture capital investment. Awards above the guidelines accounted for 70 percent of NIH's SBIR dollars and 23 percent of DOD's. Agency officials said NIH and DOD made such awards generally to fund relatively expensive research or to ensure high-quality results. Awards above the guidelines to firms that had received venture capital investment accounted for 18 percent of NIH's awards above the guidelines, and about 8 percent of DOD's. At NIH, firms that had received venture capital investment were more likely to receive the largest awards than firms that had not. A similar relationship existed for DOD's phase I awards but not for its phase II awards. Since 2002, when SBA clarified SBIR ownership eligibility criteria, an increasing number of awards have been made to small business firms that had received venture capital investment; such firms have generally received larger awards at NIH and, in the aggregate, a larger share of NIH's and DOD's available SBIR funds. In addition, the average phase II award amount to firms that had received venture capital investment increased by over 70 percent, from about $860,000 in fiscal year 2001 to about $1.5 million in fiscal year 2004. As a result, such firms attracted a greater percentage of NIH's total SBIR dollars each year--about 21 percent on average in fiscal years 2003 and 2004, compared to an average of about 14 percent in fiscal years 2001 and 2002. At DOD we found similar trends, but to a somewhat lesser extent. NIH, DOD, and SBA focus mainly on SBIR eligibility criteria relating to ownership, for-profit status, and the number of employees when reviewing applications. Although applicants self-certify that they meet these criteria, both NIH and DOD make efforts to verify the accuracy of the information prior to making an award. When agency officials are unable to verify the accuracy of an applicant's information, they refer the matter to SBA. Both agencies limit their data collection efforts largely to information about the SBIR award itself, such as award size. Agencies are not required to gather data on characteristics of the firms receiving the awards, such as the presence of venture capital investment; as a result, this information is currently not being collected. |
gao_GAO-10-736T | gao_GAO-10-736T_0 | Diversity in the Financial Services Industry at the Management Level Did Not Change Substantially from 1993 through 2008, and Diversity in Senior Management Positions Is Limited
As discussed in our 2006 report, overall diversity in management-level positions did not change substantially from 1993 through 2004. Specifically, figure 1 shows that diversity in senior positions increased from 11.1 percent to 15.5 percent during that period. Revised EEO-1 data for the period 2005 through 2008 show an increase in minority representation in management positions from 15.5 percent to 17.4 percent (fig. 2). Management-level representation by white women and white men both decreased by about one percentage point from 2005 through 2008. Recognizing this limitation, starting in 2007 EEOC revised its data collection form for employers to divide the “officials and managers” category into two subcategories: “executive/senior-level officers and managers” and “first/midlevel officials.”
EEOC’s revised data, as reported in 2008, indicate that minorities accounted for 10 percent of senior positions in the financial services industry. In contrast, African Americans held 2.8 percent of such senior management positions, while Hispanics held 3.0 percent and Asians 3.5 percent. However, the recent financial crisis has raised questions about their ongoing commitment to initiatives and programs that are designed to promote workforce diversity. Since the mid-1990s, some financial services firms have implemented a variety of initiatives designed to recruit and retain minority and women candidates to fill key positions. Some firms and trade organizations had also developed partnerships with groups that represent minority professionals and with local communities to recruit candidates through events such as conferences and career fairs. A 2007 industry trade group study and some officials also noted that some companies were linking managers’ compensation to their progress in hiring, promoting, and retaining minority and women employees. These challenges include the following: Recruiting minority and women candidates for management development programs. However, some financial services industry officials said that middle managers may be focused on other aspects of their responsibilities, such as meeting financial performance targets, rather than the importance of implementing the organization’s diversity initiatives. An official from an investment bank told us that the bank had been reaching out to middle managers who oversaw minority and women employees by, for example, instituting an “inclusive manager program.”
In closing, with the implementation of a variety of diversity initiatives over the past 15 years, diversity at the management level in the financial services industry has improved but not changed substantially. Initiatives to promote management diversity at all levels within financial services firms face several key challenges, such as recruiting and retaining candidates and achieving the “buy-in” of middle managers. Without a sustained commitment to overcoming these challenges, management diversity in the financial services industry may continue to remain largely unchanged over time. | Why GAO Did This Study
As the U.S. workforce has become increasingly diverse, many private and public sector organizations have recognized the importance of recruiting and retaining minority and women candidates for key positions. However, previous congressional hearings have raised concerns about a lack of diversity at the management level in the financial services industry, which provides services that are essential to the continued growth and economic recovery of the country. The recent financial crisis has renewed concerns about the financial services industry's commitment to workforce diversity. This testimony discusses findings from a June 2006 GAO report (GAO-06-617), February 2008 testimony (GAO-08-445T), and more recent work on diversity in the financial services industry. Specifically, GAO assesses (1) what the available data show about diversity at the management level from 1993 through 2008 and (2) steps that the industry has taken to promote workforce diversity and the challenges involved. To address the testimony's objectives, GAO analyzed data from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC); reviewed select studies; and interviewed officials from financial services firms, trade organizations, and organizations that represent minority and women professionals. To the extent possible, key statistics have been updated.
What GAO Found
EEOC data indicate that overall diversity at the management level in the financial services industry did not change substantially from 1993 through 2008, and diversity in senior positions remains limited. In general, EEOC data show that management-level representation by minority women and men increased from 11.1 percent to 17.4 percent during that period. However, these EEOC data overstated minority representation at senior management levels, because the category includes mid-level management positions, such as assistant branch manager, that may have greater minority representation. In 2008, EEOC reported revised data for senior-level positions only, which showed that minorities held 10 percent of such positions compared with 17.4 percent of all management positions. The revised data also indicate that white males held 64 percent of senior positions in 2008, African-Americans held 2.8 percent, Hispanics 3 percent, and Asians 3.5 percent. Financial services firms and trade groups have initiated programs to increase workforce diversity, but these initiatives face challenges. The programs include developing scholarships and internships, partnering with groups that represent minority professionals, and linking managers' compensation with their performance in promoting a diverse workforce. Some firms have developed indicators to measure progress in achieving workforce diversity. Industry officials said that among the challenges these initiatives faced were recruiting and retaining minority candidates, and gaining the "buy-in" of key employees such as the middle managers who are often responsible for implementing such programs. Without a sustained commitment to overcoming these challenges, diversity at the management level may continue to remain generally unchanged over time. |
gao_GAO-02-437 | gao_GAO-02-437_0 | However, as the role of the presidentially appointed IGs in active investigations of criminal activity expanded, so too did their requests for deputation seeking the authority to make warrantless arrests, obtain and execute warrants, and carry firearms to reduce requests for assistance from other law enforcement personnel in dangerous situations. Statutory and Deputized IGs’ Law Enforcement Authority is Similar, but Differences Exist in Oversight Requirements
Regardless of the origin of law enforcement authority—either through statutory authority or deputation, IGs’ scope of law enforcement authority, supervision, and training are similar. Differences
We found differences in the level of DOJ oversight for IGs who are deputized by DOJ. Three of these believed that practices would be improved because statutory authority would enhance their investigators status as fully authorized officers in the law enforcement community. The vice chair of the President’s Council on Integrity and Efficiency said at hearings that a legislative proposal to grant permanent statutory law enforcement authority to deputized IGs would have carried with it no additional costs, in part because the deputized IGs’ criminal investigators already (1) exercised law enforcement authority through deputation, (2) trained as criminal investigators, and (3) participated in the federal law enforcement retirement system. We incorporated DOJ’s suggestion into the report. Appendix I: IG Offices That Have Made Annual Deputation Requests and Received Law Enforcement Authority
This appendix lists the 23 presidentially appointed inspectors general (IGs) who have been granted deputation through calendar year 2000 for their respective criminal investigators by the Department of Justice. | What GAO Found
At federal offices of inspectors general (IG), criminal investigators can make warrantless arrests, obtain and execute search warrants, and carry firearms. Because IGs lack permanent statutory law enforcement authority, most presidentially appointed IGs have to request temporary deputation from the Department of Justice (DOJ). However, presidentially appointed IGs at the U.S. Department of Agriculture, Department of Defense, and Department of the Treasury possess permanent statutory law enforcement authority and do not need to obtain DOJ's approval. IG criminal investigators who are deputized do not differ in terms of their scope of law enforcement authority, supervision, and training from their counterparts who have statutory law enforcement authority. Deputized IGs receive additional oversight over their law enforcement authority. Fifteen of the 23 deputized IGs report that statutory authority would improve their criminal investigative practices and enhance their recognition as fully authorized officers in the law enforcement community. DOJ is now considering its position on ways to provide law enforcement authority to deputized IGs. |
gao_RCED-97-84 | gao_RCED-97-84_0 | The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has responsibility for managing this system and ensuring the safe and efficient movement of air traffic. To successfully accomplish this mission, FAA must have a sufficient number of adequately trained air traffic controllers working at air traffic control (ATC) facilities. Specifically, we were asked to (1) identify the key variables FAA uses to project future controller staffing needs and evaluate their reasonableness, (2) determine whether FAA has identified a sufficient number of controller candidates to satisfy its short- and long-term controller staffing needs and evaluate FAA’s plans to train new controllers, and (3) identify impediments that hinder FAA from staffing ATC facilities at specified levels. However, FAA did provide copies of the models used to project attrition for fiscal year 1995. Data on the Age and Service Time of Recently Retired Controllers Indicate That Fewer Controllers Could Retire in Future Years Than FAA Has Forecast
Rather than estimating future retirements on the basis of assumptions about who will be eligible to retire, FAA could use actual information on the age and service time of those controllers who retired in recent years, as well as current controllers, to predict future retirements. Because it is uncertain whether enough controller candidates will be available from the current sources to fill these needs, FAA officials have announced plans to expand the CTI program to include more schools and have reactivated the cooperative education program. FAA Is Expanding Its Controller Candidate Pool to Address Long-Term Staffing Needs and Is Revising Its Controller Training Program
In addition to the 1,300 new controllers FAA plans to hire in fiscal years 1997 and 1998 to meet its short-term staffing needs, FAA plans to hire a large number of new controllers in fiscal years 1999 through 2002 to meet its long-term controller staffing needs. Because FAA does not know when these controllers will retire, it is uncertain when they will need to be replaced. Although FAA officials believe that revising the existing controller training program will reduce on-the-job training time and costs, this change could result in FAA incurring training costs currently being paid by controller candidates. FAA Has Identified Several Impediments That Hinder Its Ability to Staff ATC Facilities at Specified Levels
Controller staffing at the national and regional levels closely reflected the levels specified by the staffing standards. FAA Officials Identified Impediments That Contribute to Staffing Imbalances at ATC Facilities
FAA officials at the headquarters, regional, and facility levels identified a number of impediments that hinder FAA’s ability to reduce staffing differences at facilities where there are too many or too few controllers relative to their workloads. These impediments include FAA’s practice of not providing funds to move controllers until the end of the fiscal year, a practice that delays the prompt movement of controllers to fill vacancies, and regional officials’ inability to recruit local candidates to minimize controller transfers among facilities. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) efforts to address short- and long-term controller staffing needs, focusing on: (1) the key variables FAA uses to project future controller staffing needs and evaluate their reasonableness; (2) whether FAA has identified a sufficient number of controller candidates to satisfy its short- and long-term staffing needs and evaluate FAA's plans to train new controllers; and (3) impediments that hinder FAA from staffing air traffic control (ATC) facilities at specified levels.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) FAA uses two key variables to project future controller staffing needs; (2) while FAA's estimates of air traffic growth are reasonable, GAO's analysis indicated that FAA could be overstating retirements, which account for most controller attrition, for fiscal years (FY) 1999 through 2002; (3) rather than using actual information on controllers' age and service time to project future retirements, FAA bases its estimates on assumptions about when controllers will be eligible to retire; (4) FAA has identified a sufficient number of controller candidates to meet its short-term staffing needs in FY 1997 and 1998; (5) however, beyond FY 1998, it is uncertain whether current sources can provide the controller candidates FAA will need to meet its hiring goals for FY 1999 through 2002; (6) the majority of available candidates are controllers who were fired in 1981 and who FAA officials believe could be eligible to retire within a few years of reemployment; (7) however, FAA has not conducted any analysis to support this position; (8) to help meet its long-term hiring goals, FAA is expanding its collegiate program to include more schools and has reactivated the cooperative education program; (9) beginning in FY 1998, FAA will require that all new controllers receive some training at its Academy; (10) FAA believes that this will reduce on-the-job training time and costs; (11) this revision, however, could increase the federal costs of initial controller training because FAA will pay a portion of training expenses currently being paid by participants in the collegiate program; (12) FAA officials identified several principal impediments that hinder their ability to staff ATC facilities at specified levels; (13) the first is FAA headquarters' practice of generally not providing funds to relocate controllers until the end of the FY, which causes delayed controller moves and continued staffing imbalances; (14) the second impediment is the limited ability of regional officials to recruit controller candidates locally to fill vacancies at ATC facilities; (15) in addition, FAA regional officials also believe that limited hiring of new controllers in recent years has hindered their ability to fill vacancies; (16) partly due to these impediments, as of April 1996, about 53 percent of ATC facilities were not staffed at levels specified by FAA's staffing standards; (17) there are facilities where staffing differences are not justified; (18) FAA has implemented several initiatives to improve its ability to staff the facilities at specified levels; and (19) it is too early, however, to determine the effectiveness of these initiatives. |
gao_GAO-01-387T | gao_GAO-01-387T_0 | HIPAA does not allow HHS to preempt state privacy laws that are more protective of health information privacy. Privacy Regulation Establishes New Rights and Responsibilities
The new regulation establishes a minimum level of privacy protection for individually identifiable health information that is applicable nationwide. Patients’ Rights
The regulation protecting personal health information provides patients with a common set of rights regarding access to and use of their medical records. Specifically, the regulation provides patients the following:
Access to their medical records. At the same time, many groups voiced concerns about the merit, clarity, and practicality of certain requirements. Second, plans could include language in their contracts with physicians that would ensure access to patients’ medical record information. The American Health Information Management Association (AHIMA) similarly noted the timing issue for hospitals with respect to getting background medical information from a patient prior to admission. Conclusion
by stakeholder groups reflects the recent issuance of the regulation. With time, everyone will have greater opportunity to examine its provisions in detail and assess their implications for the ongoing operations of all those affected. In addition, on a more fundamental level, the uncertainty stems from HHS’ approach of allowing entities flexibility in complying with its requirements. Although organizations generally applaud this approach, they acknowledge that greater specificity would likely allay some of their compliance concerns. | What GAO Found
Advances in information technology, along with an increasing number of parties with access to identifiable health information, have created new challenges to maintaining the privacy of medical records. Patients and providers alike have expressed concern that broad access to medical records by insurers, employers, and others may result in inappropriate use of the information. Congress sought to protect the privacy of individuals' medical information as part of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA). HIPAA included a timetable for developing comprehensive privacy standards that would establish rights for patients with respect to their medical records and define the conditions for using and disclosing identifiable health information. The final privacy regulation offers all Americans the opportunity to know and, to some extent, control how physicians, hospitals, and health plans use their personal information. At the same time, these entities will face a complex set of privacy requirements that are not well understood at this time. Some of the uncertainty expressed by stakeholder groups reflects the recent issuance of the regulation. With time, everyone will have greater opportunity to examine its provisions and assess their implications for the ongoing operations of everyone affected. In addition, on a more fundamental level, the uncertainty stems from HHS' approach of allowing entities flexibility in complying with its requirements. Although organizations generally applaud this approach, they acknowledge that greater specificity would likely allay some of their compliance concerns. |
gao_AIMD-96-84 | gao_AIMD-96-84_0 | This unclassified but sensitive information constitutes a majority of the information on Defense computers. The Internet
The Internet is a global network interconnecting thousands of dissimilar computer networks and millions of computers worldwide. Therefore, only about 1 in 150 successful attacks drew an active defensive response from the organizations being tested. Attackers have stolen, modified, and destroyed both data and software. Other Attacks
The U.S. . . systems and networks is increasing . This is a concern because vulnerabilities in one part of Defense’s information infrastructure make the entire infrastructure vulnerable. Defense has developed training courses and curricula which focus on the secure operation of computer systems and the need to protect information. Firewalls permit authorized users to access and transmit privileged information and deny access to unauthorized users. The hundreds of thousands of attacks that Defense has already experienced demonstrate that (1) significant damage can be incurred by attackers and (2) attacks pose serious risks to national security. Recommendations
To better focus management attention on the Department’s increasing computer security threat and to ensure that a higher priority and sufficient resources are devoted to addressing this problem, we recommend that at a minimum the Secretary of Defense strengthen the Department’s information systems security program by developing departmentwide policies for preventing, detecting, and responding to attacks on Defense information systems, including mandating that (1) all security incidents be reported within the Department, (2) risk assessments be performed routinely to determine vulnerability to attacks and intrusions, (3) vulnerabilities and deficiencies be expeditiously corrected as they are identified, and (4) damage from intrusions be expeditiously assessed to ensure the integrity of data and systems compromised; requiring the military services and Defense agencies to use training and other mechanisms to increase awareness and accountability among installation commanders and all personnel as to the security risks of computer systems connected to the Internet and their responsibility for securing their systems; requiring information system security officers at all installations and setting specific standards for ensuring that these as well as system and network managers are given sufficient time and training to perform their duties appropriately; continually developing and cost-effectively using departmentwide network monitoring and protection technologies; and evaluating the incident response capabilities within DISA, the military services, and the Defense agencies to ensure that they are sufficient to handle the projected threat. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the extent to which Department of Defense (DOD) computer systems are attacked, focusing on the: (1) potential for further damage to DOD computer systems; and (2) challenges DOD faces in securing sensitive information on its computer systems.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) DOD relies on a complex information infrastructure to design weapons, identify and track enemy targets, pay soldiers, mobilize reservists, and manage supplies; (2) use of the Internet to enhance communication and information sharing has increased DOD exposure to attack, since the Internet provides unauthorized users a means to access DOD systems; (3) while the DOD information available on the Internet is unclassified, it is sensitive and must be restricted; (4) only about 1 in 500 attacks is detected and reported, but the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) estimates that DOD is attacked about 250,000 times per year; (5) attackers have stolen, modified, and destroyed data and software, disabled protection systems to allow future unauthorized access, and shut down entire systems and networks to preclude authorized use; (6) security breaches pose a serious risk to national security because terrorists or U.S. adversaries could disrupt the national information infrastructure; (7) security breaches cost DOD hundreds of millions of dollars annually; and (8) DOD needs to increase the resources devoted to computer security, update the policies that govern computer security, and increase security training for system and network administrators. |
gao_GGD-97-141 | gao_GGD-97-141_0 | The Postal Service is not identified as falling under any particular category of government corporation or government-created corporation-like organization. According to the Postal Service, its Board of Governors is comparable to the board of directors of a private sector corporation. To compare the characteristics of the boards of other government-created organizations with those of the Postal Service Board, we developed and sent a matrix to 11 boards, including the Postal Service Board. These organizations were described in a recent Price Waterhouse report as among the most “progressive postal administrations.”
In this report, we highlight differences between the Postal Service and the other government-created organizations as they apply to the four issues most frequently cited by current and former Board members as needing legislative attention. To provide the Subcommittee with additional information on governance issues that might be helpful in its deliberations on postal reform, we reviewed a broad range of available literature affecting both public and private boards. Areas Where a Majority of Interviewees Believed Legislative Attention Is Needed
A majority of the current and former members of the Postal Service Board of Governors whom we interviewed believed legislative attention may be warranted in three areas—the Board’s authority, Board members’ compensation, and Board members’ qualifications. Although there was no consensus among the members on the specific issues within each area of concern, several issues were mentioned frequently, and a number of legislative changes were offered for consideration. The most frequently cited issues were (1) the limitations on the Board’s authority to establish postage rates; (2) the inability of the Board to pay the PMG more than the rate for level I of the Executive Schedule—currently $148,400; (3) the Board’s lack of pay comparability with the private sector; and (4) qualification requirements that are too general to ensure that Board appointees possess the kind of experience necessary to oversee a major government business. Areas Where Some, but Less Than a Majority of, Interviewees Believed Legislative Attention Is Needed
In our discussions with current and former members of the Postal Service Board of Governors, we also identified areas where some, but less than a majority of, interviewees believed legislative attention is needed. Those areas were (1) the Board’s mission and responsibilities, (2) the Board’s relationship with postal management, (3) the Board’s accountability and performance measures, and (4) the Board’s composition and structure. One issue was the Board’s uncertainty as to how far it should go in letting the Postal Service compete and operate like a private sector corporation. The other issue concerned the limited specificity in law concerning the Board’s oversight responsibilities. The most frequently cited issue related to perceptions that the position of Chief Postal Inspector did not have all the independence necessary. The Postal Service’s General Counsel should be appointed by the Board and be directly accountable to the Board—similar to the suggestion concerning the Chief Postal Inspector. Board of Governors. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO obtained information on Postal Service governance issues, focusing on: (1) any major areas of concern, including specific issues, that current and former members of the Postal Service Board of Governors have about the Board and their suggested legislative changes; (2) major characteristics of the Postal Service's Board of Governors with the characteristics of selected boards of their government-created corporations or corporation-like organization to identity similarities and dissimilarities, particularly as they relate to the major areas of concern identified by current and former Board members; and (3) information on governance issues that might be helpful to the House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, Postal Service Subcommittee as it deliberates Postal Service reform.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) a majority of current and former members of the Postal Service Board of Governors GAO interviewed said legislative attention was needed in three broad areas; (2) however, there was not a consensus among the members on what the specific issues were within each area of concern, or what legislative changes should be considered to address their concerns; (3) the major areas of concern were the Board's authority, Board members' compensation, and Board members' qualifications; (4) within these broad areas of concern, the most frequently cited issues were: (a) the limitations on the Board's authority to establish postage rates; (b) the inability of the Board to pay the Postmaster General more than the rate for level I of the Executive Schedule; (c) the Board's lack of pay comparability with the private sector; and (d) qualification requirements that are too general to ensure that Board appointees possess the kind of experience necessary to oversee a major government business; (5) GAO's comparison of the Board of Governors with nine other boards of government-created organizations showed both similarities and dissimilarities; (6) similarities indicate that these boards were created to function much like private-sector corporate boards; (7) dissimilarities, however, reflect the amount of flexibility the boards were given to operate like private sector corporations; (8) GAO also identified four broad areas where some of the interviewees, but less than a majority, believed legislative attention was needed; (9) these areas were the Board's mission and responsibilities, the Board's relationship with Postal management, the Board's accountability and performance measures, and Board composition; (10) the most frequently cited issues in these areas were: (a) uncertainties as to how far the Board should go in letting the Postal Service compete and operate like a private-sector corporation; (b) the limited specificity in law concerning the Board's oversight responsibilities, and (c) perceptions that the Chief Postal Inspector may not have all the independence the position requires; and (11) the interviewees' concerns about many issues, such as Board authority, accountability, and how far to let the Postal Service go in competing and operating like a private sector corporation, are issues being grappled with in the larger context of streamlining government operations. |
gao_RCED-99-65 | gao_RCED-99-65_0 | Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
In response to a request from the Chairman, Subcommittee on Forests and Forest Health, we examined (1) the extent and seriousness of problems related to the health of national forests in the interior West, (2) the status of efforts by the Department of Agriculture’s Forest Service to address the most serious of these problems, and (3) barriers to successfully addressing these problems and options for overcoming them. Catastrophic Wildfires Threaten Resources and Communities
According to the Forest Service, about 39 million acres of tree stands on national forests of the interior West are at high risk of catastrophic fire, largely because the agency’s decades-old policy of suppressing historically occurring, periodic, small wildfires has led to unprecedented accumulations of flammable materials. National Forests in the Interior West Have Several Health Problems
According to the Forest Service, large areas of national forests in the interior West are not healthy. As figure 2.3 shows, over the last decade, the number of acres of national forestlands burned by wildfires has begun to increase, reversing the trend of the previous three-quarters of a century. As a result, catastrophic wildfires compromise the forests’ ability to sustain timber, outdoor recreation, clean water, and other uses. These increasing numbers of larger, more intense fires also pose hazards to human health, safety, and property. . . wildfires . Nonetheless, the agency may not be able to achieve its announced goal of adequately resolving the problem by the end of fiscal year 2015. In 1995, it announced its intention to refocus its fire management program on reducing accumulated fuels. To implement its increased emphasis on reducing accumulated fuels, the Forest Service restructured and redefined its fiscal year 1998 budget for wildland fire management to better ensure that funds are available for these activities. The Congress Has Increasingly Supported the Agency’s Efforts
The Congress has supported the Forest Service’s efforts to reduce accumulated fuels by, among other things, increasing the funding for this activity. Our analysis of the agency’s initial plans and data indicates that as many as about 10 million acres in the interior West may still have excessive fuel levels and still be at high risk of uncontrollable, catastrophic wildfire at the end of fiscal year 2015. The Agency Lacks a Cohesive Strategy for Addressing Several Barriers to Effective Action
Without adequate data, the Forest Service has not been able to develop a cohesive strategy for addressing numerous policy, programmatic, and budgetary factors that present significant barriers to the accomplishment of its fuel reduction goals. The increasing number of uncontrollable and often catastrophic wildfires in the interior West, as well as the significant costs to reduce growing hazards to natural resources and human health, safety, property, and infrastructure, present difficult policy decisions for the Forest Service and the Congress: Does the agency request, and does the Congress appropriate, the hundreds of millions of dollars a year that may be required to fund an aggressive fuel reduction program? 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 11. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on: (1) the extent and seriousness of forest-health-related problems in national forests in the interior West; (2) the status of efforts by the Forest Service to address the most serious of these problems; and (3) barriers to successfully addressing these problems and options for overcoming them.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the most extensive and serious problem related to the health of national forests in the interior West is the overaccumulation of vegetation, which has caused an increasing number of large, intense, uncontrollable, and catastrophically destructive wildfires; (2) according to the Forest Service, 39 million acres in national forests in the interior West are at high risk of catastrophic wildfire; (3) past management practices, especially the Forest Service's decades-old policy of putting out wildfires in the national forests, disrupted the historical occurrence of frequent low-intensity fires, which had periodically removed flammable undergrowth without significantly damaging larger trees; (4) because this normal cycle of fire was disrupted, vegetation has accumulated, creating high levels of fuels for catastrophic wildfires and transforming much of the region into a tinderbox; (5) the number of large wildfires, and of acres burned by them, has increased over the last decade, as have the costs of attempting to put them out; (6) these fires not only compromise the forests' ability to provide timber, outdoor recreation, clean water, and other resources, but they also pose increasingly grave risks to human health, safety, property, and infrastructure, especially along the boundaries of forests, where population has grown significantly in recent years; (7) during the 1990s, the Forest Service began to address the unintended consequences of its policy of putting out wildfires; (8) in 1997, it announced its goal to improve forest health by resolving the problems of uncontrollable, catastrophic wildfires in national forests by the end of fiscal year 2015; (9) to accomplish this goal, it has: (a) initiated a program to monitor forest health; (b) refocused its wildland fire management program to increase the number of acres on which it reduces the accumulated vegetation that forms excessive fuels; and (c) restructured its budget to better ensure that funds are available for reducing these fuels; (10) Congress has supported the Forest Service's efforts by increasing the funds for reducing fuels and authorizing a multiyear program to better assess problems and solutions; (11) the Forest Service has not yet developed a cohesive strategy for addressing several factors that present significant barriers to improving the health of the national forests by reducing fuels; and (12) many acres of national forests in the interior West may remain at high risk of uncontrollable wildfire at the end of fiscal year 2015. |
gao_GAO-14-322 | gao_GAO-14-322_0 | Testing of Critical Software Poses a Significant Challenge to the Delivery of F- 35 Warfighting Capabilities
Delays in the testing of critical mission systems software have put the delivery of expected warfighting capabilities to the Marine Corps at risk, and could affect the delivery of capabilities to the Air Force and Navy as well. F-35 developmental flight testing is separated into two key areas: mission systems and flight sciences. Mission systems testing is done to verify that the software and systems that provide critical warfighting capabilities function properly and meet requirements, while flight science testing is done to verify the aircraft’s basic flying capabilities. In a March 2013 report we found that development and testing of mission systems software was behind schedule, due largely to delayed software deliveries, limited capability in the software when delivered, and the need to fix problems and retest multiple software versions. The Director of Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E) predicts that the delivery of expected warfighting capabilities to the Marine Corps could be delayed by as much as 13 months. Delays of this magnitude could also increase the already significant concurrency between testing and aircraft procurement and result in additional cost growth. Although mission systems testing is behind, the F-35 program has been able to accomplish nearly all of its planned flight science testing. At this time it is not clear exactly which of the expected capabilities will be available as testing is still ongoing. However, given the uncertainty in mission systems software testing and the significance of the F-35 to future force structure plans, it is important that the military services have a clear understanding of the specific capabilities that they can realistically expect to receive, and those capabilities that are not likely to be delivered by their initial operational capability dates—the first of which is scheduled for July 2015. In addition, because the F-35 is DOD’s most costly and ambitious acquisition program, it is important that DOD keep Congress informed about the status of the program. Without a clear understanding of the specific capabilities that will initially be delivered, Congress and the military services may not be able to make fully informed resource allocation decisions. The F-35 program is also scheduled to begin operational testing in June 2015, to determine that the aircraft variants can effectively perform their intended missions in a realistic threat environment. Program Progress in Addressing Key Technical Risks Has Been Mixed
While the F-35 program made progress addressing some key technical risks in 2013, it continued to encounter slower than expected progress in developing the Autonomic Logistics Information System (ALIS). The program is reducing unit costs to meet targets, but a significant amount of additional cost reduction is needed if it expects to meet those targets before the beginning of full rate production—currently scheduled for 2019. Additionally, the most recent life-cycle sustainment cost estimate for the F-35 fleet is more than $1 trillion, which DOD officials have deemed unaffordable. The program’s long term sustainment estimates reflect assumptions about key cost drivers that the program does not control, including fuel costs, labor costs, and inflation rates. From fiscal year 2014 through fiscal year 2037, the program projects that it will require, on average, development and procurement funding of $12.6 billion per year, with several peak years at around $15 billion. Estimated Sustainment Costs Remain High but Emphasis on Improving Reliability Could Reduce Costs
In addition to the concerns about the affordability of the F-35 acquisition program, there are also significant concerns about the cost of operating and supporting the F-35 fleet over the coming decades. As the number of aircraft in production has increased, learning has taken place and manufacturing efficiency has improved. For example, the prime contractor has seen reductions in overall labor hours needed to manufacture the aircraft. In 2013, the contractor delivered 35 aircraft to the government, 5 more than it delivered in 2012 and 26 more than it delivered in 2011. The prime contractor has put in place a supplier management system to oversee key supplier performance allowing them to identify poor performers and take appropriate action to address issues such as part shortages and poor quality. Eventually, DOD will have to make contingency plans for these and other issues. The results of this assessment should be shared with Congress and the military services as soon as possible but no later than July 2015. DOD concurred with our recommendation. DOD agreed with GAO’s observations. Appendix Il: Scope and Methodology
To assess the program’s ongoing development and testing we reviewed the status of software development and integration and contractor management improvement initiatives. We obtained and analyzed data on flights and test points, both planned and accomplished during 2013. Joint Strike Fighter: Progress Made and Challenges Remain. | Why GAO Did This Study
The F-35 Lightning II, also known as the Joint Strike Fighter, is DOD's most costly and ambitious acquisition program. The program seeks to develop and field three aircraft variants for the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps and eight international partners. The F-35 is integral to U.S. and international plans to replace existing fighter aircraft and support future combat operations. Total U.S. planned investment in the F-35 program is approaching $400 billion to develop and acquire 2,457 aircraft through 2037, plus hundreds of billions of dollars in long-term spending to operate and maintain the aircraft.
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 mandated that GAO review the F-35 acquisition program annually for 6 years. In this, GAO's fifth annual report on the F-35, GAO assesses the program's (1) ongoing development and testing, (2) long-term affordability, and (3) manufacturing progress.
GAO reviewed and analyzed manufacturing data through December 2013, program test plans, and internal DOD analyses, and spoke with DOD, program, and contractor officials.
What GAO Found
Delays in developmental flight testing of the F-35's critical software may hinder delivery of the warfighting capabilities the military services expect. F-35 developmental flight testing comprises two key areas: mission systems and flight sciences. Mission systems testing verifies that the software-intensive systems that provide critical warfighting capabilities function properly and meet requirements, while flight sciences testing verifies the aircraft's basic flying capabilities. Challenges in development and testing of mission systems software continued through 2013, due largely to delays in software delivery, limited capability in the software when delivered, and the need to fix problems and retest multiple software versions. The Director of Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E) predicts delivery of warfighting capabilities could be delayed by as much as 13 months. Delays of this magnitude will likely limit the warfighting capabilities that are delivered to support the military services' initial operational capabilities—the first of which is scheduled for July 2015—and at this time it is not clear what those specific capabilities will be because testing is still ongoing. In addition, delays could increase the already significant concurrency between testing and aircraft procurement and result in additional cost growth. Without a clear understanding of the specific capabilities that will initially be delivered, Congress and the military services may not be able to make fully informed resource allocation decisions. Flight sciences testing has seen better progress, as the F-35 program has been able to accomplish nearly all of its planned test flights and test points. Testing of the aircraft's operational capabilities in a realistic threat environment is scheduled to begin in 2015. The program has continued to make progress in addressing some key technical risks.
To execute the program as planned, the Department of Defense (DOD) will have to increase funds steeply over the next 5 years and sustain an average of $12.6 billion per year through 2037; for several years, funding requirements will peak at around $15 billion. Annual funding of this magnitude clearly poses long-term affordability risks given the current fiscal environment. The program has been directed to reduce unit costs to meet established affordability targets before full-rate production begins in 2019, but meeting those targets will be challenging as significant cost reductions are needed. Additionally, the most recent cost estimate for operating and supporting the F-35 fleet is more than $1 trillion, which DOD officials have deemed unaffordable. This estimate reflects assumptions about key cost drivers the program can control, like aircraft reliability, and those it cannot control, including fuel costs, labor costs, and inflation rates. Reliability is lower than expected for two variants, and DOT&E reports that the F-35 program has limited additional opportunities to improve reliability.
Aircraft manufacturing continued to improve in 2013, and management of the supply chain is evolving. As the number of aircraft in production has increased, critical learning has taken place and manufacturing efficiency has improved. For example, the prime contractor has seen reductions in overall labor hours needed to manufacture the aircraft, as expected. In 2013, the contractor delivered 35 aircraft to the government, 5 more than it delivered in 2012 and 26 more than it delivered in 2011. The prime contractor has put in place a supplier management system to oversee key supplier performance.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOD assess and identify the specific capabilities that realistically can be delivered to the military services to support their respective initial operational capabilities, and share its findings with the Congress and military services prior to July 2015. DOD concurred with this recommendation. |
gao_GAO-12-2 | gao_GAO-12-2_0 | The agency may place the foster child in the home of a relative or with unrelated foster parents. TANF Child-Only Cases Have Increased Slightly, and the Composition of the Caseload Varies by State
The TANF child-only caseload increased slightly between fiscal years 2000 and 2008, but comprised a greater share of the overall TANF caseload because TANF cases with adults in the assistance unit decreased substantially. 1). The majority of families who received TANF child-only assistance included children living with parents who were ineligible for cash assistance, and about one-third included children living with nonparent caregivers. For example, as reported through our survey, almost 60 percent of TANF child-only cases in Tennessee included children living with nonparent caregivers, compared with 31 percent in Texas. Research suggests that many relative caregivers receiving cash assistance have low incomes and health problems. 4). Children who live with nonparents and receive TANF child-only assistance tend to be over 10 years old, related to their nonparent caregiver, and on assistance for at least 2 years (see table 2). Some children living with nonparents who receive TANF child-only assistance live with nonparent caregivers as a result of parental abuse or neglect, but the extent to which these children have had involvement with the state’s child welfare agency is unclear because few states collect this information. Child Welfare Involvement and Funding Availability Influence Benefit Levels and Services for Children Living with Nonparents
Benefits and Services Available to Children Living with Nonparents Depend on Child Welfare Involvement and Licensing Status of Caregiver
A child’s circumstances, level of child welfare agency involvement, and licensing status of the caregiver influence whether a child is eligible for a foster care payment or a TANF child-only payment (see fig. For one child, the national average minimum monthly foster care payment is $511 while the average TANF child-only payment is $249 (see table 3). Many children in state custody live with relatives who do not receive foster care payments because they are not licensed foster parents. Coordination Efforts Between TANF and Child Welfare Programs Can Affect Access to Services
Several State and Local Efforts Are Under Way to Coordinate TANF and Child Welfare Programs
Several states have initiated efforts to coordinate TANF and child welfare programs to better serve children living with relative caregivers. These efforts include colocating TANF and child welfare services in the same building and working together on case planning. To promote coordination between TANF and child welfare programs, HHS’ Administration for Children and Families (ACF) provided approximately $3.5 million per year for five years in grants to states and tribes. Limited Information Sharing Can Hinder Relative Caregiver Access to Available Benefits and Services
Information sharing between TANF and child welfare programs can benefit children living with relative caregivers, but our review in states where we performed site visits suggests this does not occur consistently. In addition to providing federal funding for the development of SACWIS, HHS provides guidance and technical assistance to help states develop child welfare information systems that can interact with TANF information systems, but more than half the states report obstacles to sharing information, such as privacy concerns and technical challenges. Although some states are currently sharing data, others indicated they are not due to confidentiality and privacy concerns. Specifically, we: analyzed publicly available Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) active caseload data from the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), including the number and types of families receiving TANF cash assistance and the characteristics of children and nonparent caregivers in TANF child-only cases; analyzed HHS’ Adoption and Foster Care Analysis and Reporting System (AFCARS) data reported by states including the number of foster children, number of foster children living with relatives, and the number receiving federally supported foster care payments; conducted a nationwide survey of state TANF administrators and a separate nationwide survey of state child welfare administrators; visited three states and selected localities within each state and interviewed officials administering TANF and child welfare programs; interviewed officials from HHS and reviewed pertinent federal laws, regulations, and agency guidance; and interviewed researchers and others knowledgeable about TANF and child welfare programs from a range of organizations. The child welfare survey included questions about: the financial assistance and services available to children in foster care, the extent to which relative homes are licensed as foster parents, kinship care programs, implementation of subsidized guardianship, coordination between TANF and child welfare programs, and the factors influencing the assistance available to children living with relative caregivers. Subsidized guardianship may not be a viable option for most children in TANF child-only cases because most of the children are not in state custody, and the relative caregivers are not licensed, according to some of the researchers we interviewed. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 2010, over 40 percent of families receiving cash assistance through the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program were "child-only," meaning the adults in the household were not included in the benefit calculation, and aid was provided only for the children. TANF and child welfare programs provide cash assistance and other services that support children living with nonparent caregivers. The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) Administration for Children and Families (ACF) oversees TANF and child welfare programs, which are administered by states. GAO was asked to examine the (1) trends and composition of the child-only caseload, (2) characteristics of caregivers and children in nonparent child-only cases, (3) factors influencing the level of benefits and services for children with non-parent caregivers, and (4) coordination efforts between state TANF and child welfare programs. GAO analyzed federal TANF and child welfare data; surveyed states; interviewed HHS officials and researchers; and conducted site visits in Tennessee, Texas, and Washington, selected for variation in TANF caseload characteristics and implementation of programs to support relative caregivers.
What GAO Found
Between fiscal years 2000 and 2008, TANF child-only cases increased slightly but represented a greater share of the overall TANF caseload because cases with adults in the assistance unit experienced a significant decline. The national composition of the TANF child-only caseload has remained relatively unchanged since 2000. At the end of 2010, the majority of children receiving TANF lived with parents who were ineligible for cash assistance, and one-third lived with nonparent caregivers who were relatives or unrelated adults. However, this composition varies by state. For example, in Tennessee, almost 60 percent of the TANF child-only caseload included children living with nonparent caregivers, compared with about 30 percent in Texas. Most nonparent caregivers in TANF child-only cases are unmarried women who are over 50 years old, and research suggests that they often have low incomes and health problems. The children tend to be related to their caregiver, who is often a grandparent, and they remain on assistance for at least 2 years. Some of these children live with nonparent caregivers as a result of parental abuse or neglect, substance abuse, incarceration, or mental illness, but these circumstances may or may not be known by the child welfare agency. The level of benefits and services available to children living with nonparents depends on the extent to which a child welfare agency becomes involved in the family's situation and the licensing status of the caregiver. Children in foster care with licensed foster parents are generally eligible for greater benefits and services than children in other living arrangements, who may receive TANF child-only assistance. For one child, the national average minimum monthly foster care payment is $511 while the average TANF child-only payment is $249. Most children live with relatives who do not receive foster care payments because they are not licensed foster parents or they are in informal arrangements without child welfare involvement. Other factors influencing the assistance made available to children in a relative's care include available federal funding, state budget constraints, and increased state efforts to identify relative caregivers to prevent children from being placed in the foster care system. Several state and local efforts are under way to coordinate TANF and child welfare services to better serve children living with relative caregivers, but information sharing is a challenge. Coordination efforts include colocating TANF and child welfare services and having staff from each agency work together to help relative caregivers access services. ACF currently provides grants to states and tribes to support collaboration between TANF and child welfare programs and plans to disseminate the findings. However, information and data sharing between the two programs does not occur consistently, which can hinder relatives' access to available benefits. For example, although HHS provides funding, guidance, and technical assistance to promote data sharing between TANF and child welfare programs, more than half of states reported obstacles to sharing data, such as privacy concerns.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends the Secretary of HHS direct ACF to provide more guidance on data sharing opportunities. HHS agreed with GAO's recommendation. |
gao_GAO-08-449T | gao_GAO-08-449T_0 | Background
VA’s mission is to promote the health, welfare, and dignity of all veterans in recognition of their service to the nation by ensuring that they receive medical care, benefits, social support, and lasting memorials. Over time, the use of IT has become increasingly crucial to the department’s efforts to provide such benefits and services. VA Establishes Centralized Management Structure to Improve IT Accountability
The department officially began its initiative to provide the CIO with greater authority over the department’s IT in October 2005. Important Steps Taken to Centralize Control of IT Resources but Their Effectiveness Will Depend on Additional Planned Actions
As part of its IT realignment, VA has taken important steps toward a more disciplined approach to ensuring oversight of and accountability for the department’s IT budget and resources. Within the new centralized management structure, the CIO is responsible for ensuring that there are adequate controls over the department’s IT budget and for overseeing capital planning and execution. In this regard, the department has (1) designated organizations with specific roles and responsibilities for controlling the budget to report directly to the CIO; (2) implemented an IT governance structure that assigns budget oversight responsibilities to specific governance boards; (3) finalized an IT strategic plan to guide, manage, and implement its operations and investments; (4) completed multi-year budget guidance to improve management of its IT; and (5) initiated the implementation of critical management processes. However, while VA has taken these important steps toward establishing control of the department’s IT, it remains too early to assess their overall impact because most of the actions taken have only recently become operational or have not yet been fully implemented. Thus, their effectiveness in ensuring accountability for the resources and budget has not yet been clearly established. As a second step, the department has established and activated three governance boards to facilitate budget oversight and management of its investments. However, according to Office of Information and Technology officials, with the governance boards’ first involvement in budget oversight having only recently begun (in May 2007), and with their activities to date being primarily focused on formulation of the fiscal year 2009 budget and execution of the fiscal year 2008 budget, none of the boards has yet been involved in all stages of the budget formulation and execution processes. Thus, they have not yet fully established their effectiveness in helping to ensure overall accountability for the department’s IT appropriations. Office of Information and Technology officials stated that, in response to operational experience with the 2009 budget formulation and 2008 budget execution, the department plans to further enhance the governance structure. Nevertheless, although the multi-year programming guidance holds promise for obtaining better information for portfolio management, the guidance has not been fully implemented because it is applicable to future budgets (for fiscal years 2010 through 2012). As a result, it is too early to determine VA’s effectiveness in implementing this guidance, and ultimately, its impact on the department’s IT portfolio management. However, while the department had originally stated that its new management processes would be implemented by July 2008, the IT strategic plan indicates that key elements of these processes are not expected to be completed until at least fiscal year 2011. | Why GAO Did This Study
The use of information technology (IT) is crucial to the Department of Veterans Affairs' (VA) mission to promote the health, welfare, and dignity of all veterans in recognition of their service to the nation. In this regard, the department's fiscal year 2009 budget proposal includes about $2.4 billion to support IT development, operations, and maintenance. VA has, however, experienced challenges in managing its IT projects and initiatives, including cost overruns, schedule slippages, and performance problems. In an effort to confront these challenges, the department is undertaking a realignment to centralize its IT management structure. This testimony summarizes the department's actions to realign its management structure to provide greater authority and accountability over its IT budget and resources and the impact of these actions to date. In developing this testimony, GAO reviewed previous work on the department's realignment and related budget issues, analyzed pertinent documentation, and interviewed VA officials to determine the current status and impact of the department's efforts to centralize the management of its IT budget and operations.
What GAO Found
As part of its IT realignment, VA has taken important steps toward a more disciplined approach to ensuring oversight of and accountability for the department's IT budget and resources. For example, the department's chief information officer (CIO) now has responsibility for ensuring that there are controls over the budget and for overseeing all capital planning and execution, and has designated leadership to assist in overseeing functions such as portfolio management and IT operations. In addition, the department has established and activated three governance boards to facilitate budget oversight and management of its investments. Further, VA has approved an IT strategic plan that aligns with priorities identified in the department's strategic plan and has provided multi-year budget guidance to achieve a more disciplined approach for future budget formulation and execution. While these steps are critical to establishing control of the department's IT, it remains too early to assess their overall impact because most of the actions taken have only recently become operational or have not been fully implemented. Thus, their effectiveness in ensuring accountability for the resources and budget has not yet been clearly established. For example, according to Office of Information and Technology officials, the governance boards' first involvement in budget oversight only recently began (in May 2007) with activities to date focused primarily on formulation of the fiscal year 2009 budget and on execution of the fiscal year 2008 budget. Thus, none of the boards has yet been involved in all aspects of the budget formulation and execution processes and, as a result, their ability to help ensure overall accountability for the department's IT appropriations has not yet been fully established. In addition, because the multi-year programming guidance is applicable to future budgets (for fiscal years 2010 through 2012), it is too early to determine VA's effectiveness in implementing this guidance. Further, VA is in the initial stages of developing management processes that are critical to centralizing its control over the budget. However, while the department had originally stated that the processes would be implemented by July 2008, it now indicates that implementation across the department will not be completed until at least 2011. Until VA fully institutes its oversight measures and management processes, it risks not realizing their contributions to, and impact on, improved IT oversight and accountability within the department. |
gao_GAO-12-50 | gao_GAO-12-50_0 | 1). 2). Army and Marine Corps Have Captured Limited Information on Language and Culture Predeployment Training for Ongoing Operations
The Army and Marine Corps have captured some information at the unit level for those service members who completed language and culture predeployment training for ongoing operations. Service documents also note that language and culture training completion and corresponding proficiency should be documented in service-level systems. While the Army collects some language proficiency data within this system, the Army considers these data unreliable because of weaknesses in its approach to collecting them. In January 2011, the Army established a task force to improve the accuracy of information on service members’ language proficiency available within the Total Army Personnel Database. At the time of our review, the Army Language Tracking Task Force had identified a number of key tasks and was at varying stages of completing its work. However, although several language training programs met the criteria established in DOD and service guidance, we found that the Marine Corps had not required marines who completed significant language training to take a Defense Language Proficiency Test system of tests to measure their language proficiency. Therefore, the Marine Corps does not have language proficiency data for these marines. By not capturing information within service-level training and personnel systems on the training that general purpose forces have completed and the proficiency they gained from training, the Army and Marine Corps do not have the information they need to effectively leverage the language and culture knowledge and skills of these forces when making individual assignments and assessing future operational needs. Army and Marine Corps Have Not Developed Plans to Sustain Language Skills Already Acquired through Predeployment Training
DOD and service guidance address the need to sustain language skills and the DOD strategic plan for language, regional, and culture skills calls for the services to build on existing language skills for future needs. Officials with Army and Marine Corps units preparing for deployment and those deployed in Afghanistan reported that some informal follow-on training programs were available to service members to sustain language skills, for example, utilizing self-directed learning tools such as computer-based training programs. The Marine Corps is not planning to sustain the Afghan language skills of marines that were acquired through predeployment training with a formal training program. In the absence of formal sustainment training to maintain and build upon service members’ language skills acquired for ongoing operations at considerable expense in time and resources, the Army and Marine Corps may miss opportunities to capitalize on the investments they have already made to provide predeployment language training. However, by not capturing information within service-level training and personnel systems on the completion of language and culture training and corresponding proficiency gained from training, the Army and Marine Corps do not have the information they need to effectively leverage the language and culture knowledge and skills of these forces when making individual assignments and assessing future operational needs. Despite the fact that the Army and Marine Corps have made considerable investments to provide some service members with extensive predeployment language training, the services have not determined which service members require follow-on training to sustain language skills, the amount of training required, or appropriate mechanisms for delivering the training. First, DOD pointed out that our report noted the extent to which the Army and Marine Corps used service-level training and personnel systems to record service members’ proficiency gained from predeployment training that meets DOD’s definition of “significant language training.” DOD stated that, since it believed the current definition in the report may have taken the definition out of context, it would like to clarify what constitutes a “significant language training event,” noting that DOD Instruction 5160.71 defines such an event as “at least 150 hours of immersion training or 6 consecutive weeks of 5-hours-a day classroom training, or other significant event as defined by the Secretaries of the Military Departments and the Heads of Defense Agencies and DOD Field Activities.” DOD stated that this definition was not intended to be associated with the initial acquisition of a language, but rather is associated with modifying the retesting interval for someone who has already achieved a measured proficiency. To evaluate the extent to which the Army and Marine Corps captured information within service-level training and personnel systems on the completion of language and culture training and proficiency gained by personnel through training, we focused on Army and Marine Corps language and culture predeployment training programs administered since 2009 to prepare general purpose forces for ongoing operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Defense (DOD) has emphasized the importance of developing language skills and knowledge of foreign cultures to meet current and future needs and is investing millions of dollars to provide language and culture predeployment training to its general purpose forces. DOD has also noted that such training should be viewed as a long-term investment and that training and personnel systems should better account for the knowledge and skills of service members acquired through training to help manage its forces. The committee report accompanying a proposed bill for the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011 (H.R. 5136) directed GAO to review language and culture training for Army and Marine Corps general purpose forces. For this report, GAO evaluated the extent to which these services (1) captured information in training and personnel systems on the completion of language and culture predeployment training and proficiency gained from training and (2) developed plans to sustain language skills acquired through predeployment training. GAO analyzed service documents and interviewed cognizant officials.
