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gao_GAO-04-398 | gao_GAO-04-398_0 | Millions of Dollars of Airline Tickets Were Unused and Not Refunded
As shown in table 1, data provided by five airlines and verified against Bank of America’s data showed that about 58,000 tickets with a value of $21.1 million were purchased with DOD’s centrally billed accounts but were unused and not refunded. Based on our assessment of the limited data provided by the airlines, it is possible that since fiscal year 1997, DOD purchased more than $100 million in airline tickets that were not used and not processed for refunds and for which DOD may be entitled to refunds or offsets against other payments to those airlines. As in the case of fully unused tickets, DOD was not aware of, and therefore did not maintain data on, partially unused tickets. However, we found that DOD’s flawed process relied extensively on DOD personnel to report unused tickets to the travel offices. Although some units had instituted a process by fiscal year 2002 to more systematically identify instances of unused tickets, the process was not implemented DOD-wide and could only be used to identify unused electronic—not paper—tickets. Although many DOD travelers informed the CTOs of unused tickets as required, the lack of specific internal control procedures to identify instances in which the travelers did not do so resulted in DOD paying for thousands of airline tickets that were not used and not processed for refunds. To enable DOD to systematically identify future unused airline tickets purchased through the centrally billed accounts, and improve internal controls over the processing of unused airline tickets for refunds, we recommend that the Secretaries of the Army, Air Force, and Navy and the heads of DOD agencies direct the appropriate personnel within services and agencies to take the following nine actions: evaluate the feasibility of implementing procedures to reconcile airline tickets acquired using the centrally billed accounts to travel vouchers in the current travel system; modify existing CTO contracts to include a requirement that the CTOs establish a capability to systematically identify unused e-tickets in their computer reservation systems, identify all unused tickets based on specified criteria before the unused ticket data are removed from the computer reservation systems, maintain daily schedules that identify unused tickets and how long they have been unused, routinely provide the GTOs with unused ticket reports, routinely process refunds for tickets identified as unused, and submit to the GTOs all requests for refunds that have been require the GTOs to routinely compare unused tickets processed by the CTOs to the credits on the Bank of America invoice; and require either the GTOs or the units responsible for monitoring the CTOs’ activities to determine whether the CTOs are consistently implementing the procedures to identify unused tickets and process these tickets for refunds. Our assessment covered the following: the extent of tickets charged to the centrally billed accounts that are unused and not refunded and whether DOD’s internal controls provided reasonable assurance that all unused tickets were identified and submitted for refunds. We also requested that the five airlines that DOD used most frequently provide us with data relating to tickets DOD purchased during fiscal years 2001 and 2002 that were unused and not refunded. Only one airline provided us the unused value (residual value) of partially unused tickets. As shown in table 4, while all the airlines generally provided complete data on fiscal year 2002 fully unused tickets, the airlines did not provide uniform, complete, or consistent responses to our request for fiscal year 2002 partially unused tickets, or for fully or partially unused ticket data for fiscal year 2001. As a result, we determined that it was possible that DOD had purchased at least $115 million in tickets that were unused and not refunded. | Why GAO Did This Study
Ineffective oversight and management of the Department of Defense's (DOD) travel card program, which GAO previously reported on, have led to concerns about airline tickets DOD purchased but did not use and for which it did not claim refunds. GAO was asked to (1) determine whether, and to what extent, airline tickets purchased through the centrally billed accounts were unused and not refunded and (2) determine whether DOD's internal controls provided reasonable assurance that all unused tickets were identified and submitted for refunds.
