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gao_GAO-11-333 | gao_GAO-11-333_0 | Likewise, the percentage of private- sector wage and salary workers, aged 25–64 participating in a plan fell from more than 50 percent in 2000 to 44 percent in 2008. Even though employers created more than 179,000 new plans from 2003 to 2007, the Department of Labor estimates a slight increase overall in the total number of plans from about 697,000 to only about 705,000 in the same period (see fig.1). Most of the new plans private employers created were small—about 173,000 new plans had fewer than 100 participants (about 96 percent of plans) and only about 6,000 plans had 100 participants or more (see fig. 2). Most new DB plans were even smaller than new DC plans. DC Participants with High-Incomes and Other Assets Benefited the Most from Increases in Contribution Limits
High Earners More Likely to Make DC Contributions above Statutory Limits
Based on the 2007 SCF, about 5 percent of more than 40 million DC participants contributed at or above the statutory limits for tax deferred contributions. 4). We estimated that about 72 percent of them had individual earnings at the 90th percentile ($126,000) or above for all DC participants. Increases in the Limits Have Primarily Benefited High-Income Workers
High-income workers have been the primary beneficiaries of recent increases in the limits on both individual employee contributions and combined employer and employee contributions, as well as the introduction of the catch-up contribution provision. When we compared 2007 contributions to the 2001 limits, we found that an estimated 14 percent of participants in 2007 contributed at or above the 2001 limits and these participants held an estimated 41 percent of all DC savings in 2007. Modifications to the Saver’s Credit Could Improve Retireme nt Income for Some Low-Income Workers
Incentives to Help Low Income Workers That Could Be Implemented through the Saver’s Credit
Experts we spoke with cited several options that could further encourage low-income workers to save for retirement, although each of them would create additional cost for the federal government. Provide a refundable tax credit. The Long-Term Effects of the Recent Financial Crisis on Retirement Income Security Remain Uncertain and Will Vary Widely Among Individuals
The long-term effects of the recent financial crisis on retirement income security are uncertain, but research suggests that the effects will vary widely for individuals based on factors such as age, type of pension plan, and employment status. For those who have been able to participate in an employer-sponsored pension plan throughout the financial crisis and recession, their benefit or accounts at retirement may or may not be significantly affected. Impact on DB Plans
The effects of the financial crisis and recession are different for DB plan participants than for DC plan participants, but also pose challenges to retirement security. Long-term unemployment has increased significantly as well. The biggest risk DB plan participants face with regard to retirement income is likely from unemployment. Recent trends demonstrate that the slow growth in the number of retirement plans—as new plan formation barely exceeds plan terminations—may continue to lead to many workers continuing to work at employers that do not offer a plan and thus remain without access to the associated tax benefits of employer-sponsored pension plans. For DC plans, a disproportionate share of these tax incentives accrues to higher income earners. Each provided technical comments which we incorporated as appropriate. Appendix I: Methodology
To analyze trends in new private pension plan formation in recent years, we analyzed Form 5500 filings, which the Internal Revenue Service, Department of Labor (Labor), and the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation require most private tax-qualified pension plan sponsors to file. To identify if a new defined benefit (DB) plan sponsor also offered a defined contribution (DC) plan, we used the plan sponsors’ employer identification numbers. We also conducted electronic data testing to assess missing data and other potential problems. To analyze how suggested incentives to increase retirement saving by low- income workers might affect retirement income, we used the Policy Simulation Group’s (PSG) microsimulation models to run various simulations of workers saving in DC plans over a career, changing various inputs to model different scenarios for modifying the Saver’s Credit. In addition, for this and all of the objectives we reviewed relevant federal laws and regulations. For annuity recipients in the lowest earnings quartile, the range was 75–81 percent. Private Pensions: Low Defined Contribution Plan Savings May Pose Challenges to Retirement Security, Especially for Many Low-Income Workers. | Why GAO Did This Study
Despite sizeable tax incentives, private pension participation has remained at about 50 percent of the workforce. For those in a pension plan, there is concern that these incentives accrue primarily to higher income employees and do relatively little to help lower income workers save for retirement. The financial crisis and labor-market downturn may have exacerbated these difficulties. Therefore, we examined (1) recent trends in new private pension plan formation, (2) the characteristics of defined contribution plan participants contributing at or above statutory limits, (3) how suggested options to modify an existing credit for low-income workers might affect their retirement income, and (4) the long-term effects of the recent financial crisis on retirement savings. To answer these questions, GAO reviewed reports, federal regulations, and laws, and interviewed academics, agency officials, and other relevant experts. We also analyzed Department of Labor and 2007 Survey of Consumer Finance (SCF) data, and used a microsimulation model to assess effects of modifying tax incentives for low-income workers. We incorporated technical comments from the departments of Labor and Treasury, the Internal Revenue Service, and the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation as appropriate.
What GAO Found
Net new plan formation in recent years has been very small, with the total number of single employer private pension plans increasing about 1 percent from about 697,000 in 2003 to 705,000 in 2007. Although employers created almost 180,000 plans over this period, this formation was largely offset by plan terminations or mergers. About 92 percent of newly formed plans were defined contribution (DC) plans, with the rest being defined benefit (DB) plans. New plans were generally small, with about 96 percent having fewer than 100 participants. Regarding the small percentage of new DB plans, professional groups such as doctors, lawyers, and dentists sponsored about 43 percent of new small DB plans, and more than 55 percent of new DB plan sponsors also sponsored DC plans. The low net growth of private retirement plans is a concern in part because workers without employer-sponsored plans do not benefit as fully from tax incentives as workers that have employer-sponsored plans. Furthermore, the benefits of new DB plans disproportionately benefit workers at a few types of professional firms. Most individuals who contributed at or above the 2007 statutory limits for DC contributions tended to have earnings that were at the 90th percentile ($126,000) or above for all DC participants, according to our analysis of the 2007 SCF. Similarly, consistent with findings from our past work, high-income workers have benefited the most from increases in the limits between 2001 and 2007. Finally, we found that men were about three times as likely as women to make so-called catch-up contributions when DC participants age 50 and older were allowed to contribute an extra $5,000 to their plans. We found that several modifications to the Saver's Credit--a tax credit for low-income workers who make contributions to a DC plan--could provide a sizeable increase in retirement income for some low wage workers, although this group is small. For example, under our most generous scenario, Saver's Credit recipients who fell in the lowest earnings quartile experienced a 14 percent increase in annual retirement income from DC savings, on average. The long-term effects of the financial crisis on retirement income are uncertain and will likely vary widely. For those still employed and participating in a plan, the effects are unclear. Data are limited, and while financial markets have recovered much of their losses from 2008, it is not fully known yet how participants will adjust their contributions and asset allocations in response to market volatility in the future. In contrast, although data are again limited, the unemployed, especially the long-term unemployed, may be at risk of experiencing significant declines in retirement income as contributions cease and the probability of drawing down retirement accounts for other needs likely increases. The potential troubling consequences of the financial crisis may be obscuring long standing concerns over the ability of the employer-provided pension system in helping moderate and low-income workers, including those with access to a plan, save enough for retirement. |
gao_GAO-01-788 | gao_GAO-01-788_0 | Conclusions
The U.N. headquarters complex clearly needs to be renovated, and the Secretary-General will ask member states to make key decisions in 2002 about the future of the renovation. As host country to U.N. headquarters, the United States needs to play a major role in making these decisions if the renovation is to proceed. However, the administration and State have not yet developed a comprehensive U.S. position on the renovation. Assuming the United States decides to support the renovation, it needs considerable lead time to examine the issues, including what scope of renovation meets U.N. and U.S. needs in the 21st century, what share of the renovation costs would the United States be willing to provide, and what process is needed to ensure that the construction is cost-effective and timely. One option for examining these issues would be to establish a team comprised of experts on construction management and U.N. issues, using appropriate administration resources from State, the National Academy of Sciences, and the General Services Administration. | What GAO Found
The United Nations' (U.N.) headquarters in New York clearly needs to be renovated, and the Secretary-General will ask member states to make key decisions in 2002 about the future of the renovation. As host country to U.N. headquarters, the United States needs to play a major role in making these decisions if the renovation is to proceed. However, the administration and the Department of State have not yet developed a comprehensive U.S. position on the renovation. Assuming the United States decides to support the renovation, it needs considerable lead time to examine the issues, including what scope of renovation meets U.N. and U.S. needs in the 21st century, what share of the renovation costs would the United States be willing to provide, and what process is needed to ensure that the construction is cost-effective and timely. One option for examining these issues would be to establish a team comprised of experts on construction management and U.N. issues, using appropriate administration resources from State, the National Academy of Sciences, and the General Services Administration. |
gao_GAO-08-737T | gao_GAO-08-737T_0 | SSA projects that the benefit payments and number of beneficiaries for the three programs will increase in fiscal years 2008 and 2009 (see tables 1 and 2). Field offices, which served approximately 42 million customers in fiscal year 2007, are a vital component for delivering SSA services to the public. Figure 1 shows the various options by which customers may conduct their business with SSA. Field Offices Largely Met Work Demands with Fewer Staff, but Staffing Reductions May Have Contributed to Some Adverse Effects
Despite operating with fewer staff from fiscal year 2005 to 2007 and an increased demand for services, field offices largely met work demands; however, staffing reductions may have contributed to some adverse effects. SSA and its field offices used various strategies to manage work demands, such as sharing work among offices, redirecting staff to serve critical needs outside of their usual responsibilities, encouraging customer use of the internet and telephone services, and deferring certain work. In addition, staff are experiencing high stress levels, lacking sufficient time for training, and facing other adverse effects according to field office managers and staff. As a result, the average amount of work produced by field office staff increased by 4.9 percent between fiscal years 2005 and 2007 (see table 4). SSA Used Various Strategies to Manage Staffing Declines
SSA is shifting work among field offices based on their workloads in an effort to increase overall efficiency. SSA is encouraging customers to use automated services to help field offices accomplish their work. When reviews of benefits are delayed, some beneficiaries may continue to receive benefits when they no longer qualify. Staffing Reductions May Have Contributed to a Buildup of Certain Work, Longer Customer Waiting Times, More Unanswered Customer Calls, and Other Adverse Effects
According to SSA officials, staffing imbalances resulted in a buildup of 1,000 workyears, for work that SSA was not able to complete by the end of fiscal year 2007. Growth in Work Demands and an Employee Retirement Wave May Pose Serious Challenges for Service Delivery in the Future without a Clear Plan
Retirement and disability filings by the nation’s approximately 80 million baby boomers are projected to significantly increase SSA’s workload, providing additional stress on the field office workforce. SSA’s ability to meet its growing workload challenges will be more difficult with the anticipated retirements of many of the agency’s most experienced field office workers. Based on the agency’s projections, 44 percent of today’s SSA workforce will retire by 2016. Field office managers and staff at many of the locations we visited stated that it typically takes 2 to 3 years for new employees to become fully proficient. This will include 2,350 new hires for regional and field office operations, almost all of whom will go to field offices. SSA currently lacks a plan to address the mounting service delivery challenges that it faces, though officials told us that they are currently working to finalize the agency’s Annual Strategic Plan, which is expected to address these issues. Projected increases in claims for benefits from the nation’s approximately 80 million baby boomers and a large retirement wave among SSA’s most experienced staff will place additional pressure on field offices, and SSA may find it increasingly difficult to manage without a clear plan for addressing these challenges. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this statement. In their response, SSA said that the testimony understated the connection between the stress that field offices are under from increased work demands and the agency’s funding shortfalls. Social Security Administration: Effective Leadership Needed to Meet Daunting Challenges (GAO/HEHS-96-196, Sept. 12, 1996). | Why GAO Did This Study
Millions of people rely on the services of Social Security Administration (SSA) field offices. In fiscal year 2007, SSA's approximately 1,300 field offices provided service to about 42 million customers. People use these offices to apply for Social Security cards, apply for retirement and disability benefits, establish direct deposit, and a host of other services. While customers may conduct their business using SSA's online, telephone, or other service options, many prefer the personalized contact provided in field offices. Over the last several years, staffing reductions have challenged field offices' ability to manage work, while continuing to deliver quality customer service. To assess how field offices are managing these challenges, GAO was asked to determine (1) the effect that reduced staffing levels may be having on field office operations and (2) the challenges that SSA faces in meeting future service delivery needs. This statement is drawn from GAO's ongoing study on field offices for the committee, which is expected to be issued later this year. To conduct this work, GAO interviewed SSA officials in headquarters, and other components, and analyzed various data on SSA's workloads and other data. In commenting on a draft of this testimony, SSA said that GAO understated the connection between staffing stresses from increased work demands and the agency's funding shortfalls.
What GAO Found
SSA field offices largely met work demands between fiscal years 2005 and 2007 despite operating with fewer staff and an increased demand for services, but staffing reductions may have had some adverse effects. Field offices were able to minimize the impact of staffing reductions on work because staff productivity increased by 4.9 percent. SSA and its field offices used various strategies to manage its work with fewer staff. Field offices shared work among offices and redirected staff to meet critical needs. SSA also encouraged customers to make greater use of Internet and other electronic services. Additionally, SSA deferred work that it deemed a relatively low priority, such as conducting reviews of beneficiaries' continuing eligibility. Deferring these reviews, means that beneficiaries who no longer qualify for benefits may still receive payments--which may decrease SSA's chances of recovering the erroneous payments. Despite SSA efforts to manage the staffing reductions, customers experienced longer waiting times and more unanswered calls to field offices, according to SSA data. Also, staff reported experiencing high stress levels and insufficient time for training. Growth in claims from the nation's baby boomers and a retirement wave of its most experienced staff may pose serious challenges for SSA if the agency does not have a clear plan. The first wave of approximately 80 million baby boomers is reaching the age of retirement eligibility, and SSA estimates that retirement and disability filings will increase the agency's work by approximately 1 million annual claims by 2017. To further compound this challenge, SSA projects that 44 percent of its workforce will retire by 2016. Because retirements will occur among the agency's most experienced staff, this will have a serious impact on field offices' institutional knowledge. SSA is planning on hiring an additional 2,350 new employees this fiscal year for regional and field office operations, almost all of whom will go to the field offices. Agency officials stated, however, that it typically takes 2 to 3 years for staff to gain the experience they need to function independently. SSA is using various strategies to recruit new employees to fill knowledge gaps. SSA is finalizing its Annual Strategic Plan which will describe the agency's strategies for addressing these issues. |
gao_GAO-08-957 | gao_GAO-08-957_0 | The researchers have also found that transfer pricing abuses may play a role in explaining the differences. FCDCs Reported Lower Tax Liabilities Than USCCs by Most Measures
Our comparison of tax liabilities highlights three measures that are used by tax experts: (1) the percentage of corporations reporting no tax liability, (2) the number of years corporations reported no tax liability, and (3) tax liabilities reported by corporations as a percentage of gross receipts and assets. From 1998 through 2001, a higher percentage of all FCDCs reported no tax liability than all USCCs, but differences after 2001 were not statistically significant. A Greater Percentage of Large FCDCs Reported No Tax Liability over Multiple Years between 1998 and 2005
In the 8 years from 1998 through 2005, large FCDCs in a panel data set that we analyzed consisting of tax returns that were present in the SOI corporate files in every year were more likely to report no tax liability over multiple years than large USCCs in the same panel data set. In 2005, losses from prior years and tax credits had less impact on where on the tax return large corporations first established no tax liability. FCDCs Reported Less Tax Liability Than USCCs as a Percentage of Both Gross Receipts and Total Assets
Alternative comparisons of FCDCs and USCCs based on ratios of reported tax liabilities to gross receipts or total assets also showed that FCDCs reported less tax than USCCs. We did not attempt to explain the extent to which these factors or others, such as transfer pricing abuses, might explain differences in the reported tax liabilities of FCDCs and USCCs. FCDCs Reported Higher Average Gross Receipts and Assets Than USCCs
FCDCs tended to be larger in that in 2005 they reported higher average assets and gross receipts than USCCs, as shown in figure 6. FCDCs and USCCs Were Concentrated in Different Industries
In 2005, FCDCs and USCCs differed in their distribution across industries. When the focus is limited to large corporations, FCDCs were relatively more concentrated in manufacturing and wholesale trade. Large USCCs were more evenly distributed across the industries shown in figure 7. On July 21, the Research, Analysis and Statistics unit provided comments via e-mail on technical issues, which we incorporated into this report where appropriate. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of this assignment were to study (1) how the tax liability of foreign-controlled domestic corporations (FCDC) compares to that of U.S.-controlled corporations (USCC)—including the percentage of corporations reporting zero tax liabilities for tax years 1998 through 2005 and (2) how corporate characteristics, such as age, size, or industry, compare between FCDCs and USCCs. We requested comments on a draft of this report from the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. | Why GAO Did This Study
Concerns about transfer pricing abuse have led researchers to compare the tax liabilities of foreign- and U.S.-controlled corporations. (Transfer prices are the prices related companies charge on intercompany transactions.) However, such comparisons are complicated because other factors may explain the differences in reported tax liabilities. In three prior reports, GAO found differences in the percentages of foreign-controlled and U.S.-controlled corporations reporting no tax liability. GAO was asked to update the previous reports by comparing: (1) the tax liabilities of foreign-controlled domestic corporations (FCDC) and U.S.-controlled corporations (USCC)-including those reporting zero tax liabilities for 1998 through 2005 (the latest available data) and (2) characteristics of FCDCs and USCCs such as age, size, and industry. GAO analyzed data from the Internal Revenue Service's Statistics of Income samples of corporate tax returns. GAO does not make any recommendations in this report. In commenting on a draft of this report, IRS provided comments on technical issues, which we incorporated into this report where appropriate.
What GAO Found
FCDCs reported lower tax liabilities than USCCs by most measures shown in this report. A greater percentage of large FCDCs reported no tax liability in a given year from 1998 through 2005. For all corporations, a higher percentage of FCDCs reported no tax liabilities than USCCs through 2001 but differences after 2001 were not statistically significant. Most large FCDCs and USCCs that reported no tax liability in 2005 also reported that they had no current-year income. A smaller proportion of these corporations had losses from prior years and tax credits that eliminated any tax liability. By another measure, large FCDCs were more likely to report no tax liability over multiple years than large USCCs. In 2005, comparisons of FCDCs and USCCs based on ratios of reported tax liabilities to gross receipts or total assets showed that FCDCs reported less tax than USCCs. FCDCs and USCCs differed in age, size, and industry. FCDCs were younger than USCCs in that a greater percentage had been incorporated for 3 years or less from 1998 through 2005. In 2005, FCDCs were larger on average than USCCs in that they reported higher average gross receipts and assets than USCCs. A comparison by industry in 2005 showed that large FCDCs were relatively more concentrated in manufacturing and wholesale trade, while large USCCs were more evenly distributed across industries. GAO did not attempt to determine the extent to which these factors and others, such as transfer pricing abuse, explain differences in tax liabilities. |
gao_GAO-09-663T | gao_GAO-09-663T_0 | Since 2003, DOD’s portfolio of major defense acquisition programs has grown from 77 to 96 programs and its investment in those programs has grown from $1.2 trillion to $1.6 trillion (fiscal year 2009 dollars). The total cost growth for DOD’s portfolio of major defense acquisition programs is higher than it was 5 years ago, but at $296 billion, it is actually less than the 2007 portfolio’s cost growth of $301 billion. For DOD’s 2008 portfolio of programs, total research and development costs are 42 percent higher than originally estimated, and the average delay in delivering initial capabilities is 22 months. What Needs to Change? As illustrated in figure 1 below, collectively, these processes create pressures to promise high performance, keep cost estimates low, and proceed with calendar- driven versus knowledge-driven schedules. DOD’s processes for identifying warfighter needs, funding programs, and developing and procuring weapon systems—which collectively define DOD’s overall weapon system investment strategy—do not work together to provide the best value to the warfighter and to the taxpayer. At the individual program level, a military service typically establishes and DOD approves a business case containing requirements that are not fully understood and cost and schedule estimates that are based on optimistic assumptions rather than on sufficient knowledge. However, it does not adequately prioritize those needs from a joint, departmentwide perspective and lacks the agility to meet changing warfighter demands. Recent and Proposed Reform Efforts Could Improve Weapon Programs
There is widespread recognition of the problems that affect the acquisition system and DOD and the Congress have taken and proposed several steps to remedy them. Efforts to Prioritize Needs and Manage Resources
DOD has recently implemented measures to better address the needs of the joint warfighter and align the demand for weapon systems with available resources. However, DOD must ensure that these changes to the acquisition process are consistently implemented and reflected in decisions on individual programs. Some of the key changes being introduced by DOD and the Congress to establish knowledge-based business cases for weapon programs include: Increased emphasis on early systems engineering activities and the enhancement of systems engineering capabilities within the department; A requirement for competitive prototyping of a proposed weapon system or key system elements during the technology development phase; Certification that critical technologies have been demonstrated in a relevant environment before the start of system development, employing independent technology readiness assessments to make these determinations; Early milestone reviews for programs going through the pre–systems Conducting preliminary design reviews before starting system Requiring early cost estimates for the milestone decision to move into technology development phase; and Elevating the role of independent cost estimates in the acquisition process, by establishing a director or principal advisor for cost estimating who reports to the Secretary of Defense and the Congress. Concluding Observations on Achieving Lasting Reform
I would like to offer a few thoughts about other factors that should be considered so that we make the most out of today’s opportunity for meaningful change. First, I think it is useful to think of the processes that affect weapon system outcomes (requirements, funding, and acquisition) as being in a state of equilibrium. For reforms to work, they will have to address these forces as well. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since 1990, GAO has designated the Department of Defense's (DOD) management of its major weapon acquisitions as a high-risk area; however DOD's problems delivering weapon systems on time, at the estimated cost, in the planned amounts, and with the promised performance go back decades. Congress and DOD have continually explored ways to improve acquisition outcomes, yet problems persist. The committee asked GAO to testify on measures needed to reform the acquisition of major weapon systems and related legislative proposals. Specifically, this statement will describe the poor outcomes on weapon system investments that make reform imperative; attributes of the requirements, funding, and acquisition processes that will need to change for reform to be effective; and positive steps that Congress and DOD have taken to improve weapon program outcomes. The statement will also examine other factors that should be considered as the committee moves forward with its reform efforts. The testimony is drawn from GAO's body of work on DOD's requirements, funding, and acquisition processes. GAO has made numerous recommendations aimed at improving DOD's management of its major weapon acquisitions, but it is not making any new recommendations in this testimony.
What GAO Found
DOD must get a better return on investment from its weapon system programs. Since fiscal year 2003, DOD has increased the number of major defense acquisition programs and its overall investment in them. The cumulative cost growth for DOD's programs is higher than it was 5 years ago, but at $296 billion (fiscal year 2009 dollars), it is less than last year when adjusted for inflation. For DOD's 2008 portfolio of programs, research and development costs are now 42 percent higher than originally estimated and the average delay in delivering initial capabilities has increased to 22 months. These problems have roots in not only the acquisition process, but also in the requirements and funding processes. Collectively, these processes create pressures to demand high performance, keep cost estimates low, and proceed with calendar-driven versus knowledge-driven schedules. These processes also do not adequately prioritize needs from a joint, departmentwide perspective, respond to changing warfighter demands, or constrain the number of programs to a level that is supportable by available resources. Programs are allowed to enter and proceed through the acquisition process with requirements that are not fully understood, cost and schedule estimates that are based on optimistic assumptions, and a lack of sufficient knowledge about technology, design, and manufacturing. Congressionally-mandated and DOD-initiated changes to the acquisition system could provide the basis for sounder programs and improved acquisition outcomes. The committee's proposed legislation dealing with requirements, systems engineering, technology and integration risk assessment, and cost estimation--also address areas in need of reform. However, past reform efforts have failed to produce lasting change. To make the most out of this opportunity, the weapons acquisition environment and the incentives inherent within it will also have to be confronted and addressed. |
gao_HEHS-99-32 | gao_HEHS-99-32_0 | On the basis of these characteristics, child welfare researchers and practitioners have inferred that the quality of kinship care may be lower than the quality of care in other foster care settings. For Most Measurements of Quality, Kinship Care and Other Foster Care Were Comparable but Some Safety and Quality Assurance Concerns Remain
Our analysis of the caseworkers’ responses to our survey of open foster care cases in California and Illinois showed that, overall, the quality of both kinship care and other foster care was good and that in most respects the experiences of children in kinship care and in other foster care settings were comparable. However, we also found that while the caseworker in most kinship as well as other foster care cases believed that the caregivers were likely to enforce court-ordered restrictions on parental visits, the proportion of cases in which this view was held was smaller for kinship care cases than other foster care cases. Kinship Care Cases in California Differed From Those in Illinois With Regard to Permanency Goals and Time in Foster Care
Previous research on children who have left the foster care system has shown that children who had been in kinship care were less likely to be adopted and stayed longer in foster care than other foster children. However, we found no consistent pattern between California and Illinois. In California, there was no difference between kinship care and other foster care in the length of time children spent in foster care. Most have shown that children in kinship care were less likely than other foster children to be adopted. The large number of children in kinship care with the goal of long-term foster care is not surprising given that according to California officials, the state had only recently begun to offer adoption and guardianship options specifically designed for a foster child’s relatives. Open Kinship Care Cases in Illinois More Often Had Goals of Adoption or Guardianship and Had Been in the System Less Time Than Other Foster Care Cases
In contrast to our findings in California, data from our survey in Illinois indicated that children in kinship care as of September 15, 1997, were more likely to have the goal of adoption or guardianship than other foster children in the system at that time. According to state officials, Illinois has found that kinship caregivers, contrary to popular belief, are willing to adopt, and Illinois is actively pursuing adoption in these cases. States Are Taking Steps to Help Ensure That Kinship Care Meets the Needs of Foster Children
Since the fall of 1997, both California and Illinois have been instituting new programs and practices that are designed to (1) increase the likelihood that permanent living arrangements will be found for children in kinship care, as well as other foster care settings, who cannot return to their parents and (2) continue to ensure that kinship care is of good quality. Both States Have Initiated Programs to Encourage Kinship Caregivers to Provide Permanent Homes for Foster Children
Both California and Illinois are attempting to help ensure that children in kinship care spend as little time in the foster care system as possible. Parenting-skill assessments by caseworkers in kinship care cases were comparable to parenting-skill assessments by caseworkers in other foster care cases. In care less than 30 days In care 30 days or more (.001)
Total placements (.01)
Percentage of foster children with (.01)
Percentage of foster children who entered care between 1988 and 1990 in California and had placements within 4 years after entry(continued)
Percentage of foster children who had at least one placement before current placement (.001)
Percentage of foster children with different degrees of integration according to foster parents (.001) and social workers (.001)
Children who felt that they were very much part of the foster family Children who felt somewhat like a foster child Children who felt very much like a foster child Average age of foster caregivers in years Foster mothers (.01)
Male foster caregivers (.05)
Female foster caregivers (.05)
Percentage of female foster caregivers 55 years of age or older (.01)
Percentage of primary female foster caregivers by age (.005)
Percentage of married foster caregivers (.05)
Percentage of single foster caregivers (.001)
Percentage of married foster caregivers by genderFoster mothers (.01)
Percentage of foster caregivers who had completed high schoolMean number of years of school completedFoster fathers (.05)
Foster mothers (.001)
Percentage of foster caregivers who did not have a high school diplomaFemale (.001)
Male (.01)
Percentage of primary female foster caregivers with education by category (.00001)
Percentage of foster caregivers in fair or poor healthMale (.001)
Female (.001)
Percentage of foster caregivers whose income was less than $15,000 a yearPercentage of foster families with income by category (.01)
Average annual gross income, including foster care payments (.001)
Average annual income, disregarding money received from either Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC)-Family Grant or AFDC–Foster Care Percentage of primary female caregivers with household income by category (.000005)
Percentage of foster caregivers whoHad a fire extinguisher (.001)
Had a complete first aid kit (.001)
Knew cardiopulmonary resuscitation (.001)
Percentage who felt that training adequately prepared them to be a foster parent (.01)
Percentage who received training (.001)
Percentage of foster caregivers who received servicesSpecialized training (.001)
Support group (.001)
Respite care (.001)
Mean number of services foster caregivers received (.001)
Percentage of foster children who were not well known to the caseworker (.0001)
Mean number of caseworkers’ visits with foster children during a 6-month period (.05)
Mean number of caseworkers’ visits with foster children in past 12 monthsAverage number of hours per month foster children spent with a caseworker (.01)
Table III.17: What Required Health Services Did the Foster Child Receive? | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed how well kinship care is serving foster children, focusing on the: (1) quality of care that children in kinship care receive compared with that received by other foster children, as measured by a caseworker's assessment of a caregiver's parenting skills, the extent to which a foster child is able to maintain contact with familiar people and surroundings, and a caregiver's willingness to enforce court-ordered restrictions on parental visits; (2) frequency with which state child welfare agencies pursue various permanent living arrangements and the time children in kinship care have spent in the system compared with other foster children; and (3) recent state initiatives intended to help ensure that children in kinship care receive good quality foster care and are placed in permanent homes in a timely manner.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) GAO's survey of open foster care cases in California and Illinois showed that in most respects the quality of both kinship and other foster care was good and that the experiences of children in kinship care and children in other foster care settings were comparable; (2) GAO found that caregivers both in kinship care and in other foster care settings demonstrated good parenting skills overall; (3) GAO also confirmed the belief that there is more continuity in the lives of children in kinship care before and after they enter foster care than there is in other foster children's lives; (4) in cases in which the courts have restricted parental visits with foster children to ensure the children's safety, the proportion of cases in which the caseworker believed that the caregiver was likely to enforce the restrictions was somewhat smaller among kinship care cases than among other foster care cases; (5) some of the standards that California and Illinois use to ensure good quality foster care and the level of support each state provides to foster caregivers are lower for kinship care than other types of foster care; (6) previous research on children who have left foster care has shown that children who had been in kinship care were less likely to be adopted and stayed longer in foster care than other foster children; (7) between California and Illinois, GAO's survey showed no consistent findings regarding the relationship between kinship care and permanency goals or the time foster children had spent in the system; (8) in Illinois, kinship care cases were more likely to have a permanency goal of adoption or guardianship than other foster care cases; (9) Illinois has found that kinship caregivers are willing to adopt, and Illinois is actively pursuing adoption in kinship care cases; (10) in California, kinship care cases were less likely than other foster care cases to have adoption or guardianship as a goal; (11) according to California officials, this may be because, at the time of GAO's survey, the state had only recently begun to offer adoption and guardianship options specifically designed for a foster child's relatives; (12) in California, there was no significant difference between the average length of time that children in kinship care and children in other settings had spent in the system; (13) in Illinois, children in kinship care had spent significantly less time in the system than other foster children; and (14) both California and Illinois are now taking steps to better ensure the good quality of kinship care and to encourage kinship caregivers to provide permanent homes for foster children who cannot return to their parents. |
gao_GAO-03-950 | gao_GAO-03-950_0 | However, for hypertension drugs where differences in racial response have been documented in adult drug studies, FDA required, and drug sponsors included, larger numbers of children from specific racial and ethnic groups. Most of FDA’s written requests for studies that have been issued since BPCA took effect required drug sponsors to report the number of racial and ethnic minorities in their final study results. The Proportions of Children in Racial and Ethnic Minority Groups in Clinical Studies for Exclusive Marketing Rights Were Lower Than Their Proportions in the U.S. Population
Compared with their proportions in the U.S. population, smaller proportions of African American, Hispanic, and Asian children were included in clinical studies for the drugs that were granted 6 months of additional exclusive marketing rights by FDA from January 4, 2002, through March 6, 2003. Pediatric Studies for Hypertension Drugs Included More Children of Racial and Ethnic Minority Groups
FDA required that sponsors increase representation of children of ethnic and racial minority groups in clinical studies for drugs used to treat diseases that disproportionately affect children in such groups or where evidence from studies on adults suggests that for certain classes of drugs differences in metabolism or response for racial or ethnic groups exist. Drugs of Importance to Minority Children Are Being Studied in Response to Pediatric Exclusivity Provision Requests
Some drugs that may be used to treat diseases or conditions that disproportionately affect children of racial and ethnic minority groups are being studied under the pediatric exclusivity provision. In addition, 6 of the 22 written requests for new studies that FDA issued to drug manufacturers during this period also included treatments for diseases or conditions disproportionately affecting minorities, such as type II diabetes, hypertension, sickle cell anemia, HIV, and hepatitis B.
FDA Monitoring of Data on Minority Representation Needs Improvement
FDA does not have a system in place to serve as a single source of data to allow the agency to efficiently determine the extent of minority enrollment in drug studies under the pediatric exclusivity provision. Further, we found that some study reports submitted to FDA from drug sponsors did not specify the race and ethnicity of study participants. For example, in the completed studies for the 23 drugs granted additional exclusive marketing rights that we examined, the race or ethnicity of 86 percent of study participants was identified, but study sponsors did not specify the race or ethnicity of 960 children, or 14 percent of the studies’ populations. Recently, FDA issued draft guidance to improve drug sponsors’ reporting of racial and ethnic minority representation data, and FDA is planning to develop a database to monitor demographic variables in drug trials across the agency. Eighty-six percent of study participants were identified by race or ethnicity. FDA officials told us that it would be several years before the system is operational. FDA also agreed with our recommendation and reported that it has already begun to implement it. First, FDA was critical of our comparison of the proportions of minority children study participants to the proportions of minority children in the population. Further, FDA has previously used the methodology we employed in its analyses of adult study participants. To determine whether drugs used to treat conditions or diseases disproportionately affecting minorities are being studied under the pediatric exclusivity provision, we obtained data on the prevalence of selected diseases or conditions that disproportionately affect minorities and examined the list of drugs for which FDA has either granted exclusive marketing rights or issued study requests from January 4, 2002, through March 6, 2003, to determine if any of these drugs may be used to treat these diseases or conditions. | Why GAO Did This Study
Drug effectiveness and adverse events can vary between children and adults and among racial and ethnic groups. The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is authorized under the pediatric exclusivity provision to grant drug sponsors 6 months of additional exclusive marketing rights for conducting clinical drug studies in children. The Best Pharmaceuticals for Children Act of 2002 (BPCA) expanded this provision to require FDA to take into account the adequacy of minority representation in pediatric exclusivity studies. BPCA also directed GAO to evaluate the representation of minorities in such studies. GAO examined the extent to which minority children are represented, whether drugs that treat diseases disproportionately affecting minority groups are studied under the provision, and FDA's monitoring of the representation of minority children in the studies. GAO reviewed related FDA documents, FDA requests for pediatric studies and final study results, and interviewed FDA officials and other experts.
What GAO Found
Compared with the proportions of children from racial and ethnic minority groups in the U.S. population, smaller proportions of children from minority groups were included in the pediatric clinical drug studies requested by FDA before the enactment of BPCA that GAO reviewed. However, FDA required, and drug sponsors included, larger proportions of African American children in clinical studies for hypertension drugs because there is evidence that hypertension is more prevalent and more severe among African Americans. Furthermore, FDA has requested that forthcoming studies for certain drugs include larger proportions of minority children. Studies of some drugs that may be used to treat diseases or conditions that disproportionately affect minorities have been completed and additional such studies have been requested by FDA. From January 4, 2002, through March 6, 2003, FDA granted additional exclusive marketing rights to four drugs that may be used to treat conditions such as hypertension, type II diabetes, and sickle cell anemia--conditions or diseases that disproportionately affect minority children. During that time, FDA also issued written requests for studies of six drugs for these conditions. FDA does not have a system in place to serve as a single source of data to allow the agency to efficiently determine the extent of participation of children by racial and ethnic group under the pediatric exclusivity provision. GAO found that some study reports submitted to FDA from drug sponsors did not specify the race and ethnicity of all study participants. Across all the studies for drugs granted additional exclusive marketing rights that GAO reviewed, 86 percent of study participants were identifiable by race or ethnicity, but the race or ethnicity of 14 percent of study participants was unknown. In January 2003, FDA issued draft guidance recommending that drug sponsors use standard definitions for race and ethnicity in drug studies. However, drug sponsors are not required to use these definitions. FDA has also begun to develop an agency-wide system to monitor demographic characteristics of study participants, such as age, sex, and race. FDA agreed with the GAO recommendation to specify the categories that sponsors should use to report minority representation as well as GAO's findings regarding the efficiency of its data collection systems. FDA expressed concerns about the GAO comparison of the proportion of minorities in drug studies to their proportion in the U.S. population. However, FDA had previously used the methodology GAO employed in its analyses of adult study participants. |
gao_GGD-98-40 | gao_GGD-98-40_0 | IRS has about 40 audit sources, which are programs and techniques used to select potentially noncompliant returns for audit. The number of IRS closed audits of returns filed by IRS employees; 4. The number of audits of IRS employees that were randomly selected; 5. Our objectives were to provide information on (1) the number of audits selected overall and at random for tax returns filed by all taxpayers and by IRS employees across the nation and in Georgia; (2) the profile of the taxpayers subjected to the random audits by state, type of taxpayer return, taxpayer income level, and taxpayer occupation; (3) the results of the random audits in terms of number of audits for which additional taxes were recommended as well as the amount of these additional taxes and the number of referrals to IRS’ CID; (4) the known burdens imposed on taxpayers subjected to random audits; and (5) the alternatives other than random selection that IRS might have used to meet its objectives. During this period, IRS did not randomly select any taxpayers from the population of all taxpayers for audit. IRS did identify six subpopulations with known or suspected noncompliance from which it randomly selected taxpayers for audit. Random Audits Conducted Nationwide and in the Georgia District
During the 3 years, IRS did not randomly select any taxpayers from the population of all taxpayers for audit. IRS chose these six subpopulations nonrandomly on the basis of historically high noncompliance rates or other evidence of suspected high noncompliance rates. Table 2 shows the number of random audits across the six project subpopulations for the nation and Georgia during fiscal years 1994 through 1996. Compared with all its audits, IRS rarely did random audits. As table 3 shows, the 6 projects included 7,421 taxpayers. Profile of Taxpayers Selected for the Six Projects
To profile the characteristics of taxpayers audited through the six projects, we analyzed IRS data on the 2,961 audited returns. State Location of the Taxpayer
For fiscal years 1994 to 1996, 16 states had fewer than 10 random audits, and 10 states had more than 100 random audits. However, IRS usually audits a higher percentage of returns that report higher income. Of the 2 projects with more than 200 audited returns, the average amount of additional taxes recommended per individual return audited for the EIC project was $1,653; and for the eating and drinking establishments project, the average amount of additional taxes recommended was $12,711—double the national average of $6,251 for fiscal years 1994 to 1996. Burden Imposed on Taxpayers Selected for Audit in the Six Projects
According to IRS, any audit—whether randomly selected or otherwise—imposes some level of cost and burden on taxpayers. Outside these research purposes, IRS officials indicated that they would have little incentive to randomly select returns for audit because IRS wants to invest its limited audit resources productively. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Internal Revenue Service's (IRS) use of random audits during fiscal years 1994 through 1996, focusing on the: (1) number of audits selected overall and at random for tax returns filed by all taxpayers and by IRS employees across the nation and in Georgia; (2) profile of the taxpayers subjected to random audits by state, type of taxpayer return, taxpayer income level, and taxpayer occupation; (3) results of the random audits in terms of the number of audits for which additional taxes were recommended as well as the amount of these additional taxes and the number of referrals to IRS' Criminal Investigation Division; (4) known burdens imposed on taxpayers subjected to random audits; and (5) alternatives that IRS might have used other than random selection to meet its objectives.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) between the fiscal years 1994 and 1996, the number of audits nationwide increased from 1.4 million to 2.1 million; (2) the increases were due to audits of taxpayers claiming the earned income credit (EIC); (3) during fiscal years 1994 through 1996, the IRS did not randomly select returns for audit from either the population of all taxpayers or all returns; (4) IRS has about 40 audit sources, which are programs and techniques used to select potentially noncompliant returns for audit; (5) IRS audit sources do not rely on random selection from the population of all returns but rather IRS selects returns having characteristics indicative of potential noncompliance; (6) IRS did identify six projects involving subpopulations of taxpayers with indications of noncompliance from which taxpayers were randomly selected for audit; (7) IRS chose six subpopulations for the six projects nonrandomly on the basis of known or suspected high noncompliance rates and other criteria, including geographic location or business size; (8) the number of audits generated by random selection for these six projects was small compared with the million or more audits done each year; (9) IRS does not randomly audit its 100,000-plus employees; (10) IRS treats its employees the same as other taxpayers for the purposes of audit selection, with one exception: IRS has a special program for auditing returns filed by specific types of employees; (11) this special program has not used random selection; (12) although the IRS data show the projects covered taxpayers in almost all states, 16 states had fewer than 10 random audits, and 10 states had more than 100 such audits; these 10 states, generally, had a higher number of audits because an IRS field office for those states ran 1 of the 6 projects; (13) most audited individuals in the six projects reported positive income below $25,000; (14) audit results for the two projects with more than 200 audited returns showed that the percentage of audits recommending additional taxes was 46 percent for the EIC project and 80 percent for the eating and drinking establishment project; (15) according to IRS, any audit imposes some level of costs and burden on taxpayers; (16) IRS had no alternative data sources that would accomplish the objectives of the six projects other than random audits; and (17) IRS officials said they have little incentive to randomly select taxpayers for audits because IRS' regular audit programs generally find more noncompliance at lower costs. |
gao_GAO-10-823 | gao_GAO-10-823_0 | Background
NTIA and RUS have until September 30, 2010, to obligate the Recovery Act funding for broadband projects. Table 4 compares the agencies’ first-round application review processes. NTIA and RUS Funded 150 Projects Totaling $2.2 Billion in the First Funding Round
In the first round of broadband stimulus funding, NTIA and RUS received almost 2,200 applications and awarded 150 grants, loans, and loan/grant combinations totaling over $2.2 billion in federal funds to a variety of entities for projects in nearly every state and U.S. territory. This funding includes over $1.2 billion for 82 BTOP projects and more than $1 billion for 68 BIP projects. RUS awarded grants, loans, and loan/grant combinations to a variety of entities. NTIA’s and RUS’s Due- Diligence Reviews Consistently Substantiated Information in the Awardees’ Applications
To substantiate information in the applications, NTIA, RUS, and their contractors reviewed financial, technical, environmental, and other documents and determined the feasibility and reasonableness of each project. Based on our analysis of the files of 32 awarded applications, we found that the agencies consistently reviewed the applications and substantiated the information as specified in the first-round funding notice, a finding consistent with the Department of Commerce Inspector General’s April 2010 report. In each of the files we reviewed, we observed written documentation that the agencies and their contractors had reviewed and verified pertinent application materials, or made notes to request additional documentation where necessary. NTIA and RUS Face Challenges in Awarding Funds on Time and Have Taken Actions to Streamline Application Reviews
NTIA and RUS Must Award a Significant Amount of Funds in a Short Time
During the second funding round, NTIA and RUS have more funds to award and less time to award these funds than they had for the first round, and although the agencies received fewer applications for the second round, they are conducting more due-diligence reviews than they did for the first round. However, as the Recovery Act’s obligation deadline draws near, the agencies may face increased pressure to approve awards. RUS is also putting into place a multifaceted oversight framework to monitor compliance and progress for recipients of BIP funding. NTIA and RUS will need to oversee a far greater number of projects than in the past. In addition, BTOP- and BIP-funded projects are likely to be much larger and more diverse than projects funded under the agencies’ prior broadband-related programs. Adding to these challenges, NTIA and RUS must ensure that the recipient constructs the infrastructure project in the entire project area, not just the area where it may be most profitable for the company to provide service. Both NTIA and RUS face the risk of having insufficient staff and resources to actively monitor BTOP- and BIP- funded projects after September 30, 2010. Because of this, it is critical that the oversight plans the agencies are developing recognize the challenges that could arise from a possible lack of resources for program oversight after September 30, 2010. Planning for these various contingencies can help the agencies mitigate the effect that limited resource levels may have on postaward oversight. Conclusion
The Recovery Act broadband stimulus programs are intended to promote the availability and use of broadband throughout the country, as well as create jobs and stimulate economic development. Recommendation for Executive Action
To ensure effective monitoring and oversight of the BTOP and BIP programs, we recommend that the Secretaries of Agriculture and Commerce incorporate into their risk-based monitoring plans, steps to address the variability in funding levels for postaward oversight beyond September 30, 2010. NTIA took no position on our recommendation. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of this report were to examine (1) the results of the first broadband stimulus funding round; (2) the extent to which the National Telecommunications and Information Administration’s (NTIA) and the Rural Utilities Service’s (RUS) due-diligence review substantiated information in the awardees’ applications; (3) the challenges, if any, facing NTIA and RUS in awarding the remaining broadband stimulus funds; and (4) the actions, if any, NTIA and RUS are taking to oversee grant and loan recipients. In addition to reviewing the sample, we interviewed agency officials and two award recipients. | Why GAO Did This Study
Access to affordable broadband service is seen as vital to economic growth and improved quality of life. To extend broadband access and adoption, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (Recovery Act) provided $7.2 billion to the Department of Commerce's National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) and the Department of Agriculture's Rural Utilities Service (RUS) for grants or loans to a variety of program applicants. The agencies are awarding funds in two rounds and must obligate all funds by September 30, 2010. This report addresses the results of the first broadband stimulus funding round, the extent to which NTIA's and RUS's application reviews substantiated application information, the challenges facing NTIA and RUS in awarding the remaining funds, and actions taken to oversee grant and loan recipients. GAO analyzed program documentation, reviewed a judgmentally-selected sample of applications from first round award recipients, and interviewed agency officials and industry stakeholders.
What GAO Found
In the first round of broadband stimulus funding that began in July 2009 and ended in April 2010, NTIA and RUS received over 2,200 applications and awarded 150 grants, loans, and loan/grant combinations totaling $2.2 billion to a variety of entities in nearly every state and U.S. territory. This funding includes $1.2 billion for 82 projects awarded by NTIA and more than $1 billion for 68 projects awarded by RUS. NTIA primarily awarded grants to public entities, such as states and municipalities, whereas RUS made grants, loans, and loan/grant combinations primarily to private-sector entities, such as for-profit companies and cooperatives. NTIA and RUS consistently substantiated information in first round award recipients' applications. The agencies and their contractors reviewed financial, technical, environmental, and other documents and determined the feasibility and reasonableness of each project. GAO's review of 32 award recipient applications found that the agencies consistently reviewed the applications and substantiated the information as specified in the first funding notice. In each of the files, GAO observed written documentation that the agencies and their contractors reviewed and verified pertinent application materials, and requested additional documentation where necessary. To meet the Recovery Act's September 30, 2010, deadline for obligating broadband funds, NTIA and RUS must award approximately $4.8 billion--or more than twice the amount they awarded during the first round--in less time than they had for the first round. As the end of the Recovery Act's obligation deadline draws near, the agencies may face increased pressure to approve awards. NTIA and RUS also lack detailed data on the availability of broadband service throughout the country, making it difficult to determine whether a proposed service area is unserved or underserved, as defined in the program funding notices. To address these challenges, NTIA and RUS have streamlined their application review processes by, for example, eliminating joint reviews and reducing the number of steps in the due-diligence review process, and NTIA began using Census tract data to verify the presence of service. NTIA and RUS are putting oversight plans in place to monitor compliance and progress for broadband stimulus funding recipients, but some risks remain. The agencies will need to oversee far more projects than in the past and these projects are likely to be much larger and more diverse than projects funded under the agencies' prior broadband-related programs. Additionally, NTIA and RUS must ensure that the recipients construct the infrastructure projects in the entire project area, not simply the area where it may be most profitable for the company to provide service. Both NTIA and RUS face the risk of having insufficient resources to actively monitor Recovery Act funded broadband projects. Because of this, planning for a possible lack of resources for program oversight after September 30, 2010, can help the agencies mitigate the effect of limited resources on postaward oversight. The Secretaries of Agriculture and Commerce should incorporate into their risk-based monitoring plans, steps to address variability in funding levels for postaward oversight beyond September 30, 2010. Both agencies took no position on GAO's recommendation and noted steps being taken to complete their respective programs. |
gao_GAO-10-822T | gao_GAO-10-822T_0 | Opportunities for Strengthening Interagency Collaboration
National security threats have evolved and require involvement beyond the traditional agencies of DOD, the Department of State, and USAID. Our work has also identified actions that agencies can take to enhance collaboration. Developing and Implementing Overarching, Integrated Strategies to Achieve National Security Objectives
Although some agencies have developed or updated overarching strategies on national security-related issues, our work has identified cases where U.S. efforts have been hindered by the lack of information on roles and responsibilities of organizations involved or the lack of mechanisms to coordinate their efforts. Creating Collaborative Organizations That Facilitate Integrated National Security Approaches
Organizational differences—including differences in agencies’ structures, planning processes, and funding sources—can hinder interagency collaboration. Agencies lack adequate coordination mechanisms to facilitate this collaboration during planning and execution of programs and activities. Developing a Well-Trained Workforce
Federal agencies do not always have the right people with the right skills in the right jobs at the right time to meet the challenges they face, to include having a workforce that is able to quickly address crises. To effectively and efficiently address today’s national security challenges, federal agencies need a qualified, well-trained workforce with the skills and experience that can enable them to integrate the diverse capabilities and resources of the U.S. government. Furthermore, agencies’ personnel systems often do not recognize or reward interagency collaboration, which could diminish agency employees’ interest in serving in interagency efforts. Sharing and Integrating National Security Information Across Agencies
U.S. government agencies do not always share relevant information with their national security partners due to a lack of clear guidelines for sharing information and security clearance issues. Federal, state, and local governments and private-sector partners are making progress in sharing terrorism-related information. When agencies do share information, managing and integrating information from multiple sources presents challenges regarding redundancies in information sharing, unclear roles and responsibilities, and data comparability. Moreover, the strategy identifies key steps for improving interagency collaboration. Strengthening interagency collaboration—with leadership as the foundation—can help transform U.S. government agencies and create a more unified, comprehensive approach to national security issues at home and abroad. | Why GAO Did This Study
Recent terrorist events such as the attempted bomb attacks in New York's Times Square and aboard an airliner on Christmas Day 2009 are reminders that national security challenges have expanded beyond the traditional threats of the Cold War Era to include unconventional threats from nonstate actors. Today's threats are diffuse and ambiguous, making it difficult--if not impossible--for any single federal agency to address them alone. Effective collaboration among multiple agencies and across federal, state, and local governments is critical. This testimony highlights opportunities to strengthen interagency collaboration by focusing on four key areas: (1) developing overarching strategies, (2) creating collaborative organizations, (3) developing a well-trained workforce, and (4) improving information sharing. It is based on GAO's body of work on interagency collaboration.
What GAO Found
Federal agencies have an opportunity to enhance collaboration by addressing long-standing problems and better positioning the U.S. government to respond to changing conditions and future uncertainties. Progress has been made in enhancing interagency collaboration, but success will require leadership commitment, sound plans that set clear priorities, and measurable goals. The agencies involved in national security will need to make concerted efforts to forge strong and collaborative partnerships, and seek coordinated solutions that leverage expertise and capabilities across communities. Today, challenges exist in four key areas: 1) Developing and implementing overarching strategies. Although some agencies have developed or updated overarching strategies on national security-related issues, GAO's work has identified cases where U.S. efforts have been hindered by the lack of information on roles and responsibilities of organizations involved or coordination mechanisms. 2) Creating collaborative organizations. Organizational differences--including differences in agencies' structures, planning processes, and funding sources--can hinder interagency collaboration. Agencies lack adequate coordination mechanisms to facilitate this collaboration during planning and execution of programs and activities. 3) Developing a well-trained workforce. Agencies do not always have the right people with the right skills in the right jobs at the right time to meet the challenges they face--including having a workforce that is able to quickly address crises. Moreover, agency performance management systems often do not recognize or reward interagency collaboration, and training is needed to understand other agencies' processes or cultures. 4) Sharing and integrating national security information across agencies. U.S. government agencies do not always share relevant information with their national security partners due to a lack of clear guidelines for sharing information and security clearance issues. Additionally, incorporating information drawn from multiple sources poses challenges to managing and integrating that information. Strengthening interagency collaboration--with leadership as the foundation--can help transform U.S. government agencies and create a more unified, comprehensive approach to national security issues at home and abroad. |
gao_GAO-13-664 | gao_GAO-13-664_0 | DOL Has Made Limited Progress in Implementing Recommendations
DOL is in the early stages of implementing several of the report’s recommendations, but implementation of the remaining recommendations has not occurred. The agency has begun to take initial steps to respond to three of the report’s six recommendations: improve interagency collaboration, create an advisory committee subgroup for Native American veterans, and conduct a needs assessment. DOL has taken little to no action on the remaining three recommendations: increase outreach, pursue program flexibility, and boost economic development. DOL officials told us that leadership transitions and budget challenges have significantly contributed to their current position and limited endorsement of these recommendations. To respond to the recommendations to increase collaboration with federal and state agencies and outreach to tribal governments, DOL has begun collaborating with agencies that serve veterans, including VA and BIA, to learn more about how to better serve Native American veterans and has conducted several listening sessions with tribal leadership. Advisory subcommittee. DOL is currently developing a proposal, to be presented to ACVETEO, to establish a subgroup for Native American veterans, and is also considering appointing a representative from the Native American veterans’ community to join ACVETEO. Economic development. Since delivering the report in 2010, DOL has not developed a strategy that specifically establishes roles and responsibilities, goals, and time frames for implementation of the report’s recommendations. Expanded Efforts Could Improve Implementation of the 2010 Recommendations
DOL could expand on its efforts to implement the 2010 report’s recommendations to improve employment service delivery to Native American veterans on tribal land, even within its constrained budget environment. In addition, DOL can leverage state level collaborations with other agencies and tribal governments. Advisory subcommittee. While economic development is not DOL’s primary mission, the agency has an opportunity to better understand and support economic development on tribal land by reviewing its existing grants and guidance on this topic and identifying lessons learned to disseminate to its grantees that provide these critical employment and training services to Native American veterans on tribal land and forming partnerships with other agencies that can support these efforts. Ensure it has a written strategy to position the agency to efficiently and effectively respond to the 2010 recommendations, including the identification of roles and responsibilities as well as the goals, costs, and time frames to complete their implementation. 2. To identify such lessons or practices, DOL could: a. Regarding our recommendation to expand collaboration with other agencies, DOL agreed and noted that collaboration with other agencies has been effective in addressing the needs of Native American veterans living on tribal land. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Groups Interviewed
Appendix I: Groups Interviewed Department of Labor (DOL), Veterans’ Employment and Training Service, including senior agency officials, and State Directors for Veterans’ Employment and Training (DVETs) from Arizona, New Mexico, North Carolina, Alaska, Hawaii, Washington, North Dakota, and Montana Department of Labor (DOL), Division of Indian and Native American Programs (DINAP)
Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), Office of Tribal Government Relations Department of the Interior, Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA)
Small Business Administration (SBA)
Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC)
State veterans coordinators from Arizona, New Mexico, North Carolina, Alaska, Hawaii, North Dakota, and Montana Disabled Veterans’ Outreach Program specialists (DVOPs) and Local Veterans’ Employment Representatives (LVERs) from Arizona, New Mexico, North Carolina, Alaska, Hawaii, and Montana Zuni Tribe of the Zuni Reservation, New Mexico Navajo Nation, Arizona, New Mexico, and Utah Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead Reservation Spirit Lake Tribe, North Dakota White Earth Band of the Minnesota Chippewa Tribe, Minnesota Papa Alo Lokahi (Uncles and Aunties initiative)
Appendix II: Status of Recommendations from DOL’s 2010 Report and Steps to Improve upon Efforts
Recommendation Summary The 2010 report found that there was a need for increased collaboration across federal and state agencies with tribal governments in improving employment for Native American veterans. For example, our site visits indicated that some Native Americans veterans received employment services from Education’s Vocational Rehabilitation Services for American Indians with Disabilities program. DOL can consider partnering with this program to jointly serve Native American veterans. In Montana, a DVOP established a partnership with the mobile VA Vet Center to provide both health and employment services to Native American veterans in remote areas (see fig.). Specifically, DOL has identified a potential source for data within DOD that provides race and ethnicity as well as address information for returning veterans that could help DVOPs and LVERs target their visits to tribal land, but its plans to acquire these data are still being negotiated and could take time to finalize. Assess Needs (cont.) With regard to additional flexibilities that could help meet the needs of Native American veterans living on tribal lands, DOL has indicated that it is open to identifying any such opportunities that exist under current law, although to date it has taken little action in this area. Boost Economic Development (cont.) | Why GAO Did This Study
The unemployment rate for all veterans has risen since the beginning of the economic downturn, but the unemployment rate for Native Americans living on tribal land has been higher. In addition, tribal land is frequently located in remote areas characterized by limited economic development, which can make finding a job challenging. DOL administers several grant programs that provide employment assistance to all eligible veterans, including Native Americans. In response to a statutory mandate, in October 2010, DOL submitted a report to Congress recommending that the agency take actions to increase employment and training opportunities for Native American veterans living on tribal lands. GAO assessed (1) the status of DOL efforts to implement the report's recommendations and (2) whether and how DOL can improve on its efforts to implement the report's recommendations. GAO reviewed federal laws, regulations, and DOL guidance; interviewed DOL, state, and tribal officials as well as Native American veterans; and conducted site visits to tribal lands in four U.S. regions.
What GAO Found
The Department of Labor (DOL) is in the early stages of implementing several of the 2010 report's recommendations, but implementation of the remaining recommendations has not occurred. The agency has begun to take steps to respond to three of the report's six recommendations: improve interagency collaboration, create an advisory subcommittee for Native American veterans, and conduct a needs assessment. To increase collaboration, DOL has conducted several listening sessions with tribal leadership and begun collaborating with agencies that serve veterans, including the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) and the Department of the Interior's Bureau of Indian Affairs, to learn more about how to better serve Native American veterans. With regard to an advisory subcommittee, DOL is developing a proposal to establish a subgroup for Native American veterans on its existing veterans' employment and training advisory committee, and is considering appointing a representative from the Native American veterans' community to serve on that committee. To assess need, DOL has identified a potential source for data within DOD that provides race and ethnicity and address information for returning veterans that could help better target visits to tribal land, but its plans to acquire these data are still being negotiated and could take time to finalize. However, DOL has taken little to no action on recommendations to increase outreach, pursue program flexibility, and boost economic development. DOL officials told us that leadership transitions and budget challenges have contributed to their limited response to date. In addition, since delivering the report in 2010, DOL has not developed a strategy that specifically establishes roles and responsibilities, goals, costs, and time frames for implementation of the report's recommendations.
DOL could build on its efforts to implement the report's recommendations, even in a constrained budget environment. For example, DOL could expand the collaboration it has begun with other agencies that serve Native American veterans on tribal land, such as the Department of Education (Education). GAO site visits indicated that some Native American veterans received employment services from a vocational rehabilitation program administered by Education. DOL can consider partnering with this program. DOL could also identify and disseminate lessons learned from states that have collaborated with other agencies and tribal governments. For example, a DOL program in Montana has leveraged other agency resources, such as collaborating with the VA Vet Center to provide both health and employment services to Native American veterans in remote tribal areas using mobile units, an approach that may be applicable in other states. To boost economic development, DOL could review information from its existing grants and guidance on economic development to disseminate to DOL grantees that serve Native American veterans.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOL develop a written strategy to implement the 2010 recommendations that incorporates roles and responsibilities, goals, costs, and time frames. DOL should also expand collaboration with other agencies to leverage resources and identify and disseminate lessons learned from prior relevant efforts. DOL agreed with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-14-264 | gao_GAO-14-264_0 | The first approach—the “assumed-return approach”— bases the discount rate on a long-term assumed average rate of return on the pension plan’s assets (which includes expected long-term stock market returns to the extent plan assets are so invested, and which, in recent years, and as employed by U.S. public plan sponsors, often would produce discount rates between 7 and 8 percent). The use of a 25-year historical average results in current discount rates that are significantly in excess of current or recent interest rates on high quality bonds. Defined Benefit Systems in Selected Other Countries
The discount rate approaches and regulatory structure governing pension plans in Canada, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom differ in various ways from those in the United States. Discount Rates for Sponsors of Public Sector Plans and Private Sector Multiemployer Plans Differ from Those of Private Sector Single- Employer Plans, Resulting in Different Incentives for Both and, for the Former, Higher Reported Funded Ratios and Lower Reported Costs
Public and private sector DB pension plans are subject to different rules and guidance regarding discount rates. Under FASB standards, plan sponsors are required to discount using “settlement rates,”---which can be based on the discount rates implicit in the current prices of annuity contracts, such as PBGC’s rates, but can also be based on current high quality bond rates, which plan sponsors generally do--- while plans are required to discount using best-estimate assumed rates of return. At this difference in discount rates, the present value of a benefit payment due in 15 years for a private sector single-employer plan sponsor for financial reporting would be almost 50 percent higher than for a comparable public Some experts (including those on the GASB) view sector plan sponsor.differences between public sector and private sector single-employer discounting approaches as appropriate because they see public plans as going concerns that can best estimate their pension costs using very long-term assumed returns as their discount rate. Some experts said that the assumed-return approach could incentivize public plan sponsors to invest in riskier assets because doing so can increase the assumed-return discount rate, thereby lowering reported liabilities and reducing funding requirements. Experts Identified a Variety of Considerations for Setting Discount Rate Policy and Many Saw Value in Plan Sponsors Reporting Multiple Measures
For many of the experts we interviewed, the appropriate discount rate to use depends on the purpose of the measurement. There are at least five key purposes for which one might determine a discounted value of future benefits: (1) determining the required or recommended amount that the plan sponsor should contribute into the plan; (2) reporting plan liabilities to shareholders, taxpayers, plan participants, or other stakeholders, such as for financial reporting; (3) determining the amount needed to terminate a plan, settle a portion of plan liabilities, or to guarantee or minimize risk on pensions earned to date; (4) expressing the value of participants’ benefits (for example, in putting a value on their total compensation); and (5) determining optional Several lump sum amounts payable to participants in lieu of an annuity.experts with whom we spoke also indicated that their views on the appropriateness of different rates for different purposes of the measurement vary between public and private plans. A number of experts emphasized transparency or comparability considerations in setting the discount rate and many supported the reporting of multiple measures of liability using different discount rates. Third, actual returns for any particular plan would also depend on plan characteristics and cash flows. However, in those cases where these other countries use assumed returns, or some allowance for assumed returns—for example, one of the two Canadian measures, the rate for Dutch recovery plans, and the U.K.’s plan-specific approach—these assumed returns tend to be lower than assumed returns currently used by U.S. public plans. The practices of selected foreign countries—notably, Canada, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom—may provide insight into ways that other pension systems discount liabilities, applying a variety of approaches to discounting, with significant government oversight, and generally using lower discount rates than U.S. assumed returns. Key contributors to this report are found in appendix V.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
To analyze differences of opinion concerning discount rates for pension plan valuations and funding, GAO examined (1) the significance of the differences in discounting approaches used by public versus private sector pension plans; (2) the purposes for measuring the value of a plan’s future benefits and key considerations for determining plan discount rate policy; (3) the approaches select countries have taken to choose discount rates. We examined relevant literature on pension discount rates. We spoke to experts in these countries and reviewed publicly-available documents. ERISA Requirements
With regard to the rates they use to discount benefits, single-employer sponsors are generally required to use a bond-based approach to determine the minimum required contribution. However, within this framework, these sponsors have options which can result in measurements of plan liabilities that may not be closely tied to current market conditions. As discussed, under ERISA, private sector multiemployer plans generally discount using an assumed rate of return for funding purposes. base funding target of 105 percent using prescribed market interest rates. | Why GAO Did This Study
Defined benefit plans use interest rates to “discount,” or determine the current value, of estimated future benefits. Experts in the United States have disagreed on both the approach that should be taken by plans to determine a discount rate and the appropriate rate to be used. Different discount rates can create large differences in the valuation of a plan's obligations, which in turn can lead various stakeholders to draw different conclusions about a plan's health, the value of a plan's benefits, and the contributions required to fund them.
As requested, GAO examined different approaches used to determine the discount rate. This report addresses (1) the significance of differences in approaches used to determine discount rates among public and private plans; (2) purposes for measuring the value of a plan's future benefits and key considerations for determining discount rate policy; and (3) approaches selected countries have taken to choose discount rates.
For this review, GAO analyzed provisions in relevant federal laws and regulations, as well as financial reporting and actuarial standards. GAO also reviewed relevant literature and interviewed experts, including experts in Canada, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom—countries with significant defined benefit systems. In addition, GAO modeled hypothetical pension investment portfolios and cash flows to calculate average investment returns using available historical data.
What GAO Found
Public and private sector defined benefit pension plans are subject to different rules and guidance regarding discount rates—interest rates used to determine the current value of estimated future benefit payments. These differences can result in significant implications:
Sponsors of public sector plans generally use discount rates using a long-term assumed average rate of return on plan assets. This approach results in reported obligations that generally appear lower than those of comparable private sector single-employer plans. Some experts believe this approach may encourage public plans to invest in riskier assets, which can increase the assumed return and thereby lower estimated obligations and plan contributions. Other experts believe this approach helps to maintain more predictable and lower costs. Private sector multiemployer plans generally use an assumed rate of return for funding purposes.
Sponsors of private sector single-employer pension plans use bond-based discount rates, which are generally lower than assumed rates of return, for financial reporting of their plans' liabilities. Experts believe this approach may encourage plans to invest in less risky assets, particularly high-quality bonds, to make pension costs less volatile, but it may increase current reported costs. Funding requirements for these plans are tied to historical interest rates, which can reduce funding compared to measures based on more recent interest rates.
Experts identified at least five purposes for measuring the value of future benefits where discount rates are used, including determining sponsor contributions, reporting plan liabilities to stakeholders, determining the amount needed to secure benefits, measuring the value of employee benefits, and determining lump sum settlement amounts. They also identified a variety of considerations in setting discount rate policy, including cost, risk, fairness, sustainability, transparency, and comparability. To address trade-offs among these varied and sometimes competing purposes and considerations, many experts saw value in reporting multiple measures of plan obligations, using different discount rates. Some experts also regarded assumed returns used by U.S. public plans as too high under current market conditions.