What GAO Found
The Army and Marine Corps have documented some information at the unit level for service members who completed language and culture predeployment training, but the services have not fully captured information within service-level training and personnel systems on service members who completed training or their corresponding proficiency. DOD and service guidance require the services to document language and culture training completion and proficiency gained from training in service-level systems. However, GAO identified several factors that limited the services' ability to implement this guidance. For example, the Army's primary training system did not have data fields for all mandatory language and culture tasks and, as a result, units were unable to document the completion of this training. In addition, while the Army collects some language proficiency data within its primary personnel system, the Army considers these data unreliable because of weaknesses in its approach to collecting them. To improve the accuracy of information within this system, the Army established a task force in January 2011, which has identified a number of key tasks and is at varying stages of completing its work. The Marine Corps did not document language and culture predeployment training completion in any servicewide training or personnel system and a system has not been designated for this purpose. Further, the Marine Corps had not required marines who completed significant language training to take formal proficiency tests and, therefore, the service did not have language proficiency data for these marines. By not capturing information within service-level training and personnel systems on the training that general purpose forces have completed and the language proficiency gained from training, the Army and Marine Corps do not have the information they need to effectively leverage the language and culture knowledge and skills of these forces when making individual assignments and assessing future operational needs. The Army and Marine Corps have not developed plans to sustain language skills already acquired through predeployment training. The services have made considerable investments to provide some service members with extensive predeployment language training. For example, as of July 2011, over 800 soldiers have completed about 16 weeks of Afghan language training since 2010 at a cost of about $12 million. DOD and service guidance address the need to sustain language skills and the DOD strategic plan for language, regional, and culture skills calls for the services to build on existing language skills for future needs. However, we found that the services had not yet determined which service members require follow-on language training to sustain skills, the amount of training required, or appropriate mechanisms to deliver the training. Although informal follow-on training programs were available to sustain language skills, such as computer-based training, these programs were voluntary. In the absence of formal sustainment training programs to maintain and build upon service members' language skills, the Army and Marine Corps may miss opportunities to capitalize on the investments they have already made to provide predeployment language training for ongoing operations. GAO made recommendations intended to improve the availability of information on training completion and proficiency and help DOD plan for sustainment training. DOD generally agreed with the recommendations, but stated that the definition of significant language training was not intended to describe training for initial skills. However, DOD noted that current guidance does not preclude language proficiency testing at this stage. |
gao_GAO-09-541 | gao_GAO-09-541_0 | After the 2005 Gulf Coast hurricanes, the Louisiana Commissioner of Administration created the Disaster Recovery Unit within OCD to administer the state’s share of CDBG disaster relief funds. Both Louisiana and Mississippi devoted most of their allocations toward housing assistance, with a majority directed toward homeowners. This helped Mississippi to avoid many of the challenges and delays that Louisiana would experience as discussed in the next section of this report. Federal Guidance Was Insufficient to Address Louisiana’s Approach to Housing Recovery
As Louisiana and Mississippi planned their housing recovery efforts, Louisiana designed different solutions than Mississippi did. Louisiana initially adopted a plan that tied federal funds to home reconstruction and controlled the flow of funds to homeowners while Mississippi paid homeowners for their losses regardless of their intentions to rebuild. Specifically, Louisiana initially created a program that incorporated certain elements from two different housing recovery program models: compensation and rehabilitation. Although there is no written guidance distinguishing between the two models, HUD officials explained to us what the major differences are between the two programs. Generally, in a rehabilitation program, funds are used explicitly for repairs or reconstruction projects. In contrast, a compensation program disburses grant payments directly to homeowners for the damages they suffered regardless of whether they intend to repair or rebuild. As a result, Louisiana encountered many challenges to implementing its recovery efforts that Mississippi did not. In Louisiana, there were two major problems stemming from its particular program and funding designs. According to HUD officials, they found that the program was operating more like a rehabilitation program— meaning that CDBG funds were paying for home repairs and reconstruction exclusively—and therefore, participating homes were subject to site-by-site environmental reviews. Conflicting Federal Determinations Hindered Coordination of Federal Funding Sources
While the CDBG program provided much of the federal assistance in the aftermath of the 2005 Gulf Coast hurricanes, several other federal programs provided assistance to Louisiana to support the state’s comprehensive long-term recovery efforts, including among others, FEMA’s Hazard Mitigation Grant Program (HMGP). FEMA Accepted Revised HMGP Application, but Delays Continued
Louisiana successfully redesigned the program to use HMGP funding primarily for elevation grants, but the vast majority of homeowners have yet to receive funds. Homeowner demand for the projects has been less than expected, in part because of the length of time it has taken to develop and implement the program. Louisiana and Mississippi Took Similar Approaches to Address Human Capital Needs for Unprecedented Program Size
In the immediate aftermath of such a catastrophic disaster, Louisiana and Mississippi state development agencies lacked sufficient capacity to effectively manage billions of dollars in federal assistance. Both States Hired Additional State Agency Staff and Private Contractors
Officials from the state development agencies—OCD and MDA— recognized the need to build the states’ organizational capacities to address the enormous task of developing and managing massive housing recovery programs. The lump-sum compensation design that both Louisiana and Mississippi ultimately chose channeled CDBG funds to homeowners with fewer assurances to the states that people would actually rebuild and contribute to community development. To identify Louisiana’s and Mississippi’s priorities and how those priorities changed over time, we obtained and reviewed state planning documents and budget data from April 2006 to September 2008 and interviewed state program and budget officials responsible for administering and managing CDBG programs in Louisiana and Mississippi. To determine what challenges states faced with their housing recovery programs, we relied primarily on testimonial evidence from key federal officials at HUD headquarters in Washington, D.C.; HUD field offices in New Orleans, Louisiana and Jackson, Mississippi; the Office of the Federal Coordinator for Gulf Coast Rebuilding; and FEMA, as well as key state officials in Louisiana and Mississippi. | Why GAO Did This Study
Almost 4 years after the 2005 Gulf Coast hurricanes, the region continues to face daunting rebuilding challenges. To date, $19.7 billion in Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) funds have been appropriated for Gulf Coast rebuilding assistance--the largest amount in the history of the program. GAO was asked to report on (1) how Louisiana and Mississippi allocated their shares of CDBG funds, (2) what difficulties Louisiana faced in administering its housing recovery program, and (3) what human capital challenges Louisiana and Mississippi encountered and the efforts taken to address those challenges. GAO interviewed federal and state officials and reviewed budget data, federal regulations, and state policies and planning documents.
What GAO Found
Louisiana and Mississippi received the largest shares of CDBG disaster funds and targeted the majority toward homeowner assistance, allocating the rest to economic development, infrastructure, and other projects. Between 2006 and 2008, Louisiana's total allocation devoted to housing increased from 77 to 86 percent while Mississippi's decreased from 63 to 52 percent as the state focused on economic development. With homeowners as the primary focus, Louisiana initially adopted a plan that linked federal funds to home reconstruction and controlled the flow of funds to homeowners, while Mississippi paid homeowners for their losses regardless of their intentions to rebuild. This helped Mississippi avoid challenges that Louisiana would encounter, but with fewer assurances that people would actually rebuild. Louisiana's approach to housing recovery created a program that incorporated certain elements from two different models--compensation and rehabilitation--funded with multiple federal funding streams. While there is no written guidance that distinguishes between the two models, Housing and Urban Development (HUD) explained the major differences. In a rehabilitation model, funds are used explicitly for repairs or reconstruction, requiring site-specific environmental reviews. In contrast, a compensation program disburses funds directly to homeowners for damages suffered regardless of whether they intend to rebuild and does not trigger site-specific environmental reviews. Federal guidance was insufficient to address Louisiana's program and funding designs. Two major problems stemmed from the state's approach. First, HUD and the state disagreed as to whether the incremental disbursement of funds subjected homeowners' properties to environmental reviews. Despite many iterations of the program, HUD ordered a cease and desist of the program, leading the state to abandon its original plans and issue lump-sum payments to recipients. Continual revision and re-submittal of the design contributed to a 12-month evolution of the program. Second, conflicting federal determinations hindered coordination of CDBG and the Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA) Hazard Mitigation Grant Program (HMGP) funds. According to state officials, the Federal Coordinator for Gulf Coast Rebuilding advised them to use most of the HMGP funds to acquire properties through their housing recovery program. FEMA rejected this plan, in part, because it determined that the program gave preference to the elderly. However, HUD is subject to similar legal requirements and did not find the program discriminatory. Louisiana changed its plans and used HMGP funds for a home elevation program. In sum, it took FEMA and the state over a year to reach agreement, delaying assistance to homeowners. In the immediate aftermath of the 2005 hurricanes, Louisiana and Mississippi lacked sufficient capacity to suddenly administer and manage CDBG programs of such unprecedented size. Both states created new offices to direct disaster recovery efforts and hired additional state agency staff and private contractors to implement homeowner assistance programs. |
gao_GAO-01-327 | gao_GAO-01-327_0 | In addition to uncertainties over the future market price of power, TVA’s future competitive position will be affected by a number of issues, including the specific requirements of any legislation that might remove TVA’s legislative protections, including whether it would be able to retain some or all of the competitive advantages described previously; actions being taken by TVA to prepare for competition in relation to those being taken by TVA’s competitors; the amount of time before TVA might lose its protections from competition and is required to compete with other utilities—the longer TVA is legislatively protected from competition, the longer it will have to reduce its debt and related financing costs and recover deferred costs through rates; the extent to which TVA would write off all or a portion of the cost of its deferred nuclear units to retained earnings should it go from a regulated to a restructured, competitive environment. Conclusions
If TVA were to lose its legislative protections today, its high level of debt and corresponding high financing costs would be a competitive challenge. This competitive challenge would be even greater if it were at the same time attempting to recover costs of deferred assets through rates. Despite having reduced its debt and deferred assets over the past 3 years, TVA still compares unfavorably to its likely competitors in these regards. In addition, TVA is revising its goals for reducing debt and deferred assets downward significantly. Whether or not the deferred assets will contribute to stranded costs that are recoverable from customers depends on the specific requirements of any legislation that might remove TVA’s legislative protections and TVA’s ability to retain its current competitive advantages in a restructured environment. Ultimately, TVA’s ability to be competitive will depend on the future market price of power, which cannot be predicted with any certainty. | What GAO Found
If the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) were to lose its legislative protections today, its high level of debt and corresponding high financing costs would be a competitive challenge. This competitive challenge would be even greater if it were at the same time attempting to recover costs of deferred assets through rates. Despite having reduced its debt and deferred assets over the past three years, TVA still compares unfavorably to its likely competitors in these areas. In addition, TVA is revising its goals for reducing debt and deferred assets downward significantly. Whether or not the deferred assets will contribute to stranded costs that are recoverable from customers depends on the specific requirements of any legislation that might remove TVA's legislative protections and TVA's ability to retain its current competitive advantages in a restructured environment. In addition, the longer that TVA has to prepare for competition, the longer it will have to reduce debt and recover the costs of its deferred assets and position itself more competitively. Ultimately, TVA's ability to be competitive will depend on the future market price of power, which cannot be predicted with any certainty. |
gao_GAO-08-951 | gao_GAO-08-951_0 | In fiscal year 2008, Treasury plans to spend approximately $3 billion for 234 IT investments— including about $2 billion (about 71 percent) for 60 major investments. Treasury’s EVM Policy Is Not Fully Consistent with Best Practices
While Treasury has established policy to guide its implementation of EVM, key components of this policy are not fully consistent with best practices. The policy currently in place fully addresses three of the seven components, partially addresses three, and does not address one (see table 2). According to the CPIC Director, Treasury’s EVM working group, which was established in January 2008, is working on the development of a revised EVM policy, which, according to Deputy Assistant Secretary for Information Systems and Chief Information Officer, is expected to be finalized by October 2008. These weaknesses exist in part because, as previously noted, Treasury’s policy does not fully address key elements and because the department does not have a mechanism to enforce its implementation. When executing work plans and recording actual costs, two of the six investments incorporated government costs with contractor costs. In regards to implementation, the department is not fully addressing key practices needed to effectively manage its critical investments. Until the department defines a comprehensive policy and establishes a process for ensuring effective EVM implementation, it will be difficult for Treasury to optimize the effectiveness of EVM as a management tool and consistently implement the fundamental practices needed to effectively manage its critical programs. Implement a process for ensuring effective implementation of EVM throughout the department by establishing a comprehensive EVM system by, among other things, defining the scope of effort using a work breakdown structure that allows for traceability across EVM project management documents; ensuring the development of validated performance measurement baselines that includes planned costs and schedules; ensuring that the data resulting from the EVM system are reliable, including executing the work plan and recording both government and ensuring that the program management team is using earned value data for decision-making by systematically using EVM performance metrics in making the ongoing monthly decisions required to effectively manage the investment; and properly documenting updates to the performance measurement baseline as changes to the cost and schedule occur. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Comments from the Department of Treasury
Appendix II: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to determine whether the Department of the Treasury and its key component agencies (1) have the policies in place to effectively implement earned value management (EVM) and (2) are adequately using EVM techniques to manage critical system investments. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 2008, the Department of Treasury (Treasury) plans to spend approximately $3 billion on information technology (IT) investments--the third largest planned IT expenditure among civilian agencies. To more effectively manage such investments, in 2005 the Office of Management and Budget required agencies to use earned value management (EVM). EVM is a project management approach that, if implemented appropriately, provides objective reports of project status, produces early warning signs of impending schedule delays and cost overruns, and provides unbiased estimates of a program's total costs. GAO was asked to assess whether the department and its key component agencies (1) have the policies in place to effectively implement EVM and (2) are adequately using EVM techniques to manage critical system investments. GAO compared agency policies to best practices identified in the Cost Assessment Guide and reviewed the implementation of key EVM practices for several investments.
What GAO Found
The Department of Treasury's EVM policy is not fully consistent with best practices. Specifically, of seven best practices that leading organizations address in their policies, Treasury's policy fully addresses three, partially addresses three, and does not address the training component. According to the Director for Capital Planning and Investment Control, the department is currently working on revising its policy and according to Deputy Assistant Secretary for Information Systems and Chief Information Officer expects to finalize it by October 2008. Until Treasury develops a comprehensive policy to guide its efforts, it will be difficult for the department to optimize the effectiveness of EVM as a management tool. The department and its bureaus are not fully implementing key EVM practices needed to effectively manage their critical system investments. Specifically, the six programs at Treasury that GAO reviewed were not consistently implementing practices needed for establishing a comprehensive EVM system, ensuring that data from the system are reliable, and using the data to help manage the program. For example, when executing work plans and recording actual costs, a key practice for ensuring that the data resulting from the EVM system are reliable, only two of the six investments reviewed incorporated government costs with contractor costs. These weaknesses exist in part because Treasury's policy is not comprehensive and because the department does not have a process for ensuring effective EVM implementation. Unless the department consistently implements fundamental EVM practices, it may not be able to effectively manage its critical programs. |
gao_GAO-12-196T | gao_GAO-12-196T_0 | Background
Since 1974, the SSI program, under Title XVI of the Social Security Act, as amended, has provided benefits to low-income blind and disabled persons, including adults and children as well as certain aged individuals who meet financial eligibility requirements and SSA’s definition of disability. After initial verification, the field office transmits the case file to their state disability determination services office for a medical evaluation. Number of Children Applying for and Receiving SSI Benefits Due to Mental Impairments Has Increased
The numbers of children applying for and receiving SSI benefits due to a mental impairment has increased over the past decade and now comprise a growing majority of all child beneficiaries. 2). Our preliminary research suggests that several factors may have contributed to the increased number of child applicants and beneficiaries, including but not limited to SSA’s and child advocates’ outreach efforts, improved access to health insurance for children, the rising number of children living in poverty, and increased diagnosis of certain mental impairments. However, the relative effects of these and other factors on program growth are not fully known at this time. While it is unclear how various factors are contributing to growth at this time, SSA data show that since fiscal year 2000, children with mental impairments have represented the majority of all child applications and medical allowances for SSI benefits. 3). As of December 2010, about 95,000 (11 percent) children with mental impairments were receiving SSI benefits due to autism. Examiners Report Using a Combination of Key Information Sources in Determining Medical Eligibility
In our preliminary work, DDS officials reported that they rely on a combination of key medical and nonmedical information—such as medical records, prescribed medications, school records, and teacher and parent assessments—in determining a child’s medical eligibility. Several DDS officials said that when making a determination, they consider the totality of information related to the child’s impairments, rather than one piece of information in isolation. In response to concerns among many about the role medication plays in the determination process, we asked SSA and DDS officials how information about a child’s use of prescribed medications is used, and they told us it is generally given no more weight than any other medical or nonmedical information in determining a child’s medical eligibility. Several DDS officials told us school records and teacher assessments (standardized questionnaires) are especially critical, because these assessments provide information on the child’s functioning over time and are generally more objective than parent assessments. Despite the importance of nonmedical information in determining a child’s medical eligibility, our preliminary work shows that examiners sometimes face challenges obtaining complete information. SSA Has Conducted Significantly Fewer CDRs for SSI Children with Mental Impairments
SSA is required to periodically review the medical eligibility of certain individuals, though our preliminary work shows that SSA has conducted significantly fewer CDRs for children receiving SSI benefits in recent years, including those with mental impairments. Between fiscal years 2000 and 2010, childhood CDRs for those recipients under age 18 and age 18 redeterminations overall fell from more than 200,000 to about 126,000 (a 38 percent decrease), and more specifically, childhood CDRs for those with mental impairments declined from more than 84,000 to about 13,000 (an 84 percent decrease) (see fig. SSA has recently estimated that that the CDR process yielded a savings-to-cost ratio of roughly $12.50 to $1 in fiscal year 2009, and that those CDRs conducted for adults and children combined in fiscal year 2009 will save federal programs an estimated $4.6 billion. SSA and DDS officials have acknowledged that the agency is not conducting reviews for child recipients in a timely manner, and in some cases, they have not conducted required childhood CDRs prior to a child’s age 18 redeterminations. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Social Security Administration's (SSA) Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program provides cash benefits to eligible low-income disabled individuals, including children, as well as certain others. Children may generally qualify for SSI benefits if they meet certain financial requirements and are deemed to have a qualifying medically determinable physical or mental impairment of a specified duration or severity that results in a functional limitation. In 2010, SSA paid more than $9 billion to about 1.2 million disabled children. Over the past decade, the overall number of children receiving SSI benefits has continued to rise. In this statement, GAO discusses initial observations from its ongoing review and examines (1) the trends in the rate of children receiving SSI benefits due to mental impairments over the past decade; (2) the role that medical and nonmedical information, such as medication and school records, play in the initial determination of a child's medical eligibility; and (3) the steps SSA has taken to monitor the continued medical eligibility of these children. To examine these issues, GAO analyzed program data, interviewed SSA officials, conducted site visits to SSA field offices and state disability determination services (DDS) offices, and interviewed external experts. This work is ongoing and GAO has no recommendations at this time. GAO plans to issue its final report in April 2012.
What GAO Found
The numbers of children applying for and receiving SSI benefits due to a mental impairment has increased over the past decade and now comprise a growing majority of all child beneficiaries. While more than half of child applicants are denied each year, children with mental impairments, such as autism, have represented a growing share of those medically allowed for benefits--increasing from 60 to 67 percent between fiscal years 2000 and 2010. Factors including but not limited to the rising number of children living in poverty and increased diagnosis of certain mental impairments may have contributed to such growth. However, the relative effects of these and other factors on program growth are not fully known at this time. Generally, DDS officials reported that they rely on a combination of key medical and nonmedical information--such as medical records and teacher and parent assessments--in determining a child's medical eligibility and that they consider the totality of information related to the child's impairments, rather than one piece of information in isolation. For example, SSA and DDS officials said that they consider a child's use of prescribed medications in the context of other information including school records and teacher assessments, which are critical in evaluating the child's functioning over time. Yet, despite the importance of such nonmedical evidence, GAO's work shows that examiners sometimes face challenges in obtaining this information partly due to teachers' reluctance to complete the assessments. SSA is required to periodically review the medical eligibility of certain children receiving SSI benefits, but GAO's work shows that SSA has conducted significantly fewer childhood continuing disability reviews (CDR) in recent years. Between fiscal years 2000 and 2010, the number of childhood CDRs and age 18 reviews overall fell from more than 200,000 to about 126,000 (a 38 percent decrease), while childhood CDRs for those with mental impairments dropped from more than 84,000 to about 13,000 (an 84 percent decrease). SSA officials have acknowledged that the agency is not conducting childhood CDRs in a timely manner mostly due to resource constraints. However, SSA recognizes the importance of conducting CDRs and has recently estimated that the CDR process yields a savings-to-cost ratio of $12.50 to $1. |
gao_GAO-16-834 | gao_GAO-16-834_0 | The potential effects of climate change on these ecosystems are complex and often difficult to predict, according to the 2014 National Climate Assessment. NOAA Is Taking a Variety of Actions to Support States’ Efforts to Enhance Marine Coastal Ecosystem Resilience, and States Have Generally Positive Views of NOAA’s Actions
NOAA is taking a variety of actions under the CZMA to support states’ efforts to make their marine coastal ecosystems more resilient to climate change, and states generally view NOAA’s actions as positive steps. The CZMA provides a foundation for managing marine coastal ecosystems and partnering with states to work towards the agency’s goals of achieving resilient coastal communities and healthy coastal ecosystems, according to the officials. Financial Incentives
NOAA has targeted some of the financial incentives it provides to states under the CZMA for activities aimed at addressing the impacts of climate change and enhancing marine coastal resilience. For example, within the National Coastal Zone Management Program for fiscal years 2016 to 2020, NOAA designated coastal hazards—physical threats to life and property, such as sea level rise—as an enhancement area of national importance. NOAA also increased the total amount available for these competitive grants from $1 million in fiscal years 2014 and 2015 to $1.5 million for fiscal year 2016. Officials from all 25 state coastal zone management programs said that financial assistance provided by NOAA has been critical for planning projects designed to enhance marine coastal ecosystem resilience and reduce the potential impacts of climate change. Officials from nearly all state coastal zone management programs expressed concern, however, that the amount of financial assistance available is insufficient to address states’ needs in implementing projects. For example, officials from 15 of the 25 state programs said that coastal zone management grants have been the primary source of funding from NOAA that they have used for efforts related to ecosystem resilience. However, these grants generally cannot be used to purchase land or for construction projects—activities the states identified as important for improving the resilience of their coastlines. Technical Assistance
Through its administration of the National Coastal Zone Management Program, NOAA has also provided technical assistance to coastal states to help them understand and address the potential impacts of climate change on marine coastal ecosystems. For instance, the Digital Coast contains an interactive tool that allows users to estimate sea level rise and simulate different sea level rise scenarios using elevation and surface data to help identify coastal areas that may be affected by rising sea levels in a changing climate. Officials from all 25 state coastal zone management programs said that the technical information NOAA provides has generally helped them incorporate climate information into their state programs. NOAA has developed instructor-led and online training on topics such as the use of marine coastal ecosystems for improving community resilience and understanding how to use the tools found in the Digital Coast as a way to plan for and take action to address the potential impacts of climate change. National Estuarine Research Reserve System
NOAA officials said that the National Estuarine Research Reserve System is important for marine coastal ecosystem resilience, in part, because the reserves serve as “living laboratories” for the study of estuaries and natural and man-made changes, including the impacts of climate change. For example, in 2014, coastal zone managers from one state partnered with the state’s research reserve staff, along with NOAA and others, to study and map marsh migration patterns across the state’s coastline to determine how marsh ecosystems may respond to rising sea levels. Officials from 19 of the 25 state coastal zone management programs said that the work carried out through their respective research reserves plays an important role in furthering their understanding of how climate change may affect the structure and function of estuarine ecosystems. Agency Comments
We provided the Department of Commerce a draft of this report for review and comment. | Why GAO Did This Study
Coastal areas—home to over half of the U.S. population—are increasingly vulnerable to catastrophic damage from floods and other extreme weather events that are expected to become more common and intense, according to the 2014 Third National Climate Assessment. This assessment further indicated that less acute effects from changes in the climate, including sea level rise, could also have significant long-term impacts on the people and property along coastal states. Marine coastal ecosystems—including wetlands and marshes—can play an important role in strengthening coastal communities' resilience to the impacts of climate change, such as protecting eroding shorelines from sea level rise. Under the CZMA, NOAA is responsible for administering a federal-state partnership that encourages states to balance development with the protection of coastal areas in exchange for federal financial assistance and other incentives.
GAO was asked to review federal efforts to adapt to potential climate change effects on coastal ecosystems. This report provides information about NOAA's actions to support states' efforts to make marine coastal ecosystems more resilient to the impacts of climate change and states' views of those actions. GAO reviewed the CZMA and relevant NOAA policies and guidance; interviewed officials from NOAA headquarters and six regional offices; and conducted structured interviews with officials from the 25 state coastal zone management programs in all 23 marine coastal states.
NOAA provided technical comments on this report.
What GAO Found
The Department of Commerce's National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) is taking a variety of actions to support states' efforts to make their marine coastal ecosystems more resilient to climate change, and states generally view NOAA's actions as positive steps. The Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA) provides a foundation for managing these ecosystems and partnering with states to work towards the agency's goals of achieving resilient coastal communities and healthy coastal ecosystems, according to NOAA officials. Through the federal-state partnership established under the CZMA, GAO found that NOAA has taken actions, including:
Financial incentives. NOAA has targeted some of its financial incentives for activities aimed at addressing the impacts of climate change. For example, NOAA designated coastal hazards—physical threats to life and property, such as sea level rise—as the focus of CZMA competitive grants. States competed for a total of $1.5 million in grants in fiscal year 2016. Officials from all 25 state programs that GAO interviewed said funding provided by NOAA has been critical for planning projects related to ecosystem resilience, but also expressed concern that the amount of funding is insufficient to address states' needs in implementing projects. For instance, officials from 15 state programs further indicated that coastal zone management grants have been a primary source of funding from NOAA, but that they generally cannot be used to purchase land or for construction projects, activities states identified as important for improving coastal resilience.
Technical assistance. NOAA has provided assistance largely through technical information, guidance, and training to help states better understand and address the potential impacts of climate change on marine coastal ecosystems. For example, NOAA helped develop an interactive digital tool to simulate different sea level rise scenarios. NOAA also developed guidance to help identify ways ecosystems may be used to enhance the resilience of coastal areas, such as using natural shorelines to buffer the effects of erosion. In addition, NOAA developed training on topics such assessing the vulnerability of coastal areas. State managers GAO interviewed had generally positive views of the technical assistance provided by NOAA. For example, officials from all 25 state programs said that the technical information NOAA provides has generally helped them incorporate climate information into their state programs.
National Estuarine Research Reserve System. NOAA, in partnership with coastal states, manages 25 marine-based estuary reserves, in part, to study natural and man-made changes to estuaries (bodies of water usually found where rivers meet the sea), including the potential impacts of climate change. For example, in 2014, one state used its research reserve to study and map marsh migration patterns across the state's coastline to determine how these ecosystems may respond to rising sea levels. Officials from 19 of the 25 state programs said that work carried out through the research reserves plays an important role in furthering their understanding of how climate change may affect the structure and function of estuarine ecosystems. |
gao_GAO-12-238T | gao_GAO-12-238T_0 | A Lack of Site- Specific Data, Such as Local Projections of Expected Changes, Can Challenge the Ability of Officials to Manage the Effects of Climate Change
As we reported in October 2009, insufficient site-specific data, such as local projections of expected changes, make it hard for federal, state, and local officials to predict the impacts of climate change, and thus hard for these officials to justify the current costs of adaptation efforts for potentially less certain future benefits. Based on the responses by a diverse array of federal, state, and local officials knowledgeable about adaptation to a web-based questionnaire designed for that report, related challenges generally fit into two main categories: (1) translating climate data—such as projected temperature and precipitation changes—into information that officials need to make decisions and (2) difficulty in justifying the current costs of adaptation with limited information about future benefits. Federal Actions to Provide and Interpret Site-Specific Information Would Help Officials Understand the Impacts of Climate Change and Available Adaptation Strategies
Federal actions to provide and interpret site-specific information would help address challenges associated with adaptation efforts, based on our analysis of responses to the web-based questionnaire and other materials analyzed for our October 2009 report. The report discussed several potential federal actions that federal, state, and local officials identified as useful to inform adaptation decision making. These included state and local climate change impact and vulnerability assessments and the development of processes and tools to access, interpret, and apply climate information. About 61 percent (107 of 176) of the federal, state, and local officials who responded to the web-based questionnaire developed for our October 2009 adaptation report rated the “creation of a federal service to consolidate and deliver climate information to decision makers to inform adaptation efforts” as very or extremely useful. Respondents offered a range of potential strengths and weaknesses for such a service. Several said that a climate service would help consolidate information and provide a single-information resource for local officials, and others said that it would be an improvement over the current ad hoc system. Other respondents to our questionnaire, however, were less enthusiastic about the creation of a climate service. Some voiced skepticism about whether it was feasible to consolidate climate information, and others said that such a system would be too rigid and may get bogged down in lengthy review processes. We have not made recommendations regarding the creation of a climate service within NOAA or any other agency or interagency body, although the provision of climate data and services will be an important consideration in future governmentwide strategic planning efforts, particularly in an era of declining budgets. Federal Climate Change Strategic Planning Efforts Could Be Improved
Federal strategic planning efforts could be improved for many aspects of the climate change enterprise. Our October 2009 report on climate change adaptation concluded that, to be effective, related federal efforts must be coordinated and directed toward a common goal. This report recommended the development of a strategic plan to guide the nation’s efforts to adapt to a changing climate, including the identification of mechanisms to increase the capacity of federal, state, and local agencies to incorporate information about current and potential climate change impacts into government decision making. Some actions have subsequently been taken to improve federal adaptation efforts, but our May 2011 report on climate change funding found that federal officials do not have a shared understanding of strategic governmentwide priorities. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. | Why GAO Did This Study
Climate change is a complex, crosscutting issue that poses risks to many existing environmental and economic systems, including agriculture, infrastructure, ecosystems, and human health. A 2009 assessment by the United States Global Change Research Program (USGCRP) found that climate-related changes--such as rising temperature and sea level--will combine with pollution, population growth, urbanization, and other social, economic, and environmental stresses to create larger impacts than from any of these factors alone. According to the National Academies, USGCRP, and others, greenhouse gases already in the atmosphere will continue altering the climate system into the future, regardless of emissions control efforts. Therefore, adaptation--defined as adjustments to natural or human systems in response to actual or expected climate change--is an important part of the response to climate change. This testimony addresses (1) the data challenges that federal, state, and local officials face in their efforts to adapt to a changing climate, (2) the actions federal agencies could take to help address these challenges, and (3) federal climate change strategic planning efforts. The information in this testimony is based on prior work, largely on GAO's recent reports on climate change adaptation (GAO-10-113) and federal climate change funding (GAO-11-317). These reports are based on, among other things, analysis of studies, site visits to areas pursuing adaptation efforts, and responses to a web-based questionnaire sent to federal, state, and local officials.
What GAO Found
As GAO reported in October 2009, challenges from insufficient site-specific data--such as local projections--make it hard for federal, state, and local officials to predict the impacts of climate change, and thus hard to justify the current costs of adaptation efforts for potentially less certain future benefits. Based on responses from a diverse array of federal, state, and local officials knowledgeable about adaptation, related challenges generally fit into two main categories: (1) translating climate data--such as projected temperature and precipitation changes--into information that officials need to make decisions and (2) the difficulty in justifying the current costs of adaptation with limited information about future benefits. Federal actions to provide and interpret site-specific information would help address data challenges associated with adaptation efforts, based on responses to GAO's web-based questionnaire sent to federal, state, and local officials and other materials analyzed for its October 2009 report. In addition to several potential federal actions identified as useful by respondents to GAO's questionnaire, including the development of state and local climate change vulnerability assessments, GAO's 2009 report also contained information about the creation of a federal climate service. Specifically, about 61 percent (107 of 176) of respondents rated the "creation of a federal service to consolidate and deliver climate information to decision makers to inform adaptation efforts" as very or extremely useful. Respondents offered a range of potential strengths and weaknesses for such a service. For example, several respondents stated that a climate service would help consolidate information and provide a single information resource for local officials. However, some respondents to GAO's questionnaire voiced skepticism about whether it was feasible to consolidate climate information, and others stated that such a service would be too rigid and may get bogged down in lengthy review processes. GAO has not made recommendations regarding the creation of a climate service within the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration or any other agency or interagency body. Federal strategic planning efforts could be improved for many aspects of the climate change enterprise. For example, GAO's October 2009 report on climate change adaptation concluded that, to be effective, related federal efforts must be coordinated and directed toward a common goal. This report recommended the development of a strategic plan to guide the nation's efforts to adapt to a changing climate, including the identification of mechanisms to increase the capacity of federal, state, and local agencies to incorporate information about current and potential climate change impacts into government decision making. Some actions have subsequently been taken to improve federal adaptation efforts, but GAO's May 2011 report on climate change funding found that federal officials do not have a shared understanding of strategic governmentwide priorities. |
gao_GAO-07-232 | gao_GAO-07-232_0 | From fiscal year 2002 through fiscal year 2005, the Air Force’s total on- hand inventory increased by $1.2 billion, representing about 10 percent of the total $12.6 billion increase in DOD inventory during this period. More than Half of the Air Force’s Secondary Inventory Was Not Needed to Support Requirements, Although Demand for Some Items Increased
More than half of the Air Force’s on-order and on-hand secondary inventory, worth an average of $31.4 billion, was not needed to support its requirements from fiscal years 2002 through 2005, although increases in demand have contributed to a slight reduction in the percentage of this on- hand inventory and a reduction in the number of years of supply this inventory represents. However, this inventory represents an average of about 65 percent (about $18.7 billion) of the value of unneeded on-hand inventory. While increasing demands have resulted in the Air Force reducing the number of years of supply this inventory represents, 79 percent of the Air Force’s inventory items not needed to support requirements had no recurring demands at all, resulting in a potentially infinite supply of those items. Although DOD’s supply chain management regulation provides guidance for developing materiel requirements based on customer expectations while minimizing inventories, over the 4-year period an average of 52 percent ($1.3 billion) of the Air Force’s on-order inventory was not needed. Our analysis shows that between September 30, 2002, and September 30, 2005, the percentage of the Air Force’s unneeded on-hand inventory was reduced by 2.7 percent, due, in part, to increases in the demand for the items, although the value of this unneeded inventory remained the same. Reasons Vary for Air Force Maintaining On-Order and On-Hand Inventory Not Needed to Support Requirements
Responses from Air Force item management specialists and our analysis of the Air Force’s inventory data identified a variety of reasons for maintaining on-order and on-hand inventory not needed to support current requirements, such as decreasing demands, retaining items used to support aging weapon systems that have diminishing sources of supply or are being phased out of service, retaining items to support new weapon systems, and not terminating eligible contracts for on-order items not needed to support requirements. During our analysis, Air Force officials acknowledged that they are aware that decreases in demand have resulted in having more inventory than is needed to support requirements; however, the Air Force has not evaluated why it continues to experience these decreases in demand or taken actions to mitigate the effect of these changes. Air Force Inventory Shortages Remained the Same
Although more than half of its secondary inventory was not needed to support requirements, the Air Force still had shortages of certain items in inventory. When the Air Force buys unneeded items, it is obligating funds unnecessarily, which could lead to not having sufficient funds to purchase needed items, which also may negatively affect readiness. Without modifying its policies to provide incentives to reduce the amount of inventory on order that is not needed to support requirements or conducting a comprehensive assessment to validate the need to retain unneeded on-hand inventory that does not have recurring demands, the Air Force will continue its past practices of purchasing and retaining items that it does not need and then spending additional resources to handle and store these items. Recommendations for Executive Action
To meet customer expectations while minimizing inventory and to reduce the Air Force’s inventory not needed to support requirements, we are recommending that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Air Force to take the following four actions: modify its policies to provide incentives to reduce purchases of on-order inventory that are not needed to support requirements, such as requiring contract termination review for all unneeded on-order inventory or reducing the funding available for the Air Force Materiel Command by an amount up to the value of the Air Force’s on-order inventory that is not needed to support requirements; conduct a comprehensive assessment of the inventory items on hand that are not needed to support requirements and that have no recurring demands and revalidate the need to continue to retain these items, and, as part of this assessment, consider establishing ongoing requirements for items supporting weapon systems that have lengthy projected life spans; evaluate the reasons why the Air Force continually experiences decreases in demands which have contributed to having more than half of its inventory on hand not needed to support requirements; and after evaluating the reasons for the decreases in demand, determine what actions are needed to address these decreases and then take steps to implement these actions. | Why GAO Did This Study
At a time when U.S. military forces and their equipment are in high demand, effective management of the Department of Defense's (DOD) inventory is critical to ensure that the warfighter has the right items at the right time. The Air Force is the largest contributor to DOD's total on-hand inventory on the basis of inventory value. Under the statutory authority of the Comptroller General to conduct evaluations on his own initiative, GAO determined the extent to which (1) the Air Force's on-order and on-hand inventory reflect the amount of inventory needed to support required inventory levels from fiscal years 2002 through 2005, and (2) the Air Force had shortages in its inventory needed to support required levels during this period. To address these objectives GAO analyzed Air Force secondary inventory data (spare parts such as engines and guided missiles) from fiscal years 2002 through 2005.
What GAO Found
More than half of the Air Force's secondary inventory (spare parts), worth an average of $31.4 billion, was not needed to support required on-hand and on-order inventory levels from fiscal years 2002 through 2005, although increased demand due to ongoing military operations contributed to slight reductions in the percentage of inventory on hand and the number of years of supply it represents. DOD regulations provide guidance for developing materiel requirements based on customer expectations while minimizing inventories. However, the value of Air Force on-order inventory not needed to support required inventory levels increased by about 7.8 percent, representing an average of 52 percent ($1.3 billion) of its on-order inventory. The Air Force has continued to purchase unneeded on-order inventory because its policies do not provide incentives to reduce the amount of inventory on order that is not needed to support requirements. When the Air Force buys these items it may obligate funds unnecessarily, which could lead to not having sufficient obligation authority to purchase needed items and could negatively impact readiness. In addition, although the percentage of the Air Force on-hand inventory was reduced by 2.7 percent due to increases in demand, about 65 percent ($18.7 billion) of this inventory was not needed to support required inventory levels. GAO calculated that it costs the Air Force from $15 million to $30 million annually to store its unneeded items. Of the Air Force's inventory items not needed to support required inventory levels, 79 percent had no recurring demands (such as engines and airframe components), resulting in a potentially infinite supply of those items. The Air Force has continued to retain this unneeded inventory with no recurring demands, in part, because the Air Force has not performed a comprehensive assessment to revalidate the need to continue to retain these items. For the remaining 21 percent of items that had recurring demands, increasing demands resulted in a reduction in the number of years of supply that this inventory represents, with the largest quantity and value of items having between 2 to 10 years of supply. Inventory not needed to support required inventory levels can be attributed to many long-standing problems, such as decreasing demands, retaining items used to support aging weapon systems that have diminishing sources of supply or are being phased out of service, and not terminating contracts for on-order items. Air Force officials acknowledged that decreases in demand have resulted in having more inventory than is needed; however, the Air Force has not evaluated why it continues to experience decreases in demand or taken actions to mitigate the effect of these changes. Without taking actions to reduce its unneeded inventory, the Air Force will continue its past practices of purchasing and retaining items it does not need and then spending additional resources to handle and store these items. Although more than half of its secondary inventory was not needed to support required levels, the Air Force still had shortages of certain items. From fiscal years 2002 through 2005, the percentage and value of the Air Force's inventory shortages remained the same at about 8 percent and $1.2 billion. |
gao_GAO-08-897T | gao_GAO-08-897T_0 | To protect the over one million federal employees and about 9,000 GSA facilities from the risk of terrorist and criminal attacks, in fiscal year 2007, FPS had about 1,100 employees, of which 541, or almost 50 percent, were inspectors. FPS’s Ability to Accomplish Its Mission Is Hampered by Operational Challenges and the Steps It Has Taken May Not Fully Resolve Them
FPS faces several operational challenges, including decreasing staff levels, which has led to reductions in the law enforcement services that FPS provides. While FPS has taken steps to address these challenges, it has not fully resolved them. The decrease in FPS’s duty hours has also jeopardized police officer and inspector safety, as well as building security. However, ensuring the quality and timeliness of them is an area in which FPS continues to face challenges. Similarly, one regional supervisor stated that, in the course of reviewing a BSA for an address he had personally visited, he realized that the inspector completing the BSA falsified information and had not actually visited the site because the inspector referred to a large building when the actual site was a vacant plot of land owned by GSA. FPS Has Taken Some Actions To Resolve Operational Challenges But Its Actions May Not Fully Resolve These Challenges
According to FPS, it has a number of ongoing efforts that are designed to address some of its longstanding challenges. For example, the approach does not emphasize law enforcement responsibilities, such as proactive patrol. FPS’s Actions to Address Budgetary Challenges Have Had Adverse Implications
FPS funds its operations through the collection of security fees charged to tenant agencies for security services. However, until recently these fees have not been sufficient to cover its projected operational costs. Because of these actions, fiscal year 2007 was the first year FPS’s collections were sufficient to cover its costs. FPS also projects that collections will cover its costs in fiscal year 2008. FPS’s Basic Security Fee Does Not Account for Risk and Raises Questions about Equity FPS’s primary means of funding its operations is the fee it charges tenant agencies for basic security services, as shown in figure 4. The basic security fee does not include contract guard services. In fiscal year 2008, FPS charged 62 cents per square foot for basic security and has been authorized to increase the rate to 66 cents per square foot in fiscal year 2009. Many of these buildings rarely receive services from FPS staff and rely mostly on local police for law enforcement services. Several stakeholders have raised questions about whether FPS has an accurate understanding of the cost of providing security at GSA facilities. FPS Faces Limitations in Assessing Its Performance
To determine how well it is accomplishing its mission to protect GSA facilities, FPS has identified some output measures, such as determining whether security countermeasures have been deployed and are fully operational, the amount of time it takes to respond to an incident and the percentage of BSAs completed on time. However, FPS has not developed outcome measures to evaluate the results and the net effect of its efforts to protect GSA facilities. FPS is also limited in its ability to assess the effectiveness of its efforts to protect GSA facilities, in part, because it does not have a data management system that will allow it to provide complete and accurate information on its security program. Without a reliable data management system, it is difficult for FPS and others to determine the effectiveness of its efforts to protect GSA facilities or for FPS to accurately track and monitor incident response time, effectiveness of security countermeasures, and whether BSAs are completed on time. In the report we issued last week, we recommended that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the Director of FPS to develop and implement a strategic approach to manage its staffing resources; clarify roles and responsibilities of local law enforcement agencies in regards to responding to incidents at GSA facilities; improve FPS’s use of the fee- based system by developing a method to accurately account for the cost of providing security services to tenant agencies; assess whether FPS’s current use of a fee-based system or an alternative funding mechanism is the most appropriate manner to fund the agency; and develop and implement specific guidelines and standards for measuring its performance including the collection and analysis of data. This concludes our testimony. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Federal Protective Service (FPS) is responsible for providing physical security and law enforcement services to about 9,000 General Services Administration (GSA) facilities. To accomplish its mission of protecting GSA facilities, FPS currently has an annual budget of about $1 billion, about 1,100 employees, and 15,000 contract guards located throughout the country. GAO was asked to provide information and analysis on challenges FPS faces including ensuring that it has sufficient staffing and funding resources to protect GSA facilities and the over one million federal employees as well as members of the public that work in and visit them each year. GAO discusses (1) FPS's operational challenges and actions it has taken to address them, (2) funding challenges, and (3) how FPS measures the effectiveness of its efforts to protect GSA facilities. This testimony is based on our recently issued report (GAO-08-683) to this Subcommittee.
