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gao_GAO-06-542T | gao_GAO-06-542T_0 | In some cases, a consular officer may determine the need for a Security Advisory Opinion, which is a response from Washington on whether to issue a visa to the applicant. Applicants May Face Extensive Wait Times for Visa Interviews
According to consular officials, posts that consistently have wait times for visa interview appointments of 30 days or longer may have a resource or management problem. As of March 2006, State’s data showed that between September 2005 and February 2006, 97 posts reported maximum wait times of 30 or more days in at least one month; at 20 posts, the reported wait times were in excess of 30 days for the entire 6-month period. Moreover, in February 2006, nine posts reported wait times in excess of 90 days (see table 1). However, since September 2001, several factors have exacerbated wait times for visas. Visa Policy and Procedural Changes Have Increased Consular Workload
Since the September 11 attacks, Congress, State, and DHS have initiated a series of changes to policies and procedures designed to enhance border security. These changes have added to the complexity of consular officers’ workload and, in turn, exacerbated State’s resource constraints. As previously mentioned, some applicants have faced additional delays due to various special security checks, or Security Advisory Opinions. Staffing Shortfalls Impact the Effectiveness of Visa Operations
In September 2005, we reported that State faced staffing shortfalls in consular positions—a key factor affecting the effectiveness of the visa process and the length of time applicants must wait for visas. Although these posts had other mid- or seniorlevel consular officers, their availability on visa issues was limited because of their additional responsibilities. We have reported on numerous occasions that factors such as staffing shortages have contributed to long wait times for visas at some posts. However, while we have not studied this issue, the disparity in wait times among posts may indicate the need to reallocate positions to address the growing consular demand and long wait times at some posts. Conclusions
The visa process presents a balance between facilitating legitimate travel and identifying those who might harm the United States. Border Security: Actions Needed to Strengthen Management of Department of Homeland Security’s Visa Security Program. Border Security: New Policies and Procedures Are Needed to Fill Gaps in the Visa Revocation Process. State Department: Backlogs of Tourist Visas at U.S. Consulates. | Why GAO Did This Study
In deciding to approve or deny a visa application, the Department of State's (State) consular officers are on the front line of defense in protecting the United States against those who seek to harm U.S. interests. To increase border security following the September 11 attacks, Congress, State, and the Department of Homeland Security initiated a series of changes to border security policies and procedures. These changes have added to the complexity of consular workload. But consular officers must balance this security responsibility against the need to facilitate legitimate travel. In recent years, GAO has issued a series of reports on the visa process. This statement discusses (1) wait times for visas, (2) factors that affect wait times, and (3) GAO's recent work on consular staffing.
What GAO Found
As a result of changes since September 11, 2001, aimed at strengthening visa policies and procedures, applicants have faced extensive wait times for visas at some posts. According to consular officials, posts that consistently have wait times of 30 days or longer for interview appointments may have a resource problem. During a recent 6-month period, 97 of State's 211 visa-issuing posts reported maximum wait times of 30 or more days in at least one month; at 20 posts, the reported wait times were in excess of 30 days for this entire 6-month period. Further, in February 2006, 9 posts reported wait times in excess of 90 days. Several factors have contributed to these delays at some consular posts. For example, Congress, State, and the Department of Homeland Security have initiated new policies and procedures since the September 11 attacks to strengthen the security of the visa process; however, these new requirements have increased consular workload and exacerbated delays. Additionally, some applicants have faced additional delays because of special security checks for national security concerns. Other factors, such as resurgence in visa demand and ongoing embassy facility limitations, could continue to affect wait times. We recently reported that State had not conducted a worldwide, comprehensive assessment of staffing requirements for visa operations. While State has increased hiring of consular officers, there is a need for such an assessment to ensure that State has sufficient staff at key consular posts, particularly in light of the visa processing delays at some posts. |
gao_GAO-13-402T | gao_GAO-13-402T_0 | Leveraging Surface Transportation Investments to Further National Interests
Given the condition and needs of the transportation system and the federal government’s fiscal outlook, DOT faces several challenges in leveraging investment in surface transportation networks to further national interests. More specifically, DOT faces challenges related to (1) transitioning to a goal-oriented, performance-based approach, (2) targeting funds to national priorities such as our freight network, (3) effectively managing discretionary grant and credit assistance programs, and (4) effectively overseeing programs and spending. In July 2012, the President signed into law the Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act (MAP-21) that included provisions to move toward a more performance-based highway and transit program. Successfully implementing a performance-based approach entails new responsibilities for DOT and its operating administrations. First, its administration and oversight of programs have tended to be process-oriented, rather than outcome-oriented. DOT has not implemented this recommendation. DOT also faces challenges overseeing other programs going forward. To enhance safety, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) is shifting to a data-driven, risk- based safety oversight approach—called a safety management system (SMS) approach. Our recent work on transportation safety across all modes has highlighted the need for improvement in data and oversight. Data are also critical for the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) to target resources and identify which of the hundreds of thousands of commercial motor vehicles operating on our nation’s roads pose the highest safety concerns. We recommended that FMCSA develop a data-driven approach to target new carriers attempting to disguise their former identities and expand this new approach to examine all motor carriers. For example, while we can draw some conclusions about general aviation accident characteristics, limitations in flight activity (e.g., flight hours) and other data preclude a complete assessment of general aviation safety. GAO has recommended, among other things, that FAA require the collection of general aviation aircraft flight-hour data in ways that minimize the impact on the general aviation community, set safety improvement goals for individual general aviation-industry segments, and develop performance measures for significant activities that aim to improve general aviation safety. FAA is currently working to implement these recommendations. Effectively Implementing the Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen)
Another area that I would like to address is the implementation of NextGen. This complex multiagency undertaking is intended to transform the current radar-based system into an aircraft-centered, satellite navigation-based system and is estimated to cost between $15 billion and $22 billion through 2025. FAA has taken several steps to improve NextGen implementation and is continuing to address critical issues that we, stakeholders, and others have identified, including three key challenges that affect NextGen implementation: delivering and demonstrating NextGen benefits, keeping key NextGen acquisitions within cost estimates and on schedule, and balancing NextGen implementation with maintaining and operating the current air traffic control system during the transition. Delivering and Demonstrating NextGen Benefits
FAA must deliver systems, procedures, and capabilities that provide aircraft operators with a return on their investments in NextGen avionics. However, past delays with the En Route Automation Modernization (ERAM) program—a critical program for NextGen—illustrate how delays can affect overall acquisition and maintenance costs as well as time frames for other programs. The successful implementation of NextGen—both in the midterm (through 2020) and in the long term (beyond 2020)—will be affected by how well FAA manages such program interdependencies. Managing the Transition to NextGen
Particularly in light of constrained budget resources, FAA will have to balance its priorities to help ensure that NextGen implementation stays on course. For example, FAA’s NextGen modeling indicates that even if all ongoing and planned NextGen technologies are implemented, 14 airports—including some of the 35 busiest—may not be able to meet the projected increases in demand (table 1). Effective information security controls are required to ensure that financial and sensitive information is adequately protected from inadvertent or deliberate misuse, fraudulent use, and improper disclosure, modification, or destruction. DOT has been challenged to effectively protect its computer systems and networks. In summary, as the principal agency responsible for implementing national transportation policy and administering most federal transportation programs, DOT faces several key challenges going forward in leveraging surface transportation investments, improving surface and aviation transportation safety, effectively implementing NextGen, and improving information security. Addressing these challenges in an environment of increasing need and increasing fiscal challenges will require looking at the entire range of federal activities and reexamining federal spending and tax expenditures to improve and enhance these systems that are vital to the nation’s economy. Next Generation Air Transportation System: FAA Faces Implementation Challenges. | Why GAO Did This Study
The nation's transportation system--including highways, airways, pipelines, and rail systems that move both people and freight--is critical to the economy and affects the daily lives of most Americans. However, this system is under growing strain, and estimates of the cost to repair and upgrade the system to meet current and future demands are in the hundreds of billions of dollars. At the same time, traditional funding sources--in particular motor fuel and truck-related taxes--are eroding and the federal government faces long-term fiscal challenges. Addressing these challenges will require looking across federal activities and reexamining all types of federal spending and tax expenditures.
DOT is the principal agency responsible for implementing national transportation policy and administering most federal transportation programs. This statement discusses four key management challenges facing DOT: (1) leveraging surface transportation investments to further national interests, (2) improving surface and aviation transportation safety, (3) effectively implementing the Next Generation Air Transportation System and (4) improving information security. This statement is based on GAO's previous reports and testimonies, which are listed at the end of the statement. GAO has made a number of recommendations to DOT to more effectively leverage the departments' investments and enhance the safety of the traveling public, among other areas. DOT actions underway to address these recommendations are described in this statement.
What GAO Found
Leveraging surface transportation investments to further national interests : The Department of Transportation (DOT) faces several challenges leveraging investment in surface transportation networks to meet national goals and priorities. For example, DOT has to transition to a goal-oriented, performance-based approach for highway and transit programs, as required by the Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act (MAP-21). Successfully implementing a performance-based approach entails new responsibilities for DOT since, as GAO has previously reported, its program oversight has generally been process-oriented rather than outcome-oriented. DOT also faces challenges related to targeting funds to priorities like the nation's freight network, effectively managing discretionary grant and credit assistance programs, and effectively overseeing other programs, such as the federal-aid highway program.
Improving surface and aviation transportation safety : GAO's recent work on safety across all modes has highlighted the need for improved data reliability and oversight. For example, data are critical for identifying commercial motor vehicles that pose the highest safety concerns. In 2012, GAO recommended that the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) develop a data-driven approach to target carriers operating illegally by attempting to disguise their former identities and expand this approach to examine all new motor carriers. FMCSA is currently working to develop such a data-driven approach. Aviation safety-data collection and oversight also can be improved. For example, limitations in flight activity (e.g., flight hours) and other data preclude a complete assessment of general aviation safety. GAO recommended, among other things, that the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) require the collection of general aviation aircraft flight-hour data in ways that minimize the impact on the general aviation community and set safety improvement goals for individual general aviation-industry segments, which FAA is working to address.
Effectively implementing the Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen) : NextGen is intended to transform the current radar-based system to an aircraft-centered, satellite navigation-based system. FAA faces three key challenges going forward. One challenge is delivering procedures and capabilities that provide aircraft operators with a return on investment in NextGen avionics to incentivize further investments. FAA also faces challenges keeping key NextGen acquisitions within cost estimates and on schedule. NextGen implementation will be affected by how well FAA manages the program's interdependencies, as delays in one program can affect timeframes for other programs and overall acquisition and maintenance costs. Finally, FAA faces challenges managing the transition to NextGen. FAA will have to balance its priorities to ensure that NextGen implementation stays on course while continuing to maintain current equipment and facilities. FAA's modeling indicates that even if all NextGen technologies are implemented, 14 airports--including some of the 35 busiest--may not be able to meet projected increases in demand.
Improving information security : DOT faces challenges effectively protecting its computer systems and networks. GAO and others have found that DOT has not consistently implemented effective controls to ensure that financial and sensitive information is adequately protected from unauthorized access and other risks. |
gao_GAO-11-636 | gao_GAO-11-636_0 | USAID and USDA are not required to achieve a specific level of cost recovery for their monetization transactions. Instead, they are only required to achieve reasonable market price, which has not been clearly defined. Therefore, a combined total of $219 million of appropriated funds was ultimately not available for development projects. The cargo preference mandate requires that 75 percent of U.S. food aid be shipped on U.S.-flag vessels. While implementing partners report cost recovery data to USAID and USDA, the agencies do not use the data to monitor sales prices over time. As a result, its cost recovery was lower than estimated. However, we found that USAID’s assessments were conducted for a limited number of countries and have not yet been updated to reflect changing market conditions. We also found that USDA’s UMRs contained weaknesses, such as a lack of methodology and errors in formulas. These adverse impacts may include discouraging food production by local farmers, which in turn could undermine the food security goals of the development projects funded by monetization. USAID and USDA Are Required to Ensure that Monetization Does Not Cause Adverse Market Impacts, but the Volume Programmed for Monetization in More than a Quarter of Cases May Have Increased the Risk of Displacing Commercial Trade
USAID and USDA Are Required by Law to Ensure that Monetization Does Not Cause Adverse Market Impacts that May Run Counter to Development Goals
By law, USAID and USDA are required to ensure that monetization transactions do not lead to adverse market impacts, such as causing disincentives to, or interference with, domestic production or marketing of the same or similar commodities. Furthermore, without conducting post-monetization transaction impact evaluations, the agencies cannot determine the actual impacts of monetization, even when the volume of the commodity monetized is more than 25 percent of the commodity’s commercial import volume. Finally, transportation costs constitute about a third of the overall costs of monetization over the 3-year period we examined, and the 3-year reflagging rule—which only applies to food aid and not to the defense agencies and the U.S. Export-Import Bank—can limit competition among ships eligible to transport U.S. food aid, further increasing cost. Matter for Congressional Consideration
Consistent with rules that apply to the Maritime Security Fleet and vessels transporting other U.S. government cargo, Congress should consider amending the Cargo Preference Act of 1954 to eliminate the 3-year waiting period imposed on foreign vessels that acquire U.S.-flag registry before they are eligible for carriage of preference food aid cargos. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve the extent to which monetization proceeds cover commodity and other associated costs and the agencies’ ability to meet requirements to ensure that monetization does not cause adverse market impacts, we recommend that the Administrator of USAID and the Secretary of Agriculture take the following four actions: 1. jointly develop an agreed-upon benchmark or indicator to determine “reasonable market price” for sales of U.S. food aid for monetization; 2. monitor food aid sales transactions to ensure that the benchmark set to achieve “reasonable market price” in the country where the commodities are being sold is achieved, as required by law; 3. improve market assessments and coordinate to develop them in countries where both USAID and USDA may monetize; and 4. conduct market impact evaluations after monetization transactions have taken place to determine whether they caused adverse market impacts. DOT disagreed with our Matter for Congressional Consideration on the basis of its concern regarding the potentially detrimental impact the statutory change may have on the U.S. maritime industry. Metric tons of commodity 12. Figure 10 shows the total volume of commodities programmed for monetization in each country by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) between fiscal years 2008 and 2010. In a 2009 report to Congress, U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) jointly stated that, due to the declining size of the U.S.-flag commercial fleet, USAID and USDA are forced to compete with the Department of Defense and other exporters for space aboard the few remaining U.S.-flag vessels, thereby limiting competition in transportation contracting and leading to higher freight rates. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since the Food Security Act of 1985, Congress has authorized monetization--the sale of U.S. food aid commodities in developing countries to fund development. In fiscal year 2010, more than $300 million was used to procure and ship 540,000 metric tons of commodities to be monetized by the U.S. Agency for International Development and the U.S. Department of Agriculture. Through analysis of agency data, interviews with agency officials, and fieldwork in three countries, this report (1) assesses the extent to which monetization proceeds cover commodity and other associated costs and (2) examines the extent to which U.S. agencies meet requirements to ensure that monetization does not cause adverse market impacts.
What GAO Found
GAO found that the inefficiency of the monetization process reduced funding available to the U.S. government for development projects by $219 million over a 3-year period. The process of using cash to procure, ship, and sell commodities resulted in $503 million available for development projects out of the $722 million expended. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) are not required to achieve a specific level of cost recovery for monetization transactions. Instead, they are only required to achieve reasonable market price, which has not been clearly defined. USAID's average cost recovery was 76 percent, while USDA's was 58 percent. Further, the agencies conduct limited monitoring of sale prices, which may hinder their efforts to maximize cost recovery. Ocean transportation represents about a third of the cost to procure and ship commodities for monetization, and legal requirements to ship 75 percent of the commodities on U.S.-flag vessels further increase costs. Moreover, the number of participating U.S.-flag vessels has declined by 50 percent since 2002, and according to USAID and USDA, this decline has greatly decreased competition. Participation may be limited by rules unique to food aid programs which require formerly foreign-flag vessels to wait 3 years before they are treated as U.S.-flag vessels. USAID and USDA cannot ensure that monetization does not cause adverse market impacts because they monetize at high volumes, conduct weak market assessments, and do not conduct post-monetization evaluations. Adverse market impacts may include discouraging food production by local farmers, which could undermine development goals. To help avoid adverse market impacts, the agencies conduct market assessments that recommend limits on programmable volume of commodities to be monetized. However, USAID's assessments were conducted for just a subset of countries and have not yet been updated to reflect changing market conditions, and USDA's assessments contained weaknesses such as errors in formulas. Both agencies have at times programmed for monetization at volumes in excess of limits recommended by their market assessments. Further, the agencies monetized more than 25 percent of the recipient countries' commercial import volume in more than a quarter of cases, increasing the risk of displacing commercial trade. Finally, the agencies do not conduct post-monetization impact evaluations, so they cannot determine whether monetization caused any adverse market impacts.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that Congress consider eliminating the 3-year waiting period for foreign vessels that acquire U.S.-flag registry to be eligible to transport U.S. food aid. Further, the USAID Administrator and the Secretary of Agriculture should develop a benchmark for "reasonable market price" for food aid sales; monitor these sales; improve market assessments and coordinate efforts; and conduct postmarket impact evaluations. USAID and USDA generally agreed with our recommendations. DOT disagreed with our Matter for Congressional Consideration due to its concern that the proposed statutory change might be detrimental to the U.S. maritime industry. |
gao_GGD-96-53 | gao_GGD-96-53_0 | Diesel Excise Tax Collections Increased Significantly
Moving the point at which taxes are collected to the terminal level and dyeing diesel fuel on which the full excise taxes have not been paid, together with concerted enforcement on the highways, appear to have increased diesel excise tax collections. IRS’ data for calendar year 1994 show that the excise tax collected on diesel fuel increased about $1.2 billion, or about 22.5 percent, as compared with 1993, while total highway usage increased only about 2.2 percent in the same period, according to preliminary data. This increase does not include amounts collected as a result of the 4.3 cent per gallon increase in the tax rate itself. Concerns Over Additives to Diesel Fuel
According to IRS officials, the most complex diesel fuel excise tax regulatory problem is the definition and collection of excise taxes on products—primarily kerosene—that are added to diesel fuel for use on the highway. The retailer now has three gallons of cocktailed diesel fuel, but has only paid tax on two gallons of the product. In its June 30, 1994, final regulations, IRS did not reduce the concentration of dye. The requirement does not differentiate between high and low sulfur fuels. Internal Audit believes that only about $3 million of the scheme-related refunds were issued to the taxpayers. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the collection of diesel fuel excise taxes, focusing on: (1) changes in diesel fuel tax collections in 1994; (2) concerns about Internal Revenue Service (IRS) changes to diesel fuel taxation requirements; and (3) fraudulent claims involving excise tax refunds.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) IRS determined that diesel excise tax collections increased about $1.2 billion from 1993 to 1994; (2) this increase did not include amounts collected as a result of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act 1993 fuel tax rate increase; (3) increased tax compliance accounted for between $600 million and $700 million of the increase; (4) IRS has addressed the two major concerns regarding the Environmental Protection Agency's dyeing requirements, but has not addressed concerns about the concentration of dye required and the impact of the requirements on fuel availability at marinas; (5) IRS has not addressed concerns about tax collection on products added to diesel fuel after leaving the terminal; and (6) the new diesel fuel taxation approach remains vulnerable to fraudulent excise tax refund claims, but IRS has not determined the extent of such fraud. |
gao_GAO-02-1004 | gao_GAO-02-1004_0 | ISC Has Made Limited Progress Implementing Its Responsibilities
ISC has carried out some elements of its responsibilities, but it has made little progress on several other responsibilities given to it by the executive order. In 1997 ISC disseminated information on entry security technology for buildings with high security designations to member agencies for their consideration and implementation, if applicable; and it developed a draft report on preparedness for nuclear, biological, and chemical events. ISC also has been a forum for federal agencies to discuss security-related issues and share information and ideas. GSA has acknowledged the lack of consistent and aggressive leadership by GSA, inadequate staff support and funding for the ISC, and ISC’s difficulty in making decisions and has initiated efforts to address them. The creation of DHS would have significant implications for ISC and its responsibilities. There is hereby established within the executive branch the Interagency Security Committee (‘‘Committee’’). 2. Chair. 3. Working Groups. (a) The Committee shall: (1) establish policies for security in and protection of Federal facilities; (2) develop and evaluate security standards for Federal facilities, develop a strategy for ensuring compliance with such standards, and oversee the implementation of appropriate security measures in Federal facilities; and (3) take such actions as may be necessary to enhance the quality and effectiveness of security and protection of Federal facilities, including but not limited to: (A) encouraging agencies with security responsibilities to share security- related intelligence in a timely and cooperative manner; (B) assessing technology and information systems as a means of providing cost-effective improvements to security in Federal facilities; (C) developing long-term construction standards for those locations with threat levels or missions that require blast resistant structures or other specialized security requirements; (D) evaluating standards for the location of, and special security related to, day care centers in Federal facilities; and (E) assisting the Administrator in developing and maintaining a centralized security database of all Federal facilities. 7. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO reviewed efforts by the Interagency Security Committee (ISC) to protect critical federal infrastructure since the committee was created in 1995.
What GAO Found
ISC is chaired by the General Services Administration (GSA) and comprises 14 department-level agencies and other executive agencies and officials. ISC's primary responsibilities are to (1) establish policies for security in and protection of federal facilities; (2) develop and evaluate security standards for federal facilities, develop a strategy for ensuring compliance with such standards, and oversee the implementation of appropriate security measures in federal facilities; and (3) take the steps necessary to enhance the quality and effectiveness of security and protection of federal facilities. ISC has carried out some of its responsibilities, but it has made little progress on others. During the past 7 years, ISC has developed and issued security design criteria and minimum standards for building access procedures; disseminated information to member agencies, for their consideration and implementation, on entry security technology for buildings needing the highest security levels; and through its meetings and 13 working groups, provided a forum for federal agencies to discuss security issues and share information and ideas. ISC has made little or no progress in developing and establishing policies for security in and protection of federal facilities, developing a strategy for ensuring compliance with security standards, overseeing the implementation of appropriate security in federal facilities, and developing a centralized security database of all federal facilities. Several factors have limited ISC's progress, including (1) the lack of consistent and aggressive leadership by GSA, (2) inadequate staff support and funding for ISC, and (3) ISC's difficulty in making decisions. The creation of a Department of Homeland Security (DHS) would have significant implications for ISC and its responsibilities. |
gao_GAO-10-426 | gao_GAO-10-426_0 | Medicare covers and pays for a range of health care services, equipment, and drugs, and uses various payment systems. The home infusion provider may provide any necessary skilled nursing services directly or may contract with a home health agency to do so. The benefit would have provided comprehensive coverage of all the components of home infusion therapy, including intravenous drugs, equipment and supplies, and skilled nursing services when needed. The extent of coverage depends on whether the beneficiary is homebound, as well as factors related to the beneficiary’s condition and treatment needs. Other non-homebound beneficiaries have little or no coverage for home infusion therapy under Medicare FFS. Some Homebound Beneficiaries Have Comprehensive Coverage of Home Infusion Therapy, and Others Have Limited Coverage
Some Medicare FFS beneficiaries who are homebound—that is, generally confined to their homes and in need of nursing care on an intermittent basis—have coverage for all components of home infusion therapy. In addition, infusion drugs may be covered for beneficiaries who are enrolled in Part D plans or have other prescription drug coverage. 2.) Most of these insurers use a combination of payment mechanisms that include a fee schedule for infusion drugs, a fee schedule for nursing services, and a bundled payment per day for therapy for all other services and supplies provided. Commercial Health Plans and Some MA Plans Provide Comprehensive Coverage of Home Infusion Therapy
The health insurers in our study told us that they provide comprehensive coverage of home infusion therapy under all of their commercial health plans and some MA plans. Nationwide, nearly one out of every five MA beneficiaries has comprehensive coverage of home infusion therapy through a bundle that includes drugs and associated supplies and services. CMS allows MA plans to cover infusion drugs as a Part C mandatory supplemental benefit—a benefit not covered by Medicare FFS, but available to every beneficiary in the plan—to better coordinate benefits for home infusion therapy under Parts C and D. According to CMS, allowing MA plans to cover infusion drugs in this way would also facilitate access to home infusion therapy— including drugs as well as the other needed components—and obviate the need for more costly hospital stays and outpatient services. 3.) The health insurers in our study reported using these pricing data in different ways. Most of the health insurers we spoke with also use a fee schedule to pay for nursing services. Health Insurers Employ Standard Industry Practices to Manage Utilization of Home Infusion Therapy and Ensure Quality
Most of the health insurers in our study—both commercial and MA plans—use standard industry practices to manage utilization of home infusion and ensure quality of services for their members. None of the insurers reported significant problems with improper payments for home infusion therapy services. The plan typically requires providers to submit patient information in advance to support a request for coverage and receive payment authorization. These include developing a limited provider network of infusion pharmacies and home health agencies, requiring provider accreditation, coordinating care among providers, and monitoring patient complaints. Conclusions
Due to the limited coverage of home infusion therapy under Medicare FFS and some MA plans, non-homebound beneficiaries would need to obtain treatment in alternate and potentially more costly settings—such as a hospital, outpatient department, or physician’s office—to have all of the components of infusion therapy covered. HHS Comments
HHS stated that Medicare covers infusion therapy in the home for beneficiaries who are receiving the home health benefit; other beneficiaries have access to infusion therapy in alternate settings, such as hospitals, outpatient departments, and physician offices. | Why GAO Did This Study
Infusion therapy--drug treatment generally administered intravenously--was once provided strictly in hospitals. However, clinical developments and emphasis on cost containment have prompted a shift to other settings, including the home. Home infusion requires coordination among providers of drugs, equipment, and skilled nursing care, as needed. GAO was asked to review home infusion coverage policies and practices to help inform Medicare policy. In this report, GAO describes (1) coverage of home infusion therapy components under Medicare fee-for-service (FFS), (2) coverage and payment for home infusion therapy by other health insurers--both commercial plans and Medicare Advantage (MA) plans, which provide a private alternative to Medicare FFS, and (3) the utilization and quality management practices that health insurers use with home infusion therapy benefits. To do this work, GAO reviewed Medicare program statutes, regulations, policies, and benefits data. GAO also interviewed officials of five large private health insurers that offered commercial and MA plans.
What GAO Found
The extent of Medicare FFS coverage of home infusion therapy depends on whether the beneficiary is homebound, as well as other factors related to the beneficiary's condition and treatment needs. Some Medicare FFS beneficiaries who are homebound have comprehensive coverage of home infusion therapy, which includes drugs, equipment and supplies, and skilled nursing services when needed. For non-homebound beneficiaries with particular conditions needing certain drugs and equipment, Medicare FFS coverage of home infusion is limited to the necessary drugs, equipment, and supplies, and excludes nursing services. For other non-homebound beneficiaries, Medicare FFS coverage is further limited; infusion drugs may be covered for those enrolled in a prescription drug plan, but neither equipment and supplies nor nursing services are covered. These non-homebound beneficiaries would need to obtain infusion therapy in a hospital, nursing home, or physician's office to have all therapy components covered. The health insurers in GAO's study provide comprehensive coverage of home infusion therapy under all of their commercial plans. Some insurers also provide comprehensive coverage under their network-based MA plans, which may provide benefits beyond those required under Medicare FFS. Nationwide, nearly one out of every five MA beneficiaries has comprehensive coverage through an MA plan that has chosen to cover home infusion therapy as a supplemental benefit. To pay providers of home infusion therapy, most of the insurers in GAO's study use a combination of payment mechanisms. These include a fee schedule for infusion drugs, a fee schedule for nursing services, and a bundled payment per day of therapy for all other services and supplies. Most of the health insurers in GAO's study use standard industry practices to manage utilization of home infusion therapy and ensure quality of care. Specifically, most health insurers require that infusion providers submit patient information in advance to support a request for coverage and receive payment authorization. Also, health insurers may review samples of claims postpayment to determine if claims were billed and paid appropriately. None of the insurers in GAO's study stated that they have had significant problems with improper payments or quality for home infusion therapy services. In addition, health insurers reported taking various steps to ensure the quality of services delivered in the home. These included developing a limited provider network of infusion pharmacies and home health agencies, requiring provider accreditation, coordinating care among providers, and monitoring patient complaints. In commenting on a draft of this report, the Department of Health and Human Services stated Medicare covers infusion therapy at home for beneficiaries receiving the home health benefit, while other beneficiaries have access to infusion therapy in alternate settings. The Department suggested GAO reword its recommendation to clarify that a change to Medicare benefits would require statutory authority, and GAO has done so. |
gao_GAO-06-885T | gao_GAO-06-885T_0 | Since 2001, DOD has prepared reports on the costs of its involvement in GWOT. Funding for the Global War on Terrorism
Since 2001, Congress has appropriated about $430 billion to DOD and other U.S. government agencies for military operations and reconstruction and stabilization activities supporting GWOT. Some funding has also come through the normal baseline budget appropriated to the departments. Since September 2001, DOD has received about $386 billion to fund military operations supporting GWOT. In addition, about $44 billion has been made available to U.S. agencies—including DOD, USAID, and State—for reconstruction and stabilization efforts in Iraq ($34.5 billion) and Afghanistan ($9 billion) with an additional $400 million for use in Iraq and Afghanistan through the Commander’s Emergency Response Program. In addition to the funding provided to support military operations, Congress has appropriated about $44 billion to DOD and other U.S. government agencies to support important reconstruction and stabilization activities in Iraq and Afghanistan since 2001. The U.S. Has Reported Hundreds of Billions in Costs of Ongoing Military and Reconstruction and Stabilization Operations, but Data Weaknesses Make It Difficult to Reliably Know Cost of Military Operations
Since GWOT began in 2001, U.S. government agencies have reported hundreds of billions of dollars in costs for overseas military and reconstruction operations; however, as we have previously reported, data reliability and reporting concerns make it difficult to know DOD’s total GWOT costs. U.S government agencies have reported costs of about $23 billion for Iraqi reconstruction and stabilization. This, along with DOD’s cost reliability and reporting problems, make it difficult for the decision makers to reliably know how much the war is costing, to determine how appropriated funds are being spent, and to use historical data to predict future trends. DOD’s Reported Costs for Military Operations
Since the attacks of September 11, 2001, DOD has reported cumulative incremental costs of about $273 billion, through the end of April 2006, on military operations overseas in support of GWOT. The difference between the amount appropriated and DOD’s reported costs through April 2006 can generally be attributed to these unreported obligations for intelligence and Army modular force transformation, as well as funding for procurement, military construction, and research, development, test, and evaluation, which can be obligated over multiple years, that has not yet been obligated. As a result, neither DOD nor Congress can reliably know how much the war is costing. As we reported in September 2005, we found numerous problems with DOD’s processes for recording and reporting costs for GWOT. Factors affecting the reliability of DOD’s reported costs include long-standing deficiencies in DOD’s financial management systems and business processes, the use of estimates instead of actual costs, and the lack of supporting documentation. In our September 2005 report, we made several recommendations to the Secretary of Defense to (1) undertake a series of steps to ensure that the services’ reported GWOT costs are accurate and reliable; (2) direct the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) to oversee the services’ efforts and to develop a systematic process to review and test the reliability of the overall GWOT reports; (3) expand the department’s financial management regulation for contingency operations to include contingencies as large as GWOT; and (4) establish guidelines to control costs and require the services to keep the Comptroller’s office informed of their efforts in this area. However, costs are difficult to predict because they depend on several direct and indirect cost variables. These costs will require administration decision makers and Congress to consider difficult trade-offs as the nation faces increasing fiscal challenges in the years ahead. Future DOD Costs
The future costs associated with DOD’s commitments to GWOT depend on several variables, including (1) the extent and duration of operations, (2) the types of facilities that will be required to support troops overseas, and (3) the amount of equipment that will need to be restored or replaced. Future Nation-Building Costs
Future cost variables for other U.S. government agencies include the efforts to help form national and provincial governments and build management capacity in both Afghanistan and Iraq and build capable and loyal Iraqi and Afghani security forces. | Why GAO Did This Study
After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the President announced a Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), requiring the collective instruments of the entire federal government to counter the threat of terrorism. Ongoing military and diplomatic operations overseas, especially in Iraq and Afghanistan, constitute a key part of GWOT. These operations involve a wide variety of activities such as combating insurgents, civil affairs, capacity building, infrastructure reconstruction, and training military forces of other nations. The U.S. has reported substantial costs to date for GWOT related activities and can expect to incur significant costs for an unspecified time in the future, requiring decision makers to consider difficult trade-offs as the nation faces increasing long-range fiscal challenges. GAO has issued several reports on current and future financial commitments required to support GWOT military operations, as well as diplomatic efforts to stabilize and rebuild Iraq. This testimony discusses (1) the funding Congress has appropriated to the Department of Defense (DOD) and other U.S. government agencies for GWOT-related military operations and reconstruction activities since 2001; (2) costs reported for these operations and activities and the reliability of DOD's reported costs, and (3) issues with estimating future U.S. financial commitments associated with continued involvement in GWOT.
What GAO Found
Since 2001, Congress has appropriated about $430 billion to DOD and other government agencies for military and diplomatic efforts in support of GWOT. This funding has been provided through regular appropriations as well as supplemental appropriations, which are provided outside of the normal budget process. Since September 2001, DOD has received about $386 billion for GWOT military operations. In addition, agencies including the Department of State, DOD, and the Agency for International Development have received since 2001 about $44 billion to fund reconstruction and stabilization programs in Iraq ($34.5 billion) and Afghanistan ($9 billion) and an additional $400 million to be used in both Iraq and Afghanistan. Since 2001, U.S. government agencies have reported significant costs associated with GWOT, but GAO has concerns with the reliability of DOD's reported cost data. Through April 2006, DOD has reported about $273 billion in incremental costs for GWOT-related operations overseas--costs that would not otherwise have been incurred. DOD's reported GWOT costs and appropriated amounts differ generally because DOD's cost reporting does not capture some items such as intelligence and Army modular force transformation. Also, DOD has not yet used funding made available for multiple years, such as procurement and military construction. GAO's prior work found numerous problems with DOD's processes for recording and reporting GWOT costs, including long-standing deficiencies in DOD's financial management systems and business processes, the use of estimates instead of actual cost data, and the lack of adequate supporting documentation. As a result, neither DOD nor the Congress reliably know how much the war is costing and how appropriated funds are being used or have historical data useful in considering future funding needs. GAO made several recommendations to improve the reliability and reporting of GWOT costs. In addition to reported costs for military operations, U.S. agencies have obligated about $23 billion of $30 billion received for Iraqi reconstruction and stabilization, as of January 2006. U.S commitments to GWOT will likely involve the continued investment of significant resources, requiring decision makers to consider difficult trade-offs as the nation faces increasing fiscal challenges in the years ahead; however, predicting future costs is difficult as they depend on several direct and indirect cost variables. For DOD, these include the extent and duration of military operations, force redeployment plans, and the amount of damaged or destroyed equipment needed to be repaired or replaced. Future cost variables for other U.S. government agencies include efforts to help form governments and build capable and loyal security forces in Afghanistan and Iraq, and meet the healthcare needs of veterans, including providing future disability payments and medical services. |
gao_GAO-13-204 | gao_GAO-13-204_0 | Electronic Meth Precursor Tracking Systems and Prescription-Only Laws and Ordinances
Since the passage of the CMEA, some states have implemented electronic systems to track sales of products containing PSE. Meth Lab Incidents Rose after a Sharp Decline and Have Wide-Ranging Impacts on Communities
Meth Lab Incidents Declined Sharply Following Implementation of State and Federal PSE Sales Restrictions
According to DEA data on meth lab incidents, after peaking in 2004, the number of lab incidents nationwide declined through 2007 after the implementation of state and federal regulations on PSE product sales. Federal, state, and local law enforcement officials attribute this rising trend primarily to two factors:
The emergence of a new technique for smaller-scale production. By automating the logbook requirement set forth by the CMEA, electronic tracking systems can make PSE sales information more accessible to law enforcement to help it investigate potential PSE diversion, find meth labs, and prosecute individuals for meth-related crimes. Meth Producers Use Smurfing to Circumvent Tracking Systems, and Lab Incidents in Tracking States Have Not Declined
While electronic tracking systems such as NPLEx are designed to prevent individuals from purchasing more PSE than allowed by law, meth cooks have been able to limit the effectiveness of such systems as a means to reduce diversion through the practice of smurfing. Smurfing is a technique meth cooks use to obtain large quantities of PSE by recruiting individuals or groups of individuals to purchase the legal allowable amount of PSE products at multiple stores, and then aggregate for meth production. Prescription-Only Appears to Help Reduce Lab Incidents; Full Impact on Consumers Is Unknown and May Be Limited on Health Care System
Implementation of Prescription-Only Approach Followed by Declines in Lab Incidents, although Some PSE Diverted from Other States
The number of reported meth lab incidents in both Oregon and Mississippi declined following the adoption by those states of the prescription-only approach for PSE product sales (see fig. According to state and local law enforcement officials in Oregon and Mississippi, the prescription-only approach contributed to the reduction of reported meth lab incidents within those states. While the impact of the prescription-only approach on the health care system is generally unknown, on the basis of limited information available from health care providers in Oregon and Mississippi, it does not appear that there has been a substantial increase in workload demands to provide and dispense prescriptions for PSE products. From the limited information and data that are available to date, it is not clear that they have been substantial in the two states that have adopted the prescription-only approach to date. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to identify (1) trends in domestic meth lab incidents over the last decade and the impact of domestic meth labs on the communities affected by them; (2) the impact of electronic tracking systems on domestic meth lab incidents and the limitations, if any, of using these systems; and (3) the impact of prescription-only laws on domestic meth lab incidents and any implications of this approach for consumers and the health care system. This nonprobability sample of states was selected to reflect a mix of characteristics such as the type of approach chosen for controlling the sale of pseudoephedrine (PSE) products (electronic tracking or prescription-only), length of time the approach has been in use, and the number of meth labs seized relative to the state’s population size. | Why GAO Did This Study
Meth can be made by anyone using easily obtainable household goods and consumer products in labs, posing significant public safety and health risks and financial burdens to local communities and states where the labs are found. Meth cooks have discovered new, easier ways to make more potent meth that require the use of precursor chemicals such as PSE. Some states have implemented electronic tracking systems that can be used to track PSE sales and determine if individuals comply with legal PSE purchase limits. Two states, along with select localities in another state, have made products containing PSE available to consumers by prescription only. GAO was asked to review issues related to meth. Thus, GAO examined, among other things, (1) the trends in domestic meth lab incidents over the last decade; (2) the impact of electronic tracking systems on meth lab incidents and limitations of this approach, if any; and (3) the impact of prescription-only laws on meth lab incidents and any implications of adopting this approach for consumers and the health care system. GAO analyzed data such as data on meth lab incidents and PSE product sales and prescriptions. GAO also reviewed studies and drug threat assessments and interviewed state and local officials from six states that had implemented these approaches. These states were selected on the basis of the type of approach chosen, length of time the approach had been in use, and the number of meth lab incidents. The observations from these states are not generalizable, but provided insights on how the approaches worked in practice.
What GAO Found
Methamphetamine (meth) lab incidents--seizures of labs, dumpsites, chemicals, and glassware--declined following state and federal sales restrictions on pseudoephedrine (PSE), an ingredient commonly found in over-the-counter cold and allergy medications, but they rose again after changes to methods in acquiring PSE and in the methods to produce meth. According to Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) data, the number of lab incidents nationwide declined through 2007 after the implementation of state and federal regulations on PSE product sales, which started in 2004. The number of meth lab incidents reported nationally increased after 2007, a trend primarily attributed to (1) the emergence of a new technique for smaller-scale production and (2) a new method called smurfing--a technique used to obtain large quantities of PSE by recruiting groups of individuals to purchase the legally allowable amount of PSE products at multiple stores that are then aggregated for meth production.
Electronic tracking systems help enforce PSE sales limits, but they have not reduced meth lab incidents and have limitations related to smurfing. By electronically automating and linking log-book information on PSE sales, these systems can block individuals from purchasing more than allowed by law. In addition, electronic tracking systems can help law enforcement investigate potential PSE diversion, find meth labs, and prosecute individuals. However, meth cooks have been able to limit the effectiveness of such systems as a means to reduce diversion through the practice of smurfing.
The prescription-only approach for PSE appears to have contributed to reductions in lab incidents with unclear impacts on consumers and limited impacts on the health care system. The implementation of prescription-only laws by Oregon and Mississippi was followed by declines in lab incidents. Law enforcement officials in Oregon and Mississippi attribute this reduction in large part to the prescription-only approach. Prescription-only status appears to have reduced overall demand for PSE products, but overall welfare impacts on consumers are unclear because of the lack of data, such as the cost of obtaining prescriptions. On the basis of the limited information available from health care providers in Oregon and Mississippi, there has not been a substantial increase in workload demands to provide and dispense prescriptions for PSE products. |
gao_GAO-01-6 | gao_GAO-01-6_0 | SBIRS-low Program Employs a High-Risk Acquisition Strategy
The Air Force’s current SBIRS-low acquisition schedule is at high risk of not delivering the system on time or at cost or with expected performance. SBIRS-low Program Includes Immature Critical Technologies
The SBIRS-low program has high technical risks because some critical satellite technologies have been judged to be immature for the current stage of the program. Alternative Approaches to SBIRS-low Have Not Been Assessed
Current DOD acquisition policy and procedures require that assessments be made of the cost and mission effectiveness of space systems to alternative terrestrial—land, sea, and air—systems. Despite this requirement, DOD has not adequately analyzed or identified cost-effective alternatives to SBIRS-low that could satisfy critical missile defense requirements such as a Navy ship-based radar capability. According to Air Force Space Command officials, terrestrial alternatives to SBIRS-low do not exist. Studies on various aspects of the National Missile Defense System by the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization and other organizations have pointed out that alternatives to SBIRS-low may exist. Scope and Methodology
To evaluate risks of the current acquisition schedule, we had discussions with officials of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics; the Under Secretary of Defense for the Comptroller; the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence; the Office of the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation; the Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation; and the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition, all in Washington, D.C. We also held discussions with, and reviewed documents from, officials of the SBIRS program office in Los Angeles, California; the U.S. and Air Force Space Commands, Colorado Springs, Colorado; the Defense Contract Management Agency offices in Van Nuys, California, and Phoenix, Arizona; the Air Force Operational Test and Evaluation Center, Buckley Air National Guard Base, Aurora, Colorado; TRW, Inc., Redondo Beach, California; and Spectrum Astro, Gilbert, Arizona. GAO Comments
1. 2. 3. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Pentagon considers defenses to counter attacks from ballistic missiles, both long-range strategic and shorter-range theater missiles, to be critical to U.S. national security. The Air Force is developing a new satellite system, called Space-Based Infrared System-low (SBIRS-low) to expand the military's infrared satellite capabilities for supporting ballistic missile defenses. GAO reviewed the Defense Department's (DOD) efforts to acquire SBIRS-low. Specifically, GAO (1) evaluated the cost, schedule, and performance risks of the current acquisition schedule; (2) evaluated the program's technical risks; and (3) determined whether DOD has assessed alternative approaches to SBIRS-low.
What GAO Found
GAO found that the Air Force's current SBIRS-low acquisition schedule is of high risk of not delivering the system on time or at cost or with expected performance. SBIRS-low has high technical risks because some critical satellite technologies have been judged immature for the current stage of the program. DOD acquisition policy and procedures require that the cost and mission effectiveness of space systems be assessed relative to alternative terrestrial systems. However, the Air Force has not analyzed or identified terrestrial alternatives to the SBIRS-low system because, according to Air Force Space Command officials, terrestrial alternatives do not exist. Nevertheless, studies on various aspects of the National Missile Defense system by the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization and other groups have pointed out alternatives to SBIRS-low, such as sea- or land-based radar. |
gao_GAO-11-846 | gao_GAO-11-846_0 | DOE plans additional transactions involving excess uranium. DOE Has Used Nearly 1,900 Metric Tons of Excess Uranium to Pay for More Than $250 Million in Cleanup Services
From December 2009 through June 2011, DOE used 1,873 metric tons of its excess natural uranium to pay for $256 million in cleanup services at its Portsmouth facility (see table 1). In these transactions, DOE released in total about 1,473 metric tons of uranium valued at about $194.3 million. DOE’s Transactions Did Not Exceed Targets Set by Its Uranium Management Plan, but DOE’s Activities Were Not Consistent with the Plan in Other Ways
DOE’ s excess uranium transactions have been consistent with parts of its uranium management plan but not with others. With regard to other provisions, however, DOE has departed somewhat from the plan. For example, DOE has deviated from the schedule of uranium transfers articulated by the plan, resulting in more uranium entering the market much sooner than cited. DOE’s Uranium Transactions Have Not Exceeded the Target of 10 Percent of Domestic Uranium Demand Specified by the Plan
The total amount of uranium that DOE sold or transferred from January 2008 to June 2011 has stayed below the target specified in the department’s December 2008 uranium management plan. The plan stated that DOE would adhere to a target for uranium sales and transfers of no more than 10 percent of the annual U.S. requirements for nuclear fuel. DOE’s Uranium Transactions with USEC Were Consistent with Federal Law Governing Uranium Transactions but Did Not Comply with Federal Fiscal Law
We found that DOE’s uranium transactions with USEC constituted sales authorized under the USEC Privatization Act and that conditions the act requires before a uranium sale can be made were met. We found, however, that by not depositing an amount equivalent to the proceeds from these transactions into the Treasury, DOE violated the miscellaneous receipts statute. Second, the USEC Privatization Act requires that the Secretary of Energy receive no less than fair market value for uranium sold. Third, the act requires the Secretary of Energy to determine that proposed transactions will have no adverse material impact on the domestic uranium mining, conversion, and enrichment industries. By not doing so, DOE has inappropriately circumvented the power of the purse granted to Congress under the Constitution and violated the miscellaneous receipts statute. Matter for Congressional Consideration
If Congress sees merit in using proceeds from the barter, transfer, or sale of federal uranium assets to pay for environmental cleanup of uranium enrichment facilities, it should consider: providing DOE with explicit authority to barter excess uranium and to retain the proceeds from barters, transfers, or sales or directing DOE to sell federal uranium assets for cash and directing that collected proceeds be made available for obligation only to the extent and in the amount provided in advance in appropriations acts for necessary expenses in decontaminating and decommissioning uranium facilities and directing DOE to deposit into the Treasury any excess over what is appropriated. In its written comments, reproduced in appendix IV, DOE agreed with our recommendation to update its excess uranium management plan but disagreed that the department violated federal fiscal law. To identify specific transactions involving natural uranium during this time frame, we also obtained and reviewed individual nuclear materials transaction reports, which detailed the change of uranium ownership from DOE to the United States Enrichment Corporation (USEC) and to Fluor-B&W Portsmouth. Appendix III: Legal Analysis of DOE’s Strategy to Finance USEC’s Cleanup Work at the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant
Introduction and Summary of Conclusions
As part of GAO’s review of DOE’s overall uranium management plan, we examined what DOE referred to as a series of “barter arrangements” between DOE and USEC for accelerated cleanup services at the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant. The value USEC attributed to the uranium was also the price received from its buyers, and the fact that costs were deducted from the value means that the value DOE received equaled the net proceeds of the sale to a third party from its agent, USEC, rather than the price of the sale from USEC as buyer. DOE Violated the Miscellaneous Receipts Statute by Not Depositing the Value of Net Proceeds from Uranium Transactions with USEC into the Treasury
Our present review found, as did our analysis of similar transactions in 2006, that DOE did not comply with the miscellaneous receipts statute because it did not deposit the proceeds from sale of its uranium into the Treasury. In providing uranium to USEC for sale to a third party and allowing USEC to keep the proceeds, DOE constructively received money for the government. | Why GAO Did This Study
Uranium is a key component in the production of nuclear energy and nuclear weapons. The Department of Energy (DOE) manages the nation's surplus uranium, which is derived in part from former nuclear weapons production. In 2008, DOE published a uranium management plan that set a target for DOE uranium sales and transfers to avert harm to the domestic uranium industry. In 2009, DOE began using natural uranium to pay for cleanup work at a former uranium enrichment facility in Ohio, without having identified such transactions in its 2008 plan. As directed, GAO reviewed DOE's uranium management program. This report examines (1) DOE's uranium transactions and plans for future transactions, (2) the extent to which these transactions were consistent with DOE's uranium management plan, and (3) the extent to which these transactions were consistent with federal law. GAO reviewed transaction documents and contracts and interviewed knowledgeable DOE, contractor, and uranium industry officials and uranium market analysts.
What GAO Found
In a series of seven transactions from December 2009 through June 2011, DOE used 1,873 metric tons of natural uranium to pay for $256 million in cleanup services provided by two contractors at the Portsmouth, Ohio, enrichment facility, and additional transactions are planned. Six out of seven of these transactions involved the United States Enrichment Corporation (USEC), former operator of the Portsmouth facility. DOE released 1,473 metric tons of uranium, and USEC provided $194 million in cleanup services at the Portsmouth facility. Among other activities, USEC's services included removing chemical and hazardous materials from the plant. The seventh transaction involved a second contractor. In June 2011, DOE released 400 metric tons of uranium, and the contractor agreed to provide $62 million in decontamination and decommissioning services. DOE officials said the department expects to continue transferring natural uranium to this contractor for cleanup services through 2013. DOE's uranium transactions have been consistent with parts of its uranium management plan but not with others. The plan states that DOE would adhere to a target for uranium sales and transfers of no more than 10 percent of annual domestic fuel requirements for uranium. DOE's releases of uranium into the commercial market did not exceed the annual target specified in the plan, ranging from 5 percent of demand in 2008 to 6 percent in 2010--well below the 2008 plan's designated target. With regard to other provisions, however, DOE has departed somewhat from the plan. For example, the department has deviated from the schedule of uranium transfers articulated by the plan, allowing more uranium to enter the market sooner than cited. DOE's uranium transactions with USEC were sales authorized by the USEC Privatization Act, but they did not comply with federal fiscal law. The USEC Privatization Act requires that before a uranium sale, DOE must determine that the materials are surplus to national security needs; that the department is receiving fair market value; and that the sales will not adversely affect the domestic uranium mining, conversion, and enrichment industries. GAO found that DOE met these requirements. Nevertheless, by not depositing the value of the net proceeds from the sales of uranium into the Treasury, DOE violated the miscellaneous receipts statute. This statute requires an official or agent of the government receiving money from any source on the government's behalf to deposit the money in the Treasury. As GAO found when it reviewed a similar series of transactions in 2006, DOE provided the uranium to USEC for sale to a third party and allowed USEC to keep the proceeds of the sales. Even with no money changing hands, GAO concludes that an amount equivalent to the value that went to USEC should have gone to the Treasury. By not depositing an amount equal to the value of the uranium into the Treasury, DOE has inappropriately circumvented the power of the purse granted to Congress under the Constitution.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOE update its uranium management plan and suggests that Congress consider authorizing DOE to, among other things, retain the proceeds of future uranium transactions. DOE agreed to update its uranium management plan but disagreed that its actions did not comply with federal fiscal law. GAO maintains, however, that DOE's comments do not undermine the conclusion that the department violated the miscellaneous receipts statute. |
gao_T-HEHS-97-119 | gao_T-HEHS-97-119_0 | Within this population, however, individuals’ health needs and associated medical costs can vary substantially. Compared with Medicare-only beneficiaries, dually eligible beneficiaries are more likely to live in a nursing home or live alone; have a serious and chronic condition, and physical or cognitive have less access to a regular source of care and preventive services, and higher use of emergency room care. Medicaid is a health insurance program financed and administered by both the federal government and the states. According to the level of support provided by Medicaid, the dually eligible population is divided into two major groups: (1) those receiving Medicare cost-sharing support and additional Medicaid health care benefits (“full-benefit” individuals) and (2) those receiving help from Medicaid only to cover out-of-pocket costs after payment by Medicare. Benefit Overlaps Foster Shifting of Fee-for-Service Costs Between Programs
Both Medicare and Medicaid devote substantial resources to providing care to the dually eligible population. This makes the substitution of services provided—and the resulting shifting of costs between federal and state levels—one alternative for limiting a program’s fiscal liability. The net burden is likely to fall more heavily on the federal government, as the payer for all Medicare and more than half of Medicaid expenditures. reduce its costs by capitalizing on the movement of Medicare’s home health benefit from a post-acute focus to include long-term care benefits. States’ Desire to Use Managed Care May Conflict With Federal Guarantees to Medicare Beneficiaries
States are beginning to explore the use of managed care to serve their dually eligible populations. Thus, as states consider enrolling dual eligibles in their managed care programs, they face certain barriers that require federal and state cooperation to overcome. With federal waivers from some statutory requirements, several states have removed key administrative obstacles, permitting the enrollment of the dually eligible population. Differences in Managed Care Participation Terms Complicate States’ Efforts to Coordinate Care
altogether in the case of states that have obtained special approval from HCFA. As states seek greater control of their health financing and care delivery obligations, these program differences may serve as barriers to enrolling dual eligibles in a single managed care plan. But dually eligible beneficiaries who exercise their Medicare right to leave the plan during the Medicaid lock-in period may expose the state to the cost-sharing obligations incurred with a fee-for-service or Medicare managed care provider and preclude the Medicaid plan’s potential to organize a system of coordinated services. setting—people with the demographic and health status traits of dual eligibles makes it difficult to identify beneficiary protections that will be effective and will minimize problems in coordinating these two programs. Regardless of the approaches taken, our recent work in both Medicare and Medicaid managed care stresses repeatedly that, to ensure program accountability for the interests of both beneficiaries and the federal government, rigorous federal and state oversight of care and effective quality monitoring systems are essential. 5, 1997). 4, 1995). | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed several issues that arise in financing health care for people known as dual eligibles, Medicare beneficiaries who are also eligible for some form of Medicaid support, focusing on: (1) the health characteristics of those who are eligible for both Medicare and Medicaid and the key structural differences between the two programs that serve this population; (2) benefit overlaps between these two programs and the associated shifting of care and costs between federal and state levels; and (3) states' efforts to use managed care to serve this population.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the dually eligible population consists of people with a range of health needs, from the young to the very old and from the healthy to the disabled or chronically ill in nursing homes; (2) compared with Medicare-only beneficiaries, however, dually eligible beneficiaries are more likely to have poorer health status and require costly care, including long-term care; (3) meeting their needs under two programs that are administered under different rules complicates matters in both fee-for-service and managed care environments; (4) the potential to cover posthospital and long-term care benefits under either program has resulted in costs being shifted between programs; (5) because the federal government pays the full cost of Medicare and shares the cost of Medicaid with the states, the greater financial burden generally falls on the federal government; (6) to better coordinate acute and long-term care needs while holding down costs, some states are assessing the potential for enrolling their dually eligible populations in a single managed care plan; (7) however, differences in Medicare and Medicaid requirements for commercial managed care participation can create barriers to this approach; (8) because these barriers are largely related to certain statutory beneficiary guarantees, including beneficiaries' freedom to choose their own provider, granting waivers from federal requirements to states that are designing comprehensive managed care programs remains a delicate issue; (9) the implications of managing the costs of care for this population are significant at both the federal and state levels; (10) the issue is important to the federal government because it pays for Medicare as well as for over half of Medicaid's costs; (11) it is also important to state governments, because they have little control over federal decisions, such as the imposition of new Medicare cost-sharing requirements, that make their budgets vulnerable to unplanned fiscal liabilities; and (12) as states pursue greater flexibility to design more efficient and effective service delivery programs for this population through waivers of certain beneficiary protections guaranteed by federal statute, federal and state governments' rigorous oversight of care delivery remains essential. |
gao_GAO-08-319 | gao_GAO-08-319_0 | Agencies’ Reported A&AS Obligations Are Not Accurate or Used for Management Purposes
Agencies’ reported A&AS obligations to OMB for inclusion in the President’s budget are inaccurate to the point of being meaningless. First, the different interpretations of the broad A&AS definition contribute to errors in identifying contracts. Third, the lack of integration of agency procurement and budget systems thwarts accurate accounting of A&AS contracts. Agencies Do Not Use Reported A&AS Obligations for Management Purposes
Agency officials told us they see little or no internal value in tracking A&AS obligations as a separate category of services since they do not use the information for management purposes. Further, at the agencies we reviewed, officials told us they manage their A&AS contracts, as they do their other professional support service contracts, through established acquisition management procedures. Reflecting the lack of a clear distinction between A&AS and other professional management support services, OMB rescinded its Circular No. Overall, 63 percent of the A&AS contract actions were issued or awarded on other than a sole source basis. Agencies’ A&AS Contract Actions Generally Met Statutory Period of Performance Limits
Most contract actions we reviewed had periods of performance (including all contract options and award terms) that were less than 5 years—the statutory limit for A&AS task order contracts, but 2 exceeded and 10 had the potential to exceed the limit. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
For the Department of Defense and selected civilian agencies, our objectives were to (1) assess whether reported obligations for advisory and assistance services (A&AS) are accurate or used for management purposes and (2) identify the extent to which A&AS contracts are used for recurring services and periods greater than 5 years, as well as the contract types and vehicles used. The results of our agency-specific contract file reviews are generalizable to the particular agency location where we reviewed contract files. We also interviewed agency procurement and budget officials to discern their processes and procedures for reporting A&AS obligations to OMB and discussed the accuracy and usefulness of reported A&AS obligations with officials from OMB and the Office of Federal Procurement Policy. Because the focus of this report was the government’s budget reporting of A&AS obligations, we did not address compliance with various A&AS-related provisions, such as the requirement for multiple awards for A&AS task order contracts (10 U.S.C. In particular, our contract file review findings enabled us to analyze the contract types used by agencies to procure A&AS, the degree of interagency contracting for A&AS, and the level of competition for A&AS contract actions. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since 1994, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has been required by law to collect and report obligations for advisory and assistance services (A&AS) in the President's budget. The initial intent for this requirement is not clear, however. The statutory definition of A&AS covers three broad categories of management and professional support services. For many years, GAO and others have reported on inaccuracies in agencies' reporting of A&AS obligations. This report follows up on GAO's past work, pursuant to the fiscal year 2007 Defense Authorization Act. GAO assessed (1) whether reported A&AS obligations are accurate or used for management purposes and (2) the extent to which A&AS contracts are used for recurring services and for longer than 5 years and the contract types and vehicles used. GAO analyzed legislative history and reviewed 334 randomly selected contract files across 10 agencies, the results of which are generalizable to locations visited.