Selected countries we examined reported that they apply a variety of approaches to discounting. Canada requires determination of multiple measures of plan obligations, based on both assumed returns and high-quality bond rates and annuity prices. The Netherlands requires that plan obligations be measured based on market interest rates, but allows the use of assumed returns for determining plan contributions or developing recovery plans. In the United Kingdom, discount rates are determined on a plan-specific basis and can include some allowance for assumed returns in excess of high-quality bond rates, depending on plan characteristics and the strength of the sponsor. To the extent that plans in these countries use long-term assumed rates of return, they are generally lower than the 7.5 to 8 percent used by many U.S. public plans under recent market conditions. Experts GAO interviewed in these countries described a greater degree of government oversight which might help explain their use of lower assumed returns.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is not making any recommendations in this report. |
gao_GAO-05-1020T | gao_GAO-05-1020T_0 | Also affected were the estimated 40,000 responders who were involved in some capacity in the days, weeks, and months that followed, including personnel from many government agencies and private organizations as well as other workers and volunteers. Several federally funded programs monitor the health of people who were exposed to the WTC attack and its aftermath. Of the four programs that offer medical examinations to WTC responders, the only one that is open to federal workers who responded to the disaster in an official capacity is the one implemented by HHS. Health Monitoring Programs Implemented by State and Local Governments or Private Organizations Have Made Progress
Three federally funded programs implemented by state and local governments or private organizations—the FDNY WTC Medical Monitoring Program, WTC Medical Monitoring Program (worker and volunteer program), and New York State responder screening program— have made progress in monitoring the physical and mental health of people affected by the WTC attack. The FDNY program completed initial screening for over 15,000 firefighters and emergency medical service personnel, and the worker and volunteer program completed initial screening for over 14,000 other responders. The New York State program screened about 1,700 of the estimated 9,800 state workers and National Guard personnel who responded to the WTC disaster. Programs Provide Data for WTC-Related Health Research
In addition to providing medical examinations, these three programs—the FDNY program, the worker and volunteer program, and the New York State program—have collected information for use in scientific research to better understand the health consequences of the WTC attack and other disasters. For example, the FDNY program reported on the injuries and illnesses experienced by firefighters and emergency medical service workers after responding to the attack. Registry officials would like to conduct subsequent follow-up surveys periodically through about 2023—20 years after the program began in 2003—but have not yet secured funding for long-term monitoring. Program Officials Are Concerned That Current Federal Funding Arrangements Will End before Needed Monitoring Is Complete
Officials from the FDNY, worker and volunteer, and WTC Health Registry programs are concerned that current federal funding arrangements for programs designed to track participants’ health over time may be too short to allow for identification of all the health effects that may eventually develop. HHS’s Program for Screening Federal Responders Has Accomplished Little and Is on Hold
HHS’s OPHEP established the WTC Federal Responder Screening Program to provide medical screening examinations for an estimated 10,000 federal workers who responded to the WTC disaster in an official capacity and were not eligible for any other medical monitoring program. The program began in June 2003—about a year later than other monitoring programs—and completed screenings for 394 workers. Lessons from WTC Health Monitoring Programs Could Assist Future Monitoring Efforts
Officials involved in the WTC health monitoring programs implemented by state and local governments or private organizations—including officials from the federal administering agencies—derived lessons from their experiences that could help officials design such programs in the future. They include the need to quickly identify and contact people affected by a disaster, the value of a centrally coordinated approach for assessing individuals’ health, the importance of monitoring both physical and mental health, and the need to plan for providing referrals for treatment when screening examinations identify health problems. Concluding Observations
Federally funded programs implemented by state and local governments or private organizations to monitor the health effects of the WTC attack on thousands of people who responded to the disaster have made progress. Because of this program’s limited activity, and the inability of federal workers to participate in other monitoring programs because of the assumption that they would have the opportunity to receive screening examinations through the HHS program, many federal responders may not have had an opportunity to identify and seek treatment for health problems related to the WTC disaster. For state responders, the opportunity for continued monitoring could be lost if they are not informed that they are now eligible to participate in the worker and volunteer program. | Why GAO Did This Study
After the 2001 attack on the World Trade Center (WTC), nearly 3,000 people died and an estimated 250,000 to 400,000 people who lived, worked, or attended school in the vicinity were affected. An estimated 40,000 people who responded to the disaster--including New York City Fire Department (FDNY) personnel and other government and private-sector workers and volunteers--were exposed to numerous physical and mental health hazards. Concerns remain about the long-term health effects of the attack and about the nation's capacity to plan for and respond to both short- and long-term health effects in the event of a future attack or other disaster. Several federally funded programs have monitored the physical and mental health effects of the WTC attack. These monitoring programs include one-time screening programs and programs that also conduct follow-up monitoring. GAO was asked to assess the progress of these programs. GAO examined (1) federally funded programs implemented by state and local government agencies or private institutions, (2) federally administered programs to monitor the health of federal workers who responded to the disaster in an official capacity, and (3) lessons learned from WTC monitoring programs. GAO reviewed program documents and interviewed federal, state, and local officials and others involved in WTC monitoring programs.
What GAO Found
Three federally funded monitoring programs implemented by state and local governments or private organizations after the WTC attack have provided initial medical examinations--and in some cases follow-up examinations--to thousands of affected responders to screen for health problems. For example, the FDNY medical monitoring program completed initial screening for over 15,000 firefighters and emergency medical service personnel, and the worker and volunteer program screened over 14,000 other responders. The New York State responder screening program screened about 1,700 state responders before ending its examinations in 2003. Most state responders have not been informed that they are now eligible to participate in the worker and volunteer program, and New York State responders could miss the opportunity for continued monitoring. These monitoring programs and the WTC Health Registry have collected information that program officials believe researchers could use to help better understand the health consequences of the attack and improve treatment. Program officials expressed concern, however, that current federal funding arrangements for long-term monitoring may be too short to allow for identification of all future health effects. In contrast to the progress made by other federally funded programs, the Department of Health and Human Services' (HHS) program to screen federal workers who were sent by their agencies to respond to the WTC disaster has accomplished little and is on hold. The program--which started about one year later than other WTC monitoring programs--completed screening of 394 of the estimated 10,000 federal workers who responded in an official capacity to the disaster, but HHS officials suspended examinations and the program has not screened anyone since March 2004. The program's limited activity and the exclusion of federal workers from other monitoring programs because of the assumption that they could receive screening examinations through the HHS program may have resulted in many federal responders losing the opportunity to identify and seek treatment for their WTC-related health problems. Officials involved in WTC health monitoring programs cited lessons from their experiences that could help others who may be responsible for designing and implementing health monitoring efforts that follow other disasters, such as Hurricane Katrina. These include the need to quickly identify and contact people affected by a disaster; to monitor for mental health effects, as well as physical injuries and illnesses; and to anticipate when designing disaster-related monitoring efforts that there will likely be many people who require referrals for follow-up care and that handling the referral process may require substantial effort. HHS and New York State officials provided comments on the facts contained in this testimony and GAO made changes as appropriate. |
gao_GAO-13-192 | gao_GAO-13-192_0 | Institutions’ Financial Strength and the Outcomes of Auctions Will Help Determine When Remaining Participants Exit CPP
While repayments and income from CPP investments have exceeded the original outlays, the financial strength of participating institutions and the outcome of future securities auctions will help determine when the remaining institutions exit the program. However, the number of institutions that have missed payments has been rising. Competing Goals and Market Conditions Have Affected Treasury’s Exit from GM and Ally
Since investing roughly $80 billion in the automotive industry, as of September 30, 2012, Treasury had received more than $40 billion in proceeds. Mortgage Programs Remain Active, and Oversight Has Shown Both Challenges and Improvements
To help meet EESA’s goals of preventing avoidable foreclosures and preserving homeownership, Treasury allocated $45.6 billion in TARP funds to three mortgage programs:
Making Home Affordable (MHA), which has several components, including the Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP);
Housing Finance Agency Innovation Fund for the Hardest Hit Housing Markets (Hardest Hit Fund or HHF); and
Department of Housing and Urban Development’s (HUD) Federal Housing Administration (FHA) Refinance of Borrowers in Negative Equity Positions (FHA Short Refinance or FHASR). September 2012 only about 1.1 million permanent modifications had been started.experienced a significant decline, as shown in figure 10. One process, which Treasury announced in May 2011, requires large servicers participating in HAMP to identify a “relationship manager” to serve as the borrower’s single point of contact throughout the delinquency or imminent default resolution process, effective September 1, 2011. By implementing this requirement, called the single point of contact requirement, Treasury was seeking to enhance communications between servicers and borrowers during the delinquency resolution process.point of contact requirement, Treasury adopted compliance review procedures to determine whether servicers (1) had established a single point of contact in accordance with MHA requirements, (2) were monitoring assignments and activities to verify that they were in accordance with internal policies and MHA guidance, and (3) had created To monitor servicers’ implementation of the single written notices of assignments or changes and sent accurate, timely information on them to borrowers. Treasury put in place another process aimed at enhancing borrower assistance: a case escalation process for resolving borrower inquiries and disputes. In its capacity as the MHA program administrator, Fannie Mae staffs the HAMP Solution Center and oversees vendors that staff MHA Help and the HOPE Hotline, according to Treasury. Treasury’s continued attention to resolutions of escalated cases and the performance of the support centers and servicers is instrumental in helping to ensure that eligible borrowers receive appropriate assistance. Treasury, Ally Financial, and General Motors provided technical comments that we have incorporated as appropriate. We are sending copies of this report to the Financial Stability Oversight Board, Special Inspector General for TARP, interested congressional committees and members, and Treasury. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives in this report were to examine the condition and status of (1) nonmortgage-related Troubled Asset Relief Programs (TARP) programs and (2) TARP mortgage programs, including Treasury’s efforts to ensure that servicers are implementing two new requirements. To assess the condition and status of all the nonmortgage-related programs initiated under the TARP, we collected and analyzed data about program utilization and assets held, as applicable, focusing primarily on financial information that we had audited in the Office of Financial Stability’s (OFS) financial statements, as of September 30, 2012. Further, we reviewed Treasury documentation such as program terms, press releases, and reports on TARP programs and costs. For the Community Development Capital Initiative, we interviewed program officials to determine what exit concerns Treasury has for the program. To update the status of the American International Group, Inc. (AIG)
Investment Program (formerly the Systemically Significant Failing Institutions Program), we reviewed relevant documents from Treasury and other parties. To assess the status of TARP-funded mortgage programs and Treasury’s efforts to ensure servicers are implementing the Making Home Affordable (MHA) single point of contact and resolution of escalated cases requirements, we reviewed Treasury reports, guidance, and documentation and interviewed Treasury officials. That sale marked the wind down of this TARP program. Troubled Asset Relief Program: Opportunities Exist to Apply Lessons Learned from the Capital Purchase Program to Similarly Designed Programs and to Improve the Repayment Process. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 authorized Treasury to create TARP, a $700 billion program designed to restore liquidity and stability to the financial system and to preserve homeownership by assisting borrowers struggling to make their mortgage payments. The act also required that GAO report every 60 days on TARP activities in the financial and mortgage sectors. This report examines the condition and status of (1) nonmortgage-related TARP programs and (2) TARP-funded mortgage programs and Treasury's efforts to better ensure that servicers are implementing as intended two new requirements designed to improve interactions with borrowers (the MHA single point of contact and resolution of escalated cases requirements). To do this work, GAO analyzed audited financial data for various TARP programs; reviewed documentation such as program terms and agency reports on TARP programs; and interviewed Office of Financial Stability officials.
Treasury generally agreed with the findings. Treasury, Ally Financial, and General Motors provided technical comments that GAO incorporated, as appropriate.
What GAO Found
As of September 30, 2012, the Department of the Treasury (Treasury) was managing assets totaling $63.2 billion in nonmortgage-related Troubled Asset Relief Programs (TARP). As of this date, Treasury had exited 4 of the 10 nonmortgage-related programs, and in December 2012 Treasury announced the exit from a fifth program--the American International Group (AIG) Investment Program. Exactly when Treasury will exit the remaining five programs remains uncertain. Treasury has identified several factors that will affect its decisions. For example,
for the Capital Purchase Program (CPP, created to provide capital to financial institutions), the financial condition of the participating institutions and the success of auctions;
for the Community Development Capital Initiative (CDCI, created to provide capital to credit unions and financial institutions in underserved communities), which Treasury has not yet decided to exit, the financial condition of the participating institutions and the rate at which the institutions repay Treasury; and
for the Automotive Industry Financing Program (AIFP, created to prevent a significant disruption of the American automotive industry).
Some programs, such as CPP, have yielded returns that exceed the original investments. Others, such as CDCI and AIFP, have not.
Unlike the nonmortgage-related TARP programs, TARP-funded mortgage programs, which focus on mitigating foreclosures, are ongoing, and Treasury's oversight of new requirements designed to improve servicers' interactions with borrowers showed both challenges and improvements. Treasury allocated $45.6 billion in TARP funds to three programs, including Making Home Affordable (MHA), but more than $40 billion of the funding has not yet been disbursed, and the programs have not reached the expected number of borrowers. The centerpiece of MHA is the Home Affordable Modification Program, which has provided about 1.1 million permanent modifications to borrowers. To help ensure that homeowners receive appropriate assistance from servicers under this and other MHA programs, since September 2011 Treasury has required servicers to identify a "relationship manager" to serve as the homeowner's single point of contact throughout a delinquency or imminent default resolution process. GAO found that Treasury's initial reviews of servicers' implementation of this requirement had identified some inconsistencies. However, oversight of a second requirement designed to improve the resolution of borrower inquiries and disputes (escalated cases) showed that the nine largest servicers had met the performance target. Treasury officials said that the MHA program administrator, Fannie Mae, handled oversight of the escalation process and the vendors who supported in keeping with Treasury's guidelines. |
gao_HEHS-98-93 | gao_HEHS-98-93_0 | The demographic analysis in this report, however, focuses on the group of children for whom coverage is mandated. Illegal aliens are eligible only for emergency services under Medicaid. Medicaid-Eligible Children Who Are Uninsured Have Characteristics That Can Be Used to Target Outreach Efforts
Uninsured Medicaid-eligible children differ somewhat from those currently enrolled in Medicaid, and these differences can be used by states to focus their outreach and enrollment efforts. Overall, about 23 percent—or 3.4 million—of the 15 million children who were eligible for Medicaid were uninsured in 1996. 1.) They are disproportionately children of the working poor, Hispanic, and U.S.-born children of foreign-born parents or foreign-born, and they are more likely to live in the West and the South. Hispanics, U.S.-Born Children of Foreign-Born Parents, and Immigrant Children Are More Likely to Be Uninsured
Among racial and ethnic groups, the proportion of uninsured Medicaid-eligible children, as well as the proportion enrolled in Medicaid, varies by racial and ethnic group. 2.) Over 70 percent of children in immigrant families are Hispanic, suggesting that outreach efforts be targeted to the Hispanic community as well as use Spanish-language outreach materials and applications. 3.) Even families who know about the program may not realize that they could be eligible. With the long-standing link between Medicaid and AFDC, many families—both those who have never received welfare and those who have—assume that if they are not receiving cash assistance, they are not eligible for Medicaid. Two types of families tend to be unaware of their eligibility: working families who assume that Medicaid eligibility is tied to welfare eligibility and families who were previously on welfare and believe that, because of welfare reform, they are no longer eligible for Medicaid. Families May Not Perceive a Need for Medicaid Due to Good Health and Alternative Sources of Care
Several state officials, providers, and one expert told us that some families do not become concerned about health care access until their children become sick and, therefore, do not enroll them in Medicaid—especially if the children are relatively healthy. State officials, beneficiary advocates, and other experts told us that lengthy enrollment forms and the associated documentation requirements create a barrier for families. In addition to length, enrollment forms often require extensive documentation. A valid and reliable eligibility determination process is important to state officials to ensure program integrity. Some States Use Innovative Strategies to Target Outreach and Encourage Enrollment
To enroll eligible children in Medicaid, some states are using innovative strategies that are intended to increase knowledge and awareness of the program and its benefits, minimize the perceived social stigma, and simplify and streamline the eligibility process. To improve the enrollment process, some states have adopted strategies to assist immigrant families or have simplified and streamlined the eligibility process by shortening forms and accepting applications at many new sites, as well as mail-in applications. They generally agreed that a successful education and outreach program should target outreach to low-income working families with children, using nontraditional methods and locations, and work in collaboration with community groups, schools, providers, and advocates. In addition, states have advertised the program as one that is intended for working families, while some have included policies to avoid displacing private health insurance. 4.) 1.) 8, 1997). | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reported on children who are eligible for Medicaid but are not enrolled, focusing on: (1) the demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of children who qualify for Medicaid, and identifying groups in which uninsured children are concentrated and to whom outreach efforts might be expected; (2) the reasons these children are not enrolled in Medicaid; and (3) strategies that states and communities are using to increase employment.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of uninsured Medicaid-eligible children suggest that outreach strategies could be targeted to specific groups; (2) in 1996, 3.4 million Medicaid-eligible children--23 percent of those eligible under the federal mandate--were uninsured; (3) the majority were children of working poor or near poor, and their parents were often employed by small firms and were themselves uninsured; (4) uninsured children who are eligible for Medicaid are more likely to be in working families, Hispanic, and either U.S.-born to foreign-born parents or foreign born; (5) state officials, beneficiary advocates, and health care providers whom GAO contacted cited several reasons that families do not enroll their children in Medicaid; (6) lower income working families may not realize that their children qualify for Medicaid, or they may think their children do not need coverage if they are not currently sick; (7) under welfare reform, the delinking of Medicaid and cash assistance may cause some confusion for families, although GAO found that states were making efforts to retain a single application and eligibility determination process to avoid this problem; (8) in addition, many low-income families believe that Medicaid carries the same negative image of dependency that they attach to welfare; (9) immigrant families, many of whom are Hispanic, face additional barriers, including language and cultural separateness, fear of dealing with the government, and changing eligibility rules; (10) the enrollment process for Medicaid can involve long forms and extensive documentation, which are intended to ensure program integrity but often are a major deterrent to enrollment; (11) recognizing these impediments, some states have undertaken education and outreach initiatives and have tried to change the image of the program and simplify enrollment to acquire only necessary information; (12) these efforts include mass media campaigns and coordination of effort with community organizations and provider groups; (13) some states have made the enrollment process more accessible for working families, using mail-in applications or enrollment at sites chosen for their convenience; (14) several states have changed the name of the program to minimize its identification with welfare and other assistance programs; (15) many states provide Spanish-language applications and some are working with community groups; and (16) some states have also simplified the enrollment procedure by shortening the enrollment form and reducing the documentation requirements. |
gao_GAO-04-580T | gao_GAO-04-580T_0 | The primary purpose of the appraisal reforms contained in Title XI was to assist in protecting the federal deposit insurance funds—and, by extension, mortgage lenders—from avoidable losses. Private entities—the Appraisal Standards Board (ASB) and the Appraiser Qualifications Board (AQB)—establish minimum standards for the development and reporting of real estate appraisals and minimum qualification criteria for certified appraisers. Since the AQB set its original criteria in 1991, for example, it has issued numerous interpretations and approved two revisions of its criteria. Under Title XI, the federal financial institution regulatory agencies are to accept a state’s certifications and licenses unless the Appraisal Subcommittee issues a written finding that the state certifying and licensing agency has failed to recognize and enforce the standards, requirements, and procedures of Title XI; does not have enough authority to carry out its functions under Title XI; or does not make decisions on appraisal standards and qualifications or supervise appraiser practices in a way that carries out the purposes of Title XI. The federal financial institution regulators generally require the use of certified appraisers for commercial transactions of $250,000 or more and “complex” residential transactions of $250,000 or more. Appraisal Subcommittee Monitors Title XI Regulatory Activities
Title XI created the Appraisal Subcommittee within the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council and established it as the principal federal agency responsible for monitoring the activities of the other components of the real estate appraisal industry oversight structure. Accordingly, the subcommittee performs on-site field reviews of state agency programs and maintains communications with appraisers, state and federal agencies, and users of appraisal services. Accordingly, we recommended that the subcommittee develop and apply consistent criteria to assess states’ compliance with Title XI requirements. Entities Cited Potential Impediments to Fulfilling Their Title XI Roles
The private, state, and federal entities involved in the oversight of the real estate appraisal industry identified a number of factors that they believe could constrain their ability to fulfill their Title XI responsibilities. Appraisal Subcommittee officials reported that rule-making authority and additional enforcement sanctions could facilitate the subcommittee’s oversight of state compliance. Industry Participants Raised Various Concerns about the Title XI Oversight Structure
Representatives of federal and state regulatory agencies, appraiser trade groups and education providers, and the mortgage industry expressed various concerns and conflicting viewpoints about the Title XI regulatory structure. However, there was no clear consensus regarding the need for or impact of possible changes. However, our survey indicated that state regulatory agencies continue to vary widely on these issues. Variations in State Regulatory Agencies’ Enforcement of Title XI Requirements
Some industry participants reported a lack of uniformity in processing complaints and taking disciplinary actions against those problem appraisers that were referred to state regulatory authorities. To improve the process for referring problem appraisals by entities that oversee or use real estate appraisals to the state appraiser agencies for possible enforcement actions, we recommended that the Appraisal Subcommittee work with Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and HUD to ensure that the referral of problem appraisals (1) are provided in a format that is useful to the state appraiser agencies and (2) facilitate the subcommittee’s efforts to monitor decisions made by the states regarding the supervision of appraiser practices. No Clear Consensus Regarding the Need for Changes to the Title XI Regulatory Structure
Among the various representatives of trade groups, education providers, and other industry participants that we contacted, there were differing opinions as to what, if any, changes were necessary to Title XI. | Why GAO Did This Study
The appraisal and mortgage lending industry has changed dramatically since the passage of Title XI of the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989. Some have concluded that the problems Title XI was intended to address--the risk to the federal deposit insurance funds and the lack of uniform standards and qualifications--no longer exist. This statement is based on GAO's May 14, 2003, report and discusses the roles of private, state, and federal entities that oversee the appraisal industry; the challenges that Title XI presented to these entities; and industry participants' concerns about the effectiveness of the Title XI regulatory structure.
What GAO Found
Title XI created a complex oversight structure for real estate appraisals and appraisers that involves private, state, and federal entities. Two private entities under the Appraisal Foundation establish uniform rules for real estate appraisals and set minimum criteria for certifying appraisers. State regulatory agencies certify appraisers based on these criteria. In addition, states (1) implement licensing of real estate appraisers and (2) monitor and supervise compliance with appraisal standards and requirements. The federal financial regulators oversee financial institutions' use of appraisals, and a federal agency, the Appraisal Subcommittee, monitors the functions of the entities. As part of its oversight activities, the Appraisal Subcommittee performs field reviews of the state appraiser regulatory agencies. GAO found that these reviews and their resulting reports could be more useful if based on clear and consistent criteria for assessing states' compliance with Title XI requirements. All of these entities except the federal financial regulators identified potential impediments to carrying out their Title XI responsibilities. The two private entities stated that fund limitations could impede their ability to ensure that development of standards and qualifications evolve with changing conditions. State agencies said that funding shortfalls hindered their ability to enforce compliance. Appraisal Subcommittee staff reported that rule-making authority and additional enforcement sanctions could facilitate its oversight of state compliance with Title XI. The lack of funding and resources cited by state appraiser regulatory agencies and the two private entities, which establish appraisal standards and appraiser qualification criteria, could affect their future ability to fulfill their Title XI responsibilities. At the same time, the Appraisal Subcommittee has accumulated an operating surplus of almost $4 million from fees levied and collected by the states on behalf of the federal government. Industry participants raised concerns about aspects of the Title XI regulatory system for appraisers. They cited differences in state regulation that affect both lenders and appraisers, gaps in Title XI's coverage--for example, transactions of less than $250,000 do not require an appraisal, high fees and burdensome processes for having appraiser education courses approved, and weak enforcement and complaints processing. Some industry participants felt that states, traditionally involved in regulating professions, should solely regulate the appraisal industry. Others felt that the current structure needed a significant overhaul to become effective. GAO found no clear consensus among the state regulatory agencies it surveyed or other industry participants regarding the need for or impact of possible changes to the Title XI regulatory structure. |
gao_GAO-09-289 | gao_GAO-09-289_0 | Growth in TDRL caseloads could be related to a combination of increases in the number of cases going through the military’s disability evaluation system, higher TDRL placement rates, and low numbers of cases removed from the TDRL relative to numbers of new cases being added to the list. The Characteristics of TDRL Placements Have Changed Somewhat in Recent Years
DOD-wide, servicemembers placed on the TDRL in each calendar year from 2000 through 2007 varied little with respect to their military status, years of service, and most prevalent disabling conditions. In each of these years, most TDRL placements had been active duty personnel, although the small proportion who had been reservists grew considerably between 2000 and 2007. Most TDRL placements in each year also had fewer than 20 years of service and, over time, their average years of service declined, DOD-wide. The disabilities most prevalent among TDRL placements have consistently been musculoskeletal, mental, or neurological in nature. Among those with mental and neurological disabilities, the incidence of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) and residual conditions related to traumatic brain injury (TBI) increased substantially across all of the services. Very Few TDRL Placements Returned to Military Service, Half Received a Final Determination within 3 Years, and Many Received a Final Disability Rating Identical to the Initial Rating While there are variations in TDRL results across the services, some outcomes for this group were more common than others. Finally, only 7 percent of TDRL placements, DOD-wide, received a final disability rating that would have resulted in permanent disability payment amounts higher than their TDRL payments. 5.) DOD-wide, for those placed on the TDRL in calendar years 2000 through 2003 who were ultimately placed on the PDRL, 73 percent were assigned a final disability rating that was no different from their initial disability rating. They also do not routinely compile information on TDRL outcomes that could better inform PEB determinations related to the stability of disabilities. Despite indications that the services face challenges providing medical reexaminations at least once every 18 months as required by law, none monitor the extent to which this requirement is met. Moreover, although TDRL reexamination requirements can place burdens on TDRL retirees and MTFs, the use of examinations by nonmilitary physicians to reduce these burdens is limited. The Services’ Procedures Do Not Ensure Consistent Enforcement of TDRL Rules
DOD requires temporary retirees to submit to a periodic medical examination at least once every 18 months. TDRL Information Is Not Always Adequate or Accessible to Temporary Retirees
Information about temporary disability retirement that the services provide to those they place on the TDRL is not always clear or complete and can be difficult for TDRL retirees to access. The official PEB findings forms, themselves, do not fully explain the reason for an individual’s placement on the list or what is required of the TDRL retiree. TDRL retirees participating in our focus groups expressed considerable confusion about and dissatisfaction with their limited access to information and contacts. To ensure that temporary retirees receive adequate information to understand why they are placed on the list and the importance of complying with TDRL requirements, we recommend that the Secretaries of the Air Force, Army, and Navy take the following three actions: Assess the adequacy of information they provide regarding the TDRL, including the information contained on their PEB findings forms and other materials, and provided by PEBLOs, and make improvements where needed; take steps to encourage ongoing contact between temporary retirees and TDRL administrators by, for example, maintaining a working and easily accessible TDRL administrative telephone hotline for temporary retirees; and improve access to Web-based information about the TDRL. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
The objectives of our review were to examine (1) recent trends in the Temporary Disability Retired List (TDRL) caseload size, (2) recent trends in the characteristics of servicemembers placed on the TDRL, (3) disability retirement outcomes for TDRL placements, (4) the adequacy of TDRL management, and (5) the adequacy of information provided to temporary retirees. | Why GAO Did This Study
Service members found unfit for duty due to a service-related illness or injury may be eligible for military disability retirement. When their disability is not stable, however, they may be placed on the military's Temporary Disability Retired List (TDRL) and granted temporary benefits for as long as 5 years. GAO was asked to respond to concerns about TDRL caseloads, management, and impact on servicemembers. To address these concerns, we analyzed TDRL data; interviewed military officials; reviewed laws, regulations, and other relevant documents; and conducted 12 focus groups with temporary retirees. This report examines (1) recent trends in the TDRL caseload size, (2) recent trends in the characteristics of those placed on the TDRL, (3) disability retirement outcomes for TDRL placements, (4) the adequacy of TDRL management, and (5) the adequacy of information provided to TDRL retirees.
What GAO Found
TDRL caseloads within the Department of Defense (DOD) grew by 43 percent, from 9,983 in fiscal year 2003 to 14,285 in fiscal year 2007. Growth in caseloads could be attributable to a combination of increases in the number of cases going through the military's disability evaluation system, higher TDRL placement rates, and low numbers of cases removed from the TDRL relative to new cases added to the list. DOD-wide, servicemembers placed on the TDRL in each calendar year from 2000 through 2007 varied little with respect to their military status, years of service, and disabilities. In each of these years, most TDRL placements had been active duty personnel, although the small proportion who had been reservists grew considerably. Most TDRL placements in each year also had fewer than 20 years of service and, over time, their average years of service declined. The disabilities most prevalent among TDRL placements were musculoskeletal, mental, or neurological in nature. Among those with mental and neurological disabilities, the incidence of post traumatic stress disorder and conditions related to traumatic brain injury increased substantially across the services. Although the experiences of temporary disability retirees varied, some outcomes were more common than others. DOD-wide, very few who were placed on the list between calendar years 2000 and 2003 returned to military service. Further, about half received a final determination within 3 years and, of those who ultimately received permanent disability benefits, 73 percent had final disability ratings that were no different than their initial ratings. Finally, only 7 percent of TDRL placements, DOD-wide, received a final disability rating that qualified them for permanent disability payment amounts higher than their TDRL payments. DOD and the services do not effectively manage key aspects of the TDRL process. The military does not systematically examine physical evaluation board (PEB) stability decisions for accuracy and consistency or routinely compile information on TDRL outcomes to better inform its assessments of stability. According to TDRL administrative staff, ensuring that medical reexaminations are done in TDRL cases at least once every 18 months is often a challenge. However, the military does not monitor the extent to which this requirement is met. Moreover, there is limited use of nonmilitary physicians to perform reexaminations, which could reduce burdens on medical treatment facilities. Finally, military procedures do not ensure consistent enforcement of TDRL rules. Information about the TDRL that the services provide is not always clear or complete and can be difficult to access. PEB findings forms provided to temporary retirees do not fully explain why service members are placed on the list or what is required of them. Temporary retirees reported that counseling related to PEB decisions was inconsistent and lacking in followthrough. Information from military pamphlets, brochures, fact sheets, and Web sites is often incomplete or difficult to find. Temporary retirees participating in our focus groups expressed considerable confusion about and dissatisfaction with their limited access to information and points of contact. |
gao_GAO-02-467T | gao_GAO-02-467T_0 | The budgetary surpluses of recent years put us in a stronger position to respond both to the events of September 11 and to the economic slowdown than would otherwise have been the case. However, going forward, the nation’s commitment to surpluses will truly be tested. Saving the Social Security surplus became an achievable and compelling fiscal policy goal for the nation in this context. At least for the next several years the baseline does not turn to unified surplus. Although long-term projections are inherently more uncertain than short- term forecasts, in some ways we can be surer about the outlook 20 years from now since it is driven by known demographics. GAO’s Model Simulations Illustrate Long-Term Budget Challenges
Because of the coming demographic shift, the message from our simulations remains the same as last year, indeed as since we first published results from our long-term model in 1992: Absent policy change, in the long term, persistent deficits and escalating debt driven by entitlement spending will overwhelm the budget. To move into the future with no changes in federal health and retirement programs is to envision a very different role for the federal government. The budget process is the one place where we as a nation can conduct a healthy debate about competing claims and new priorities. However, such a debate will be needlessly constrained if only new proposals and activities are on the table. A fundamental review of existing programs and operations can create much-needed fiscal flexibility to address emerging needs by weeding out programs that have proven to be outdated, poorly targeted, or inefficient in their design and management. We need to think about what government should do in the 21st century and how it should do business. Budget Process Should Facilitate Discipline and Awareness of Long- Term Implications of Decisions
Today the Congress faces the challenge of sorting out these many claims on the federal budget without the fiscal benchmarks and rules that served as guides through the years of deficit reduction. However, the combination of the economic slowdown and the need to respond to the events of September 11 has overtaken that measure. However, the demographic trends that drive the long-term outlook have not changed. | What GAO Found
Combating terrorism and ensuring homeland security have created urgent claims on the nation's attention and on the federal budget. Although an economic recovery seems to be underway, the recession that began last spring has had real consequences for the budget. At the same time, the fiscal pressures created by the retirement of the baby boomers and rising health care costs continue unchanged. However, the surpluses also put the nation in a stronger position to respond to the events of September 11 and to the economic slowdown. The nation's commitment to surpluses will be tested. A return to surplus will require sustained discipline and difficult choices. Because the longer-term outlook is driven in large part by known demographic trends, the outlook 20 years from now is surer than the forecast for the next few years. The message of GAO's updated simulations remains the same as last year: absent structural changes in entitlement programs for the elderly, persistent deficits and escalating debt will overwhelm the budget in the long term. Both longer-term and new commitments undertaken after September 11 sharpen the need for competing claims and new priorities. A fundamental review of existing programs and activities is necessary both to increase fiscal flexibility and to make government fit the modern world. Stated differently, there is a need to consider the proper role of the federal government in the 21st century and how government should do business. The fiscal benchmarks and rules that moved the country from deficit to surplus expire this fiscal year. Any successor system should include a debate about reprioritization today and a better understanding of the long-term implications of different policy choices. Many things that the nation may be able to afford today may not be sustainable in the future. |
gao_GAO-12-303 | gao_GAO-12-303_0 | State and urban area homeland security strategies are required by FEMA for receiving SHSP and UASI funding. Overlap and Other Factors Increase the Risk of Duplication among Grant Programs
Grant Programs Have Similar Goals, Fund Similar Projects, and Exist in the Same Urban Areas, Which Increases the Risk of Duplication
The four grant programs in our review—SHSP, UASI, PSGP, and TSGP—have overlapping goals, project types, and funding jurisdictions, which increases the risk of duplication among the programs. Although the specifics of the four programs vary, they share the overarching goal of enhancing the capacity of state and local emergency responders to prevent, respond to, and recover from a terrorism incident involving chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or other explosive devices, or cyber attacks. Differences in Administrative Processes among the Four Grant Programs Result in Varied Levels of Information on Which Award Decisions Are Based
FEMA’s ability to track which projects receive funding among the four grant programs is varied because the project-level information FEMA has available to make award decisions—including grant funding amounts, grant recipients, and grant funding purposes—also varies by program. Delegating administrative duties to stakeholders reduces FEMA’s administrative burden, but also contributes to FEMA having less visibility over some grant applications, specifically those funded via SHSP and UASI. Agency officials stated that this system, once completed, will help FEMA to manage all of its preparedness grants, and has an explicit goal of enhancing project-level data collection. However, collecting information with this level of detail could help FEMA better position itself to assess applications and ensure that it is using its resources effectively. Enhanced Federal Coordination Could Help Reduce the Risk of Duplication
FEMA, as well as state and local stakeholders, have taken steps to improve coordination in selecting and administering the four grant programs, but additional FEMA action could help reduce the risk of duplication among these programs. However, since the review process for grant applications falls within each separate branch and grant program––and since there is no process in place to ensure that grant information is exchanged in the review process—FEMA cannot identify whether grant monies are being used for any unnecessary duplicative purposes. We recognize the challenges associated with reviewing a large volume of grant applications, but to help reduce the risk of funding duplicative projects, FEMA could benefit from exploring opportunities to enhance its coordination of project reviews while also taking into account the large volume of grant applications it must process. A revised implementation plan that includes more specific project schedule information and accurate timelines for implementation could help guide efforts and keep the development of these measures on track for successful and timely implementation. DHS Has Initiatives under Way to Evaluate Overall Effectiveness across Grant Programs, but Has Not Completed These Efforts
Apart from developing performance measures for each grant program, DHS also has several initiatives under way to measure the collective effectiveness of its grant programs in achieving shared program goals, as shown in table 6 below. As shown above, FEMA’S efforts to measure the collective effectiveness of its grants programs are recent and ongoing and thus it is too soon to evaluate the extent to which these initiatives will provide FEMA with the information it needs to determine whether these grant programs are effectively improving the nation’s security. Conclusions
From fiscal years 2002 through 2011, DHS has distributed about $20.3 billion through four homeland security preparedness grants that specifically target state, urban, port, and transit security. Additionally, since DHS’s existing output-based performance measures for the SHSP and UASI programs do not provide DHS with the information it needs to assess grant effectiveness and FEMA has not yet implemented outcome-based performance measures for any of the four programs, it will be difficult for FEMA to fully assess the effectiveness of these grant programs. Because the project plan FEMA has in place to guide its efforts to develop measures does not provide adequate information to determine what measures will be implemented for each grant program and when this implementation will occur, FEMA does not have reasonable assurance that these measures will be implemented in a timely way to help assess the programs’ effectiveness. To better identify and reduce the risk of duplication through improved data collection and coordination, we recommend that the FEMA Administrator: take steps, when developing ND Grants and responding to the May 2011 FEMA report recommendations on data requirements, to ensure that FEMA collects project information with the level of detail needed to better position the agency to identify any potential unnecessary duplication within and across the four grant programs, weighing any additional costs of collecting these data; and explore opportunities to enhance FEMA’s internal coordination and administration of the programs in order to identify and mitigate the potential for any unnecessary duplication. DHS concurred with all three recommendations, and requested that the first two recommendations be considered resolved and closed. The 5 interconnected programs shared the same grant guidance in fiscal year 2011, but each program had a separate funding allocation. | Why GAO Did This Study
From fiscal years 2002 through 2011, the Department of Homeland Securitys (DHS) Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) distributed approximately $20.3 billion to four grant programs: the State Homeland Security Program, Urban Areas Security Initiative, Port Security Grant Program, and Transit Security Grant Program. These programs are intended to enhance the capacity of state and local first responders to prevent, respond to, and recover from a terrorism incident. GAO was asked to evaluate the extent to which: (1) overlap and other factors among these programs could impact the risk of duplication; (2) mechanisms exist that enhance coordination and reduce the risk of duplication and how they are being implemented; and (3) DHS has implemented performance measures to evaluate the effectiveness of these programs. To address these objectives, GAO reviewed grant guidance and funding allocation methodologies. GAO also interviewed DHS officials, and grant administrators in five urban areasselected because they receive funding from all four grant programs in this reviewabout grant processes and program challenges, among other things.
What GAO Found
Multiple factors contribute to the risk of duplication among four FEMA grant programs that GAO studiedthe State Homeland Security Program (SHSP), Urban Areas Security Initiative (UASI), Port Security Grant Program, and Transit Security Grant Program. Specifically, these programs share similar goals, fund similar projects, and provide funds in the same geographic regions. Further, DHSs ability to track grant funding, specific funding recipients, and funding purposes varies among the programs, giving FEMA less visibility over some grant programs. Finally, DHSs award process for some programs bases decisions on high-level, rather than specific, project information. Although GAOs analysis identified no cases of duplication among a sample of grant projects, the above factors collectively put FEMA at risk of funding duplicative projects. FEMA officials stated that there is a trade-off between enhancing management visibility and reducing administrative burden, but also recogized that FEMA should use more specific project-level information for award decisions and have taken initial steps towards this goal. For example, FEMA is considering how to better use existing grant information and has also begun to phase in a grants management system that includes an explicit goal of collecting project-level information. However, FEMA has not determined all of its specific data requirements. As FEMA determines these requirements, it will be important to collect the level of information needed to compare projects across grant programs. Given the limitations in currently collected information, FEMA would benefit from collecting information with greater detail as this could help FEMA better position itself to assess applications and ensure that it is using its resources effectively.
FEMA, as well as state and local stakeholders, have taken steps to improve coordination in administering the four programs, but FEMA could take further action. For example, FEMA does not internally coordinate application reviews across the four programs. Specifically, the programs are managed by two separate FEMA divisions which review grant applications for each program separately and there is no process in place to ensure that application information is shared among the programs during this process. Thus, it is difficult for FEMA to identify whether grant monies are being used for the same or similar purposes. FEMA could benefit from further examining its internal grant coordination process, while considering the large volume of grant applications it must process.
FEMA introduced some performance measures for the UASI and SHSP programs in 2011 that add value, but these measures do not assess program effectiveness. FEMA has efforts under way to develop outcome measuresthat will focus on program effectivenessfor each of the four grant programs in this review, but has not completed these efforts. Further, the FEMA project plan that guides these efforts does not provide information on what measures will be implemented for each grant program and when this will occur. A revised project plan that includes more specific schedule information and accurate implementation timelines could help guide these efforts. DHS also has several efforts under way to measure the collective effectiveness of its grant programs in achieving shared program goals, but these efforts are recent and ongoing. Thus, it is too soon to evaluate the extent to which these initiatives will provide FEMA with the information it needs to determine whether these grant programs are effectively improving the nations security.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DHS: (1) collect project information with the level of detail needed to identify any unnecessary duplication; (2) explore opportunities for enhanced internal coordination in grant administration; and (3) revise its plan to ensure the timely implementation of performance measures to assess the effectiveness of these grants. DHS concurred with all recommendations. |
gao_GAO-16-779 | gao_GAO-16-779_0 | Although federal funding is provided to states to help improve highway infrastructure, state and local agencies own and maintain most of the nation’s bridges. The percentage of structurally deficient deck area and bridges declined along the same trajectory from 2006 to 2015. Specifically, the deck area on bridges classified as structurally deficient decreased from 9 percent to 7 percent, and over the same time period, structurally deficient bridges, by number of bridges, decreased from 13 percent to 10 percent (see fig. Specifically, our review of 2015 NBI data shows that some states have substantially higher percentages of deck area on bridges classified as structurally deficient than others have (see fig. Bridge Conditions May Become More Challenging to Address as Bridges Age
The number of bridges and amount of total deck area increased dramatically from the 1950s through 1970s. Federal Bridge Funding has Been Stable in the Last 10 Years, but the Effects of Expended Resources Are Unclear
Federal Funds Obligated for Bridge Projects Have Generally Remained Stable
Federal funds obligated for bridges have remained relatively stable over the last 10 years, between $6 billion and $7 billion annually in most years (see table 1). In the last 10 years, federal obligations have shifted somewhat from building new bridges to projects that preserve existing bridges. Given that FHWA already estimates total funds dedicated to bridges and collects data on bridge conditions nationwide, it has the information needed to create performance measures that would demonstrate the link between federal funding and the outcomes for bridges. We have reported that linking performance outcomes with information on resources invested (i.e., data on the resources used to produce an outcome, including costs) can help agencies to more clearly understand how changes in invested resources may result in changes to performance. Using such performance measures would help FHWA to demonstrate the link between federal funding and outcomes for bridges. Selected States Reported Little Change in the Way They Fund and Manage Highway Bridges, and Identified Various Challenges Related to Funding and Aging Bridges
Selected States Reported That Bridge Funding Has Generally Not Changed but That Flexibility of Funding Has Increased
Most of the state government officials we interviewed reported that, consistent with FHWA data, bridge funding has been stable since the federal bridge program was consolidated into other programs in 2012. We interviewed officials from 24 states and D.C., and officials from 21 states and D.C. told us there had been no change in funding their bridge programs in the last 4 years. Officials from 3 states reported an overall increase in bridge funding since that time, although officials from 2 of those states indicated that the increase in bridge funding was not necessarily a result of federal changes. The general stability in bridge funding may be a result of the long time frame for programming bridge projects, which could create a lag in funding levels’ response to policy changes. Officials from some selected states reported increased flexibility in their ability to use federal funds for bridges. In addition to allowing states the flexibility to determine whether to spend federal highway funds on bridges or other highway needs, changes provided by MAP-21 gave states flexibility to use federal funds for a greater range of bridge projects. Specifically, officials from 18 states and D.C. reported that they give bridges the same priority as they did prior to MAP-21. Of the officials we interviewed from 24 states and D.C., officials from 14 described inadequate funding as a challenge. Officials from 13 of the states we interviewed reported aging bridges as a challenge. For many of these states, the challenge of aging bridges is intertwined with the challenge of inadequate funds. Recommendation for Executive Action
We recommend that the Secretary of the Department of Transportation direct the FHWA Administrator to develop an efficiency measure or measures that demonstrate the linkage between the federal funding of bridges and the desired performance outcomes, such as maintained or improved bridge conditions, and report the resulting information to Congress. In addition, DOT provided technical comments that we incorporated as appropriate. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report addresses the funding and management of bridges and examines: (1) trends, over the past 10 years, in the condition of the nation’s bridges; (2) trends, over the same period, in federal funding of the nation’s bridges and how FHWA monitors the linkage between this funding and outcomes; and (3) changes since MAP-21 in how selected states fund and manage their bridge programs, including any challenges they face. | Why GAO Did This Study
The nation's 612,000 bridges are critical elements of the surface transportation system, but the entire system is under growing strain and funding it is on GAO's High Risk List. While state and local governments own and maintain most of the nation's bridges, the federal government provides some funding for them, administered by FHWA. In 2012, legislative changes consolidated the bridge-funding program into other highway programs, giving states more flexibility in how to allocate funds.
GAO was asked to review the funding and management of bridges. This report examines trends, over the past 10 years, in (1) the condition and (2) the funding of the nation's bridges, as well as (3) how states fund and manage their bridge programs, given the 2012 legislative changes. GAO analyzed FHWA's bridge conditions and funding data; reviewed applicable laws, relevant FHWA program guidance, and federal guidance on performance measures; and interviewed federal officials and transportation officials from 24 states and D.C., selected to include those with large bridge inventories, among other factors.
What GAO Found
Bridge conditions have generally improved nationwide from 2006 to 2015, based on GAO analysis of federal bridge data. For example, the percentage of structurally deficient bridge deck area (the surface area that carries vehicles) decreased from 9 percent to 7 percent nationwide during this period. The number of structurally deficient bridges also decreased from 13 percent to 10 percent nationwide. However, some states have substantially higher percentages of structurally deficient deck area than others. Bridge conditions may become more challenging to address as bridges age, because the number of bridges and amount of total deck area increased dramatically from the 1950s through the 1970s, generally with a 50-year design life. Analysis of federal bridge data shows that the amount of structurally deficient deck area is greatest for bridges built from 1960 through 1974, indicating an expected need for additional maintenance, replacement, or rehabilitation.
Federal funds obligated for bridge projects have remained relatively stable from 2006 to 2015, between $6 billion and $7 billion annually in most years. During this period, the use of federal funds on bridges shifted somewhat from building new bridges to projects that preserve existing bridges, such as bridge rehabilitation or preventative maintenance. While the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) estimates total funds dedicated to bridges and collects data on bridge conditions nationwide, it does not track the linkage between federal funds and changes in bridge conditions. GAO has previously reported that linking performance outcomes with resources invested can help agencies to more clearly determine how changes in invested resources may result in changes to performance. Using such performance measures would help FHWA demonstrate the link between federal funding and outcomes for bridges.
Officials from the selected 24 states and the District of Columbia (D.C.) reported little change in the way they have funded and managed bridges since 2012. Officials from 21 states and D.C. reported bridge funding has been stable since the federal bridge program was consolidated in 2012. Officials from 3 states reported an increase in bridge funding since that time. The general stability in bridge funding may be a result of the long time frame for planning bridge projects; for example, bridge funding cycles can be 5 years or longer, a time span that means any changes would not be apparent for several years. Officials from 10 states mentioned increased flexibility in their ability to use federal funds for bridge projects. Changes from the Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act provided states flexibility to determine whether to spend federal highway funds on bridges or other highway needs. Further, officials from 18 states and D.C. reported that they have not changed how they prioritize bridge projects relative to other transportation projects. With respect to challenges, officials from 14 states described inadequate funding as a challenge, and officials from 13 states reported aging bridges as a challenge. For many of these states, the challenge of maintaining aging bridges is intertwined with the challenge of inadequate funds.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOT direct FHWA to develop measures on the linkage between the federal funding of bridges and the desired outcomes—maintained or improved bridge conditions—and report results to Congress. DOT concurred with our recommendation. DOT also provided technical comments, which we incorporated, as appropriate. |
gao_HEHS-97-4 | gao_HEHS-97-4_0 | States Privatize to Improve Child Support Services, Handle Growing Caseloads, and Obtain Additional Resources
Overall, officials in the states with full-service privatization efforts most frequently cited a desire to improve the child support services offered, the need to serve their soaring caseloads, and the ability to deploy additional child support staff as reasons why they fully privatized local offices. Some states have implemented full-service privatization in a way that minimizes displacement of public employees. Outcomes Are Comparable, but Cost-Effectiveness Varied
Our analysis suggests that fully privatized offices can produce performance outcomes comparable to those of public child support programs. While performance outcomes show that the privatized offices did at least as well or better than their public counterparts, the cost-effectiveness results were more mixed for the periods reviewed. The difference in location rates was not statistically significant. Arizona’s Privatized Office Performed as Well as Public Office and Was More Cost-Effective
In Arizona, performance outcomes on our review cases revealed that the privately run office in Yavapai County did about as well as the public office in Mohave County that we compared it with; however, the privatized office was more cost-effective during our 18-month review period. In the first privatized office, we did not have a sufficient number of cases to compare the public and privatized offices’ performance in locating noncustodial parents, establishing paternity and support orders, and collecting support owed. Factors Believed to Affect Performance and Cost-Effectiveness
State and contractor officials believed that several factors affect an office’s performance and cost-effectiveness. Factors generally believed to benefit contractors include the increased flexibility contractors have in acquiring resources, managing staff, and having greater access to technology. Welfare Reform Partially Resolves the Issue of Access to IRS Data
One major issue that could have impeded future full-service privatization—contractors’ access to IRS tax information—has been partially resolved by the recent enactment of welfare reform legislation. The issue focuses on whether full-service child support enforcement contractors have the same authority to access IRS data for locating noncustodial parents and enforcing child support orders as public offices have under the law. However, according to state officials, requiring this additional level of verification by public employees may negate some of the perceived benefits of full-service privatization. Collections and enforcement involves enforcing, monitoring, and processing payments. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on states' efforts to fully privatize local child support enforcement offices, focusing on: (1) states' rationale for full-service privatization; (2) how the performance and cost-effectiveness of full-service privatization efforts compare with publicly managed child support enforcement; and (3) what, if any, issues could affect future full-service privatization contracts.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) fifteen states have turned to full-service privatization of selected local child support enforcement offices as a way to improve performance and handle growing caseloads that are reaching or exceeding 1,000 cases per worker in some instances; (2) for some offices, privatization has also been a response to state restrictions on hiring additional public employees; (3) in the three comparisons of performance GAO conducted, fully privatized offices performed at least as well as or, in some instances, better than public child support programs in locating noncustodial parents, establishing paternity and support orders, and collecting support owed; (4) the relative cost-effectiveness of the privatized versus public offices, however, differed among the comparisons GAO made; (5) Virginia's and Arizona's privatized were more cost-effective, 60 percent and 18 percent, respectively, than their public counterparts, but in Tennessee, one public office was 52 percent more cost-effective than the privatized office reviewed, while the remaining privatized office in Tennessee was about as cost-effective as its public counterpart; (6) according to state and contractor officials, differences in performance and cost-effectiveness among private and public offices may have resulted from the increased flexibility contractors have in acquiring resources and managing staff, contractors' greater access to technology, differences in the complexity of the caseloads, and varying payment rates to contractors for child support enforcement services; and (7) an issue of contractor access to Internal Revenue Service data that could have impeded future full-service privatization has been partially addressed by recent welfare reform legislation which authorizes state child support agencies to disclose to contractors certain, but not all, restricted tax data that are useful in locating parents and enforcing payment. |
gao_GAO-13-221 | gao_GAO-13-221_0 | Federal Environmental Laws That May Be Involved in the Pipeline Permitting Process
Several federal environmental laws and agencies may come into play in the permitting process for natural gas pipelines, depending on the proposed route for the pipeline. Federal resource agencies are responsible for managing and protecting natural and cultural resources such as wetlands, forests, wildlife, and historic properties. The Interstate and Intrastate Pipeline Permitting Processes Can be Complex, with Multiple Stakeholders and Steps
Both the interstate and intrastate pipeline permitting processes are complex in that they can involve multiple federal, state, and local agencies, as well as public interest groups and citizens, and include multiple steps. The interstate permitting process involves three key phases: a voluntary pre-filing phase, an application phase, and a post- authorization phase with multiple steps. According to stakeholders we spoke with, the interstate process is consistent because FERC acts as a lead agency in coordinating multiple stakeholders. The intrastate process can also include multiple stakeholders and steps. In the pre-filing phase, FERC and the applicant focus on gathering the necessary information for the environmental analysis, which may involve numerous federal, state, and local agencies and is typically the most complex and time-consuming step of the permitting process. There is no uniform standard for right-of-way agreements and eminent domain authority, and procedures vary by state. Of the 11 states we reviewed, 5 have agencies charged with siting intrastate natural gas pipelines. These 5 states require advance approval of the location and the route of the pipeline. The remaining 6 do not have siting agencies that require advance approval of location and route. State environmental laws and regulations are applicable to intrastate pipelines. Time Frames for Interstate and Intrastate Pipeline Permitting Processes Vary Because of Multiple Factors
For interstate pipelines, FERC’s public record information system contains documents that provide dates associated with the phases of the permitting process; however, FERC does not track the time it takes to complete the process. Using the information available on interstate natural gas pipeline projects certified from January 1, 2010, to October 24, 2012, we determined that the average processing time from pre-filing to certification for interstate natural gas pipeline projects was 558 days, and the processing times ranged from 370 to 886 days. For projects that begin in the application phase, the average processing time from formal filing to certification was 225 days for this period. For intrastate pipelines, because the permitting process varies by state, the time frames for those processes may also vary. Delays in state and local government reviews. State and local permitting and review processes can take time and affect federal decision-making time frames because some federal agencies cannot issue their permits until state and local governments have completed their own permitting processes. According to a Corps official and state officials, some states experience delays in completing these reviews. Overlap of federal, state, and local environmental processes. Incomplete applications. Natural Gas Pipeline Stakeholders Identified Management Practices to Improve the Permitting Process
According to officials from federal and state agencies and representatives from industry and public interest groups we interviewed, several management practices could be implemented to help overcome some of the challenges of a complex permitting process identified by these stakeholders. Stakeholders we spoke with and the administration, in its plan for implementing the executive order, identified the following management practices as effective, among others:
Ensuring a lead agency is coordinating the efforts of federal, state, and local permitting processes for intrastate pipelines. Representatives from industry and public interest groups we interviewed noted that the interstate process is better coordinated than intrastate processes because FERC is designated as the lead agency for the environmental review of a pipeline project, but there is no similar lead agency in the intrastate permitting process. Ensure effective collaboration of the numerous stakeholders. Providing planning tools to help companies plan routes for pipelines and avoid sensitive environmental resources. Offering industry the option to fund contractors or agency staff to expedite the permitting process. Increase the opportunities for public comments. The Department of Agriculture provided written comments in which they generally agreed with the overall findings of the report. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives for this review were to determine (1) the processes necessary for pipeline companies to acquire permits to construct interstate and intrastate natural gas pipelines; (2) information available on the time frames associated with the natural gas pipeline permitting process; and (3) stakeholder-identified management practices, if any, that may improve the permitting process. To understand processes and permits required to construct natural gas pipelines at the federal level, we reviewed relevant federal laws and regulations, as well as agency documentation, such as the interagency agreement between the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) and nine other federal agencies regarding their coordination during the review process for the National Environmental Policy Act and efforts to facilitate the development of natural gas pipeline projects. | Why GAO Did This Study
Recent growth in domestic natural gas production, particularly due to increased production from shale, is resulting in an increase in the pipelines needed to transport that gas. Constructing natural gas pipelines requires clearing and maintaining rights-of-way, which may disturb habitat and historical and cultural resources. These resources are protected under a variety of federal, state, and local regulations implemented by multiple agencies. The laws, regulations and stakeholders involved in the permitting process depend on where the pipeline is constructed. FERC is the lead federal agency in approving interstate pipelines, coordinating with federal, state, and local agencies, but FERC is not involved in the approval of intrastate pipelines.
In response to the Pipeline Safety, Regulatory Certainty, and Job Creation Act of 2011, GAO determined (1) the processes necessary to acquire permits to construct interstate and intrastate natural gas pipelines, (2) information available on the time frames associated with the natural gas pipeline permitting process, and (3) stakeholder-identified management practices that may improve the permitting process. GAO reviewed relevant laws and regulations and interviewed federal officials, state officials from a nonprobability sample of 11 states, and representatives from natural gas industry associations and public interest groups.
GAO makes no recommendations in this report. The Departments of Agriculture and Defense generally agreed with the findings, and the other agencies had no comments
What GAO Found
Both the interstate and intrastate natural gas pipeline permitting processes are complex and can involve multiple federal, state, and local agencies, as well as public interest groups and citizens, and include multiple steps. The interstate process involves a voluntary pre-filing phase, an application phase, and a post-authorization phase with multiple steps that stakeholders reported to be consistent among projects because the process is led by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). FERC coordinates with federal, state, and local agencies that have statutory and regulatory authority over various environmental laws and regulations. For example, if a proposed pipeline may affect endangered species, FERC coordinates with the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, which reviews the impacts on such species. The intrastate process can also involve multiple stakeholders and steps, but, unlike in the interstate process, GAO found that the stakeholders and steps vary by state. For example, of the 11 states GAO reviewed, 5 have agencies charged with approving the route of natural gas pipelines and require advance approval of the location and route, and the remaining 6 do not. Pipeline companies must also comply with various federal and state environmental laws and regulations; however, in most of the 11 states, no one agency is charged with coordinating the implementation of these laws and regulations as FERC is for the interstate process.
Time frames associated with the interstate and intrastate permitting processes vary because of multiple factors, according to stakeholders. For the interstate process, FERC does not track time frames, citing the limited usefulness of such data. GAO analyzed public records and found that, for those projects that were approved from January 2010 to October 2012, the average time from pre-filing to certification was 558 days; the average time for those projects that began at the application phase was 225 days. For the intrastate process, because processes vary by state, the time frames of those processes may also vary. GAO found little comprehensive data on the intrastate process. According to GAO's discussions with stakeholders, several factors can affect the time frame for the permitting process of a given project, including different types of federal permits or authorizations, delays in the reviews needed by governmental stakeholders, and incomplete applications. For example, state and local permitting and review processes can affect federal decision-making time frames because some federal agencies will not issue their permits until state and local governments have completed their own permitting processes, according to some stakeholders.
Officials from federal and state agencies and representatives from industry and public interest groups told GAO that several management practices could help overcome challenges they associated with an efficient permitting process and obtaining public input: (1) ensure a lead agency is coordinating the efforts of federal, state, and local permitting processes for intrastate pipelines, (2) ensure effective collaboration of the numerous stakeholders involved in the permitting process, (3) provide planning tools to assist companies in routing pipelines and avoiding sensitive environmental resources, (4) offer industry the option to fund contractors or agency staff to expedite the permitting process, and (5) increase the opportunities for public comments. |
gao_GAO-12-728 | gao_GAO-12-728_0 | In April 2006, we reported that USAID planned to construct and rehabilitate 150 miles of paved road between Banda Aceh and Meulaboh at an estimated cost of $245 million, or $1.6 million per mile, with an estimated completion date of September 2009. USAID Constructed Road under Several Major Contracts, with Numerous Factors Delaying Completion
From August 2005 to September 2010, USAID awarded five contracts to reconstruct the coastal road in Aceh Province, Indonesia—three contracts for construction, one contract for design and supervision, and one contract for project management. Lack of acceptable progress by the priority contractor resulted in USAID’s reducing the scope of the work, partially terminating the contract, and hiring a third construction contractor to complete the unfinished work. Community opposition to the new road alignment resulted in delays, according to USAID. USAID Took Several Actions to Ensure Quality of Indonesia Road Design and Construction but Lacks Quality Assurance Mechanism for Sections Still under Warranty
USAID’s actions to ensure the Indonesia road’s quality included, among others, hiring an experienced project manager and requiring 1-year warranties for completed road sections. In April 2006, USAID hired a U.S.-registered professional engineer as its Project Manager for the entire road construction project. Design and supervision. USAID’s Project Manager and Parsons inspected road sections during construction, when construction was completed, and when the completed sections were handed over to the Indonesian government following the 1- year warranty period. USAID officials in Jakarta told us in April 2012 that USAID was considering rehiring the former Project Manager on an intermittent basis to perform inspections of the approximately 50 miles of road sections prior to expiration of the sections’ 1-year warranties. USAID Took Actions to Enhance Indonesia Road’s Sustainability, but Several Factors Could Decrease Its Life Expectancy
To enhance the Indonesia road’s sustainability, USAID designed and constructed it to withstand heavy weights, included in the design several features intended to minimize environmental impact, and provided assistance to the Indonesian Directorate General of Highways (the Directorate). However, the Directorate has not taken action to prevent the construction of buildings and has not removed existing buildings that have been constructed in the right-of-way. Such construction could obstruct drainage channels and cause erosion and flooding. Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
We provided a draft of this report, as well as a video of our March 2012 inspection of the road, to USAID and State for their review. In addition, USAID concurred with our recommendation that it ensure that road sections still under warranty are inspected in a timely manner and that it require the contractor to repair any defective sections. USAID concurred with the intent of our recommendation that, to help ensure the road’s sustainability for the intended 10 years, it should work with the Indonesian government to develop and implement a process addressing factors that could affect the road’s sustainability. We maintain that it is essential that USAID work proactively with the Indonesian government to develop and implement a process that addresses certain factors, such as the use of overweight vehicles, construction in the right- of-way, and the creation of unauthorized access roads, that could affect the road’s sustainability. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
We reviewed the 91-mile road constructed by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) in Aceh Province, Indonesia, following the December 2004 tsunami. Our objectives in this report were to (1) describe USAID’s road construction operations as well as factors that delayed the road’s completion, (2) assess USAID efforts to ensure the road’s quality, and (3) examine factors that could affect the road’s sustainability. | Why GAO Did This Study
In December 2004, an earthquake in the Indian Ocean caused a major tsunami that devastated several countries, affecting Indonesia most severely. In May 2005, Congress appropriated $908 million for aid to the affected countries. USAID budgeted $245 million of this amount to rehabilitate and construct a 150-mile paved coastal road in Aceh Province, Indonesia, with a planned completion date of September 2009. After reducing the projects scope, USAID completed a 91-mile road in April 2012 at an estimated cost of $256 million. GAO was asked to (1) describe USAIDs construction operations as well as factors that delayed the roads completion, (2) assess USAIDs efforts to ensure the roads quality, and (3) examine factors that could affect the roads sustainability. GAO reviewed USAID documents, interviewed USAID and Indonesian officials, and traveled the entire length of the road.
What GAO Found
From August 2005 to September 2010, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) awarded five contracts to reconstruct a major coastal road in Aceh Province, Indonesia. Three of the contracts were for construction, one contract was for design and supervision, and one contract was for project management. Several factors delayed the roads completion and increased costs. For example, according to USAID, when one contractor did not make acceptable progress, the agency reduced the scope of work, terminated construction of an 8-mile road section, and hired another contractor to complete the section. Other factors included the Indonesian governments difficulty in acquiring land for the road and local opposition to the new road alignment.
USAID took several actions to ensure quality in the roads design and construction. For example, USAID hired an experienced, U.S.-registered professional engineer as Project Manager and hired a U.S.-based engineering firm to design the road and supervise most construction. USAID also required contractors to remain liable for any quality defects for 1 year after completing road sections. In addition, USAID required the Project Manager and the engineering firm to perform routine inspections, including final inspections when the warranties ended. Some inspections revealed poor-quality work that the contractors corrected. However, the engineering firms and Project Managers contracts ended in March 2012 and April 2012, respectively, leaving no qualified staff to inspect around 50 milesmore than half of the completed roadstill under warranty. USAID told GAO it is considering rehiring the Project Manager on an intermittent basis, but USAID has not finalized this arrangement and has no mechanism to ensure quality in these sections.
USAID also took several actions to help ensure the roads sustainability, such as designing it to withstand heavy weights and providing a maintenance plan and equipment to the Indonesian Directorate General of Highways. However, various factors could affect the roads sustainability for its intended 10-year design life. For example, according to USAID and Indonesian officials, the Directorate lacks resources needed to maintain the road. Also, according to USAID, the Indonesian government has not taken certain actions, such as using portable scales to prevent overweight vehicles that could cause pavement failure and prohibiting construction in the road right-of-way that could obstruct drainage.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that USAID (1) ensure that road sections still under a 1-year warranty are inspected in a timely manner and require the construction contractor to make any needed repairs and (2) work with the Indonesian government to develop and implement a process addressing factors that could affect the roads sustainability. USAID stated that it concurred with GAOs first recommendation and concurred with the intent of GAOs second recommendation.
View a video of GAOs March 2012 inspection of the road. h ttp://www.gao.gov/multimedia/video#video_id=592299. |
gao_GAO-17-64 | gao_GAO-17-64_0 | Background
Traditionally, drug compounding is the process of combining, mixing, or altering ingredients to create a customized medication for an individual patient. An outbreak of fungal meningitis in 2012 linked to contaminated compounded drugs led to questions about the safety and quality of compounded drugs, and raised concerns about state and federal oversight of drug compounding. The act established a new type of facility, an outsourcing facility, that prepares sterile compounded drugs and which may compound drugs without patient-specific prescriptions. Drugs Are Compounded in a Variety of Settings; FDA and Some States Collect Data on the Number of Drug Compounders, but Not the Volume of Compounded Drugs
Our survey of state pharmacy regulatory bodies found that drugs are compounded in a variety of pharmacy and other health care settings, including outsourcing facilities. National data on the extent of drug compounding, as measured by the number of prescriptions or the volume of compounded drugs (e.g., number of units), were not available from our survey, as only one state reported collecting these data, and its data were limited to sterile compounded drugs. Nearly All States Reported Having Drug Compounding Laws, Though Few Apply to Nonpharmacists, and States Conduct Inspections and Can Take Actions to Enforce These Laws
Respondents in almost all of the states we surveyed reported having laws, regulations, or policies specific to the practice of drug compounding. To help ensure compliance with state laws, regulations, or policies specific to drug compounding, respondents in most states reported inspecting pharmacies and other drug compounders, and most reported their state can take several types of actions against noncompliant pharmacies or other drug compounders. About Three Quarters of States Reported Participating in FDA- Sponsored Activities and Obtaining FDA Drug Compounding Information; Some States Reported Challenges with This Communication
FDA has communicated with states on compounding issues in a variety of ways, including FDA-sponsored activities, such as intergovernmental meetings; most states reported this communication was helpful. FDA has issued numerous guidance documents related to drug compounding, and conducted more than 300 inspections of drug compounders. FDA has also taken action, including issuing warning letters, when issues have been identified in these inspections. For outsourcing facilities, which register with FDA, the agency is required to inspect them on a risk-based schedule. Some Stakeholder Organizations said the Amount of Time it Takes FDA to Finalize Draft Documents Related to Drug Compounding is Challenging
Officials from 6 of the 25 stakeholder organizations we interviewed said the amount of time it takes FDA to finalize guidance and other relevant documents, including the list of drugs that are difficult to compound, is challenging. Some states and stakeholder organizations reported differences between the protocols that some states and FDA use when inspecting pharmacies engaged in drug compounding that are not outsourcing facilities. Agency Comments
We provided a draft of this report to the Secretary of Health and Human Services. HHS also provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. Appendix II: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The Drug Quality and Security Act (DQSA), enacted in November 2013, included a provision for GAO to review drug compounding. We examined (1) the settings in which drugs are compounded, and the extent of drug compounding in each state; (2) state laws, regulations, and policies governing drug compounding, and how they are enforced; (3) how communication is conducted between states and FDA, as well as among states, regarding compounding, and any associated challenges; and (4) steps FDA has taken to implement its responsibilities to oversee drug compounding since enactment of the DQSA, and any challenges that have been reported with these efforts. Finally, to address steps FDA has taken to implement its regulatory responsibilities to oversee drug compounding and related challenges, we reviewed relevant laws and analyzed FDA data on inspections of drug compounders and actions taken related to its inspections of these entities. 2016 Survey of State Pharmacy Regulatory Bodies on Drug Compounding
We administered a web-based survey to the state pharmacy regulatory bodies in the 50 states, the District of Columbia, Guam, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands. Interviews with Officials in Stakeholder Organizations, State Government Agencies, and FDA
To further address our objectives, we interviewed officials from 25 stakeholder organizations that have a stake or an interest in drug compounding to obtain information such as reviews on the extent of drug compounding; reviews of state laws, regulations, and policies on drug compounding; their perspectives on any challenges in communication between FDA and states, as well as among states, related to drug compounding; and their perspectives on FDA’s implementation of the DQSA. | Why GAO Did This Study
Drug compounding is the process of combining, mixing, or altering ingredients to create a drug tailored to the needs of an individual patient. An outbreak of fungal meningitis in 2012 linked to contaminated compounded drugs raised concerns about state and federal oversight of drug compounding. The Drug Quality and Security Act, enacted in 2013, helped clarify FDA's authority and included a provision for GAO to report on drug compounding.
This report examines (1) the settings in which drugs are compounded, and the extent of drug compounding; (2) state laws and policies governing drug compounding, and how they are enforced; (3) communication between states and FDA, as well as among states, regarding drug compounding, and the associated challenges; and (4) steps FDA has taken to implement its responsibilities to oversee drug compounding, and challenges that have been reported with these efforts.
GAO surveyed state pharmacy regulatory bodies in the 50 states, the District of Columbia, Guam, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands (all but 4 completed the survey); reviewed documents and interviewed officials from FDA, 25 stakeholder organizations (including national pharmacy and medical associations), and agencies in 3 states selected for having differing laws and policies; reviewed relevant laws; and examined FDA data on drug compounding inspections and actions taken.
HHS provided general comments on a draft of this report, as well as technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate.