What GAO Found
FPS faces several operational challenges that hamper its ability to accomplish its mission and the actions it has taken may not fully resolve these challenges. FPS's staff has decreased by about 20 percent from fiscal years 2004 through 2007. FPS has also decreased or eliminated law enforcement services such as proactive patrol in many FPS locations. Moreover, FPS has not resolved longstanding challenges, such as improving the oversight of its contract guard program, maintaining security countermeasures, and ensuring the quality and timeliness of building security assessments (BSA). For example, one regional supervisor stated that while reviewing a BSA for an address he personally visited he realized that the inspector completing the BSA had falsified the information because the inspector referred to a large building when the actual site was a vacant plot of land owned by GSA. To address some of these operational challenges, FPS is currently changing to an inspector based workforce, which seeks to eliminate the police officer position and rely primarily on FPS inspectors for both law enforcement and physical security activities. FPS is also hiring an additional 150 inspectors. However, these actions may not fully resolve the challenges FPS faces, in part because the approach does not emphasize law enforcement responsibilities. Until recently, the security fees FPS charged to agencies have not been sufficient to cover its costs and the actions it has taken to address the shortfalls have had adverse implications. For example, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) transferred emergency supplemental funding to FPS. FPS restricted hiring and limited training and overtime. According to FPS officials, these measures have had a negative effect on staff morale and are partially responsible for FPS's high attrition rates. FPS was authorized to increase the basic security fee four times since it transferred to DHS in 2003, currently charging tenant agencies 62 cents per square foot for basic security services. Because of these actions, FPS's collections in fiscal year 2007 were sufficient to cover costs, and FPS projects that collections will also cover costs in fiscal year 2008. However, FPS's primary means of funding its operations--the basic security fee--does not account for the risk faced by buildings, the level of service provided, or the cost of providing services, raising questions about equity. Stakeholders expressed concern about whether FPS has an accurate understanding of its security costs. FPS has developed output measures, but lacks outcome measures to assess the effectiveness of its efforts to protect federal facilities. Its output measures include determining whether security countermeasures have been deployed and are fully operational. However, FPS does not have measures to evaluate its efforts to protect federal facilities that could provide FPS with broader information on program outcomes and results. FPS also lacks a reliable data management system for accurately tracking performance measures. Without such a system, it is difficult for FPS to evaluate and improve the effectiveness of its efforts, allocate its limited resources, or make informed risk management decisions. |
gao_GAO-11-782T | gao_GAO-11-782T_0 | In Recent Years Nearly a Fifth of Low- Income Older Adults Were Food Insecure and Most Did Not Receive Assistance from Meals Programs Despite Increased Demand
Analysis of data from the Current Population Survey’s (CPS) Food Security Supplement shows that in 2009, about 19 percent of households with adults ages 60 and over with low incomes—under 185 percent of the poverty line—were food insecure. These adults were uncertain of having or unable to acquire enough food because they lacked resources. In comparison, slightly less than 15 percent of all households were food insecure. A small but significant portion of households with older adults had very low food security in 2009—about 8 percent of those with households under 185 percent of poverty and about 14.5 percent of those with incomes under the poverty line. In these households, one or more household members’ eating patterns were disrupted and their food intake reduced, at least some time during the year because they could not afford enough food. We have found that some of these programs, including those serving older adults, provide comparable benefits to similar or overlapping populations. For example, the Elderly Nutrition Program administered by the Administration on Aging (AoA), provides home-delivered and congregate meals primarily to individuals 60 years and older. Separately, other programs administered by USDA, including the Commodity Supplemental Food Program, targets a similar population, providing food to older adults, as well as women, infants and children who are also served by the Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children (WIC). program. In addition, individuals eligible for groceries through the Commodity Supplemental Food Program or services through the Elderly Nutrition Program may also be eligible for groceries through the Emergency Food Assistance Program and for targeted benefits that are redeemed in authorized stores through the largest program, SNAP. In fact, a recent AoA report conducted by Mathematica found that seven percent of congregate meal recipients and 16 percent of home-delivered meal recipients were also receiving SNAP benefits. The availability of multiple programs with similar benefits helps ensure that those in need have access to nutritious food, but can also increase administrative costs, which account for approximately a tenth to more than a quarter of total costs among the largest of these programs. In addition, our previous work has shown that overlap among programs can lead to inefficient use of federal funds, duplication of effort, and confusion among those seeking services. We have found in previous work that despite the potential benefits of varied points of entry, program rules related to determining eligibility often require the collection of similar information by multiple entities. For example, an older adult might apply for congregate meals through the Elderly Nutrition Program at their local area agency on aging, electronic benefits through SNAP at the Health and Human Services office, and vouchers for fresh fruit and vegetables through the Senior Farmers’ Market Nutrition Program at a local food bank. Most of the 18 programs have specific and often complex administrative procedures that federal, state, and local organizations follow to help manage each program’s resources. According to our previous work and state and local officials, rules that govern these and other nutrition assistance programs often require applicants who seek assistance from multiple programs to submit separate applications for each program and provide similar information verifying, for example, household income. This can create unnecessary work for both providers and applicants and may result in the use of more administrative resources than needed. In April 2010, we recommended that USDA, as the principal administrator of the federal government’s food assistance programs, identify and develop methods for addressing potential inefficiencies among food assistance programs and reducing unnecessary overlap among its smaller food assistance programs while ensuring that those who are eligible receive the assistance they need. In addition, collection of adequate and consistent information about older adults’ needs and the extent to which they are met could help providers make informed decisions about serving those most in need. Careful, thoughtful actions will be needed to address issues involving potential duplication, overlap, and fragmentation among federal programs and activities. Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP)
The Emergency Food Assistance Program 15. | Why GAO Did This Study
This testimony discusses our recent work on food insecurity among older adults and the nutrition assistance programs available to assist them, including nutrition assistance programs authorized under the Older Americans Act of 1965 (OAA). This work can help inform government policymakers as they address the needs of one of our nation's most vulnerable populations while ensuring the efficiency and effectiveness of federal programs given rapidly building fiscal pressures facing our national government. While the economy is still recovering and in need of careful attention, widespread agreement exists on the need to look not only at the near term but also at steps that begin to change the long-term fiscal path as soon as possible without slowing the recovery. Our recent work can help with this by identifying potential inefficiency and overlap among programs. At the same time, there is recognition that the services provided by the OAA can play an important role in helping older adults remain in their homes and communities. As the Congress takes steps to address the fiscal challenge, it will be important that these steps are balanced with efforts to ensure the health and well-being of older adults. This testimony today is based on two recent reports, our April 2010 report on domestic food assistance and our February 2011 report on the unmet need for services under the OAA. This testimony highlights key findings from each of these reports related to (1) the prevalence of food insecurity and the receipt of nutrition services among older adults; and (2) the extent to which nutrition assistance programs show signs of inefficiency or overlap. This statement will discuss some of the challenges related to ensuring the most efficient provision of services, and suggest how better information could help policymakers address overlap and duplication among programs while ensuring those most in need have access to services..
What GAO Found
Analysis of data from the Current Population Survey's (CPS) Food Security Supplement shows that in 2009, about 19 percent of households with adults ages 60 and over with low incomes--under 185 percent of the poverty line--were food insecure. These adults were uncertain of having or unable to acquire enough food because they lacked resources. In comparison, slightly less than 15 percent of all households were food insecure. A small but significant portion of households with older adults had very low food security in 2009--about 8 percent of those with households under 185 percent of poverty and about 14.5 percent of those with incomes under the poverty line. In these households, one or more household members' eating patterns were disrupted and their food intake reduced, at least some time during the year because they could not afford enough food. We have found that some of the domestic food assistance programs, including those serving older adults, provide comparable benefits to similar or overlapping populations. For example, the Elderly Nutrition Program administered by the Administration on Aging (AoA), provides home-delivered and congregate meals primarily to individuals 60 years and older. Separately, other programs administered by USDA, including the Commodity Supplemental Food Program, targets a similar population, providing food to older adults, as well as women, infants and children who are also served by the Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children (WIC) program. In addition, individuals eligible for groceries through the Commodity Supplemental Food Program or services through the Elderly Nutrition Program may also be eligible for groceries through the Emergency Food Assistance Program and for targeted benefits that are redeemed in authorized stores through the largest program, the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP). In fact, a recent AoA report conducted by Mathematica found that seven percent of congregate meal recipients and 16 percent of home-delivered meal recipients were also receiving SNAP benefits. The availability of multiple programs with similar benefits helps ensure that those in need have access to nutritious food, but can also increase administrative costs, which account for approximately a tenth to more than a quarter of total costs among the largest of these programs. In addition, our previous work has shown that overlap among programs can lead to inefficient use of federal funds, duplication of effort, and confusion among those seeking services. We have found in previous work that despite the potential benefits of varied points of entry, program rules related to determining eligibility often require the collection of similar information by multiple entities. For example, an older adult might apply for congregate meals through the Elderly Nutrition Program at their local area agency on aging, electronic benefits through SNAP at the Health and Human Services office, and vouchers for fresh fruit and vegetables through the Senior Farmers' Market Nutrition Program at a local food bank. Most of the 18 programs have specific and often complex administrative procedures that federal, state, and local organizations follow to help manage each program's resources. According to our previous work and state and local officials, rules that govern these and other nutrition assistance programs often require applicants who seek assistance from multiple programs to submit separate applications for each program and provide similar information verifying, for example, household income. This can create unnecessary work for both providers and applicants and may result in the use of more administrative resources than needed. |
gao_GAO-08-779T | gao_GAO-08-779T_0 | Persons Are Frequently Associated With Ugland House Registered Entities
The international law firm of Maples and Calder, with its associated businesses - Maples Corporate Services Limited and Maples Finance Limited - is the sole occupant of Ugland House. As of March 2008 the Cayman Islands Registrar reported that 18,857 entities were registered at the Ugland House address. Maples and Calder senior partners told us that approximately 5 percent of the entities registered at Ugland House were wholly owned by U.S. persons, while 40 to 50 percent were related to the U.S. in that they had a billing address in the United States. According to the partners, U.S. persons associated with Ugland House registered entities are often participants in investment and structured-finance activities, including those related to hedge funds and securitization. The Cayman Islands may attract U.S-related financial activity because of characteristics including its reputation for stability and compliance with international standards, its business-friendly regulatory environment, and its prominence as an international financial center. Another frequent reason for doing business in the Cayman Islands is to obtain tax advantages, such as through reduction or deferral of U.S. taxes. The investment income of U.S. tax-exempts may be subject to UBIT if earned by an investment vehicle organized as a U.S. partnership, a formation common among U.S.-based hedge funds. Lastly, as with other offshore jurisdictions, some U.S. persons may establish entities in the Cayman Islands to illegally evade taxes or avoid detection and prosecution of illegal activities. The U.S. Government Has Access To Several Information Sources Regarding U.S. Taxpayers’ Business Activities in the Cayman Islands, but Most Information is Self Reported
Individual U.S. taxpayers and corporations are generally required to self- report their taxable income to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). When an individual or corporation conducts business in the Cayman Islands, there is often no third-party reporting of transactions, so disclosures to IRS and U.S. regulators are dependent on the accuracy and completeness of the self-disclosure. Some financial intelligence information on U.S. persons’ Cayman activities is available to U.S. regulators. Despite these challenges, U.S. officials consistently report that cooperation by the Cayman Islands government in enforcement matters has been good. Although the Maples and Calder law firm provides services that even U.S. government-affiliated entities have found useful for international transactions and the Cayman Islands government has taken affirmative steps to meet international standards, the ability of U.S. persons to establish entities with relatively little expense in the Cayman Islands and similar jurisdictions facilitates both legal tax minimization and illegal tax evasion. Despite the Cayman Islands’ adherence to international standards and the international commerce benefits gained through U.S. activities in the Cayman Islands, Cayman entities nevertheless can be used to obscure legal ownership of assets and associated income and to exploit grey areas of U.S. tax law to minimize U.S. tax obligations. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Cayman Islands is a major offshore financial center and the registered home of thousands of corporations and financial entities. Financial activity there is in the trillions of dollars annually. One Cayman building--Ugland House--has been the subject of public attention as the listed address of thousands of companies. To help Congress better understand the nature of U.S. persons' business activities in the Cayman Islands, GAO was asked to study (1) the nature and extent of U.S. persons' involvement with Ugland House registered entities and the nature of such business; (2) the reasons why U.S. persons conduct business in the Cayman Islands; (3) information available to the U.S. government regarding U.S. persons' Cayman activities; and (4) the U.S. government's compliance and enforcement efforts. GAO interviewed U.S. and Cayman government officials and representatives of the law firm housed in Ugland House, and reviewed relevant documents. The full report on GAO's review is GAO-08-778 , being released at the same time as this testimony.
What GAO Found
The sole occupant of Ugland House is Maples and Calder, a law firm and company-services provider that serves as registered office for the 18,857 entities it created as of March 2008, on behalf of a largely international clientele. According to Maples partners, about 5 percent of these entities were wholly U.S.-owned and 40 to 50 percent had a U.S. billing address. Ugland House registered entities are often participants in investment and structured-finance activities, including those related to hedge funds and securitization. Gaining business advantages, such as facilitating U.S.-foreign transactions or minimizing taxes, are key reasons for U.S. persons' financial activity in the Cayman Islands. The Cayman Islands' reputation as a stable, business-friendly regulatory environment also attracts business. This activity is typically legal, such as when pension funds and other U.S. tax-exempt entities invest in Cayman hedge funds to maximize their investment return by minimizing U.S. taxes. Nevertheless, as with other offshore jurisdictions, some U.S. persons may use Cayman Island entities to illegally evade income taxes or hide illegal activity. Information about U.S. persons' Cayman activities comes from self-reporting, international agreements, and less formal sharing with the Cayman government. Because there is often no third-party reporting, self-reported information may be vulnerable to being inaccurate or incomplete. U.S. officials said the Cayman government has been responsive to taxpayer-specific information requests. The Internal Revenue Service has several initiatives that target offshore tax evasion, including cases involving Cayman entities, but oversight and enforcement challenges related to offshore financial activity exist. U.S. officials said that cooperation with the Cayman Islands government has been good. Also, Maples partners said that ultimate responsibility for compliance with U.S. tax laws lies with U.S. taxpayers. |
gao_AIMD-98-34 | gao_AIMD-98-34_0 | About the Study
This report presents the results of our survey of the background and training of key financial management personnel at 34 of the largest private corporations and 19 of the largest state governments in the United States. We asked surveyed organizations for information on the education, work experience, training, and professional certifications of their key financial management personnel—chief financial officers (CFO), controllers, and managers and supervisors—working in financial reporting, financial analysis, and accounting operations positions. In addition, we asked for information on training and qualification requirements for these personnel. The revenues of the state government respondents ranged from $10.8 billion to $108.2 billion. Education Attained—Fortune 100 Companies
In the Fortune 100 companies, more than 90 percent of financial management personnel held undergraduate degrees, with about 75 percent holding either accounting or other business degrees. Overall, about 40 percent of the Fortune 100 personnel held advanced degrees. In the Fortune 100 companies, the majority of advanced degrees held were MBAs. In addition, CFOs, controllers, and managers and supervisors of financial analysis were more likely to hold advanced degrees other than MBAs or master’s degrees in accounting. Work Experience
Financial management personnel in the Fortune 100 companies responding to the survey had, on average, about 14 years of total experience in corporate accounting, public accounting, internal auditing, or accounting systems design and maintenance. The state governments’ CFOs and controllers averaged 20 and 21 years of work experience, respectively, in these areas. This total experience included an average of 4 years combined experience in public accounting, internal auditing, or systems design and maintenance, fields which often provide exposure to a broad base of accounting issues throughout an organization. About 70 percent of Fortune 100 respondents set aside between 1 and 2 percent of their budget for financial management salaries and benefits for training financial management personnel. Training Attained—State Government Organizations
State government financial management personnel completed, on average, about 31 hours of training in 1996. Most of the hours completed were in technical accounting subjects. Training Requirements—State Government Organizations
Few state government respondents had any financial management training requirements. Professional Certifications
The following sections describe the certifications attained and required for Fortune 100 and state government financial management personnel. For example, about 31 percent of Fortune 100 respondents required a CPA for their managers of financial reporting, and 11 percent to 21 percent required a CPA for other positions. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the background and training of key financial personnel at 34 of the largest private corporations and 19 of the largest state governments in the United States, focusing on: (1) education, work experience, training, and professional certifications of their key management personnel; and (2) training and qualification requirements for these personnel.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) while a majority of Fortune 100 and state government financial management personnel held undergraduate degrees in accounting or other business fields, personnel in chief financial officer (CFO) and controller positions were more likely to also hold advanced degrees; (2) in both sectors, managers and supervisors of financial analysis were more likely to hold advanced degrees than their counterparts in financial reporting and accounting operations; (3) in the Fortune 100 companies, the most common advanced degree was a Master of Business Administration (MBA); (4) in state governments, MBAs and other master's degrees were both prevalent; (5) accounting, auditing, and systems experience of financial management personnel averaged about 14 years for Fortune 100 companies and about 20 years for state government organizations; (6) for each sector, the majority of the work experience was in corporate or governmental accounting and finance, respectively; (7) combined experience in public accounting, internal auditing, and accounting systems design and maintenance averaged 2.5 years for the Fortune 100 respondents and about 4 years for the state government respondents; (8) these fields often provide personnel with a broad base of experience with accounting, and other organizationwide issues; (9) continuing professional education training was encouraged in Fortune 100 and state government organizations responding to GAO's survey; (10) on average, Fortune 100 and state government financial management personnel completed about 26 to 31 hours of training, respectively, in 1996; (11) respondents from both groups received the majority of their training in technical accounting subjects; (12) about 70 percent of Fortune 100 respondents and 45 percent of state government respondents set aside from 1 to 2 percent of their budgets for financial management staff salaries and benefits to train these staff each year; (13) as for professional certifications, over 40 percent of the Fortune 100 and about 30 percent of the state controllers and managers and supervisors of financial reporting were certified public accountants; and (14) in addition, about 10 percent of state government personnel, across positions, were certified government financial managers. |
gao_GAO-14-692T | gao_GAO-14-692T_0 | Limitations in the Inventory Undermine Ability to Determine Extent of Civilian IC Elements’ Reliance on Contractors
Limitations in the core contract personnel inventory hinder the ability to determine the extent to which the eight civilian IC elements used these personnel in 2010 and 2011 and to identify how this usage has changed over time. IC CHCO uses the inventory information in its statutorily- mandated annual personnel assessment to compare the current and projected number and costs of core contract personnel to the number and costs during the prior 5 years. Additionally, IC CHCO did not clearly explain the effect of the limitations when reporting the information to Congress. We identified several issues that limit the comparability, accuracy, and consistency of the information reported by the civilian IC elements as a whole including:
Changes to the definition of core contract personnel. IC CHCO explained in both documents that this civilian IC element’s rebaselining had an effect on the element’s reported number of contractor personnel for fiscal year 2010 but did not explain how this would limit the comparability of the number and costs of core contract personnel for both this civilian IC element and the IC as a whole. Most of the civilian IC elements did not maintain readily available documentation of the information used to calculate the number of FTEs reported for a significant number of the records we reviewed. For 37 percent of the 287 records we reviewed, however, we could not determine the reliability of the information reported. For example, we found that the civilian IC elements either under- or over-reported the amount of contract obligations by more than 10 percent for approximately one-fifth of the 287 records we reviewed. Inventory Provides Limited Insight into Functions Performed by Contractors and Reasons for Their Use
The civilian IC elements have used core contract personnel to perform a range of functions, including human capital, information technology, program management, administration, collection and operations, and security services, among others. However, the aforementioned limitations we identified in the obligation and FTE data precluded us from using the information on contractor functions to determine the number of personnel and their costs associated with each function category. Further, the civilian IC elements could not provide documentation for 40 percent of the contracts we reviewed to support the reasons they cited for using core contract personnel. Limited Progress Has Been Made in Developing Policies and Strategies on Contractor Use to Mitigate Risks
CIA, ODNI, and the executive departments that are responsible for developing policies to address risks related to contractors for the six civilian IC elements within those departments have generally made limited progress in developing such policies. Further, the eight civilian IC elements have generally not developed strategic workforce plans that address contractor use and may be missing opportunities to leverage the inventory as a tool for conducting strategic workforce planning and for prioritizing contracts that may require increased management attention and oversight. Within the IC, core contract personnel perform the types of functions that may affect an IC element’s decision-making authority or control of its mission and operations. DHS and State had issued policies and guidance that addressed generally all of OFPP Policy Letter 11-01’s requirements related to contracting for services that closely support inherently governmental functions. We also found that decisions to use contractors were not guided by strategies on the appropriate mix of government and contract personnel. ICD 612 directs IC elements to determine, review, and evaluate the number and uses of core contract personnel when conducting strategic workforce planning but does not reference the requirements related to determining the appropriate workforce mix specified in OMB’s July 2009 memorandum or require elements to document the extent to which contractors should be used. For example, based on the contract documents we reviewed, we identified at least 128 instances in the 287 records we reviewed in which the functions reported in the inventory data did not reflect the full range of services listed in the contracts. In our January 2014 report, we concluded that without complete and accurate information in the core contract personnel inventory on the extent to which contractors are performing specific functions, the civilian IC elements may be missing an opportunity to leverage the inventory as a tool for conducting strategic workforce planning and for prioritizing contracts that may require increased management attention and oversight. To improve the ability of the civilian IC elements to strategically plan for their contractors and mitigate associated risks, we also recommended that IC CHCO revise ICD 612 to require IC elements to identify their assessment of the appropriate workforce mix on a function-by-function basis, assess how the core contract personnel inventory could be modified to provide better insights into the functions performed by contractors, and require the IC elements to identify contracts within the inventory that include services that are critical or closely support inherently governmental functions. IC CHCO generally agreed with these recommendations and indicated it would explore ways to address the recommendations. | Why GAO Did This Study
The IC uses core contract personnel to augment its workforce. These contractors typically work alongside government personnel and perform staff-like work. Some core contract personnel require enhanced oversight because they perform services that could significantly influence the government's decision making.
In September 2013, GAO issued a classified report that addressed (1) the extent to which the eight civilian IC elements use core contract personnel, (2) the functions performed by these personnel and the reasons for their use, and (3) whether the elements developed policies and strategically planned for their use. GAO reviewed and assessed the reliability of the elements' core contract personnel inventory data for fiscal years 2010 and 2011, including reviewing a nongeneralizable sample of 287 contract records. GAO also reviewed agency acquisition policies and workforce plans and interviewed agency officials. In January 2014, GAO issued an unclassified version of the September 2013 report, GAO-14-204 . This statement is based on the information in the unclassified GAO report.
What GAO Found
Limitations in the intelligence community's (IC) inventory of contract personnel hinder the ability to determine the extent to which the eight civilian IC elements—the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), and six components within the Departments of Energy, Homeland Security, Justice, State, and the Treasury—use these personnel. The IC Chief Human Capital Officer (CHCO) conducts an annual inventory of core contract personnel that includes information on the number and costs of these personnel. However, GAO identified a number of limitations in the inventory that collectively limit the comparability, accuracy, and consistency of the information reported by the civilian IC elements as a whole. For example, changes to the definition of core contract personnel limit the comparability of the information over time. In addition, the civilian IC elements used various methods to calculate the number of contract personnel and did not maintain documentation to validate the number of personnel reported for 37 percent of the records GAO reviewed. GAO also found that the civilian IC elements either under- or over-reported the amount of contract obligations by more than 10 percent for approximately one-fifth of the records GAO reviewed. Further, IC CHCO did not fully disclose the effects of such limitations when reporting contract personnel and cost information to Congress, which limits its transparency and usefulness.
The civilian IC elements used core contract personnel to perform a range of functions, such as information technology and program management, and reported in the core contract personnel inventory on the reasons for using these personnel. However, limitations in the information on the number and cost of core contract personnel preclude the information on contractor functions from being used to determine the number of personnel and their costs associated with each function. Further, civilian IC elements reported in the inventory a number of reasons for using core contract personnel, such as the need for unique expertise, but GAO found that 40 percent of the contract records reviewed did not contain evidence to support the reasons reported.
Collectively, CIA, ODNI, and the departments responsible for developing policies to address risks related to contractors for the other six civilian IC elements have made limited progress in developing those policies, and the civilian IC elements have generally not developed strategic workforce plans that address contractor use. Only the Departments of Homeland Security and State have issued policies that generally address all of the Office of Federal Procurement Policy's requirements related to contracting for services that could affect the government's decision-making authority. In addition, IC CHCO requires the elements to conduct strategic workforce planning but does not require the elements to determine the appropriate mix of government and contract personnel. Further, the inventory does not provide insight into the functions performed by contractors, in particular those that could inappropriately influence the government's control over its decisions. Without complete and accurate information in the inventory on the extent to which contractors are performing specific functions, the elements may be missing an opportunity to leverage the inventory as a tool for conducting strategic workforce planning and for prioritizing contracts that may require increased management attention and oversight.
What GAO Recommends
In the January 2014 report, GAO recommended that IC CHCO take several actions to improve the inventory data's reliability, revise strategic workforce planning guidance, and develop ways to identify contracts for services that could affect the government's decision-making authority. IC CHCO generally agreed with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-03-1048T | gao_GAO-03-1048T_0 | Condition of Aerial Refueling Fleet
The KC-10 aircraft are relatively young, averaging about 20 years in age. Consequently, much of the focus on modernization of the tanker fleet is centered on the KC-135s, which were built in the 1950s and 1960s, and now average about 43 years in age. While the KC-135 fleet averages more than 40 years in age, the aircraft have relatively low levels of flying hours. The Air Force projects that E and R models have lifetime flying hours limits of 36,000 and 39,000 hours, respectively. According to the Air Force, only a few KC-135s would reach these limits before 2040, but at that time some of the aircraft would be about 80 years old. Flying hours for the KC-135s averaged about 300 hours per year between 1995 and September 2001. Since then, utilization is averaging about 435 hours per year. The Air Force Report on The KC-767A Aircraft Lease
Section 8159 of the Department of Defense Appropriations Act for fiscal year 2002, which authorized the Air Force to lease the KC-767A aircraft, also specified that the Air Force could not commence lease arrangements until 30 calendar days after submitting a report to the House and Senate Armed Services and Appropriations Committees (1) outlining implementation plans and (2) describing the terms and conditions of the lease and any expected savings. The Air Force also submitted the report of the proposed lease to the committees as required by section 8159. The Air Force eventually plans to replace all 543 KC-135 aircraft over the next 30 years and considered lease and purchase alternatives to acquire the first 100 aircraft. Office of Management and Budget Circular A-94 directs a comparison of the present value of lease versus purchase before executing a lease. In its report, the Air Force estimated that purchasing would be about $150 million less than leasing on a net present value basis. The Air Force plans to award a contract to a special purpose entity created to issue bonds needed to raise sufficient capital to purchase the new aircraft from Boeing and to lease them to the Air Force. The lease will be a three-party contract between the government, Boeing, and the special purpose entity. Office of Management and Budget Circular A-11 requires that an operating lease meet certain terms and conditions including a prohibition on paying for more than 90 percent of the fair market value of the asset over the life of the lease at the time that the lease is initiated. According to the report, if the government were to terminate the lease, it must do so for all of the delivered aircraft and may terminate any planned aircraft for which construction has not begun, must give 12-months advance notification prior to termination, return the aircraft, and pay an amount equal to 1 year’s lease payment for each aircraft terminated. If termination occurs before all aircraft have been delivered, the price for the remaining aircraft would be increased to include unamortized costs incurred by the contractor that would have been amortized over the terminated aircraft and a reasonable profit on those costs. At the expiration of the lease, the Air Force will return the aircraft to the special purpose entity after removing, at government expense, any Air Force unique configurations. The contractor will warrant that each aircraft will be free from defects in materials and workmanship, and the warranty will be of 36 months duration and will commence after construction of the commercial Boeing 767 aircraft, but before they have been converted into aerial refueling aircraft. Upon delivery to the Air Force, each KC-767A aircraft will carry a 6-month design warranty, 12-month material and workmanship warranty on the tanker modification, and the remainder of the original warranty on the commercial components of the aircraft, estimated to be about 2 years. Considerations in Reviewing the Proposed Lease
Because we have only had the Air Force report for a few days, we do not have any definitive analytical results. However, we do have a number of questions and observations about the report that we believe are important for the Congress to explore in reaching a decision on the Air Force proposal. It would be useful for the Congress to understand the process the Air Force followed. | Why GAO Did This Study
This testimony discusses the Air Force's report on the planned lease of 100 Boeing 767 aircraft modified for aerial refueling. These aircraft would be known by a new designation, KC-767A. Section 8159 of the Department of Defense Appropriations Act for fiscal year 2002 authorizes the Air Force to lease up to 100 KC-767A aircraft. We received the report required by section 8159 when it was sent to the Congress on July 10. We subsequently received a briefing from the Air Force and some of the data needed to review the draft lease and lease versus purchase analysis. However, we were permitted to read the lease for the first time on July 18 but were not allowed to make a copy and so have not had time to fully review and analyze the terms of the draft lease. As a result, this testimony today will be based on very preliminary work. It will (1) describe the condition of the current aerial refueling fleet, (2) summarize the proposed lease as presented in the Air Force's recent report, (3) present our preliminary observations on the Air Force lease report, and (4) identify related issues that we believe deserve further scrutiny.
What GAO Found
The KC-10 aircraft are relatively young, averaging about 20 years in age. Consequently, much of the focus on modernization of the tanker fleet is centered on the KC-135s, which were built in the 1950s and 1960s, and now average about 43 years in age. While the KC-135 fleet averages more than 40 years in age, the aircraft have relatively low levels of flying hours. The Air Force projects that E and R models have lifetime flying hours limits of 36,000 and 39,000 hours, respectively. According to the Air Force, only a few KC-135s would reach these limits before 2040, but at that time some of the aircraft would be about 80 years old. Flying hours for the KC-135s averaged about 300 hours per year between 1995 and September 2001. Since then, utilization is averaging about 435 hours per year. The Air Force eventually plans to replace all 543 KC-135 aircraft over the next 30 years and considered lease and purchase alternatives to acquire the first 100 aircraft. Office of Management and Budget Circular A-94 directs a comparison of the present value of lease versus purchase before executing a lease. In its report, the Air Force estimated that purchasing would be about $150 million less than leasing on a net present value basis. The Air Force plans to award a contract to a special purpose entity created to issue bonds needed to raise sufficient capital to purchase the new aircraft from Boeing and to lease them to the Air Force. The lease will be a three-party contract between the government, Boeing, and the special purpose entity. Office of Management and Budget Circular A-11 requires that an operating lease meet certain terms and conditions including a prohibition on paying for more than 90 percent of the fair market value of the asset over the life of the lease at the time that the lease is initiated. According to the report, if the government were to terminate the lease, it must do so for all of the delivered aircraft and may terminate any planned aircraft for which construction has not begun, must give 12-months advance notification prior to termination, return the aircraft, and pay an amount equal to one year's lease payment for each aircraft terminated. If termination occurs before all aircraft have been delivered, the price for the remaining aircraft would be increased to include unamortized costs incurred by the contractor that would have been amortized over the terminated aircraft and a reasonable profit on those costs. At the expiration of the lease, the Air Force will return the aircraft to the special purpose entity after removing, at government expense, any Air Force unique configurations. The contractor will warrant that each aircraft will be free from defects in materials and workmanship, and the warranty will be of 36 months duration and will commence after construction of the commercial Boeing 767 aircraft, but before they have been converted into aerial refueling aircraft. Upon delivery to the Air Force, each KC-767A aircraft will carry a 6-month design warranty, 12-month material and workmanship warranty on the tanker modification, and the remainder of the original warranty on the commercial components of the aircraft, estimated to be about 2 years. Because we have only had the Air Force report for a few days, we do not have any definitive analytical results. However, we do have a number of questions and observations about the report that we believe are important for the Congress to explore in reaching a decision on the Air Force proposal. |
gao_GAO-04-872T | gao_GAO-04-872T_0 | Examining Social Security’s Effects on Distribution of Benefits and Taxes
Under Social Security, retired workers can receive benefits at age 65 that equal about 50 percent of pre-retirement earnings for an illustrative worker with relatively lower earnings but only about 30 percent of earnings for one with relatively higher earnings. Other such program features include provisions for disabled workers, spouses, children, and survivors. Changes in the program over time also affect the distribution of benefits across generations. Today, I would like to share our findings regarding how to define and describe “progressivity,” defining appropriate benchmarks for assessing the future outlook for individuals’ Social Security benefits, what factors influence the distributional effects of the current Social Security program, and how various reform proposals might vary in their distributional effects. Different Distributional Measures Reflect Different Perspectives
Two distinct perspectives on Social Security’s goals suggest different approaches to measuring progressivity. Both perspectives provide valuable insights. An adequacy perspective focuses on benefit levels and how well they help ensure a minimal subsistence or maintain pre- entitlement living standards. An equity perspective focuses on rates of return and other measures relating lifetime benefits to lifetime contributions. Note however that equity measures cannot accurately assess the distributional effects of reform proposals that rely on general revenue transfers. Program’s Distributional Effects Reflect Various Program Features and Demographic Patterns
Social Security’s distributional effects reflect program features, such as its benefit formula, and demographic patterns among its recipients, such as marriage between lower and higher earners. The disability benefit formula also favors lower earners, and disability recipients are disproportionately lower earners. Household formation tends to reduce the system’s tilt toward lower earners because some of the lower-earning individuals helped by the program live in high-income households. Also, differences in mortality rates may reduce rates of return for lower earners, as studies show they may not live as long as higher earners and therefore would receive benefits for fewer years. For example, Model 2 of the President’s Commission to Strengthen Social Security (CSSS) proposes a new system of voluntary individual accounts along with a combination of certain benefit reductions for all beneficiaries and selected benefit enhancements for selected low earners and survivors. According to our simulations, the distribution of benefits under Model 2 could favor lower earners more than the distribution of benefits under either currently promised or currently funded benefits. Again, this assumes that all account participants would invest in the same portfolios. Social Security: Long-Term Financing Shortfall Drives Need for Reform (GAO-02-845T, June 19, 2002). | Why GAO Did This Study
Under the current Social Security benefit formula, retired workers can receive benefits at age 65 that equal about 50 percent of preretirement earnings for an illustrative low-wage worker but only about 30 percent for an illustrative high-wage worker. Factors other than earnings also influence the distribution of benefits, including the program's provisions for disabled workers, spouses, children, and survivors. Changes in the program over time also affect the distribution of benefits across generations. Social Security faces a long-term structural financing shortfall. Program changes to address that shortfall could alter the way Social Security's benefits and revenues are distributed across the population and affect the income security of millions of Americans. The Chairman of the Senate Special Committee on Aging asked us to discuss how selected Social Security reform proposals might affect the distribution of benefits and taxes.
What GAO Found
Two distinct perspectives on Social Security's goals suggest different approaches to measuring "progressivity," or the distribution of benefits and taxes with respect to various earnings levels. Both perspectives provide valuable insights. An adequacy perspective focuses on benefit levels and how well they maintain pre-retirement living standards. An equity perspective focuses on rates of return and other measures relating lifetime benefits to contributions. Both perspectives examine how their measures are distributed across earnings levels. However, equity measures take all benefits and taxes into account, which is difficult to calculate for reform proposals that rely on general revenue transfers because it is unclear who will bear the relative burden for those general revenues. The Social Security program's distributional effects reflect both program features and demographic patterns among its recipients. In addition to the benefit formula, disability benefits favor lower earners because disabled workers are more likely to be lower lifetime earners. In contrast, certain household patterns reduce the system's tilt toward lower earners, for example, when lower earners have high-earner spouses. The advantage for lower earners is also diminished by the fact that they may not live as long as higher earners and therefore would get benefits for fewer years on average. Proposals to alter the Social Security program would have different distributional effects, depending on their design. Model 2 of the President's Commission to Strengthen Social Security proposes new individual accounts, certain benefit reductions for all beneficiaries, and certain benefit enhancements for selected low earners and survivors. According to our simulations, the combined effect could result in lower earners receiving a greater relative share of all benefits than under the current system if all workers invest in the same portfolio. |
gao_NSIAD-95-156 | gao_NSIAD-95-156_0 | Two projects—coal industry restructuring and housing sector reform—met or exceeded their objectives. Three projects—health care, commercial real estate, and environmental policy—met few or none of their objectives. These projects were effecting change because they had sustainability—benefits that extend beyond the project’s life span—built into their design and they focused on issues on a national or regional scale. Also, Russian officials said the project had little or no effect on the availability of commercial real estate in their cities. Common Themes to Successful Projects
Successful projects (1) had strong support and involvement at all levels of the Russian government, (2) had a long-term physical presence by U.S. contractors in Russia, and (3) were designed to achieve maximum results by supporting Russian initiatives, having a broad scope, and including elements that made them sustainable. A critical element to a project’s success was the degree to which Russian officials were committed to reform in the particular sector. In contrast, some projects were not designed to maximize their potential impact. However, to respond quickly, USAID made certain exceptions to its normal procedures and processes. USAID/Moscow has adequately managed and monitored the project. The project did not contribute to systemic reform and was not sustainable. This regulation contributed to the poor results of the project. III.1 and III.2.) 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. Although we recognize that this project was only one of many in the energy sector, we found that the project is unlikely to contribute to systemic reform because of its design and the lack of monitoring and follow-up by USAID. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Agency for International Development's (AID) assistance projects in Russia, focusing on whether: (1) individual AID projects met their objectives and contributed to systemic reforms; (2) the projects had common characteristics that contributed to their successful or unsuccessful outcomes; and (3) AID adequately managed the Russian projects.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) some of the projects reviewed fully met or exceeded their objectives, while other projects met few or none of their objectives; (2) three AID projects contributed to fundamental structural changes in Russia because they had sustainability built into their design and they focused on national or regional issues; (3) the successful projects had broad and strong support from all levels of the Russian government, U.S. contractors with long-term physical presence in Russia, a broad scope to maximize benefits, and specific sustainability objectives, and complemented or supported Russian initiatives; (4) Russian officials' commitment to reform in certain sectors was critical to project success; (5) the unsuccessful projects were poorly designed and implemented and often had little or no impact on problems; (6) AID made certain exceptions to its normal procedures and processes in its desire to respond quickly to assist Russia; and (7) AID failed to adequately manage some projects because of problems in delegating management and monitoring responsibility to the Moscow AID office, inadequate staff, and inadequate management information systems. |
gao_GAO-12-126 | gao_GAO-12-126_0 | However, to the extent that such information is derived from purchasing agreements containing confidentiality clauses, these data intermediaries may be potential targets of litigation by device manufacturers. For example, the APC payment for a pacemaker implantation procedure represents a bundled payment for the pacemaker device, routine supplies, and the operating or procedure room. Medicare’s Payment Systems Indirectly Account for Prices Hospitals Pay for IMDs; Efforts Are Under Way to Better Account for These Prices
Medicare does not directly purchase IMDs but accounts for hospitals’ IMD prices indirectly. CMS collects data on hospitals’ costs for all services and supplies from Medicare cost reports. Further charges reported on the outpatient claims generally reflect what the hospital reports as the full cost of the IMD. While cardiac and orthopedic procedures accounted for nearly all IMD-related expenditures, orthopedic procedures accounted for most of the increase in such expenditures during our period of study. Utilization increased at a faster rate for orthopedic devices and explained the majority of changes in expenditures for IMD procedures during the period. Medicare Expenditures for IMD Procedures Increased from About $16 Billion to $20 Billion between 2004 and 2009, with Orthopedic IMD Procedures Driving Most of That Growth
From 2004 through 2009, expenditures for hospital IMD procedures increased from $16.1 billion to $19.8 billion, an increase of 4.3 percent per year—a rate equal to that of Medicare spending for other hospital procedures. 2). 6). Per-beneficiary utilization related to cardiac stents, AICDs, and pacemakers all decreased in the inpatient setting and increased in the outpatient setting. Information Available on the Prices Hospitals Paid for Selected IMDs Shows Substantial Variation; Hospital-Physician Relationships Are a Particular Influence on Prices Paid
Complete and comparable information on the prices hospitals paid for the various models of IMDs was limited, as reflected in responses to our data request. The price information that was provided showed substantial variation in the prices hospitals paid for the same type of device. A particular factor that influences the prices hospitals pay for IMDs is hospitals’ ability to manage relationships with physicians and manufacturers. Various Factors Limit the Availability of Detailed Information on the Prices Hospitals Paid for Selected IMDs
Detailed information on both the specific model purchased and the sale price net of discounts and rebates is needed to accurately compare the amount hospitals paid for various types of IMDs. However, not all 39 hospitals, 5 GPOs, the VA health care system, and 8 DOD medical centers or hospitals responding to our request provided us with such detailed information for three types of cardiac IMDs and two types of orthopedic IMDs purchased during fiscal year 2010. Concluding Observations
The lack of price transparency for the IMDs we examined makes it difficult to know whether hospitals are achieving the best device prices. This lack of price transparency may have implications for Medicare because excess or unnecessary IMD costs that hospitals incur may be passed on to the Medicare program. While we were able to obtain detailed IMD pricing data from 31 of the 60 hospitals we contacted, the effort revealed the challenges in compiling and analyzing meaningful price information even from this relatively small number of hospitals. Furthermore, we observed substantial variation in the prices that these 31 hospitals paid for cardiac devices. These data suggest that some hospitals have substantially less bargaining power with the small group of companies that manufacture particular IMD devices and consequently face challenges in obtaining more favorable prices. Physician preferences for particular manufacturer’s devices and models may further complicate hospitals’ bargaining power. Such preferences may shape hospitals’ purchasing decisions and limit their ability to obtain volume discounts from device manufacturers. Moreover, many device manufacturers require confidentiality clauses that prohibit hospitals from disclosing their negotiated prices with third parties, which may include physicians. Agency and Industry Comments
The Department of Health and Human Services and VA reviewed a draft of this report and provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. DOD also reviewed a draft of this report and had no comments. | Why GAO Did This Study
Implantable medical devices (IMD)including a variety of cardiac and orthopedic devices provided to Medicare beneficiaries in inpatient or outpatient hospital settingsrepresent a significant share of hospitals supply costs. Hospitals purchase IMDs directly from manufacturers or through group purchasing organizations (GPO) and their purchasing agreements often contain confidentiality clauses restricting them from revealing to third parties the prices they pay for such devices. Policymakers are concerned that the lack of price transparency inhibits competition in the device market, leading to higher costs for hospitals, and ultimately higher Medicare spending. GAO was asked to examine (1) Medicare spending and utilization trends for procedures involving IMDs provided to beneficiaries, and (2) what available information shows about the prices hospitals pay for IMDs and any factors particular to the IMD market that influence those prices. GAO analyzed the most recently available Medicare inpatient and outpatient hospital claims from fiscal years 2004 through 2009. GAO requested price information on five devices from 60 hospitals, 6 GPOs, Department of Defense (DOD) medical centers, and the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) health system. GAO interviewed officials from GPOs, device manufacturers, large hospital systems, and small hospitals about the factors that affect the prices hospitals pay for IMDs.
What GAO Found
From 2004 through 2009, expenditures for hospital IMD procedures increased from $16.1 billion to $19.8 billion, an increase of 4.3 percent per yeara rate equal to that of Medicare spending for other hospital procedures. While cardiac and orthopedic procedures accounted for nearly all IMD-related expenditures, orthopedic procedures accounted for most of the increase in such expenditures during this period. Utilization increased at a faster rate for orthopedic devices and accounted for the majority of changes in expenditures for IMD procedures during the period.
The information GAO obtained on the amounts hospitals paid for selected IMDs showed substantial variation. For a number of reasons, the detailed information needed to accurately compare prices across hospitalsboth the specific model and sale price net of discounts and rebateswas not reported by all respondents for all IMDs in our study. However, data from 31 hospitals indicated substantial variation in reported prices for cardiac devices. For example, the difference between the lowest and highest price hospitals reported paying for a particular automated implantable cardioverter defibrillator (AICD) model was $6,844. The difference between the highest and lowest price reported for another AICD model was $8,723. The price differences for the remaining two AICD models in our study fell in between $6,844 and $8,723. The median prices across the four AICD models ranged from $16,445 to $19,007. A factor particular to the IMD market that affects prices hospitals pay is the influence of physicians on hospitals IMD purchasing. Although physicians are not involved in price negotiations, they often express strong preferences for certain manufacturers and models of IMDs. To the extent that physicians in the same hospital have different preferences for IMDs, it may be difficult for the hospital to obtain volume discounts from particular manufacturers. Also, confidentiality clauses barring hospitals from sharing price information make it difficult to inform physicians about device costs and thereby influence their preferences. Other factors that influence IMD prices include the degree of seller competition and a hospitals market share.
These data suggest that some hospitals have substantially less bargaining power with the small group of companies that manufacture particular IMDs and consequently face challenges in obtaining more favorable prices. The lack of price transparency and the substantial variation in amounts hospitals pay for some IMDs raise questions about whether hospitals are achieving the best prices possible. Any excess or unnecessary costs that hospitals incur through IMD pricing may be passed onto the Medicare program.
The Department of Health and Human Services, VA, and DOD reviewed a draft of this report and had no general comments. |
gao_GAO-12-689 | gao_GAO-12-689_0 | VA Changed Estimates Supporting the Request, but Factors That Account for Most of the Changes Were Not Transparent
Request Increased $165 Million, Reflecting an Increase in Initiatives and a Decrease in Both Ongoing Services and Available Resources
The President’s fiscal year 2013 budget request for VA health care services was $165 million more than the advance appropriations request for the same year. This decline in anticipated resources was partially offset by the $110 million decrease in expected obligations, which resulted in the net increase in the President’s request of $165 million. Three factors accounted for most of the changes in the estimates that supported the President’s fiscal year 2013 budget request when compared to the earlier, advance appropriations request; however, VA, in its budget justification, was not transparent about two of the factors. The three factors that accounted for the $2 billion increase in the initiatives estimate and the $2.1 billion decrease in the ongoing health care services estimate were: (1) a new approach in reporting the estimate for initiatives, (2) updated assumptions and data to estimate ongoing health care services, and (3) additional funding needed for initiatives. VA used a new reporting approach for initiatives that combined both funding for initiatives and funding for certain ongoing health care services in its initiatives estimate, which increased VA’s initiatives estimate and decreased VA’s ongoing services estimate. Nevertheless, by not stating in its budget justification that it made this change, VA has not made it transparent that the estimate for initiatives is greater and the estimate for ongoing services is less than they would have been using VA’s past reporting approach. However, in its fiscal year 2013 budget justification, VA did not make it clear that part of the additional increase in its initiatives estimate occurred because VA’s earlier estimate in support of the advance appropriations request did not include funding for all the initiatives the agency intended to continue. However, VA did not state that some initiatives for which estimates were included in the fiscal years 2013 and 2014 advance appropriations requests would require additional funding if the initiatives were to be continued. The lack of transparency regarding the factors that changed VA’s estimates for ongoing health care services and initiatives results in unclear information for congressional deliberation. Past Issues in VA’s Estimates for NRM and Operational Improvements Remain
Our analysis of the estimates supporting the President’s fiscal year 2013 budget request found that VA’s supporting estimates (1) do not address historical discrepancies between estimated and actual NRM spending and (2) lack analytical support for expected savings from some operational improvements. Regarding NRM, VA’s fiscal year 2013 estimate does not appear to correct for the long-standing pattern of VA’s NRM spending exceeding its estimates and was based on a policy decision. More recently, we found that in fiscal year 2011 VA spent about $2 billion for NRM, which was $867 million more than estimated (see fig. According to VA officials, NRM spending has exceeded estimates of needed funding in recent years because VA medical facilities have spent more funds on NRM projects that were originally expected to be spent on other activities— such as utilities, grounds maintenance, and janitorial services. This spending is consistent with VA’s authority to increase or decrease the amounts VA allocates from the Medical Facilities account for NRM and with congressional committee report language. When we asked VA officials if the fiscal year 2013 estimate addressed the historical discrepancies between amounts estimated and actual spending, VA officials said that all information was considered in developing the estimate. However, VA officials noted that the amount requested was a policy decision and did not specifically say whether these discrepancies were addressed. Regarding operational improvements, VA estimated savings for fiscal year 2013 using the same methodologies it used in the past, some of which we recently reported lacked analytical support or were flawed. We also recommended that VA develop a sound methodology for estimating savings from its operational improvements. VA’s most recent NRM estimates do not appear to correct for the long-standing pattern where VA’s NRM spending exceeds VA’s NRM estimates. Until these issues are addressed, VA’s estimates of NRM and operational improvements are of limited use for decision makers. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve the transparency and reliability of information presented in VA’s congressional budget justifications that support the President’s budget request for VA health care, we recommend the Secretary of VA take the following three actions:
State in future budget justifications whether the estimates for initiatives include funding for ongoing health care services. State in future budget justifications whether the estimates for initiatives in support of the advance appropriations request reflect all the funding that may be required if all initiatives are to be continued. Department of Veterans Affairs: Issues Related to Real Property Realignment and Future Health Care Costs. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Veterans Health Care Budget Reform and Transparency Act of 2009 requires GAO to report on the Presidents annual budget request to Congress for VA health care services. GAOs previous work found that VAs NRM spending exceeded its estimates in recent years and that some of VAs estimates of savings from operational improvements lacked analytical support or were flawed.
Building on GAOs past work and the Presidents most recent request for VA health care, this report examines (1) key changes to the fiscal year 2013 budget request compared to the 2013 advance appropriations request, and certain aspects of the fiscal year 2014 advance appropriation request and supporting estimates; and (2) whether the issues GAO identified regarding NRM and operational improvements continue in the estimates for the most recent request. GAO reviewed the Presidents budget request, VAs budget justification, and VA data. GAO interviewed VA officials and staff from the Office of Management and Budget.
What GAO Found
The Presidents fiscal year 2013 budget request for the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) health care services was $165 million more than the earlier advance appropriations request for the same year. This request reflected a $2 billion increase for initiatives and a $2.1 billion decrease for ongoing health care services, for a net decrease of $110 million in expected obligations. This decrease partially offset a decline in anticipated resources available to VA of $275 million, resulting in the net increase in the Presidents request of $165 million. Two of the three factors that accounted for most of these changes were not transparent. First, VA used a new reporting approach for initiatives that combined both funding for initiatives and for certain ongoing health care services in its initiatives estimate. Previously, VA had reported only funding it identified for initiatives during that year. This new reporting approach resulted in an increase in VAs initiatives estimate and a commensurate decrease in VAs ongoing services estimate. VA officials told GAO that this change was made to be more transparent about the total funding needed for initiatives. However, because VA did not disclose this change in its budget justification, VA has not made it transparent that its initiatives estimate is greater and its ongoing health care services estimate is lower than they would have been using VAs past approach. Second, VA included additional funding in its initiatives estimate, in part, to fund initiatives that were not identified in the fiscal year 2013 advance appropriations request. VA also did not make transparent in its budget justifications that some initiatives identified in its fiscal years 2013 and 2014 advance appropriations requests may require additional funding if the initiatives are continued. The lack of transparency regarding VAs estimates for initiatives and ongoing health care services results in unclear information for congressional deliberation.