What GAO Found
Control breakdowns over the centrally billed accounts resulted in DOD paying for airline tickets that were not used and not processed for refund. DOD was not aware of this problem before our audit and did not maintain data on unused tickets. We determined, based on airline data, that DOD had purchased--primarily in fiscal years 2001 and 2002--about 58,000 tickets with a residual (unused) value of more than $21 million that remained unused and not refunded as of October 2003. We also identified more than 81,000 partially unused airline tickets with a purchase price of about $62 million that will require additional analysis to determine the residual value. Based on further analysis of the limited data, it is possible that DOD purchased at least $100 million in airline tickets that it did not use and for which it did not claim refunds from fiscal years 1997 through 2003. Although GAO asked DOD's five most frequently used airlines for fiscal year 2001 and 2002 unused ticket data, the airlines did not provide uniform, complete, or consistent responses. For example, one airline did not provide partially unused ticket data, another airline's fiscal year 2001 data covered only September 2001, while yet another airline provided data on electronic tickets dating back to November 1998. Although additional data on unused tickets may be available from the airlines' archives, our attempts to obtain additional information were unsuccessful. DOD's unused ticket problems were caused by a flawed process that relied extensively on DOD personnel to report unused tickets to the travel offices. Although it appears that many unused tickets were processed for a refund, the internal controls DOD had in place did not detect millions of dollars of unused airline tickets. Specifically, DOD did not systematically implement compensating procedures to identify instances in which DOD personnel did not report unused tickets, or reconcile the centrally billed accounts to travel claims to determine whether airline tickets were used. Although some units had instituted a process by fiscal year 2002 to more systematically identify instances of unused tickets, the process was not implemented DOD-wide, DOD did not verify that units were consistently implementing the process, and the process could only identify unused electronic--not paper--tickets. |
gao_GAO-09-921 | gao_GAO-09-921_0 | Full Picture of Agencies’ Use of Cost- Reimbursement Contracts Is Unclear
The complete picture of the government’s use of cost-reimbursement contracts is unclear. From fiscal years 2003 through 2008, federal obligations under cost-reimbursement contracts were reported to have increased by $16 billion, from $120 billion to $136 billion. When viewed as a percentage of total reported federal obligations, this represented a decrease over the 6-year period, from 34 percent to 26 percent. Missing Contract Types and Obligations Using “Other” Contract Type Contribute to Lack of Clarity about Extent of Cost-Reimbursement Obligations
Although FPDS-NG guidance states that contract type is a required field for all contracts, we found that billions of dollars in obligations are either missing a contract type (i.e., no contract type was reported) or the contract type is indicated as “other.” In fiscal year 2008, over $10 billion in obligations was reported as missing a contract type and $4.3 billion was reported as “other.” In addition, some very large contracts that had been previously labeled as cost-reimbursement were subsequently coded as missing a contract type in fiscal year 2008. Rationale for Using Cost-Reimbursement Contracts Is Often Not Clear, and Analysis Is Not Conducted to Determine if Contract Type with Firmer Pricing Is Warranted
Contracting officials frequently did not document contract files to show why they awarded cost-reimbursement contracts. Of the 92 contract files we reviewed, we found that 28, or 30 percent, contained no documentation showing why a cost-reimbursement contract was selected for award, including in the acquisition plans. For example, two contract files contained the statement, “these activities are non-routine, complex in nature, and specific requirements have not been completely defined.” Two other contract files had the following language: “due to the uncertainties involved in the performance of this contract, costs cannot be estimated with sufficient accuracy to use any type of fixed-price contract.”
Table 6 contains representative examples of rationales we found to be brief and not clearly tied to the individual procurements. We did not assess whether an agency’s decision to use a cost- reimbursement contract was the most appropriate choice of contract type during our review, but we generally found no evidence that agency officials assessed, for example, the contract’s pricing history or requirements under the contracts we reviewed to determine whether there was a basis for firmer pricing, even when the contracts had been in place for several years. Agencies Do Not Always Ensure That Contractors’ Accounting Systems Are Adequate for Determining Costs Applicable to Contracts
Cost-reimbursement contracts are to be used only when the contractor’s accounting system is adequate for determining costs applicable to the contract. Timely Accounting System Approval in 52 Cases Reviewed; 13 Others Approved After Award
Of the 92 contract files we reviewed, only 52 (about 57 percent) had any evidence that contractors’ accounting systems had been deemed adequate in a current time frame (within 4 years or less) before contract award. The civilian agency procedures call for program officials to review contractors’ invoices. DOD Reliance on Contractor-Provided Program Management Data May Be Inadequate if Required Audits Are Not Conducted to Supplement Cost Surveillance
At DOD, procedures for monitoring contractor costs depend in large part on the EVM system—a tool that presents contractor-provided data to measure the value of work accomplished in a given period compared to the planned value of work scheduled and the actual cost of work accomplished—supplemented with audits for the purpose of testing whether invoiced costs are allowable. Our recent work has raised concerns in this regard. We found little evidence that agency officials are analyzing whether such a transition can be made. Finally, OFPP stated that a decision was recently made, while our report was at OFPP for comment, to make changes to FPDS-NG to eliminate the “combination” contract type as an option for new contracts starting in fiscal year 2010. To determine agencies’ rationales for using cost-reimbursement contracts, whether contracting officers had deemed contractor accounting systems adequate for determining costs applicable to the contracts, and procedures for surveillance of contractor cost controls, we took the following steps. | Why GAO Did This Study
Federal agencies obligate billions of dollars annually using cost-reimbursement contracts. This type of contract involves high risk for the government because of the potential for cost escalation and because the government pays a contractor's costs of performance regardless of whether the work is completed. As such, cost-reimbursement contracts are suitable only when the cost of the work to be done cannot be estimated with sufficient accuracy to use fixed-price contracts. Agencies may use this contract type only if certain conditions are met. At your request, GAO assessed (1) the extent of agencies' obligations under these contracts, (2) the rationales for using this contract type, (3) determinations that contractors' accounting systems are adequate for determining costs applicable to the contracts, and (4) procedures for monitoring contractor cost controls. GAO analyzed federal procurement data and contract files and interviewed contracting and other government officials.