What GAO Found
GAO's survey of state pharmacy regulatory bodies found that drugs are compounded in a variety of health care settings, and some data are collected on the number of entities that compound drugs (drug compounders), but not the volume of compounded drugs. In addition to pharmacies, drug compounding settings include physicians' offices and outsourcing facilities—a new type of facility established by law in 2013, which can compound sterile drugs without patient-specific prescriptions and register with and are inspected by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), an agency within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). While FDA and some states collect data on drug compounders, only one state reported collecting data on the number of prescriptions or the volume of compounded drugs. In addition, states GAO surveyed and stakeholders GAO interviewed did not collect data specific to the extent of compounding performed by nonpharmacists, such as physicians.
Nearly all of the states GAO surveyed reported having drug compounding laws, regulations, or policies, though few apply to nonpharmacists, and states conduct inspections and can take actions to enforce them. Less than 20 percent of states reported having laws, regulations, or policies specific to compounding by nonpharmacists (e.g., physicians), and these state laws varied. To help ensure compliance, most states reported inspecting drug compounders, such as pharmacies and outsourcing facilities, and most states can take several types of actions against pharmacies, including monetary fines, and suspension and revocation of a license or registration.
Most states reported being satisfied with their communication with FDA and other states, although some reported challenges. About three quarters of the states reported participating in FDA-sponsored activities, such as intergovernmental meetings, and obtaining information from FDA's website. Some states reported challenges with this communication, such as getting FDA to respond to requests for information. In terms of communication between states, most survey respondents reported that they are satisfied with this communication, which occurs through conferences and other activities.
FDA has taken steps to implement its regulatory responsibilities to oversee drug compounding, but states and stakeholder organizations have cited challenges and concerns. FDA has issued numerous draft and final guidance documents related to drug compounding, and conducted more than 300 inspections of drug compounders, which resulted in actions such as FDA issuing warning letters and voluntary recalls of potentially contaminated compounded drugs. Some stakeholder organizations said the amount of time it takes FDA to finalize the guidance and other documents—including those required by the 2013 law—is challenging. FDA officials noted that reviewing the large number of comments received has contributed to the time the agency has taken to finalize them. States and stakeholder organizations also cited concerns related to access to compounded drugs and differences between states and FDA on the appropriate inspection protocols to use when inspecting drug compounders. In August 2016, FDA changed its procedures to address concerns about the appropriate protocols to use for these inspections. |
gao_GAO-13-563T | gao_GAO-13-563T_0 | Background
The radio frequency spectrum is the resource that makes possible wireless communications and supports a vast array of government and commercial services. FCC and NTIA, with direction from Congress and the President, jointly determine the amount of spectrum allocated for federal, nonfederal, and shared use. Twelve agencies previously operated communication systems in this band, including DOD. The report found, for example, that clearing and vacating federal users from certain bands was not a sustainable basis for spectrum policy largely because of the high cost to relocate federal agencies and disruption to the federal missions. Some Agencies Underestimated 1710- 1755 MHz Band Relocation Costs, Although Auction Revenues Appear to Exceed Those Costs
Some Federal Agencies Underestimated Relocation Costs
Actual costs to relocate communications systems for 12 federal agencies from the 1710-1755 MHz band have exceeded original estimates by about $474 million, or 47 percent, as of March 2013. Although 11 of the 12 agencies plan to spend the same amount or more than they estimated, DOD expects to complete the 1710-1755 MHz transition for about $275 million, or approximately $80 million less than its cost estimate. DOD officials told us that the relocation of systems from the 1710-1755 MHz band has been less expensive than originally estimated because many of its systems were simply re-tuned to operate in the 1755-1850 MHz band. Auction Revenues Appear to Exceed Agency Relocation Costs
The auction of the 1710-1755 MHz band raised almost $6.9 billion in gross winning bids from the sale of licenses to use these frequencies. As mentioned above, NTIA reports that it expects agencies to complete the relocation effort between 2013 and 2017; therefore, the final net revenue amount may change. DOD’s Preliminary Cost Estimate Substantially or Partially Met GAO’s Identified Best Practices, but Changes in Assumptions May Affect Future Costs
DOD’s Preliminary Cost Estimate for Relocating from the 1755-1850 MHz Band Substantially or Partially Met GAO’s Identified Best Practices
DOD’s Office of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE) led the effort to prepare the department’s preliminary cost estimate portion of its study to determine the feasibility of relocating its 11 major radio systems from the 1755-1850 MHz band. These characteristics of cost estimates help minimize the risk of cost overruns, missed deadlines, and unmet performance targets:
A comprehensive cost estimate ensures that costs are neither omitted nor double counted. However, some programs did not list all the discrete tasks required for relocation, and not all the individual programs had evidence of cost-influencing ground rules and assumptions. Well-documented—Substantially Met: We found that management reviewed and accepted the estimate, the estimate was consistent with the technical baseline data, and documentation for the majority of programs was sufficient that an analyst unfamiliar with the program could understand and replicate what was done. Accurate—Partially Met: We found that DOD properly applied appropriate inflation rates and made no apparent calculation errors. In addition, the estimated costs agreed with DOD’s prior relocation cost estimate for this band conducted in 2001. However, no confidence level was specifically stated in DOD’s cost estimate to determine if the costs considered are the most likely costs, which is required to fully or substantially meet this characteristic. However, some sensitivity analyses and risk assessments were only completed at the program level for some programs, and not at all at a summary level. As the Assumptions Supporting DOD’s Cost Estimate for Relocating from the 1755-1850 MHz Band Change, Costs May Also Change
Even though DOD’s preliminary cost estimate substantially met some of our best practices, as the assumptions supporting the estimate change over time, costs may also change. According to DOD officials, any change to key assumptions about the bands to which systems would move could substantially change relocation costs. No Government Revenue Forecasts Exist for a Potential Auction of the 1755- 1850 MHz Band, and a Variety of Factors Could Influence Auction Revenues
Federal Agencies Have Not Produced a Revenue Forecast for the 1755-1850 MHz Band
No official government revenue forecast has been prepared by CBO, FCC, NTIA, or OMB for a potential auction of the 1755-1850 MHz band licenses, but some estimates might be prepared once there is a greater likelihood of an auction. The study assumed that the 1755-1850 MHz band would be generally cleared of federal users. A Variety of Factors Could Influence Auction Revenues
Like all goods, the price of licensed spectrum, and ultimately the auction revenue, is determined by supply and demand. In 2010, the President directed NTIA to work with FCC to make 500 MHz of spectrum available for use by commercial broadband services within 10 years. This represents a significant increase in the supply of spectrum available for licensing in the marketplace. Demand. The expected, potential profitability of a spectrum license influences the level of demand for it. | Why GAO Did This Study
Radio frequency spectrum is the resource that makes possible wireless communications. Balancing competing industry and government demands for a limited amount of spectrum is a challenging and complex task. In 2006, FCC completed an auction of spectrum licenses in the 1710-1755 MHz band that had previously been allocated for federal use. As part of an effort to make additional spectrum available for commercial use, DOD assessed the feasibility of relocating 11 major communication systems from the 1755-1850 MHz band. In September 2011, DOD found that it would cost about $13 billion over 10 years to relocate most operations from the 1755-1850 MHz band.
GAO was asked to review the costs to relocate federal spectrum users and revenues from spectrum auctions. This testimony addresses our preliminary findings on (1) estimated and actual relocation costs and revenue from the previously auctioned 1710-1755 MHz band, (2) the extent to which DOD followed best practices to prepare its preliminary cost estimate for vacating the 1755-1850 MHz band, and (3) existing government or industry forecasts for revenue from an auction of the 1755-1850 MHz band. GAO reviewed relevant reports; interviewed DOD, FCC, NTIA, and Office of Management and Budget officials and industry stakeholders; and analyzed the extent to which DOD's preliminary cost estimate met best practices identified in GAO's Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide (Cost Guide).
What GAO Found
Actual costs to relocate federal users from the 1710-1755 megahertz (MHz) band have exceeded the original $1 billion estimate by about $474 million as of March 2013, although auction revenues appear to exceed relocation costs by over $5 billion. Actual relocation costs exceed estimated costs for various reasons, including unforeseen challenges and some agencies not following the National Telecommunications and Information Administration's (NTIA) guidance for preparing the cost estimate. In contrast, the Department of Defense (DOD) expects to complete relocation for about $275 million or approximately $80 million less than its $355 million estimate. According to DOD officials, the relocation of systems from this band has been less expensive than originally estimated because many systems were simply re-tuned to operate in the adjacent 1755-1850 MHz band. The auction of the 1710-1755 MHz band raised almost $6.9 billion in gross winning bids. NTIA expects agencies to complete the relocation effort between 2013 and 2017; therefore, final net auction revenue (auction revenue less relocation costs) may change.
DOD's preliminary cost estimate for relocating systems from the 1755-1850 MHz band substantially or partially met GAO's best practices, but changes in key assumptions may affect future costs. Adherence with GAO's Cost Guide helps to minimize the risk of cost overruns, missed deadlines, and unmet performance targets. GAO found that DOD's estimate substantially met the comprehensive and well-documented best practices. For instance, it included complete information about systems' life cycles and documentation for the majority of systems was sufficient. However, not all programs had evidence of cost-influencing ground rules and assumptions, and some of the source data were insufficient. GAO also determined that DOD partially met the accurate and credible best practices. For example, DOD applied appropriate inflation rates and its estimated costs generally agreed with its 2001 cost estimate for this band. However, DOD did not develop a confidence level, making it difficult to determine if the costs considered are the most likely costs, and DOD only completed some sensitivity analyses and risk assessments at the program level for some programs. DOD officials said that changes to key assumptions could substantially change its costs. Most importantly, decisions about which spectrum band DOD would relocate to are still unresolved. Nevertheless, DOD's cost estimate was consistent with its purpose--informing the decision to make additional spectrum available for commercial wireless services.
No government revenue forecast has been prepared for a potential auction of licenses in the 1755-1850 MHz band, and a variety of factors could influence auction revenues. One private sector study in 2011 forecasted $19.4 billion in auction revenue for licenses in this band, assuming that federal users would be cleared and the nationwide spectrum price from a previous auction, adjusted for inflation, would apply to this spectrum. The price of spectrum, and ultimately auction revenue, is determined by supply and demand. The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and NTIA jointly influence the amount of spectrum allocated to federal and nonfederal users (the supply). The potential profitability of a spectrum license influences its demand. Several factors would influence profitability and demand, including whether the spectrum is cleared of federal users or must be shared. |
gao_GAO-10-132T | gao_GAO-10-132T_0 | Background
As you know, Mr. Chairman, the decennial census is a constitutionally mandated enterprise critical to our nation. Census data are used to apportion seats and redraw Congressional districts, and to help allocate over $400 billion in federal aid to state and local governments each year. We added the 2010 Census to our list of high-risk areas in March 2008 because improvements were needed in the Bureau’s management of IT systems, the reliability of the HHCs, and the quality of the Bureau’s cost estimates. The Bureau Has Made Progress on the Management and Testing of Key IT Systems, but Little Time Remains to Address Outstanding Issues
Since 2005, we have reported on weaknesses in the Bureau’s management of its IT acquisitions, and issues continue concerning the Bureau’s IT management and testing of key 2010 Census systems. The Bureau has also made progress in end-to-end testing, but substantial work remains to be completed. For example, the Bureau has completed limited end-to-end tests for nonresponse follow-up and group-quarters enumeration on the Paper-Based Operations Control System (PBOCS), a work flow management system the Bureau developed late in the census cycle when it moved from the HHCs to a paper-based approach to nonresponse follow-up and other field operations. According to the CIO, the Bureau has taken steps to address some of these findings, such as providing additional resources for testing and development; however, resolving problems found during testing before the systems need to be deployed will be a challenge. The Bureau is continuing to examine how improvements will be made. The testing and improvements the Bureau made to the reliability of the HHCs prior to the start of address canvassing, including a final field test that was added to the Bureau’s preparations in December 2008, played a key role in the pace of the operation, but other factors, once address canvassing was launched, were important as well, including the (1) prompt resolution of problems with the HHCs as they occurred and (2) lower than expected employee turnover. Address Canvassing Costs Exceeded Budget Because of Unanticipated Workload and Hiring
According to the Bureau’s preliminary analysis, the estimated cost for address canvassing field operations was $444 million, or $88 million (25 percent) more than its initial budget of $356 million. The largest field operation will be nonresponse follow-up, when the Bureau is to go door to door in an effort to collect data from households that did not mail back their census questionnaire. Accurate cost estimates are essential to a successful census because they help ensure that the Bureau has adequate funds and that Congress, the administration, and the Bureau itself can have reliable information on which to base decisions. Officials said that DBiT is capturing actual fiscal year 2009 costs, which will be used to estimate the life cycle cost for the 2020 census. Bureau Needs to Improve Its Policies and Procedures for Fingerprinting Temporary Employees
To better screen its workforce of hundreds of thousands of temporary census workers, the Bureau plans to fingerprint its temporary workforce for the first time in the 2010 Census. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) is to provide the results of a name background check when temporary workers are first recruited. The Bureau stated that it has taken steps to improve image quality for fingerprints captured in future operations by refining instruction manuals and providing remediation training on proper procedures. Concluding Observations
The Bureau has made remarkable progress in improving its overall readiness for 2010, with substantial strides being made in the management of its IT systems and other areas. That said, as I noted throughout this statement, considerable challenges and uncertainties lie ahead. While the decennial is clearly back on track, many things can happen over the next few months, and keeping the entire enterprise on plan continues to be a daunting challenge fraught with risks. | Why GAO Did This Study
The decennial census is a constitutionally-mandated activity that produces data used to apportion congressional seats, redraw congressional districts, and help allocate billions of dollars in federal assistance. In March 2008, GAO designated the 2010 Census a high-risk area in part because of information technology (IT) shortcomings. The U.S. Census Bureau (Bureau) has since strengthened its risk management efforts and made other improvements; however, in March 2009, GAO noted that a number of challenges and uncertainties remained. This testimony discusses the Bureau's readiness for 2010 and covers: (1) the delivery of key IT systems, (2) preliminary findings on the results of address canvassing and the lessons learned from that operation that can be applied to subsequent field operations, and (3) the Bureau's progress in improving its cost estimation abilities. The testimony is based on previously issued and ongoing GAO work.
What GAO Found
The Bureau continues to make noteworthy gains in mitigating risks and in keeping the headcount on-track, but a number of challenges remain. Specifically, over the last few months, the Bureau has made important strides in improving oversight of testing key IT systems. For example, the Bureau named a testing officer to monitor the testing of census-taking activities. The Bureau has also made progress in system testing, but faces tight timeframes in finalizing the paper-based operations control system (PBOCS), which will be used to manage field operations. If any significant problems are identified during the testing phases of PBOCS, there will be little time, in most cases, to resolve the problems before the system needs to be deployed. Address canvassing, an operation where temporary workers known as listers go door-to-door to verify and update address data, finished ahead of schedule, but was over budget. Based on initial Bureau data, the preliminary figure on the actual cost of address canvassing is $88 million higher than the original estimate of $356 million, an overrun of 25 percent. A key reason for the overrun is that the Bureau did not update its cost estimates to reflect the changes to the address canvassing workload. Further, the Bureau did not follow its staffing strategy and hired too many listers. The Bureau's efforts to fingerprint employees, which was required as part of a criminal background check, did not proceed smoothly, in part because of training issues. As a result, over 35,000 temporary census workers--over a fifth of the address canvassing workforce--were hired despite the fact that their fingerprints could not be processed and they were not fully screened for employment eligibility. The Bureau is refining instruction manuals and taking other steps to improve the fingerprinting process for future operations. GAO is unable to verify the accuracy of the $14.7 billion estimated cost of the 2010 Census because key details and assumptions are unavailable. However, the Bureau is taking steps to improve its cost estimation process for 2020, including training its staff in cost estimation skills. While the Bureau has taken a number of actions to mitigate risk and its overall readiness for 2010 has improved, much work remains to be done. Many things can happen over the next few months, and keeping the entire enterprise on-plan will continue to be a daunting challenge fraught with risks. High levels of public participation, and continued Bureau and congressional attention to stewardship, performance, and accountability, will be key to a successful census. |
gao_GAO-07-523 | gao_GAO-07-523_0 | U.S. State and USAID Strategic Plan Includes Broad Education Goals
State and USAID have strategic goals specific to promoting improved education. 3). The agency supports basic education by providing school meals or take-home rations to students overseas and by facilitating the sale of food commodities to support basic education programs in communities. From fiscal years 2001 to 2006, there was no government-wide mechanism to facilitate interagency collaboration and, as a result, at the headquarters level we identified instances where agencies missed opportunities to collaborate and maximize U.S. resources. In addition, we found that the level of U.S. coordination with host governments and other donors in the eight countries we visited also varied. Without effective coordination, donors cannot easily monitor or assess the host government’s progress toward achieving international goals, such as Education for All by 2015, one of State-USAID’s strategic goals. The Level of U.S. Assessing Basic Education Programs’ Quality Results Is Difficult
While U.S. agencies we reviewed conduct basic education-related activities to achieve different goals, most assess and report on the results of their activities by collecting and using output measures–-or the direct products and services delivered by a program, such as numbers of schools built or children enrolled. Without this information, agency officials cannot determine if programs are achieving their strategic goals. For example, DOL primarily uses education activities as a mechanism for alleviating child labor and reports on children removed or prevented from exploitive work. Recommendations for Executive Action
To enhance efforts to coordinate and better assess the results of U.S. international basic education-related activities, we are making three recommendations: to improve interagency coordination of basic education efforts at headquarters in Washington, we recommend that the Secretary of State work with the heads of executive branch agencies responsible for international basic education-related assistance to convene formal, periodic meetings at the headquarters level amongst cognizant officials; to improve interagency coordination in recipient countries, we recommend that the Secretary of State direct the relevant countries’ Ambassadors to establish a mechanism to formally coordinate U.S. agencies’ implementation of international basic education-related activities in the relevant country; and to better assess the results of U.S. basic education assistance, we recommend that the Secretary of State, through the DFA, work with USAID and to the extent practicable, with other U.S. agencies providing basic education related-assistance to develop a plan to identify indicators that would help agencies track improvements in access to quality education. Scope and Methodology
To describe U.S. agencies’ basic education activities and how the activities are planned, we obtained and analyzed strategic, budget, and programmatic documents for fiscal years 2001 through 2006 from the Departments of Agriculture (USDA), Defense (DOD), Labor (DOL), and State (State), as well as the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and the Peace Corps. GAO Comments
1. 2. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pub. L. No. 109-102, section 567, mandated that GAO analyze U.S. international basic education efforts overseas. In this report, GAO (1) describes U.S. agencies' basic education activities and how the agencies plan them; (2) examines U.S. coordination of basic education efforts among U.S. agencies, and with host governments and international donors; and (3) examines how U.S. agencies assess the results of their basic education programs. In conducting this work, GAO obtained and analyzed relevant agencies' documents and met with U.S. and foreign government officials and nongovernmental organizations, traveling to selected recipient countries.
What GAO Found
Several U.S. agencies--the Departments of Agriculture (USDA), Defense (DOD), Labor (DOL), and State, as well as the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and the Peace Corps--support basic education activities overseas. State and USAID have strategic goals specific to promoting improved education. Several other U.S. agencies support basic education-related activities as part of programs that address their broader mission goals. For example, DOL supports alternative school programs as a way to remove children from exploitative work, USDA provides school meals or take-home rations to students, and DOD constructs dormitories and schools to provide better access for children who have to travel long distances to attend classes. GAO found that agencies did not always coordinate in the planning or delivery of basic education-related activities. From 2001 to 2006, there was no government-wide mechanism to facilitate interagency collaboration and, as a result, GAO identified instances where agencies missed opportunities to collaborate and maximize U.S. resources. In addition, GAO found that the level of U.S. coordination with host governments and other donors in the eight visited countries varied. Without effective coordination, donors cannot easily monitor or assess the host government's progress toward achieving international goals, such as Education for All by 2015, one of State-USAID's strategic goals. While U.S. agencies GAO reviewed conduct basic education-related programs to achieve different goals, most collect and use output measures, such as the numbers of schools built or children enrolled, to assess and report on results. USAID is the only agency with an education-specific goal of increasing access to quality basic education. However, in many instances, USAID faces challenges in collecting valid and reliable data needed to measure improvements in education quality. Without this information, agency officials cannot fully determine if the programs are achieving their strategic goals. |
gao_GAO-06-1016 | gao_GAO-06-1016_0 | In 2004, Congress passed REA, in part, as a response to the suggestions and concerns documented in these previous reports. Working Groups Formed to Foster Interagency Cooperation and Coordination on REA Implementation Issues Have Made Progress, but Some Issues Remain Unresolved
The four technical working groups formed by DOI and USDA to facilitate interagency cooperation and coordination on specific REA implementation issues have made progress. In addition, the working group has not determined the price to charge for the new pass. Most Agencies Have Reviewed and Begun to Modify Recreation Fee Programs to Implement REA, but Some Units are Still Transitioning, Reclamation Is Not Yet Participating, and Agencies Have Been Slow to Issue Final Guidance
After the passage of REA, agencies directed their units to assess and modify their fee programs to comply with REA criteria. FS reviewed its existing recreation fees and stated that it dropped 437 sites, such as trailheads and picnic areas, from its fee program because they did not meet the new criteria described under REA. Some Agencies Do Not Have a System of Routine Audits to Account for Collected Fee Revenues
Many units have not implemented a system of routine audits to help ensure that fees are collected and used as authorized and that collected funds are safeguarded. At BLM, FWS, and FS, most proposed projects are approved at the local unit level. At NPS, however, projects must be reviewed and approved at the unit and regional levels, as well as at the headquarters or department level before projects are funded. However, according to NPS officials, it can sometimes take 1 year or more to obtain approval to fund a project under this process. Many agency officials at the unit and regional levels expressed frustration about the length of time it takes to obtain approval for funding NPS projects, and some noted that the approval process has delayed project implementation and/or has contributed to units having unobligated fee revenue balances. Fee-Collecting Units Cite Several Reasons for Unobligated Balances
Those recreation fee collecting units reporting an unobligated balance cited a variety of reasons for why all available funds were not obligated. In addition, many of the unit staff we visited or who commented on our survey stated that recreation fee revenues are essential to providing services at their recreation areas that would not otherwise be funded. In order to improve agencies’ implementation of the Federal Lands Recreation Enhancement Act and improve the accountability and controls for recreation fee collection, we recommend that the Secretary of the Interior direct the Director, National Park Service; Director, Bureau of Land Management; and Director, Fish and Wildlife Service to promptly issue final regulations and implementation guidance on the fee program, including detailed policy and procedure guidance; and Director, Bureau of Land Management and Director, Fish and Wildlife Services to ascertain the extent to which their units do not have effective processes and procedures for accounting for and controlling collected fees and develop guidance for implementing appropriate and effective internal controls over cash management. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Based on the congressional request letter of May 2005 and subsequent discussions with your staffs, we agreed to determine (1) what agencies have done to coordinate the implementation of the Federal Lands Recreation Enhancement Act (REA), including preparing for the new interagency federal lands pass; (2) what agencies have done to implement the REA fee and amenity requirements and sufficiency of guidance for REA implementation; (3) the extent to which the agencies have control and accounting procedures for collected recreation fee revenues; (4) how participating agencies prioritize and approve activities and projects funded with fee revenues; and (5) the extent to which units have unobligated fund balances and if recreational fees are being used to fund projects formerly funded with other appropriations. We developed and administered a nationwide survey to agency officials responsible for fee programs under REA. One of REA’s goals was to reduce visitor confusion. Comments from the Forest Service
The following are GAO’s comments on the Department of Agriculture’s Forest Service letter dated September 7, 2006. | Why GAO Did This Study
In recent years, Congress has expressed concerns about the federal land management agencies' ability to provide quality recreational opportunities and reduce visitor confusion over the variety of user fees. In December 2004, Congress passed the Federal Lands Recreation Enhancement Act (REA) to standardize recreation fee collection and use at federal lands and waters. GAO was asked to determine (1) what the agencies have done to coordinate implementation of REA, (2) what agencies have done to implement REA, (3) the extent to which agencies have controls and accounting procedures for collected fees, (4) how projects and activities are selected to receive funding from fees, and (5) the extent of unobligated fund balances. To answer these objectives, GAO reviewed agency guidance, analyzed fee data, interviewed officials, visited 26 fee-collecting units, and administered a nationwide survey to 900 fee-collecting units.
What GAO Found
The Departments of the Interior (DOI) and Agriculture (USDA) established four working groups to facilitate interagency cooperation and coordination of REA implementation. Each working group has made progress, but some issues remain unresolved. For example, the Interagency Pass working group has yet to determine the price to charge for the new pass, which is to be implemented in January 2007. To implement REA, agencies reviewed their fee programs and made modifications to the fee programs at some of their units. For example, several of USDA's Forest Service units dropped 437 sites from their fee program, such as picnic areas, because they did not meet REA criteria. However, not all units are in compliance with REA. Many agency officials said that while the agencies have issued some interim guidance, REA was difficult to interpret and suggested the need for more specific and detailed guidance on the fee program. In addition, DOI's Bureau of Reclamation has not yet determined whether to implement REA. Reclamation is assessing how REA applies to its operations. Some agencies lack adequate controls and accounting procedures for collected recreation fees and lack effective guidance for establishing such controls. On the basis of visits, some units did not have an effective means of verifying whether all collected fees are accounted for. In addition, many units have not implemented a system of routine audits to help ensure that fees are collected and used as authorized and that collected funds are safeguarded. The various agencies participating under REA have different processes for selecting projects to be funded with recreation fee revenues. At DOI's Bureau of Land Management and Fish and Wildlife Service and USDA's Forest Service, most proposed projects are approved at the local unit level, usually within a few weeks. At DOI's National Park Service, fee projects are reviewed and approved at the unit, regional, and headquarters or department level before projects are funded. According to National Park Service officials, under this process, it can sometimes take a year or more to obtain approval for a requested fee project, which delays project implementation and contributes to unobligated fee revenue balances. Agencies have $300 million in unobligated fee revenue balances. Unit officials cited several reasons for the unobligated balances, such as the need to save for large projects. Many unit officials also said that recreation fee revenues are essential to providing services at their recreation areas that would not otherwise be funded. |
gao_GAO-08-321 | gao_GAO-08-321_0 | The fees vary in the way they are set, collected, used, and reviewed, which may affect their efficiency, equity, revenue adequacy, and administrative costs. The Inspection Process Is Largely Consolidated but the Inspection Fees Vary in How Rates Are Set and Adjusted, the Portion of Costs Recovered, and How Costs Are Assigned to Users
Although all of the fees we examined vary in how they are set and adjusted, these differences are a particular issue with the inspection fees. Misalignments Exist between Fee Collections and Activities for Which They May Be Used
All of the fees we reviewed suffer from some misalignment—although the nature of that misalignment varies—which affects how the fees are used. There Is No Link between the Amount of Annual HMF Collections and Expenditures
Since 2003, HMF collections have significantly exceeded funds appropriated for harbor maintenance, resulting in a large and growing surplus in the trust fund. For example, CBP and APHIS report separately on the customs, immigration, and AQI vessel fees, and the reviews generally do not reflect input from the other. Furthermore, CBP’s review of the MPF does not detail program costs and project fee collections, or provide enough information to determine if the amount, structure, or authorized uses of the fee should be updated. Unless remedied, differences such as the way overtime charges are assessed for commercial vessel inspections, as well as misalignments between actual and reimbursable inspection activities, will persist, causing confusion and raising equity concerns. Assess interest and penalties on late HMF payments for domestic shipments, shipments into foreign trade zones, and sea passengers. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
In order to provide context as Congress considers funding options for port programs, we examined (1) what is known about the way selected fees assessed on air and sea port users are set, collected, used, and reviewed (including the views of stakeholders) and (2) the effects of these attributes on program operations. To meet this objective, we examined selected fees that are assessed on port users; specifically the Harbor Maintenance Fee (HMF), Merchandise Processing Fee (MPF), Customs Inspection Fees, Immigration User Fee, and Agricultural Quarantine Inspection (AQI) User Fees. We interviewed officials responsible for managing the selected user fees at the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps), the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS), and the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) offices in Washington, D.C. CBP administers the MPF and Customs inspection fees, and it collects the HMF on behalf of the Corps. | Why GAO Did This Study
America's port infrastructure is vital to U.S. foreign trade and a bulwark for national security. One way the federal government funds port-related programs is to levy user fees. GAO was asked to examine (1) what is known about the way selected fees assessed on air and sea port users are set, collected, used, and reviewed and (2) the effects of these attributes on program operations. GAO examined the Harbor Maintenance Fee (HMF), the Merchandise Processing Fee (MPF), and the Customs, Immigration, and Agricultural Quarantine Inspection (AQI) user fees assessed on air and cruise passengers and commercial vessels using criteria that have often been used to assess user fees and taxes--equity, efficiency, revenue adequacy, and administrative burden.
What GAO Found
The port-related fees GAO examined vary in how they are set, collected, used, and reviewed, creating misalignments between the fees and corresponding services, as well as administrative and oversight challenges. Although the customs, immigration, and AQI inspections have largely been consolidated under U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), the corresponding fees remain separate and distinct and differ in how the rates are set and adjusted, the portion of costs they recover, and on whom the fees are levied. For example, overtime charges are handled differently for each type of inspection, creating confusion about the circumstances under which overtime must be paid, at what rate, and for which services. Certain collection methods increase administrative costs and reduce compliance. For example, quarterly remittance delays availability of funds and failure to charge interest and penalties on certain late payments is costly and discourages compliance. Further, lack of coordination between CBP and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers inhibits oversight of certain HMF payments. All of the fees GAO reviewed suffer from some misalignment--for example, with their respective costs or activities--which affects how the fees are used. For example, since 2003, HMF collections have far exceeded funds appropriated for harbor maintenance, resulting in a large and growing surplus in the trust fund. Also, not all MPF and customs inspection activities are reimbursable and not all reimbursable activities are inspection related. Finally, agency user fee reviews are not always comprehensive. For example, CBP's review of the MPF does not detail program costs, project collections, or provide enough information to determine if the amount, structure, or authorized uses of the fee should be updated. Further, limited opportunities for substantive communication with HMF stakeholders hamper their understanding of the fee. |
gao_GAO-07-912 | gao_GAO-07-912_0 | In brief, Sentinel is to meet FBI’s pressing need for a modern, automated capability for investigative case management and information sharing to help field agents and intelligence analysts perform their jobs more effectively and efficiently. Important Steps in Soliciting Sentinel Contractor Proposals and Awarding the Prime Contract Were Conducted
The FBI took a number of important steps when soliciting offers from contractors to lead the development of Sentinel and in evaluating the offers and making a contract award decision. An Effective Risk Management Process Has Been Defined and Is Being Followed for Sentinel
The FBI has established and is following effective processes for proactively identifying and mitigating program risks before they have a chance to become actual cost, schedule, or performance problems. Most Key Tracking and Oversight Activities Being Performed for Sentinel Contractors
The FBI is performing a range of activities to effectively define expectations for its prime contractor and to measure performance against and hold the contractor accountable for meeting these expectations. As a result, the FBI cannot adequately ensure that these support contractors are performing required program management functions effectively and efficiently. The FBI has taken a number of actions to satisfy these best practices with respect to the Sentinel prime contractor; however, the bureau has not done the same in tracking and overseeing the many support contractors that are performing program management functions. However, it has not, for example, established and applied measurable performance standards in its support contractors’ statements of work. FBI Policies and Procedures Governing Sentinel Schedule and Cost Estimates Do Not Reflect Important Best Practices
The FBI’s policies and procedures that form the basis for Sentinel’s schedule and cost estimates are not fully consistent with reliable estimating practices. While the FBI has issued an IT program management handbook, related guidance, and tools that define how IT program schedules and costs are to be estimated, this handbook and related material do not, for example, address having a historical database of program schedule and cost estimates to inform future estimates. In particular, the estimates to date did not include all relevant costs and could not be verified by supporting documentation. Without well-defined policies, procedures, and supporting tools for estimating IT programs’ schedules and costs, the reliability of these programs’ respective estimates is questionable and, in the case of Sentinel, a key basis of informed investment management is missing. FBI Office of the CIO officials agreed that these practices are not included in the bureau’s policies and procedures that form the basis for IT program cost estimates and that they need to be. For example, according to program officials, none of the estimates was derived using a historical database reflecting actual and estimated costs on similar programs. Recommendations
To strengthen the FBI’s management of its Sentinel program, we are recommending that the FBI Director instruct the bureau’s CIO to work with Sentinel support contractors, where feasible, to establish and implement performance standards in statements of work relative to the quality and timeliness of products and the performance of services and revise the IT handbook and related guidance to address schedule and cost estimating best practices that are identified in this report as not being addressed in FBI policies and procedures and ensure that these best practices are fully employed on all major IT programs, including Sentinel. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to determine the FBI’s (1) use of effective practices for acquiring Sentinel and (2) basis for reliably estimating Sentinel’s schedule and costs. Best Practices Relevant to Any IT Business Systems Acquisition
1. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Sentinel program is intended to replace and expand on the Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI) failed Virtual Case File (VCF) project and thereby meet the bureau's pressing need for a modern, automated capability to support its field agents and intelligence analysts' investigative case management and information sharing requirements. Because of the FBI's experience with VCF and the importance of Sentinel to the bureau's mission operations, GAO was asked to conduct a series of reviews on the FBI's management of Sentinel. This review focuses on the FBI's (1) use of effective practices for acquiring Sentinel and (2) basis for reliably estimating Sentinel's schedule and costs. To address its objectives, GAO researched relevant best practices, reviewed FBI policies and procedures, program plans and other program documents, and interviewed appropriate program officials.
What GAO Found
The FBI is managing its Sentinel program according to a number of key systems acquisition best practices. For example, the FBI has followed best practices when soliciting offers from contractors to lead the development of Sentinel; it has also followed the practices in evaluating the offers and making a contract award decision. In addition, it has established and is following effective processes to proactively identify and mitigate program risks before they have a chance to become actual cost, schedule, or performance problems. Further, it has taken a range of steps to effectively define expectations for its prime contractor and to measure performance against these expectations and related incentives and hold the contractor accountable for results. However, the bureau has not done the same for one key aspect of tracking and overseeing its program management support contractors. In particular, it has not established performance and product quality standards for these support contractors. According to FBI officials, such standards are not necessary because they monitor their support contractors on a daily basis, including the review and approval of all work products. By not implementing this practice, GAO believes that the FBI's monitoring does not adequately ensure that Sentinel support contractors are performing important program management functions effectively and efficiently. The FBI's policies, procedures, and supporting tools that form the basis for Sentinel's schedule and cost estimates do not adequately reflect key best practices. While the FBI has issued an information technology (IT) program management handbook, related guidance, and tools that define how IT program schedules and costs are to be estimated, this handbook and related material do not, for example, address such key practices as having a historical database of program schedule and cost estimates to inform future estimates. As a result, the reliability of Sentinel's schedule and cost estimates is questionable. GAO's analyses of the Sentinel cost estimates and program officials' statements confirm this. For example, the analyses show that the estimates do not include all relevant costs, such as a technology refresh, and are not grounded in fully documented methodologies or a corporate history of experiences on other IT programs. FBI officials agreed that they need to update their IT program management handbook and related materials to incorporate schedule and cost estimating best practices and to establish a historical database of its estimating experiences on IT programs. Until FBI takes these steps, IT programs, such as Sentinel, are unlikely to have reliable schedule and cost estimates to support informed investment decision making, and their actual progress is unlikely to track closely to estimates. |
gao_GAO-16-673 | gao_GAO-16-673_0 | According to experts, cultural property looted from Iraq and Syria is at risk of being trafficked to the United States and Europe. Both organizations are private companies that, according to their representatives, include some information from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and other law enforcement agencies in their databases, in addition to registering stolen items on behalf of individuals. Agencies and the Smithsonian Have Undertaken Five Types of Activities to Protect Iraqi and Syrian Cultural Property Since 2011
U.S. agencies and the Smithsonian have undertaken five categories of activities intended to protect Iraqi and Syrian cultural property, including awareness raising, information sharing, law enforcement efforts, overseas capacity building, and preventing destruction, as shown in figure 7. Overseas capacity building. For one of these projects, working with museums and conservation specialists, State established and funded an archaeological site protection and collection management training facility in Erbil, Iraq, which State officials said had trained approximately 350 Iraqi professionals between 2009 and June 2016 using public and private U.S. funds. Preventing destruction. For instance, their training on the use of sandbags and other materials to protect ancient mosaics at a Syrian museum resulted in the reportedly successful protection of immovable mosaics at the Ma’arra Museum in Idlib Province. Art Market Experts’ Top-Rated Suggestions Include Improving Information Sharing, Clarifying Guidance, Creating a Strategy, and Establishing a DOD Contact
Art market experts we interviewed suggested 25 ways in which the U.S. government could improve its cultural property protection activities. For example, art market experts reported that looters may steal items from museums and from storage sites or artifacts from archaeological excavations in Iraq and Syria. U.S. officials generally agreed with this suggestion and emphasized their ongoing work in this area. Smithsonian officials noted they viewed this suggestion as being helpful. Agency officials had mixed responses to this suggestion, noting that increased training is tied to additional agency resources. Agency Comments
We are not making any recommendations in this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report describes (1) activities undertaken by U.S. agencies and the Smithsonian Institution (Smithsonian) to protect Iraqi and Syrian cultural property since 2011, and (2) art market experts’ suggestions for improving U.S. government activities. To determine the activities undertaken by U.S. agencies and the Smithsonian to protect Iraqi and Syrian cultural property, we reviewed documents and data related to cultural property provided by the Smithsonian and U.S. agencies, including the Departments of State (State), Homeland Security (DHS), Justice (DOJ), the Treasury, Defense (DOD), the Interior (Interior); and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). To obtain art market experts’ suggestions to improve U.S. government activities to protect Iraqi and Syrian cultural property, we conducted interviews with a nongeneralizable sample of 35 U.S.-based art market experts knowledgeable in cultural property protection issues, including antiquities. Import Restrictions on Iraqi and Syrian Cultural Property
Since 1983, through the Convention on Cultural Property Implementation Act (CPIA), the United States has restricted the importation of certain cultural property from state parties to the 1970 United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property (1970 UNESCO Convention). Preventing Destruction. Appendix IV: Complete List and Ratings of Art Market Experts’ Suggestions for Improvements to the U.S. Government’s Iraqi and Syrian Cultural Property Protection Efforts
We asked a nongeneralizeable sample of 35 art market experts to suggest ways the U.S. government could improve efforts to protect Iraqi and Syrian cultural property. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and other groups have seized upon the conflicts in Iraq and Syria to destroy, loot, and traffic cultural property, including antiquities. According to the United Nations (UN), this destruction and looting has reached unprecedented levels. The UN has also reported that since the civil war in Syria began in 2011, ISIS has used the sale of looted Iraqi and Syrian cultural property to generate income to strengthen its capabilities to carry out attacks. Under the Convention on Cultural Property Implementation Act, signed into law in 1983, and other laws, the United States has restricted the importation of certain, but not all, Iraqi and Syrian cultural property.
GAO was asked to examine the protection of Iraqi and Syrian cultural property, including views of art market experts. This report describes (1) activities undertaken by U.S. agencies and the Smithsonian Institution to protect Iraqi and Syrian cultural property since 2011, and (2) art market experts' suggestions for improving U.S. government activities. GAO reviewed documents and interviewed U.S., international, and foreign officials. GAO interviewed a nongeneralizable sample of U.S.-based art market experts representing different categories of the art market to obtain suggestions for potentially improving U.S. government activities. GAO then asked experts to rate the importance of these suggestions and obtained U.S. officials' views on experts' top-rated suggestions.
GAO is not making recommendations in this report.
What GAO Found
U.S. agencies and the Smithsonian Institution (Smithsonian) have undertaken five types of activities to protect Iraqi and Syrian cultural property since 2011, which include awareness raising, information sharing, law enforcement, overseas capacity building, and destruction prevention. For example, the Department of Homeland Security reported coordinating with the Federal Bureau of Investigation and other agencies to open 18 Iraqi and Syrian cultural property cases—such as those regarding smuggling by individuals and international criminal organizations—between 2011 and February 2016. To enhance the capacity of partners overseas, the Department of State (State), the government of Iraq, and others established an archaeological and cultural management training facility in Erbil, Iraq. In addition, to prevent destruction, the Smithsonian and others trained Syrian antiquities professionals to use sandbags and other materials to protect ancient mosaics at a Syrian museum, reportedly resulting in the successful protection of the museum collection when it was bombed.
Types of Iraqi and Syrian Items at Risk of Being Trafficked
Art market experts identified suggestions related to improving information sharing, clarifying guidance, creating a strategy, and establishing a Department of Defense contact as most important to improving U.S. government activities for cultural property protection. For example, art market experts suggested U.S. agencies could work with nongovernmental entities, such as museums overseas and foreign countries, to improve data management. Specifically, they suggested the creation of a database including information, such as museum catalogues, that could help verify if art market items were stolen. U.S. officials GAO contacted generally agreed with this suggestion and reported some ongoing work in this area. For example, State officials noted that State provides funding to support several projects annually to inventory museum and archaeological sites, including in countries where cultural property may be at risk. Agency officials had various responses to other art market experts' suggestions. |
gao_GAO-10-193 | gao_GAO-10-193_0 | Trained individuals can be recruited to participate on neighborhood, business, or government teams to assist first responders. FEMA Faces Challenges Measuring the Performance of Its Community Preparedness Efforts and the Ready Campaign
FEMA faces challenges in measuring the performance of local community preparedness efforts because it lacks accurate information on those efforts. FEMA is also confronted with challenges in measuring performance for the Ready Campaign because the Ready Campaign is not positioned to control the placement of its preparedness messages or measure whether its message is changing the behavior of individuals. In our past work we reported on the importance of ensuring that program data are of sufficient quality to document performance and support decision making. FEMA programs report the number of local units registered nationwide as a principal performance measure, but FEMA does not verify that the registration data for Citizen Corps Councils, CERT, or Fire Corps volunteer organizations are accurate. However, of the 17 organizations registered as councils that we contacted during our site visits, 12 were active and 5 were not active as councils. Therefore, FEMA does not have reasonable assurance that its data about the number of registrations for local Citizen Corps programs are accurate, which may affect its ability to measure the results of those programs. By developing an approach to ensure the accuracy of local Citizen Corps program data, FEMA managers and others would be better positioned to understand why Citizen Corps programs that no longer exist were disbanded, possible strategies for reconstituting or creating new programs, and a foundation for developing outcome measures that gauge whether local programs are achieving goals associated with enhancing community preparedness. With regard to the Ready Campaign’s ability to control the distribution of its message, our past work has shown that it is important for agencies to measure their performance based on clear and reliable data that are linked to program goals, but also recognizes that agencies whose programs rely on others to deliver services, like the Ready Campaign, may need to use substitute measures—such as counts of Web site hits and the number of television announcements—which are not linked to outcomes. FEMA Has Not Developed a Strategy Encompassing How Citizen Corps, Its Partner Programs, and the Ready Campaign Are to Operate within the Context of the National Preparedness System
While DHS’s and FEMA’s strategic plans have incorporated efforts to promote community preparedness, FEMA has not developed a strategy encompassing how Citizen Corps, its partner programs, and the Ready Campaign are to operate within the context of the National Preparedness System. NPD’s operating plan and spreadsheet also did not include other key elements of an effective national strategy, such as how NPD will measure progress in meeting defined goals and objectives and the potential costs and types of investments needed to implement community preparedness programs. The FEMA official leading the development of the NPD strategic plan told us that NPD had begun to develop a strategic plan, but it had not developed a timeline with milestone dates for completing it because NPD is waiting to coordinate the plan’s development with the revision of HSPD- 8 and the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review. They also would provide FEMA managers and other decision makers with insights into (1) NPD’s overall progress in completing these strategies, (2) a basis for determining what, if any, additional actions need to be taken, and (3) the extent to which these strategies can be used as building blocks for the national preparedness strategy and FEMA’s strategic approach. The majority of those responding to the surveys said they plan to rely on assistance from first responders during a major disaster. This would also provide FEMA managers the basis for exploring (1) why programs that no longer exist were disbanded, and (2) possible strategies for reconstituting local programs or developing new ones. Recommendations for Executive Action
To better ensure that national community preparedness efforts are effective and completed in a timely fashion, we recommend that the Administrator of FEMA take the following two actions: examine the feasibility of developing various approaches for ensuring the accuracy of registration data of local Citizen Corps Councils and partner programs, and develop plans including timelines and milestone dates for completing and implementing (1) NPD’s strategic plan and (2) its Community Preparedness Strategic Approach, including details on how Citizen Corps, partner programs, and the Ready Campaign are to operate within the context of the National Preparedness System. | Why GAO Did This Study
Individuals can reduce their need for first responder assistance by preparing for a disaster. By law, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) in the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is to develop a National Preparedness System (NPS) that includes community preparedness programs. These programs account for less than 0.5 percent of FEMA's budget. They include the Citizen Corps Program (CCP) and partner programs, e.g., Fire Corps, which provide volunteers to assist first responders. FEMA's Ready Campaign promotes preparedness through mass media. GAO was asked to review federal efforts to promote community preparedness. GAO was asked to address (1) challenges, if any, FEMA faces in measuring the performance of CCP, its partner programs, and the Ready Campaign, and (2) actions, if any, FEMA has taken to develop a strategy to encompass how these programs are to operate within the context of the NPS. GAO analyzed documents on preparedness plans and strategies and compared reported performance data with observations during 12 site visits, selected primarily on the basis of major disasters. While not projectable, the results add insight.
What GAO Found
FEMA faces challenges measuring performance for CCP, its partner programs, and the Ready Campaign because (1) it relies on states to verify data for local program units and (2) it is unable to control the distribution of the Ready Campaign messages or measure whether the messages are changing the behavior of individuals. GAO's past work showed the importance of ensuring that program data are of sufficient quality to document performance and support decision making. FEMA includes the number of local volunteer organizations registered nationwide as its principal performance measure for community preparedness, but does not verify that registration data are accurate. For example, 5 of the 17 registered Citizen Corps councils GAO contacted were not active as councils. FEMA relies on state officials to verify the accuracy of the data, and does not have staff or processes for this purpose. FEMA officials agreed that the data are inaccurate, and have plans to improve the registration process, but this process is not designed to ensure accurate data because states will continue to be responsible for verifying the accuracy of data. FEMA counts requests for literature, Web site hits, and the number of television and radio announcements made to gauge performance of the Ready Campaign, but it does not control when information is accessed or viewed. Also, changes in behavior can be the result of a variety of factors, including campaigns sponsored by other organizations. GAO's past work stated that agencies should measure performance based on accurate, clear, and reliable data that are clearly linked to program goals, but also recognized that programs like the Ready Campaign may need to rely on substitute measures that it uses such as Web site hits. GAO recognizes that FEMA is challenged measuring the performance of CCP, partner programs, and the Ready Campaign, but examining the feasibility of approaches to verify data on CCP and its partner programs could position FEMA to begin to (1) explore why programs that no longer exist were disbanded and (2) develop possible strategies for reconstituting local programs or developing new ones. FEMA's challenges in measuring the performance of community preparedness programs are compounded because it has not developed a strategy to show how its community preparedness programs and the Ready Campaign are to operate within the context of the NPS. In April and October 2009, GAO reported that FEMA's National Preparedness Directorate (NPD), responsible for community preparedness, had not developed a strategic plan; rather it used an operating plan, which lacked key elements of an effective national strategy, such as how to gauge progress. GAO recommended that NPD develop a strategic plan that contains these key elements. FEMA agreed and reported that it is taking actions to strengthen strategic planning. While officials said an NPD strategic plan and a community preparedness strategy are being developed, NPD has not developed timelines with milestone dates for completing these strategies. By doing so, consistent with standard management practices for implementing programs, FEMA would be better positioned to show progress and provide insights into how these plans can be used as building blocks for the national preparedness strategy. |
gao_GAO-09-1038T | gao_GAO-09-1038T_0 | Security Assessment from September 2008 Report
Select agent regulations do not mandate that specific perimeter security controls be present at BSL-4 labs, resulting in a significant difference in perimeter security between the nation’s five labs. While three labs had all or nearly all of the key security controls we assessed, our September 2008 report demonstrated that two labs (Labs C and E) had a significant lack of these controls. CDC Has Taken Limited Action to Require Specific Perimeter Security Controls
Significant perimeter security differences continue to exist among the nation’s five BSL-4 labs operational at the time of our most recent assessment. The WG is chaired by HHS and the Department of Defense (DOD) and includes representatives from several federal agencies and includes a subgroup that is focused on physical and facility security of biolabs. Two Labs Take Action to Improve Perimeter Security Controls
Although CDC has taken limited action to address our findings from our September 2008 report, the two deficient BSL-4 labs have made progress on their own. In our July 2009 report, we stated that one BSL-4 lab made a significant number of improvements to increase perimeter security, thus reducing the likelihood of intrusion. The second one made three changes and formed a committee to consider and prioritize other changes. Camera coverage includes all exterior lab entrances. The cameras currently cover the exterior of the building. Armed guards are present on the campus. Additional Observations on Federal Oversight of BSL-4 Labs
In our July 2009 report, we made two additional observations that concern perimeter security differences among the nation’s five BSL-4 labs that were operational at the time of our assessment: All five BSL-4 labs operating in 2008 had a security plan in place when we assessed them. For example, Lab B is a military facility subject to far stricter DOD physical security requirements. CDC inspection officials stated their training and experience had been mainly in the area of safety. According to CDC officials, they are developing a comprehensive strategy for safety and security of biosafety labs and will adjust the training and inspection process accordingly to match this comprehensive strategy. | Why GAO Did This Study
Biosafety laboratories are primarily regulated by either the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) or the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), depending on whether the substances they handle pose a threat to the health of humans or plants, animals, and related products, respectively. Currently, all operational biosafety level 4 (BSL-4) labs are overseen by HHS's Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). BSL-4 labs handle the world's most dangerous agents and toxins that cause incurable and deadly diseases. This testimony summarizes GAO's previously issued reports on perimeter security at the nation's BSL-4 laboratories that were issued in September 2008 (GAO-08-1092) and July 2009 (GAO-09-851). Specifically, this testimony describes (1) the findings and recommendation on key perimeter security controls at five of the nation's operational BSL-4 labs, (2) CDC efforts to address our recommendation, (3) improvements that have been made to the perimeter security controls at the two labs found to be deficient, and (4) other observations about the BSL-4 labs GAO assessed.
What GAO Found
Significant perimeter security differences continue to exist among the nation's five BSL-4 laboratories operational at the time of GAO's assessment. In September 2008, GAO reported that three of the five labs had all or nearly all of the 15 key controls GAO evaluated. Two labs, however, demonstrated a significant lack of these controls, such as camera coverage for all exterior lab entrances and vehicle screening. As a result, GAO recommended that CDC work with USDA to require specific perimeter security controls at high-containment facilities. However, as we reported in July 2009, CDC has taken limited action on the GAO recommendation. In July 2009, GAO reported that the two deficient labs made progress on their own despite CDC's limited action. One made a significant number of improvements, thus reducing the likelihood of intrusion. The second made a few changes and formed a committee to consider and prioritize other improvements. Two additional observations about BSL-4 labs concern the significant perimeter security differences among the five labs GAO originally assessed for our September 2008 report. First, labs with stronger perimeter controls had additional security requirements mandated by other federal agencies. For example, one lab is a military facility subject to far stricter Department of Defense physical security requirements. Second, CDC inspection officials stated their training and experience has been focused on safety. CDC officials said they are developing a comprehensive strategy for safety and security of labs and will adjust the training and inspection process to match this strategy. |
gao_AIMD-96-29 | gao_AIMD-96-29_0 | development teams. As a result, NWS risks unnecessarily spending money on AWIPS capabilities that do not satisfy any of its mission improvement goals—better forecasts, fewer field offices, and fewer staff. However, this translation did not, nor was it intended to, link requirements or capabilities to mission improvements. However, whether all of the 450 capabilities it plans for AWIPS are necessary to accomplish this is unknown because the process it has followed in developing AWIPS, while providing for traceability between proposed system capabilities and user expressed needs, does not include validating that these capabilities explicitly and measurably advance NWS’ mission efficiency and effectiveness, which NWS has defined in terms of improved forecasts, fewer field offices, and reduced staffing levels. Rather, we are saying that NWS is spending hundreds of millions of dollars without knowing whether all AWIPS capabilities will contribute to its stated reasons for investing in the system (improving forecasts and reducing field offices and staffing levels). In particular, we reviewed analyses of AWIPS’ prototyping efforts, memoranda from the 1992 rebaselining of the AWIPS requirements, the System/Segment Specification for the National Weather Service Advanced Weather Interactive Processing System, and the Requirements Traceability Document for the AWIPS Hydrometeorological Computer Software Configuration Item. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the National Weather Service's (NWS) Advanced Weather Interactive Processing System (AWIPS), focusing on whether the proposed AWIPS capabilities will improve weather forecasts and reduce staffing levels and the number of weather offices.
What GAO Found
GAO found that NWS: (1) needs to replace the outdated systems that its field offices use and has developed 22,000 AWIPS requirements to support 450 capabilities to achieve its mission of improving forecasts and reducing staffing levels and the number of weather offices; (2) may be spending money unnecessarily on capabilities that do not contribute to its mission, since it has not justified whether proposed improvements to AWIPS are necessary to advance its mission efficiently and effectively; and (3) is developing a process to ensure that AWIPS requirements are not duplicative or obsolete, but the process does not trace all planned capabilities to stated mission improvement goals. |
gao_GAO-16-757 | gao_GAO-16-757_0 | As figure 1 shows, the number of U.S. universities that have partnered with Chinese universities to establish cooperative, degree-granting institutions has increased since 2011. State annually publishes country reports on global human rights practices, including academic freedom. Universities Reported Receiving Support from Chinese Universities and Government Entities, with Limited Support from the U.S. Government
The 12 U.S. universities we reviewed generally reported receiving support for their institutions in China from their Chinese partner universities and from Chinese government entities, with limited funding from U.S. government agencies and private donors. Universities reported contributions from their partner universities and from Chinese provincial and local governments for land, building construction, and use of campus facilities. Almost all of the universities said their institutions in China generated net revenue or had neutral impact on their budget. About half of the universities that we reviewed address at least one of the freedoms of speech, assembly, and religion or worship in university policies. About Half of Universities Address Access to Information, but Few Agreements and Other Policies Include Internet Protections
About half of the universities we reviewed have agreements or policies that address access to information by outlining responsibilities for themselves and their Chinese partners for providing access to physical or digital libraries. A few universities’ documents include language that indicates possible Internet constraints. U.S. University Members Generally Indicated They Experienced Academic Freedom, but Internet Censorship and Other Factors Posed Constraints
Faculty, students, and administrators we interviewed generally indicated that they experienced academic freedom at U.S. universities’ institutions in China, but they also indicated that Internet censorship, self-censorship, and other factors presented constraints. We visited universities that had uncensored Internet access and universities that did not. At several universities that lacked access to uncensored Internet content, students and faculty told us that, as a result, they sometimes face challenges teaching, conducting research, and completing coursework. Universities’ Legal Status May Be Correlated with Academic Freedom
The three universities we reviewed that are approved by the Chinese Ministry of Education as having independent legal status share characteristics that may be correlated with greater academic and other freedoms on campus. Concluding Observations
In recent years, a growing number of U.S. universities have established degree-granting institutions with Chinese partners in an environment, as characterized by the Department of State, of worsening human rights and academic freedom conditions in China. We provided a draft of this report to the Departments of Education and of State for comment. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
In this report, we reviewed (1) funding and other support provided by the U.S. government and other sources to U.S. universities to operate in China; (2) the treatment of academic and other key freedoms in arrangements between U.S. universities and their Chinese partners; and (3) the experience of academic and other key freedoms by faculty, students, and staff at selected U.S. universities in China. In our discussions with faculty members and students, we addressed topics such as the reasons they chose to work or study at the programs in China, the extent to which they may be constrained from teaching or studying certain topics, their experience of Internet access in China, campus life and student activities, any differences they have perceived or experienced between U.S. and Chinese faculty and students, and other topics relating to their experience at the program particularly as it relates to academic and other freedoms. | Why GAO Did This Study
In its Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2015, the Department of State (State) concluded that academic freedom, a longstanding concern in China, had recently worsened. At the same time, the number of U.S. universities establishing degree-granting institutions in partnership with Chinese universities—teaching predominantly Chinese students—has increased. While universities have noted that these institutions offer benefits, some academics and others have raised questions as to whether faculty, students, and staff may face restricted academic freedom and other constraints.
This report reviews (1) funding and other support provided to U.S. universities to operate in China; (2) the treatment of academic and other key freedoms in arrangements between U.S. universities and their Chinese partners; and (3) the experience of academic and other key freedoms by faculty, students, and staff at selected U.S. universities in China. GAO reviewed 12 U.S. universities that have established degree-granting institutions in partnership with Chinese universities; interviewed and obtained university documents and questionnaire responses; interviewed faculty and students; and visited the campuses of 5 institutions selected on the basis of their location, student demographics, date of establishment, and other factors. GAO also interviewed officials and obtained information from the Departments of Education (Education) and State. GAO makes no recommendations in this report. Education and State had no comments on a draft of this report.
What GAO Found
The 12 U.S. universities GAO reviewed generally reported receiving support for their institutions in China from Chinese government entities and universities, with limited funding from U.S. government agencies and other donors. Universities reported contributions from Chinese provincial and local governments and from partner universities for land, building construction, and use of campus facilities. Fewer than half of the universities reported receiving federal funding. Almost all of the U.S. universities said their programs in China generated net revenue for the university or had a neutral impact on its budget.
Universities' agreements with their Chinese partners or other policies that GAO reviewed generally include language protecting academic freedom or indicating their institution in China would adhere to U.S. standards. About half of universities GAO reviewed address access to information, such as providing faculty and students with access to physical or online libraries, though few universities' agreements and policies include language protecting Internet access. About half of the universities' policies include language indicating protection of at least one other key freedom—speech, assembly, or religion.
University members generally indicated that they experienced academic freedom, but they also indicated that Internet censorship and other factors presented constraints. Administrators said they generally controlled curriculum content, and faculty and students said they could teach or study what they chose. However, fewer than half of the universities GAO reviewed have uncensored Internet access. At several universities that lacked uncensored Internet access, students and faculty told us that, as a result, they sometimes faced challenges teaching, conducting research, and completing coursework. Administrators, faculty, and students also cited examples of self-censorship, where certain sensitive political topics—such as Tiananmen Square or China's relationship with Taiwan—were avoided in class, and of constraints faced by Chinese students in particular. Universities approved by the Chinese Ministry of Education as having independent legal status share characteristics—such as campuses located away from their Chinese university partner's campus and extensive student life programs—that may be correlated with greater academic freedom and other key freedoms. |
gao_GGD-96-177 | gao_GGD-96-177_0 | Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
To report on the status of exchange compliance with the existing and heightened standards and CFTC actions to enforce the FTPA audit trail provisions, we reviewed CFTC’s (1) November 1994 report to Congress on audit trails; (2) June 1995 report on the results of exchange audit trail testing; (3) November 3, 1995, letters to four exchanges with agency conclusions related to their good faith efforts to comply with the FTPA; (4) August 1996 report on the status of exchange audit trail compliance and the results of further exchange audit trail testing; (5) other relevant CFTC studies and reports; and (6) the legislative history of the FTPA. On the basis of this and other evidence, CFTC found that 7 of 11 exchanges were in compliance with the 1-minute trade timing and sequencing standards. It also plans to act on exchange petitions for exemption from the dual trading ban beginning in September 1996. The exchanges initially told CFTC that AUDIT would be operational by the October 28, 1995, statutory deadline for implementing the FTPA heightened audit trail standards. In June 1996, the exchanges testified that the FTPA requirement to capture broker receipt time was not currently practicable. Conclusions
CFTC has taken actions to enforce exchange compliance with the FTPA audit trail standards. Further, CFTC has not yet fully addressed the practicability of all the act’s requirements as part of its ongoing effort to enforce the heightened standards. CFTC Recommendations to Futures Exchanges for Improving Their Audit Trails and Exchange Responses
The following are the audit trail improvements that CFTC recommended in June 1995 to the Chicago Board of Trade (CBT), Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME), Coffee, Sugar & Cocoa Exchange (CSCE), and New York Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX) and the exchanges’ individual responses. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on the Commodity Futures Trading Commission's (CFTC) actions to enforce Futures Trading Practices Act (FTPA) audit trail provisions.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) 7 U.S. futures exchanges are in compliance with FTPA 1-minute trade timing and sequencing standards; (2) CFTC is unable to determine the status of four other exchanges until it reviews the results of the audit trail tests; (3) audit trail test results for the Chicago Board of Trade (CBT) and the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME) are not precise enough to verify their compliance with existing audit trail standards; (4) none of the exchanges fully complied with the heightened audit trail standards as of October 28, 1995; (5) CFTC has delayed requiring some audit trail enhancements to existing systems due to assurances that electronic trading terminals would be in place by the statutory deadline; (6) CFTC has granted the Coffee, Sugar & Cocoa Exchange and the New York Mercantile Exchange temporary relief from the FTPA statutory deadline; (7) CBT and CME were not in compliance with the heightened FTPA guidelines after additional retests; (8) CFTC has not determined the practicability of certain FTPA provisions, including the requirement to capture broker receipt time for customer orders; (9) CFTC plans to act on exchange petitions for exemption from the dual trading ban; and (10) CFTC needs to keep Congress informed of its actions to facilitate additional FTPA audit standards. |
gao_GAO-17-748 | gao_GAO-17-748_0 | VHA Directive 6330
VHA Directive 6330 governs the organization’s policy management; the June 2016 revisions established clearer definitions for national policy and guidance documents. Specifically, the revised directive defines national policy as a document that “establishes a definite course of action for VHA and assigns responsibilities for executing that course to identifiable individuals or groups.” The directive stipulates that two primary document types are to be used for national policy—directives and notices:
Directives are to be used to establish national policy and contain certain types of information, such as the roles and responsibilities for each component of the organization. VHA Has Taken Steps to Align Existing National Policy Documents with New Definitions, but It Continues to Use Program Office Memos to Issue Policy VHA Is Aligning Existing Policy Documents with Its New Definitions
We found that VHA is in the process of reviewing existing national policy documents to align with its new policy definitions as outlined in Directive 6330. However, existing guidance documents, such as program office memos, have not been included in this review because there is no central repository that would facilitate their identification, and the number of these documents is unknown. Without further steps to clarify how and when program office memos should be used, the continued use of these memos by program offices may undermine VHA’s efforts to implement new policy and guidance definitions, as intended. VHA Has a Standard Process for Making National Policy Documents Accessible to VISNs and VAMCs, but Lacks Such a Process for Guidance Documents VHA Has a Standard Process to Make National Policy Documents Accessible to VISNs and VAMCs
As a part of its updated Directive 6330 on national policy management, VHA established a standard process to make national policy documents accessible to VISNs and VAMCs. VHA Does Not Have a Process to Consistently Make Guidance Documents Accessible to VISNs and VAMCs
Unlike with national policy documents, there is no standard process used to ensure guidance documents issued by various VHA program offices are consistently made accessible to VISNs and VAMCs. Guidance documents, such as program office memos, that do not go through the formal VHA review process are not posted on VHA’s publications website and are maintained in different ways by the program offices that develop them. Without a standard process for consistently maintaining and disseminating guidance documents to VISNs and VAMCs, the agency lacks assurance that staff members receive and follow the same guidance, as intended. VHA Does Not Routinely Collect Information on Local Challenges with National Policy Implementation and Lacks Information on Policy Exemption Waivers for VAMCs VHA Does Not Consistently Collect Information on the Challenges VISNs and VAMCs Face in Implementing National Policy
VHA has not consistently solicited input on national policies either prior to issuance or after implementation from VISNs and VAMCs. Officials from the four VISNs and eight VAMCs in our review outlined a variety of challenges they face when implementing national policy, including insufficient or undefined time frames and conflicting policies on the same topic. Resource constraints. However, VHA officials have yet to finalize it. VHA Lacks Information on Approved Policy Exemption Waivers Because It Has Not Established a Process for Approving, Tracking, and Reassessing Them
In certain cases, when VAMCs may be unable to comply with all or part of a national policy, program offices may approve policy exemption waivers on an informal and ad hoc basis. No central tracking. There is no VHA requirement for program offices to reassess issued policy exemption waivers to determine whether they are still needed. VISNs and VAMCs in Our Review Develop and Maintain Various Local Policies, but VHA Does Not Ensure That They Align with National Policies
VISNs and VAMCs in Our Review Develop Their Own Policies That Are Maintained Locally
Almost all of the VISNs and VAMCs in our review told us that they had developed their own local policies. VHA Does Not Have a Process to Systematically Ensure That Local Policies Are Aligned with National Policies
VHA has not established a process for systematically ensuring that local policies are aligned with national policies, which increases the risk of inconsistent policy implementation across VAMCs—one of the primary reasons that VA health care was placed on our high-risk list. Without a standard process to ensure local policy alignment with national policy, VHA may continue to experience inconsistent practices across its health care system. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO was asked to conduct a management review of VHA; this is the sixth report in the series. In this review of VHA's policy management, GAO examines the extent to which (1) VHA has implemented its new definitions for national policy and guidance documents; (2) VHA ensures that national policy and guidance documents are accessible to VISNs and VAMCs; (3) VHA collects information on local challenges with implementing national policy, including the exemptions granted when policy requirements cannot be met; and (4) local policies are developed and maintained by VISNs and VAMCs, and whether they are aligned with national policies.
GAO reviewed agency documentation, including VHA's revised directive on policy management. GAO also interviewed VHA officials involved with policy improvement efforts, as well as officials from a nongeneralizable sample of four national program offices, four VISNs, and eight VAMCs selected to provide geographic variation, among other factors.
What GAO Found
The Veterans Health Administration (VHA)—within the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA)—is taking steps to align existing national policy documents with newly revised definitions that streamline and clarify document use. According to the new definitions in its June 2016 directive on policy management, directives and notices are now the sole documents for establishing national policy; other types of documents, such as program office memos, are considered guidance. VHA is reviewing about 800 existing national policy documents to eliminate those that no longer meet its new definitions, and to rescind or recertify those that are outdated. At this time, VHA is not planning to review guidance documents, such as program office memos and standard operating procedures, to assess whether they align with its updated directive, because there is no central repository for these documents and it would be too resource intensive to locate all of them. Further, GAO's review found—contrary to VHA's updated directive—that program offices are continuing to use memos to issue policy. The continued use of program office memos to establish national policy undermines VHA's efforts to improve its policy management.
VHA has a standard process for making national policy documents accessible to VA medical centers (VAMC) and the Veterans Integrated Service Networks (VISN) to which the medical centers report, but lacks a process for making guidance documents accessible. VHA makes national policy documents accessible to all organizational levels through a publications website and e-mail distribution list as outlined in its June 2016 directive. However, GAO found that VHA has not established a similar process for program offices to make guidance documents accessible at the local level. Specifically, there is no central repository, such as a publications website, for guidance documents, and the program offices do not track or consistently disseminate the guidance documents they issue. Without a standard process for consistently maintaining and disseminating guidance, VHA lacks assurance that staff receive and follow the same guidance, as intended.
VHA does not routinely collect information on local challenges with national policy implementation or on exemption waivers. The four VISNs and eight VAMCs in GAO's review reported various challenges they face when implementing national policy, such as resource constraints and undefined time frames. In instances where VAMCs cannot meet policy requirements, program offices may approve policy exemption waivers on an ad hoc basis. However, GAO found that VHA lacks complete information on approved policy exemption waivers because it does not have a standard process for approving, tracking, and reassessing them. In recognition of this issue, VHA established a committee to develop a waiver process in June 2017.