The issues GAO previously identified related to NRM (non-recurring maintenance), such as renovations and other improvements of VA medical facilities, and operational improvements remain. VAs fiscal year 2013 estimate for NRM$710 milliondoes not appear to correct for the long-standing pattern where VAs NRM spending exceeds VAs NRM estimates. For example, in fiscal year 2011 VA spent about $2 billion for NRM, which was $867 million more than estimated. According to VA officials, this pattern has occurred because VA medical facilities have spent more funds on NRM projects that were originally expected to be spent on other activitiessuch as utilities, grounds maintenance, and janitorial serviceswhich is consistent with VAs authority to allocate its appropriations. When GAO asked if the fiscal year 2013 estimate addressed the historical discrepancies between estimated and actual NRM spending, VA officials said that all information was considered in developing the estimate. However, they noted that the final estimate was a policy decision and did not say specifically whether these discrepancies were addressed. Regarding operational improvements, VA estimated savings for fiscal year 2013 using the same methodologies it used in the past, some of which GAO previously found lacked analytical support or were flawed. GAO previously recommended that VA develop a sound methodology for estimating savings from its operational improvements, which according to officials, VA is addressing for future estimates. Until these issues are addressed, VAs estimates of NRM and operational improvements may not be reliable and are of limited use for decision makers.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that VA state in its budget justification whether the estimates for initiatives include funding for ongoing services and whether its advance appropriations request reflects funding that may be required if initiatives are continued. GAO also recommends that VAs NRM estimates fully account for the long-standing pattern of medical facilities spending more on NRM than originally expected. VA concurred except for the recommendation on advance appropriations, which GAO believes is needed to improve transparency. |
gao_GAO-12-536 | gao_GAO-12-536_0 | The two principal multilateral regimes that address exports of UAVs are the MTCR and Wassenaar. Wassenaar, established in 1996, is a voluntary association of 41 countries that share the goal of limiting the spread of certain conventional weapons and sensitive dual-use items having both civilian and military applications. There are also U.S. government agencies that gather and analyze information on the proliferation of UAV systems and related technologies and produce UAV-related threat assessments and other UAV-related information. UAVs are also increasingly used in a number of civil and commercial applications, such as law enforcement, but national and international regulations place restrictions on most of these applications. UAV Proliferation Presents Risks for the United States, but Selected Transfers Support Its Interests
The United States likely faces increasing risks as additional countries of concern and terrorist organizations acquire UAV technology. UAVs can provide countries and terrorists organizations with increased abilities to gather intelligence on and conduct attacks against U.S. interests. We were told that the significant growth in the number of countries that have acquired UAVs, including key countries of concern, has increased the threat to the United States. Transfers of U.S. UAV Technology Increase Allies’ Capabilities and Strengthen the Industrial Base for UAV Production
Although UAV proliferation poses risks, the U.S. government has determined that selected transfers of UAV technology can further national security objectives. Italy and the United Kingdom also successfully deployed U.S. UAVs in Afghanistan to collect intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance data on Taliban activity. The United States Made Proposals to Address the Proliferation of UAVs through the MTCR but Members Did Not Agree to Most of the Changes
The United States proposed changes to address how the MTCR applies to UAVs, but MTCR members only reached a consensus to accept one of the changes. While Wassenaar applies to the export of some military and dual-use systems used on UAVs, it does not apply to other dual-use enabling technologies, according to available analysis. This fact raises concerns about the potential for nonmembers to undermine the regimes’ ability to limit UAV proliferation. The United States Has Also Used Bilateral Demarches to Address UAV Proliferation Concerns
In addition to employing multilateral diplomacy to address UAV proliferation concerns, the United States employed bilateral diplomacy, chiefly in the form of demarches, to address specific concerns with foreign governments. State provided to us approximately 70 cables containing UAV-related demarches issued to 20 foreign governments and a multilateral regime during the period from January 2005 to September 2011. Over 75 percent of the cables provided responded to efforts by a small number of countries of concern to obtain controlled and uncontrolled technologies for use in their UAV programs. Agencies Coordinate to Control the Spread of UAV Technology, but Could Strengthen Their Approval, Monitoring, and Enforcement Efforts
U.S. agencies coordinate in a variety of ways to control the spread of UAV technology, but could strengthen their processes for approving, monitoring, and enforcing export control requirements on UAVs. Second, DOD, State, and Commerce each conduct end-use monitoring of some UAV technology, but differences in the agencies’ programs may result in similar items being subject to different levels of oversight. Additionally, many UAV-related license applications are reviewed by the Missile Technology Export Control Group (MTEC). The U.S. government has authorized the export of a range of UAV technology, but database limitations impair its ability to oversee the release of such technology. Specifically, State’s licensing database was not designed to produce complete data on the number, types, and value of UAV technology that State has licensed for export. We recommend that all U.S. agencies with information relevant to the export licensing process should seek to improve mechanisms for information sharing. State and DOD also agreed with our recommendation to harmonize their approaches to the end-use monitoring of UAVs. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To assess the global trends in the development, acquisition, and application of unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) technology worldwide since 2005, we obtained, analyzed, and corroborated private sector open source and U.S. government reporting on U.S. and foreign UAV activities from various sources and spoke to representatives of U.S. private sector associations representing companies that manufacture UAVs. To assess the extent to which the U.S. government has coordinated its export control efforts to limit the spread of UAV technology, we obtained and analyzed fiscal years 2005 through 2010 export licensing and end- use monitoring data from Commerce and State. For this reason, this appendix provides additional information about these changes. | Why GAO Did This Study
The global use of UAVs has increased significantly over time, raising concerns about their proliferation. MTCR and Wassenaar are the multilateral regimes that address UAV proliferation. MTCR seeks to limit the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction delivery systems, while Wassenaar seeks to limit the spread of certain conventional weapons and sensitive technologies with both civilian and military uses. This report is an unclassified version of a classified report issued in February 2012. GAO was asked to address (1) global trends in the use of UAV technology, (2) U.S. national security considerations concerning UAV proliferation, (3) multilateral and bilateral tools to control UAV proliferation, and (4) coordination of U.S. efforts to limit the spread of UAV technology. To conduct this review, GAO analyzed intelligence, licensing, and end-use monitoring data, and interviewed U.S. and foreign officials.
What GAO Found
Since 2005, the number of countries that acquired an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) system nearly doubled from about 40 to more than 75. In addition, countries of proliferation concern developed and fielded increasingly more sophisticated systems. Recent trends in new UAV capabilities, including armed and miniature UAVs, increased the number of military applications for this technology. A number of new civilian and commercial applications, such as law enforcement and environmental monitoring, are available for UAVs, but these applications are limited by regulatory restrictions on civilian airspace.
The United States likely faces increasing risks as countries of concern and terrorist organizations seek to acquire UAV technology. Foreign countries and terrorists acquisition of UAVs could provide them with increased abilities to gather intelligence on and conduct attacks against U.S. interests. For instance, some foreign countries likely have already used UAVs to gather information on U.S. military activities overseas. Alternatively, the U.S. government has determined that selected transfers of UAV technology support its national security interests by providing allies with key capabilities and by helping retain a strong industrial base for UAV production. For instance, the United Kingdom and Italy have used UAVs purchased from the United States to collect data on Taliban activity in Afghanistan.
The United States has engaged in multilateral and bilateral diplomacy to address UAV proliferation concerns. The United States principally engaged the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) to address multilateral UAV proliferation concerns. Since 2005, the United States proposed certain significant changes to address how MTCR controls UAVs, but members could not reach a consensus for these changes. Also, while the Wassenaar Arrangement (Wassenaar) controls the export of some key dual-use UAV components, it does not control other dual-use technologies that are commonly used in UAVs. The Department of State (State) has also used diplomatic cables to address the proliferation of UAV-related technologies bilaterally. State provided to GAO about 70 cables that it sent from January 2005 to September 2011 addressing UAV-related concerns to about 20 governments and the MTCR. Over 75 percent of these cables focused on efforts by a small number of countries of concern to obtain UAV technology.
U.S. agencies coordinate in several ways to control the spread of UAV technology, but could improve their UAV-related information sharing. For instance, an interagency group reviews many license applications to export UAV technology. However, there is not a formal mechanism to ensure that licensing agencies have relevant and timely intelligence information when making licensing decisions. Also, States licensing database cannot provide aggregate data on military UAV exports State has authorized, which may impair the U.S. governments ability to oversee the release of sensitive UAV technology. The Department of Defense (DOD) and State each conduct end-use monitoring of some UAV exports, but differences in the agencies programs may result in similar types of items being subject to different levels of oversight.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that State improve its export licensing database to better identify authorized UAV exports, that relevant agencies improve mechanisms for sharing information relevant to the export licensing process, and that State and DOD harmonize their UAV end-use monitoring approaches. The agencies generally agreed with the recommendations. |
gao_GAO-13-508T | gao_GAO-13-508T_0 | Over the past 5 years, our work has recommended numerous actions that can be taken to address the problems we identified. The Current Status and Cost of Space Systems Acquisitions
Most of DOD’s major satellite programs are in mature phases of acquisition and cost and schedule growth is not as widespread as it was in prior years. However, the satellites, ground systems, and user terminals are not optimally aligned and the cost of launching satellites continues to be expensive. Most of DOD’s major satellite programs are in mature phases of acquisition, that is, the initial satellites have been designed, fabricated and launched into orbit while additional satellites of the same design are being produced. For the portfolio of major satellite programs, new cost and schedule growth is not as widespread as it was in prior years, but DOD is still experiencing problems in these programs. Also, the work performed to date for development of the first two GPS III satellites continues to cost more than DOD expected. Since the program entered system development, total program costs have increased approximately $180 million. Though satellite programs are not experiencing cost and schedule problems as widespread as in years past, we have reported that ground control systems and user terminals in most of DOD’s major space systems acquisitions are not optimally aligned, leading to underutilized on-orbit satellite resources and limited capability provided to the warfighter. Another acquisition challenge facing DOD is the cost of launching satellites into space. DOD has benefited from a long string of successful launches, including three military and four intelligence community satellites this year. However, each launch can range from $100 million to over $200 million. Recent GAO Findings Related to Space Systems Acquisitions
Over the past year, we have reported on DOD’s progress in closing knowledge gaps in its new Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) acquisition strategy, DOD’s efforts to introduce new launch providers, opportunities to help reduce satellite program costs, and the Air Force’s satellite control operations and modernization efforts with comparisons to commercial practices. These reports further highlight the successes and challenges that have faced the space community as it has sought to mitigate rising costs and deliver modernized capabilities. We reported in July 2012 that DOD had numerous efforts in progress to address the knowledge gaps and data deficiencies identified in our September 2011 report, such as completing or obtaining independent cost estimates for two EELV engines and completing a study of the liquid rocket engine industrial base. However, we found that more action was needed to ensure that launch mission assurance activities were not excessive, to identify opportunities to leverage the government’s buying power through increased efficiencies in launch acquisitions, and to strategically address longer-term technology investments. We reported this month that DOD’s satellite control networks are fragmented and potentially duplicative. Finally, we found that DOD faced barriers that complicate its ability to make improvements to its satellite control networks and adopt commercial practices. We recommended that the Secretary of Defense direct future DOD satellite acquisition programs to determine a business case for proceeding with either a dedicated or shared network for that program’s satellite control operations and develop a department-wide long-term plan for modernizing its AFSCN and any future shared networks and implementing commercial practices to improve DOD satellite control networks. DOD agreed with our recommendations. Recent Actions Taken to Address Space Systems Acquisition Problems
Congress and DOD continue to take steps towards reforming the defense acquisition system to increase the likelihood that acquisition programs will succeed in meeting planned cost and schedule objectives. DOD also participates in the newly re-formed Space Industrial Base Council, which is made up of senior level personnel at agencies across the federal government that develop space systems. The changes DOD has been making to leadership and oversight appear to be increasing senior management attention on space programs, but it is unclear whether the changes will be enough to overcome the problems we identified with fragmented leadership in the past. In conclusion, DOD has made credible progress in stabilizing space programs. Space Acquisitions: DOD Faces Challenges in Fully Realizing Benefits of Satellite Acquisition Improvements. | Why GAO Did This Study
Each year, DOD spends billions of dollars to acquire space-based capabilities that support military and other government operations. Just a few years ago, the majority of DOD's space programs were characterized by significant cost and schedule growth. In 2012, GAO reported that the worst of those space acquisition problems now appear to be behind the department. While new major satellite acquisitions are facing potential cost growth and schedule slips, they are not as widespread and significant as they were several years ago. However, the department still faces serious challenges, such as the high cost of launching satellites, fragmented satellite control operations, as well as disconnects between fielding satellites and synchronizing ground systems.
To address the progress DOD has made this year, this testimony focuses on (1) the current status and cost of DOD space systems acquisitions, (2) the results of GAO's space system-related reviews this past year, and (3) recent actions taken to address acquisition problems. This testimony is based on previously issued GAO products over the past 5 years, interviews with DOD officials, and an analysis of DOD funding estimates.
GAO is not making recommendations in this testimony. However, in previous reports, GAO has generally recommended that DOD adopt best practices for developing space systems. DOD agreed and is in the process of implementing such practices. DOD agreed with GAO's characterization of recent actions it has taken to improve space acquisitions.
What GAO Found
Most of the Department of Defense's (DOD) major satellite programs are in mature phases of development, that is, the initial satellites have been designed, fabricated, and launched into orbit while additional satellites of the same design are being produced. For the portfolio of major satellite programs, new cost and schedule growth is not as widespread as it was in prior years, but DOD is still experiencing problems. For example, total program costs have increased approximately $180 million from a baseline of $4.1 billion for one of two satellite programs that are in the earlier phases of acquisition. Though satellite programs are not experiencing problems as widespread as in years past, ground control systems and user terminals in most of DOD's major space system acquisitions are not optimally aligned, leading to underutilized satellites and limited capability provided to the warfighter. For example, the development and fielding of user terminals for a Navy communications satellite program lag behind the launch of new satellites by more than a year. Additionally, the development of ground software needed to extract capabilities of new missile warning satellites is not expected to be complete until at least 2018, even though satellites are being launched. Another acquisition challenge facing DOD is the cost of launching satellites into space, which range from around $100 million to over $200 million per launch.
Recent GAO space system-related reviews highlight other difficulties facing the space community as it has sought to mitigate rising costs and deliver modernized capabilities. For instance, in July 2012 GAO reported that DOD had numerous efforts in progress to address knowledge gaps and data deficiencies in its Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle acquisition strategy. However, GAO also reported that more action was needed to identify opportunities to leverage the government's buying power through increased efficiencies in launch acquisitions. In April 2013 GAO reported that satellite control networks are fragmented and potentially duplicative. Moreover, GAO found that DOD faced barriers--such as lacking long-term plans and reliable cost data--that complicate its ability to make improvements to its satellite control networks and adopt commercial practices. GAO recommendations included determining business cases for proceeding with either dedicated or shared satellite control networks for future satellite programs and implementing commercial practices to improve DOD satellite control networks.
Congress and DOD continue to take steps towards reforming the defense acquisition system to increase the likelihood that acquisition programs will succeed in meeting planned cost and schedule objectives. For instance, in response to legislation passed in 2009, DOD has taken steps that should help improve the department's acquisition process and create more executable programs, such as developing performance measures to assess acquisition program activities. DOD has also undertaken actions such as chartering senior-level reviews of space programs and participating in governmentwide space councils. The changes DOD has been making to leadership and oversight appear to be increasing senior management attention on space programs, but it is unclear whether the changes will overcome the problems GAO has identified with fragmented leadership in the past. |
gao_T-OGC-98-38 | gao_T-OGC-98-38_0 | GAO conducted a review to determine whether all final rules covered by CRA and published in the Register were filed with the Congress and GAO. As a result of GAO’s compliance audit, however, 264 rules now have been filed with GAO and the Congress and are thus now effective under CRA. Sixty-Day Delay and “Good Cause”
One area of consistent difficulty in implementing CRA has been the failure of some agencies to delay the effective date of major rules for 60 days as required by section 801(a)(3)(A) of the act. Definitions of Rules and Major Rules
One early question about implementation of CRA was whether Executive agencies or OIRA would attempt to avoid designating rules as major and thereby avoid GAO’s review and the 60-day delay in the effective date. While we are unaware of any rule that OIRA misclassified to avoid the major rule designation, the failure of agencies to identify some issuances as “rules” at all has meant that some major rules have not been identified. CRA contains a broad definition of “rule,” including more than the usual “notice and comment” rulemakings under the Administrative Procedure Act which are published in the Federal Register. Additionally, some agencies prepare rather comprehensive narrative reports on nonmajor rules. After almost 2 years’ experience in carrying out our responsibilities under the act, we can suggest four areas in which OIRA should exercise more leadership within the Executive branch regulatory community, consistent with the intent of the Executive Order, to enhance CRA’s effectiveness and its value to the Congress and the public. We believe that OIRA should: require standardized reporting in a GAO-prescribed format that can readily be incorporated into GAO’s database; establish a system to monitor compliance with the filing requirement on an ongoing basis; provide clarification on the “good cause” exception to the 60-day delay provision and oversee agency compliance during its Executive Order 12866 review; and provide clarifying guidance as to what is a rule that is subject to CRA and oversee the process of identifying such rules. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed its experience in fulfilling its responsibilities under the Congressional Review Act (CRA).
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) its primary role under the CRA is to provide Congress with a report on each major rule concerning GAO's assessment of the promulgating federal agency's compliance with the procedural steps required by various acts and Executive orders governing the regulatory process; (2) these include preparation of a cost-benefit analysis, when required, and compliance with the Regulatory Flexibility Act, the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, the Administrative Procedure Act, the Paperwork Reduction Act, and Executive Order 12866; (3) GAO's report must be sent to the congressional committees of jurisdiction within 15 calendar days; (4) although the law is silent as to GAO's role relating to the nonmajor rules , GAO believes that basic information about the rules should be collected in a manner that can be of use to Congress and the public; (5) to do this, GAO has established an database that gathers basic information about the 15-20 rules GAO receives on the average each day; (6) GAO's database captures the title, agency, the Regulation Identification Number, the type of rule, the proposed effective date, the date published in the Federal Register, the congressional review trigger date, and any joint resolutions of disapproval that may be enacted; (7) GAO has recently made this database available, with limited research capabilities, on the Internet; (8) GAO conducted a review to determine whether all final rules covered by CRA and published in the Federal Register were filed with Congress and GAO; (9) as a result of GAO's compliance audit, 264 rules have been filed with GAO and Congress and are now effective under CRA; (10) one area of consistent difficulty in implementing CRA had been the failure of some agencies to delay the effective date of major rules for 60 days as required by the act; (11) one early question about implementation of CRA was whether executive agencies or the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) would attempt to avoid designating rules as major and thereby avoid GAO's review and the 60-day delay in the effective date; and (12) while GAO is unaware of any rule that OIRA misclassified to avoid the major rule designation, the failure of agencies to identify some issuances as rules at all has meant that some major rules have not been identified. |
gao_GAO-07-1105 | gao_GAO-07-1105_0 | Background
In managing the funds that flow through the federal government’s account, Treasury frequently accumulates cash due to timing differences in when borrowing occurs, taxes are received, and agency payments are made. Treasury often receives large cash inflows in the middle of the month and makes large, regular payments in the beginning of the month. Before Treasury invests any portion of its operating cash balance, Treasury generally targets a $5 billion balance in the TGA. 1.) 2.) A stable TGA balance assists the Federal Reserve in its execution of monetary policy. The three short-term vehicles currently used by Treasury subject Treasury to high concentration risks and have limited capacity. To improve returns, Treasury established the TIO program in 2003, which provides near market rates of return but still subjects Treasury to concentration risk and does not alleviate Treasury’s capacity concerns. Treasury earned near market rates of return in the pilot, but because of its temporary status and limits in Treasury’s current legislative authority, the pilot’s features—including participants, collateral, trading terms, and clearing and settlement arrangements—are restricted and prevent Treasury from accessing the broader repo market. The TT&L Program Serves Key Functions but Has Significant Limitations
The TT&L program provides Treasury with an effective system for collecting federal tax payments and helps Treasury meet its target balance in the TGA, but it subjects Treasury to concentration risk and earns a return well below market rate. TIO Rates: TIOs earn a higher rate of return than TT&L deposits. Options Exist to Increase Treasury’s Rate of Return and Reduce Risk on Short- Term Investments
Treasury Should Minimize TT&L Investments and Expand the Repo Program to Increase Returns and Reduce the Risks of Concentration and Constrained Capacity
Treasury could increase its return on investment by continuing to reduce funds in TT&L accounts and reallocate those funds to a mix of TIOs and repos. Treasury Will Need to Consider Primary Investment Objectives If Given Authority to Design a Permanent, Expanded Repo Program
In designing the operational elements of a permanent, expanded repo program, Treasury would need to consider industry investment practices in designing the program’s operational elements and managing risks that are associated with the selection of participants, collateral types, terms of trade, and trading arrangements. It is maintained across the 12 Federal Reserve Banks and rolled into one account at the end of each business day. | Why GAO Did This Study
Growing debt and net interest costs are a result of persistent fiscal imbalances, which, if left unchecked, threaten to crowd out spending for other national priorities. The return on every federal dollar that the Department of the Treasury (Treasury) is able to invest represents an opportunity to reduce interest costs. This report (1) analyzes trends in Treasury's main receipts, expenditures, and cash balances, (2) describes Treasury's current investment strategy, and (3) identifies options for Treasury to consider for improving its return on short-term investments. GAO held interviews with Treasury officials and others and reviewed related documents.
What GAO Found
In managing the funds that flow through the federal government's account, Treasury frequently accumulates cash because of timing differences between when borrowing occurs, taxes are received, and agency payments are made. Treasury often receives large cash inflows in the middle of the month and makes large, regular payments in the beginning of the month. Treasury uses three short-term vehicles--Treasury Tax & Loan (TT&L) notes, Term Investment Option (TIO) offerings, and limited repurchase agreements (repo)--to invest operating cash. Before Treasury invests any portion of its operating cash balance, Treasury generally targets a $5 billion balance in its Treasury General Account (TGA) which is maintained across the 12 Federal Reserve Banks. The TT&L program provides Treasury with an effective system for collecting federal tax payments while assisting the Federal Reserve in executing monetary policy, but it subjects Treasury to concentration risk and earns a return well below the market rate. The TIO program earns a greater rate of return but it also subjects Treasury to concentration risk. Both programs also present capacity concerns. Treasury began testing repos through a pilot program in 2006. Repos have earned near market rates of return, but because of the pilot's scope and the current, limited legislative authority under which it operates, the repo participants, collateral, trading terms, and trading arrangements are restricted. A permanent, expanded repo program could permit Treasury to earn a higher rate of return, expand investment capacity, and reduce concentration risk. If given authority to design such a program, Treasury would need to tailor it to meet liquidity needs and to achieve a higher rate of return while minimizing risks that are associated with the selection of program participants, collateral types, terms of trade, and trading arrangements. |
gao_GAO-02-77 | gao_GAO-02-77_0 | The informal and formal networks established by FAA and the military services to exchange critical aviation safety information have proven useful. However, because recent and expected retirements threaten to erode informal networks, additional formal channels of communication are needed to help ensure that safety risks common to both military and civil aircraft are identified and addressed in a formal, systematic, and timely manner. This includes the exchange of information on how FAA and the military services have addressed particular aviation safety concerns. Existing gaps in the formal processes used by FAA and the military services to exchange critical safety information—evidenced by the investigation of fuel tank flammability after the crash of TWA Flight 800 and the Strandflex case—could also allow for communication lapses and delays in getting critical safety information to the right parties in a timely manner, potentially resulting in the loss of lives and aircraft. | What GAO Found
The informal and formal networks used by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and the military services to exchange critical aviation safety information have proven useful. However, because recent and expected retirements threaten to erode informal networks, additional formal channels of communication are needed to ensure that common safety risks are identified and addressed in a systematic and timely manner. This includes the exchange of information on how FAA and the military services have addressed particular aviation safety concerns. Existing gaps in the formal processes used by FAA and the military services to exchange information could allow for communication lapses and delays in getting critical safety information to the right parties in a timely manner, potentially resulting in the loss of lives and aircraft. |
gao_GAO-04-688T | gao_GAO-04-688T_0 | In 1996, to help multilateral creditors meet the cost of the HIPC Initiative, the World Bank established a HIPC Trust Fund with contributions from member governments and some multilateral creditors. Key Multilateral Development Banks Face Significant Challenges to Financing the Existing Initiative
The World Bank, AfDB, and IaDB face a combined financing shortfall of $7.8 billion in present value terms under the existing HIPC Initiative (see table 1). The World Bank Has An Estimated Financing Gap of $6 Billion
Financing the enhanced HIPC Initiative remains a major challenge for the World Bank. If donor countries close the financing gap through future replenishments, we estimate that the U.S. government could be asked to contribute $1.2 billion, which is based on its historical replenishment rate of 20 percent to IDA. To eliminate this shortfall, donor countries may be asked to provide the necessary funds through a future replenishment contribution. Second, the financing shortfall does not include any additional relief that may be provided to countries because their economies deteriorated since they originally qualified for debt relief. Achieving Economic Growth and Debt Relief Targets Requires Substantial Financial Assistance
Even if the $7.8 billion shortfall is fully financed, we estimate that, if exports grow slower than the World Bank and IMF project, the 27 countries that have qualified for debt relief may need more than $375 billion in additional assistance to help them achieve their economic growth and debt relief targets through 2020. This $375 billion consists of $153 billion in expected development assistance, $215 billion in assistance to fund shortfalls from lower export earnings, and at least $8 billion for debt relief (see fig. Countries Face a Substantial Financial Shortfall in Export Earnings
We estimate that 23 of the 27 HIPC countries will earn about $215 billion less from their exports than the World Bank and IMF project. Under lower, historical export growth rates, countries are likely to have lower export earnings and unsustainable debt levels (see table 2). High export growth rates are unlikely because HIPC countries rely heavily on primary commodities such as coffee, cotton, and copper for much of their export revenue. Therefore, if countries are to achieve economic growth rates consistent with their development goals, donors would need to fund the $215 billion shortfall. After examining 40 strategies for providing debt relief, we narrowed our analysis to three specific strategies: (1) switching the minimum percentage of loans to grants for future multilateral development assistance for each country to achieve debt sustainability, (2) paying debt service in excess of 5 percent of government revenue, and (3) combining strategies (1) and (2). We estimate that the additional cost of this strategy would be $8.5 billion. If the United States decides to help fund the $375 billion, we estimate that it could cost approximately $52 billion over 18 years, both in bilateral grants and in contributions to multilateral development banks. Historically, the United States has been the largest contributor to the World Bank and IaDB, and the second largest contributor to the AfDB, providing between 11 and 50 percent of their funding. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative, established in 1996, is a bilateral and multilateral effort to provide debt relief to poor countries to help them achieve economic growth and debt sustainability. Multilateral creditors are having difficulty financing their share of the initiative, even with assistance from donors. Under the existing initiative, many countries are unlikely to achieve their debt relief targets, primarily because their export earnings are likely to be significantly less than projected by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF). In a recently issued report, GAO assessed (1) the projected multilateral development banks' funding shortfall for the existing initiative and (2) the amount of funding, including development assistance, needed to help countries achieve economic growth and debt relief targets. The Treasury, World Bank, and African Development Bank commented that historical export growth rates are not good predictors of the future because significant structural changes are under way in many countries that could lead to greater growth. We consider these historical rates to be a more realistic gauge of future growth because of these countries' reliance on highly volatile primary commodities and other vulnerabilities such as HIV/AIDS.
What GAO Found
The three key multilateral development banks we analyzed face a funding shortfall of $7.8 billion in 2003 present value terms, or 54 percent of their total commitment, under the existing HIPC Initiative. The World Bank has the most significant shortfall--$6 billion. The African Development Bank has a gap of about $1.2 billion. Neither has determined how it would close this gap. The Inter-American Development Bank is fully funding its HIPC obligation by reducing its future lending resources to poor countries by $600 million beginning in 2009. We estimate that the cost to the United States, based on its rate of contribution to these banks, could be an additional $1.8 billion. However, the total estimated funding gap is understated because (1) the World Bank does not include costs for four countries for which data are unreliable and (2) all three banks do not include estimates for additional relief that may be required because countries' economies deteriorated after they qualified for debt relief. Even if the $7.8 billion gap is fully financed, we estimate that the 27 countries that have qualified for debt relief may need an additional $375 billion to help them achieve their economic growth and debt relief targets by 2020. This $375 billion consists of $153 billion in expected development assistance, $215 billion to cover lower export earnings, and at least $8 billion in debt relief. Most countries are likely to experience higher debt burdens and lower export earnings than the World Bank and IMF project, leading to an estimated $215 billion shortfall over 18 years. To reach debt targets, we estimate that countries will need between $8 billion and $20 billion, depending on the strategy chosen. Under these strategies, multilateral creditors switch a portion of their loans to grants and/or donors pay countries' debt service that exceeds 5 percent of government revenue. Based on its historical share of donor assistance, the United States may be called upon to contribute about 14 percent of this $375 billion, or approximately $52 billion over 18 years. |
gao_GAO-09-771 | gao_GAO-09-771_0 | First, neither Poland nor the Czech Republic has ratified key bilateral agreements with the United States, limiting DOD’s ability to finalize key details of the sites, such as how security will be provided. Second, DOD’s efforts to establish the roles and responsibilities of key U.S. stakeholders for the European sites remain incomplete. Without clear definitions of the roles that MDA and the services will be responsible for and agreement on criteria for transfer, DOD will continue to face uncertainties in determining how the European Interceptor Site and the European Midcourse Radar Site will be sustained over the long term. Delayed Ratification of Key Agreements with Host Nations and Incomplete Agreements between MDA and the Services Present Challenges to DOD’s Planning and Implementation of Ballistic Missile Defenses in Europe
While DOD has made progress with key international partners and U.S. stakeholders on the planning and implementation of missile defenses in Europe, several challenges affect DOD’s ability to carry out its plans for the ballistic missile defenses in Europe. Finally, DOD’s efforts to finalize roles and responsibilities for the European sites remain incomplete because MDA and the services have not yet made important determinations, such as establishing the criteria that must be met before the transfer of specific European missile defense sites to the services. MDA has been directed by DOD since 2002 to begin planning for the transfer of missile defense elements, including the direction to coordinate with the services on resources and personnel needed to deliver an effective transition of responsibility. Key principles for cost estimating state that complete cost estimates are important in preparing budget submissions and for assessing the long-term affordability of a program. However, the initial estimates did not include all costs primarily because MDA developed and submitted the military construction estimate to Congress before key site design work had been completed and without an Army Corps of Engineers review of the estimate. As a result of the above limitations, DOD’s projected military construction costs for the European Interceptor Site and the European Midcourse Radar Site are expected to increase significantly from DOD’s original $837.5 million estimate in the fiscal year 2009 budget. DOD’s Operations and Support Cost Estimates for Ballistic Missile Defenses in Europe Are Not Complete, and It Is Unclear How These Costs Will Be Funded over the Long Term
DOD’s operations and support cost estimates for ballistic missile defenses in Europe are not complete because they do not include operations and support costs for base operations managed by the Army and Air Force. Although MDA and the Army and Air Force have initiated the development of total operations and support cost estimates for the interceptor and radar sites, these estimates are not yet complete as key cost factors that will affect those estimates remain undefined. To provide for military construction cost estimates for ballistic missile defenses in Europe that are based on the best available data, direct MDA, in coordination with the Army and Air Force, to provide Congress annually, in alignment with the budget, updated military construction cost estimates for the European Interceptor Site and the European Midcourse Radar Site that reflect the data gathered from all site design efforts since project initiation; have been independently reviewed and verified by the Army Corps of Engineers; account for all military construction costs for the sites, including Army and Air Force base support facility requirements, recognizing that certain assumptions about host nation contributions will have to be made; and include costs for possible currency fluctuations. To provide for more complete military construction estimates for future ballistic missile defense sites, such as the still-to-be-determined European site for the mobile radar system, direct MDA to follow military construction regulations by utilizing the Army Corps of Engineers to complete required site design and analysis and verify military construction cost estimates before submitting cost estimates to Congress. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) estimated in 2008 that the potential costs of fielding ballistic missile defenses in Europe would be more than $4 billion through 2015. Planned ballistic missile defenses in Europe are intended to defend the United States, its deployed forces, and its allies against ballistic missile attacks from the Middle East. They are expected to include a missile interceptor site in Poland, a radar site in the Czech Republic, and a mobile radar system in a still-to-be-determined European location. GAO was asked to evaluate the Department of Defense's (DOD) plans for missile defense sites in Europe and address to what extent DOD has (1) planned for the sites' implementation and (2) estimated military construction and long-term operations and support costs. Accordingly, GAO reviewed key legislation; examined policy and guidance from MDA, the Army, the Air Force, and the Army Corps of Engineers; analyzed budget documents and cost estimates; and visited sites in Poland and the Czech Republic.
What GAO Found
DOD has begun planning for the construction and implementation of the European missile defense sites, including coordinating with international partners and U.S. stakeholders; however, several challenges affecting DOD's implementation of ballistic missile defenses in Europe remain. First, neither Poland nor the Czech Republic has ratified key bilateral agreements with the United States, limiting DOD's ability to finalize key details of the sites, such as how security will be provided. Second, DOD's efforts to establish the roles and responsibilities of key U.S. stakeholders for the European sites remain incomplete because MDA and the services have not yet made important determinations, such as establishing the criteria that must be met before the transfer of the European missile defense sites from MDA to the Army and Air Force. Since 2002, MDA has been directed by DOD to begin planning for the transfer of missile defense elements, including the direction to coordinate with the services on resources and personnel needed to provide an effective transition of responsibility. Without clear definitions of the roles that MDA and the services will be responsible for and agreement on criteria for transfer, DOD will continue to face uncertainties in determining how the European Interceptor Site and the European Midcourse Radar Site will be sustained over the long term. DOD's cost estimates for military construction and operations and support have limitations and do not provide Congress complete information on the true costs of ballistic missile defenses in Europe. Key principles for cost estimating state that complete cost estimates are important in preparing budget submissions and for assessing the long-term affordability of a program. Further, according to DOD military construction regulations, the Army Corps of Engineers typically certifies that key construction design milestones have been met and verifies military construction cost estimates before the estimates are submitted as budget requests. However, DOD's original military construction estimates in the fiscal year 2009 budget did not include all costs, primarily because MDA submitted the estimates before accomplishing key design milestones and without a review by the Army Corps of Engineers. Consequently, DOD's projected military construction costs for the interceptor and radar sites could potentially increase from DOD's original $837 million estimate to over $1 billion. DOD operations and support cost estimates are also incomplete because they do not include projected costs for base operations that will be managed by the Army and Air Force. Key cost factors that will affect these estimates, such as how security will be provided at the sites, remain undefined. In addition, MDA and the services have not yet agreed on how the operations and support costs for the interceptor and radar sites will be funded over the long term. As a result, Congress does not have accurate information on the full investment required for ballistic missile defenses in Europe. |
gao_GAO-13-648 | gao_GAO-13-648_0 | The requirement that GAO evaluate the plans submitted pursuant to subsections 366(a) and (b) within 90 days of receiving the report from DOD has also been extended through fiscal year 2018. We found that the 2012 Sustainable Ranges Report met the annual statutory reporting requirements for DOD to describe its progress in implementing its sustainable ranges plan and any actions taken or to be taken in addressing training constraints caused by limitations on the use of military lands, marine areas, or airspace. In its 2012 report, DOD provided updates to several elements of the plan required by the act to be included in DOD’s original submission in 2004. DOD Met the Annual Reporting Requirements in Its 2013 Sustainable Ranges Report
The 2013 Sustainable Ranges Report met the annual statutory reporting requirements for DOD to describe its progress in implementing its sustainable ranges plan and any actions taken or to be taken in addressing training constraints caused by limitations on the use of military lands, marine areas, or airspace. These elements include (1) proposals to enhance training range capabilities and address any shortfalls, (2) goals and milestones for tracking progress implementing DOD’s sustainment plan, and (3) projected funding requirements for implementing planned actions, among others. In its 2013 report, DOD also reported on four emerging challenges to training and its training ranges. All of the military services reported that their range assessment data had not significantly changed from the 2012 report. The elements of DOD’s 2013 Sustainable Ranges Report describe the department’s progress in implementing its comprehensive plan and addressing training constraints at its ranges, thus meeting the annual reporting requirements of the act. DOD Has Implemented All Prior GAO Recommendations
DOD has implemented all of the 13 recommendations made by GAO since 2004 for expanding and improving its reporting on sustainable ranges. DOD subsequently addressed these 2 recommendations by developing and launching a range assessment module within the Defense Readiness Reporting System. Additionally, DOD created a range visibility tool within its range scheduler system to enable a user to query and identify the availability of training ranges across the Army, Marine Corps, and Navy. Future improvements include plans to provide a link to the Air Force range scheduling system to optimize utilization of training resources. In its written comments, reproduced in appendix III, DOD stated that it agrees in general with the report. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To determine whether the Department of Defense’s (DOD) 2013 Sustainable Ranges Report met the reporting requirements specified in section 366(a) of the Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003, as amended, we reviewed the report and compared it with those requirements. We identified the actions DOD has taken to meet these recommendations in its reporting submissions on sustainable ranges. Military Training: DOD’s Report on the Sustainability of Training Ranges Addresses Most of the Congressional Reporting Requirements and Continues to Improve with Each Annual Update. | Why GAO Did This Study
As U.S. forces draw down from Afghanistan and home training is expanded, the competition for training ranges may also increase. Section 366 of the Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (as amended) required DOD to submit a comprehensive plan to address training constraints caused by limitations on the use of military lands, marine areas, and airspace available in the United States and overseas for training, and provide annual progress reports on these efforts through 2018. The act also requires GAO to submit annual evaluations of DODs reports to Congress within 90 days of receiving them from DOD. In this report, GAO examined (1) whether DODs 2013 Sustainable Ranges Report met the legislative requirements; and (2) whether DOD acted on GAO previous recommendations to improve its submissions.
GAO is not making any recommendations in this report. In commenting on this report, DOD stated that it agrees in general with the report.
What GAO Found
The 2013 Sustainable Ranges Report of the Department of Defense (DOD) met the annual statutory reporting requirements for the department to describe its progress in implementing its sustainable ranges plan and any additional actions taken or planned for addressing training constraints caused by limitations on the use of military lands, marine areas, or airspace. DOD's 2013 report provides updates to several elements of the plan that the act required it to include in its annual progress reports, including (1) proposals to enhance training range capabilities and address any shortfalls; (2) goals and milestones for tracking progress in the implementation of its sustainment plan; and (3) projected funding requirements for each of the military services to implement their planned actions. DOD reported that there were no significant changes in range capability or encroachment since 2012. It identified emerging challenges to training range sustainability, and reported on actions being taken to mitigate them. It used goals and milestones in its progress updates, and reported its projected funding requirements for implementing planned actions. Together these elements describe DOD's progress in implementing its comprehensive plan and addressing training constraints at its ranges, thus meeting the annual reporting requirements of the act.
DOD has now implemented all prior GAO recommendations focused on meeting the requirements of the act and improving report submissions. GAO reported in 2012 that DOD had implemented all but 2 of 13 prior recommendations. DOD has subsequently addressed these 2 recommendations by developing and launching the range assessment module within the Defense Readiness Reporting System. Additionally, DOD created a range visibility tool within its range scheduler system to enable a user to query and identify the availability of training ranges across the Army, Marine Corps, and Navy to optimize utilization of training resources. Future improvements include plans to provide a link to the Air Force range scheduling system. Through the changes DOD has implemented in its annual reporting over the past several years, the department has continually improved reporting on the sustainability of its ranges. |
gao_T-RCED-98-188 | gao_T-RCED-98-188_0 | Individual Inspections
FAA guidance prescribes an annual inspection to cover all aspects of a repair station’s operations, including the currency of technical data, facilities, calibration of special tooling and equipment, and inspection procedures, as well as to ensure that the repair station is performing only the work that it has approval to do. Most inspectors are responsible for oversight at more than one repair station. In the past 4 years, an average of only 23 of these inspections have been conducted annually at repair stations (less than 1 percent of the repair stations performing work for air carriers). From fiscal year 1993 through 1996, we found 16 repair stations that were inspected by a single inspector and were also inspected by a special team of inspectors during the same year. Many of the deficiencies the teams identified were systemic and apparently long-standing, such as inadequate training programs or poor quality control manuals. First, many FAA inspectors responsible for conducting individual inspections said that, because they have many competing demands on their time, their inspections of repair stations may not be as thorough as they would like. Thus, in our October 1997 report, we recommended that FAA expand the use of locally based teams for repair station inspections, particularly for those repair stations that are large or complex. Follow-Up and Documentation of Inspections
FAA’s guidance is limited in specifying what documents pertaining to inspections and follow-up need to be maintained. However, responses from the repair stations were not on file in about one-fourth of these instances, and FAA’s assessments of the adequacy of the corrective actions taken by the repair stations were not on file in about three-fourths of the instances. Without better documentation, FAA cannot readily determine how quickly and thoroughly repair stations are complying with regulations. Just as important, FAA cannot identify trends on repair station performance in order to make informed decisions on how best to apply its inspection resources to those areas posing the greatest risk to aviation safety. FAA is spending more than $30 million to develop a system called the Safety Performance Analysis System, whose intent is to help the agency identify safety-related risks and establish priorities for its inspections. To address these problems, we recommended that FAA specify what documentation should be maintained in its files to record complete inspection results and follow-up actions, and that FAA monitor the implementation of its strategy for improving the quality of data in its new management information system. FAA Actions Under Way to Improve Repair Station Oversight
FAA has several efforts under way that may hold potential for improving its inspections of repair stations. This update, begun in 1989, has been repeatedly delayed and still remains in process. The most recent target—to have draft regulations for comment published in the Federal Register during the summer of 1997—was not met. A third effort involves increasing and training FAA’s inspection resources. Survey responses from current inspectors indicated that the success of this effort will depend partly on the qualifications of the new inspectors and on the training available to all of those in the inspector ranks. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) oversight of repair stations that maintain and repair aircraft and aircraft components, focusing on: (1) the practice of using individual inspectors in repair station inspections; (2) the condition of inspection documentation; and (3) current FAA actions to improve the inspection process.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) FAA was meeting its goal of inspecting every repair station at least once a year and 84 percent of the inspectors believed that the overall compliance of repair stations was good or excellent; (2) more than half of the inspectors said that there were areas of compliance that repair stations could improve, such as ensuring that their personnel receive training from all airlines for which they perform work and have current maintenance manuals; (3) while FAA typically relies on individual inspectors, the use of teams of inspectors, particularly at large or complex repair stations, may be more effective at identifying problems and are more liable to uncover systemic and long-standing deficiencies; (4) because of insufficient documentation, GAO was unable to determine how well FAA followed up to ensure that the deficiencies found during the inspections were corrected; (5) GAO was not able to assess how completely or quickly repair stations were bringing themselves into compliance; (6) because FAA does not tell its inspectors what documentation to keep, the agency's ability to identify and react to trends is hampered; (7) FAA is spending more than $30 million to develop a reporting system that, among other things, is designed to enable the agency to apply its inspection resources to address those areas that pose the greatest risk to aviation safety; (8) as GAO has reported in the past, this goal will not be achieved without significant improvements in the completeness of inspection records; (9) since the May 1996 crash of a ValuJet DC-9 in the Florida Everglades, FAA has announced new initiatives to upgrade the oversight of repair stations; (10) these initiatives were directed at clarifying and augmenting air carriers' oversight of repair stations, not at ways in which FAA's own inspection resources could be better utilized; (11) FAA has several other efforts under way that would have a more direct bearing on its own inspection activities at repair stations; (12) one effort would revise the regulations governing operations at repair stations, and another would revise the regulations governing the qualifications of repair station personnel; (13) the revision of the regulations began in 1989 and has been repeatedly delayed; (14) the third effort is the addition of more FAA inspectors, which should mean that more resources can be devoted to inspecting repair stations; (15) FAA has recently announced a major overhaul of its entire inspection process; and (16) it is designed to systematize the process and ensure consistency in inspections and in reporting the results of these inspections so as to allow more efficient targeting of inspection resources. |
gao_GAO-04-921 | gao_GAO-04-921_0 | TANF has a goal of promoting work and helping welfare recipients move toward self-sufficiency. The Rural TANF Caseload Is About 14 Percent of the National Caseload, Is Concentrated in Economically Disadvantaged Counties, and Has Declined at About the Same Rate as the Urban Caseload
Rural TANF families constitute about 14 percent of the total TANF monthly caseload for the 48 states covered by our study combined. However, when states are looked at individually, the rural portion of the TANF caseload ranges from 0.02 percent to 77 percent. TANF Families Living in Rural Counties Are About 14 Percent of the National Caseload but Form a Larger Percentage in Most Individual States
In 2003, during an average month, about 293,000 families living in rural counties received cash assistance under TANF programs of the combined 48 states included in our analysis. Rural Areas Present TANF Clients with Shortages in Jobs and Services but Also Foster Program Collaboration and Personal Attention to Clients
Several studies and our own site visits indicate that transportation shortages, fewer jobs, low wages, and a scarcity of ancillary services are common challenges to welfare reform in rural areas. Transportation is a fundamental challenge for rural TANF recipients. Rural areas also have less variety in the types of jobs available. On the other hand, the welfare reform-related studies that have looked at employment in rural areas present a more positive picture. Rural TANF Programs Foster Collaboration and Personal Attention from Caseworkers
Caseworkers and service providers cited strengths that their areas have in implementing welfare reform that they associate with the rural environment. Rural TANF Programs Transport Services to Clients and Leverage Resources to Provide Mentoring, Transportation, Job, and Child Care Assistance
The rural TANF programs we visited have devised many ways to bring services to distant clients, and they have tended to leverage their resources by collaborating with one another and with community institutions, focusing effort as they did so on helping clients surmount rural shortages in transportation, child care, and jobs. HHS Has Several Initiatives That Could Benefit Rural TANF Programs
HHS’s Administration for Children and Families has planned and undertaken several initiatives that could assist TANF programs and TANF families in rural areas. ACF’s Office of Planning, Research, and Evaluation is currently sponsoring a demonstration project to evaluate the effectiveness of welfare-to-work strategies being used in rural areas of Illinois and Nebraska. Technical assistance to TANF programs. Summaries and results of these meetings or conference calls are posted on ACF’s Web site. Promoting use of the Earned Income Tax Credit. Rural TANF programs we visited have developed some strategies to help them address the challenges their clients face, but the challenges continue. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology of TANF Caseload Data Analysis
To address questions about the rural Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) caseload, we collected and analyzed county-level TANF caseload data from states. 4 and table 2 of app. Do Income Support Levels and Work Incentives Differ between Rural and Urban Areas? Welfare Reform: Moving Hard-to-Employ Recipients into the Workforce. | Why GAO Did This Study
About 49 million people, or 17 percent of the country's total population, live in rural communities, and 18 states have at least a third of their population in rural areas. Rural areas often have less favorable employment conditions than urban areas and have fewer public transportation options to help people get to and from work. Given these conditions and the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program's emphasis on moving recipients into jobs and on the path toward self-sufficiency, some have questioned how welfare reform is working in rural areas. To inform discussions of these concerns, GAO is reporting on (1) the size and distribution of the rural TANF caseload and how the caseload's size has changed over time, (2) the challenges and strengths that rural TANF programs have in implementing welfare reform, (3) the strategies being used to address these challenges, and (4) what the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) is doing to help rural areas address these challenges. To obtain this information, we used multiple methodologies, including analysis of county-level caseload data, as well as site visits, a review of studies on welfare reform in rural areas, and numerous interviews with caseworkers, government officials and other experts.