What GAO Found
Agencies' reported A&AS obligations are inaccurate to the point of being meaningless and are not used for management purposes. GAO found a range of factors that contribute to significant inaccuracies in these data. Almost 20 percent of the 334 contract actions GAO reviewed were erroneously identified as A&AS, including services such as fitness center maintenance and telecommunications cabling installation. Agency officials frequently cited the broad nature of the A&AS definition as a problem. Agencies GAO reviewed generally encountered challenges in tying reported A&AS obligations to their corresponding contracts because of the lack of integration of procurement and budget data systems. Agency and OMB officials unanimously told GAO they do not use reported A&AS obligations for management or other purposes. Acquisition officials said they oversee their A&AS contracts, as they do their other professional services contracts, with established contract management procedures. Reflecting the lack of a clear distinction between A&AS and general professional services contracts, DOD retracted its A&AS directive and replaced it with general service contracting guidance in 2004. Even as far back as 1996, a code to specifically designate A&AS contracts was removed from the Federal Procurement Data System, the government's procurement information system. Agencies frequently awarded contracts for A&AS on a recurring basis and to the same contractor. Overall 63 percent of the A&AS contract actions were issued on other than a sole-source basis. Most task order contracts reviewed met the A&AS statutory period of performance limit of 5 years; but 2 exceeded and 10 had the potential (if options were exercised) to exceed this limit. Agencies used various contract types and vehicles to procure A&AS. Almost half of the actions GAO reviewed were time-and-materials, and over 40 percent were under interagency vehicles, primarily orders under the General Services Administration's schedule contracts. |
gao_GGD-96-15 | gao_GGD-96-15_0 | In addition, the policy letter requires agency officials to evaluate the potential for a conflict of interest and to determine whether an actual conflict exists before a contract is awarded. Compliance With the Certification Requirement Has Varied
Agency compliance with the requirement for obtaining contractors’ OCI certifications or advisory and assistance service contracts has varied. At two of the three agencies we reviewed—EPA and DOE—we found certificates in contract files in almost all cases in which they were required. The IG reported that, in most cases, DOD contracting officers failed to obtain the OCI certificates required by the FAR. Its April 1993 report stated that of 19 agencies reviewed, contractors’ certifications were obtained only at 9 of them. Case 1. Case 2. DOE and EPA offered formal in-house OCI training. The Navy did not have an OCI training course. We also asked them how they believed the OCI screening process could be improved. As shown by a 1993 PCIE study, however, agencies’ implementation of OCI requirements for advisory and assistance services has varied. We also noted that Navy contracting officials were not routinely evaluating contracts prior to award for potential conflicts of interest. Recommendations to the Director, OMB
We recommend that the Director, OMB (1) emphasize to heads of agencies the importance of ensuring that contracting officials receive sufficient training to help them to identify and to avoid and mitigate OCI situations and (2) take steps to avoid the possibility that the FAR might be interpreted to imply that if certificates have been obtained from contractors, agencies should not obtain other information in conducting an evaluation of the potential for conflicts of interest. At that time, we will send copies of this report to the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the Secretaries of Energy, Defense, and Navy, and the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a legislative requirement and a congressional request, GAO reviewed three federal agencies' implementation of the Office of Management and Budget's (OMB) policies on conflicts of interest, focusing on: (1) whether the agencies have complied with existing requirements to identify and evaluate potential organization conflicts of interest (OCI); and (2) ways that agencies could improve their screening for such conflicts.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) although the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Department of Energy (DOE) obtained contractors' OCI certifications in almost all of the cases reviewed, the Navy failed to obtain OCI certifications in most cases, mainly because contracting officers did not request or require them; (2) the Navy has since stressed the importance of obtaining OCI certifications; (3) a 1993 Presidential council report showed that only 9 of 19 agencies reviewed obtained OCI certifications; (4) many agency officials did not believe the certifications were an effective deterrent; (5) self-certifications have limitations because differences of opinion or interpretation cause potential OCI underreporting; (6) the OMB requirement that agencies evaluate the potential for OCI is an important supplemental control; (7) DOE and EPA have conducted preaward evaluations for potential OCI; (8) although the Navy has not routinely conducted required preaward OCI evaluations, it has tried to prevent future conflicts of interests; and (9) agencies could improve their screening for OCI by ensuring that all responsible officials receive OCI training to avoid misinterpretation. |
gao_GAO-12-501T | gao_GAO-12-501T_0 | Process and System Weaknesses Hindered Army’s Ability to Identify a Valid Population of Military Payroll Transactions
We found that the Army could not readily identify a complete population of Army payroll accounts for fiscal year 2010, given existing procedures and systems. The Army and DFAS-IN did not have an effective, repeatable process for identifying the population of active duty payroll accounts. In addition, the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC), DOD’s central source for personnel information, did not have an effective process for comparing military pay account files to military personnel files to identify a valid population of military payroll transactions. For example, it took 3 months and repeated attempts before DFAS-IN could provide a population of service members who received active duty Army military pay in fiscal year 2010. Similarly, it took DMDC over 2 months to compare the total number of fiscal year 2010 active duty payroll accounts to its database of personnel files. Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government requires all transactions and other significant events to be clearly documented and the documentation readily available for examination. DOD’s Financial Improvement and Audit Readiness (FIAR)
Guidance sets out key tasks essential to achieving audit readiness, including defining and identifying the population of transactions for audit purposes. The GAO/PCIE Financial Audit Manual provides guidance concerning typical control activities, such as independent checks on the validity, accuracy, and completeness of computer-processed data.Without effective processes for identifying a complete population of Army military pay records and comparing military pay accounts to personnel records, the Army will have difficulty meeting DOD’s 2014 Statement of Budgetary Resources audit readiness goal and its 2017 goal for a complete set of auditable financial statements. The Army Was Unable to Provide Documentation to Support the Validity and Accuracy of a Sample of Payroll Transactions
We identified deficiencies in DFAS-IN and Army processes and systems for readily identifying and providing documentation that supports payments for Army military payroll. First, DFAS-IN had difficulty retrieving and providing usable Leave and Earnings Statement files for our sample items. Second, the Army and DFAS-IN were able to provide complete documentation for 2 of our 250 military pay account sample items, partial support for 3 sample items, but no support for the remaining 245 sample items. Because the Army was unable to provide documents to support reported payroll amounts for our sample of 250 soldier pay accounts, we were unable to determine whether the Army’s payroll accounts were valid and we could not verify the accuracy of payments and reported active duty military payroll. Further, because military payroll is significant to the financial statements, the Army will not be able to pass an audit of its Statement of Budgetary Resources without resolving these control weaknesses. In addition, the Army’s efforts to achieve auditability are compounded by payroll system limitations. Army Military Pay Audit Readiness Efforts Currently Under Way
DOD’s November 2011 FIAR Status Report includes DOD’s goal of achieving audit readiness for its Statement of Budgetary Resources by the end of fiscal year 2014. DOD and the Army have established interim goals for meeting the fiscal year 2014 Statement of Budgetary Resources audit readiness goal. Concluding Observations
Active Army military payroll, reported at $46.1 billion for fiscal year 2010, is material to the Army’s financial statements and, as such, will be significant to DOD’s audit readiness goals for the Statement of Budgetary Resources. Moreover, these initiatives, while important, do not address (1) establishing effective processes and systems for identifying a valid population of military payroll records, (2) ensuring Leave and Earnings Statement files and supporting personnel documents are readily available for verifying the accuracy of payroll records, (3) ensuring key personnel and other pay-related documents that support military payroll transactions are centrally located, retained in service member Official Military Personnel Files, or otherwise readily accessible, and (4) requiring the Army’s Human Resources Command to periodically review and confirm that service member Official Military Personnel File records in iPERMS or other master personnel record systems are consistent and complete. In addition, the Army’s military pay auditability weaknesses have departmentwide implications for other military components, such as the Air Force and the Navy, that share some of the same military pay process and systems risks as the Army. | Why GAO Did This Study
This testimony discusses our work on the significant challenges the Army faces in achieving audit readiness for its military pay. The Armys military pay is material to the Armys financial statements. The Chief Financial Officers Act of 1990, as amended, established requirements for 24 agencies, including the Department of Defense (DOD), to prepare annual financial statements and have them audited. Further, the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2010 mandated that DOD be prepared to validate (certify) that its consolidated financial statements are ready for audit by September 30, 2017. On October 13, 2011, the Secretary of Defense directed the department to achieve audit readiness for the Statement of Budgetary Resources, one of the principal financial statements, by the end of fiscal year 2014 as an interim milestone for DOD to meet the legal requirement in the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2010 to achieve full audit readiness for all DOD financial statements by 2017.
The Armys active duty military payroll, comprising about 20 percent of its reported $233.8 billion in fiscal year 2010 net outlays, is significant to both Army and DOD efforts to meet DODs 2014 Statement of Budgetary Resources auditability goal as well as the mandate to achieve full audit readiness for all DOD financial statements by 2017. For years, we and others have reported continuing deficiencies with the Armys military payroll processes and controls. These reported continuing deficiencies in Army payroll processes and controls have called into question the extent to which the Armys military payroll transactions are valid and accurate, and whether the Armys military payroll is auditable. Further, other military components, such as the Air Force and the Navy, share some of the same process and system risks as the Army.
Today's remarks are based on our report, "DOD Financial Management: The Army Faces Significant Challenges in Achieving Audit Readiness for Its Military Pay," which is being released today. The testimony focuses on problems that impede the Armys ability to (1) identify a valid population of military payroll transactions and (2) provide documentation that supports the validity and accuracy of payments for Army military payroll.
What GAO Found
We found that the Army could not readily identify a complete population of Army payroll accounts for fiscal year 2010, given existing procedures and systems. The Army and DFAS-IN did not have an effective, repeatable process for identifying the population of active duty payroll accounts. In addition, the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC), DODs central source for personnel information, did not have an effective process for comparing military pay account files to military personnel files to identify a valid population of military payroll transactions. For example, it took 3 months and repeated attempts before DFAS-IN could provide a population of service members who received active duty Army military pay in fiscal year 2010. Similarly, it took DMDC over 2 months to compare the total number of fiscal year 2010 active duty payroll accounts to its database of personnel files. "Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government" requires all transactions and other significant events to be clearly documented and the documentation readily available for examination. DODs "Financial Improvement and Audit Readiness (FIAR) Guidance" sets out key tasks essential to achieving audit readiness, including defining and identifying the population of transactions for audit purposes. The "GAO/PCIE Financial Audit Manual" provides guidance concerning typical control activities, such as independent checks on the validity, accuracy, and completeness of computer-processed data. Without effective processes for identifying a complete population of Army military pay records and comparing military pay accounts to personnel records, the Army will have difficulty meeting DODs 2014 Statement of Budgetary Resources audit readiness goal and its 2017 goal for a complete set of auditable financial statements.
We identified deficiencies in DFAS-IN and Army processes and systems for readily identifying and providing documentation that supports payments for Army military payroll. First, DFAS-IN had difficulty retrieving and providing usable Leave and Earnings Statement files for our sample items. Second, the Army and DFAS-IN were able to provide complete documentation for 2 of our 250 military pay account sample items, partial support for 3 sample items, but no support for the remaining 245 sample items. Because the Army was unable to provide documents to support reported payroll amounts for our sample of 250 soldier pay accounts, we were unable to determine whether the Armys payroll accounts were valid and we could not verify the accuracy of payments and reported active duty military payroll. Further, because military payroll is significant to the financial statements, the Army will not be able to pass an audit of its Statement of Budgetary Resources without resolving these control weaknesses. |
gao_GAO-15-634T | gao_GAO-15-634T_0 | USDA Has Taken Steps to Help Identify and Prevent Ineligible Participants from Receiving Benefits
In May 2014, we reported that USDA had taken several steps to implement or enhance controls to identify and prevent ineligible beneficiaries from receiving school-meals benefits. For example:
USDA worked with Congress to develop legislation to automatically enroll students who receive SNAP benefits for free school meals; SNAP has a more-detailed certification process than the school-meals program. The number of school districts directly certifying SNAP-participant children increased from the 2008 through 2013 school years. Starting in the 2013–2014 school year, USDA increased the frequency with which state agencies complete administrative reviews from every 5 years to every 3 years. As part of this process, state agencies are to conduct on-site reviews of school districts to help ensure that applications are complete and that the correct eligibility determinations were made based on applicant information. USDA Could Explore Options to Enhance the Verification Process to Further Strengthen Integrity While Ensuring Legitimate Access
In our May 2014 report, we identified opportunities to strengthen oversight of the school-meals programs while ensuring legitimate access, including clarifying use of for-cause verification, studying the feasibility of electronic data matching to verify income, and verifying a sample of households that are categorically eligible for assistance. Income Verification
In addition to for-cause verification, school districts are required to annually verify a sample of household applications approved for free or reduced-price school-meals benefits to determine whether the household has been certified to receive the correct level of benefits—we refer to this process as “standard verification.” Standard verification is generally limited to approved applications considered “error-prone.” Error-prone is statutorily defined as approved applications in which stated income is within $100 of the monthly or $1,200 of the annual applicable income- eligibility guideline. In a nongeneralizable review of 25 approved civilian federal-employee household applications for our May 2014 report, we found that 9 of 19 households that self-reported household income and size information were not eligible for free or reduced-price-meal benefits they were receiving because their income exceeded eligibility guidelines. In May 2014, we recommended that USDA develop and assess a pilot program to explore the feasibility of computer matching school-meal participants with other sources of household income, such as state income databases, to identify potentially ineligible households—those with income exceeding program-eligibility thresholds—for verification. USDA concurred with our recommendations and told us in January 2015 that direct-verification computer matching is technologically feasible with data from means-tested programs, and that data from SNAP and other programs are suitable for school-meals program verification in many states. Verification of Categorical Eligibility
In May 2014, we found that ineligible households may be receiving free school-meals benefits by submitting applications that falsely state that a household member is categorically eligible for the program due to participating in certain public-assistance programs—such as SNAP—or meeting an approved designation—such as foster child or homeless. In May 2014, we recommended that USDA explore the feasibility of verifying the eligibility of a sample of applications that indicate categorical eligibility for program benefits and are therefore not subject to standard verification. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. | Why GAO Did This Study
In fiscal year 2014, 30.4 million children participated in the National School Lunch Program and 13.6 million children participated in the School Breakfast Program, partly funded by $15.1 billion from USDA. In May 2014, GAO issued a report on (1) steps taken to help identify and prevent ineligible beneficiaries from receiving benefits in school-meal programs and (2) opportunities to strengthen USDA's oversight of the programs.
This testimony summarizes GAO's May 2014 report ( GAO-14-262 ) and January 2015 updates from USDA. For the May 2014 report, GAO reviewed federal school-meals program policies, interviewed program officials, and randomly selected a nongeneralizable sample that included 25 approved applications from civilian federal-employee households out of 7.7 million total approved applications in 25 of 1,520 school districts in the Dallas, Texas, and Washington, D.C., regions. GAO performed limited eligibility testing using civilian federal-employee payroll data from 2010 through 2013 due to the unavailability of other data sources containing nonfederal-employee income. GAO also conducted interviews with households. GAO referred potentially ineligible households to the USDA Inspector General.
In its 2014 report, GAO recommended that USDA explore (1) using computer matching to identify households with income that exceeds program-eligibility thresholds for verification, and (2) verifying a sample of categorically eligible households. USDA generally agreed with the recommendations and is taking actions to address them.
What GAO Found
In May 2014, GAO reported that the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) had taken several steps to implement or enhance controls to identify and prevent ineligible beneficiaries from receiving school-meals benefits. For example:
USDA worked with Congress to develop legislation to automatically enroll students who receive Supplemental Nutritional Assistance Program benefits for free school meals; this program has a more-detailed certification process than the school-meals program.
Starting in the 2013–2014 school year, USDA increased the frequency with which state agencies complete administrative reviews of school districts from every 5 years to every 3 years. As part of this process, state agencies review applications to determine whether eligibility determinations were correctly made.
In its May 2014 report, GAO identified opportunities to strengthen oversight of the school-meals programs while ensuring legitimate access, such as the following:
If feasible, computer matching income data from external sources with participant information could help identify households whose income exceeds eligibility thresholds. As of May 2014, school districts verified a sample of approved applications deemed “error-prone”—statutorily defined as those with reported income within $1,200 of the annual eligibility guidelines—to determine whether the household is receiving the correct level of benefits (referred to as standard verification in this testimony). In a nongeneralizable review of 25 approved applications from civilian federal households, GAO found that 9 of 19 households that self-reported household income and size information were ineligible and only 2 could have been subject to standard verification.
Verifying a sample of categorically eligible applications could help identify ineligible households. GAO reported that school-meal applicants who indicate categorical eligibility (that is, participating in certain public-assistance programs or meeting an approved designation, such as foster children) were eligible for free meals and were generally not subject to standard verification. In a nongeneralizable review of 25 approved applications, 6 households indicated categorical eligibility, but GAO found 2 were ineligible. |
gao_GAO-04-463 | gao_GAO-04-463_0 | The Act (as amended) prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, sex, handicap, and familial status. These certified state and local agencies could be civil rights agencies like the Michigan Department of Civil Rights. HUD’s Fair Housing Enforcement Process Provides the Framework for Handling Complaints
The fair housing enforcement process consists of three stages: (1) intake, during which FHEO or FHAP agencies receive inquiries from individuals with housing discrimination concerns and determine whether those concerns involve a potential violation of the Act; (2) investigation, during which FHEO or FHAP agency investigators collect evidence to determine if reasonable cause exists to believe that a discriminatory housing practice has occurred or is about to occur; and (3) adjudication, during which an independent fact finder determines whether the person charged with discrimination (the respondent) did in fact violate the Act. FHEO may also close complaints administratively for several reasons—for example, if the complainant withdraws the complaint. For example, some FHEO offices and FHAP agencies used experienced investigators during the intake stage, while others did not. Some officials at locations that used experienced investigators said that this practice had improved the quality of intake and decreased the overall length of the enforcement process. While FHEO’s Handbook contains significant guidance, policies, and procedures, FHAP agencies have not been required to follow them. Some of the improvement in the number of FHEO investigations completed in 100 days may have been the result of an initiative aimed at reducing the number of aged cases in FHEO’s inventory. It is too soon to determine what effect this initiative might have on the timeliness of investigations. Third, hub directors and other officials pointed to human capital issues as potentially increasing the length and decreasing the thoroughness of investigations, including staff shortages, low skill levels, lack of training and guidance, and inadequate travel resources. However, persons who have experienced alleged discrimination in housing can sometimes face a lengthy wait before their complaint is resolved. Recommendations
To improve the management and oversight of the fair housing enforcement process, we recommend that the HUD Secretary direct the Assistant Secretary of FHEO to take the following 4 actions: establish a way to identify and share information on effective practices among its regional fair housing offices and FHAP agencies; ensure that the automated case-tracking system includes complete, reliable data on key dates in the intake stage of the fair housing enforcement process for FHAP agencies; ensure that the automated case-tracking system includes complete, reliable data on key dates in the adjudication stage of the fair housing enforcement process for both FHEO and FHAP agencies; ensure that the automated case-tracking system includes complete, reliable data on the outcomes of the adjudication stage of the fair housing enforcement process for FHEO and FHAP agencies; and ensure that hubs enter cause dates into the automated case-tracking system in a consistent manner. Specifically, we obtained TEAPOTS data on complaint investigations completed from 1996 through 2003 by FHEO and FHAP agencies and attempted to measure (1) the time elapsed between a complainants’ first contact with either the FHEO or a FHAP agency and the date that the complaint was filed; (2) the time elapsed between filing a complaint and completing an investigation; and (3) the time elapsed between completing an investigation and the final disposition, the end of the adjudication process. | Why GAO Did This Study
Discrimination in housing on the basis of race, sex, family status, and other grounds is illegal in the United States. Each year, the Department of Housing and Urban Development's Office of Fair Housing and Equal Opportunity (FHEO) and related agencies carry out enforcement activities for several thousand complaints of housing discrimination. The timeliness and effectiveness of the enforcement process have been continuing concerns. GAO describes the stages and practices of the fair housing enforcement process, looks at recent trends, and identifies factors that may influence the length and thoroughness of the process.
What GAO Found
The current fair housing enforcement process provides a framework for addressing housing discrimination complaints. Both FHEO and Fair Housing Assistance Program (FHAP) agencies located around the country take inquiries about potential incidences of discrimination and conduct investigations to determine whether discrimination did in fact occur. The practices used during intake and investigation differ among FHEO and the FHAP agencies, as the state and local agencies have some discretion in determining which practices work best for them. As a result, some agencies have developed procedures that they said improved the quality of intake and made investigations easier. For example, some FHAP agencies use experienced investigators during the intake process to help clients develop formal complaints. To date, FHEO has not looked at such practices to determine if they should be disseminated for potential use at other locales. Further, individuals alleging discrimination in housing sometimes face a lengthy wait to have their complaints investigated and decided. Although the law sets a benchmark of 100 days to complete investigations into complaints of discrimination, FHEO and the FHAP agencies often do not meet that deadline. The typical time to complete an investigation in 1996 through 2003 was more than 200 days, with some investigations taking much longer. However, a lack of data makes it impossible to assess the full length and outcomes of fair housing enforcement activities. For example, because FHAP agencies are not required to report intake data to FHEO, complete information is not available on the number of initial contacts individuals alleging discrimination make with FHAP agencies. A lack of data on the ultimate outcomes of some investigations conducted by both FHEO and FHAP agencies may also prevent FHEO from fully measuring the time that complaints face before cases are ultimately decided. Human capital management challenges, such as ensuring adequate numbers of trained staff, further affect FHEO's ability to carry out its mission in a timely manner. |
gao_GAO-09-762 | gao_GAO-09-762_0 | A sizable minority of wounded warriors submitted their applications more than a year after injury, often foregoing some retroactive benefits because of this delay in applying. About 60 percent of the applicants with no pending claims have been approved for benefits by SSA, with a majority of the approved claimants having a mental health disorder as their primary impairment. SSA has for some time been considering a legislative proposal to change or waive the statutory retroactive benefit period specifically for wounded warriors to help those who may not apply soon enough after disability onset. A Small Percentage of Wounded Warriors Receiving DOD or VA Benefits Also Receive SSA Benefits, and Those With Higher Disability Ratings Are More Likely to Receive Benefits From SSA
Among almost 251,000 wounded warriors receiving DOD or VA disability benefits, we found that about 26,000 (10 percent) of this cohort had applied for SSA disability benefits and about 9,000 (4 percent) were receiving SSA benefits as of July 2008. 6.) SSA, DOD, and VA Have Developed Programs and Initiatives to Reach Wounded Warriors, Particularly since 2007
SSA, DOD, and VA have taken individual and collaborative steps at the national level to establish and maintain outreach to wounded warriors who may qualify for SSA disability benefits. Since 2007, SSA has increased its outreach efforts to wounded warriors by initiating contact with DOD and VA medical facilities and tailoring its information about disability benefits to meet their needs. 7.) This level of interaction was less common at VA sites. A Number of Challenges Affect Agencies’ Outreach Efforts to Wounded Warriors, Especially for Those with TBI and PTSD
Agency efforts to help wounded warriors learn about and apply for SSA disability benefits early in the recovery process can be affected by challenges, including some servicemembers not being ready to apply and misinformation that may be passed among wounded warriors. SSA Is Expediting Wounded Warrior Claims With Assistance From D and VA, but The Transfer Of D Medical Records Can Prolong Decision- Making
as established a nationwide policy requiring its district offices, the state SSA has expedited the processing of wounded warrior benefit claims, with ses in the transfer of DOD assistance from VA and DOD; however, weaknes medical records to SSA can prolong decision-making for some cases. DOD medical records are transferred to SSA as paper documents, a process which can take weeks or months, according to DDS officials. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
We were asked to examine (1) the number of wounded warriors who have applied and been approved for Social Security Administration (SSA) disability benefits, and the extent to which wounded warriors who receive Department of Defense (DOD) or Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) disability benefits also receive SSA benefits; (2) the extent to which SSA, DOD, and VA have worked to inform wounded warriors about and help them apply for SSA disability benefits, and the challenges that confront this outreach effort; and (3) whether the agencies have taken any steps to facilitate the processing of wounded warriors’ SSA disability benefit claims. We obtained and analyzed administrative data from SSA, DOD, and VA on wounded warriors’ utilization of financial benefits from all three agencies. Section 2: How you learned about SSA benefits
4. | Why GAO Did This Study
Disability benefits available through the Social Security Administration (SSA) can be an important source of financial support for some wounded warriors, and Congress has mandated that the Departments of Defense (DOD) and Veterans Affairs (VA) help them learn about and apply for such benefits. GAO was asked to determine: (1) how many wounded warriors have applied and been approved for SSA benefits and the extent to which they are receiving benefits from across the three agencies; (2) what steps DOD, VA, and SSA have taken to inform wounded warriors about SSA benefits, and the challenges that confront this process; and (3) steps taken by all three agencies to facilitate the processing of wounded warrior disability claims. Focusing on those wounded since 2001, GAO reviewed policy documents, contacted DOD and VA medical facilities, surveyed wounded warriors, and analyzed administrative data.
What GAO Found
As of December 2008, about 7,600 of the16,000 wounded warriors who have applied for SSA disability benefits since 2001 have been approved. The majority filed their applications since 2007. Also, a sizable minority of approved claimants filed long enough after injury that they lost some retroactive benefits; SSA is considering a legislative proposal to change the retroactive period for wounded warriors. Among wounded warriors receiving DOD or VA disability benefits, 4 percent were receiving SSA benefits. In addition, more than 6 percent had applied but were not receiving SSA benefits; some still had claims pending. Those with higher disability ratings from DOD or VA were more likely to receive SSA benefits. To varying degrees, SSA, DOD, and VA have increased outreach to help wounded warriors learn about and apply for SSA disability benefits. Since 2007, SSA has increased its outreach to DOD and VA medical facilities and has tailored benefit information for wounded warriors. DOD--and to some extent VA--have incorporated SSA information into their case management practices as well. Locally, DOD and SSA staff have worked together to reach servicemembers, but collaboration has been less common at VA hospitals. Meanwhile, there are challenges to reaching and working with this population. Many of the wounded warriors may not be ready or able to hear about SSA benefits early in their recovery. Also, brain injuries and mental health disorders can impede many wounded warriors' ability to absorb outreach information and complete the benefit application. With help from DOD and VA, SSA has been able to expedite processing of wounded warrior claims. SSA has established a nationwide policy requiring its offices to give priority to wounded warrior claims. For their part, DOD helps SSA identify claimants who are wounded warriors, and VA has expedited the transfer of its medical records and histories to SSA. However, DOD's paper-based transfer of medical records to SSA is slow, which can prolong the process by weeks or months, according to claims processing staff. |
gao_GAO-16-206T | gao_GAO-16-206T_0 | While the Bureau has made some limited use of administrative records during past decennials, it plans to use them much more extensively in 2020. In its first operational plan for the 2020 Census (released October 6, 2015), the Bureau reported design decisions including the use of administrative records to identify vacant addresses in advance of follow- up field work and to enumerate nonresponding households when possible in order to reduce the need for repeated contact attempts during its nonresponse follow-up operation (NRFU). The Bureau also updated the life-cycle cost estimate for the 2020 Census to $12.5 billion (in constant 2020 dollars). This is slightly lower than the Bureau’s prior life-cycle cost estimate of $12.7 billion. We plan to assess the reliability of the new cost estimate and examine the practices the Bureau used to produce it after the Bureau makes the model and its supporting documentation available. Administrative Records Can Reduce 2020 Fieldwork, but the Bureau Will Need to Better Define Milestones and Deadlines to Help Manage Risks
Bureau officials have said they hope to use administrative records to reduce the field work involved in the most expensive census operation— NRFU, when Bureau staff traditionally knock on doors across the country at homes of people who did not respond to the census, or who were missed by census mailings. The Bureau has reported that the following three uses are key to potentially saving up to $1.4 billion compared to using traditional census methods. Identify vacant housing units. One of the largest efficiency gains to the census may come simply from using administrative records to remove these vacant units from the follow-up workload. In a test in Arizona earlier this year, this use of administrative records enabled the Bureau to reduce the NRFU workload by 11 percent. Identify and enumerate occupied nonresponding housing units. Predict the best times to complete NRFU. The Bureau Plans Additional Opportunities for Using Administrative Records in the 2020 Census
In addition to the three uses the Bureau has committed to, the Bureau has identified nine additional uses of administrative records that may help further reduce cost or improve the quality of the census (see figure 1). The Bureau has not separately estimated cost savings for these nine uses, but has begun researching the feasibility of most of them. The Bureau Has Identified Potential Sources for Most of the Administrative Records It Hopes to Use for the 2020 Census
The Bureau has identified and obtained access to nearly all of the sources that it believes it needs in order to leverage all of the opportunities it has identified (see figure 2). Both of these databases would help the Bureau improve its ability to find historically “hard-to-count” groups, such as certain minority groups or young children. Setting Deadlines Would Help the Bureau Ensure It Makes Timely Decisions on Administrative Records
While the Bureau is to be commended for its efforts to expand its use of administrative records to control costs and increase accuracy, we identified actions the Bureau could take to increase its chances of success. Bureau officials have stated that final decisions on the use of administrative records are needed by the end of fiscal year 2017 in order to be included in the Bureau’s 2018 full end-to-end test. However, these deadlines do not appear in schedule documents. The Department of Commerce—the Bureau’s parent agency—concurred with our recommendation. The Bureau Is Taking Steps to Address Challenges to Using Administrative Records for the 2020 Census; Implementing Our Previous Recommendations Could Help
The Bureau is taking steps to address challenges it faces in using administrative records to control costs and improve the quality of the 2020 Census. One challenge facing the Bureau is ensuring the quality of the records it receives from other agencies and levels of government. A second challenge involves protecting confidential data. A third challenge concerns public acceptance and attitudes about sharing of personal data across government agencies for the purposes of the census. The Bureau agreed with the recommendation and, in November 2014, it provided us with a congressional engagement plan. Key Assumptions for Estimated Cost Savings from Administrative Records Are Logical; the Bureau Will Continue to Validate the Assumptions
As part of our recently released review, we determined that key assumptions in the Bureau’s administrative records cost area made sense. | Why GAO Did This Study
With a life-cycle cost of about $13 billion, the 2010 Census was the most expensive U.S. census in history and was 56 percent more costly than the $8.1 billion 2000 Census (in constant 2010 dollars). The Bureau estimates that its use of administrative records in the 2020 Census will reduce the cost compared to traditional census methods by $1.4 billion.
Given the potential cost savings associated with the use of administrative records, this testimony, which is based on a report GAO released last month, focuses on (1) the Bureau's plans for using administrative records, and the opportunities and challenges the Bureau faces going forward; and (2) the key assumptions supporting estimates of expected cost savings. To meet these objectives, GAO reviewed Bureau planning documents and test plans, and interviewed Bureau officials. GAO also relied on its Schedule Assessment Guide.
What GAO Found
The U.S. Census Bureau (Bureau) estimates that it can save around $1.4 billion using administrative records, compared to relying solely on traditional enumeration methods. While the Bureau has made some limited use of administrative records during past decennials, it plans to use them much more extensively in 2020 to achieve these savings.
For example, the Bureau plans to use administrative records to reduce the field work required for its most expensive census operation—nonresponse follow-up—when temporary Bureau employees knock on doors across the country to obtain information from people who did not respond to the census, or who were missed by census mailings. According to the Bureau, using administrative records to (1) identify vacant housing units; (2) identify and enumerate occupied nonresponding housing units when the records meet a certain quality threshold; and (3) predict the best times to visit a household can generate substantial cost savings. The Bureau is also exploring the feasibility of nine additional uses of administrative records that could reduce costs and improve the quality of the census still further. The Bureau already has access to nearly all of the data sources it needs to achieve the desired cost savings. It is also working to gain access to additional databases that could help improve its ability to find historically hard-to-count populations, such as certain minority groups and young children. While the Bureau is to be commended for its efforts to expand its use of administrative records, going forward, it will be important to set deadlines to help ensure it makes timely decisions on these other databases and uses of administrative records. According to Bureau officials, final decisions on the use of administrative records are needed by the end of fiscal year 2017 so the records can be adequately tested in the Bureau's full end-to-end test in 2018. However, these deadlines do not appear in schedule documents.
It will also be important for the Bureau to address key challenges to using administrative records, including (1) ensuring the quality of the records it receives from other government agencies; (2) protecting confidential data; and (3) ensuring congressional and public acceptance of the Bureau's plan to share personal data across government agencies. The Bureau's ongoing research and testing efforts can help with the first challenge. Fully implementing our prior recommendations to strengthen the security of its information systems and to develop a congressional outreach strategy could help address the second and third challenges.
Key assumptions the Bureau used in estimating potential cost savings from administrative records are logical, and the Bureau plans to provide additional support for them. For example, the Bureau's assumption that it could reduce its follow-up workload follows clearly from the Bureau's use of administrative records to remove vacant units from among those housing units needing follow-up because people did not respond to the census, reducing that workload by 11.6 percent. The Bureau released an updated life-cycle cost estimate in October 2015, and GAO anticipates reviewing its reliability after the Bureau makes support for the estimate available.
What GAO Recommends
In its report issued last month GAO recommended that the Census Director set deadlines for making final decisions about which records to use, and for what purpose. This will help ensure the Bureau's resources focus on those activities that show the most promise for reducing enumeration costs. The Department of Commerce—the Bureau's parent agency—concurred with GAO's findings and recommendation. |
gao_GAO-13-320 | gao_GAO-13-320_0 | OSHA develops and enforces federal safety and health standards under the OSH Act. In addition, OSHA reviews, approves, and evaluates the plans and operations of states that have chosen to operate their own occupational safety and health programs. Monitoring of State-Run Programs
State-run occupational safety and health programs are monitored by OSHA’s national office, its 10 regional offices and the regions’ area offices. OSHA Lacks a Time Frame for Resuming Federal Enforcement in States with Performance Issues
OSHA regional officials consult with the national office when responding to state-run programs with performance issues, according to OSHA officials, and the agency may withdraw approval of a state-run program and resume federal enforcement if a state fails to comply substantially with any provision of its state plan. However, when states face challenges in administering their programs, it can lead to performance issues which, if not addressed in a timely manner, may persist and result in inadequate safety and health protection for workers. Recommendations for Executive Action
To better assist states in ensuring they have sound occupational safety and health programs, we recommend that the Secretary of Labor direct the Assistant Secretary for Occupational Safety and Health to take steps to help address challenges that have posed long-standing risks to states with state-run occupational safety and health programs in training staff to administer their programs. Finally, to better position the agency to respond to states facing challenges, we also recommend that OSHA document lessons learned from its experiences in assisting states with their enforcement responsibilities and resuming federal enforcement of state-run programs. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) is generally responsible for setting and enforcing occupational safety and health standards in the nation's workplaces. OSHA carries out enforcement directly in 34 states and territories, while the remaining 22 have chosen to administer their own enforcement programs (referred to as state-run programs) under plans approved by OSHA. GAO was asked to review issues related to state-run programs. This report examines (1) what challenges states face in administering their safety and health programs, and (2) how OSHA responds to state-run programs with performance issues. GAO reviewed relevant federal laws, regulations and OSHA policies; conducted a survey of 22 state-run programs; and interviewed officials in OSHA's national office, all 10 OSHA regions, and from a nongeneralizable sample of 5 state-run programs; and interviewed labor and business associations and safety and health experts.
What GAO Recommends
Congress should consider giving OSHA a mechanism to expedite assistance to states experiencing challenges. In addition, OSHA should take a number of actions, including facilitating access to training; establishing time frames for resuming enforcement if states do not address challenges in a timely manner; and documenting lessons from its past experiences in resuming federal enforcement of state-run programs. In response, OSHA agreed with the recommendations and said it will explore ways to implement them. |
gao_GAO-01-385T | gao_GAO-01-385T_0 | In addition, projections based on current-law assumptions may overstate likely future revenues. All projections are surrounded by uncertainty. Budget Policy in a Time of Surplus
Today Congress and the President face a very different set of budget choices than did your recent predecessors. After years of restraint, there are pent-up demands—for tax cuts and/or for spending. Simply put, we are not saving enough as a nation. Moving From Balancing the Budget to Balancing Fiscal Risk
While these new surplus projections offer an opportunity to address today’s needs and the many pent-up demands held in abeyance during years of fighting deficits, they do not eliminate our obligation to prepare for the future. This suggests that whatever the fiscal choices made in allocating the surplus among debt reduction, tax cuts, and spending increases, approaches should be explored to mitigate risk to the long term. You face the need not only to make choices about tax and spending policy, but also to design a process for the future. Not only should policy choices be examined individually, but also their aggregate impact on the nation’s long-term economic health should be considered. | What GAO Found
In this statement, the Comptroller General discusses the fiscal policy challenges facing Congress and the nation. The focus of tax administration and budgeting are shifting because of current and projected budget surpluses. The Comptroller General speaks of the need for fiscal responsibility when using surplus projections to design tax and spending policies. These projections are based on a set of assumptions that may or may not hold. They are not a precise prediction of a future and should be used as a reference point when making policy decisions. Although the projected surpluses can provide an opportunity to respond to pent-up demands for additional spending or tax cuts, Congress must balance those demands with the nation's long-term economic health. |
gao_GAO-12-353 | gao_GAO-12-353_0 | From fiscal years 2006 through 2011, the JAG program awarded about $4 billion, including about $2 billion in funding from the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, to help state and local jurisdictions fund a wide variety of criminal justice activities, including corrections, prosecution and courts, and law enforcement, among others. Within the “law enforcement” area, the JAG program permits grantees to purchase equipment, such as ballistic-resistant and stab-resistant vests. However, BJA does not know how much grantees have spent on body armor because it is not required to track expenditures for specific purposes. In particular, NIJ’s research has supported studies to enhance compliance test methods; augment ballistic materials; improve the design, comfort, and coverage of body armor; explore the effect of increased body armor coverage on the ability of officers to comfortably carry out their duties; and examine the effects of physical and environmental factors, such as extreme temperatures, on the performance and wear and tear of body armor. NIJ has been setting voluntary body armor performance standards since 1972. Specifically, the online BVP system is designed to allow only jurisdictions approved through the award process to submit payment requests to ensure the eligibility of the jurisdictions; require that the highest elected official in the jurisdiction, or his or her designee, electronically verify payment requests to ensure accountability; allow BVP funding recipients to request payments for purchased vest models approved by NIJ, which appear on the drop-down list within the online system, to ensure that funds are only used for NIJ- compliant body armor; require BVP funding recipients to manually enter details from the purchase invoice, including the quantity, date ordered, and unit price to ensure that the body armor was purchased within the 2-year period specified in the terms of the BVP award and enhance accountability by allowing the request to be traced back to a specific purchase; and not allow BVP funding recipients to enter costs exceeding the authorized limit of $2,250 per vest. BJA Could Enhance Controls over the BVP Program to Better Manage Risk
BJA has designed several controls, but it could take two key actions to strengthen them. The BVP program has not deobligated undisbursed funds for future use from grant awards whose terms have ended. Of this amount, the program disbursed about $247 million to grantees through reimbursements. About $27 million in funds that BJA could deobligate. Thus, BJA could deobligate funds from these grants that have closed. A number of factors can affect the use and effectiveness of body armor. DOJ has taken steps to address these factors and has efforts under way to further advance the use and effectiveness of body armor. Comfort, fit, and coverage. Exposure to environmental conditions. Recommendations for Executive Action
To enhance management of body armor funding, improve grantee accountability in the use of federal funds, reduce the risk of grantee noncompliance with program requirements, and ensure consistency in the department’s efforts to promote law enforcement officer safety, we recommend that the BJA Director take the following five actions: 1. Deobligate undisbursed funds from grants in the BVP program that have closed. 3. 4. DOJ generally agreed with the recommendation that it establish requirements within the JAG program that grantees using the money for body armor purchases have written mandatory wear policies in place and that they are permitted to purchase only NIJ- compliant body armor. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report answers the following questions: (1) What efforts does the Department of Justice (DOJ) have under way to support state and local law enforcement’s use of body armor? (3) What factors affect body armor’s use and effectiveness and how has DOJ has addressed these factors? To identify DOJ’s body armor efforts to support state and local law enforcement, we examined program data on BJA’s Bulletproof Vest Partnership (BVP) program for fiscal years 1999 through 2011 as well as its Edward Byrne Justice Assistance Grant (JAG) program for fiscal years 2006 through 2011. These are two grant programs supporting state and local law enforcement’s purchases of body armor. To evaluate the extent to which DOJ designed controls over and coordinated its body armor efforts, we assessed DOJ’s body armor program policies, procedures, processes, and coordination efforts using standards for internal control in the federal government and leading practices for grant management and stakeholder coordination.discussed body armor efforts and coordination issues with federal officials inside and outside of DOJ. We obtained perspectives on NIJ’s coordination efforts and body armor standards and compliance testing programs from interviews with nonprobability samples of six body armor manufacturers, two NIJ- approved body armor testing laboratories, and two body armor materials manufacturers. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since 1987, body armorin the form of ballistic-resistant and stab-resistant vestshas reportedly saved the lives of over 3,000 law enforcement officers nationwide. Recognizing body armors value, the Department of Justice (DOJ)through its Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) and its National Institute of Justice (NIJ)has implemented initiatives to support state and local law enforcement agencies use of body armor. GAO was asked to examine (1) DOJs efforts to support the use of body armor, (2) the extent to which DOJ has designed controls to manage and coordinate these efforts, and (3) the factors affecting body armors use and effectiveness and steps DOJ has taken to address them. GAO reviewed information on DOJs efforts, and interviewed officials from BJA, NIJ, 6 manufacturers, 2 laboratories, 3 law enforcement associations, 10 state and local jurisdictions, and 12 stakeholders in and outside of government. GAO selected these organizations nonrandomly based in part on their size, and location. GAO also examined body armor literature on key factors affecting body armors use and effectiveness and reviewed DOJs efforts to address these factors.
What GAO Found
The Department of Justice (DOJ) has a number of initiatives to support body armor use by state and local law enforcement, including funding, research, standards development, and testing programs. Two Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) grant programs provide funding to state and local law enforcement to facilitate their body armor purchases. The Bulletproof Vest Partnership (BVP) program offers 2-year grants on a reimbursable basis. The Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant (JAG) program provides 4-year grant money up front that can be used to fund body armor procurement along with other criminal justice activities. Since the BVP programs inception in 1999, it has reimbursed grantees about $247 million for their purchases of nearly 1 million vests. The JAG program has provided nearly $4 billion from fiscal years 2006 through 2011, but BJA does not know how much of this amount grantees have spent on body armor because it is not required to track expenditures for specific purposes. BJA reports that from fiscal years 2006 through 2011, 357 grantees intended to use JAG funds for ballistic-resistant vest procurement, but it does not track how many grantees intended to purchase stab-resistant vests. The National Institute of Justice (NIJ) sponsors body armor research, establishes body armor performance standards, and oversees body armor testing for compliance.
DOJ designed several internal controls to manage and coordinate BJAs and NIJs body armor activities, but could take steps to strengthen them, consistent with standards for internal control. For example, the BVP program has not deobligated about $27 million in undisbursed funds from grant awards whose terms have ended. To strengthen fund management, DOJ could deobligate these funds for grants that have closed and, for example, apply the amounts to new awards or reduce requests for future budgets. Also, unlike the BVP program, the JAG program does not require that the body armor purchased be NIJ compliant or that officers be mandated to wear the armor purchased. To promote officer safety and harmonize the BVP and JAG programs, DOJ could establish consistent body armor requirements.
Factors affecting body armor use and effectiveness include law enforcement agencies policies mandating wear; the comfort, fit, and coverage of the vests; degradation caused by wear and tear; and exposure to environmental conditions. Among other efforts to address these factors, DOJ has revised its standards and compliance tests to incorporate the latest technology.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that among other actions, DOJ deobligate undisbursed funds from grants in the BVP program that have closed, establish consistent requirements within its body armor grant programs, and track grantees intended stab-resistant vest purchases. DOJ generally agreed with the recommendations. |
gao_GAO-01-882 | gao_GAO-01-882_0 | BLM Transferred 79,000 Acres Under Four Key Statutes
Four key statutes authorize BLM to transfer land. For example: BLM field office staff inspected a 160-acre parcel in Idaho that had been transferred to a nonprofit group to develop and use as a trap-shooting and rifle range. Under R&PPA, BLM transferred about 42,000 acres during fiscal years 1991 through 2000 and received a total of about $2.6 million: about 22,000 acres were transferred to state or local governments for historic monument or recreation purposes (at no cost); about 17,000 acres to state or local governments for other government-controlled purposes that serve the general public (for the greater of $10 per acre or $50 total); and the remaining approximate 3,000 acres to state or local governments or nonprofit organizations for other public purposes (for a percentage of the appraised value). The Forest Service, in contrast, sold about 2,000 acres during this same 10-year period, and received about $5 million, under two key statutes: about 800 acres under the Townsite Act and about 1,200 acres under the Small Tracts Act. When BLM and the Forest Service sold land noncompetitively, the agencies generally used appraised values as sale prices; however, the appraisals sometimes underestimated the parcel’s fair market value because they did not reflect the buyer’s current or planned use of the land. BLM Usually Received Prices Higher Than Appraised Values in Competitive Sales
BLM offered land for sale competitively—either through public auctions or modified competitive sales—when agency personnel believed that there might be more than one potential buyer. At a minimum, these frontage acres might have been more appropriately offered for competitive sale. BLM and Forest Service Usually Received Prices Equal to Appraised Values in Direct Sales
When BLM and the Forest Service sold land directly (noncompetitively) to applicants—usually the current user of the land or the adjacent landowner who planned to use it for a specific purpose—the agencies generally used the appraised value as the sale price. Both BLM and the Forest Service sold several parcels directly to adjacent homeowners who had mistakenly built part of their residences on federal land. FLPMA requires that BLM receive at least fair market value when it sells land, but the agency has sold land for less than its appraised value—which estimates fair market value—in response to specific circumstances despite having no authority to do so. | What GAO Found
Since 1781, the federal government has transferred or sold about 1.1 billion acres to nonfederal entities--such as state and local governments, businesses, nonprofit groups, and individual citizens--under various initiatives that promoted general economic development, developed transportation systems, supported public schools, and encouraged settlement of the western frontier. Today, the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) and the Forest Service administer about seventy percent of the 657 million acres that remain in federal ownership. These agencies continue to transfer and sell federal land, but under more limited circumstances. For example, a community might want to develop a public park, a nonprofit group might want land for a shooting range, or a homeowner might want to obtain clear property title after mistakenly building part of his house on federal land. During fiscal years 1991 through 2000, BLM alone was authorized by law to transfer land. BLM transferred about 79,000 acres during this period under four key statutes and received about $3 million. BLM and the Forest Service are both authorized by law to sell land and are directed by law to receive at least fair market value when they do so; BLM has broader authority and has sold much more land, about 56, 000 acres, and received about $74 million. In contrast, the Forest Service sold only about 2,000 acres, all noncompetitively, and received about $5 million. When BLM and Forest Service sold land, they both generally received at least the appraised value. BLM generally offered land for competitive sale when agency personnel believed there was more than one potential buyer for the parcel; in these sales, the agency used appraised values as starting bids--that is, as minimum sale prices--and received prices that were, on average, about eighteen percent higher than appraised values. When BLM or the Forest Service sold land noncompetitively, they generally set the sale price at the appraised value. Some of the parcels the agencies sold noncompetitively might have been more appropriately offered for competitive sale, and in some of the noncompetitive sales, the appraised value underestimated the fair market value because it was not based on the land's current or planned use. |
gao_GAO-06-844T | gao_GAO-06-844T_0 | FEMA Paid About $1 Billion to Individuals Who Provided Invalid Registration Data
Because of FEMA’s failure to establish basic upfront validation controls over registrants’ identity and address information, we estimate that FEMA made approximately $1 billion of improper and potentially fraudulent payments based on invalid registrations. This represents 16 percent of all individual assistance payments for hurricanes Katrina and Rita. For example, rental assistance payments were made to registrants that used a post office box and a cemetery as damaged properties. In fact, as part of our ongoing forensic audit, FEMA continues to provide rental assistance to GAO based on registrations that contained fictitious identities and bogus damaged addresses. In one case, FEMA even sent GAO a check for expedited assistance after an inspector could not confirm that the property existed, and FEMA had decided not to provide housing assistance to this registration. We drew our statistical sample from a population of 2.6 million payments made in the wake of hurricanes Katrina and Rita, totaling over $6 billion through mid-February 2006. The 95 percent confidence interval associated with our estimate of improper and potentially fraudulent registrations ranges from a low of $600 million to a high of $1.4 billion in improper and potentially fraudulent payments. These include individuals who had never lived at the damaged property, did not live at the damaged property at the time of the disasters, or used bogus property addresses on their registrations. GAO audit and investigative work found no evidence that the individual ever lived at the property. We did not test whether registrants received duplicate benefits from other FEMA programs, such as free hotel lodging and trailers, which would have resulted in FEMA paying duplicate housing benefits to the same registrant. Undercover Investigations and Case Study Examples of Fraudulent and Improper IHP Payments
Given the considerable amount of potentially fraudulent and improper payments identified in our statistical sample, it is not surprising that FEMA continued to provide rental assistance payments to GAO investigators based on bogus registrations. As discussed previously, one statistical sample item we tested related to an improper and potentially fraudulent payment FEMA made to an individual who received expedited and rental assistance as a result of using a post office box as a damaged property address. Registrants Using Prisoner Identities Received Millions in Disaster Assistance Payments
FEMA paid millions of dollars to over 1,000 registrants who used names and SSNs belonging to state and federal prisoners for expedited and housing assistance. As a result, FEMA disbursed about $1.5 million of taxpayer money for over 750 debit cards that FEMA cannot establish went to disaster victims. Table 5 details some of the debit cards activities we found that are not necessary to satisfy legitimate disaster needs. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope and Methodology
Our objectives were to (1) provide an estimate of improper and potentially fraudulent payments related to certain aspects of the disaster registrations, (2) identify whether FEMA made improper or potentially fraudulent IHP payments to registrants who were incarcerated at the time of the disaster, (3) identify whether FEMA provided registrants with rental assistance payments at the same time it was paying for their hotel rooms, and (4) review FEMA’s accountability over debit cards and controls over proper debit card usage. To provide an estimate of improper and potentially fraudulent payments related to certain aspects of the disaster registrations, we drew a statistical sample of 250 payments from the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)’s Individuals and Households Program (IHP) payments. We also used data mining and forensic audit techniques to identify registrants who stayed in hotels paid for by FEMA who also received rental assistance payments through the IHP program. | Why GAO Did This Study
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita destroyed homes and displaced millions of individuals. In the wake of these natural disasters, Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) responded to the need to provide aid quickly through the Individuals and Households Program (IHP) program, which provides housing assistance, real and personal property assistance, and for other immediate, emergency needs. As of February 2006, FEMA made 2.6 million payments totaling over $6 billion. Our testimony today will (1) provide an estimate of improper and potentially fraudulent payments through February 2006 related to certain aspects of the disaster registrations, (2) identify whether improper and potentially fraudulent payments were made to registrants who were incarcerated at the time of the disaster, (3) identify whether FEMA improperly provided registrants with rental assistance payments at the same time it was paying for their lodging at hotels, and (4) review FEMA's accountability over debit cards and controls over proper debit card usage. To estimate the magnitude of IHP payments made on the basis of invalid registrations, we selected a random statistical sample of 250 payments made to hurricanes Katrina and Rita registrants as of February 2006. We also conducted data mining and investigations to further illustrate the effects of control breakdowns.
What GAO Found
We estimate that through February 2006, FEMA made about 16 percent or $1 billion in improper and potentially fraudulent payments to registrants who used invalid information to apply for disaster assistance. Based on our statistical sample, we are 95 percent confident that the range of improper and potentially fraudulent payments is from $600 million to $1.4 billion. In our assessment of whether a payment was improper and potentially fraudulent, we did not test for other evidence of impropriety or potential fraud, such as insurance fraud and bogus damage claims. This means our review potentially understates the magnitude of improper payments made. Examples of fraud and abuse include payments to registrants who used post office boxes, United Parcel Service stores, and cemeteries as their damaged property addresses. Absent proper verification, it is not surprising that FEMA continued to pay fictitious disaster registrations set up by GAO as part of our ongoing forensic audit. In one case, FEMA paid nearly $6,000 to our registrant who submitted a vacant lot as a damaged address. Below is a copy of a rental assistance check sent to GAO after FEMA received feedback from its inspector that the GAO undercover registrant did not live at the damaged address, and after a Small Business Administration inspector reported that the damaged property could not be found. We also found that FEMA provided expedited and housing assistance to individuals who were not displaced. For example, millions of dollars in expedited and housing assistance payments went to registrations containing the names and social security numbers of individuals incarcerated in federal and state prisons during the hurricanes. In addition, FEMA improperly paid individuals twice for their lodging--paying their hotels and rental assistance at the same time. For example, at the same time that FEMA paid $8,000 for an individual to stay in California hotels, this individual also received three rental assistance payments for both hurricane disasters. Finally, we found that FEMA could not establish that 750 debit cards worth $1.5 million went to hurricane Katrina victims. We also found debit cards that were used for a Caribbean vacation, professional football tickets, and adult entertainment. |
gao_GAO-06-914 | gao_GAO-06-914_0 | Background
At DOD’s request, Congress approved legislative authority in 1997 for privatizing utility systems at military installations. GAO Report Identified Weaknesses in Program Implementation
In May 2005, we issued a report that identified management weaknesses in DOD’s implementation of the utility privatization program. The report noted that utility privatization implementation had been slower than expected, the services’ economic analyses supporting utility privatization decisions provided an unrealistic sense of savings to a program that generally increases government utility costs, DOD’s funding obligations would likely increase faster than they would under continued government ownership, DOD did not require that the services’ economic analyses be subjected to an independent review for accuracy and compliance with guidance, implementation of the fair market value requirement in some cases resulted in higher contract costs for utility services, the services had not issued specific contract administration guidance for the program, and DOD’s preferred approach of permanently conveying utility system ownership to contractors may give the contractor an advantage when negotiating service contract changes or renewals. None of the services met DOD’s September 2005 implementation goal and the program’s estimated completion date has now slipped to September 2011. Service officials stated that additional delays occurred because the services decided to suspend the program between October 2005 and March 2006. According to the officials, the suspension was provided to allow DOD and the services time to review concerns noted in our May 2005 report, develop and issue supplemental guidance for the program, and implement program changes necessitated by modifications in the program’s legislative authority made by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006. 2688 authority bringing the total number of awarded projects to 81. However, the services have awarded no projects under this authority since DOD issued supplemental program guidance in November 2005. Program Delays Have Resulted in Increased Implementation Costs
With program delays, the services’ estimated program implementation costs have increased from about $268 million through fiscal year 2005 to about $285 million through fiscal year 2006. DOD’s Changes to Improve Utility Privatization Implementation Have Addressed Many Areas but Have Not Eliminated All Program Concerns
DOD has made many changes to improve the management and oversight of the utility privatization program since our May 2005 report. We found that changes to address some issues have not been effectively implemented, some changes were not sufficient to totally eliminate the concerns, and DOD did not make changes to address some concerns causing continued questions about the reliability of the economic analyses, the availability of funds to pay for the remaining projects that might be privatized, the adequacy of contract oversight in projects awarded prior to DOD’s changes, and the control of long-term cost growth in utility privatization contracts. However, in view of competing needs and budget priorities, questions remain over availability of the additional funds needed to complete the program. Although it is too early in the program’s implementation to know to what extent DOD’s efforts will be successful in ensuring equitable contract price adjustments and limiting long-term cost growth in the utility privatization program, our review found indications that containing cost growth may become a concern. If fully implemented, the changes should result in more reliable economic analyses supporting proposed privatization projects, improved budgetary consideration of increased utility costs from privatization, enhanced oversight of privatization contracts, and reduced instances where contractors recover more than the amounts they paid as the fair market value for system conveyances. Also, although DOD’s changes designed to improve utility privatization contract administration and oversight are key steps in the right direction, it may take some time to fully implement improvements as new privatization contracts are awarded and oversight of older contracts is assessed. Recommendations for Executive Action
We recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Installations and Environment) to take the following seven actions: require independent reviewers to report to decision makers on the thoroughness of each economic analysis and any significant anomalies in the assumptions used and estimated costs for each ownership option; issue guidance requiring the services to perform the postconveyance reviews as noted in DOD’s March 2006 report to Congress; address the utility privatization program potential funding shortfall in view of all DOD and service funding and priority needs; ensure that utility privatization contracts awarded prior to the November 2005 supplemental guidance have adequate resources and contractor performance surveillance plans; place additional emphasis on monitoring contract cost growth as utility privatization contracts undergo periodic price adjustments and other changes are negotiated; require, in addition to the “should cost” estimate, that each project economic analysis include the system’s current annual costs and the actual expected annual costs if the system is not privatized; and issue detailed guidance explaining how the services should incorporate margins of error in the economic analyses. 2. | Why GAO Did This Study
Department of Defense (DOD) installations have about 2,600 electric, water, wastewater, and natural gas utility systems valued at about $50 billion. In 1997, DOD decided that privatization was the preferred method for improving utility systems, and Congress approved legislative authority for privatizing DOD's utility systems with Public Law No. 105-85. DOD estimates that some utility privatization contracts will cost over $100 million. In a May 2005 report, GAO identified several management weaknesses in DOD's implementation of the program. The Fiscal Year 2006 National Defense Authorization Act required GAO to evaluate and report on changes to the utility privatization program since May 2005. Accordingly, this report updates the status of the program and discusses the effect of DOD's changes on the concerns noted last year. To conduct this review, GAO summarized program status and costs, assessed DOD's changes to program guidance and in other areas, and reviewed the services' implementation of the changes.
What GAO Found
DOD's progress in implementing the utility privatization program has been slower than expected and the estimated completion date has slipped from the department's target of September 2005 to September 2011. DOD attributed the delays to the complexity of the program and to the services' decision to suspend and reassess the management of the program between October 2005 and March 2006. Since May 2005, the services privatized 14 utility systems under the legislative authority for the program, bringing the total number of awarded projects to 81. However, the services have awarded no projects since DOD issued new program guidance in November 2005. Meanwhile, the services' total estimated program implementation costs through fiscal year 2006 have increased to $285 million, and more funds will be required before the program is completed in 2011. Since GAO's May 2005 report, DOD has issued new guidance and required changes in procedures. If fully implemented, these changes should result in more reliable economic analyses, improved budgetary consideration of increased utility costs, enhanced oversight of privatization contracts, and reduced instances where contractors recover more than the fair market value paid for system conveyances. However, a number of concerns from the May 2005 report remain. For example, although DOD made changes to improve the reliability of project economic analyses by requiring independent reviews, GAO reviewed 10 economic analyses and found reliability issues that had not been identified during the independent reviews. DOD directed the services to adequately consider in their budgets the increased costs resulting from utility privatization. However, questions remain over the availability of the funds needed to complete the program because the services estimate that they will need $453 million more than is currently programmed to pay costs associated with remaining utility systems that might be privatized. Although DOD made many changes to improve contract administration and oversight, it may take some time to fully implement the changes as new privatization contracts are awarded. GAO's review of five projects awarded prior to DOD's changes found continuing questions about the adequacy of resources provided to perform oversight and the lack of required plans for overseeing contractor performance. It is too early in the program's implementation to know to what extent DOD's efforts will be successful in ensuring equitable periodic contract price adjustments and limiting long-term cost growth in the utility privatization program. However, GAO found indications that cost growth may become a challenge. DOD did not change its guidance to require that project economic analyses depict the actual expected costs of continued government ownership if the systems are not privatized. Therefore, DOD's reported $650 million in long-term cost reductions is unrealistic. |
gao_GAO-04-857T | gao_GAO-04-857T_0 | Critical Internal Controls Were Ineffective
Our review found that VHA’s internal controls were not designed to provide reasonable assurance that improper purchase card and convenience check purchases would not occur or would be detected in the normal course of business. Generally, we found that internal controls were not operating as intended because cardholders and approving officials were not following operating guidance governing the program, and in the case of documentation and vendor-offered discounts, they lacked guidance. We also found instances where purchase card and convenience check transactions lacked key supporting documentation. Noncompliance with Purchasing Requirements Resulted in Instances of Improper Purchases
The lack of adequate internal controls resulted in numerous violations of applicable laws and regulations and VA/VHA purchase card policies. We classified purchases made in violation of applicable laws and regulations or VA/VHA purchase card policies as improper purchases. We found violations that included purchases for personal use such as food or clothing, purchases that were split into two or more transactions to circumvent single purchase limits, purchases over the $2,500 micro- purchase threshold that were either beyond the scope of the cardholder’s authority or lacked evidence of competition, and purchases made from an improper source. While the total amount of improper purchases we identified, based on limited scale audit work, is relatively small compared to the more than $1.4 billion in annual purchase card and convenience check transactions, we believe our results demonstrate vulnerabilities from weak controls that could have been exploited to a much greater extent. Poor Controls Resulted in Some Wasteful and Questionable Purchases
The ineffectiveness of internal controls was also evident in the number of transactions that we classified as (1) wasteful, that is, excessive in cost compared to other available alternatives or for questionable government need, or (2) questionable because there was insufficient documentation to determine what was purchased. Of the 982 nonstatistical sample transactions we reviewed, 250 transactions, totaling $209,496, lacked key purchase documentation. Because we tested only a small portion of the transactions that appeared to have a higher risk of fraud, waste, or abuse, there may be other improper, wasteful, and questionable purchases in the remaining untested transactions. For example, we identified two transactions for 3,348 movie gift certificates, totaling over $30,000. For these purchases, the cardholders and A/OPCs could provide neither the award letters nor justification for the awards. We identified a cardholder who purchased a $999 digital camera when there were other less costly digital cameras widely available. These purchases were from vendors that would more likely be selling unauthorized or personal use items. Examples of these types of purchases included a purchase form Radio Shack totaling $3,305, a purchase from Daddy’s Junky Music totaling $1,041, a purchase from Gap Kids totaling $788, and a purchase from Harbor Cruises totaling $357. In closing, Mr. Chairman, I want to emphasize that without improvements in its internal controls to strengthen segregation of duties; documentation of purchase transactions; timely recording, review, and reconciliation of transactions; and program monitoring, VHA will continue to be at risk for noncompliance with applicable laws and regulations and its own policies and remain vulnerable to improper, wasteful, and questionable purchases. Our report, which is being released at this hearing, makes 36 recommendations to strengthen internal controls and compliance in VHA’s purchase card program to reduce its vulnerability to improper, wasteful, and questionable purchases. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Office of Inspector General (OIG) has continued to identify significant vulnerabilities in the department's use of government purchase cards. Over the years, the OIG has identified internal control weaknesses that resulted in instances of fraud and numerous improper and questionable uses of purchase cards. The OIG has made a number of recommendations for corrective action. Given that VA is the second largest user of the governmentwide purchase card program, with reported purchases totaling $1.5 billion for fiscal year 2002, and because of the program weaknesses reported by the OIG, GAO was asked to determine whether existing controls at the Veterans Health Administration (VHA) were designed to provide reasonable assurance that improper purchases would be prevented or detected in the normal course of business, purchase card and convenience check expenditures were made in compliance with applicable laws and regulations, and purchases were made for a reasonable cost and a valid government need. GAO's report on this issue, released concurrently with this testimony, makes 36 recommendations to strengthen internal controls and compliance in VHA's purchase card program to reduce its vulnerability to improper, wasteful, and questionable purchases.