VISNs and VAMCs in GAO's review develop and maintain various local policies, but VHA does not ensure that they align with national policies. Specifically, GAO found that VHA does not have a process for program offices to systematically ensure that local policies align with national policies. Without such a process, VHA may continue to experience inconsistent policy implementation across its health care system.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is making six recommendations to VHA, which include clarifying national policy and guidance documents, ensuring access to guidance documents, incorporating local feedback into national policy, establishing a process to approve and track policy exemption waivers, and ensuring alignment of local and national policy. VHA generally concurred with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_RCED-97-19 | gao_RCED-97-19_0 | Amount and Percentage of Funds Lent Generally Increased
The overall amount of funds lent by the nine states increased between 1995 and 1996, from $3.3 billion to $4.0 billion. As figure 1 shows, all nine states increased the amount of funds they lent between 1995 and 1996. Six states increased their amount by 15 to 29 percent. The other three states increased their amount of funds lent by 30 percent or more. Three states increased their percentage by 17 percentage points or more. Specifically, five states lent 80 percent or more of their available funds, another three states lent 70 to 79 percent, and the final state lent 60 percent. Lack of Legislative Reauthorization and Other Federal-Level Factors Constrained Lending in Eight States
Officials in eight of the nine states cited one or more factors at the federal level as affecting the amounts and percentages of funds they lent. Finally, in three states, officials identified other reasons, such as federal restrictions on the use of SRF funds. Expiration of Legislative Authorization Discouraged Some Potential Borrowers
Officials in seven of the nine states said that the lack of reauthorization of the Clean Water Act limited their success in lending funds. Louisiana officials said that before the prevailing-wage requirement expired, the state had experienced difficulties in making loans largely because local officials perceived the requirement as increasing the costs of projects. In the early years of the SRF program, Pennsylvania officials decided to finance about $248 million in wastewater projects with these state funds rather than wait for SRF funding to become available, according to state officials. According to a state official, efforts to inform local government officials about the SRF program and interest them in participating were not effective in the program’s early years. Amount of funds lent (thousands of dollars)
Methodology for Computing the Percentage of Funds Lent
To determine the percentage of funds lent by each state as of the end of 1995 and 1996, we divided the total amount of funds lent by the total funds available to lend, both as of the end of the year. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed selected states' use of their revolving funds, focusing on the: (1) amount of funds lent and the percentage of available funds lent, as of the end of each state's fiscal year (FY) 1996; and (2) factors at the federal and state levels that constrained the amount and percentage of funds lent.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) the nine states GAO surveyed increased the total amount of funds they lent from $3.3 billion in 1995 to $4.0 billion in 1996; (2) six states achieved an increase of between 15 and 29 percent, and the other three states achieved an increase of 30 percent or more; (3) seven of the nine states increased the percentage of available funds they lent, and of these seven, three states increased this proportion by 17 percentage points or more; (4) the percentage of funds lent as of the end of 1996 varied substantially among the nine states; (5) five states had lent 80 percent or more of their available funds, three states had lent between 70 and 79 percent, and one state had lent 60 percent; (6) in eight of the nine states, officials identified the expiration of the authorizing legislation, as well as federal requirements, as affecting the amount and percentage of funds lent; (7) officials in seven states said that other federal requirements, such as a prevailing-wage provision, discouraged some communities from seeking loans; (8) in two states, officials said that the decisions made by the state programs constrained lending; (9) program managers in one state decided to finance certain wastewater projects from state funds rather than from the revolving fund, thereby limiting both the amount and the percentage of funds lent from the revolving fund; and (10) in the other state, efforts to publicize the program to local officials were not effective in the early years of the program. |
gao_GAO-11-771T | gao_GAO-11-771T_0 | In Afghanistan, DCMA teams include administrative contracting officers, and quality assurance representatives, who ensure that the contractors perform work to the standards written in the contracts and oversee the CORs assigned to DCMA-administered contracts. DOD’s CORs Are Not Fully Prepared for Their Roles and Responsibilities in Afghanistan
DOD’s Training Does Not Fully Prepare Most CORs for Their Roles and Responsibilities of Contract Management and Oversight
DOD has added new training for CORs serving in contingencies, but some gaps in training remain and not all of the required training is being conducted or completed. DOD has taken some actions to improve the capability of CORs to provide management and oversight of contracts in contingency operations such as Afghanistan. These actions include developing a new COR training course, with a focus on contingency operations, and developing a COR certification program. According to personnel in Afghanistan, none of the required COR training provides enough specifics about contract management and oversight in Afghanistan. For example, the required training does not provide CORs with information regarding important issue areas like the Afghan First Program, which encourages an increased use of local personnel and vendors for goods and services as part of the U.S. counterinsurgency strategy, and working with private security contractors. For example, military personnel have been appointed to oversee construction contracts without the necessary engineering or construction experience, in part because their units lack personnel with those technical skills. As a result, according to officials there have been newly constructed buildings used by both U.S. and Afghan troops that had to be repaired or rebuilt before being used because the CORs providing the oversight were not able to adequately ensure proper construction. According to personnel we interviewed, this resulted in a waste of money as well as lower morale due to substandard facilities; and in an increased risk to bases and installations because required infrastructure such as guard towers, fire stations, and gates were lacking. Contracting officials from one regional contracting center told us that guard towers at a forward operating base were so poorly constructed that they were unsafe to occupy; they were subsequently torn down and reconstructed. In addition, in some cases units did not assign enough CORs to provide oversight. As a result, units may not always use the tools available to help prepare for contract management operations in Afghanistan. DOD, USAID, and State Efforts to Vet Non-U.S. The purpose of this vetting process—which includes the examination of available background and intelligence information—is to reduce the possibility that insurgents or criminal groups could use U.S. contracting funds to finance their operations. Also CENTCOM Contracting Command officials said that when the contract was established, it was with the intention of determining a non-U.S. vendor’s eligibility to be awarded a contract in Afghanistan prior to award. To address these vendor vetting limitations in Afghanistan, in our June 2011 report we made several recommendations to DOD. USAID Has Recently Begun to Implement A Vendor Vetting Process
In January 2011, in order to counter potential risks of U.S. funds being diverted to support criminal or insurgent activity, USAID created a process for vetting prospective non-U.S. contract and assistance recipients (i.e., implementing partners) in Afghanistan. State Has Not Created a Vendor Vetting Process for Afghanistan
As of May 2011, the State Department (State) was not vetting vendors in Afghanistan. To help ensure that State resources are not diverted to insurgent or criminal groups, we recommended that State assess the need and develop possible options for vetting non-U.S. vendors—for example, these could include leveraging existing vendor vetting processes, such as USAID’s, or developing a unique process. DOD and USAID both concurred with our recommendation, but State did not comment on it. DOD Has Not Fully Addressed GAO Recommendations
Since the beginning of our work on operational contract support in 1997, we have made numerous recommendations to DOD to help improve the oversight and management of contractors used to support contingency operations. Specifically, we have made recommendations in the areas of developing guidance, planning for contractors in future operations, tracking contractor personnel, providing sufficient numbers of oversight personnel, and training non acquisition personnel including CORs and other key leaders such as unit commanders and senior staff. Concluding Observations
DOD and the services have taken some important steps to institutionalize OCS—for example, by issuing joint doctrine, including some training in professional military education, and establishing a vetting cell to vet non- U.S. vendors in Afghanistan, to minimize the risk of criminal groups using contracts to fund their operations but DOD’s efforts have not gone far enough. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Departments of Defense (DOD) and State (State) and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) have collectively obligated billions of dollars for contracts and assistance to support U.S. efforts in Afghanistan. The work of GAO and others has documented shortcomings in DOD's contract management and oversight, and its training of the non-acquisition workforce. Addressing these challenges can help DOD meet warfighter needs in a timely and costconscious manner; mitigate the risks of fraud, waste, and abuse; and minimize the operational risks associated with contractors. This testimony addresses the extent to which (1) DOD's Contracting Officer's Representatives (COR) are prepared for their roles and responsibilities and provide adequate contract oversight in Afghanistan; (2) DOD, State, and USAID vet non-U.S. firms for links to terrorist and insurgent groups in Afghanistan; and (3) DOD has implemented GAO's past recommendations. The testimony is based on GAO's recently published reports and testimonies on operational contract support, including a June 2011 report on vetting of non-U.S. vendors in Afghanistan, as well as providing preliminary observations as a result of ongoing audit work in Afghanistan. GAO's work included analyses of a wide range of agency documents, and interviews with defense officials including CORs, contracting officers, and contract management officials in the United States and Afghanistan.
What GAO Found
DOD has taken actions to better prepare CORs to conduct contract oversight and management in Afghanistan; however, CORs are not fully prepared for their roles and responsibilities to provide adequate oversight there. To improve the capability of CORs to provide contract management and oversight in contingencies, DOD has developed a new, contingency-focused COR training course, issued new guidance, and developed a COR certification program. Nonetheless, gaps in the training exist. For example, according to DOD personnel in Afghanistan, the required training does not provide CORs with enough specificity about contracting in Afghanistan, such as information about the Afghan First Program, which encourages an increased use of local goods and services, or working with private security contractors. Also, whether a COR has relevant technical expertise is not always considered prior to assigning an individual to oversee a contract, even though CORs have a significant role in determining if products or services provided by the contractor fulfill the contract's technical requirements. However, according to officials, some CORs appointed to oversee construction contracts have lacked necessary engineering or construction experience, in some cases resulting in newly constructed buildings that were to be used by U.S. or Afghan troops having to be repaired or rebuilt. According to CORs and commanders in Afghanistan, poor performance on construction contracts has resulted in money being wasted, substandard facilities, and an increased risk to bases. For example, contracting officials from one regional contracting center told GAO that construction of guard towers at a forward operating base was so poor that they were unsafe to occupy. DOD and USAID have both established processes to vet non-U.S. vendors in Afghanistan, but GAO has identified limitations; additionally, State has not yet developed a vendor vetting process. The purpose of DOD's vetting process begun in August 2010--which includes the examination of available background and intelligence information--is to reduce the possibility that insurgents or criminal groups could use U.S. contracting funds to finance their operations. Additionally, in January 2011 USAID also began to implement a process to vet prospective non-U.S. contract and assistance recipients (i.e., implementing partners) in Afghanistan. GAO made recommendations, such as to formalize their vetting processes, which, both agencies concurred with. For example, USAID signed a mission order in May 2011 codifying the details of its vetting process. As of May 2011, State had not developed a vendor vetting process for non-U.S. vendors in Afghanistan, though officials stated they are considering several options.
What GAO Recommends
GAO has made numerous recommendations in areas such as developing guidance, tracking contractor personnel, providing oversight personnel, and training, and DOD has made strides in addressing some of them. However, it has not fully implemented other previous recommendations, such as ensuring training for commanders and senior leaders and improvements to the contracting personnel tracking system in Afghanistan. |
gao_GAO-16-326 | gao_GAO-16-326_0 | 1.) For the 11 CO-OPs that continued to operate, CMS disbursed, as of November 2015, about $897 million (74 percent) of the CO-OP program loans awarded. Initial CMS Monitoring Focused on CO-OPs’ Progress as Start-up Issuers
CMS’s initial activities to monitor the CO-OPs, starting when it began awarding CO-OP loans in early 2012, tracked their progress in becoming health insurance issuers (for example, establishing provider networks, arranging appropriate office space, and filling key management positions) and their compliance with program requirements (for example, establishing governance subject to a majority vote of its members and incorporating ethics and conflict-of-interest standards). CMS account managers maintained documentation of these teleconferences electronically. CMS Expanded and Refined CO-OP Monitoring Activities as the Program Matured
As CO-OPs began enrolling members, CMS supplemented its initial monitoring activities with additional tools to evaluate CO-OP performance and sustainability. CMS officials told us that they expect to monitor CO-OPs that have ceased operations to the extent possible. CMS officials also noted that the direct analysis may, at times, be focused on particular areas of concerns. Long-term sustainability. Working capital. 6. To respond to issues identified at individual CO-OPs using the direct analysis and risk assessment tools, as well as its other monitoring activities, in November 2014, CMS formally established a framework, known as an escalation plan, for evaluating and responding to concerns. Using a standard set of questions, the account manager assesses the issue in light of five sets of considerations: (1) whether the issue was self- reported by the CO-OP and the frequency with which the CO-OP experienced the same or other issues, (2) the potential impact on the CO-OP’s state licensure and exchange participation, (3) the potential impact on the CO-OP’s approved business plan, (4) the potential impact on the CO-OP’s compliance with program requirements, and (5) the potential impact on the CO-OP’s members and markets where it participates. As of November 9, 2015, CMS had required corrective action plans or implemented enhanced oversight plans (or both) for 15 CO-OPs, of which 8 continue to operate in 2016. Both CO-OPs ceased operations on, or before, January 1, 2016. In addition, CMS officials told us that, to the extent possible, they plan to monitor CO-OPs that have ceased operations. CMS officials told us that their goal is to work with the CO-OPs and their states’ departments of insurance to bring operations to an end in a way that minimizes negative effects on members, as well as to recover program loan funding to the extent possible. CO-OPs’ 2015 Premiums Were Generally Lower than Their 2014 Premiums and Other Issuers’ 2015 Premiums
Most CO-OPs’ Premiums for 2015 Were Lower than Their 2014 Premiums
Our analysis showed that in most of the 20 states where CO-OPs offered health plans on the exchange during both the 2014 and 2015 open enrollment periods, the state-wide average monthly premium for a 30-year-old individual to purchase a CO-OP silver health plan was lower for 2015 than for the previous year. Average CO-OP Premiums in 2015 Were Generally Lower than those for Other Issuers
In the 23 states where CO-OPs offered health plans on the states’ health insurance exchanges in 2015, our analysis showed that the average monthly premiums for CO-OP health plans in all tiers were lower than the average monthly premiums for other health plans for 30-year-old individuals in most rating areas. For all five tiers, the average premiums for CO-OP health plans were lower than the average premiums for other health plans in more than 75 percent of ratings areas where both a CO-OP and at least one other issuer offered health plans. CO-OP Enrollment Doubled from 2014 to 2015, but Less than Half Was in CO-OPs Continuing in 2016, and Enrollment for Most CO-OPs Differed from Projections
The 22 CO-OPs that participated in the 2015 open enrollment period together reported, as of June 30, 2015, enrollment of over 1 million— more than double the total enrollment reported at the same time the previous year. As figure 7 shows, of the 11 CO-OPs that have ceased operations, 6 did not meet their individual enrollment projections, while 5 CO-OPs exceeded their projections. Our analysis, however, also found that 4 CO-OPs had not yet reached a program benchmark of enrolling at least 25,000 members. According to CMS officials, exceeding this benchmark can be important for CO-OPs, because that number of enrollees should better allow a health insurance issuer to cover its fixed costs. CMS officials told us that they are monitoring the CO-OPs’ enrollment with attention to this benchmark. Agency Comments
We provided a draft of this report to HHS for comment. In its written comments, which appear in appendix XV, HHS stated its commitment to CO-OP beneficiaries and taxpayers in managing the CO-OP program, noted the achievements of the CO-OP program to date, and described developments in the department’s oversight activities. HHS also provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. Rating area 14 includes Holmes and Wayne counties. Appendix XIII: Premiums for the Consumer Operated and Oriented Plans Relative to Premiums for Other Health Plans in Oregon
The state-wide average monthly premium for the two consumer operated and oriented plans’ (CO-OP) silver health plans for 30-year-old individuals in Oregon increased from 2014 to 2015 and, for the one CO-OP that continued to operate in 2016, increased again from 2015 to 2016. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act established the CO-OP program and provided loans that helped create 23 CO-OPs to offer qualified health plans to individuals and small employers. While the program seeks to increase competition and improve accountability to members, questions have arisen about their long-term sustainability and their effects on health insurance markets, particularly as 12 CO-OPs ceased operations on or before January 1, 2016.
In April 2015, GAO issued its first report examining the status of CO-OP premiums, enrollment, and program loans in 2014 ( GAO-15-304 ). As one CO-OP ceased operations in early 2015, GAO was asked to review the CO-OP program again. This report examines (1) how CMS monitors the CO-OPs' performance and sustainability; (2) how CO-OP premiums changed from 2014 to 2015, and in 2015, how they compared to premiums for other health plans; and (3) how CO-OP enrollment changed from 2014 to 2015, and in 2015, how it compared to projections. GAO analyzed 2014 and 2015 premium and enrollment data from CMS, states, and the National Association of Insurance Commissioners; and reviewed applicable regulations, policies, procedures, and documentation of CMS monitoring activities. GAO also interviewed CMS officials.
In commenting on a draft of this report, the Department of Health and Human Services stated its commitment to CO-OP beneficiaries and taxpayers, and provided technical comments, which GAO incorporated as appropriate.
What GAO Found
The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services' (CMS) monitoring of the consumer governed, nonprofit health insurance issuers—known as consumer operated and oriented plans (CO-OPs)—evolved as the CO-OP program matured, and as 12 of the 23 CO-OPs ceased operations on or before January 1, 2016. CMS's initial monitoring activities, starting when it began to award CO-OP program loans in early 2012, focused on the CO-OPs' progress as start-up issuers and their compliance with program requirements. Since then, CMS refined and expanded its monitoring to evaluate CO-OP performance and sustainability. CMS officials use enrollment and financial data to identify CO-OPs for which actual performance differed substantially from what was expected. CMS officials also perform routine assessments of each CO-OP's risk in various areas, such as working capital and management. To evaluate and respond to financial or operational issues identified at CO-OPs, CMS formalized a framework that it called an escalation plan. Under this plan, CMS may require that a CO-OP take corrective actions or the agency may implement an enhanced oversight plan based on its evaluation of the issue. As of November 2015, CMS used its escalation plan to evaluate and respond to issues at 18 CO-OPs, including 9 of the CO-OPs that have ceased operations. CMS officials told GAO that they plan to work with states' departments of insurance to continue monitoring CO-OPs that have ceased operations to the extent possible in order to minimize any negative impact on members and, if possible, recover loans made through the program.
GAO found that in 14 of the 20 states where CO-OPs offered health plans during both 2014 and 2015, the average CO-OP premiums for 30-year-old individuals purchasing silver health plans—the most commonly selected plan—were lower in 2015 than the average premiums for such plans in 2014. In the 23 states where CO-OPs offered health plans during 2015, the average premiums for all CO-OP health plans were lower than those for other issuers in more than 75 percent of rating areas—geographical areas established by states and used, in part, by issuers to set premium rates. Across the 23 states, average silver health plan premiums were lower for CO-OPs than other issuers in 31 percent to 100 percent of rating areas.
In addition, GAO found that the combined enrollment for the 22 CO-OPs that offered health plans in 2015 was over 1 million as of June 30, 2015, more than double the enrollment of a year earlier. More than half of these members were in CO-OPs that ceased operations. GAO also found that the combined enrollment for all 22 CO-OPs in 2015 exceeded their projections for 2015 by more than 6 percent. Of the 11 CO-OPs that have ceased operations, 6 did not meet their individual enrollment projections for 2015. Among the 11 CO-OPs that continue to operate in 2016, 4 CO-OPs had not yet reached a program benchmark of enrolling at least 25,000 members. CMS officials told GAO that exceeding this benchmark represents a level of enrollment that should better allow an issuer to cover its fixed costs; CMS officials told GAO that they are monitoring the CO-OPs' enrollment with attention to this benchmark. |
gao_GAO-17-223 | gao_GAO-17-223_0 | CMS Has Made Limited Progress since July 2014 to Validate MA Encounter Data; Stakeholder Organizations Questioned the Effectiveness of CMS Efforts
Since our July 2014 report, CMS has taken additional steps across several activities to ensure that MA encounter data are complete but has yet to fully address data accuracy. 2)
The agency has taken the following steps, which address primarily the completeness of encounter data and provide feedback to MAOs on data submission:
Creating a report card with basic statistics on the completeness of encounter data for MAOs. Developing an automated report for MAOs on diagnoses used for risk adjustment. The stakeholder organizations we interviewed raised several issues with CMS’s recent actions to ensure the completeness of MA encounter data. When asked about this concern, CMS officials noted that they publicly announced how the agency intends to implement the risk adjustment transition in December 2015, and the methodology has not changed. CMS officials told us that its response time for emailed questions on MA encounter data largely depends on the complexity of the issue. Without medical record reviews, CMS cannot substantiate the information in MAO encounter data submissions and lacks evidence for determining the accuracy of encounter data. To the extent that CMS is making payments based on data that have not been fully validated for completeness and accuracy, the soundness of billions of dollars in Medicare expenditures remains unsubstantiated. Given the limited progress CMS has made, we continue to believe that the agency should complete all the steps necessary to validate the data before using them to risk adjust payments or for other intended purposes, as we recommended in our July 2014 report. CMS Has Detailed Plans for Using MA Encounter Data for Risk Adjustment but Not for Other Purposes, Creating Unease among Some Stakeholder Organizations
CMS Plans to Fully Transition to Using MA Encounter Data for Risk Adjustment Purposes by 2020, Generating Mixed Reactions from Some Stakeholder Organizations
Since our July 2014 report, CMS has made progress in defining its objectives for using MA encounter data for risk adjustment purposes and in communicating its plans and time frames to MAOs. However, representatives from several health insurance and provider trade associations we interviewed said that many MAOs and providers are apprehensive about CMS’s time frame because it does not allow sufficient time for a successful transition. The agency noted that it has worked with MAOs to correct issues with how the agency applies the methodology for identifying diagnoses for risk adjustment is applied. CMS’s Plans and Time Frames for Using MA Encounter Data for Other Authorized Purposes Remain Undeveloped, Creating Unease among Some Stakeholder Organizations
Although the agency has formulated general ideas of how to use MA encounter data for some purposes besides risk adjustment, CMS has not determined specific plans and time frames for most of the additional purposes for which the data may be used, namely (1) to update risk adjustment models; (2) to calculate Medicare disproportionate share hospital percentages; (3) to conduct quality review and improvement activities; (4) for Medicare coverage purposes; (5) to conduct evaluations and other analysis to support the Medicare program (including demonstrations) and to support public health initiatives and other health care-related research; (6) for activities to support the administration of the Medicare program; (7) for activities to support program integrity; and (8) for purposes authorized by other applicable laws. However, this is inconsistent with federal internal control standards relating to risk assessment and information and communication that call for clearly defining objectives and communicating those objectives to key external organizations. CMS officials told us they anticipate including MA encounter data in the Fraud Prevention System to help identify abusive billing practices, but have yet to fully develop plans for this proposed use. To date, CMS officials reported that the Center for Program Integrity has begun using encounter data to determine improper payments to providers. Representatives from health insurance and provider trade associations and research organizations emphasized that CMS should implement appropriate safeguards for releasing MA encounter data to external entities similar to those protections used for Medicare FFS data. Furthermore, in the absence of planning for all of the authorized uses, the agency cannot be assured that the amount and types of data being collected are necessary and sufficient for specific purposes. Given the agency’s limited progress on developing plans for additional uses of encounter data, we continue to believe that CMS should establish specific plans and time frames for using the data for all intended purposes, in addition to risk adjusting payments to MAOs, as we recommended in our July 2014 report. Agency Comments
We provided a draft of this report to the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) for comment. HHS provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. | Why GAO Did This Study
CMS collects MA encounter data to help ensure the proper use of federal funds by improving risk adjustment in the MA program—the private health plan alternative to traditional Medicare—and for other potential purposes. CMS's ability to make proper payments depends on the completeness and accuracy of MA encounter data. In July 2014, GAO reported that CMS had taken some, but not all, appropriate actions to validate the completeness and accuracy of encounter data and had not fully developed plans for using them.
GAO was asked to provide an update on its July 2014 findings. In this report, GAO identifies (1) steps CMS has taken to validate MA encounter data, and (2) CMS's plans and time frames for using MA encounter data—as well as stakeholder perspectives on these steps and plans.
To do this work, GAO compared CMS activities with the agency's protocol for validating Medicaid encounter data—comparable data collected and submitted by entities similar to MAOs—and federal internal control standards. In addition, GAO reviewed relevant agency documents and interviewed CMS officials on MA encounter data collection and reporting. GAO also reviewed comments in response to CMS's 2014 proposed rule and reports from stakeholder organizations. GAO also interviewed a non-generalizable selection of 11 stakeholders including health insurance and provider trade associations and research organizations. HHS provided technical comments on this report that were incorporated as appropriate.
What GAO Found
Since GAO issued its July 2014 report, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) has made limited progress to validate the completeness and accuracy of Medicare Advantage (MA) encounter data. CMS collects encounter data—detailed information about the care and health status of MA enrollees—to determine payments to MA organizations (MAO). These entities received approximately $170 billion to provide coverage to nearly one-third of all Medicare beneficiaries in 2015. The agency uses a risk adjustment process to account for differences in enrollees' expected health care costs relative to an average beneficiary. Without complete and accurate encounter data, CMS cannot appropriately risk adjust MAO payments. CMS has begun compiling basic statistics on the volume and consistency of data submissions and preparing automated summary reports for MAOs indicating diagnosis information used for risk adjustment. However, CMS has yet to undertake activities that fully address encounter data accuracy, such as reviewing medical records. (See figure.) Furthermore, some health insurance and provider trade associations GAO interviewed voiced concerns about CMS's ability to properly identify diagnoses used for risk adjustment. CMS officials noted that they are working with MAOs to refine how the methodology used to obtain diagnoses data is applied. To the extent that CMS is making payments based on data that have not been fully validated for completeness and accuracy, the soundness of billions of dollars in Medicare expenditures remains unsubstantiated. Given the agency's limited progress, GAO continues to believe that CMS should implement GAO's July 2014 recommendation that CMS fully assess data quality before use.
Since the July 2014 report, CMS has made progress in developing plans to use MA encounter data for risk adjustment, but has not specified plans and time frames for most other purposes, such as conducting program evaluations and supporting public health initiatives. CMS began phasing in patient diagnosis information from encounter data in its risk adjustment process in 2015 and intends to rely completely on those data by 2020. Because it has primarily focused on collecting comprehensive encounter information for risk adjustment purposes—which is key to ensuring proper payments—CMS officials told GAO that the agency has largely deferred planning for additional uses of the data. Some stakeholder organizations have objected to the risk adjustment transition time frame, asserting that it does not allow sufficient time for a successful transition. According to CMS, the multiyear transition time frame is reasonable. Some stakeholders also were concerned that releasing data to external entities could compromise the confidentiality of proprietary information, such as payments to providers. CMS officials said that they intend to use data protections similar to those used with other Medicare data. In the absence of planning for all of the authorized uses, the agency cannot be assured that the amount and types of data being collected are necessary and sufficient for specific purposes. Given the agency's limited progress, GAO continues to believe that CMS should implement GAO's July 2014 recommendation that CMS fully develop plans for the additional uses of encounter data. |
gao_GAO-12-890 | gao_GAO-12-890_0 | Populations Exposed to Significant Airport Noise Have Declined Because of Improvements in Aircraft Technology
The number of people exposed to airport noise has been steadily declining for several decades, according to FAA. In light of the shrinking airport noise contours discussed above, FAA’s enforcement of grant eligibility criteria—related to noise exposure maps and the assessment of interior residential noise—creates a risk that some noise grants may not have met eligibility criteria, especially in the edges of the noise contour where noise may be below DNL 65 dB. Grants Are Widely Used for Noise Insulation Projects and Land Acquisition
Since fiscal year 1982, FAA has provided about $5.8 billion in AIP noise grants to 481 commercial and general aviation airports, reflecting broad participation in the program by airports through the program’s history. In the first decades of the program, noise grants largely went to projects in areas most significantly impacted by airport noise—generally areas closest to airports—while grants in more recent years have gone to projects in areas that are less significantly impacted, but still deemed to be exposed to DNL 65 dB or higher noise levels (see fig. 5). Outdated Noise Exposure Maps and Inconsistent Application of Interior Noise Standards Increase Risks for Noise Grant Funds
We found that many of the FAA-accepted maps used to determine project eligibility for noise grants are outdated and could overstate the actual size of the DNL 65+ dB areas around airports, putting some federal grant investments at risk of funding projects that do not meet the eligibility criteria. In addition, nine of the 126 airports with maps from 1999 or before received a total of $87.6 million in grants in fiscal years 2010 and 2011 for residential insulation projects in the DNL 65-69 dB area of the official map. FAA’s Strategic Goal for Noise Reduction Is Not Linked to Noise Grant Program
FAA has established an overall agency goal for addressing airport noise—which covers all noise-related agency efforts, not just the AIP noise grant program—to reduce the population living in significantly noise This goal impacted areas to below 300,000 people nationwide by 2018.is articulated in the Department of Transportation’s fiscal year 2013 performance plan, FAA’s long-range strategic plan—Destination 2025— and other FAA performance documentation. As a result of establishing a strategic goal and a corresponding measure of progress that do not account for AIP noise grants results, there is insufficient performance information about the nature and extent of remaining airport noise exposure and the contribution of noise grants in mitigating the impact of that exposure. Without this information, Congress and FAA program managers cannot make fully informed decisions about what the noise grant program can reasonably be expected to address in the future and the extent to which noise exposure remains a constraint on growth. Airports Continue to Plan Noise Mitigation Projects, but of a Changing Nature
The 2011 National Plan of Integrated Airport Systems (NPIAS) report, which includes airport projects from fiscal years 2011 through 2015, shows continued plans for noise mitigation projects, but a drop in the number of projects and the number of airports planning them. The 2011 NPIAS report to Congress includes planned AIP-eligible projects. Some communities around airports that are exposed to significant airport noise are not likely to receive residential noise insulation. Airports are free to choose not to perform residential noise insulation projects because developing an NCP—a necessary step for the airport to take to receive AIP funds for such projects—is voluntary. To the extent that airports without NCPs continue not to participate in the Part 150 program, the people living in areas significantly impacted by airport noise may never receive the benefits of noise mitigation.is about a third of the remaining population that FAA’s MAGENTA model estimated is exposed to significant airport noise. Second, approximately one-third of the estimated remaining population exposed to significant airport noise resides near airports that have yet to and may never establish an NCP. After 30 years, it appears unlikely that this population will ever be reached by the current program. DOT and FAA officials provided technical comments that we incorporated as appropriate. We acknowledged these actions in our report, but these targets, results, and reporting are not linked to FAA’s strategic noise goal and measurement approach nor are they included in FAA’s reporting on progress toward that strategic goal. FAA reviewed our recommendations and agreed to consider them for action. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report addresses the following objectives: (1) how airports’ noise exposure has changed since federal noise grants were first funded, (2) how Airport Improvement Program (AIP) grants have been used by airports to mitigate noise and what have these grants achieved, and (3) the likely future demand for AIP noise set-aside grants. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) predicts that air traffic in the United States will increase 20 percent by 2024. If not mitigated, the noise associated with these flights could significantly diminish the quality of life for communities surrounding airports and constrain an airports ability to expand. Over the last 30 years, Congress has provided billions of dollars in grants under the Airport Improvement Program to airports to reduce and mitigate significant noise exposure. FAAs overall strategic noise goal is to reduce the population exposed to significant noise to fewer than 300,000 people nationwide.
At your request, GAO (1) described how airport noise exposure has changed, (2) evaluated noise grant results, and (3) assessed potential future demand for these grants. GAO analyzed FAA data on noise grants, planned projects, and population exposure and reviewed relevant literature. GAO also conducted interviews with relevant airport and FAA officials and industry representatives, as well as visited seven airports that have used noise grants, judgmentally selected based on size, location, and other factors.
What GAO Found
The number of people in the United States exposed to significant airport noise has steadily declined from roughly 7 million people in 1975 to about 309,000 today. This change reflects large decreases in the size of areas that are exposed to significant airport noise and is primarily due to improvements in aircraft technology.
Since 1982, FAA has provided $5.8 billion in Airport Improvement Program noise grants to 481 airports for residential and public building noise insulation and land acquisition, among other project types. The majority of grants went to airports that voluntarily undertook Noise Compatibility Programs (NCP). While these funds benefitted thousands of people, GAO identified two areas of concern regarding FAAs enforcement of project eligibility criteria that creates a risk that some undetermined amount of grant funds may have gone to projects that do not meet FAAs project eligibility criteria. First, FAA does not always require airports to maintain updated and accurate noise exposure maps to define eligible project areas. For example, half of the noise exposure mapswhich show the areas around an airport that are exposed to significant airport noise and are a key element in determining project eligibilityare from the 1990s or earlier. For an airport to receive a noise grant, program criteria generally require that such maps are updated every 5 years, but nine airports received $87.6 million in grants in fiscal years 2010 to 2011 based on maps that predate 2000. Second, FAA has inconsistently implemented requirements that limit residential noise insulation projects to homes with interior noise levels above an established threshold. In the absence of FAA enforcement, airports have little incentive to update maps and limit residential treatment because doing so might eliminate planned projects expected by the public. Concurrent to GAOs review, FAA issued new guidance that should substantially address this risk if effectively implemented. Further, the results of noise grants are not linked to FAAs strategic noise reduction goal and measurement approach. For example, the goal does not include the results of noise insulation of homes and schools. As a result, there is insufficient performance information about the effects of noise grants and the extent to which noise exposure remains a constraint on airport growth.
There has been an increase in the estimated cost of planned noise mitigation projects in FAAs 2011 National Plan of Integrated Airport Systems report to Congress, but a number of indicators point to a future decline in demand for grants for noise projects. Specifically, the 2011 report, compared to prior reports, includes a smaller portion of projects in the most significantly noise-impacted areas. Further, since the 2001 report, the number of airports planning eligible noise projects is down 16 percent, with about half the number of planned projects. Additionally, fewer airports are developing new noise compatibility programs and many of the 234 airports with such programs may be completed. For example, 102 of 137 airports with an NCP more than 10 years old received no noise grants since 2007, an indication that those airports may have completed all eligible projects in those plans. Finally, about a third of the people living in significantly noise-impacted areas reside near airports that have not completed, and may never complete, an NCP, a necessary step before an airport can use noise grants for residential noise insulation. This population, therefore, may never be reached by FAAs grant program.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the Department of Transportation align its strategic goal for noise reduction with the results of the noise grant program and establish corresponding performance measures. The department provided technical comments and agreed to consider the recommendations. |
gao_NSIAD-98-22 | gao_NSIAD-98-22_0 | Congress created DOT&E in response to reports of conflicts of interest in the acquisition community’s oversight of operational testing leading to inadequate testing of operational suitabilityand effectiveness and the fielding of new systems that performed poorly. By law, DOT&E serves as the principal adviser on operational test and evaluation in DOD and bears several key responsibilities, including monitoring and reviewing all operational test and evaluation in DOD, reporting to the Secretary of Defense and congressional committees whether the tests and evaluations of weapon systems were adequate and whether the results confirmed that the system is operationally suitable and effective for combat before a decision is made to proceed to full-rate production, and submitting to the Secretary of Defense and congressional decisionmakers an annual report summarizing operational test and evaluation activities during the preceding fiscal year. The following year, DOD proposed legislative changes that would have reduced the scope and authority of DOT&E. The impact of DOT&E oversight varies with the system under development. DOT&E Recommended Follow-On Operational Test and Evaluation
When DOT&E concludes that a weapon system has not fully demonstrated operational suitability or effectiveness, or if new testing issues arise during initial operational test and evaluation, it may recommend that follow-on operational test and evaluation be done after the full-rate production decision. However, several current trends have the potential to adversely affect DOT&E’s independence and its ability to affect operational test and evaluation, including (1) service challenges to DOT&E’s authority to require and oversee follow-on operational testing and evaluation, (2) declining resources available for oversight, (3) the management of limited resources to address competing priorities, (4) DOT&E’s participation in the acquisition process as a member of the program manager’s working-level integrated product teams, and (5) greater integration of developmental and operational testing. DOT&E’s impact on operational testing is dependent upon its ability to manage these divergent forces while maintaining its independence. The foundation of interagency (i.e., DOT&E and service operational test agencies) relations is based on the independence of DOT&E, its legislative mandate, and its independent reporting to Congress. An unfavorable DOT&E report does not necessarily prevent full-rate production. DOT&E oversight reduces, but does not eliminate, the risk that new systems will not be operationally effective and suitable. In conducting our 13 case studies, we assessed the strengths and weaknesses of the organizational framework in DOD for operational testing via test agency representatives, an assessment on the origins and implementation (exemplified by the 13 cases) of the title 10 amendments creating and empowering DOT&E, and a review of the literature. Efforts to enhance the efficiency of acquisition, in general—and in operational testing, in particular—need to be well balanced with the requirement to realistically and thoroughly test operational suitability and effectiveness prior to the full-rate production decision. 2. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Department of Defense's (DOD) Office of the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation's (DOT&E) operations and organizational structure for overseeing operational testing, focusing on: (1) DOT&E's efforts and their impact on the quality of operational testing and evaluation in DOD; and (2) the strengths and weaknesses of the current organizational framework in DOD for operational testing.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) GAO's review of 13 case studies indicated that DOT&E oversight of operational testing and evaluation increased the probability that testing would be more realistic and more thorough; (2) specifically, DOT&E was influential in advocating increasing the reliability of the observed performance and reducing the risk of unknowns through more thorough testing, conducting more realistic testing, enhancing data collection and analysis, reporting independent findings, and recommending follow-on operational test and evaluation when suitability or effectiveness was not fully demonstrated prior to initiating full-rate production; (3) the independence of DOT&E--and its resulting authority to report directly to Congress--is the foundation of its effectiveness; (4) that independence, along with its legislative mandate, provides sufficient freedom and authority to exercise effective oversight of the operational testing and evaluation of new systems before a decision is made to begin full-rate production; (5) DOT&E can reduce the risk that systems are not adequately tested prior to the full-rate production decision but DOT&E cannot ensure that: (a) only systems whose operational effectiveness and suitability have been demonstrated through operational testing will proceed to the full-rate production decision; or (b) new fielded systems will accomplish their missions as intended or that the fielded systems are safe, survivable, and effective; (6) DOT&E management must balance its oversight responsibilities for operational testing with the broader acquisition priorities of program managers and service test agencies; (7) though supportive of DOT&E's mission and independence, program and service representatives frequently considered the time, expense, and resources expended to accommodate DOT&E concerns to be ill-advised; (8) several current trends may challenge DOT&E's ability to manage its workload and its ability to impact operational test and evaluation: (a) service challenges to DOT&E's authority to require and oversee follow-on operational testing and evaluation; (b) a decline in resources available for oversight; (c) an expansion of DOT&E involvement in activities other than oversight of major acquisition programs; (d) participation of DOT&E in the acquisition process as a member of working-level integrated product teams; and (e) greater integration of developmental and operational testing; and (9) these trends make it imperative that DOT&E prioritize its workload to achieve a balance between the oversight of major defense acquisition programs and other initiatives important to the quality of operational test and evaluation. |
gao_GAO-11-365 | gao_GAO-11-365_0 | This rate is generally designed to cover the costs that an efficient provider would incur to provide the bundled services. This bundled payment did not cover all dialysis-related items and services. Including Oral-Only ESRD Drugs in the Bundled Payment Could Promote Efficiency, Clinically Appropriate Care, and Access to These Drugs
There are three key reasons for including oral-only ESRD drugs in the bundled payment for dialysis care: to encourage more efficient care, to encourage more clinically appropriate care, and to increase access to these drugs for certain beneficiaries. As a result, dialysis organizations gain financially if beneficiaries receive these drugs to treat mineral and bone disorder instead of drugs included in the bundled payment, such as vitamin D, even though doing so may not always represent the most clinically appropriate care. Finally, including oral-only ESRD drugs in the bundled payment for dialysis care could improve access to these drugs for certain beneficiaries, including beneficiaries who do not currently have prescription drug coverage and beneficiaries with Part D prescription drug coverage whose annual drug costs are within a certain range. Most Large Dialysis Organizations Provided Oral-Only ESRD Drugs to Some Beneficiaries in 2010; Both Large and Small Organizations Identified Potential Issues with Providing These Drugs in 2014
Three of the 4 large dialysis organizations in our review reported that they provided oral-only ESRD drugs to some of the Medicare beneficiaries they served in 2010. In contrast, all 16 of the small dialysis organizations in our review reported that they did not provide these drugs to beneficiaries in 2010. Both Large and Small Dialysis Organizations Identified Several Issues That Could Affect Their Ability to Provide Oral- Only ESRD Drugs in 2014
Both the large and small dialysis organizations in our review identified several issues that could affect their ability to provide oral-only ESRD drugs in 2014. Specifically, 3 of the 4 large dialysis organizations and 11 of the 16 small dialysis organizations in our review noted that they were concerned about the extent to which the bundled payment for dialysis care would cover their costs of obtaining oral-only ESRD drugs and providing these drugs to beneficiaries. CMS officials told us that they had identified two potential sources of data on payments under Medicare for oral-only ESRD drugs that they could use to account for these drugs in the bundled payment—payments for these drugs under Medicare’s Part D and Retiree Drug Subsidy programs. Although CMS is limited to using data on payments under Part D for oral- only ESRD drugs to account for oral-only ESRD drugs in the bundled payment, certain aspects of these data suggest that the data on total payments under Part D for 2007 through 2009 may understate the costs that dialysis organizations would incur to provide these drugs. CMS does not know whether the payment amount for the entire bundle of items and services, including oral-only ESRD drugs, will be adequate—that is, whether it will cover the costs incurred by an efficient dialysis organization to supply oral-only ESRD drugs in addition to the range of other items and services included in the bundle. However, the possibility that Part D data may understate the costs of providing oral-only ESRD drugs raises questions about the adequacy of the overall bundled payment rate. CMS Is Developing New Quality Measures Related to Mineral and Bone Disorder; However, CMS’s System for Collecting Data for Its Quality Measures Has Been Delayed
CMS is currently developing new quality measures for monitoring treatment of mineral and bone disorder in order to identify measures for which a consensus target level can be proposed based on the clinical evidence available. CMS is also developing a new data collection system, called CROWNWeb, which the agency plans to use to collect data to support these new measures. With regard to our recommendation that CMS ensure the availability of data for monitoring the treatment of mineral and bone disorder, CMS noted that it plans to include measures related to mineral and bone disorder in the ESRD Quality Incentive Program (QIP). The five groups’ comments on our draft report generally focused on three areas of concern: (1) the reasons for including oral-only ESRD drugs in the bundled payment system, (2) the data CMS intends to use to account for oral-only ESRD drugs in the bundled payment system, and (3) CMS’s ability to monitor the quality of care provided to dialysis beneficiaries. | Why GAO Did This Study
For most individuals with end-stage renal disease (ESRD), Medicare purchases a bundle of dialysis-related services using a single payment. In 2014, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) plans to include in this bundled payment "oral-only" ESRD drugs used to treat mineral and bone disorder. Currently, Medicare generally pays for these drugs only if the beneficiary has Part D prescription drug coverage. This report (1) describes the rationales for including oral-only ESRD drugs in the bundled payment, (2) examines dialysis organizations' recent experience providing oral-only ESRD drugs and their future ability to provide these drugs, (3) examines the data sources that CMS could use to account for oral-only ESRD drugs in the bundled payment, and (4) examines CMS's ability to monitor treatment of mineral and bone disorder. GAO interviewed CMS officials, experts in mineral and bone disorder, and representatives of 4 large and 16 small dialysis organizations. GAO also reviewed ESRD payment regulations, related reports, clinical guidelines, and state pharmacy licensure requirements in 10 selected states.
What GAO Found
There are three key reasons for including oral-only ESRD drugs in the bundled payment for dialysis care. First, including these drugs could promote more efficient dialysis care, because organizations that provide this care receive a fixed payment and gain financially to the extent they reduce their costs for the items and services included in the bundle. Second, including the oral-only ESRD drugs could promote clinically appropriate care. Currently, dialysis organizations gain financially if beneficiaries receive oral-only ESRD drugs instead of drugs that are in the bundle because this reduces costs without reducing the payment these organizations receive. Including oral-only ESRD drugs in the bundle would remove financial incentives under the payment system to use certain drugs over others. Finally, including oral-only ESRD drugs in the bundled payment could improve access to these drugs for certain beneficiaries, such as those who currently lack separate prescription drug coverage for these drugs. Three of the 4 large dialysis organizations interviewed by GAO reported that they provided oral-only ESRD drugs to some of the beneficiaries they served in 2010. In contrast, all of the 16 small dialysis organizations that GAO interviewed reported that they did not provide these drugs in 2010. Regardless of their recent experience providing oral-only ESRD drugs, the large and small organizations GAO interviewed identified issues that could affect their ability to provide these drugs in 2014. For example, most organizations expressed concern about whether the bundled payment for dialysis care would adequately cover the costs of providing oral-only ESRD drugs. To account for oral-only ESRD drugs in the payment bundle in 2014, CMS officials noted that they would be limited to using data on payments for these drugs under Medicare Part D. However, these data may understate the costs that dialysis organizations would incur to provide these drugs, in part, because Medicare currently pays for these drugs primarily for those beneficiaries with Part D coverage. Although CMS does not know whether the bundled payment in 2014 will be sufficient to cover the costs that efficient dialysis organizations would incur to provide the entire bundle of dialysis-related items and services, a potential underestimate of the total cost to provide oral-only ESRD drugs raises questions about payment adequacy beginning in 2014. GAO and others have stated that inadequate payments could lead to access and quality of care issues for beneficiaries on dialysis. CMS is developing new, consensus-based measures that it could use to monitor treatment of mineral and bone disorder. CMS is also developing a new Web-based system to collect data for such measures. However, full implementation of this new system has been delayed repeatedly, and dialysis organizations and others GAO interviewed expressed concern about the reliability of data collected using this system. Recognizing the importance of timely and reliable quality monitoring under bundled payment systems, CMS officials told GAO that they intend to collect data using an alternative mechanism in 2011.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that CMS assess payment adequacy when oral-only ESRD drugs are included in the bundled payment and ensure availability of reliable data for monitoring treatment of mineral and bone disorder. CMS agreed with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-10-25 | gao_GAO-10-25_0 | TALF was designed to reopen the securitization markets in an effort to improve access to credit for consumers and businesses. The program provides loans to certain institutions and business entities in return for collateral in the form of securities that are forfeited if the loans are not repaid. Treasury has pledged $20 billion for TALF LLC—a special purpose vehicle created by FRBNY—to purchase the underlying collateral associated with TALF loans in the event the loans are not repaid. As of December 2009, FRBNY has made about $61.6 billion in loans under TALF. Of that amount, $47.5 billion in TALF loans remained outstanding as of the end of December 2009. 1). For most TALF-eligible collateral, FRBNY will stop providing new TALF loans in March 31, 2010, while new-issue CMBSs will be accepted as collateral on new TALF loans through June 30, 2010. How TALF Works
A number of entities help administer the TALF program. FRBNY has a precertification process to streamline the process for certain eligible borrowers. Third, Treasury and FRBNY analyses project minimal, if any, likelihood that TARP funds will be used for TALF-related purchases, and Treasury currently projects a profit from TALF. While TALF poses minimal risks to TARP even in adverse market conditions, our analyses showed that CMBSs held as collateral as of September 2009 potentially pose higher risks than ABSs and under adverse conditions losses could exceed $500 million. Such risks include the risk that FRBNY might not identify instances of material noncompliance with program requirements by TALF participants. As shown in figure 5, the level of enhancement for every TALF-eligible asset class increased. Documenting the basis for decisions is an important part of the decision-making process. Moreover, documenting the rationale for major program decisions would help ensure that the program objectives are being met and that it is functioning as intended. Unless Treasury documents the rationale for major program decisions that it made with the Federal Reserve, it cannot demonstrate accountability for meeting the goals of TALF and could unnecessarily place TARP funds at risk. Given the distressed conditions in the commercial real estate market, as part of its ongoing monitoring of TALF collateral, continue to give greater attention to reviewing risks posed by CMBSs. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of this report are to (1) analyze the risks that the Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF) presents to Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) funds and therefore to taxpayers, (2) evaluate how the Department of the Treasury (Treasury) analyzed the risk of TALF assets and used this information in making decisions on TALF with the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Federal Reserve) and the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY), and (3) assess the condition of securitization and credit markets before and after TALF’s implementation based on indicators tracked by Treasury and FRBNY. Because of these limitations, the evaluative content of this report is limited to Treasury’s role of safeguarding TARP funds related to TALF and we did not review or evaluate any monetary policy actions taken by the Federal Reserve or FRBNY with respect to TALF. We also reviewed other factors that have an impact on the risk to TARP funds and taxpayers, including the return on equity for TALF borrowers, credit enhancement of TALF securities, and the risks of asset-backed securities (ABS) and commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS). | Why GAO Did This Study
The Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF) was created by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Federal Reserve) to help meet consumer and small business credit needs by supporting issuance of asset-backed securities (ABS) and commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS). This report assesses (1) the risks TALF-eligible assets pose to the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), (2) Department of the Treasury's (Treasury) role in decision making for TALF, and (3) the condition of securitization markets before and after TALF. GAO reviewed program documents, analyzed data from prospectuses and other sources, and interviewed relevant agency officials and TALF participants.
What GAO Found
TALF contains a number of risk management features that in turn likely reduce the risk of loss to TARP funds, but risks remain. TALF was designed to reopen the securitization markets in an effort to improve access to credit for consumers and businesses. The Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY), which manages TALF, is authorized to lend up to $200 billion to certain eligible borrowers in return for collateral in the form of securities that are forfeited if the loans are not repaid. To assist in this effort, Treasury has pledged $20 billion of TARP funds in the form of credit protection to the program in the event the loans are not repaid. As of December 2009, FRBNY has made about $61.6 billion in TALF loans, of which $47.5 billion remained outstanding. For most TALF-eligible collateral, FRBNY will stop providing new TALF loans in March 2010, while new-issue CMBSs will be accepted as collateral on new TALF loans through June 2010. Treasury and FRBNY analyses project minimal, if any, use of TARP funds for TALF-related losses, and Treasury currently anticipates a profit. While GAO found that the overall risks TALF poses to TARP funds are likely minimal, GAO analyses showed that CMBSs potentially pose higher risk of loss than ABSs. As shown in figure 1, ongoing uncertainty in the commercial real estate market and TALF exposure to legacy CMBSs warrant ongoing monitoring. Finally, TALF may present risks beyond the potential risks to TARP, such as the risk that FRBNY might fail to identify material noncompliance with program requirements by TALF participants. Because the Federal Reserve views TALF as a monetary policy tool, however, statutory limitations on GAO's authority prohibited GAO from auditing FRBNY's role in administering TALF. Treasury has not fully documented its rationale, as part of its decision-making processes, for reaching final decisions related to the risks of TALF--including decisions involving other agencies. For example, the outcomes of Treasury's internal analysis of the amount of equity that TALF borrowers should hold in TALF ABS collateral, along with other TALF program terms, sometimes differed from FRBNY's. However, there was no clear documentation or explanation of how the discrepancies were resolved or how final decisions were made with FRBNY. Documenting the rationale and basis for these decisions would increase transparency and strengthen internal controls for TALF decision-making processes. Moreover, a sound decision-making process would help ensure that TALF objectives are being met and that it is functioning as intended. Unless Treasury documents the basis for major program decisions that it made with the Federal Reserve, it cannot demonstrate accountability for meeting the goals of TALF and could unnecessarily place TARP funds at risk. |
gao_T-NSIAD-96-243 | gao_T-NSIAD-96-243_0 | At Singapore, proposals are expected for WTO members to begin work on the next generation of trade issues. However, because these issues include areas heretofore outside the scope of detailed trade negotiations—environmental protection, investment rules, competition policy, labor standards, and bribery and corruption—it is unlikely members will reach consensus on the WTO’s role. Early meetings of some WTO committees were focused on establishing new working procedures and work agendas necessary to implement the Uruguay Round agreements. Notifications take many forms. Limitations in members’ reporting may make it difficult for the ministers to assess progress in some areas. It is unclear to what extent the ministers at the WTO Singapore meeting will analyze the implementation of the new dispute settlement process and what criteria they would use to do so. Implementation of the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing
example, increase market access in key sectors and improve protection of intellectual property rights. Implementation of Agricultural Commitments
Liberalizing agricultural trade was a key U.S. objective during the Uruguay Round. implementation of the agreement, preparing for negotiations to resume is also important. Trade and Investment Rules
specific service sectors, including business services and construction and engineering services. On the other hand, the United States and other nations would like to continue focusing on the OECD negotiations rather than negotiating in the WTO, believing that (1) the OECD has the potential to achieve a higher standard of liberalization (that is, on a par with NAFTA and U.S. bilateral investment treaties) than the WTO could and (2) some WTO members are not ready for such an agreement. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed the implementation of the Uruguay Round agreements and the World Trade Organization's (WTO) operations in the context of the upcoming Singapore ministerial meeting.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) implementation of the Uruguay Round agreements is complex, and the Singapore meeting will provide WTO member countries with the opportunity to take stock of their implementation efforts; (2) limitations and variations in the amount of information reported by member countries has made it difficult for WTO committees and working groups to oversee implementation of the agreements and a new dispute settlement mechanism; (3) implementation of the WTO Agreement on Textiles and Clothing has been a major area of contention between exporting and importing countries; (4) the United States has many concerns regarding the implementation of commitments to liberalize agricultural trade, and has indicated that it will propose further agricultural reform negotiations; (5) it is not clear whether efforts to liberalize trade in the services sector will be successful, since WTO member countries have been unable to reach final agreements covering some sectors; and (6) it is expected that WTO members will begin work on the next generation of trade issues in such areas as environmental protection, investment rules, competition policy, labor standards, and bribery and corruption at the Singapore meeting. |
gao_GAO-05-994T | gao_GAO-05-994T_0 | In 2002, we recommended actions to strengthen the visa process as an antiterrorism tool, including establishing a clear policy on the priority attached to addressing national security concerns through the visa process; creating more comprehensive, risk-based guidelines and standards on how consular officers should use the visa process to screen against potential terrorists; performing a fundamental reassessment of staffing and language skill requirements for visa operations; and revamping and expanding consular training courses to place more emphasis on detecting potential terrorists. Consular officers also indicated that additional guidance is needed on certain interagency protocols. However, DHS has not provided guidance to consular officers regarding the roles and geographic responsibilities for its personnel. As of April 30, 2005, we found that 26 percent of midlevel consular positions were either vacant or filled by an entry-level officer (see fig. Senior (44)
Vacant (58)
Midlevel (478)
Staffed with entry-level officers (65)
Staffed by at least midlevel officers (355)
Entry-level (879)
During our February 2005 visits to Riyadh, Jeddah, and Cairo, we observed that the consular sections were staffed with entry-level officers on their first assignment with no permanent, midlevel visa chief to provide supervision. Today we are reporting that State has made a number of improvements in its recruitment of language proficient Foreign Service officers, expanded and revamped consular training, and increased the attention paid to fraud prevention. State has taken several steps to increase its focus on preventing and detecting fraud in the visa process. For example, by 2004, State’s Bureau of Diplomatic Security had deployed 25 visa fraud investigators to U.S. embassies and consulates. Actions Needed to Strengthen Management of DHS’s Visa Security Program
In September 2003, DHS assigned Visa Security Officers (VSO) to consular posts in Saudi Arabia and plans to assign staff to other posts to strengthen the visa process at these locations. As we addressed in our July 2005 report, according to State Department consular officers, the deputy chief of mission, and DHS officials, VSOs in Saudi Arabia enhance the security of the visa adjudication process at these consular posts, though several issues raise concerns about the VSOs’ role and impact. VSOs in Saudi Arabia provide an additional law enforcement capability to the visa adjudication process and have access to and experience using important law enforcement information not readily available to consular officers. DHS has not maintained measurable data to fully demonstrate the impact of VSOs on the visa process. However, DHS has not developed a system to fully track the results of visa security activities in Saudi Arabia. It would also be useful to inform the Congress, as well as State and other agencies who participate in the visa process at consular posts overseas. Recommendations
In our July 2005 report, we recommended that DHS develop a strategic plan to guide the operations of the Visa Security Program in Saudi Arabia and the program’s expansion to other embassies and consulates. Border Security: Actons Needed to Strengthen Management of Department of Homeland Securiy’s Visa Security Program. October 21, 2002. | Why GAO Did This Study
In adjudicating a visa application, Department of State (State) consular officers are on the front line of defense against those whose entry would likely be harmful to U.S. national interests. In October 2002, we identified shortcomings and made recommendations on the role of national security in the visa process. This testimony discusses our report issued today on actions taken since our 2002 report to strengthen the visa process, as well as areas that deserve additional management actions. It also discusses our July 2005 report on the status of the assignment of Department of Homeland Security (DHS) personnel to U.S. consular posts overseas.
What GAO Found
State and DHS have taken many steps to strengthen the visa process as an antiterrorism tool. Consular officers are receiving clear guidance on the importance of addressing national security concerns through the visa process, and State has established clear procedures on visa operations worldwide. State has also increased its hiring of consular officers and language proficient Foreign Service officers, and has enhanced training and fraud prevention efforts. Further, consular officers have access to more information from intelligence and law enforcement agencies. However, some areas require additional attention. For example, officers we spoke with said that guidance is needed on DHS staff's roles and responsibilities overseas. In addition, while State has hired more consular officers, it continues to experience shortages in supervisory staff. As of April 30, 2005, 26 percent of midlevel positions were either vacant or filled by entry-level staff. During our February 2005 visits to three consular posts in Saudi Arabia and Egypt--all of which are of interest to U.S. antiterrorism efforts--the visa sections were staffed with first-tour officers and no permanent midlevel visa chiefs to provide direct oversight. Further improvements are also needed in training and fraud prevention, as well as information sharing with the FBI. In September 2003, DHS assigned visa security personnel to consular posts in Saudi Arabia. According to DHS, State's consular officials, and the deputy chief of mission in Saudi Arabia, the DHS officers in Saudi Arabia strengthen visa security. However, DHS does not maintain comprehensive data on their activities and thus is unable to fully demonstrate the program's impact. Further, DHS has not developed a strategic plan for visa security operations in Saudi Arabia or for the planned future expansion of the program. |
gao_RCED-95-162 | gao_RCED-95-162_0 | Introduction
The Trans-Alaska Pipeline System (TAPS) is the primary transportation link for 20 percent of the nation’s domestically produced oil. These findings, together with those from other reviews of TAPS, have focused even more attention on the pipeline’s condition. The assessments focused on compliance with the requirements and management systems relating to operational integrity. The study found that JPO was not effectively addressing the prevention of pipeline hazards. Specifically, we • assessed Alyeska’s progress in resolving deficiencies identified by the QTC • determined whether Alyeska’s planned actions for three areas of deficiency—electrical integrity, quality, and maintenance—will address these deficiencies; • determined whether regulators are taking action to improve regulatory oversight of the pipeline; and identified the root causes of the deficiencies. Alyeska Made Progress Completing Action Items
By the end of April 1995, Alyeska reported that it had completed work on 3,030 of the 4,920 action items—about 62 percent (see table 2.2). Completing the corrective actions will take longer than planned. Alyeska is correcting these deficiencies. It is • developing a master equipment list to identify the structures, systems, and components to be included in the TAPS quality program and developing a procedure for documenting and controlling the list; • developing a document establishing the importance of various equipment to ensure the integrity of TAPS and thus the extent to which elements of the quality program apply to the equipment; • developing a risk-based cause and corrective action program that will use maintenance histories to improve future reliability; and • updating the “as-built” documentation to ensure that drawings of all TAPS’ structures, systems, and components reflect current configurations, performing a limited functional check to ensure that the selected equipment operates as provided in specifications, and developing implementing procedures to ensure that the documentation and conditions of TAPS’ equipment and facilities remain current and consistent. For example, it has strengthened JPO’s regulatory staff, and JPO is in the process of reorganizing its monitoring program to address prior limitations. Taken together, however, the efforts set in motion over the past 2 years demonstrate that JPO is making a concerted effort to improve. JPO’s operating philosophy is intended to be one of quality management, which emphasizes preventing rather than reacting to problems through closer study and knowledge of TAPS’ systems and processes. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on the progress made in correcting deficiencies in the operation and management of the Trans-Alaska Pipeline System (TAPS), focusing on: (1) whether the planned corrective actions will address deficiencies in the pipeline's electrical systems, quality, and preventive maintenance; (2) whether regulators are taking action to improve oversight of the pipeline; and (3) the root causes of pipeline deficiencies.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) the pipeline contractor has corrected about 62 percent of the almost 5,000 identified deficiencies as of April 1995, but it does not expect to be finished until the end of 1996, 2 years later than it had originally planned; (2) the contractor has corrected most electrical problems, focused management attention on the quality program, and is overhauling its maintenance program; (3) if the contractor completes actions to address these deficiencies, the TAPS problems should be corrected; (4) pipeline regulators are making a concerted effort to increase staff and reorganize to strengthen their focus on monitoring contractor operations; and (5) the root causes of the pipeline's deficiencies include the contractor's philosophy of reacting to problems rather than conducting programs aimed at prevention and early detection and regulators' inadequate oversight of contractor operations. |
gao_GAO-13-580T | gao_GAO-13-580T_0 | Background
As the central human resources agency for the federal government, OPM is tasked with ensuring that the government has an effective civilian workforce. To carry out this mission, OPM delivers human resources products and services including policies and procedures for recruiting and hiring, provides health and training benefit programs, and administers the retirement program for federal employees. Federal Employee Retirement Application Processing Is Complex
OPM and employing agencies’ human resources and payroll offices are responsible for processing federal employees’ retirement applications. OPM Has a Long History of Unsuccessful Retirement Modernization Initiatives
Recognizing the need to modernize its retirement processing, in the late 1980s OPM began initiatives that were aimed at automating its antiquated paper-based processes. In mid-1996, OPM terminated the program. OPM’s Unsuccessful Retirement Modernization Efforts Were Plagued by IT Management Weaknesses
OPM’s efforts to modernize its retirement system were hindered by weaknesses in several key IT management disciplines. For example, in reporting on RSM in February 2005, we noted weaknesses in project management, risk management, and organizational change management. Although OPM had defined major retirement modernization project components, it had not defined the dependencies among them. By not identifying critical dependencies among project components, OPM increased the risk that unforeseen delays in one activity could hinder progress in other activities. OPM officials acknowledged that they did not have a process for identifying and tracking retirement modernization project risks and mitigation strategies on a regular basis but stated that the agency’s project management consultant would assist it in implementing a risk management process. Lacking such a process, OPM did not have a mechanism to address potential problems that could adversely impact the cost, schedule, and quality of the retirement modernization project. Without having and implementing such a plan, effective implementation of new systems could be hindered by confusion about user roles and responsibilities. At the time of our review, 1 month before OPM planned to deploy a major system component, test results showed that the component had not performed as intended. The high degree of concurrent testing that OPM planned to meet its February 2008 deployment schedule increased the risk that the agency would not have the resources or time to verify that the planned system worked as expected. Fundamental to reliable EVM is the development of a baseline against which variances are calculated. However, this view of project performance was not reliable because the baseline on which it was based did not reflect the full scope of the project, had not been validated, and was unstable (i.e., subject to frequent changes). We recommended that the Director of OPM conduct effective system tests prior to system deployment and improve program cost estimation and progress reporting. In April 2009, we again reported on OPM’s retirement modernization, noting that the agency still remained far from achieving the modernized Specifically, we retirement processing capabilities that it had planned.noted that significant weaknesses continued to exist in the areas of cost estimating, progress reporting, and testing, while also noting two additional weaknesses related to planning and oversight. By not completing these steps, OPM increased the risk that it would produce an unreliable estimate and not have a sound basis for measuring project performance and formulating retirement modernization budgets. OPM Has Reported Taking Actions to Improve Retirement Processing
In mid-January 2012, OPM released a plan to undertake targeted, incremental improvements to retirement processing rather than a large- scale modernization, which described planned actions in four areas: hiring and training 56 new staff to adjudicate retirement claims and 20 additional staff to support the claims process; establishing higher production standards and identifying potential working with other agencies to improve the accuracy and completeness of the data they provide to OPM for use in retirement processing; and improving the department’s IT by pursuing a long-term data flow strategy, exploring short-term strategies to leverage work performed by other agencies, and reviewing and upgrading systems used by retirement services. These efforts include providing retirees with the ability to view the status of their cases through OPM’s web-based application, Services Online; developing the capability to accept electronic data that are transferred from one of the seven federal payroll processing centers; enhancing its internal web-based application, Data Viewer, to allow 11 other agencies to view retirement case packets; upgrading its data storage capacity and production printer; sponsoring a challenge, in cooperation with the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, for developers to create a system with accounting tools for processing service credits; updating reporting guides to include processes for sending electronic retirement data to OPM; and planning an initiative to develop an automated retirement case management system to replace the agency’s existing document and case control system in fiscal year 2014. Although the Associate Director for Retirement Services stated that investing in IT is important for improving the efficiency of retirement claims processing, the agency has not yet planned for improving or replacing the remaining legacy systems that support retirement processing. For over two decades, the agency’s retirement modernization efforts were plagued by weaknesses in management capabilities that are critical to the success of such endeavors. | Why GAO Did This Study
OPM is the central human resources agency for the federal government and, as such, is responsible for ensuring that the government has an effective civilian workforce. As part of its mission, OPM defines recruiting and hiring processes and procedures; provides federal employees with various benefits, such as health benefits; and administers the retirement program for federal employees. OPM's use of IT is critical in carrying out its responsibilities; in fiscal year 2013 the agency plans to invest about $85 million in IT systems and services. For over two decades, OPM has been attempting to modernize its federal employee retirement process by automating paper-based processes and replacing antiquated information systems. However, these efforts have been unsuccessful, and the agency canceled its most recent large-scale retirement modernization effort in February 2011.
GAO was asked to summarize its work on challenges OPM has faced in attempting to modernize the federal employee retirement process and to describe the agency's recent reported actions to improve its retirement processing. To do this, GAO generally relied on previously published work.
What GAO Found
In a series of reviews, GAO found that the Office of Personnel Management's (OPM) retirement modernization efforts were hindered by weaknesses in key management practices that are essential to successful information technology (IT) modernization projects. For example, in 2005, GAO made recommendations to address weaknesses in the following areas:
Project management: While OPM had defined major components of its retirement modernization effort, it had not identified the dependencies among them, increasing the risk that delays in one activity could have unforeseen impacts on the progress of others.
Risk management: OPM did not have a process for identifying and tracking project risks and mitigation strategies on a regular basis. Thus, it lacked a mechanism to address potential problems that could adversely impact the cost, schedule, and quality of the modernization effort.
Organizational change management: OPM had not adequately prepared its staff for changes to job responsibilities resulting from the modernization by developing a detailed transition plan. This could lead to confusion about roles and responsibilities and hinder effective system implementation.
In 2008, as OPM was on the verge of deploying an automated retirement processing system, GAO reported deficiencies in and made recommendations to address additional management capabilities:
Testing: The results of tests 1 month prior to the deployment of a major system component revealed that it had not performed as intended. These defects, along with a compressed testing schedule, increased the risk that the system would not work as intended upon deployment.
Cost estimating: The cost estimate OPM developed was not fully reliable. This meant that the agency did not have a sound basis for formulating budgets or developing a program baseline.
Progress reporting: The baseline against which OPM was measuring the progress of the program did not reflect the full scope of the project; this increased the risk that variances from planned performance would not be detected.
In 2009, GAO reported that OPM continued to have deficiencies in its cost estimating, progress reporting, and testing practices and made recommendations to address these and other weaknesses in the planning and oversight of the modernization effort. OPM agreed with these recommendations and began to address them, but, in February 2011, it terminated the modernization effort.