What GAO Found
According to our analysis of 48 states, about 293,000 families living in rural counties received TANF cash assistance during an average month in 2003. Rural TANF families are about 14 percent of all TANF families, but the rural portion of individual states' TANF caseload ranges from 0.02 percent to 77 percent. Rural TANF families are concentrated in counties with disadvantaged conditions, including high unemployment and low median income. Since 1997, when welfare reform was implemented nationally, rural and urban TANF caseloads have declined by about the same amount--44 percent--when all reporting states' counties are aggregated. The rural TANF caseworkers and service providers at sites we visited reported that transportation difficulties, job shortages, low wages, and lack of services, especially child care, challenged their efforts to help clients become employed and move toward self-sufficiency. However, they also cited strengths, including collaboration and personal attention to clients. To address the challenges they face, the rural TANF programs we visited have employed a variety of strategies including nontraditional methods of connecting clients with services and cooperative arrangements that leverage resources. Some of the strategies adopted by rural TANF agencies take a more targeted approach, working to overcome one particular challenge or set of challenges that clients face, especially in the areas of transportation, employment, and child care. The Department of Health and Human Services' Administration for Children and Families has undertaken several efforts that could assist TANF programs and recipients in rural areas. These include rural conferences, a demonstration project, technical assistance to rural programs, and a rural task force with representatives from different programs, including TANF. Plans are under way for an Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) initiative targeting rural TANF recipients. |
gao_NSIAD-98-192 | gao_NSIAD-98-192_0 | Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
In response to a request from Representatives Nancy Pelosi and Barney Frank, we reviewed the multilateral development banks’ record in ensuring that meaningful public consultation takes place on the projects they support. Our specific objectives were to describe the steps the banks have taken to ensure meaningful public consultation on the environmental implications of proposed projects and timely public access to project documents; evaluate the quality of consultation that occurs on bank-supported projects and the documentation on the consultation that is provided to executive directors; and determine the extent to which the banks provide broad, timely public access to project information on proposed projects, including environmental assessment reports. Conclusions
The banks have adopted guidelines and created systems to provide for meaningful public consultation during project development, complemented by efforts to enhance public access to relevant information through bank public information centers. Several factors contributed to the quality of consultation on the projects we examined. World Bank-supported projects also employed comparatively good consultation practices. Most of these projects were supported by the International Finance Corporation or sponsored by the government of China. As shown in figure 3.1, consultation on 50 percent of the projects (22 of 44) was exemplary or good, while it was adequate on 25 percent (11 of 44) of the projects. Bank intervention generally improved sponsor practices. Comparatively good consultation practices were also associated with projects that (1) used community-based approaches in design and implementation, (2) had a “high profile” because of recent adverse publicity on similar projects, and (3) were supported by the World Bank. The median rating for consultation on the projects supported by the Corporation or sponsored by the government of China was less than adequate compared to the median rating of good for all other projects. Critical to their decision in these cases is complete and accurate information on the projects, including a description of the public consultation that has taken place. Recommendation
We recommend that the Secretary of the Treasury instruct the U.S. executive directors at the banks to work with other executive directors and bank management to have the banks improve compliance with their guidelines on providing timely public access to project profiles and EA reports through their internet home pages. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed certain aspects of the environmental assessment and information disclosure policies and practices of the multilateral development banks, focusing on the: (1) steps the banks have taken to ensure meaningful public consultation on the environmental implications of proposed projects and timely public access to relevant project documents; (2) quality of consultation that occurs on bank-supported projects and the documentation on the consultation that is provided to executive directors; and (3) extent to which the banks provide broad, timely public access to project information, including environmental assessment reports.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the multilateral development banks, led by the World Bank, have taken significant steps to ensure that meaningful public consultation takes place on the environmental implications of the projects they fund; (2) GAO believes, however, that the banks can take further steps to build on the progress that has been achieved by ensuring that executive directors receive complete and accurate documentation about the consultation practices that have been employed in developing proposed projects, and by more consistently providing the public with timely access to environmental information on these projects; (3) the banks have adopted guidelines that require sponsors to consult with the public in developing projects, and created systems to provide worldwide public access to information about these projects--including information on their environmental implications; (4) generally, public consultation on the projects that GAO reviewed was adequate or better, and bank intervention improved sponsor practices on nearly every project; (5) several factors contributed to the quality of consultation; (6) for example, good consultation was associated with projects employing community-based approaches to project development, as well as those having a high profile because of recent adverse publicity on similar projects; (7) also, in general, World Bank-supported projects received higher ratings than the projects supported by the other banks GAO reviewed; (8) nevertheless, consultation on 25 percent (11 of 44) of the projects, primarily projects supported by the International Finance Corporation or sponsored by the government of China, was less than adequate; (9) also, documentation given to the executive directors provided incomplete or inaccurate information about the consultation measures employed on many of the projects; and (10) the banks' Internet home pages were inconsistent in meeting their own guidelines for providing public information concerning project profiles and environmental assessment reports. |
gao_GAO-17-351 | gao_GAO-17-351_0 | The program expects to reach peak production rates for U.S. aircraft in 2022, at which point DOD expects to spend more than $14 billion a year on average for a decade (see fig. These dates represented a delay of 5 to 6 years from the program’s initial baseline. Continuing Problems with Flight Testing of Software Capabilities Will Delay the Completion of Development and Increase Development Costs
DOD will need more time and money than expected to complete the remaining 10 percent of the F-35 development program. However, based on our analysis, the program’s projection is optimistic as it does not reflect historical F-35 test data. According to GAO best practices, credible schedule estimates are rooted in historical data. Delays in Developmental Testing Will Likely Affect Plans for Initial Operational Testing, Navy Operational Capability Dates, and Full-Rate Production
Delays in developmental testing will likely drive delays in current plans to start F-35 initial operational test and evaluation. Likewise, DOD’s full-rate production decision, currently planned for April 2019, may have to be delayed. Based on the program office’s estimate of a 5-month delay in developmental testing, the F-35 program will need an additional $532 million to complete the development contract. If developmental testing is delayed 12 months, as we estimate, and operational testing is not completed until 2020, as projected by DOT&E, then we estimate that the program could need more than an additional $1.7 billion to complete the F-35 development contract. DOD’s Planned Investments in Modernization and Economic Order Purchase May Be Premature
In fiscal year 2018, F-35 program officials expect to invest more than $1.2 billion to start two efforts while simultaneously facing significant shortfalls in completing the F-35 baseline development program, as discussed above. Specifically, DOD and program officials project that in fiscal year 2018 the program will need over $600 million to begin development of follow-on modernization of the F-35 and more than $650 million to procure economic order quantities (EOQ) of parts to achieve cost savings during procurement. Until Block 3F testing is complete, DOD will not have the knowledge it needs to develop and present an executable business case for Block 4, with reliable cost and funding estimates. However, the requirements for the first increment of that effort, known as Block 4, have not been finalized. Currently, F-35 program officials plan to release the RFP for Block 4.1 development in the third quarter of fiscal year 2017, nearly 1 year before we estimate Block 3F developmental testing will be completed. Program officials have stated that Block 3F is the foundation for Block 4, but continuing delays in Block 3F testing make it difficult to fully understand Block 3F functionality and its effect on early Block 4 capabilities. However, as of January 2017, contractors stated they were still negotiating the terms of this arrangement; therefore, the specific costs and benefits remained uncertain. According to internal control standards, agencies should communicate with external stakeholders, such as Congress. In addition, with baseline development still ongoing the program will not likely have the knowledge it needs to present a sound business case for soliciting contractor proposals for Block 4 development in fiscal year 2017. 1. 2. 3. DOD did not concur with our recommendation to reassess the additional cost and time needed to complete developmental testing using historical program data. We continue to believe that our recommendation is valid. DOD stated that it partially concurred with our third recommendation to finalize the details of investments associated with an EOQ purchase in fiscal year 2018, and submit a report to Congress with the fiscal year 2018 budget request that clearly identifies those details. We discussed key aspects of F-35 development progress, including flight testing progress, with program management and contractor officials as well as DOD test officials and program test pilots. We also reviewed and analyzed best practices identified by GAO and reviewed relevant DOD policies and statutes. We compared the acquisition plans to these policies and practices. F-35 Joint Strike Fighter: Assessment Needed to Address Affordability Challenges. | Why GAO Did This Study
The F-35 Joint Strike Fighter is DOD's most expensive and ambitious acquisition program. Acquisition costs alone are estimated at nearly $400 billion, and beginning in 2022, DOD expects to spend more than $14 billion a year on average for a decade.
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015 included a provision for GAO to review the F-35 acquisition program annually until the program reaches full-rate production. This, GAO's second report in response to that mandate, assesses, among other objectives, (1) progress of remaining program development and testing and (2) proposed future plans for acquisition investments. To conduct this work, GAO reviewed and analyzed management reports and historical test data; discussed key aspects of F-35 development with program management and contractor officials; and compared acquisition plans to DOD policy and GAO acquisition best practices.
What GAO Found
Cascading F-35 testing delays could cost the Department of Defense (DOD) over a billion dollars more than currently budgeted to complete development of the F-35 baseline program. Because of problems with the mission systems software, known as Block 3F, program officials optimistically estimate that the program will need an additional 5 months to complete developmental testing. According to best practices, credible estimates are rooted in historical data. The program's projections are based on anticipated test point achievements and not historical data. GAO's analysis—based on historical F-35 flight test data—indicates that developmental testing could take an additional 12 months (see table below). These delays could affect the start of the F-35's initial operational test and evaluation, postpone the Navy's initial operational capability, and delay the program's full rate production decision, currently planned for April 2019.
Program officials estimate that a delay of 5 months will contribute to a total increase of $532 million to complete development. The longer delay estimated by GAO will likely contribute to an increase of more than $1.7 billion, approximately $1.3 billion of which will be needed in fiscal year 2018.
Meanwhile, program officials project the program will need over $1.2 billion in fiscal year 2018 to start two efforts. First, DOD expects it will need over $600 million for follow-on modernization (known as Block 4). F-35 program officials plan to release a request for Block 4 development proposals nearly 1 year before GAO estimates that Block 3F—the last block of software for the F-35 baseline program—developmental testing will be completed. DOD policy and GAO best practices state that requirements should be approved and a sound business case formed before requesting development proposals from contractors. Until Block 3F testing is complete, DOD will not have the knowledge it needs to present a sound business case for Block 4. Second, the program may ask Congress for more than $650 million in fiscal year 2018 to procure economic order quantities—bulk quantities. However, as of January 2017 the details of this plan were unclear because DOD's 2018 budget was not final and negotiations with the contractors were ongoing. According to internal controls, agencies should communicate with Congress, otherwise it may not have the information it needs to make a fully informed budget decision for fiscal year 2018. Completing Block 3F development is essential for a sound business case and warrants funding priority over Block 4 and economic order quantities at this time.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOD use historical data to reassess the cost of completing development of Block 3F, complete Block 3F testing before soliciting contractor proposals for Block 4 development, and identify for Congress the cost and benefits associated with procuring economic order quantities of parts. DOD did not concur with the first two recommendations and partially concurred with the third while outlining actions to address it. GAO continues to believe its recommendations are valid, as discussed in the report. |
gao_GAO-17-27 | gao_GAO-17-27_0 | Reported Disruptions of DOD-Owned Utility Systems Cause a Range of Financial and Operational Impacts
Respondents to our survey of DOD-owned utility systems identified 4,393 instances of utility disruptions caused by the failure of DOD-owned equipment for fiscal years 2009 through 2015, and the results of our survey and interviews with DOD installation officials indicated that these disruptions have caused a range of financial and operational impacts. Several factors contributed to the equipment failures that lead to disruptions to DOD-owned utility systems, such as the utility equipment operating beyond its intended life. In addition, 270 disruptions were on natural gas utility systems and 343 were on wastewater systems. According to installation officials, some utility systems are experiencing or are at risk of experiencing disruptions because the equipment is operating beyond its intended life. These respondents reported experiencing a total of over $29 million in financial impacts for fiscal years 2009 through 2015 (see table 4). For example, an official from Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst, New Jersey, provided an example of a moderate operational impact. According to our survey responses, 151 out of 364 survey respondents reported that they did not have information on utility disruptions for any fiscal year from 2009 through 2015. An overarching reason we found for disruption information not being available is that the services vary in the extent to which each has issued guidance to collect and retain utility disruption information at the installation level. However, we found that some of the Army installations did not consistently have information about disruptions. The Navy’s guidance, if implemented as directed, may help installations track utility disruption information and thus enable them to make sound decisions. On the other hand, installation-level utility system owners and managers who do not have access to information about disruptions may not have the information they need to make informed decisions or to compete effectively for limited repair funds. DOD Is Implementing a Standardized Condition Assessment Process to Improve Data Reliability, but It Could Result in Differences in the Facility Condition Index across the Services DOD Is Implementing a Standardized Condition Assessment Process to Improve Data Reliability
DOD is currently implementing a standardized condition assessment process to improve the data reliability of its facility condition data. Further, the military services are allowed to customize certain settings within the process which could result in differences in the FCI across the services. Without taking steps to ensure that the services’ condition standards for the utilities module and other modules will provide the department with comparable and reliable FCI data, the SMS utilities module, currently under development, may not provide DOD information that is comparable across the department’s facilities. The Air Force and Marine Corps do not have a service-wide requirement to collect and report utility disruption data. Without taking steps to ensure that the services’ condition standards for the utilities module will provide the department with comparable and reliable FCI data, the SMS utilities module, currently under development, may not provide DOD information that is comparable across the department’s facilities. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve the information that DOD, military service officials, and installation-level utility system owners and maintainers need to make maintenance or other investment decisions, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following three actions:
Direct the Secretary of the Army to take steps to implement existing guidance so that disruption information is consistently available at the installation level;
Direct the Secretary of the Air Force to issue guidance to the installations to require the collection and retention of disruption; and
Direct the Commandant of the Marine Corps to issue guidance to the installations to require the collection and retention of disruption information. To provide DOD with more consistent information about the condition of DOD-owned utility systems as DOD continues to develop the SMS module for utility systems, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Energy, Installations, and Environment, in coordination with the military services, take actions to govern the consistent use of condition standards of utility systems to be assessed using the SMS utilities module, and if applicable, for other facilities assessed using other SMS modules. To assess the extent to which owners and managers of DOD-owned utility systems have information about disruptions caused by equipment failures, we included a question in our survey regarding the availability of information on disruptions from fiscal year 2009 through 2015 and a question about the usefulness of disruption information in managing utility systems. | Why GAO Did This Study
DOD installations rely on utilities, such as electricity, to accomplish their missions and disruptions can hamper military operations. Senate Report 114-49 included a provision for GAO to report on DOD-owned utility disruptions. This report (1) describes the number, causes and impacts of utility disruptions caused by the failure of DOD-owned utility infrastructure for fiscal years 2009 through 2015; (2) assesses the extent to which owners and managers of DOD-owned systems have access to utility disruption information; and (3) assesses the extent to which the implementation of a standardized facility condition assessment process provides DOD consistent information about its utility systems.
GAO surveyed a representative group of 453 DOD-owned electric, water, wastewater, and natural gas utility systems, evaluated DOD policies and reports, interviewed officials, and conducted interviews with several survey respondents who experienced the most disruptions.
What GAO Found
Based on GAO's survey of Department of Defense (DOD) owned utility systems, there were 4,393 instances of utility disruptions caused by equipment failure for fiscal years 2009 through 2015 and the results of our survey and interviews with DOD installation officials indicated that these disruptions have caused a range of financial and operational impacts. Survey respondents identified several factors that contributed to equipment failures that led to disruptions, such as equipment operating beyond its intended life; poor equipment condition; and equipment not being properly maintained. Survey respondents reported over $29 million in financial impacts for fiscal years 2009 through 2015. Installation officials reported experiencing operational impacts such as a week-long shut down of operations at an Army facility on Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst, New Jersey.
Information about utility disruptions is not consistently available to DOD utility owners and managers at the installation level. Specifically, 151 out of 364 survey respondents stated that they did not have information on utility disruptions for any fiscal year from 2009 through 2015. An overarching reason GAO found for disruption information not being available is that the services vary in the extent to which each has issued guidance to collect and retain utility disruption information at the installation level. The Army has some guidance to report utility disruptions, but we found that some installations did not consistently have this information available. The Air Force and Marine Corps do not have current guidance directing the installations to track utility disruption information. The Navy issued new guidance in 2015 which, if implemented as directed, may improve the collection of utility disruption information. According to installation and headquarters officials, there are benefits to collecting utility disruption information since it can be used to identify repairs and to prioritize funding for those repairs. However, without guidance directing installations to collect information about all types of utility disruptions, service officials may not have the information needed to make informed decisions or to compete effectively for limited repair funds.
DOD's implementation of the Sustainment Management System (SMS), a software tool to conduct standardized condition assessments, may not provide it with comparable and reliable facility condition index (FCI) data -- a metric used to make strategic investment decisions. In 2013, to improve the reliability of FCI data, DOD directed the services to use SMS which standardizes the way the services conduct condition assessments and calculate the FCI. According to officials, the SMS module for utility systems is still in development, but modules for other facilities, such as buildings, are complete and in use. While the SMS process is intended to provide DOD with credible FCI data, GAO found the process could result in differences in the FCI because the services are able to customize settings, called condition standards, within the process. Variation among the condition standards could result in facilities having differences in the FCI although the assessed physical conditions of the facilities are the same. As a result, the FCI data would not be comparable. Without taking steps to ensure that the services' condition standards for the utilities module, which is under development, will provide the department with comparable and reliable FCI data, the SMS utilities module may not provide DOD information that is comparable across the department.
What GAO Recommends
To improve utility system information, GAO is recommending that the Army, Air Force, and Marine Corps take steps or provide guidance to consistently collect disruption information, and that while the SMS utilities module is under development, DOD take steps to ensure that the services apply condition standards consistently. DOD concurred with the recommendations to collect disruption data and partially concurred with the other recommendation stating that it would determine if further consistent condition standards are needed. |
gao_GAO-09-120 | gao_GAO-09-120_0 | According to UNHCR, three solutions are available: First, voluntary repatriation is the preferred solution for the majority of refugees. Refugee Admissions Program (USRAP). State Department and UN Fund Assistance to Support Iraqi Refugees
To implement its goal and objectives for Iraqi refugees, State primarily funds and monitors the activities of its implementing partners, which include international organizations and NGOs. However, State did not aggregate individual project or program performance so that it could measure progress toward its overall goal and objectives. Lack of Reliable Needs Estimates and Funding Data Affects U.S. and UNHCR Efforts to Assist Iraqi Refugees
U.S. and UNHCR efforts to provide sufficient humanitarian assistance to Iraqi refugees are challenged by the lack of reliable needs estimates and data on funding targeted at Iraqi refugee programs. Iraqi refugees primarily live interspersed among the local urban populations, rather than concentrated in camps, and are not easily identified. According to the UN, statistics on the number of Iraqi refugees in neighboring countries vary and are difficult to verify. The U.S. government and UNHCR, reportedly the largest bilateral and multilateral funding sources, do not always designate and report funding solely for Iraqi refugee programs, which target refugees and the vulnerable populations of the countries that host them. Because of the number of overlapping appeals, it is difficult to track the amount requested and funded for all Iraq-related humanitarian assistance. Conditions in Iraq are not suitable for their return, and host countries such as Jordan and Syria prefer that the refugees return to Iraq. According to IOM, the Iraqi government has cited improvements in security and offered financial incentives (about 1 million Iraqi dinars) to returning refugee families. The United States Has Made Recent Progress in Resettlement Efforts, but Limited Numbers of Refugees May Be Resettled Worldwide
The U.S. government has made progress in resettling Iraqi refugees under its U.S. Lack of Comprehensive International Strategic Planning Has Hindered Efforts to Assist and Protect Iraqi Refugees
According to U.S., UN, foreign government, and NGO officials, the international community lacks a comprehensive strategy to address the Iraqi refugee situation. Specifically, the international community lacks a strategic planning effort for the assistance of Iraqi refugees that includes (1) a comprehensive assessment of the needs of Iraqi refugees and vulnerable host government populations and uses this assessment to prioritize activities for funding; (2) a discussion of the limitations of annual budget cycles and efforts to mitigate these limitations; and (3) a coordination mechanism involving all stakeholders, including host country governments, international organizations, international and local NGOs (including local churches), and donor countries. Second, State, UNHCR, and NGOs do not have a strategy that addresses concerns raised about factors that may impact assistance efforts, such as the limitations of working with annual budget cycles and efforts to mitigate these limitations. Performance measures and indicators should be clearly linked to progress in achieving stated goals and objectives. In conjunction with relevant U. S. agencies and in coordination with the donor community, work with UNHCR and the governments of Iraq, Jordan, Syria, and other relevant host governments to build on the efforts in the 2009 UN Consolidated Appeal for Iraq and the Region and develop a comprehensive international strategy for providing assistance and solutions for Iraqi refugees. This program had resulted in 705 visas issued in fiscal year 2008. Appendix II: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
To examine efforts to protect and assist Iraqi refugees, we assessed challenges in (1) measuring and monitoring progress in achieving U.S. goals for assisting Iraqi refugees, (2) providing humanitarian assistance to Iraqi refugees, (3) offering solutions for Iraqi refugees, and (4) developing an international strategic plan to address the Iraqi refugee situation. To assess U.S. government and international efforts to provide humanitarian assistance to Iraqi refugees and to assess international strategic planning efforts to address the Iraqi refugee situation, we interviewed officials of the U.S., Jordanian, Syrian, and Iraqi governments; UNHCR, the International Organization for Migration (IOM), and other United Nations (UN) agencies; nongovernmental organizations; and research institutes. 4. | Why GAO Did This Study
Iraqi refugees are one of the largest urban populations the UN has been called on to assist. The UN reports government estimates of up to 4.8 million Iraqis displaced within the last 5 years, with 2 million fleeing, primarily to Syria and Jordan. GAO examined challenges in (1) measuring and monitoring progress in achieving U.S. goals for assisting Iraqi refugees, (2) providing humanitarian assistance to Iraqi refugees, (3) offering solutions for Iraqi refugees, and (4) developing an international strategic plan to address the Iraqi refugee situation. GAO analyzed reports and data; met with officials from the U.S. government, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), international organizations, and NGOs; and did fieldwork in Jordan and Syria.
What GAO Found
To implement its 2008 goal and objectives for Iraqi refugees, State primarily funded and monitored the efforts of its implementing partners, which include international organizations and nongovernmental organizations (NGO). These activities provided Iraqi refugees and host country populations with education, vocational training, health care, food, and financial support. However, State did not clearly link program achievements to its stated goal and objectives for Iraqi refugees. As a result, State has limited information to assess and report its progress in reaching its goal and objectives and improve program effectiveness. Insufficient numbers of staff to monitor projects, difficulties gaining access to projects and refugees, and the lack of reliable data have challenged State's efforts to ensure that projects help the intended beneficiaries. U.S. and international efforts to provide humanitarian assistance to Iraqi refugees in neighboring countries are impeded by the lack of reliable estimates on the needs of Iraqi refugees and data on the funding targeted at Iraqi refugee programs. Iraqi refugees live interspersed among the local urban populations and are not easily identified. Official government estimates on the number of Iraqi refugees in each country may be overstated. It is also difficult to determine the amount of funding provided for Iraqi refugee programs because the U.S. government and UNHCR, the largest bilateral and multilateral funding sources, do not report funding for Iraqi refugee programs separately from that provided for all Iraq-related humanitarian assistance. The U.S. government and UNHCR face challenges in offering solutions for Iraqi refugees. According to UNHCR, voluntary repatriation is the preferred solution, but conditions in Iraq are not yet suitable for Iraqis to return. According to the International Organization for Migration, the Iraqi government has cited improvements in security and offered financial incentives to returning refugee families. Although another solution is integration and settlement in host countries, Syria and Jordan consider Iraqi refugees "guests" who should return to Iraq once the security situation improves. The U.S. government has made progress in resettling Iraqi refugees under its U.S. Refugee Admissions Program, with 15,431 refugees resettled in the United States in fiscal years 2007 and 2008. According to U.S., UN, foreign government, and NGO officials, the international community lacks a comprehensive international strategy to address the Iraqi refugee situation. Although the 2009 UN Consolidated Appeal showed progress in strategic planning, the UN and international community continue to lack a longer-term approach. First, the international community lacks a comprehensive independent assessment of the needs of vulnerable Iraqi refugees and the populations that host them. Second, State, UNHCR, and NGOs do not have a strategy that addresses factors that may affect assistance efforts. Third, the international community has lacked a coordination mechanism that involves all stakeholders. |
gao_GAO-16-158 | gao_GAO-16-158_0 | DOD and VHA Have Developed Medication Treatment Recommendations for PTSD and Mild TBI and VHA Monitors the Prescribing of Certain Medications for PTSD
DOD and VHA Have Collaborated to Develop Clinical Practice Guidelines for Medication Treatment for PTSD and Mild TBI
DOD and VHA have jointly developed clinical practice guidelines related to PTSD and mild TBI, which include recommendations for the treatment of symptoms among servicemembers and veterans with these conditions. Additionally, the guideline states that the use of antipsychotics (atypical and conventional) to treat PTSD is not supported because the existing evidence is insufficient to warrant their use. VHA Monitors the Prescribing of Medications to Treat PTSD, but DOD and the Army Do Not; None Monitor Mild TBI Medications Given Lack of Specific Medication Recommendations in Mild TBI Clinical Guideline
VHA monitors the prescribing of medications that are included in the PTSD guideline, but DOD and the Army do not monitor such prescribing among servicemembers. This requirement encompasses measures focused on reducing prescriptions for benzodiazepines, antipsychotics, and other classes of psychiatric medications to treat veterans with PTSD. DOD officials told us that DOD relies on each military service to review the medication prescribing practices of its providers and helps facilitate medication reviews by generating reports for all MTFs that include a list of patients who are prescribed multiple psychiatric and pain medications. Federal internal control standards require federal agencies to have control activities in place to establish and review performance measures over time and then implement ongoing monitoring to assess the quality of performance and ensure that the findings of reviews are promptly resolved. Without ongoing monitoring of Army providers’ prescribing of antipsychotics and benzodiazepines to servicemembers with PTSD, the Army may be unable to identify and address prescribing practices that are inconsistent with the guideline and do not have a clinical justification. These medications are prescribed to treat symptoms that are common among servicemembers and veterans with PTSD or mild TBI. DOD and VHA officials we spoke with agreed that the formulary differences did not affect the continuation of medications for servicemembers transitioning from DOD to VHA. We also found that the vast majority of these medications that were actually prescribed by DOD in fiscal year 2014 were on both formularies. VHA Has Two Key Efforts to Help Ensure Continuation of Medications, but Lack of Clarity of One Effort May Limit Its Effectiveness
VHA’s Nonformulary Request Process Helps Ensure Continuation of Medications and Most Requests Are Adjudicated within 96 Hours and Approved
VHA’s nonformulary request process is one key effort that helps newly transitioned veterans, including those with PTSD or mild TBI, avoid medication discontinuations that could occur as the result of differences in the DOD and VA formularies, according to providers we interviewed and VHA documents we reviewed. VHA’s nonformulary request data show that pharmacists approved the majority of the nonformulary requests that providers submitted from fiscal years 2012 through 2014. The VHA data also showed that the vast majority of requests that providers appealed were adjudicated within the required timeline of 96 hours (91 percent) from fiscal years 2012 through 2014. VHA Issued a Policy to Help Ensure Continuation of Certain Medications for Transitioning Servicemembers, but It Lacks Clarity
VHA issued a policy in January 2015 that instructs providers not to discontinue mental health medications initiated by DOD providers due to differences in the DOD and VA formularies; another key effort to help ensure medication continuation. This lack of clarity in VHA’s policy is inconsistent with federal internal control standards, which state that agencies should establish control activities, such as developing clear policies, in order to accomplish the agency’s objectives. Ensuring that medication regimens are continued when clinically appropriate is critical for servicemembers transitioning their health care from DOD to VHA, including those with PTSD and mild TBI. However, we found that VHA’s new policy to ensure the continuation of mental health medications lacks clarity on the types of medications considered mental health medications, and, as a result, VHA providers may be inappropriately changing or discontinuing mental health medications due to formulary differences, potentially increasing the risk of adverse health effects for transitioning servicemembers. Appendix I: Formulary Comparison
We found that the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) formulary included 57 percent of the psychiatric, pain, and sleep medications on the Department of Defense (DOD) formulary, as of August 2015, and these medications represented the most frequently prescribed psychiatric, pain, and sleep medications on the DOD formulary in fiscal year 2014. | Why GAO Did This Study
Medication continuation, when clinically appropriate, is critical for transitioning servicemembers with PTSD or TBI who have been prescribed psychiatric, pain, or sleep medications. Adverse health effects may occur if these medications are inappropriately discontinued.
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015 included a provision for GAO to assess transitions of care, particularly medication continuation for servicemembers with PTSD or TBI transitioning to VHA. GAO examined (1) the extent to which DOD and VHA developed and monitored recommended medication practices for PTSD and TBI; (2) the extent to which psychiatric, pain, and sleep medications on DOD's formulary are on VA's formulary, and how differences might affect medication continuation; and (3) key efforts VHA has to help ensure medication continuation, and the extent it is monitoring these efforts. GAO reviewed documents and analyzed DOD and VHA data from fiscal years 2012 through 2015; and interviewed DOD and VHA officials from headquarters and five Army and DOD facilities, selected for variation in size and location. GAO focused on the Army as the largest number of its servicemembers served in recent conflicts.
What GAO Found
The Department of Defense (DOD) and the Department of Veterans Affairs' (VA) Veterans Health Administration (VHA) have collaborated to develop clinical practice guidelines for post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and mild traumatic brain injury (TBI). The mild TBI guideline does not include recommendations based on scientific evidence regarding the use of medications to treat symptoms because of a lack of available research; however, the PTSD guideline discourages the use of benzodiazepines (a sedative) and states that the use of antipsychotics to treat PTSD lacks support, based on available research. VHA monitors the prescribing of benzodiazepines and antipsychotics to treat PTSD nationally and by VA medical centers (VAMC) and requires VAMCs to implement improvement plans if their prescribing is significantly higher than the average of all VAMCs. GAO found that DOD relies on each military service to review the medication prescribing practices of its providers and that the Army does not monitor the prescribing of medications to treat PTSD on an ongoing basis. Without such monitoring, the Army may be unable to identify and address practices that are inconsistent with the guideline. Federal internal control standards require agencies to have control activities to establish performance measures, implement ongoing monitoring to assess performance, and ensure that the findings of reviews are promptly resolved.
As of August 2015, VA's formulary included 57 percent of the psychiatric, pain, and sleep medications on DOD's formulary. These medications are prescribed to treat symptoms common among servicemembers and veterans with PTSD or mild TBI, and most of the DOD prescriptions in fiscal year 2014 for these medications (88 percent) were on both formularies. In addition, DOD and VHA officials GAO interviewed agreed that the differences did not affect the continuation of medications for servicemembers transitioning from DOD to VHA.
VHA has two key efforts to help ensure continuation of medications for transitioning servicemembers, including those with PTSD or mild TBI, but a lack of clarity of one effort may limit its effectiveness. VHA's nonformulary request process is one key effort that helps ensure newly transitioned veterans avoid medication discontinuations due to differences between the DOD and VA formularies. VHA monitors nonformulary requests. VHA data show that 81 percent of requests submitted from fiscal years 2012 through 2014 were approved, and 98 percent of requests were adjudicated within VHA's required time frame of 96 hours. The other key effort is VHA's 2015 policy instructing its providers not to discontinue mental health medications initiated by DOD providers due to formulary differences. However, VHA providers GAO interviewed had varying interpretations of which medications are covered by this policy, and VHA officials acknowledged that the definition of a mental health medication could be subjective. Federal internal control standards state that agencies should establish control activities, such as developing clear policies. Because VHA's policy lacks clarity, VHA providers may be inappropriately discontinuing mental health medications due to formulary differences, which could increase the risk of adverse health effects for transitioning servicemembers.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the Army monitor prescribing practices of medications discouraged under the PTSD guideline and that VHA clarify its medication continuation policy. DOD and VHA concurred with the recommendations. |
gao_GAO-03-452T | gao_GAO-03-452T_0 | Between 1998 and 2001, VBA hired about 2,000 new examiners (see figure 1). Attrition At VBA Is Higher For Newly Hired Examiners Than For The Agency Overall
In fiscal year 2000, the attrition rate for new examiners at VBA was about 15 percent, more than twice as high as the 6 percent rate for all employees who left that year. About 15 percent of the new examiners hired in fiscal year 2000 left the agency within 1 year of being hired. According to human capital experts, in general, new employees tend to leave at higher rates than all other employees. However, for all new federal employees—those hired in fiscal year 1998, 1999, and 2000—as many as 17 percent left within 12 months of being hired. Using this method, VBA reported attrition rates similar to those found by GAO. VBA Lacks Adequate Data On Reasons Employees Leave And Analysis Of Staff Attrition
While VBA has descriptive data on how employees separate from the agency (whether through resignation, termination, retirement, or transfer), it does not have adequate analytic data on the reasons why employees, particularly new employees, leave the agency. VBA collects some data on the reasons for attrition in exit interviews. However, these data are not systematically collected in a consistent manner and not compiled or analyzed. Furthermore, VBA has not performed the types of analysis on its data that would help the agency determine whether it can reduce its attrition rate. VBA Collects Some Data on Types of Separations, but Data on Reasons Are Limited
While VBA systematically collects descriptive data on how employees leave the agency, the data on the reasons employees leave is not systematically collected or analyzed. While VBA conducts exit interviews to collect information on the reasons employees resign, it does not have a standard process for these interviews, nor are they conducted consistently for all separating employees, according to VBA officials. Review of attrition data at certain regional offices. VBA has begun to address some of the findings from these special studies or reports. While one of VBA’s special reports did some broad comparisons of VBA’s attrition to the attrition at other federal agencies, VBA has not compared, as we have done, the attrition of newly hired examiners to the attrition of employees in other parts of the federal government with comparable job series. Obtaining better attrition data and conducting adequate analysis of attrition and the reasons for attrition could help VBA target future recruitment efforts and minimize attrition. Understanding the reasons for attrition could help the agency minimize the investment in training lost when a new employee leaves. | Why GAO Did This Study
By the year 2006, the Veterans Benefits Administration (VBA) projects it will lose a significant portion of its mission-critical workforce to retirement. Since fiscal year 1998, VBA has hired over 2,000 new employees to begin to fill this expected gap. GAO was asked to review, with particular attention for new employees, (1) the attrition rate at VBA and the soundness of its methods for calculating attrition and (2) whether VBA has adequate data to effectively analyze the reasons for attrition. To answer these questions, we obtained and analyzed attrition data from VBA's Office of Human Resources, calculated attrition rates for VBA and other federal agencies using a government-wide database on federal employment, and interviewed VBA officials about their efforts to measure attrition and determine why new employees leave.
What GAO Found
About 15 percent of new examiners hired in fiscal year 2000 left VBA within 12 months of their hiring date, more than double the 6 percent rate of all VBA employees who left in fiscal year 2000. In general, new hire attrition tends to exceed the rate for all other employees, and VBA's 15 percent rate is similar to the attrition rate for all new federal employees hired between fiscal years 1998 and 2000, when as many as 17 percent left within 12 months of being hired. VBA does not have adequate data on the reasons why employees, particularly new employees, choose to leave the agency. VBA has descriptive data on how employees leave the agency (whether through resignation, retirement, or transfer), but VBA does not have comprehensive data on the reasons employees resign. While VBA collects some data on the reasons for attrition in exit interviews, these data are limited because exit interviews are not conducted consistently, and the data from these interviews are not compiled and analyzed. Without such data, VBA cannot determine ways to address the reasons employees are leaving. Furthermore, VBA has not performed analysis to determine whether it can reduce its staff attrition. Improved collection and analysis of attrition data, including data on the reasons for attrition, could help the agency minimize the lost investment in training, particularly when new employees resign. A forthcoming report will explore options for improving VBA's collection and analysis of attrition data. |
gao_HEHS-99-25 | gao_HEHS-99-25_0 | This organizationally complex structure has contributed to a number of problems. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Social Security, Committee on Ways and Means, asked us to (1) assess SSA’s efforts to redesign its disability claims process and (2) identify any actions needed to better ensure future progress. In addition, problems with SSA’s approach to designing and managing its tests of new initiatives contributed to marginal and inconclusive test results and made it more difficult for SSA to discern how a tested initiative would operate if implemented on a widespread basis. Delays Continue Under Revised Plan
Even under its scaled-back plan, SSA continues to experience delays. Limited Progress Is Related to SSA’s Testing and Implementation Strategy
SSA’s difficulties in achieving appreciable improvements in its disability claims process have been caused, in part, by the scope of SSA’s revised plan and the agency’s strategy for testing its proposed process changes. While SSA could not have predicted the precise impact of not including a particular process change in its stand-alone tests, the agency understood from the outset of its redesign effort that proposed changes were closely linked and that they depended on each other—especially on computer supports—to dramatically improve the process. As SSA continues its redesign work, it has an opportunity to apply lessons learned from its 4 years of reengineering experience, as well as from other commonly accepted reengineering and management best practices. Once agreement is reached, SSA will need to test this mechanism. Prioritizing its key redesign objectives might help SSA to better focus its efforts. Recommendations
As SSA proceeds with further exploration and testing of redesign initiatives and considers implementation options, it should take the following steps to improve the likelihood of making key improvements to the disability claims process: further focus resources on those initiatives, such as process unification, quality assurance, and computer support systems, that offer the greatest potential for achieving SSA’s most critical redesign objectives; test promising concepts at a few sites in an integrated fashion; establish key supports and explore feasible alternatives before committing significant resources toward the testing of specific initiatives, such as the DCM; develop a comprehensive set of performance goals and measures to assess and monitor changes in the disability claims process; and ensure that quality assurance processes are in place that both monitor and promote the quality of disability decisions. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO: (1) reviewed the Social Security Administration's (SSA) efforts to redesign its disability claims process; and (2) identified actions that SSA could take to better ensure future progress.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) even with its scaled-back plan, SSA has been unable to keep its redesign activities on schedule and to demonstrate that its proposed changes will significantly improve the claims process; (2) the inability to keep on schedule was caused, in part, by SSA's overly ambitious plan and its strategy for testing proposed changes; (3) other problems with the design of its tests weakened SSA's ability to predict how the initiatives would operate if implemented; (4) the problems that led to SSA's redesign effort persist, and as SSA continues its efforts to improve the disability claims process the agency has an opportunity to learn from its experience and the best practices of other organizations with reengineering experience; (5) SSA could improve its chances of making future progress by further scaling back its near-term efforts to include only initiatives that are critical to improving the disability claims process; (6) in addition, by testing related process changes together, rather than on a stand-alone basis, and at a smaller number of sites, SSA could free up resources while still obtaining valuable data; (7) SSA should also explore feasible alternatives before committing significant resources toward the testing of specific initiatives; (8) because a process change might function differently under actual operational conditions than it did in a test environment, SSA will need to revise its performance measures to better monitor and more fully assess the impact of changes on the process; and (9) moreover, SSA will need to ensure that an adequate quality assurance process is in place so that any changes SSA makes to the process do not compromise the quality of decisions. |
gao_GAO-12-261 | gao_GAO-12-261_0 | Federal Funding for Activities That Reduce Diesel Emissions Is Fragmented across 14 Programs
Federal grant and loan funding for activities that reduce mobile source diesel emissions is fragmented across 14 programs at DOE, DOT, and EPA. Nevertheless, each of these programs allows or requires a portion of its funding to support activities that have the effect of reducing mobile source diesel emissions. Specifically, 13 of the programs provide funding through competitive and formula grants, and 1 program—DOT’s State Infrastructure Banks program—provides loans.gaps in the programs, such as mobile sources that are not eligible for funding. We did not identify any From fiscal years 2007 through 2011, these 14 programs obligated at least $1.4 billion for activities that have the effect of reducing mobile source diesel emissions. As table 2 shows, each of the 14 relevant programs overlaps with at least one other program in the specific types of activities they fund, the program goals, or the eligible recipients of funding. We also identified several instances of duplication where more than one program provided funding to the same recipient for the same type of activities. Even with duplication among the programs, several factors make it difficult to precisely determine whether unnecessary duplication exists. The Effectiveness of Federal Funding for Diesel Emissions Reduction Activities Is Unknown
The effectiveness of federal funding for activities that reduce mobile source diesel emissions is unknown because agencies vary in the extent to which they have established performance measures. In addition, few programs collect performance information on their diesel emissions reduction activities because 13 of the 14 programs that fund these activities have purposes other than reducing diesel emissions. This incomplete performance information may limit the ability of agencies to assess the effectiveness of their programs and activities that reduce diesel emissions. DOE and EPA have established performance measures for the strategic goals related to their programs that reduce mobile source diesel emissions. DOT has established such performance measures for two of its administrations—the Federal Aviation Administration and Federal Highway Administration—but has not established such measures for the Federal Transit Administration for two of the four strategic goals that link to its programs that fund diesel emissions reduction activities. We have also reported that principles of good governance indicate that agencies should establish quantifiable performance measures to demonstrate how they intend to achieve their goals and measure the extent to which they have done so. Agency officials said they generally collect information on the current condition of the nation’s transit fleet, the use of public transportation, and transit fleet compliance with the Americans with Disabilities Act to measure the performance of the agency’s transit programs. EPA. DOE. According to agency officials, this is due to the differing purposes and goals of each program, which often do not directly relate to reducing diesel emissions. However, we have previously reported that, although federal programs have been designed for different purposes or targeted for different population groups, coordination among programs with related responsibilities is essential to efficiently and effectively meet national concerns. We reported that uncoordinated program efforts can waste scarce funds, confuse and frustrate program customers, and limit the overall effectiveness of the federal effort. Conclusions
Over time, EPA has issued more stringent emissions regulations for new diesel engines and vehicles, but existing diesel trucks, buses, locomotives, ships, agriculture equipment, and construction equipment continue to emit harmful pollution. This strategy should help the agencies identify agency roles and responsibilities for activities that reduce diesel emissions, including how a collaborative effort will be led; identify and address any unnecessary duplication, as appropriate; identify and leverage resources needed to support funding activities that reduce diesel emissions; assess baseline levels of diesel pollution and the contributors to mobile source diesel emissions to help agencies target, within their discretion, investments and, as appropriate, inform efforts to measure program effectiveness; and develop crosscutting performance measures, as appropriate, to monitor the collective results of federal funding for activities that reduce diesel emissions. DOT questioned several of this report’s key findings and its recommendations. Instead, we recommended that (1) the Federal Transit Administration develop performance measures for two of its agencywide strategic goals and (2) DOE, DOT, and EPA establish a strategy for collaboration on diesel emissions reduction activities that, among other things, helps the agencies develop crosscutting performance measures, as appropriate, to assess the collective results of federal funding for activities that reduce diesel emissions. As our report states, DOE, DOT, and EPA were generally unaware of other programs that fund activities that decrease diesel emissions. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report examines the (1) extent to which duplication, overlap, fragmentation, or gaps, if any, exist among federal grant, rebate, and loan programs that address mobile source diesel emissions; (2) effectiveness of federal funding for activities that reduce mobile source diesel emissions; and (3) extent to which collaboration takes place among agencies that fund activities that reduce mobile source diesel emissions. In addition, we obtained and analyzed funding data from the Department of Energy (DOE), the Department of Transportation (DOT), and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to determine the total amount of federal funding for diesel emissions reduction projects from fiscal years 2007 through 2011. | Why GAO Did This Study
Exhaust from diesel engines is a harmful form of air pollution. EPA has issued emissions standards for new diesel engines and vehicles, but older mobile sources of diesel emissionssuch as trucks and busescontinue to emit harmful pollution. Programs at DOE, DOT, and EPA provide funding for activities that reduce diesel emissions, such as retrofitting existing diesel engines and vehicles. The existence of these programs at multiple agencies has raised questions about the potential for unnecessary duplication. In response to a mandate in the Diesel Emissions Reduction Act of 2010, GAO examined the (1) extent of duplication, overlap, fragmentation, or gaps, if any, among federal grant, rebate, and loan programs that address mobile source diesel emissions; (2) effectiveness of federal funding for activities that reduce mobile source diesel emissions; and (3) extent of collaboration among agencies that fund these activities. GAO analyzed program data, documents, and relevant laws and regulations and interviewed agency officials. GAO also reviewed three diesel-related tax expenditures.
What GAO Found
Federal grant and loan funding for activities that reduce mobile source diesel emissions is fragmented across 14 programs at the Department of Energy (DOE), the Department of Transportation (DOT), and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). From fiscal years 2007 through 2011, the programs obligated at least $1.4 billion for activities that have the effect of reducing mobile source diesel emissions. The programs have varying goals and purposes; nevertheless, each program allows or requires a portion of its funding to support activities that reduce mobile source diesel emissions, such as replacing fleets of older diesel trucks or school buses with natural gas vehicles. In addition, each of the 14 programs overlaps with at least one other program in the specific activities they fund, the program goals, or the eligible recipients of funding. GAO also identified several instances of duplication where more than one program provided grant funding to the same recipient for the same type of activities. However, GAO was unable to determine whether unnecessary duplication exists because of limited information on program administrative costs, among other things. GAO did not find any gaps among the programs, such as mobile sources that are not eligible for funding.
The effectiveness of federal funding for activities that reduce mobile source diesel emissions is unknown because agencies vary in the extent to which they have established performance measures. DOE and EPA have established performance measures for the strategic goals related to their programs that reduce mobile source diesel emissions. DOT has established such measures for two of its administrationsthe Federal Aviation Administration and Federal Highway Administrationbut has not established such measures for the Federal Transit Administration for two of the four strategic goals that link to its programs that fund diesel emissions reduction activities. Instead, agency officials said they collect information on the current condition of the nations transit fleet, among other things, to measure the performance of its programs. As GAO has previously reported, principles of good governance indicate that agencies should establish quantifiable performance measures to demonstrate how they intend to achieve their goals and measure the extent to which they have done so. In addition, 13 of the 14 programs have purposes other than decreasing diesel emissions, and diesel reductions are a side benefit of efforts to achieve these other goals. As a result, few programs collect diesel-related performance information. Incomplete performance information may limit the ability of agencies to assess the effectiveness of their programs and activities that reduce diesel emissions.
The programs that fund activities that reduce diesel emissions generally do not collaborate because of the differing purposes and goals of each program, according to senior DOE, DOT, and EPA officials. The officials also were sometimes unaware of other programs that fund similar activities and said that any existing collaboration was on a case-by-case basis. GAOs previous work has shown that although federal programs have been designed for different purposes, coordination among programs with related responsibilities is essential to efficiently and effectively meet national concerns. Further, without a coordinated approach, programs can waste scarce funds, confuse and frustrate program customers, and limit the overall effectiveness of the federal effort.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOTs Federal Transit Administration develop performance measures for its two relevant strategic goals and that DOE, DOT, and EPA establish a strategy for collaboration among their programs that fund activities that reduce diesel emissions. DOE and EPA agreed with the relevant recommendation, and DOE questioned several findings. DOT questioned several findings and both recommendations and neither agreed nor disagreed with the recommendations. GAO continues to believe in the need for the performance measures and collaboration. |
gao_GAO-09-862T | gao_GAO-09-862T_0 | Information Is Limited on the Water Supply and Water Quality Impacts of the Next Generation of Biofuels
Our work to date indicates that while the water supply and water quality effects of producing corn-based ethanol are fairly well understood, less is known about the effects of the next generation of feedstocks and fuels. The cultivation of corn for ethanol production can require substantial quantities of water—from 7 to 321 gallons per gallon of ethanol produced—depending on where it is grown and how much irrigation water is used. Furthermore, corn is a relatively resource-intensive crop, requiring higher rates of fertilizer and pesticide applications than many other crops; some experts believe that additional corn production for biofuels conversion will lead to an increase in fertilizer and sediment runoff and in the number of impaired streams and other water bodies. In contrast to corn-based ethanol, our work to date indicates that much less is known about the effects that large-scale cultivation of cellulosic feedstocks will have on water supplies and water quality. Since potential cellulosic feedstocks have not been grown commercially to date, there is little information on the cumulative water, nutrient, and pesticide needs of these crops, and it is not yet known what agricultural practices will actually be used to cultivate these feedstocks on a commercial scale. Uncertainty also exists regarding the water supply impacts of converting feedstocks into biofuels. Water consumed in the corn-ethanol conversion process has declined over time with improved equipment and energy efficient design, according to a 2009 Argonne National Laboratory study, and is currently estimated at 3 gallons of water required for each gallon of ethanol produced. For the conversion of cellulosic feedstocks, the amount of water consumed is less defined and will depend on the process and on technological advancements that improve the efficiency with which water is used. Our work to date also indicates that additional research is needed on the storage and distribution of biofuels. To overcome potential compatibility issues, future research is needed on other conversion technologies that can be used to produce renewable and advanced fuels that are capable of being used in the existing infrastructure. Key Efforts to Reduce Use of Freshwater at Power Plants May Not Be Fully Captured in Existing Federal Data
In our work to date, we have found (1) the use of advanced cooling technologies can reduce freshwater use at thermoelectric power plants, but federal data may not fully capture this industry change; (2) the use of alternative water sources can also reduce freshwater use, but federal data may not systematically capture this change; and (3) federal research under way is focused on examining efforts to reduce the use of freshwater in thermoelectric power plants. For example, plants using advanced cooling technologies may cost more to build and operate; require more land; and, because these technologies can consume a significant amount of energy themselves, witness lower net electricity output—especially in hot, dry conditions. For these reasons, a number of power plant developers in the United States and across the world have adopted advanced cooling technologies, but according to EIA officials, the agency’s forms have not been designed to collect information on the use of advanced cooling technologies. Use of these alternative water sources can ease the development process where freshwater sources are in short supply and lower the costs associated with obtaining and using freshwater when freshwater is expensive. Because of these advantages, alternative water sources play an increasingly important role in reducing power plant reliance on freshwater, but can pose challenges, including requiring special treatment to avoid adverse effects on cooling equipment, requiring additional efforts to comply with relevant regulations, and limiting the potential locations of power plants to those nearby an alternative water source. EIA collects annual data from power plants on their water use and water source. In 2008, DOE awarded about $9 million to support research and development of projects that, among other things, could improve the performance of advanced cooling technologies, recover water used to reduce emissions of air pollutants at coal plants for reuse, and facilitate the use of alternative water sources such as polluted water for cooling. This task will be particularly difficult, given the interdependency between energy production and water supply and water quality and the strains that both these resources currently face. | Why GAO Did This Study
Water and energy are inexorably linked--energy is needed to pump, treat, and transport water and large quantities of water are needed to support the development of energy. However, both water and energy may face serious constraints as demand for these vital resources continues to rise. Two examples that demonstrate the link between water and energy are the cultivation and conversion of feedstocks, such as corn, switchgrass, and algae, into biofuels; and the production of electricity by thermoelectric power plants, which rely on large quantities of water for cooling during electricity generation. At the request of this committee, GAO has undertaken three ongoing studies focusing on the water-energy nexus related to (1) biofuels and water, (2) thermoelectric power plants and water, and (3) oil shale and water. For this testimony, GAO is providing key themes that have emerged from its work to date on the research and development and data needs with regard to the production of biofuels and electricity and their linkage with water. GAO's work on oil shale is in its preliminary stages and further information will be available on this aspect of the energy-water nexus later this year.