What GAO Found
Weaknesses in VHA's controls over the use of purchase cards and convenience checks resulted in instances of improper, wasteful, and questionable purchases. These weaknesses included inadequate segregation of duties; lack of key supporting documents; lack of timeliness in recording, reconciling, and reviewing transactions; and insufficient program monitoring activities. Generally, GAO found that internal controls were not operating as intended because cardholders and approving officials were not following VA/VHA operating guidance governing the program and, in the case of documentation and vendor-offered discounts, lacked adequate guidance. The lack of adequate internal controls resulted in numerous violations of applicable laws and regulations and VA/VHA purchase card policies that GAO identified as improper purchases. GAO found violations of applicable laws and regulations that included purchases for personal use such as food or clothing, purchases that were split into two or more transactions to circumvent single purchase limits, purchases over the $2,500 micro-purchase threshold that were either beyond the scope of the cardholder's authority or lacked evidence of competition, and purchases made from an improper source. While the total amount of improper purchases GAO identified is relatively small compared to the more than $1.4 billion in annual purchase card and convenience check transactions, they demonstrate vulnerabilities from weak controls that may have been exploited to a much greater extent. The ineffectiveness of internal controls was also evident in the number of transactions classified as wasteful or questionable. GAO identified over $300,000 in wasteful or questionable purchases, including two purchases for 3,348 movie gift certificates totaling over $30,000 for employee awards for which award letters or justification for the awards could not be provided and a purchase for a digital camera totaling $999 when there were other less costly digital cameras widely available. Also, 250 questionable purchases totaling $209,496 from vendors that would more likely be selling unauthorized or personal use items lacked key purchase documentation. Examples of these types of purchases included a purchase from Radio Shack totaling $3,305, a purchase from Daddy's Junky Music totaling $1,041, a purchase from Gap Kids totaling $788, and a purchase from Harbor Cruises totaling $357. Missing documentation prevented determining the reasonableness and validity of these purchases. Because only a small portion of the transactions that appeared to have a higher risk of fraud, waste, or abuse were tested, there may be other improper, wasteful, and questionable purchases in the remaining untested transactions. |
gao_GAO-13-431 | gao_GAO-13-431_0 | For example, states are required to provide information and report to HHS on their use of TANF funds in TANF state plans outlining how each state intends to run its TANF program (generally filed every 2 years), quarterly reports on demographic and economic circumstances and work activities of families receiving cash assistance, quarterly financial reports providing data on federal TANF and state MOE expenditures, and annual reports on state programs funded with MOE funds, among other things. TANF’s Role in Providing Cash Assistance to Needy Families Has Evolved
Fewer Eligible Families Receive Cash Assistance
A key TANF purpose stated in law is to provide assistance to needy families so that children may be cared for in their own homes or homes of relatives. With the TANF block grant in effect replacing AFDC—a key federal cash welfare program for needy families—in fiscal year 1997, much attention has focused since then on the decline in the number of families receiving TANF cash assistance and the implications for poor children and families. The law does not explicitly state that poverty reduction is a TANF purpose, and there are generally no federal requirements or benchmarks as to eligibility criteria or benefit amounts, or on the percentage of low-income families who are to be covered by a state’s TANF program. 1). The relatively modest increase in TANF caseloads—and decreases in some states—has raised questions about the responsiveness of TANF to changing economic conditions. In 2012, HHS officials noted that they do not have the authority to require states to provide basic information about the cash assistance programs, including state TANF eligibility criteria, benefits levels, and other program features. Composition of the Cash Assistance Caseload Has Changed
Much of the federal welfare policy discussion has focused on how to help low-income parents caring for their children become employed and less dependent on government assistance. We reported in 2012 that the percentage of child-only cases increased from about 23 percent from July through September 1997 to over 40 percent in fiscal year 2010. Approach to Measuring Work Participation Has Limitations
States Have Generally Met Work Participation Rates by Using Credits Allowed by Law
One of the four TANF purposes is to end dependence of needy parents on government benefits by promoting job preparation, work, and marriage; TANF's work participation rate requirement is in keeping with the purpose of helping parents prepare for and find jobs. numbers of families receiving TANF cash assistance over a specified time period are accounted for in each state’s caseload reduction credit, which essentially then lowers the states’ required work participation rate from 50 percent.For example, if a state’s caseload decreases by 20 percent during the relevant time period, the state receives a caseload reduction credit equal to 20 percentage points, which results in the state work participation rate requirement being adjusted from 50 to 30 percent. This is the same conclusion we reached in our 2005 report that recommended changes to improve this measure of states’ performance. States May Not Serve Some Families that are Not Work-Ready
Work participation rate requirements can play an important role in encouraging states to move TANF recipients into work; however, our work indicates some ways that current policies may be discouraging states from engaging some TANF recipients with complex needs and from providing an appropriate mix of activities. Additional information may be needed before adopting any of these potential options. Information Available to Assess Recent Trends in TANF Spending is Limited
Performance Information for Non-Cash Services is Incomplete
We reported in 2012 that the TANF block grant has evolved into a flexible funding stream that states use to support a broad range of allowable services, but the accountability framework currently in place in federal law Declining cash and regulations has not kept pace with this evolution.assistance caseloads freed up federal TANF and state MOE funds for states, and over time, states shifted spending to other forms of aid, which we refer to as non-cash services. However, there are no reporting requirements mandating performance information specifically on families receiving non-cash services or their outcomes. Still, we concluded that without more information that encompasses the full breadth of states’ uses of TANF funds, Congress will not be able to fully assess how funds are being used, including who is receiving services or what is being achieved. Some Potential Options
Potential options are available to provide additional information on non- cash services and state MOE expenditures that may be useful for making decisions regarding the TANF block grant and better ensure accountability for TANF funds (see table 3). Concluding Observations
We have identified a number of potential options that could improve TANF performance and oversight as the program is currently designed, based on our prior work. These options are not intended to be exhaustive, and it is not the purpose of this report to recommend or endorse any particular policy option. In addition, there may be a number of other options that would warrant further analysis. HHS provided technical comments which we incorporated as appropriate. We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional committees, the Secretary of Health and Human Services, and other interested parties. Temporary Assistance for Needy Families: State Maintenance of Effort Requirements and Trends. Welfare Reform: Better Information Needed to Understand Trends in States’ Uses of the TANF Block Grant. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 1996, Congress made sweeping changes to federal welfare policy by replacing the previous cash assistance program with the TANF block grant. Since then through fiscal year 2011, the federal government and states have spent a total of nearly $434 billion for TANF. The block grant was reauthorized under the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, and is currently authorized through September 30, 2013. To inform a potential reauthorization of TANF, GAO was asked to discuss its key findings on TANF performance and oversight from its previous work and identify potential options that would address these findings. This report discusses issues and options in three selected areas: (1) TANF's role in providing cash assistance to low-income families, (2) measurement of TANF work participation, and (3) information on states' use of TANF funds. In addition to summarizing its previous work on these issues, GAO reviewed relevant federal laws, regulations, and agency documents as well as transcripts from relevant congressional hearings from 2009 through 2012 to identify potential options. GAO also spoke with HHS officials and selected three TANF experts with a range of views to share their perspectives on these issues.
What GAO Found
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families' (TANF) role in providing cash assistance has evolved; fewer eligible families receive cash assistance and the composition of the caseload has changed. GAO noted in 2010 that 87 percent of the dramatic decline from 1995 through 2005 in the number of families receiving cash assistance was due a decline in eligible families participating in TANF, rather than increased incomes. Changes to state TANF programs, such as mandatory work requirements and lower benefits, account in part for this decline. Relatively modest caseload increases in recent years nationwide, as well as decreases in some states, have raised questions about TANF's responsiveness to changing economic conditions. GAO also reported in 2011 that the composition of the TANF caseload has changed, with about 40 percent of cases now comprised of children only, with the adult not receiving benefits, and little known nationwide about state policies for aiding these children. Potential options to better understand TANF's role as a cash assistance program may include: improving information on the extent to which states provide cash assistance to eligible low-income families, and requiring states to include more information--for example in TANF state plans submitted to the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)--on features such as benefit amounts and services provided.
The current approach used to measure the extent to which states engage TANF recipients in work activities as defined by federal law has limitations. GAO reported in 2010 and 2011 that most states relied on several factors allowed in law, including credits for caseload reductions, to reduce the percentage of families they needed to engage in work to meet their work participation rate requirements. GAO also reported that current policies may be discouraging states from serving some families who are not "work-ready" through TANF, such as those with significant barriers to employment or complex needs. Potential options to address these issues may include: eliminating, limiting, or modifying some of the credits states may use to reduce their work participation rate requirements; adjusting requirements to better ensure states engage those not work-ready; and developing an additional or alternate set of measures that focus on employment outcomes. However, more information may be needed to assess the potential impacts of any changes to work participation requirements.
Limitations exist in the information available to assess states' use of federal TANF funds and state expenditures related to minimum state spending requirements under TANF, known as maintenance of effort (MOE) requirements. GAO reported in 2012 that the TANF block grant has evolved into a flexible funding stream that states use to support a broad range of non-cash services, but information requirements for assessing TANF performance have not kept pace with this evolution. For example, there are no reporting requirements mandating performance information specifically on families receiving non-cash services or their outcomes. GAO also reported in 2012 that states have reported increased levels of MOE spending for a variety of reasons, including helping them reduce their work participation rate requirements as allowed by law. Potential options to better understand federal and state TANF spending may include: improving reporting and performance information to encompass the full breadth of states' use of TANF funds, and requiring a review of MOE expenditures used to meet TANF requirements.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is not making recommendations, but rather identifying some potential options that might improve TANF performance, depending on Congress' goals for the program. These options are not intended to be exhaustive, and there may be a number of other options that warrant further analysis. HHS provided technical comments on a draft of this report. |
gao_T-HEHS-98-117 | gao_T-HEHS-98-117_0 | Eligibility Criteria Permit Easy Access to the Home Health Benefit
Since Medicare’s inception, the home health benefit has undergone several changes in which coverage criteria and their enforcement have alternately tightened and relaxed. Diminished Oversight Ripened Opportunity for Exploitation
The relationship between the funding levels for payment safeguard activities and the proportion of claims reviewed helps explain the weak oversight of Medicare’s home health benefit in the 1990s. As a result of decreased review, agencies were less likely to be caught if they abused the home health benefit. Cost-report audits help identify providers’ attempts to shift inappropriate or unnecessary costs to the program. Certification Process Ineffective in Excluding Problem Providers
In our December 1997 report on the home health survey and certification process, we noted that becoming a Medicare-certified home health agency has been too easy, particularly in light of the number of problem agencies identified in various studies in recent years. Once certified, it was unlikely that home health agencies would be terminated from the program or otherwise penalized, even when they had been repeatedly cited for not meeting Medicare’s conditions of participation or for providing substandard care. Recent Legislation Fosters Greater Oversight, Introduces Payment Reforms
With the passage of HIPAA and BBA, the Congress recently provided important new resources and tools to fight fraud and abuse in general and home health care offenses in particular. In addition to earmarking funds for anti-fraud-and-abuse activities, the legislation offers specific civil and criminal penalties against health care fraud as well as opportunities to improve detection capabilities. For example, in an egregious case of home health fraud that our Office of Special Investigations reported on in 1995, the HHS Inspector General charged ABC Home Health Care with billing Medicare for items that were solely for the owner’s or his family’s personal use, including condominium utility expenses, maid services, and automobile lease payments. Medicare Fraud and Abuse: Summary and Analysis of Reforms in the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 and the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 (GAO/HEHS-98-18R, Oct. 9, 1997). 5, 1997). | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed Medicare benefit fraud and abuse in the home health industry, focusing on: (1) the general nature of beneficiary eligibility criteria; (2) the diminished Medicare contractor review and audit effort; (3) weaknesses in Medicare's home health provider certification processes; and (4) new tools Congress provided to strengthen oversight of the home health benefit.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) several historical factors have produced an environment that, until recently, has enabled improper billing and cost-reporting practices to grow unchecked; (2) legislation and coverage policy changes in response to court decisions in the 1980's made it easier for beneficiaries to obtain home health coverage and harder for Medicare claims reviewers to deny questionable claims; (3) from 1989 until recently, the volume of claims reviews and cost-report audits plummeted, reducing the likelihood that improprieties would be detected; (4) because of the laxity of Medicare's survey and certification process, agencies with no experience or proof of capability were certified as providers; (5) moreover, home health agencies were unlikely to be terminated or penalized even when they were cited repeatedly for providing substandard care or otherwise failed to comply with conditions of participation; (6) recent legislation has enhanced the Health Care Financing Administration's ability to improve its oversight of the home health benefit; (7) in 1995, a multiagency government effort known as Operation Restore Trust launched a new anti-fraud-and-abuse campaign, targeting home health services, among others, for investigation; (8) the following year, the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 provided dedicated funding to finance, in part, the investigative efforts of the Department of Health and Human Services' Office of the Inspector General and other federal agencies; and (9) a year later, the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 mandated reforming Medicare's method of paying for home health services and contained additional provisions designed to tighten the use and oversight of the home health benefit. |
gao_GAO-03-660T | gao_GAO-03-660T_0 | Components of the Interior Enforcement Strategy
In January 1999, INS issued its Interior Enforcement Strategy. 2. Deter, dismantle, and diminish smuggling or trafficking of aliens. 3. Respond to community reports and complaints about illegal immigration. 4. 5. Block and remove employers’ access to undocumented workers. The strategy emphasizes denying employers access to unauthorized workers by checking their compliance with the employment verification requirements in the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986. Challenges to Implementing the Interior Enforcement Programs
Our work has shown that INS faced numerous daunting enforcement issues, as will BICE as it assumes responsibility for the strategy. Having data on how to effectively allocate staff and placing sufficient staff in the right locations is important if BICE is to achieve program goals. With respect to alien smuggling, INS lacked field intelligence staff to collect and analyze information. The worksite enforcement program received a relatively small portion of INS’s staffing and budget. Given limited enforcement resources, BICE needs to assure that it targets those industries where employment of illegal aliens poses the greatest potential risk to national security. INS’s interior enforcement strategy did not define the criteria for opening investigations of employers suspected of criminal activities. They said that training in this area was critically needed. The strategy stated that specific performance measurements would be developed in the annual performance plans required by the Government Performance and Results Act. Some of the challenges discussed above carry over from the INS, such as the need for sound intelligence information, efficient use of resources and management of workloads, information systems that generate timely and reliable information, clear and current guidance, and appropriate performance measures. Other challenges are emerging. These include creating appropriate cooperation and collaboration mechanisms to assure effective program management, and reinforcing training and management controls to help assure compliance with DHS policies and procedures and the proper treatment of citizens and aliens. For example, both the Border Patrol, now located in the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (BCBP), and BICE’s immigration investigations program conducted alien smuggling investigations prior to the merger into DHS. The Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services (BCIS) is responsible for administering services such as immigrant and nonimmigrant sponsorship, work authorization, naturalization of qualified applicants for U.S. citizenship, and asylum. However, some try to obtain these benefits through fraud, and investigating fraud is the responsibility of BICE’s Immigration Investigations program. INS’ approach to addressing benefit fraud was fragmented and unfocused. For example, as part of a special registration program for visitors from selected foreign countries, immigration investigators have been fingerprinting, photographing, and interviewing aliens upon entry to the U.S. Immigration investigators have also participated in anti-terrorism task forces across the country and helped interview thousands of non- immigrant aliens to determine what knowledge they may have had about terrorists and terrorist activities. | Why GAO Did This Study
Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Immigration Interior Enforcement Strategy's implementation is now the responsibility of the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (BICE). This strategy was originally created by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). In the 1990s, INS developed a strategy to control illegal immigration across the U.S. border and a strategy to address enforcement priorities within the country's interior. In 1994, INS's Border Patrol issued a strategy to deter illegal entry. The strategy called for "prevention through deterrence"; that is, to raise the risk of being apprehended for illegal aliens to a point where they would consider it futile to try to enter. The plan called for targeting resources in a phased approach, starting first with the areas of greatest illegal activity. In 1999, the INS issued its interior enforcement strategy designed to deter illegal immigration, prevent immigration-related crimes, and remove those illegally in the United States. Historically, Congress and INS have devoted over five times more resources in terms of staff and budget on border enforcement than on interior enforcement.
What GAO Found
INS's interior enforcement strategy was designed to address (1) the detention and removal of criminal aliens, (2) the dismantling and diminishing of alien smuggling operations, (3) community complaints about illegal immigration, (4) immigration benefit and document fraud, and (5) employers' access to undocumented workers. These components remain in the BICE strategy. INS faced numerous challenges in implementing the strategy. For example, INS lacked reliable data to determine staff needs, reliable information technology, clear and consistent guidelines and procedures for working-level staff, effective collaboration and coordination within INS and with other agencies, and appropriate performance measures to help assess program results. As BICE assumes responsibility for strategy implementation, it should consider how to address these challenges by improving resource allocation, information technology, program guidance, and performance measurement. The creation of DHS has focused attention on other challenges to implementing the strategy. For example, BICE needs to coordinate and collaborate with the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services (BCIS) for the timely and proper adjudication of benefit applications, and with the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (BCBP) to assist in antismuggling investigations and sharing intelligence. In addition, BICE needs to assure that training and internal controls are sufficient to govern investigators' antiterrorism activities when dealing with citizens and aliens. |
gao_GAO-15-265 | gao_GAO-15-265_0 | Over time, State has identified concerns about the SWT program, such as abuses of some SWT participants by employers, links between some SWT participants and organized crime, and overshadowing of the program’s cultural exchange component by its work component. Participants come from all over the world and work throughout the United States year-round, based on the timing of their major academic breaks. For example, State records show that in 2014, approximately 79,000 SWT participants from more than 120 countries worked in all 50 states and the District of Columbia. SWT Program Funding
As a private sector exchange program, the SWT program is primarily funded through fees paid by SWT sponsors and participants. The 2012 IFR explained that the 2012 regulatory changes included, among others, increased language requirements for participants, requiring them to have sufficient English not only to perform their jobs, as previously required, but also to protect themselves as they navigate daily life; an expanded list of job placement requirements and prohibitions—for example, placements must be seasonal or temporary, must provide opportunities for participants to interact regularly with U.S. citizens, and must not displace U.S. citizen workers; and requirements that sponsors submit annual participant price lists to provide itemized breakdowns of costs that participants must pay to both overseas agents and sponsors; assist participants in arranging housing and transportation when needed; and vet domestic agents. State officials told us that as of October 2014, State had no current plans for lifting the program cap. State Conducts Oversight of Sponsors, Employers, and Participants but Has Limited Information about Program Costs
State has several mechanisms for monitoring and enforcing compliance with SWT regulations intended to prevent abuse of the program and of participants. In 2011 through 2014, State conducted on-site reviews of 18 sponsors that were active during this period. KCC verifies employers of participants from non-visa-waiver countries as well as participants from visa waiver countries in preplaced jobs. State also oversees participants’ welfare through complaints that it receives from participants, the general public, and State officials and through incident reports from sponsors. Sponsors submit this information in incident reports. Because State has not established mechanisms to ensure, respectively, that sponsors provide complete and consistent lists of participant fees and that this information is made publicly available, State’s ability to protect participants from excessive and unexpected program costs is limited. In response, State reported in 2012 that it had begun meeting with sponsors to discuss ways to establish an open and transparent process for capturing fees that they and their overseas agents may charge participants. Without detailed criteria that would allow State to assess the sufficiency or appropriateness of the cultural component, State lacks assurance that SWT participants’ experiences of U.S. culture further State’s public diplomacy goals. Some SWT sponsors in the United States also maintain alumni networks, although State does not require them to do so. Conclusions
By allowing large numbers of young, educated people—approximately 79,000 in 2014—to experience life in the United States each year and return home to share their experiences, the SWT program offers the potential to strengthen U.S. relationships abroad and further U.S. public diplomacy. As a result, State lacks assurance that SWT participants engage in cultural exchanges that will benefit the participants and align with its public diplomacy goals. Recommendations for Executive Action
To enhance State’s efforts to protect SWT participants from abuse and the SWT program from misuse, we recommend that the Secretary of State direct the Bureau of Education and Cultural Affairs to take the following three actions: establish a mechanism to ensure that sponsors provide complete and consistent lists of fees that participants must pay, establish a mechanism to ensure that information about these participant fees is made publicly available, and establish detailed criteria that will allow State to assess the sufficiency and appropriateness of opportunities for cultural activities outside the workplace that sponsors provide to SWT participants. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report examines (1) changes to program requirements that the Department of State (State) has made since 2010 to better protect the Summer Work Travel (SWT) program and participants, (2) State’s oversight of SWT sponsors’ compliance with program regulations and of participants’ welfare, and (3) efforts State has made to strengthen the program’s cultural exchange aspect and further its broader public diplomacy goals. | Why GAO Did This Study
Created under the Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961, the SWT program is intended to further U.S. public diplomacy by giving foreign undergraduate students short-term opportunities to experience the people and way of life in the United States. In 2005, GAO found that State's oversight was insufficient to prevent abuse of the SWT program or its participants. Since 2010, some misuses of the program by participants and criminal organizations and abuses of participants—for example, low wages and substandard living conditions—have been reported. Also, State has noted that the program's work component has often overshadowed its cultural component.
GAO was asked to report on State's oversight and implementation of the SWT program. This report examines, among other things, steps that State has taken since 2010 to strengthen program requirements as well as State's oversight of sponsors and participants. GAO reviewed program regulations and other SWT documents. GAO also interviewed U.S. officials and others involved in the program in the United States and in Bulgaria, Ireland, Turkey, and Russia, countries that GAO selected on the basis of factors such as the number of SWT participants from each country.
What GAO Found
Each year, college and university students from all over the world participate in the Department of State's (State) Summer Work Travel (SWT) program. State records show that in 2014, about 79,000 participants from more than 120 countries worked up to 4 months in jobs such as lifeguard, cashier, and resort worker throughout the United States (see map). Participants are meant to experience U.S. culture by interacting with Americans during work and through cultural activities in their free time. State administers the program in partnership with U.S. private sector sponsors that serve as participants' primary contacts. Program funding comes primarily from fees paid by participants and sponsors.
State has taken several steps to strengthen SWT requirements since 2010. For example, in 2011, State began requiring sponsors to verify employers and job offers and prohibited jobs such as adult entertainment and domestic help. State also capped the number of participants at 109,000 until it could determine that it had addressed identified concerns; as of October 2014, State had no plans for lifting the cap. State made further changes in 2012, such as requiring—in response to allegations of excessive participant costs—that sponsors annually submit lists of fees that SWT participants pay them and their overseas agents. State also required sponsors to provide participants cultural opportunities outside the workplace.
State oversees sponsors through both general and targeted reviews of their compliance with program requirements. State oversees participants' welfare by periodically interviewing a small number of participants and investigating complaints and reports from participants and others. However, State does not have mechanisms to ensure that sponsors submit complete and consistent lists of fees that participants pay them and their overseas agents and that this information is made publicly available. State thus has limited ability to protect participants from excessive and unexpected costs. Further, State officials told GAO that it cannot assess the sufficiency and appropriateness of participants' cultural opportunities outside the workplace because the 2012 requirement lacks detailed criteria. As a result, State cannot be assured that SWT participants' experiences of U.S. culture align with its public diplomacy goals.
What GAO Recommends
State should establish mechanisms to ensure that sponsors submit complete and consistent lists of participant fees and that this information is made publicly available. State should also provide detailed criteria for assessing the sufficiency and appropriateness of participants' cultural opportunities. State agreed with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-03-173 | gao_GAO-03-173_0 | Financial Services Sector Faces Cyber Threats
The financial services sector faces cyber threats similar to those faced by other critical infrastructure sectors, but the potential for monetary gains and economic disruptions may increase its attractiveness as a target. As discussed in the previous section of this report, such threats include attacks from individuals and groups with malicious intent, such as crime, terrorism, and foreign intelligence. Industry Groups in the Financial Services Sector Have Taken Steps to Improve Information Sharing and Address Threats to Its Infrastructure
Financial services industry groups have taken several steps to address cyber threats and improve information sharing, and they plan to take continuing action to further address these issues. First, industry representatives collaboratively developed a sector strategy—National Strategy for Critical Infrastructure Assurance—that discusses additional efforts necessary to identify, assess, and respond to sectorwide threats. Third, several other industry groups representing the various segments of the financial services sector are taking steps to better coordinate industry efforts and to improve information security across the sector. Treasury also chairs the Financial and Banking Information Infrastructure Committee of the President’s Critical Infrastructure Protection Board. In both of its roles, Treasury has taken steps designed to establish better relationships and methods of communication between regulators, assess vulnerabilities (as discussed earlier in this report), and improve communication within the financial services sector. Finally, as previously mentioned, the President’s Special Advisor for Cyberspace Security chairs the Critical Infrastructure Protection Board and works closely with the federal government and the private sector to coordinate protection of the nation’s critical infrastructure information systems, including those in the financial services industry. Federal entities have taken a number of steps to coordinate federal government and private-sector efforts and to assist the financial services sector in its CIP effort, but Treasury has not undertaken a comprehensive assessment, as called for in federal CIP policy, of the potential use of public policy tools to encourage increased sector participation. Finally, federal regulators have taken several steps to address information security issues, including consideration of information security risks in determining the scope of their examinations of financial institutions and development of guidance for examining information security and for protecting against cyber threats. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to identify the (1) general nature of the cyber threats faced by the financial services industry; (2) steps the financial services industry has taken to share information on and to address threats, vulnerabilities, and incidents; (3) relationship between government and private sector efforts to protect the financial services industry’s critical infrastructures; and (4) actions financial regulators have taken to address these cyber threats. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since 1998, the federal government has taken steps to protect the nation's critical infrastructures, including developing partnerships between the public and private sectors. These cyber and physical public and private infrastructures, which include the financial services sector, are essential to national security, economic security, and/or public health and safety. GAO was asked to review (1) the general nature of the cyber threats faced by the financial services industry; (2) steps the financial services industry has taken to share information on and to address threats, vulnerabilities, and incidents; (3) the relationship between government and private sector efforts to protect the financial services industry's critical infrastructures; and (4) actions financial regulators have taken to address these cyber threats.
What GAO Found
The types of cyber threats that the financial services industry faces are similar to those faced by other critical infrastructure sectors: attacks from individuals and groups with malicious intent, such as crime, terrorism, and foreign intelligence. However, the potential for monetary gains and economic disruptions may increase its attractiveness as a target. Financial services industry groups have taken steps and plan to take continuing action to address cyber threats and improve information sharing. First, industry representatives, under the sponsorship of the U.S. Department of the Treasury, collaboratively developed a sector strategy which discusses additional efforts necessary to identify, assess, and respond to sector-wide threats. However, the financial services sector has not developed detailed plans for implementing its strategy. Second, the private sector's Financial Services Information Sharing and Analysis Center was formed to facilitate sharing of cyber-related information. Third, several other industry groups are taking steps to better coordinate industry efforts and to improve information security across the sector. Several federal entities play critical roles in partnering with the private sector to protect the financial services industry's critical infrastructures. For example, the Department of the Treasury is the sector liaison for coordinating public and private efforts and chairs the federal Financial and Banking Information Infrastructure Committee, which coordinates regulatory efforts. As part of its efforts, Treasury has taken steps designed to establish better relationships and methods of communication between regulators, assess vulnerabilities, and improve communications within the financial services sector. In its role as sector liaison, Treasury has not undertaken a comprehensive assessment of the potential use of public policy tools by the federal government to encourage increased participation by the private sector. The table below shows the key public and private organizations involved in critical infrastructure protection. Federal regulators, such as the Federal Reserve System and the Securities and Exchange Commission, have taken several steps to address information security issues. These include consideration of information security risks in determining the scope of their examinations of financial institutions and development of guidance for examining information security and for protecting against cyber threats. |
gao_GAO-08-277T | gao_GAO-08-277T_0 | Background
The federal government has enriched uranium for use by commercial nuclear power plants and for defense-related purposes for more than 40 years at three plants, located near Oak Ridge, Tennessee; Paducah, Kentucky; and Portsmouth, Ohio (see fig. In 1992, the Congress passed the Energy Policy Act, which established the Uranium Enrichment Decontamination and Decommissioning Fund to pay for the costs of decontaminating and decommissioning the nation’s three uranium enrichment plants. At Projected Costs and Revenues, the Fund Will Be Insufficient to Complete Cleanup at the Three Plants
Under a variety of models using DOE’s projected costs and revenues, the Fund will be insufficient to cover all of its authorized activities. Using DOE’s projections that 2044 would be the most likely date for completion of cleanup at the plants, we estimated that cleanup costs would exceed Fund revenues by $3.8 billion to $6.2 billion (in 2007 dollars). Because DOE had not determined when decontamination and decommissioning work would begin at the Paducah and Portsmouth plants, and because federal contributions to the Fund have been less than the authorized amount, we developed several alternative models to assess the effects of different assumptions on the Fund’s sufficiency. Thus, deferred time frames were determined by DOE, assuming that all work would be completed at the Portsmouth plant first and then initiated at the Paducah plant. Although our analysis was able to capture several uncertainties potentially affecting the Fund—including interest rates, inflation rates, cost and revenue variances, and the timing of decontamination and decommissioning—additional uncertainties exist that we could not capture. Uncertainty Over the Extent of the Fund’s Insufficiency Remains Because DOE Has Yet to Issue Plans for the Paducah and Portsmouth Plants
Uncertainty over the extent of the Fund’s insufficiency remains because DOE has not issued plans that identify the most probable time frames and costs for the decontamination and decommissioning of the Paducah and Portsmouth plants. According to DOE officials, it is now in the process of finalizing a report that contains new schedule and cost information for both plants and addresses the sufficiency of the Fund. Until DOE resolves uncertainties surrounding the plants’ cleanup, including when cleanup activities are expected to both begin and end, it is not possible to more precisely determine the total funding needed to cover the authorized cleanup activities. However, until this detailed information is made available, we cannot assess how DOE’s updated time frames and cost estimates may affect the Fund’s sufficiency. As a result, we believe that DOE should finalize plans for the Paducah and Portsmouth plants so that it can better determine the extent to which Fund extensions may be needed. | Why GAO Did This Study
Cleaning up the nation's three uranium enrichment plants will cost billions of dollars and could span decades. These plants--located near Oak Ridge, Tenn.; Paducah, Ky.; and Portsmouth, Ohio--are contaminated with radioactive and hazardous materials. In 1992, the Energy Policy Act created the Uranium Enrichment Decontamination and Decommissioning Fund (Fund) to pay for plant cleanup. Fund revenues come from an assessment on domestic utilities and federal government appropriations. In 2004, GAO reported on the Fund's sufficiency to cover authorized activities. GAO recommended that Congress consider reauthorizing the Fund for 3 more years, to 2010, and require the Department of Energy (DOE) to reassess the Fund's sufficiency before it expired to determine if further extensions were needed. Because decisions not yet made by DOE could affect the cost of cleanup and the Fund's sufficiency, GAO also recommended that DOE develop decontamination and decommissioning plans for the Paducah and Portsmouth plants that would identify the most probable time frames and costs for completing the cleanup work. This testimony is based on GAO's 2004 report. It summarizes the extent to which the Fund may be sufficient to cover authorized activities and the status of DOE's progress in developing decontamination and decommissioning plans for the Paducah and Portsmouth plants.
What GAO Found
GAO's analysis showed that the Fund will be insufficient to cover all authorized activities. Using DOE's estimates for the cleanup costs at the three plants and current and likely revenue projections, GAO developed a number of simulation models that factored in annual cost and revenue projections and uncertainties surrounding inflation rates, costs, revenues, and the timing of the final cleanup work at the Paducah and Portsmouth plants. Specifically, GAO's baseline model demonstrated that by 2044, the most likely date for completing all cleanup activities at the plants, cleanup costs will have exceeded revenues by $3.8 billion to $6.2 billion (in 2007 dollars). Importantly, GAO found that the Fund would be insufficient irrespective of which estimates were used or what time frames were assumed. DOE has not yet issued plans for the decontamination and decommissioning of the Paducah and Portsmouth plants as GAO recommended. According to DOE officials, the department is developing a report to Congress that will contain updated information for both plants. DOE did not make that information available to GAO, however, and hence GAO was unable to assess how any new schedule or cost estimates may affect the Fund's sufficiency. Until DOE issues plans that provide the most probable time frames and costs for completing decontamination and decommissioning at the Paducah and Portsmouth plants, it is not possible to more precisely determine the total funding needed to cover the authorized cleanup activities. |
gao_GAO-09-190 | gao_GAO-09-190_0 | Background
The Medical Device Amendments of 1976 established three classes of medical devices. In 1990, the SMDA required FDA to 1. before December 1, 1995, order industry submission of safety and effectiveness information for preamendment class III device types that were not yet required to go through the PMA process; 2. after ordering industry submission of safety and effectiveness information but before December 1, 1995, publish regulations for each such device either revising its classification into class I or class II or requiring it to remain in class III; and 3. as promptly as is reasonably achievable, but not later than 12 months after the effective date of a regulation requiring a device to remain in class III, establish a schedule for the promulgation of regulations requiring the submission of PMAs for the preamendment class III device types required to remain in class III. FDA Used the 510(k) Process to Review Class I and II Device Submissions, and Used Both the 510(k) and PMA Processes to Review Class III Device Submissions
In fiscal years 2003 through 2007, FDA reviewed all submissions for class I and II devices through the 510(k) process, and reviewed submissions for some types of class III devices through the 510(k) process and others through the PMA process. Specifically, FDA reviewed all 13,199 submissions for class I and class II devices through the 510(k) process, clearing 11,935 (90 percent) of these submissions. FDA also reviewed 342 submissions for class III devices through the 510(k) process, clearing 228 (67 percent) of these submissions. In addition, the agency reviewed 217 original PMA submissions and 784 supplemental PMA submissions for class III devices and approved 78 percent and 85 percent, respectively, of these submissions. Table 1 summarizes the FDA review decisions, by class of device, in fiscal years 2003 through 2007 for 510(k) and PMA submissions. FDA Has Not Issued Regulations Requiring PMA Submissions for Some Types of Class III Devices
Although Congress envisioned that class III devices would be approved through the more stringent PMA process, and the SMDA required that FDA establish a schedule for doing so, this process remains incomplete. The 228 class III submissions that FDA cleared through the 510(k) process in fiscal years 2003 through 2007 were allowed to undergo premarket review through the 510(k) process because they were for preamendment class III device types, or those substantially equivalent to them, for which FDA had not yet issued regulations either requiring PMA submissions or reclassifying them. 4). In establishing device classes in 1976, Congress envisioned that all class III devices would eventually be required to undergo premarket review through the more stringent PMA process, which requires the manufacturer to provide evidence, which may include clinical data, providing reasonable assurance that the new device is safe and effective. As of October 2008, FDA had reclassified 45 device types and published regulations requiring PMAs for 53 device types. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) is responsible for oversight of medical devices sold in the United States. Regulations place devices into three classes, with class III including those with the greatest risk to patients. Unless exempt by regulation, new devices must clear FDA premarket review via either the 510(k) premarket notification process, which determines if a new device is substantially equivalent to another legally marketed device, or the more stringent premarket approval (PMA) process, which requires the manufacturer to supply evidence providing reasonable assurance that the device is safe and effective. Class III devices must generally obtain an approved PMA, but until FDA issues regulations requiring submission of PMAs, certain types of class III devices may be cleared via the 510(k) process. The FDA Amendments Act of 2007 mandated that GAO study the 510(k) process. GAO examined which premarket review process--510(k) or PMA--FDA used to review selected types of device submissions in fiscal years 2003 through 2007. GAO reviewed FDA data and regulations, and interviewed FDA officials.
What GAO Found
In fiscal years 2003 through 2007, as part of its premarket review to determine whether devices should be permitted to be marketed in the United States, FDA: (1) reviewed 13,199 submissions for class I and II devices via the 510(k) process, clearing 11,935 (90 percent) of these submissions; (2) reviewed 342 submissions for class III devices through the 510(k) process, clearing 228 (67 percent) of these submissions; and (3) reviewed 217 original and 784 supplemental PMA submissions for class III devices and approved 78 percent and 85 percent, respectively, of these submissions. Although Congress envisioned that class III devices would be approved through the more stringent PMA process, and the Safe Medical Devices Act of 1990 required that FDA either reclassify or establish a schedule for requiring PMAs for class III device types, this process remains incomplete. GAO found that in fiscal years 2003 through 2007 FDA cleared submissions for 24 types of class III devices through the 510(k) process. As of October 2008, 4 of these device types had been reclassified to class II, but 20 device types could still be cleared through the 510(k) process. FDA officials said that the agency is committed to issuing regulations either reclassifying or requiring PMAs for the class III devices currently allowed to receive clearance for marketing via the 510(k) process, but did not provide a time frame for doing so. |
gao_GAO-17-371 | gao_GAO-17-371_0 | 2. In fiscal year 2016, almost 30.5 million employment tax returns were filed. IRS selected a random sample of about 7,200 taxpayers that filed Form 941 employment tax returns from tax years 2008 to 2010. Instead, IRS officials described high-level concepts of what they would like to do with the NRP results in 2017 or beyond. RAAS officials said they have not developed specific plans to analyze the data due to competing priorities and limited resources. IRS also uses the NRP data to help update its estimate of the tax gap. Moreover, by not analyzing these data, IRS will not have current tax gap estimates, continuing to rely on outdated information. Noncompliance Varied across Employment Tax Issues and Employer Size
Given that IRS has not completed its own analysis, we reviewed the NRP employment tax results for tax years 2008 through 2010 to identify areas—known as issues—of noncompliance in terms of the examination proposing adjustments to the amount of taxable wages. Worker Classification and Fringe Benefits Were Among the Most Frequent Issues of Noncompliance and Led to Highest Percentage of Wage Adjustments
By reviewing the results from the NRP employment tax examinations for tax years 2008 through 2010, we identified issues where employers were noncompliant in reporting taxable wages. Worker classification issues included reclassifications involving corporate officers, statutory employees such as drivers who distributed certain food items and the factors that may be used to determine whether the worker was an independent contractor or employee based on, among other things, whether the employer controlled how the worker was to provide the service, such as through written contracts and training. IRS Business Units Applied Aspects of NRP Examination Practices to Operational Employment Tax Examinations
NRP Examinations Led to Changes in Planning, Documenting, and Reporting of Operational Employment Tax Examinations
Certain practices that were used for NRP examinations were carried over and are now used for operational employment tax examinations by the three business units that participated in the NRP study. According to IRS examiners, having the related income tax return, the Exempt Organization return, or specific lines of information from those returns help to identify issues to examine. IRS officials said that the purpose of the NRP employment tax study was not to improve the operational examination process, but to improve tax gap estimates and identify noncompliance areas. IRS Examiners See Benefits to NRP Practices for Operational Employment Tax Examinations, but Half Were Unaware They Could Request Access to Certain Practices
Examiners Would Like Access to NRP Practices at the Start of Operational Examinations but IRS Officials Raised Concerns
IRS examiners who have worked on both NRP employment tax examinations and operational employment tax examinations identified NRP practices that they would like to have access to when operational employment tax examinations start. When the CP2100 and cash transaction data did apply, survey respondents who used both types of data on operational employment tax examinations since completing the NRP study generally found them helpful. However, examiners are not always aware of how to access each NRP practice. This is inconsistent with IRS’s strategic plan to empower employees with the tools and training to further develop skill proficiency and improve business performance. However, IRS does not uniformly remind all examiners how to access them. Without examiners being aware of these practices and able to utilize them when needed, they may be limited in their ability to effectively examine employment tax returns. IRS examiners said CP2100 can help an examiner narrow the scope and better plan the examination. Ensuring that examiners are given the opportunity to access certain NRP practices—and are aware of how to do that—once they move from NRP examinations to operational examinations could reduce the burden placed on taxpayers and help examiners identify examination issues. 2. 3. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to (1) evaluate how the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) plans to analyze the National Research Program (NRP) data, (2) review NRP data available on areas of noncompliance, (3) describe NRP examination practices that IRS applied to operational employment tax examinations, and (4) assess additional NRP examination practices that could be applied to operational employment tax examinations. To evaluate IRS’s plans to analyze the NRP data and use the NRP results on noncompliance areas, we interviewed IRS research and examination officials about their research and analysis plans and gathered documentation where available. However, according to IRS, this would not be possible based on resources available for the study. Second, we sent a survey to all IRS examiners who worked on NRP and operational examinations to get their views on additional potential improvements. These included: 1. | Why GAO Did This Study
Employers report employment taxes for Social Security, Medicare, unemployment insurance, and income taxes to IRS. In fiscal year 2016, these totaled almost $2.28 trillion. Each year, IRS examines a small percentage of employment tax returns to check employer compliance (known as operational examinations).
GAO was asked to review how practices from NRP examinations could improve operational examinations. This report (1) evaluates how IRS plans to analyze the NRP results, (2) describes GAO's review of available NRP data, and (3) describes NRP practices IRS applied to operational examinations and assesses whether additional improvements could be made to operational examinations. GAO reviewed documentation, interviewed officials, and reviewed the NRP results. GAO also surveyed all IRS examiners who completed both NRP and operational examinations on ideas for improving operational examinations.
What GAO Found
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) uses its National Research Program (NRP) to study tax compliance issues. These NRP studies generally rely on detailed examinations of a random sample of tax returns and use different practices (including tools and procedures) than IRS's routine operational examinations. IRS recently completed the examinations for an NRP study on employment tax returns filed from tax years 2008 to 2010. This study was the first IRS had done on employment taxes in over 30 years. Based on IRS guidance, NRP results are intended to factor into IRS decisions about compliance areas and to be used to estimate the tax gap—the difference between taxes owed and those voluntarily paid on time. Although the examinations for the study are done, IRS has not developed formal plans to analyze the results to (1) identify areas of noncompliance, (2) address such noncompliance, or (3) update its employment tax gap estimate. IRS officials said they have not developed such formal plans due to competing research priorities and limited resources, and because the NRP results have not yet been finalized. Without completed analysis of the NRP employment tax results, IRS risks using outdated data to make decisions about compliance and areas of the tax gap to pursue.
GAO reviewed the available NRP study results on noncompliance and found that taxable wages for worker classification and fringe benefits were among the most frequently misreported and led to the highest wage adjustment amounts on average. Worker classification issues arise when employers misclassify employees as independent contractors or other nonemployees. If employees are misclassified, the employer's obligation to withhold and pay employment taxes is not established and goes unpaid. Fringe benefits issues involve property, a service, or cash received that should be treated as taxable wages but are not.
IRS carried over certain NRP practices to operational employment tax examinations, including tools to help plan, document, and report the results of examinations but IRS examiners who responded to GAO's survey identified additional improvements that could be made to operational examinations.
More than 90 percent of examiners said that they would like to have a certain tool—electronic data on the information returns of employers—when operational examinations start instead of on request, which they said would help identify issues to examine sooner and put fewer burdens on taxpayers. Although IRS officials said that providing the tool when all examinations start would not be a good use of IRS resources, they did not have data to evaluate whether and when providing this tool would improve examinations.
Half of IRS examiners who were asked about two specific NRP tools in GAO's survey were not aware of how to request them for use during operational examinations. According to IRS officials, these tools may only be used infrequently during employment tax examinations. However, ensuring IRS examiners are aware of how to access them would be in line with IRS's strategic goal of empowering employees with tools and training. Without examiners being aware of these tools and able to utilize them when needed, they may be limited in their ability to effectively examine employment tax returns.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that IRS develop plans to analyze the NRP results in 2017 to address areas of noncompliance identified, and update its employment tax gap estimates; determine whether and when to provide certain data upfront before an examination starts; and periodically remind IRS examiners how they can access certain tools. IRS agreed with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-09-617 | gao_GAO-09-617_0 | Leading Organizations and Experts Identified Key Types and Attributes of Information Security Measures
Leading organizations and experts have identified different types of measures that are useful in helping to achieve information security goals. Leading Organizations and Experts Identified Key Practices for Developing and Using Information Security Measures
Leading organizations and experts from whom we obtained input indicated that the successful development of information security measures depends on adherence to a number of key practices, including focusing on risks, involving stakeholders, assigning accountability, and linking to business goals. Presenting these may be appropriate for information security managers but not for higher-level executives. Agency Information Security Measures and Development Processes Have Not Always Fully Adhered to Key Practices
Federal agencies’ information security performance measures and their processes for developing them have not always followed key practices identified by leading organizations. While agencies have developed measures that fall into each of the three major types (i.e., compliance, control effectiveness, and program impact), on balance they have relied primarily on compliance measures, which have a limited ability to gauge program effectiveness. 3). To the extent that agencies do not use quantifiable measures of their security control activities, they may limit their ability to produce accurate and useful assessments of their information security programs. Agency Measures Were Not Linked to Business Goals Leading organizations and NIST have stated that security measures need to be linked to an organization’s overall business priorities to demonstrate their importance in accomplishing the organization’s mission. Further, OMB’s annual report to Congress on information security also does not reflect key practices for communicating the effectiveness of an information security program. As a result, OMB is limited in its ability to report on the effectiveness of agency information security programs. In addition, a measure should be collected only if it is useful in the decision-making process. Until OMB begins to collect effectiveness measures and report their results through key practices such as tailoring measures to the audience; correlating data to derive greater meaning; and capturing progress, trends, and deficiencies of security controls, the utility of its reports to Congress on the effectiveness of federal information security programs will be limited. The specific data elements that OMB required agencies to report have been largely inadequate to measure the effectiveness of federal information security programs, and OMB has not sufficiently used key practices, such as correlating the data and discussing trends and weaknesses, that would have provided a more complete and valuable assessment. Direct agency CIOs to ensure that all of their measures exhibit the four key attributes of a measure (i.e., that it be measurable, meaningful, repeatable and consistent, and actionable). To improve OMB’s process for collecting measures and reporting to Congress on the status of information security programs, we are recommending that the Director of OMB take the following two actions: Revise annual reporting guidance to agencies to require (1) reporting on a balanced set of measures, including measures that focus on the effectiveness of control activities and program impact, and (2) inclusion of all key attributes in the development of measures. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of our review were to (1) describe key types and attributes of performance measures, (2) identify the practices of leading organizations for using measures to guide and monitor their information security control activities, (3) identify what measures federal agencies use to guide and monitor their information security control activities and how they are developed, and (4) identify the effectiveness of the measures- reporting practices that the federal government uses to inform Congress about the effectiveness of information security programs. All were prominent, nationally known organizations. To determine the effectiveness of the federal government’s practices for reporting performance measures, we reviewed prior GAO reports and relevant laws and guidance such as the Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002 (FISMA) to identify mandatory and optional practices for reporting information security program information (including performance measurement information) to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and Congress. | Why GAO Did This Study
Information security is a critical consideration for federal agencies, which depend on information systems to carry out their missions. Increases in reports of security incidents demonstrate the urgency of adequately protecting the federal government's data and information systems. Agencies are required to report to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) on their information security programs, and OMB is to report results to Congress. Agencies have reported progress in carrying out their activities and have used a variety of measures as the basis of that reporting. GAO was asked to (1) describe key types and attributes of performance measures, (2) identify practices of leading organizations for developing and using measures to guide and monitor information security activities, (3) identify the measures used by federal agencies and how they are developed, and (4) assess the federal government's practices for informing Congress on the effectiveness of information security programs. To do this, GAO met with leading organizations, consulted with experts, and reviewed major federal agencies' policies and practices.
What GAO Found
Experts and leading organizations (nationally known organizations, academic institutions, and state agencies with enterprisewide information security measurement programs) have identified key types and attributes of successful information security measures. These measures fell into three major types: (1) compliance with policies, standards, or legal and regulatory requirements; (2) effectiveness of information security controls; and (3) overall impact of an organization's information security program. Experts and leading organizations also identified four key attributes of successful measures. Specifically, measures should be quantifiable, meaningful (i.e., have targets for tracking progress, be clearly defined, and be linked to organizational priorities), repeatable and consistent, and actionable (i.e., be able to be used to make decisions). Practices of leading organizations for developing measures emphasized the importance of focusing on the risks facing the organization, involving stakeholders from the beginning of the development process, assigning accountability for results, and linking information security programs to overall business goals. Key practices for using the resulting measurements include tailoring information to specific audiences (e.g., senior executives or unit managers); correlating measures to better assess outcomes; and reporting on the progress, trends, and weaknesses revealed by the collected data. Federal agencies have tended to rely on compliance measures for evaluating their information security controls and programs. The measures developed by agencies have not always exhibited the key attributes identified by leading organizations, and agencies have not always followed key practices in developing their measures, such as focusing on risks. To the extent that agencies do not measure the effectiveness and impact of their information security activities, they may be unable to determine whether their information security programs are meeting their goals. OMB's process for collecting and reporting on agency information security programs employs key practices identified by leading organizations and experts but is lacking in some areas. Specifically, many of the measures that OMB requires have key attributes such as being quantifiable, having targets, and being repeatable and consistent, but others do not. Further, OMB's process for collecting information from agencies relies on measures that do not demonstrate the effectiveness of control activities or the impact of information security programs. In addition, OMB does not adequately tailor its reporting for its congressional audience, correlate the data it collects, or discuss trends and weaknesses in information security controls and programs. Until OMB collects measures of the effectiveness of information security programs and appropriately reports the results, Congress will be hindered in its assessment of federal agencies' information security programs. |
gao_GAO-02-680 | gao_GAO-02-680_0 | Specifically, these programs insure mortgage loans for the construction, purchase, substantial rehabilitation, and refinancing of multifamily apartments and health care facilities. Processes and Procedures for Reviewing and Monitoring MAP Lenders’ Underwriting of Loans Were Not Always Effectively Implemented
HUD did not always comply with or effectively implement processes and procedures for reviewing and monitoring MAP lenders’ underwriting of loans. HUD’s procedures require field staff to conduct and document reviews of lenders’ mortgage insurance applications to ensure lenders’ compliance with HUD’s underwriting requirements before the loans are insured. However, at the field offices we visited, we found that the staff did not always properly document their reviews. HUD Has Held Some Lenders Accountable for Specific Violations, but Has Had a Limited Basis for Identifying Lenders with Patterns of Noncompliance
To hold MAP lenders accountable for specific violations of program requirements or for exhibiting patterns of noncompliance, HUD’s Office of Multifamily Housing can suspend or terminate their ability to participate in the MAP program. Conclusions
FHA insures several billion dollars in mortgages for multifamily housing properties each year. At that time, we will send copies to the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development. | Why GAO Did This Study
Each year, the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) insures billions of dollars in multifamily housing mortgage loans to help construct, rehabilitate, purchase, and refinance apartments and health care facilities. However, the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) lacks assurances that the lenders approved for the Multifamily Accelerated Processing (MAP) program always meet all of HUD's qualifications. HUD's guidance requires prospective lenders to submit documents showing that they are financially sound, have a satisfactory lending record, and have qualified underwriters.
What GAO Found
GAO found that HUD did not always comply with, or effectively implement, controls and procedures for reviewing and monitoring MAP lenders' underwriting of loans. Before issuing a loan, field staff are required to conduct and document reviews of lenders' mortgage insurance applications and associated loan exhibits to ensure compliance with HUD underwriting requirements. However, staff did not always properly document their reviews. HUD has held some lenders accountable for specific violations of program requirements but is unable to systematically identify lenders that exhibit patterns of noncompliance. To hold lenders accountable for specific violations or for patterns of noncompliance, HUD's Office of Multifamily Housing can suspend or terminate their ability to participate in the MAP program. |
gao_T-HEHS-97-88 | gao_T-HEHS-97-88_0 | Once a recipient begins receiving benefits, SSA is required to periodically conduct Continuing Disability Reviews (CDR) to determine whether a recipient’s condition remains disabling. SSA Pays Inadequate Attention to Verifying Recipients’ Financial Eligibility
To correctly determine an individual’s initial and continuing financial eligibility, SSA needs accurate and timely information because it is much easier to prevent overpayments than to recover them. This puts SSI at risk because it collects only about 15 percent of outstanding overpayments. SSA’s processes and procedures for determining disability have placed the SSI program at particular risk for fraud, waste, and abuse. Our work has shown, however, that SSA has not placed adequate emphasis on CDRs of SSI cases. During the past decade, the proportion of middle-aged SSI recipients has steadily increased. The Congress has also put forth several proposals in these areas. They have also served to compromise the integrity of the program and reinforce public perceptions that the SSI program pays benefits to too many people for too long. Our work has shown that SSI’s vulnerability is due both to problems in program design and inadequate SSA management attention to the program. Revising SSA’s approach to managing the program will require sustained attention and direction at the highest levels of the agency as well as actively seeking the cooperation of the Congress in improving the program’s operations and eligibility rules. Related GAO Products
Social Security Disability: Improvements Needed to Continuing Disability Review Process (GAO/HEHS-97-1, Oct. 16, 1996). Supplemental Security Income: Some Recipients Transfer Valuable Resources to Qualify for Benefits (GAO/HEHS-96-79, Apr. Each day, GAO issues a list of newly available reports and testimony. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed the Social Security Administration's (SSA) Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program and GAO's decision to designate the program one of its high-risk areas.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the SSI program has had significant problems in determining initial and continuing financial eligibility because of the agency's reliance on individuals' own reports of their income and resources and failure to thoroughly check this information; (2) moreover, the judgmental nature of SSA's disability determination process and SSA's past failure to adequately review SSI recipients to determine whether they remain disabled have also exposed the program to fraud, waste, and abuse; (3) SSA is at risk of paying some SSI recipients benefits for too long because it has not adequately addressed their special vocational rehabilitation needs or developed an agencywide strategy for helping recipients who can enter the workforce; (4) the Congress has recently made several changes that address program eligibility issues and increase the frequency of SSA's continuing eligibility reviews; (5) SSA has also begun addressing its program vulnerabilities and has made the prevention of fraud and abuse a part of its plan for rebuilding public confidence in the agency; (6) however, GAO's concerns about underlying SSI program vulnerabilities and the level of management attention devoted to these vulnerabilities continue; and (7) as part of GAO's high-risk work, it is continuing to evaluate the underlying causes of long-standing SSI problems and the actions necessary to address them. |
gao_RCED-96-24 | gao_RCED-96-24_0 | Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report’s objectives were to determine (1) the nation’s progress in achieving goals for the use of safety belts, (2) the strategies used most successfully by some states to increase safety belt use, and (3) federal strategies that could help increase this use. More specifically, at the various locations, we obtained and reviewed pertinent documents, including NHTSA’s Regional Action Plans and the states’ Highway Safety Plans, which described the state’s strategies for increasing the use of safety belts and provided information on past successes; reviewed materials developed for public information and education campaigns and for community-based traffic safety programs; discussed with state officials what the federal government is currently doing to increase safety belt use, what is and is not working well, and what changes are desirable; reviewed appropriate laws and regulations and other relevant documents; reviewed the methodologies NHTSA used to calculate the rate of seat belt analyzed the methodologies used in state surveys to determine whether the states were consistent in how the surveys were planned and conducted; and reviewed NHTSA’s guidelines on the state surveys of safety belt use to determine the extent to which the guidance provides for consistent surveys. Belt use in light trucks and vans has remained relatively low. NHTSA could improve the guidelines for the state surveys, but the effect of such improvements could be minimal since the state laws vary significantly and NHTSA does not offer financial incentives to encourage the states to improve their surveys. As shown in table 3.1, the 10 states we visited included 3 states with primary enforcement laws, 6 states with secondary enforcement laws, and 1 state with no law. Primary Enforcement Laws Are Key to Increasing Safety Belt Use
States with primary enforcement laws have been the most successful in increasing safety belt use. This success is the result of law enforcement officers stopping and assessing fines to a vehicle’s occupants solely for not using their safety belts. Conclusions
The states that are most successful in increasing their rates of safety belt use have comprehensive programs that include mandatory primary enforcement laws that are visibly and aggressively enforced. Federal efforts have been effective in encouraging federal employees to use safety belts in motor vehicles. States could be encouraged to implement comprehensive safety belt programs that provide for primary rather than secondary enforcement; coverage of all of the occupants in all of the vehicles in which belts are installed, including the occupants of passenger cars’ rear seats and the occupants of light trucks and vans; and aggressive enforcement and higher fines/penalties to encourage belt use. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed whether federal and state efforts have been successful in increasing the use of safety belts in motor vehicles, focusing on: (1) the progress that has been made in achieving seat belt use goals; (2) state strategies that have been successful in increasing seat belt use; and (3) federal strategies that could increase seat belt use.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) since 1982, the use of safety belts nationwide has increased significantly; (2) the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) is unable to report on safety belt use with any accuracy because state surveys use varying methodologies to measure seat belt usage; (3) NHTSA could increase the reliability of usage rates if it developed narrower survey guidelines, but changes are unlikely, since state seat belt laws vary and NHTSA no longer provides financial incentives to encourage states to improve their surveys; (4) states with the highest usage rates generally have primary enforcement laws, which allow law enforcement officers to ticket violators solely for not using seat belts, visible and aggressive enforcement, and active public information programs; (5) states with primary enforcement laws averaged 15 percent higher use rates than states with secondary enforcement laws; (6) financial disincentives in federal transportation law have encouraged many states to adopt primary and secondary enforcement laws; (7) as of 1992, 17 states did not require occupants of light trucks or vans to use safety belts; (8) the lack of laws governing restraint use in light trucks has become an increasing problem, since these vehicles have unfavorable rollover rates and their sales are increasing; (9) the fines assessed for not using seat belts remain low; and (10) the federal government and states could increase the use of safety belts by developing and distributing a model safety law and enacting laws that provide for primary enforcement, coverage of all occupants in all types of vehicles, aggressive enforcement, and higher fines. |
gao_GAO-01-667 | gao_GAO-01-667_0 | Background
DOD may be unable to prevent an attack using chemical or biological weapons. Therefore, DOD has determined that servicemembers must be protected to survive and conduct effective military operations. DOD’s Assessment Process Is Unreliable for Determining Risk to Military Operations
DOD’s assessment process for determining the risk to military operations is unreliable, and, as a result, the Department’s current determination that the risk is generally low is inaccurate. Inadequate Inventory Management Is an Additional Risk Factor
Shortcomings in DOD’s inventory management of chemical and biological protective equipment adversely affect the Department’s ability to accurately assess the readiness of the services to meet requirements for the equipment and mitigate the risk of shortages. We included in our scope chemical and biological protective suits, masks and breathing filters, gloves, boots, and hoods. 2000). | What GAO Found
The Department of Defense (DOD) believes it is increasingly likely that an adversary will use chemical or biological weapons against U.S. forces to degrade superior U.S. conventional warfare capabilities, placing servicemembers' lives and effective military operations at risk. To reduce the effects of such an attack on military personnel, DOD has determined the quantity of chemical and biological protective suits, masks, breathing filters, gloves, boots, and hoods that are needed based on projected wartime requirements. DOD's assessment process is unreliable for determining the risk to military operations. DOD's 2000 report is inaccurate because it includes erroneous inventory data and wartime requirements. Inadequate inventory management is an additional risk factor because readiness can be compromised by DOD's inventory management practices, which prevent an accurate accounting of the availability or adequacy of its protective equipment. |
gao_T-HEHS-99-111 | gao_T-HEHS-99-111_0 | In some cases, assisted living facilities may serve residents who meet the level-of-care criteria for admission to a nursing home. The states have the primary responsibility for overseeing the care that assisted living facilities provide residents, and few federal standards or guidelines govern assisted living. Assisted Living Facility Services and Resident Needs Vary Widely
provide housekeeping, laundry, meals, transportation to medical appointments, special diets, and assistance with medications. Consumers May Lack Adequate Information to Select a Facility That Best Meets Their Needs
Given the variation in what is labeled assisted living, prospective residents must rely primarily on information supplied to them by facilities to select one that best meets their needs and preferences. Such information should include the cost of the basic service package and what it includes; the availability of additional services, who will provide them, and their cost; the circumstances under which costs may change; how the facility monitors resident health care; the qualifications of staff who provide personal care, medications, and health services; discharge criteria, such as when a resident may be required to leave the facility, and the procedures for notifying and relocating the resident; and grievance procedures. Contracts and other written materials we reviewed were often unclear or inconsistent with each other or with requirements of state regulation regarding how long residents could remain as their needs change, resident notification requirements, and other procedural requirements for discharge. To ensure that assisted living facilities comply with the various licensing requirements, all four states conduct periodic inspections or surveys of facilities, and they may also conduct more frequent inspections in response to specific complaints. However, the four states vary in the frequency and content of assisted living facility inspections. In addition to the state licensing agency, other state agencies play a role in the oversight of assisted living facilities. The States Identify Quality-of-Care and Consumer Protection Problems in Assisted Living Facilities
Given that the states vary in their licensing requirements for assisted living facilities and in their approaches to oversight, the type and frequency of quality-of-care and consumer protection problems identified by the states may not fully portray the care and services the facilities actually provide. Using available data and reports from state licensing, ombudsman, and APS agencies in the four states, we determined that 27 percent of the 753 facilities in our sample were cited for five or more quality-of-care or consumer protection related problems during 1996 and 1997. Most of these verified problems pertained to quality-of-care rather than consumer protection issues. In Florida and Oregon, the two states in which APS agencies have some responsibility for oversight of residents in assisted living facilities, resident abuse was also often cited. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed quality-of-care and consumer protection issues in assisted living facilities in California, Florida, Ohio, and Oregon, focusing on: (1) residents' needs and the services provided in assisted living facilities; (2) the extent to which facilities provide consumers with sufficient information for them to choose a facility that is appropriate for their needs; (3) the four states' approaches to oversight of assisted living; and (4) the types of quality-of-care and consumer protection problems they identify.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) assisted living facilities vary widely in the types of services they provide and the residents they serve; (2) they range from small, freestanding, independently-owned homes with a few residents to large, corporately owned communities that offer both assisted living and other levels of care to several hundred residents; (3) some assisted living facilities offer only meals, housekeeping, and limited personal assistance, while others provide or arrange for a range of specialized health and related services; (4) they also vary in the extent to which they admit residents with certain needs and whether they retain residents as their needs change; (5) given the variation in what is labelled assisted living, prospective residents must rely on information supplied to them by facilities to select one that best meets their needs and preferences; (6) in many cases, assisted living facilities did not routinely give consumers sufficient information to determine whether a particular facility could meet their needs, for how long, and under what circumstances; (7) moreover, GAO identified numerous examples of vague, misleading, or even contradictory information contained in written materials that facilities provide to consumers; (8) the states have the primary responsibility for the oversight of care furnished to assisted living facility residents; (9) all four states reviewed have licensing requirements that must be met by most facilities providing assisted living services, and state licensing agencies routinely inspect or survey facilities to ensure compliance with state regulations; (10) however, the licensing standards as well as the frequency and content of the periodic inspections vary across the states; (11) given the absence of any uniform standards for assisted facilities across the states and the variation in their oversight approaches, the results of state licensing and monitoring activities on quality-of-care and consumer protection issues also vary, including the frequency of identified problems; (12) however, using available inspection surveys and reports from the other oversight agencies in the four states, GAO determined that the states cited more than 25 percent of the 753 facilities in its sample for five or more quality-of-care or consumer-protection related deficiencies or violations during 1996 and 1997; and (13) state officials attributed most of the common problems identified in assisted living facilities to insufficient staffing and inadequate training, exacerbated by high staff turnover and low pay for caregiver staff. |
gao_GAO-04-837T | gao_GAO-04-837T_0 | U.S. These challenges have come from within the industry as well as from external factors affecting the demand for air travel. The airlines’ increased use of the Internet to reduce ticket distribution costs. The emergence of well- capitalized low-cost airlines has also been a significant challenge. An economic downturn that began in 2000 depressed airline revenues, and the terrorist attacks of September 11th, the Iraq war, and the outbreak of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) have compounded this trend. In Response to Challenges, Legacy Airlines Reduced Costs and Cut Capacity, While Low- Cost Airlines Grew
Airlines responded very differently to the challenges of the last few years. Legacy airlines faced with mounting losses and curtailed demand for air travel sought to reduce capacity and along with it their operating expenses. Legacy airlines cut operating expenses by $12.7 billion between October 1, 2001, and December 31, 2003. This 14.5 percent reduction in operating expenses exceeds the percentage reduction in seat capacity of 12.6 percent during the same period. 1). In the aftermath of September 11th, legacy airlines shifted some of their routes over to regional airlines in an attempt to reduce seat capacity on these routes. The seven low-cost airlines increased seat capacity by 26.1 percent during the same period that legacy airlines cut capacity by 12.6 percent, but total operating costs for low-cost airlines increased by a more modest 9.8 percent, or a little more than $1 billion. 2). Low-Cost Airlines Have Significantly Lower Unit Costs Than Legacy Airlines
Legacy airlines, as a group, have been unsuccessful in sufficiently reducing their costs to make them more competitive with low-cost airlines. Low-Cost Airlines Are Profitable Owing to Lower Costs
Low-cost airlines have been able to use their relative cost advantage to remain profitable at a time when fares are down throughout the industry. Legacy Airlines’ Financial Condition Has Deteriorated Since 2000
Since 2000, the financial condition of legacy airlines has deteriorated. Both legacy airlines and low-cost airlines increased their cash balances following the events of September 11th; legacy airlines did so primarily through borrowing, while low-cost airlines increased theirs by generating profits as well as borrowing. Since 2001, legacy airlines have taken on more debt, relying on creditors for more of their capital needs than they have in the past. Three years of losses have left legacy airlines in a weakened financial position with large debt and pension obligations looming in the next few years. Instead, the airline industry is being transformed into two industries, profitable low-cost point-to-point airlines that continue to grow and extend their reach into ever more markets and the major network legacy airlines that account for the vast majority of the industry’s losses. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since 2001, the U. S. airline industry has confronted financial losses of previously unseen proportions. From 2001 through 2003, the industry reported losses of about $23 billion, and two of the nation's largest airlines went into bankruptcy. Since September 11, 2001, the U.S. government has provided struggling airlines with $7.0 billion in direct assistance and many billions more in indirect assistance in the form of loan guarantees, a tax holiday, and pension relief. Under the 2003 Emergency Wartime Supplemental Appropriations Act (P.L. 108-11) and Vision 100--Century of Aviation Reauthorization Act (P.L. 108-176), Congress mandated that GAO review measures taken by air carriers to reduce costs, improve their revenues and profits, and strengthen their balance sheets. Later this year, GAO will provide a report to Congress in response to these mandates. This statement provides a preliminary summary of that work and focuses on three main questions: (1) what have been the major challenges to the airline industry since 1998; (2) what costcutting measures have airlines reported taking to remain financially viable; and (3) what is the financial condition of the airline industry?