In January 2012, OPM released a plan to improve retirement processing that aimed at targeted, incremental improvements rather than a large-scale modernization. Toward this end, OPM has reported hiring new claims-processing staff, taking steps to identify potential process improvements, and working with other agencies to improve data quality. Further, the agency reported making IT improvements that allow retirees to view the status of their accounts and automating parts of the retirement application process. However, the plan reflects a less ambitious goal for retirement processing timeliness and does not address improving or replacing the legacy systems that support retirement processing.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is not making new recommendations at this time. GAO has previously made numerous recommendations to address IT management challenges that OPM has faced in carrying out its retirement modernization efforts. Fully addressing these challenges remains key to the success of OPM's efforts. |
gao_GAO-08-350 | gao_GAO-08-350_0 | While the report described DOD’s immediate needs and ability to fund those needs, it did not include information on (1) the funding requirements for fiscal year 2009 and beyond, even though the survey used to develop the funding requirements asked contractors about their clearance needs through 2010; and (2) the tens of millions of dollars that the DSS Director testified to Congress in May 2007 were necessary to maintain the infrastructure supporting the industry security clearance program. Our September 2006 report showed that longer delays are found in some phases of the process than in others (e.g., our analysis of 2,259 cases showed that the application-submission phase took an average of 111 days to complete instead of the goal of 14 days) and suggested that monitoring each of the phases would help DOD to identify where actions are needed to improve timeliness. The OUSD(I) Director of Security and the DSS Director told us that because the DOD report included both the average time to complete an investigation and the time to process the clearance from start to finish, the department did not include the times to process the additional discrete phases of the clearance process. In deciding not to provide certain important information in its first annual report to Congress, DOD has limited the information available to Congress as it oversees the effectiveness of DOD’s industry personnel security clearance processes. Finally, by not including measures of quality in the clearance processes, DOD has only partially supported its assertion that it has made improvements to the clearance processes. Many of DOD’s Records of the Numbers and Costs of Security Clearance Investigations and Adjudications Were Not Available or Were Considered Unreliable
DOD reported that OPM conducted 81,495 investigations for the department in fiscal year 2005 and 138,769 in fiscal year 2006 and that DOD staff granted clearance eligibility to 113,408 industry personnel in fiscal year 2005 and 144,608 industry personnel in fiscal year 2006. However, we are unable to report the numbers and unit costs of investigations and adjudications for industry personnel for fiscal years 2000 through 2004, because DOD either was not able to provide data or supplied data that we found to be insufficiently reliable to report. DOD’s Procedures for Projecting Future Investigation Needs and Its Plans for Improving and Funding the Industry Clearance Program Are Evolving
Changes are occurring in the way in which DOD estimates its future investigations needs, as well as its plans and funding for modifying the personnel security clearance program for industry personnel. Similarly, DOD is not pursuing DOD- specific planning for reducing backlogs and delays as well as steps to adequately fund its clearance process but instead is participating in governmentwide planning efforts to improve clearance processes. However, DOD has had difficulties in projecting its departmentwide clearance needs accurately. First, starting in 2006, DSS made its annual survey accessible through the Internet. Consequently, DOD does not have a comprehensive plan to address department-specific clearance backlogs, delays, and program funding. (3) To what extent has DOD developed procedures to estimate the number of investigations to be conducted; plans to reduce delays and backlogs in the clearance program, if any; and provide funding? In 2006, the John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 mandated that (1) DOD report annually on the future requirements of its industry personnel security investigations program and (2) we evaluate DOD’s first report in response to this mandate and provide additional information on eight issues. For the additional information on the number and cost—including information on surcharges that DOD paid to the Office of Personnel Management (OPM)—of each type of industry clearance work performed in DOD’s personnel security clearance program, we limited our scope to DSS- and OPM-conducted investigations and DOD adjudications of initial and renewal top secret, secret, and confidential clearances for industry personnel completed in fiscal years 2000 through 2006. The sources also provided insights into possible causes and effects related to our findings about whether the DOD report addressed each of the issues specified in the mandate. Our methodology to determine the extent to which DOD has developed procedures to estimate the number of future investigations needed for industry personnel included three steps: (1) we obtained and analyzed documents describing DOD’s procedures for estimating the number of industry investigations, (2) we reviewed DSS’s Internet-based survey of contractors who perform classified work for the government and discussed our observations of this survey with the DSS Director and DSS officials responsible for this survey, and (3) we reviewed documents obtained from DOD officials describing ongoing research on potential changes to the methods DOD uses to make these estimates. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Defense (DOD) industry personnel security clearance program has long-standing delays and backlogs in completing clearance requests and difficulties in accurately projecting its future needs for investigations to be conducted by the Office of Personnel Management (OPM). In 2006, Congress mandated that DOD report annually on the future requirements of the program and DOD's efforts to improve it, and that GAO evaluate DOD's first report. Specifically, GAO was required to report on (1) the extent to which the report responds to the issues in the mandate, (2) the number and cost of clearance investigations and adjudications in fiscal years 2000-2006, and (3) the extent to which DOD has developed procedures to estimate future needs, plans to reduce delays and backlogs, and plans to provide funding for the program. To accomplish these objectives, GAO obtained and reviewed laws, executive orders, policies, reports, and other documents related to the security clearance process and interviewed officials from a range of government offices concerned with the clearance process.
What GAO Found
Although DOD's first annual report responded to the issues specified in the mandate, it did not include certain important information that was available on funding, processing times, and quality. DOD's report limited the funding requirements information for its industry security clearance program to 2007 and 2008, even though the department asserted before Congress in May 2007 that it would need tens of millions of dollars in the future to maintain the infrastructure supporting the program and to cover operating costs. While DOD reported the average total time for DOD industry clearances and the average time to complete all clearance investigations, it did not include information on the time to complete any of the other phases (e.g., adjudication). GAO's September 2006 report suggested that longer delays are found in some phases of the process than in others and that quantifying those delays would be useful. The DOD report was largely silent on measures of quality in the clearance process, which is crucial if agencies are to accept the validity of clearances from other agencies. By not including these types of information, DOD limited the information available to Congress as it oversees the effectiveness of DOD's industry personnel security clearance program. GAO was unable to report the number and unit cost of investigations and adjudications for fiscal years 2000 through 2004 because data were either unavailable or insufficiently reliable. However, DOD reported that OPM conducted 81,495 and 138,769 investigations of industry personnel in fiscal years 2005 and 2006, respectively, and DOD granted clearance eligibility to 113,408 and 144,608 industry personnel in fiscal years 2005 and 2006, respectively. In estimating unit costs, DOD and OPM did not account for all factors affecting the cost of a clearance--factors that would have made the DOD-provided estimates higher. These factors included (1) the cost of special interviews that are sometimes necessary to resolve discrepancies in information and (2) that top secret clearance adjudications normally take about twice as long as those for secret/confidential clearances. DOD's procedures and plans are evolving, including procedures for projecting the number of future investigations it will need and plans to reduce backlogs and delays, as well as steps to fund the industry clearance program. In ongoing efforts to address the continued inaccuracy of its projections of future clearance needs, DOD has taken several steps. For example, DOD made its voluntary annual survey of contractors performing classified government work accessible through the Internet in 2006 and began encouraging industry staff to complete it. The response rate increased to 86 percent of industry personnel in 2007. Further, while DOD does not have its own plan to address the funding of its clearance program and its delays in processing clearances, it is currently participating in a governmentwide effort to make clearance processes more efficient and cost-effective. Streamlining and improving the efficiency of its clearance process is also one of DOD's top transformation priorities. In its 2004 report, GAO recommended that DOD implement a comprehensive plan and improve its estimates of future investigation needs. |
gao_GAO-04-966 | gao_GAO-04-966_0 | Our first objective was to assess AOC’s progress over the 6-month period from December 1, 2003, through May 31, 2004, on eight key issues that deserve near-term attention and focus: (1) stakeholder involvement, (2) employee communications, (3) auditable financial statements and related internal controls, (4) financial reporting for operating units and cost accounting, (5) information security management, (6) worker safety performance measures, (7) Capitol complex master planning, and (8) strategic management of recycling. Our second objective, which was mandated by the Consolidated Appropriations Resolution, 2003 (Public Law 108-7), was to assess AOC’s COO action plan that was issued in December 2003. For example, AOC has not reached agreement with Congress on how best to develop a clear, transparent, and documented understanding of how AOC sets project priorities and how progress will be assessed. AOC has taken some steps to involve congressional and other stakeholders; however, it has yet to fully engage these stakeholders. As we reported in January 2004, AOC planned to begin issuing a complete set of audited financial statements for fiscal year 2004. In addition, AOC has made progress in institutionalizing its policies on inventory management and control. Recommendations for Agency Actions
To enhance the successful development of useful financial, cost, and performance reporting for major operating units and appropriate cost accounting, we recommend that the Architect of the Capitol direct the Chief Operating Officer and the Chief Financial Officer to work with operating managers to assess the usefulness of financial- statement-level information, take an active role in AOC near-term efforts to develop agencywide performance measures, and review all available options to determine whether substantial work can begin, prior to fiscal year 2006, on the analyses needed to identify changes necessary to implement useful cost accounting at AOC, and have senior management visibly demonstrate its continuing commitment to and support for making AOC-wide system, procedural, and cultural changes necessary to provide managers with timely financial, cost, and performance information by monitoring the efforts’ implementation and related milestones, ensuring the commitment to and support for the efforts by participating AOC units, and acting to resolve any impediments that may arise. Since then, AOC has continued to make progress in implementing our recommendations, but important work remains in five basic areas of information security management. Over the 6 months we reviewed, AOC made progress in developing performance measures to track the agency’s worker safety efforts, but the implementation of these measures is a work in progress. AOC Has Taken Steps to Develop a Capitol Complex Master Plan, but Lack of Congressional and Other Stakeholder Involvement and Delays Hamper Additional Progress
Developing a Capitol complex master plan is critical to strategic project management because it would help facilitate consistent management and oversight of projects and establish long-term priorities. AOC has made progress toward developing a mission and goals for its recycling programs in accordance with our January 2003 recommendation. The COO Action Plan, however, was not submitted to the committees until December 22, 2003— 59 days late. Overall, the plan’s high-level description of the action items assumes that Congress and other users have a deep and detailed knowledge of AOC’s goals, internal operations, and management functions—a level of knowledge that is not reasonable to expect. As part of this effort, the Architect and the COO should work with Congress to determine Congress’ information needs and the timing and format of delivery of that information that will best meet Congress’ needs. AOC has made progress in addressing the eight key management control issues and the corresponding recommendations outlined in this report; however, AOC management will need to build on its efforts to date and more fully engage congressional and other stakeholders to ensure that their interests and expectations are incorporated into AOC’s organizational transformation. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Conference Report on the Consolidated Appropriations Resolution, 2003, directed GAO to monitor AOC's progress in implementing recommendations contained in GAO's management review of AOC's operations, issued in January 2003. This is the second status report in which GAO examines the actions taken by AOC to implement selected GAO recommendations. Additionally, the Consolidated Appropriations Resolution, 2003, mandated GAO to assess AOC's Chief Operating Officer's (COO) action plan. This report provides that assessment.
What GAO Found
AOC has made progress on key management control issues, but substantial work remains to achieve sustained, long-term management improvements and organizational transformation. These key issues include (1) stakeholder involvement, (2) employee communications, (3) auditable financial statements and related internal controls, (4) financial reporting for operating units and cost accounting, (5) information security management, (6) worker safety performance measures, (7) Capitol complex master planning, and (8) strategic management of recycling. For example, AOC has not fully engaged its congressional and other stakeholders in developing a clear, transparent, and documented understanding of how AOC sets project priorities and how progress will be assessed. AOC has taken some steps to involve its stakeholders by delivering planning documents and responding to requests for information. AOC has made progress addressing employee communications issues and can maintain momentum by fully and effectively implementing its planned initiatives. AOC has made progress in preparing auditable agencywide financial statements; however, it has deferred the audit of a complete set of financial statements from fiscal year 2004 to fiscal year 2005. Also, substantial work remains before AOC can provide its managers with the meaningful financial, cost, and performance information needed to enhance their management of operating units. AOC has continued to make some progress establishing the management foundation for effective information security management, but much remains to be accomplished, such as completing system risk assessments and monitoring and evaluating its security policies and controls. Additionally, AOC has developed performance measures to track worker safety, but work remains to ensure successful implementation of these measures. In regard to project management, AOC has taken steps to develop a Capitol complex master plan and expects it to be available for stakeholder comment in February 2006. Given the importance of the master plan, stakeholder involvement early in and throughout its development is key to the plan's ultimate acceptance and value. Similarly, AOC has made progress developing a mission statement and goals for its recycling program as part of its broader Environmental Program Plan, although AOC does not expect to obtain congressional input until after the plan has been completed--an important omission. The Architect and the COO need to work with Congress to determine Congress' information needs--with a specific focus on AOC's project management--and the timing and format of delivery of that information that will best meet Congress' needs. The COO Action Plan was submitted to Congress on December 22, 2003--59 days late. Overall, the plan's high-level description of action items assumes that Congress and other users have a deep and detailed knowledge of AOC's goals, internal operations, and management functions--a level of knowledge that is not reasonable to expect. |
gao_GAO-10-963 | gao_GAO-10-963_0 | Scope and Methodology
To determine the soundness of IRS’s PDC study as primary support for IRS’s decision to discontinue contracting out tax debt collection, we reviewed the study report and supporting documents and other data. To determine what changes IRS has planned or made to its collection approach based on its PCA experience and the PDC study, we reviewed program documents and interviewed IRS officials on their processes and procedures for collecting tax debt. Methodological Errors and Narrow Scope Limit the Study’s Usefulness in Supporting the PDC Decision
According to IRS officials, the PDC study was not originally intended or designed to be primary support for IRS’s PDC program decision. Even though other factors, such as potential increases in IRS collection staffing, were considered, based on our interviews with IRS officials and IRS’s announcement of the program’s termination, the study results played a primary role in supporting the decision. Nevertheless, neither we nor IRS officials know whether the PDC study results and decision on the program would have differed significantly if the study had been designed to be primary support for IRS’s PDC program. The Study Result May Be Over- or Understated Because the Sample Was Not Generalizable to the PDC Population
Because IRS did not perform certain analyses and documentation is not available to do those analyses, it is unclear whether the study’s results are accurate. Different Study Objectives and Design Would Have Better Supported the Program Decision-Making Process
Because the PDC study had a narrow objective of comparing the results of collection efforts by IRS and PCAs for the PCA-type cases, its design did not consider other factors included in federal and other guidance on conducting program analyses. However, beyond not addressing whether to continue the PDC program, the study did not analyze alternatives for program scale, such as expanding the PDC program or scaling it back to a segment of cases that might be more cost effective for PCAs to work than IRS. In 2004, we concluded that IRS should do a study in line with federal guidance, such as comparing the results of using PCAs to the results from using the same amount of funds to be paid to PCAs in an unconstrained manner that IRS determined to be the most effective overall way of achieving its collection goals. IRS Has Not Changed Its Collection Approach Based on Its PDC Experience and Study, and Whether IRS Will Work Certain PCA- Type Cases Is Unclear
Although the Basis Was Not Documented, IRS Concluded That No PCA Practices Should Be Adopted
In authorizing the PDC program in 2004, Congress required IRS to create a measurement plan to capture information on successful collection techniques used by the contractors that IRS could adopt. The PCAs’ best practices were to be compared with IRS’s collection practices. In an unpublished draft biennial report, IRS said it reviewed PCA best practices and concluded that none of them were sufficiently better than IRS’s practice to merit adoption. It said that IRS did not find any immediate opportunities to adopt PCA practices, but provided no details beyond this sentence. Conflicting Information on Whether or How IRS Will Work PCA-Type Cases
IRS officials said that IRS had not changed its criteria to start regularly selecting PCA-type cases to work because the PDC study results were not sufficient to identify which of the PCA-type cases could be productively worked. However, IRS officials said that they were surprised by the study results, which indicated that IRS staff might have better results working these cases than some of the cases IRS normally works. IRS does not have guidance for managers on the types of analyses that should be done and documented to support program decisions. Recommendations for Executive Action
We recommend that the Commissioner of Internal Revenue take the following three actions: Establish guidance on the types of analyses that should be done to support decisions to initiate, renew, or expand programs. Establish a policy requiring documentation for the design, analyses, and conclusions of studies supporting program changes. IRS disagreed with our finding that its PDC study was not soundly designed to support its decision on whether to continue contracting out debt collection. Our report discusses our reasoning in detail, focusing on the study’s methodological errors, narrow scope, and lack of adherence to guidance for doing such studies. IRS agreed with our two recommendations dealing with establishing guidance on analyses to support decisions to initiate, renew, or expand a program and policies to ensure documentation of such studies. Although IRS’s comments on the draft report said that the need for completing the pilot case study was overtaken by the development of the CDA models, in separate technical comments IRS officials said they were continuing to work the pilot cases and provided no indication that they would stop working them before CDA is implemented in January 2011. | Why GAO Did This Study
In September 2006, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) started the private debt collection (PDC) program for using private collection agencies (PCA) to help collect some unpaid tax debts. Aware of concerns that PCAs might cost more than using IRS staff, IRS began studying the collection costs and performance of PCAs and IRS. In March 2009, IRS announced that it would not renew its PCA contracts based on the study and announced plans for increasing collection staffing. As requested, GAO is reporting on whether (1) the study was sound as primary support for IRS's PDC decision and (2) IRS has planned or made changes to its collection approach based on its PCA experience and PDC study. GAO compared IRS's study to federal and other guidance on what should be included in analyses to support program decisions and analyzed IRS's changes given expectations that IRS would consider PCAs' best practices.
What GAO Found
IRS's comparative study of the PDC program was not soundly designed to support its decision on whether to continue contracting out debt collection. Although the study was not originally intended or designed as primary support for the decision, IRS officials nonetheless used it as such. IRS did not have guidance for program managers on the type of analysis that should be done to support decisions to create, renew, or expand programs. IRS had not retained sufficient documentation on the sample used in the study or documented some analyses that would have been helpful if performed. The study results may be overstated or understated because the study sample was not generalizable to the program as a whole. The study had a narrow objective of comparing results for IRS working the same cases as PCAs had, and as a result, the study design did not consider other factors recommended by Office of Management and Budget and other guidance on conducting program analysis. For example, the study did not analyze alternatives to program scale, such as expanding it or scaling it back. Program analysis guidance states that to the extent possible all costs and benefits should be counted and alternative means of achieving a program's goals should be considered. But the study did not identify important costs and benefits, such as whether taxpayers' compliance costs would be different if IRS or PCAs work debt cases. Nevertheless, neither GAO nor IRS officials know whether the study results and decision on the program would have differed significantly if it had been designed to be primary support for IRS's PDC program. In commenting on a draft of GAO's report, IRS disagreed that the PDC study was not soundly designed. GAO stands by its analysis detailing the study's errors, narrow scope, and lack of adherence to guidance. These design and methodology deficiencies limited the study's usefulness in supporting IRS's decision. IRS has not made or planned changes to its collection approach based on its PCA experience and study. In authorizing the use of PCAs, Congress required IRS to report to Congress its measurement plan to identify any of the PCAs' best practices that IRS could adopt to improve its own collection operations. IRS did not continue to report to Congress as required. In an unpublished draft report, IRS asserted that it had reviewed a number of PCA practices and found no immediate opportunities to change its collection approach. IRS did not provide GAO documentation on the study to support that conclusion. In part because PCA-type cases had previously been considered low priority, IRS officials were surprised by the PDC study results, which indicated that IRS staff might have better results working PCA-type cases than some of the cases IRS normally works. IRS officials said that they initiated a pilot study in 2009 to help them decide whether to use IRS staff to work selected types of PCA cases. As GAO concluded its review, IRS provided conflicting information on the role of the pilot study. On one hand, IRS said a collection selection system to be implemented in January 2011 overtook the need for the study. On the other hand, an IRS official said that the results from PCA-type cases were not used in the development of the new case selection system.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that IRS (1) establish guidance on analyses to support program decisions, (2) establish a policy requiring documentation of program studies, and (3) ensure that PCA-type case results are considered for IRS's new case selection model. IRS agreed with the first two recommendations and agreed in principle with the third, which GAO revised to reflect updated information that IRS provided. |
gao_GAO-11-35 | gao_GAO-11-35_0 | Oil Shale Development Could Adversely Impact Water Resources, but the Magnitude of These Impacts Is Unknown
Oil shale development could have significant impacts on the quality and quantity of surface and groundwater resources, but the magnitude of these impacts is unknown because some technologies have yet to be commercially proven, the size of a future oil shale industry is uncertain, and knowledge of current water conditions and groundwater flow is limited. According to these experts, in the absence of effective mitigation measures, impacts from oil shale development to water resources could result from disturbing the ground surface during the construction of roads and production facilities, withdrawing water from streams and aquifers for oil shale operations, underground mining and extraction, and discharging waste waters from oil shale operations. Based on our review of available information for the life cycle of oil shale production, existing estimates suggest that from about 1 to 12 barrels of water could be needed for each barrel of oil produced from in-situ operations, with an average of about 5 barrels. About 2 to 4 barrels of water could be needed for each barrel of oil produced from mining operations with a surface retort. Power generation. Estimates of Water Needs for In-Situ Development Vary Significantly
Based on studies that we reviewed, the total amount of water needed for in-situ oil shale operations could vary widely, from about 1 to 12 barrels of water per barrel of oil produced over the entire life cycle of oil shale operations. Water Is Likely to Be Available Initially from Local Sources, but the Size of an Oil Shale Industry May Eventually Be Limited by Water Availability
Water is likely to be available for the initial development of an oil shale industry, but the eventual size of the industry may be limited by the availability of water and demands for water to meet other needs. Substantial population growth and its correlative demand for water are expected in the oil shale regions of Colorado and Utah. Colorado’s and Utah’s obligations under interstate compacts could further reduce the amount of water available for development. In addition, DOE and Interior officials noted that they seldom formally share the information on their water-related research with each other. DOE Funds Research on Water Rights, Water Needs, and the Impacts of Oil Shale Development on Water Resources
DOE has sponsored most of the oil shale research that involves water- related issues. Of the 18 officials and experts we contacted, 17 noted that there are insufficient data to understand the current baseline conditions of water resources in the Piceance and Uintah Basins. Specifically, the Secretary should direct the appropriate managers in the Bureau of Land Management and the U.S. Geological Survey to 1. establish comprehensive baseline conditions for groundwater and surface water quality, including their chemistry, and quantity in the Piceance and Uintah Basins to aid in the future monitoring of impacts from oil shale development in the Green River Formation; 2. model regional groundwater movement and the interaction between groundwater and surface water, in light of aquifer properties and the age of groundwater, so as to help in understanding the transport of possible contaminants derived from the development of oil shale; and 3. coordinate with the Department of Energy and state agencies with regulatory authority over water resources in implementing these recommendations, and to provide a mechanism for water-related research collaboration and sharing of results. To determine the extent to which water is likely to be available for commercial oil shale development and its source, we compared the total needs of an oil shale industry of various sizes to the amount of surface water and groundwater that the states of Colorado and Utah estimate to be physically and legally available, in light of future municipal and industrial demand. To identify federally funded research efforts to address the impacts of commercial oil shale development on water resources, we interviewed officials and reviewed information from offices or agencies within DOE and the Department of the Interior (Interior). These discussions involved officials with all the federal offices either sponsoring or performing water-related oil shale research and state agencies involved in regulating water resources. | Why GAO Did This Study
Oil shale deposits in Colorado, Utah, and Wyoming are estimated to contain up to 3 trillion barrels of oil--or an amount equal to the world's proven oil reserves. About 72 percent of this oil shale is located beneath federal lands, making the federal government a key player in its potential development. Extracting this oil is expected to require substantial amounts of water and could impact groundwater and surface water. GAO was asked to report on (1) what is known about the potential impacts of oil shale development on surface water and groundwater, (2) what is known about the amount of water that may be needed for commercial oil shale development, (3) the extent to which water will likely be available for commercial oil shale development and its source, and (4) federal research efforts to address impacts to water resources from commercial oil shale development. GAO examined environmental impacts and water needs studies and talked to Department of Energy (DOE), Department of the Interior (Interior), and industry officials.
What GAO Found
Oil shale development could have significant impacts on the quality and quantity of water resources, but the magnitude of these impacts is unknown because technologies are years from being commercially proven, the size of a future oil shale industry is uncertain, and knowledge of current water conditions and groundwater flow is limited. In the absence of effective mitigation measures, water resources could be impacted from ground disturbances caused by the construction of roads and production facilities; withdrawing water from streams and aquifers for oil shale operations, underground mining and extraction; and discharging waters produced from or used in operations. Estimates vary widely for the amount of water needed to commercially produce oil shale primarily because of the unproven nature of some technologies and because the various ways of generating power for operations use differing quantities of water. GAO's review of available studies indicated that the expected total water needs for the entire life cycle of oil shale production ranges from about 1 barrel (or 42 gallons) to 12 barrels of water per barrel of oil produced from in-situ (underground heating) operations, with an average of about 5 barrels, and from about 2 to 4 barrels of water per barrel of oil produced from mining operations with surface heating. Water is likely to be available for the initial development of an oil shale industry, but the size of an industry in Colorado or Utah may eventually be limited by water availability. Water limitations may arise from increases in water demand from municipal and industrial users, the potential of reduced water supplies from a warming climate, fulfilling obligations under interstate water compacts, and the need to provide additional water to protect threatened and endangered fishes. The federal government sponsors research on the impacts of oil shale on water resources through DOE and Interior. DOE manages 13 projects whose water-related costs total about $4.3 million, and Interior sponsored two water-related projects, totaling about $500,000. Despite this research, nearly all of the officials and experts that GAO contacted said that there are insufficient data to understand baseline conditions of water resources in the oil shale regions of Colorado and Utah and that additional research is needed to understand the movement of groundwater and its interaction with surface water. Federal agency officials also said they seldom coordinate water-related oil shale research among themselves or with state agencies that regulate water. Most officials noted that agencies could benefit from such coordination.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that Interior establish comprehensive baseline conditions for water resources in oil shale regions of Colorado and Utah, model regional groundwater movement, and coordinate on water-related research with DOE and state agencies involved in water regulation. Interior generally concurred with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_HEHS-96-48 | gao_HEHS-96-48_0 | Because resource allocation is a sensitive and complex undertaking in VA’s health care system, VA has made a considerable investment in it. Another important aspect of the RPM system is its ability to forecast workload changes. The System Does Not Address Veterans’ Unequal Access to Care
Part of VA’s original plan for RPM was to use it to help alleviate inconsistencies in veterans’ access to outpatient care—a plan that has not materialized. Facilities cannot efficiently adjust to large budget changes. First, given that the initial 2 years of the system’s implementation were intended to help facilities adjust to the new process, the Deputy Under Secretary for Health told us in September 1995 that VA was planning to reallocate a significantly larger amount of money for the fiscal year 1996 facility budgets based on RPM. Furthermore, officials indicated that they were implementing a Decision Support System to better coordinate VA’s clinical and financial data systems and allow VA to compute more accurately the costs of specific services provided to each patient. Recommendations
We recommend that the Secretary of Veterans Affairs direct the Under Secretary for Health to link the resource allocation process to the strategic planning process in the VISN structure so that (1) allocations are more clearly associated with VA’s long-range goals, performance standards, and workload priorities; and (2) facility and VISN managers are given short- and long-range financial objectives; institute a formal review and evaluation process within the resource allocation system to examine the reasons for cost variations among facilities and VISNs; establish a process for evaluating non-RPM patient care funds to determine whether they can be included in the RPM allocation system, including exploring options for using existing financial management systems to capture data on the provision of non-RPM allocated funds by facility and program area; and explore options for using existing or improved databases to (1) understand the extent to which veterans within the same priority categories have consistent access to care within the VA health care system and (2) include such data in VA’s resource allocation system to help ensure that veterans have consistent access to care throughout the system. VA’s Resource Planning and Management System
The Resource Planning and Management system is the management decision process VA uses to allocate most of its resources and to compare VA medical facilities’ performance. The data also show changing facility workloads. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Department of Veterans Affairs' (VA) resource allocation system, focusing on the: (1) extent to which VA resources are distributed equally among VA facilities; and (2) causes of unequal resource allocations among VA health care facilities.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) the VA resource allocation system enables VA to identify potential inequities in resource allocations and forecast facility workload changes, but VA has made only minimal changes in facilities' funding levels; (2) there is a significant difference between comparable health care facilities' operating costs and patient workloads; (3) VA has not used its resource planning and management system (RPM) to ensure that resources are allocated to facilities within the same priority category; (4) VA excluded over $4 billion of its medical care appropriation from the RPM process during the first 2 years of RPM because it wanted to give VA facilities more time to adjust to the reallocation process and large budget changes; (5) the RPM system does not address veterans' unequal access to outpatient care; and (6) VA plans to reallocate a larger portion of its fiscal year 1996 facility budgets based on the RPM process and implement a decision support system to better compute the costs of specific services provided to each patient. |
gao_GAO-12-876T | gao_GAO-12-876T_0 | Consequently, ineffective information security controls can result in significant risks, including loss or theft of resources, including money and intellectual property; inappropriate access to and disclosure, modification, or destruction of sensitive information; use of computer resources for unauthorized purposes or to launch attacks on other computers systems; damage to networks and equipment; loss of business due to lack of customer confidence; and increased costs from remediation. The Nation Faces an Evolving Array of Cyber-Based Threats
Cyber-based threats are evolving and growing and arise from a wide array of sources. These sources include business competitors, corrupt employees, criminal groups, hackers, and foreign nations engaged in espionage and information warfare. These threat sources vary in terms of the capabilities of the actors, their willingness to act, and their motives, which can include monetary gain or political advantage, among others. These sources of cyber threats make use of various techniques, or exploits, to adversely affect an organization’s computers, software, or networks, or to intercept or steal valuable or sensitive information. Cyberspace—where much business activity and the development of new ideas often take place—amplifies these threats by making it possible for malicious actors to quickly steal and transfer massive quantities of data while remaining anonymous and difficult to detect. Using such techniques, threat actors may target individuals, resulting in loss of privacy or identity theft; businesses, resulting in the compromise of proprietary information or intellectual property; critical infrastructures, resulting in their disruption or destruction; or government agencies, resulting in the loss of sensitive information and damage to economic and national security. The following examples from news media and other public sources illustrate that a broad array of information and assets remain at risk. A retailer reported in May 2011 that it had suffered a breach of its customers’ card data. These incidents illustrate the serious impact that cyber threats can have on, among other things, the security of sensitive personal and financial information and proprietary information and intellectual property. While these effects can be difficult to quantify monetarily, they can include any of the following:
For consumers or private citizens: identity theft or compromise of personal and economic information and costs associated with lower- quality counterfeit or pirated goods. Security Controls and Other Techniques Can Reduce Vulnerability to Cyber-Based Attacks
The prevalence of cyber threats and the risks they pose illustrate the need for security controls and other actions that can reduce organizations’ vulnerability to such attacks. In prior reports, we have made hundreds of recommendations to federal agencies to better protect their systems and cyber-reliant critical infrastructures. Cybersecurity technology must work within an overall security process and be used by trained personnel. Key Federal Agencies Have Responsibilities for Protecting Intellectual Property
Multiple federal agencies undertake a wide range of activities in support of IP rights. Some of these agencies are the Departments of Commerce (including the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office), State, Justice (including the FBI), Health and Human Services, and Homeland Security; the U.S. Trade Representative; the U.S. Over the years, Congress and the administration have created interagency mechanisms to coordinate federal IP law enforcement efforts. In summary, the ongoing efforts to steal U.S. companies’ intellectual property and other sensitive information are exacerbated by the ever- increasing prevalence and sophistication of cyber-threats facing the nation. Moreover, effective coordination among federal agencies responsible for protecting IP and defending against cyber- threats, as well as effective public-private partnerships, are essential elements of any nationwide effort to protect America’s businesses and economic security. Cybersecurity: Continued Attention Is Needed to Protect Federal Information Systems from Evolving Threats. | Why GAO Did This Study
The threat of economic espionagethe theft of U.S. proprietary information, intellectual property (IP), or technology by foreign companies, governments, or other actorshas grown. Moreover, dependence on networked information technology (IT) systems has increased the reach and potential impact of this threat by making it possible for hostile actors to quickly steal massive amounts of information while remaining anonymous and difficult to detect. To address this threat, federal agencies have a key role to play in law enforcement, deterrence, and information sharing. Consistent with this threat, GAO has designated federal information security as a governmentwide high-risk area since 1997 and in 2003 expanded it to include protecting systems and assets vital to the nation (referred to as critical infrastructures). GAO was asked to testify on the cyber aspects of economic espionage. Accordingly, this statement discusses (1) cyber threats facing the nations systems, (2) reported cyber incidents and their impacts, (3) security controls and other techniques available for reducing risk, and (4) the responsibilities of key federal entities in support of protecting IP. To do this, GAO relied on previously published work in this area, as well as reviews of reports from other federal agencies, media reports, and other publicly available sources.
What GAO Found
The nation faces an evolving array of cyber-based threats arising from a variety of sources. These sources include criminal groups, hackers, terrorists, organization insiders, and foreign nations engaged in crime, political activism, or espionage and information warfare. These threat sources vary in terms of the capabilities of the actors, their willingness to act, and their motives, which can include monetary gain or political advantage, among others. Moreover, potential threat actors have a variety of attack techniques at their disposal, which can adversely affect an organizations computers or networks and be used to intercept or steal valuable information. The magnitude of the threat is compounded by the ever-increasing sophistication of cyber attack techniques, such as attacks that may combine multiple techniques. Using these techniques, threat actors may target individuals and businesses, resulting in, among other things, loss of sensitive personal or proprietary information.
These concerns are highlighted by reports of cyber incidents that have had serious effects on consumers and businesses. These include the compromise of individuals sensitive personal data such as credit- and debit-card information and the theft of businesses IP and other proprietary information. While difficult to quantify monetarily, the loss of such information can result in identity theft; lower-quality counterfeit goods; lost sales or brand value to businesses; and lower overall economic growth and declining international trade.
To protect against these threats, a variety of security controls and other techniques are available. These include technical controls such as those that manage access to systems, ensure system integrity, and encrypt sensitive data. But they also include risk management and strategic planning that organizations undertake to improve their overall security posture and reduce their exposure to risk. Further, effective public-private partnerships are a key element for, among other things, sharing information about threats.
Multiple federal agencies undertake a wide range of activities in support of IP rights. Some of these agencies include the Departments of Commerce, Justice, and Homeland Security, among others. For example, components within the Justice Department and the Federal Bureau of Investigation are dedicated to fighting computer-based threats to IP. In addition, both Congress and the Administration have established interagency mechanisms for better coordinating the protection of IP. Ensuring effective coordination will be critical for better protecting the economic security of Americas businesses.
What GAO Recommends
In prior reports, GAO has made hundreds of recommendations to better protect federal systems, critical infrastructures, and intellectual property. |
gao_GAO-13-132T | gao_GAO-13-132T_0 | Armed with the stolen identity, the thief can then file a fraudulent tax return seeking a refund. Much Remains Unknown about the Extent and Nature of Identity Theft
The full extent and nature of identity theft-based refund fraud is not known, but IRS data indicate that it is a large and growing problem. Understanding the extent and nature of identity theft-related refund fraud is important to crafting a response to it. Program officials said that one of the challenges they face in combating this type of fraud is its changing nature. However, the better IRS managers’ understanding of the problem, the better they can respond and the better Congress can oversee IRS’s efforts. IRS officials described several areas where the extent and nature of identity theft is unknown. Total number and cost of fraudulent returns. IRS does not know the full extent of the occurrence of identity theft. Officials said that they count the refund fraud cases that IRS identifies but that they do not estimate the number of identity theft cases that go undetected. Identity of the thieves. Unless IRS pursues a criminal investigation, IRS generally does not know the real identity of the thieves. Whether a fraudulent return is an individual attempt or part of a broader scheme. Identifying new schemes or significant cases, such as one identity thief using numerous taxpayer identities, depends on analysts noticing patterns or other indications that a few cases may be part of a larger scheme. As a result, some schemes or cases involving multiple taxpayers may go undetected. Characteristics of known identity theft returns. IRS officials told us that the agency does not systematically track characteristics of known identity theft returns, including the type of return preparation (e.g. paid preparer or software), whether the return is filed electronically or on paper, or how the individual claimed a refund (e.g. check, direct deposit, or debit card). While much remains unknown about identity theft, IRS has taken steps to collect program data on its identity theft detection and resolution efforts. IRS developed the internal Refund Fraud and Identity Theft Global Report (Global Report) in July 2012 to consolidate and track existing information about identity theft incidents from multiple sources within IRS. The report is used to provide information to IRS senior management and the Identity Theft Advisory Councilidentity theft metrics and to provide a standard source of information for responding to data requests from external entities, according to PGLD officials. In a selective review of the Global Report, we found that it had many of the attributes we have previously found to be useful for program monitoring. However, we also found some areas where additional information or clarification of information currently in the report could make it more useful, as explained in table 3. With such additional information, IRS management or other entities that use the report would have a clearer picture of not only what is known about identity theft-based refund fraud, but the strengths and limitations of the available information. The quality of the report will also be enhanced by the institution of process controls to help ensure consistency in how the data in the report are compiled, verified, and validated. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve the identity theft information available to IRS management and Congress, we recommend that the Acting Commissioner of Internal Revenue update the Refund Fraud and Identity Theft Global Report to: provide definitions, data sources, and the frequency of data updates for data elements where such information is missing; document procedures used to compile and validate data; and describe limitations of the data presented. We revised language in the report to emphasize that, like other forms of fraud, CI focuses its identity theft-related refund fraud investigations on the most serious cases. | Why GAO Did This Study
Identity theft is a growing and evolving problem that imposes a financial and emotional toll on its victims. As of September 30, 2012, IRS had identified almost 642,000 incidents of identity theft that impacted tax administration in 2012 alone, a large increase over prior years. A taxpayer may have his or her tax refund delayed if an identity thief files a fraudulent tax return seeking a refund using a legitimate taxpayer's identity information.
GAO was asked to describe identity theft issues at IRS and limits to what is known about the extent of identity theft. GAO updated its analysis on identity theft with current data on identity theft cases and interviewed IRS officials. GAO also reviewed past GAO reports to identify key attributes of successful performance measures and compare information provided by the Global Report
What GAO Found
Understanding the extent and nature of identity theft-related refund fraud is important to crafting a response to it, but Internal Revenue Service (IRS) managers recognize that they do not have a complete picture. Program officials said that one of the challenges they face in combating this type of fraud is its changing nature and how it is concealed. While perfect knowledge about cases and who is committing the crime will never be attained, the better IRS understands the problem, the better it can respond and the better Congress can oversee IRS's efforts. IRS officials described several areas where the extent and nature of identity theft is unknown.
Total number and cost of fraudulent returns. IRS does not know the full extent of the occurrence of identity theft. Officials said that they count the refund fraud cases that IRS identifies but that they do not estimate the number of identity theft cases that go undetected.
Identity of the thieves. Unless IRS pursues a criminal investigation, IRS generally does not know the real identity of the thieves.
Whether a fraudulent return is an individual attempt or part of a broader scheme. Identifying new schemes or significant cases, such as one thief using numerous taxpayer identities, depends on analysts noticing patterns or other indications that a few cases may be part of a larger scheme. As a result, some schemes or cases involving multiple taxpayers may go undetected.
Characteristics of known identity theft returns. IRS officials told us that the agency does not systematically track characteristics of known identity theft returns, including the type of return preparation (e.g., paid preparer or software), whether the return is filed electronically or on paper, or how the individual claimed a refund (e.g., check, direct deposit, or debit card).
While much remains unknown about identity theft, IRS has taken steps to organize what it knows in a newly developed Refund Fraud and Identity Theft Global Report (Global Report). The Global Report consolidates and tracks information about identity theft incidents and IRS detection and resolution efforts from multiple sources within IRS. The report provides information to IRS senior management and a standard source of information for responding to data requests from external entities. GAO's selected review of the Global Report against key attributes of successful performance measures found that it had many of the attributes useful for program monitoring, but also had some areas where additional information or clarification would make the report more helpful. Updating the Global Report to provide information on definitions, data sources, and limitations such as the unknown number of undetected fraudulent returns, could help ensure users have a more complete picture of the data and its strengths and limitations. The quality of the report will also be enhanced by the institution of process controls to help ensure consistency in how the data in the report are compiled, verified and validated.
What GAO Recommends
To improve information available to IRS management and Congress, GAO recommends that IRS update the Global Report to provide definitions and data sources, where such information is missing; document procedures used to compile and validate the data; and describe limitations of the data presented.
IRS officials agreed with our recommendations. Based on their comment, we revised language in the report to clarify that, like other forms of fraud, IRS conducts criminal investigations only in the most serious identity theft-related refund fraud cases. |
gao_GAO-15-325 | gao_GAO-15-325_0 | Significant Work Remains to Field 14 Fully Capable C-27Js
As of January 2015, the Coast Guard has transferred 2 of 14 C-27Js to its aircraft maintenance facility, after returning them to flyable status, and is in the process of developing a detailed plan for fielding all 14 aircraft by 2022. Currently, the Coast Guard is assessing the first two planes and establishing the key steps necessary to finish inducting these aircraft. The Coast Guard Must Address Risks Related to Spare Parts, Technical Data, and Understanding the Condition of the Aircraft
The successful and cost effective fielding of the C-27J is contingent on the Coast Guard’s ability to address three risk areas, related to the following:
Purchasing spare parts—The Coast Guard had to develop its own list of spare parts for the aircraft, as existing lists are not available. Accessing technical data—The Coast Guard does not have full access to the technical data for the C-27J, which are required to maintain the aircraft over the long term and make modifications to the aircraft’s structure—for example, to install sensors. While the Air Force was operating the C-27J, it encountered issues keeping its fleet in operable condition due to difficulties with obtaining spare parts. Current Fixed-Wing Fleet Plan Achieves Savings but Does Not Meet Flying Hour Needs, and Revised Analysis Is Years Away
The C-27J will improve the affordability of the Coast Guard’s fixed-wing fleet, but the current fleet of aircraft that the Coast Guard is pursuing is not optimal in terms of cost and flight hour capability. However, the source of these savings has shifted. A significant portion of the savings now results from a drop in the number of flight hours the fleet will achieve due to reducing the planned quantity of aircraft. In the meantime, DHS and the Coast Guard have paused the HC-144 acquisition program, but historically the Coast Guard has received C-130J aircraft without budgeting for them. Current Fleet Plan Should Save Money but Does Not Meet Flight Hour Goal
To determine the potential impact of the C-27J on the cost and fight hour capability of the Coast Guard’s fixed-wing fleet, we compared three scenarios: the 2007 program of record (without the C-27J), to which we applied updated assumptions and the data in the Coast Guard’s business case, the Coast Guard’s C-27J business case as presented to Congress in 2013, and the Coast Guard’s current plan, to which we applied updated assumptions and the data in the Coast Guard’s business case. We calculated this difference using the Coast Guard’s goal of 52,400 annual flight hours as a baseline. The Coast Guard is undertaking this effort consistent with direction from Congress. According to the Coast Guard, this action would add 600 flight hours per year and save $322 million over the next 30 years. In total, since 2000, the Coast Guard has received 12 HC-130Js, currently valued at approximately $100 million each, without including them in its budget requests. In the meantime, although the Coast Guard has exercised prudence in pausing the HC-144 program, it may continue to receive HC- 130Js before it knows that it needs these aircraft and before it has determined the capabilities of its C-27J fleet. As a result, if the Coast Guard continues to receive HC-130Js while it revisits its needs, the capability and cost of the Coast Guard’s fixed-wing fleet runs the risk of being dictated by the assets the Coast Guard already owns rather than what it needs. Recommendations for Executive Action
We recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security and the Commandant of the Coast Guard inform Congress of the time frames and key milestones for completing the fleet mix study, including the specific date when the Coast Guard will publish its revised annual flight hour needs and when it plans to inform Congress of the corresponding changes to the composition of its fixed-wing fleet to meet these needs. DHS did not agree with our second recommendation, that the Commandant of the Coast Guard advise Congress to modify the provision of any additional HC-130Js pending the results of the fleet mix study. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of this report were to determine (1) the status of the transfer of the C-27Js from the Air Force to the Coast Guard, including cost and schedule estimates, plans for testing, and establishing a maintenance program—as well as any obstacles the Coast Guard faces to field the transferred aircraft, and (2) to what extent the acquisition will affect the overall cost and performance of the Coast Guard’s fixed wing aviation fleet. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Air Force is transferring 14 C-27J aircraft to the Coast Guard. Once modified into surveillance aircraft, the C-27Js will be a part of the Coast Guard's fixed-wing aircraft fleet. In 2007, the Coast Guard established a baseline of aircraft quantities and costs known as the program of record. This baseline established the cost and quantity of aircraft necessary to achieve its goal of 52,400 flight hours per year. The Coast Guard's aircraft, including the HC-144 and HC-130J/H, are integral to its missions, such as counterdrug and search and rescue.
GAO was asked to review the transfer of the C-27J to the Coast Guard. This report assesses (1) the status of the transfer and risks the Coast Guard faces in fielding the transferred aircraft; and (2) the extent to which acquiring the C-27J affects the overall cost and performance of the Coast Guard's fixed-wing aviation fleet.
GAO analyzed program documents and maintenance records for the C-27J. GAO interviewed Coast Guard and Air Force officials and private contractors. GAO also analyzed the Coast Guard's C-27J business case.
What GAO Found
As of January 2015, the Coast Guard had transferred 2 of the 14 C-27J aircraft it is receiving from the Air Force to its aircraft maintenance facility, with plans to field 14 fully operational C-27Js by 2022. According to initial Coast Guard estimates, while the aircraft come at no cost, the Coast Guard needs about $600 million to fully operationalize them. This process is complex and significant work and risk remain. For example, the Coast Guard must establish its needs and purchase a set of spare parts for each aircraft, but faces hurdles due to potential pricing issues and delivery delays from the manufacturer. Also, the Coast Guard does not have access to the manufacturer's technical data that are required for modifications to the aircraft's structure to, for example, incorporate radar. These and other risks may inhibit the Coast Guard's ability to operate the aircraft as planned. However, the Coast Guard is working to mitigate these risks.
The C-27J will improve the affordability of the Coast Guard's fixed-wing fleet, but the fleet as currently planned may not be optimal in terms of cost and flight hour capability. The Coast Guard submitted a business case to Congress in 2013 that determined the C-27J would save $837 million over 30 years, compared to the program of record, without reducing fleet performance. GAO estimates that the fleet the Coast Guard is currently pursuing achieves nearly all of these savings. However, the source of these savings has shifted. A significant portion of the savings now results from an 18 percent drop in flight hours due to a change in the mix of aircraft the Coast Guard intends to pursue. GAO used updated information in conducting its analysis, such as the expected service life of each aircraft type. Consistent with congressional direction, the Coast Guard is conducting a multi-phased analysis of its mission needs—including its flight hour goals and fleet of fixed-wing assets—but will not present the full results prior to its 2019 budget request. In the meantime, the Coast Guard has prudently paused its existing HC-144 acquisition program. However, since 2000, the Coast Guard has received 12 HC-130Js without budgeting for them and it may continue to receive these aircraft while it studies its fixed-wing fleet needs. If the Coast Guard continues to receive these aircraft in the near term, the capability and cost of the Coast Guard's fixed-wing fleet runs the risk of being dictated by the assets the Coast Guard already owns rather than what it determines it needs.
What GAO Recommends
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Coast Guard should advise Congress of the time frames for the Coast Guard's fleet analysis and to modify the provision of additional HC-130Js, as appropriate, in the interim. DHS agreed with the first recommendation, but did not agree with the second recommendation. If the Coast Guard accepts additional HC-130Js before completing the fleet mix study, the aircraft may be in excess of the Coast Guard's need. |
gao_GAO-12-322 | gao_GAO-12-322_0 | 1). GASB’s standards require reporting financial information on pensions, such as the annual pension cost, contributions actually made to the plan, and the ratio of assets to liabilities. Plans Have Sufficient Assets to Pay Near- Term Benefits, but Growing Budget Pressures Will Challenge Their Sustainability
Although pension plans suffered significant investment losses from the recent economic downturn, which was the most serious since the Great Depression, most state and local government plans currently have assets sufficient to cover their benefit commitments for a decade or more. 2). At the same time, data on individual plans indicate that this measure can vary considerably across plans. Benefit increases were another important reason for the growing gap between assets and liabilities over the past decade. For example, 11 states increased pension benefits in 2001 according to reports from the National Conference of State Legislatures. Plans Are Vulnerable to Pressures on State and Local Budgets
Fiscal pressures on state and local governments’ budgets add to the challenges faced by plan sponsors and their ability to make adequate contributions to their pension plans. As a result, higher pension contributions have been needed at the same time state and local governments have faced added pressures to balance their budgets. Based on our tabulation of state legislative changes reported annually by NCSL, we found that the majority of states have modified their existing defined benefit systems to reduce member benefits, lowering future liabilities. Half of states have increased required member (that is, employee) contributions, shifting costs to employees. Some states and localities have also taken action to lower pension contributions in the short term by changing actuarial methods, and a few have issued pension bonds to finance their contributions or to lower their costs by reducing the gap between plan assets and liabilities. Three States Recently Adopted Hybrid Approaches, Reducing Risk for Plan Sponsors
Although a majority of states have continued to use traditional defined benefit plans as their primary pension system, our analysis of NCSL annual reports on recent pension legislation found that, since 2008, three states—Georgia, Michigan, and Utah—have implemented hybrid approaches as primary plans for large groups of employees, shifting some investment risk to new employees. Some States and Localities Have Adjusted Pension Funding Practices, Potentially Increasing Future Costs
To address rising actuarially required pension contribution levels and budget pressures, some states and localities have taken actions to limit employer contributions in the short term or refinance their contributions. States and Localities Often Combine Strategies
States and localities often packaged multiple pension changes together. Whether the state’s statutorily required contributions are funded through POBs or general revenue does not directly affect the financial condition of the pension system. Concluding Observations
State and local governments continue to experience the lingering effects of investment losses and budget pressures in the wake of the recent economic downturn. Although most large state and local government pension plans still maintain substantial assets, sufficient to cover their pension obligations for a decade or more, heightened concerns over the long-term sustainability of the plans has spurred many states and localities to implement a variety of reforms, including reductions in benefits and increases in member contributions. Going forward, growing budget pressures will continue to challenge state and local governments’ abilities to provide adequate contributions to help sustain their pension plans and ensure a secure retirement for current and future employees. Agency Comments
We provided officials from the Internal Revenue Service and the Social Security Administration with a draft of this report. They provided technical comments that we incorporated, as appropriate. | Why GAO Did This Study
Over 27 million employees and beneficiaries are covered by state and local government pension plans. However, the recent economic downturn and associated budget challenges confronting state and local governments pose some questions as to the sustainability of these plans, and what changes, if any, state and local governments are making to strengthen the financial condition of their pension plans. GAO was asked to examine
(1) recent trends in the financial condition of state and local government pension plans and
(2) strategies state and local governments are using to manage pension costs and the impacts of these strategies on plans, sponsors, employees, and retirees.
To address these topics, GAO analyzed various measures of sector-wide financial condition based on national-level data on pension funding from the U.S. Census Bureau and others, and reviewed information on recent state legislative changes affecting government pensions from annual reports prepared by the National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL). GAO did not assess the soundness of individual plans, but did obtain documents and conduct interviews with pension and budget officials in eight states and eight localities, selected to illustrate the range of strategies being implemented to meet current and future pension funding requirement.
The Internal Revenue Service and Social Security Administration provided technical comments, which were incorporated, as appropriate.
What GAO Found
Despite the recent economic downturn, most large state and local government pension plans have assets sufficient to cover benefit payments to retirees for a decade or more. However, pension plans still face challenges over the long term due to the gap between assets and liabilities. In the past, some plan sponsors have not made adequate plan contributions or have granted unfunded benefit increases, and many suffered from investment losses during the economic downturn. The resulting gap between asset values and projected liabilities has led to steady increases in the actuarially required contribution levels needed to help sustain pension plans at the same time state and local governments face other fiscal pressures.
Since 2008, the combination of fiscal pressures and increasing contribution requirements has spurred many states and localities to take action to strengthen the financial condition of their plans for the long term, often packaging multiple changes together. GAOs tabulation of recent state legislative changes reported by NCSL and review of reforms in selected sites revealed the following:
Reducing benefits: 35 states have reduced pension benefits, mostly for future employees due to legal provisions protecting benefits for current employees and retirees. A few states, like Colorado, have reduced postretirement benefit increases for all members and beneficiaries of their pension plans.
Increasing member contributions: Half of the states have increased member contributions, thereby shifting a larger share of pension costs to employees.
Switching to a hybrid approach: Georgia, Michigan, and Utah recently implemented hybrid approaches, which incorporate a defined contribution plan component, shifting some investment risk to employees.
At the same time, some states and localities have also adjusted their funding practices to help manage pension contribution requirements in the short term by changing actuarial methods, deferring contributions, or issuing bonds, actions that may increase future pension costs. Going forward, growing budget pressures will continue to challenge state and local governments abilities to provide adequate contributions to help sustain their pension plans. |
gao_GAO-08-208T | gao_GAO-08-208T_0 | Scope and Methodology
To respond to these questions, we interviewed agency and industry officials, reviewed documents, and consulted with biodefense experts. The act also authorizes HHS to procure these countermeasures for the Strategic National Stockpile. The BioShield program stockpiled BioThrax for the Strategic National Stockpile for postexposure use in the event of a large number of U.S. civilians being exposed to anthrax. Three Factors Contributed to the Failure of ASPR’s First Project BioShield Effort to Produce an rPA Anthrax Vaccine
Three major factors contributed to the failure of the first Project BioShield procurement effort. First, ASPR awarded the first BioShield procurement contract to VaxGen when its product was at a very early stage of development and many critical manufacturing issues had not been addressed. Second, VaxGen took unrealistic risks in accepting the contract terms. HHS Awarded the Contract Too Soon
ASPR’s decision to launch the VaxGen procurement contract for the rPA anthrax vaccine at an early stage of development, combined with the delivery requirement for 25 million doses within 2 years, did not take the complexity of vaccine development into consideration and was overly aggressive. VaxGen Took Unrealistic Risks in Accepting the Procurement Contract
VaxGen officials told us that they understood their chances for success were limited and that the contract terms posed significant risks. These risks arose from aggressive time lines, VaxGen’s limitations with regard to in-house technical expertise in stability and vaccine formulation—a condition exacerbated by the attrition of key staff from the company as the contract progressed—and its limited options for securing additional funding should the need arise. When VaxGen failed to meet a critical performance milestone to initiate the next clinical trial, ASPR terminated the contract. Key Parties Did Not Clearly Articulate and Understand Critical Requirements
Important requirements regarding the data and testing required for the rPA anthrax vaccine to be eligible for use in an emergency were not known at the outset of the procurement contract. In addition, ASPR’s anticipated use of the rPA anthrax vaccine was not articulated to all parties clearly enough and evolved over time. Finally, according to VaxGen, purchases of BioThrax raised the requirement for use of the VaxGen rPA vaccine. All of these factors created confusion over the acceptance criteria for VaxGen’s product and significantly diminished VaxGen’s ability to meet contract time lines. ASPR purchased 10 million doses of BioThrax in 2005 and 2006 as a stopgap measure for post- exposure situations. The EUA guidance states that FDA will “authorize” an unapproved or unlicensed product—such as the rPA anthrax vaccine candidate—only if “there is no adequate, approved and available alternative.” According to the minutes of the meeting between FDA and VaxGen, in January 2006, FDA reported that the unlicensed rPA anthrax vaccine would be used in an emergency after the stockpiled BioThrax, that is, “when all of the currently licensed had been deployed.” This diminished the likelihood of a scenario where the rPA vaccine might be expected to be used out of the stockpile and, in VaxGen’s opinion, raised the bar for its rPA vaccine. ASPR Lacks an Effective Strategy to Minimize Waste in the Strategic National Stockpile and Plans to Use Expired Anthrax Vaccine
We identified two issues related to using the BioThrax in the Strategic National Stockpile. Three lots of BioThrax vaccine in the stockpile have already expired, resulting in losses of over $12 million. ASPR could minimize the potential waste of these lots by developing a single inventory system with DOD—which uses large quantities of the BioThrax vaccine— with rotation based on a first-in, first-out principle. DOD and ASPR officials told us that they discussed a rotation option in 2004 but identified several obstacles. ASPR’s planned use of expired vaccine would violate FDA’s current rules and could undermine public confidence because ASPR would be unable to guarantee the potency of the vaccine. With the termination of the contract, the government does not have a new, improved anthrax vaccine for the public, and the rest of the biotech industry is now questioning whether the government can clearly define its requirements for future procurement contracts. | Why GAO Did This Study
The anthrax attacks in September and October 2001 highlighted the need to develop medical countermeasures. The Project BioShield Act of 2004 authorized the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) to procure countermeasures for a Strategic National Stockpile. However, in December 2006, HHS terminated the contract for a recombinant protective antigen (rPA) anthrax vaccine because VaxGen failed to meet a critical contractual milestone. Also, supplies of the licensed BioThrax anthrax vaccine already in the stockpile will start expiring in 2008. GAO was asked to testify on its report on Project BioShield, which is being released today. This testimony summarizes (1) factors contributing to the failure of the rPA vaccine contract and (2) issues associated with using the BioThrax in the stockpile. GAO interviewed agency and industry officials, reviewed documents, and consulted with biodefense experts.
What GAO Found
Three major factors contributed to the failure of the first Project BioShield procurement effort for an rPA anthrax vaccine. First, HHS's Office of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response (ASPR) awarded the procurement contract to VaxGen, a small biotechnology firm, while VaxGen was still in the early stages of developing a vaccine and had not addressed many critical manufacturing issues. This award preempted critical development work on the vaccine. Also, the contract required VaxGen to deliver 25 million doses of the vaccine in 2 years, which would have been unrealistic even for a larger manufacturer. Second, VaxGen took unrealistic risks in accepting the contract terms. VaxGen officials told GAO that they accepted the contract despite significant risks due to (1) the aggressive delivery time line for the vaccine, (2) VaxGen's lack of in-house technical expertise--a condition exacerbated by the attrition of key company staff as the contract progressed--and (3) VaxGen's limited options for securing any additional funding needed. Third, important Food and Drug Administration (FDA) requirements regarding the type of data and testing required for the rPA anthrax vaccine to be eligible for use in an emergency were not known at the outset of the procurement contract. In addition, ASPR's anticipated use of the rPA anthrax vaccine was not articulated to all parties clearly enough and evolved over time. Finally, according to VaxGen, the purchase of BioThrax for the stockpile as a stopgap measure raised the bar for the VaxGen vaccine. All these factors created confusion over the acceptance criteria for VaxGen's product and significantly diminished VaxGen's ability to meet contract time lines. ASPR has announced its intention to issue another request for proposal for an rPA anthrax vaccine procurement but, along with other HHS components, has not analyzed lessons learned from the first contract's failure and may repeat earlier mistakes. According to industry experts, the lack of specific requirements is a cause of concern to the biotechnology companies that have invested significant resources in trying to meet government needs and now question whether the government can clearly define future procurement contract requirements. GAO identified two issues related with the use of the BioThrax in the Strategic National Stockpile. First, ASPR lacks an effective strategy to minimize the waste of BioThrax. Starting in 2008, several lots of BioThrax in the Strategic National Stockpile will begin to expire. As a result, over $100 million per year could be lost for the life of the vaccine currently in the stockpile. ASPR could minimize such potential waste by developing a single inventory system with DOD--a high-volume user of BioThrax--with rotation based on a first-in, first-out principle. DOD and ASPR officials identified a number of obstacles to this type of rotation that may require legislative action. Second, ASPR planned to use three lots of expired BioThrax vaccine in the stockpile in the event of an emergency. This would violate FDA rules, which prohibit using an expired vaccine, and could also undermine public confidence because the vaccine's potency could not be guaranteed. |
gao_T-RCED-99-123 | gao_T-RCED-99-123_0 | Between 1995 and 1998, USDA paid participating insurance companies about $1.7 billion in administrative expense reimbursements. Changes in Premium Rates for Traditional Crop Insurance Have Improved the Program’s Actuarial Condition, but Some Rates Remain Too Low
In 1995, we reported that for the six crops we reviewed—barley, corn, cotton, grain sorghum, soybeans, and wheat—basic premium rates overall were 89 percent adequate, on average, to meet the Congress’s legislative requirement of actuarial soundness. However, we found that while overall premiums were approaching actuarial soundness, USDA’s rates for some crops and locations and for some coverage and production levels were too low. These actions have contributed to the federal crop insurance program’s achieving a loss ratio well below the target in recent years, thereby improving the program’s financial soundness. Opportunities to Reduce Government Costs for Private Sector Delivery
In 1997, we reported that USDA’s administrative expense reimbursements to participating insurance companies selling traditional buyup insurance—31 percent of premiums—were much higher than the expenses that can be reasonably associated with the sale and service of federal crop insurance. Additionally, about $43 million of the companies’ reported expenses could not be reasonably associated with the sale and service of federal crop insurance to farmers. Subsequent to our report, the Agricultural Research, Extension, and Education Reform Act of 1998 revised reimbursement rates downward to 24.5 percent of premiums for traditional buyup insurance. Problems With USDA-Supported Revenue Insurance Plans Need to Be Addressed
In 1998, we reported shortcomings in the way premium rates are established for each of the three revenue insurance plans we reviewed. As a result of the shortcomings with the revenue insurance plans’ rating methods and to ensure premiums were appropriate to the risk each farmer presents, we recommended that the Secretary of Agriculture direct the Administrator of the Risk Management Agency to address the shortcomings in the methods used to set premiums. With respect to Crop Revenue Coverage, which does not incorporate the interrelationship between crop prices and farm-level yields, we recommended that the Risk Management Agency direct the plan’s developer to base premium rates on a revenue distribution or another appropriate statistical technique that recognizes this interrelationship. While USDA subsequently took action to improve the actuarial soundness of the Revenue Assurance plan, it has not, to date, acted on our recommendations regarding the other two plans. Furthermore, continued oversight of the reasonableness of the program’s administrative reimbursement rate is necessary. Increased program participation and sales volume that could result from crop insurance reform may lead to lower delivery costs, warranting a downward adjustment in the rate. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed the Department of Agriculture's (USDA) crop insurance program, focusing on whether USDA: (1) has set adequate insurance rates to achieve the legislative requirement of actuarial soundness; (2) appropriately reimburses participating crop insurance companies for their administrative costs; and (3) has established methodologies in the revenue insurance plans that set sound premium rates.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) several aspects of the program are of concern and need attention; (2) in 1995, GAO reported that premiums charged to farmers for crop insurance were not adequate to achieve the actuarial soundness as mandated by Congress; (3) GAO's review showed that the basic premium rates for the six crops reviewed--barley, corn, cotton, grain sorghum, soybeans, and wheat--were approaching actuarial soundness in 1995, but USDA's rates for some crops and locations and for some coverage and production levels were well below the legislative requirement; (4) in 1997, GAO reported that the government's administrative expense reimbursement to insurance companies--31 percent of premiums--was greater than the companies' reported expenses to sell and service federal crop insurance; (5) furthermore, GAO stated that some of these reported expenses did not appear to be reasonably associated with the sale and service of federal crop insurance; (6) the Agricultural Research, Extension, and Education Reform Act of 1998 subsequently revised reimbursement rates downward to 24.5 percent of premiums for most crop insurance; (7) however, continued oversight of the reasonableness of the program's administrative reimbursement rate is necessary; (8) increased program participation and sales volume that could result from crop insurance reform may lead to lower delivery costs, warranting a downward adjustment in the rate; (9) in 1998, GAO reported its doubts about whether new USDA-supported revenue insurance plans were actuarially sound over the long term and appropriate to the risk each farmer presents to the program; (10) specifically, with respect to the most popular plan, Crop Revenue Coverage, GAO recommended that USDA's Risk Management Agency require the plan's developer to base premium rates on a revenue distribution or other appropriate statistical technique that recognizes the interrelationship between farm-level yields and expected crop prices; (11) USDA, to date, has not fully acted on the recommendations; (12) this year Congress is once again considering reforms to the federal crop insurance program; and (13) continued oversight of the federal crop insurance program is needed to help ensure, among other things, the adequacy of premium rates, the reasonableness of administrative expense reimbursements to companies, and the soundness of revenue insurance plans. |
gao_GAO-09-28 | gao_GAO-09-28_0 | The act required the federal judiciary to collect and report certain new aggregate statistics. Limitations Exist to the Availability, Accuracy, and Accessibility of Information on Consumer Bankruptcies
AOUSC publishes certain aggregate statistics related to the numbers of bankruptcy filings. Documents within individual case files contain a range of information, but few data exist on the causes of bankruptcy and the characteristics of bankruptcy filers. There has been long-standing recognition that much of the data in the bankruptcy system may not be accurate—largely because much of the data is self-reported by debtors in the official bankruptcy forms—although these data are sufficiently reliable for the purposes of initiating a bankruptcy case. Several factors create challenges to improving the bankruptcy data system. Most notably, facilitating public access to data in bankruptcy files—which can contain highly personal information—can raise privacy and security concerns. The federal judiciary also has noted that collection of demographic or other additional data is not its mission and would require added resources; further, the judicial process may not be well suited to capturing certain types of information, such as the reasons a consumer files for bankruptcy. Bankruptcy case files are publicly accessible, but not in a format that readily allows for compilation and analysis. The U.S. Party/Case Index was designed to allow nationwide searches of individual bankruptcy cases, and although it serves that function, its search parameters are limited and the results do not include much of the data held by the system. Public accessibility must balance privacy and security concerns. Collection of demographic and other additional data is not the judiciary’s mission. A range of bankruptcy stakeholders, including some judges, researchers, and Trustee Program staff, have suggested improving public access to data that already exist in the judiciary’s data systems. Bankruptcy Reform Act’s Data Requirements Provide Some Benefits, but Several Factors Limit the Usefulness of the Data
The Bankruptcy Reform Act required AOUSC to compile and report certain statistics on consumer bankruptcy cases on an annual basis, and it required the Trustee Program to require uniform forms for the final reports submitted by private trustees at the end of each bankruptcy case. The New Data Requirements Will Provide Some Additional Information about Consumer Bankruptcies
The new annual statistics and the uniform final reports required under the Bankruptcy Reform Act will provide some additional information that may be useful in understanding the characteristics of consumer bankruptcy cases and differences among such cases across the country. Releasing Case-Level Data Used for Bankruptcy Reform Act Statistics Could Be Beneficial
AOUSC currently has no plans to provide public access to the raw, case- level data used to generate the statistics required by the Bankruptcy Reform Act. A variety of stakeholders in the bankruptcy process told us that these case-level data would be useful—despite their limitations—if made publicly available as a data set. Further, Trustee Program staff and a researcher told us that access to the case-level data could enable external parties to assess their reliability and limitations—for example, by verifying the data against the case files in PACER and removing erroneous data values. Congress is similarly limited in its ability to make bankruptcy policy and formulate legislation based on empirical data rather than anecdotal evidence. Better access to bankruptcy data already held in the judiciary’s data systems could facilitate scholarly research, the informed allocation of bankruptcy resources, and the formulation of bankruptcy policy. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our report objectives were to examine (1) the availability and accessibility of data from the bankruptcy system and (2) the potential benefits and limitations of the new data requirements of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (Bankruptcy Reform Act) in addressing these issues. | Why GAO Did This Study
There have been long-standing questions about a lack of comprehensive and reliable information on consumer bankruptcies. The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (Bankruptcy Reform Act) required the federal judiciary's Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts (AOUSC) to collect and report certain additional bankruptcy statistics and required the U.S. Trustee Program, which oversees bankruptcy case administration, to develop uniform final reports that provide certain specified data about each case. GAO was asked to examine the (1) availability and accessibility of data from the personal bankruptcy system and (2) potential benefits and limitations of the new data requirements of the Bankruptcy Reform Act in addressing these issues. GAO examined bankruptcy data systems and obtained documentation and interviewed staff from AOUSC, bankruptcy courts, and the Trustee Program; groups representing consumers and creditors; data providers; and academic researchers and other stakeholders.