What GAO Found
While the effects of producing corn-based ethanol on water supply and water quality are fairly well understood, less is known about the effects of the next generation of biofuel feedstocks. Corn cultivation for ethanol production can require from 7 to 321 gallons of water per gallon of ethanol produced, depending on where it is grown and how much irrigation is needed. Corn is also a relatively resource-intensive crop, requiring higher rates of fertilizer and pesticides than many other crops. In contrast, little is known about the effects of large-scale cultivation of next generation feedstocks, such as cellulosic crops. Since these feedstocks have not been grown commercially to date, there are little data on the cumulative water, nutrient, and pesticide needs of these crops and on the amount of these crops that could be harvested as a biofuel feedstock without compromising soil and water quality. Uncertainty also exists regarding the water supply impacts of converting cellulosic feedstocks into biofuels. While water usage in the corn-based ethanol conversion process has been declining and is currently estimated at 3 gallons of water per gallon of ethanol, the amount of water consumed in the conversion of cellulosic feedstocks is less defined and will depend on the process and on technological advancements that improve the efficiency with which water is used. Finally, additional research is needed on the storage and distribution of biofuels. For example, to overcome incompatibility issues between the ethanol and the current fueling and distribution infrastructure, research is needed on conversion technologies that can be used to produce renewable fuels capable of being used in the existing infrastructure. With regard to power plants, GAO has found that key efforts to reduce use of freshwater at power plants are under way but may not be fully captured in existing federal data. In particular, advanced cooling technologies that use air, not water, for cooling the plant, can sharply reduce or even eliminate the use of freshwater, thereby reducing the costs associated with procuring water. However, plants using these technologies may cost more to build and witness lower net electricity output--especially in hot, dry conditions. Nevertheless, a number of power plant developers in the United States have adopted advanced cooling technologies, but current federal data collection efforts may not fully document this emerging trend. Similarly, plants can use alternative water supplies such as treated waste water from municipal sewage plants to sharply reduce their use of freshwater. Use of these alternative water sources can also lower the costs associated with obtaining and using freshwater when freshwater is expensive, but pose other challenges, including requiring special treatment to avoid adverse effects on cooling equipment. Alternative water sources play an increasingly important role in reducing power plant reliance on freshwater, but federal data collection efforts do not systematically collect data on the use of these water sources by power plants. To help improve the use of alternatives to freshwater, in 2008, the Department of Energy awarded about $9 million to examine among other things, improving the performance of advanced cooling technologies. Such research is needed to help identify cost effective alternatives to traditional cooling technologies. |
gao_GAO-01-356 | gao_GAO-01-356_0 | Proper tracking and recording of MLAP costs is especially important since this program is partially funded through mining fees that Congress has made available only for mining law administration program operations. Conclusions
The Congress and program managers need accurate cost information in order to make informed program and budgeting decisions. However, the results of our work at BLM show that BLM’s financial records have not accurately reflected the true costs of its programs because the costs of some labor and a number of contracts and services costs were not charged to the appropriate program. Other subactivities have benefited from the charging of these improper costs to MLAP. Correspondingly, fewer funds have been available for actual MLAP operations. BLM has taken steps to make correcting adjustments for certain of these improper charges, including the development of an Instruction Memorandum. Therefore, until additional procedures for MLAP are developed and implemented, the Congress and program managers can place only limited reliance on the accuracy of MLAP cost information. Recommendations for Executive Action
We recommend that the Director of the Bureau of Land Management take the following four actions: make correcting adjustments for improper charges to appropriation remind employees that time charges and other obligations are to be made to the benefiting subactivity as stated in BLM’s Fund Coding Handbook and develop a mechanism to test compliance; provide detailed guidance clarifying which tasks are chargeable to MLAP operations, such as those listed in the background section of this report; and conduct training on this guidance for all employees authorized to charge MLAP. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Bureau of Land Management's (BLM) Mining Law Administration Program (MLAP) is responsible for managing the environmentally responsible exploration and development of locatable minerals on public lands. The program is funded through mining fees collected from the holders of unpatented mining claims and sites and by appropriations to the extent that fees are inadequate to fund the program. Congress and program managers need accurate cost information in order to make informed program and budgeting decisions.
What GAO Found
However, GAO found that BLM's financial records did not accurately reflect the true costs of its programs because the costs of labor and a number of contracts and services costs were charged to MLAP and not to the appropriate program. As a result, other subactivities benefited from the charging of these improper costs and fewer funds have been available for actual MLAP operations. BLM has taken steps to make correcting adjustments for improper charges to MLAP contracts and services; however, additional adjustments are needed to correct for labor costs that were improperly charged to MLAP. Until these adjustments for improperly charged labor are made, Congress and program managers can place only a limited reliance on the accuracy of MLAP cost information. |
gao_GAO-10-39 | gao_GAO-10-39_0 | Of key concern is the loss of government control over and accountability for mission-related policy and program decisions when contractors provide services that closely support inherently governmental functions. All 7 of the proposed acquisitions for professional, administrative, and management services and more than 75 percent of the 64 related task orders we reviewed required the contractor to provide services that closely supported inherently governmental functions. DOD Faces Challenges In Implementing Performance-Based Practices on Professional and Management Support Task Orders
DOD faces challenges in defining requirements and outcome-based measures when using a performance-based approach to acquire professional and management support services. Performance Standards and Measures Were Not Always Well Suited to Assess the Outcomes of the Broad Range of Contracted Services
While DOD identified as performance-based all but one of the task orders we reviewed, we found that almost all of the task orders had broadly defined requirements that listed various categories of services and related activities the contractor may be required to perform over the course of the order rather than expected results. The other task orders that included cost and schedule performance standards were assessed subjectively, based on the number of complaints lodged against the contractor. DOD personnel relied on subjective measures to assess the quality of contractor services provided in 40 of the 64 task orders we reviewed. The military departments may have missed opportunities to include and use objective performance measures that were better suited to assess contract outcomes in several of the task orders we reviewed. Furthermore, in 3 of these cases, surveillance personnel did not receive the required training until at least a year after they were assigned to monitor a contractor’s performance. Nevertheless, DOD’s policies do not require that DOD personnel include an assessment of these risks when their proposals for contractor support are submitted for approval under DOD’s management review process. DOD’s peer review process is beginning to assess this issue just prior to and then after contract award, but with only a handful of reviews performed on such contracts, it is too early to gauge whether the process will be successful in encouraging DOD personnel to address these issues across the range of DOD’s services contracts. Recommendations for Executive Action
To better inform acquisition decisions, assist DOD personnel in performing their management oversight responsibilities, and improve DOD’s surveillance of services contracts, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following four actions: revise documentation requirements for DOD’s current management review to include information on the extent to which services to be provided will closely support inherently governmental functions as well as the consideration given to using DOD civilian employees to perform such functions; require before the award of any contract or issuance of task order for services closely supporting inherently governmental functions that program and contracting officials consider and document their assessment of the unique risks of these services and the steps that have been taken to mitigate such risks; develop guidance to identify approaches that DOD should take to enhance management oversight when contractors provide services that closely support inherently governmental functions; and direct the military departments to review their procedures to ensure that properly trained surveillance personnel have been assigned prior to and throughout a contract’s period of performance. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To determine whether the Department of Defense’s (DOD) policies and actions to improve its management of services contracts addressed issues affecting professional and management support contracts, we examined (1) the extent to which DOD considered the risks associated with contractors closely supporting inherently governmental functions at key acquisition decision points;(2) how DOD was implementing performance- based acquisitions practices, such as identifying requirements in terms of expected and measurable outcomes; (3) the extent to which DOD designated trained surveillance personnel; and (4) whether recent actions to implement a peer review process may improve DOD’s management and use of such contracts. | Why GAO Did This Study
In fiscal year 2008, the Department of Defense (DOD) obligated $200 billion on services contracts, including $42 billion for professional and management services. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) previously identified weaknesses in DOD's management and oversight of services contracts, contributing to DOD contract management being on GAO's high-risk list. For selected professional and management support contracts, GAO was asked to examine (1) the extent to which DOD considered the risks of contractors closely supporting inherently governmental functions at key decision points, (2) how DOD implemented performance-based practices, (3) the extent to which DOD designated trained surveillance personnel, and (4) whether a new review process may improve DOD's management of such contracts. GAO reviewed federal regulations, agency policies and guidance, and analyzed seven acquisitions approved from 2004 to 2007 and 64 related task orders for services.
What GAO Found
DOD policies do not require assessments of the risks associated with contractors closely supporting inherently governmental functions as part of its management reviews of acquisition strategies nor when task orders are issued for professional and management services. Such risks include the potential loss of government control over and accountability for mission-related policy and program decisions. Though all seven acquisitions and more than 75 percent of the task orders GAO reviewed provided for such services, GAO found no evidence that these risks were among those considered in the documentation reviewed. DOD guidance issued after these acquisitions were approved requires that consideration be given to using civilian personnel rather than contractors when the activities closely support inherently governmental functions. This guidance, however, does not require DOD personnel to consider and document risks posed when contractors perform these activities. Further, DOD personnel were unaware of the need to provide enhanced oversight when contracting for such services. DOD faces challenges in defining requirements and outcome-based measures when acquiring professional and management services. DOD personnel generally expressed task order requirements in terms of a broad range of activities that contractors may perform, but used standards and measures that were not always well-suited to assess outcomes. DOD made more use of objective measures to assess cost and schedule performance, but generally relied on subjective measures to assess the quality of the contractors' work. For example, DOD often measured quality based on the number of complaints lodged against the contractor, which provided little detail into how desired outcomes were achieved. DOD also missed opportunities to include objective measures that may have been better suited to assess outcomes. DOD officials stated that developing outcome-based, objective measures is challenging, but noted that initiatives are under way to better utilize such approaches. DOD has made progress in ensuring that trained surveillance personnel are assigned to monitor contract performance. Surveillance personnel were assigned to all 64 of the task orders GAO reviewed, and all but 3 had received required training. GAO identified, however, 3 instances of surveillance personnel who were not assigned before the contractor began work on a task order and 20 instances of personnel who did not receive training prior to beginning surveillance duties. In September 2008, DOD implemented a new peer review process that is tasked to address, among other issues, contractors closely supporting inherently governmental functions, the use of performance-based practices, and contractor surveillance. As of October 2009, four pre-award reviews and one post-award review of professional and management support contracts have been conducted and it is too early to tell whether such reviews will encourage DOD personnel to address these issues across the range of DOD's services contracts. |
gao_GAO-01-1071 | gao_GAO-01-1071_0 | BBA permitted new types of health plans, such as PPOs, to participate in Medicare and included provisions designed to encourage a wider geographic availability of health plans. The extent to which this will occur is uncertain. Expenditures
On average, HCFA spent $107.8 million annually to run NMEP in fiscal years 1998, 1999, and 2000. Funding Sources
During NMEP’s first 3 fiscal years (1998 to 2000), approximately three- fourths of the expenditures were funded from user fees collected from M+C plans. Beneficiary and Plan Reaction to NMEP
Beneficiaries and beneficiary advocacy groups generally praised NMEP’s major activities. Industry officials representing M+C plans offered a mixed reaction to NMEP. Most of HCFA’s research and implementation efforts concentrated on improving the mandated information outlets—the Medicare handbook, telephone help line, Internet site, and local education programs—and the content of the information available through those outlets. However, HCFA-sponsored research suggests that NMEP may need to adopt new education strategies to encourage other beneficiaries to actively consider their Medicare options. BBA requirements. For example, the mailing must include information on the FFS program’s covered benefits and cost sharing; procedures for selecting an M+C plan or the FFS program; beneficiary rights and the appeals process in both M+C plans and the FFS program; and descriptions of benefits, enrollment rights, and other requirements of Medicare supplemental policies (Medigap). We also spoke with representatives from beneficiary advocacy groups (AARP, Medicare Rights Center, and the Center for Medicare Education) and health care plan associations (American Association of Health Plans and the Health Insurance Association of America). 10, 1997). | What GAO Found
The Balanced Budget Act of 1997 (BBA) established the Medicare+Choice (M+C) program to expand health plan choices. BBA permitted Medicare participation by preferred provider organizations, provider-sponsored organizations, and insurers offering private fee-for-service plans or medical savings accounts. It also encouraged the wider availability of health maintenance organizations, which have long been an option for many beneficiaries. To help beneficiaries understand and consider all of their Medicare options, the National Medicare Education Program offers a toll-free help line, informational mailings to beneficiaries, an Internet site, and educational and publicity campaigns. During fiscal years 1998 through 2000, the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) spent an average of $107.8 million on the program annually. Most of the money came from user fees collected from M+C plans. Reaction to the program has generally been positive among beneficiaries and beneficiary advocacy groups, but representatives of M+C plans offered a mixed assessment. Program activities have increased the information available to beneficiaries on Medicare, the M+C program, and specific health plans. However, the extent to which the program has motivated beneficiaries to actively weigh their health plan options is unknown. |
gao_GAO-07-875 | gao_GAO-07-875_0 | Field Visits at 23 Detention Facilities Showed Systemic Telephone Access Problems and Instances of Noncompliance with Other Standards
Our field observations at 23 alien detention facilities showed systemic telephone system problems at 16 of 17 facilities that use the pro bono telephone system, but no pattern of noncompliance for other standards we reviewed. These instances of noncompliance varied across facilities that we visited, and unlike the telephone system problems, did not appear to show a persistent pattern of noncompliance. Over this period, the rate of successful connections was never above 74 percent. ICE officials stated that approximately 200 facilities currently use the PCS pro bono telephone system. The standards we reviewed included medical care, hold rooms, use of force, food service, recreation, access to legal materials, and detainee grievance procedures. Specifically, ICE’s Detention Inspection Worksheet used by reviewers does not require that a reviewer check that detainees are able to make successful connections through the pro bono telephone system. The primary mechanism for detainees to file external complaints is directly with the OIG, either in writing or by phone using the OIG complaint hotline. Of the approximately 1,700 detainee complaints in the OIG database that were filed in fiscal years 2003 through 2006, OIG investigated 173 and referred the others to other DHS components as displayed in figure 11. Conclusions
While ICE annual inspection reviews of detention facilities noted various deficiencies in compliance with ICE’s standards, insufficient internal controls and weaknesses in ICE’s compliance review process resulted in ICE’s failure to identify telephone system problems that we found to be pervasive at most of the detention facilities we visited. ICE confirmed that the contractor did not comply with the terms and conditions of the contract and in June 2007 requested that the OIG review the extent of noncompliance with the terms and conditions of the contract. Recommendations for Executive Action
To ensure that detainees can make telephone calls to access legal services, report complaints, and obtain assistance from their respective consulates, as specified in ICE National Detention Standards and that all detainee complaints are reviewed and acted upon as necessary, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the Assistant Secretary for U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement to take the following actions: Amend the DRO compliance inspection process relating to the detainee telephone access standard to include: measures to ensure that facility and/or ICE staff frequently test to confirm that the ICE pro bono telephone system is functioning properly; revisions to ICE’s compliance review worksheet to require ICE reviewers, while conducting annual reviews of the telephone access standard at detention facilities, to test the detainee pro bono telephone system by attempting to connect calls and record any automated voice messages as to why the call is not being put through. | Why GAO Did This Study
The total number of aliens detained per year by the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) increased from about 95,000 in fiscal year 2001 to 283,000 in 2006. The care and treatment of these detained aliens is a significant challenge to ICE. GAO was asked to review ICE's implementation of its detention standards for aliens in its custody. GAO reviewed (1) detention facilities' compliance with ICE's detention standards, (2) ICE's compliance review process, and (3) how detainee complaints regarding conditions of confinement are handled. To conduct its work, GAO reviewed DHS documents, interviewed program officials, and visited 23 detention facilities of varying size, type, and geographic location.
What GAO Found
GAO's observations at 23 alien detention facilities showed systemic telephone system problems at 16 of 17 facilities that use the pro bono telephone system, but no pattern of noncompliance for other standards GAO reviewed. At facilities that use the ICE detainee pro bono telephone system, GAO encountered significant problems in making connections to consulates, pro bono legal providers, or the DHS Office of the Inspector General (OIG) complaint hotline. Monthly performance data provided by the phone system contractor indicates the rate of successful connections through the detainee pro bono telephone system was never above 74 percent. ICE officials stated there was little oversight of the telephone contract. In June 2007, ICE requested an OIG audit of the contract,stating that the contractor did not comply with the terms and conditions of the contract. Other instances of deficiencies GAO observed varied across facilities visited but did not appear to show a pattern of noncompliance. These deficiencies involved medical care, use of hold rooms, use of force, food service, recreational opportunities, access to legal materials, facility grievance procedures, and overcrowding. ICE annual compliance reviews of detention facilities identified deficiencies similar to those found by GAO. However, insufficient internal controls and weaknesses in ICE's compliance review process resulted in ICE's failure to identify telephone system problems at most facilities GAO visited. ICE's inspection worksheet used by its detention facility reviewers did not require that a reviewer confirm that detainees are able to make successful connections through the detainee pro bono telephone system. Detainee complaints may be filed with several governmental and nongovernmental organizations. Detainee complaints mostly involved legal access, conditions of confinement, property issues, human and civil rights, medical care, and employee misconduct at the facility. The primary way for detainees to file complaints is to contact the OIG. OIG investigates the most serious complaints and refers the remainder to other DHS components. |
gao_GAO-01-188 | gao_GAO-01-188_0 | The Division’s policies and procedures manual outlines the processes for investigating potential antitrust violations. Officials from the Division, FTC, and USDA said that their agencies maintain a cooperative working relationship with regard to anticompetitive matters in the agriculture industry. For example, 4 of the 165 complaints and leads the Division received during fiscal years 1997 through 1999 were referred to FTC. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope and Methodology
Our objectives were to (1) describe the Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division’s (Division) interaction with the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) with regard to antitrust matters in the agriculture industry, (2) provide information on the number of complaints and leads in the agriculture industry received by the Division for fiscal years 1997 through 1999, and (3) provide information on the number and type of closed matters in the agriculture industry for fiscal years 1997 through 1999. 1.) | Why GAO Did This Study
This report reviews the Department of Justice's Antitrust Division's overall policies and procedures for carrying out its statutory responsibilities, particularly as they apply to the agriculture industry. GAO describes (1) the Division's interaction with the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the Department of Agriculture (USDA) with regard to antitrust matters in the agriculture industry, (2) the number of complaints and leads in the agriculture industry received by the Division for fiscal years 1997 through 1999, and (3) the number and types of closed matters in the agriculture industry for fiscal years 1997 through 1999. GAO also describes the Division's policies for and procedures for investigating potential anti-trust violations.
What GAO Found
GAO found that the Division (1) maintains a cooperative working relationship with regard to anticompetitive matters in the agriculture industry with FTC and USDA, (2) received an estimated 165 complaints and leads related to the agriculture industry in fiscal years 1997 through 1999, (3) closed 1,050 matters during that period. |
gao_GAO-10-753T | gao_GAO-10-753T_0 | Extra Space in Courthouses Cost an Estimated $835 Million in Constant 2010 Dollars to Construct and $51 Million Annually to Rent, Operate, and Maintain
The 33 federal courthouses completed since 2000 include 3.56 million square feet of extra space—28 percent of the total 12.76 million square feet constructed. The extra square footage consists of space that was constructed above the congressionally authorized size, due to overestimating the number of judges the courthouses would have, and without planning for courtroom sharing among judges. Overall, this space represents about 9 average-sized courthouses. The estimated cost to construct this extra space, when adjusted to 2010 dollars, is $835 million, and the annual cost to rent, operate, and maintain it is $51 million (see fig. More specifically, the extra space and its causes are as follows: 1.7 million square feet caused by construction in excess of congressional 887,000 extra square feet caused by the judiciary overestimating the number of judges the courthouses would have in 10 years; and 946,000 extra square feet caused by district and magistrate judges not sharing courtrooms. Most Courthouses Exceed Congressionally Authorized Size Due to a Lack of Oversight by GSA
Most Courthouses Constructed Since 2000 Exceed Authorized Size, Some by Substantial Amounts
Twenty seven of the 33 federal courthouses constructed since 2000 exceed their congressionally authorized size, and 15 of the 33 courthouses exceed their congressionally authorized size by 10 percent or more. Twelve of the 15 courthouses that exceed the congressionally authorized gross square footage by 10 percent or more also had total project costs that exceeded the total project cost estimate provided to congressional authorizing committees. Overall, the judiciary has 119, or approximately 26 percent, fewer judges than the 461 it estimated it would have. For this report, we were not able to determine the degree to which inaccurate caseload projections contributed to inaccurate judge estimates because the judiciary did not retain the historic caseload projections used in planning the courthouses. Using the judiciary’s data, we designed a model for courtroom sharing that shows that judges could share courtrooms at a high enough level to reduce the number of courtrooms needed in 27 of the 33 district courthouses built since 2000 by a total of 126 courtrooms—about 40 percent of the total number of district and magistrate courtrooms constructed since 2000. While some judges remained skeptical that courtroom sharing among district judges could work on a permanent basis, judges with experience in sharing courtrooms said that they overcame the challenges when necessary and trials were never postponed because of sharing. Our model’s application of the judiciary’s data shows that more sharing opportunities are available. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
For the 33 federal courthouses completed since 2000, we examined (1) whether the courthouses contain extra space and any costs related to it, (2) how the actual size of the courthouses compares with the congressionally authorized size, (3) how courthouse space based on the judiciary’s 10-year estimates of judges compares with the actual number of judges; and (4) whether the level of courtroom sharing supported by data from the judiciary’s 2008 study of district courtroom sharing could have changed the amount of space needed in these courthouses. Additionally, we used district courtroom scheduling and use data to model courtroom sharing scenarios. | Why GAO Did This Study
The federal judiciary and the General Services Administration (GSA) are in the midst of a multibillion-dollar courthouse construction initiative, which began in the early 1990s and has since faced rising construction costs. As requested, for 33 federal courthouses completed since 2000, GAO examined (1) whether they contain extra space and any costs related to it, (2) how their actual size compares with the congressionally authorized size, (3) how their space based on the judiciary's 10-year estimates of judges compares with the actual number of judges, and (4) whether the level of courtroom sharing supported by the judiciary's data could have changed the amount of space needed in these courthouses. GAO analyzed courthouse planning and use data, visited courthouses, modeled courtroom sharing scenarios, and interviewed judges, GSA officials, and other experts. The findings in this testimony are preliminary because the federal judiciary and GSA are still in the process of commenting on GAO's draft report and did not provide comments on this testimony.
What GAO Found
The 33 federal courthouses completed since 2000 include 3.56 million square feet of extra space--28 percent of the total 12.76 million square feet constructed. The extra square footage consists of space that was constructed (1) above the congressionally authorized size, (2) due to overestimating the number of judges the courthouses would have, and (3) without planning for courtroom sharing among judges. Overall, this space represents about 9 average-sized courthouses. The estimated cost to construct this extra space, when adjusted to 2010 dollars, is $835 million, and the annual cost to rent, operate and maintain it is $51 million. Twenty seven of the 33 courthouses completed since 2000 exceed their congressionally authorized size by a total of 1.7 million square feet. Fifteen exceed their congressionally authorized size by more than 10 percent, and 12 of these 15 also had total project costs that exceeded the estimates provided to congressional committees--8 by less than 10 percent and 4 by 10 to 21 percent. There is no requirement to notify congressional committees about size overages, as is required for cost overages of more than 10 percent. A lack of oversight by GSA, including a lack of focus on not exceeding the congressionally authorized size, contributed to these size overages. The judiciary overestimated the number of judges that would be located in 23 of 28 courthouses whose space planning occurred at least 10 years ago, causing them to be larger and costlier than necessary. Overall, the judiciary has 119, or approximately 26 percent, fewer judges than the 461 it estimated it would have. This leaves the 23 courthouses with extra courtrooms and chamber suites that, together, total approximately 887,000 square feet. A variety of factors contributed to the judiciary's overestimates, including inaccurate caseload projections and long-standing difficulties in obtaining new authorizations. However, the degree to which inaccurate caseload projections contributed to inaccurate judge estimates cannot be measured because the judiciary did not retain the historic caseload projections used in planning the courthouses. Using the judiciary's data, GAO designed a model for courtroom sharing, which shows that there is enough unscheduled time for substantial courtroom sharing. Sharing could have reduced the number of courtrooms needed in courthouses built since 2000 by 126 courtrooms--about 40 percent of the total number--covering about 946,000 square feet. Some judges GAO consulted raised potential challenges to courtroom sharing, such as uncertainty about courtroom availability, but others indicated they overcame those challenges when necessary, and no trials were postponed. The judiciary has adopted policies for future sharing for senior and magistrate judges, but GAO's analysis shows that additional sharing opportunities are available. For example, GAO's courtroom sharing model shows that there is sufficient unscheduled time for 3 district judges to share 2 courtrooms and 3 senior judges to share 1 courtroom. |
gao_T-NSIAD-96-85 | gao_T-NSIAD-96-85_0 | These records indicated that, as previously disclosed by the White House, staff members flew in military helicopters 14 times without the President, Vice President, First Lady, wife of the Vice President, or Heads of State during this period. Our work did not identify any additional White House staff flights. The automated data we obtained covered 6,120 flights of HMX-1 aircraft from January 21, 1993, to May 24, 1994. Travel by Senior Officials on Government Aircraft
Approximately 500 fixed-wing airplanes and 100 helicopters are used for DOD’s OSA mission, which includes transporting senior-level officials in support of command, installation, or management functions. April 1995 Osa Inventory Is 10 Times Greater Than Number of OSA Aircraft Used in the Persian Gulf War
DOD’s policy states that the OSA inventory of fixed-wing aircraft should be based solely on wartime requirements. Plans are also underway to assign to the Joint Chiefs of Staff responsibility for determining DOD’s annual OSA requirements. The new policy (1) requires the services to use the smallest and most cost-effective mission-capable aircraft available; (2) requires the Secretary of Defense’s or the military department secretary’s approval for use of military aircraft by required use officials for permanent change-of-station moves;(3) prohibits the scheduling of training flights strictly to accommodate senior-level officials’ travel; (4) allows the military department secretaries to further restrict the required use designation for four-star officers in their respective departments; and (5) limits the use of helicopters for senior-level officials’ travel. For both the Air Force and the Army, the most frequently traveled helicopter route was between Andrews Air Force Base and the Pentagon, a distance of about 15 miles. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed the use of military helicopters and other government aircraft to transport White House staff and senior-level military and civilian officials.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) White House staff members had flown in military helicopters 14 times from January 21, 1993 to May 24, 1994 without the accompaniment of the President, Vice President, First Lady, Vice-President's wife, or Heads of State; (2) Department of Defense (DOD) policy states that the military services' operational support airlift (OSA) inventory of fixed-wing aircraft should be based strictly on wartime requirements, but DOD has not provided guidance on how the services should count their OSA aircraft or determine their wartime requirements; (3) the April 1995 OSA inventory of 520 fixed wing aircraft exceeds the Air Force's wartime requirements; (4) the military helicopters located in the Washington, D.C. area are not justified based on OSA wartime requirements; (5) the most frequent flight for DOD senior officials is to or from Andrews Air Force Base, MD; (6) in response to GAO recommendations, the Joint Chiefs of Staff has recommended a reduction in the number of OSA aircraft and DOD has strengthened the policy governing the use of OSA aircraft by senior-level travelers; and (7) only 19 of 1,500 aircraft operated by civilian agencies are used to routinely transport senior-level officials. |
gao_RCED-98-49 | gao_RCED-98-49_0 | Lenders Made Few Conventional Home Purchase Loans to Native Americans on Trust Lands
Few Native Americans have purchased homes on trust lands by using private, conventional financing. The most significant barriers are that lenders (1) are uncertain about whether they can foreclose on Native American trust lands to recover their loan funds; (2) have difficulty understanding the implications of the different types of land ownership because of the complex status of Native American trust lands; (3) are unfamiliar with the tribal courts in which litigation is conducted in the event of a foreclosure; and (4) are concerned about the absence of housing ordinances governing foreclosures in tribal communities. We found that the lenders that made the 91 conventional home purchase loans to Native Americans on trust lands during the 5-year period of calendar years 1992 through 1996 did so by creating special programs or using long-standing relationships with tribes and their members to facilitate lending. The special programs emphasized homeownership counseling and the negotiation of housing ordinances. In addition, some public and private organizations are developing initiatives that could simplify and may have some potential to increase conventional home purchase lending to Native Americans on trust lands. Other Lending Initiatives for Native Americans on Trust Lands
The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) and the Federal Home Loan Bank (FHLBank) System have efforts under way to address the broader issue of Native Americans’ access to financing and capital. New Law’s Effect on Conventional Home Purchase Lending on Trust Lands Is Uncertain
The extent to which the Native American Housing Assistance and Self-Determination Act of 1996 (NAHASDA) will increase conventional home purchase lending for Native Americans on trust lands is uncertain. The act contains provisions that allow tribes to leverage grant funds and to extend land lease terms from 25 to 50 years. However, whether tribes can or will use leveraged funds to encourage conventional home purchase lending on trust lands is uncertain, and many tribes’ land lease terms already exceeded 25 years. Private mortgage lenders, as they become knowledgeable of the process of making home purchase loans on trust lands, may increase the number of such loans. Conventional home purchase loans are made by private lenders without federal assistance, such as federal loan guarantees or insurance. We also visited and interviewed members of the Navajo Tribe and the Oneida Tribe of Indians of Wisconsin and lenders that made conventional home purchase loans on Native American trust lands. Despite a large backlog of requests for title documents, BIA’s certification process for trust lands has not been a deterrent to conventional home purchase lending. Additional Barriers Impede Lenders From Making Conventional Home Purchase Loans to Native Americans on Trust Lands
In addition to the barriers discussed in the body of this report, two other barriers have made it difficult to attract private financing for Native Americans to buy homes on trust lands: (1) the low socioeconomic status of many Native Americans on trust lands and (2) the remoteness of the Native American trust lands. To learn whether implementing the Native American Housing Assistance and Self-Determination Act of 1996 will result in more conventional home purchase loans being made to Native Americans on trust lands, we reviewed the act; reviewed literature on the act; and interviewed representatives of HUD, lending organizations, and tribal organizations to gain their perspectives on the law. Washington, D.C.: May 1996. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the homeownership opportunities for Native Americans on trust lands through private, conventional lending, focusing on: (1) the number of conventional home purchase loans private lenders made to Native Americans on trust lands; (2) the major barriers to conventional home purchase lending to Native Americans on trust lands; (3) efforts to facilitate conventional home purchase lending to Native Americans on trust lands; (4) whether the implementation of the Native American Housing Assistance and Self-Determination Act of 1996 will result in more conventional home purchase loans being made to Native Americans on trust lands; and (5) whether the backlog at the Bureau of Indian Affairs of requests for certifying documents affecting the legal status of the trust lands has been a deterrent to conventional home purchase lending to Native Americans.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) few Native Americans have purchased homes on trust lands by using private, conventional financing; (2) during the 5-year period of calendar year 1992 through 1996, lenders made only 91 conventional home purchase loans to Native Americans on trust lands; (3) moreover, of the 91 such loans GAO identified, 80 were made to the members of two tribes--the Tulalips of Marysville, Washington, and the Oneida Tribe of Indians of Wisconsin; (4) making conventional home purchase loans on Native American trust lands involves overcoming long-standing barriers; (5) the most significant barriers are that lenders: (a) are uncertain about whether they can foreclose on Native American trust lands to recover their loan funds; (b) have difficulty understanding the implications of the different types of land ownership because of the complex status of Native American trust lands; (c) are unfamilar with the tribal courts in which litigation is conducted in the event of a foreclosure; and (d) are concerned about the absence of housing ordinances governing foreclosure in tribal communities; (6) some mortgage lenders, as well as public and private organizations, have initiated efforts to increase Native Americans' opportunities to finance homes on trust lands with conventional home purchase loans; (7) to make the 91 loans GAO identified, lenders created special programs emphasizing the development of housing ordinances and homeownership counseling services or used long-standing relationships with tribes and tribe members; (8) other broader public and private efforts begun recently, such as the Federal National Mortgage Association's lending initiatives for Native Americans, may have some potential for increasing the number of conventional home purchase loans on trust lands; (9) other efforts by the Federal Home Loan Bank System and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency may have some potential for improving Native Americans' overall access to financing and capital, which may, among other things, encourage more conventional home purchase loans on trust lands; (10) the extent to which the Native American Housing Assistance and Self-Determination Act of 1996 will increase conventional home purchase lending for Native Americans on trust lands is uncertain; (11) this act, which became effective on October 1, 1997, contains provisions that allow tribes to leverage housing block grant funds and extend land lease terms from 25 to 50 years; and (12) however, whether tribes can or will use leveraged funds to encourage conventional home purchase lending is uncertain, and many tribes' land lease terms have already exceeded 25 years. |
gao_NSIAD-95-23 | gao_NSIAD-95-23_0 | According to DOD IG officials, servicemembers who report alleged reprisal for whistleblowing activities to the DOD IG have the following benefits that servicemembers who report to a service or local IG do not:
The reprisal complaint is handled through a formal statutory process. 1034 because the military services had not issued implementing regulations. Whistleblowers Can Challenge Reprisals That Occurred Before the Whistleblower Act
The BCMR system provides a mechanism for servicemembers to challenge reprisals that occurred before 10 U.S.C. 1034 was enacted in 1988. Although servicemembers are required to request corrections to their records within 3 years after they discover reprisals, the Boards are authorized to waive the time limit if the case has merit. 1034 and section 546, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense revise DOD Directive 7050.6 to require that (1) the military service and local IGs refer allegations of reprisal against whistleblowers to the DOD IG if an initial screening indicates that an allegation may have substantial merit and (2) the DOD IG use the same procedures for referred cases of reprisal allegations as it uses for cases it investigates or delegates for investigation and approve all resulting reports; direct the service secretaries to expeditiously develop and implement regulations establishing clear and specific procedures related to whistleblower reprisals, including mental health evaluations, as required by DOD directives; instruct the service secretaries and the DOD IG to develop strategies to ensure that servicemembers are informed of their rights, the extent of protection afforded, and the proper filing procedures relating to reprisal allegations for whistleblowing; and instruct the BCMRs to establish a code and/or a subcode within the BCMRs’ index system for identifying cases and decisions involving whistleblower reprisal and involuntary mental health referrals and evaluations, as administratively required. 2. 3. 4. Comments From the Department of Defense
The first copy of each GAO report and testimony is free. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the reprisal protection given to military whistleblowers, focusing on whether: (1) the system provides effective means for the investigation and disposition of alleged whistleblower reprisals; and (2) service members have a mechanism to challenge alleged reprisals that occurred before enactment of the whistleblower act.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) only those whistleblowers who report alleged reprisals to the Department of Defense (DOD) Inspector General (IG) are protected under the act; (2) service members who report alleged reprisals to a service or local IG are not fully protected; (3) few service members have reported the use of mental health evaluations as reprisals for whistleblowing; (4) the services have not issued required regulations to ensure that whistleblowers are protected from reprisal; (5) the services have not adequately informed service members of the proper procedures for filing allegations of reprisals, particularly to DOD IG; and (6) a service member who was subject to reprisal prior to the whistleblower act can seek relief from the Board for the Correction of Military Records (BCMR) if the request is made within 3 years after the member discovers the error or the Board determines that the case has merit. |
gao_GAO-08-598 | gao_GAO-08-598_0 | NRC Has Implemented Three of the Six Recommendations from GAO’s 2003 Report
Since 2003, NRC has worked with agreement states and others to identify the radioactive materials that pose the greatest risk of being used to make an RDD, established additional security measures for these materials, and taken steps to ensure the increased security measures are effectively implemented. However, NRC has not successfully corrected the weaknesses in its radioactive materials licensing processes. Finally, NRC has not yet decided whether certain radioactive sources need stronger licensing requirements. 1). According to NRC, all increased controls were to be fully implemented by June 2006. Weaknesses Persist in NRC’s Materials Licensing Process
To increase the security of radioactive materials and sealed sources and better ensure that they are used as intended, we recommended in 2003 that NRC modify its process for issuing specific licenses to ensure that such sources cannot be purchased before NRC has verified, through inspection or other means, that the materials and sources will be used as intended. NRC Has Taken No Significant Actions to Mitigate the Potential Psychological Effects of an RDD
In addition to recommending that NRC work with agreement states and others to identify and better secure the radioactive sources that pose the greatest risk of being used to make an RDD, we also recommended that NRC determine how to effectively mitigate the potential psychological effects of malicious use of radioactive materials. NRC Has Improved Its Ability to Monitor and Track Radioactive Sealed Sources, but New Systems Have Been Delayed
NRC has developed an interim database that can monitor and track the more dangerous, category 1 and 2 radioactive sealed sources. In its technical comments on a draft of this report, NRC told us that it is developing a third system—a license verification system—which, once operational, will draw on the information in NSTS and the Web-based licensing system which will provide regulators and vendors of radioactive sources with an easily accessible ability to verify that those seeking to purchase nationally tracked sources are licensed to do so. Moreover, the Web- based licensing system may not initially include any information on radioactive materials licenses issued by agreement states—which represent over 80 percent of all U.S. licenses for these materials. The delays in the development of both the NSTS and the Web-based licensing system are especially consequential because NRC officials, both commissioners and staff, have identified the deployment of these systems as key to improving the control and accountability of radioactive materials in the United States. More specifically, in NRC’s September 2007 public hearing addressing the weaknesses that we uncovered in NRC’s materials licensing program, the commissioners said that an expanded NSTS including category 3 and perhaps the largest category 4 sources, a Web- based licensing system including agreement state data, and some means for making relevant information in both of these systems available to vendors and officials at ports of entry, would be a secure and effective means of verifying that those seeking to obtain radioactive materials, or enter the United States with licensable quantities of radioactive materials or sources, were doing so for legitimate purposes. However, some equipment that is used to protect CBP officers is in short supply. Some Radiation Detection Equipment Is in Short Supply
Finally, we found that personal radiation detectors—an important component of the suite of radiation detection equipment at the borders— are in short supply. This updated guidance, however, was not effectively communicated to officers at the border. The recent decision to develop a third new system has added to these concerns. While CBP has a comprehensive system in place to detect radiation at ports of entry on the northern and southern borders, CBP’s task of preventing the smuggling of radioactive materials is made more difficult by the fact that guidance on when officers should verify whether radioactive materials being brought into the United States are legitimately licensed has not been effectively communicated. Finally, to improve the likelihood of preventing radioactive sources and materials from being smuggled into the United States, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the Commissioner of Customs and Border Protection to effectively communicate current Customs and Border Protection guidance to officers at ports of entry regarding when they are required to contact the National Targeting Center to verify that radioactive materials are legitimately licensed, and take measures to ensure that this guidance is being followed. Even very small amounts of radioactive material are sufficient to set off the radiation detectors of first responders. | Why GAO Did This Study
Concerns have grown that terrorists could use radioactive materials and sealed sources (materials sealed in a capsule) to build a "dirty bomb"-- a device using conventional explosives to disperse radioactive material. In 2003, GAO found weaknesses in the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC) radioactive materials licensing process and made recommendations for improvement. For this report, GAO assesses (1) the progress NRC has made in implementing the 2003 recommendations, (2) other steps NRC has taken to improve its ability to track radioactive materials, (3) Customs and Border Protection's (CBP) ability to detect radioactive materials at land ports of entry, and (4) CBP's ability to verify that such materials are appropriately licensed prior to entering the United States. To perform this work, GAO assessed documents and interviewed NRC and CBP officials in headquarters and in several field locations.
What GAO Found
NRC has implemented three of the six recommendations in GAO's 2003 report on the security of radioactive sources. It has worked with the 35 states to which it ceded primary authority to regulate radioactive materials and sources and others to (1) identify sealed sources of greatest concern, (2) enhance requirements to secure radioactive sources, and (3) ensure security requirements are implemented. In contrast, NRC has made limited progress toward implementing recommendations to (1) modify its process for issuing licenses to ensure that radioactive materials cannot be purchased by those with no legitimate need for them, (2) determine how to effectively mitigate the potential psychological effects of malicious use of such materials, and (3) examine whether certain radioactive sources should be subject to more stringent regulations. Beyond acting on GAO's recommendations, NRC has also taken four steps to improve its ability to monitor and track radioactive materials. First, NRC created an interim national database to monitor the licensed sealed sources containing materials that pose the greatest risk of being used in a dirty bomb. Second, NRC is developing a National Source Tracking System to replace the interim database and provide more comprehensive, frequently updated information on potentially dangerous sources. However, this system has been delayed by 18 months and is not expected to be fully operational until January 2009. Third, NRC is also developing a Web-based licensing system that will include more comprehensive information on all sources and materials that require NRC or state approval to possess. Finally, NRC is developing a license verification system that will draw information from the other new systems to enable officials and vendors to verify that those seeking to bring these radioactive materials into the country or purchase them are licensed to do so. However, these systems are more than 3 years behind schedule and may not include the licensing information, initially at least, on radioactive materials regulated by agreement states--which represent over 80 percent of all U.S. licenses for such materials. The delays in the deployment and full development of these systems are especially consequential because NRC has identified their deployment as key to improving the control and accountability of radioactive materials. While CBP has a comprehensive system in place to detect radioactive materials entering the United States at land borders, some equipment that is used to protect CBP officers is in short supply. Specifically, vehicles, cargo, and people entering the United States at most ports of entry along the Canadian and Mexican borders are scanned for radioactive materials with radiation detection equipment capable of detecting very small amounts of radiation. However we found that personal radiation detectors are not available to all officers who need them. Moreover, while CBP has systems in place to verify the legitimacy of radioactive materials licenses, it has not effectively communicated to officers at the borders when they must contact officials to verify the license for a given sealed source. Consequently, some CPB officers are not following current guidance, and some potentially dangerous radioactive materials have entered the country without license verification. |
gao_GAO-17-550 | gao_GAO-17-550_0 | Among Other Trends, the Percentage of Obligations to Small Businesses in Puerto Rico Was Relatively High, and Use of SBA Programs Varied
Our analysis of federal prime contracting data identified a number of trends in federal contracting obligations to small businesses in Puerto Rico from fiscal years 2006 through 2016. Additionally, we found that a greater percentage of obligations was awarded to small businesses in Puerto Rico through full and open competition and the 8(a) program compared to the other three SBA socioeconomic contracting programs. Small Businesses in Puerto Rico Received a Relatively High Percentage of Federal Prime Contracting Obligations
The percentage of federal prime contracting obligations awarded to small businesses within Puerto Rico for contracts performed there was relatively high from fiscal years 2006 through 2016, particularly in the last 4 fiscal years. In fiscal year 2016, small businesses in Puerto Rico received about 47 percent of federal prime contracting obligations (about $319 million out of $682 million) for work performed there. Stakeholders Believe That Small Business Challenges in Puerto Rico May Be Exacerbated by Geography and Economic Conditions
Stakeholders we spoke with identified a number of challenges that small businesses in Puerto Rico may face in obtaining federal contracting opportunities. These challenges included increased use of contract bundling or consolidation, difficulty in meeting contract procurement requirements, and lack of knowledge about the federal procurement process. None of the stakeholders we interviewed identified federal laws that have created unique challenges for small businesses in Puerto Rico in obtaining federal contracting. SBA has conducted various small business outreach activities in Puerto Rico, including training and seminars, to promote participation in its small business contracting programs. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report examines (1) trends in small business contracting and the use of Small Business Administration (SBA) programs that provided federal contracting preferences to small businesses in Puerto Rico from fiscal years 2006 through 2016, and (2) stakeholder views on any challenges small businesses in Puerto Rico face in obtaining federal contracting opportunities, including those posed by federal laws, and steps SBA and other agencies have taken to assist Puerto Rican small businesses in obtaining federal contracting opportunities. We used the nationwide data as a reference point for our analysis of small business federal contracting trends in Puerto Rico. Those programs are 8(a) Business Development (8(a)), Historically Underutilized Business Zones (HUBZone), Women-Owned Small Business (WOSB), and Service- Disabled Veteran-Owned Small Business (SDVOSB). To identify stakeholder views on any challenges small businesses in Puerto Rico face in obtaining federal contracting opportunities, including those posed by federal laws, and steps SBA and other agencies have taken to assist Puerto Rican small businesses in obtaining federal contracting opportunities, we interviewed SBA officials and other stakeholders, such as federal agency contracting officials, industry associations, and economic development entities in Puerto Rico. We also conducted a literature review of trade articles, academic articles, testimonies, and GAO and SBA reports to identify challenges cited for the 8(a), HUBZone, WOSB, and SDVOSB programs and challenges faced by small businesses in federal contracting in Puerto Rico. The keywords used included “SBA,” “Puerto Rico,” and “contracting,” and the names of the four SBA programs we reviewed in this report. | Why GAO Did This Study
SBA administers several programs nationwide and in Puerto Rico that provide federal contracting preferences to small businesses. The Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act includes a provision for GAO to review the application and utilization of SBA programs in Puerto Rico.
GAO examined, among other things, (1) trends in small business contracting and the use of SBA programs in Puerto Rico that provide contracting preferences to small businesses and (2) stakeholder views on any challenges that small businesses in Puerto Rico face in obtaining federal contracting opportunities.
To analyze trends in the use of SBA programs, GAO obtained data on prime contracts for Puerto Rico for fiscal years 2006 through 2016 and used nationwide data as a reference point. GAO interviewed stakeholders such as federal agency contracting officials, industry associations in Puerto Rico, and economic development entities about any challenges small businesses in Puerto Rico face in obtaining federal contracts and steps SBA has taken to promote participation in its programs. Additionally, GAO conducted a literature review to identify challenges cited for the 8(a), HUBZone, WOSB, and SDVOSB programs and challenges faced by small businesses in federal contracting in Puerto Rico.
GAO makes no recommendations in this report.
What GAO Found
From fiscal years 2006 through 2016, a higher percentage of federal contracting obligations was awarded to small businesses within Puerto Rico for contracts performed there compared to the percentage for small businesses nationwide, particularly in the last 4 fiscal years of the period (see fig.). In fiscal year 2016, small businesses in Puerto Rico received about 47 percent of federal contracting obligations to Puerto Rico (about $319 million out of $682 million) compared to 23 percent of federal obligations awarded to small businesses nationwide. Of the four Small Business Administration (SBA) programs that provide contracting preferences based on socioeconomic designations, a higher percentage of obligations was awarded in Puerto Rico through the 8(a) Business Development program compared to the Historically Underutilized Business Zone (HUBZone), Women-Owned Small Business (WOSB), and Service-Disabled Veteran-Owned Small Business (SDVOSB) programs. The use of 8(a) contract awards in Puerto Rico was somewhat higher than nationwide, while the use of the other three SBA programs was roughly comparable.