What GAO Found
U.S. airlines, particularly major network or "legacy" airlines, have faced an unprecedented set of challenges since 1998 that have reshaped the industry and reduced the demand for air travel. Within the industry, the growth of the Internet as a means to sell and distribute tickets and the emergence of well-capitalized low-cost airlines as a powerful market force have created unprecedented pressures on how airlines operate and price their products. Coincidently, a series of largely unforeseen events--among them a steep decline in business travel, the September 11th terrorist attacks, war in the Middle East, and global recession--have combined to seriously disrupt the demand for air travel. To counter these challenges, airlines undertook very different strategies. Legacy airlines sought to cut costs, while low-cost airlines took advantage of legacy airlines' retrenchment and expanded. Legacy airlines collectively reported a reduction in operating costs of $12.7 billion (14.5 percent) between the October 1, 2001 (immediately after September 11th) and the end of 2003. The reductions occurred in nearly all areas of operations, but 43 percent of the savings came from labor. Legacy airlines reduced their seat capacity by 12.6 percent as they reduced operations and shifted service to their regional airline partners. Conversely, low-cost airlines increased seating capacity by 26.1 percent as they expanded their operations, and operating expenses actually increased by just over $1 billion (9.8 percent). Since 2000, the financial condition of legacy airlines, as a group, has deteriorated significantly. Despite their cost-cutting efforts, legacy airlines' unit costs have not declined, and low-cost airlines enjoy even a greater cost competitive advantage. Meanwhile, neither legacy nor lowcost airlines have been able to significantly improve their revenues owing to weak fare growth and overcapacity in the system. As a result, legacy airlines have recorded nearly $25 billion in operating losses since 2001, while low-cost airlines have remained profitable throughout. Two major legacy airlines have already declared bankruptcy; others may follow. |
gao_GAO-15-394 | gao_GAO-15-394_0 | The 2013 act significantly changed the federal helium program. Refiners Bought All Helium Offered at Auction and Sales for Higher Than Expected Prices
During the summer of 2014, refiners purchased all the helium offered during BLM’s first competitive helium auction and in two subsequent noncompetitive sales at prices that were higher than expected by participants and BLM officials. BLM and refiners and nonrefiners cited multiple, possible reasons for the auction’s outcomes, including that refiners had an advantage over nonrefiners in terms of having existing infrastructure to refine helium without paying another company to do so. Two Refiners Won All the Auctioned Helium at an Average Price of $161 per Thousand Cubic Feet
Two refiners purchased all 93 million cubic feet of helium that BLM auctioned for delivery in fiscal year 2015 for an average price of $161 per thousand cubic feet. Specifically:
Refiners may have been more willing to pay higher prices at the auction since their costs for refining crude helium are lower than those of nonrefiners. The Auction Price Affected BLM’s Sales Price, and Sales Were Restricted to Refiners
After the auction, BLM sold more than 1 billion cubic feet of helium in the two August 2014 sales to the four refiners at a higher than expected price. BLM Clarified Its Definition of Excess Refining Capacity
Since its implementation of the first phase of the act, BLM has taken steps to clarify its definition of excess refining capacity to help improve reporting of excess capacity by refiners. BLM Does Not Have Full Assurance that Refiners Are Satisfying the Tolling Provision
The act’s tolling provision states that, as a condition of sale or auction, refiners must make excess refining capacity available at commercially reasonable rates to certain nonrefiners, but BLM does not have full assurance that refiners are satisfying the provision. According to language in the Senate report accompanying the act, refiners were to “make excess refining capacity available to others at commercially reasonable rates as a condition of their continued participation in helium allocations and auctions.” BLM does not have this assurance because, according to BLM officials, they (1) have not obtained all relevant information about refiners’ efforts to satisfy the tolling provision, (2) have not defined or identified criteria for a commercially reasonable rate, (3) have not determined what to do if a refiner does not satisfy the tolling provision, and (4) believe the agency’s approach to ensuring that refiners satisfy the tolling provision is consistent with current market conditions. Therefore, reporting information about refiners’ attempts to negotiate tolling agreements is voluntary. As a result, refiners reported inconsistent information about their attempts to negotiate tolling agreements on their fiscal year 2014 tolling report forms. For example, some refiners reported that they had attempted to negotiate tolling agreements but did not report any details about the volumes or rates offered. The officials with the Office of the Solicitor said BLM also may need to issue a rule to require refiners to report information about attempts to negotiate tolling agreements that do not result in signed agreements. BLM officials also said they were concerned that issuing a rule might delay future auctions and sales, pending final issuance of the rule. BLM Faces a Number of Decisions Related to Upcoming Helium Auction, Sale, and New Storage Contracts as It Continues to Implement the Act
As BLM continues to implement the various phases of the act, the agency faces decisions during the spring and summer of 2015 related to the upcoming fiscal year 2016 helium auction, the upcoming fiscal year 2016 helium sale, and the agency’s new storage contracts. BLM Faces Decisions Related to the Upcoming Helium Auction
In creating the agency’s plan for conducting the fiscal year 2016 auction, BLM officials face decisions on how the agency will (1) conduct a market survey that will be used to inform the minimum auction price, (2) determine the amount of helium the agency will make available for auction, and (3) choose a method to conduct the auction, among other things. BLM Plans to Conduct a Market Survey to Inform the Minimum Auction Price but Has Not Finalized the Scope of the Survey
BLM officials said the agency plans to contract with an independent third party to conduct a survey of helium transactions that will provide the basis for the agency to set the minimum auction price for the fiscal year 2016 auction, but the agency has not decided on the scope of the survey. BLM officials said they are considering such an increase because they believe that auctioning larger volumes of helium will result in increased revenues and increased competition. BLM officials told us they considered multiple auction methods when choosing the live auction, but that they did not assess the auction methods based on maximizing revenue. Also, BLM officials said they were familiar with the live auction method because BLM uses it in other applications, such as in selling oil and gas leases. As of February 2015, however, BLM helium program officials had not evaluated the various methods. Conclusions
BLM’s implementation of the Helium Stewardship Act of 2013 is a work in progress. The act requires BLM to use an auction method that maximizes revenue. Recommendations for Executive Action
To provide the agency with better information to support its decisions when implementing the act, we recommend that the Secretary of the Interior direct the Director of BLM to take the following two actions: issue a rule—perhaps an interim final rule if BLM finds there is good cause to do so, given the time constraints—to require refiners to report information about signed agreements to toll less than 15 million cubic feet of helium and about refiners’ attempts to negotiate tolling agreements that do not result in signed agreements; and assess auction methods based on revenue generation, using available information, and select a method that would maximize revenue for the upcoming helium auction. | Why GAO Did This Study
Helium is a key nonrenewable resource with a variety of uses. The federal government maintains an underground reservoir near Amarillo, Texas, for the storage of both federally owned helium and helium owned by private companies. The Helium Stewardship Act of 2013 establishes a phased process for the privatization of the federal helium reserve in a competitive market fashion. As part of that process, BLM conducted an auction and two sales of federal helium in the summer of 2014.
GAO was asked to assess BLM's implementation of the act. This report examines (1) the outcomes of BLM's summer 2014 helium auction and sales, (2) BLM's administration of the act's tolling provision (tolling refers to a helium refiner processing or refining another party's crude helium for an agreed upon price), and (3) upcoming decisions BLM faces as it continues implementing the act. GAO reviewed the 2013 act, BLM's auction and sales results, and tolling agreement reports; interviewed BLM and other Interior officials and representatives of 12 of the 13 refiners and nonrefiners that registered to participate in the auction.
What GAO Found
In the summer of 2014, refiners purchased all the helium offered in the Department of the Interior's Bureau of Land Management's (BLM) first-ever competitive helium auction at higher than expected prices. Two refiners purchased all 93 million cubic feet of helium that was auctioned at an average price of $161 per thousand cubic feet—significantly above the prices offered by most other bidders. BLM, refiners, and nonrefiners identified possible reasons for the auction's outcome, including that refiners had an advantage at the auction because their costs for refining crude helium were lower than those of nonrefiners. After the auction, BLM sold more than 1 billion cubic feet of helium in two sales that were restricted to refiners. Since BLM used the average auction price to help set the sales price, the sales price also was higher than expected.
BLM has taken steps to help improve reporting by refiners, but the agency does not have full assurance that refiners are satisfying the tolling provision. The tolling provision requires refiners, as a condition of sale or auction, to make excess refining capacity available at commercially reasonable rates to certain nonrefiners. BLM officials said that one way refiners can satisfy the tolling provision is to attempt to negotiate tolling agreements. The act does not require refiners to report information to BLM about their attempts to negotiate agreements that do not result in signed agreements, so the reporting of this information is voluntary. BLM requested that refiners report this information, but the refiners' responses were inconsistent. For example, some refiners reported that they had attempted to negotiate agreements but did not report details about volume or rates offered. Officials from Interior's Office of the Solicitor said BLM may need to issue a rule to require refiners to report about their attempts to negotiate tolling agreements. However, BLM officials said they do not intend to issue such a rule because it is a time-consuming process that might delay future auctions and sales. Nevertheless, without information about refiners' attempts to negotiate agreements, BLM cannot determine the extent to which refiners with excess capacity are satisfying the tolling provision.
BLM faces a number of decisions about its continued implementation of the act, including decisions related to the auction of a portion of the helium BLM will make available for delivery during fiscal year 2016. Specifically, BLM officials said they plan to contract with a third party to conduct a survey of helium transactions that will form the basis for the fiscal year 2016 minimum auction price, but they have not determined the scope of the survey. Also, BLM officials said they are considering increasing the amount of helium the agency will auction for fiscal year 2016 above the amount set in the act because they think it will increase competition at the auction. In addition, BLM faces a decision in selecting a method for conducting the fiscal year 2016 auction. The act requires BLM to use an auction method that maximizes revenue. BLM officials said they considered multiple methods before selecting the live auction method used for the agency's first auction, but they did not assess the methods based on maximizing revenue. As of February 2015, BLM officials had not evaluated various methods, such as sealed bids or simultaneously auctioning multiple lots. Without assessing auction method options based on revenue generation, BLM does not have assurance that a live auction will maximize revenue as required.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that BLM (1) issue a rule to, among other things, collect information about refiners' attempts to negotiate tolling agreements and (2) assess and select an auction method that would maximize revenue. Interior disagreed with the first recommendation because it believes existing mechanisms provide needed information, and agreed with the second. GAO continues to believe that its recommendation is valid. |
gao_GAO-11-604 | gao_GAO-11-604_0 | Background
The NAS consists of a wide assortment of technologies operated by FAA, other federal agencies, such as DOD, and industry participants such as airlines. This report focuses on the mechanisms used to transfer research and technology between partner agencies and private industry and FAA, which can include the transfer of FAA and partner agency research to the private sector to develop a technology, or the transfer of research or technology developed by partner agencies or the private sector to FAA. 1.) Some Mechanisms for Partner Agency Collaboration Are Effective, While Others Fail to Ensure Resources Are Being Leveraged
FAA and NASA Use a Variety of Mechanisms to Coordinate Research and Transfer Technology; Some Are Consistent with Key Practices in Interagency Coordination
election, assignment, nd chedling of ircrft to rnw to imltneously optimize opertion crossltiple irport. Consistent with key practices that can help enhance and sustain interagency collaboration, these teams identify common outcomes, establish a joint strategy to achieve that outcome, and define each agency’s role and responsibilities, allowing FAA and NASA to overcome differences in agency missions, cultures, and established ways of doing business. 2.) Mechanisms for Collaborating on Research and Technology Development Efforts with DOD and DHS Do Not Ensure That Resources Are Fully Leveraged
FAA and DOD Mechanisms Have Yet to Fully Determine What Research, Technology, or Expertise DOD Has to Support NextGen Activities
DOD has not completed an inventory of its research and development portfolio related to NextGen, impeding FAA’s ability to identify and leverage potentially useful research, technology, or expertise from DOD. Limited collaboration between DHS and FAA could result in conflicts in NextGen priorities and needs in the future. FAA and Partner Agencies Are Working to Address Research Gaps
FAA and partner agencies are working to address previously identified research gaps, though coordination is an issue in some areas. A lack of coordination could result in a duplication of research or an inefficient use of resources. Numerous Mechanisms Are Available to Collaborate with Industry and to Identify and Transfer Technology, but Some Lack Flexibility and Outcomes Can Be Unclear
FAA’s Acquisition Management System Provides a Framework for Technology Identification, Development, and Transfer, but Can Lack Flexibility
Broadly speaking, FAA’s Acquisition Management System (AMS) provides a framework for FAA to undertake research and development of concepts and technologies, progress that technology to a point where FAA can define the requirements to meet its needs, and then either identify existing technology that meets those needs or request proposals from industry to develop the technology. Within the AMS, FAA may use several mechanisms at various stages to conduct outreach, collaborate with private sector firms, and transfer technology. In particular, FAA may use several types of research and development agreements between itself and the private sector as mechanisms to facilitate technology transfer. However, under some circumstances, stakeholders said that AMS can lack flexibility for FAA to consider alternative technologies or new ideas for certain technologies or sub-systems within an acquisition once the process is underway. FAA also has an unsolicited proposal evaluation process that is designed as a mechanism for private industry to offer unique ideas or approaches outside FAA’s competitive procurement process; however, it has not proven to be a significant source of new technology for FAA. We are therefore not making recommendations in this report about this issue. For example, while FAA conducts market analysis, holds numerous events with industry, enters into various collaborative agreements, and has numerous mechanisms—such as the NextGen Institute, demonstrations, and testing facilities—to collaborate with industry and provide opportunities for technology transfer, it is not always clear what comes out of these mechanisms, and some in industry have indicated that, despite all of these collaborative activities, it is not always evident what are the “entry points” to FAA for getting technologies or ideas considered. Recommendation for Executive Action
To more fully leverage the potential of NextGen partner agencies’ research and technology development efforts, we recommend that the Secretary of Transportation direct the Administrator of the FAA to work with the Secretaries of Defense and Homeland Security to develop mechanisms that will further clarify NextGen interagency collaborative priorities and enhance technology transfer between the agencies. The Department of Transportation provided technical comments by e-mail, which we incorporated as appropriate, but did not comment whether or not it agreed with our recommendation. Because the mechanisms DOD and DHS identified have not yet demonstrated these results, we believe that fully implementing the recommendation is still important beyond the existing mechanisms used by DOD and DHS. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) is developing and implementing a broad transformation of the national airspace system known as the Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen). NextGen is a complex undertaking that requires new technologies and supporting infrastructure and involves the activities of several agencies as well as private industry. This report provides information on the effectiveness of (1) FAA's and the federal partner agencies' mechanisms for collaborating and leveraging resources to develop and implement NextGen, and (2) FAA's mechanisms for working with and transferring technology to or from private industry. To do this, we assessed FAA and partner agency mechanisms against applicable agreements, the agencies' own guidance for these activities, as well as applicable key practices that GAO has reported can enhance federal collaborative efforts.
What GAO Found
Some mechanisms for FAA and partner agency collaboration are effective, though others fail to ensure research and technology from the partner agencies and industry are fully used by FAA. Some mechanisms used by FAA and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) for coordinating research and transferring technology are consistent with several key practices in interagency coordination. For instance, FAA and NASA use research transition teams to coordinate research and transfer technologies from NASA to FAA. The design of these teams is consistent with several key practices GAO has identified in previous work that can enhance interagency coordination, such as identifying common outcomes, establishing a joint strategy to achieve that outcome, and defining each agency's role and responsibilities. This allows the agencies to overcome differences in mission, culture, and ways of doing business. However mechanisms for collaborating with other partner agencies do not always ensure that FAA effectively leverages agency resources. For example, the mechanisms used by FAA, DOD, and DHS have not yet resulted in a full determination of what research, technology, or expertise FAA can leverage to benefit NextGen. Further, collaboration between FAA, DOD, and DHS may be limited by differing priorities. Finally, FAA and the Joint Planning and Development Office--an interagency organization created to plan and coordinate research for NextGen--have not fully coordinated the partner agencies' research efforts, though they are working to address research gaps. A lack of coordination could result in a duplication of research or an inefficient use of resources. Numerous mechanisms are available to FAA to collaborate with industry to identify and transfer technology to advance NextGen, but some lack flexibility and outcomes can be unclear. Within its Acquisition Management System (AMS), FAA may use several mechanisms at various stages to conduct outreach, collaborate with private-sector firms, or transfer technology. In particular, FAA may use several types of research and development agreements between itself and the private sector as mechanisms to facilitate technology transfer. However, stakeholders said that the system can lack flexibility, in some circumstances, to consider alternative technologies or new ideas once the process is underway.
What GAO Recommends
GAO has made recommendations in the past to improve FAA's AMS system. FAA has begun to implement these recommendations. FAA is beginning to use a new, possibly more flexible, contracting vehicle--Systems Engineering 2020--to acquire the research, development, and systems engineering support to integrate NextGen concepts. FAA also reviews unsolicited proposals as a mechanism for private industry to offer unique ideas or approaches outside of the competitive procurement process. However, FAA's unsolicited proposal process is not a significant source of new technology for FAA. Other mechanisms such as outreach events with private industry and NextGen test facilities might enhance knowledge and result in technology transfer, but outcomes, such as specific benefits, from some of these mechanisms can be unclear. GAO recommends that FAA and the Departments of Defense (DOD) and Homeland Security (DHS) work together to develop mechanisms that will enhance collaboration and technology transfer between the agencies. GAO and others have outstanding recommendations related to interaction with industry that FAA has begun to address and GAO makes no further recommendations in this report. DOD and DHS concurred with the recommendation, while FAA did not comment on whether or not it agreed. |
gao_GAO-08-443 | gao_GAO-08-443_0 | In addition to examining the benefits trade preference programs provide, Congress will need to consider concerns by beneficiary and other developing countries, industry groups, and economic experts surrounding these programs. Preference Programs Have Some Economic Effects on the United States and Provide an Opportunity to Advance U.S. Foreign Policy
The overall effects of trade preference programs on the U.S. economy are small, but preference programs have direct effects on U.S. businesses, consumers, and the federal budget. Effects on U.S. industries and individual businesses vary; some have shared-production arrangements with preference beneficiaries, while a few U.S. industries compete with imports benefiting from preferences. To shed light on the question of whether U.S. trade preference programs are helping countries develop, we look at the fundamental link between the programs and the trade activity of beneficiary countries, focusing on three key elements: (1) the extent and nature of the new opportunities provided under U.S. preference programs, (2) whether countries are fully using the available opportunities, and (3) whether U.S. imports from beneficiaries have grown and diversified. But, as figure 1 shows, notable gaps remain in tariff lines available for duty-free import under preference programs, particularly in agricultural and textile and apparel products. Turkey also has been buffeted by rising commodity prices in sectors such as jewelry. First, programs offer duty-free access to the U.S. market to increase beneficiary trade, to the extent that it does not harm U.S. industries. Second, policymakers face a trade-off between longer or permanent program duration, which may encourage investment, and shorter renewal periods, which may provide leverage to achieve other policy goals. Finally, the preference programs balance these trade-offs against a backdrop of increasing global trade liberalization. Separate Approaches to Preference Programs Impede Assessing Whether They Are Meeting Shared Goals
Trade preference programs have proliferated over time, but Congress has not considered U.S. trade preferences as a whole. Different Approaches Agencies Use to Monitor Compliance with Program Criteria Result in Disconnected Reviews
Two different approaches—a petition process and periodic reviews—have evolved to monitor compliance with criteria set for various trade preference programs. trade preference programs in a manner that contributes to economic development in beneficiary countries.” However, there is no formal cross- programmatic examination of the preference programs collectively. Conclusions
Congress created these programs over the years to address compelling trade and foreign policy objectives. Scope and Methodology
In this report, we (1) describe how U.S. preference programs affect the United States, (2) review the effects of the programs on exports and development of foreign beneficiaries, (3) identify trade-offs facing the programs, and (4) evaluate the overall approach to preference programs. More complex rules apply to some products, notably apparel. | Why GAO Did This Study
U.S. trade preference programs promote economic development in poorer nations by providing export opportunities. The Generalized System of Preferences, Caribbean Basin Initiative, Andean Trade Preference Act, and African Growth and Opportunity Act unilaterally reduce U.S. tariffs for many products from over 130 countries. However, three of these programs expire partially or in full this year, and Congress is exploring options as it considers renewal. GAO was asked to review the programs' effects on the United States and on foreign beneficiaries' exports and development, identify policy trade-offs concerning these programs, and evaluate the overall U.S. approach to preference programs. To address these objectives, we analyzed trade data, reviewed trade literature and program documents, interviewed U.S. officials, and did fieldwork in six countries.
What GAO Found
Overall, trade preference programs have a small effect on the U.S. economy. Some U.S. industries have shared-production arrangements with foreign producers that depend on preference benefits, while others compete with preference imports. Preference programs are used to advance U.S. goals, such as intellectual property rights protection. Developing countries extensively use preferential access to boost exports to the United States. Preference imports have grown faster than overall U.S. imports, and recent changes in product coverage have expanded beneficiaries' export opportunities. Gaps in duty-free access continue for sectors such as agriculture and apparel. Preference exports remain concentrated in a few countries and products, but trends indicate greater diversification and increased use by the poorest countries. Those GAO interviewed in beneficiary countries also stressed the benefits derived from preferences. Preference programs balance two key policy trade-offs. First, programs offer duty-free access to the U.S. market to increase beneficiaries' trade, while attempting not to harm U.S. industries. Second, Congress faces a trade-off between longer program renewals, which may encourage investment, and shorter renewals, which may provide more opportunities to change the programs to meet evolving priorities. Finally, some beneficiary countries' concerns over the eroding value of preferences must be weighed against the likely greater economic benefits of broader trade liberalization. Trade preference programs have proliferated over time, becoming more complex, but neither Congress nor the interagency Trade Policy Staff Committee that manages the programs has formally considered them as a whole. Responsive to their legal mandates, the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) and other agencies use different approaches to monitor compliance with program criteria, resulting in disconnected review processes and gaps in reporting on some countries and issues. Separate reporting and examination also hinder measuring programs' contribution to economic development. |
gao_GAO-03-40 | gao_GAO-03-40_0 | Total Funding for Bureau Planning Was Lower Than Requested
As shown in table 1, the Department of Commerce requested a total of $268.7 million for 2000 Census planning and development in the President’s Budgets for fiscal years 1991 through 1997. The program received total funding of $223.7 million from the Congress, or about 83 percent of the amount requested. Bureau records indicated that the bulk of $86 million of decennial funding received through the end of fiscal year 1995 was obligated for program development and evaluation methodologies, testing and dress rehearsals, and planning for the acquisition of automated data processing and telecommunications support. Funding and Other Factors Affected Planning Efforts
The U.S. Census Bureau was responsible for carrying out its mission within the budget provided and bureau management determined the specific areas in which available resources were invested. We could not determine what effect, if any, that higher funding levels might have had on census operations as this is dependent upon actual implementation and the results of management decisions that may or may not have occurred. However, according to bureau officials, lower than requested funding levels for fiscal years 1993 through 1997 adversely affected the bureau’s planning and development efforts for the 2000 Census. Difficulties in retaining knowledgeable staff. Scaled-back plans for testing and evaluating 1990 Census data. 3. Delays in implementing a planning database. Limited resources to update address databases. 6. 10. 2000 Census Planning Provides Lessons Learned for The 2010 Census
The bureau’s experience in preparing for the 2000 Census underscores the importance of solid, upfront planning and adequate funding levels to carry out those plans. Thorough and comprehensive planning and development efforts are crucial to the ultimate efficiency and success of any large, long-term project, particularly one with the scope, magnitude, and deadlines of the U.S. decennial census. For the first year of the 7-year 2000 Census planning and development phase, the fiscal year 1991 funding received was $1.5 million and the bureau obligated the entire amount. The funding now identified eight major study areas for the 2000 Census as indicated in table 2. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO reviewed the funding of 2000 Census planning and development efforts and the impact it had on census operations.
What GAO Found
Total funding for the 2000 Census, referred to as the life cycle cost, covers a 13-year period from fiscal year 1991 through fiscal year 2003 and is expected to total $6.5 billion adjusted to 2000 year dollars. This amount was almost double the reported life cycle cost of the 1990 Census of $3.3 billion adjusted to 2000 year dollars. Considering these escalating costs, the experience of the U.S. Census Bureau in preparing for the 2000 Census offers valuable insights for the planning and development efforts now occurring for the 2010 Census. Thorough and comprehensive planning and development efforts are crucial to the ultimate efficiency and success of any large, long-term project, particularly one with the scope, magnitude, and the deadlines of the U.S. decennial census. For fiscal years 1991 through 1997, $269 million was requested in the President's Budgets for 2000 Census planning and development and the program received funding of $224 million by Congress, or 83 percent of the amount requested. According to U.S. Census Bureau records, the bulk of the $86 million in funding received through the end of fiscal year 1995 was obligated for program development and evaluation methodologies, testing and dress rehearsals, and planning for the acquisition of automated data processing and telecommunications support. The U.S. Census Bureau was responsible for carrying out its mission within the budget provided and bureau management determined the specific areas in which available resources were invested. GAO could not determine what effect, if any, that higher funding levels might have had on bureau operations as this is dependent upon actual implementation and the results of management decisions that may or may not have occurred. According to bureau officials, early planning and development efforts for the 2000 Census were adversely affected by lower funding than requested for fiscal years 1993 through 1997. They identified 10 areas where additional funding could have been beneficial. These included difficulties in retaining knowledgeable staff, scaled back plans for testing and evaluating 1990 Census data, delays in implementing a planning database, and limited resources to update address databases. The bureau's experience in preparing for the 2000 Census underscores the importance of solid, upfront planning and adequate funding levels to carry out those plans. |
gao_T-HEHS-98-114 | gao_T-HEHS-98-114_0 | For example, guarantees of access to coverage for employers apply only in the small-group market, and the individual market guarantee applies only to certain eligible individuals who lose group coverage. HHS is responsible for enforcing HIPAA with respect to insurance carriers in the group and individual markets, but only in states that do not already have similar protections in place or do not enact and enforce laws to implement HIPAA standards. The implementation of HIPAA is ongoing, in part, because the regulations were issued on an “interim final” basis. Among the 13 states using the federal fallback approach, we found that some initial carrier marketing practices may have discouraged HIPAA eligibles from enrolling in products with guaranteed access rights. After the federal fallback provisions took effect, many consumers told state insurance regulators that carriers did not disclose the existence of a product to which the consumers had HIPAA-guaranteed access rights or, when the consumers specifically requested one, the carrier said it did not have such a product available. Issuers of Health Coverage Are Concerned About HIPAA’s Administrative Burden and Possible Unintended Consequences
Issuers of health coverage are concerned about the administrative burden and the unintended consequences of certain HIPAA requirements. Finally, issuers cite some HIPAA provisions that have the potential to be abused by consumers. State Insurance Regulators Say Lack of Sufficient Clarity and Detail in Some HIPAA Regulations Hinders Implementation Efforts
State regulators have encountered difficulties implementing HIPAA provisions in instances in which federal regulations lacked sufficient clarity. discussed earlier, the ambiguity in the risk-spreading requirement for products available to HIPAA-eligible individuals has been cited as a factor contributing to high rates for these products, which in some states range from 140 to 600 percent or more of standard rates. Unexpectedly Large Role for Federal Regulators May Strain Resources, Hamper Oversight
States have the option of enforcing HIPAA’s access, portability, and renewability standards as they apply to fully insured group and individual health coverage. According to HHS officials, the agency as well as the Congress and others assumed HHS would generally not have to perform this role, believing instead that states would not relinquish regulatory authority to the federal government. What could be characterized as “early implementation hurdles,” especially those related to the clarity of federal regulations, may be largely resolved during 1998, as federal agencies issue further regulatory guidance to states and issuers. Moreover, as states and issuers gain experience in implementing HIPAA standards, the intensity of their dissatisfaction may diminish. This situation is likely to continue unless HHS interprets the statute to require (in federal fallback states) more explicit and comprehensive risk-spreading requirements or that states adopt other mechanisms to moderate rates of guaranteed access coverage for HIPAA eligibles. Credit for Prior Coverage (Portability)
Issuers of group coverage must credit an enrollee’s period of prior coverage against their preexisting condition exclusion period. The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996: Early Implementation Concerns (GAO/HEHS-97-200R, Sept. 2, 1997). | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed the implementation of the private insurance market provisions of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA).
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) although HIPAA gives people losing coverage a guarantee of access to coverage in the individual market, consumers attempting to exercise this right have been hindered in some states by carrier practices and pricing and by their own misunderstanding of this complex law; (2) in the 13 states using the federal fallback approach to guaranteed access, some carriers initially discouraged people from applying for the coverage or charge them as much as 140 to 600 percent of the standard rate; (3) many consumers also do not fully understand the eligibility criteria that apply and as a result may risk losing their right to coverage; (4) issuers of health coverage believe certain HIPAA provisions are burdensome to administer, may create unintended consequences, or may be abused by consumers; (5) issuers also fear that HIPAA's guaranteed renewal provision could cause those eligible for Medicare to pay for redundant coverage and hinder carriers' ability to sell products to children and other targeted populations; (6) certain protections for group plan enrollees may create an opportunity for consumer abuse, such as the guarantees of credit for prior coverage, which could give certain enrollees an incentive, when they need medical care, to switch from low-cost, high-deductible coverage to more expensive, low-deductible coverage; (7) state insurance regulators have encountered difficulties implementing and enforcing HIPAA provisions where federal guidance lacks sufficient clarity or detail; (8) federal regulators face an unexpectedly large role under HIPAA, which could strain the Department of Health and Human Service's (HHS) resources and weaken its oversight; (9) in states that do not pass legislation implementing HIPAA provisions, HHS is required to take on the regulatory role; (10) as federal agencies issue more guidance and states and issuers gain more experience with HIPAA, concerns about the clarity of its regulations may diminish; (11) whether unintended consequences will occur is as yet unknown, in part because sufficient evidence has not accumulated; (12) in federal fallback states, premiums for group-to-individual guaranteed access coverage are likely to remain high unless regulations with more explicit risk-spreading requirements are issued at the federal or state level; (13) HHS' ability to meet its growing oversight role may prove inadequate given the current level of resources, particularly if more states cede regulatory authority to the federal government; and (14) in any case, as early challenges are resolved during 1998, other challenges to implementing HIPAA may emerge. |
gao_GAO-17-505T | gao_GAO-17-505T_0 | BSEE Leadership Has Started Several Initiatives to Improve the Bureau’s Safety and Environmental Oversight Capabilities, but Its Actions Have Hindered Progress
We found that BSEE leadership has started several initiatives to improve its safety and environmental oversight capabilities, but its limited efforts to obtain and incorporate input from within the bureau have hindered its progress. Since 2012, BSEE has sought to augment its annual inspection program with a risk-based inspection program, but limited efforts to obtain and incorporate input from experienced regional personnel have hindered BSEE’s ability to develop and implement the risk-based program. However, to date, BSEE has not successfully implemented this supplemental risk-based inspection capability. BSEE leadership led the development of the risk-based program; however, according to officials, leadership developed the program with little input from regional personnel. As a result, BSEE first identified deficiencies with its risk-based program during pilot testing in 2015, rather than working closely with experienced regional personnel earlier in the process to obtain their input to identify potential deficiencies and remediate them during program development. Moreover, because the efforts were uncoordinated, they resulted in the inefficient use of resources. Without higher-level oversight within Interior establishing a mechanism for BSEE management to obtain and incorporate input from personnel within the bureau and any external parties that can affect the bureau’s ability to achieve its objectives, BSEE’s risk-based inspection program and Environmental Stewardship efforts are likely to experience continued implementation and efficacy problems. BSEE Leadership Has Made Limited Progress in Implementing Strategic Initiatives to Improve Its Internal Management
We found that since 2013, BSEE has begun four strategic initiatives to improve its internal management—two to improve its decision-making capabilities and two to enhance communication and transparency—but their successful implementation has been hindered by limited leadership commitment and not addressing factors contributing to trust concerns. The officials said BSEE planned to finalize a plan for its prioritized risk treatments by August 2016 but did not do so because of the temporary halt to ERM implementation. BSEE’s initiative to develop performance measures has been comprised of three sequential efforts, in 2014, 2015, and 2016. For the first two efforts, the bureau contracted with a consultant. BSEE terminated the first effort, and although the consultant delivered a report identifying 12 performance measures during the second effort, BSEE officials said they were not implementing them due to a variety of factors, including data availability limitations. For its third effort to develop performance measures in 2016, BSEE headquarters officials told us that this initiative, which is being conducted internally by BSEE personnel, represents the beginning of a multi-year effort to implement a performance management system. BSEE initially planned to finalize its internally developed list of performance measures in February 2016 but did not meet this deadline. In December 2016, BSEE completed a report that discusses 17 performance measures and the bureau’s plans for future iterations of their development. An example of leadership commitment is continuing oversight and accountability, which BSEE leadership has not demonstrated for implementing internal management initiatives, as evidenced by its limited progress in implementing key strategic initiatives as well as its inability to address long-standing oversight deficiencies. Without higher-level oversight within Interior addressing BSEE’s leadership commitment deficiencies— including by implementing internal management initiatives and ongoing strategic initiatives—in a timely manner, the bureau is unlikely to succeed in implementing such initiatives. | Why GAO Did This Study
This testimony summarizes the information contained in GAO's March 2017 report, entitled Oil and Gas Management: Stronger Leadership Commitment Needed at Interior to Improve Offshore Oversight and Internal Management ( GAO-17-293 ).
What GAO Found
The Department of the Interior's (Interior) Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE) leadership has started several key strategic initiatives to improve its offshore safety and environmental oversight, but its limited efforts to obtain and incorporate input from within the bureau have hindered its progress. For example, to supplement its mandatory annual regulatory compliance inspections, in 2012, BSEE leadership began developing a risk-based inspection initiative to identify high-risk production facilities and assess their safety systems and management controls. During pilot testing in 2016, several deficiencies--including the usefulness of its facility risk-assessment model and unclear inspection protocols--caused BSEE to halt the pilot. According to bureau officials, during the development of the initiative, BSEE headquarters did not effectively obtain and incorporate input from regional personnel with long-standing experience in previous risk-based inspection efforts, who could have identified deficiencies earlier in the process. GAO previously found that when implementing large-scale management initiatives a key practice is involving employees to obtain their ideas by incorporating their feedback into new policies and procedures. Instead, BSEE leadership appears to have excluded the input of regional personnel by, for example, not incorporating input beyond the risk-assessment tool when selecting the first pilot facility, even though it was prescribed to do so in the bureau's inspection planning methodology. This undercut the pilot effort, raising questions about whether the bureau's leadership has the commitment necessary to successfully implement its risk-based program. Without higher level leadership within Interior establishing a mechanism for BSEE to obtain and incorporate input from personnel within the bureau, BSEE's risk-based inspection initiative could face continued delays.
Similarly, since 2013, BSEE leadership has started several key strategic initiatives to improve its internal management, but none have been successfully implemented, in part, because of limited leadership commitment. For example, BSEE's leadership identified the importance of developing performance measures in its 2012-2015 strategic plan. BSEE began one of three attempts to develop performance measures in July 2014 by hiring a contractor to develop measures, but the bureau terminated this contract in January 2015 after determining a need to complete its internal reorganization before developing such measures. A second effort to develop performance measures started in December 2015, using the same consultant, and yielded 12 performance measures in March 2016, but BSEE did not implement them, in part, because data did not exist to use the measures. By the time BSEE received this consultant's report, it had already begun a third effort to internally develop performance measures; as of November 2016 had identified 17 draft performance measures, but BSEE leadership missed repeated deadlines to review them. BSEE officials told GAO that after leadership approval, the bureau plans to pilot these measures and develop others. BSEE leadership has not demonstrated continuing oversight and accountability for implementing internal management initiatives, as evidenced by its limited progress implementing key strategic initiatives. Without higher-level oversight within Interior addressing leadership commitment deficiencies within BSEE, the bureau is unlikely to succeed in implementing internal management initiatives. |
gao_GAO-08-488T | gao_GAO-08-488T_0 | Implementation of a risk analysis model to calculate scores for states and urban areas, defining relative Risk, as the product of Threat, Vulnerability, and Consequences. DHS Has Used an Evolving Risk-Based Methodology to Allocate Federal Grant Funds
DHS has used an evolving risk-based methodology to identify the states and urban areas eligible for HSGP grants and the amount of funds they receive. Given the uncertainties inherent in risk assessment, the methodology uses a combination of empirical data (e.g., population, asset location) and policy judgment (e.g., the nature of the threat for specific areas and the weights to be assigned to specific variables in the model such as critical infrastructure, and population and population density). Figure 2 provides an overview of the factors included in the risk analysis model for fiscal year 2007 and, according to our ongoing work, for fiscal year 2008 and their relative weights. Information on these inputs comes from the Department of Defense and DHS. DHS Has a Variety of Mechanisms in Place to Communicate with States and Localities about Grant Allocation Decisions
According to DHS officials and HSGP grant assistance documents we reviewed, DHS communicates with its state and local stakeholders by: (1) providing to each state and urban area the individual threat assessments that DHS is using to calculate the risk analysis model’s Threat Index; (2) validating the nonpublic, critical infrastructure assets that comprise the risk analysis model’s National Infrastructure Index; (3) providing midpoint reviews of states’ and urban areas’ draft investment justification proposals that are later reviewed during DHS’s effectiveness assessment process; (4) providing technical assistance as states and urban areas prepare the documentation for their grant applications; and (5) convening conferences to solicit stakeholder feedback. 3). We concluded that the ability of states and localities to spend grant funds expeditiously was complicated by the need to fulfill state and local legal and procurement requirements, which in some cases added months to the purchasing process. We reported a variety of steps that had been taken by states, DHS, and the Congress to streamline the expenditure of grant funds. In addition, we found that reporting categories were not consistent across fiscal years. As part of our ongoing work in reviewing DHS grant allocation and management efforts, we plan to determine whether the data FEMA maintains on grant expenditures across fiscal years allows FEMA to analyze trends in grant obligations and expenditures. DHS Does Not Yet Have a Means to Measure Program Outcomes to Further the Nation’s Homeland Security Preparedness Goals
While DHS has distributed over $19 billion in federal emergency preparedness funding to states, localities, and territories since fiscal year 2002, and taken steps to gather information, establish goals and measures, and measure progress, we still know little about how states have used federal funds to build their capabilities or reduce risks. Nor do we know how effective this national investment has been because DHS’s monitoring of homeland security grant expenditures does not provide a means to measure the achievement of desired program outcomes to strengthen the nation’s homeland security capabilities. Related GAO Products
Department of Homeland Security: Progress Report on Implementation of Mission and Management Functions. Homeland Security Grants: Observations on Process DHS Used to Allocate Funds to Selected Urban Areas. Homeland Security: Management of First Responder Grant Programs and Efforts to Improve Accountability Continue to Evolve. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since 2002, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has distributed over $19 billion in homeland security grants to enhance the nation's preparedness and response capabilities. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is responsible for all preparedness efforts including allocating and managing these grants. This testimony examines (1) the process and methods to allocate homeland security grants to state and local governments, (2) how DHS communicates with states and localities in making grant allocation decisions, (3) what challenges affect the expeditious spending of DHS grant funds by states and localities; and (4) the extent that DHS measured program outcomes as part of its efforts to monitor the expenditure of grant dollars. GAO's testimony is based on products issued from April 2005 through July 2007 on DHS's grant management system, and on GAO's ongoing mandated work related to FEMA's risk-based grant distribution processes for fiscal years 2007 and 2008. To conduct this work, GAO reviewed relevant documents on FEMA's risk analysis model and interviewed agency officials.
What GAO Found
DHS uses an evolving risk-based methodology to identify the urban areas eligible for homeland security grants and the amount of funds states and urban areas receive. DHS designed the methodology to measure the relative risk of a given state or urban area using a risk analysis model that defined Risk as the product of Threat times Vulnerability and Consequences (R = T * (V & C)). Given the uncertainties inherent in risk assessment, the methodology uses a combination of empirical data (e.g., population, asset location) and policy judgment (e.g., the nature of the threat for specific areas and the weights to be assigned to specific variables in the model such as critical infrastructure, population, and population density). According to FEMA officials and GAO's review of homeland security grant assistance documents, FEMA communicates with its state and local stakeholders by (1) providing individual threat assessments that DHS is using for its risk analysis model to each state and urban area, (2) validating the nonpublic national infrastructure data that are also part of the risk analysis model, (3) reviewing states' and urban areas' draft investment proposals that are later submitted and rated during DHS's effectiveness assessment process, (4) providing technical assistance as states and urban areas prepare grant applications, and (5) holding post-award conferences to solicit stakeholder feedback. In April 2005, GAO reported that the ability of states and localities to spend grant funds expeditiously was complicated by the need to fulfill legal and procurement requirements, which in some cases added months to the purchasing process. GAO also reported a variety of steps that had been taken by states, DHS, and the Congress to streamline the expenditure of grant funds. However, GAO was unable to examine trends in obligations and expenditures for grant programs across fiscal years because the budget data FEMA provided did not specify grant expenditures by fiscal year and reporting categories were not consistent across fiscal years. Although DHS has taken some steps to establish goals, gather information, and measure progress, its monitoring of homeland security grant expenditures does not provide a means to measure the achievement of desired program outcomes. FEMA's current efforts do not provide information on the effectiveness of those funds in improving the nation's capabilities or reducing risk. DHS leadership has identified this issue as a high priority, and is trying to develop a more quantitative approach to accomplish the goal of using this information for the more strategic purpose of monitoring the achievement of program goals, according to FEMA officials. |
gao_GAO-12-188 | gao_GAO-12-188_0 | In February 2007, we reported on the process that DOD and DOE have established for fulfilling the annual assessment of the safety, performance, and reliability of the nation’s nuclear stockpile.STRATCOM Commander’s annual assessment of the nuclear stockpile is based primarily on the advice of a technical advisory group and provides an operational perspective; (2) the technical advisory group holds an annual conference where each entity involved in managing the stockpile—national laboratories, Project Officer Groups, NNSA, and DOD—present briefings to provide a complete perspective on the various issues affecting the stockpile; and (3) the laboratory director’s annual assessment is derived primarily from ongoing activities associated with NNSA’s Stockpile Stewardship Program, such as the results of weapon system and component level tests conducted We found that (1) the by NNSA’s stockpile surveillance program as well as data that provides an assessment of a weapon’s current reliability. Action Being Taken to Address Limitations of U.S. Nuclear Weapons
For all U.S. nuclear weapons in the current nuclear stockpile, NNSA identified 52 weapon limitations, and of these, the majority fall into six types. Furthermore, the national laboratories identified four existing weapon limitations (8 percent of all limitations) that are no longer valid—because, among other things, corrective action to address the limitation is complete—while some limitations will remain in effect until DOD changes potentially outdated military requirements. Eighty-six percent of these limitations fall into 6 types: detonation safety under abnormal conditions, weapon reliability, weapon delivery, more frequent replacement of limited life components, nuclear yield, and worker safety. However, some DOD officials expressed concerns to us over the impact of a few weapon limitations, such as increased maintenance costs or additional issues to consider when developing war plans. For most limitations about which they raised concerns, DOD officials told us that current DOD mitigation actions, as well as the successful completion of ongoing and planned NNSA efforts, should address these concerns. DOD officials stated that the current stockpile allows sufficient flexibility to mitigate limitations. However, they told us there may be less flexibility in the future as the stockpile continues to age and decreases in size. NNSA Has Not Developed a Corrective Action Plan to Improve the Nuclear Stockpile Surveillance Program
NNSA has begun to implement some of the recommendations from its draft October 2010 management review of the nuclear stockpile surveillance program, but NNSA has not developed a formal corrective action plan to guide its multiple actions. Actions NNSA has taken to implement the recommendations include the following:
The creation of a Senior Technical Advisor for Surveillance (senior advisor) position. This position was created in response to the review’s recommendation to establish strong NNSA leadership for the surveillance program. According to an OMB circular that defines management’s responsibility for internal control in federal agencies, federal managers are to develop a corrective action plan to address weaknesses found in program operations, as identified through management reviews, inspector general and GAO reports, program evaluations, and financial statement audits. Corrective action plans are to include specific dates, assigned responsibilities, and metrics to measure progress to resolve the findings of audits and reviews. According to the acting senior advisor, NNSA did not address many of the findings and recommendations in its three previous surveillance program management reviews primarily because the agency did not have a specific approach for implementation. Without such a plan, it is unclear how NNSA will (1) ensure that the draft review’s recommendations are fully implemented and (2) demonstrate to key stakeholders, such as Congress and DOD, that NNSA is committed to improving the surveillance program. With most weapons currently in the stockpile having been produced over 20 years ago and being sustained beyond their original design lifetimes, it is a testament to NNSA, the national laboratories, and the production plants that DOD officials were confident that nuclear weapon limitations do not currently reduce the effectiveness of the nation’s strategic deterrent. However, several factors raise concerns with the limitations and NNSA’s management of them. Second, NNSA guidance on limitations does not always clearly communicate to DOD the potential impacts that limitations have on nuclear weapon operations, maintenance, and war planning and does not include all identified limitations; it is uncertain if the risks associated with limitations are comprehensively identified and analyzed. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve the processes used to test and report on the nation’s nuclear weapons stockpile, we are making four recommendations to the Secretaries of Defense and of Energy and the Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration, as appropriate:
To improve the clarity of information NNSA provides to DOD about nuclear weapon limitations, we recommend that the Secretary of Energy and the Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, (1) expand the guidance provided by NNSA to DOD so that it includes each existing limitation and (2) assess, and revise as appropriate, the guidance provided by NNSA to DOD to ensure it clearly describes the potential impacts that each limitation may have on nuclear weapon operations, maintenance, and war planning. A-123. | Why GAO Did This Study
Most weapons in the U.S. nuclear stockpile were produced over 20 years ago and are being sustained beyond original design lifetimes. It is critical to ensure that these weapons are safe, secure, and reliable to perform as the nations nuclear deterrent. The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), a semiautonomous agency within the Department of Energy, is responsible for the nations nuclear weapons program. NNSA identifies nuclear weapon limitationsareas where military requirements may not be metand conducts nonnuclear tests to evaluate the condition and reliability of weapons through its nuclear stockpile surveillance program. GAO was asked to determine the (1) number and types of such limitations and any concerns raised by Department of Defense (DOD) officials, and (2) actions NNSA has taken to implement its prior recommendations for the nuclear stockpile surveillance program. GAO reviewed agency documents, analyzed limitations, and interviewed key NNSA and DOD officials.
What GAO Found
For the 52 NNSA identified limitations for all weapons in the U.S. nuclear stockpile, 86 percent fall into six types: detonation safety under abnormal conditions, weapon reliability, weapon delivery, more frequent replacement of limited life components, nuclear yield, and worker safety. Some DOD officials expressed concern over the impact that certain weapon limitations have on weapon operation, maintenance, and war planning. According to DOD officials, current DOD mitigation actions, as well as the successful completion of ongoing and planned NNSA efforts, should address most limitations for which the officials raised concerns. DOD officials stated that the current stockpile allows sufficient flexibility to mitigate limitations. However, they told GAO that there may be less flexibility in the future as the stockpile continues to age and decreases in size. For each weapon system, NNSA provides DOD with guidance containing additional information on nuclear weapon limitations. However, GAO found that this guidance does not cover all limitations and some DOD officials said that it may not provide them with relevant information for some limitations. Specifically, the guidance addresses approximately 60 percent of all limitations but does not include limitations based on certain weapon components. In addition, one senior DOD official stated that the guidance did not help clarify the potential impact that a particular limitation may have on weapon operation and maintenance. The applicable military service is now conducting its own analysis of this limitations potential impact. Furthermore, the national laboratories identified four existing weapon limitations (8 percent of all limitations) that are no longer valid because, among other reasons, corrective action to address the limitations is complete. In addition, it is uncertain if an ongoing DOD and NNSA review of nuclear weapon military requirements will be used to eliminate limitations based on potentially outdated military requirements.
NNSA has begun to implement some recommendations from the agencys draft October 2010 management review of the nuclear stockpile surveillance program but has not developed a corrective action plan to guide its multiple actions. For example, NNSA (1) created and staffed the position of Senior Technical Advisor for Surveillance in response to the reviews recommendation to establish strong NNSA leadership and (2) established a formal process for setting surveillance testing requirements. National laboratory and DOD officials GAO interviewed generally viewed NNSAs actions as positive steps to improve the program. However, NNSA has not developed a corrective action plan, as called for by Office of Management and Budget Circular No. A-123. According to this circular on management controls, federal managers are to develop a corrective action plan to address program operations weaknesses identified through management reviews, among other things. Such plans are to include specific dates, assigned responsibilities, and metrics to measure progress and hold management accountable. According to a senior level NNSA official, the agency did not implement many of the recommendations from three prior surveillance program management reviews primarily because there was no specific approach for implementation. Without a corrective action plan, it is unclear how NNSA will (1) ensure that the draft October 2010 management reviews recommendations are fully implemented and (2) demonstrate to key stakeholders, such as Congress and DOD, that NNSA is committed to improving the surveillance program.
What GAO Recommends
Among other things, GAO recommends that NNSA, in appropriate collaboration with DOD, expand guidance on weapon limitations to include all limitations, revise this guidance to clearly describe the limitations potential impacts, and develop a corrective action plan for implementing surveillance program recommendations. NNSA generally agreed with GAOs recommendations and outlined planned actions to address them. DOD agreed with GAOs recommendations. |
gao_GAO-13-547T | gao_GAO-13-547T_0 | DHS Can Strengthen the Efficiency and Effectiveness of Its Operations and Achieve Cost Savings by Reducing Fragmented, Overlapping, or Potentially Duplicative Activities
Areas of Fragmentation, Overlap, and Potential Duplication at DHS
Since 2011, we have identified 11 areas across DHS where fragmentation, overlap, or potential duplication exists, and suggested 24 actions to the department and Congress to help strengthen the efficiency and effectiveness of DHS operations. In April 2013, we identified 2 new areas where DHS could take actions to address fragmentation, overlap, or potential duplication. First, we found that DHS does not have a department-wide policy defining research and development (R&D) or guidance directing how components are to report R&D activities. As a result, the department does not know its total annual investment in R&D, a fact that limits DHS’s ability to oversee components’ R&D efforts and align them with agency-wide R&D goals and priorities. However, we identified at least 6 components with R&D activities and an additional $255 million in R&D obligations in fiscal year 2011 by other DHS components that were not reported to OMB in the budget process. To address this issue, we suggested that DHS develop and implement policies and guidance for defining and overseeing R&D at the department. Concurrent with the release of our 2013 annual report, we updated our assessments of the progress that DHS has made in addressing the actions we suggested in our 2011 and 2012 annual reports.outlines the 2011-2012 DHS-related areas in which we identified Table 1 fragmentation, overlap, or potential duplication, and highlights DHS’s and Congress’s progress in addressing them. Although the executive branch and Congress have made some progress in addressing the issues that we have previously identified, additional steps are needed to address the remaining areas and achieve associated benefits. Opportunities for Cost- Saving and Revenue Enhancements at DHS
Our 2011-2013 annual reports also identified 13 areas where DHS or Congress should consider taking 29 actions to reduce the cost of operations or enhance revenue collection for the Department of the Treasury. Of the 21 related actions we suggested that DHS or Congress take in our March 2011 and February 2012 reports to either reduce the cost of government operations or enhance revenue collection, as of March 2013, 3 (about 14 percent) have been addressed, 11 (about 52 percent) have been partially addressed, and 7 (about 33 percent) have not been addressed. DHS Needs to Strengthen Its Management Functions
Following its establishment in 2003, DHS focused its efforts primarily on implementing its various missions to meet pressing homeland security needs and threats, and less on creating and integrating a fully and effectively functioning department. As the department matured, it has put into place management policies and processes and made a range of other enhancements to its management functions, which include acquisition, information technology, financial, and human capital management. The department has made considerable progress in transforming its original component agencies into a single cabinet-level department and positioning itself to achieve its full potential; however, challenges remain for DHS to address across its range of missions. As a result, in February 2013, we narrowed the scope of the high-risk area and changed the focus and name from Implementing and Transforming the Department of Homeland Security to Strengthening the Department of Homeland Security Management Functions. Of the 31 actions and outcomes GAO identified as important to addressing this area, DHS has fully or mostly addressed 8, partially addressed 16, and initiated 7. Moving forward, DHS needs to, for example, validate required acquisition documents in a timely manner, and demonstrate measurable progress in meeting cost, schedule, and performance metrics for its major acquisition programs. Information technology management: DHS has defined and begun to implement a vision for a tiered governance structure intended to improve information technology (IT) program and portfolio management, which is generally consistent with best practices. Since it began operations in 2003, DHS has implemented key homeland security operations and achieved important goals and milestones in many areas. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since beginning operations in 2003, DHS has become the third-largest federal department, with more than 224,000 employees and an annual budget of about $60 billion. Over the past 10 years, DHS has implemented key homeland security operations and achieved important goals to create and strengthen a foundation to reach its potential. Since 2003, GAO has issued more than 1,300 reports and congressional testimonies designed to strengthen DHSs program management, performance measurement efforts, and management processes, among other things. GAO has reported that overlap and fragmentation among government programs, including those of DHS, can cause potential duplication, and reducing it could save billions of tax dollars annually and help agencies provide more efficient and effective services. Moreover, in 2003, GAO designated implementing and transforming DHS as high risk because it had to transform 22 agencies into one department, and failure to address associated risks could have serious consequences. This statement addresses (1) opportunities for DHS to reduce fragmentation, overlap, and duplication in its programs; save tax dollars; and enhance revenue, and (2) opportunities for DHS to strengthen its management functions.
What GAO Found
Since 2011, GAO has identified 11 areas across the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) where fragmentation, overlap, or potential duplication exists and 13 areas of opportunity for cost savings or enhanced revenue collections. In these reports, GAO has suggested 53 total actions to the department and Congress to help strengthen the efficiency and effectiveness of DHS operations. In GAOs 2013 annual report on federal programs, agencies, offices, and initiatives that have duplicative goals or activities, GAO identified 6 new areas where DHS could take actions to address fragmentation, overlap, or potential duplication or achieve significant cost savings. For example, GAO found that DHS does not have a department-wide policy defining research and development (R&D) or guidance directing components how to report R&D activities. Thus, DHS does not know its total annual investment in R&D, which limits its ability to oversee components R&D efforts. In particular, GAO identified at least 6 components with R&D activities and an additional $255 million in R&D obligations in fiscal year 2011 by DHS components that was not centrally tracked. GAO suggested that DHS develop and implement policies and guidance for defining and overseeing R&D at the department. In addition, GAO reported that by reviewing the appropriateness of the federal cost share the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) applies to agreements financing airport facility modification projects related to the installation of checked baggage screening systems, TSA could, if a reduced cost share was deemed appropriate, achieve cost efficiencies of up to $300 million by 2030 and be positioned to install a greater number of optimal baggage screening systems. GAO has also updated its assessments of the progress that DHS and Congress have made in addressing the suggested actions from the 2011 and 2012 annual reports. As of March 2013, of the 42 actions from these reports, 5 have been addressed (12 percent), 24 have been partially addressed (57 percent), and the remaining 13 have not been addressed (31 percent). Although DHS and Congress have made some progress in addressing the issues that GAO has previously identified, additional steps are needed to address the remaining areas to achieve associated benefits.