What GAO Found
There are limitations to the availability, accuracy, and accessibility of data on consumer bankruptcies. AOUSC publishes certain aggregate statistics related to the numbers of filings, but few data are available on the causes of bankruptcy and the characteristics of bankruptcy filers. Studies show that the information in the bankruptcy case files is not always accurate because much of it is self-reported by debtors who frequently make errors, although these data are sufficiently reliable for the purposes of initiating a bankruptcy case. Bankruptcy case files are publicly accessible through the Public Access to Court Electronic Records system, but not in a format that allows the data they hold to be easily extracted and used for research or analysis. Another system, the U.S. Party/Case Index, was designed for nationwide searches for individual cases; while it serves that purpose, its search parameters are limited and the output does not include much of the data held in the system. Several factors create challenges to expanding data on consumer bankruptcies--most notably, privacy and security concerns related to facilitating public access to the highly personal data contained in bankruptcy files. The federal judiciary also has noted that collection of demographic and other additional data is not its mission and would require further resources. Nonetheless, a range of bankruptcy stakeholders, including some judges, researchers, and U.S. Trustee Program staff, have suggested that the judiciary identify and implement practicable ways to improve public access to data that already exist in its data systems, which could facilitate scholarly research and the formulation of bankruptcy policy and legislation. While the data requirements of the Bankruptcy Reform Act are a step toward making more information on consumer bankruptcies available, their value is likely to be limited. The new annual statistics will provide some additional information that may be helpful in identifying differences in bankruptcy cases across judicial districts. In addition, the uniform final reports required by the act will standardize the data in the reports and assist the U.S. Trustee Program in overseeing case administration. However, for several reasons the statistics required under the act are likely to be of limited value. For example, many of the statistics are relatively narrow in scope and were not intended to provide certain key information, such as the causes of bankruptcy and the demographic characteristics of filers. Further, the AOUSC data are provided as aggregated statistics--rather than data on individual cases--which limits the extent to which they can be analyzed. As such, a variety of stakeholders in the bankruptcy process told us that the underlying case-level data used to generate the statistics could be useful if made publicly available as a data set. AOUSC currently has no plans to provide public access to these case-level data, in part, officials say, because they first need to identify and address privacy and security issues. GAO acknowledges the importance of those issues, but believes that better access to bankruptcy data already held in the judiciary's data systems--such as these case-level data--would allow external parties to assess the data's reliability and limitations and could facilitate empirical research and the formulation of bankruptcy policy. |
gao_GAO-08-909T | gao_GAO-08-909T_0 | According to the Department of Health and Human Services’ budget justification, FDA plans to direct the $42 million to strategic actions described in its Food Protection Plan. As shown in table 1, the plan outlines spending on all three core elements of the Food Protection Plan––a total of about $21 million for prevention, about $34 million for intervention, and about $23 million for response for fiscal years 2008 and 2009. More recently, a senior level FDA official provided us with an estimate of 5 years for fully implementing the plan. However, FDA has not provided us with timelines for the various strategies described in the plan. While the work plan provides some basic information, more specific information, such as estimated resources needed to implement the various strategies— the core elements, goals, and deliverables—as well as the overall plan and timeframes for implementing the strategies, are needed to assess FDA’s progress in implementing the plan or in acquiring the resources and authorities it needs. From the information we have obtained on the Food Protection Plan, it is unclear what FDA’s overall resource need is for implementing the plan. The overall resource need could be significant. For example, if FDA were to inspect each of the approximately 65,500 domestic food firms regulated by FDA, at the Commissioner’s May 2008 estimate of $8,000 for a domestic food safety inspection, it would cost approximately $524 million to inspect all of these facilities once. In addition, in March 2008, FDA officials indicated that a progress report on actions taken to implement the Food Protection Plan would be issued in April 2008. In May, FDA officials told us that they had prepared a draft progress report, but as of June 4, 2008, FDA had not made this report public. We have noted that public reporting is the means through which the federal government communicates the results of its work to the Congress and the American people. FDA’s Proposal to Focus Inspections Based on Risk Can Help Target Scarce Resources
The Food Protection Plan identifies the need to focus safety inspections based on risk, which is particularly important as the numbers of food firms have increased while inspections have decreased. In its Food Protection Plan, FDA has identified some actions to better identify food vulnerabilities and assess risks. Conducting inspections based on risk has the potential to be an efficient and effective approach for FDA to target scarce resources, particularly when the number of inspections has not kept pace with the growth in firms between 2001 and 2007. Specifically, while the number of domestic firms under FDA’s jurisdiction increased from about 51,000 to more than 65,500, the number of firms inspected declined slightly, from 14,721 to 14,566. GAO Has Issued Recommendations Intended to Help Leverage Resources and Improve Operations, but FDA Has Implemented Few of Them
FDA has implemented few of our past recommendations to improve food safety oversight. We have made 34 food safety related recommendations to FDA since 2004 and, as of May 2008, FDA has implemented 7. For the remaining recommendations, FDA has not fully implemented them, however, in some cases, FDA has taken some steps. The planned activities in the Food Protection Plan could help address several of these recommendations. In a January 2004 report regarding seafood safety, we recommended that, among other things, FDA make it a priority to establish equivalence agreements with other countries. We found that such agreements would shift some of FDA’s oversight burden to foreign governments. FDA did not concur with this recommendation, and as of May 2008, has not yet established equivalence agreements with any foreign countries. The Food Protection Plan requests that Congress allow the agency to enter into agreements with exporting countries to certify that foreign producers’ shipments of high-risk products comply with FDA standards. To conclude, FDA’s release of the Food Protection Plan is a positive first step toward modernizing FDA’s approach to food safety to better meet the challenges of an increasingly global food supply and respond to shifting demographics and consumption patterns. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is responsible for ensuring the safety of roughly 80 percent of the U.S. food supply, including $417 billion worth of domestic food and $49 billion in imported food annually. Changing demographics and consumption patterns along with an increase in imports have presented challenges to FDA. At the same time, recent outbreaks, such as E. coli from spinach and Salmonella from tomatoes, have undermined consumer confidence in the safety of the food supply. In November 2007, FDA released its Food Protection Plan, which articulates a framework for improving food safety oversight. In January 2008, GAO expressed concerns about FDA's capacity to implement the Food Protection Plan and noted that more specific information about the strategies and resources needed to implement the plan would facilitate congressional oversight. This testimony focuses on (1) FDA's progress in implementing the Food Protection Plan, (2) FDA's proposal to focus inspections based on risk, and (3) FDA's implementation of previously issued GAO recommendations intended to improve food safety oversight. To address these issues, GAO reviewed FDA documents, such as FDA's operations plan, and FDA data related to the plan. GAO also interviewed FDA officials regarding the progress made. GAO also analyzed FDA data on domestic and foreign food firm inspections. GAO also analyzed the status of past recommendations.
What GAO Found
Since FDA's Food Protection Plan was first released in November 2007, FDA has added few details on the resources and strategies required to implement the plan. FDA plans to spend about $90 million over fiscal years 2008 and 2009 to implement several key actions, such as identifying food vulnerabilities and risk. From the information GAO has obtained on the Food Protection Plan, however, it is unclear what FDA's overall resource need is for implementing the plan, which could be significant. For example, based on FDA estimates, if FDA were to inspect each of the approximately 65,500 domestic food firms regulated by FDA once, the total cost would be approximately $524 million. In addition, timelines for implementing the various strategies in the plan are also unclear, although a senior level FDA official estimated that the overall plan will take 5 years to complete. Importantly, GAO has noted that public reporting is the means through which the federal government communicates the results of its work to the Congress and the American people. FDA officials told GAO that they had prepared a draft report on progress made in implementing the Food Protection Plan, but as of June 4, 2008, FDA told GAO that the Department of Health and Human Services had not cleared the report for release. The Food Protection Plan identifies the need to focus safety inspections based on risk, which is particularly important as the numbers of food firms have increased while inspections have decreased. For example, between 2001 and 2007, the number of domestic firms under FDA's jurisdiction increased from about 51,000 to more than 65,500, while the number of firms inspected declined slightly, from 14,721 to 14,566. Thus, conducting safety inspections based on risk has the potential to be an efficient and effective approach for FDA to target scarce resources based on relative vulnerability and risk. FDA has implemented few of GAO's past recommendations to leverage its resources and improve food safety oversight. Since 2004, GAO has made a total of 34 food safety related recommendations to FDA, and as of May 2008, FDA has implemented 7 of these recommendations. For the remaining recommendations, FDA has not fully implemented them, however, in some cases, FDA has taken some steps. However, the planned activities in the Food Protection Plan could help address several of the recommendations that FDA has not implemented. For example, in January 2004, GAO recommended that FDA make it a priority to establish equivalence agreements with other countries. We found that such agreements would shift some of FDA's oversight burden to foreign governments. As of May 2008, FDA has not yet established equivalence agreements with any foreign countries. The Food Protection Plan requests that Congress allow the agency to enter into agreements with exporting countries to certify that foreign producers' shipments of designated high-risk products comply with FDA standards. |
gao_GAO-12-736 | gao_GAO-12-736_0 | See below for an example of an administrative forfeiture. For more information on how agencies qualify for equitable sharing, see appendix I.
AFF Revenues and Expenditures Have Increased since Fiscal Year 2003, and DOJ’s Process for Carrying Over Funds Could Be More Transparent
From fiscal years 2003 through 2011, AFF revenues and expenditures increased, with annual revenues doubling in fiscal year 2006, due in part to an increase in forfeitures resulting from fraud and financial crimes investigations. AFF’s Revenues More than Tripled from Fiscal Years 2003 through 2011
In the 9-year period from fiscal years 2003 through 2011, AFF revenues totaled $11 billion, growing from $500 million in fiscal year 2003 to $1.8 billion in fiscal year 2011. Specifically, expenditures increased from $458 million in fiscal year 2003 to $1.3 billion in fiscal year 2011. Revenues resulting from forfeitures are used to pay the forfeiture program’s expenditures in three major categories: 1. payments to third parties, including payments to satisfy interested parties such as lienholders, as well as the return of funds to victims of large-scale fraud; 2. equitable sharing payments to state and local law enforcement agencies that participated in law enforcement efforts resulting in the forfeitures; and 3. all other program operations expenses that include a total of 13 expenditure categories such as asset management and disposal, the storage and destruction of drugs, and investigative expenses leading to a seizure. DOJ Carries Over Funds Needed to Cover Anticipated Expenditures in the Next Fiscal Year, but Transparency Could Be Improved
At the end of each fiscal year, DOJ carries over funds in order to help ensure it has sufficient resources to cover all AFF expenses that may not be covered by the next year’s revenues; however, the process DOJ uses to determine how much to carry over each year is not documented or outlined in its Congressional Budget Justifications. They then carry over funds needed to cover anticipated expenses for the coming year including funds needed to cover the costs of pending equitable sharing and third-party payments as well as funds needed to ensure the Asset Forfeiture Program’s solvency—including the anticipated costs associated with continuing forfeiture activities—at the start of the next fiscal year. According to DOJ officials, they consider a number of factors when calculating the funds needed to maintain solvency, such as historical data including information on the costs of past contracts, salary costs, and other expenses; known future expenses including salaries and contracts; and the costs of any potential new expenditures. After these funds have been reserved, any funds determined to be in excess of these requirements (excess unobligated balances) may be declared as Super Surplus. To make up the difference needed to meet the $495 million rescission in fiscal year 2011, DOJ used unobligated balances in the amount of $233 million. DOJ Could Enhance Controls and Oversight Mechanisms for Its Equitable Sharing Program
DOJ has established guidelines and oversight mechanisms for the equitable sharing program, but additional controls could enhance the consistency and transparency of the program. In addition, DOJ has established mechanisms governing how DOJ agencies should make equitable sharing determinations. For example, if a state or local law enforcement agency contributed additional resources or equipment to an investigation, its sharing percentage might be adjusted upward from what it would be based on work hours alone. While DOJ has established guidance indicating that adjustments to sharing percentages may be made when a state or local law enforcement agency’s work hours alone do not reflect the value of its participation in an investigation, DOJ has not developed guidance regarding how to apply the qualitative factors that may warrant departures from sharing percentages. This is particularly important given that these determinations represent DOJ’s overall assessment of each agency’s unique contributions to an investigation and are a key component of how DOJ makes decisions about how much to award each agency. Establishing a mechanism to ensure that this information is documented by all DOJ agencies responsible for making equitable sharing determinations could enhance the transparency of equitable sharing decisions. However, because the information that serves as the basis for equitable sharing recommendations—including work hours and the qualitative factors used to make adjustments to sharing percentages—are not subject to review by agency headquarters officials, DOJ does not have reasonable assurance that the equitable sharing determinations are made in accordance with the established guidance. Conclusions
With more than $1 billion in forfeited assets deposited into the AFF every year since 2006, the Asset Forfeiture Program generates substantial revenue for the Department of Justice. To help improve transparency over the AFF’s use of funds, we recommend that the Attorney General provide more detailed information to Congress as part of the AFF’s annual budget process, clearly documenting how DOJ determines the amount of funds to be carried over into the next fiscal year. Establish a mechanism to ensure that the basis for equitable sharing determinations—including the work hours contributed by all participating agencies and the rationale for any adjustments to sharing percentages—are recorded in the documents provided to agency headquarters officials for review and approval. Develop a risk-based mechanism to monitor whether key information in support of equitable sharing determinations is recorded and the extent to which sharing determinations are made in accordance with established guidance. 5. | Why GAO Did This Study
Every year, federal law enforcement agencies seize millions of dollars in assets in the course of investigations. The AFF was established to receive the proceeds of forfeiture and holds more than $1 billion in assets. DOJ uses the proceeds from forfeitures primarily to cover the costs of forfeiture activities. DOJ also shares forfeiture proceeds with state and local agencies that participate in joint investigations through its equitable sharing program. GAO was asked to review (1) AFFs revenues and expenditures from fiscal years 2003 through 2011 and DOJs processes for carrying over funds for the next fiscal year, and (2) the extent to which DOJ has established controls to help ensure that the equitable sharing program is implemented in accordance with established guidance. GAO analyzed data on AFF revenues, expenditures, and balances; interviewed DOJ officials; and analyzed a sample of 25 equitable sharing determinations, which included 5 determinations from each relevant DOJ agency. GAOs analysis of the samples was not generalizable, but provided insight into DOJs decisions.
What GAO Found
Annual revenues into the Assets Forfeiture Fund (AFF) from forfeited assets increased from $500 million in 2003 to $1.8 billion in 2011, in part due to an increase in prosecutions of fraud and financial crimes cases. Expenditures in support of forfeiture activities such as equitable sharing payments to state and local law enforcement agencies and payments to victims also increased over the same 9-year period, growing from $458 million in 2003 to $1.3 billion in 2011. The Department of Justice (DOJ) uses the difference between revenues and expenditures in any year to help cover anticipated expenses in the next fiscal year. Because the AFF uses fund revenues to pay for the expenses associated with forfeiture activities, DOJ carries over funds at the end of each fiscal year to ensure it has sufficient resources to cover expenses that may not be covered by the next years revenues. When determining the amounts to carry over, DOJ reviews historical data on past program expenditures, analyzes known future expenses such as salaries and contracts, and estimates the costs of any potential new expenditures. However, DOJ has not documented the process for determining the amount of funds needed to cover anticipated expenditures in the next fiscal year in its annual budget justifications. Providing more transparent information as part of the AFFs annual budget process would better inform Congress oversight of the AFF. Further, after DOJ obligates funds needed to cover program expenses, any remaining AFF funds identified at the end of a fiscal year may be declared an excess unobligated balance. DOJ has the authority to use these balances for any of the departments authorized purposes. Per Office of Management and Budget guidance, in recent years, DOJ used these excess unobligated balances to help cover rescissions. Rescissions cancel the availability of DOJs previously enacted budget authority, making the funds involved no longer available for obligation. For example, in fiscal year 2011, DOJ used excess unobligated balances to help cover a $495 million AFF program rescission.
DOJ has established guidelines for making equitable sharing determinations, but controls to ensure consistency and transparency could be improved. For example, DOJ agencies responsible for making equitable sharing determinations may make adjustments to sharing percentages when work hours alone do not reflect the relative value of an agencys contribution to an investigation. If a state or local law enforcement agency contributed a helicopter or a drug-sniffing dog to an investigation, its sharing percentage might be adjusted upward from what it would be based on work hours alone. However, DOJs guidance does not include information regarding how decisions about these adjustments to sharing determinations should be made. This is particularly important given that these determinations represent DOJs overall assessment of each agencys unique contributions and are a key component of how DOJ determines how much to award to each agency. Furthermore, key information that serves as the basis for equitable sharing determinationssuch as the work hours contributed by each of the participating agencies in an investigationis not subject to review by approving authorities. Developing guidance regarding how these decisions are to be made, documenting the basis for these decisions, and subjecting them to review and approval would help ensure the consistency and transparency of equitable sharing determinations.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that, among other things, DOJ clearly document how it determines the amount of funds that will need to be carried over for the next fiscal year, develop guidance on how components should make adjustments to equitable sharing determinations, and ensure that the basis for equitable sharing determinations is documented and subjected to review and approval. DOJ concurred with GAOs recommendations. |
gao_GAO-04-1065 | gao_GAO-04-1065_0 | The cargo preference and Maritime Security Programs are intended to support both as part of the U.S.-flag fleet. Cargo Preference and Maritime Security Programs Provide Incentives to Retain U.S.-Flag Ships and Mariners
The cargo preference and Maritime Security Programs both provide incentives to retain privately owned U.S.-flag ships and their U.S.-citizen mariners for commercial and national defense purposes. MSF currently has 47 ships, of which 37 have participated in cargo preference food aid shipments. MSF and Non-MSF Carriers Compete for Bagged Food Aid Shipments
MSF and non-MSF carriers compete only for bagged food aid shipments because MSF vessels do not carry bulk food aid. Increasing Share of Food Aid Is Shipped as Bagged Cargo
Although on average approximately 67 percent of food aid was shipped as bulk cargo and 33 percent as bagged cargo from fiscal years 1999 to 2003, the share of food aid shipped as bagged cargo generally increased during these years. Changes in food aid spending from fiscal years 1999 to 2003 have contributed to this shift from bulk to bagged cargo. MSF vessels carried about 45 percent of this cargo and non-MSF vessels carried 55 percent. Cargo Preference Requirements Affect Whether Food Aid Shipments Are Awarded to MSF or Non-MSF Carriers
Cargo preference requirements affect the results of competition between MSF and non-MSF carriers for food aid shipments. Multiple Factors Determine How Tonnage Limit Changes Would Impact Food Aid Carriers
Our analysis of data from program agencies and carriers suggests that establishing a bagged tonnage limitation could reduce MSF vessels’ market share in food aid, but the extent will depend on the limitation level and the options MSF carriers have in responding to it. Using recent data, we examined daily limits of 7,500, 5,000, and 2,500 tons and found that the percentage of MSF food aid voyages affected rises from 3 percent at a limit of 7,500 tons to 19 percent at a limit of 2,500 tons. The major food aid ports would generally experience a limited impact on their overall port activity from a bagged tonnage limit, although specific food aid terminals could potentially be affected, depending on the extent of any limitation and the MSF carriers’ responses to it. If carriers never forgo the subsidy, the impacts of a limitation on MSF carriers would be greater. As discussed with Committee representatives, we have focused on answering the following questions: (1) how the cargo preference and Maritime Security Programs are designed to meet their objectives and who participates in them; (2) what the nature and extent are of MSF and non-MSF carrier participation in the food aid program; (3) how establishing a bagged cargo preference tonnage limitation on MSF vessels would be expected to affect the MSF, other U.S.- flag ships, the cargo preference food aid program, and the ports servicing these ships. For affected voyages, an MSF carrier may be able to (1) continue carrying some food aid up to the limit, (2) replace some food aid above a limit with other cargo, and (3) continue carrying food aid above a limit if it were more profitable than the subsidy payment for that voyage plus any net revenue from replacing the food aid with other cargo. 1. | Why GAO Did This Study
Food aid cargo must generally be carried on U.S.-flag ships under requirements set by the cargo preference program. Two groups of carriers compete for this cargo: (1) those that participate in the Maritime Security Program and receive an annual government subsidy--generally liners operating on scheduled routes and (2) those that do not--generally carriers operating on a charter basis. Congress directed GAO to study (1) how the cargo preference and Maritime Security programs are designed and who participates;(2) the nature and extent of MSF and non-MSF carrier participation and competition in the food aid program; and (3) how a tonnage limitation on bagged preference cargo for MSF vessels could affect MSF, other U.S.-flag ships, the cargo preference food aid program, and the ports servicing these ships.
What GAO Found
The cargo preference program and the Maritime Security Program provide incentives to retain privately owned U.S.-flag ships and their U.S. citizen mariners for commercial and national defense purposes. The cargo preference program is open to all U.S.-flagged vessels, while the Maritime Security Fleet (MSF) subsidy is only available to certain militarily useful vessels. Of the 47 ships currently in the MSF, 37 have participated in cargo preference food aid shipments. MSF and non-MSF carriers compete for food aid shipped as bagged cargo, which averaged 33 percent of food aid shipments by tonnage from fiscal years 1999 to 2003. There is no competition for bulk food aid shipments because MSF carriers do not carry bulk cargo. Changes in food aid spending have contributed to a shift from bulk to bagged cargo and increased reliance on bagged cargo by some non-MSF carriers. From 1999 to 2003, MSF carriers shipped about 45 percent and non-MSF carriers 55 percent of bagged food aid cargo. Competition between MSF and non-MSF carriers for bagged food aid is affected by certain cargo preference requirements. Establishing a tonnage limitation on MSF vessels would likely reduce their share of food aid shipments, but the extent would depend on factors such as the level of the limit and the options MSF carriers have in responding to it. We examined three proposed limits and found that the percentage of food aid voyages carrying more than the proposed limit rises from 3 percent with a limit of 7,500 tons to 19 percent above 2,500 tons, according to fiscal year 2001 to 2003 data. The actual impact on MSF carriers will be smaller if they are able to (1) carry some food aid up to the limit, (2) replace some food aid above the limit with other cargo, and/or (3) elect to carry food aid even without the subsidy. Food aid agencies are concerned about the impacts of a tonnage limit, including increased delays in providing food aid, administrative burdens, and higher shipping costs. Major ports would generally experience a limited overall impact of a tonnage limitation, but specific food aid terminals could be affected. |
gao_AIMD-97-61 | gao_AIMD-97-61_0 | Rationale for Creating DFAS
Before 1991, the military services maintained separate finance and accounting operations that were duplicative and inefficient. Before fiscal year 1991, the military services and defense agencies each had their own financial management structure, consisting of a headquarters comptroller organization; finance and accounting centers; and accounting, finance, and disbursing offices at military bases. This has allowed it to reduce the number of locations and personnel needed to perform these operations and to begin standardizing its accounting systems and processes. DFAS is currently consolidating all its activities into 5 centers and not more than 21 operating locations. DFAS currently has 23,500 employees. According to DOD, however, there should have been about 18,000 finance and accounting personnel left with the military services in 1994. Between fiscal years 1996 and 2000, DFAS estimates its budget will decrease by about 10 percent—from $1.64 billion in fiscal year 1996 to $1.47 billion in 2000 in constant 1996 dollars. DOD’s $240-billion appropriation for fiscal year 1996 was used to pay about 6 million people and about 17 million invoices charged to nearly 12 million contracts. To process financial transactions and account for the receipt and expenditure of funds, DFAS and military services’ finance and accounting operations are generally divided into nine functional activities. Finance and Accounting in the Department of Defense
This appendix provides an overview of the Department of Defense’s (DOD) finance and accounting operations. Annually, DFAS processes about 2.1 million travel settlements. We focused our work on describing how DOD is organized to perform finance and accounting, the size of the finance and accounting infrastructure, and the various activities that are performed by DFAS and the military services. To determine the type of activities DOD finance and accounting personnel are responsible for performing, we reviewed DOD’s Chief Financial Officer Financial Management 5-Year Plan, the DFAS Customer Service Plan, the responsibility matrices negotiated by DFAS with each of the military services, and work flow descriptions for each finance and accounting activity. 1, 1995). 9, 1994). A recorded menu will provide information on how to obtain these lists. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on the Department of Defense's (DOD) management of its financial operations, focusing on: (1) DOD's rationale for creating the Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS); (2) the current size of the DOD finance and accounting infrastructure; and (3) the various finance and accounting activities performed by DOD personnel.
What GAO Found
GAO reported that: (1) Before fiscal year 1991, the military services and defense agencies independently managed their finance and accounting operations. Because these decentralized operations were highly inefficient and failed to produce reliable information for decision makers, DOD created DFAS to consolidate, standardize, and integrate finance and accounting operations. DFAS inherited 26,000 finance and accounting personnel but about 18,000 personnel remained with the military services to perform managerial accounting and customer service activities at local installations and bases. (2) By the end of fiscal year 1998, DFAS expects that all 332 installation-related finance and accounting offices will be closed and their operations transferred to 5 large centers and no more than 21 new operating locations. This consolidation will help DFAS, between fiscal years 1996 and 2000, reduce its budget from $1.64 billion to about $1.47 billion (in constant 1996 dollars); its personnel from 23,500 to about 20,000; and the number of finance and accounting systems from 217 to about 110. The military services reported that they still have close to 17,000 personnel in their finance and accounting network and are not planning any specific reductions. (3) DOD's finance and accounting activities are generally divided into 9 functional areas (accounting, payroll, contract payments, etc.). Improving these areas is an enormous task, involving the replacement of many antiquated systems and processes. The task is even move difficult considering the volume of transaction that must be continued while improvements are being made. Annually, for example, DOD disburses around $260 billion on 17 million invoices, 6 million payroll accounts, and 2 million travel vouchers. |
gao_GAO-12-558 | gao_GAO-12-558_0 | DOD Does Not Know the Extent to Which It Relies on Long-term Maintenance Contracts
At the departmental level, neither DOD nor the individual military departments know the extent to which weapon system programs rely on long-term maintenance contracts. We found that these contracts varied widely in terms of breadth of requirements, potential period of performance, and value. However, USD(AT&L) is not required to include information DOD’s limited visibility over long-term maintenance contracts reflects broader DOD challenges with managing services acquisition. Over the past decade, our work has identified the need for DOD to obtain better data on its contracted services to enable it to make more strategic decisions. Each of these reviews provides for the discussion of issues related to contracting strategy, but DOD officials noted that they do not collect or maintain information on what type of contracting approach was used to acquire all services that support DOD weapon systems. DOD officials noted that although long-term contracts can encourage contractors to invest in new facilities, equipment, and processes to support depot-level maintenance, such contracts may hinder the government’s ability to appropriately incentivize the contractor’s performance and control costs. Early Acquisition Decisions Limit DOD’s Ability to Select Alternative Maintenance Providers
Decisions made early in the acquisition process can limit DOD’s ability to select alternative maintenance providers over the life cycle of a weapon system program. Program officials believed they could select an alternative service provider in the future for 5 of the 10 contracts we reviewed, but the degree to which the government obtained access to technical data would be an obstacle in doing so for the other half. The programs, however, had yet to determine the extent to which they will acquire these data or the cost to do so. Table 2 summarizes the impact of technical data access on DOD programs’ ability to select alternate services providers for maintenance on the contracts we reviewed. Programs Use Different Approaches to Incentivize Performance and Obtain Insights into Contractor Costs
Once the decision is made to use long-term contracts, DOD faces choices on how to best incentivize contractor performance and manage costs. Program offices using contracts lasting 5 years, on the other hand, made less use of incentives and generally did not have the ability to renegotiate contract prices, but believed that the shorter-term nature of the contracts mitigated some of their risks. Table summarizes the incentives and tools used for cost insight and cost control. Across the five contracts with a maximum length of five years, three used monetary incentives and none used incentives that lengthen the contract’s term. DOD has not collected information concerning the effectiveness of the various incentives or cost-control tools used on long-term maintenance contracts, but it has recognized efforts made by individual programs to improve acquisitions of such services. DOD is considering several policy and data- related initiatives that could improve its insight on these contracts, but these efforts are in the early stages of development. Recommendations for Executive Action
To help inform DOD’s use of long-term maintenance contracts, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, in coordination with cognizant offices within each of the military departments, to take the following two actions:
Collect and analyze information on the use of long-term maintenance contracts by major weapon system programs; and
Collect and disseminate lessons learned or best practices regarding the use of incentives and cost-control tools that can maximize the government’s leverage when considering the future use of such contracts. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To gain insight into the how long-term maintenance contracts are managed by the Department of Defense (DOD), we assessed (1) the extent to which DOD uses long-term maintenance contracts to support major weapon system programs, (2) DOD’s ability to select alternative maintenance services providers for its major weapon system programs, and (3) how long-term maintenance contracts have been structured to incentivize contractors’ performance and manage contractor costs. For the eight programs DOD identified as having such a review between October 2010 and October 2011, we interviewed program officials and reviewed acquisition documents, such as acquisition strategies and life-cycle sustainment plans, which described the rationale for the program’s plans to acquire technical data rights. | Why GAO Did This Study
DOD spends billions annually to maintain its weapon systems and, at times, uses long-term maintenance contracts with a potential period of performance of 5 years or more. These contracts can encourage contractors to invest in new facilities, equipment, and processes, but may hinder DODs ability to incentivize contractors performance and control costs, especially in the absence of a competitive environment or if DOD does not acquire access to technical data that can enable DOD to select an alternative maintenance provider.
GAO was asked to evaluate (1) the extent to which DOD uses long-term maintenance contracts, (2) DODs ability to select alternative maintenance providers, and (3) how these contracts have been structured to incentivize performance and manage cost. GAO reviewed a nongeneralizable sample of 10 long-term contracts to illustrate different maintenance approaches. GAO interviewed program officials and reviewed contract documentation. GAO also reviewed information on eight programs recently reviewed by DOD to determine how these programs addressed technical data needs.
What GAO Found
At the departmental level, neither the Department of Defense (DOD) nor the individual military departments know the extent to which weapon system programs rely on long-term maintenance contracts. DOD policy requires DOD and the military departments to approve acquisition strategies and lifecycle sustainment plans, which include information on contractor support, but DOD officials reported that they do not collect information on the use of long-term contracts. DODs limited visibility over long-term maintenance contracts reflects broader DOD challenges with managing services acquisition. GAOs past work has identified the need for DOD to obtain better data on its contracted services to enable it to make more strategic decisions. DOD is considering a number of policy- and data-related initiatives that could improve its knowledge of these contracts, but these efforts are in the early stages of development.
Decisions made early in the acquisition process can limit DODs ability to select alternative maintenance providers over the life cycle of a weapon system program. Program officials believed that DOD had the ability to select alternative service providers for half of the contracts GAO reviewed, as DOD either had sufficient technical data or there was an existing competitive environment. DOD officials believed the lack of technical data, funding, or expertise would hinder them from selecting alternative service providers on the other contracts GAO reviewed. Recent legislation and DODs 2010 efficiency initiatives emphasize the importance of technical data considerations. GAO found that eight weapon systems that underwent DOD acquisition-related reviews between October 2010 and October 2011 considered technical data issues, but not all have determined the extent to which they will acquire these data or the cost to do so.
Once the decision is made to use long-term contracts, DOD faces choices on how to best incentivize contractor performance and manage costs. GAO found that the 10 long-term maintenance contracts reviewed varied in terms of the incentives employed and tools used to gain insight into contractor costs. For example, GAO found that all 5 contracts with the longest durations, potentially ranging from 9 to 22 years, used monetary incentives such as award or incentive fees, or contract term incentives that can extend the life of the contract by several years. However, DOD and program officials expressed some concerns about the lack of insight on contractors costs. In two cases, program offices established fixed prices for the entire potential length of the 9- and 15-year contracts without the ability to renegotiate prices or obtain incurred cost data. In comparison to the contracts with the longest durations, the five contracts GAO reviewed with maximum lengths of 5 years made less use of incentives or cost-control tools and generally did not have the ability to renegotiate contract prices, but program officials believed that the shorter-term nature of the contracts mitigated some of their risks. DOD does not collect information concerning the effectiveness of the various incentives or cost control tools used on long-term maintenance contracts, but it has identified efforts made by individual programs to improve acquisition of maintenance services. Developing lessons learned on what incentives and cost-control tools work best would help inform future acquisition strategies and reduce risk.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOD collect information on the extent to which DOD uses long-term maintenance contracts and develop lessons learned regarding the use of incentives and cost-control tools. DOD concurred with each of the recommendations and indicated that it would develop methodologies to implement them. |
gao_GAO-12-652T | gao_GAO-12-652T_0 | In recent years, IRS has improved its returns processing but has seen its taxpayer service performance deteriorate. However, as we have reported, IRS has experienced declines in performance in selected taxpayer service areas, most notably with respect to providing live telephone assistance and timely responses to taxpayers’ correspondence.from IRS to paper correspondence or have access to information online, they call IRS, correspond again, or seek face-to-face assistance—all of which are costly to IRS and burdensome to the taxpayer. Opportunities Exist to Improve the Taxpayer Experience and Voluntary Compliance
To improve the taxpayer experience and voluntary compliance, IRS has a range of options. Simplifying the tax code could reduce unintentional errors and make intentional tax evasion harder. IRS Can Provide More Self- Service Tools to Give Taxpayers Better Access to Information
GAO-12-176. develop an online locator tool listing volunteer tax preparation sites— and IRS introduced an enhanced volunteer site locator tool in 2012;complete an Internet strategy that provides a justification for online self-service tools as IRS expands its capacity to introduce such tools. According to IRS officials, the study should be completed later this year. Better Leveraging of Third Parties Could Provide Taxpayers With Other Avenues to Receive Service
Paid Preparer Regulations
GAO-12-176. most effective for improving the quality of tax returns prepared by different types of paid preparers. Almost 30 percent of taxpayers use such software to prepare their returns and, in the process, understand their tax obligations, learn about tax law changes, and get questions answered. Many also electronically file through their software provider. Consequently, tax software companies are another important intermediary between taxpayers and IRS. We have reported that IRS has made considerable progress in working with tax software companies to provide, for example, clearer information about why an e-filed return was not accepted, require additional information on returns to allow for IRS to better identify the software used, and enhance security requirements for e-filing. Expanded Information Reporting Could Reduce Taxpayer Burden and Improve Accuracy
Information reporting is a proven tool that reduces tax evasion, reduces taxpayer burden, and helps taxpayers voluntarily comply. Identifying additional third-party reporting opportunities is challenging. Implementing Modernized Systems Should Provide for Faster Refunds and Account Updates
Modernized systems should better position IRS to conduct more accurate and faster compliance checks, which benefits taxpayers by detecting errors before interest and penalties accrue. Two new, modernized systems IRS is implementing include the following:
Customer Account Data Engine (CADE) 2. Expanding Pre-Refund Compliance Checks Could Result in More Efficient Error Correction
The Commissioner of Internal Revenue has talked about a long-term vision to increase pre-refund compliance checks before refunds are sent to taxpayers. Reducing Tax Code Complexity Could Ease Taxpayer Burden and Make It Easier to Comply
Tax code complexity can make it difficult for taxpayers to voluntarily comply. These criteria include the equity, or fairness, of the tax system; the economic efficiency, or neutrality, of the system; and the simplicity, transparency, and administrability of the system. In closing, improving the taxpayer experience and increasing voluntary compliance will not be achieved through a single solution. Because voluntary compliance is influenced by so many factors, multiple approaches, such as those listed here, will be needed. | Why GAO Did This Study
The U.S. tax system depends on taxpayers calculating their tax liability, filing their tax return, and paying what they owe on timewhat is often referred to as voluntary compliance. Voluntary compliance depends on a number of factors, including the quality of IRSs assistance to taxpayers, knowledge that its enforcement programs are effective, and a belief that the tax system is fair and other people are paying their share of taxes. Voluntary compliance is also influenced by other parties, including paid tax return preparers, tax software companies, and information return filers (employers, financial institutions, and others who report income or expense information about taxpayers to IRS). For this testimony, GAO was asked to (1) evaluate the current state of IRSs performance and its effect on the taxpayer experience, and (2) identify opportunities to improve the taxpayer experience and voluntary compliance. This testimony is based on prior GAO reports and recommendations. Additionally, GAO analyzed IRS data in delivering selected taxpayer services in recent years.
What GAO Found
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has made improvements in processing tax returns, and electronic filing (e-filing), which provides benefits to taxpayers including faster refunds, continues to increase. However, IRSs performance in providing service over the phone and responding to paper correspondence has declined in recent years. For 2012, as with previous years, IRS officials attribute the lower performance to other funding priorities.
The following are among the opportunities to improve the taxpayer experience and increase voluntary compliance that GAO identifies in this testimony:
IRS can provide more self-service tools to give taxpayers better access to information. IRS can create an automated telephone line for amended returns (a source of high call volume) and complete an online services strategy that provides justification for adding new self-service tools online.
Better leveraging of third parties could provide taxpayers with other avenues to receive service. Paid preparers and tax software providers combine to prepare about 90 percent of tax returns. IRS is making progress implementing new regulation of paid preparers. As it develops better data, IRS should be able to test strategies for improving the quality of tax return preparation by paid preparers. Similarly, IRS may also be able to leverage tax software companies.
Expanded information reporting could reduce taxpayer burden and improve accuracy. Expanded information reporting, such as the recent requirements for banks and others to report businesses credit card receipts to IRS, can reduce taxpayers record keeping and give IRS another tool.
Implementing modernized systems should provide faster refunds and account updates. Modernized systems should allow IRS to conduct more accurate and faster compliance checks, which benefits taxpayers by detecting errors before interest and penalties accrue.
Expanding pre-refund compliance checks could result in more efficient error correction. Expanding such checks could reduce the burden of audits on taxpayers and their costs to IRS.
Reducing tax complexity could ease taxpayer burden and make it easier to comply. Simplifying the tax code could reduce unintentional errors and make intentional tax evasion easier to detect.
What GAO Recommends
GAO has made numerous prior recommendations that could help improve the taxpayer experience. Congress and IRS have acted on some recommendations, while others are reflected in the strategies presented in this testimony. |
gao_GAO-17-284 | gao_GAO-17-284_0 | However, in 2015 we reported that, among other things, additional work was needed for DHS to continue to improve its IT management. FITARA includes provisions related to seven areas of management— referred to as FITARA sections. OMB’s FITARA Implementation Guidance
In June 2015, OMB released guidance that describes how agencies are to implement FITARA. As part of this process, the CIO is responsible for reviewing, prior to award, contracts and agreements that have planned values of $2.5 million or more, among other criteria. DHS Has Taken Steps that Fully Implemented Most, but Not All, of the Selected FITARA Action Plans
Of the 31 selected action plans that we reviewed, 28 of them (about 90 percent) have been fully implemented as of December 2016 (that is, the evidence provided by DHS fulfilled all aspects of the action plan’s description), as the department reported. DHS Faces Several Challenges in Implementing FITARA
DHS currently faces a number of important challenges in implementing several selected FITARA provisions. Moreover, until the department takes actions that fully address these challenges, the goal of FITARA to elevate the role of the department CIO may not be fully realized. However, the DHS CIO did not directly review and approve the contracts for these troubled investments, as required by FITARA for contracts associated with major investments. Until the governance process is updated in a way that increases the CIO’s and appropriate delegates’ reviews of contracts and agreements associated with major and non-major investments, the DHS CIO will continue to have limited visibility into the department’s planned IT expenditures. However, as of October 2016, the CIO was no longer directly responsible for the full evaluations or the associated risk ratings that are publicly reported on the IT Dashboard for approximately one-third of the department’s major IT investments. Moreover, DHS’s CIO was previously responsible for evaluating and reporting the associated risk ratings of the department’s 30 major IT investments on the Master Acquisition Oversight List against the criteria that OMB’s 2015 guidance stated CIOs may use to evaluate and report the risk of their programs. However, as shown in table 4, under the new process facilitated by the Office of Program Accountability and Risk Management, the CIO is only responsible for assessing these investments against one of OMB’s criteria. Specifically,
DHS has not defined its IT acquisition cadre. Specifically, related to the department’s incomplete implementation of its action plan to use the updated DHS TechStat process to provide support to failing or troubled programs, until the CIO finalizes the department’s TechStat policy, DHS will be limited in its ability to help such programs. Specifically, we are recommending that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the Under Secretary for Management to direct the Chief Information Officer to take the following actions: finalize the department’s TechStat policy; update the department’s IT Acquisition Review governance process to increase the number of contracts and agreements (associated with both major and non-major investments) that are reviewed by the CIO and appropriate delegates; establish time frames and implement a plan for (1) identifying the specific staff or positions currently within the department’s IT acquisition cadre; and (2) assessing whether these staff and positions address all of the specialized skills and knowledge needed, as outlined in OMB’s Office of Federal Procurement Policy’s guidance for developing an IT acquisition cadre; and establish time frames and implement a plan for (1) identifying the department’s future IT skillset needs as a result of DHS’s new delivery model, (2) conducting a skills gap analysis, and (3) resolving any skills gaps identified. Further, we are recommending that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the Under Secretary for Management to update the department’s acquisition policies and guidance to be consistent in identifying that the DHS CIO is to certify investments’ incremental development activities; update DHS headquarters’, Customs and Border Protection’s, and U.S. Coast Guard’s processes to track, for all contracts and agreements, the IT investment with which each is associated (as applicable); and update and implement the process DHS uses for assessing the risks of major IT investments to ensure that the CIO rating reported to the Dashboard fully reflects the CIO’s assessment of each major IT investment. In its comments, the department concurred with all seven of our recommendations and provided estimated completion dates for implementing each of them. Appendix I: The Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Action Plans to Implement Information Technology Acquisition Reform
The table below lists DHS’s 131 Federal Information Technology Acquisition Reform Act (FITARA) action plans and the respective Office of Management and Budget (OMB) common baseline sections with which they are associated. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 2014, Congress enacted IT reform legislation, referred to as FITARA, which includes provisions related to seven areas of IT acquisition management. In 2015, OMB released FITARA implementation guidance that outlined agency CIO responsibilities and required agencies to develop action plans for implementing the guidance.
This report examines, among other things, the extent to which DHS has implemented selected action plans and the key challenges that DHS has faced in implementing selected FITARA provisions.
To do so, GAO analyzed DHS's efforts to implement a sample of 31 of 109 action plans that DHS had reported as complete and that described later-stage implementation steps. To determine challenges, GAO analyzed and compared DHS documentation, including a random sample of IT-related contracts and agreements, to selected FITARA provisions to identify gaps between what was required by FITARA and what DHS had implemented. These provisions required, among other things, significant coordination between DHS headquarters and five components.
What GAO Found
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has fully implemented 28 of the 31 selected Federal Information Technology (IT) Acquisition Reform Act (FITARA) action plans; however, as of December 2016, DHS did not fulfill all aspects of 3 action plans. For example, one action plan is to use an updated process for reviewing troubled programs to provide support to such programs; however, DHS has not finalized its policy for this process. Until DHS ensures that these 3 plans are implemented, it will lack assurance that it is fulfilling FITARA's goals.
DHS faces challenges in implementing certain FITARA provisions:
Chief Information Officer (CIO) approval of contracts and agreements. FITARA requires, among other things, the agency CIO to review and approve IT contracts and agreements associated with major investments (e.g., high cost) prior to award. However, the CIO did not participate in the approval of any of the 48 contracts in GAO's sample associated with major investments. While DHS has made improvements to its review process, until the Office of the CIO determines how to increase its review of contracts and agreements, the CIO will continue to have limited visibility into planned IT expenditures.
CIO evaluation of risk. DHS's Office of the CIO was conducting risk evaluations of major IT investments and updating the ratings on the Office of Management and Budget's (OMB) public website known as the IT Dashboard, as required by FITARA. However, in October 2016, DHS changed its process for evaluating 30 of DHS's 93 major IT investments and, as a result, the CIO is no longer primarily responsible for the evaluations or associated risk ratings that are publicly reported for these investments. Instead, multiple DHS organizations and officials are to evaluate these investments and the CIO's assessment only accounts for about 18 percent of the total score. Further, while under the old process, DHS's CIO was responsible for assessing these 30 investments against criteria that OMB guidance stated CIOs may use, under the new process, the CIO is only to assess these investments against one of OMB's criteria (see table below). This process change challenges the CIO's ability to publicly report risk ratings.
Until DHS addresses these challenges, the goal of FITARA to elevate the role of the department CIO in acquisition management will not be fully realized.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is making 7 recommendations to DHS to ensure that it fully and effectively implements FITARA. Among other things, GAO recommends that DHS fully implement the action plans and address challenges related to CIO contract approval and evaluation of risk. DHS concurred with all 7 recommendations and provided estimated completion dates for implementing each of them. |
gao_GAO-02-186 | gao_GAO-02-186_0 | Other states also discussed the need to revise criteria that are difficult to use in identifying impairments. These five pollutants have been found to be among the leading causes of impairment nationwide. EPA and the states have identified numerous inconsistencies of this kind. States Use a Range of Quality Assurance Procedures
States use a range of quality assurance procedures to ensure that the data they use to assess their waters are valid. Reliability of EPA’s Impaired Waters Database Limited by Inconsistent Data
Owing, in part, to the inconsistencies in states’ approaches to identifying impaired waters, the information in EPA’s database of impaired waters is of questionable reliability. Because states identify the size of impaired waters differently, EPA’s tally of both the total number of impaired waters nationwide and the number of TMDLs that must be established is not reliable. Indeed, some flexibility in key listing-related functions, such as the adoption of water quality standards and water quality monitoring, is provided under both the Clean Water Act and EPA regulations. Recommendations for To provide greater consistency in the way states list their impaired waters, Executive Action we recommend that the Administrator, EPA, provide additional guidance to the states on carrying out the key functions (including standard-setting, water quality monitoring, and data assessment) that influence how states identify the waters for their section 303(d) lists; work with the agency’s regional offices to ensure a more consistent interpretation of the agency’s policies on the criteria that states must meet to remove waters from their section 303(d) lists; provide clear guidance to the states on the information they should use to describe their methodologies for developing their section 303(d) lists; and work with the states to help resolve discrepancies that arise in the listing of interstate waters. | What GAO Found
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) believes that more than 20,000 bodies of water throughout the country are too polluted to meet water quality standards. States use different approaches to identify impaired waters. This variation has led not only to inconsistencies in the listing of impaired waters but also to difficulties in identifying the total number of impaired waters nationwide and the total number of total maximum daily loads (TMDL) needed to bring such waters up to standards. Under the Clean Water Act and its regulations, EPA has given the states some flexibility to develop listing approaches that are tailored to their circumstances. However, some of the approaches have no appropriate scientific basis. States apply a range of quality assurance procedures to ensure the quality of data used to make impairment decisions. Although states have long used quality assurance procedures for the data they collect directly, they have become increasingly vigilant about applying such procedures to data from other sources. Because of inconsistencies in states' approaches to identifying impaired waters, the information in EPA's database of impaired waters is of questionable reliability. The number of impaired waters cannot be compared from one state to the next, and EPA cannot reliably tally the number of TMDLs that must be completed nationwide. EPA's database also distorts the size of some of the states' impaired waters when they are mapped on EPA's website. |
gao_GAO-07-911T | gao_GAO-07-911T_0 | Concerns regarding the level of protection and amount of IBA needed to protect U.S. forces have been raised in recent years, prompted by a number of reports, newspaper articles, and recalls of issued body armor by both the Army and the Marine Corps. Army and Marine Corps Body Army Meets Current Theater Requirements
Army and Marine Corps body armor currently meets theater ballistic requirements and the required amount needed for personnel in theater, including the amounts needed for the surge of troops into Iraq. Used by all U.S. military service members and DOD civilians in the area of operations, the IBA consists of an outer tactical vest with ballistic inserts or plates that cover the front, back, and sides. The vest and inserts currently meet the theater ballistic requirements. The vest provides protection from 9mm rounds, while the inserts provide protection against 7.62mm armor- piercing rounds. CENTCOM requires that all U.S. military forces and all DOD civilians in the area of operations receive the body armor system. Currently, service members receive all service-specific standard components of the body armor system prior to deploying. The Army and the Marine Corps provide the DOD civilians with components of the armor system. Controls in Place to Assure Body Armor Meets Requirements
The Army and Marine Corps have controls in place during manufacturing and after fielding to assure that body armor meets requirements. Both services conduct quality and ballistic testing prior to fielding and lots are rejected if the standards are not met. They both also conduct formal testing on every lot of body armor (vests and protective inserts) prior to acceptance and issuance to troops. During production, which is done at several sites, the lots of body armor are sent to a National Institute of Justice-certified laboratory for ballistic testing and to the Defense Contract Management Agency for quality testing (size, weight, stitching) prior to issuance to troops. Although not required to do so, after the systems have been used in the field, the Army does limited ballistic testing of outer tactical vests and environmental testing of the outer tactical vests and the inserts. Additionally, to determine future improvements, the Army and the Marine Corps body armor program offices monitor and assess the use of body armor in the field, including the review of medical reports from the Armed Forces Medical Examiner. Army and Marine Corps Share Body Armor Information
The Army and Marine Corps share information regarding ballistic requirements and testing, and the development of future body armor systems, although they are not required to do so. DOD officials indicate that there is no requirement to share information. Title 10 of the U.S. Code allows each service to have separate programs, according to Army and Marine Corps officials. Nevertheless, the services are sharing information regarding ongoing research and development for the next generation of body armor. Contractors and Non- DOD Civilians Are Provided Body Armor Where Permitted
Regarding contractors or non-DOD civilians, DOD Instruction 3020.41 allows DOD to provide body armor to contractors where permitted by applicable DOD instructions and military department regulations and where specified under the terms of the contract. It is CENTCOM’s position that body armor will be provided to contractors if it is part of the terms and conditions of the contract. However, the officials said that commanders, at their discretion, can provide body armor to any personnel within their area of operation. | Why GAO Did This Study
In recent years, a number of reports and newspaper articles have cited concerns regarding the level of protection and the available amounts of body armor to protect deployed service members. As part of GAO's efforts to monitor the Department of Defense's (DOD) and the services' action to protect ground forces, GAO reviewed the Army and Marine Corps's actions to address these concerns. On April 26, 2007, GAO issued a report regarding the Army and the Marine Corps's individual body armor systems. Today's testimony summarizes the report's findings regarding the extent to which the Army and Marine Corps (1) have met the theater requirements for body armor, (2) have the controls in place to assure that the manufacturing and fielding of body armor meet requirements, and (3) have shared information regarding their efforts on body armor ballistic requirements and testing. The report also included additional information concerning whether contractors or non-DOD civilians obtain body armor in the same way as U.S. forces and DOD civilians given the number of contractors and non-DOD civilians in Central Command's (CENTCOM) area of operation. GAO did not make recommendations in the report. DOD officials did not provide written comments on the report but technical comments were incorporated as appropriate.
What GAO Found
Army and Marine Corps body armor currently meets theater ballistic requirements and the required amount needed for personnel in theater, including the amounts needed for the surge of troops into Iraq. The Interceptor Body Armor (IBA) consists of an outer tactical vest with ballistic inserts or plates that cover the front, back, and sides. The vest and inserts currently meet the theater ballistic requirements. The vest provides protection from 9mm rounds, while the inserts provide protection against 7.62mm armor-piercing rounds. CENTCOM requires that all U.S. military forces and all DOD civilians in the area of operations receive the body armor system. Currently, service members receive all service-specific standard components of the body armor system prior to deploying. The Army and the Marine Corps provide the DOD civilians with components of the armor system. The Army and Marine Corps have controls in place during manufacturing and after fielding to assure that body armor meets requirements. Both services conduct quality and ballistic testing prior to fielding, and lots (a grouping of items varying in number) are rejected if the standards are not met. They also conduct formal testing on every lot of body armor (vests and protective inserts) prior to acceptance and issuance to troops. During production, which is done at several sites, the lots of body armor are sent to a National Institute of Justice-certified laboratory for ballistic testing and to the Defense Contract Management Agency for quality testing (size, weight, stitching) prior to issuance to troops. Although not required to do so, after the systems have been used in the field, the Army does limited ballistic and environmental testing to determine future improvements. The Army and Marine Corps share information regarding ballistic requirements and testing although they are not required to do so. Title 10 of the U.S. Code allows each service to have separate programs, according to Army and Marine Corps officials. Nevertheless, the services are sharing information regarding ongoing research and development for the next generation of body armor. DOD Instruction 3020.41 allows DOD to provide body armor to contractors and non-DOD civilians where permitted by applicable DOD instructions and military department regulations and where specified under the terms of the contract. It is CENTCOM's position that body armor will be provided to contractors if it is part of the terms and conditions of the contract. However, the officials indicated that commanders, at their discretion, can provide body armor to any personnel within their area of operation. |
gao_T-RCED-98-27 | gao_T-RCED-98-27_0 | Status of the Program in the Six Urban EZs
When we issued our December 1996 report, all six of the urban EZs had met the criteria defined in OBRA 1993, developed a strategic plan, signed an agreement with HUD and their respective states for implementing the program, signed an agreement with their states for obtaining the EZ/EC SSBG funds, drafted performance benchmarks, and established a governance structure. However, the EZs differed in their geographic size, population, and other demographic characteristics, reflecting the selection criteria. Subsequently, we surveyed 32 program participants, including those we had already interviewed, and asked them to indicate the extent to which a broad set of factors had helped or hindered the program’s implementation. Similarly, the following six factors were frequently identified by survey respondents as having constrained their efforts to plan and implement the EZ program: difficulty in selecting an appropriate governance board structure, the additional layer of bureaucracy created by the state government’s involvement, preexisting relationships among EZ stakeholders, pressure for quick results from the media, the lack of federal funding for initial administrative activities, and pressure for quick results from the public and private sectors. Program Evaluation Efforts Could Be Improved
From the beginning, the Congress and HUD have made evaluation plans an integral part of the EZ program. OBRA 1993 required that each EZ applicant identify in its strategic plan the baselines, methods, and benchmarks for measuring the success of its plan and vision. However, the measures being used generally described the amount of work that would be produced (outputs) rather than the results that were anticipated (outcomes). In addition, HUD and the EZs may not be able to describe the extent to which the program’s activities are helping to accomplish the program’s mission. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed the Empowerment Zone and Enterprise Community (EZ/EC) program, focusing on: (1) the status of the program's implementation in the six urban empowerment zones, which are located along the east coast and in the mid-west regions of the United States; (2) the factors that program participants believe have either helped or hindered efforts to carry out the program; and (3) the plans for evaluating the program.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) all six of the urban EZs had met the criteria defined in the program's authorizing legislation, developed a strategic plan, signed an agreement with the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and their respective states for implementing the program, signed an agreement with their states for obtaining funds, drafted performance benchmarks, and established a governance structure; (2) however, the EZs differed in their geographic and demographic characteristics, reflecting the selection criteria in the authorizing legislation; (3) many officials involved in implementing the program generally agreed on factors that had either helped or hindered their efforts; (4) for example, factors identified as helping the program's implementation included community representation within the governance structures and enhanced communication among stakeholders; (5) similarly, factors identified as hindering the program's implementation included preexisting relationships among EZ stakeholders and pressure for quick results; (6) from the beginning, the Congress and HUD made evaluation plans an integral part of the EZ program by requiring each community to identify in its strategic plan the baselines, methods, and benchmarks for measuring the success of its plan; and (7) however, the measures being used generally describe the amount of work that will be produced (outputs) rather than the results that are anticipated (outcomes). |
gao_GAO-03-1155T | gao_GAO-03-1155T_0 | Prior to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, federal attention at ports tended to focus on navigation and safety issues, such as dredging channels and environmental protection. Passed in November 2002, MTSA imposed an ambitious schedule of requirements on a number of federal agencies. Most of the agencies with MTSA responsibilities were reorganized into the Department of Homeland Security in March 2003, less than 5 months after MTSA enactment. Among the 22 agencies in the new department were some relatively new organizations, such as TSA. Progress Has Been Made in Implementing MTSA
Since the passage of MTSA in 2002 the responsible agencies—primarily the Coast Guard, TSA, and BCBP in DHS, along with MARAD in the Department of Transportation—have made strides in implementing the act’s security provisions. MTSA called for actions in 46 key areas we identified. Thus far, we have received information from the responsible agencies on 43 of these areas. Of the 43 areas, work is done in 2 (issuing interim rules and developing training for maritime security personnel), and under way in 40 others. The rules set requirements for many of the provisions delegated to the Coast Guard under MTSA. Developing all of the policies and programs to make this system work is still under way and will continue to pose challenges to continued progress. Three relate primarily to security issues: (1) the limited number of ports that will be covered by the vessel identification system, (2) questions about the scope and quality of port security assessments, and (3) the Coast Guard’s plans not to individually approve security plans for foreign vessels. The remaining two relate primarily to operational and efficiency matters: (1) potential duplication of maritime intelligence efforts and (2) inconsistency with Port Security Grant Program requirements. Vessel Identification System Will Cover a Limited Number of Ports
The main security-related issue involves the implementation of a vessel identification system. Concerns about Port Security Assessments
Another security-related issue involves the Coast Guard’s efforts to address MTSA’s security planning requirements through a series of security assessments of individual ports. MTSA required the Secretary of Transportation to establish a program of grants to ports and other entities to implement area and facility-specific security plans. | Why GAO Did This Study
After the events of September 11, 2001, concerns were raised over the security of U.S. ports and waterways. In response to the concerns over port security, Congress passed the Maritime Transportation Security Act in November 2002. The act created a broad range of programs to improve the security conditions at the ports and along American waterways, such as identifying and tracking vessels, assessing security preparedness, and limiting access to sensitive areas. A number of executive agencies were delegated responsibilities to implement these programs and other provisions of the act. The Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation asked GAO to conduct a review of the status of the agencies' efforts to implement the security requirements of the act. This testimony reflects GAO's preliminary findings; much of GAO's work in the area is still under way.
What GAO Found
Agencies responsible for implementing the security provisions of the Maritime Transportation Security Act have made progress in meeting their requirements. Thus far, GAO has obtained information about 43 of 46 specific action areas, and efforts are under way in 42 of them. For example, the Coast Guard, the Department of Homeland Security agency with lead responsibility for most of the assignments, has published six interim rules covering responsibilities ranging from security of port facilities to vessel identification systems. Two other agencies within the new department--the Transportation Security Administration and the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection--have actions under way in such areas as establishing an identification system for millions of port workers and setting information requirements for cargo. The Maritime Administration, a Department of Transportation agency, has already completed or is well into implementing such responsibilities as developing training for security personnel. While much has been accomplished, GAO's review found five areas of concern. Three relate primarily to security issues: (1) only a limited number of ports covered by vessel identification system; (2) questions about the scope and quality of port security assessments; and (3) concerns related to approving security plans for foreign vessels. Two relate primarily to organizational and operational matters: (1) potential duplication of maritime intelligence efforts; and (2) inconsistency with Port Security Grant Program requirements. |
gao_T-GGD-00-32 | gao_T-GGD-00-32_0 | We do know, however, that domestic and foreign banks operating in the United States have been increasing their private banking activities and their reliance on income from private banking. Regulatory Efforts to Oversee Private Banking Activities
Federal banking regulators may review banks’ efforts to prevent or detect money laundering in their private banking activities during examinations,including recent examinations focused on their private banking activities. Instead of monitoring formal compliance, U.S. banking regulators try to identify what efforts the branches are making to combat money laundering and to determine whether the banks’ corporate KYC policies are being applied to activities, such as private banking activities, that the offshore branches may engage in. Offshore Jurisdictions’ Bank Secrecy Laws Represent Key Barriers to U.S. Regulators’ Oversight of Offshore Banking Activities
The third major area for our work was barriers to regulators’ efforts to oversee offshore banking activities in general. We found that secrecy laws in many offshore jurisdictions represent key barriers to U.S. oversight of offshore banking activities. For example, a limitation in some jurisdictions is that since regulators have been precluded from conducting on-site examinations, they rely primarily on banks’ internal audits to determine how well KYC policies and procedures are being applied to offshore branches of U.S. banks. Future Challenges That Confront Efforts to Combat Money Laundering
Several challenging questions confront U.S. policymakers and others involved in ongoing domestic and international efforts to combat money laundering through offshore banking activities. Other questions remain, related to the domestic oversight of banking and money laundering—especially with regard to the adequacy of current examination procedures, including knowing your customer. Does the jurisdiction require banks to report suspicious transactions? | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed money laundering in relation to private banking and highlighted some regulatory issues related to the vulnerability of selected offshore jurisdictions to money laundering, focusing on: (1) regulators' oversight of private banking in general; (2) regulators' oversight of private banking in selected offshore jurisdictions; (3) barriers that have hampered regulators' oversight of offshore banking; and (4) future challenges that confront regulators' efforts to combat money laundering in offshore jurisdictions.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) federal banking regulators have overseen private banking through examinations that, among other things, focus on banks' "know your customer" policies; (2) these policies enable banks to understand the kinds of transactions a particular customer is likely to engage in and to identify any unusual or suspicious transactions; (3) federal banking regulators have examination procedures that cover private banking activities conducted by banks operating in the United States; (4) in cases that involve private banking activities conducted by branches of U.S. banks operating in offshore jurisdictions, examiners rely primarily on banks' internal audit functions; (5) GAO found that the key barriers to U.S. regulators' oversight of offshore banking activities are secrecy laws that restrict access to banking information or that prohibit on-site examinations of U.S. bank branches in offshore jurisdictions; and (6) an important challenge that confronts efforts to combat money laundering is the extent to which such secrecy laws will continue to be barriers to U.S. and foreign regulators. |
gao_GAO-16-13 | gao_GAO-16-13_0 | The NIH Revitalization Act of 1993 and NIH Inclusion Policy
The Revitalization Act required NIH to ensure the appropriate inclusion of women in NIH-funded clinical research, including clinical trials. More Women Than Men Were Enrolled in NIH Research Overall, but NIH Does Not Examine Detailed Data to Identify Potential Challenges to Enrolling Women
NIH data show that over the last decade more women than men have been enrolled across all NIH-funded clinical research, including phase III clinical trials. As of fiscal year 2015, these data are reported to NIH through its Inclusion Monitoring System—one part of NIH’s awardee data system. Specifically, in fiscal year 2014, among all NIH-funded clinical research studies, 57 percent of enrollees (16.4 million) were women, and 39 percent (11 million) were men. NIH Does Not Make IC- Level Enrollment Data Readily Available or Examine Detailed Enrollment Data to Identify Potential Challenges to Enrolling Women in Specific Research and Disease Areas
NIH collects and reviews aggregated enrollment data from the ICs; however, NIH officials do not make these IC-level enrollment data readily available to the public or other interested parties. Information is needed throughout the agency to achieve all of its objectives, and effective communication should occur in a broad sense, with information flowing down, across, and up the organization. In addition, by not routinely examining more detailed enrollment data that is aggregated by sex—such as data at the disease and condition level—NIH is limited in its ability to identify whether women are sufficiently represented in studies in specific areas that cross ICs—such as obesity. Further, NIH does not have information of sufficient detail to monitor and determine if the aggregate enrollment data from across NIH inadvertently mask low enrollment for particular research areas or diseases or conditions. NIH Does Not Record Whether Clinical Trials Will Analyze Sex Differences to Allow Summary Analysis and Reporting for Oversight of Its Inclusion Policy
NIH’s Inclusion Policy requires that individual awardees conducting phase III clinical trials consider whether analysis of potential differences in study outcomes between women and men is needed in their studies, consistent with the Revitalization Act’s provisions regarding the design of certain clinical trials. However, the agency does not maintain, analyze, or report summary data to oversee whether analysis of outcomes by sex are planned or conducted, when applicable, across all NIH-funded clinical trials. To ensure awardees’ compliance with this requirement, NIH officials told us they rely on the agency’s peer review process for reviewing applications, and after awards are made, on IC program officers’ monitoring of individual awardees. NIH program officers monitor individual awardees’ compliance with the analysis requirement of the Inclusion Policy; however, the agency lacks summary data on awardees’ analysis plans, including the percentage of awardees in a given year with trials designed to identify potential sex differences, when applicable. NIH’s lack of summary data and reporting regarding the analysis requirement of the Inclusion Policy conflicts with federal internal control standards. First, federal internal control standards require that federal agencies have control activities in place to ensure that management’s directives are carried out and that these controls are monitored. By not examining more detailed enrollment data—such as data aggregated by research area or specific to various diseases and conditions—NIH cannot know whether it is adequately including women across all of the research it supports. Without summary data, such as the proportion of trials being conducted that intend to analyze differences in outcomes for men and women, and reporting on that data, NIH and Congress cannot know whether or to what extent current efforts are helping to ensure that differences in clinical outcomes by sex are identified and that NIH is supporting research that can be used to shape improved medical practices for both women and men. Recommendations for Executive Action
To ensure effective implementation of the Inclusion Policy in a manner consistent with the Revitalization Act’s provisions regarding the design of certain clinical trials, the NIH Director should take the following five actions: make IC-level enrollment data readily available through public means, such as NIH’s regular biennial report to Congress on the inclusion of women in research, or through NIH’s website; examine approaches for aggregating more detailed enrollment data at the disease and condition level, and report on the status of this examination to key stakeholders and through its regular biennial report to Congress on the inclusion of women in research; ensure that program officers have a means for recording information obtained from monitoring awardees’ plans for and progress in conducting analyses of potential differences in outcomes by sex; on a regular basis, systematically collect and analyze summary data regarding awardees’ plans to conduct analyses of potential sex differences, such as the proportion of trials being conducted that intend to analyze differences in outcomes for men and women; and report on this summary data and the results of this analysis in NIH’s regular biennial report to Congress on the inclusion of women in research. We also spoke with or received written responses from officials and program officers from 3 institutes and centers (ICs) of the National Institutes of Health (NIH) about the factors affecting women’s participation in clinical research reported by NIH awardees. | Why GAO Did This Study
Women make up over half the U.S. population, but historically have been underrepresented in clinical research supported by NIH and others. As a result, differences in the manifestation of certain diseases and reactions to treatment in women compared with men were not identified. For example, there have been instances of women having adverse effects that differed from those of men related to medications and other treatments. NIH's Inclusion Policy established requirements governing women's inclusion in its clinical research.
GAO was asked to provide information on women's participation in NIH research. Among other reporting objectives, GAO examined (1) women's enrollment and NIH's efforts to monitor this enrollment in NIH-funded clinical research; and (2) NIH's efforts to ensure that NIH-funded clinical trials are designed and conducted to analyze potential sex differences, when applicable. To do this, GAO reviewed relevant laws and policies, including the Inclusion Policy, and federal standards for internal control; reviewed and analyzed NIH enrollment data from fiscal years 2005-2014; and interviewed NIH and IC officials and other experts.
What GAO Found
Data from the National Institutes of Health (NIH) show that more women than men were enrolled in NIH-funded clinical research for fiscal years 2005-2014, but NIH does not make certain enrollment data readily available to interested parties or examine other detailed data to identify potential challenges to enrolling women in specific research and disease or condition areas. In fiscal year 2014, for example, NIH reported that across all of the clinical research studies it funded—including phase III clinical trials, the largest studies involving human subjects— 57 percent of enrollees (16.4 million) were women. NIH collects enrollment data from individual awardees through its Institutes and Centers (IC)—which generally fund studies in different research areas—and publicly reports data on aggregate enrollment as part of its implementation of the Inclusion Policy developed to implement provisions of the NIH Revitalization Act of 1993. However, NIH does not make the IC-level enrollment data from each of the 25 ICs that report data readily available to interested parties, so that interested parties must make an effort to seek out this data. In addition, NIH does not routinely examine more detailed enrollment data, such as enrollment data organized by the disease and condition being studied. As a result, NIH is limited in its ability to identify whether women are sufficiently represented in studies in specific areas—such as cardiovascular disease—or if the agency-wide data inadvertently mask enrollment challenges. By not examining more detailed data on enrollment below the aggregate level, NIH cannot know whether it is adequately including women in all of the research it supports, in a manner consistent with its Inclusion Policy. Further, NIH's reporting and monitoring in this area is inconsistent with federal internal control standards, which call for agencies to have controls to help ensure effective information flow and effective monitoring of agency activities.