Agencies and industry associations GAO interviewed identified several challenges small businesses in Puerto Rico may face in obtaining federal contracting opportunities. Challenges they identified included a lack of knowledge about the federal contracting process; difficulty meeting procurement requirements; and difficulty accessing bonding, financing, and capital. Many of these challenges are similar to those GAO identified in a September 2012 report (GAO-12-873) that small businesses in general face in seeking federal contracting opportunities. However, stakeholders indicated that some challenges may be exacerbated by Puerto Rico's geography and economic conditions. Stakeholders did not identify any federal laws that have created unique contracting challenges for small businesses in the region. SBA and the three other federal agencies GAO contacted identified examples of conducting outreach, providing training and seminars, coordinating with local organizations, and other efforts intended to help Puerto Rican small businesses obtain federal contracting opportunities. |
gao_GAO-03-278 | gao_GAO-03-278_0 | Background
The National Airlift Policy, issued in June 1987, reinforced the need for and use of the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) program, established in 1951. CRAF Participants Can Respond as Required
More aircraft are committed to the CRAF program than are needed to fulfill the wartime requirements established by the Mobility Requirements Study 2005 (MRS-05). Officials from CRAF air carrier participants that we visited confirmed that they would be able to provide the agreed levels of airlift capacity within the necessary time frames and that the turmoil in the airline industry after the attacks of September 11, 2001, would not affect their ability to do so. Over 94 percent, or 892, of 946 wide-body missions flown by CRAF participants in the first 10 months of fiscal year 2002 were carried out by B-747s, which accounted for only 38 percent of wide-body cargo aircraft committed to the CRAF program. We obtained mission data and found that almost half of the 892 CRAF missions flown on B-747s in the first 10 months of fiscal year 2002 did not use all available space or weight capacities. Over 40 percent of these recent missions flown by B-747s did not utilize all the available pallet positions and carried less than 55.7 tons. Conclusions
The upcoming reevaluation of mobility requirements may increase the need for CRAF in the future. However, the last study did not consider some factors—such as the ability of commercial aircraft to carry different sized cargo—that, if included, could provide more accurate and realistic requirements. There are strong indications that some major program participants are dissatisfied with their share of a key CRAF incentive, the opportunity to bid on peacetime mobility business, because DOD uses almost exclusively only one type of aircraft for peacetime cargo missions. This could cause difficulties in meeting requirements at a time when participation in peacetime business or CRAF activation is crucial. Recommendations for Executive Action
We recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct that the reevaluation of mobility requirements mandated by the Defense Planning Guidance include a more thorough study of CRAF capabilities, to include the types of cargo CRAF can carry and how much CRAF aircraft can land and be unloaded and serviced at military bases, and the Air Mobility Command determine whether smaller wide-body aircraft could be used as efficiently and effectively as the larger B-747-type planes to handle the peacetime cargo business that DOD uses as an incentive for CRAF participants. We obtained and reviewed data from and interviewed officials at the U.S. Transportation Command, U.S. Air Mobility Command, Office of the Secretary of Defense, and representatives of six CRAF participants, which represent about 38 percent of the total CRAF aircraft commitment, to conclude whether the participants could respond to an activation with the required number of aircraft and crews and in the required time frame. We also interviewed representatives of six CRAF participants, representing both passenger and cargo air carriers, to determine whether the incentives used to attract and retain program participants are effective. | Why GAO Did This Study
In the event of a national emergency, the Department of Defense (DOD) can use commercial aircraft drawn from the Civil Reserve Air Fleet to augment its own airlift capabilities. The Civil Reserve Air Fleet is a fleet of aircraft owned by U.S. commercial air carriers but committed voluntarily to DOD for use during emergencies. After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, many air carriers experienced financial difficulties. This sparked concern about the fleet's ability to respond, if activated, and prompted the Subcommittee to ask GAO to determine whether the fleet could respond to an activation with the required number of aircraft and crews and in the required time frame. The Subcommittee also wanted to know whether the incentives used to attract and retain participants are effective.
What GAO Found
Civil Reserve Air Fleet participants can respond to an emergency or a war with the required number of aircraft and crews and within the required time frame. Currently, there are more aircraft committed to the fleet than are needed to fill the wartime requirements identified in the DOD Mobility Requirements Study 2005, which determined the requirements to fight and win two major theater wars. However, Civil Reserve Air Fleet requirements may increase the next time mobility requirements are studied. The last mobility requirements study was limited in that it did not consider the use of excess Civil Reserve Air Fleet capacity and the ability of some commercial aircraft to carry larger cargo than standard-sized pallets. The incentives currently in place to encourage participation in the program, especially the incentive to participate in DOD's peacetime business, might be losing effectiveness and could become disincentives in the future. Some participants are not able to bid on peacetime cargo business because their fleets do not include B- 747s, the predominant aircraft DOD uses for peacetime cargo missions. GAO found that B-747s carried out 94 percent of 946 missions flown by commercial aircraft in the first 10 months of fiscal year 2002. Furthermore, over 40 percent of recent missions did not use all available space or weight limits aboard B-747s. These missions might have been carried out less expensively with smaller wide-body aircraft. Using smaller aircraft would provide more peacetime business to a greater share of program participants, thus enhancing current incentives. However, the Air Force does not have sufficient management information to identify options for selecting the best available aircraft type for the mission. |
gao_GAO-02-347T | gao_GAO-02-347T_0 | ACF, CMS, and FNS review these submissions and make funding decisions on the basis of their review, which they are generally required to complete within 60 days. Because the federal response to a state request may be to ask for additional information, a thorough assessment of the state’s concerns about timeliness requires reliable data that track a request from the time the federal agency first receives it until the agency finally approves or disapproves it. However, this information is not readily available because (1) the system used by ACF and CMS headquarters to manage the approval process does not track the life cycle of a request and (2) FNS and CMS regional offices do not have a central tracking system (although some of these regional offices used automated spreadsheets to track the status of state requests). Agency Responses to State Cost Allocation Plans for IT Projects Are Sometimes Inconsistent
While federal officials from the departments of Agriculture and HHS stated that they ensure the consistency of cost allocation requirements for IT projects by coordinating their reviews, we identified instances of inconsistent federal actions. These plans are used to identify, measure, and allocate expected project costs between the state and the federal program(s). OMB Circular A-87 provides the states wide latitude in developing a cost allocation plan. State cost allocation plans for systems development and acquisition projects must be approved by each federal agency expected to provide funding. In summary, Mr. Chairman, the federal approval and funding process in which states are required to submit various planning and acquisition documents for federal agency approval is largely governed by regulation. The Administration for Children and Families (ACF) provides funding to states and local governments to run this program. Appendix II: Scope and Methodology
To determine the statutory and regulatory requirements for federal approval and funding of state information technology (IT) development and acquisition projects for the Child Support Enforcement, Child Welfare, Medicaid, and Food Stamps programs, we reviewed applicable provisions of the U.S. Code and Code of Federal Regulations. | Why GAO Did This Study
This testimony discusses federal agency processes for approval of state information technology (IT) projects supporting state-administered federal human services programs.
What GAO Found
Federal approval and funding processes for state IT development and acquisition projects for the Child Support Enforcement, Child Welfare, and Food Stamps programs require the establishment of federal funding participation rates, the documentation that states must submit, and the time frames in which the federal agency must respond to the request. Assessment of the federal approval and funding process requires complete and reliable data that track a request from agency receipt until the agency finally approves or disapproves the request. However, such information is not readily available and the process cannot be thoroughly assessed because (1) the system used by the Administration for Children and Families (ACF) and The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) headquarters to manage the approval process does not track the life cycle of a request and (2) the Department of Agriculture's Food and Nutrition Services (FNS) and CMS regional offices do not have a central tracking system. However, in a vast majority of cases, agencies responded to states' IT planning and acquisition requests within 60 days, as required by regulation. State cost allocation plans--which are used to identify, measure, and allocate expected project costs among the state and the federal programs--for systems development and acquisition projects must be approved by each federal agency expected to provide funding. To ensure that they provide a consistent response to state requests that include cost allocation plans, ACF, CMS, and FNS officials stated that they coordinate their reviews of multiprogram requests. These reviews are based on the requirements in OMB Circular A-87, which provides the states wide latitude in developing cost allocation plans for IT development and acquisition projects. |
gao_GAO-05-81 | gao_GAO-05-81_0 | In assuming the responsibility for immigration enforcement and services, DHS inherits many of these management challenges. Overall, most field officials we contacted who responded to this question in CBP, CIS, and ICE characterized communication and coordination among their programs as good or excellent. Many SAC officials with whom we spoke also noted that several important steps to fully integrate former INS and Customs investigators remain to be taken. Lack of Uniform Policies and Procedures for Some Operations Reportedly Causes Confusion and Hinders the Creation of a New Culture
Some officials told us that ICE has been slow to establish uniform operational policies and procedures, causing confusion and some delay in the creation of a new unified ICE culture. Additionally, officials in all three agencies cited problems with administrative computer systems for travel, budget, and payroll— administrative functions that are handled by the individual bureaus and are not a part of shared services. Some officials we contacted in CBP, CIS, and ICE said they had to use mission staff in this way because they did not have enough administrative support to compensate for the realignment of administrative staff to shared services, the addition of mission personnel that have come as a result of mergers of some programs in the transition, and hiring freezes. In this regard, we and others have studied the experiences of other public and private organizations that have undergone successful mergers and transformations. Establish a Communication Strategy to Create Shared Expectations and Report Related Progress
Creating an effective, ongoing communication strategy is essential to implementing a merger or transformation. To accomplish this, DHS’s three immigration bureaus are tasked with establishing clear communication and coordination among one another and with the efficient and effective integration of the roles and responsibilities of the former immigration and customs investigative workforces, all while implementing a new system for providing administrative services. The sentiment among the field officials within CBP, CIS, and ICE we contacted demonstrates the importance of them having additional explanation and guidance from DHS and the headquarters management of each of the respective bureaus that delineates the (1) specific roles and responsibilities for conducting uniform immigration program operations, such as benefit fraud investigations, parole decisions, and controlled deliveries and (2) processes and procedures for making the shared services system work more efficiently. 477(d)(1)—mandated us to review the transfer of functions from the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and identify issues associated with the transition. Our overall objectives were to assess the status of (1) communication and coordination among immigration programs in DHS field offices, (2) integration of immigration and customs investigators in U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) field offices, and (3) administrative services and systems used by DHS’s immigration agencies’ field offices. Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS) and ICE transition documents; DHS, CIS, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), and ICE memos on communicating and coordinating; DHS shared services implementation plans; our past reports; and other relevant documents. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) assumed responsibility for the immigration enforcement and services programs of the former Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) in 2003. The three DHS bureaus with primary responsibility for immigration functions are U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS), and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). This transfer creates a great opportunity for DHS to address long-standing management and operational problems within INS. The Homeland Security Act requires GAO to review the transfer of immigration functions to DHS. In response, this report assesses the status of (1) communication and coordination of roles and responsibilities, (2) integration of immigration and customs investigators in ICE, and (3) administrative services and systems in CBP, CIS, and ICE.
What GAO Found
Most of the field officials with whom GAO spoke generally characterized communication and coordination with other DHS immigration programs in their geographic area as good or excellent. Other officials noted, that in some areas related to investigative techniques and other operations, unresolved issues regarding the roles and responsibilities of CBP, CIS, and ICE give rise to disagreements and confusion, with the potential for serious consequences. According to headquarters and field officials, some guidance has been made available to the field, and there are plans to provide more. Most ICE field officials GAO contacted said they have taken initial steps toward integrating the former immigration and customs investigators, such as establishing cross-training and pay parity. Most of these officials said, however, that additional important steps remained to be completed to fully integrate investigators. They reported that the lack of uniform policies and procedures for some ICE operations has caused confusion and hindered the creation of a new integrated culture. Headquarters officials said they were responding to these challenges. Officials in CBP, CIS, and ICE expressed confusion about a new shared services system for mission support when interviewed 3 to 4 months after the system was instituted. They also expressed frustration with problems they have encountered with travel, budget, and payroll systems, which are not a part of the shared services system. Additionally, the realignment of staff for shared services, along with other events, has resulted in some mission staff being assigned administrative work as a collateral duty, which may affect mission productivity. Key practices used by other public and private organizations that have undergone successful mergers and transformations may be helpful to DHS in addressing the challenges raised in this report and in transforming immigration enforcement and services. These key practices include establishing communication strategies to create shared expectations and involving employees to gain ownership for changes. |
gao_GAO-07-52 | gao_GAO-07-52_0 | They may, however, obtain a waiver of this requirement from the Department of Homeland Security at the request of a state or federal agency if they have agreed to practice in an underserved area for at least 3 years. Federal agencies were first authorized to request J-1 visa waivers for physicians in graduate medical education in September 1961. States and federal agencies have some discretion in shaping their J-1 visa waiver programs to address particular needs or priorities. Waivers Remain a Major Means for Providing Physicians to Underserved Areas
States and federal agencies reported requesting more than 1,000 J-1 visa waivers in each of fiscal years 2003 through 2005 (see fig. In contrast to our findings a decade ago, states have become the primary source of waiver requests for physicians to practice in underserved areas, accounting for 90 percent or more of requests in each of fiscal years 2003 through 2005. States varied, however, in the number of waivers they requested in fiscal years 2003 through 2005. Waivers Were Requested for Physicians to Work in a Variety of Practice Specialties, Settings, and Locations
States and federal agencies requested waivers for physicians to practice a variety of specialties, with states requesting waivers for physicians to practice both primary and nonprimary care and federal agencies generally focusing on primary care. Overall, more than three-quarters (77 percent) of waivers requested by states and federal agencies in fiscal year 2005 were for physicians to work in facilities located in HPSAs, and 16 percent were for physicians to work in facilities located in MUA/Ps that were outside of HPSAs. HHS Lacks Data to Account for Waiver Physicians in Its Efforts to Address Physician Shortages
Although the use of J-1 visa waivers remains a major means of providing physicians to practice in underserved areas, HHS does not have the information needed to account for waiver physicians in its efforts to address physician shortages. Without such information, when considering where to place NHSC physicians, HHS has no systematic means of knowing whether the needs of a HPSA are already being met through waiver physicians. Appendix I: Physician Need and Number of Primary Care Waiver and National Health Service Corps Physicians, by State
This appendix presents the following information for each state as of the end of fiscal year 2005: (1) the number of primary care physicians the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) identified as needed to remove primary care health professional shortage area (HPSA) designations, (2) our estimate of the number of J-1 visa waiver physicians practicing primary care, (3) the number of National Health Service Corps (NHSC) physicians practicing primary care, and (4) primary care waiver and NHSC physicians as a percentage of the HHS-identified need. Foreign Physicians: Exchange Visitor Program Becoming Major Route to Practicing in U.S. Underserved Areas. | Why GAO Did This Study
Many U.S. communities face difficulties attracting physicians. To address this problem, states and federal agencies have turned to foreign physicians who have just completed graduate medical education in the United States under J-1 visas. Ordinarily, these physicians must return home after completing their programs, but this requirement can be waived at the request of a state or federal agency if the physician agrees to practice in an underserved area. In 1996, GAO reported that J-1 visa waivers had become a major source of physicians for underserved areas but were not well coordinated with Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) programs for addressing physician shortages. GAO was asked to examine (1) the number of waivers requested by states and federal agencies; (2) waiver physicians' practice specialties, settings, and locations; and (3) the extent to which waiver physicians are accounted for in HHS's efforts to address physician shortages. GAO surveyed states and federal agencies about waivers they requested in fiscal years 2003-2005 and reviewed HHS data.
What GAO Found
The use of J-1 visa waivers remains a major means of providing physicians to practice in underserved areas of the United States. More than 1,000 waivers were requested in each of fiscal years 2003 through 2005 by states and three federal agencies--the Appalachian Regional Commission, the Delta Regional Authority, and HHS. At the end of fiscal year 2005, the estimated number of physicians practicing in underserved areas through J-1 visa waivers exceeded the number practicing there through the National Health Service Corps (NHSC)--HHS's primary mechanism for addressing physician shortages. In contrast to a decade ago, when federal agencies requested the vast majority of waivers, states have become the primary source of J-1 visa waiver requests, accounting for 90 percent or more of waiver requests in fiscal years 2003 through 2005. States and federal agencies requested waivers for physicians to work in a variety of practice specialties, settings, and locations. In fiscal year 2005, a little less than half of the waiver requests were for physicians to practice exclusively primary care. More than three-quarters of the waiver requests were for physicians to work in hospitals or private practices, and about half were for physicians to practice in rural areas. HHS does not have the information needed to account for waiver physicians in its efforts to address physician shortages. Without such information, when considering where to place NHSC physicians, HHS has no systematic means of knowing if an area's needs are already being met by waiver physicians. |
gao_GAO-09-521 | gao_GAO-09-521_0 | Taxpayers can claim paid real-estate taxes as an itemized deduction on Schedule A of the federal income tax return for individuals. We estimate that 38.8 million taxpayers claimed this deduction in 2001. Any evaluation of the factors that contribute to taxpayers overstating the real-estate tax deduction would need to take paid preparers and tax software into consideration. To describe the extent that IRS examinations of the real-estate tax deduction focus on potential overstatements due to taxpayer inclusion of nondeductible charges, we reviewed IRS guidance for examiners related to the real-estate tax deduction, and interviewed IRS examiners about the standard procedures and methods they use for auditing this deduction. Taxpayers Face Challenges Determining What Real-Estate Taxes They Can Deduct for Their Federal Income Tax Returns
Local governments generally do not inform taxpayers what charges on real-estate tax bills qualify as deductible real-estate taxes, which creates a challenge for taxpayers attempting to determine what they can deduct. Many Bills Contain Generally Nondeductible Charges, and Taxpayers in Two Jurisdictions Likely Overstated Their Deductions, but the Full Extent of Overstatement Is Unknown
As mentioned earlier, deductible real-estate taxes are generally ad valorem or based on the assessed value of property. Even so, some of these options could improve compliance with the real-estate tax deduction while generating lower costs and burdens for IRS and third parties. Those include placing a stronger disclaimer early in the guidance to alert taxpayers about the need to check whether all charges on their real-estate tax bill are deductible; across the IRS publications we reviewed, such an explicit disclaimer either was made near the end of the guidance or not at all; clarifying that a real-estate tax bill may not be sufficient evidence of deductibility if the bill includes nondeductible charges that are not clearly stated; our work showed that some bills could not be relied upon to prove deductibility but we found nothing that explicitly told taxpayers that they could not always rely on the bills as such evidence; and providing information or a worksheet on possible steps to take to obtain information about whether bills include nondeductible charges and what those charges are; to the extent that taxpayers may not know where to find the information necessary to determine whether any charges on their local bills are nondeductible, the guidance could suggest steps to help taxpayers start to get the necessary information. However, the costs involved may not be justified given the current lack of information about the extent of noncompliance caused by claiming nondeductible charges and the associated tax loss. However, this cost could be justified to ensure compliance with the existing law. To learn more about where tax noncompliance is most likely, we recommend that the Commissioner of Internal Revenue identify a cost-effective means of obtaining information about charges that appear on real-estate tax bills in order to identify local governments with potentially large nondeductible charges on their bills; and if such local governments are identified, obtain and use the information, including uses such as compliance research focused on nondeductible charges; outreach to such local governments to help them determine which charges are deductible charges and help affected taxpayers correctly compute the deduction; targeted outreach to the tax-preparation and mortgage-servicer industries, and targeted examinations of the real- estate tax deduction in the localities. IRS also noted that determining deductibility can be complex and that neither the local real-estate tax bills nor mortgage service documents tell taxpayers what amounts are deductible. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Joint Committee on Taxation identified improved taxpayer compliance with the real-estate tax deduction as a way to reduce the federal tax gap--the difference between taxes owed and taxes voluntarily and timely paid. Regarding the deduction, GAO was asked to examine (1) factors that contribute to taxpayers including nondeductible charges, (2) the extent that taxpayers may be claiming such charges, (3) the extent that Internal Revenue Service (IRS) examinations focus on the inclusion of such charges, and (4) possible options for improving taxpayer compliance. GAO surveyed a generalizable sample of local governments, studied taxpayer compliance in two jurisdictions that met selection criteria, reviewed IRS documents, and interviewed government officials and others. Addressing the complexity of current tax law on real-estate tax deductions was outside the scope of this review.
What GAO Found
Taxpayers who itemize federal income-tax deductions and whose local real-estate tax bills include nondeductible charges face challenges determining what real-estate taxes they can deduct on their federal income tax returns. Neither local-government tax bills nor mortgage-servicer documents identify what taxpayers can properly deduct. Without such information, determining deductibility can be complex and involve significant effort. While IRS guidance for taxpayers discusses what qualifies as deductible, it does not indicate that taxpayers may need to check both tax bills and other information sources to make the determination. In addition, tax software and paid preparers may not ensure that taxpayers only deduct qualified amounts. There are no reliable estimates for the extent of noncompliance caused by taxpayers claiming nondeductible charges, or the associated federal tax loss. However, GAO estimates that almost half of local governments nationwide included generally nondeductible charges on their bills. While the full extent of overstatement is unknown due to data limitations, GAO estimates that taxpayers in two counties collectively overstated their deductions by at least $23 (or $46 million using broader matching criteria). IRS examinations of real-estate tax deductions focus more on whether the taxpayer owned the property and paid the taxes than whether the taxpayer claimed only deductible amounts, primarily because nondeductible charges are generally small. IRS guidance does not require examiners to request proof of deductibility or direct them to look for nondeductible charges on tax bills. Various options could improve compliance with the real-estate tax deduction, such as providing taxpayers with better guidance and more information, and increasing IRS enforcement. However, the lack of information regarding the extent of noncompliance and the associated tax loss makes it difficult to evaluate these options. If IRS obtained information on real-estate tax bill charges, it could find areas with potentially significant noncompliance and use targeted methods to reduce noncompliance in those areas. |
gao_GAO-08-482 | gao_GAO-08-482_0 | Furthermore, our 1989 report recommended that EPA take the following four actions to improve its implementation and evaluation of the SPCC program: better define the training needs for the agency’s SPCC inspectors because each of EPA’s regions had established a training program for SPCC inspectors using different program styles, curricula, and manuals; develop instructions for performing and documenting inspections because EPA had not required the regions to follow uniform inspection or documentation procedures, allowing regions in many cases to let inspectors rely on their experience and knowledge; establish a national policy for fining violators because, in the absence of a policy, regions had adopted inconsistent polices and rarely assessed fines; and develop a system of inspection priorities, based on a national inventory of tanks, because, without knowing the location and number of facilities or tanks, EPA could not assess the relative risk of spills to the environment or target for inspections the facilities most in need of attention. Our survey shows that EPA’s regional offices inspected a total of 3,359 facilities for compliance with the SPCC rule from fiscal year 2004 through fiscal year 2006, or less than 1 percent of EPA’s estimate of the number of SPCC-regulated facilities in the United States. However, the number of facilities inspected in each EPA region varied in these years—from 184 in Region 10 to 745 in Region 6. EPA Has Developed SPCC Policies and Procedures to Promote Consistent Enforcement of SPCC Regulations
While regional offices have flexibility in implementing the SPCC program to address factors unique to each region, EPA has taken steps over the last several years to promote consistency in how the regions interpret and enforce the SPCC regulations. First, facilities subject to the SPCC rule are not required to identify themselves to EPA, and therefore EPA cannot effectively identify and target facilities for inspection and enforcement. Second, the national database EPA is creating to improve SPCC program management is limited to facilities that have already been inspected; consequently, the database will not enable program managers to better identify additional SPCC facilities. EPA Has Limited Data for Identifying Facilities Subject to the SPCC Program and Effectively Targeting Inspections
Although EPA estimated in 2005 that more than 500,000 facilities nationwide could be subject to the SPCC rule, the actual number is unknown. Furthermore, the six states use this information to periodically inspect all of their regulated facilities. While the six states have different requirements, they all collect data on their entire regulated universe rather than on only a limited portion of the total facilities, as EPA does. According to these state officials, this can range from occasional discussions to no contact at all. Conclusions
Leaking aboveground storage tanks can contaminate soil and waterways and threaten human health and the environment before the leaks are identified and stopped. Without more comprehensive data on the universe of facilities that are subject to the SPCC rule, EPA cannot employ a risk-based approach to target its SPCC inspections to those facilities that pose the greatest risks of oil spills into or upon U.S. navigable waters and adjoining shorelines. Similarly, incomplete information on the universe of SPCC facilities prevents EPA from determining whether and to what extent the SPCC program is achieving its goals. Recommendations for Executive Action
To better identify and target SPCC facilities for inspection, we recommend that the Administrator of EPA direct the Office of Emergency Management to take the following two actions: analyze the costs and benefits of the options available to EPA for obtaining key data about the universe of SPCC-regulated facilities, including, among others, a tank registration program similar to those employed by some states, which would require tank owners to report to EPA, on a regular basis, facility information such as the number of facilities and tanks, their size, age, location, quality of construction, and methods of operation and in conjunction with states that have oil spill prevention programs, develop uniform guidance for EPA regional offices on how to better communicate and coordinate with those states on SPCC-related issues. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope and Methodology
To determine how the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regions implement the Spill Prevention, Control, and Countermeasure (SPCC) program, we spoke with EPA headquarters on the overall management of the program, including the organizational structure, formulation and implementation of the SPCC rule and amendments, training of staff on the rule, funds allocated to the program, enforcement policy, and headquarters’ interaction and coordination with the EPA regions that implement the program. We then interviewed officials from aboveground oil storage tank inspection programs in six states—Florida, Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey, New Mexico, and Virginia. 2. 3. How often does your region re-evaluate these criteria? | Why GAO Did This Study
Oil leaks from aboveground tanks have contaminated soil and water, threatening human health and wildlife. To prevent damage from oil spills, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) issued the Spill Prevention, Control, and Countermeasure (SPCC) rule in 1973. EPA's 10 regions inspect oil storage facilities to ensure compliance with the rule. EPA estimates that about 571,000 facilities are subject to this rule. Some states also regulate oil storage tanks. GAO determined (1) how EPA regions implement the SPCC program, (2) the data EPA has to implement and evaluate the program, and (3) whether some states' tank programs suggest ways for EPA to improve its program. GAO surveyed all 10 EPA regions and interviewed officials in EPA and six states selected on the basis of experts' recommendations, among other criteria.
What GAO Found
EPA allows regional offices flexibility to implement the SPCC program according to their individual circumstances. These differences account, at least in part, for regional variations in the number of SPCC inspections. According to GAO's survey, during fiscal years 2004 through 2006, EPA regions conducted 3,359 SPCC inspections--less than 1 percent of EPA's estimate of SPCC facilities--ranging from 184 in Region 10 to 745 in Region 6. Furthermore, because of regional differences in the number of inspections and the enforcement mechanisms used, the number of SPCC enforcement actions also varied. While EPA allows regional flexibility, it has begun implementing SPCC policies and procedures to promote consistency in how the SPCC regulations are interpreted and enforced. EPA has information on only a portion of the facilities subject to the SPCC rule, hindering its ability to identify and effectively target facilities for inspection and enforcement, and to evaluate whether the program is achieving its goals. Because facilities subject to the SPCC rule do not have to report to EPA, the agency can only estimate the universe of SPCC-regulated facilities and must try to identify them through such means as oil spill data, state referrals, and Internet searches. Through inspections, EPA determines if the facility is subject to the rule. While inspections of known SPCC facilities are generally risk-based, the risk assessments exclude the large number of estimated SPCC facilities that have not yet been identified and that may pose more serious threats than those currently targeted for inspection. EPA is developing a national database to promote standard data collection across regions and expand the facility information available to regional managers. However, this database is limited to previously inspected facilities and will not enable EPA to identify SPCC facilities beyond those already known. Ultimately, incomplete information on which facilities are subject to the SPCC rule, and where and how often leaks may occur, prevents EPA from effectively targeting inspections to facilities that potentially pose the highest risks. Furthermore, EPA does not have performance measures to examine the program's effectiveness. EPA is developing additional measures, but without more complete data on the SPCC-regulated universe, these measures cannot gauge the program's accomplishments. The tank inspection programs of Florida, Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey, New Mexico, and Virginia can provide EPA with insight on potential improvements to the SPCC program. For example, five of the six states use tank registration and reporting systems to collect data on oil storage facilities, giving them information on the universe of facilities subject to state regulations. These states can therefore inspect all their facilities or target those they believe present the highest risks of spills. By taking a similar approach, EPA would have more complete data for setting inspection priorities based on risk. Furthermore, because these states have detailed knowledge of their facilities, EPA could benefit from increased coordination with them, when, for example, it identifies facilities and targets inspections. |
gao_GAO-08-169 | gao_GAO-08-169_0 | Contractor employees often work inside DOD facilities, alongside DOD employees, to provide these services. Indications are, however, that significant numbers of contractor employees are working side-by-side with government employees in certain segments of the department, based in part on information we obtained from 21 DOD offices we reviewed. As shown in table 1, at 15 of these offices, contractor employees outnumber DOD employees and the percentage of contractor employees in the remaining offices ranges from 19 to 46 percent. Few Laws or DOD- Wide Policies Address Personal Conflicts of Interests among Contractor Employees
Contractor employees are not subject to the same laws and regulations that are designed to prevent conflicts of interests among federal employees. On the other hand, some program managers, realizing the risk from potential personal conflicts of interest, have established their own safeguards for particularly sensitive areas where contractor employees provide support to decision processes. For example, all DOD offices we reviewed that used contractor employees in the source selection process use additional safeguard controls such as contract clauses designed to prevent personal conflicts of interests. DOD’s review addressed FFRDC sponsoring agreements, contracts, and internal policies and procedures. However, a number of program managers as well as defense contractor company officials expressed concern that adding new safeguards will increase costs for the government and are unnecessary since government officials—not contractors—are the ones ultimately making the decisions. Viewpoints of Ethics Officials and Senior Leaders
Senior officials within DOD responsible for ensuring integrity in employee conduct and in the contracting function as well as the OGE told us that they believed that there are risks associated with personal conflicts of interests not just in program offices that involve contractors in source selection, but those that use contractors in other ways to support spending decisions. In developing its policy, DOD should include the following requirements for defense contractor companies: require a written code of business ethics and conduct applicable to contractor personnel working on certain DOD mission-critical advisory and assistance type services to: prohibit contractor personnel from participating in a government contract in which they have a personal conflict of interest; require contractor personnel to avoid the appearance of loss of impartiality in performing contracted duties for DOD; require contractor personnel to disclose personal conflicts of interest to their employer prior to beginning work on these contracts; require the contractor to review and address any personal conflicts of interest its employees might have before assigning them to deliver contracted services; prohibit contractor personnel from using non-public government information obtained while performing work under the contract for personal gain; prohibit contractor employees providing procurement support services from having future employment contact involving a bidder in an ongoing procurement; impose limits on the ability of contractors and their employees on accepting gifts (defined as almost anything of monetary value, such as cash, meals, trips, or services) in connection with contracted duties; and prohibit misuse of DOD contract duties to provide preferential treatment to a private interest. Other specific objectives were to assess (2) what safeguards there are to prevent conflict of interests for contractor employees and (3) whether government and contractor officials believe additional safeguards are necessary. To obtain similar information from each of the 21 DOD offices, we interviewed these officials to obtain their views and supporting documentation using a structured set of questions covering several topics including (1) the types of services being provided by contractor employees, (2) their concerns about the integrity of the information and advice being provided by the contractor employees with regard to personal conflicts of interest, and (3) what safeguards such as contract clauses the offices are using to ensure that the assistance and advice provided is not impaired due to contractor employees conflicts of interest. | Why GAO Did This Study
Many defense contractor employees work side-by-side with federal employees in Department of Defense (DOD) facilities performing substantially the same tasks affecting billions in DOD spending. Given concerns with protecting the integrity of DOD operations, GAO was asked to assess (1) how many contractor employees work in DOD offices and what type of mission-critical contracted services they perform, (2) what safeguards there are to prevent personal conflicts of interest for contractor employees when performing DOD's tasks, and (3) whether government and defense contractor officials believe additional safeguards are necessary. GAO reviewed conflicts of interest laws and policies and interviewed ethics officials and senior leaders regarding applicability to DOD federal and contractor employees. GAO judgmentally selected and interviewed officials at 21 DOD offices with large contractor workforces, and 23 of their contractors.
What GAO Found
Indications are that significant numbers of defense contractor employees work alongside DOD employees in the 21 DOD offices GAO reviewed. At 15 offices, contractor employees outnumbered DOD employees and comprised up to 88 percent of the workforce. Contractor employees perform key tasks, including developing contract requirements and advising on award fees for other contractors. In contrast to federal employees, few government ethics laws and DOD-wide policies are in place to prevent personal conflicts of interest for defense contractor employees. Several laws and regulations address personal conflicts of interest, but just one applies to both federal and contractor employees. Some DOD offices and defense contractor companies are voluntarily adopting safeguards. For example, realizing the risk from personal conflicts of interest for particularly sensitive areas, the 19 DOD offices GAO reviewed that used contractor employees in the source selection process all use safeguards such as contract clauses that prohibit contractor employees' participation in a DOD procurement affecting a personal financial interest. In certain other tasks, only 3 of the 23 defense contractors GAO reviewed had safeguards requiring employees to identify potential conflicts of interest so they can be mitigated. In general, government officials believed that current requirements are inadequate to prevent conflicts from arising for certain contractor employees influencing DOD decisions, especially financial conflicts of interest and impaired impartiality. Some program managers and defense contractor officials expressed concern that adding new safeguards will increase costs. But ethics officials and senior leaders countered that, given the risk associated with personal conflicts of interest and the expanding roles that contractor employees play, such safeguards are necessary. |
gao_GAO-04-539 | gao_GAO-04-539_0 | To determine how DOE evaluates its contractor postretirement benefit programs and compares the benefits offered by DOE contractors with private industry benchmarks, we reviewed DOE Order 350.1 and other agency policy and procedure guidance related to the completion of contractor comparison studies, interviewed DOE officials from CHRM to determine procedures used to assess the quality of the contractor comparison studies, obtained and analyzed the most recent comparison studies completed by DOE contractors for all locations subject to the valuation provisions of DOE Order 350.1, and reviewed the most recent comparison studies for all locations subject to the DOE Order 350.1 valuation provisions for compliance with DOE policies and procedures. To assess DOE’s oversight of its contractors’ pension and postretirement health benefit programs, we reviewed the FAR and other applicable standards related to allowable pension and postretirement health costs under contracts with commercial organizations; determined applicable internal control procedures for DOE’s contractor benefits program using our Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government and Internal Control Management and Evaluation Tool; reviewed related DOE policy and procedure guidance and interviewed DOE officials regarding procedures for overseeing contractor benefit programs in existence through the end of fiscal year 2003; and reviewed contractor locations subject to the provisions of DOE Order 350.1 for compliance with DOE policies and procedures related to the review of changes to contractor postretirement benefit programs. Reported Unfunded Balances for Contractor Postretirement Benefits Are Significant, and Amounts for Post- Closure Benefits Are Increasing
In DOE’s fiscal year 2003 Performance and Accountability Report, the agency reported that the present value of estimated contractor postretirement and pension benefits that were unfunded as of September 30, 2003, totaled $13.4 billion. This figure, also called the funded status, is an actuarial estimate of future postretirement benefits attributed to contractor employee service rendered prior to the measurement date less the fair market value of accumulated assets dedicated to the payment of the obligation. Contractor employee postretirement benefits at these sites had total unfunded balances in excess of $1.5 billion as of September 30, 2003. Evaluation of Contractor Benefits Could Be Improved
DOE Order 350.1 generally requires that contractors periodically complete self-assessments of major nonstatutory benefit programs against professionally recognized measures. A Significant Number of Contractors Do Not Complete DOE Order 350.1 Comparison Studies
A significant number of DOE contractors, and the postretirement benefits they offer, are not subject to the comparison study provisions of DOE Order 350.1. In addition, the studies were not performed at six contractor sites that were closed, or nearing completion. DOE contracting officers are primarily responsible for determining the allowability of DOE contractor employee benefit costs and administering the benefits. Accordingly, DOE’s current monitoring and risk assessment process is largely performed by contracting officers who are responsible for reviewing benefit programs at one contractor site. DOE’s evaluation of total benefits in the benefit value study rather than a review of the individual benefit components does not fully address the differences in costs between deferred benefit programs, such as pension and postretirement health benefits, and other benefit components. This information is important because decisions on changes to pension and postretirement health benefits can have a significant impact on DOE’s long-term budgetary needs. For example, a 1 percent increase in a contractor employee’s current year vacation benefits has less impact on DOE’s long-term costs and budgetary needs than a 1 percent increase in postretirement pension or health benefits, which have a continuous and compounding effect as they are paid out in each year of retirement. For example, postretirement health benefits average more than 44 percent greater than the average of the DOE contractors’ competitors, while defined benefit pensions average 29 percent greater. Formal management reviews that attempt to identify and correct areas of nonconformance, propagate best practices agencywide, and focus on long-term budgetary needs could improve DOE’s oversight of the contractor employee postretirement benefits program. 2. 3. 4. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Energy (DOE), which carries out its national security, environmental cleanup, and research missions through extensive use of contractors, faces significant costs for postretirement health and pension benefits for contractor employees. Given DOE's long history of using contractors and the rising cost of postretirement benefits, the Chairman, House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development, asked GAO to (1) analyze DOE's estimated financial obligation for postretirement health and pension benefits for contractor employees at the end of fiscal year 2003, (2) determine how DOE evaluates its contractor postretirement health and pension benefit programs and assesses the comparative levels of benefits offered by contractors, and (3) assess how DOE's oversight of these benefits could be enhanced.
What GAO Found
As of September 30, 2003, DOE reported an estimated $13.4 billion in unfunded contractor postretirement health and pension benefits. This figure is an actuarial estimate of all benefits attributed to employee service before September 30, 2003, minus the fair market value of assets dedicated to the payment of retiree benefits. The unfunded balance has grown over the past 4 fiscal years as a result of the continuing accumulation of benefits, declining interest rates, and negative returns on pension assets. A significant portion of the unfunded balance relates to benefit programs at contractor sites that have already closed or will close once the work is complete. DOE Order 350.1 generally provides that contractors periodically complete selfassessment studies comparing their benefits to professionally recognized measures. DOE uses these studies to make decisions about the level of contractor benefits. While the most recently completed comparison studies suggest that DOE has been successful in offering total contractor benefits that are comparable to those of selected competitors, the DOE Order 350.1 studies are not performed at a significant number of contractor locations, and alternative review procedures performed by DOE personnel are inconsistent from one contractor location to another; thus DOE's ability to evaluate the full range of programs is limited. In addition, GAO found that a number of contractor studies completed under DOE Order 350.1 did not conform to prescribed and recommended methodologies, calling into question the validity and comparability of the results. Moreover, DOE's current focus on total benefits rather than individual benefit components in evaluating benefits does not fully recognize the differences in costs between deferred benefit programs, such as pension and postretirement health benefits, and other benefit components. This distinction is important because changes to pension and postretirement health benefits can have a significant impact on DOE's long-term costs and budgetary needs. For example, a 1 percent increase in a contractor employee's current year vacation benefits has less impact on DOE's long-term costs and budgetary needs than a 1 percent increase in postretirement pension or health benefits, which have a continuous and compounding effect as they are paid out in each year of retirement. While reported total contractor benefits are comparable to selected competitors, as stated above, the postretirement health benefits of DOE contractor employees at these sites averaged more than 44 percent greater than the average of the contractors' competitors, while defined benefit pension benefits averaged 29 percent greater. The approval and monitoring of DOE contractor employee pension and postretirement health benefits is primarily the responsibility of DOE contracting officers, who administer contracts at individual contractor locations. Management does not systematically review information developed at individual contractor locations to identify best practices or areas where benefit comparisons do not adhere to agency requirements or guidance. Developing and disseminating this information agencywide would enhance DOE's oversight of contractor employee benefits and provide information needed to manage postclosure benefit costs. |
gao_GAO-05-834T | gao_GAO-05-834T_0 | Legacy Airlines Must Reduce Costs to Restore Profitability
Since 2000, legacy airlines have faced unprecedented internal and external challenges. Internally, the impact of the Internet on how tickets are sold and consumers search for fares and the growth of low cost airlines as a market force accessible to almost every consumer has hurt legacy airline revenues by placing downward pressure on airfares. This is especially true of airlines that did not have fuel hedging in place. Legacy airlines, as a group, have been unsuccessful in reducing their costs to become more competitive with low cost airlines. While legacy airlines have been able to reduce their overall costs since 2001, these were largely achieved through capacity reductions and without an improvement in their unit costs. During the first quarter of 2005, both legacy and low cost airlines continued to struggle to reduce costs, in part because of the increase in fuel costs. Legacy airlines have lost a cumulative $28 billion since 2001 and are predicted to lose another $5 billion in 2005, according to industry analysts. Low cost airlines also reported net operating losses of almost $0.2 billion, driven primarily by ATA’s losses. Bankruptcy is Common in the Airline Industry, but There is No Evidence that it is Harmful to the Industry or Competitors
Airlines seek bankruptcy protection for such reasons as severe liquidity pressures, an inability to obtain relief from employees and creditors, and an inability to obtain new financing, according to airline officials and bankruptcy experts. As a result of the structural problems and external shocks previously discussed, there have been 160 total airline bankruptcy filings since deregulation in 1978, including 20 since 2000, according to the Air Transport Association. With very few exceptions, airlines that enter bankruptcy do not emerge from it. We also reviewed numerous other bankruptcy and airline industry studies and spoke to industry analysts to determine what evidence existed with regard to the impact of bankruptcy on the industry. Both studies found that airlines under bankruptcy protection did not lower their fares or hurt competitor airlines, as some have contended. This study found that bankrupt firms’ performance deteriorated prior to filing for bankruptcy and that their rivals’ profits also declined during this period. Legacy Airlines Face Significant Near-term Liquidity Pressures, including $10.4 Billion in Pensions Contributions over the Next 4 Years
Under current law, legacy airlines’ pension funding requirements are estimated to be a minimum of $10.4 billion from 2005 through 2008. In contrast, low cost airlines have eschewed defined benefit pension plans and instead use defined contribution (401k-type) plans. The size of legacy airlines’ future fixed obligations, including pensions, relative to their financial position suggests they will have trouble meeting their various financial obligations. While cash from operations can help fund some of these obligations, continued losses and the size of these obligations put these airlines in a sizable liquidity bind. The cost to PBGC and participants of defined benefit pension terminations has grown in recent years as the level of pension underfunding has deepened. Dramatic changes in the level and nature of demand for air travel combined with an equally dramatic evolution in how airlines meet that demand have forced a drastic restructuring in the competitive structure of the industry. However, this should not be confused with causing the industry’s instability. There is no clear evidence that bankruptcy has contributed to the industry’s economic ills, including overcapacity and underpricing, and there is some evidence to the contrary. However, the termination of pension obligations by United Airlines and US Airways has had substantial and wide-spread effects on the PBGC and thousands of airline employees, retirees, and other beneficiaries. If their plans are frozen so that future liabilities do not continue to grow, allowing an extended payback period may reduce the likelihood that these airlines will file for bankruptcy and terminate their pensions in the coming year. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since 2001, the U.S. airline industry has confronted unprecedented financial losses. Two of the nation's largest airlines--United Airlines and US Airways--went into bankruptcy, terminating their pension plans and passing the unfunded liability to the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC). PBGC's unfunded liability was $9.6 billion; plan participants lost $5.2 billion in benefits. Considerable debate has ensued over airlines' use of bankruptcy protection as a means to continue operations, often for years. Many in the industry and elsewhere have maintained that airlines' use of this approach is harmful to the industry, in that it allows inefficient carriers to reduce ticket prices below those of their competitors. This debate has received even sharper focus with pension defaults. Critics argue that by not having to meet their pension obligations, airlines in bankruptcy have an advantage that may encourage other companies to take the same approach. GAO is completing a report for the Committee due later this year. Today's testimony presents preliminary observations in three areas: (1) the continued financial difficulties faced by legacy airlines, (2) the effect of bankruptcy on the industry and competitors, and (3) the effect of airline pension underfunding on employees, airlines, and the PBGC.
What GAO Found
U.S. legacy airlines have not been able to reduce their costs sufficiently to profitably compete with low cost airlines that continue to capture market share. Internal and external challenges have fundamentally changed the nature of the industry and forced legacy airlines to restructure themselves financially. The changing demand for air travel and the growth of low cost airlines has kept fares low, forcing these airlines to reduce their costs. They have struggled to do so, however, especially as the cost of jet fuel has jumped. So far, they have been unable to reduce costs to a level with their low-cost rivals. As a result, legacy airlines have continued to lose money--$28 billion since 2001. Although some industry observers have asserted that airlines undergoing bankruptcy reorganization contribute to the industry's financial problems, GAO found no clear evidence that historically airlines in bankruptcy have financially harmed competing airlines. Bankruptcy is endemic to the industry; 160 airlines filed for bankruptcy since deregulation in 1978, including 20 since 2000. Most airlines that entered bankruptcy have not survived. Moreover, despite assertions to the contrary, available evidence does not suggest that airlines in bankruptcy contribute to industry overcapacity or that bankrupt airlines harm competitors by reducing fares below what other airlines are charging. While bankruptcy may not be detrimental to rival airlines, it is detrimental for pension plan participants and the PBGC. The remaining legacy airlines with defined benefit pension plans face over $60 billion in fixed obligations over the next 4 years, including $10.4 billion in pension obligations--more than some of these airlines may be able to afford given continued losses. While cash from operations can help fund some of these obligations, continued losses and the size of these obligations put these airlines in a sizable liquidity bind. Moreover, legacy airlines still face considerable restructuring before they become competitive with low cost airlines. |
gao_HEHS-98-84 | gao_HEHS-98-84_0 | In general, a charter school in a state using this approach receives federal funds directly from the SEA—and thus is treated as an LEA—if the school was chartered by a state agency or through a parent LEA—if the school was chartered by a district or substate agency. Table 2 shows the number of charter schools surveyed receiving IDEA funds or IDEA-funded special education services by funding model. Charter school officials who did not apply cited reasons similar to those who did not apply for title I funds such as (1) a lack of time to do so, (2) they were not eligible for funds, (3) they did not know about the availability of IDEA funds, or (4) they found that applying for these funds would cost more than the funding would provide. Most Charter School Operators Believe That Their Share of Title I and IDEA Funds Is Fair
Regardless of funding model, two-thirds of the charter school operators expressing an opinion believed that they received a fair share of title I and IDEA funding. (See tables 3 and 4.) Factors That Help or Hinder Schools in Accessing Federal Funds Do Not Vary Significantly by Funding Path
Many of the factors that helped or hindered charter schools in accessing federal funds, according to our work, had no relation to whether schools received their funds directly from the state or indirectly through a parent school district. One factor, however, that hindered dependent but not independent charter schools in accessing funds was the working relationship between a charter school and its sponsoring district. On the other hand, several charter school operators in California and Colorado—states that consider most charter schools dependent members of existing school districts— reported that receiving IDEA-funded special education services, rather than funds, from their local school districts helped them access federal funds. State and Federal Efforts to Help Charter Schools Access Federal Funds
Several states and the Department of Education have begun initiatives to help charter schools access federal funds. Some states, for example, are revising or developing alternative allocation policies and procedures to better accommodate charter schools’ access to federal funds and providing training and technical assistance to charter school operators. The Department of Education recently issued guidance to states and school districts about allocations of title I funds to charter schools. Department of Education Efforts to Help Charter Schools Access Federal Funds
During our study, the Department of Education developed guidance to states and LEAs on allocating title I funds to charter schools. The Department also funded the development of an Internet web site with general information on federal programs, charter school operational issues, a charter school resource directory and profiles of states that have authorized charter schools as well as profiles of individual charter schools. Title I and IDEA Allocation Approaches Used in Selected States
In general, states allocate title I and Individuals With Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) funds to charter schools on the basis of schools’ local educational agency (LEA) status. Eligible expenses are billed to the state and reimbursed up to a school’s allocation. Charter and other public schools apply for assistance to the ISD. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on: (1) the way selected states allocate Elementary and Secondary Education Act Title I and Individuals With Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) funds to charter and other public schools; (2) factors that help and hinder charter schools in accessing Title I and IDEA funds; (3) whether factors that help or hinder charter schools to access federal funds vary by the funding path used in selected states; and (4) state and federal efforts designed to help charter schools access federal funds.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) in general, states either allocate funds to charter schools directly, considering them to be independent school districts or local educational agencies (LEA), or indirectly through a parent school district, considering a charter school to be a member of an existing school district; (2) overall, about two-fifths of the charter schools GAO surveyed received Title I funds, and slightly more than half of them received IDEA funds or IDEA-funded special education services; (3) most charter schools that did not receive funds did not apply for them; (4) two-thirds of charter school operators whom GAO surveyed and who expressed an opinion believed that they received a fair share of Title I or IDEA funds or IDEA-funded special education services; (5) a variety of barriers, according to GAO's review, have made it difficult for charter schools to access Title I and IDEA funds; (6) these barriers include a lack of enrollment and student eligibility data to submit to states before funding allocation decisions are made and the time required and costs involved in applying for such funds; (7) charter school operators most often cited training and technical assistance and notification of their eligibility for federal funds as factors that helped them access Title I and IDEA funds; (8) many factors that helped or hindered charter schools access federal funds had no relation to the schools' receiving their funds directly from the state or indirectly through a parent school district, but some factors did relate to the funding path; (9) for example, the working relationship between a charter school and its sponsoring district could either help or hinder the school's access to federal funds; (10) in contrast, charter schools treated as LEAs and receiving federal funds directly from the state were largely unaffected by their relationships with local school districts; (11) several states and the Department of Education have begun initiatives to help charter schools access federal funds; (12) some states are revising or developing alternative allocation policies and procedures to improve charter schools' access to federal funds and providing training and technical assistance to charter school operators; and (13) the Department recently issued guidance to states and LEAs on allocating federal Title I funds to charter schools and has funded the development of an Internet web site with information on federal programs, charter school operational issues, a charter school resource directory as well as profiles of charter school states and charter schools. |
gao_GAO-03-697 | gao_GAO-03-697_0 | These 16 programs are administered by DOT, HHS, Education, and DOL. As the table shows, transportation is not the primary purpose of most of these programs. Extent of Spending on Services for the Transportation- Disadvantaged Is Not Fully Known but Is in the Billions of Dollars
Available information shows that federal programs spent an estimated $2.4 billion on transportation services for transportation-disadvantaged populations in fiscal year 2001, and additional state and local spending for these populations was several hundred million dollars more. The amount spent on transportation services by the remaining 33 federal programs is unknown, mainly because the majority of programs do not require recipients of federal funds to report transportation spending information to the federal agency. Coordination Efforts Vary, but Some Successful Efforts Show Promising Results
Efforts to improve services and achieve cost savings through coordination of transportation activities among agencies at all levels of government vary. The strategic and annual performance plans of the other federal agencies that fund transportation services for the transportation-disadvantaged generally do not mention coordination of such services. Although these two agencies comprise the majority of funding for transportation that we were able to identify, the Departments of Labor and Education also have a significant number of programs—more than one-third of the total—that provide services to the transportation-disadvantaged. Potential Options to Improve Coordination
Federal, state, and local officials, as well as experts in the area, have suggested three potential options to improve coordination of transportation services among federal programs: (1) harmonizing standards and requirements among federal programs, (2) expanding interagency forums and providing and disseminating additional guidance and information on coordination, and (3) providing financial incentives or coordination mandates. To promote and enhance federal, state, and local transportation coordination activities, we recommend that the Secretaries of the Departments of Health and Human Services, Labor, Education, and Transportation take the following actions: As member agencies of the Coordinating Council on Access and Mobility, ensure that the long-term goals in the Council’s strategic plan have clear links to the individual tasks in its action plan and that these actions are tied to measurable annual performance goals. In particular: The Department of Health and Human Services provided written comments on the draft of this report which are presented and evaluated in appendix V. The department noted that it has initiated actions to implement our recommendations, including (1) strengthening the linkage between the Coordinating Council’s strategic and action plans, (2) reviewing the department-wide strategic plan for opportunities to reflect its transportation coordination efforts, (3) developing coordination guidance, and (4) linking the Coordinating Council’s Web site to the Department of Health and Human Services’ Web site. The Departments of Transportation and Health and Family Services are trying to coordinate Medicaid transportation. | Why GAO Did This Study
Millions of Americans are unable to provide their own transportation--or even use public transportation--for Medicaid appointments, Head Start classes, job training, or other services. Such "transportation disadvantaged" persons are often disabled, elderly, or low income. Various federal programs are authorized to provide transportation services to them. GAO was asked to (1) identify the federal programs that fund such transportation services and the amount spent on them, (2) assess the extent of coordination among the various programs, and (3) identify any obstacles to coordination and potential ways to overcome such obstacles.