While challenges remain across its missions, DHS has made considerable progress since 2003 in transforming its original component agencies into a single department. As a result, in its 2013 biennial high-risk update, GAO narrowed the scope of the area and changed its focus and name from Implementing and Transforming the Department of Homeland Security to Strengthening the Department of Homeland Security Management Functions. To more fully address this area, DHS needs to further strengthen its acquisition, information technology, and financial and human capital management functions. Of the 31 actions and outcomes GAO identified as important to addressing this area, DHS has fully or mostly addressed 8, partially addressed 16, and initiated 7. Moving forward, DHS needs to, for example, validate required acquisition documents in a timely manner, and demonstrate measurable progress in meeting cost, schedule, and performance metrics for its major acquisition programs. In addition, DHS has begun to implement a governance structure to improve information technology management consistent with best practices, but the structure covers less than 20 percent of DHSs major information technology investments.
What GAO Recommends
While this testimony contains no new recommendations, GAO previously made about 1,800 recommendations to DHS designed to strengthen its programs and operations. The department has implemented more than 60 percent of them and has actions under way to address others. |
gao_GAO-14-796T | gao_GAO-14-796T_0 | Background
Since its implementation in 2009, Secure Flight has changed from a program that identifies passengers as high risk solely by matching them against the No Fly and Selectee Lists to one that assigns passengers a risk category: high risk, low risk, or unknown risk. TSA Lacks Key Information to Determine whether the Secure Flight Program Is Achieving Its Goals
In September 2014, we reported that Secure Flight has established program goals that reflect new program functions since 2009 to identify additional types of high-risk and also low-risk passengers; however, current program performance measures do not allow Secure Flight to fully assess its progress toward achieving all of its goals. We also found in September 2014 that TSA lacks timely and reliable information on all known cases of Secure Flight system matching errors. We recommended that TSA develop a mechanism to systematically document the number and causes of the Secure Flight system’s matching errors, in accordance with federal internal control standards. TSA Has Processes in Place to Implement Secure Flight Screening Determinations at Checkpoints, but Could Take Further Action to Address Screening Errors
In September 2014, we reported that TSA has processes in place to implement Secure Flight screening determinations at airport checkpoints, but could take steps to enhance these processes. TSA information from May 2012 through February 2014 that we assessed indicates that screening personnel have made errors in implementing Secure Flight determinations at the checkpoint. However, we found that TSA does not have a systematic process for evaluating the root causes of these screening errors at the checkpoint across airports, which could allow TSA to identify trends across airports and target nationwide efforts to address these issues. Therefore, we recommended in September 2014 that TSA develop a process for evaluating the root causes of screening errors at the checkpoint and then implement corrective measures to address those causes. Uncovering and addressing the root causes of screening errors could allow TSA to strengthen security screening at airports by reducing the number of these errors at the checkpoint. Passengers who are determined to have been incorrectly matched to or listed on high-risk lists based on the TSDB are added to a list of passengers known as the TSA Cleared List, which allows them to be cleared (not identified as high risk) nearly 100 percent of the time. In January 2014, DHS TRIP also reduced its target for one of its key performance indicators—average number of days for DHS TRIP redress cases to be closed—from 93 to 78 days. In January 2014, DHS TRIP also established intermediate and long-term performance goals for the appeals process for the first time. TSA Has Implemented Oversight Mechanisms to Address Passenger Privacy Requirements, but Additional Actions Could Better Ensure Full Compliance
TSA has taken steps to implement privacy oversight mechanisms, but, as we reported in September 2014, additional actions could allow TSA to sustain and strengthen its efforts. TSA has also implemented privacy training for new Secure Flight staff, and all DHS employees receive annual privacy training. However, we found that existing Secure Flight staff do not receive job-specific privacy refresher training consistent with Office of Management and Budget (OMB) requirements. We recommended that TSA provide at least annual job-specific privacy refresher training in order to further strengthen Secure Flight’s protection of personally identifiable information. DHS concurred with our recommendation and stated that TSA’s OIA will develop and deliver job-specific privacy refresher training for all Secure Flight staff. We also reported in September 2014 that TSA documents some aspects of its Secure Flight privacy oversight mechanisms, such as scheduled destructions of passenger data and reviews of planned changes to the Secure Flight system. However, TSA does not have a mechanism to comprehensively document and track key privacy-related issues and decisions that arise through the development and use of Secure Flight—a mechanism TSA planned to develop when Secure Flight implementation began in 2009. | Why GAO Did This Study
As requested, this testimony summarizes the findings from two reports GAO issued in September 2014, about the Secure Flight program: Secure Flight: TSA Should Take Additional Steps to Determine Program Effectiveness ( GAO-14-531 ) and Secure Flight: TSA Could Take Additional Steps to Strengthen Privacy Oversight Mechanisms ( GAO-14-647 ). This testimony summarizes the findings of those reports. For those reports, GAO analyzed TSA documents and data related to performance measures, screener performance at airport checkpoints, the redress process, and privacy protections, and interviewed relevant officials.
What GAO Found
Since 2009, the Transportation Security Administration’s (TSA) Secure Flight program has changed from a program that identifies passengers as high risk solely by matching them against the No Fly List, composed of individuals who should be precluded from boarding an aircraft, and the Selectee List, composed of individuals who should receive enhanced screening at the airport security checkpoint, to one that assigns passengers a risk category: high risk, low risk, or unknown risk. Secure Flight has established program goals that reflect these new program functions; however, current program performance measures do not allow Secure Flight to fully assess its progress toward achieving all of its goals. Furthermore, TSA lacks timely and reliable information on all known cases of Secure Flight system matching errors.
TSA has processes in place to implement Secure Flight screening determinations at airport checkpoints, but could take steps to enhance these processes. TSA information from May 2012 through February 2014 indicates that screening personnel have made errors in implementing Secure Flight determinations at the checkpoint. However, TSA does not have a process for systematically evaluating the root causes of these screening errors. Evaluating the root causes of screening errors, and then implementing corrective measures, in accordance with federal internal control standards, to address those causes could allow TSA to strengthen security screening at airports.
The Department of Homeland Security Traveler Redress Inquiry Program (DHS TRIP) affords passengers who may have been incorrectly matched to or listed on high-risk lists based on the Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB)—the U.S. government’s consolidated list of known and suspected terrorists—an opportunity to seek redress. Passengers who, through the redress process, are determined to have been misidentified to a TSDB-based high-risk list are added to the TSA Cleared List, which allows them to be cleared (not identified as high risk) nearly 100 percent of time. In fiscal year 2013, DHS TRIP began working to reduce processing time for its redress and appeals cases. Specifically, DHS has reduced its target for average number of days for redress cases to be closed and has established a performance goal for the appeals process. DHS TRIP plans to periodically review its progress in achieving its appeals performance goal and determine by February 2015 whether further changes to the appeals process are warranted.
TSA has taken steps to implement several of the privacy oversight mechanisms it planned to establish when Secure Flight implementation began in 2009, but additional actions could allow TSA to sustain and strengthen its efforts. TSA has implemented privacy training for new Secure Flight staff, and all DHS employees receive annual privacy training. However, existing Secure Flight staff do not receive job-specific privacy refresher training consistent with Office of Management and Budget (OMB) requirements. Providing job-specific privacy refresher training could further strengthen Secure Flight’s protection of personally identifiable information. TSA also documents some aspects of its Secure Flight privacy oversight mechanisms, such as scheduled destructions of passenger data. However, TSA does not have a mechanism to comprehensively document and track key privacy-related issues and decisions that arise through the development and use of Secure Flight.
What GAO Recommends
In GAO’s September 2014 reports, GAO recommended that TSA develop measures to address all aspects of performance related to Secure Flight program goals, develop a mechanism to systematically document the number and causes of Secure Flight system matching errors, develop a process to regularly evaluate the root causes of screening errors at security checkpoints and implement measures to address these causes, provide job-specific privacy refresher training for Secure Flight staff, and develop a mechanism to document and track key Secure Flight privacy issues and decisions. DHS concurred with GAO’s recommendations. |
gao_GAO-04-614 | gao_GAO-04-614_0 | Background
In November 2003, Congress authorized a new performance-based pay system for members of the SES. While Education, HHS, and NASA have undertaken important and valuable efforts to link their career senior executive performance management systems to their organizations’ success, senior executives’ perceptions indicate that these three agencies have opportunities to use their career senior executive performance management systems more strategically to strengthen that link. Conclusions
Senior executives need to lead the way for federal agencies to transform their cultures to be more results oriented, customer focused, and collaborative in nature to meet the challenges of the 21st century. Performance management systems can help manage and direct this transformation process. In addition, as the administration is about to implement a performance-based pay system for the SES, valid, reliable, and transparent performance management systems with reasonable safeguards are critical. The experiences and progress of Education, HHS, and NASA should prove helpful to those agencies as well as provide valuable information to other agencies as they seek to use senior executive performance management as a tool to drive internal change and achieve external results. Objective, Scope, and Methodology
To meet our objective to assess how well selected agencies are creating linkages between senior executive performance and organizational success through their performance management systems, we applied the key practices we previously identified for effective performance management. We selected the Department of Education, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) for our review to reflect variations in mission, size, organizational structure, and use of their performance management systems for career senior executives. Link pay to individual and organizational performance. | Why GAO Did This Study
Congress and the administration have established a new performance-based pay system for members of the Senior Executive Service (SES) that is designed to provide a clear and direct linkage between SES performance and pay. Also, GAO previously reported that significant opportunities exist for agencies to hold the SES accountable for improving organizational results. GAO assessed how well selected agencies are creating linkages between SES performance and organizational success by applying nine key practices GAO previously identified for effective performance management. GAO selected the Department of Education, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA).
What GAO Found
Senior executives need to lead the way to transform their agencies' cultures to be more results-oriented, customer focused, and collaborative in nature. Performance management systems can help manage and direct this process. While Education, HHS, and NASA have undertaken important and valuable efforts to link their career SES performance management systems to their organizations' success, there are opportunities to use their systems more strategically. For example, as indicated by the executives themselves, the agencies can better use their performance management systems as a tool to manage the organization or to achieve organizational goals. As Congress and the administration are reforming SES pay to better link pay to performance, valid, reliable, and transparent performance management systems with reasonable safeguards are critical. Information on the experiences and knowledge of these agencies should provide valuable insights to other agencies as they seek to drive internal change and achieve external results. |
gao_GAO-09-487 | gao_GAO-09-487_0 | Supporting Documentation Varied Based on Reporting Requirements
While no specific requirements exist for lobbyists to create or maintain documentation, GAO’s review showed that lobbyists could provide documentation to varying degrees for the reporting elements in their disclosure reports. We estimate that lobbyists could provide some form of written documentation for income or expenses for approximately 99 percent of disclosure reports for the first three quarters of 2008. Overall, lobbyists could provide documentation for all seven reporting elements we reviewed on about 35 percent of the disclosure reports (34 of 98) in GAO’s sample. We estimate that lobbyists were unable to provide documentation for one or more elements on about 65 percent of the lobbying activity disclosure reports (64 of 98) we reviewed. As of March 18, 2009, lobbyists had amended 12 disclosure reports included in our sample to correct income or expenses, information on the entities lobbied, lobbyists listed, or other information. In the 2 other cases, the lobbyists said they realized that they had failed to report covered positions and plan to amend their disclosure reports. Most Contributions Reports Could Be Supported by FEC Data or Documentation
Reports of federal campaign and other political contributions are required to be reported under the Act. In addition, we estimate that 16 percent of the reports had errors or omissions, or failed to disclose required contributions. Newly Registered Lobbyists Generally Met Reporting Requirements
New registrations filed in the first three quarters of 2008 were largely followed by disclosure reports for the filing period as required. However, we could not identify corresponding reports of lobbying activity for 518 (approximately 13 percent) of the 4,134 new registrations. We were able to match approximately 88 percent of newly registered lobbyists to disclosure reports filed during the second quarter. In addition, our review of contributions reports identified some small firms and sole proprietors that did not understand the requirement for both firms and individual lobbyists to file contributions reports. In our last report on lobbying disclosure, we stated that we believe that the lobbying community could benefit from creating an organization to share examples of best practices of the types of records maintained to support filings and use this information gathered over an initial period to formulate minimum standards for recordkeeping; provide training for the lobbying community on reporting and disclosure requirements, intended to help the community comply with the Act; and report annually to the Secretary of the Senate and the Clerk of the House on opportunities to clarify existing guidance and ways to minimize sources of potential confusion for the lobbying community. U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of Columbia Is Making Progress on Its Approach to Focusing Resources on Lobbyists Who Fail to Comply
The U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of Columbia (the Office) is responsible for the enforcement of the Act. Since September 2008, the Office has assigned an additional staff member to assist with lobbying compliance issues. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Consistent with the requirements of the Honest Leadership and Open Government Act (HLOGA), our objectives were to: determine the extent to which lobbyists can demonstrate compliance by providing support for information on registrations and reports filed in response to requirements of the amended Lobbying Disclosure Act (the Act); identify the challenges lobbyists cite in complying with the Act and suggestions for improving compliance; and describe the resources and authorities available to effectively enforce the Act including the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of Columbia’s efforts to focus resources on lobbyists who continually fail to comply with the Act. We contacted each lobbyist in our sample and asked them to provide support for key elements in their reports, including: the amount of income reported for lobbying activities; the amount of expenses reported on lobbying activities; the names of lobbyists who had held covered official positions; the houses of Congress and federal agencies that they lobbied; the names of foreign entities with interest in the client; the names of individuals no longer acting as a lobbyist for the client; and the names of any member organizations of a coalition or association that actively participated in lobbying activities on behalf of the client. We then selected a systematic random sample of 100 LD-203 reports from the approximately 6,048 LD-203 reports that contain contributions. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Honest Leadership and Open Government Act (HLOGA) of 2007 amended the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995 by doubling the frequency of lobbyists' reporting and increasing criminal and civil penalties. This is GAO's second report in response to the Act's requirement for GAO to annually (1) determine the extent to which lobbyists can demonstrate compliance with the Act by providing support for information on their registrations and reports, (2) describe challenges identified by lobbyists to complying with the Act, and (3) describe the resources and authorities available to the U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of Columbia's efforts to enforce the Act. For this report, GAO placed increased emphasis on written documentation to support disclosure reports. GAO reviewed a random sample of 100 lobbyist disclosure reports filed during the first three quarters of calendar year 2008. GAO also selected a random sample of 100 reports of federal political contributions, filed for the first time, for mid-calendar-year 2008. This methodology allowed GAO to generalize the sample results to the populations of 40,169 lobbying activity disclosure reports and 6,048 reports with contributions filed. GAO met with lobbyists regarding their filings and with the U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of Columbia regarding resources, authorities, and efforts to focus resources on lobbyists who fail to comply with the Act.
What GAO Found
While there are no specific requirements for lobbyists to create or maintain documentation related to disclosure reports they file under HLOGA, GAO's review showed that lobbyists were generally able to provide documentation, although in varying degrees, to support items in their disclosure reports. For income and expenses, two key elements of the disclosure reports, lobbyists could provide written documentation for an estimated 99 percent of the reports. However, in approximately 14 percent of cases, the documentation provided either was incomplete or contradicted the reported amount of income or expense. In addition to income and expenses, GAO reviewed five other data elements in the disclosure reports, and lobbyists who were required to report on these elements could provide documented support for all items in an estimated 35 percent of the reports. As of March 18, 2009, lobbyists had amended 12 disclosure reports included in GAO's sample to make corrections on one or more data elements. For political contribution reports, filed for the first time in 2008, GAO estimates that 65 percent of the reports could be supported by FEC data or documentation provided by lobbyists. An estimated 16 percent of the reports contained erroneous entries or failed to disclose required contributions. The majority of lobbyists who newly registered with the Secretary of the Senate and Clerk of the House in the first three quarters of 2008 filed required disclosure reports for the period. However, for about 13 percent of the registrants, GAO could not identify a corresponding report on file for their lobbying activity, likely because either a report was not filed or reports that were filed contained information, such as client names, that did not match. Similar to GAO's findings in the first review of lobbying disclosure, most lobbyists felt that existing guidance for filing required registrations and reports was sufficient. However, GAO's review of documentation and lobbyists' statements indicates some opportunities to strengthen lobbyists' understanding of the requirements. Some small firms and sole proprietors indicated they did not understand the requirement for both firms and individual lobbyists to file reports on financial contributions. GAO continues to believe, as noted in its first report, that the lobbying community could benefit from creating an organization to focus on sharing best practices, providing training, and reporting on opportunities to minimize potential confusion. In response to an earlier GAO recommendation, in April 2009 the U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of Columbia (the Office) plans to put in place a system to better track, analyze, and report on its enforcement activities. The Office also has assigned an additional staff member to assist with lobbying compliance issues. |
gao_GAO-03-576 | gao_GAO-03-576_0 | Waivers Are Vehicle for Dramatic Growth in Medicaid Home and Community-Based Services
Medicaid-covered HCBS services have become a growing component of state long-term care systems, with most of the growth accounted for by substantial increases in the number of HCBS waivers and the beneficiaries served through waivers. However, the share of spending for institutional care declined from 86 to 71 percent, while the share spent for home and community-based care grew from 14 to 29 percent. As shown in figure 1, waiver spending grew from 5 percent of all Medicaid long-term care spending in fiscal year 1991 to 19 percent in fiscal year 2001. Frequently cited quality-of-care problems included (1) failure to provide authorized or necessary services, (2) inadequate assessment or documentation of beneficiaries’ care needs in the plan of care, and (3) inadequate case management. Because CMS has not provided detailed guidance to states on federal requirements for HCBS quality assurance systems, the waiver applications and annual reports submitted by states to CMS for waivers serving the elderly often contained little or no information on state mechanisms for ensuring quality, raising a question as to whether CMS had adequate information to approve or renew some waivers. State Oversight and Quality Issues in Waivers Serving the Elderly Have Been Identified by CMS Regional Offices and States
Although information on the quality of care provided in the 79 waiver programs serving the elderly is limited, state oversight problems were identified by CMS regional offices or states in 15 of 23 waivers and quality- of-care problems in 36 of 51waivers that we were able to examine. CMS Guidance to States and Oversight Of HCBS Waivers Are Inadequate to Ensure Quality Care
CMS has not developed detailed guidance for states on appropriate quality assurance approaches as part of the initial waiver approval process. Moreover, although CMS oversight has identified some quality problems, it does not adequately monitor HCBS waiver programs or the quality of care provided to waiver beneficiaries for waivers serving the elderly as well as those serving other target populations. CMS does not hold its regional offices accountable for conducting and documenting periodic waiver reviews, nor does CMS hold states accountable for submitting annual reports on the status of quality in their waivers. Our analysis of regional office review reports for 21 HCBS waivers serving the elderly found that the reviews varied considerably in the number of beneficiary records evaluated and their method of determining the sample, potentially limiting their ability to generalize findings from the sample to the universe of waiver beneficiaries. Recommendations for Executive Action
To ensure that state quality assurance efforts are adequate to protect the health and welfare of HCBS waiver beneficiaries, we recommend that the Administrator of CMS develop and provide states with more detailed criteria regarding the necessary components of an HCBS waiver quality assurance system, require states to submit more specific information about their quality assurance approaches prior to waiver approval, and ensure that states provide sufficient and timely information in their annual waiver reports on their efforts to monitor quality. To strengthen federal oversight of the growing HCBS waiver programs and to ensure the health and welfare of HCBS waiver beneficiaries, we recommend that the Administrator ensure allocation of sufficient resources and hold regional offices accountable for conducting thorough and timely reviews of the status of quality in HCBS waiver programs, and develop guidance on the scope and methodology for federal reviews of state waiver programs, including a sampling methodology that provides confidence in the generalizability of the review results. As of June 2002, almost one-fifth of all HCBS waivers in place for 3 years or more had either never been reviewed or were renewed without a review; 14 of these waivers had 10 or more years elapse without a regional office review. The full extent of such problems is unknown because many state waivers lacked a recent CMS review. CMS did not comment directly on our conclusion that the agency is not fully complying with statutory and regulatory requirements when it renews waivers. Appendix VIII: Comments from the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services | Why GAO Did This Study
Home and community-based settings have become a growing part of states' Medicaid long-term care programs, serving as an alternative to care in institutional settings, such as nursing homes. To cover such services, however, states often obtain waivers from certain federal statutory requirements. GAO was asked to review (1) trends in states' use of Medicaid home and community-based service (HCBS) waivers, particularly for the elderly, (2) state quality assurance approaches, including available data on the quality of care provided to elderly individuals through waivers, and (3) the adequacy of federal oversight of state waivers. GAO is recommending that the Administrator of CMS take steps to (1) better ensure that state quality assurance efforts are adequate to protect the health and welfare of HCBS waiver beneficiaries, and (2) strengthen federal oversight of the growing HCBS waiver programs. Although CMS raised certain concerns about aspects of the report, such as the respective state and federal roles in quality assurance and the potential need for additional federal oversight resources, CMS generally concurred with the recommendations.
What GAO Found
From 1991 through 2001, Medicaid long-term care spending more than doubled to over $75 billion, while the proportion spent on institutional care declined. Over a similar time period, HCBS waivers grew from 5 percent to 19 percent of such expenditures--from $1.6 billion to $14.4 billion--and the number of waivers, participants, and average state per capita spending also grew significantly. Since 1992, the number of waivers increased by almost 70 percent to 263 in June 2002, and the number of beneficiaries, as of 1999, had nearly tripled to almost 700,000, of which 55 percent were elderly. In the absence of specific federal requirements for HCBS quality assurance systems, states provide limited information to the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), the federal agency that administers the Medicaid program, on how they assure quality of care in their waiver programs for the elderly. States' waiver applications and annual reports for waivers for the elderly often contained little or no information on state mechanisms for assuring quality in waivers, thus limiting information available to CMS that should be considered before approving or renewing waivers. GAO's analysis of available CMS and state waiver oversight reports for waivers serving the elderly identified oversight weaknesses and quality of care problems. More than 70 percent of the waivers for the elderly that GAO reviewed documented one or more quality-of-care problems. The most common problems included failure to provide necessary services, weaknesses in plans of care, and inadequate case management. The full extent of such problems is unknown because many state waivers lacked a recent CMS review, as required, or the annual state waiver report lacked the relevant information. CMS has not developed detailed state guidance on appropriate quality assurance approaches as part of initial waiver approval. Although CMS oversight has identified some quality problems in waivers, CMS does not adequately monitor state waivers and the quality of beneficiary care. The 10 CMS regional offices are responsible for ongoing monitoring for HCBS waivers. However, CMS does not hold these offices accountable for completing periodic waiver reviews, nor does it hold states accountable for submitting annual reports on the status of waiver quality. Consequently, CMS is not fully complying with statutory and regulatory requirements when it renews waivers. As of June 2002, almost one-fifth of waivers in place for 3 years or more had either never been reviewed or were renewed without a review; for an additional 16 percent of waivers, reports detailing the review results were never finalized. Regional office personnel explained that limited staff resources and travel funds often impede the timing and scope of reviews. While regional office reviews include record reviews for a sample of waiver beneficiaries, they do not always include beneficiary interviews. The reviews also varied considerably in the number of beneficiary records reviewed and their method of determining the sample. |
gao_GAO-01-377 | gao_GAO-01-377_0 | We analyzed the data, by race/ethnicity and gender, to identify trends in the percentages of women and minorities employed in the career SES governmentwide and in each of 24 CFO agencies over the 10-year period. To look at representation in the career SES compared with other labor forces, we calculated the proportions of women and minorities in the career SES, as of September 30, 1999, and compared the result with similarly calculated proportions of women and minorities in the six labor forces. By the end of fiscal year 1999, the difference had increased to about 15 percentage points. For fiscal years 1990 through 1999, annual appointments to the career SES included more women and minorities as the decade went on. Trends in SES Appointments Compared With the GS-15 Pipeline
As part of our analysis of diversity in appointments to the SES, we compared the composition of actual SES appointments to the composition of the pipeline—the feeder group from which new SES members were appointed. The minority percentage of appointments ranged from about 13 percent in 1990 to 22 percent in 1999. As we pointed out in this report, our objective, among others, was to describe how the representation of women and minority employees in the career SES compared with other labor forces. | Why GAO Did This Study
This report analyzes the gender and racial/ethnic diversity in the career Senior Executive Service (SES) governmentwide. GAO examines (1) whether the composition of the career SES changed during the 10-year period ending in fiscal year 1999 to include more minorities and women, (2) what proportion of women and minorities were appointed to the career SES annually during this 10-year period and whether the appointments reflected the SES "pipeline"--the group from which new SES members were generally appointed, and (3) how the representation of women and minority employees in the career SES as of fiscal year 1999 compared with other labor forces.
What GAO Found
GAO found that the representation of women and minorities in the career SES steadily increased during the 1990's, with the proportion of women going from 10 percent in 1990 to 22 percent in 1999. Similarly, the percentage of minority members went from seven percent to about 13 percent. The vast majority of these appointments came from within the ranks of GS-15 employees. Women and minorities had a somewhat lower representation in the SES when compared to other labor forces. |
gao_GAO-08-770 | gao_GAO-08-770_0 | NIST Has Defined and Implemented an Accreditation Approach That Reflects Relevant Standards but Is Missing Details Needed for Consistent and Verifiable Implementation
NIST’s defined approach to accrediting voting system laboratories largely reflects applicable HAVA requirements and relevant international standards, both of which are necessary to an effective program. In particular, because NIST’s defined program does not, for example, specify the nature and extent of assessment documentation to generate or retain or specify the version of the voting system standards to be used, our analysis of NIST’s efforts in accrediting four laboratories could not confirm that the agency has consistently followed its defined accreditation program. However, they said that they do not have documented plans to accomplish this. According to NIST officials, these HAVA requirements are relevant and important to defining an effective voting system testing laboratory accreditation program. As a result, NIST has incorporated key aspects of an effective accreditation body into its voting system accreditation program. For example: One type of checklist (the supplemental handbook checklist) was prepared for only two of the four laboratory assessments. However, this draft manual omits important content. Because this manual was not available for EAC to use on the four laboratory accreditations that it has completed, the accreditations were performed using a largely undocumented series of steps. However, they said that they do not yet have documented plans to accomplish this. With respect to the remaining three HAVA requirements, the draft EAC accreditation manual also requires (1) that the commissioners vote on the accreditation of laboratories recommended by NIST for accreditation, (2) that EAC publish an explanation for the accreditation of any laboratory not recommended by NIST for accreditation, and (3) that the commissioners vote on the proposed revocation of a laboratory’s accreditation. Further, the manual is silent on the steps to be followed and criteria to be applied in reviewing a laboratory’s application and the qualifications required for accreditation reviewers. Further, while EAC officials said that they plan to evolve their approach to VSTL accreditation and to address these gaps, EAC does not have documented plans for accomplishing this. Available Documentation Does Not Demonstrate EAC’s Basis for Accrediting Laboratories to Date
As of May 2008, EAC has accredited four laboratories, but the documentation associated with each of these accreditations is not sufficient to recreate a meaningful understanding of how each evaluation was performed and how decisions were made, and thus, the bases for each accreditation were not clear. According to EAC officials, the review steps were not documented. Both NIST and EAC play critical roles in ensuring that the laboratories that test these two variables have the capability, experience, and competence necessary to test a voting system against the relevant standards. To help EAC in evolving its VSTL accreditation program, we recommend that the Chair of the EAC ensure that the EAC Executive Director develops and executes plans that specify tasks, milestones, resources, and performance measures that provide for the following action: Establish and implement practices for the VSTL accreditation program consistent with accreditation program management guidance published by NIST and GAO, including documentation of specific accreditation steps and criteria to guide assessors in conducting each laboratory review; transparent requirements for the qualifications of accreditation reviewers; requirements for the adequate maintenance of records related to the VSTL accreditation program; and requirements for determining laboratory financial stability. With respect to our finding that NIST’s defined approach for accrediting VSTLs does not cite explicit qualifications for the persons who conduct the technical assessments, the institute stated that it does explicitly cite assessor qualifications for its overall national laboratory accreditation program, adding that this approach to specifying assessor qualifications has a proven record of success. As we state in our report, we reviewed the documentation associated with the accreditation assessments for these four laboratories, and we found that all four were not documented in a similar manner, even though they were based on the same version of the program handbook. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to determine whether the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and the Election Assistance Commission (EAC) have defined effective voting system testing laboratory (VSTL) accreditation approaches, and whether each is following its defined approach. | Why GAO Did This Study
The 2002 Help America Vote Act (HAVA) created the Election Assistance Commission (EAC) and assigned both it and the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) responsibilities for accrediting laboratories that test voting systems. NIST assesses a laboratory's technical qualifications and makes recommendations to EAC, which makes a final accreditation decision. In view of the continuing concerns about voting systems and the important roles that NIST and EAC play in accrediting the laboratories that test these systems, GAO was asked to determine whether each organization has defined an effective approach for accrediting laboratories that test voting systems and whether each is following its defined approach. To accomplish this, GAO compared NIST and EAC policies, guidelines, and procedures against applicable legislation and guidance, and reviewed both agencies' efforts to implement them.
What GAO Found
NIST has largely defined and implemented an approach for accrediting voting system testing laboratories that incorporates many aspects of an effective program. In particular, its approach addresses relevant HAVA requirements and reflects relevant laboratory accreditation guidance, including standards accepted by the international standards community. However, NIST's defined approach does not, for example, cite explicit qualifications for the persons who conduct accreditation technical assessments, as called for in federal accreditation program guidance. Instead, NIST officials said that they rely on individuals who have prior experience in reviewing such laboratories. Further, even though the EAC requires that laboratory accreditation be based on demonstrated capabilities to test against the latest voting system standards, NIST's defined approach has not always cited these current standards. As a result, two of the four laboratories accredited to date were assessed using assessment tools that were not linked to the latest standards. Moreover, available documentation for the four laboratory assessments was not sufficient to determine how the checklists were applied and how decisions were reached. According to NIST officials, the four laboratories were consistently assessed. Moreover, they said that they intend to evolve NIST's accreditation approach to, for example, clearly provide for sufficient documentation of how accreditation reviews are conducted and decisions are reached. However, they had yet to develop specific plans for accomplishing this. EAC recently developed a draft laboratory accreditation program manual, but this draft manual does not adequately define all aspects of an effective approach, and it was not used in the four laboratory accreditations performed to date. Specifically, while this draft manual addresses relevant HAVA requirements, such as the requirement for the commissioners to vote on the accreditation of any laboratory that NIST recommends for accreditation, it does not include a methodology governing how laboratories are to be evaluated or criteria for granting accreditation. Because the manual was not approved at the time EAC accredited four laboratories, these accreditations were governed by a more broadly defined accreditation review process that was described in correspondence sent to each laboratory and a related document receipt checklist. As a result, these accreditations were based on review steps that were not sufficiently defined to permit them to be executed in a repeatable manner. According to EAC officials, including the official who conducted the accreditation reviews for the four laboratories, using the same person to conduct the reviews ensured that the steps performed on the first laboratory were repeated on the other three. However, given that both the steps and the results were not documented, GAO could not verify this. EAC officials stated that they intend to evolve the program manual over time and apply it to future accreditations and reaccreditations. However, they did not have specific plans for accomplishing this. Further, although EAC very recently approved an initial version of its program manual, this did not occur until after EAC provided comments, and GAO had finalized, this report. |
gao_GAO-07-1106T | gao_GAO-07-1106T_0 | Background
The decennial census is the nation’s largest, most complex survey. 2010 Comprehensive Project Plan with Updated Cost Information Still Not Firm
Careful planning and monitoring are key to successfully managing a complex undertaking such as the decennial census. However, in June 2006 before this subcommittee, we testified that the Bureau’s $11.3 billion life- cycle cost estimate for the 2010 Census lacked timely and complete supporting data. In our view, revising cost estimates with the most current information allows the Bureau to better manage the cost of the census and make necessary resource trade-offs. 2008 Dress Rehearsal Experience Points to Further Testing of Software for LUCA Operations
During the address canvassing phase of the 2008 Dress Rehearsal, the Bureau tested a prototype of the handheld computers that it intends to use for 2010. Automating operations allows the Bureau to reduce the cost of operations; thus, it is critical that the risks surrounding the use of the handheld devices be closely monitored and effectively managed to ensure their success. Given the lateness in the testing cycle, the Bureau now runs the risk that if problems do emerge, little time will be left to develop, test, and incorporate refinements to the handheld devices before 2010. However, the Bureau did not test its computer-based training software in the Dress Rehearsal. The automation of key census processes involves an extensive reliance on contractors. Consequently, contract oversight and management become a key challenge to a successful census. The importance of testing is particularly important, since systems and functionality planned for the 2010 Census will not be available for the 2008 Dress Rehearsal. In addition, the project office did not identify any risks associated with using the handheld mobile computing devices. Bureau Is Designing Decennial Activities in the Geographic Area Affected by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, but Needs to Finalize Plans and Related Milestones
As part of our evaluation of the Bureau’s LUCA Dress Rehearsal, we visited the localities along the Gulf Coast to assess the effect that Hurricanes Katrina and Rita might have on decennial activities in these geographic areas, and we found that the damage and devastation of these hurricanes will likely affect the Bureau’s LUCA program and possibly other operations. The Bureau has begun to take steps toward addressing these issues by developing proposed actions. However, the Bureau has not yet finalized plans and milestones related to changes in actions for modifying address canvassing or subsequent operations in hurricane- affected areas. The Bureau’s plans for how it may adjust address canvassing operations in the Gulf Coast region can also have implications for subsequent operations. 2000 Census: Lessons Learned for Planning a More Cost-Effective 2010 Census. | Why GAO Did This Study
The decennial census is a Constitutionally-mandated activity that produces critical data used to apportion congressional seats, redraw congressional districts, and allocate billions of dollars in federal assistance. The Census Bureau (Bureau) estimates the 2010 Census will cost $11.3 billion, making it the most expensive in the nation's history after adjusting for inflation. This testimony, based primarily on GAO's issued reports and preliminary observations from our ongoing work, discusses the extent to which the Bureau has (1) developed a comprehensive project plan with the most current cost data; (2) incorporated lessons learned from Dress Rehearsal activities; (3) managed automation and technology for the reengineered census; and (4) planned for an accurate census in areas affected by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.
What GAO Found
The Bureau is conducting its Dress Rehearsal of the 2010 Census, the last opportunity it will have to test its design under census-like conditions. Given the importance of a successful enumeration and the complexities of enumerating a hard-to-count population in a more technology-dependent census, our message remains that the risks associated with the decennial must be closely monitored, evaluated, and managed. GAO found that the Bureau is developing but has not yet completed a comprehensive project plan that includes milestones, itemized costs, and measurable goals, nor has it updated the 2010 life-cycle cost estimate to reflect current information from testing. Having a comprehensive project plan and updated cost information will allow the Bureau to manage the operations and cost of the decennial census. Moreover, GAO observed technical problems with the handheld computing devices used in the Dress Rehearsal by field staff for address canvassing (in which the Bureau verifies addresses). If the device does not function as expected or needed, little time will be left for the Bureau to take corrective action. In addition, during the LUCA Dress Rehearsal, the Bureau did not fully test software tools intended to reduce burden on participants. Also, the Bureau's level of reliance on automation and technology for the 2010 Census, at an estimated cost of $3 billion, makes effective contractor oversight (of cost, schedule, and technical performance) and risk management activities imperative. Finally, in the Gulf Coast Region, the condition of the changing housing stock is likely to present additional challenges for the address canvassing operation and subsequent operations. However, the Bureau has not finalized plans for modifying the address canvassing operation or subsequent operations in the Gulf Coast region. |
gao_GAO-02-716 | gao_GAO-02-716_0 | Programs Vary in How Aggressively They Implement PRWORA’s Fugitive Felon Provisions
The extent to which PRWORA’s fugitive felon provisions have been implemented in SSI, TANF, Food Stamp, and housing assistance programs varies. SSA and Some State Programs Also Match Recipient and Arrest Warrant Data
In addition to the practice of asking applicants to report their fugitive felon status when they apply for benefits, SSI and some state Food Stamp and TANF programs identify and remove fugitive felons already on the rolls by comparing entire recipient files with a law enforcement agency’s arrest warrant data. Aggressive Implementation of the Law Poses a Number of Challenges for Programs
There are a number of reasons why the law is not aggressively implemented by all programs that are required to deny benefits to fugitive felons. First, centralized arrest warrant databases are not readily available to programs. Third, a lack of information about how to conduct computerized matching and where to find assistance hampers many state program officials. Finally, in the Food Stamp and TANF programs, the lack of criteria for what constitutes a fugitive may interfere with states’ ability to act decisively to deny benefits to those wanted for felonies or probation or parole violations. There is also evidence that a fugitive felon is defined differently across, and perhaps within, programs. FNS, for example, has directed state Food Stamp programs to deny benefits to individuals with outstanding arrest warrants only when the program has verified that these individuals are aware of the warrants. To oversee and better implement these provisions in the TANF program, we recommend that the Secretary of Health and Human Services encourage states to test the feasibility and effectiveness of routinely matching TANF applicant and recipient records with arrest warrants by providing them with information on the matching activities of other state TANF programs and their results and on accessing available arrest warrant databases such as NCIC; monitor states’ computerized matching efforts to identify fugitive felons and their results; determine what criteria state TANF programs are using to remove recipients wanted for felonies or probation or parole violations from the TANF rolls, and if these criteria differ across states, provide TANF programs with clear guidance on the circumstances under which benefits to fugitive felons should be terminated; and issue guidance on the circumstances under which TANF programs are required to provide information about TANF recipients to law enforcement agencies. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
In order to determine the extent to which actions have been taken to ensure that fugitive felons do not receive Supplemental Security Income (SSI), Food Stamp, Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF), or housing assistance benefits, we interviewed federal officials in the Social Security Administration (SSA), the Department of Agriculture (USDA), the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), and the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and reviewed regulations and other documents that provide policy on handling fugitive felons as applicants or beneficiaries. In our telephone survey, we collected data on the actions these programs had taken to implement the fugitive felon provisions in the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) of 1996. | What GAO Found
In response to concerns that individuals wanted in connection with a felony or violating terms of their parole or probation could receive benefits from programs for the needy, Congress added provisions to the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 that prohibit these individuals from receiving Supplemental Security Income (SSI), Food Stamp benefits, and Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) and make fugitive felon status ground for the termination of tenancy in federal housing assistance programs. In addition, the act directs these programs to provide law enforcement officers with information about program recipients for whom there are outstanding warrants to assist in their apprehension. Actions taken to implement the act's fugitive felon provisions have varied substantially by program. In implementing provisions to prohibit benefits to fugitive felons, all but housing assistance programs include, at a minimum, a question about fugitive felon status in their applications. SSI and some state Food Stamp and TANF programs also seek independent verification of fugitive felon status by using computer matching to compare arrest warrant and program recipient files. To date, 110,000 beneficiaries have been identified as fugitive felons and dropped from the SSI, Food Stamp, and TANF rolls, and many have been apprehended. Computerized file matching has been responsible for the identification of most of these fugitive felons. Aggressive implementation of the act's fugitive felon provisions poses a number of challenges for programs. First, centralized and complete national and statewide arrest warrant data for computer matching are not readily available. Second, because direct access to arrest warrants and criminal records is limited to law enforcement personnel, computer matching requires what many state TANF and Food Stamp officials view as a burdensome and complex negotiation process to obtain these records. Third, the absence of information and guidance about how to conduct file matching and overcome its logistical challenges has also hindered aggressive implementation of the law. Finally, there is evidence that individuals with outstanding warrants for felonies, or probation or parole violations, may continue to collect benefits because there may be differences in the interpretation of what constitutes a fugitive felon within the Food Stamp and TANF programs. |
gao_GAO-03-1099 | gao_GAO-03-1099_0 | Design Process Provides for Collaboration
DHS’s and OPM’s effort to design a new human capital system is collaborative and facilitates participation of employees from all levels of the department. DHS Personnel System will Need To Be Integrated with Mission and Program Goals
DHS will need to ensure that the development of the human capital policy options by the Core Design Team is integrated with the accomplishment of DHS programmatic goals as defined in the forthcoming strategic plan. In light of this, we previously stated that the success of the DHS transformation requires the department to link its human capital strategy with its homeland security strategy. DHS is currently developing a strategic plan. Process Steered by Guiding Principles
The Secretary and Director outlined four principles to serve as a framework for the Core Design Team during their first meeting in April:
The system has to support both the mission and the people charged with implementing the mission. These principles can serve as core values for human capital management at DHS – values that define the attributes that are intrinsically important to what the new organization does and how it will do it. Finally, they appropriately identify the need to support the mission and employees of the department, protect basic civil service principles, and hold employees accountable for performance. Ambitious Timeline Established
DHS and OPM established a 9- to 10-month timeline for completing the design process with the expectation that the final regulations will be issued in early 2004. Although the establishment of a clear timeline is positive, a majority of DHS stakeholders we interviewed expressed concerns about its compressed schedule. 3 and 4.) Communications Plan Recently Completed
DHS recently completed a noteworthy communications strategy that provides a structured and planned approach to communicate with DHS stakeholders regarding the human capital system. Building on the current effort, DHS will need to provide adequate opportunities for feedback once the options are released, including providing an adequate level of detail on how the new system will impact employees. Design Process Provides for Employee Involvement
Employee perspectives on the design of the DHS human capital system are sought through many mechanisms, including the Core Design Team with its members from multiple DHS components, Town Hall meetings, focus groups, the field team, and an e-mail mailbox for employee comments. Conclusions
DHS and OPM have developed a process to design the new personnel system that is stimulated and supported by top leadership in both organizations and is generally inclusive, both in terms of the membership of the Core Design Team and multiple opportunities to provide input. Substantial involvement of field staff in the development and implementation of the new human capital system is essential given that over 90 percent of DHS civilian employees are in the field. Moving forward, it is critical that the new human capital system be linked to the DHS strategic plan and that DHS continue to communicate with and involve its employees. Accordingly, we are recommending that once the strategic plan is completed the Secretary of DHS and the Director of OPM ensure that the options selected for the new human capital system support and facilitate the accomplishment of the department’s strategic goals and objectives, as identified in the new strategic plan. This was done to help federal agencies implement successful cultural transformations, including DHS. 5.) Smith made key contributions to this report. | Why GAO Did This Study
The success of the transformation and implementation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is based largely on the degree to which human capital management issues are addressed. Recognizing this, the legislation creating DHS provided it with significant flexibility to design a modern human capital management system. Congressional requesters asked GAO to describe the process DHS has in place to design its human capital system and involve employees, and analyze the extent to which this process reflects elements of successful transformations.
What GAO Found
The effort to design a human capital management system for DHS generally reflects important elements of effective transformations. (1) Leadership: One of the strengths of the effort to transform the culture of organizations going into DHS has been the on-going commitment of both DHS and Office of Personnel Management (OPM) leaders to stimulate and support the effort to design a human capital system. (2) Strategic Goals: DHS is currently developing a strategic plan. Although DHS human resource leaders are included on the strategic planning team, it will not be complete until the end of September 2003. Consequently, DHS will need to ensure that the development of the human capital policy options is integrated with the accomplishment of DHS programmatic goals as defined in the forthcoming strategic plan. Such integration is important to ensure that the human capital system enables the department to acquire, develop, and retain the core competencies necessary for DHS to accomplish its programmatic goals. (3) Key Principles: The DHS Secretary and OPM Director outlined four principles to serve as a critical framework for the human capital system. These principles appropriately identify the need to support the mission and employees of the department, protect basic civil service principles, and hold employees accountable for performance. (4) Timeline: Agency officials established an ambitious 9- to 10-month timeline for completing the design process, aiming to issue final regulations in early 2004. Some DHS stakeholders we interviewed expressed concerns about the compressed schedule. Officials leading the design effort report the aggressive schedule is necessary to relieve employee anxiety and maximize the time available for implementation. (5) Design Team: The design team includes staff from multiple organizational units within DHS, OPM, and the three major unions. (6) Communication: DHS recently finalized a communication plan that provides a structured and planned approach to communicate with DHS stakeholders regarding the human capital system. Moving forward, DHS will need to provide adequate opportunities for feedback once the options are released. (7) Employee Involvement: Employees are provided multiple opportunities to be included in the design process, including participation in the Core Design Team, the Town Hall meetings, the field team, the focus groups, and an e-mail mailbox for employee comments. Experience has shown that in making major changes in the cultures of organizations, how it is done, when it is done, and the basis on which it is done can make all the difference in whether it is ultimately successful. The analysis of DHS's effort to design a human capital system can be particularly instructive in light of legislative requests for agency-specific human capital flexibilities at the Department of Defense and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. |
gao_HEHS-99-53 | gao_HEHS-99-53_0 | Beyond these outcome measures, VA has three process goals: to increase (1) the number of community-based beds for homeless veterans, (2) VA facilities’ efforts to coordinate with other providers of homeless services, and (3) the number of homeless veterans treated in VA’s health care system. VA also provides medical, mental health, substance abuse, and social services to homeless veterans through its mainstream health care programs. HCHV staff also serve as case managers for homeless veterans. The DCHV program focuses on rehabilitation. VA’s Role in Providing Health Services
While VA has expanded its homeless programs and community partnerships, it continues to be a provider of medical, mental health, and substance abuse services to homeless veterans through its general health care programs. Effectiveness of VA Homeless Programs Is Unclear
Although NEPEC collects extensive data, VA has little information about the effectiveness of its homeless programs. Homeless program sites submit primarily descriptive data about veterans and program characteristics. These data are of limited use in assessing program effectiveness, however, because no follow-up information is obtained after a veteran is discharged from a residential or DCHV treatment program. As a result, VA does not know whether veterans served by its homeless programs remain employed or stably housed. Program managers use this information to monitor and compare program sites. These measures reflect four different categories of information about sites: (1) program structure (for example, the average number of days veterans spend in residential treatment and the average number of unique veterans served by each clinical staff member); (2) patient characteristics (for example, the percentage of veterans served who were not literally homeless at the time of intake and the percentage of veterans served who were diagnosed with a serious mental illness or substance abuse disorder); (3) program process measures which indicate how the program operates (for example, percentage of veterans served who were contacted by outreach and the percentage of veterans inappropriately placed in residential treatment); and (4) status at discharge (for example, percentages of veterans who report being housed and employed at discharge). Many questions remain unanswered, but several broad themes have emerged from these efforts. Experts agree that the continuum of care for the homeless must include a range of housing and treatment options, and that flexibility is needed to match homeless persons to appropriate services. Because the homeless have diverse needs and local resources vary, flexibility is needed in serving individuals and in arranging partnerships among organizations. We made this change. To describe the programs and approaches used by VA to assist homeless veterans, we obtained documents from VA headquarters and NEPEC that identified and provided detailed information about VA’s homeless efforts. To determine what VA knows about the effectiveness of its homeless programs, we reviewed NEPEC reports issued since the inception of VA’s homeless programs. Supported Housing. Comprehensive Homeless Centers (CHC). 10. 5. 6. 11. 12. Housed at discharge. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the effectiveness of efforts to assist homeless veterans, focusing on: (1) describing the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) homeless programs; (2) determining what VA knows about the effectiveness of its homeless programs; and (3) examining promising approaches aimed at different groups of homeless veterans.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) VA's homeless assistance and treatment programs address diverse needs of homeless veterans by providing services such as case management, employment assistance, and transitional housing; (2) VA also provides medical, mental health, substance abuse, and social services to homeless veterans through its hospitals, outpatient clinics, and other health care facilities; (3) because of resource constraints and legislative mandates, VA expanded its homeless veterans efforts by better aligning itself with other federal departments, state and local government agencies, and community-based organizations; (4) the goal of this effort is to develop a continuum of care for the homeless--that is, to identify or create options for addressing the full array of housing, health, and service needs of this population; (5) VA has little information about the effectiveness of its homeless programs; (6) VA has relied on the Northeast Program Evaluation Center (NEPEC) to gather and report information about its homeless programs; (7) each of VA's homeless program sites routinely submits extensive data, mostly related to client characteristics and operations at individual program sites; (8) these data are used primarily to provide program managers with information about service delivery and are of limited use in assessing program effectiveness; (9) to evaluate effectiveness, information must be gathered about intended program results; (10) the outcome measures that NEPEC uses focus on housing, employment, and changes in substance abuse and mental health at the time veterans are discharged from VA's homeless programs; (11) little is known about whether veterans served by VA's homeless programs remain housed or employed, or whether they instead relapse into homelessness; (12) many questions about how to treat homelessness remain unanswered; and (13) experts agree, however, that a comprehensive continuum of care for the homeless--such as that which VA is striving to achieve--should include a range of housing and service alternatives, with specific approaches at any one site reflecting local needs and local resources. |
gao_GAO-06-297T | gao_GAO-06-297T_0 | Charities’ roles in responding to disasters can vary. National Response Plan
The U.S. government’s National Response Plan provides a single, comprehensive framework for the federal response to domestic incidents, such as natural disasters and terrorist attacks. Following September 11, GAO Reported That More Effective Collaboration Could Enhance Charities’ Contributions in Disasters
Following September 11, GAO reported several lessons learned that could help charities enhance their response to future disasters. These included easing access to aid for eligible individuals, enhancing coordination among charities and between charities and FEMA, increasing attention to public education, and planning for future events. Following our report, seven of the largest disaster response charities, in partnership with FEMA, formed the Coordinated Assistance Network (CAN) to ease collaboration and facilitate data sharing. In addition, state and local emergency preparedness efforts could explicitly address the role of charities and charitable aid in future events. Charities Formed National Network to Improve Coordination
GAO recommended that FEMA convene a working group to encourage charities involved in disaster response to integrate lessons learned from the September 11 attacks. Charities also experienced problems in providing services to victims in some hard-to-reach areas. Charities Have Raised More than $2.5 Billion Following the Gulf Coast Hurricanes
Charities have raised more than $2.5 billion in cash donations in response to the Gulf Coast hurricanes, according to the Center on Philanthropy at Indiana University. Charities Took Steps to Improve Coordination but Experienced Some Challenges
Charities operating in the Gulf Coast region following the hurricanes coordinated services through the convening of major national disaster relief organizations at the American Red Cross headquarters, daily conference calls organized by National VOAD, and databases established by CAN. In the weeks following Hurricane Katrina, the American Red Cross organized a national operations center with representatives from FEMA and several major national charities, including the Southern Baptist Convention and the Salvation Army, at its headquarters in Washington, D.C. Because of the scale of the hurricane disaster and the large response needed, this was the first time the American Red Cross coordinated this type of national operations center following a disaster. During these calls, both the federal government and charities were able to provide information and answer questions about services provided, needs identified, and the organizations’ abilities to meet these needs. Charities Struggled to Balance Access to Services with Concerns Regarding Safety of Service Providers and Victims
GAO teams that visited the Gulf Coast in October 2005 observed that the American Red Cross did not provide relief in certain areas because of safety policies; and thus, other charities, such as the Salvation Army and smaller charities, often helped to meet the needs of those areas. Although smaller organizations provided needed charitable services in the Gulf Coast region, some concerns have been raised about the organizations’ abilities to provide adequate services to victims. GAO’s ongoing work on the coordination of charitable efforts in response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita will examine how these recommendations have been implemented and how effectively charities coordinated in response to recent hurricanes. | Why GAO Did This Study
The devastation and dislocation of individuals experienced throughout the Gulf Coast in Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, and Texas in the wake of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita has raised concern about both the charitable sector's and the government's abilities to effectively respond to such disasters. To strengthen future disaster response and recovery operations, the government needs to understand what went right and what went wrong, and to apply these lessons. The National Response Plan outlines the roles of federal agencies and charities in response to national disasters. Recognizing the historically large role of charities in responding to disasters, the plan included charities as signatories and gave them considerable responsibilities. In addition to carrying out the responsibilities outlined in the National Response Plan, charities served as partners to the federal government in providing both immediate and long-term assistance following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. GAO was asked to provide an overview of lessons learned from charities' response to previous disasters as well as preliminary observations about the role of charities following the Gulf Coast hurricanes. As part of our ongoing work, GAO will continue to analyze federal and charitable efforts following the hurricanes.
What GAO Found
Following September 11, 2001, GAO reported lessons learned that could help charities enhance their response to future disasters. These included easing access to aid for eligible individuals, enhancing coordination among charities and between charities and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), increasing attention to public education, and planning for future events. GAO also recommended that FEMA convene a working group of charities to coordinate lessons learned following September 11. Following the GAO report, seven disaster response charities partnering with FEMA formed the Coordinated Assistance Network to improve collaboration and facilitate data sharing. Following the Gulf Coast hurricanes, charities raised more than $2.5 billion dollars, according to Indiana University's Center of Philanthropy, with more than half of these funds going to the American Red Cross. GAO's preliminary work shows that these charities have taken steps to improve coordination of relief efforts by sharing information through daily conference calls and electronic databases. Despite these efforts, charities faced some challenges in coordinating service delivery. For example, some charities reported that their volunteers needed additional training to use the databases. GAO teams that visited the Gulf Coast region in October 2005 observed that in areas where the American Red Cross did not provide services, the Salvation Army and smaller organizations--often local churches--were able to meet many of the charitable needs of hard-to-reach communities. The American Red Cross's efforts to protect service providers may have prohibited it from operating in some of the harder-to-reach areas. Additionally, some concerns were raised about smaller charities' abilities to provide adequate disaster relief services. |
gao_GAO-12-374T | gao_GAO-12-374T_0 | Management of Arlington Contracts Improved, but Additional Steps Are Needed to Ensure Continued Progress
The Army has taken a number of steps since June 2010 at different levels to provide for more effective management and oversight of contracts supporting Arlington, including improving visibility of contracts, establishing new support relationships, formalizing policies and procedures, and increasing the use of dedicated contracting staff to manage and improve acquisition processes. While significant progress has been made, we have recommended that the Army take further action in these areas to ensure continued improvement and institutionalize progress made to date. Using data from multiple sources, we identified 56 contracts and task orders that were active during fiscal year 2010 and the first three quarters of fiscal year 2011 under which these contracting offices obligated roughly $35.2 million on Arlington’s behalf. These contracts and task orders supported cemetery operations, such as landscaping, custodial, and guard services; construction and facility maintenance; and new efforts to enhance information technology systems for the automation of burial operations. At the time of our review, we found that ANCP did not maintain complete data on contracts supporting its operations. However, some of the agreements governing these relationships do not yet fully define roles and responsibilities for contracting support. These organizations are also responsible for managing the use of contracts in support of their efforts; however, the agreement with ANCP does not specifically address roles and responsibilities associated with the use and management of these contracts supporting Arlington requirements. Army Has Made Progress in Addressing Other Management Deficiencies at Arlington, but Challenges Remain
The Army has also taken positive steps and implemented improvements to address other management deficiencies and to provide information and assistance to families. It has implemented improvements across a broad range of areas at Arlington, including developing procedures for ensuring accountability over remains, taking actions to better provide information- assurance, and improving its capability to respond to the public and to families’ inquiries. Nevertheless, we identified several areas where challenges remain:
Managing information-technology investments. Updating workforce plans. Developing an organizational assessment program. Coordinating with key partners. Developing written guidance for providing assistance to families. Formal Collaboration between the Army and VA Could Lead to Improvements across All National Cemeteries
A transfer of jurisdiction for the Army’s two national cemeteries to VA is feasible based on historical precedent for the national cemeteries and examples of other reorganization efforts in the federal government. However, we identified several factors that may affect the advisability of making such a change, including the potential costs and benefits, potential transition challenges, and the potential effect on Arlington’s unique characteristics. In addition, given that the Army has taken steps to address deficiencies at Arlington and has improved its management, it may be premature to move forward with a change in jurisdiction, particularly if other options for improvement exist that entail less disruption. During our review, we identified opportunities for enhancing collaboration between the Army and VA that could leverage their strengths and potentially lead to improvements at all national cemeteries. Additionally, the Army’s national cemeteries are funded through a different appropriations structure than VA’s national cemeteries. Since the Army IG issued its findings in June 2010, the Army and VA have taken steps to partner more effectively. Summary of Recommendations for Further Improvements at Arlington National Cemetery
The success of the Army’s efforts to improve contracting and management at Arlington will depend on continued focus in various areas. With regard to other management challenges at Arlington, we recommended that the Army implement its enterprise architecture and reassess ongoing and planned information-technology investments; update its assessment of ANCP’s workforce needs; develop and implement a program for assessing and improving cemetery operations; develop memorandums of understanding with Arlington’s key operational partners; develop a strategic plan; and develop written guidance to help determine the types of assistance that will be provided to families affected by burial errors. DOD partially agreed with our other recommendations. Both DOD and VA concurred with this recommendation. | Why GAO Did This Study
Arlington National Cemetery (Arlington) contains the remains of more than 330,000 military servicemembers, their family members, and others. In June 2010, the Army Inspector General identified problems at the cemetery, including deficiencies in contracting and management, burial errors, and a failure to notify next of kin of errors. In response, the Secretary of the Army issued guidance creating the position of the Executive Director of the Army National Cemeteries Program (ANCP) to manage Arlington and requiring changes to address the deficiencies and improve cemetery operations. In response to Public Law 111-339, GAO assessed several areas, including (1) actions taken to improve contract management and oversight, (2) the Armys efforts to address identified management deficiencies and provide information and assistance to families regarding efforts to detect and correct burial errors, and (3) factors affecting the feasibility and advisability of transferring jurisdiction for the Armys national cemeteries to the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA). The information in this testimony summarizes GAOs recent reports on Arlington contracting (GAO-12-99) and management (GAO-12-105). These reports are based on, among other things, analyzing guidance, policies, plans, contract files, and other documentation from the Army, Arlington, and other organizations and interviews with Army and VA officials.
What GAO Found
GAO identified 56 contracts and task orders that were active during fiscal year 2010 and the first three quarters of fiscal year 2011 under which contracting offices obligated roughly $35.2 million on Arlingtons behalf. These contracts supported cemetery operations, construction and facility maintenance, and new efforts to enhance information technology systems for the automation of burial operations. The Army has taken a number of steps since June 2010 at different levels to provide for more effective management and oversight of contracts, establishing new support relationships, formalizing policies and procedures, and increasing the use of dedicated contracting staff to manage and improve its acquisition processes. However, GAO found that ANCP does not maintain complete data on its contracts, responsibilities for contracting support are not yet fully defined, and dedicated contract staffing arrangements still need to be determined. The success of Arlingtons acquisition outcomes will depend on continued management focus from ANCP and its contracting partners to ensure sustained attention to contract management and institutionalize progress made to date. GAO made three recommendations to continue improvements in contract management. The Department of Defense (DOD) partially concurred and noted actions in progress to address these areas.
The Army has taken positive steps and implemented improvements to address other management deficiencies and to provide information and assistance to families. It has implemented improvements across a broad range of areas at Arlington, including developing procedures for ensuring accountability over remains and improving its capability to respond to the public and to families inquiries. Nevertheless, the Army has remaining management challenges in several areasmanaging information technology investments, updating workforce plans, developing an organizational assessment program, coordinating with key partners, developing a strategic plan, and developing guidance for providing assistance to families. GAO made six recommendations to help address these areas. DOD concurred or partially concurred and has begun to take some corrective actions.
A transfer of jurisdiction for the Armys two national cemeteries to VA is feasible based on historical precedent for the national cemeteries and examples of other reorganization efforts in the federal government. However, several factors may affect the advisability of making such a change, including the potential costs and benefits, potential transition challenges, and the potential effect on Arlingtons unique characteristics. In addition, given that the Army has taken steps to address deficiencies at Arlington and has improved its management, it may be premature to move forward with a change in jurisdiction, particularly if other options for improvement exist that entail less disruption. GAO identified opportunities for enhancing collaboration between the Army and VA that could leverage their strengths and potentially lead to improvements at all national cemeteries. GAO recommended that the Army and VA develop a mechanism to formalize collaboration between these organizations. DOD and VA concurred with this recommendation.