NIH requires that phase III clinical trial awardees consider whether analysis of potential differences in outcomes between women and men is needed in their studies—one of the key requirements of its Inclusion Policy; however, the agency does not maintain, analyze, or report summary data to oversee whether analysis of outcomes by sex are planned or conducted. NIH officials told GAO that they rely on peer review and program officer monitoring to ensure awardee compliance with the analysis requirement. However, NIH program officers do not have a required field in a reporting system or other means to record the information they collect to monitor awardees' analysis plans and compliance with the Inclusion Policy requirement. In addition, there is no data element in NIH's data system to indicate whether an awardee's study should or does include plans for an analysis of potential differences in research outcomes by sex. As a result, NIH lacks summary data, such as the percentage of awardees in a given year with trials designed to identify potential differences in clinical outcomes by sex. Without this summary information, NIH cannot report this information in the agency's biennial reports to Congress and other stakeholders. The lack of summary data and reporting compromises NIH's monitoring of its implementation of the Inclusion Policy and conflicts with federal internal control standards, which call for agencies to ensure the flow of information about agency activities, provide for internal and external communication, and conduct periodic monitoring. Further, it limits NIH's assurance that it is supporting research that can be used to shape improved medical practice for both women and men.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that NIH examine and report more detailed data on women's enrollment in NIH-funded studies, and collect, examine, and report data on the extent to which these studies include analyses of potential differences between women and men. NIH agreed with GAO's recommendations and plans to take action to implement them. |
gao_NSIAD-99-231 | gao_NSIAD-99-231_0 | As part of its responsibilities, the State Department regulates direct commercial arms sales through export licenses and reviews and approves arms sales under the FMS program. The National Disclosure Policy was established to provide a framework for the approval or denial of the transfer of classified military information to foreign governments and international organizations. FMS Program Relies on the Disclosure Process to Determine What Technology May Be Transferred
The U.S. government has a complex process with many participants to determine what technology may be transferred as part of a proposed sale. An interagency committee oversees the National Disclosure Policy and considers exceptions to the policy when classified military information is involved in the proposed transfer. The committee does not approve actual foreign military sales but provides authority to transmit the classified information associated with sales. The committee has a process for reviewing exceptions to the National Disclosure Policy. Certain Controlled Technology Is Not Properly Identified and Reviewed Under the FMS Program
The U.S. government has not established a process for ensuring that certain controlled items are fully and systematically identified when reviewing country requests for information or approving agreements to purchase items through the FMS program. These initiatives contain proposals focused on shortening the technology transfer review time, for example, by more rigorously implementing DOD requirements for program documentation that assesses what technology may be transferred. Some of the initiatives address the need to improve information to support technology transfer decisions. For example, the DOD and industry working group is proposing more rigorous implementation of current requirements to prepare weapon systems program documents that include technology transfer assessments. Conclusions
The Foreign Military Sales program does not have a systematic process to identify and review certain controlled technologies. As a result, items controlled by an international missile nonproliferation agreement were sold through the Foreign Military Sales program without proper review and approval. Recommendations
To provide for proper review and approval of proposed exports of controlled technologies through the Foreign Military Sales program, we recommend that the Secretaries of State and Defense establish a process to identify all items on a proposed Foreign Military Sales agreement that are controlled under the Missile Technology Control Regime or other nonproliferation agreements by taking full advantage of the expertise that resides in the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, the military services, or elsewhere; refer the information to the State Department; direct the Missile Technology Export Control group or other nonproliferation groups to review missile technology-related items or other controlled items to ensure compliance with the nonproliferation agreements; and reflect this process in ongoing reinvention efforts. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed how the Foreign Military Sales program safeguards technology and arms transfers, focusing on the: (1) process for deciding what technology may be transferred as part of a sale through the program; (2) controls for ensuring that technology transfer considerations have been weighed when reviewing requests and agreements; and (3) Department of Defense's (DOD) proposals to improve technology transfer procedures.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the U.S. government relies on a complex process with many participants to determine what technology may be transferred as part of a sale through the Foreign Military Sales program; (2) technology transfer decisions begin with an interagency National Disclosure Policy Committee process; (3) when making overall policy decisions, the committee provides authority for the government to transmit classified information associated with military items but does not approve the actual transfer of those items; (4) it does not typically address whether systems must be sold through the Foreign Military Sales program or a direct commercial sale; (5) the committee has a process for reviewing exceptions to the National Disclosure Policy; (6) within the National Disclosure Policy framework, separate organizations within the military departments recommend whether the requested items under their jurisdiction may be sold and manage the sales; (7) the U.S. government has not established a process for ensuring that certain controlled items are fully and systematically identified when reviewing requests or approving agreements under the Foreign Military Sales program; (8) as a result of weaknesses in the review process, items controlled by an international missile nonproliferation agreement have been transferred under the program without proper review and approval; (9) as structured, DOD's proposals to reform the Foreign Military Sales program are primarily focused on reducing time for making technology transfer decisions; (10) in considering DOD's efforts to shorten the processing time, officials acknowledge the need to properly assess the national security risks and benefits of proposed transfers; (11) a DOD and industry working group proposes more rigorously implementing requirements to make technology transfer assessments early in the planning of a weapon program; and (12) such assessments are a means of expediting technology transfer decisions when responding to foreign customers' requests. |
gao_GAO-14-8 | gao_GAO-14-8_0 | Specifically, ESRA contains several key provisions related to the management, core functions, and processes of IES: all research conducted by IES is to use scientifically based research standards that include, where appropriate, making claims of causal relationships only in random assignment experiments; education evaluations conducted by IES are to employ experimental designs using random assignment, when feasible; all research, statistics, and evaluation reports conducted by or supported through IES must be subjected to rigorous peer review before being published or otherwise made available to the public; the Director of IES will be appointed by the President, by and with consent of the Senate, for a 6-year term and will propose the Institute’s overall research priorities and report biennially to Congress and others on the Institute’s activities, among other duties; and a board of directors is established—the NBES—whose duties include, among other things, (1) advising and consulting with the Director of IES regarding its policies and approving the Director’s overall research priorities, (2) reviewing and approving procedures for peer review, and (3) reviewing the work of IES to ensure the consistency of scientifically valid research. IES Supports High- Quality Research, but Lacks Key Processes and Performance Measures in Some Areas
IES Supports High-Quality Research, but Does Not Monitor the Timeliness of Some Aspects of Its Peer Review Process
IES has substantially improved the education research field. In recent years however, the time it takes to complete this review process substantially increased, from an average of 117 days in fiscal year 2011 to 175 days in fiscal year 2012 and 150 days in fiscal year 2013. Despite IES’s recent efforts to increase the relevance of its research, IES does not have a structured process for incorporating feedback from policymakers and practitioners into its research agenda. Within that framework, we found that agencies should establish a structured process for developing their research and evaluation priorities that considers key stakeholders’ input. IES’s Performance Measures Do Not Reflect Its Current Programs
IES cannot demonstrate the impact of its efforts to improve the quality and relevance of its research in some areas because its performance measures have not been updated to reflect its current programs. In addition, according to federal internal control standards and leading practices on performance management, agencies should establish performance measures for their activities and continually compare actual performance data against these goals. In addition, IES does not publicly report on the overall performance of the REL program, which constitutes one of the agency’s largest investments. Research and Technical Assistance Groups Take Steps to Disseminate Relevant Research, but IES Has Not Fully Assessed These Efforts
Groups Have Produced Research and Products for Use by Policymakers and Practitioners, but Relevance and Dissemination Could Be Improved
RELs, Comprehensive Centers, and R & D Centers have taken various steps to provide relevant research to the education field. However, some noted that further efforts are needed to leverage intermediary groups to better market REL and R & D Center work to reach IES’s target audiences. IES Coordinates with Other Federal Agencies, but Fragmented Evaluation Funding Poses Challenges for Education’s Evaluation Efforts
IES Coordinates with Other Agencies to Increase the Use of Evidence in Federal Decision Making and Research Planning
IES coordinates with relevant federal research agencies on projects to increase federal agencies’ use of research evidence in guiding funding decisions. For example, IES co-led a joint Education-NSF working group to develop common evidence guidelines for education research and development. Education’s Inability to Combine Evaluation Funding Poses Challenges for Evaluation Planning Efforts
IES coordinates within the department to plan evaluations of Education programs. As a result, OPEPD and IES officials said that some evaluations, including high- priority evaluations, may not occur. For example, IES officials told us that the department is interested in conducting evaluations of the Mathematics and Science Partnerships and Promise Neighborhoods programs, but there is not sufficient evaluation funding under these programs due to the statutory limitation and Education does not have the authority to combine evaluation funds across the department and use them to conduct evaluations of these or other high-priority programs. We have previously reported that many Education programs, especially smaller programs, have not been evaluated, which can limit the ability of Congress to make informed decisions about which programs to continue, expand, modify, consolidate, or eliminate. For example, in 2009, we reported that 11 of Education’s programs focused on teacher quality had been operating for over seven years and had never been evaluated. According to a senior IES official, if the department were able to combine funds authorized to be used for evaluation it would have more flexibility to conduct appropriate evaluations of any of ESEA programs that need evaluation. In order to identify leading practices and target areas for improvement, IES should assess the effectiveness of REL and R & D Center dissemination strategies by, for example, collecting consistent data and lessons learned from these groups to inform future dissemination efforts. Education generally agreed with our recommendations and has several plans in place to address them. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our review examined (1) the extent to which the Institute for Education Sciences (IES) demonstrates its ability to support high-quality research and fulfill its mission; (2) the extent to which selected Department of Education (Education) research and technical assistance groups disseminate relevant products to the field; and (3) how IES coordinates its activities with other relevant federal research entities and within Education. During these discussion groups, we met with a total of 16 senior education researchers and discussed issues such as IES’s research standards, peer review process, and the relevance and dissemination practices of IES overall, as well as those of selected IES research and technical assistance groups, specifically—the Regional Educational Laboratories (REL) and Research & Development Centers (R & D Center). | Why GAO Did This Study
The federal government has a longstanding role in conducting education research and collecting education data, and IES has a broad mission to provide this information to a wide variety of stakeholders. With a fiscal year 2013 budget of just under $600 million, IES is Education's primary research and evaluation arm. GAO was asked to review IES's performance. This report examines: (1) the extent to which IES has demonstrated its ability to support high-quality research and fulfill its mission, (2) the extent to which selected Education research and technical assistance groups disseminate relevant products to the education field, and (3) how IES coordinates its activities with other relevant federal research agencies and within Education. GAO reviewed relevant federal laws and regulations, agency documents and data, interviewed agency officials and stakeholders, and analyzed information from selected research and technical assistance groups. GAO also compared IES's practices to federal internal control standards and leading practices for performance management and collaboration.
What GAO Found
The Department of Education's (Education) Institute of Education Sciences (IES) supports high-quality research, but lacks certain key procedures needed to fulfill other aspects of its mission. According to stakeholders, IES has substantially improved the quality of education research since its inception over a decade ago. However, GAO identified concerns with IES's ability to produce timely and relevant research. For example, IES's efforts are slow to respond to stakeholders' needs, in part, because the time IES's products have spent in peer review has substantially increased in recent years--from an average of 117 days in fiscal year 2011 to 150 days in fiscal year 2013--and IES does not monitor some aspects of these timeframes. In addition, IES does not have a structured process for incorporating stakeholder input into its research agenda, which previous GAO work has shown to be key to sound federal research programs. Lastly, IES's performance measures do not fully reflect its current programs, which is not consistent with leading practices GAO has identified for performance management. For example, IES does not publicly report on the overall performance of the Regional Educational Laboratories (REL) program, which constitutes one of the agency's largest investments. IES officials said that they have begun to develop new performance measures for all of their programs, but these will not be in place until fiscal year 2015.
Although Education's research and technical assistance groups have taken steps to disseminate relevant research to the education field, IES does not always assess these efforts. Some stakeholders raised concerns about the dissemination of relevant products from the RELs and Research and Development Centers (R & D Center). For example, they told GAO that these groups do not always adapt their products for use by both policymaker and practitioner audiences. Further, IES has not fully assessed REL and R & D Center dissemination efforts. As a result, IES does not know if these efforts are effective in meeting their mandated goal of providing usable research and information to stakeholders. GAO's prior work on information dissemination suggests that further assessment could help inform IES's oversight of the RELs and R & D Centers to improve these groups' dissemination to key audiences.
IES coordinates with other relevant federal research agencies to increase the use of research evidence in federal decision-making. For example, IES and the National Science Foundation recently released guidelines to help improve the quality of evidence resulting from federally-funded education research, which stakeholders said will benefit the education field. Within the department, IES plans evaluations of Education programs through coordination with various other offices. However, Education lacks statutory authority to combine evaluation funds for Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) programs, which officials said limits the department's ability to conduct high-quality evaluations of programs it considers most important. GAO's prior work has shown that many Education programs, especially smaller programs, have not been evaluated, limiting the ability of Congress to make informed policy decisions. For example, in 2009, GAO reported that 11 of Education's teacher quality programs had not been evaluated in more than 7 years. Officials said that the ability to combine evaluation funds would allow the department to conduct needed evaluations of ESEA programs.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that Congress consider granting Education authority to combine funds authorized for evaluation of ESEA programs, and IES use available data to manage its peer review process, develop a structured process to gather stakeholder input, develop performance measures that reflect all key agency activities, and assess REL and R & D Center dissemination strategies. Education agreed with our recommendations. |
gao_GAO-14-403T | gao_GAO-14-403T_0 | Strategic Plan for Serving Congress
In December 2013, Members and their staff were invited to comment on our draft Strategic Plan for Serving Congress in FYs 2014-2019. The draft plan was issued in February 2014 and outlines our proposed goals and strategies for supporting Congress’s top priorities. I have met with the chairs and ranking members of many of the standing committees and their subcommittees to hear firsthand feedback on our performance, as well as highlight the need to prioritize requests for our services to maximize the return on investment. GAO Recognized as One of the “Best Places to Work”
We take great pride in reporting that we continue to be recognized as an employer of choice, and have been consistently ranked near the top on “best places to work” lists. Fiscal Year 2015 Requirements
GAO’s FY 2015 budget request will preserve staff capacity and continue critical infrastructure investments. Offsetting receipts and reimbursements primarily from program and financial audits and rental income totaling $30.9 million are expected in FY 2015. In order to address the priorities of Congress, GAO needs a talented, diverse, high-performing, knowledgeable workforce. However, a significant proportion of our employees are currently retirement eligible, including 34 percent of our executive leadership and 21 percent of our supervisory analysts. Therefore, workforce and succession planning remain a priority for GAO. In FY 2014, through a targeted recruiting GAO plans to hire entry-level staff and student interns, boosting our staff capacity for the first time in 3 years to 2,945 FTE. This will allow GAO to reverse the downward trend in our FTEs and achieve some progress in reaching our optimal staffing level of 3,250 FTE, and develop a talent pool for the future. Improvements to our aging IT infrastructure will allow GAO to further streamline business operations, reduce redundant efforts, increase staff efficiency and productivity, improve access to information, and enhance our technology infrastructure to support an array of engagement management, human capital, and financial management systems. GAO also plans to continue upgrading aging building systems to ensure more efficient operations and security. To support these requirements our FY 2015 budget request includes resources to: begin upgrading the heating, ventilation, and air conditioning system to increase energy efficiency and reliability; repair items identified in our long-range asset management plan, such as the water heater, chiller plant, and cooling fans; enhance continuity planning and emergency preparedness address bomb blast impact mitigation efforts. | What GAO Found
GAO's fiscal year (FY) 2015 budget request of $525.1 million seeks an increase of 3.9 percent to maintain staff capacity as well as continue necessary maintenance and improvements to our information technology (IT) and building infrastructure. Additionally, receipts and reimbursements, primarily from program and financial audits, and rental income, totaling $30.9 million are expected in FY 2015.
GAO recently issued our draft Strategic Plan for Serving Congress in FYs 2014-2019. The plan outlines our proposed goals and strategies for supporting Congress's top priority. I also have met with the Chairs and Ranking Members of many of the standing committees and their subcommittees to hear firsthand feedback on our performance, as well as prioritize requests for our services to maximize the return on investment.
In order to address Congressional priorities, and fulfill GAO's mission, a talented, diverse, high-performing, knowledgeable workforce is essential. Workforce and succession planning remain a priority for GAO. A significant proportion of our employees are currently retirement eligible, including 34 percent of our executive leadership and 21 percent of our supervisory analysts.
In 2014, through a targeted recruiting strategy to address critical skills gaps, GAO plans to boost our employment level for the first time in 3 years to 2,945 Full Time Equivalents (FTE). The requested FY 2015 funding level will preserve strides planned for FY 2014 to increase our staff capacity. In conjunction with the ongoing recruiting efforts and planning, we will revive our intern program and hire and train an increased number of entry level employees. This will reverse the downward staffing trajectory, develop a talented cadre of analyst and leaders for the future, achieve progress in reaching an optimal FTE level of 3,250 FTE, and assist GAO in meeting the high priority needs of Congress.
We also take great pride in reporting that we continue to be recognized as an employer of choice, and have been consistently ranked near the top on "best places to work" lists.
Improvements to our aging IT infrastructure will allow GAO to further streamline business operations, increase staff efficiency and productivity, as well as improve access to information. Planned investments in IT will address deferred upgrades and enhance our technology infrastructure to support an array of engagement management, human capital, and financial management systems.
We also plan to continue upgrading aging building systems to ensure more efficient operations and security. Areas of focus include, increasing the energy efficiency and reliability of the heating, ventilation, and air conditioning system; enhancing continuity planning and emergency preparedness capabilities; and addressing bomb blast impact mitigation efforts. |
gao_GAO-08-70 | gao_GAO-08-70_0 | DOD is subject to many of the major provisions of IDEIA and must include students with disabilities in its standardized testing. DOD Offers Professional Development to Teachers of Struggling Readers and Has Used Funds Designated for Dyslexia to Support That Effort
DOD offers professional development to all staff to help them support students who struggle to read, including those who may have dyslexia, and used designated funds to supplement existing training efforts across its schools. This professional development prepares teachers to assess student literacy skills and provides strategies to help instruct struggling readers. Designated Funds Were Used for Online Courses That Include a Component on Dyslexia and for Additional Tools to Assess Student Literacy
DOD reported it had fully obligated the $3.2 million designated for professional development on dyslexia, with about $2.9 million for online courses and literacy assessment tools. Reported obligations also included tools to help teachers identify and support students who struggle to read, some of who may have dyslexia. DOD Screens Students to Identify Those Who Struggle to Read and Provides Them with Supplemental Instruction
DOD schools identify students who have difficulty reading and provide them with supplemental reading services. DOD Schools Provide Special Education Services for Eligible Children with Disabilities
Those students whose performance does not improve through their enrollment in supplemental reading programs or who have profound reading difficulties may be eligible to receive special education services. Students with dyslexia may qualify for special education services under the specific learning disability category, but students must meet specific criteria. DOD Assesses All Students Using Standardized Tests but Does Not Report Separately on the Academic Achievement of Those with Disabilities
DOD assesses the academic achievement of all students using standardized tests. DOD does not generally report disaggregated test scores for students with disabilities. A primary goal of its strategic plan is for all students to meet or exceed challenging academic content standards, and DOD uses standardized test score data to determine progress towards this goal. However, unlike U.S. public school systems that are subject to the No Child Left Behind Act, DOD is not required to report test scores of designated student groups. Conclusions
On the whole, DOD students perform well in reading compared with public school students in the United States, and in some cases DOD ranks near the top of all school systems, as measured by students’ performance on standardized tests. Recommendation
To improve DOD’s accountability for the academic achievement of its students with disabilities, including certain students who may have dyslexia, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense instruct the Director of the Department of Defense Education Activity to publish separate data on the academic achievement of students with disabilities at the systemwide, area, district, and school levels when there are sufficient numbers of students with disabilities to avoid violating students’ privacy. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to determine: 1) what professional development DOD provides its staff to support students with dyslexia and how the fiscal year 2004-to-2006 funds designated for this purpose were used, (2) what identification and instructional services DOD provides to students who may have dyslexia, and (3) how DOD assesses the academic achievement of students with disabilities, including dyslexia. To meet these objectives, we interviewed and obtained documentation from DOD and others, conducted a Web-based survey of all 208 DOD school principals, and visited or interviewed by phone officials and parents in six school districts. | Why GAO Did This Study
Many of our nation's military and civilian personnel depend on Department of Defense (DOD) schools to meet their children's educational needs. These schools provide a range of educational services including programs for students with disabilities and those who struggle to read, some of whom may have a condition referred to as dyslexia. To determine how DOD supports students with dyslexia and how it used $3.2 million in funds designated to support them, GAO was asked to examine: (1) what professional development DOD provides its staff to support students with dyslexia and how the fiscal year 2004-to-2006 funds designated for this purpose were used, (2) what identification and instructional services DOD provides to students who may have dyslexia, and (3) how DOD assesses the academic achievement of students with disabilities, including dyslexia. To address these objectives, GAO conducted a survey of all school principals and interviewed agency officials, school personnel, and parents in six school districts.
What GAO Found
DOD provides a mix of online and classroom training to teachers who work with students who struggle to read, and DOD used 2004-to-2006 funds designated for professional development on dyslexia, in particular, to supplement these efforts. Most of the online and classroom professional development prepares teachers and specialists to assess student literacy and provides them with strategies to teach students who have particular difficulties. For the 2004-to-2006 funding for professional development on dyslexia, DOD supplemented its existing training with online courses that include specific modules on dyslexia and tools to assess students' literacy skills. DOD identifies students who struggle to read--some of who may have dyslexia--through standardized tests and provides them with supplemental reading instruction. DOD uses standardized tests to screen its students and identify those who need additional reading instruction, but these schools do not generally label them as dyslexic. To teach students they identify as struggling readers, DOD schools primarily employ an intensive multimedia reading program that is highly regarded by the principals, teachers, and parents GAO interviewed. Those students whose performance does not improve through their enrollment in supplemental reading programs or who have profound reading difficulties may be eligible to receive special education services. DOD is subject to many of the requirements of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act of 2004 on the education of students with disabilities. Students with dyslexia may qualify for these services, but they must meet program eligibility requirements. DOD uses the same standardized tests it uses for all students to assess the academic achievement of students with disabilities, including those who may have dyslexia, but does not report specifically on the outcomes for students with disabilities. A primary goal of DOD's strategic plan is for all students to meet or exceed challenging academic standards. To measure progress towards this goal, DOD assesses all students' academic achievement and school performance by comparing test scores to a national norm or to a national proficiency level. Overall, students perform well in reading compared to U.S. public school students. DOD disaggregates test scores for students with disabilities but does not report such information publicly. In contrast, U.S. public school systems under the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 must report such data. Without this information, it is difficult for parents, policy makers, and others to measure the academic achievement of students with disabilities relative to all other students in the DOD school system. |
gao_GAO-03-740T | gao_GAO-03-740T_0 | VA can bill insurers for treatment of conditions that are not a result of injuries or illnesses incurred or aggravated during military service. The medical documentation process involves properly documenting the health care provided to patients by physicians and other health care providers. In September 1999, VA adopted a fee schedule, called “reasonable charges.” Reasonable charges are itemized fees based on diagnoses and procedures. This schedule allows VA to more accurately bill for the care provided. Third-Party Collections Increased
For fiscal year 2002, VA collected $687 million in insurance payments, up 32 percent compared to the $521 million collected during fiscal year 2001. Collections through the first half of fiscal year 2003 total $386 million in third-party payments. Operational Problems Limit Collections, but VA Lacks an Estimate of Uncollected Dollars
Studies have suggested that operational problems—missed billing opportunities, billing backlogs, and inadequate pursuit of accounts receivable—limited VA’s collections in the years following the implementation of reasonable charges. 2001 Plan to Improve Collections Is Partially Implemented; Other Initiatives Being Developed
VA continues to implement its 2001 Improvement Plan, which is designed to increase collections by improving and standardizing VA’s collections processes. These problems include unidentified insurance for some patients, insufficient documentation for billing, coding staff shortages, gaps in the automated capture of billing data, and insufficient pursuit of accounts receivable. When fully implemented, the plan’s actions are intended to improve collections by reducing operational problems, such as missed billing opportunities. Information obtained from CBO in April 2003 indicates that 10 are complete and 7 are scheduled for implementation by the end of 2003. Implementation of the remaining actions will begin in 2004 as part of a financial system pilot with full implementation expected in 2005 or 2006. Officials in the office told us that they have developed a new approach for improving third-party collections that can help increase revenue collections by further revising processes and providing a new business focus on collections. Concluding Observations
As VA faces increased demand for medical care, particularly from higher- income veterans, third-party collections for nonservice-connected conditions remain an important source of revenue to supplement VA’s appropriations. VA has been improving its billing and collecting under a reasonable-charges fee schedule it established in 1999, but VA has not completed its efforts to address problems in collections operations. In this regard, it is important that VA develop a reliable estimate of uncollected dollars. VA also does not have a complete measure of its full collections costs. Consequently, VA cannot determine how effectively it supplements its medical care appropriation with third-party collections. Related GAO Products
VA Health Care: Third Party Collections Rising as VA Continues to Address Problems in Its Collections Operations. GAO-03-145. Washington, D.C.: January 31, 2003. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) collects health insurance payments, known as third-party collections, for veterans' health care conditions it treats that are not a result of injuries or illnesses incurred or aggravated during military service. In September 1999, VA adopted a new fee schedule, called "reasonable charges," that it anticipated would increase revenues from third-party collections. In January 2003, GAO reported on VA's third-party collection efforts and problems in collections operations for fiscal year 2002 as well as VA's initiatives to improve collections (VA Health Care: Third-Party Collections Rising as VA Continues to Address Problems in Its Collections Operations, ( GAO-03-145 , Jan. 31, 2003)). GAO was asked to discuss its findings and update third-party collection amounts and agency plans to improve collections.
What GAO Found
VA's fiscal year 2002 third-party collections rose by 32 percent over fiscal year 2001 collections, to $687 million, and available data for the first half of fiscal year 2003 show that $386 million has been collected so far. The increase in collections reflects VA's improved ability to manage the larger billing volume and more itemized bills required under its new fee schedule. VA managers in three regional health care networks attributed billings increases to a reduction of billing backlogs and improved collections processes, such as better medical documentation prepared by physicians, more complete identification of billable care by coders, and more bills prepared per biller. Although collections are increasing, operational problems, such as missed billing opportunities, persist and continue to limit the amount VA collects. VA has been implementing the action items in its Revenue Cycle Improvement Plan of September 2001 that are designed to address operational problems, such as unidentified insurance for some patients, insufficient documentation of services for billing, shortages of billing staff, and insufficient pursuit of accounts receivable. VA reported in April 2003 that 10 of 24 action items are complete; 7 are scheduled for implementation by the end of 2003; and the remaining actions will begin in 2004 with full implementation expected in 2005 or 2006. These dates are behind VA's original schedule. In addition, the Chief Business Office, established in May 2002, has developed a new approach that combines the action items with additional initiatives. Given the growing demand for care, especially from higher-income veterans, it is important that VA resolve its operational problems and sustain its commitment to maximizing third-party collections. It is also important for VA to develop a reliable estimate of uncollected dollars and a complete measure of its collections costs. Without this information, VA cannot evaluate its effectiveness in supplementing its medical care appropriation with third-party dollars. |
gao_GAO-04-755 | gao_GAO-04-755_0 | To assess the implementation effectiveness of the key control activities for the three areas of operation, we used a case study approach, reviewing transaction documentation at six VA medical centers selected based on size and medical specialization diversity of the location’s part-time physicians and other factors. The property control records were such that we could not select a statistical sample of test items that would allow our results to be projected to the location’s entire property universe. At five locations, VHA officials found from 13 to 39 of the 100 items we tested at each location to determine if they were on hand, while at the sixth medical center, Atlanta, 62 of 100 items were found. A 1997 addition to VA’s Handbook 7127, “Materiel Management Procedures,” established a $5,000 threshold for property that must be inventoried. The Information Resources Management department (IRM) at the six medical centers we visited had developed alternative procedures to maintain accountability for computer equipment that cost less than $5,000. However, all six locations lacked information about which drugs qualified for credit, and only one pharmacy inventoried non-narcotic drugs before they were turned over to the contractor. However, we found that each of the six medical centers we visited essentially used an honor system for returning drugs to manufacturers for credit, relying on contractors that collected and processed recalled, expired, or deteriorated drugs. We found that at four of the six pharmacies visited, physical control over non- narcotic drugs held for return was lacking. Anyone with access to the pharmacy also had access to the drugs. The combination of weaknesses in record keeping and physical controls over non-narcotic drugs held for return exposed them to potential loss, theft, or unauthorized use. Controls over Part-time Physician Time and Attendance Could Be Strengthened Further
Our review of part-time physician time and attendance documentation for the two pay periods ending in September 2003 showed that scheduled and actual hours worked were not always documented according to policy at the six medical centers we visited. We also found that latitude provided in VHA’s Directive 2003-001, issued in January 2003, on time and attendance of part-time physicians was a factor in the various ways the six locations carried out part-time physician attendance monitoring responsibilities. On the day we reviewed part-time physician sign-in sheets at the Houston medical center, we noted that only 2 of 15 physicians scheduled to work had signed in. We recommend that the Secretary of Veterans Affairs direct the Assistant Secretary for Management to clarify existing guidance and establish consistent parameters for personal property that is required to be accounted for in the property control records and that is subject to physical inventory to include sensitive property, provide a more comprehensive list of the type of personal property assets that are considered sensitive for accountability purposes, direct that physical inventories of personal property be performed by the A&MM staff or other parties who are independent of those with property custodian responsibilities, and reinforce VA’s requirement to attach bar code labels to agency personal property. To improve oversight of medical center operations, we recommend that the Acting Under Secretary for Health designate a headquarters-level staff office to monitor medical facilities’ credits for returned drugs; review returned drug credits and related pertinent information for VA medical facilities and determine, especially for those with unusual performance patterns, whether there might be additional opportunities for credits; develop procedures to periodically test whether the amount of credits received for returned drugs is correct; implement procedures to periodically test whether the amount of credits that medical centers received for returned drugs is correct; conduct a best practices review of procedures implemented by VA medical centers and service areas to identify those most effective in documenting daily attendance of part-time physicians and periodically monitoring employee compliance with time and attendance requirements; and use the results of the best practices review to provide more definitive policy guidance to improve control effectiveness over part-time physician attendance monitoring. To address the weaknesses noted during our visits to six VA medical centers, we recommend that the Acting Under Secretary for Health require the directors of those medical centers to determine the location or disposition of personal property items not found during our site visits; review property records to identify and correct erroneous or incomplete prepare a running list of all non-narcotic drugs held for return in facility pharmacies as they are removed from current supplies to compare with contractor-prepared lists of returned drugs; improve physical security over non-narcotic drugs held for return in facility pharmacies as they are removed from current supplies; and analyze information regarding drugs returned to manufacturers to identify potential improvements that might increase the amount of credits received, such as improving the timeliness of returning drugs consistently turned in too late to qualify for credit. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) provides health care to veterans through the $27 billion Veterans Health Administration (VHA) medical programs. VHA administers and operates VA's medical system, providing care to nearly 5 million patients in 2003. As of September 2003, VHA operated 160 hospitals, 847 outpatient clinics, 134 nursing homes, 42 domiciliaries, and 73 comprehensive home care programs, including facilities in every state, Puerto Rico, the Philippines, and Guam. VHA is responsible for effective stewardship of the resources provided to it by Congress, which asked GAO to review internal controls in three areas of operation at selected VHA medical centers. GAO conducted a review to assess the effectiveness of control activities over (1) personal property, (2) drugs returned for credit, and (3) part-time physician time and attendance.
What GAO Found
GAO's review found that six selected VA medical centers lacked a reliable property control database. The property databases for the six medical centers contained incomplete information. As a result, GAO could not select a statistical sample of test items so that results could be projected to each location's entire property universe. Key policies and procedures established by VA to control personal property provided facilities with substantial latitude in conducting physical inventories and maintaining their property management systems, which resulted in reduced property accountability. For example, VA's Materiel Management Procedures handbook allowed the person responsible for custody of VA property to attest to the existence of that property rather than requiring independent verification. Also, personnel at some locations interpreted a policy that established a $5,000 threshold for property that must be inventoried as a license to ignore VA requirements to account for lower cost items that are susceptible to theft or loss, such as personal computers and peripheral equipment. These weak practices, combined with lax implementation, resulted in low levels of accountability and heightened risk of loss. VHA personnel located fewer than half of the 100 items GAO selected at each of five medical centers and 62 of 100 items at the sixth medical center. The process for obtaining credit for recalled, expired, or deteriorated drugs was, in essence, an honor system. Each of the six pharmacies GAO visited used a contractor to return drugs to the manufacturer for credit, but only one of the pharmacies inventoried non-narcotic drugs before they were turned over to the contractor. None of the pharmacies had enough information about which drugs qualified for credit to be able to reconcile the credits they received with the drugs they had turned over to the contractor. There was no agency-level oversight of returned drug information to help identify improvements that might increase the credits that VA receives. At four of the six facilities, non-narcotic drugs held for return were stored in unsecured open bins accessible to anyone in the pharmacy. The combined lack of record keeping and physical controls over non-narcotic drugs held for return exposed them to potential loss, theft, or unauthorized use. Scheduled and actual hours worked by part-time physicians at the six locations GAO visited were not always documented in accordance with a January 2003 VHA directive. Five of the six locations had not prepared written work schedules for all part-time physicians as required. GAO found that latitude provided in the directive resulted in wide variation in procedures used by the six medical centers to verify physician compliance with work schedules. While some timekeepers used informal notes to record daily attendance, one facility required physicians to sign in. However, on the day of GAO's review, only two of 15 scheduled physicians had signed in. Attendance monitoring procedures at the six locations varied in frequency and included monitoring all part-time physicians once per quarter at one location and 5 percent of part-time physicians each month at another. |
gao_GAO-03-176 | gao_GAO-03-176_0 | Between 2000 and 2001, SNFs’ average amount of nursing time changed little, remaining slightly under 3 and one-half hours per patient day. For most categories of SNFs, changes in staffing ratios were small. The share of a SNF’s patients who were covered by Medicare was not a factor in whether facilities increased their nursing time. Although SNFs with higher total margins in 2000—that is, those with revenues substantially in excess of costs—might have been best able to afford increases in nursing staff, those with the highest total margins did not raise their staffing substantially more than others. Although the payment change could have paid for about 10 added minutes of nursing time per patient day for all SNF patients, we found that on average SNFs increased their staffing ratios by less than 2 minutes per patient day. Matter for Congressional Consideration
Our analysis of available data on SNF nursing staff indicates that, in the aggregate, SNFs did not have significantly higher nursing staff time after the increase to the nursing component of Medicare’s payment. Data Sources Considered
To assess the impact on nurse staffing ratios of the April 1, 2001, increase in the nursing component of the SNF payment, we needed a nationally uniform data source that included the number of patients and the number of nursing staff (full-time equivalents (FTE)) or nursing hours, for two periods—before April 1, 2001, to establish a baseline, and after April 1, 2001. Related GAO Products
Skilled Nursing Facilities: Providers Have Responded to New Payment System By Changing Practices. | Why GAO Did This Study
The nation's 15,000 skilled nursing facilities (SNF) play an essential role in our health care system, providing Medicare-covered skilled nursing and rehabilitative care each year for 1.4 million Medicare patients who have recently been discharged from acute care hospitals. In recent years, many analysts and other observers, including members of Congress, have expressed concern about the level of nursing staff in SNFs and the impact of inadequate staffing on the quality of care. GAO's analysis of available data shows that, in the aggregate, SNFs' nurse staffing ratios changed little after the increase in the nursing component of the Medicare payment took effect. Overall, SNFs' average nursing time increased by 1.9 minutes per patient day, relative to their average in 2000 of about 3 and one-half hours of nursing time per patient day. For most SNFs, increases in staffing ratios were small.
What GAO Found
Further, GAO found that the share of SNF patients covered by Medicare was not a factor in whether facilities increased their nursing time. Similarly, SNFs that had a total revenues considerably in excess of costs before the added payments took effect did not increase their staffing substantially more than others. |
gao_GAO-14-13 | gao_GAO-14-13_0 | Background
Although there were about 32,000 motor vehicle traffic fatalities in the United States in 2011, the number has generally declined in recent years. DOT and Industry Have Developed and Piloted V2V Technologies, Which Offer Potentially Significant Safety Benefits If Broadly Deployed
Efforts by DOT and the automobile industry to develop V2V technologies have reached the point at which they have been tested in a 12-month, real world pilot that will conclude in February 2014. These efforts have focused on developing and testing needed components including hardware to send and receive data among vehicles, software applications to analyze data and identify potential collisions, vehicle features that issue warnings to drivers of these potential collisions, and a security system to ensure trust in the data that are being communicated among vehicles. According to DOT, once deployed, V2V technologies have the potential to address—by providing warnings to drivers—76 percent of all potential multi-vehicle crashes involving at least one light-duty vehicle. Development of these technologies has progressed to the point of real world testing. The result will be an estimate of the effectiveness of V2V safety applications. Driver response: The benefits of V2V technologies will also depend on how well drivers respond to warning messages. DOT has been collaborating with automobile manufacturers and others to identify potential solutions to these challenges and is planning continued efforts to support the eventual deployment of V2V technologies. V2V Technology Deployment Challenges and Efforts to Address Them
According to experts we interviewed, DOT officials, automobile manufacturers, and other stakeholders, the deployment of V2V technologies faces a number of challenges, including: (1) finalizing the technical framework and management structure of a V2V communication security system to ensure trust among vehicles, (2) ensuring that the possible sharing of the band of radio-frequency spectrum used by V2V communications will not adversely affect their performance, (3) considering human factors to ensure that drivers respond appropriately to V2V warnings, (4) addressing the uncertainty related to potential liability issues posed by V2V technologies, and (5) addressing any concerns the public may have about V2V technologies, including those related to privacy. Technical framework: Of the 21 experts we interviewed, 12 cited the technical development of a V2V communication security system as a great or very great challenge to the deployment of V2V technologies. As noted earlier, DOT officials told us that they do not want to take certain actions, such as determining the structure of a V2V communication security system, until after NHTSA’s late 2013 decision on how to proceed regarding V2V technologies. Costs of V2V Technologies Are Being Studied and Are Likely to Be Influenced by Various Factors Including Specifics of V2V Communication Security System
DOT and the automobile industry, through the CAMP VSC 3 Consortium, are currently analyzing the total costs of deploying V2V technologies, which include the costs of in-vehicle components and the costs associated with a V2V communication security system. DOT is currently obtaining estimates of the costs of in-vehicle V2V components from automobile manufacturers and industry suppliers and has engaged a contractor to study the potential costs of providing V2V communications security through a number of possible technical and management options. NHTSA will use these cost estimates to inform its decision on how to proceed with V2V technologies later this year. All of the automobile manufacturers we interviewed said that it is difficult to estimate the costs of in-vehicle V2V components at this time because too many factors remain unknown. Although the costs of in-vehicle V2V components are difficult to estimate at this time, they may be modest compared to the price of a new vehicle. Furthermore, it is currently not only difficult to estimate the potential costs, but unclear who or what entity—consumers, automobile manufacturers, DOT, state and local governments, or others—would pay the costs. Agency Comments
We provided a draft of this report to the Secretary of Transportation and the Chairman of the Federal Communications Commission for review and comment. In addition, we collaborated with the National Academies of Sciences (NAS) to identify and recruit experts in vehicle-to-vehicle technologies. Specifically, we are examining: (1) the progress of development of connected vehicle technologies that involve vehicle-to-vehicle communications and their anticipated benefits; (2) the challenges that affect the development and deployment of these technologies and their potential costs; and (3) how the U.S. Department of Transportation is leading efforts to address these challenges. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 2011, 5.3 million vehicle crashes in the United States resulted in more than 2.2 million injuries and about 32,000 fatalities. While improvements in automobile safety have reduced the number of fatalities in recent decades, DOT has worked with the automobile industry to develop V2V technologies, through which vehicles are capable of warning drivers of imminent collisions by sharing data, including information on speed and location, with nearby vehicles. GAO was asked to review the status of V2V technologies. GAO examined (1) the state of development of V2V technologies and their anticipated benefits; (2) the challenges, if any, that will affect the deployment of these technologies and what actions, if any, DOT is taking to address them; and (3) what is known about the potential costs associated with these technologies.
GAO reviewed documentation on V2V technology-related efforts by DOT and automobile manufacturers, visited a pilot study of V2V technologies in Michigan, and interviewed DOT officials, automobile manufacturers, and 21 experts identified by the National Academies of Sciences. Experts were selected based on their level of knowledge and to represent a variety of subject areas related to V2V technology development.
DOT and the Federal Communications Commission reviewed a draft of this report and provided technical comments which were incorporated as appropriate.
What GAO Found
The development of vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) technologies has progressed to the point of real world testing, and if broadly deployed, they are anticipated to offer significant safety benefits. Efforts by the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) and the automobile industry have focused on developing: 1) in-vehicle components such as hardware to facilitate communications among vehicles, 2) safety software applications to analyze data and identify potential collisions, 3) vehicle features that warn drivers, and 4) a national communication security system to ensure trust in the data transmitted among vehicles. According to DOT, if widely deployed, V2V technologies could provide warnings to drivers in as much as 76 percent of potential multi-vehicle collisions involving at least one light vehicle, such as a passenger car. Ultimately, however, the level of benefits realized will depend on the extent of the deployment of these technologies and the effectiveness of V2V warnings in eliciting appropriate driver responses. The continued progress of V2V technology development hinges on a decision that the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) plans to make in late 2013 on how to proceed regarding these technologies. One option would be to pursue a rulemaking requiring their inclusion in new vehicles.
The deployment of V2V technologies faces a number of challenges, which DOT is working with the automobile industry to address. According to experts, DOT officials, automobile manufacturers, and other stakeholders GAO interviewed, these challenges include: 1) finalizing the technical framework and management framework of a V2V communication security system, which will be unique in its size and structure; 2) ensuring that the possible sharing with other wireless users of the radio-frequency spectrum used by V2V communications will not adversely affect V2V technology's performance; 3) ensuring that drivers respond appropriately to warnings of potential collisions; 4) addressing the uncertainty related to potential liability issues posed by V2V technologies; and 5) addressing any concerns the public may have, including those related to privacy. DOT is collaborating with automobile manufacturers and others to find potential technical and policy solutions to these challenges and plans to continue these efforts. Although V2V technologies are being tested in a real-world pilot that will end in February 2014, DOT officials stated that they cannot fully plan for deployment until NHTSA decides how to proceed later this year.
DOT and the automobile industry are currently analyzing the total costs associated with V2V technologies, which include the costs of both in-vehicle components and a communication security system. All of the automobile manufacturers GAO interviewed said that it is difficult to estimate in-vehicle V2V component costs at this time because too many factors--such as future production volumes and the time frame of deployment--remain unknown. The costs associated with a V2V communication security system also remain unknown as the specifics of the system's technical framework and management structure are not yet finalized. While the costs of in-vehicle V2V components may be modest relative to the price of a new vehicle, some experts noted that the potential costs associated with the operation of a V2V communication security system could be significant. Further, it is currently unclear who--consumers, automobile manufacturers, DOT, state and local governments, or others--would pay the costs associated with a V2V communication security system. |
gao_RCED-96-155 | gao_RCED-96-155_0 | Multiple Federal Programs Directly or Indirectly Provide Telecommunications Assistance
At least 28 federal programs in 15 agencies provide funding for telecommunications programs. In fiscal year 1995, the 13 telecommunications programs provided about $715.8 million for about 540 projects. Communities Identified Three Steps for Developing a Telecommunications Project
Officials in five rural communities that have obtained federal funds for telecommunications projects identified three key actions for putting telecommunications projects into place: (1) developing a basic understanding of the potential benefits of telecommunications technologies; (2) engaging in long-term planning to determine the need for, and ensure the technical and financial feasibility of, their project; and (3) building partnerships among the key players who would be needed to support and/or benefit from the project. Experts Reported That Changes in Telecommunications Programs Could Make Them More Useful to Rural Areas
Rural development experts and public officials we interviewed suggested three ways to improve federal programs providing telecommunications assistance: (1) educating rural communities on the potential benefits of telecommunications technologies, (2) building in requirements for considering telecommunications technologies in long-range planning, and (3) making the multiple federal programs easier to use. She believes that better education, training, and overall exposure to these technologies are needed by rural areas. Rural health care providers, patients, and rural communities benefit from this grant program. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed rural communities' efforts to develop advanced telecommunications technologies, focusing on: (1) federal programs that fund rural telecommunications projects; (2) lessons learned for developing such projects; and (3) whether changes to these programs are needed.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) as of December 1995, there were at least 28 programs that provided discretionary development funds for rural telecommunications projects; (2) 13 designated programs provided about $715.8 million for 540 telecommunications projects; (3) program users and rural development experts believe that rural communities need a basic understanding of telecommunications technologies and their potential benefits, strategic plans to determine the technical and financial feasibility of telecommunications development, and partnerships among key players involved in constructing, financing, and using telecommunications networks; (4) rural development experts and public officials believe that telecommunications programs could be improved by educating rural communities on the potential benefits of telecommunications technologies, building in requirements for considering telecommunications technologies in long-range planning, and making multiple federal programs easier to use; (5) most federal agencies lack the resources required for educational outreach programs; and (6) 1996 legislation emphasizes the need for rural communities to include telecommunications projects in their long-term planning and coordination of multiple federal programs. |
gao_GAO-03-367 | gao_GAO-03-367_0 | DOD also provided cost estimates for implementing the recommendations. Four of these issues address the recommendations included in DOD’s November 2002 report to Congress. DOD’s Recommendations Offer Solutions to Long-Standing Problems
The three recommendations in DOD’s report to Congress offer solutions to several of the current program’s long-standing problems, such as the liability/claims process and the low quality of service. If implemented, the first recommendation (i.e., reengineering the liability/claims process by adopting commercial practices of minimum valuation, simplifying the filing of claims, and providing direct settlement with the carrier) has the potential to help reduce the length of time it currently takes to resolve claims for lost, destroyed, or damaged household goods because the carrier recovery time would be eliminated for most moves, increase the reimbursement rates military personnel receive for their losses, and reduce DOD’s claims-related costs. While the shipments included in the evaluation do not represent all shipment types managed annually by DOD, we believe that the evaluation results provide sufficient information to allow DOD to initiate actions to improve its current personal property program within budget constraints. Therefore, the ability to implement changes to the existing program within the cost estimates reported to Congress is uncertain. Due to the long- standing problems with this program and the high pilot program costs that contributed to the military services’ early termination of participating in one of the pilot programs, we believe that by quantifying the risk associated with this projection, DOD could provide the military services and Congress information needed to develop and review future budget requests for this program. Further, without carefully monitoring costs during the implementation process and assessing costs and benefits from a period succeeding full implementation of the recommendations, DOD will not have the information needed to determine if anticipated improvements in the program are being achieved at a reasonable cost. Soundness of Estimates to Develop Cost for Changing Claims and Contracting Processes Varies
The soundness of the three adjustments the Military Traffic Management Command used to develop its estimated 13 percent increase over the current program costs to implement the remaining recommendations—the claims process and performance-based service contracts—varies. The Military Traffic Management Command did not provide the same level of evidentiary support that it provided on the other two adjustments. While DOD did not quantify the risk, per se, it believes a conservative approach was taken in developing the savings in each of the three adjustments. Therefore, DOD was precluded from projecting the extent to which the recommended improvements can be achieved DOD-wide. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve the personal property program for military personnel, their families, and program administrators, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Commander, U.S. Transportation Command, to initiate actions to implement the three recommendations contained in DOD’s report to Congress within budget constraints, provide the military services and Congress additional information to quantify the risk associated with achieving the projected 13 percent cost estimate before the claims process and performance-based service contracts recommendations are implemented to provide the military services with information needed for budgeting purposes, monitor costs for all recommendations during the implementation phase to ensure that the proposed changes are being achieved within an acceptable and a predefined range, and assess the effects of the three recommendations on the personal property program (to be carried out after the summertime peak-moving season once the recommendations have been implemented) to determine whether the anticipated improvements in the program are being achieved at a reasonable cost. Without providing the range of possible cost increases and the risk regarding the likelihood of achieving this 13 percent projection within that range, DOD may encounter a repetition of its experience with one of the pilot programs, which had to be terminated because actual costs exceeded projected costs. Our finding that the implementation of the information technology improvements recommendation would likely cost $7 million rather than the $4 million to $6 million that DOD projected was based on information we received from DOD during the audit. To determine the reliability of pilot program shipment-related costs used in the report, we reviewed the data collection efforts used by each pilot program for the transportation and storage of household goods included in the Transportation Command’s evaluation. Further, we reviewed the constructed cost methodology used to develop the estimates of what DOD would have paid to make comparable shipments under the current program in the pilot programs’ test areas. This occurred when the match showed a difference of more than $1.00. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Defense (DOD) spends more than $1.7 billion each year to move and store over 600,000 household goods shipments when relocating military personnel. It conducted and evaluated several pilot program studies aimed at fixing its problem-plagued program and, in 2002, issued a report to Congress with three recommendations. The 1997 Defense Appropriations Act Conference Report directed GAO to validate the results achieved by the pilot programs. In response, GAO examined the extent to which DOD's recommendations to Congress (1) offer solutions to long-standing problems in the current program and (2) are supported by the evaluation's findings and should be implemented. GAO also assessed the soundness of methodologies used by DOD to develop cost estimates to implement the recommendations.
What GAO Found
The recommendations in DOD's report to Congress have the potential to resolve several long-standing problems found in the current personal property program, which manages the transportation and storage of household goods. The recommendations, if implemented, would (1) reengineer the claims process to reduce the length of time it currently takes to resolve claims for lost, destroyed, or damaged household goods and increase the reimbursement rates that military personnel currently receive for their losses; (2) use performance-based service contracts to improve the generally low quality of service that DOD currently gets from the moving industry; and (3) put in place new information technology with interface capabilities to enable program managers and users to monitor in-transit shipments and track the number and cost of shipments processed each year. The recommendations in DOD's report to Congress are supported by the Transportation Command's evaluation of the pilot programs' findings and should be implemented within budget constraints. DOD's approach in conducting the evaluation was methodologically sound: It developed an evaluation plan to guide its work and adjusted the plan when necessary to address differences in the pilot programs' approaches. While the shipments included in the evaluation do not represent all shipment types managed annually by DOD, GAO believes that the evaluation results provide sufficient information to allow DOD to initiate actions to improve its current personal property program. GAO found that the soundness of methodologies used to develop DOD's cost estimates varied. Therefore, DOD's ability to implement changes to the existing program within the cost estimates DOD reported to Congress is uncertain. GAO found that the estimate to implement the information technology recommendation was $7 million rather than the $4 million to $6 million estimate DOD reported to Congress. In developing cost estimates for the remaining recommendations, DOD did not provide the same level of evidentiary support for one of the three adjustments it used to align the pilot programs' costs to current program costs. As a result, GAO questions the extent to which these recommendations can be implemented within DOD's estimated 13 percent increase over current program costs. While DOD believes it used a conservative approach in developing this 13 percent estimate, it has not quantified the risk associated with the projection, which could provide the military services and Congress information needed to develop and review future budget requests for this program. Without providing the range of possible cost increases and the risk regarding the likelihood of achieving this 13 percent projection within that range, DOD may find a repeat of what occurred during the pilots, where the military services terminated participation in one of the pilot programs due to costs exceeding projections. GAO also found that without carefully monitoring costs during the implementation phase and assessing costs and benefits from a period succeeding full implementation of the recommendations, DOD would not have the information needed to determine if anticipated improvements in the program are being achieved at a reasonable cost. |
gao_GAO-10-5 | gao_GAO-10-5_0 | The majority of disability claims remained pending because they took significantly more time to process than death and education claims. All Education Claims and Over Three-Quarters of Closed Death Claims Were Approved, while Most Disability Claims Remained Pending
While we estimated that about 80 percent of all PSOB program claims initiated in fiscal years 2006 through 2008 were closed as of April 2009, we found that the closure rate varied by type of claim—about 100 percent for education claims, 78 percent for death claims, and 31 percent for disability claims. According to PSOB officials, obtaining this documentation may take months or years. However, we could not determine how long the attorney review portion of the process took because of the PSOB Office’s inconsistent claim file documentation on the dates during which the reviews occurred. Some State and Local Officials We Interviewed Were Concerned about Their Lack of Awareness of Some Program Benefits, Difficulties with Establishing Eligibility, and Perceived Long Wait Times for Benefits
State and local officials were not always aware of PSOB program benefits, especially those for disability and education. Overall, officials most frequently expressed concern about what they believed to be a long wait time for PSOB benefits, and frustration about the lack of communication from the PSOB Office about claim status and estimated wait times for receiving benefits. Officials Said That Submitting All Necessary Paperwork to Prove Eligibility Was Difficult and Time-consuming
Officials in all five states we visited also told us that when applying for benefits, submitting all the necessary paperwork to prove eligibility was difficult and can be time-consuming. While It Is Taking Steps to Improve, the PSOB Office Does Not Yet Follow Government Guidelines for Performance Monitoring
Overall, we found that while it is taking steps to improve, the PSOB Office does not follow government standards and guidelines for setting goals and monitoring performance. However, we found that other federal programs that provide benefits after work-related injury and illness have been able to set strategic goals and monitor performance. In addition, the PSOB program has initiated several efforts in an attempt to address concerns about the lack of program awareness, the burdensome application process, and obtaining claims status. Without this information, the program office cannot communicate with claimants and other public stakeholders about how long the claims process is expected to take and whether program constraints, such as required procedures and limited resources, are affecting the process. (2) What issues, if any, were raised by state and local agencies and advocacy organizations seeking benefits on the behalf of claimants? (3) To what extent does the PSOB program follow recognized government standards and guidelines for effective program management? As shown in table 3, the states were selected based on geographic location, the percentage of the national total number of public safety officers that was in a state for calendar years 2006 to 2008, the number of work-related deaths among public safety officers in a state for calendar years 2005 to 2007, variation in the amount of state workers’ compensation benefits, variation in the availability and amount of state lump-sum death benefits, and recommendations from advocacy groups and employee organizations. To evaluate the effectiveness of the PSOB program’s management, we interviewed program officials and reviewed and analyzed available documents on performance monitoring, program outreach and assistance for those seeking benefits, and current and future plans for automating the claims process. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 1976, Congress established the Public Safety Officers' Benefits (PSOB) program, which is administered by the Department of Justice (Justice) and provides lump-sum payments to eligible public safety officers and their survivors after a line-of-duty death or permanent and total disability. The program also provides educational benefits to an eligible officer's spouse and children. GAO was asked to determine (1) the extent to which claimants receive PSOB program benefits and how long the claims process takes, (2) any issues raised by state and local agencies and others who assist claimants in seeking benefits, and (3) the extent to which the PSOB program follows recognized government standards and guidelines for effective program management. To address these objectives, we reviewed PSOB claims that were opened during fiscal years 2006 to 2008 for all three types of claims, reviewed relevant agency documents, and interviewed PSOB program officials, representatives of advocacy organizations, and state and local officials in five selected states.
What GAO Found
GAO found that all education claims and over three-quarters of death claims opened in fiscal years 2006 through 2008 were closed and approved as of April 2009, while only about 31 percent of disability claims initiated during that period had determinations. The majority of disability claims remained pending because they took significantly longer to process than other claims--while education and death claims were generally processed in under a year, disability claims took between 17 and 26 months. GAO was unable to pinpoint which steps of the claims process were most time-consuming because claims files that GAO reviewed did not consistently document the date when claims passed through each step of the process. State and local officials GAO interviewed were generally concerned about their lack of awareness of certain PSOB program benefits, challenges with establishing eligibility, and the perceived long wait time for benefits. Specifically, officials were generally more aware of death than disability and education benefits. Officials also stated that submitting all the necessary paperwork to prove eligibility was difficult and time-consuming due, in part, to how long it took to obtain necessary documents from other organizations. Officials most frequently expressed concern about perceived long wait times for receiving benefits and also reported difficulties obtaining information about claims status. While it is taking steps to improve, the PSOB program does not follow government guidelines for performance monitoring. Specifically, according to Justice officials, the PSOB program has not set strategic goals and measures, monitored performance, or reported results because it is a payment program, and its budget is largely mandatory. However, other federal programs that provide benefits after work-related injury and illness have established performance measures, such as ones for claims-processing timeliness, and report their results publicly. Also, while the PSOB program has initiated several outreach and assistance efforts to claimants and state and local agencies in recent years, these efforts are not monitored, resulting in uncertainty as to whether they are adequate. |
gao_GAO-06-966 | gao_GAO-06-966_0 | The Corps Cannot Accurately Identify How Many Continuing Contracts It Has Awarded because It Does Not Track These Contracts
The Corps does not track information on the number of contracts that it awards with a continuing contracts clause; therefore, it could not identify the number or the dollar value of such contracts awarded in fiscal years 2003–2005. We independently identified the number of continuing contracts awarded by the Corps in fiscal years 2003–2005 by reviewing the agency’s contracting data, and we determined that 1,592 (about 10 percent) of all contracts awarded during this 3-year period most likely included and used a continuing contracts clause. The full costs to the federal government of the 1,592 contracts were more than $3.96 billion at award. However, the Corps only obligated $655 million to current appropriations when these contracts were awarded; the outstanding commitment at the time of award was about $3.30 billion, and the Corps expects to obligate this amount to subsequent years’ appropriations. Prior to 2005, the Corps Routinely Included a Continuing Contracts Clause in Most Contracts
The Corps’ routine practice was to include a continuing contracts clause in most of the contracts it awarded during fiscal years 2003–2005. For example, for the 107 randomly selected continuing contracts awarded in fiscal years 2003–2005 that we reviewed, we found only 8 continuing contracts that were valued at more than $10 million dollars and involved contracted work that required more than 12 calendar months to complete. In contrast, many of the 107 continuing contracts we reviewed were short-term and/or low dollar value contracts. These actions helped the Corps meets its policy of expending all available appropriations in the fiscal year appropriated by allowing the money to be spent on other contracts. The Corps’ Revised Processes for Approving Continuing Contracts Has Reduced Their Use, but It Still Lacks Criteria for When Their Use Is Appropriate
In fiscal year 2005 and again in 2006, in response to congressional committee direction, the Corps implemented new processes that require districts to, among other things, obtain headquarters’ approval before using continuing contracts. As a result, headquarters continues to receive and approve continuing contracts for short-term, low dollar value contracts. The guidance also established criteria for the kinds of situations in which a contract should generally be fully funded. To respond to these new congressional requirements, in December 2005, the Corps issued additional guidance that is effective through the end of fiscal year 2006, which, among other things:reaffirmed its policy that districts should use fully funded contracts as their primary contracting option; directed that continuing contracts should only be used as the contracting option of last resort; summarized new information that the districts are required to provide in their requests to use continuing contracts, including an explanation on why using a continuing contract is in the best interest of the government; and directed districts to take measures to ensure that contractor costs generally do not exceed the amount appropriated for projects in fiscal year 2006. The Corps believes that these requests demonstrated a strong business case for using a continuing contract; however, we believe that the Corps might have been able to fully fund some of these contracts if, at the time of award, the Corps had adequate appropriations to cover the contract amount. Recommendations for Executive Action
To ensure the judicious use of continuing contracts by the Corps districts and to provide better management of projects that use such contracts, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Commanding General and the Chief of Engineers of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to take the following three actions: eliminate the routine use of continuing contracts by adopting good project planning and management practices rather than relying on continuing contracts; establish meaningful criteria for the use of continuing contracts, including an assessment of dollar value and length of time needed to complete contracted work so that districts have clear guidance on when a continuing contract may be used; and develop a tracking system to monitor the use of continuing contracts. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To determine the number and dollar amount of continuing contracts the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) awarded during fiscal years 2003– 2005, we reviewed the Corps’ quarterly reports to the appropriations committees on their use of these contracts. To determine how the Corps’ process for approving and using continuing contracts changed since 2005 and whether the changes reduced their use of these contracts, we obtained Corps guidance documents for approving and using continuing contracts and interviewed Corps officials at districts, divisions, and headquarters. | Why GAO Did This Study
The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) is authorized under the River and Harbor Act of 1922 to issue contracts with a continuing contracts clause to carry out certain projects. This allows the Corps to award multi-year contracts without having received appropriations to cover the full contract amount. The Corps has used these contracts for decades, but modified their use in 2005, in response to congressional committee concerns that their use may have been ineffective. GAO was asked to determine (1) the number and dollar amount of continuing contracts the Corps awarded during fiscal years 2003?2005; (2) the circumstances in which the Corps used continuing contracts in fiscal years 2003-2005; and (3) how the Corps' process for approving and using continuing contracts changed since 2005, and whether the changes reduced the use of these contracts. For these objectives, GAO reviewed the Corps' contracting data, a random sample of 107 continuing contracts, and districts' requests to use continuing contracts
What GAO Found
The Corps does not know how many continuing contracts it awarded in fiscal years 2003-2005 or the dollar value of these contracts, because it does not track information on the contracts awarded with a continuing contracts clause. Although the Corps was directed to provide the appropriations committees with quarterly reports on their use of continuing contracts in fiscal year 2006, GAO found that the information was inaccurate. For example, at least 13 continuing contracts were missing from the reports and 10 continuing contracts had inaccurate values. Because the Corps could not provide information on the number of continuing contracts awarded for fiscal years 2003-2005, GAO analyzed the Corps' contracting data and determined that 1,592 contracts awarded in these 3 years most likely included and used a continuing contracts clause. These contracts were expected to cost more than $3.96 billion when awarded and would generally be funded to cover the full contract amount (fully funded) pursuant to requirements of the Antideficiency Act. However, continuing contracts are exempt from the act. Consequently, the Corps only obligated $655 million when it awarded these contracts, leaving an outstanding commitment of about $3.30 billion to be covered by future years' appropriations. During fiscal years 2003?2005, the Corps' standard operating practice was to include a continuing contracts clause in most contracts. As a result, many continuing contracts were used for short term and low dollar value contracts. The Corps might have been able to fully fund some of these contracts if, at the time of award, the Corps had adequate appropriations to cover the contract amount. For example, for the 107 continuing contracts GAO reviewed, about one-third were valued at less than $1 million. In only 8 of 107 continuing contracts that GAO reviewed, the contract value was more than $10 million and involved work that required more than 12 calendar months to complete. The Corps also used continuing contracts extensively to move funds among projects and help meet its policy of expending all available appropriations in the fiscal year appropriated. For fiscal years 2003-2005, GAO found that over half of the contracts reviewed were awarded during the last quarter of the fiscal year as continuing contracts with little or no associated obligations, thereby shifting the obligations to pay for these contracts into future years. The Corps responded to congressional committee direction in 2005 and again in 2006 to monitor the use of continuing contracts by, among other things, requiring districts to obtain headquarters' approval before using such contracts. The new processes reduced the use of continuing contracts, but have not prevented the approval of continuing contracts for short-term, low dollar value contracts. This occurred because the Corps established criteria on when contracts should be fully funded, but did not establish criteria for when continuing contracts should be used. |
gao_GAO-07-248 | gao_GAO-07-248_0 | Thus, the DMIA did not specifically require the collection of any new data on foreign nationals departing at land POEs. These data are checked against databases or watch lists of known criminals and suspected terrorists. US-VISIT officials told us that it is their position that once US-VISIT entry capability equipment was installed and operating, CBP became responsible for identifying problems and notifying US-VISIT when US-VISIT-related problems occurred so that US-VISIT can work with CBP to resolve them. Nevertheless, CBP officials at 9 of the 12 sites we visited where computer processing problems were identified said they did not always use the help desk to report or resolve computer problems (and thereby generating a record of the problems). For example, the RFID solution does not meet the congressional requirement for a biometric exit capability because the technology that has been tested cannot meet a key goal of US-VISIT—ensuring that visitors who enter the country are the same ones who leave. DHS was to have reported to Congress by June 2005 on how the agency intended to fully implement a biometric entry/exit program. Until such a plan is finalized and issued, DHS is not able to articulate how entry/exit concepts will fit together—including any interim nonbiometric solutions—and neither DHS nor Congress is positioned to prioritize and allocate resources for a US-VISIT exit capability or plan for the program’s future. However, DHS has not defined a strategic context that shows how US-VISIT fits with other land border initiatives. Among other things, we found that: key decisions had yet to be made about what documents other than a passport would be acceptable when U.S. citizens and citizens of Canada enter or return to the United States—a decision critical to making decisions about how DHS is to inspect individuals entering the country, including what common facilities or infrastructure might be needed to perform these inspections at land POEs; a DHS and Department of State proposal to develop an alternative form of passport, called a PASS card, would rely on RFID technology to help DHS process U.S. citizens re-entering the country, but DHS had not made decisions involving a broad set of considerations that include (1) utilizing security features to protect personal information, (2) ensuring that proper equipment and facilities are in place to facilitate crossings at land borders, and (3) enhancing compatibility with other border crossing technology already in use. Finally, DHS has not articulated how US-VISIT fits strategically and operationally with other land-border security initiatives, such as the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative and Secure Border Initiative. Recommendations for Executive Action
To help DHS achieve benefits commensurate with its investment in US- VISIT at land POEs and security goals and objectives, we are recommending that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the US- VISIT Program Director, in collaboration with the Commissioner of CBP, to take the following two actions: improve existing management controls for identifying and reporting computer processing and other operational problems as they arise at land POEs and ensure that these controls are consistently administered; and develop performance measures for assessing the impact of US-VISIT operations specifically at land POEs. We also recommend that as DHS finalizes the statutorily mandated report describing a comprehensive biometric entry and exit system for US-VISIT, the Secretary of Homeland Security take steps to ensure that the report include, among other things, information on the costs, benefits, and feasibility of deploying biometric and nonbiometric exit capabilities at land POEs; a discussion of how DHS intends to move from a nonbiometric exit capability, such as the technology currently being tested, to a reliable biometric exit capability that meets statutory requirements; and a description of how DHS expects to align emerging land border security initiatives with US-VISIT and what facility or facility modifications would be needed at land POEs to ensure that technology and processes work in harmony. Appendix V: Land Ports of Entry (POE) at Which US-VISIT Has Been Installed
According to the US-VISIT program office, US-VISIT entry capability was installed at the following land POE by December 31, 2005. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) established the U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US-VISIT) program to collect, maintain, and share data on selected foreign nationals entering and exiting the United States at air, sea and land ports of entry (POEs). These data, including biometric identifiers like digital fingerprints, are to be used to screen persons against watch lists, verify visitors' identities, and record arrival and departure. GAO was asked to review implementation at land POE facilities and in doing so GAO analyzed: (1) efforts to implement US-VISIT entry capability; (2) efforts to implement US-VISIT exit capability; and (3) DHS's efforts to define how US-VISIT fits with other emerging border security initiatives. GAO reviewed DHS and US-VISIT program documents, interviewed program officials, and visited 21 land POEs with varied traffic levels on both borders.