What GAO Found
Sixty-two federal programs--most of which are administered by the Departments of Health and Human Services, Labor, Education, and Transportation--fund transportation services for the transportation disadvantaged. The full amount these programs spend on transportation is unknown because transportation is not always tracked separately from other spending. However, available information (i.e., estimated or actual outlays or obligations) on 29 of the programs shows that federal agencies spent at least an estimated $2.4 billion on these services in fiscal year 2001. Additional spending by states and localities is also not fully known but is at least in the hundreds of millions of dollars. Efforts to improve services and achieve cost savings through coordination of transportation activities (through sharing resources or information or consolidating services under a single agency) among federal agencies vary. The Coordinating Council on Access and Mobility--a body with representation from the Departments of Transportation and Health and Human Services--has undertaken some activities to improve coordination. However, other agencies that administer a substantial number of programs for the transportation-disadvantaged, such as the Departments of Labor and Education, are not part of the Council. In addition, the Coordinating Council's strategic plan is not linked to its action plan and contains few measurable performance goals. The strategic and annual performance plans of the Departments of Transportation and Health and Human Services contain few references to coordination relating to their subagencies and programs that fund transportation services for the transportation disadvantaged, and the plans of the Departments of Labor and Education do not mention coordinating these services. Obstacles impeding coordination include concern among administrators that their own participants might be negatively affected, program rules that limit use by others, and limited guidance and information on coordination. To mitigate these obstacles, officials and experts suggested making federal standards more consistent, creating a clearinghouse or better Web site to facilitate interagency communication and provide better guidance on coordination, and providing financial incentives or instituting mandates to coordinate. |
gao_GAO-08-255T | gao_GAO-08-255T_0 | The agency also published in May 2007 a final rule related to Medicaid payment and financing. Concerns about Certain Medicaid Financing Arrangements that Undermine Medicaid’s Fiscal Integrity Are Long-Standing
From 1994 to 2005, we have reported numerous times on a number of financing arrangements that create the illusion of a valid state Medicaid expenditure to a health care provider. The supplemental payments connected with these arrangements were illusory, however, because states required these government providers to return part or all of the payments to the states. Financing arrangements involving illusory payments to Medicaid providers have significant fiscal implications for the federal government and states. The exact amount of additional federal Medicaid funds generated through these arrangements is not known, but was in the billions of dollars. First, inappropriate state financing arrangements effectively increased the federal matching rate established under federal law by increasing federal expenditures while state contributions remained unchanged or even decreased. Under its Medicaid matching formula, the state paid $10.5 million and CMS paid $30.5 million as the federal share of the supplemental payment. Second, CMS had no assurance that these increased federal matching payments were retained by the providers and used to pay for Medicaid services. Federal Medicaid matching funds are intended for Medicaid- covered services for the Medicaid-eligible individuals on whose behalf payments are made. Third, these state financing arrangements undermined the fiscal integrity of the Medicaid program because they enabled states to make payments to government providers that significantly exceeded their costs. CMS Oversight Initiative to End State Financing Arrangements Lacked Transparency
Our March 2007 report on a recent CMS oversight initiative to end certain financing arrangements where providers did not retain the payments provides context for CMS’s May rule. Responding to concerns about states’ continuing use of creative financing arrangements to shift costs to the federal government, CMS has taken steps starting in August 2003 to end inappropriate state financing arrangements by closely reviewing state plan amendments on a state-by-state basis. As a result of CMS initiative, from August 2003 through August 2006, 29 states ended one or more arrangements for financing supplemental payments, because providers were not retaining the Medicaid payments for which states had received federal matching funds. CMS’s initiative was a departure from the agency’s past oversight approach, which did not focus on whether individual providers were retaining the supplemental payments they received. CMS had not used any of the means by which it typically provides information to states about the Medicaid program, such as its published state Medicaid manual, standard letters issued to all state Medicaid directors, or technical guidance manuals, to inform states about the specific standards it used for reviewing and approving states’ financing arrangements. The federal government and states have a responsibility to administer the program in a manner that assures expenditures benefit those low-income people for whom benefits were intended. The program’s long-term fiscal sustainability is important for beneficiaries, providers, states, and the federal government. Related GAO Products
Medicaid Financing: Federal Oversight Initiative Is Consistent with Medicaid Payment Principles but Needs Greater Transparency. | Why GAO Did This Study
Medicaid, a joint federal-state program, financed the health care for about 60 million low-income people in fiscal year 2005. States have considerable flexibility in deciding what medical services and individuals to cover and the amount to pay providers, and the federal government reimburses a proportion of states' expenditures according to a formula established by law. The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) is the federal agency responsible for overseeing Medicaid. Growing pressures on federal and state budgets have increased tensions between the federal government and states regarding this program, including concerns about whether states were appropriately financing their share of the program. GAO's testimony describes findings from prior work conducted from 1994 through March 2007 on (1) certain inappropriate state Medicaid financing arrangements and their implications for Medicaid's fiscal integrity, and (2) outcomes and transparency of a CMS oversight initiative begun in 2003 to end such inappropriate arrangements.
What GAO Found
GAO has reported for more than a decade on varied financing arrangements that inappropriately increase federal Medicaid matching payments. In reports issued from 1994 through 2005, GAO found that some states had received federal matching funds by paying certain government providers, such as county operated nursing homes, amounts that greatly exceeded established Medicaid rates. States would then bill CMS for the federal share of the payment. However, these large payments were often temporary, since some states required the providers to return most or all of the amount. States used the federal matching funds obtained in making these payments as they wished. Such financing arrangements had significant fiscal implications for the federal government and states. The exact amount of additional federal Medicaid funds generated through these arrangements is unknown, but was in the billions of dollars. Because such financing arrangements effectively increase the federal Medicaid share above what is established by law, they threaten the fiscal integrity of Medicaid's federal and state partnership. They shift costs inappropriately from the states to the federal government, and take funding intended for covered Medicaid costs from providers, who do not under these arrangements retain the full payments. In 2003, CMS began an oversight initiative that by August 2006 resulted in 29 states ending inappropriate financing arrangements. Under the initiative, CMS sought satisfactory assurances that a state was ending financing arrangements that the agency found to be inappropriate. According to CMS, the arrangements had to be ended because the providers did not retain all payments made to them but returned all or a portion to the states. GAO reported in 2007 that, although CMS's initiative was consistent with Medicaid payment principles, it was not transparent in implementation. CMS had not used any of the means by which it normally provides states with information about Medicaid program requirements, such as the published state Medicaid manual, standard letters issued to all state Medicaid directors, or technical guidance manuals. Such guidance could be helpful to inform states about the specific standards it used for reviewing and approving states' financing arrangements. In May 2007, CMS issued a final rule that would limit Medicaid payments to government providers' costs. GAO has not reported on CMS's rule. |
gao_GAO-10-16 | gao_GAO-10-16_0 | Scope and Methodology
We took several steps to update information on the status of TARP funds, including disbursements, dividend payments, repurchases, and warrant liquidations, from October 3, 2008, through September 25, 2009 (unless otherwise noted), and the status of Treasury’s actions taken in response to recommendations from our TARP reports, including its progress in developing a comprehensive system of internal control. We also met with officials from each organization and relevant state insurance regulators. To assess OFS’s processes for (1) management and oversight of contractors’ and financial agents’ performance, and (2) managing conflicts of interest of contractors and financial agents supporting TARP administration and operations, we reviewed applicable documents that had become available from OFS since our June 2009 report. Some of our recommendations applied to TARP in general, while others, such as CPP and HAMP, were program specific. We are addressing these issues in ongoing work. Amid concerns about the direction of the program and lack of transparency, the new administration has attempted to provide a more strategic direction for using the remaining funds an created a number of programs aimed at stabilizing the securitization markets, preserving homeownership, and most recently at providing assistance to community banks and small businesses. Others, such as HAMP and PPIP, face ongoing implementation or operational challenges. Over the Last Year, Treasury Has Disbursed Almost $364 Billion and Had More Than
In the past year, Treasury has implemented a range of TARP progr stabilize the financial system. troubled asset purchases and outstanding commitments to purchase and the total face amount of outstanding guarantees as of September 25, 2009, almost $329 billion remains available under the almost $700 billion limit on Treasury’s authority to purchase or insure troubled assets; however, while Treasury has updated its projected use of funds for AGP and AIFP, it has not modified any of its estimates for the others despite changes in curre market conditions, program participation rates, and repurchases since March 2009. As of September 25, 2009, Treasury had provided capital to 685 financial institutions through CPP. Home Affordable Modification Program Continues to Face Ongoing Challenges
HAMP faces a significant challenge that centers on uncertainty over the number of homeowners it will ultimately help. Treasury has already hired a communications director and four staff members to support its efforts to communicate with the public and Congress on the homeownership programs. Although Treasury has an appropriate management infrastructure in place, it must remain vigilant in managing and monitoring conflicts of interest that may arise with the use of private sector resources. Though OFS now has close to 200 staff, some key senior positions have not been permanently filled, such as the Chief Homeownership Preservation Officer and Chief Investment Officer. Without more current and meaningful estimates about projected uses of the remaining funds, Treasury’s ability to plan for and effectively execute the next phase of the program will be limited. Status of Efforts
The only participating institution was American International Group, Inc. (AIG). Appendix VIII: The Public-Private Investment Program
The Department of the Treasury (Treasury)—with assistance from the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (Federal Reserve) and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC)—designed the Public-Private Investment Program (PPIP) to lessen the impact of legacy assets on balance sheets and thereby improve consumer and business lending. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO's eighth report assesses the Troubled Asset Relief Program's (TARP) impact over the last year. Specifically, it addresses (1) the evolution of TARP's strategy and the status of TARP programs as of September 25, 2009; (2) the Department of the Treasury's (Treasury) progress in creating an effective management structure, including hiring for the Office of Financial Stability (OFS), overseeing contractors, and establishing a comprehensive system of internal control; and (3) indicators of TARP's performance that could help Treasury decide whether to extend the program. GAO reviewed relevant documentation and met with officials from OFS, contractors, and financial regulators.
What GAO Found
Over the last year, TARP in general, and the Capital Purchase Program (CPP) in particular, along with other efforts by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Federal Reserve) and Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), have made important contributions to helping stabilize credit markets. TARP is still a work in progress, and many uncertainties and challenges remain. For example, while some CPP participants had repurchased over $70 billion in preferred shares and warrants as of September 25, 2009, whether Treasury will fully recoup TARP assistance to the automobile industry and American International Group Inc., among others, remains uncertain. Moreover, other programs, such as the Public-Private Investment Program and the Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP) are still in varying stages of implementation. As of September 25, 2009, Treasury had disbursed almost $364 billion in TARP funds; however, Treasury has yet to update its projected use of funds for most programs in light of current market conditions, program participation rates, and repurchases. Without more current estimates about expected uses of the remaining funds, Treasury's ability to plan for and effectively execute the next steps of the program will be limited. Amid concerns about the direction and transparency of TARP, the new administration has attempted to provide a more strategic direction for using the remaining funds. TARP has moved from investment-based initiatives to programs aimed at stabilizing the securitization markets and preserving homeownership, and most recently at providing assistance to community banks and small businesses. While some programs, such as the Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility, appear to have generated market interest, others, such as HAMP, face ongoing implementation and operational challenges. Related to transparency, Treasury has taken a number of steps to improve communication with the public and Congress, including launching a Web site and preparing to hire a communications director for OFS to support these efforts. Treasury has also made significant progress in establishing and staffing OFS; however, it must continue to focus on filling critical leadership positions, including the Chief Homeownership Preservation Officer and Chief Investment Officer, with permanent staff. Treasury's network of contractors and financial agents that support TARP administration and operations has grown from 11 to 52. While Treasury has an appropriate infrastructure in place, it must remain vigilant in managing and monitoring conflicts of interests that may arise with the use of private sector sources. |
gao_AIMD-97-145 | gao_AIMD-97-145_0 | The long-term cost of a direct loan, however, may be much less than a grant because of loan repayments. Scope and Methodology
To determine whether the CSM complies with applicable laws and accounting standards, provides reliable results, and is maintained and operated under a system of adequate controls, we engaged the independent public accounting firm of Ernst & Young to perform an attestation in accordance with American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) attestation standards on OMB management’s assertions regarding the CSM’s capabilities and limitations. To ensure that Ernst & Young complied with contract requirements and applicable auditing standards, we defined the scope of work to be completed by Ernst & Young; met periodically with Ernst & Young during the course of its evaluation and attended key meetings with them, including their initial meeting with OMB staff; reviewed Ernst & Young’s work in accordance with generally accepted performed a limited analysis of the CSM, its assumptions, and mechanics in order to better understand the results of Ernst & Young’s work; analyzed the discounting formulas used by the CSM to discount the cash flows to the time of disbursement; and developed a limited number of test cash flow spreadsheets for use with the CSM to compare its results with those calculated manually and to gain an understanding of the proper use of the CSM. To identify supplemental audit steps that auditors should perform, we reviewed the CSM’s User’s Guide, OMB’s assertions, and Ernst & Young’s report. 2 define the cost of a direct loan or loan guarantee as the net present value of estimated future cash flows at the time when the loan is disbursed. The CSM’s calculation of subsidies complies with this definition in that the CSM computes a subsidy cost by calculating the net present value of agency-generated cash flows of expected payments to and from the government by discounting these cash flows to the fiscal year when they are disbursed. Because of these limitations, the subsidy percentage calculated by the CSM may differ from a “theoretically precise” result. Except for one of the limitations, however, our assessment is that CSM users and their auditors can take steps to minimize or eliminate the impact of the limitations. Of the several limitations OMB included in its assertions, three impact the subsidy cost calculations. In the audits of credit agencies’ financial statements for fiscal year 1995, significant weaknesses were identified with the quality of cash flow estimates and supporting data. 2. Further, OMB staff noted that OMB’s management assertions, which Ernst & Young concluded are “fairly stated in all material respects,” state that the effect of limitations in the current release of the CSM, based on cases reviewed to date, “have not revealed any instance in which such differences were significant.”
Procedures Auditors Should Perform to Ensure Proper Use of the Credit Subsidy Model
OMB’s assertions and Ernst & Young’s report pointed out that proper use of the CSM is the responsibility of the user agencies. Therefore, to ensure that CSM subsidy calculations are correct, auditors will need to, among other things, obtain assurance that agencies are using the CSM properly. With assistance from the Federal Audit Executive Council, credit agencies’ inspectors general, representatives of the Governmentwide Credit Reform Subgroup, and OMB’s credit reform staff, we identified supplemental audit procedures to be performed in audits of federal credit agencies and subsidy calculations. In addition, we recommend that the Director of OMB ensure that the following steps are taken in developing the next revision to the CSM: revise the discounting equations in the CSM to follow standard finance strengthen controls over the CSM by implementing a VV&T or similar process, improve the CSM documentation to correct for the mistakes and omissions noted in OMB’s assertions and Ernst & Young’s report, and enhance the CSM printout with additional data so that users and auditors are able to specifically identify which data were used by the CSM in the subsidy calculations. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO reviewed the Office of Management and Budget's (OMB) Credit Management Subsidy Model (CSM), focusing on whether the CSM: (1) conforms with relevant provisions of applicable legislation and accounting standards; (2) provides reliable results; and (3) is maintained and operated under a system of adequate controls. An additional objective was to identify supplemental audit steps that auditors should perform to ensure that federal credit agencies are using the CSM properly. GAO contracted with the independent public accounting firm of Ernst & Young LLP to evaluate OMB's written representations (assertions) about the CSM's capabilities and opine on whether they are fairly stated in all material respects.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) OMB's assertions on the CSM thoroughly explain the CSM's capabilities, limitations, and user agency responsibilities; (2) Ernst & Young concluded that OMB's assertions on the CSM are fairly stated in all material aspects and recommended several steps OMB should take to improve the reliability of CSM results and controls surrounding it; (3) based on GAO's review of Ernst & Young's work, GAO generally concurs with its conclusion and recommendations; (4) the Federal Credit Reform Act of 1990 and related federal accounting standards define the cost (subsidy) of a direct loan or loan guarantee as the estimated long-term cost to the government on a net present value basis at the time when a loan is disbursed; (5) the operation of the CSM conforms with this definition in that the model computes a subsidy cost by calculating the estimated net present value, at the time of loan disbursement, of agency-generated cash flows over the life of the loan; (6) OMB's assertions state that because of several limitations in the CSM's design, the subsidy cost calculated by the CSM may differ from a theoretically precise result; (7) for all but one of the limitations, credit agencies and their auditors can take steps to minimize or eliminate the impact of the limitations on the subsidy cost calculation; (8) the impact on the subsidy cost calculation of the limitation involving the use of nonstandard equations for discounting certain projected cash flows, however, is more difficult to evaluate and cannot be minimized by credit agencies and their auditors; (9) several weaknesses were identified relating to controls surrounding the development, maintenance, and use of the CSM; (10) GAO believes that if OMB implements a validation, verification, and testing approach (VV&T) or similar process, improves documentation, and provides guidance to credit agencies on controlling access to the CSM, the basic control weaknesses identified by Ernst & Young will be addressed; (11) OMB's assertions also state that user agencies are responsible for properly using the CSM; (12) consequently, when obtaining assurance that CSM subsidy cost calculations are correct, auditors will need to ensure that agencies are properly using the CSM; and (13) to help auditors obtain this assurance, GAO identified, with assistance from OMB staff, a series of supplemental audit procedures for auditors to follow when auditing federal credit agencies' financial statements and subsidy cost calculations. |
gao_GAO-01-226 | gao_GAO-01-226_0 | English-Based Approaches Predominate; In the Six States Reviewed, Most Children Receive Services for 4 Years or Less
English-based instruction is more commonly found in the nation’s public schools than bilingual instruction is. As school districts address the various challenges associated with meeting the educational needs of children with limited English proficiency, districts are also required to provide these children equal educational opportunities under title VI of the Civil Rights Act. OCR’s Title VI Requirements Are Set Forth in Three Policy Documents
Castaneda set forth a three-part test for determining whether a school district has adopted a satisfactory method for teaching children with limited English proficiency. Moreover, there is no clear time line for acquiring English proficiency. Even though different approaches to English language instruction may be effective, many variables may influence the choice of program used by a school, such as the percentage of students with limited English proficiency, the number of languages spoken by students, and students’ family backgrounds. As a result, local decisions about the amount of time needed to attain proficiency and the amount of language support that should be provided may differ. However, guidance from OCR provides the framework and standards that school districts must meet to ensure that students with limited English proficiency have a meaningful opportunity to participate in public education. | What GAO Found
Experts disagree about the best methods to teach student who speak little English. Even though different approaches to English language instruction may be effective, many variables may influence a given school's program choices. Moreover, there is no clear time line for acquiring English proficiency. Local decisions about the amount of time needed to attain proficiency and the amount of language support that should be provided may differ. Of the two main instructional approaches, English-based instruction is more common than instruction in a student's native language. Most students spent four or less years in these programs. School districts are required to ensure that English-language instruction is adequate and to provide these children with equal educational opportunities. The Office of Civil Rights (OCR) has adopted procedural requirements for criteria for judging the adequacy of local English-language instruction programs in meeting those needs. In three policy documents, OCR set forth requirements that school districts must meet to pass a three-pronged test established by the courts. When the adequacy of local English-language instruction programs is questioned, OCR investigates and, if problems are found, enters into agreement with the district specifying how the district will address the issues. |
gao_GAO-10-724 | gao_GAO-10-724_0 | Through the CoC system HUD allocates homeless assistance grants to organizations that participate in homeless assistance program planning networks. In a prior GAO report, we discussed the three most common federal definitions of rural— from the Bureau of the Census, the Department of Agriculture’s (USDA) Economic Research Service, and the Office of Management and Budget— which have differing criteria, such as population threshold or proximity to urban areas. However, even within one measure such as population threshold, different agencies can use different parameters and therefore identify different areas as rural. The range of living situations of persons experiencing homelessness in rural areas may overlap with the living situations of those experiencing homelessness in nonrural areas. However with a limited number of shelters or other outreach, they may not be accessing services. Challenges in Collecting Comprehensive Data Make Understanding the Extent of Homelessness in Rural and Nonrural Areas Difficult
Due to limited comprehensive data and challenges in combining data from different federal sources, understanding the extent of homelessness in rural and nonrural areas is difficult. Each agency focuses on the segments of the homeless population that the agency serves, resulting in incompatible data for comparison and analysis. In total, these programs fund permanent and short term housing and a variety of supportive services such as mental health services, substance abuse treatment, case management, and job training. This funding may be used to expand water and sewer services and to provide housing assistance. Limited Data Are Available on the Amount of Targeted and Nontargeted Assistance to Rural Versus Nonrural Areas
The amount of federal funding for targeted homeless assistance programs in rural areas is uncertain. For instance, HUD’s CoC programs maintain data on the amount of assistance for rural areas; however, grant applicants could designate (self-identify)—based on a HUD provided definition of rural area—whether they were in rural areas or not. Similarly, funding information on the mainstream and other nontargeted programs that can provide support to individuals or families experiencing homelessness is limited. Barriers to the Rural Homeless Population Seeking Assistance Include Limited Availability of Services, Lack of Transportation, and Lack of Affordable Housing
According to state and local officials, as well as individuals experiencing homelessness we interviewed in the states we visited, limited availability of services, lack of transportation, and lack of affordable housing have been some common barriers that the rural homeless population encounters when seeking assistance. Because shelters are one of the visible points of entry to a network of services such as health care, alcohol and drug treatment, job training, and case managers, those experiencing homelessness in rural areas who are without shelters may be more likely to be disconnected from caseworkers who can provide referrals to these supportive services. Limited Effective Collaboration among Federal Homelessness Programs Has Hindered Opportunities to Integrate Services
While a few examples of federal collaboration regarding homelessness have demonstrated aspects of effective collaboration, effective collaboration has been limited between HUD and HHS, two of the key federal agencies funding housing and supportive services that include programs for more than one subpopulation. Particularly, VA identified a number of Veterans Affairs Medical Centers to participate in the program and provide case management resources. Data limitations and the array of federal programs, some of which are not specifically targeted toward homelessness and some of which do not track if their services or dollars have been expended in rural areas or on persons experiencing homelessness, have resulted in multiple data sets that do not allow for an overall assessment of the characteristics and extent of rural homelessness or a comparison with nonrural homelessness. By more formally linking housing and supportive services, HUD and HHS could increase their ability and opportunities to address gaps in efforts to effectively address homelessness and decrease challenges to service providers and persons experiencing homelessness. Recommendation for Executive Action
To strengthen formal collaboration efforts, we recommend that the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development and the Secretary of Health and Human Services direct the appropriate program offices to further explore opportunities to more formally link housing and supportive services—in the most appropriate forms and combinations of mainstream and targeted programs identified by both agencies—with specific consideration for how such collaboration could minimize barriers to service provision in rural areas. Both HHS and HUD generally agreed with our recommendation and provided technical comments which we incorporated, as appropriate. We selected the site visit locations based on several factors, including (1) discussions with advocates and researchers in the field of homelessness—including the Housing Assistance Council, the National Alliance to End Homelessness, the National Law Center on Homelessness and Poverty, and the Urban Institute—to learn about rural homelessness issues and the outcomes across different states; (2) a review of studies and reports on local and state efforts to serve the homeless in rural areas, including papers prepared for the 2007 National Symposium on Homelessness Research that highlighted issues related to rural homelessness; (3) the presence of tribal lands and colonias; and (4) geographical diversity. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Homeless Emergency Assistance and Rapid Transition to Housing (HEARTH) Act of 2009 directed GAO to conduct a broad study of homelessness in rural areas. In this report, we provide information about rural homelessness issues, based in significant part on our work in rural areas within six selected states. Specifically, the report addresses the following questions: (1) What are the characteristics of homelessness in rural areas? (2) What assistance is available to individuals or families experiencing homelessness and what amount of funding have the federal departments and agencies awarded to organizations that assist persons experiencing homelessness in rural areas? (3) What barriers do persons experiencing homelessness and homeless service providers encounter when seeking assistance or funding to provide assistance? To address these issues, GAO reviewed relevant literature, conducted site visits, and interviewed agency officials.
What GAO Found
Rural homelessness involves a range of living situations but comparing the extent of homelessness in rural and nonrural areas is difficult primarily due to data limitations. Based on GAO visits to six states, persons experiencing homelessness in rural areas could be living in one of a limited number of shelters, in extremely overcrowded situations, in severely substandard housing, or outdoors. While HUD and other agencies collect some data on homeless populations, several challenges exist in using these data to compare the extent of homelessness in rural and nonrural areas. They include difficulties in counting transient populations, limited reporting by service providers in federal data systems, inconsistent reporting across programs, and focusing on the segments of the homeless population that the agency serves. Definitional differences also make comparisons difficult. For instance, the three most common federal definitions of rural use differing criteria such as population or proximity to urban areas. Even within one measure such as population, different agencies can use different parameters and therefore identify different areas as rural. A number of federal programs exist to support those experiencing homelessness in rural areas. Targeted and nontargeted programs fund permanent and emergency housing and supportive services such as mental health services, case management, and job training. However, federal agencies maintain limited data on the amount of homeless assistance awarded to rural areas, making comparisons with assistance awarded to nonrural areas difficult. For instance, HUD maintains some data on the amount of homeless assistance awarded to rural areas through its targeted programs, but the data are based on providers' identification of locations as rural or not. Nontargeted programs can serve persons experiencing homelessness but do not track how much funding is used for homeless assistance. As a result of data limitations such as these, comparisons of funding levels offer limited insight into the relationship between the size of the homeless population in an area and the amount of funding received. Barriers to accessing and providing homeless services in rural areas include limited access to services, large service areas, dispersed populations, and a lack of transportation and affordable housing according to state and local officials and persons experiencing homelessness in the states we visited. For instance, many rural areas have few shelters or shelters with few beds serving very large areas. A program in which HUD provides housing vouchers to homeless veterans and the Department of Veterans Affairs provides clinical and case management services to these same veterans is one of a limited number of examples of formal collaboration and leveraging of federal resources that link housing and supportive services. The effects of limited collaboration may be particularly acute in rural areas because of the barriers cited above. Without a more formal linking of housing and supportive services by HUD and HHS, two of the key agencies for funding these activities, the effectiveness of federal efforts to address homelessness may be diminished.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the Departments of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and Health and Human Services (HHS) explore further opportunities to strengthen formal collaboration on linking housing and supportive services to address homelessness, with specific consideration for how such collaboration can minimize barriers to service provision in rural areas. HHS and HUD generally agreed with the recommendation. |
gao_GAO-17-67 | gao_GAO-17-67_0 | SBA’s 2006 Forms Management Program, SOP 00 30 3, provides written operating procedures for the agency’s Paperwork Reduction Act clearance process. Next, Records Management Division officials said they solicit public comments and coordinate with the relevant program offices as well as Office of General Counsel (OGC) and Office of Inspector General (OIG) to evaluate the information collection. We also observed from a demonstration that the Electronic Loan Application disaster business loan application forms include the OMB control number, expiration date, and a disclaimer that if the OMB control number is missing, an applicant is not required to complete the forms. According to SBA officials, SBA uses the surveys, both administered by phone, to solicit input and suggestions for improvements. SBA Could Better Integrate Consistent Information about the Disaster Business Loan Process into Its Web Portal and More Fully Define Loan Terminology
Disaster Loan-Related Information Is Not Easily Accessible
SBA has published several written and electronic resources about the disaster loan process, but much of this information is not easily accessible to loan applicants and SBA’s resource partners from the disaster loan assistance web portal. 14 and 15) set out the three steps of the loan process, required documents, and estimated time frames. For example, according to SBDCs we interviewed as well as responses to SBA and the ACSI surveys, some business loan applicants found the loan process and required documentation confusing for the following reasons: Inconsistent information about loan application process. The Paperwork Reduction Act and OMB state that agencies should explain the collection and use of personal information and promote transparency with the public. Furthermore, according to OMB’s directive on open government, transparency promotes accountability by providing the public with information about government activities. Some Business Loan Applicants Are Confused about Finance Terminology
Our SBDC interviews indicate that some business loan applicants are confused about the finance terminology and financial forms required in the application, particularly the requirement that they submit a personal financial statement. Federal statute requires agencies to use clear and understandable terminology. A more integrated, consistent, and clear dissemination of information by SBA would help business disaster victims better access information about the disaster loan process, better understand the loan document requirements and expected time frames, and better understand the definition of loan terminology, thus helping to reduce victims’ burdens in recovering from disasters. To help reduce confusion about the disaster loan process and the time frames applicants may experience, the Administrator of the Small Business Administration should ensure the consistency of content across its disaster loan process resources by including in these written and online resources, as appropriate, the following: (1) the three-step process; (2) the types of documentation SBA may request and the general reasons why such information may be requested; and (3) estimates of loan processing time frames applicants might experience and external factors, such as the severity of a disaster, that may affect these time frames using, for example, estimates from its forecasting and related planning tools. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The Recovery Improvements for Small Entities After Disaster Act of 2015 includes a provision for us to evaluate the steps that the Small Business Administration (SBA) has taken to comply with the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 in administering its Disaster Loan Program. Specifically, this report examines (1) controls in SBA’s process for complying with the form renewal requirements of the Paperwork Reduction Act in administering its Disaster Loan Program, and (2) SBA’s recent and planned actions to reduce the burden of business loan applicants for the Disaster Loan Program. We also interviewed SBA officials to understand SBA’s compliance with the act’s requirements and the effectiveness of SBA’s controls. To examine the extent to which SBA has developed plans or implemented actions to further reduce the paperwork burden of disaster business loan applicants, we reviewed SBA’s 2015 Performance Report and other SBA documentation that set out recent and planned actions intended to reduce burden or enhance loan processes for disaster business loan applicants. We selected a nongeneralizable sample of eight SBDCs to interview, based on which counties in each of the four Census regions had the highest number of approved disaster business loans for calendar years 2012 through April 1, 2016. | Why GAO Did This Study
According to SBA, the agency received more than 40,000 disaster business loan applications from fiscal years 2010 through 2014, and estimates that applicants spent on average a total of more than 25,000 hours per year filling out disaster loan application forms. PRA requires agencies to minimize paperwork burden on individuals and small businesses. The Recovery Improvements for Small Entities After Disaster Act of 2015 includes a provision for GAO to evaluate SBA's compliance with PRA. This report examines (1) controls in SBA's process for complying with PRA form renewal requirements in administering its disaster business loans, and (2) SBA's recent and planned actions to reduce burden for business loan applicants.
GAO analyzed applicable laws and guidance, including PRA and OMB and SBA guidance and policies, relevant reports, and loan applicants' responses to SBA and other surveys. GAO also interviewed SBA officials and a nongeneralizable sample of eight SBA resource partners (Small Business Development Centers) that provided disaster-related assistance to businesses, based on county-level loan approvals for 2012 through April 1, 2016.
What GAO Found
The Small Business Administration (SBA) process for complying with the Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA) includes a number of controls to help disaster business loan forms comply with the act and Office of Management and Budget (OMB) requirements (see figure). For example, SBA has a standard operating procedure that documents its clearance process; a requirement to solicit public comments; and a requirement that offices of Disaster Assistance, General Counsel, and Inspector General review submission packages for PRA clearance. SBA surveys business loan applicants to solicit suggestions for improving the loan process. The disaster business loan forms also include a valid OMB control number, as required by PRA.
SBA has implemented and planned actions to streamline the disaster business loan process, but the agency has not made loan-related information and requirements easily accessible or consistent, or defined key terms, contributing to applicants' burden. SBA's 2015 Performance Report set out the agency's recent and planned actions, including streamlining the loan process and enhancing online loan application capabilities. SBA has published written and electronic materials about the disaster loan process, but applicants cannot easily access these materials from SBA's dedicated disaster loan web portal, contrary to federal guidelines for improving digital services. Also, SBA's materials provide inconsistent information on the process, required documents, and estimated processing time frames. Business loan applicants reported that they found the documentation requirements confusing and the application time frames unclear. PRA and an OMB directive on open government generally state that agencies should explain the collection and use of information and promote transparency by providing the public with information about government activities. Similarly, some Small Business Development Centers told GAO that loan applicants have expressed confusion over undefined financial terminology in SBA's loan application, particularly terminology in the required personal financial statement. Federal law requires agencies' forms be written using plain language that is appropriate for the intended audience. Improved integration of electronic resources and consistency of information in SBA's materials would help business disaster victims better access resources and understand the disaster loan process and expected time frames. Further, providing definitions of loan terminology can help reduce victims' confusion.
What GAO Recommends
SBA should (1) better integrate disaster-loan-related information on its web portal; (2) improve consistency of information, including the loan process, required documents, and estimated time frames, in paper and electronic resources; and (3) define financial terminology on disaster business loan application forms. SBA agreed with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-04-718 | gao_GAO-04-718_0 | In fiscal year 2003, VA spent about $26 billion to provide healthcare to 4.5 million veterans. A national contract may also include requirements of other federal agencies such as the Department of Defense. 1). In fiscal year 2003, for example, VA medical center purchases represented $3.9 billion, or over 63 percent, of the $6.2 billion in total sales from VA’s schedule contracts. In fiscal year 2001, the VA Inspector General (IG) issued a report that expressed significant concerns about the effectiveness of VA’s acquisition system. Many VA Contracts Offer Favorable Prices and Savings, but VA Could Further Leverage Its Buying Power When Acquiring Healthcare Services
The FSS and national contracts that VA has awarded have resulted in more favorable prices and yielded substantial savings. To strengthen its bargaining position during FSS contract negotiations, VA has relied on pre-award audits of vendors’ contract proposals and post-award audits of vendors’ contract actions. Audits Have Helped VA Obtain Most Favored Customer Prices and Savings
To help ensure VA obtains most favored customer prices on FSS contracts for medical products and services, VA’s Office of Inspector General entered into a memorandum of understanding with VA’s Office of Acquisition and Materiel Management to conduct pre-award and post- award audits of FSS contracts. According to VA officials, VA’s pharmaceutical standardization program led to savings of $394 million for 84 categories of drugs in fiscal year 2003. Second, VA consolidates its purchases of high-tech medical equipment to achieve additional savings. According to VA officials, this resulted in savings of $2 million. VA Has Potential for Additional Savings When Contracting for Healthcare Services
While the National Acquisition Center has actively looked for ways to reduce the cost of pharmaceuticals and medical supplies and equipment, it has not taken the same aggressive approach to negotiate more favorable prices for healthcare services. Only $66 million of these services were purchased from FSS contracts. Between fiscal years 1999 and 2003, total medical-center FSS purchases more than doubled (see table 3). Although medical centers’ FSS purchases showed an increase between fiscal year 1999 and 2001, the VA IG reported in May 2001 that medical centers were often not using the VA contracts to purchase medical products because medical centers were not required to buy from FSS and national contracts. The VA IG estimated that over five years (the typical life of national contracts) VA could save about $1.4 billion if medical centers purchased medical products from FSS and national contracts. There are two primary reasons why VA medical centers have not purchased medical products from the best sources. VA Does Not Have Complete Information on the FSS Program Costs
To operate the FSS program, VA is supposed to identify all program costs and charge a fee to its customers based on these costs. Currently, VA charges FSS users a fee of 0.5 percent of sales to cover the cost of operating the schedules program. Without knowing the full cost of administering the program, VA has no assurance that the user fee accurately covers program costs. Despite this accomplishment, VA could achieve significantly more savings—through leveraging its purchasing power to negotiate FSS and national contracts for healthcare services used at VA’s 160 medical centers and through improved oversight of medical center purchases. Specifically, we recommend that the Secretary of the Department of Veterans Affairs explore opportunities to use its buying power to obtain more favorable prices for healthcare services, strengthen oversight to ensure medical centers use FSS and national contracts to get the best prices available, and identify the complete cost of the FSS program and reassess its user fee to determine if it needs to be adjusted. To identify opportunities to improve purchasing practices and increase savings, we met with VA medical center procurement officials. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) provides healthcare to millions of veterans at VA's medical centers and healthcare facilities across the country. To support veterans, VA manages a Federal Supply Schedule (FSS) program and a national contract program. Both use VA's sizeable buying power to provide VA and other federal agencies discounts on medical products and services. To cover its costs in running the FSS program, VA charges its customers a user fee. Although sales through VA's FSS and national contracts totaled almost $7 billion in fiscal year 2003, concerns have been raised about the efficiency of these contract programs. GAO was asked to determine whether the FSS and national contracts have provided medical products at favorable prices and to identify opportunities to improve purchasing practices and increase savings. GAO was also asked to determine if VA's user fee is sufficient to cover program cost.
What GAO Found
The more than 1,200 FSS and 330 national contracts that VA has awarded have resulted in more competitive prices and have yielded substantial savings. VA has achieved these favorable prices and savings, in part, by exercising its audit rights and access to contractor data to pursue best prices aggressively for medical supplies and services. For example, pre-award audits of vendors' contract proposals and post-award audits of vendors' contract actions resulted in savings of about $240 million during fiscal years 1999 to 2003. VA has also taken steps to further leverage its buying power on widely used healthcare items--such as pharmaceuticals and high-tech medical equipment--through its national contracts. According to VA, its national pharmaceutical contracts have led to a cost avoidance of $394 million in fiscal year 2003. However, VA has not taken the same aggressive approach to negotiate more competitive prices for healthcare services, such as radiology. In fiscal year 2003, healthcare services totaled about $1.7 billion, yet VA facilities only purchased about $66 million through VA FSS contracts. Instead, most medical healthcare services are purchased through contracts that individual VA medical centers have negotiated, a process that may not provide the most favorable prices. VA could also realize additional savings through improved medical center purchasing practices. Despite increases in medical centers' FSS purchases--which more than doubled between fiscal years 1999 and 2003--medical centers have not always taken advantage of the best prices available through VA's contracts. For example, in fiscal year 2001, a VA Inspector General (IG) report stated that VA medical centers frequently purchased healthcare products from local sources, instead of from available FSS contracts. Although VA has since implemented policies and procedures that generally require its medical centers to purchase medical products and services through VA's contract programs, a more recent VA IG report found that medical centers continued to make purchases from local suppliers. The VA IG estimated that, with improved procurement practices at medical centers, VA could save about $1.4 billion over 5 years. However, ensuring VA medical centers comply with VA's purchasing policies and procedures will be a challenge for VA, in part, because its monitoring of purchases lacks adequate rigor. The user fee that VA collects on FSS purchases--0.5 percent of sales--is expected to approximate the program costs. VA, however, does not have complete information on the costs to administer the FSS program. Without this cost data, VA is unable to know whether it is charging an appropriate user fee. |
gao_GAO-17-468 | gao_GAO-17-468_0 | Common military training is required for all servicemembers. The Army, Marine Corps, Navy, and Air Force each have about 19 mandatory training requirements. For example, the Office of the DOD Chief Information Officer is the lead proponent for Cybersecurity. DOD and the Military Services Have Made Efforts to Review and Validate Common Military Training Requirements
DOD and the military services have made efforts to review and validate the need for the current common military training requirements. DOD, for example, established the Common Military Training Working Group in February 2015 to, among other things, review and validate common military training. The Acting Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness signed the Common Military Training Working Group Charter in December 2016. According to an Office of the Deputy for Force Training official, the working group held its first organizational meeting in January 2017 and a second meeting in February 2017 at the Advanced Distributed Learning Office, at which it received a briefing on its learning science and technology portfolio. The working group’s charter states that it will review common military training requirements for validity. However, according to that official, the office is in the process of developing future working group meeting agendas to discuss topics such as validating training requirements. According to officials, the Navy and Marine Corps annually review and validate mandatory training requirements. Finally, according to Air Force officials, the Air Force reviewed and validated existing mandatory training requirements during its October 2016 training review. Specifically, DOD Instruction 1322.31 calls for the working group to periodically evaluate common military training for effectiveness, among other things, and DOD Directive 1322.18 states that it is DOD’s policy to assess military training throughout the department. The Common Military Training Working Group charter directs the group to review common military training requirements for effectiveness. We found that some military service boards and committees have made independent efforts to assess the effectiveness of their respective mandatory military training courses, including common military training. For example, in 2015 the Army Mandatory Training Task Force evaluated the accessibility and effectiveness of current training materials. Military Services Offer Flexibilities Regarding Course Delivery Methods and Are Taking Steps to Consolidate Training and Reduce Training Time
The military services offer varying degrees of flexibility for providing course delivery methods that allow individuals to complete mandatory training requirements, including common military training, according to guidance we reviewed and servicemembers’ perspectives we obtained. According to estimates provided by service officials, it would take an individual less than 20 hours to complete all the common military training. The military services are also taking initial steps toward reducing training time for some mandatory training requirements, including common military training, by updating their guidance, combining similar training topics, and eliminating redundancies. The Air Force issued a memo in August 2016 outlining steps to address training demands such as establishing a task force to streamline training, among other things, and focusing on computer-based training requirements and their effect on the force. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To describe what efforts DOD and the services have made to review and validate common military training requirements, we collected and reviewed DOD and service-level guidance to determine the training required to complete common military training and the process for reviewing, validating, consolidating, and eliminating common military training. To describe steps that DOD and the services have taken to evaluate the effectiveness of common military training requirements, we collected and reviewed DOD and service-level guidance explaining the process to evaluate common military training. To describe the flexibilities that the services offer regarding course delivery methods, steps they are taking to consolidate training and reduce training time, and their perspectives on various aspects of training, we collected service-level training guidance that explains the level of flexibility units have to complete common military training. These requirements fall under the services’ definitions of mandatory training requirements. | Why GAO Did This Study
DOD requires all servicemembers to complete training that provides common knowledge and skills. Common military training across the military services includes topics such as Suicide Prevention, Cybersecurity, and Sexual Assault Prevention and Response. DOD has identified a need to reduce training requirements because of concerns from the services about the amount of time it takes to complete training, and in 2012 asked the RAND Corporation to examine the services' mandatory training—which includes common military training—requirements and options for standardization. RAND recommended, among other things, that DOD consider adopting standardized, computer-based training and issue a single DOD directive that lists all requirements.
House Report 114-537 accompanying a bill for the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 included a provision for GAO to examine the military services' actions to assess mandatory military training requirements. This report describes (1) efforts that DOD and the services have made to review and validate common military training requirements; (2) steps that DOD and the services have taken to evaluate the effectiveness of these requirements; and (3) flexibilities the services offer regarding course delivery methods, steps they are taking to consolidate and reduce training time, and their perspectives on various aspects of training. GAO reviewed DOD and military service training guidance and interviewed officials at DOD headquarters and military service offices.
What GAO Found
The Department of Defense (DOD) and the military services have made recent efforts to review and validate common military training requirements. DOD established the Common Military Training Working Group in February 2015 to, among other things, review and validate common military training requirements. In December 2016 the Acting Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness signed the Common Military Training Working Group Charter, which states that the working group will review common military training requirements for validity. According to an Office of the Deputy for Force Training official, the working group held its first meeting in January 2017 and a second meeting in February 2017. According to that official, the Office of the Deputy for Force Training is in the process of developing future working group meeting agendas to discuss topics such as validating training requirements. In addition, some of the military services have taken steps to review and validate common military training. For example, according to officials, the Navy and Marine Corps annually review and validate mandatory training requirements, while the Army reviews and validates mandatory training requirements biennially or as directed. According to Air Force officials, the Air Force reviewed and validated existing mandatory training requirements during its October 2016 training review.
DOD has directed the Common Military Training Working Group to evaluate the effectiveness of common military training requirements. DOD Instruction 1322.31 calls for the working group to periodically review common military training and evaluate it for effectiveness, among other things, and the working group's charter states that it will review common military training requirements for effectiveness. In addition, some DOD proponents responsible for managing a specific common military training core curriculum, as well as the military service boards, have made independent efforts to assess the effectiveness of their respective mandatory military training courses, including common military training. For example, in 2015 the Army Mandatory Training Task Force evaluated the accessibility and effectiveness of current training materials.
The military services offer varying degrees of flexibility for providing course delivery methods that allow individuals to complete mandatory training requirements, including common military training. For example, training guidance provided by the Marine Corps, Navy, and Air Force indicates that the services may rely on a variety of delivery methods for training, including distance learning systems, formal courses, and one-on-one instruction. According to estimates provided by service officials, it would take an individual less than 20 hours to complete all common military training requirements. Nevertheless, the military services are taking steps to reduce training time for some mandatory training requirements by updating their guidance, combining similar training topics, and eliminating redundancies. For example, the Air Force has reviewed all of its training topics to determine which ones to streamline or consolidate. GAO interviewed servicemembers from across the services who informally presented a range of perspectives regarding various aspects of training. |
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