What GAO Recommends
In the reports, GAO made several recommendations to help Arlington sustain progress made to date. |
gao_RCED-95-45 | gao_RCED-95-45_0 | The United States and Canada each inspect a limited amount of imported foods. Table 1 describes selected regional and agency-to-agency arrangements for sharing information on potentially unsafe imports, foods rejected as unsafe, and inspections of foreign plants. Opportunities for Enhancing the Safety of Imported Foods
Opportunities exist for improving the current U.S.-Canada information-sharing system in two areas: (1) shipments of unsafe foods refused at one country’s port of entry and (2) inspections of foreign food-processing plants. The United States and Canada have an opportunity to build on each other’s information about foreign food-processing plants that ship products to North America. Additional information about each country’s experiences in inspecting foreign plants could, in turn, enable the United States and Canada to maximize scarce inspection resources by coordinating such inspections. Recommendations
To better ensure the safety of imported foods and to make better use of limited resources, we recommend that the Secretaries of Agriculture and of Health and Human Services take the lead in developing, in concert with their Canadian counterparts and to the extent necessary with the U.S. Customs Service, a more comprehensive system for sharing crucial information on and coordinating activities for unsafe imported foods. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO reviewed how the United States and Canada share information on and coordinate activities for shipments of unsafe imported foods, focusing on whether opportunities exist to make better use of limited inspection resources and thereby increase the likelihood that unsafe imported foods would be stopped from entering the United States and Canada.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) U.S. and Canadian food safety officials share information through generally informal agency-to-agency exchanges and cross-border contacts at ports of entry; (2) U.S.-Canadian information sharing efforts focus primarily on shipments of potentially unsafe foods, food shipments refused at one port of entry that may be rerouted to the other port, and inspections of foreign food-processing plants; (3) opportunities exist for the United States and Canada to develop a more comprehensive system for sharing information about shipments of unsafe foods and inspections of foreign food-processing plants and for coordinating these inspections; and (4) improvements in U.S. and Canadian information sharing efforts would enable the two nations to better target their limited inspection resources. |
gao_GAO-12-873 | gao_GAO-12-873_0 | Agency and Advocacy Group Officials Differed in Their Opinions on Contracting Challenges That Minority-Owned Businesses May Face
Federal agency and advocacy group officials that we interviewed differed in their opinions on challenges that small businesses—including those that are minority-owned—may face when seeking to contract with the federal government. The challenges identified included a lack of performance history and knowledge of the federal contracting process, contract bundling, a lack of access to contracting officials, lack of monitoring of subcontracting plans, and difficulties assessing capital. Since few small businesses can obtain this bonding capacity, this official said that these businesses rely on “teaming” arrangements—two or more businesses that collectively pursue larger procurement contracts—to expand their opportunities. For example, an official at one In general, advocacy groups identified linguistic and cultural barriers as a challenge for minority-owned businesses on a limited basis. Officials from advocacy groups also cited examples of cultural barriers. Agency Outreach Efforts Help Address Some Challenges Facing Small and Minority-Owned Businesses
As we have previously noted, federal agencies conduct outreach to help minority-owned businesses seeking federal government contracts. Federal Agencies Collect Some Information on Contracting Assistance Provided to Minority-Owned Businesses
Federal agencies we contacted generally collect and report information on contracting assistance they provide to small and small disadvantaged businesses. A majority of the federal agencies we contacted told us that the extent to which they met SBA prime and subcontracting goals for the various socioeconomic categories of businesses (including the small disadvantaged business goal) provided a measure of their efforts to assist minority-owned businesses in contracting with the federal government. In addition, all four agencies we reviewed met their prime contracting goals of 5 percent, and three met their 5 percent subcontracting goals for this category. Two agencies we reviewed collected and reported data by minority group. For fiscal year 2011, MBDA reported that its business centers helped minority-owned businesses obtain 1,108 transactions (the sum of contracts and financings) totaling over $3.9 billion (see table 1). For example, SBA reported that of the 7,814 8(a) program participants in fiscal year 2011—the most recent data available—more than 90 percent of the participants were minority-owned businesses (see fig. While providing support to minority-owned businesses, these agencies and offices were outside of the scope of our review, which as we stated in our report, focused on the four agencies—DHS, DOD, GSA, and HHS—that accounted for about 70 percent of total federal obligations to small, minority-owned businesses in fiscal year 2010. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to describe: (1) what federal agency officials and advocacy groups identified as challenges that small, minority-owned businesses may face in seeking to contract with the federal government— including any linguistic or cultural barriers—and agencies’ efforts to address them, and (2) what information is available on federal efforts to assist small, minority-owned businesses in contracting with the federal government. We analyzed information on programs that provide federal contracting assistance and resources on contracting opportunities, and are available to minority-owned businesses. These agencies were the Departments of Defense (DOD), Health and Human Services (HHS), and Homeland Security (DHS), and, the General Services Administration (GSA). We conducted interviews with officials from the selected agencies and contracting offices to identify and obtain available information on their outreach efforts to assist minority-owned businesses. Appendix II: Percentage of Obligated Funds for Contracts to Socioeconomic Categories by Minority Group, Fiscal Year 2011
We analyzed data from the Federal Procurement Data System – Next Generation to determine the amount of obligated funds for contracts that federal agencies made to small businesses by minority group for fiscal year 2011. As figure 3 shows, the federal government obligated over $36 billion (35.1 percent) to small, minority-owned businesses in fiscal year 2011. | Why GAO Did This Study
Each year, the government obligates billions in contracts to businessesnearly $537 billion in fiscal year 2011. About $104 billion (19.4 percent) was obligated to small businesses, and over $36 billion of this amount was obligated to small businesses that identified themselves as minority-owned (see figure). In this report, GAO describes (1) what federal agency officials and advocacy groups identified as challenges small, minority-owned businesses may face in seeking federal government contractsincluding any linguistic or cultural barriersand agencies efforts to address them, and (2) what information is available on federal efforts to assist small, minority-owned businesses in contracting with the federal government. For selected agencies, GAO analyzed data on obligations to minority-owned businesses, reviewed information on programs and resources that can assist minority-owned businesses, reviewed relevant information from the Department of Justice on agencies Limited English Proficiency plans, and interviewed officials from selected federal agencies and advocacy groups that provide assistance to minority-owned businesses. In written comments, Commerce said that GAO had not covered all federal efforts to support small, minority-owned business contracting. As GAO noted in the report, this study focused on selected agencies and contracting activities that accounted for about 70 percent of total federal obligations to small, minority-owned businesses in fiscal year 2010.
What GAO Found
While their views varied to some degree, federal agency officials and advocacy groups GAO contacted identified a number of challenges that small, minority-owned businesses may face in pursuing federal government contracts. For example, officials and advocacy groups pointed to a lack of performance history and knowledge of the federal contracting process as significant barriers. Officials from advocacy groups cited additional challenges, such as difficulty gaining access to contracting officials and decreased contracting opportunities resulting from contract bundlingthe consolidation of two or more contracts previously performed under smaller contracts, into a single contract. Officials from agencies that accounted for 70 percent of federal contracting with small, minority-owned businesses(the Departments of Defense, Health and Human Services, and Homeland Security, and the General Services Administration) told GAO that they conducted outreach to help small, minority-owned businesses with these challenges. Their outreach efforts include one-on-one interviews between contracting office staff and businesses seeking federal contracts. Linguistic and cultural barriers were identified as a challenge on a limited basis.
Federal agencies GAO contacted collected and reported some information on the contracting assistance provided to small disadvantaged businessesincluding those that are minority-owned. Two agencies GAO reviewed collected and reported data by minority group. The Minority Business Development Agency in the Department of Commercecreated to foster the growth of minority-owned businesses of all sizesreported that its business centers helped these businesses obtain 1,108 financings and contracts worth over $3.9 billion in fiscal year 2011. For the same fiscal year, the Small Business Administration (SBA) reported that more than 90 percent of its primary business development program participants were minority-owned businesses. Federal agencies that GAO contacted said that the goals SBA negotiated with federal agencies for contracting with various socioeconomic categories, including small disadvantaged businesses, provided some information on efforts to assist minority-owned businesses. In fiscal year 2011, agencies GAO contacted met their prime contracting goal and three out of four agencies met their subcontracting goals. GAO generally found limited data on participants in agency outreach efforts because the agencies are not required to, and therefore generally do not, collect data on the minority group or socioeconomic category of businesses that participate in outreach events for federal contracting opportunities. |
gao_GAO-02-582 | gao_GAO-02-582_0 | However, Congress has repeatedly noted weaknesses in DOD’s ability to use this mechanism to effectively control costs and operate in a business-like fashion. In fiscal year 2001, the Defense Working Capital Fund—which consisted of the Army, Navy, Air Force, Defense-wide, and Defense Commissary Agency working capital funds—was the financial vehicle used to buy about $70 billion in defense commodities including fuel. Cash Movements Masked the Full Cost of Fuel and Affected the Budget
Substantial cash movements (adjustments) into and out of the fund, while disclosed to Congress in budget documents, have kept prices from reflecting the full cost of fuel and affected the development of future years’ stabilized annual fuel prices. Table 1 shows the various cash movements out of the working capital fund from fiscal years 1993 through 2002. For example, $800 million removed in fiscal year 2001 caused the stabilized price in fiscal year 2003 to be $7.27 per barrel higher than necessary. Surcharge Inaccuracies also Affect Budget Information
The estimated surcharge portion of the price supporting budget requests has not accurately accounted for fuel-related costs consistent with DOD’s Financial Management Regulation. We found that no adjustments for these overcharges, as required by DOD’s Financial Management Regulation, were made in fiscal years 1994 through 2001. As a result, we could not determine whether the Defense Energy Support Center was charged the appropriate amount. Conclusions
Fuel prices have not reflected full costs. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve the overall accuracy of DOD’s fuel pricing practices, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct DOD’s comptroller to: Provide a rationale to Congress, consistent with language in the applicable appropriations act, to support the movement of funds from the working capital fund and to identify the effect on future prices. | What GAO Found
The Department of Defense (DOD) Defense Working Capital Fund was used to buy $70 billion in commodities in fiscal year 2001. This amount is estimated to grow to $75 billion for fiscal year 2003. The department's financial management regulation states that fund activities will operate in a business-like fashion and incorporate full costs in determining the pricing of their products. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal year 2001 requires that GAO review the working capital fund activities to identify any potential changes in current management processes or policies that would result in a more efficient and economical operation. The act also requires that GAO review the Defense Logistics Agency's (DLA) efficiency, effectiveness, and flexibility of operational practices and identify ways to improve services. One such DLA activity, the Defense Energy Support Center, sold $4.7 billion of various petroleum-related products to the military services in fiscal year 2001. DOD's fuel prices have not reflected the full cost of fuel as envisioned in the working capital fund concept because cash movements to the fund balance and surcharge inaccuracies have affected the stabilized annual fuel prices. Over $4 billion was moved into and out of the working capital fund from fiscal year 1993 to 2002. These adjustments affected the extent to which subsequent years' prices reflected the full cost of fuel. In addition, the surcharges did not accurately account for fuel-related costs as required by DOD's Financial Management Regulation. |
gao_GAO-09-242T | gao_GAO-09-242T_0 | Principles for Large- Scale Federal Financial Assistance Efforts Could Guide Congressional Consideration of Auto Manufacturers’ Requests
We have identified three fundamental principles that can serve as a framework for considering large-scale federal assistance efforts. These principles are (1) identifying and defining the problem, (2) determining the national interests and setting clear goals and objectives that address the problem, and (3) protecting the government’s interests. Identify and define the problem: The government should clearly identify and define the specific problems confronting the industry— separating out those that require an immediate response from those structural challenges that will take more time to resolve. General Motors and Ford have not been profitable since at least 2006, and sales have decreased substantially for the Big 3 in 2008. In this regard, deteriorating financial and real estate markets, weakening labor markets, and high fuel prices have contributed to reductions in consumers’ demand for new vehicles, particularly less fuel-efficient vehicles. Determine national interests and set clear goals and objectives that address the problem: After defining the problem, Congress must determine whether a legislative solution best serves the national interest. It is important that the legislation include a clear and concise statement of the objectives and goals of the assistance program. Protecting the government’s interest: Because these assistance programs pose significant financial risk to the federal government, appropriate mechanisms should be included to protect taxpayers from excessive or unnecessary risks. 3. Using the Principles As a Framework for Considering Financial Assistance for the Auto Manufacturing Industry
Congress could apply these principles if it decides to offer financial assistance to the domestic auto manufacturers. If Congress determines that the systemic, economic consequences of risking the immediate failure of any or all of these companies are too great, a two-pronged approach in applying the principles could be appropriate. Specifically, Congress could 1) authorize immediate, but temporary, financial assistance to the auto manufacturing industry and 2) concurrently establish a board to approve, disburse, and oversee the use of these initial funds and provide any additional federal funds and continued oversight. Among other responsibilities, Congress could give the board authority to establish and implement eligibility criteria for potential borrowers and to implement procedures and controls in order to protect the government’s interests. This board could also oversee any structural reforms of the companies. While the exact membership of a board to provide financial assistance to the Big 3 auto manufacturers could differ, past federal financial assistance efforts suggest that it would be prudent to include representatives from agencies knowledgeable about the auto manufacturing industry as well as from those agencies skilled in financial and economic analysis and assistance. In addition, the board should be required to provide periodic reports to Congress. | Why GAO Did This Study
The current economic downturn has brought significant financial stress to the auto manufacturing industry. Recent deteriorating financial, real estate, and labor markets have reduced consumer confidence and available credit, and automobile purchases have declined. While auto manufacturers broadly have experienced declining sales in 2008 as the economy has worsened, sales of the "Big 3" (General Motors, Chrysler, and Ford) have also declined relative to those of some other auto manufacturers in recent years because higher gasoline prices have particularly hurt sales of sport utility vehicles. In addition to causing potential job losses at auto manufacturers, failure of the domestic auto industry would likely adversely affect other sectors. Officials from the Big 3 have requested, and Congress is considering, immediate federal financial assistance. This testimony discusses principles that can serve as a framework for considering the desirability, nature, scope, and conditions of federal financial assistance. Should Congress decide to provide financial assistance, we also discuss how these principles could be applied in these circumstances. The testimony is based on GAO's extensive body of work on previous federal rescue efforts that dates back to the 1970s.
What GAO Found
From our previous work on federal financial assistance to large firms and municipalities, we have identified three fundamental principles that can serve as a framework for considering future assistance. These principles are (1) identifying and defining the problem, (2) determining the national interests and setting clear goals and objectives that address the problem, and (3) protecting the government's interests. First, problems confronting the industry must be clearly defined--separating out those that require an immediate response from those structural challenges that will take more time to resolve. Second, Congress should determine whether the national interest will be best served through a legislative solution, or whether market forces and established legal procedures, such as bankruptcy, should be allowed to take their course. Should Congress decide that federal financial assistance is warranted, it is important that Congress establish clear objectives and goals for this assistance. Third, given the significant financial risk the federal government may assume, the structure Congress sets up to administer any assistance should provide for appropriate mechanisms, such as concessions by all parties, controls over management, compensation for risk, and a strong independent board, to protect taxpayers from excessive or unnecessary risks. These principles could help the Congress in deciding whether to offer financial assistance to the domestic auto manufacturers. If Congress determines that a legislative solution is in the national interest, a two-pronged approach could be appropriate in these circumstances. Specifically, Congress could 1) authorize immediate, but temporary, financial assistance to the auto manufacturing industry and 2) concurrently establish a board to approve, disburse, and oversee the use of these initial funds and provide any additional federal funds and continued oversight. This board could also oversee any structural reforms of the companies. Among other responsibilities, Congress could give the board authority to establish and implement eligibility criteria for potential borrowers and to implement procedures and controls in order to protect the government's interests. |
gao_GAO-07-68 | gao_GAO-07-68_0 | Subsequent to the task force’s recommendations, Congress exempted for fiscal year 2005 certain DHS first responder grant programs from the provision of the CMIA that limits the extent to which grantees can hold federal funds prior to payout by requiring federal agencies and states to minimize the time elapsing between transfer of funds from Treasury and payment by the states. We Found No Substantial Evidence That the CMIA Prevented First Responders from Receiving DHS Grant Funds When Such Funds Were Needed
We found no substantial evidence that the CMIA provision that limits the extent to which grantees can hold federal funds before payout, prior to its exemption for certain first responder grants in fiscal year 2005, had prevented first responders from receiving DHS grant funds when such funds were needed. Specifically, the majority of SAAs we contacted did not cite the CMIA as a contributing factor to first responder funding delays, and the National Governors Association, U.S. Conference of Mayors, and other associations we contacted did not provide information that demonstrated that the CMIA prevented local governments and other subgrantees from receiving first responder grant funding when they needed it. In March 2006, DHS reported that the CMIA exemption had been used only to a minimal extent and, according to a DHS official, DHS is meeting with SAAs and local governments to determine the impacts, if any, of the CMIA exemption on first responder grant funding. Generally, however, the SAA officials were more apt to tie delays in operations related to first responders to factors other than the CMIA. Moreover, the report discusses numerous factors other than the CMIA that contribute significantly to funding delays. Furthermore, many state and local governments lack the purchasing power to obtain the goods and services in a timely fashion. While state single audits can be an important oversight tool for cash advance funding, they are not designed to replace program management’s oversight responsibilities. Regardless of whether cash advance funding for first responder grants is made available under the CMIA exemption and DHS’s 120-day cash advance funding provision or on a case-by-case basis, it is critical for DHS to provide proper oversight of cash advance funding to help ensure that associated interest liabilities due to the federal government are accurately recorded by grantees and subgrantees and promptly paid. According to Treasury officials, the vast majority of homeland security first responder grants were not included in the TSAs for fiscal years 2005 and 2006. However, such audits are not designed to replace program management’s oversight responsibilities and may not cover all first responder grants due to the grants’ relatively small dollar amounts. This is important because DHS lacks the policies and procedures necessary to provide adequate oversight of cash advance funding, regardless of whether the cash advance funding is made widely available under the CMIA exemption and DHS’s corresponding 120-day cash advance funding provision, or on a case-by- case basis as allowed under Treasury regulations implementing the CMIA. Specifically, we recommend that the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security direct the Executive Director of the Office of Grants and Training to complete ongoing monitoring efforts involving state grantees that receive DHS first responder grant funding and use information obtained from such monitoring to identify the significant issues that have resulted in delays in the drawdown and disbursement of DHS grant funds; determine the impact of the CMIA exemption on first responders in their ability to obtain and use grant funds to meet program needs; assess the impact the CMIA exemption and DHS’s 120-day cash advance funding provision could have on DHS’s ability to provide adequate oversight if state grantees and local government subgrantees were to use them extensively; determine whether case-by-case cash advance funding provides a reasonable alternative to the CMIA exemption and DHS’s 120-day cash advance funding provision; and based on the results of the monitoring efforts, take appropriate actions, which could include making either legislative or operational recommendations, to improve first responders’ ability to receive and use DHS grant funds when needed and DHS’s oversight of such funds. | Why GAO Did This Study
A key provision of the Cash Management Improvement Act (CMIA) of 1990 (P.L. 101-453), as amended, requires the federal government and the states to minimize the time between transfer of federal funds and payments made by states for federal grant program purposes. Concerns were expressed by representatives of local government subgrantees that more flexibility was needed in the receipt of federal funding for first responders. Congress exempted certain first responder grants from this CMIA provision in the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) fiscal years 2005 and 2006 appropriations acts. Under the exemption, grantees can receive cash advance funding and hold such funds for extended periods of time prior to payment. GAO was asked to (1) assess whether this CMIA provision, prior to its exemption in fiscal year 2005, had prevented DHS grant recipients from receiving first responder grant funds when such funds were needed; and (2) identify any key fiscal and accountability implications of the exemption.
What GAO Found
GAO found no substantial evidence that the CMIA provision that limits the extent to which grantees can hold federal funds before making program payments, prior to its exemption for certain first responder grants in fiscal year 2005, prevented first responders from receiving DHS grant funds when such funds were needed. The vast majority of the officials of State Administrative Agencies (SAA) and national associations contacted neither cited the CMIA as a contributing factor to funding delays nor provided information that demonstrated that the CMIA prevented state grantees or local government and other subgrantees from receiving first responder grant funding when such funding was needed. Rather, the officials generally attributed delays in first responder operations to factors other than the CMIA, such as vendor delays in delivering goods and services and problems related to a lack of human resources to deal with the large influx of grant awards after the September 11, 2001, attacks. The information GAO obtained from these officials was consistent with the findings of DHS's Homeland Security Advisory Council's Task Force on State and Local Homeland Security Funding, which found that numerous factors other than the CMIA contributed to funding delays for first responders. According to DHS, as of March 2006, state grantees and local government subgrantees had used the CMIA exemption and DHS's corresponding 120-day cash advance funding provision, which DHS established to implement the CMIA exemption, only to a minimal extent. DHS's Office of Grant Operations is working with SAAs and local government entities to determine the extent to which the CMIA exemption may be used and the impact extensive use could have on DHS. According to a DHS official, extensive use of the CMIA exemption and DHS's 120-day cash advance funding provision could create management oversight difficulties for DHS. Concerns about oversight difficulties are warranted, as DHS currently lacks the policies and procedures to track and report on specific cases of cash advance funding. Such advances are not subject to Treasury's oversight through its administration of the CMIA program. While states' single audits are a tool for oversight, such audits are not designed to replace program management's oversight responsibilities, and GAO found that they may not cover all first responder grants because of the relatively small size of the grants. Importantly, case-by-case cash advance funding can be allowed by Treasury regulations implementing the CMIA and other applicable regulations. Such funding could enable DHS to focus its oversight efforts on grantees and subgrantees that have a demonstrated need for such funding. However, regardless of whether cash advance funding is available under the CMIA exemption and DHS's corresponding 120-day cash advance funding provision, or on a case-by-case basis, proper oversight is critical to ensure that interest due the federal government resulting from cash advance funding is accurately recorded and promptly paid. |
gao_GAO-08-692 | gao_GAO-08-692_0 | 1). A Growing Number of Pension Plans Are Investing in Hedge Funds or Private Equity, but Such Investments Are Generally a Small Portion of Plan Assets
According to several recent surveys, investments in hedge funds and private equity are typically a small portion of total plan assets—about 4 to 5 percent on average—but a considerable and growing number of plans invest in them. Survey data on plans with less than $200 million in assets are unavailable and, thus, the extent to which small plans invest in hedge funds and private equity is unknown. While More Pension Plans Invest in Private Equity, the Number of Plans with Investments in Hedge Funds Has Experienced Greater Growth in Recent Years
Two recent surveys of pension plans indicate that a considerable number of plans invest in hedge funds or private equity. Hedge Funds Pose Significant Challenges and Risks, Beyond Those Posed by Traditional Investments
Pension plans face a number of challenges in hedge fund investing beyond those of more traditional investing, including specific investment risks, limited transparency and liquidity, and risks related to the operations of the hedge fund. Private Equity Investments May Provide Important Benefits, but Pension Plans Face Limited Access to Top- Performing Funds and Other Challenges
According to plan representatives, investment consultants, and other experts we interviewed, pension plans invest in private equity primarily to attain returns superior to those attained in the stock market in exchange for greater risk, but such investments pose several distinct challenges. Taking Steps to Address the Challenges and Risks of Investing in Private Equity May Be Too Costly and Complex for Some Plans
Plan representatives said that they take several key steps to address the challenges of investing in private equity funds. The Federal Government Does Not Specifically Limit or Monitor Private Sector Plans’ Investments in Hedge Funds and Private Equity, but Some States Do So for Public Sector Plans through Various Approaches
The federal government does not specifically limit or monitor private sector pension investments in hedge funds or private equity, and state approaches for public plans vary. To date, Labor has not acted on this recommendation. This official noted that, for example, blanket prohibitions on investments such as international stocks or real estate have given way to permission for a wider range of investments. Among these seven states, the restriction may be in the form of (i) a provision applicable to investments in hedge funds or private equity funds specifically, (ii) an exclusive list of permissible of investments that is not likely to capture hedge funds or private equity investments, or (iii) a provision that restricts investments in certain categories of assets that, because of the typical structure or investment strategy of hedge funds or private equity funds, are likely to apply to investments in such funds. For example, in 2006, the ERISA Advisory Council recommended that Labor publish guidance about the unique features of hedge funds and matters for consideration in their use by qualified plans. 2. 3. What mechanisms regulate and monitor pension plan investments in hedge funds and private equity funds? To answer the first question, we obtained and analyzed survey data of private and public sector defined benefit (DB) plans on the extent of plan investments in hedge funds and private equity from three private organizations: Greenwich Associates, Pensions & Investments, and Pyramis Global Advisors. | Why GAO Did This Study
Millions of retired Americans rely on defined benefit pension plans for their financial well-being. Recent reports have noted that some plans are investing in 'alternative' investments such as hedge funds and private equity funds. This has raised concerns, given that these two types of investments have qualified for exemptions from federal regulations, and could present more risk to retirement assets than traditional investments. To better understand this trend and its implications, GAO was asked to examine (1) the extent to which plans invest in hedge funds and private equity; (2) the potential benefits and challenges of hedge fund investments; (3) the potential benefits and challenges of private equity investments; and (4) what mechanisms regulate and monitor pension plan investments in hedge funds and private equity. To answer these questions GAO interviewed relevant federal agencies, public and private pension plans, industry groups and investment professionals, and analyzed available survey data.
What GAO Found
According to several recent surveys of private and public sector plans, investments in hedge funds and private equity generally comprise a small share of total plan assets, but a considerable and growing number of plans have such investments. Available survey data of mid to large-size plans indicate that between 21 and 27 percent invest in hedge funds while over 40 percent invest in private equity; such investments are more prevalent among larger plans, as shown below. The extent of investment in hedge funds and private equity by plans with less than $200 million in total assets is unknown. Pension plans invest in hedge funds to obtain a number of potential benefits, such as returns greater than the stock market and stable returns on investment. However, hedge funds also pose challenges and risks beyond those posed by traditional investments. For example, some investors may have little information on funds' underlying assets and their values, which limits the opportunity for oversight. Plan representatives said they take steps to mitigate these and other challenges, but doing so requires resourcesbeyond the means of some plans. Pension plans primarily invest in private equity funds to attain returns superior to the stock market. Pension plan officials GAO spoke with generally had a long history of investing in private equity and said such investments have met expectations for returns. However, these investments present several challenges, such as wide variation in performance among funds, and the resources required to mitigate these challenges may be too substantial for some plans. The federal government does not specifically limit or monitor private sector plan investment in hedge funds or private equity, and state approaches to public plans vary. Under federal law, fiduciaries must comply with a standard of prudence, but no explicit restrictions on hedge funds or private equity exist. Although a federal advisory council recommended that the Department of Labor (Labor) develop guidance for plans to use in investing in hedge funds, Labor has not yet done so. While most states also rely on a standard of investor prudence, some also have legislation that restricts or prohibits plan investment in hedge funds or private equity. For example, one state prohibits plans below a certain size from investing directly in hedge funds. |
gao_GAO-02-532 | gao_GAO-02-532_0 | The effectiveness of mammography as a cancer detection technique is directly tied to the quality of mammography procedures. National Capacity for Mammography Services Is Generally Adequate
The nation’s overall capacity to meet the growing demand for mammography services is generally adequate. Between 1998 and 2000, screening rates for women in this age group increased in all but one state (i.e., Oklahoma) and the District of Columbia, and 39 states had an increase of more than 10 percent in the total number of women age 40 and above who had received a mammogram within the past year. Counties with Largest Losses Are Mostly Rural; Most Reported No Significant Problems
Because data are not available to measure the effect of capacity loss on the mammography utilization rates at the county level, we randomly selected 37 of the 121 counties that lost more than 25 percent of their machines for in-depth analysis at the local level. While no problems were reported in nine counties, officials in the other nine counties reported a variety of problems. In Chicago, Houston, and Los Angeles, long waiting time problems were concentrated in public health facilities that served low income populations. In almost all cases where some problems were reported, officials said that women who needed a diagnostic mammogram generally were able to get appointments within 1 to 3 weeks. All of these 18 counties are in metropolitan areas. For each selected location, both rural and metropolitan, we interviewed officials familiar with the availability of mammography services in these areas to obtain their views on whether women in their areas were experiencing problems with long waiting times for appointments and/or long travel distance to obtain services. | What GAO Found
Breast cancer is the second leading cause of cancer deaths among American women. In 2001, 192,200 new cases of breast cancer were diagnosed and 40,200 women died from the disease. The probability of survival increases significantly, however, when breast cancer is discovered in its early stages. Currently, the most effective technique for early detection of breast cancer is screening mammography, an X-ray procedure that can detect small tumors and breast abnormalities up to two years before they can be detected by touch. Nationwide data indicate that mammography services are generally adequate to meet the growing demand. Between 1998 and 2000, both the population of women 40 and older and the extent to which they were screened increased by 15 percent. Although mammography services are generally available, women in some locations have problems obtaining timely mammography services in some metropolitan areas. However, the greatest losses in capacity have come in rural counties. In all, 121 counties, most of them rural, have experienced a drop of more than 25 percent in the number of mammography machines in the last three years. Officials from 37 of these counties reported that the decrease had not had a measurable adverse effect on the availability of mammography services. By contrast, in 18 metropolitan counties that lost a smaller percentage of their total capacity, officials in half of the counties reported service disruptions. Officials from six other urban areas, including Houston and Los Angeles, reported that public health facilities serving low income women had long waiting times. However, most women whose clinical exam or initial mammogram indicated a need for a follow-up mammogram were able to get appointments within one to three weeks. |
gao_T-AIMD-98-22 | gao_T-AIMD-98-22_0 | Ensuring That CIOs Fulfill a Critical Leadership Role
Senior executives in the successful organizations we studied were personally committed to improving the management of technology. The PRA and the Clinger-Cohen Act make federal agency heads directly responsible for establishing goals and measuring progress in improving the use of information technology to enhance the productivity and efficiency of their agency’s operations. An agency should place its CIO at a senior management level, working as a partner with other senior officials in decision-making on information management issues. Specifically, agencies should appoint a CIO with expertise and practical experience in technology position the CIO as a senior partner reporting directly to the agency head; ensure that the CIO’s primary responsibilities are for information have the CIO serve as a bridge between top management, line management, and information management support professionals, working with them to ensure the effective acquisition and management of the information resources needed to support agency programs and missions; task the CIO with developing strategies and specific plans for the hiring, training, and professional development of staff in order to build the agency’s capability to develop and manage its information resources; and support the CIO position with an effective CIO organization and management framework for implementing agencywide information technology initiatives. Shortly after the Clinger-Cohen Act went into effect, OMB evaluated the status of CIO appointments at the 27 agencies. OMB noted that at several agencies, the CIO’s duties, qualifications, and placement met the requirements of the Clinger-Cohen Act. However, OMB had concerns about a number of other agencies that had acting CIOs, CIOs whose qualifications did not appear to meet the requirements of the Clinger-Cohen Act, and/or CIOs who did not report directly to the head of the agency. OMB also raised concerns about agencies where the CIOs had other major management responsibilities or where it was unclear whether the CIOs’ primary duty was the information resource management function. One area that we will focus on during the coming year is CIOs who have major responsibilities in addition to information management. At present, only 12 agencies have CIOs whose responsibilities are focused solely on information management. We are particularly troubled by agencies that have vested CIO and Chief Financial Officer responsibilities in one person. Because it may be difficult for the CIO of a large department to adequately oversee and manage the specific information needs of the department’s major subcomponents, we have also supported the establishment of a CIO structure at the subcomponent and bureau levels. We have reported on instances where the subcomponent CIOs were not organizationally positioned and empowered to discharge key CIO functions. While these activities have proved useful, the Council does not yet have a strategic plan to help guide its work and serve as a benchmark for measuring progress. Ultimately, the successful implementation of information management reforms depends heavily upon the skills and performance of the entire CIO organization within departments and agencies—not just the CIO as a single individual. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed the importance of having strong agency chief information officers (CIO) and an effective CIO Council, focusing on its study of how leading private- and public-sector organizations control system development projects and successfully apply technology to improve their performance, which identified a specific set of strategic practices that these organizations use to improve performance through information management.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) senior executives in the successful organizations it studied were personally committed to improving the management of technology; (2) applicable laws make federal agency heads directly responsible for establishing goals and measuring progress in improving the use of information technology to enhance the productivity and efficiency of agency operations and assign a wide range of duties and responsibilities to CIOs; (3) agencies should place CIOs at a senior management level, working as a partner with other senior officials in decisionmaking on information management issues; (4) having effective CIOs will make a difference in building the institutional capacity and structure needed to implement sound management practices; (5) shortly after the Clinger-Cohen Act went into effect, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) evaluated the status of CIO appointments at 27 agencies and noted that at several agencies, the CIO's duties, qualifications, and placement met the act's requirements; (6) however, OMB had concerns about a number of other agencies that had acting CIOs, CIOs whose qualifications did not appear to meet the act's requirements, or CIOs who did not report directly to the head of the agency; (7) OMB also raised concerns about agencies where the CIOs had other major management responsibilities or where it was unclear whether the CIOs' primary duty was information resource management; (8) one area that GAO will focus on is CIOs who have major responsibilities in addition to information management; (9) only 12 agencies have CIOs whose responsibilities are focused solely on information management; (10) GAO is particularly troubled by agencies that have vested CIO and Chief Financial Officer responsibilities in one person; (11) because it may be difficult for the CIO of a large department to adequately oversee and manage the specific information needs of the department's major subcomponents, GAO has also supported the establishment of a CIO structure at the subcomponent and bureau levels; (12) GAO has reported on instances where the subcomponent CIOs were not organizationally positioned and empowered to discharge key CIO functions; (13) the CFO Council has played a lead role in creating goals for improving federal financial management practices; the Council does not yet have a strategic plan to help guide its work and serve as a benchmark for measuring progress; and (14) ultimately, the successful implementation of information management reforms depends heavily upon the skills and performance of the entire CIO organization within departments and agencies, not just the CIO as an individual. |
gao_GAO-12-973 | gao_GAO-12-973_0 | The fee-for-service portion of the Medicare program (Parts A and B) processes approximately a billion claims each year from about 1.5 million providers who deliver and bill Medicare for health care services and supplies. CMS’s Implementation of HETS to Assist Providers
To assist providers with verifying beneficiaries’ eligibility for services under Medicare, and in response to HIPAA requirements, CMS provided an electronic mechanism that allowed providers to access real-time data at the point care is scheduled or delivered. CMS officials stated that the agency does not receive any payments for the use of HETS, nor does the agency require Medicare providers to use HETS to verify eligibility prior to filing claims CMS intended for HETS to be used by health care providers; health care clearinghouses, which are entities that provide electronic data exchange services for their customers; and Medicare Administrative Contractors (MACs) that assist CMS in processing claims. As of June 2012, CMS reported that 244 entities were using the system; these included 130 providers, 10 Medicare Administrative Contractors, and 104 clearinghouses that conduct query and response The agency further reported transactions for about 400,000 providers.that, during the first 6 months of 2012, the system processed more than 380 million transactions from these users. System performance data showed that, since May 2011, HETS has been consistently providing service to its users 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, except during regularly scheduled maintenance periods, which occur on Monday mornings from midnight until 5:00 a.m. (CMS sometimes schedules additional outages for system maintenance and upgrades, usually during one or two weekends each month.) E-Government Act of 2002, Pub L. No. occurring between 8:00 a.m. and 4:00 p.m. eastern time, Monday through Friday. Users of the system told us that since CMS completed hardware and software improvements in spring 2011, they have been satisfied with its operational status. In this regard, CMS projected the increase in transaction volume to continue at a rate of about 40 percent for the next several years. The officials we spoke with also described several technical improvements they intend to take to increase the system’s capacity to handle growing numbers of transactions, including some consistent with the contractors’ evaluations. CMS’s plans also identified a step to, by the end of August 2012, migrate the current HETS database to a new operating platform that is scalable to accommodate the expected increase in transaction volume. Among other things, these include activities to support the current system until the redesigned system is implemented, including development of tools that enable the HETS contractors to proactively monitor system components, additional services to enhance production capacity, and automated processes for starting up and shutting down the application. For example, CMS documented in the HETS Rules of Behavior that users must adhere to the authorized purposes for requesting Medicare beneficiary eligibility data. By establishing practices and procedures intended to protect the privacy of Medicare beneficiaries’ personal health information, and assessing the impact and risks associated with the use of HETS, CMS took required steps to address privacy principles reflected by HIPAA, the HIPAA rules, and the Privacy Act and has acted in accordance with OMB’s guidance for protecting personally identifiable information. According to officials in HHS’s Office for Civil Rights, no violations of the HIPAA Privacy Rule resulting from the use and disclosure of data provided by HETS have been reported since the system was implemented. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to (1) identify the operational status of HETS, (2) identify any steps CMS has taken to ensure users’ satisfaction and plans to take to ensure the performance of the system supports future requirements, and (3) describe CMS’s policies, processes, and procedures for protecting the privacy of beneficiary eligibility data provided by the system. To identify the operational status of HETS, we collected and analyzed documentation from program officials that described the use and daily operations of the system, such as reports on incoming transaction volume, response time, and downtime, along with documents that describe outcomes of the system, such as reported problems. We also discussed with the users their experiences with other automated eligibility verification systems provided by commercial health insurers. To identify the steps that CMS has taken to ensure that HETS users remain satisfied with the performance of the system and that the agency plans to take to ensure the system provides the level of service needed to support future requirements, we reviewed agency documents, such as project timelines and system release notes, and reports of users’ calls to the help desk. Finally, to describe the policies, processes, and procedures established by CMS to ensure that the privacy of beneficiary eligibility data is protected, we evaluated agency documentation such as HETS privacy impact and risk assessments, and agreements with users that describe CMS’s and users’ responsibilities and requirements for protecting the data processed and provided by the system. Appendix II: HETS Transaction Volumes and Response Times
HETS program officials provided system-generated data that reflected the performance of the system in terms of the numbers of transactions processed each month and the response time in four categories. | Why GAO Did This Study
Medicare is a federal program that pays for health care services for individuals 65 years and older and certain individuals with disabilities. In 2011, Medicare covered about 48.4 million of these individuals, and total expenditures for this coverage were approximately $565 billion. CMS, the agency within the Department of Health and Human Services that administers Medicare, is responsible for ensuring that proper payments are made on behalf of the program's beneficiaries. In response to HIPAA requirements, CMS developed and implemented an information technology system to help providers determine beneficiaries' eligibility for Medicare coverage. In May 2005 CMS began offering automated services through HETS, a query and response system that provides data to users about Medicare beneficiaries and their eligibility to receive payment for health care services and supplies.
Because of the important role that HETS plays in providers having access to timely and accurate data to determine eligibility, GAO was asked to (1) identify the operational status of HETS, (2) identify any steps CMS has taken to ensure users' satisfaction and plans to take to ensure the system supports future requirements, and (3) describe CMS's policies, processes, and procedures for protecting the privacy of data provided by HETS.
To do so, GAO collected and analyzed documentation from program officials, such as reports on transaction volume and response times, agreements with users, and CMS's privacy impact and risk assessments of HETS. GAO also interviewed program officials and system users.
What GAO Found
The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) currently offers to Medicare providers and Medicare Administrative Contractors the use of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) Eligibility Transaction System (HETS) in a real-time data processing environment. HETS is operational 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, except during regularly scheduled maintenance Monday mornings, from midnight until 5:00 a.m., and when CMS announces other maintenance periods during one or two weekends each month. According to program officials, 244 entities were using HETS in 2012, including about 130 providers, 104 clearinghouses that provide data exchange services to about 400,000 health care providers, and 10 Medicare contractors that help CMS process claims for services. From January through June 2012, HETS processed each month an average of 1.7 million to 2.2 million queries per day with most of the queries submitted between the hours of 8:00 a.m. and 4:00 p.m. eastern time. The users with whom we spoke confirmed that operational problems they experienced with the system in 2010 and the first few months of 2011 were resolved in spring 2011 after CMS implemented several hardware and software replacements and upgrades. System performance reports for the first 6 months of 2012 showed that the average response time per transaction was less than 3 seconds. Users described experiences with the system that were consistent with these data. They told us that they are currently satisfied with the operational status of HETS and that the system provides more complete information and reliable service than other systems that they use to verify eligibility with commercial health insurers.
CMS took steps to ensure users remain satisfied with the system's performance, including notifying users in advance of system downtime, providing help desk support, and monitoring contractors' performance. The agency had also planned several technical improvements intended to increase HETS' capacity to process a growing number of transactions, which the agency projected to increase at a rate of about 40 percent each year. These plans include a redesign of the system and migration to a new database environment that is scalable to accommodate the projected increase in transaction volume. According to HETS program officials, near-term plans also include the implementation of tools to enable proactive monitoring of system components and additional services intended to enhance production capacity until the planned redesign of the system is complete.
To help protect the privacy of beneficiary eligibility data provided by HETS, CMS established policies, processes, and procedures that are intended to address principals reflected by the HIPAA Privacy Rule. For example, in its efforts to ensure proper uses and disclosures of the data, CMS documented in user agreements the authorized and unauthorized purposes for requesting Medicare beneficiary eligibility data. Additionally, the agency conducted privacy impact and risk assessments of HETS as required by the E-Government Act of 2002. Officials from the Department of Health and Human Services' Office for Civil Rights stated that no privacy violations had been reported regarding the use of the protected health data provided by HETS since its implementation in 2005. |
gao_T-GGD-97-52 | gao_T-GGD-97-52_0 | IRS’ High-Risk Areas
For years we have chronicled IRS’ struggle to modernize and manage its operations, especially in the high-risk areas, and have made scores of recommendations to improve IRS’ systems, processes, and procedures. It is clear that in order to achieve its stated goals of reducing the volume of paper tax returns, providing better customer service, and improving compliance with the nation’s tax laws, IRS must successfully modernize its systems and operations. To accomplish this modernization, however, IRS needs to develop comprehensive business strategies to ensure that its new and revised processes drive systems development and acquisition. Solving the problems in the high-risk areas is not an insurmountable task, but it requires sustained management commitment, accurate information systems, and reliable performance measures to track IRS’ progress and provide the data necessary to make informed management decisions. The result has often been inefficient and ineffective programs and operations that are vulnerable to waste, fraud, abuse, and mismanagement. At a minimum, IRS needs an implementation strategy that includes both performing cost-benefit analyses and developing reasonable estimates of the extent, time frames, and resources required to correct its high-risk vulnerabilities. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed the Internal Revenue Service's (IRS) efforts to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of its program areas that GAO has designated as high risk because of their vulnerability to waste, fraud, abuse, and mismanagement.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) for years GAO has chronicled IRS' struggle to modernize and manage its operations, especially in the high-risk areas, and has made scores of recommendations to improve IRS' systems, processes, and procedures; (2) it is clear that in order to achieve its stated goals of reducing the volume of paper tax returns, providing better customer service, and improving compliance with the nation's tax laws, IRS must successfully modernize its systems and operations; (3) to accomplish this modernization, however, IRS needs to develop comprehensive business strategies to ensure that its new and revised processes drive systems development and acquisition; (4) solving the problems in the high-risk areas is not an insurmountable task, but it requires sustained management commitment, accurate information systems, and reliable performance measures to track IRS' progress and provide the data necessary to make informed management decisions; and (5) at a minimum, IRS needs an implementation strategy that includes both performing cost-benefit analyses and developing reasonable estimates of the extent, time frames, and resources required to correct its high-risk vulnerabilities. |
gao_HEHS-97-12 | gao_HEHS-97-12_0 | The combined budget authority of HHS, Education, and VA was about $3.68 billion, or 83 percent of the total federal funding for substance abuse treatment and prevention activities for that year. 2.) Treatment services can include diagnostic assessment; detoxification; and medical, psychiatric, and psychological counseling. These activities include providing information and education that increase knowledge of drug abuse and alternative drug-free life styles, encouraging communities to implement responses to drug use, and drug testing. Combined expenditures rose from $1.3 billion to about $1.6 billion—about a $300 million increase. Conclusions
Federal, state, county, and local governments and the private sector all provide funding for substance abuse treatment and prevention activities. The latest and best data available show that (1) the federal government has been a major contributor of funds, providing more than $4 billion in fiscal year 1994; (2) state and local governments spent a little more than $1.5 billion in their 1994 fiscal years; and (3) private funding exceeded $1 billion in 1993. To obtain information on private sector funding, we contacted the Department of Health and Human Service’s (HHS) Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA) and numerous other organizations. Federal Budget Authority for Substance Abuse Treatment and Prevention Activities, Fiscal Years 1995-97
Administration for Children and Families Centers for Disease Control and Prevention Health Resources and Services Administration Special Supplemental Program for Women, Infants, and Children (WIC) (continued)
Federal Substance Abuse Treatment and Prevention Program Funding and Descriptions
This appendix provides information on the substance abuse treatment and prevention activities of various federal agencies. 6, 1996). | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on the financial support provided for substance abuse and treatment activities by federal, state, and local governments and the private sector.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) federal funding for substance abuse treatment and prevention activities increased from $2.8 billion in fiscal year (FY) 1990 to $4.4 billion in FY 1994; (2) the Departments of Health and Human Services, Education, and Veterans Affairs provided 83 percent of total federal funding for treatment and prevention activities for FY 1994; (3) numerous programs in 16 federal agencies covered a broad range of treatment and prevention services and often targeted specific populations; (4) treatment services included diagnostic assessment, detoxification, and counseling, while prevention activities usually included providing information and education about alternatives to and consequences of alcohol abuse and illicit drug use; (5) state, county, and local governments' total expenditures for treatment and prevention activities increased from about $1.3 billion in FY 1990 to about $1.6 billion in FY 1994; and (6) although data on private-sector funding for substance abuse treatment are very limited, available sources indicate funding of more than $1 billion in 1993. |
gao_GAO-17-304 | gao_GAO-17-304_0 | For decades, FWS has faced challenges in implementing its Section 4 program, in part because of a high volume of litigation and petitions seeking to add a large number of species to the threatened and endangered species lists. A Variety of Plaintiffs Filed 141 Deadline Suits Involving 1,441 Species, Mostly Against FWS
Based on our review, we found that a variety of plaintiffs filed 141 deadline suits against the Services for allegedly failing to comply with statutory deadlines for Section 4 actions involving 1,441 species during fiscal years 2005 through 2015. The Majority of Deadline Suits Were Resolved through Settlement Agreements, and FWS Delayed Some Section 4 Actions to Prioritize Those Covered by Settlement Agreements and Court Orders
Based on our analysis, we found that the majority of ESA Section 4 deadline suits filed in fiscal years 2005 through 2015 were resolved through negotiated settlement agreements that established schedules for the Services to complete the actions involved in the suits. Officials from both Services said they prioritized completing actions included in settlement agreements in implementing their Section 4 workloads. NMFS officials indicated that the deadline suits and their resulting settlement agreements did not have a significant effect on the implementation of the agency’s Section 4 program. In contrast, FWS has delayed completing some Section 4 actions to complete those included in settlement agreements. FWS has initiated several changes to its Section 4 program to help prioritize the order in which it addresses its backlog of hundreds of overdue actions and to help increase the efficiency of its Section 4 program, including revising information requirements for listing petitions. The Majority of Deadline Suits Were Resolved through Negotiated Settlement Agreements Establishing Schedules for the Services to Complete Section 4 Actions
The Services resolved the majority of deadline suits filed during fiscal years 2005 through 2015 by negotiated settlement agreements, whereby the parties generally agreed on a schedule for the Services to complete the Section 4 actions at issue in the suits. The officials said that most deadline suits are resolved through a negotiated settlement agreement because in the majority of them, it is undisputed that a statutory deadline was missed. Other than agreed-upon schedules for completing Section 4 actions, the settlement agreements and court orders did not affect the substantive basis or procedural rule-making requirements the Services were to follow in completing the actions. Similarly, the provisions also stated that the agreements did not change any of the procedures to be followed, or the substance of, any rulemaking action to be completed under the agreement, such as opportunities for public comment on proposed listing rules. According to NMFS officials, deadline suits and their resulting settlement agreements during fiscal years 2005 through 2015 did not have a significant effect on the implementation of their Section 4 program. The Departments of Commerce, the Interior, and Justice each provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. Appendix I: List of Endangered Species Act Section 4 Deadline Suits, Fiscal Years 2005- 2015
Section 4 deadline suits include citizen suits filed against the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) and National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) to compel compliance with statutory deadlines for certain actions under Section 4 of the Endangered Species Act (ESA). Section 4 of the act includes statutory deadlines for the Services to complete certain mandatory actions, including making findings on petitions to list or delist species, designating or revising critical habitat, and conducting 5-year status reviews of listed species. | Why GAO Did This Study
To receive protection under the ESA—enacted to conserve at risk species—a species must first be added to one of the federal lists of threatened or endangered species. FWS and NMFS jointly administer the ESA and have programs that encompass actions related to Section 4 of the ESA. Some of these actions—such as making findings on petitions filed by a person or group requesting addition or removal of species from one of the lists—must be completed by specific statutory deadlines.
GAO was asked to review deadline litigation brought under Section 4 of the ESA. This report examines (1) the number and scope of deadline suits filed against the Services during fiscal years 2005 through 2015 under Section 4 of the ESA, and (2) the outcomes of these suits and the effect, if any, the suits had on the Services' implementation of their Section 4 programs.
GAO reviewed the ESA and agency documents; obtained a list of Section 4-related suits filed during fiscal years 2005 through 2015 from the Department of Justice, which is responsible for representing the Services; identified from the list those that were deadline suits and compared the list with other sources to confirm reliability; analyzed the suits, including documentation on how they were resolved; and interviewed Justice, FWS, and NMFS officials.
The agencies provided technical comments on this report.
What GAO Found
GAO found that plaintiffs filed 141 deadline suits against the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) and National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) for allegedly failing to take actions within statutory deadlines under Section 4 of the Endangered Species Act (ESA) during fiscal years 2005 through 2015 (see figure). Section 4 contains mandatory deadlines for such actions as making findings on petitions to list or delist species as threatened or endangered. The suits involved 1,441 species and cited a range of Section 4 actions, but most suits were related to missed deadlines for issuing findings on petitions to list species.
Figure: Number of Endangered Species Act Section 4 Deadline Suits Filed, Fiscal Years 2005-2015
The majority of deadline suits filed during fiscal years 2005 through 2015 were resolved through negotiated settlement agreements that established schedules for the agencies to complete the actions involved in the suits. Agency officials said that most deadline suits are resolved through settlement because it is undisputed that a statutory deadline was missed. Other than setting schedules for completing Section 4 actions, the settlement agreements did not affect the substantive basis or procedural rule-making requirements the Services were to follow in completing the actions, such as providing opportunities for public notice and comment on proposed listing rules. Officials also said they prioritize completing actions in settlement agreements in implementing their Section 4 programs. NMFS officials indicated that work resulting from deadline suits did not have a significant effect on the implementation of their program, in part because NMFS has not had a high number of petitions to list species. In contrast, FWS has delayed completing some actions to complete those included in settlement agreements. FWS has initiated several changes to help improve Section 4 program implementation, including developing a 7-year workplan that prioritizes the order for completing overdue actions and revising information requirements for listing petitions. |
gao_GAO-17-235 | gao_GAO-17-235_0 | DOE Uses Cost- Surveillance Procedures to Manage Its Risk of Fraud and Other Improper Payments, but Challenges Limit the Effectiveness of This Approach DOE Uses Prepayment Invoice Reviews to Monitor Non-M&O Contract Costs, but Shortcomings in Its Control Activities and Resource Challenges Limit the Effectiveness of These Reviews
DOE uses prepayment invoice reviews to monitor the costs of non-M&O contracts but has shortcomings in its control activities at the six site offices that oversee them, as well as resource challenges that limit the effectiveness of these reviews. We have reported previously on DOE’s invoice review policies and procedures at one of DOE’s largest clean-up sites. However, as discussed above, DOE’s Acquisition Guide does not contain the details necessary to be an operating procedure. The Fraud Reduction and Data Analytics Act of 2015, which Congress passed in June 2016, establishes requirements aimed at improving federal agencies’ controls and procedures for assessing and mitigating fraud risks and directs OMB to establish implementation guidelines that incorporate the leading practices identified in the Fraud Risk Framework. DOE officials told us that they plan to meet the requirements of the Fraud Reduction and Data Analytics Act of 2015 but should not be expected to implement private industry leading practices prior to the issuance of OMB guidance. Without implementing these selected leading practices for managing its risk of fraud, DOE is missing an opportunity to better position itself to meet the requirements of the Fraud Reduction and Data Analytics Act of 2015 and to organize and focus its resources in a way that would allow the department to mitigate the likelihood and impact of fraud. Moreover, DOE is missing an opportunity to allow managers to monitor large amounts of data more efficiently. Data Analytics Helped Identify Potentially Improper Charges, but Billions in Costs Could Not Be Analyzed Because Contractor Data Were Not Sufficiently Detailed
In applying data analytics to identify potential indicators of fraud or other improper payments associated with selected DOE contracts, we found that much of the cost data we requested from two DOE contractors for the purpose of performing data analytics was not suitable for analysis. The data were not suitable either because they were not for a complete universe of transactions that was reconcilable with amounts billed to DOE or because they were not sufficiently detailed. According to the Fraud Risk Framework, effective fraud risk managers collect and analyze data on identified fraud trends and use them to improve fraud risk management activities. Without a department-wide invoice review policy or well-documented procedures, DOE management does not have assurance that invoice reviews are being performed or that these control activities are operating as intended. DOE has not required that its contractors maintain sufficiently detailed transaction- level cost data that are reconcilable with amounts charged to the government. Without requiring contractors to maintain such data— including cost data that, at a minimum, represent a full data population and contain the details necessary to determine the nature of each cost transaction—DOE will not be well positioned to meet the requirements of the Fraud Reduction and Data Analytics Act of 2015 and employ data analytic techniques as a means to more efficiently monitor contractor costs and manage its risk of fraud and other improper payments. DOE generally concurred in principle with five of our recommendations. In its letter, DOE agreed to (1) establish a DOE-wide invoice review policy that includes requirements for sites to establish well- documented invoice review operating procedures; (2) create a structure with a dedicated entity within DOE to design and oversee fraud risk management activities—but stated that it will have to consider the cost, benefits, and need for a separate organization before implementing a dedicated antifraud entity to design and oversee fraud risk management activities; (3) conduct fraud risk assessments that are tailored to each program and use the assessments to develop a fraud risk profile; (4) develop and document an antifraud strategy that describes the programs’ approaches for addressing the prioritized fraud risks identified during the fraud risk assessment; and (5) design and implement specific control activities, including fraud awareness training and data analytics, to prevent and detect fraud and other improper payments. Therefore, we continue to believe that DOE needs to implement our recommendation and require contractors to maintain sufficiently detailed transaction-level cost data that are reconcilable with amounts charged to the government. Our report examined the extent to which DOE’s approach to managing its risk of fraud and other improper payments incorporates leading practices, such as the use of data analytics. To examine the extent to which DOE’s approach incorporates leading practices, such as the use of data analytics, through our review of standards and guidance of the Institute of Internal Auditors, federal internal control standards, and our Fraud Risk Framework, we identified key leading practices for managing the risk of fraud and improper payments in the federal government. | Why GAO Did This Study
Over the past decade, incidents of fraud by DOE contractors have occurred. From 2003 through 2008, employees of one contractor at DOE's Hanford site in Washington state made hundreds of fraudulent purchases and solicited and received kickbacks. In another case, Hanford contractors agreed to pay a combined $125 million to settle disputed claims regarding federal dollars spent on nonnuclear-compliant parts. To help federal program managers combat fraud, in July 2015, GAO issued leading practices for managing fraud risks.
GAO was asked to review DOE's processes, programs, and practices for managing its risk of fraud. This report examines (1) DOE's approach to managing its risk of fraud and other improper payments and challenges, if any, that may limit the effectiveness of this approach; (2) the extent to which DOE's approach incorporates leading practices; and (3) the application of data analytics in identifying potential indicators of fraud or other improper payments associated with selected DOE contracts.
What GAO Found
The Department of Energy (DOE) manages the risk of fraud and improper payments through its internal controls program, which includes, among other things, prepayment invoice reviews and post payment audits. However, several challenges limit the effectiveness of this approach. For example, DOE does not have a department-wide invoice review policy or well-documented procedures at five of the six sites with invoice review responsibilities. Consequently, DOE has no assurance that control activities at these sites are operating as intended. Time constraints also limit the effectiveness of invoice reviews. For example, some invoices can have numerous associated transactions and the reviews must be completed within a limited time frame before payment, which may be as short as 10 days.
DOE's approach to managing fraud risk does not incorporate leading practices such as creating a dedicated antifraud entity to lead fraud risk management activities; conducting regular fraud risk assessments that are tailored to the program; developing and documenting a strategy to mitigate assessed fraud risks; or designing and implementing specific control activities, such as data analytic activities, to prevent and detect fraud. By not implementing leading practices, DOE is missing an opportunity to organize and focus its resources in a way that would allow it to mitigate the likelihood and impact of fraud. Moreover, the Fraud Reduction and Data Analytics Act of 2015 establishes requirements aimed at improving federal agencies' controls and procedures for assessing and mitigating fraud risks through the use of data analytics. The legislation also directs the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to, among other things, establish implementation guidelines that incorporate fraud risk management leading practices. DOE officials told GAO that they plan to meet the requirements of the act but should not be expected to implement private industry leading practices prior to the issuance of OMB guidance. Incorporating leading practices could also help DOE more effectively implement the act's requirements once OMB guidance is available.
It is not possible to fully employ data analytics as a tool to identify potential indicators of fraud or other improper payments at DOE because of limitations in contractor-maintained cost data. Much of the cost data maintained by the two DOE contractors GAO selected for data analytic purposes could not be used because these data did not include a complete universe of transactions that was reconcilable with amounts billed to DOE or did not contain details necessary to determine the nature of costs charged to DOE. Because DOE does not require its contractors to maintain sufficiently detailed transaction-level cost data that are reconcilable with amounts charged to DOE, it is not well positioned to employ data analytics as a fraud detection tool. Effective fraud risk managers collect and analyze data and identify fraud trends and use them to improve fraud risk management activities, according to leading practices that GAO has previously identified. Without the detailed data necessary to conduct such analysis, DOE is missing an opportunity to develop, refine, and improve its experience with data analytic tools and techniques, and better position itself to meet the requirements of the Fraud Reduction and Data Analytics Act.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is making six recommendations, including that DOE establish invoice review policies and procedures, employ leading practices such as data analytics to help manage fraud risk, and require that its contractors maintain sufficiently detailed cost data for reconciling with amounts charged. DOE generally concurred with five of GAO's six recommendations but did not agree to require contractors to maintain detailed data. GAO continues to believe that the recommendation is valid, as discussed in the report. |
gao_GAO-12-357 | gao_GAO-12-357_0 | In 2008, Congress amended section 2330a to add a requirement for the Secretary of Defense to submit an annual inventory of the activities performed pursuant to contracts for services for or on behalf The inventory is to include a of DOD during the preceding fiscal year.number of specific data elements for each identified activity, including the function and missions performed by the contractor; the contracting organization, the component of DOD administering the contract, and the organization whose requirements are being met through contractor performance of the function; the funding source for the contract by appropriation and operating agency; the fiscal year the activity first appeared on an inventory; the number of full-time contractor employees (or its equivalent) paid for performance of the activity; a determination of whether the contract pursuant to which the activity is performed is a personal services contract; and a summary of the information required by section 2330a(a) of title 10 of the U.S. Code. In November 2011, DOD submitted to Congress a plan that included instructions to the military departments and DOD components to document contractor FTEs and begin the collection of contractor manpower data. DOD officials noted that developing a common data system to collect and house contractor manpower data would be challenging given the different requirements of the military departments and components. Consequently, DOD does not expect to be able to fully collect contractor-reported direct labor information until fiscal year 2016. As such, DOD officials acknowledged that the factors that limited the utility, accuracy, and completeness of using FPDS-NG remained. In our January 2011 report, we recommended that DOD develop a plan of action, including anticipated time frames and necessary resources, to facilitate the department’s intent of collecting manpower data and to address other limitations in its current approach to meeting inventory requirements. Further, while these efforts address the collection of contractor manpower data, they do not specify how DOD will obtain the remaining required data, such as identifying the requiring activity and all functions and missions performed by the contractor, to meet the legislative inventory requirements. Navy headquarters officials had no assurance that their commands conducted the required reviews, and we found no evidence at the Navy commands we contacted that the required reviews were conducted. In contrast, we also found that some contractors continued to perform inherently governmental functions. For example, Army officials cited difficulty in hiring DOD civilians caused by DOD’s decision to freeze civilian FTE levels at the fiscal year 2010 level as hindering their ability to resolve instances identified during the inventory review process. The Army and Air Force identified 1,935 and 91 instances, respectively, in which contractors were performing inherently governmental functions. The variation in the number of cases reported by the Army and the Air Force may reflect differences in their approaches to conducting the inventory reviews. The guidance, however, does not clearly establish lines of accountability and responsibility within the military departments and defense components for conducting the inventory reviews and addressing instances where contractors are identified as performing inherently governmental functions. The absence of guidance, at all levels, providing clear lines of responsibility for conducting, documenting, and addressing issues identified during the fiscal year 2009 inventory review process contributed to instances in which contractors continued to perform functions identified as being inherently governmental in 8 of the 12 Army and Air Force cases we reviewed. DOD’s December 2011 guidance will require the military departments and defense components to certify that they have conducted the required reviews, but the guidance does not clearly establish lines of accountability and responsibility within the military departments and defense components for doing so. Recommendations for Executive Action
To address these issues we are making the following three recommendations: To improve the execution and utility of the inventory review process, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense ensure that the military departments and defense components issue guidance to their commands that provides clear lines of authority, responsibility, and accountability for conducting an inventory review and resolving instances where functions being performed by contractors are identified as inherently governmental functions. DOD concurred with our recommendations to address instances we reviewed in which the Army and Air Force identified that contractors were still performing functions deemed inherently governmental. To satisfy the mandate for 2011, we assessed (1) the progress the Department of Defense (DOD) has made in addressing limitations in its approach when compiling the fiscal year 2010 inventories on contracted services and in developing a strategy to obtain manpower data and (2) the extent to which the military departments addressed issues with contractors performing inherently governmental functions identified during reviews of their fiscal year 2009 inventories. For the fiscal year 2010 inventory, AT&L continued to rely on data from the Federal Procurement Data System- Next Generation (FPDS-NG) for most defense components other than the Army and the TRICARE Management Activity. | Why GAO Did This Study
DOD relies on contractors to perform many functions, which can offer benefits for DOD. GAOs work has shown that reliance on contractors to support core missions, however, can place DOD at risk of contractors performing inherently governmental functions.