What GAO Found
US-VISIT entry capability has been installed at 154 of the 170 land POEs. Officials at all 21 sites GAO visited reported that US-VISIT had improved their ability to process visitors and verify identities. DHS plans to further enhance US-VISIT's capabilities by, among other things, requiring new technology and equipment for scanning all 10 fingerprints. While this may aid border security, installation could increase processing times and adversely affect operations at land POEs where space constraints, traffic congestion, and processing delays already exist. GAO's work indicated that management controls in place to identify such problems and evaluate operations were insufficient and inconsistently administered. For example, GAO identified computer processing problems at 12 sites visited; at 9 of these, the problems were not always reported. US-VISIT has developed performance measures, but measures to gauge factors that uniquely affect land POE operations were not developed; these would put US-VISIT officials in a better position to identify areas for improvement. US-VISIT officials concluded that, for various reasons, a biometric US-VISIT exit capability cannot now be implemented without incurring a major impact on land POE facilities. An interim nonbiometric exit technology being tested does not meet the statutory requirement for a biometric exit capability and cannot ensure that visitors who enter the country are those who leave. DHS has not yet reported to Congress on a required plan describing how it intends to fully implement a biometric entry/exit program, or use nonbiometric solutions. Until this plan is finalized, neither DHS nor Congress is in a good position to prioritize and allocate program resources or plan for POE facilities modifications. DHS has not yet articulated how US-VISIT is to align with other emerging land border security initiatives and mandates, and thus cannot ensure that the program will meet strategic program goals and operate cost effectively at land POEs. Knowing how US-VISIT is to work with these initiatives, such as one requiring U.S. citizens, Canadians, and others to present passports or other documents at the border in 2009, is important for understanding the broader strategic context for US-VISIT and identifying resources, tools, and potential facility modifications needed to ensure success. |
gao_GAO-03-344 | gao_GAO-03-344_0 | In addition to freight, air carriers also transport mail. I for a chronology of the incidents and the federal response.) Vulnerabilities Exist in Air Cargo Security
Vulnerabilities have been identified in the air cargo system by the 1996 Gore Commission, DOT’s OIG, TSA, experts with whom we spoke, and other government and industry studies. Specifically, vulnerabilities have been identified in the security procedures of some air carriers and freight forwarders, including the adequacy of background investigations for all persons handling cargo. The known shipper program is TSA’s primary approach for ensuring air cargo security and complying with the cargo-screening requirements of the Aviation and Transportation Security Act. The amount of cargo theft that occurs in these locations indicates the security problem. Progress Has Been Made in Implementing Key Recommendations on Air Cargo Security
FAA or TSA has implemented a number of key recommendations or mandates to improve air cargo security made over the past 12 years by the Aviation Security Improvement Act of 1990, the Gore Commission, the Cargo Working Group, and DOT’s OIG. For example, in 1999, FAA, in cooperation with the air cargo industry, developed security training guides for air carriers and ground personnel who handle air cargo. However, other recommendations by those groups, such as conducting research and operational tests of technology to screen cargo for explosives, are ongoing and not yet completed by TSA or have not been implemented. Technologies to Enhance Air Cargo Security
Our research identified a number of technologies, such as electronic seals, that have the potential to strengthen air cargo security by making it more difficult for freight to be tampered with during transport by truck from the shipper to the aircraft and in cargo-handling facilities. Since 1997, FAA and now TSA have been working to develop a cargo profiling system that is similar to the Computer Assisted Passenger Prescreening System. A Comprehensive Plan and Risk Management Approach Have Been Identified As Ways to Improve Air Cargo Security in the Long Term
The Gore Commission and aviation industry representatives have suggested that FAA implement a comprehensive plan to address the threat of explosives and other dangerous objects in cargo. Without a comprehensive plan for air cargo security that incorporates a risk management approach, TSA and other federal decisionmakers cannot know whether resources are being deployed as effectively and efficiently as possible to reduce the risk and mitigate the consequences of a terrorist attack. | Why GAO Did This Study
U.S. air carriers transport billions of tons of cargo each year in both passenger planes and all-cargo planes. Typically, about one-half of the hull of each passenger aircraft is filled with cargo. As a result, any vulnerabilities in the air cargo security system potentially threaten the entire air transport system. GAO agreed to determine the security vulnerabilities that have been identified in the air cargo system, the status of key recommendations that have been made since 1990 to improve air cargo security, and ways in which air cargo security can be improved in the near-and long-term.
What GAO Found
Numerous government and industry studies have identified vulnerabilities in the air cargo system. These vulnerabilities occur in the security procedures of some air carriers and freight forwarders and in possible tampering with freight at various handoffs that occur from the point when cargo leaves a shipper to the point when it is loaded onto an aircraft. As a result, any weaknesses in this program could create security risks. FAA or the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), which now has responsibility for ensuring air cargo security, has implemented a number of key recommendations and mandates to improve air cargo security made since 1990 by numerous government organizations. For example, FAA and the air cargo industry developed security training guides for air carriers and ground personnel who handle air cargo. However, a few recommendations by those groups, such as conducting research and operational tests of technology to screen cargo for explosives, are ongoing and not yet completed by TSA, or have not been implemented. Federal reports, industry groups, and security experts have identified operational and technological measures that have the potential to improve air cargo security in the near-term. Examples of the measures include checking the identity of individuals making cargo deliveries and implementing a computerized cargo profiling system. In addition, long-term improvements, such as developing a comprehensive cargo-security plan, have been recommended by the above sources, but not implemented by TSA. Each potential improvement measure, however, needs to be weighed against other issues, such as costs and the effects on the flow of cargo. Without a comprehensive plan that incorporates a risk management approach and sets deadlines and performance targets, TSA and other federal decisionmakers cannot know whether resources are being deployed as effectively and efficiently as possible in implementing measures to reduce the risk and mitigate the consequences of a terrorist attack. |
gao_GAO-10-17 | gao_GAO-10-17_0 | Over the years, Congress has provided several mechanisms for disaster assistance, including HUD’s CDBG program funds for recovery. Federal Assistance for Permanent Housing after the 2005 Storms Included Grants, Loans, and Tax Incentives, and States Designed Programs to Award the Majority of This Assistance
After Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, federal assistance for the repair or replacement of permanent housing was made available to homeowners and rental property owners in three forms: grants, loans, and tax incentives. State agencies were responsible for administering two of the three tax incentive programs that we reviewed. States Created New Programs to Deliver CDBG Funds to Homeowners and Rental Property Owners and Used Their Discretion in Prioritizing Beneficiaries and Designing Programs
Congress provided states broad discretion and flexibility in deciding how to allocate CDBG funds and for what purposes. Federal Disaster Housing Assistance Addressed the Repair and Replacement Needs of More Homeowner Units than Rental Units, and Progress in Completing Rental Units Has Been Limited
Federal programs we reviewed addressed the repair and replacement needs of more homeowner units than rental units. In both states, more homeowner units were damaged than rental units, but the proportional damage to the rental stock was generally greater. The difference in the level of assistance for homeowner and rental units was largely due to states’ decisions to allocate most of their CDBG funds to programs for homeowners. Specifically, federal programs provided assistance to about 303,000 homeowner units compared to over 43,000 rental units. When the estimated number of funded units is compared to the estimated number of damaged units in Louisiana and Mississippi, we found that federal programs funded about 62 percent of the estimated number of the damaged homeowner units and about 18 percent of the estimated number of damaged rental units in both states combined (see fig. These challenges have contributed to the slow pace of recovery in the Gulf Coast region. 8). Without specific direction on how to better target disaster-related CDBG funds for the redevelopment of homeowner and rental units after future disasters, states’ allocation of assistance to homeowners and rental property owners may again result in significant differences in the level of assistance provided. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to (1) describe how federal disaster-related assistance for permanent housing has been provided to homeowners and rental property owners affected by the 2005 Gulf Coast hurricanes; (2) evaluate the extent to which federally funded programs responded to the needs of homeowners and rental property owners in repairing or replacing units damaged by these hurricanes; and (3) describe the challenges that homeowners and rental property owners have faced in applying for and using federal assistance, and potential options for addressing these challenges. Mississippi allocated $1.96 billion for this program. | Why GAO Did This Study
In response to the 2005 Gulf Coast hurricanes, Congress provided about $130 billion in disaster recovery assistance, including assistance for permanent housing. Congress has expressed an interest in how this assistance has been allocated to homeowners and rental property owners, particularly for state-administered programs. GAO's objectives were to review (1) how federal disaster-related assistance for permanent housing has been provided to homeowners and rental property owners, (2) the extent to which federally funded programs have responded to the needs of homeowners and rental property owners, and (3) the challenges that homeowners and rental property owners have faced in applying for and using federal assistance, and potential options for addressing these challenges. To address these objectives, GAO analyzed documentation for key programs and program data, and interviewed federal, state, and local officials regarding the challenges associated with these programs.
What GAO Found
Federal post-disaster assistance for permanent housing was made available to homeowners and rental property owners following the 2005 Gulf Coast hurricanes through grants, loans, and tax incentives. State agencies were largely responsible for administering the programs that delivered most of the assistance, including the Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) program, the most widely used source of federal funds. Congress provided states with broad flexibility in their use of CDBG funds. Federal programs GAO reviewed addressed the repair and replacement needs of more homeowner units than rental units. In both Louisiana and Mississippi, more homeowner units were damaged than rental units, but the proportional damage to the rental stock was generally greater. Programs GAO reviewed provided about $13 billion in assistance for the repair and replacement of about 303,000 homeowner units, and about $1.8 billion for over 43,000 rental units. When the estimated number of assisted units is compared to the estimated number of damaged units, 62 percent of damaged homeowner units and 18 percent of damaged rental units were assisted. The difference in the level of assistance for homeowner and rental units was largely due to states' decisions to award the majority of their CDBG funds to programs for homeowners. When attempting to use the programs GAO reviewed, both homeowners and rental property owners encountered delays in funding availability and other challenges, which have likely contributed to the slow pace of recovery in some areas and fewer affordable units for renters. GAO and others have previously recommended options to minimize these challenges. However, without specific direction on how to better target disaster-related CDBG funds for the redevelopment of homeowner and rental units after future disasters, states' allocation of assistance to homeowners and rental property owners may again result in significant differences in the level of assistance provided. |
gao_GGD-96-51 | gao_GGD-96-51_0 | Unlike domestic rate changes, the Postal Service’s rate changes for international postal services are not reviewed by the Postal Rate Commission (PRC) and the delivery of outbound international mail is not covered by the Private Express Statutes (PES). To provide worldwide mail service, the Postal Service uses the domestic mail system as an integral part of the UPU international distribution network. However, when the Postal Service issued regulations suspending the restrictions for “extremely urgent letters” in 1979, private U.S. carriers used that suspension to expand a practice called “international remailing.” Through remailing, U.S. mailers bypassed the Postal Service, using private carriers to deposit U.S. outbound nonexpedited international letter mail directly into foreign postal systems either (1) for return to the United States and delivery by the Postal Service at rates below domestic postage (known as “ABA remail”); (2) for delivery within the destination country at rates below U.S. international postage (known as “ABB remail”); or (3) for distribution and delivery to other countries, also at rates below U.S. international postage (known as “ABC” remail). 3.) The Postal Service Said It Plans to Compete More “Aggressively” in the International Mail Market
The Postal Service believes that it needs to be a competitor in the international mail market for two reasons. The Postal Service and Its Competitors Have Long Faced Contentious Legal and Regulatory Issues Regarding International Mail Delivery
The Postal Service’s efforts to compete for increased shares of the international mail markets have raised issues for both the Service and its competitors. Specifically, the Postal Service is attempting to overcome what it considers to be statutory and regulatory barriers that limit its ability to compete for international mail business. The Postal Service Allegedly Gained From Its Role in the Universal Postal Union at the Expense of Its Competitors
According to ACCA, the Postal Service has benefited from (1) its official role as a national postal administration and (2) its exclusive access to foreign postal administrations through UPU, by receiving special treatment from customs services under both United States and foreign laws. The Postal Service also defends its responsibility as the U.S. representative in the UPU on the basis of its statutory and treaty obligations. The Postal Service said that it does not price its services below costs. ACCA also believes that the Postal Service has made inappropriate comparisons of Service and Federal Express market shares and misstated its overall share of the international mail market. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Postal Service's (USPS) participation in the international mail market, focusing on: (1) USPS responsibility for delivering and receiving international mail; (2) the competition for international mail delivery and USPS plans to increase its competitiveness; (3) legal or regulatory issues arising out of the competition in international mail services.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) USPS and other Universal Postal Union (UPU) members provide a worldwide mail delivery network even to remote locations; (2) USPS is concerned that it is losing international mail market share to private carriers whose services are more dependable, faster, and cheaper than USPS service; (3) some foreign postal services also compete in the United States for certain outbound international bulk business mail; (4) USPS has developed an aggressive strategy to regain market share that includes new services, service improvements, and market-based prices; (5) USPS officials believe that the statutory requirement that it use U.S. flag carriers at Department of Transportation-set rates limits its ability to compete for international mail; (6) competitors believe that USPS unfairly benefits from its federal status, exclusive access to foreign postal administrations, and status as the sole U.S. UPU representative; (7) competitors believe that certain USPS pricing practices violate laws and regulations and the Postal Rate Commission should set international mail rates just as it does domestic rates; (8) although competitors believe that USPS status as the sole UPU representative is unconstitutional, USPS believes it is justified by its statutory and treaty obligations that are not shared by its domestic competitors; and (9) the USPS role in the international mail market is similar to the issues surrounding USPS competitiveness in the domestic market. |
gao_GAO-07-375 | gao_GAO-07-375_0 | Background
Overview of Key Legislation Enacted After 9/11 Related to Aviation and Border Security
After the attacks of September 11, 2001, Congress and the President enacted several new laws intended to address many of the vulnerabilities exploited by the terrorists by strengthening layers of defense related to aviation and border security. Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology). Stronger Layered Defenses for Aviation Security in Place, Though We Reported More Needs to Be Done to Enhance Passenger Screening Operations and Security of Other Transportation Modes
TSA and other agencies have taken steps to strengthen the various layers of commercial aviation defense—including passenger prescreening (conducted after a reservation is made), passenger checkpoint screening (conducted once passengers are at the airport and proceeding to the gate with any carry-on bags), and in-flight security—that were exploited by the hijackers on 9/11. Areas of Aviation System Not Exploited by 9/11 Terrorists Also Have Been Strengthened, though Implementation and Resource Challenges Remain
Two aspects of commercial aviation that were not directly implicated in the 9/11 scenario—checked baggage screening and air cargo screening— are nonetheless recognized as important components of a layered system of aviation defense. 4). Congress, DHS, and State have taken numerous actions to help strengthen the visa process by, among other things, expanding the name-check system used to screen applicants (including portions of the consolidated watch list), requiring in-person interviews for nearly all applicants, revamping consular training to focus on counterterrorism, and augmenting staff at consular posts. New Visa-Related Policies and Programs Have Been Implemented to Enhance Visa Security, Improve Applicant Screening, Prevent Fraud, and More
As we reported in September 2005, State, DHS, and other agencies have taken many steps since the 9/11 attacks to strengthen the visa process as an antiterrorism tool. We are currently reviewing this issue and expect to report on our findings early this year. Efforts to Screen and Verify Travelers and Detect Fraudulent Travel Documents Have Enhanced Border Security, but We Have Reported More Work Is Needed to Ensure That Risks Posed by Certain Travelers and Cargo Are Mitigated
The processes for screening and inspecting travelers arriving at the nation’s air, land, and sea ports represent a key layer of border security defense. Since 9/11, in response to congressional requirements, DHS has begun taking steps designed to mitigate the risks posed by visa waiver travelers; however, we have reported that additional actions are needed to further mitigate the risks posed by the use of fraudulent identity documentation, including actions to ensure that foreign governments report information on lost or stolen passports. The Government Faces Challenges in Assessing and Mitigating the Inherent Security Risks of the Visa Waiver Program
While significant progress has been made to ensure that terrorists do not obtain visas as a prelude to gaining entry to the United States, visa holders are by no means the only foreign travelers coming to the United States. Since the terrorist attacks, the government has taken several actions intended to enhance the security of the Visa Waiver Program by improving program management, oversight, and efforts to assess and mitigate program risks, among other things. It is still possible for travelers such as these to use fraudulent documents as a basis for entering the country. We recently recommended that DHS finalize a mandated report to Congress on US-VISIT that would include a description of how a comprehensive biometrically based entry and exit system would work and how DHS plans to align US-VISIT with other emerging land border security initiatives. DHS agreed with these recommendations. Federal Government Must Address Strategic Challenges of Sharing Terrorism- Related Information, Managing Risk, and Structuring DHS to Meet Its Mission
Five years after 9/11 and in the wake of new terrorist threats and tactics, Congress, DHS, and other federal agencies face an array of strategic challenges that potentially affect the ability of each to effectively oversee or execute the ambitious goals and programs that are under way or planned to enhance homeland security. U.S. leaders and policy makers continue to face the need to choose an appropriate course of action going forward—setting priorities, allocating resources, and assessing the social and economic costs of the measures that may be taken governmentwide to further strengthen domestic security. Moreover, it remains vitally important for DHS to continue to develop and implement a risk- based framework to help target where the nation’s resources should be invested to strengthen security, and determine how these investments should be directed—toward people, processes, or technology. GAO-03-27. Aviation Security: Terrorist Acts Demonstrate Urgent Need to Improve Security at the Nation’s Airports. Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General. 9/11 Commission Report: Reorganization, Transformation, and Information Sharing. Homeland Security: Selected Recommendations from Congressionally Chartered Commissions and GAO. Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of State. | Why GAO Did This Study
Five years after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, GAO is taking stock of key efforts by the President, Congress, federal agencies, and the 9/11 Commission to strengthen or enhance critical layers of defense in aviation and border security that were directly exploited by the 19 terrorist hijackers. Specifically, the report discusses how: (1) commercial aviation security has been enhanced; (2) visa-related policies and programs have evolved to help screen out potential terrorists; (3) federal border security initiatives have evolved to reduce the likelihood of terrorists entering the country through legal checkpoints; and (4) the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and other agencies are addressing several major post-9/11 strategic challenges. The report reflects conclusions and recommendations from a body of work issued before and after 9/11 by GAO, the Inspectors General of DHS, State, and Justice, the 9/11 Commission, and others. It is not a comprehensive assessment of all federal initiatives taken or planned in response to 9/11. GAO is not making any new recommendations at this time since over 75 prior recommendations on aviation security, the Visa Waiver Program, and U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US-VISIT), among others, are in the process of being implemented. Continued monitoring by GAO will determine whether further recommendations are warranted.
What GAO Found
While the nation cannot expect to eliminate all risks of terrorist attack upon commercial aviation, agencies have made progress since 9/11 to reduce aviation-related vulnerabilities and enhance the layers of defense directly exploited by the terrorist hijackers. In general, these efforts have resulted in better airline passenger screening procedures designed to identify and prevent known or suspected terrorists, weapons, and explosives from being allowed onto aircraft. Nevertheless, the nation's commercial aviation system remains a highly visible target for terrorism, as evidenced by recent alleged efforts to bring liquid explosives aboard aircraft. DHS and others need to follow through on outstanding congressional requirements and recommendations by GAO and others to enhance security and coordination of passengers and checked baggage, and improve screening procedures for domestic flights, among other needed improvements. GAO's work indicates that the government has strengthened the nonimmigrant visa process as an antiterrorism tool. New measures added rigor to the process by expanding the name-check system used to screen applicants, requiring in-person interviews for nearly all applicants, and revamping consular officials' training to focus on counterterrorism. Nevertheless, the immigrant visa process may pose potential security risks and we are reviewing this issue. To enhance security and screening at legal checkpoints (air, land, and sea ports) at the nation's borders, agencies are using technology to verify foreign travelers' identities and detect fraudulent travel documents such as passports. However, DHS needs to better manage risks posed by the Visa Waiver Program, whereby travelers from 27 countries need not obtain visas for U.S. travel. For example, GAO recommended that DHS require visa-waiver countries to provide information on lost or stolen passports that terrorists could use to gain entry. We also recommended that DHS provide more information to Congress on how it plans to fully implement US-VISIT--a system for tracking the entry, exit, and length of stay of foreign travelers. While much attention has been focused on mitigating the specific risks of 9/11, other critical assets ranging from passenger rail stations to power plants are also at risk of terrorist attack. Deciding how to address these risks--setting priorities, making trade-offs, allocating resources, and assessing social and economic costs--is essential. Thus, it remains vitally important for DHS to continue to develop and implement a risk-based framework to help target where and how the nation's resources should be invested to strengthen security. The government also faces strategic challenges that potentially affect oversight and execution of new and ongoing homeland security initiatives, and GAO has deemed three challenges in particular--information sharing, risk management, and transforming DHS as a department--as areas needing urgent attention. DHS and the Department of State reviewed a draft of this report and both agencies generally agreed with the information. Both agencies provided technical comments that were incorporated as appropriate. |
gao_GAO-01-947 | gao_GAO-01-947_0 | Compensation Was the Primary Reason Staff Had Left or Were Considering Leaving SEC
Current and former staff indicated that compensation was the most important reason to leave or consider leaving SEC, followed by opportunities for advancement, the amount of uncompensated overtime, and the quality of administrative support, that are discussed later in this report. SEC Has Placed Greater Emphasis on Compensation-Based Programs Than on Noncompensation Flexibilities
In response to the high turnover rates among attorneys, accountants, and examiners, SEC has focused largely on compensation-based programs to recruit, retain, and motivate staff. SEC also uses recruitment bonuses more frequently than other government agencies. For example, SEC could offer higher rating-based performance awards. SEC Has Taken Steps to Address Strategic Human Capital Management but Faces Challenges
The high turnover rate among attorneys, accountants, and examiners has forced SEC management to focus greater attention on strategic human capital management issues. SEC has taken several positive steps to strategically align its core mission with its ability to recruit and retain qualified employees, including improving its recruitment program and adding a new human capital goal to its performance plan. Conclusions
SEC’s human capital management practices have been shaped largely by the need to confront a growing staffing crisis that threatens to impair the agency’s ability to carry out its mission. Our survey results showed that inadequate compensation is the primary reason that employees leave the agency. A. Office of Municipal Securities ............................................................0 .......
21. | Why GAO Did This Study
The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission's (SEC) human capital management practices have been shaped largely by a growing staffing crisis that threatens to undermine the agency's ability to carry out its mission. GAO surveyed current and former SEC attorneys, accountants, and examiners to determine what factors influenced turnover, satisfaction, and morale among SEC staff.
What GAO Found
GAO found that inadequate compensation is the primary reason that employees leave the agency. But staff raised other issues that warrant attention, including limited opportunities for advancement, the amount of uncompensated overtime, and the quality of administrative support services. In response to the high turnover rates, SEC has placed greater emphasis on compensation-based human capital programs, including compensation-based flexibilities and performance awards. Although SEC uses compensation-based flexibilities to a greater extent than do other government agencies, the Office of Personnel Management believes it could do more. SEC has taken several steps to focus more attention on strategic human capital management but faces continuing challenges. In April 2001, SEC integrated its human capital strategies with it's core business practices by adding a human capital goal to its 2002 Annual Performance Plan. SEC has also developed an extensive recruiting program for attorneys. |
gao_GAO-07-441 | gao_GAO-07-441_0 | Any member of the public may request access to information held by federal agencies, without showing a need or reason for seeking the information. Justice also worked with agencies to improve the quality of data in FOIA annual reports. For example, the public continued to submit more requests for information from the federal government through FOIA, but many agencies, despite increasing the numbers of requests processed, did not keep pace with this increased volume. As a result, the number of pending requests carried over from year to year has been steadily increasing. However, our ability to make generalizations about processing time is limited by the type of statistic reported (that is, the median). Our ability to make further generalizations about FOIA processing times is limited by the fact that, as required by the act, agencies report median processing times only and not, for example, arithmetic means (the usual meaning of “average” in everyday language). Agency Improvement Plans Generally Included Areas of Improvement Emphasized by the Executive Order
As required by the Executive Order, all the 25 agencies submitted improvement plans based on the results of reviews of their respective FOIA operations, as well as on the areas emphasized by the order. In some cases, agencies did not set goals for a given area because they determined that they were already strong in that area. All agency plans discussed avoiding or reducing backlog, and most (22 out of 25) established measurable goals and timetables for this area of focus. Most Agencies Plan to Increase Public Dissemination of Records through Web Sites
The Executive Order calls for “increased reliance on the dissemination of records that can be made available to the public” without the necessity of a FOIA request, such as through posting on Web sites. Medians are useful as representative numbers that are not skewed by a few outliers, but the addition of averages (arithmetic means) and ranges would enhance the ability to make useful comparisons and provide a more complete picture. The 25 agencies submitted FOIA improvement plans that generally responded to elements emphasized by the Executive Order and form a reasonable basis for carrying out the order’s goals. To ensure that its plan includes an appropriate focus on communicating with requesters and the public, we recommend that the Secretary of the Treasury direct the department’s Chief FOIA Officer to review its FOIA operations in the other areas emphasized in the Executive Order (increasing reliance on public dissemination of records, improving communications with FOIA requesters about the status of their requests, and increasing public awareness of FOIA processing) and, as appropriate, revise the improvement plan for fiscal year 2007 to include goals and milestones in these areas. EPA and NSF offered additional information about their FOIA operations. Scope and Methodology
To gauge agencies’ progress in processing requests, we analyzed the workload data (from fiscal year 2002 through 2005) included in the 25 agencies’ annual FOIA reports to assess trends in volume of requests received and processed, median processing times, and the number of pending cases. All agency workload data were self-reported in annual reports submitted to the Attorney General. = number of requests processed; Days = median days to process; ± =
No. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) establishes that federal agencies must provide access to their information, enabling the public to learn about government operations and decisions. To help ensure proper implementation, the act requires that agencies report annually to the Attorney General, giving specific information about their FOIA operations, such as numbers of requests received and processed and median processing times. Also, a recent Executive Order directs agencies to develop plans to improve FOIA operations, including decreasing backlog. For this study, GAO was asked to examine the status and trends of FOIA processing at 25 major agencies as reflected in annual reports, as well as the extent to which improvement plans contain the elements emphasized by the Executive Order. To do so, GAO analyzed the 25 agencies' annual reports and improvement plans.
What GAO Found
Based on data in annual reports from 2002 to 2005, the public continued to submit more requests for information from the federal government through FOIA. Despite increasing the numbers of requests processed, many agencies did not keep pace with the volume of requests that they received. As a result, the number of pending requests carried over from year to year has been steadily increasing. Agency reports also show great variations in the median times to process requests (less than 10 days for some agency components to more than 100 days at others). However, the ability to determine trends in processing times is limited by the form in which these times are reported: that is, in medians only, without averages (that is, arithmetical means) or ranges. Although medians have the advantage of providing representative numbers that are not skewed by a few outliers, it is not statistically possible to combine several medians to develop broader generalizations (as can be done with arithmetical means). This limitation on aggregating data impedes the development of broader pictures of FOIA operations, which could be useful in monitoring efforts to improve processing and reduce the increasing backlog of requests, as intended by the Executive Order. The improvement plans submitted by the 25 agencies mostly included goals and timetables addressing the four areas of improvement emphasized by the Executive Order: eliminating or reducing any backlog of FOIA requests; increasing reliance on dissemination of records that can be made available to the public without the need for a FOIA request, such as through posting on Web sites; improving communications with requesters about the status of their requests; and increasing public awareness of FOIA processing. Most of the plans (20 of 25) provided goals and timetables in all four areas; some agencies omitted goals in areas where they considered they were already strong. Although details of a few plans could be improved, all the plans focus on making measurable improvements and form a reasonable basis for carrying out the goals of the Executive Order. |
gao_GAO-13-135 | gao_GAO-13-135_0 | Three Federal Programs Take Different Approaches to the Shared Goal of Improving Energy Efficiency and the Scope of Covered Products Varies
The three key federal energy efficiency programs we reviewed–– minimum energy efficiency standards, EnergyGuide, and Energy Star— take different approaches to the shared goal of improving energy efficiency of selected categories of household appliances and consumer electronics. The scope of products that these three programs cover also varies. Federal minimum efficiency standards for selected categories of household appliances and consumer electronics, among other things, are designed to eliminate the least efficient products from the market. EnergyGuide is designed to provide information displayed on a label attached to selected products that enables consumers to compare the estimated energy cost and energy consumption of different models within a given product category. Manufacturers of qualified products can place the widely recognized Energy Star label on qualifying products as an indication of energy efficiency, which gives the manufacturer an incentive to improve energy efficiency. Specifically, the minimum efficiency standards currently apply to 33 selected categories of household appliances and consumer electronics;
EnergyGuide currently covers 16 such product categories; and
Energy Star program––the broadest of the three programs––currently covers 37 such product categories. Our analysis found that some products are covered by only one program, some by two programs, and some by all three. Figure 2 illustrates the coverage of product categories and the extent to which products are covered by one, two, or all three programs. Federal Energy Efficiency Programs Are Fragmented and Overlap and Have One Area of Duplication
Federal programs to increase the energy efficiency of household appliances and consumer electronics are fragmented because more than one federal agency is involved in the same broad area of national need; they overlap because the three programs have similar goals and target similar users. Fragmentation. In March 2011, we reported that fragmentation has the potential to result in duplication of resources. Overlap. In the case of these three programs, we found that their differing approaches may have complementary functions—with the minimum efficiency standards setting a minimum level of efficiency for all products in a category, EnergyGuide providing specific information about estimated energy consumption and costs to help consumers select the product that best meets their need within this range, and Energy Star identifying a group of the most energy efficient models––generally the top 25 percent–– within a given category of products. Duplication: The efforts of the three programs to improve energy efficiency for home appliances and consumer electronics are not broadly duplicative in that they are not engaged in the same activities or providing the same services; however, we identified one duplicative activity within the testing activities undertaken to support the Energy Star program. DOE’s Energy Star verification testing activities were initiated in 2010 and are funded and managed by the department, though the actual testing occurs at third-party laboratories. Officials from both DOE and EPA told us that they work closely to coordinate their efforts; however, we examined DOE and EPA verification testing data for a total of 1,238 tests during 2011 and a portion of 2012 and found 11 instances–-about 1 percent of the products tested— in which identical models were tested in the same year under the testing done for EPA and DOE. Without this information, DOE may continue to select the same models; therefore, some models may continue to be tested twice while other models go untested. As a result, the agencies cannot coordinate to ensure that scarce testing resources are maximized, either by eliminating unnecessary duplicative testing, or reallocating resources toward testing additional products. Conclusions
Three key federal programs to foster energy efficiency in household appliances and consumer electronics––the federal minimum efficiency standards, the EnergyGuide product labeling program, and the Energy Star voluntary product labeling program––each perform valuable functions in improving energy efficiency. Nonetheless, because EPA does not have timely information about the products that certification bodies have selected for testing, it cannot regularly communicate to DOE the models selected for testing to support the Energy Star program. Recommendation for Executive Action
To limit the potential for duplication in the current Energy Star verification testing activities, we recommend that the Administrator of EPA develop a process that helps ensure that the Energy Star certification bodies communicate the models they randomly select for testing to EPA and DOE as quickly as possible so that DOE can avoid selecting the same models. Both agencies acknowledged the importance of coordinating their verification testing activities. EPA agreed with our findings but disagreed with our draft recommendation and stated that it was concerned that it would be labor intensive to collect information from the certification bodies. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix III. | Why GAO Did This Study
The federal government has established three key programs to encourage energy efficiency in household appliances and consumer electronics sold in the United States: (1) federal minimum efficiency standards, led by DOE; (2) EnergyGuide, which requires product labeling and is led by the FTC; and (3) Energy Star, a voluntary labeling program led by EPA.
Pub. L. No. 111-139 requires GAO to annually identify programs, agencies, offices, and initiatives with duplicative goals and activities. In response to this mandate, the objectives for this report are to: (1) examine these three programs' approaches to improving the energy efficiency of household appliances and consumer electronics and the scope of products they cover, and (2) determine to what extent, if any, federal programs to foster energy efficiency for these products are fragmented, overlapping, or duplicative. GAO reviewed relevant legislation and program documents and spoke with staff at the agencies about each of the programs, and to stakeholders, including manufacturers.
What GAO Found
The three key federal energy efficiency programs--minimum energy efficiency standards led by the Department of Energy (DOE), EnergyGuide led by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), and Energy Star led by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) with support from DOE--take different approaches to the shared goal of improving the energy efficiency of selected categories of household appliances and consumer electronics. The scope of products covered by these three programs also varies, and a number of products are covered by only one program, while others are covered by two or all three. Examples are as follows:
Minimum energy efficiency standards establish a national minimum level of energy efficiency for selected categories of products and are designed to eliminate the least efficient products from the marketplace. These standards currently apply to 33 categories of products, including refrigerators and dishwashers.
EnergyGuide provides information displayed on a label attached to selected products that enables consumers to compare the estimated energy cost and energy consumption of different models within a given product category. EnergyGuide covers 16 such product categories, including televisions and dishwashers.
Energy Star identifies the most energy efficient models within a given category of products. Manufacturers of qualifying products can display an Energy Star label on their products that is widely recognized by buyers as an indication of energy efficiency. The program also encourages manufacturers to improve energy efficiency of some models so that those models qualify for the Energy Star label. Energy Star covers 37 such product categories, including televisions and washing machines.
Federal programs to increase the energy efficiency of household appliances and consumer electronics are fragmented and overlapping, with one area of duplication. The programs are fragmented in that three federal agencies are addressing the same broad area of national need--improving energy efficiency. The programs are overlapping in that they target similar users--consumers. While fragmentation and overlap may result in duplication of resources, GAO found that these three programs are not broadly duplicative because they are not engaged in the same activities and do not provide the same services; however, GAO identified one duplicative activity within Energy Star. Specifically, GAO identified duplication in some testing activities undertaken to verify that products meet the criteria for carrying the Energy Star label. EPA and DOE each manage separate verification testing programs and, while the agencies coordinate to minimize duplication, GAO found 11 instances in which identical models had been tested twice in the same year--about 1 percent of the products tested. This duplication occurred because EPA does not communicate to DOE about some models that have been selected for testing until after the tests are complete; therefore, some models were tested twice while other models went untested. As a result, the agencies cannot ensure that scarce testing resources are maximized, either by eliminating unnecessary duplicative testing, or reallocating resources toward testing additional products. To limit the potential for duplication in the current Energy Star verification testing activities, GAO recommends that EPA take steps to better communicate to DOE the models selected for testing so DOE can avoid testing the same ones. DOE and EPA acknowledged the importance of coordination, but EPA disagreed with the draft recommendation, citing concerns it could be labor intensive to implement. GAO revised the recommendation to clarify EPA's flexibility in implementing it.
What GAO Recommends
To limit the potential for duplication in the current Energy Star verification testing activities, GAO recommends that EPA take steps to better communicate to DOE the models selected for testing so DOE can avoid testing the same ones. DOE and EPA acknowledged the importance of coordination, but EPA disagreed with the draft recommendation, citing concerns it could be labor intensive to implement. GAO revised the recommendation to clarify EPAs flexibility in implementing it. |
gao_GAO-03-941T | gao_GAO-03-941T_0 | Through a process known as “enumeration,” unique numbers are created for every person as a work and retirement benefit record for the Social Security program. Lawfully admitted noncitizens may also qualify for a SSN for nonwork purposes when a federal, state, or local law requires a SSN to obtain a particular welfare benefit or service. As such, SSNs are often the identifier of choice among individuals seeking to create false identities. Public and Private Sector Uses and Display of SSNs
As we reported to you last year, federal, state, and county government agencies use SSNs. Certain records maintained by federal, state, and county courts are also routinely made available to the public. Although public records have traditionally been housed in government offices and court buildings, to improve customer service, some state and local government entities are considering placing more public records on the Internet. In our current work, we found that some private sector entities also rely extensively on the SSN. Some of these entities have come to rely on the SSN as an identifier to accumulate information about individuals, which helps them determine the identity of an individual for purposes such as employment screening, credit information, and criminal histories. This is particularly true of entities, known as information resellers, who amass personal information, including SSNs. CRAs are also large private sector users of SSNs. These entities often rely on SSNs, as well as individuals’ names and addresses to build and maintain credit histories. These laws limit the disclosure of information by these entities to specific circumstances. The extensive public and private sector uses of SSNs and availability of public records and other information, especially via the Internet, has allowed individuals’ personal information to be aggregated into multiple databases or centralized locations. SSA Has a Role in Preventing SSNs from Being Used to Create False Identities but Some Areas Remain Vulnerable
Because SSA is the issuer and custodian of SSN data, SSA has a unique role in helping to prevent the proliferation of false identities. Following the events of September 11, 2001, SSA began taking steps to increase management attention on enumeration and formed a task force to address weaknesses in the enumeration process. We found that fewer than half the states have used SSA’s service and the extent to which they regularly use the service varies widely. Factors such as costs, problems with system reliability, and state priorities have affected states’ use of SSA’s verification service. We also identified a key weakness in the service that exposes some states to inadvertently issuing licenses to individuals using the SSNs of deceased individuals. SSA’s Enumeration Process Helps Prevent the Proliferation of False Identities, but Additional Actions are Needed to Safeguard the Issuance of SSNs
SSA has increased document verifications and developed new initiatives to prevent the inappropriate assignment of SSNs to noncitizens who represent the bulk of all initial SSNs issued by SSA’s 1,333 field offices. SSA has increased document verifications by requiring independent verification of the documents and immigration status of all noncitizen applicants with the issuing agency—namely DHS and the Department of State (State Department) prior to issuing the SSN. In addition to the assignment of SSNs to children under the age of one, SSA’s policy for replacing Social Security cards also increases the potential for misuse of SSNs. SSA’s Verification of Driver License Applicants Helps Prevent Fraudulent Documents, but Vulnerabilities Still Exist
The events of September 11, 2001, focused attention on the importance of identifying people who use false identity information or documents, particularly in the driver licensing process. Conclusions
The use of SSNs by both public and private sector entities is likely to continue given that it is used as the key identifier by most of these entities and there is currently no other widely accepted alternative. To the extent that personal information is aggregated in public and private sector databases, it becomes vulnerable to misuse. SSA has made substantial progress in protecting the integrity of the SSN by requiring that the immigration and work status of every non-citizen applicant be verified before an SSN is issued. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 1936, the Social Security Administration (SSA) established the Social Security Number (SSN) to track worker's earnings for social security benefit purposes. However, the SSN is also used for a myriad of non-Social Security purposes. Today, the SSN is used, in part, as a verification tool for services such as child support collection, law enforcement enhancements, and issuing credit to individuals. Although these uses of SSNs are beneficial to the public, SSNs are also a key piece of information in creating false identities. Moreover, the aggregation of personal information, such as SSNs, in large corporate databases, as well as the public display of SSNs in various public records, may provide criminals the opportunity to commit identity crimes. SSA, the originator of the SSN, is responsible for ensuring SSN integrity and verifying the authenticity of identification documents used to obtain SSNs. Although Congress has passed a number of laws to protect an individual's privacy, the continued use and reliance on SSNs by private and public sector entities and the potential for misuse underscores the importance of identifying areas that can be strengthened. Accordingly, this testimony focuses on describing (1) public and private sector use and display of SSNs, and (2) SSA's role in preventing the proliferation of false identities.
What GAO Found
Public and some private sector entities rely extensively on SSNs. We reported last year that federal, state and county government agencies rely on the SSN to manage records, verify eligibility of benefit applicants, and collect outstanding debt. SSNs are also displayed on a number of public record documents that are routinely made available to the public. To improve customer service, some state and local government entities are considering placing more public records on the Internet. In addition, some private sector entities have come to rely on the SSN as an identifier, using it and other information to accumulate information about individuals. This is particularly true of entities that amass public and private data, including SSNs, for resale. Certain laws have helped to restrict the use of SSN and other information by these private sector entities to specific purposes. However, as a result of the increased use and availability of SSN information and other data, more and more personal information is being centralized into various corporate and public databases. Because SSNs are often the identifier of choice among individuals seeking to create false identities, to the extent that personal information is aggregated in public and private sector databases it becomes vulnerable to misuse. As the agency responsible for issuing SSNs and maintaining the earnings records for millions of SSN holders, SSA plays a unique role in helping to prevent the proliferation of false identities. Following the events of September 11, 2001, SSA formed a task force to address weaknesses in the enumeration process and developed major new initiatives to prevent the inappropriate assignment of SSNs to non-citizens, who represent the bulk of new SSNs issued by SSA's 1,333 field offices. SSA now requires field staff to verify the identity information and immigration status of all non-citizen applicants with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), prior to issuing an SSN. However, other areas remain vulnerable and could be targeted by those seeking fraudulent SSNs. These include SSA's process for assigning social security numbers for children under age one and issuing replacement social security cards. SSA also provides a service to states to verify the SSNs of driver license applicants. Fewer than half the states have used SSA's service and the extent to which they regularly use it varies. Factors such as cost, problems with system reliability, and state priorities and policies affect states' use SSA's service. We also identified a weakness in SSA's verification service that exposes some states to fraud by those using the SSNs of deceased persons. |
gao_GAO-03-2 | gao_GAO-03-2_0 | Our discussions with agency officials and union representatives revealed numerous human capital flexibilities that they deemed effective in managing their workforces. These flexibilities include work-life programs, such as alternative work schedules, child care assistance, and transit subsidies; monetary recruitment and retention incentives, including retention and relocation bonuses and retention allowances; special hiring authorities, such as student employment and outstanding incentive awards, which range from performance-based cash awards to time-off awards to symbolic items of nominal value, such as plaques and T-shirts. Recruitment bonuses. Outstanding scholar program. Specifically, these categories include more flexible pay approaches, greater flexibility to streamline and improve the federal hiring process, increased flexibility in addressing employees’ poor job performance, additional workforce restructuring options, and expanded flexibility in acquiring and retaining temporary employees. The managers and supervisors and human resources officials we interviewed generally believed that additional human capital flexibilities could be authorized and implemented in their agencies while also ensuring protection of employees’ rights. Some union representatives responded positively when asked if agencies could give managers additional flexibilities while protecting employees’ rights. Key Practices Can Assist Agencies in Effectively Using Flexibilities
Based on our interviews with human resources directors across the federal government and our related human capital work, we identified six key practices that agencies can implement for effectively using human capital flexibilities. Educate agency managers and supervisors on existence and use of flexibilities. According to the human resources manager, the perceived burdens of the previous administrative process led to very few awards being granted. This delegation of authority is equally important when implementing human capital flexibilities. Conclusions
The insufficient and ineffective use of flexibilities can significantly hinder the ability of federal agencies to recruit, hire, retain, and manage their human capital. If such additional flexibilities are desired, agencies should develop business cases to justify the need for the authority to implement these additional flexibilities. To ensure the most effective use of human capital flexibilities, it is important that agencies (1) plan strategically and make targeted investments, (2) ensure stakeholder input in developing policies and procedures, (3) educate managers and employees on the availability and use of flexibilities, (4) streamline and improve administrative processes, (5) build transparency and accountability into their systems, and (6) change their organizational cultures. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives for this study were to provide information on agency officials’ and union representatives’ views on (1) the most effective flexibilities for managing their workforces, (2) additional flexibilities that would be the most helpful in managing their workforces, and (3) whether employee rights could be protected if additional flexibilities were authorized and implemented within agencies and key practices that agencies should implement for effective use of human capital flexibilities, along with specific examples of such practices from selected agencies. Our interviews with these agency and union officials focused on their views about the most effective flexibilities, additional flexibilities needed, and protection of employee rights. | Why GAO Did This Study
An essential element to acquiring, developing, and retaining high-quality federal employees is agencies' effective use of human capital flexibilities. These flexibilities represent the policies and practices that an agency has the authority to implement in managing its workforce. Congressional requesters asked GAO to provide information on agency and union officials' views about the most effective human capital flexibilities, additional flexibilities needed, and whether additional flexibilities could be implemented while also protecting employees' rights. GAO was also asked to identify key practices for effective use of flexibilities. GAO interviewed the human resources directors of the federal government's 24 largest departments and agencies, and representatives of 4 national organizations representing federal employees and managers. GAO further focused its efforts on 7 federal agencies--Department of Air Force, General Services Administration, Internal Revenue Service, International Trade Administration, U.S. Mint, State Department, and Veterans Benefits Administration--interviewing more than 200 managers, supervisors, human resources officials, and union representatives in headquarters and field locations.
What GAO Found
Agency and union officials' views on human capital flexibilities. Most effective flexibilities. Existing flexibilities that are most effective in managing the workforce are work-life programs, such as alternative work schedules, child care assistance, and transit subsidies; monetary recruitment and retention incentives, such as recruitment bonuses and retention allowances; special hiring authorities, such as student employment and outstanding scholar programs; and incentive awards for notable job performance and contributions, such as cash and time-off awards. Additional flexibilities needed. Additional flexibilities that would be helpful in managing the workforce include more flexible pay approaches to compensate federal employees, greater flexibility to streamline and improve the federal hiring process, increased flexibility in addressing employees' poor job performance, additional workforce restructuring options, and expanded flexibility in acquiring and retaining temporary employees. Protection of employee rights. Managers, supervisors, and human resources officials generally believed that additional human capital flexibilities could be implemented in their agencies while also protecting employees' rights. Union representatives, however, gave mixed views ranging from the opinion that additional flexibilities could be implemented while still protecting employee rights to concerns that managers would abuse their authority. Key practices for effective use of human capital flexibilities. GAO identified six key practices for the effective use of human capital flexibilities. These practices are (1) planning strategically and making targeted investments, (2) ensuring stakeholder input in developing policies and procedures, (3) educating managers and employees on the availability and use of flexibilities, (4) streamlining administrative processes, (5) building transparency and accountability into the system, and (6) changing the organizational culture. The insufficient and ineffective use of flexibilities can significantly hinder the ability of federal agencies to recruit, hire, retain, and manage their human capital. Congress is currently debating the extent of personnel flexibilities that should be granted to the new Department of Homeland Security. While this decision is important to how the department will operate, how personnel flexibilities are implemented is equally important. |
gao_GAO-16-195T | gao_GAO-16-195T_0 | States often make two general types of Medicaid supplemental payments:
First, under federal Medicaid law, states are required to make disproportionate share hospital (DSH) payments to certain hospitals. Second, many states also make another type of Medicaid supplemental payment, referred to here as non-DSH supplemental payments, to hospitals and other providers who, for example, serve high-cost Medicaid beneficiaries. Complete and Reliable Data on Non-DSH Supplemental Payments are Lacking, Hindering Transparency and Oversight
For about two decades, we have raised concerns about supplemental payments and the adequacy of federal oversight. For example, as reported in November 2012, we found that 39 states had made non-DSH supplemental payments to 505 hospitals that, along with their regular Medicaid payments, exceeded those hospitals’ total costs of providing Medicaid care by $2.7 billion. As we concluded in our 2012 and 2015 reports, although Medicaid payments are not required to be limited to a provider’s costs of delivering Medicaid services, payments that greatly exceed these costs raise questions, including whether they are consistent with economy and efficiency, whether they contribute to beneficiaries’ access to quality care, and the extent to which they are ultimately used for Medicaid purposes. However, CMS lacks data at the federal level on non-DSH supplemental payments, and the payments are not subject to audit. In connection with the independent audit requirement, standard methods were established for calculating DSH payment amounts. For example, reporting of non-DSH payments that states make to individual hospitals and other providers relative to the providers’ Medicaid costs could improve the transparency of these payments. CMS said in 2012 that legislation was necessary for them to implement reporting and auditing requirements for DSH payments, and that legislation would be needed for the agency to implement similar requirements for non-DSH supplemental payments. States are Increasingly Relying on Providers and Local Governments to Finance Medicaid, and Data Needed for Oversight is Lacking
Our work has found that states are increasingly relying on providers and local governments to finance Medicaid, and has also pointed to the need for better data and improved oversight to ensure that Medicaid payments are financed consistent with federal requirements, to understand financing trends, and to ensure federal matching funds are used efficiently. CMS is responsible for ensuring that state Medicaid payments made under financing arrangements are consistent with Medicaid payment principles, including that they are economical and efficient, and that the federal government and states share in the financing of the Medicaid program as established by law. For example, in state fiscal year 2012, funds from providers and local governments accounted for 26 percent (or over $46 billion) of the approximately $180 billion in the total nonfederal share of Medicaid payments that year—an increase from 21 percent ($31 billion) in state fiscal year 2008. 1.) For example, in our July 2014 report, our analysis of arrangements involving financing of the nonfederal share of Medicaid payments with funds from provider taxes or local governments in three selected states illustrated how Medicaid costs can be shifted from the state to the federal government and, to a lesser extent, to health care providers and local governments. For example, in our 2014 report, we found that in one state a $220 million payment increase for nursing facilities in 2012 (which was funded by a tax on nursing facilities) resulted in an estimated $110 million increase in federal matching funds; no increase in state general funds; and a net payment increase to the facilities, after paying the taxes, of $105 million. 2.) Apart from data on provider taxes, CMS generally does not require (or otherwise collect) information from states on the funds they use to finance Medicaid, nor ensure that the data that it does collect are accurate and complete. We recommended in July 2014 that CMS take steps to ensure that states report accurate and complete information on all sources of funds used to finance the nonfederal share of Medicaid, and offered suggestions for doing so. While Congress and CMS have taken important steps to improve the integrity of the Medicaid program through improved oversight of some Medicaid supplemental payments and financing arrangements, Congress and CMS need better information and more tools to understand who receives non-DSH supplemental payments and in what amounts, to ensure they are economical and efficient as required by law, and to determine the extent to which they are ultimately used for Medicaid purposes. Appendix I: GAO’s Matters for Congressional Consideration and Agency Recommendations
The following table lists matters for congressional consideration regarding actions to improve the transparency of and accountability for the Medicaid non-disproportionate share hospital (DSH) supplemental payments states make to providers. Medicaid Financing: Questionnaire Data on States’ Methods for Financing Medicaid Payments from 2008 through 2012. Medicaid Financing: States’ Increased Reliance on Funds from Health Care Providers and Local Governments Warrants Improved CMS Data Collection. | Why GAO Did This Study
Medicaid is an over $500 billion dollar jointly financed program for which the federal government matches state Medicaid expenditures. Within certain limits, states can make supplemental payments to providers in addition to their regular claims-based payments and receive federal matching funds. These payments have grown in the past decade. To finance the nonfederal share of Medicaid payments, states can use funds from local governments and providers, within federal parameters. CMS is responsible for overseeing state programs and ensuring that state payments are consistent with Medicaid payment principles—including that they are economical and efficient, and appropriately financed.
States may have incentives to make excessive supplemental payments to certain providers who finance the nonfederal share of the payment. GAO has a body of work from 2004 to 2015 raising concerns with Medicaid supplemental payments and financing methods. Congress and CMS have taken actions to improve accountability for these payments, and GAO has made further suggestions for Congress and CMS.
This statement highlights key issues and opportunities for improving transparency and oversight from GAO's work related to (1) certain supplemental payments states make to providers, and (2) states' financing of the non-federal share of Medicaid. This testimony is based on GAO reports from 2004 to 2015 on state Medicaid financing and supplemental payments, and selected updates from CMS on the status of prior recommendations.
What GAO Found
GAO has found that complete and reliable data are lacking on the tens of billions in Medicaid supplemental payments states often make, hindering transparency and oversight. In a November 2012 report, GAO found that Congress and the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) have acted to improve transparency and accountability for one type of Medicaid supplemental payment known as disproportionate share hospital (DSH) payments, made for uncompensated care costs experienced by hospitals serving low-income and Medicaid patients. Since 2010, DSH payments are required to be reported to CMS and are subject to independent audits that assess their appropriateness. States also make other supplemental payments—referred to here as non-DSH payments—to hospitals and other providers that, for example, serve high-cost Medicaid beneficiaries. Gaps in oversight remained for non-DSH supplemental payments, which as of 2011 exceeded DSH in amounts paid. For example, GAO reported that 39 states made non-DSH supplemental payments to 505 hospitals that, along with regular Medicaid payments, exceeded those hospitals' total costs of providing Medicaid care by about $2.7 billion. Medicaid payments are not limited to a provider's costs for services, but GAO concluded in an April 2015 report that payments that greatly exceed costs raise questions about whether they are economical and efficient as required by law, and the extent to which they are ultimately used for Medicaid services. CMS lacks data on supplemental payments made to individual providers. Per federal internal control standards, agencies should have reliable information for decision making and reporting, and reasonable assurance that agency objectives, such as compliance with laws, are being met. In 2012, CMS officials said legislation was needed to implement non-DSH reporting and auditing requirements, and GAO suggested that Congress consider requiring CMS to provide guidance on permissible methods for calculating non-DSH payments and require state reports and audits.
GAO found in a July 2014 report that states are increasingly relying on providers and local governments to finance Medicaid and data needed for oversight are lacking. About $46 billion or 26 percent of the nonfederal share was financed with funds from providers and local governments in 2012—an increase from 21 percent in 2008. GAO found that states' financing arrangements can effectively shift costs from states to the federal government. In one state, a $220 million payment increase for nursing facilities funded by a $115 million tax on nursing facilities yielded a net payment increase to the facilities of $105 million. The state obtained $110 million in federal matching funds for the payments. GAO found that CMS generally does not require or otherwise collect data from states on sources of funds to finance Medicaid, nor ensure that the data it does collect are accurate and complete. GAO identified, for example, incomplete reporting of provider taxes. As a result, CMS cannot fully assess the appropriateness of states' financing or the extent to which the increased reliance on providers and local governments serves to provide fiscal relief to states or improve access. Per federal internal control standards, agencies should collect accurate and complete data for monitoring. GAO recommended in 2014 that CMS improve the data states report on Medicaid financing. The agency disagreed, stating its efforts were adequate. GAO maintains its recommendation is valid. |
gao_GAO-16-239 | gao_GAO-16-239_0 | DOD’s Report on Enlisted Aides Fully Addressed Most Statutory Reporting Requirements
DOD’s June 2015 enlisted aide report fully addressed five of the six statutory reporting requirements contained in section 504 of the Fiscal Year 2015 NDAA and partially addressed the remaining requirement. DOD’s report addressed requirements related to (1) submitting the report, (2) listing official military and representational duties that enlisted aides are authorized to perform, (3) describing procedures for allocating enlisted aide authorizations between and within the military services and the Joint Staff, (4) recommending changes to the statutory method of calculating enlisted aide authorizations, and (5) the objective of reducing by 40 the maximum number of enlisted aides authorized and allocated, subject to certain conditions. DOD partially addressed the requirement to justify enlisted aide authorizations and assignments on a billet-by-billet basis. DOD’s Report Methodologies Are Consistent with Relevant Statute, but Some Are Not Consistent with All DOD Guidance
DOD’s methodology for identifying enlisted aide duties in its report to Congress is consistent with guidance, and its methodology for allocating enlisted aides is consistent with relevant statute. However, DOD’s methodologies for allocating and justifying enlisted aides are not consistent with all DOD guidance. DOD’s Stated Methodology for Allocating Enlisted Aides Is Consistent with the Relevant Statute, but It Is Not Based on Personnel Requirements, and DOD Has Not Reallocated Aides Since 2010
DOD describes in its report a methodology for allocating enlisted aide authorizations across the military services and the Joint Staff that is consistent with relevant statute, but we found that DOD’s methodology is not based on personnel requirements. § 981, which limits enlisted aide numbers. As previously noted, DOD’s stated methodology for allocating enlisted aides is to satisfy Joint Staff needs and then distribute the authorizations remaining under the statutory cap of 300 aides on a “fair share” percentage basis according to the formula in 10 U.S.C. OUSD P&R officials told us that they have not reallocated enlisted aide authorizations since 2010 because they were revising their primary enlisted aide instruction and because they anticipated changes to the statutory formula for determining maximum enlisted aide authorizations. A 4-star general assigned to the Joint Staff hosts 150-200 qualifying representational events per year and is assigned one enlisted aide, while an Army 3-star general hosts 3 qualifying representational events per year but is also assigned one enlisted aide. Without additional guidance on how to determine enlisted aide workload in relation to factors such as housing and GFO official representational duties, military service and Joint Staff decisions regarding enlisted aide authorizations and assignments may not be consistent and transparent. Certain Data DOD Used to Reach Conclusions in Its Enlisted Aides Report Were Not Reliable
DOD used data—including justifications for the authorization and assignment of enlisted aides—to reach its conclusions regarding enlisted aide reductions and a statutory cap on enlisted aide authorizations, but our review determined that certain data were inaccurate or incomplete and, therefore, not reliable. Several justifications did not align with the number of enlisted aides authorized or assigned to a GFO billet, or authorization and assignment justifications conflicted. Our review found that some of the justification data presented in DOD’s June 2015 report were inaccurate because the Army, the Navy, and the Joint Staff did not maintain historical data on enlisted aides and, therefore, as noted above, could not produce data regarding their authorizations, assignments, and justifications as of September 30, 2014, as required by section 504 of the Fiscal Year 2015 NDAA. As noted in our report, DOD’s June 2015 enlisted aides report partially addressed the requirement to include billet-by-billet justifications for enlisted aide authorizations and assignments as of September 30, 2014, but these justifications were based on the department’s existing allocation and did not constitute an assessment of total DOD-wide enlisted aide requirements. DOD concurred, with comment, on our third recommendation, that it establish criteria for determining enlisted aide workload and include these criteria in relevant enlisted aide guidance. As a result, justifications for enlisted aide authorizations vary and are subjective, and it is unclear how duties and workload support enlisted aide assignments. We continue to maintain that, without establishing a process to assess the reliability of enlisted aide data submitted by the military services and the Joint Staff, DOD does not have reasonable assurance that the data it used to determine enlisted aide reductions were accurate, and Congress and senior DOD leaders may not have reliable data in future enlisted aide reports on which to base decisions on enlisted aides. | Why GAO Did This Study
Enlisted aides assist general and flag officers with tasks, such as uniform care, that might otherwise interfere with accomplishing their official duties. Section 504 of the fiscal year 2015 NDAA required DOD to submit to Congress a report specifying enlisted aide duties and allocation procedures; justifying aide authorizations and assignments; recommending changes to the statutory method of calculating aide authorizations; and reducing the overall number of enlisted aides by 40.
The fiscal year 2015 NDAA also included a provision for GAO to review DOD's report. This report examines the extent to which (1) DOD's report on enlisted aides addressed statutory reporting requirements; (2) DOD's methodologies for identifying enlisted aide duties, allocating enlisted aides, and justifying their necessity are consistent with relevant statutes and DOD guidance; and (3) DOD used reliable data to support its report conclusions. GAO assessed DOD's June 2015 report against statutory requirements, compared methodologies against statute and DOD guidance, analyzed fiscal years 2014 and 2015 data on aide numbers, and interviewed DOD officials.
What GAO Found
The Department of Defense's (DOD) June 2015 report on enlisted aides fully addressed five of the six statutory reporting requirements contained in section 504 of the Carl Levin and Howard P. "Buck" McKeon National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2015 and partially addressed the remaining requirement. DOD's report addressed, among other things, the requirement to describe procedures for allocating enlisted aide authorizations, and the objective to reduce by 40 the maximum number of enlisted aides authorized and allocated. GAO determined that DOD partially addressed the requirement to justify enlisted aide authorizations on a billet-by-billet basis because DOD did not provide an explanation for each individual enlisted aide, and because some data were not from September 30, 2014, as was required.
DOD's methodology for identifying enlisted aide duties is consistent with guidance, and its methodology for allocating enlisted aides is consistent with relevant statute. However, DOD's methodologies for allocating and justifying aides are not consistent with all DOD guidance. DOD's stated methodology for allocating enlisted aide authorizations is consistent with the authorization formula and cap in 10 U.S.C. § 981 by first satisfying Joint Staff needs and then allocating the remaining authorizations among the military services according to a “fair share” percentage basis. However, this methodology is not based on validated personnel requirements, as DOD guidance requires, and DOD has not applied it to reallocate enlisted aide authorizations since 2010, resulting in a disproportionate distribution of authorizations. DOD officials stated that they have not assessed DOD-wide requirements in part due to the limited timeframe for developing DOD's report, and that they have not reallocated authorizations since 2010 because they were rewriting their enlisted aide guidance and anticipated changes to the statutory formula for determining enlisted aide authorizations. Without periodically assessing enlisted aide requirements and updating allocations, DOD cannot reasonably ensure that these resources are properly matched to its changing needs. In addition, the justifications included in DOD's report vary and are subjective, and it is unclear how duties and workload support enlisted aide assignments. For instance, a 4-star Joint Staff general hosts 150-200 official representational events per year and is assigned one enlisted aide, while a 3-star Army general hosts 3 events per year but is also assigned one aide. Without additional guidance to determine enlisted aide workload, military service and Joint Staff decisions regarding authorizations and assignments may not be consistent and transparent.
Certain data DOD used in its report were inaccurate or incomplete and therefore not reliable. For example, justification data from the Army, the Navy, and the Joint Staff did not reflect enlisted aide authorizations and assignments as of September 30, 2014, as was required. Also, several justifications did not align with the number of aides authorized or assigned to a general or flag officer billet. DOD officials stated they had no reason to doubt military service and Joint Staff data, but without a process for assessing reliability DOD does not have reasonable assurance that data it used to determine enlisted aide reductions were accurate, and Congress and senior DOD leaders may not have reliable data in future enlisted aide reports on which to base decisions on enlisted aides.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOD assess DOD-wide enlisted aide requirements, reallocate enlisted aide authorizations, establish criteria for determining enlisted aide workload, and establish a process for assessing the reliability of data in future enlisted aide reports. DOD concurred, but raised some concerns. GAO addresses these concerns in this report. |
gao_GAO-05-648T | gao_GAO-05-648T_0 | In addition to providing their annual reports to the Attorney General, agencies are to make them available to the public in electronic form. The FOIA Process at Federal Agencies
Although the specific details of processes for handling FOIA requests vary among agencies, the major steps in handling a request are similar across the government. Agencies receive requests, usually in writing (although they may accept requests by telephone or electronically), which can come from any organization or member of the public. Once received, the request goes through several phases, which include initial processing, searching for and retrieving responsive records, preparing responsive records for release, approving the release of the records, and releasing the records to the requester. FOIA Implementation
Citizens have been requesting and receiving an ever-increasing amount of information from the federal government, as reflected in the increasing number of FOIA requests that have been received and processed in recent years. From 2002 to 2004, the number of requests received increased by 71 percent, and the number of requests processed increased by 68 percent. Agency Backlogs Have Increased
In addition to processing greater numbers of requests, many agencies (13 of 25) also reported that their backlogs of pending requests—requests carried over from one year to the next—have increased since 2002. In summary, FOIA continues to be a valuable tool for citizens to obtain information about the operation and decisions of the federal government. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) establishes that federal agencies must provide the public with access to government information, thus enabling them to learn about government operations and decisions. To help ensure appropriate implementation, the act requires that agencies report annually to the Attorney General, providing specific information about their FOIA operations. GAO has reported previously on the contents of these annual reports for 25 major agencies. GAO was asked to describe the FOIA process and discuss the reported implementation of FOIA.
What GAO Found
Although the specific details of processes for handling FOIA requests vary among agencies, the major steps in handling a request are similar across the government. Agencies receive requests, usually in writing (although they may accept requests by telephone or electronically), which can be submitted by any organization or member of the public. Once requests are received, the agency responds through a process that includes several phases: initial processing, searching for and retrieving responsive records, preparing responsive records for release, approving the release of the records, and releasing the records to the requester. According to data reported by agencies in their annual FOIA reports, citizens have been requesting and receiving an ever-increasing amount of information from the federal government through FOIA. The number of requests that agencies received increased by 71 percent from 2002 to 2004. Further, agencies reported they have been processing more requests--68 percent more from 2002 to 2004. For 92 percent of requests processed in 2004, agencies reported that responsive records were provided in full to requesters. However, the number of pending requests carried over from year to year--known as the backlog--has also been increasing, rising 14 percent since 2002. |
gao_GAO-05-674 | gao_GAO-05-674_0 | 1). 2). Four projects were recommended for funding with the expectation that they would be ready for new FFGAs before the end of fiscal year 2006, and an additional 6 projects were identified as potentially receiving a recommendation for New Starts funding outside of FFGAs. Administration’s Proposed Fiscal Year 2006 Budget Requests Similar Amount of Funding to Previous Years
The administration’s fiscal year 2006 budget proposal requests that $1.5 billion be made available for the New Starts program, an amount similar to that requested in the last two fiscal years. TEA-21 and subsequent amendments and legislation provided FTA the authority to make about $13.5 billion in funding commitments for New Starts projects. FTA Has Not Consistently Used the Public Notice or Rulemaking Process to Introduce Changes or Solicit Industry Comment on Proposed Changes
Of the 16 changes that FTA has made to the New Starts application, evaluation, rating, and project development oversight processes since the fiscal year 2001 evaluation cycle, seven underwent rulemaking, including providing formal notice to the transit industry and soliciting public comment, while nine changes did not (see table 2). FTA officials also said that some of the changes—such as the risk assessment requirement—involve project development oversight and do not affect the evaluation and rating process; therefore, in their view, the changes do not need to be included in program regulations. New Starts Measures Have Evolved Over Time, but Not All Measures Count Toward a Project’s Rating
Many of the measures FTA uses to evaluate and rate New Starts projects predate TEA-21 and have evolved over time. Although both TEA-21 and FTA’s current New Starts program regulations emphasize the importance of using a multiple-measure approach for evaluating projects, FTA assigns a 50 percent weight to both the cost-effectiveness and the land use criteria when developing the project justification summary rating. Project sponsors we interviewed offered suggestions for improving all of the project justification measures. Recommendations for Executive Action
To ensure that the New Starts regulations reflect FTA’s current evaluation and rating process, and to ensure that FTA’s New Starts evaluation process and policies are objective, transparent, and follow the intent of federal statute, we recommend that the Secretary of Transportation direct the Administrator, FTA, to take the following four actions: ensure that the agency’s regulations governing the New Starts evaluation and rating process reflect FTA’s current weighting practices for the criteria when the regulations are revised; improve the measures for evaluating New Starts projects so that all five project justification criteria can be used in determining a project’s overall rating, or provide a crosswalk in the agency’s New Starts regulations showing clear linkages between the criteria outlined in statute and the criteria and measures used in the rating process; publish future changes to the New Starts program in the Federal Register and subject future changes to the New Starts program to the rulemaking process or, at a minimum, a 30-day informal review and comment period, as appropriate. These interviews were designed to gain project sponsors’ perspectives on a number of topics, including the manner in which FTA communicates changes to the New Starts application, evaluation, rating, and project development oversight processes; the impact of the changes that FTA has made to the application, evaluation, rating, and project development oversight processes since the fiscal year 2001 evaluation cycle—the first full evaluation and rating cycle after the enactment of the Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century (TEA-21); and the measures FTA uses to evaluate projects. Mass Transit: Status of New Starts Transit Projects With Full Funding Grant Agreements. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century (TEA-21) and subsequent legislation authorized about $13.5 billion in guaranteed funding for the Federal Transit Administration's (FTA) New Starts program, which is used to select fixed guideway transit projects, such as rail and trolley projects, and to award full funding grant agreements (FFGA). GAO assessed the New Starts process for the fiscal year 2006 cycle. GAO identified (1) the number of projects that were evaluated, rated, and proposed for new FFGAs and the proposed funding commitments in the administration's budget request; (2) changes FTA has made to the New Starts application, evaluation, rating, and oversight processes since the fiscal year 2001 evaluation cycle and how these changes have been communicated to project sponsors; and (3) how FTA developed the measures used to evaluate and rate projects from the criteria outlined in TEA-21 and how those measures are used in the rating process.
What GAO Found
For the fiscal year 2006 evaluation cycle, FTA evaluated and rated 27 projects and identified 4 projects that were expected to be ready for new FFGAs before the end of fiscal year 2006 and an additional 6 projects that may be eligible for other funding outside of FFGAs. The administration's fiscal year 2006 budget proposal requests $1.5 billion for the New Starts program, a request similar to that of the past 2 years. FTA has made 16 changes to the New Starts application, evaluation, rating, and oversight processes since the fiscal year 2001 cycle that were primarily intended to make the process more rigorous and systematic. Seven of the 16 changes underwent rulemaking, including providing formal notice to the transit industry and soliciting comment, while 9 changes did not. FTA officials said that these nine changes are consistent with the existing regulations governing the New Starts process or relate to the project development oversight process rather than the evaluation and rating process and, therefore, in their opinion, do not need to undergo formal rulemaking. By not consistently soliciting public opinion, however, FTA is missing an opportunity to obtain stakeholder buy-in, increase the transparency of the New Starts process, and lessen potential difficulties project sponsors face in implementing the changes. Many of the measures FTA uses to evaluate and rate New Starts projects have evolved over time, with industry input, through formal rulemaking and informal efforts, such as workshops and reports. Although both TEA-21 and FTA's New Starts program regulations emphasize the importance of using a multiple-measure approach for evaluating projects, FTA assigns weight to all three financial criteria but only two of the five project justification criteria in developing a project's rating. FTA officials said that they do not use the other three project justification criteria--which are specified in TEA-21--because the measures fail to distinguish among projects. Project sponsors we interviewed offered suggestions for improving all of the project justification measures, and FTA has efforts underway to improve some of the measures. |
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