(2) the extent to which the military departments addressed instances of contractors performing functions identified as inherently governmental during reviews of their fiscal year 2009 inventories. GAO reviewed DOD guidance, interviewed acquisition and manpower officials, and assessed 12 instances from a nongeneralizable sample in which the Air Force and Army determined that contractors had performed inherently governmental functions
What GAO Found
The Department of Defense (DOD) made a number of changes to improve the utility of the fiscal year 2010 inventory, such as centrally preparing contract data to provide greater consistency among DOD components and increasing the level of detail on the services provided. DOD, however, continued to rely primarily on the Federal Procurement Data System-Next Generation (FPDS-NG) for the inventory for most defense components other than the Army. As such, DOD acknowledged a number of factors that limited the utility, accuracy, and completeness of the inventory data. For example, FPDS-NG does not identify more than one type of service purchased for each contract action, provide the number of contractor full-time equivalent personnel, or identify the requiring activity. As before, the Army used its Contractor Manpower Reporting Application to compile its fiscal year 2010 inventory. This system collects data reported by contractors on services performed at the contract line item level, including information on labor hours and the function and mission performed. DOD officials noted that the Armys current process complies with legislative requirements. In January 2011, GAO recommended that DOD develop a plan with time frames and the necessary resources to facilitate its efforts to collect contractor manpower data and address other limitations in its approach to meeting inventory requirements. DOD concurred with these recommendations. In November 2011, DOD submitted to Congress a plan to collect contractor manpower data. DOD officials noted that developing a common data system to collect and house these data would be challenging given the different requirements from the military departments and components. Consequently, DOD does not expect to fully collect contractor manpower data until fiscal year 2016. DODs plan, however, does not establish milestones or specify how it will meet the legislative requirement to identify the requiring activity and the function and missions performed by the contractor.
Military departments required reviews of their fiscal year 2009 inventories of contracted services were incomplete. Navy headquarters officials had no assurance that their commands conducted the required reviews, and GAO found no evidence at the commands it contacted that the required reviews were conducted. Army and Air Force inventory reviews identified 1,935 and 91 instances, respectively, in which contractors were performing inherently governmental functions, though this variation may reflect differences in the departments approaches to conducting the reviews. In 8 of the 12 Army and Air Force cases GAO reviewed, contractors continued to perform functions the military departments identified as inherently governmental. The absence of guidance that provided for clear lines of responsibility for conducting, documenting, and addressing the results of the reviews contributed to these outcomes. Further, Army officials cited difficulty in hiring DOD civilians caused by DODs decision to freeze civilian full-time equivalents at fiscal year 2010 levels. DOD issued guidance in December 2011 that will require the military departments and components to certify that they have conducted the required reviews. The guidance, however, does not clearly establish lines of accountability and responsibility within the military departments and defense components for conducting the inventory reviews and addressing instances where contractors are identified as performing inherently governmental functions.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the military departments and components develop guidance that provides for clear lines of authority, responsibility, and accountability for conducting an inventory review and that the Army and Air Force resolve known instances of contractors performing inherently governmental functions. DOD largely agreed with GAOs recommendations. |
gao_AIMD-99-31 | gao_AIMD-99-31_0 | However, for the two programs we reviewed, SBA initially made errors in the reestimates of its loan program’s costs, which its independent public accountant uncovered, including using incorrect discount rates, which required large adjustments to the draft financial statements. Education’s Financial Statement Estimates Were Reasonable, However Budget Estimates Were Questionable
The Department of Education was able to prepare reasonable credit program estimates for its fiscal year 1997 financial statements, based on information obtained through a significant data gathering effort from its guaranty agencies. However, the audited estimates differed materially from the credit subsidy estimates based on Education’s own database, which raises questions about the validity of Education’s database. Specifically, the IG recommended that Education (1) maintain documentation of the source of the data used in developing assumptions for its cash flow models and the models themselves, (2) validate the data used in the models, (3) update data annually to reflect the current activity, (4) perform and document sensitivity analyses to identify factors that significantly impact the loan estimates or may vary in the future as well as factors that rely on assumptions not based on current data, (5) establish clearly defined roles and responsibilities for staff and groups responsible for developing estimates of Education’s loan programs, (6) develop formalized policies and procedures for estimating the cost of credit programs, and (7) perform quality assurance reviews of loan estimates and document the results of these reviews. Additionally, HUD was unable to provide supporting data for many of the cash flow assumptions in the models. Because HUD received a qualified opinion on its fiscal year 1997 financial statements, it was required by OMB to prepare an action plan to address identified financial management issues related to the loan program cost estimation process. These problems contributed to the qualified audit opinion on VA’s fiscal year 1997 financial statements. Until these basic accounting deficiencies are resolved, VA will continue to have difficulty making reasonable estimates of its loan program costs. USDA Lacks Adequate Systems and Historical Data to Reasonably Estimate the Cost of Its Credit Programs
For fiscal year 1997, USDA was unable to make reasonable cost estimates for its loan programs because it did not maintain the historical data needed to predict future loan performance and used computer systems that were not appropriately configured to capture the data necessary to make such estimates. Addressing the Year 2000 problem is a major challenge for the five key credit agencies, all of which rely on computers to process and update records. According to the agencies, these mission-critical systems that support the loan cost estimation process are either currently Year 2000 compliant or are scheduled to meet the OMB goal to be compliant by March 31, 1999. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to assess (1) the ability of agencies’ to reasonably estimate the cost of their loan programs, including whether they used practices identified by the Credit Reform Task Force as being effective in making these estimates and (2) the status of agencies’ efforts to ensure that computer systems used to estimate the cost of credit programs are Year 2000 compliant. Comments From the Department of Housing and Urban Development
Comments From the Department of Veterans Affairs
The following are GAO’s comments on the Department of Veterans Affairs’ January 15, 1999, letter. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO provided information on the Small Business Administration's (SBA), the Department of Education's, the Department of Housing and Urban Development's (HUD), the Department of Veterans Affairs' (VA), and the Department of Agriculture's (USDA) abilities to reasonably estimate the cost of their loan programs, focusing on: (1) whether they used practices identified by the Credit Reform Task Force as being effective in making these estimates; and (2) the status of the agencies' efforts to ensure that computer systems used to estimate the cost of credit programs are year 2000 compliant.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the problems agencies faced in making credit subsidy estimates as required by Federal Credit Reform Act and federal accounting standards stemmed largely from their lack of: (a) reliable historical data upon which to base estimates of future loan performance; (b) adequate systems that have the capability to track the required information; (c) sound cash flow models; and (d) appropriate policies and procedures for ensuring the accuracy of data used to generate the estimates; (2) SBA was one of the two agencies able to make reasonable estimates of the cost of its loan programs in its fiscal year (FY) 1997 financial statements, primarily because the agency maintained reliable records of historical loan performance data; (3) however, SBA made significant errors in calculating its reestimates of loan program costs; (4) these errors were adjusted for in SBA's draft financial statements, thereby allowing for an unqualified audit opinion on those statements; (5) Education was able to prepare reasonable credit program estimates for its FY 1997 financial statements based on information obtained through a significant data gathering effort from its guaranty agencies; (6) however, the audited estimates differed significantly from the estimates based on data from Education's database, which raises questions about the validity of Education's database; (7) HUD was unable to provide adequate supporting data for its FY 1997 financial statement estimates of its loan program costs, which resulted in a qualified audit opinion from HUD's Inspector General on those financial statements; (8) HUD has developed an action plan to address identified financial management issues related to the loan cost estimation process; (9) VA faced significant problems performing routine accounting for its loan programs including loss of accountability over certain loans transferred to an outside servicer; (10) USDA was unable to make reasonable financial statement estimates of its loan programs' costs because it had not maintained the necessary historical data and continued to use computer systems that were not appropriately configured to capture the data necessary to make such estimates; (11) the five key credit agencies also face the challenge of addressing the year 2000 problem related to systems used in the loan cost estimation process; and (12) according to agency officials, for the 10 loan programs reviewed, all of the mission critical systems are either year 2000 compliant or are scheduled to be compliant by March 31, 1999. |
gao_GAO-12-472 | gao_GAO-12-472_0 | Non-FACA advisory groups are generally less formal than those established under and subject to the requirements of FACA. The Absence of Specific Assessment Steps and Readily Available Information on Non-FACA Groups Hinders Efforts to Assess Duplication Risk
DOT and DOE Informally Assess Advisory Groups for Duplication
The approach used by DOT and DOE to assess duplication amongst advisory groups is often informal, and agency officials are not always clear about what steps should be taken to ensure the assessment of existing advisory groups is consistently made. GSA relies on federal agencies to follow the FACA requirement to check for duplication prior to filing a charter to establish a new, or renew an existing, FACA advisory group under agency authority. Both DOT and DOE agency officials faced some challenges identifying and collecting basic information for non-FACA advisory groups—including agency points of contact and brief group descriptions—and the process was, at points, time consuming or cumbersome for them. Specifically, advisory groups can inform agencies about topics of importance to the agency’s mission, consolidate input from multiple sources, and provide input at a relatively low cost. To further review the usefulness of advisory groups, we conducted case studies on five DOT and DOE FACA and non-FACA advisory groups and identified several practices that helped enhance the usefulness of some of these advisory groups and, in some cases, also helped avoid duplication (see table 1 below). Practices identified as influencing the usefulness of some advisory groups include (1) securing clear agency commitment, (2) finding a balance between responsiveness to the agency and independence, (3) leveraging resources through collaboration with similar groups, and (4) evaluating the group’s usefulness to identify future directions for the group or actions to improve its usefulness. DOE officials also assisted with the development of agendas for meetings, which can be highly interactive. However, neither agency’s guidance includes specific steps for assessing duplication, resulting in an informal process that is not always comprehensive. DOT and DOE are only two among many federal government agencies that widely use advisory groups, however, these actions could be a good first step in facilitating coordination and sharing of information of advisory groups governmentwide. DOT and DOE agreed to consider the recommendations. To assess the extent to which DOT’s and DOE’s assessment process helps to ensure advisory groups efforts are not duplicative, and to determine what challenges may exist in assessing duplication, we narrowed the scope of our review and assessed the potential for duplication, overlap, and fragmentation among 47 of the 88 FACA and non-FACA advisory groups identified as active within fiscal year 2010. From these 47 advisory groups, we then selected those groups that focus on common issues or topic areas in these broad areas for further analysis to better understand whether in fact the groups’ efforts were potentially duplicative and interviewed agency officials in the following offices:
DOT: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) officials within the Office of the Deputy Administrator; Air Traffic Organization; Office of Aviation Safety; and Office of Policy, International Affairs and Environment that were involved in five FACA and four non-FACA advisory groups that were identified as potentially duplicative, overlapping or fragmented; and
DOE: Office of the Secretary; Office of Science; Office of Health, Safety and Security; and Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy officials that were involved in three FACA and five non-FACA advisory groups that were identified as potentially duplicative, overlapping, or fragmented. To review the usefulness of DOT and DOE advisory groups in assisting their respective agencies in carrying out their mission, and to identify practices to enhance their usefulness or help avoid duplication, we conducted in-depth case studies on three FACA and two non-FACA advisory groups. In addition, we developed criteria to understand the extent to which advisory groups provided input on topics of importance to their respective agencies’ missions and to describe the advice producing activities of advisory groups, such as whether the advisory group held meetings and produced reports and recommendations and if the groups’ objectives were documented and were related to the agency’s strategic goals or mission. We also gathered information on a selection of FACA and non-FACA advisory groups by reviewing information from the FACA database, advisory group charters and websites, relevant agency strategic planning documents, and interviewing agency officials for both FACA and non-FACA advisory groups. | Why GAO Did This Study
Advisory groupsthose established under the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA) and other groups not subject to the actcan play an important role in the development of policy and government regulations. There are more than 1,000 FACA advisory groups and an unknown number of non-FACA advisory groups governmentwide. Non-FACA groups include intergovernmental groups. Section 21 of Pub. L. No. 111-139 requires GAO to conduct routine investigations to identify programs, agencies, offices, and initiatives with duplicative goals and activities. In that context, GAO reviewed (1) the extent to which the Department of Transportations (DOT) and Department of Energys (DOE) assessment process helps ensure advisory group efforts are not duplicative and what challenges, if any, exist in assessing potential duplication, and (2) to what extent DOT and DOE advisory groups are useful in assisting their respective agencies in carrying out their missions and how the groups usefulness could be enhanced. GAO selected DOT and DOE for review based on knowledge of these agencies advisory groups. GAO interviewed agency officials; reviewed advisory group documentation; and conducted case studies of five advisory groups.
What GAO Found
Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA) and Department of Transportation (DOT) and Department of Energy (DOE) guidance require officials to check for duplication prior to filing a charter to establish a new or renew an existing FACA advisory group. However, GAO found that DOT and DOEs processes for assessing duplication are often informal, and neither agency has specific steps identified for making such an assessment. Using an informal approach without specific steps makes it more likely that agency assessments for duplication will be inconsistent or incomplete. In addition, while basic information about the 15 DOT and 21 DOE fiscal year 2010 FACA advisory groups is publicly available in the FACA database, including designated points of contact and the objectives of the groups, no such information is readily available for non-FACA advisory groups. This limits the agencies ability to fully assess the universe of advisory groups for particular topic areas. DOT and DOE officials faced some challenges identifying and collecting information for the 19 DOT and 33 DOE non-FACA advisory groups GAO reviewed, relying on various sources and Internet searches to gather basic information, since neither agency maintains an inventory of its non-FACA advisory groups and their activities. In addition, advisory groups often address complex and highly technical issues that span across agencies. For example, one advisory group GAO identified focused on experimental and theoretical research in nuclear physics. Agency officials familiar with these types of technical topic areas and other potential stakeholders covering these same topics are best positioned to assess the potential for unnecessary duplication and would be even better positioned to do so if the departments develop specific assessment steps and enhance the visibility of non-FACA advisory groups.
DOT and DOE advisory groups can be effective tools for agencies to gather input on topics of interest by informing agency leaders about issues of importance to the agencies missions, consolidating input from multiple sources, and providing input at a relatively low cost. To further review the usefulness of advisory groups, GAO conducted case studies on five DOT and DOE FACA and non-FACA advisory groups and identified several practices that could enhance the usefulness of these advisory groups and, in some cases, also help avoid duplication. These practices include the following:
securing clear agency commitment,
finding a balance between responsiveness to the agency and independence,
leveraging resources through collaboration with similar groups, and
evaluating the groups usefulness to identify future directions for the group or actions to improve its usefulness.
The practices identified can help agencies leverage the advice produced by advisory groups to more efficiently and effectively address topics of importance to the agencies. For example, DOE officials from a FACA advisory group stated that coordination with officials involved in related groups helps to ensure sharing of useful information and that efforts are complementary rather than duplicative.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOT and DOE document specific steps to assess potential duplication among FACA and non-FACA advisory groups and develop and make public basic information identifying non-FACA advisory groups to further inform periodic assessments. DOT and DOE agreed to consider the recommendations. |
gao_RCED-99-40 | gao_RCED-99-40_0 | Over Half of Able-Bodied Adults Without Dependents Are Required to Work
During April, May, and June 1998, a monthly average of about 514,200 able-bodied adults without dependents received food stamp benefits, according to information from the 42 states providing sufficient data for analysis. Of the 514,200 individuals, about 58 percent, or 296,400 of the able-bodied adults without dependents were required to meet the work requirements; 40 percent, or 208,200, were exempted from these requirements because they lived in geographic areas that had received waivers; and 2 percent, or 9,600, had been exempted by the states from the work requirements. Relatively Few Able-Bodied Adults Without Dependents Participated in Employment and Training and Workfare Programs
During April, May, and June 1998, a monthly average of 23,600 able-bodied adults without dependents filled employment and training and/or Workfare positions in the 24 states that provided sufficient data for analysis. The 23,600 individuals accounted for about half of the 47,000 able-bodied adults without dependents who were offered state-sponsored employment and training assistance and/or Workfare positions. For the first three quarters of the fiscal year, through June 30, 1998, the states spent only 28.4 percent, or $60.2 million, of the $212 million in grants, according to FNS data. Also, according to preliminary fourth-quarter financial data reported to FNS, 43 states spent about $72 million, or 41 percent of the grant funds available to them for fiscal year 1998. To better understand why the states were spending less of their grant funds than authorized, we interviewed food stamp directors and employment and training officials in 10 geographically dispersed states.In general, according to these officials, grant spending has been significantly less than authorized because (1) some states had a limited number of able-bodied adults without dependents who were required to work, (2) some states needed time to refocus their programs on able-bodied adults without dependents, and (3) some states reported that it was difficult to serve clients in sparsely populated areas because of transportation problems or the lack of appropriate jobs. Nevertheless, some of those not served by Food Stamp Employment and Training Programs may be eligible to receive employment and training through other federal and state programs. Scope and Methodology
To obtain information on the numbers of able-bodied adults without dependents who are receiving food stamps benefits, are required to meet work requirements, are exempted from the work requirements, and are participating in qualifying employment and training and/or Workfare programs, we surveyed the states and the District of Columbia. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on: (1) the number of able-bodied adults without dependents who are receiving food stamp benefits, the number who are required to meet the work requirements, and the number who are exempted from the requirements; (2) the number of able-bodied adults without dependents participating in qualifying employment and training or Workfare programs; and (3) the amounts of federal grant funds that states spent through the first three quarters of fiscal year 1998 for employment and training or workfare programs for food stamp recipients.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) in the 42 states providing sufficient data for analysis, a monthly average of about 514,200 able-bodied adults without dependents received food stamp benefits during April, May, and June 1998; (2) about 58 percent of these individuals were required to meet the work requirements, another 40 percent were not required to work because they lived in areas that were considered to have high unemployment or an insufficient number of jobs, and 2 percent had been exempted by the states from the work requirements; (3) in the 24 states providing sufficient data for analysis, a monthly average of 23,600 able-bodied adults without dependents filled state-sponsored employment and training or workfare positions; (4) these participants represented about 17 percent of the able-bodied adults without dependents who were required to work in those states to receive food stamp benefits; (5) these individuals also accounted for nearly half of the able-bodied adults without dependents who were offered employment and training assistance or workfare positions by these states; (6) as of June 30, 1998, all the states had spent only about 28 percent, or $60.2 million, of the $212 million available for state employment and training programs for food stamp recipients; (7) according to preliminary fourth-quarter financial data, 43 states had spent about $72 million, or 41 percent of the grant funds available to them for fiscal year 1998; and (8) according to federal and state officials, the low percentage of spending for food stamp employment and training programs occurred primarily because: (a) fewer able-bodied adults without dependents were required to work than anticipated and fewer than anticipated accepted this assistance; and (b) some states needed more time to refocus their food stamp employment and training programs to target these individuals. |
gao_GAO-06-275 | gao_GAO-06-275_0 | Private companies develop these price indices by collecting information about market prices from market participants in a variety of ways, including phone calls to individuals within energy trading companies. Market participants use these indices to, among other things, help them make informed decisions about buying and selling natural gas and electricity. Other federal agencies have roles affecting the electricity and natural gas markets. The Federal Government Has Undertaken Multiple Efforts to Improve Price Indices
Since 2003, FERC has undertaken a series of efforts to improve the availability and accuracy of price information, including specifically addressing price indices. In 2000 and 2001 during the energy crisis in the West, some market participants knowingly misreported data to index providers in order to influence these indices for financial gain. Using the information that it developed through its conferences and workshops, FERC developed new standards and rules of conduct for both market participants submitting trade data and for price index publishers, to help ensure that price indices were more accurate and reliable and to strengthen market participants’ confidence in price indices. FERC outlined the standards that energy market participants and index developers should follow in a 2003 policy statement. FERC has also taken steps to improve its ability to monitor price indices and enforce related market rules. Finally, the passage of the 2005 Energy Policy Act included FERC’s proposed statutory changes to address misconduct of market participants by increasing civil penalties imposed on companies that participate in anticompetitive behavior or manipulate the market. The Energy Policy Act also gives FERC authority to collect transaction information if necessary to ensure price transparency. In addition, in response to requirements in the Energy Policy Act, FERC and the CFTC entered into a memorandum of understanding to share and coordinate requests for information, which they say will allow FERC to more readily identify and sanction market manipulation. Industry Stakeholders Are Reasonably Confident in Most Price Indices
Many industry stakeholders report that they are now reasonably confident in short-term price indices, although some concerns about the transparency of long-term electricity markets remain. 1.) Consistent with what FERC found, industry trade and research organizations and others that we interviewed reported to us that their members have few significant concerns about the short-term, also called spot, price indices or long-term natural gas indices. In addition, industry participants told us that the quality of data being provided to publishers of price indices has improved since 2002. For example, according to a major price index publisher, the reporting of price information has significantly improved in the last 2 years, and, further, the quality of analysis and reliability of the prices that they report has improved. Finally, publishers are providing more information about the market, such as the number of transactions and the amounts of energy bought and sold at specific trading locations. Despite their general satisfaction with most price indices, some stakeholders reported concerns about price indices for long-term electricity markets. Stakeholders are now able to see that these markets witness fewer transactions and, as a result, are less developed than others. One factor affecting price transparency in these long-term markets is that the use of these markets collapsed in 2002 over concerns that prices were manipulated. In the absence of a mature and reliable long-term electricity market and information about prices, market participants noted that for now they rely on long-term natural gas markets and indices, which are more developed. These market participants told us that because natural gas is used extensively to generate electricity, the prices often change together. They also said that the availability and use of these natural gas markets only partly mitigates the lack of robust electricity markets, because electricity and natural gas prices can, and do, sometimes move independently. Scope and Methodology
To obtain information about efforts FERC has taken to improve natural gas and electricity price indices, we reviewed reports and other documents describing federal efforts to improve price transparency and examined literature on price transparency in the natural gas and electricity markets. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since the 1970s, the natural gas and electricity industries have each undergone a shift toward greater competition, referred to as restructuring. This restructuring has moved these industries from regulated monopolies to markets in which competitors vie for market share and wholesale prices are largely determined by supply and demand. Amid this restructuring, private companies have published information about these markets, including reports of market prices in various locations--referred to as price indices. These indices, whether for short-term "spot" or long-term "forward" markets, are developed by surveying selected market participants who voluntarily supply price information. Market participants rely on these price indices to help them make informed decisions about trading these commodities and to evaluate new investments. In recent years, confidence in price indices has been shaken due to misreporting and other abuses. During the energy crisis in the West in 2000-2001, several market participants were found to have purposefully misreported prices in order to manipulate these indices for financial gain. In this context, GAO agreed to answer the following questions: (1) What federal regulatory and statutory efforts have been taken to improve price indices in electricity and natural gas markets? (2) Have federal efforts improved industry stakeholders' confidence in these price indices?
What GAO Found
Since 2003, the federal government has undertaken a series of regulatory and statutory efforts to improve the availability and accuracy of price information in price indices. First, FERC issued standards on voluntary price reporting and rules of conduct in a July 2003 policy statement. Second, FERC has taken steps to improve its ability to monitor price indices and enforce market rules by (1) reviewing wholesale prices for anomalies that could indicate market problems and (2) collaborating with other entities, such as the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), and independent market monitoring units that monitor organized electricity markets to detect market manipulation. Third, the Energy Policy Act--enacted in August 2005--increases the amount and types of civil penalties that FERC may impose on companies that participate in anticompetitive behavior, including knowingly misreporting price information to index developers and gives FERC authority to collect additional transaction information if such information is necessary to ensure price transparency. Fourth, FERC and the CFTC entered into a memorandum of understanding to share and coordinate requests for information, which they say will allow FERC to more readily identify and sanction market manipulation. Many industry stakeholders reported that they now have greater confidence in most price indices, but some expressed concern about price indices for long-term electricity markets. FERC reported that stakeholders are generally satisfied with current price indices and that the quality of information has improved. For example, in a recent survey FERC found that two-thirds of respondents reported their confidence in price indices, on a scale of 1 to 10 (10 being most confident), as a 7 or greater. Further, FERC reported that since 2002 the quality of information has improved because (1) more companies are reporting data to publishers and (2) major publishers are providing more information about the number of transactions and volume of electricity and natural gas trades. GAO's own investigations corroborated what FERC found in its survey. Specifically, natural gas and electricity industry stakeholders reported that, in general, they are reasonably confident in the short-term prices now reported by trade publications and the improved quality of overall information. While stakeholders expressed general satisfaction with most price indices, some reported concerns about price indices in long-term electricity markets. Furthermore, stakeholders are now able to see that some of these markets witness fewer transactions and, as a result, are less developed than others. In the absence of a reliable long-term electricity market and information about prices, market participants noted that they rely on long-term natural gas markets and indices that are more developed. Stakeholders told GAO that, because natural gas is widely used to generate electricity, their prices often move together and, therefore, natural gas forward prices can substitute, to some extent, for electricity futures prices. They also said that the use of these natural gas markets only partly mitigates the lack of robust long-term electricity markets, because electricity and natural gas prices sometime move independently. |
gao_GGD-96-26 | gao_GGD-96-26_0 | To explore the reasons for foreign bank expansion in the United States, the role that foreign banks play in the U.S. economy, and whether U.S. banks face disadvantages in competing against foreign banks in U.S. markets, we interviewed officials at both U.S. banks and branches, agencies, and subsidiaries of foreign banks operating in the United States. Foreign Branches and Agencies
Foreign branches and agencies operate almost exclusively in selected wholesale banking markets in the United states, serving home-country and U.S.-corporate customers and engaging in transactions with banks and other financial institutions. As a result, at the end of 1992, foreign branches and agencies held 24 percent of the market in C&I loans. In December 1994, foreign branches and agencies held 87 percent of all IBF deposits. Our review of current laws and regulations and our interviews with U.S. and foreign bankers, executives at multinational and other corporations, U.S. bank regulators, and others indicated that differences in the legal and regulatory treatment of U.S. and foreign banks have diminished substantially since passage of the IBA. This section reviews the adaptations of U.S. laws and regulations that are made for foreign banks operating in the United States and examines the arguments that have been made concerning the competitive impact on U.S. banks of these adaptations. Changes in U.S. laws and regulations have sought to diminish the potential advantage caused by differences in capital positions across countries. Unlike most U.S. banks, foreign banks are not generally organized in a holding company structure. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the laws and regulations governing foreign banking operations in the United States.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) most foreign banks operate in U.S. wholesale banking markets, serve their home country and U.S. corporate customers, and engage in transactions with other financial institutions; (2) by the end of 1994, foreign banks held 17 percent of U.S. domestic banking assets; (3) foreign banks attained 24 percent of all U.S. commercial and industrial loans in December 1994, but they held a negligible share of the U.S. retail banking market during that same period; (4) although foreign banks are subject to the same laws and regulations as U.S. banks, they often receive different enforcement of these laws in their home countries; (5) changes in U.S. banking laws and regulations have diminished the competitive advantages previously enjoyed by foreign banks; and (6) national treatment of foreign banks is a concern for both U.S. and foreign bankers, since proposed legislation would expand the powers of bank holding companies and have a differential impact on U.S. and foreign banking operations. |
gao_GAO-09-268 | gao_GAO-09-268_0 | GAO’s Recent Report Highlighted DOD’s and VA’s Efforts to Share Health Information and Identified the Need to Set Up the Program Office and Finalize the Implementation Plan
In reporting on the departments’ progress toward developing fully interoperable electronic health records in July 2008, we highlighted several findings: DOD and VA had established and implemented mechanisms to achieve sharing of electronic health information at different levels of interoperability. Also, the departments recently expanded the number of standards and specifications with which they expect their interoperability initiatives will comply. For example, between June and October 2008, the departments increased the number of shared patients for which computable outpatient pharmacy and drug allergy data were being exchanged through the CHDR initiative by about 2,700 (from about 18,300 to over 21,000). In addition, DOD has reported progress toward certification of its health IT system in adhering to applicable standards. DOD and VA have also reported progress relative to two plans that contain objectives, initiatives, and activities related to further increasing health information sharing. However, only 3 of the 39 activities in the Joint Strategic Plan were described in results-oriented (i.e., objective, quantifiable, and measurable) terms that are characteristic of effective planning and can be used as a basis to track and measure progress toward the delivery of new interoperable capabilities. Steps Have Been Taken to Set Up the DOD/VA Interagency Program Office, but It Is Not Positioned to Function as a Single Point of Accountability
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 called for the establishment of an interagency program office and for the office to be accountable for implementing electronic health record systems or capabilities that allow for full interoperability of personal health care information between DOD and VA. Since we last reported, the departments have continued taking steps to set up the program office, although they have not yet fully executed their plan for doing so. As a result, the office is not yet in a position to be accountable for accelerating the departments’ efforts to achieve interoperability by the September 30, 2009 deadline. Consistent with the plan, the departments have taken steps, such as developing descriptions for key positions, including those of the Director and Deputy Director. Also, since we reported in July 2008, the departments developed the program office organization structure document that depicts the program office’s organization. In January 2009, the departments approved a program office charter to describe, among other things, the mission and function of the office. Our July 2008 report recommended that the departments give priority to establishing the program office by establishing permanent leadership and hiring staff. To evaluate DOD and VA plans toward developing electronic health record systems or capabilities, we obtained information from agency documentation and interviews with cognizant DOD and VA officials pertaining to the November 2007 VA/DOD Joint Executive Council Strategic Plan for Fiscal Years 2008-2010, and the September 2008 DOD/VA Information Interoperability Plan (Version 1.0) which together constitute the departments’ overall plans for achieving full interoperability of electronic health information. Further, we analyzed objectives and activities from their plans to determine if DOD and VA had established results-oriented performance measures that enable the departments to assess progress toward achieving increased sharing capabilities and functionality of their electronic health information systems. To determine whether the interagency program office is fully operational and positioned to function as a single point of accountability for developing and implementing electronic health records, we analyzed DOD and VA documentation, including the schedule for setting up the office identified in the DOD/VA Information Interoperability Plan. | Why GAO Did This Study
Under the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) are required to accelerate the exchange of health information between the departments and to develop systems or capabilities that allow for interoperability (generally, the ability of systems to exchange data) and that are compliant with federal standards. The Act also established a joint interagency program office to function as a single point of accountability for the effort, which is to implement such systems or capabilities by September 30, 2009. Further, the Act required that GAO semi-annually report on the progress made in achieving these goals. For this second report, GAO evaluates the departments' progress and plans toward sharing electronic health information that comply with federal standards, and whether the interagency program office is positioned to function as a single point of accountability. To do so, GAO reviewed its past work, analyzed agency documentation, and conducted interviews.
What GAO Found
DOD and VA continue to increase health information sharing through ongoing initiatives and related activities. Specifically, the departments' are now exchanging pharmacy and drug allergy data on over 21,000 shared patients, an increase of about 2,700 patients between June and October 2008. Further, they recently expanded the number of standards and specifications with which they expect their interoperability initiatives will comply. In addition, DOD reported that it received certification of its electronic health record system. Also, the departments have defined their plans to further increase their sharing of electronic health information. In particular, they have identified the Joint Executive Council Strategic Plan and the DOD/VA Information Interoperability Plan as the key documents defining their planned efforts to provide interoperable health records. These plans identify various objectives and activities that, according to the departments, are aimed at increasing health information sharing and achieving full interoperability, as required by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008. However, neither plan identifies results-oriented (i.e., objective, quantifiable, and measurable) performance goals and measures that are characteristic of effective planning and can be used as a basis to track and assess progress toward the delivery of new interoperable capabilities. In the absence of results-oriented goals and performance measures, the departments are not positioned to adequately assess progress toward increasing interoperability. Instead, DOD and VA are limited to assessing progress in terms of activities completed and increases in data exchanged (e.g., the number of patients for which certain types of data are exchanged). The departments have continued to take steps to set up the interagency program office. For example, they have developed descriptions for key positions and agreed with GAO's July 2008 recommendation that they give priority to establishing permanent leadership and hiring staff. Also, the departments developed the program office organization structure document that depicts the office's organization and, in January 2009, the departments approved a program office charter to describe, among other things, the mission and function of the office. Nonetheless, DOD and VA have not yet fully executed their plan to set up the program office. For example, among other activities, they have not yet filled key positions for the Director and Deputy Director, or 22 of 30 other positions identified for the office. In the continued absence of a fully established program office, the departments will remain ineffectively positioned to assure that interoperable electronic health records and capabilities are achieved by the required date. |
gao_HEHS-98-123 | gao_HEHS-98-123_0 | To remedy these problems, SSA intends to rereview all children whose benefits were terminated or denied on the basis of mental retardation. SSA Is Taking Steps to Improve the Quality of Decisions on Children
SSA’s quality assurance statistics on childhood cases show uneven accuracy rates across the states. Conclusions
SSA has made substantial progress in implementing the new childhood definition of disability through its rapid redetermination of most of these cases, its action to ensure that the redetermination process is fair, and its ongoing review of the implementation of the new regulations. Moreover, we noted the need to revise the listings 3 years ago. SSA also needs to continue its efforts to improve decisionmaking for childhood cases to better ensure that adjudicators apply the new eligibility criteria accurately and consistently. Recommendation to the Commissioner of Social Security
In view of the fact that many of SSA’s medical listings for children are outdated and allow eligibility to be based upon multiple standards of severity, we recommend that the Commissioner act immediately to update and modify its medical listings to incorporate advances in medicine and science and to reflect a uniform standard of severity. Supplemental Security Income: Review of SSA Regulations Governing Children’s Eligibility for the Program (GAO/HEHS-97-220R, Sept. 16, 1997). 5, 1996). 2, 1995). | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided additional information on the Social Security Administration's (SSA) implementation of the new eligibility standard.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) SSA has made considerable progress in implementing the welfare reform changes in eligibility for Supplemental Security Income (SSI) children; (2) it has taken important steps to safeguard fairness by identifying children whose benefits may have been terminated inappropriately and establishing remedial action to rereview their cases; (3) however, because SSA's medical listings reflect multiple levels of severity, SSA also needs to expedite updating and modifying its medical listings to ensure that all children are assessed against a uniform severity standard; (4) the need to revise the listings is a long-standing problem that GAO reported 3 years ago; (5) moreover, SSA needs to take concerted action to follow through on its plan for monitoring and continually improving the quality of decisions regarding children; and (6) consistent with its legislative mandate, GAO will continue to focus its work on SSA's efforts to provide reasonable assurance that it can administer the program consistently and improve the accuracy of childhood disability decisions. |
gao_GAO-04-438T | gao_GAO-04-438T_0 | IRS initiated CADE as part of BSM, to modernize the agency’s outdated and inefficient data management system. We made a series of recommendations for correcting these weaknesses and limiting modernization activities until they were corrected. In fiscal year 1999, IRS launched the BSM program. Also, a consistent challenge for IRS has been to make sure that the pace of systems acquisition projects does not exceed the agency’s ability to manage them. In response to our recommendations, IRS has made important progress. Second, IRS has made progress in establishing the infrastructure systems on which future business applications will run. Nevertheless, IRS continued to face challenges to fully develop and implement its modernization management capacity. We made several recommendations to address those issues. In addition to the modernization management control deficiencies discussed above, our work has shown that the increases and delays were caused, in part, by inadequate definitions of systems requirements. increases in project scope. cost and schedule estimating deficiencies. underestimating project complexity. These schedule delays and cost overruns impair IRS’s ability to make appropriate decisions about investing in new projects, delay delivery of benefits to taxpayers, and postpone resolution of material weaknesses affecting other program areas. In addition, it is critical for budgeting, management, and oversight. As noted, CADE release 1 has experienced significant reported cost overruns and schedule delays throughout its life cycle, and has yet to be delivered. SEI’s independent technical assessment of CADE pointed to four primary factors that have caused the project to get off track and resulted in such severe cost and schedule impairments: (1) the complexity of CADE release 1 was not fully understood; (2) the initial business rules engine effort stalled; (3) both IRS and PRIME technical and program management were ineffective in key areas, including significant breakdowns in developing and managing CADE requirements; and (4) the initially contentious relationship between IRS and PRIME hindered communications. IRS has reported making steady progress with implementing the BSM action plan. According to the IRS BSM program office, as of late January 2004, 27 of the 46 issue action plans have been completed. To successfully address these challenges and risks and to modernize its systems, IRS needs to continue to strengthen BSM program management by continuing efforts to balance the scope and pace of the program with the agency’s capacity to handle the workload, and institutionalize the management processes and controls necessary to resolve the deficiencies identified by the reviews and assessments. Commitment of appropriate resources and top management attention are critical to resolving the identified deficiencies. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has been grappling with modernizing its computer systems for many years. IRS's current program, commonly referred to as Business Systems Modernization (BSM), began in fiscal year 1999; about $1.4 billion has been reported spent on it to date. While progress has been made, the program continues to face significant challenges and risks. In recognition of these risks, IRS and a contractor recently completed several comprehensive assessments of BSM, including one of its Customer Account Data Engine (CADE) project, which is to modernize the agency's outdated data management system. At the request of the Subcommittee on Oversight, House Committee on Ways and Means, GAO's testimony will summarize (1) GAO's prior findings and recommendations, along with those of the recent assessments; and (2) actions IRS has taken or plans to take to address these issues.
What GAO Found
Prior GAO reviews have disclosed numerous modernization management control deficiencies that have contributed to reported cost overruns and schedule delays. Costs and completion dates for ongoing projects have grown from their initial estimates. Reasons for such delays include inadequate definition of systems requirements, increases in project scope, and underestimation of project complexity. These impair IRS's ability to make future systems investment decisions and delay delivery of benefits to taxpayers.
What GAO Recommends
GAO has made a series of recommendations focusing on stronger program management--and limiting modernization activities until such management practices were in place. IRS has made important progress in implementing management controls, establishing infrastructure, delivering certain business applications, and balancing the pace of the program with the agency's ability to manage it. Nevertheless, IRS needs to further strengthen BSM program management, including fully implementing modernization management controls in such areas as cost and schedule estimating. The recent BSM assessments identified many weaknesses, consistent with prior GAO findings, that contributed to the cost overruns and schedule delays, and offered recommendations to address them. IRS has responded by identifying 46 discrete issues to be resolved; according to the agency, 27 of these have been completed. Commitment of appropriate resources, top management attention, and continuing oversight by Congress and others are critical to the success of BSM. |
gao_RCED-96-233 | gao_RCED-96-233_0 | Background
The nation’s transportation system depends increasingly on innovations from research to improve its performance. Such research spans three distinct modes—highways, mass transit, and railroads. ISTEA Provided New Direction and Funding for Surface Transportation Research
The Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991 (ISTEA) expressed the need for a new direction in surface transportation research, finding that despite an annual federal expenditure of more than $10 billion on surface transportation and its infrastructure, the federal government lacked two key components for an effective surface transportation research program: (1) a clear vision of the role of federally funded surface transportation research and (2) an integrated framework for the fragmented surface transportation research programs dispersed throughout the government. This report discusses (1) the public and private funding for surface transportation research, (2) the transportation community’s views on the federal role for research and DOT’s ability to fulfill that role, and (3) the issues that the transportation community believes the Congress and DOT should consider during ISTEA’s reauthorization. Most of DOT’s Surface Transportation Research Budget Has Gone to FHWA
Between fiscal year 1992 and fiscal year 1996, DOT budgeted about $2.9 billion (in appropriations and contract authority) for surface transportation research—about 2 percent of its total surface transportation budget. RSPA’s customers include DOT’s modal agencies, state and local governments, the transportation community, and academia. DOT has established councils and committees to coordinate its research both internally and externally. Private companies also focus on applied research. Conclusions
Transportation stakeholders generally agree that the federal government should remain a leader in surface transportation research, serving as the primary source of funds, developing a strategic plan, and acting as a focal point for technology transfer. First, it does not address the total surface transportation system, giving limited attention to system assessment, policy, and intermodal research. Second, it does not include enough basic, long-term, high-risk research to respond to complex, persistent problems. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on surface transportation research, focusing on: (1) public and private funding for surface transportation research; (2) the transportation community's views on such research and the Department of Transportation's (DOT) ability to fulfill that role; and (3) issues that the transportation community believes that Congress and DOT should address during the reauthorization of the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991 (ISTEA).
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) between fiscal years 1992 and 1996, DOT provided $2.9 billion for surface transportation research programs to five modal agencies, with the Federal Highway Administration (FHwA) receiving $2.1 billion; (2) FHwA allocated almost half of its funding to its Intelligent Transportation Systems Program, and other agencies conducted research on vehicle and driver safety, high-speed ground transportation, mass transit operations, and advanced transportation technologies; (3) ISTEA has encouraged greater public and private cooperation as well as university involvement, and states have increased the amount of federal and state money they spend on such research; (4) the transportation community generally agreed that DOT should lead the nation's surface transportation research program and serve as a focal point for technology transfer, since it has broader interests and a wider perspective than the other parties; (5) DOT has improved external and internal coordination of its surface transportation research program, but lacks the resources and authority to create an integrated framework or strategic plan for surface transportation research; and (6) the transportation community believes that the surface transportation research program does not adequately address the total surface transportation system, giving limited attention to system assessment, policy, and intermodal research, and does not include enough basic, long-term, high-risk research to respond to complex, persistent problems. |
gao_GAO-10-947 | gao_GAO-10-947_0 | 1). EPA’s implementation of its reorganization plan caused widespread concern among its staff, the public, interested parties, and Congress. In addition, EPA in January 2007 imposed a moratorium on its reorganization efforts. Until April 2007, EPA’s library network operations had been guided by EPA’s Information Resources Management Policy Manual, which stated that the library network was to provide EPA staff with access to information to carry out the agency’s mission and that the libraries were to provide state agencies and the public with access to the library collection. EPA Has Not Completed a Strategic Plan for Its Library Network Identifying an Overall Strategy for the Network
Although it has been preparing a strategic plan for its library network for 3 years, EPA has not completed a plan identifying its overall network strategy, with implementation goals and a timeline for what it seeks to accomplish. The draft outline of the strategic plan is largely a list of current and planned EPA activities—primarily placeholders to be completed. The draft outline of the strategic plan also does not set out the details of how funding decisions are made. Thus, without a detailed strategy for how decisions are made to acquire, deploy, and manage funding resources across the library network, EPA may find it difficult, particularly in an era of declining budgets and competing national priorities, to achieve its vision for the library network and to fully meet the needs of library users. Since 2008, EPA Has Reopened Closed Libraries and Taken Other Actions
EPA has reopened all of the libraries it closed in 2007 and has taken other actions to improve library operations. In addition to reopening the closed libraries, according to EPA officials we spoke with, EPA developed standards for the regional and headquarters libraries’ use of space, on-site collections, staffing, and services. Housed in EPA’s Office of Information Analysis and Access, within the Office of Environmental Information, the national library program manager is charged with carrying out day-to-day activities of the library network and with bringing focus and cohesion to the network. To fulfill this leadership role, EPA officials said, the national library program manager is to work closely with the management of EPA’s Office of Environmental Information to set in motion a number of actions meant to improve library network operation and communication. EPA Has Resumed Digitizing Unique EPA Documents but Has Not Inventoried Its Holdings
EPA has restarted its process of digitizing some of its libraries’ holdings, but because the agency has not completed an inventory of its holdings, it does not know the total number of documents to be digitized. Without a complete catalog or inventory of its holdings, EPA cannot determine which documents, or how many, will need to be digitized and, consequently, cannot accurately estimate the total cost of digitization or how long it will take. EPA Has Taken Steps to Communicate with Staff and Other Stakeholders about Its Network, but Its Staff Survey Was Flawed
EPA has taken steps to communicate with staff and other stakeholders about its library network—including providing information about the libraries as well as soliciting information from library users—but a 2009 survey about its staff’s information needs was flawed. The next annual meeting is scheduled for March 2011. If, in future assessments of users’ needs, EPA fails to correct the flawed methods of its previous staff surveys, the agency is unlikely to obtain accurate information that would enable it to make appropriate decisions on the corrective actions that would best address those needs. Ensure that the data analysis protocols used for conducting surveys of users’ needs—including sampling procedures and response rates—are sufficiently sound methodologically to provide reliable information on which to base decisions and allocate resources efficiently. With clarifications, the agency concurred with our recommendations. EPA acknowledged that the planning document available on the agency’s Web site—which our report refers to as the draft outline of the strategic plan— has provided more of a working agenda than a strategic plan to guide the rebuilding of the library program. We compared library operations before, during, and after attempted reorganization in fiscal year 2007; obtained and reviewed library network policy and procedures; reviewed the agency’s draft outline of a strategic plan for the library network; obtained and reviewed documents on EPA’s digitization process; and reviewed EPA’s efforts to communicate with and solicit input from users. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) library network provides agency staff and the public with access to environmental information. A 2006 attempt by EPA to reorganize its network by consolidating libraries and making more materials and services available online caused concern among users, and in 2007, EPA put a moratorium on its reorganization plans. Congress requested that GAO report on the reorganization and has again requested a follow-up on these issues. Accordingly, GAO reviewed (1) the status of EPA's overall strategy for its library network, (2) the status of EPA's plan to reopen the libraries it closed and other actions planned or taken, (3) EPA's efforts to digitize printed documents to make them electronically available, and (4) EPA's efforts to communicate with staff and other stakeholders about its library network. GAO reviewed regulations and agency funding and inventory documents and interviewed EPA staff and contractors, as well as independent library professionals. GAO also assessed the reliability of EPA's data on library holdings and from EPA's staff survey on library use and needs.
What GAO Found
Although EPA has taken a number of steps to meet the needs of library users, it has not completed a plan identifying an overall strategy for its library network, with implementation goals and a timeline of what it intends to accomplish. Scheduled for completion in 2008, the strategic plan was to provide EPA staff and the public a detailed view of EPA's library operations and future direction. The draft outline of the strategic plan, however, is largely a placeholder list of current and planned EPA activities. For example, while it emphasizes the central role to be played by electronic library resources, the draft outline does not contain goals or a timeline for completing an inventory of holdings or digitizing those holdings. The draft outline also does not set out details of how funding decisions are to be made. Given the current economic environment, without a completed strategic plan, including a detailed strategy for acquiring, deploying, and managing funding, EPA may find itself hard-pressed to ensure that the network can meet its users' needs. The agency has reopened libraries closed during reorganization, although about half the network's 10 regional libraries are operating with reduced hours. EPA has also developed standards for the regional and headquarters libraries' use of space, on-site collections, staffing, and services. The agency has also hired a national library program manager to carry out day-to-day activities and bring focus and cohesion to the network. Working closely with EPA management and library staff, the national library program manager, who is responsible for library network strategic planning, has set in motion a number of actions meant to improve library network operation and communication, including working closely with internal and external advisory boards and creating a library policy and related procedures. EPA has resumed digitizing some of its libraries' documents, although it has not inventoried the network's holdings. The agency is digitizing documents in three phases. Phase 1 was completed in January 2007, phase 2 is scheduled for completion in December 2010, and planning has begun for phase 3. Because EPA has not taken a complete inventory of its library holdings, however, it cannot determine which documents, or how many, will need to be digitized and, consequently, cannot accurately estimate the total cost of digitization or how long it will take. Since we reported on the library network reorganization in 2008, EPA has taken steps to communicate with staff and other stakeholders about its library network, including providing information about the libraries and soliciting information from library users. EPA has also made improvements to the main Internet gateway to the network, making more documents available electronically and providing better access to electronic documents and services. Nevertheless, because EPA's 2009 survey of the information needs and library use of its staff had methodological flaws--similar to those GAO identified in 2008--the agency is unlikely to obtain accurate information that would enable it to make appropriate decisions on the corrective actions that would best address library users' needs.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends, among other actions, that EPA complete its strategic plan for the library network and ensure that survey methods provide reliable data on which to base decisions. With clarifications, EPA concurred with our recommendations. |
gao_GAO-03-695 | gao_GAO-03-695_0 | DOD Uses Contractors for a Wide Range of Services Because of Force Size Limitations and a Lack of Military Capability and Capacity
Contractors provide the military with a wide variety of services from food, laundry, and recreation services to maintenance of the military’s most sophisticated weapons systems. DOD uses contractors during deployments because limits are placed on the number of U.S. military personnel assigned to a region, required skills may not be available in the service, or the services want to husband scarce skills to ensure that they are available for other contingencies. In Bosnia, for example, the Army replaced soldiers at the gate and base perimeter with contracted security guards. DOD and the Services Have Not Identified Essential Services Provided by Contracts or Developed Plans for Their Continuation Should Contractors Not Be Available
Contractors provide DOD with a wide variety of services at deployed locations, and while DOD uses contractors as part of the total force mix and recognizes the need to continue essential contractor services during crises, it has not included them in operational and strategic planning. Additionally, DOD has limited knowledge of the extent to which DOD Instruction 3020.37 is being implemented. For example, in our review of the logistics portion of the operations plan for the war in Iraq, which addresses contracting, we found that there were no backup plans should contractors become unavailable to provide essential services. Assuming that existing contractor employees will be available to perform essential services may not always be realistic. In the case of contractor support for deployed forces, we found no DOD- wide guidance that establishes any baseline policy regarding the use of contractors to support deployed forces or the government’s obligations to these contractors. The Navy and the Marine Corps have also not developed much guidance on dealing with contractors in deployed locations. The responsibility for assuring that contractors receive adequate force protection starts with the combatant commander, extends downward, and includes the contractor.”
The Air Force policy memorandum states, “The Air Force may provide or make available, under terms and conditions as specified in the contract, force protection … commensurate with those provided to DOD civilian personnel to the extent authorized by U.S. and host nation law.”
As a result, the combatant commander does not have a uniform set of requirements he can incorporate into his planning process but instead has to work with requirements that vary according to the services and the individual contracts. However, these clauses are not mandatory and did not appear to be widely known by contracting officers. An Army official told us that commanders sometimes do not know that they are responsible for requesting and nominating a contracting officer’s representative for contracts supporting their command. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To identify the types of services contractors provide to deployed U.S. forces we met with officials at the Department of Defense (DOD) who have responsibility for identifying contractor needs, issuing contracts, managing contracts once they are executed, and utilizing contractors to fulfill their missions. To assess DOD’s efforts to identify those contractors that provide mission essential services and to maintain essential services if contractors are unable to do so, we reviewed applicable DOD Inspector General reports as well as DOD and its components’ policies, regulations, and instructions for ensuring the continuation of essential services. To assess the adequacy of guidance and oversight mechanisms in place to effectively manage contractors who support deployed forces we reviewed DOD’s and its components’ policies, regulations, and instructions that relate to the use of contractors that support deployed forces. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Defense (DOD) uses contractors to provide a wide variety of services for U.S. military forces deployed overseas. We were asked to examine three related issues: (1) the extent of contractor support for deployed forces and why DOD uses contractors; (2) the extent to which such contractors are considered in DOD planning, including whether DOD has backup plans to maintain essential services to deployed forces in case contractors can no longer provide the services; and (3) the adequacy of DOD's guidance and oversight mechanisms in managing overseas contractors efficiently.
What GAO Found
While DOD and the military services cannot quantify the totality of support that contractors provide to deployed forces around the world, DOD relies on contractors to supply a wide variety of services. These services range from maintaining advanced weapon systems and setting up and operating communications networks to providing gate and perimeter security, interpreting foreign languages, and preparing meals and doing laundry for the troops. DOD uses contractor services for a number of reasons. In some areas, such as Bosnia and Kosovo, there are limits on the number of U.S. military personnel who can be deployed in the region; contract workers pick up the slack in the tasks that remain to be done. Elsewhere, the military does not have sufficient personnel with the highly technical or specialized skills needed in-place (e.g., technicians to repair sophisticated equipment or weapons). Finally, DOD uses contractors to conserve scarce skills, to ensure that they will be available for future deployments. Despite requirements established in DOD guidance (Instruction 3020.37), DOD and the services have not identified those contractors that provide mission essential services and where appropriate developed backup plans to ensure that essential contractor-provided services will continue if the contractor for any reason becomes unavailable. Service officials told us that, in the past, contractors have usually been able to fulfill their contractual obligations and, if they were unable to do so, officials could replace them with other contractor staff or military personnel. However, we found that this may not always be the case. DOD's agencywide and servicewide guidance and policies for using and overseeing contractors that support deployed U.S. forces overseas are inconsistent and sometimes incomplete. Of the four services, only the Army has developed substantial guidance for dealing with contractors. DOD's acquisition regulations do not require any specific contract in deployment locations for contract workers. Of 183 contractor employees planning to deploy with an Army division to Iraq, for example, some did not have deployment clauses in their contracts. This omission can lead to increased contract costs as well as delays in getting contractors into the field. At the sites that we visited in Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Persian Gulf, we found that general oversight of contractors appeared to be sufficient but that broader oversight issues existed. These include inadequate training for staff responsible for overseeing contractors and limited awareness by many field commanders of all the contractor activities taking place in their area of operations. |
gao_GGD-98-130 | gao_GGD-98-130_0 | The Results Act is intended to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of federal programs by establishing a system to set goals for program performance and to measure results. The Results Act requires each performance plan to identify annual performance goals that cover all of the program activities in the agency’s budget. OPM’S Plan Describes an Extensive Set of Activities Related to Its Strategic Goals, but the Result to Be Achieved Is Only Partially Clear
OPM’s annual performance plan specifies quite clearly its goals—generally expressed as planned activities—for fiscal year 1998 and how those planned activities relate to the goals in its published strategic plan and to program activity accounts in its proposed fiscal year 1999 budget. OPM’s plan has some measures that are related to achieving results. OPM’S Performance Plan Could More Fully Discuss How the Agency’s Strategies and Resources Will Help Achieve Its Goals
OPM’s performance plan could more fully discuss the strategies and resources the agency will use to achieve its performance goals. While not required by the Results Act, we believe that a discussion of these external factors would provide additional context regarding anticipated performance. Recognizing Data Limitations
OPM’s performance plan does not discuss a number of known data limitations that may affect the validity of many performance measures OPM plans to use. GAO Comments
1. OPM stated that in several cases where we suggested its annual performance plan could be improved, the underlying problem seemed to be a continuing disagreement between us and OPM on the strategic goals, objectives, and measures included in its Results Act strategic plan. This may contribute to the annual plan goals’ also focusing on processes or activities, which is one of the key areas in which we believe the annual performance plan could be improved. 2. We agree that providing a reference to the relevant goals in OPM’s presentation of its mandatory spending accounts would appropriately guide users of the plan to the goals and measures associated with the accounts. 3. 4. 5. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Office of Personnel Management's (OPM) annual performance plan for fiscal year (FY) 1999, focusing on whether OPM's plan complies with the statutory requirements and congressional intent as contained in the Government Performance and Results Act and related guidance.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) OPM's annual performance plan addresses the six program components required by the Results Act; (2) the plan has several performance goals and measures listed under each of its five strategic goals as identified in OPM's September 1997 strategic plan; (3) some of these goals and measures are objective and quantifiable, providing a way to judge whether the goal has been achieved; (4) the plan also lays out, very well, a clear linkage between the FY 1999 performance goals and OPM's mission and strategic goals and also between its goals and its specific program activities and related funding as presented in its 1999 budget; (5) the principal area in which the performance plan could be improved to better meet the purposes of the Results Act is in the statement of its goals; (6) OPM's annual performance plan goals, like those in its strategic plan, tend to be process or activity goals; (7) the Results Act, in contrast, envisions a much greater emphasis on outcome goals that state what overall end result the agency will achieve, such as increasing the effectiveness of the federal civilian workforce; (8) Congress sought this emphasis to help ensure that processes and activities that agencies undertake actually add up to a meaningful result that is commensurate with the resources expended; and (9) OPM's annual performance plan could also be improved by including more discussion on how its resources will be used to achieve its goals and adding a discussion of known data limitations that may affect the validity of various performance measures that OPM plans to use. |
gao_NSIAD-97-104 | gao_NSIAD-97-104_0 | The Treasury’s Submitted Plan Is Unclear and Incomplete
The Secretary of the Treasury’s submitted plan does not demonstrate how it will enable the Treasury to meet the audit plan objectives required under the act. A written plan should define the audit’s objectives and the scope and methodology to achieve those objectives. The Treasury plan’s audit objectives are not clearly stated and do not include the findings and reporting elements that the Treasury expects to develop. The plan does not describe analytical methods for studying the holding of genuine U.S. currency abroad and developing estimates of counterfeit U.S. currency abroad. However, it describes elements of a methodology that might be used to study the use of genuine U.S. currency abroad. However, the plan does not fully explain how the Treasury intends to analyze the information obtained to reach conclusions about the use of U.S. currency abroad. The Treasury official responsible for developing the plan stated that the audit objectives—to study the use and holding of genuine U.S. currency in foreign countries and develop estimates of the amount of counterfeit U.S. currency circulating outside the United States each year—are the same as those stated in the act. Further, the official told us that, with the assistance of the Federal Reserve, the Treasury intends to submit a written addendum to Congress to better explain its proposed methodologies, with the caveat that these methodologies may change based on information obtained abroad during the course of the audits. They told us that the information obtained on genuine currency usage will also be reviewed to determine whether any of the information conflicts with their assumptions about the usage of genuine U.S. currency abroad. The Treasury Intends to Develop Estimates of Genuine U.S. Currency Held Abroad
According to the Treasury official responsible for developing the plan, the Treasury plans to address holdings by establishing estimates of the total amount of genuine U.S. currency abroad. To help assure that the Treasury corrects the deficiencies in the submitted audit plan, we recommend that the Secretary of the Treasury develop and submit an addendum to more fully explain the objectives and the methods the Treasury intends to use, including a discussion of assumptions and limitations associated with the use of the resulting information. Scope and Methodology
We reviewed the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 to determine its requirements for the Treasury’s audit plan. In doing so, we determined whether the plan would enable the Secretary of the Treasury to (1) study the use and holding of U.S. currency in foreign countries and (2) develop useful estimates of the amount of counterfeit U.S. currency that circulates outside the United States each year. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Secretary of the Treasury's audit plan on the uses and counterfeiting of U.S. currency in foreign countries, focusing on whether the plan will enable the Secretary of the Treasury to: (1) study the use of U.S. currency in foreign countries; (2) study the holding of U.S. currency in foreign countries; and (3) develop useful estimates of the amount of counterfeit U.S. currency that circulates outside the United States each year.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the Secretary of the Treasury's submitted plan does not demonstrate how it will enable the Treasury to meet the audit plan objectives required under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996; (2) the plan does not clearly state the audit's objectives or the methodologies to achieve those objectives; (3) although the Treasury's plan identifies some elements of a methodology that could be employed to study the use of genuine U.S. currency abroad, it does not explain how the Treasury intends to analyze the information that might be collected; (4) the plan does not define the methodologies the Treasury expects to use to study the holding of genuine U.S. currency abroad and to develop estimates of counterfeit U.S. currency abroad; (5) the Treasury official responsible for developing the plan stated that the audit objectives of the plan are the same as those stated in the act; (6) he acknowledged that the plan does not fully address the methods for achieving the objectives; (7) this official and Federal Reserve officials said that the information obtained on genuine currency usage will be used to describe U.S. currency flows and will be reviewed to determine whether any of the information conflicts with their assumptions about the usage of genuine U.S. currency abroad; (8) the Treasury official stated that the Treasury intends to use a recently published Federal Reserve methodology to develop an estimate of the total holdings of genuine U.S. currency abroad; (9) the official also told GAO the Treasury would rely on an existing Federal Reserve methodology to develop rough estimates or ranges of estimates of counterfeit U.S. currency circulating outside the United States each year; (10) after GAO outlined its concerns about the submitted audit plan to Treasury and Federal Reserve officials, the Treasury official responsible for the plan told GAO that the Treasury, with the assistance of the Federal Reserve, planned to submit a written addendum to Congress explaining the Treasury's proposed methodologies in more detail, with the caveat that these methodologies may change based on information obtained abroad during the course of the audits; and (11) the Treasury official also indicated that the addendum would explain the assumptions the Treasury made and discuss the limitations associated with these estimates. |
gao_GAO-16-720 | gao_GAO-16-720_0 | Internal Revenue Code (IRC). Treasury (tax) regulations provide Treasury’s and IRS’s official interpretation of tax laws. Limitations of Non-IRB Guidance are Not Always Clearly Communicated
Even though IRS officials told us that only documents published in the IRB constitute guidance, and can be relied upon by taxpayers as authoritative and as precedent for their individual circumstances, limitations on the use of other IRS documents is not always clearly communicated to taxpayers. Some tax practitioners and experts have also recommended that IRS include disclaimers on information to taxpayers published outside the IRB noting any legal limitations. These policies and procedures cover the entire life cycle of a regulation or non-regulatory guidance document, including: how to identify and open a guidance project; how to comply with relevant administrative laws and executive orders that govern regulatory and guidance processes; how to draft guidance and coordinate reviews with other IRS and Treasury offices, or other agencies; and how to process public comments and finalize guidance for publication. The effect of the exemption in OMB’s bulletin is similar to that of the 1983 agreement between OMB and Treasury in that non-regulatory tax guidance is exempted from centralized review and additional analysis. More complete documentation of how IRS considers the potential effects of guidance, including consideration of public comments about any economic effects, could help IRS evaluate the risk of challenges to its assessments about whether guidance could be considered major. IRS uses a variety of documents to communicate its interpretation of tax laws to the public, but only considers guidance published in the IRB to be authoritative. While IRS does have detailed procedures for identifying, prioritizing, and issuing new guidance, it lacks documented procedures for deciding what type of guidance to issue. Our analysis indicates that IRS has inconsistently documented required steps during key phases of the guidance issuance process. Some tax regulations and other guidance are also exempt from the requirements of E.O. 12866 under a long-standing agreement between OMB and Treasury. Communicate more clearly the limitations of information not published in the IRB to taxpayers. OMB staff provided oral comments and neither agreed nor disagreed with our recommendations. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report addresses 1) how the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) communicates its interpretation of tax laws to the public, and how it decides what type of guidance to issue; 2) what relevant authorities apply (including statutes, executive orders, and Office of Management and Budget (OMB) guidance), and what policies and procedures IRS uses, when issuing its guidance; and 3) to what extent selected IRS guidance products followed relevant authorities. In these preamble sections, Treasury and IRS describe what authorities apply or do not apply to a particular regulation, and whether the regulation was subject to additional centralized reviews. | Why GAO Did This Study
The public relies on IRS guidance to understand complex tax laws and meet their responsibilities. GAO was asked to examine IRS guidance and rulemaking processes. This report reviews (1) how IRS communicates its interpretation of tax laws to the public and decides what type of guidance to issue; (2) what relevant authorities apply and what policies and procedures IRS uses when issuing guidance; and (3) to what extent selected IRS guidance products followed relevant authorities. GAO reviewed IRS policies and procedures for issuing guidance, conducted literature reviews, analyzed eight non-generalizable case files for compliance with relevant authorities, and interviewed agency officials and other subject matter experts.
What GAO Found
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) uses a variety of documents to communicate its interpretation of tax laws to the public, but only considers Internal Revenue Bulletin (IRB) guidance to be authoritative. IRS information published outside of the IRB can help taxpayers understand tax laws and make informed decisions, but does not always include information clarifying the limitations of its use. IRS has detailed procedures for identifying, prioritizing, and issuing new guidance. However, it lacks procedures for documenting the decision about what type of guidance to issue.
In a review of tax guidance, GAO found few instances in which the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) determined that a tax regulation was likely to have significant economic effects and would thus be subject to additional analysis. OMB's significance determinations largely result from initial assessments by the Department of Treasury (Treasury) and IRS that many administrative law or executive order requirements do not apply to most tax regulations and other guidance. Some tax regulations and other guidance are also exempt from further analysis and review under a 1983 agreement between OMB and Treasury, which was reaffirmed in 1993. This agreement has not been revisited in more than 20 years, and it is unclear whether this agreement is still relevant.
GAO also reviewed eight case files of non-regulatory IRS guidance documents published in 2015 and found that IRS did not consistently document required steps during key phases of the issuance process. Although these eight case files are non-generalizable, documenting key decisions may help IRS evaluate the risk of challenges to IRS assessments about whether tax guidance is significant enough to warrant additional OMB and congressional review.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is making six recommendations, including that IRS communicate more clearly the limitations of information not published in the IRB, and that IRS develop procedures to better document the type of guidance it plans to issue and the key decisions made during the evaluations. GAO also recommends that Treasury and OMB reevaluate their long-standing agreement to exempt some tax guidance and regulations from OMB oversight. IRS and Treasury agreed with all of GAO's recommendations, and OMB neither agreed nor disagreed. |
gao_GAO-13-151 | gao_GAO-13-151_0 | Background
In January 2012, IRS estimated that the gross tax gap—the difference between taxes owed and taxes paid on time—was $450 billion in tax year 2006. These audits are targeted at individual returns with broader and more complex issues. IRS spent almost 20 percent of the $1.6 billion per year that it devoted to exams opened in 2007 and 2008 on returns with positive income of at least $200,000, even though such returns accounted for only 3 percent of the 136 million individual income tax returns filed per year. 2.) Direct Revenue Return on Investment Was Highest for Examinations of Taxpayers with at Least $200,000 in Positive Income
For the 2 years of cases we reviewed, exams (both correspondence and field) of taxpayers with positive incomes of at least $200,000 produced significantly more direct revenue per dollar of cost than exams of lower- income taxpayers. Across income groups, correspondence exams were significantly more productive than field exams in terms of discounted direct revenue per dollar of cost. In contrast, the average direct yield per dollar for field exams of individual taxpayers was $1.8. Although Some Caution is Warranted, Exam Resource Reallocation Could Produce Significant Direct Revenue Gains
Modest Reallocations Might Raise Billions of Dollars in Direct Revenue with Little, If Any, Decline in Voluntary Compliance
Our analysis of a hypothetical reallocation of IRS examination resources for this 2-year period indicates that a shift of about $124 million in enforcement resources could have increased direct revenue by $1 billion over the $5.5 billion per year IRS actually collected. The result holds true as long as the average ratio of direct revenue to cost for each category of returns remained unchanged. Similar gains would recur annually, relative to the revenue that IRS otherwise would collect if it did not change its resource allocation and taxpayer behavior remained substantially the same. As shown in figure 5, our hypothetical reallocation would have increased combined coverage rates in most of the tax return categories we examined. These activities impose compliance costs on taxpayers and economic efficiency costs on society. Recommendations
To better ensure that IRS’s limited enforcement resources are allocated in a manner that maximizes the revenue yield of the income tax, subject to other important objectives of tax administration, such as minimizing compliance costs and ensuring equitable treatment across different groups of taxpayers, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue should: review disparities in the ratios of direct revenue yield to costs across different enforcement programs and across different groups of cases within programs and determine whether this evidence provides a basis for adjusting IRS’s allocation of enforcement resources each year. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Summary Methodology for Data Analysis
Our principal analysis compares the costs and direct revenues associated with correspondence and field exams that were opened during fiscal years 2007 and 2008 across the principal categories of individual taxpayers that the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) uses for exam planning purposes. Compliance burden. | Why GAO Did This Study
Heightened attention to federal deficits has increased pressure on IRS to reduce the tax gap--the difference between taxes owed and taxes paid on time--and better enforce taxpayer compliance. Resource limitations and concern over taxpayer burden, however, prevent IRS from auditing more than a small fraction of individual income tax returns filed. How IRS allocates these limited resources demands careful consideration.
As requested, this report (1) describes how IRS allocates resources across individual taxpayer compliance enforcement programs and across types of taxpayers within each program; (2) estimates the direct revenue return on investment for the individual taxpayer enforcement programs and the extent of variation across those programs and across types of taxpayers; and (3) determines the potential for gains from shifting resources from lower-yielding programs and types of taxpayers to higher-yielding ones.
To accomplish these objectives GAO analyzed IRS data on 2007 and 2008 tax returns, reviewed IRS documentation, and interviewed appropriate IRS officials.
What GAO Found
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) spends most of its enforcement resources on examinations. Correspondence exams of individual tax returns, which target fewer and simpler compliance issues, are significantly less costly on average than the broader and more complex field exams. GAO estimated that the average cost (including overhead) of correspondence exams opened in 2007 and 2008 was $274, compared to an average of $2,278 for field exams. IRS spent almost 20 percent of the $1.6 billion per year that it devoted to exams on returns from taxpayers with positive income of at least $200,000, even though such returns accounted for only 3 percent of the 136 million individual returns filed per year. (Positive income, a measure that IRS uses to classify returns for exam planning purposes, disregards losses that may offset this income).
GAO estimated that, for the 2 years of cases reviewed, correspondence exams were significantly more productive in terms of direct revenue produced per dollar of cost than field exams. Both types of exams of taxpayers with positive incomes of at least $200,000 were significantly more productive than exams of lower-income taxpayers.
GAO demonstrated how these estimates could be used to inform resource allocation decisions. For example, a hypothetical shift of a small share of resources (about $124 million) from exams of tax returns in less productive groups shown in the figure to exams in the more productive groups could have increased direct revenue by $1 billion over the $5.5 billion per year IRS actually collected (as long as the average ratio of direct revenue to cost for each category of returns did not change). These gains would recur annually, relative to the revenue that IRS would collect if it did not change its resource allocation. This particular resource shift would not reduce exam coverage rates significantly and, therefore, should have little, if any, negative effect on voluntary compliance.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that IRS review disparities in the ratios of direct revenue yield to costs across different enforcement programs and across different groups of cases and consider this evidence as a potential basis for adjusting its allocation of enforcement resources each year. IRS agreed with the recommendations. |
gao_GAO-04-484 | gao_GAO-04-484_0 | For troops stationed in Iraq, mail is transferred onto a contracted cargo plane and flown directly into Iraq. According to the Military Postal Service Agency, more than 65 million pounds of letters and parcels were delivered to U.S. Central Command’s contingency area of responsibility during calendar year 2003 at a cost of nearly $150 million. Timeliness of Mail Delivery Cannot Be Accurately Determined
The timeliness of mail delivery to troops serving in Operation Iraqi Freedom cannot be accurately determined because DOD does not have a reliable, accurate system in place to measure timeliness. Data collected by military postal units using the Transit Time Information Standard System for Military Mail indicate that average delivery times met the Army wartime standard of 12 to 18 days. Military postal officials acknowledge that mail delivery to troops serving in Operation Iraqi Freedom was not timely. In addition, more than half of the 127 soldiers and marines we talked with during informal meetings at their home bases in the United States said they were dissatisfied with the timeliness of mail delivery while they were deployed. However, on the basis of our analysis, we found that the methodology used to calculate and report transit times significantly understates the actual time it takes for a service member to receive mail. Service Members Express Dissatisfaction with Mail Service
In the absence of reliable data to describe timeliness, we held discussions with a non-representative sample of 127 soldiers and marines who served in theater, and who were selected prior to our visits to Fort Stewart, Georgia, and Camp Pendleton, California. Many Problems Identified in Operations Desert Shield/Storm Continued to Hamper Mail Delivery in Operation Iraqi Freedom
Despite differences in operational theaters and an effort by postal planners to consider experiences from Operations Desert Shield/Storm in planning for Operation Iraqi Freedom, many of the same problems continued to hamper postal operations during Operation Iraqi Freedom. These problems include (1) difficulty with implementing joint-service postal operations, (2) postal personnel who were inadequately trained and initially scarce because of late deployments, and (3) inadequate postal facilities, material-handling equipment, and transportation assets to handle mail surge. Consequently, early mail operations were conducted with insufficient postal troops to carry out the mission. Despite early efforts made by the Military Postal Service Agency in this regard, this agency does not have the authority to ensure that these problems are jointly addressed and resolved prior to the next military contingency. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To address overall issues of military mail delivery to and from the Gulf region and determine responsibilities for mail service, we obtained and reviewed Department of Defense (DOD) guidance and operations plans for mail delivery to troops serving in a contingency area, and specifically during Operation Iraqi Freedom. To assess efforts to resolve military postal problems for future contingencies, we collected any available after action reports and plans for addressing military postal problems. | Why GAO Did This Study
Mail is a morale booster for troops fighting overseas and for their families at home. More than 65 million pounds of letters and parcels were delivered to troops serving in Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003 and problems with prompt and reliable mail delivery surfaced early in the conflict. Congress and the White House forwarded more than 300 inquiries about mail delivery problems to military postal officials. GAO was directed to review mail delivery to troops stationed in the Middle East. In this report, GAO assesses (1) the timeliness of mail delivery to and from troops in Operation Iraqi Freedom, (2) how mail delivery issues and problems during this operation compared with those experienced during Operations Desert Shield/Storm in 1991, and (3) efforts to identify actions to resolve problems in establishing mail operations for future contingencies.
What GAO Found
The timeliness of mail delivery to troops serving in Operation Iraqi Freedom cannot be accurately assessed because the Department of Defense (DOD) does not have a reliable, accurate system in place to measure timeliness. In general, DOD's transit time and test letter data show that mail delivery fell within the current wartime standard of 12 to 18 days. However, the methodology used to calculate transit times significantly understated actual delivery times. In the absence of reliable data, GAO conducted discussion groups with a non-representative sample of 127 service members who served in-theater. More than half reported they were dissatisfied with mail delivery, underscoring the negative impact it can have on troop morale. Despite differences in operational theaters and efforts by DOD postal planners to incorporate Operations Desert Shield/Storm experiences into planning for Operation Iraqi Freedom, postal operations faced many of the same problems: difficulty with conducting joint-service mail operations; postal personnel who were inadequately trained and initially scarce owing to late deployments; and inadequate postal facilities, equipment, and transportation. The operations plan created for joint-service mail delivery contained certain assumptions key to its success but led to unforeseen consequences or did not occur. Also, plans for a Joint Postal Center were not fully put in place. One lesson learned from 1991 was carried out with success during Operation Iraqi Freedom: mail was transported overseas by dedicated contractor airlifts rather than by military. DOD has not officially tasked any entity to resolve the long-standing postal problems experienced during contingency operations. Moreover, the Military Postal Service Agency does not have the authority to ensure that these problems are addressed jointly. This agency and the military services, however, have taken some steps toward tackling these issues. |
gao_GAO-03-631 | gao_GAO-03-631_0 | With the passage of the No Child Left Behind Act, on January 8, 2002, the federal government intensified its focus on teacher quality by establishing a requirement in the act for teachers across the nation to be “highly qualified” in every core subject they teach by the end of the 2005-06 school year. While the act contains specific criteria for highly qualified teachers by grade and experience levels, in general, the act requires that teachers: (1) have a bachelor’s degree, (2) have state certification, and (3) demonstrate subject area knowledge for each core subject they teach. II and III for state and district authorized activities.) All state officials said they did not know the criteria for some of their teachers because Education’s draft guidance changed and was not complete. Officials also did not have all the information they needed to develop methods to evaluate subject area knowledge for their current teachers. In written comments to our survey, for example, one official said, “Questions are impossible to answer at this point because we not have finished the identification of those who need to be tested or evaluated.” Another respondent wrote that the data system “was designed years ago for state certification purposes… has not yet been updated to include all NCLBA criteria for teachers.” Other state officials also told us during our visits and through survey comments that their state certifications did not always require teachers to demonstrate subject area knowledge, so they did not have information on many teachers’ qualifications for this criteria. State and District Officials Reported Many Conditions as Hindrances to Meeting the Law
Many state officials responding to our survey reported that teacher salary issues and teacher shortages were hindrances. District officials also cited teacher salary and teacher development issues as conditions that hindered them. Our district survey also shows that significantly more high-poverty districts reported some conditions as hindrances than low-poverty districts, and rural districts officials we visited cited hindrances specific to their small size and isolated locations. These issues included low salaries, lack of incentive pay programs, and a lack of career ladders for teachers. Many of the hindrances that state and district officials reported related to conditions that they could address such as teachers’ salaries, the number of alternative certification programs, and certification requirements. To Help Teachers Meet the Requirement States Planned to Spend Most Title II Funds on Professional Development Activities, and Districts Will Spend Most on Recruitment and Retention Activities
To help meet the requirement for highly qualified teachers, state officials planned to spend most of their Title II funds on professional development activities, and district officials planned to spend a majority of their Title II funds on recruitment and retention activities. Districts Planned to Spend Larger Amounts of Other Funds and Title II Funds Are a Larger Percentage of Total for High-Poverty Districts
From our survey, we estimated all districts planned to spend much larger percentages of other federal, state, and local funds than Title II funds on authorized activities but in high-poverty districts the share of the funds was lower. Recommendation for Executive Action
In order to assist states’ efforts to determine the number of highly qualified teachers they have and the actions they need to take to meet the requirement for highly qualified teachers by the end of the 2005-06 school year, we recommend that the Secretary of Education provide more information to states. From this, we identified a population of 14,503 school districts in the 50 states and the District of Columbia. Estimates. | Why GAO Did This Study
In December 2001, Congress passed the No Child Left Behind Act (NCLBA). The act required that all teachers of core subjects be highly qualified by the end of the 2005-06 school year and provided funding to help states and districts meet the requirement. In general, the act requires that teachers have a bachelor's degree, meet full state certification, and demonstrate subject area knowledge for every core subject they teach. This report focuses on the (1) number of teachers who met the highly qualified criteria during the 2002-03 school year, (2) conditions that hinder states' and districts' ability to meet the requirement, and (3) activities on which states and districts were planning to spend their Title II funds. GAO surveyed 50 states and the District of Columbia and a nationally representative sample of districts about their plans to implement the requirement. GAO also visited and interviewed officials in 8 states and 16 districts to discuss their efforts to implement the law.
What GAO Found
GAO could not develop reliable data on the number of highly qualified teachers because states did not have the information needed to determine whether all teachers met the criteria. Officials from 8 states visited said they did not have the information they needed to develop methods to evaluate current teachers' subject area knowledge and the criteria for some teachers were not issued until December 2002. Officials from 7 of 8 states visited said they did not have data systems that could track teacher qualifications for each core subject they teach. Both state and district officials cited many conditions in the GAO survey that hinder their ability to have all highly qualified teachers. State and district officials reported teacher pay issues, such as low salaries and lack of incentive pay, teacher shortages, and other issues as hindrances. GAO's survey estimates show that significantly more high-poverty than low-poverty districts reported hindrances, such as little support for new teachers. Rural district officials cited hindrances related to their size and isolated locations. State officials reported they needed assistance or information from Education, such as in developing incentives to teach in high-poverty schools, and Education's strategic plan addresses some of these needs. To help meet the requirement for highly qualified teachers, state survey respondents reported they planned to spend about 65 percent of their Title II funds on professional development activities authorized under Title II, and districts planned to spend an estimated 66 percent on recruitment and retention. Both state and district officials planned to spend much larger amounts of funds from sources other than Title II funds on such activities. High-poverty districts planned to spend more Title II funds on recruitment and retention than low-poverty districts. State and district officials visited said that most activities were a continuation of those begun previously. |
gao_GAO-15-630 | gao_GAO-15-630_0 | Also, we determined the status of corrective actions Treasury and OMB have taken to address open recommendations relating to their processes to prepare the CFS that were detailed in our previous reports. We performed our audit of the fiscal years 2014 and 2013 CFS in accordance with U.S. generally accepted government auditing standards. Control Deficiencies Identified during Our Fiscal Year 2014 Audit
During our audit of the fiscal year 2014 CFS, we identified three new internal control deficiencies in Treasury’s processes used to prepare the CFS. Specifically, we found that Treasury did not have (1) a sufficient process to work with key federal entities prior to the end of the fiscal year to reasonably assure that new or substantially revised federal accounting standards were consistently implemented by the entities to allow appropriate consolidation at the government-wide level, (2) procedures for determining whether entities and transactions for which it does not have audit assurance are significant in the aggregate to the CFS, and (3) sufficient procedures for (a) identifying significant increases or decreases in all CFS line items and disclosures from prior fiscal year reported amounts and (b) understanding the reasons for such changes. Status of Recommendations from Prior Reports
At the end of the fiscal year 2013 audit, 31 recommendations from our prior reports regarding control deficiencies in the processes used to prepare the CFS were open. While progress was made, 24 recommendations from our prior reports remained open as of February 19, 2015, the date of our report on the audit of the fiscal year 2014 CFS. We will continue to monitor Treasury’s and OMB’s progress in addressing our recommendations as part of our fiscal year 2015 CFS audit. Agency Comments
OMB Comments
In oral comments on a draft of this report, OMB generally concurred with the findings and recommendations of this report. Treasury also provided details on its ongoing efforts to address the material weaknesses that relate to the federal government’s processes used to prepare the CFS. Recommendation and
No. Count GAO-08-748 (results of the fiscal year 2007 audit) 16 07-9 The Secretary of the Treasury should direct the Fiscal Assistant Secretary, in coordination with the Controller of OMB’s Office of Federal Financial Management, to develop and implement effective processes for monitoring and assessing the effectiveness of internal control over the processes used to prepare the CFS. Legend: CFS= consolidated financial statements of the U.S. government; OMB = Office of Management and Budget; Treasury = Department of the Treasury. I is as of February 19, 2015, the date of our report on the audit of the fiscal year 2014 CFS. The recommendations in our prior reports related to material weaknesses in the following areas: Preparation: The material weakness related to the federal government’s inability to reasonably assure that the consolidated financial statements are (1) consistent with the underlying audited entities’ financial statements, (2) properly balanced, and (3) in accordance with U.S. GAAP. Budget statements: The material weakness related to the federal government’s inability to reasonably assure that the information in the Reconciliation of Net Operating Cost and Unified Budget Deficit and the Statement of Changes in Cash Balance from Unified Budget and Other Activities is complete and consistent with the underlying information in the audited entities’ financial statements and other financial data. Intragovernmental: The material weakness related to the federal government’s inability to adequately account for and reconcile intragovernmental activity and balances between federal entities. | Why GAO Did This Study
Treasury, in coordination with OMB, prepares the Financial Report of the United States Government , which contains the CFS. Since GAO's first audit of the fiscal year 1997 CFS, certain material weaknesses and other limitations on the scope of its work have prevented GAO from expressing an opinion on the accrual-based CFS. As part of the fiscal year 2014 CFS audit, GAO identified material weaknesses and other control deficiencies in the processes used to prepare the CFS. The purpose of this report is to provide (1) details on the control deficiencies GAO identified related to the processes used to prepare the CFS, along with related recommendations, and (2) the status of corrective actions Treasury and OMB have taken to address GAO's prior recommendations relating to the processes used to prepare the CFS that remained open at the end of the fiscal year 2013 audit.
What GAO Found
During its audit of the fiscal year 2014 consolidated financial statements of the U.S. government (CFS), GAO identified control deficiencies in the Department of the Treasury's (Treasury) and the Office of Management and Budget's (OMB) processes used to prepare the CFS. These control deficiencies contributed to material weaknesses in internal control over the federal government's ability to
adequately account for and reconcile intragovernmental activity and balances between federal entities;
reasonably assure that the consolidated financial statements are (1) consistent with the underlying audited entities' financial statements, (2) properly balanced, and (3) in accordance with U.S. generally accepted accounting principles; and
reasonably assure that the information in the Reconciliation of Net Operating Cost and Unified Budget Deficit and the Statement of Changes in Cash Balance from Unified Budget and Other Activities is complete and consistent with the underlying information in the audited entities' financial statements and other financial data.
During its audit of the fiscal year 2014 CFS, GAO identified three new internal control deficiencies. Specifically, GAO found that Treasury did not have
a sufficient process to work with key federal entities prior to the end of the fiscal year to reasonably assure that new or substantially revised federal accounting standards were consistently implemented by the entities to allow appropriate consolidation at the government-wide level,
procedures for determining whether entities and transactions for which it does not have audit assurance are significant in the aggregate to the CFS, and
sufficient procedures for (1) identifying significant increases or decreases in all CFS line items and disclosures from prior fiscal year reported amounts and (2) understanding the reasons for such changes.
In addition, GAO found that various other control deficiencies identified in previous years' audits with respect to the processes used to prepare the CFS continued to exist. Specifically, 24 of the 31 recommendations from GAO's prior reports regarding control deficiencies in the processes used to prepare the CFS remained open as of February 19, 2015, the date of GAO's report on its audit of the fiscal year 2014 CFS. GAO will continue to monitor the status of corrective actions taken to address the 3 new recommendations made in this report as well as the 24 open recommendations from prior years as part of its fiscal year 2015 CFS audit.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is making three new recommendations to Treasury to address the control deficiencies identified during the fiscal year 2014 CFS audit. In commenting on GAO's draft report, Treasury and OMB generally concurred with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-08-29 | gao_GAO-08-29_0 | 2). In addition to incursions, overruns are a runway safety concern. 5). Airport ramps are typically small, congested areas in which departing and arriving aircraft are serviced by ramp workers, including baggage, catering, and fueling personnel. Several FAA offices carry out these responsibilities, including the Air Traffic Organization, which manages air traffic control—including the hiring, training, and managing of more than 14,300 air traffic controllers—and develops and maintains runway safety technology; the Office of Runway Safety, created in 1999 as part of the Air Traffic Organization to lead and coordinate the agency’s runway safety efforts— including developing a national runway safety plan and metrics for runway safety—and evaluate the effectiveness of runway safety activities; the William J. Hughes Technical Center in Atlantic City, NJ, which conducts aviation safety research; the Office of Airports—which, as of July 2007, employed 45 safety inspectors to check airports’ compliance with regulations—develops standards for airport signage, markings, and lighting, and manages the agency’s Runway Safety Area Program to address runway overruns; the Office of Aviation Safety, which conducts safety inspections of airlines, audits air traffic safety issues, and administers a program to obtain information from pilots about the circumstances of runway incursions; and the Civil Aerospace Medical Institute in Oklahoma City, which conducts aerospace medical and human factors research. According to FAA, as of May 2007, 70 percent of the 1,014 runways at 573 commercial airports in the United States substantially comply with runway safety area standards, up from 55 percent in 2000. Technology currently being installed, ASDE- X, has experienced cost increases and schedule delays from its original baselines, and is encountering some operational difficulties. At the same time, additional technology to prevent runway collisions is years away from deployment. FAA officials said that it may take 2 to 3 years before controller overtime can be reduced at some facilities, as the agency acts to replace retiring controllers. FAA Has Not Implemented NTSB’s Runway Safety Recommendations
FAA has not implemented any of NTSB’s six runway incursion prevention recommendations, made in 2000, that FAA require all airports with scheduled passenger service to deploy a ground movement safety system that will prevent runway incursions and provide a direct warning capability to flight crews; require that all runway crossings be authorized by specific air traffic control clearance; require that, when aircraft need to cross multiple runways, air traffic controllers issue an explicit crossing instruction for each runway; discontinue the practice of allowing departing aircraft to hold on active runways at night or at any time when visibility conditions preclude arriving aircraft from seeing traffic on the runway in time to initiate a safe go-around maneuver; adopt an ICAO landing clearance procedure that forbids multiple landing clearances for the same runway; and require the use of ICAO phraseology for airport surface operations, and periodically emphasize to controllers the need to use this phraseology and to speak at reasonable rates when communicating with flight crews. Progress in Addressing Ramp Safety Is Affected by a Lack of Data and Standards, but the Industry Is Taking Action to Address these Issues
The aviation industry has made efforts in recent years to address the incidence of ramp accidents. Lack of Complete Accident Data Hinders Efforts to Address Ramp Safety
We found no source of comprehensive data on airport ramp accidents. We reviewed FAA, NTSB, and OSHA ramp fatality data from 2001 through 2006 and determined that these agencies investigated 29 fatal ramp accidents during that time. The federal government has generally taken an indirect role in addressing ramp safety. FAA is not working with the aviation industry and OSHA to help collect and analyze ramp accident data, which could identify the causes and circumstances of ramp accidents, and identify corrective actions. To accomplish this, we established the following questions: (1) What progress is being made in addressing runway safety, and what additional measures, if any, could be taken? We also determined the roles and responsibilities involving runway and ramp safety of FAA, NTSB, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), airports, and airlines. To determine the factors affecting progress in improving ramp safety and what is being done by FAA and others to address those factors, we interviewed officials from FAA, airports, and aviation industry organizations; members of the Airport Operations Safety Panel, an aviation industry group that issued reports on ramp accidents in 2004 and 2005; union officials representing ramp workers and pilots; and other individuals knowledgeable about ramp safety. | Why GAO Did This Study
While aviation accidents in the United States are relatively infrequent, recent incidents have heightened concerns about safety on airport runways and ramps. As the nation's aviation system becomes more crowded every day, increased congestion at airports may exacerbate ground safety concerns. To safely handle the anticipated larger volumes of air traffic, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) is implementing the Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen) to better manage air traffic both in the air and on the ground. GAO was asked to evaluate (1) the progress being made in addressing runway safety and what additional measures, if any, could be taken and (2) the factors affecting progress in improving ramp safety and what is being done by FAA and others to address those factors. We reviewed runway and ramp safety data, interviewed agency officials and industry stakeholders, and surveyed experts.
What GAO Found
FAA and aviation stakeholders have taken steps to address runway and ramp safety, including deploying and testing technology designed to prevent runway incursions, which occur when aircraft enter the runway without authorization, and overruns, which occur when aircraft run off the ends of runways; helping to change airport layout, markings, signage, and lighting; and providing training for pilots and air traffic controllers. In addition, FAA has made progress in addressing runway overruns and reports that 70 percent of the runways at U.S. commercial airports substantially comply with runway safety area standards, up from 55 percent in 2000. However, the rate of runway incursions has not decreased over the last 5 years. In addition, FAA has not prepared a national runway safety plan since 2002, despite agency policy that it be updated every 2 to 3 years, resulting in uncoordinated efforts within the agency. Runway safety technology currently being installed is experiencing some operational difficulties with its alerting function, while additional technology to prevent runway collisions is years away from deployment. FAA also lacks data on runway overruns that could be used to analyze the causes and circumstances of such incidents. Air traffic controller fatigue, which may result from regularly working overtime, continues to be a matter of concern for the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), which investigates transportation accidents, and other aviation stakeholders. Efforts to improve safety in airport ramp areas, where departing and arriving aircraft are serviced by baggage, catering, and fueling personnel, are hindered by a lack of complete accident data and standards for ground handling, but the aviation industry is taking steps to address these problems with the goal of reducing ramp accidents. Data from 2001 through 2006 from the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), which investigates occupational accidents, NTSB, and FAA indicated that these agencies had investigated 29 fatal ramp accidents during that time. The majority of the fatalities in these accidents were ramp workers. GAO found no comprehensive nonfatal injury data on ramp accidents and neither federal nor industrywide standards for ramp operations. The federal government has generally taken an indirect role overseeing ramp safety; airlines and airports typically control the ramp areas using their own policies and procedures. Meanwhile, some airlines and airports have initiated their own efforts to address ramp safety, and aviation organizations have begun collecting ramp accident data. |
gao_GAO-07-1194T | gao_GAO-07-1194T_0 | Difficult as it may seem to deal with these long-term challenges, policymakers must not only address these entitlement programs but also reexamine other budgetary priorities in light of the changing needs of this nation in the 21st century. Accordingly, reexamining the base of all major existing federal spending and tax programs, policies, and activities by reviewing their results and testing their continued relevance and relative priority for our changing society is an important step in the process of assuring fiscal responsibility and facilitating national renewal. Performance Budgeting Can Help Facilitate Reexamination
Performance budgeting can help enhance the government’s capacity to assess competing claims in the budget by arming budgetary decision makers with better information on the results of both individual programs as well as entire portfolios of policies, tools, and programs designed to address common outcomes. With GPRA as its centerpiece, the statutory and management framework laid out in the 1990s provided a foundation for strengthening government performance and accountability. As I have previously said, PMA and its related initiatives, including PART, demonstrate the Administration’s commitment to improving federal management and performance. Properly done, performance assessment and performance budgeting information produced by GPRA and PART could provide a strong basis to support the needed review, reassessment, and reprioritization process. Moreover, little is known about the performance of tax expenditures, which are often aimed at policy goals similar to those of federal spending programs, such as those intended to encourage economic development in disadvantaged areas, finance postsecondary education, and stimulate research and development. Lack of Congressional “Buy-in” and Participation Limits the Potential of Performance Budgeting Efforts
In order for performance budgeting and program reviews to hold appeal beyond the executive branch, and to actually have an impact on legislation, garnering congressional buy-in on what to measure and how to present this information is critical. We would urge as a next step a more comprehensive and consistent approach to evaluating all programs relevant to common goals. Such an approach would require assessing the performance of all programs related to a particular goal—including tax expenditures and regulatory programs—using a common framework. In some years, total tax expenditures have approximated the size of total discretionary spending. PART, OMB’s current framework for assessing the performance of federal programs, has generally not been applied to tax expenditures. | Why GAO Did This Study
As part of its work to improve the management and performance of the federal government, GAO monitors progress and continuing challenges in using performance information to inform budgetary choices (performance budgeting). In light of the nation's long-term fiscal imbalance and other 21st century challenges, we have reported that the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA) and performance budgeting can support needed reexamination of what the federal government does, how it does it, and who does it. GAO remains committed to working with Congress and the Administration to help address these important and complex issues.
What GAO Found
Reexamining the base of all major existing federal spending and tax programs, policies, and activities by reviewing their results and testing their continued relevance and relative priority for our changing society is an important step in the process of assuring fiscal responsibility and facilitating national renewal. Reexamination can arm decision makers with better information on both individual program results and entire portfolios of programs and tools-- encompassing a wide range of discretionary, entitlement, tax, and regulatory approaches--addressing common goals. GPRA provided a foundation for strengthening government performance and accountability. The President's Management Agenda and the Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART)--OMB's framework for assessing federal program performance--continue to build on GPRA's foundation. Properly done, these and future efforts--along with a set of Key National Indicators (KNI)--could provide a strong basis to support the needed review, reassessment, and reprioritization process. Moving forward, for performance budgeting and program reviews to hold appeal beyond the executive branch and actually have an impact on legislation, congressional buy-in on what to measure and how to present this information is critical. In addition, tax expenditures result in forgone revenue that in some years has approximated the size of total discretionary spending. Yet relatively little is known about the effectiveness of these provisions, which are often aimed at policy goals similar to those of federal spending programs. To date, PART has generally not been applied to tax expenditures. GAO continues to urge as a next step a more comprehensive and consistent approach to evaluating all programs relevant to common goals. This would require assessing the performance of all programs related to a particular goal--including tax expenditures--using a common framework. |
gao_T-GGD-97-183 | gao_T-GGD-97-183_0 | Specifically, my testimony focuses on three principal issues: (1) the process, policies, and workload standards that the Judicial Conference of the United States used to assess the bankruptcy districts’ requests for additional bankruptcy judgeships; (2) how the Judiciary applied its policies and workload standards across the districts that requested bankruptcy judgeships; and (3) the extent of noncase-related travel in 1995 and 1996 by bankruptcy judges in the 14 districts for which the Judicial Conference of the United States has requested bankruptcy judgeships in 1997. In brief, we found that the Bankruptcy Committee and the Judicial Conference generally followed the Judicial Conference’s process and policies and consistently applied the Conference’s statistical workload standards in assessing individual district’s requests for additional judgeships in 1993, 1995, and 1997. Neither the Committee nor the Conference approved any request for additional judgeships from districts that did not meet this minimum standard. According to officials at the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts (AOUSC), neither the Committee nor the Judicial Conference keeps written documentation on how other available data, such as case management practices or a district’s geography (travel distances between places of holding court), were used in assessing districts’ judgeship requests. AOUSC officials also stated that the use of data other than weighted case filings in assessing judgeship needs is inherently judgmental. In assessing a bankruptcy judge’s workload, the Judicial Conference assumes that a bankruptcy judge will spend, on average, about 30 percent of his or her time—about 600 hours, or 75 work days per year—on noncase-related matters, such as travel, training, administrative affairs, and general case management activities that cannot be attributed to a specific case. We received information on noncase-related travel from 80 of the 84 authorized judges in the 15 districts that would receive or share 1 of the judgeships requested in 1997. These 80 judges reported a total of 416 noncase-related trips in 1995 and 403 in 1996. On the basis of the information reported, we calculated that overall these judges each used an average of 12.5 work days for noncase-related travel in each of these years. About 98 percent of these trips were made to destinations within the United States. Together, circuit or district meetings and activities; Judicial Conference meetings and activities; and workshops, seminars, and other activities sponsored by AOUSC or the Federal Judicial Center (FJC), accounted for about 66 percent of all noncase-related trips and about 74 percent of all noncase-related travel workdays in 1995. Comparable figures for 1996 were about 67 percent and about 73 percent, respectively. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. The amount of time devoted to noncase-related travel could potentially affect the amount of time judges have to devote to work on individual cases. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed the federal judiciary's assessment of its bankruptcy judgeship needs in the 1993, 1995, and 1997 assessment cycles.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) the Judicial Conference's Bankruptcy Committee and the Judicial Conference generally followed the Conference's process and policies, and consistently applied the Conference's workload standards in assessing individual districts' requests for additional judgeships; (2) neither the Committtee nor the Conference approved any request for additional judgeships from districts whose weighted case filings did not meet the minimum standard; (3) the Bankruptcy Committee also asked that districts requesting judgeships provide information on several factors, other than weighted filings, that may affect their need for additional judges; (4) according to officials at the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts (AOUSC), neither the Committee nor the Conference keeps written documentation on how the available data were used in assessing judgeship requests; (5) according to AOUSC, the use of such information is inherently judgmental; (6) time devoted to noncase-related travel could affect the time judges have to devote to individual cases; (7) in assessing bankruptcy judges' workload, the Judicial Conference assumes that a bankruptcy judge will spend, on average, about 30 percent of his or her time-about 600 hours, or 75 work days per year-on noncase-related matters; (8) GAO received information on non-case related travel from 80 of the 84 authorized judges in the 15 districts that would receive or share one of the judgeships requested in 1997; (9) these 80 judges reported a total of 416 noncase-related trips in 1995 and 403 in 1996, and GAO calculated that they each traveled an average of 12.5 work days for non case-related travel in each of these years; (10) about 98 percent of these trips were made to destinations within the United States; (11) together, circuit or district meetings and activities, Judicial Conference meetings and activities, and workshops, seminars, and other activities sponsored by the AOUSC or the Federal Judicial Center, accounted for about 66 percent of all trips and 74 percent of all non-case related travel workdays in 1995; and (12) comparable figures for 1996 were about 67 percent and about 73 percent, respectively. |
gao_GAO-14-543 | gao_GAO-14-543_0 | Scope and Methodology
As part of our audit of the fiscal years 2013 and 2012 CFS, we considered the federal government’s financial reporting procedures and related internal control. Also, we determined the status of corrective actions taken by Treasury and OMB to address open recommendations relating to the processes used by them to prepare the CFS that were detailed in our previous reports. Control Deficiencies Identified during Our Fiscal Year 2013 Audit
During our audit of the fiscal year 2013 CFS, we identified several new internal control deficiencies in Treasury’s and OMB’s processes used to prepare the CFS. Specifically, we found that (1) Treasury’s and OMB’s corrective action plans are not adequate to reasonably assure that internal control deficiencies involving the processes used to prepare the CFS are efficiently and effectively addressed, (2) Treasury does not have procedures to sufficiently document management’s conclusions and the basis for such conclusions regarding accounting policies for the CFS, and (3) Treasury does not have adequate procedures for verifying staff’s preparation of the narrative within the notes to the CFS to reasonably assure that the narrative is accurate and supported by the underlying financial information of the significant component entities. We also updated the description of the control deficiencies related to the long- standing material weakness regarding the federal government’s inability to adequately account for and reconcile intragovernmental activity and balances between federal entities. Without well-defined corrective action plans, Treasury’s and OMB’s efforts to address the numerous issues involving the processes used to prepare the CFS will be hampered. A summary of the significant accounting policies for the CFS is disclosed in Note 1 to the CFS, as required by U.S. generally accepted accounting principles. Status of Recommendations from Prior Reports
Of our 37 recommendations from our prior reports regarding control deficiencies in the processes used to prepare the CFS that were open at the end of the fiscal year 2012 audit, we closed 13 recommendations during our fiscal year 2013 audit. We closed the other 6 recommendations, which were related to intragovernmental activity and balances, by making 4 new recommendations in this report that are better aligned with the current status of the remaining internal control deficiencies associated with the federal government’s inability to adequately account for and reconcile intragovernmental activity and balances between federal entities and reflect certain actions taken by Treasury. Twenty-four recommendations from our prior reports remained open as of February 19, 2014, the date of our report on the audit of the fiscal year 2013 CFS. We will continue to monitor Treasury’s and OMB’s progress in addressing our recommendations as part of our fiscal year 2014 CFS audit. As the Department of the Treasury (Treasury) is designing its new financial statement compilation process to begin with the fiscal year 2004 consolidated financial statements of the U.S. government (CFS), the Secretary of the Treasury should direct the Fiscal Assistant Secretary, in coordination with the Controller of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), to develop reconciliation procedures that will aid in understanding and controlling the net position balance as well as eliminate the plugs previously associated with compiling the CFS. Treasury is committed to continuing its efforts to address the remaining control deficiencies in this area. Count 17
Recommendation The Secretary of the Treasury should direct the Fiscal Assistant Secretary, in coordination with the Controller of OMB, to modify Treasury’s plans for the new closing package to (1) require federal agencies to directly link their audited financial statement notes to the CFS notes and (2) provide the necessary information to demonstrate that all of the five principal consolidated financial statements are consistent with the underlying information in federal agencies’ audited financial statements and other financial data. | Why GAO Did This Study
Treasury, in coordination with OMB, prepares the Financial Report of the United States Government , which contains the CFS. Since GAO's first audit of the fiscal year 1997 CFS, certain material weaknesses and other limitations on the scope of its work have prevented GAO from expressing an opinion on the accrual-based CFS. As part of the fiscal year 2013 CFS audit, GAO identified material weaknesses and other control deficiencies in the processes used to prepare the CFS. The purpose of this report is to (1) provide details on the control deficiencies GAO identified related to the processes used to prepare the CFS, (2) recommend improvements, and (3) provide the status of corrective actions taken by Treasury and OMB to address GAO's prior recommendations relating to the processes used to prepare the CFS that remained open at the end of the fiscal year 2012 audit.
What GAO Found
During its audit of the fiscal year 2013 consolidated financial statements of the U.S. government (CFS), GAO identified control deficiencies in the Department of the Treasury's (Treasury) and the Office of Management and Budget's (OMB) processes used to prepare the CFS. These control deficiencies contributed to material weaknesses in internal control over the federal government's ability to
adequately account for and reconcile intragovernmental activity and balances between federal entities;
ensure that the federal government's accrual-based consolidated financial statements were (1) consistent with the underlying audited entities' financial statements, (2) properly balanced, and (3) in conformity with U.S. generally accepted accounting principles; and
ensure the consistency of (1) information used by Treasury to compute the budget deficit reported in the consolidated financial statements, (2) Treasury's records of cash transactions, and (3) information reported in federal entity financial statements and underlying financial information and records.
Specifically, for fiscal year 2013, GAO found that
Treasury's and OMB's corrective action plans are not adequate to reasonably assure that internal control deficiencies involving the processes used to prepare the CFS are efficiently and effectively addressed,
Treasury does not have procedures to sufficiently document management's conclusions and the basis for such conclusions regarding the accounting policies for the CFS, and
Treasury does not have adequate procedures for verifying staff's preparation of the narrative within the notes to the CFS to reasonably assure that the narrative is accurate and supported by the underlying financial information of the significant component entities.
GAO also updated the description of the control deficiencies related to the long-standing material weakness regarding the federal government's inability to adequately account for and reconcile intragovernmental activity and balances between federal entities. GAO closed 6 recommendations from prior GAO reports and made 4 new recommendations that are better aligned with the remaining internal control deficiencies in this area. In addition, GAO found that various other control deficiencies identified in previous years' audits with respect to the processes used to prepare the CFS continued to exist. Specifically, 24 of the 37 recommendations from GAO's prior reports regarding control deficiencies in the processes used to prepare the CFS remained open as of February 19, 2014, the date of GAO's report on its audit of the fiscal year 2013 CFS. GAO will continue to monitor the status of corrective actions taken to address the 7 new recommendations as well as the 24 open recommendations from prior years as part of its fiscal year 2014 CFS audit.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is making seven new recommendations—five to both Treasury and OMB and two to Treasury—to address the control deficiencies identified by GAO during the fiscal year 2013 CFS audit. In commenting on GAO's draft, Treasury and OMB generally concurred with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-14-561 | gao_GAO-14-561_0 | Under the act, FDA has the authority to issue regulations controlling the manufacture, marketing, and distribution of tobacco products. FDA executes its regulatory authority under the Tobacco Control Act through CTP. The act established three pathways for FDA’s review of new tobacco product submissions: (1) the Substantial Equivalence (SE) pathway, which is for new tobacco products that have the same characteristics as a predicate tobacco product that is already legally marketed or has different characteristics that do not raise different questions of public health; (2) the Exemption from SE pathway, which is for new tobacco products with minor modification of another product marketed by the same manufacturer; and (3) the Premarket Tobacco Product Application (PMTA) pathway, which is for new tobacco products that do not meet the criteria for the other two pathways. Tobacco User Fees
The Tobacco Control Act requires FDA to assess user fees on manufacturers and importers of tobacco products that are subject to FDA regulation based on their market share and specifies that tobacco user fees can only be applied toward FDA activities related to the regulation of tobacco products.collected is specified in the act for each fiscal year, beginning in fiscal year 2009 (see table 2), and the total amount does not vary based on the number of tobacco products under regulation. FDA Spent 79 Percent of User Fees Collected, Mostly in Fiscal Year 2013
As of March 31, 2014, FDA spent about $1.48 billion (79 percent) of the $1.88 billion in tobacco user fees collected (see fig. Most Spending Was for Public Education, Regulatory Science, and Compliance and Enforcement Activities
About 79 percent ($1.17 billion) of user fees spent as of March 31, 2014, on tobacco-related activities was for activities related to public education, regulatory science—which includes product research, product review, and regulation and guidance support—and compliance and enforcement. FDA’s regulatory science activities also include developing the scientific basis to support regulations and guidance for the tobacco industry, including proposed regulations to deem additional tobacco products to be subject to FDA’s authority and guidance on reporting and submission review. Compliance and Enforcement Activities
FDA’s tobacco compliance and enforcement activities have been focused on (1) tobacco retailer inspections; (2) inspections and enforcement of domestic manufacturers and imported tobacco products, and determinations of eligible predicate products in SE submissions; (3) surveillance and review of tobacco promotions, advertising, and labeling; and (4) outreach and small business assistance. FDA Encountered Challenges As It Established CTP, Including Setting Review Time Frames
FDA faced challenges related to starting up a new center, which affected CTP’s efforts to educate the public, build the regulatory science base, and enforce the new law and regulations. While FDA officials indicated that the agency has taken steps to address some of the challenges it faced— such as those related to contracting and staffing—challenges related to building the scientific basis for regulating a previously unregulated product and setting review time frames remain. The agency has indicated that it intends to identify and implement performance measures for these provisional SE submissions as it gains more experience reviewing them. This will be particularly pressing as FDA moves forward with plans to deem additional types of tobacco products to be subject to its regulatory authority, which has the potential to generate a substantial number of new submissions requiring review. Agency Comments
We provided a draft of this report to HHS for comment, and its comments are reproduced in appendix IV. HHS agreed with the need for performance measures related to its new tobacco product review process. | Why GAO Did This Study
Tobacco use is the leading cause of preventable death and disease in the United States. In 2009, the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act (Tobacco Control Act) granted FDA, an agency within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), authority to regulate tobacco products, including marketing and distribution to youth. The act established CTP, which implements the act by educating the public on the dangers of tobacco use; developing the science needed for tobacco regulation; and developing and enforcing regulations on the manufacture, marketing, and distribution of tobacco products. The act authorized FDA to assess and collect user fees from tobacco manufacturers and importers.
The Tobacco Control Act mandated that GAO review the authority and resources provided to FDA for regulating the manufacture, marketing, and distribution of tobacco products. This report examines (1) how FDA spent tobacco user fees for key activities using its authorities granted in the act, and (2) any challenges FDA encountered in using its authorities. GAO analyzed data on tobacco user fees collected and spent on key activities by FDA as of March 31, 2014; reviewed documents related to FDA's key activities, as well as relevant laws, regulations, and guidance; and interviewed CTP, public health, and tobacco industry officials.
HHS reviewed a draft of this report and agreed with GAO's reiteration of its previous recommendation that performance measures for all tobacco product reviews are needed.
What GAO Found
As of March 31, 2014, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) spent about $1.48 billion (79 percent) of the $1.88 billion in total tobacco user fees it collected since fiscal year 2009. FDA spent the majority of tobacco user fees on key activities led by the agency's Center for Tobacco Products (CTP), which is funded solely by tobacco user fees. These included activities related to public education (including public education campaigns and communicating CTP activities); regulatory science (including research, product review, and developing the science to support regulations and guidance); and compliance and enforcement (including tobacco retailer inspections; manufacturer and import inspections and enforcement; promotion, advertising, and labeling surveillance; and outreach and small business assistance).
While FDA has taken steps to address some of the challenges it has faced, including challenges related to starting up a new center, it continues to face challenges, including setting and monitoring review time frames. Until recently, CTP has not had performance measures for making final decisions on new tobacco product submissions by which to assess its progress, as GAO previously recommended. FDA has announced performance measures for two of its new tobacco product review processes (to take effect in October 2014), but not for the type of new tobacco product submission that comprises the bulk of FDA's review backlog. The agency has indicated that it intends to establish such performance measures, but until it does so, the agency's ability to assess its efforts will be limited. This will be particularly pressing as FDA moves forward with plans to deem additional types of tobacco products to be subject to its regulatory authority. |
gao_GAO-14-749 | gao_GAO-14-749_0 | The Navy plans on fielding one anti-submarine warfare (ASW) increment and four mine countermeasures (MCM) and surface warfare (SUW) increments. Initial Deployment and Further Testing Yielded Additional Learning about LCS Systems and Capabilities, but Gaps in Knowledge Remain
Since July 2013, the Navy has made progress demonstrating and testing various facets of LCS systems and capability but significant gaps remain in the Navy’s knowledge of how the LCS will operate and what capabilities it will provide the Navy. The deployment to Singapore provided the Navy with an opportunity to examine key LCS concepts operationally, including: the ship’s smaller manning profile, rotational crewing, and use of off-ship maintenance and support. The deployment was limited because only one of the two variants carrying one mission package was deployed, and mechanical problems prevented USS Freedom from spending as much time as planned underway—that is, at sea unanchored and not at port. As a result, some key concepts could not be demonstrated. The Navy has also completed additional developmental testing on the seaframes and mission packages, which has enabled the Navy to characterize performance of some systems, but many capabilities have not been demonstrated in an operational environment. Outstanding Weight Management and Concurrency Risks Continue to Complicate LCS Acquisition
Although the Navy has gained knowledge related to LCS capabilities and concepts since our July 2013 report, there continue to be significant acquisition risks to the program. Initial LCS seaframes face limitations resulting from weight growth during construction of the first several ships. This weight growth has required the Navy to make compromises on performance of LCS 1 and LCS 2 and may complicate existing plans to make additional changes to each seaframe design. Compounding these issues, the Navy has not received complete or accurate weight reports from the LCS seaframe prime contractors—and the Navy’s lengthy review process has hindered a timely resolution. As is depicted, there are several seaframes that do not have the required amount of service life remaining due to weight growth. These studies have not yet been completed. According to Navy officials, reviews of weight reports now take less than 6 months. Risk of LCS Concurrency Remains—with Mission Package Procurement Exceeding Levels Needed for Operational Testing
As we previously reported, the Navy’s acquisition approach to the LCS program involves a significant degree of concurrency; that is, the Navy is buying the ships while key concepts and performance are still being tested. As shown in figure 4, we found that a number of significant test events as outlined in the TEMP will not be completed in time to inform the development or release of a request for proposals or the award of follow- on contract(s), or they will be completed on one variant but not both. In addition, the Navy’s recent decision to accelerate the acquisition of mission packages further limits the flexibility that the program will have to adjust to any problems that may arise during operational testing. Recommendations for Executive Action
1. Have completed rough water, ship shock, and total ship survivability testing; and c. Have completed initial operational test and evaluation of the SUW mission package on the Freedom variant and the MCM mission package on the Independence variant. 2. In its written comments, which are included in appendix IV, DOD partially agreed with our recommendations to complete certain testing and deployment activities before approving the release of the request for proposals for future seaframes. DOD agreed with our recommendations related to seaframe weight management. Specifically, the service life allowance for weight is deficient by 30 tons. 3) A certification that the Joint Requirements Oversight Council— a) has reviewed the capabilities of the legacy systems that the Littoral Combat Ship is planned to replace and has compared such capabilities to the capabilities to be provided by the Littoral Combat Ship; b) has assessed the adequacy of the current capabilities development document for the Littoral Combat Ship to meet the requirements of the combatant commands and to address future threats as reflected in the latest assessment by the defense intelligence community; and c) has either validated the current capabilities development document or directed the Secretary to update the current capabilities development document based on the performance of the Littoral Combat Ship and mission modules to date. | Why GAO Did This Study
LCS represents an innovative approach to Navy acquisitions and operations, consisting of a ship—called a seaframe—and reconfigurable mission packages. These packages provide combat capability to perform three primary missions: surface warfare; mine countermeasures; and anti-submarine warfare. The Navy plans to buy no more than 32 seaframes in two variants from two shipyards, and 64 mission packages, with an estimated acquisition cost of over $25 billion in 2010 dollars. GAO was mandated to examine elements related to the LCS program. This report examines (1) knowledge that the Navy has gained since GAO issued a report on the LCS program in July 2013 and (2) outstanding acquisition risks with the LCS program. GAO analyzed key documents, including test and weight reports, and interviewed Navy officials responsible for the LCS deployment and program officials. This report is a public version of a sensitive but unclassified report issued in April 2014.
What GAO Found
Since July 2013, the Navy has continued to demonstrate and test various facets of Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) systems and capability, but important questions remain about how LCS will operate and what capabilities it will provide the Navy. The first operational deployment of an LCS to Singapore gave the Navy an opportunity to examine key LCS concepts operationally. The deployment was limited to only one of the two variants carrying one of three mission packages. In addition, mechanical problems prevented the ship from spending as much time operationally as planned. As a result, some key concepts could not be tested. The Navy has completed some additional testing on the seaframes and mission packages, which has enabled the Navy to characterize performance of some systems, but performance has not yet been demonstrated in an operational environment.
Outstanding weight management and concurrency risks related to buying ships while key concepts and performance are still being tested continue to complicate LCS acquisitions. Initial LCS seaframes face capability limitations resulting from weight growth during construction. This weight growth has resulted in the first two ships not meeting performance requirements for sprint speed and/or endurance, as well as potentially complicating existing plans to make additional changes to each seaframe design. Several seaframes now do not have the required amount of service life allowance—margin to accommodate future changes without removing weight over the ship's lifetime—but Navy officials said they have a plan to recover the service life allowance on the Independence class variant.
b
The Navy has not received accurate or complete weight reports from the seaframe prime contractors, and the Navy's lengthy review process has hindered a timely resolution of the Navy's concerns. Additionally, a number of significant test events, including rough water, shock and total ship survivability trials, will not be completed in time to inform upcoming acquisition decisions—including future contract decisions. Finally, the Navy's recent decision to accelerate low rate initial production of mission packages above the quantity necessary for operational testing limits the flexibility that the program will have to adjust to any problems that may arise during operational testing.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the Navy (1) demonstrate certain capabilities for both LCS seaframe variants before the Navy is approved for future contract awards and (2) ensure a timely review of contractor seaframe weight reports and take actions to make contractors more responsive to comments on the reports' content. DOD agreed with the weight report recommendation and partially agreed with the other, noting that it intends to complete as much testing as possible—but not all—before releasing the request for proposals for future contracts. |
gao_GAO-07-681T | gao_GAO-07-681T_0 | 1). TSA Has Made Progress since September 2006 in Implementing the TWIC Program
Since we issued our report on the TWIC program in September 2006, TSA has made progress toward implementing the TWIC program and addressing several of the problems that we previously identified regarding contract oversight and planning and coordination with stakeholders. In January 2007, TSA and the Coast Guard issued a TWIC rule that sets forth the requirements for enrolling workers and issuing TWIC cards to workers in the maritime sector and awarded a $70 million contract for enrolling workers in the TWIC program. TSA is also taking steps designed to address requirements in the SAFE Port Act regarding the TWIC program, such as establishing a rollout schedule for enrolling workers and issuing TWIC cards at ports and conducting a pilot program to test TWIC access control technologies. Since September 2006, TSA reported that it has added staff with program and contract management expertise to help oversee the TWIC enrollment contract and taken additional steps to help ensure that contract requirements are met. In addition, TSA has also focused on improving communication and coordination with maritime stakeholders, such as developing plans for conducting public outreach and education efforts. TSA and Industry Stakeholders Need to Address Challenges to Ensure the TWIC Program Is Implemented Successfully
TSA and maritime industry stakeholders need to address several challenges to ensure that the TWIC program can be implemented successfully. As we reported in September 2006, TSA and its enrollment contractor face the challenge of transitioning from limited testing of the TWIC program to successful implementation of the program on a much larger scale covering 770,000 workers at about 3,500 maritime facilities and 5,300 vessels. Maritime stakeholders we spoke to identified additional challenges to implementing the TWIC program that warrant attention by TSA and its enrollment contractor, including educating workers on the new TWIC requirements, ensuring that enrollments begin in a timely manner, and processing numerous background checks, appeals, and waiver applications. Furthermore, TSA and industry stakeholders also face difficult challenges in ensuring that TWIC access control technologies will work effectively in the maritime environment, be compatible with TWIC cards that will be issued soon, and balance security with the flow of maritime commerce. Conclusion
Preventing unauthorized persons from entering secure areas of the nation’s ports and other transportation facilities is critical to preventing a terrorist attack. While TSA plans to begin enrolling workers and issuing TWIC cards in the next few months, it is important that the agency establish clear and reasonable timeframes for implementing TWIC. Finally, it will be critical that TSA ensure that the TWIC access control technology pilot program fully test all aspects of the TWIC program on a full scale in the maritime environment and the results be used to ensure a successful implementation of these technologies in the future. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is developing the Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC) to ensure that only workers that do not pose a terrorist threat are allowed to enter secure areas of the nation's transportation facilities. This testimony is based primarily on GAO's December 2004 and September 2006 reports on the TWIC program and interviews with TSA and port officials conducted in March and April 2007 to obtain updates on the TWIC program. Specifically, this testimony addresses (1) the progress TSA has made since September 2006 in implementing the TWIC program; and (2) some of the remaining challenges that TSA and the maritime industry must overcome to ensure the successful implementation of the TWIC program.
What GAO Found
Since we issued our report on the TWIC program in September 2006, TSA has made progress toward implementing the TWIC program and addressing several of the problems that we previously identified regarding contract oversight and planning and coordination with stakeholders. Specifically, TSA has issued a TWIC rule that sets forth the requirements for enrolling workers and issuing TWIC cards to workers in the maritime sector; awarded a $70 million dollar contract for enrolling workers in the TWIC program; developed a schedule for enrolling workers and issuing TWIC cards at ports and conducting a pilot program to test TWIC access control technologies; added additional staff with program and contract management expertise to help oversee the TWIC enrollment contract; and developed plans to improve communication and coordination with maritime stakeholders, including plans for conducting public outreach and education efforts. TSA and maritime industry stakeholders still face several challenges to ensuring that the TWIC program can be implemented successfully: (1) TSA and its enrollment contractor need to transition from limited testing of the TWIC program to successful implementation of the program on a much larger scale covering 770,000 workers at about 3,500 maritime facilities and 5,300 vessels. (2) TSA and its enrollment contractor will need to educate workers on the new TWIC requirements, ensure that enrollments begin in a timely manner, and process numerous background checks, appeals, and waivers. (3) TSA and industry stakeholders will need to ensure that TWIC access control technologies will work effectively in the maritime environment, be compatible with TWIC cards that will be issued, and balance security with the flow of maritime commerce. As TSA works to implement the TWIC program and begin enrolling workers, it will be important that the agency establish clear and reasonable time frames and ensure that all aspects of the TWIC program, including the TWIC access control technologies, are fully tested in the maritime environment. |
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