What GAO Found
The complete picture of the government's use of cost-reimbursement contracts is unclear. From fiscal years 2003 through 2008 federal obligations under cost-reimbursement contracts were reported to have increased $16 billion, to $136 billion, which represented a decrease in the total percentage of federal obligations over the 6-year period, from 34 percent to 26 percent. However, the overall downward trend is misleading. A significant increase has been reported for obligations using the "combination" contract type, a category that based on GAO's analysis of 2008 data, includes many contracts with cost-reimbursement obligations that are not recorded as such. According to OFPP, a decision was recently made to eliminate the use of "combination" as a Federal Procurement Data System-Next Generation contract type, effective for all new contract awards starting in fiscal year 2010. In addition, GAO found billions of dollars for which the contract type had been coded as "missing" in fiscal year 2008. Agencies' rationales for using cost-reimbursement contracts were difficult to determine because contracting officers frequently did not document--even in acquisition plans--why they chose to use this contract type. The current requirement for such documentation is minimal, but recent legislation (not yet implemented in the Federal Acquisition Regulation) requires that acquisition plans address the rationale. Of the 92 contracts and orders GAO reviewed, about 30 percent did not include any documentation. The supporting documentation GAO did find generally did not explain why a cost-reimbursement contract for the specific requirement was selected. GAO also found little evidence that agency officials are analyzing contracts' pricing history and requirements to determine if they can transition to a contract type with firmer pricing, even though experience may provide a basis for doing so. Of the 92 contracts and orders GAO reviewed, about half had any evidence that, at least within 4 years before contract award, contractors' accounting systems had been deemed adequate to determine costs applicable to the contract. Twenty contract files had no evidence that the contractors' accounting systems were determined adequate and 20 other contract files contained determinations that had been made either many years before award or after the contract was awarded. Inadequate accounting systems, or accounting systems that had not been deemed adequate for many years, may result in the government making improper payments to contractors. GAO found a range of procedures for monitoring contractor cost controls at the agencies in its review. Procedures at the civilian agencies generally call for program officials to review contractor invoices. At the Department of Defense, cost surveillance depends on contractor-reported earned value management data, supplemented with audits for the purpose of testing whether invoiced costs are allowable. GAO's prior work has raised concerns about the effectiveness of these audits. |
gao_GAO-05-658 | gao_GAO-05-658_0 | Businesses file for bankruptcy under chapter 7 when they are ceasing operations. Thus, although national bankruptcy data show that 231,630 businesses operating in the United States filed for bankruptcy in fiscal years 1998 through 2003—an average of about 38,600 businesses a year— how many of these had environmental liabilities is not known. Currently, information on bankrupt businesses with federal environmental liabilities is limited to data on the bankruptcy cases that the Justice Department has pursued in court on behalf of EPA and other agencies, such as the Department of the Interior. In fiscal years 1998 through 2003, the Justice Department filed 136 such claims, 112 of which related to hazardous waste liabilities under Superfund and RCRA. EPA Faces Significant Challenges When Seeking to Hold Businesses Responsible for Their Cleanup Obligations, Particularly Businesses in Bankruptcy and Other Financial Distress
In its efforts to hold businesses responsible for their cleanup obligations, particularly when they are in bankruptcy or other financial distress, EPA faces significant challenges, often stemming from the differing goals of environmental laws that hold polluting businesses liable for cleanup costs and other laws that, in some cases, allow businesses to limit or avoid responsibility for such liabilities. Legal and Informational Challenges Constrain EPA’s Ability to Hold Businesses in Bankruptcy Responsible for Their Cleanup Obligations
An obvious challenge that EPA faces when it attempts to ensure that businesses in bankruptcy carry out their environmental cleanup obligations is that the businesses may have little or no financial resources to pay EPA or any other creditors. Specifically, while environmental laws generally impose cleanup costs on the parties responsible for pollution, one purpose of bankruptcy law is to give the debtor a fresh start by discharging existing claims against the debtor, including environmental claims in some cases. For example, in many bankruptcy cases there may be few, if any, assets available for distribution to creditors. EPA has on occasion used other enforcement authorities, including (1) obtaining offsets, which allow the government to redirect payments or tax refunds it owes businesses to federal agencies with claims against these businesses and (2) filing liens on property for which the government has incurred expenses under Superfund. Greater use of these authorities could produce additional payments for cleanups from liable businesses, even in bankruptcies. EPA Has Not Implemented a Statutory Mandate under Superfund to Establish Financial Assurance Requirements for Certain Businesses Handling Hazardous Substances
Despite a requirement to do so in the 1980 statute creating the Superfund program, EPA has not issued regulations requiring certain businesses that handle hazardous substances to demonstrate their ability to pay for environmental cleanup costs. In addition, over time, businesses have become more sophisticated in using the limited liability principle to protect their assets by separating them from their liabilities. In addition, to better ensure that the financial assurances EPA does require under the Superfund and RCRA corrective action programs provide sufficient funds for cleanups in the event liable parties do not fulfill their environmental obligations, EPA should enhance its efforts to manage and enforce the financial assurance requirements for Superfund and RCRA corrective action cleanups by taking the following actions: Evaluate the financial assurances the agency accepts in light of such factors as the financial risks EPA faces if liable parties do not meet their cleanup obligations; the varying financial risks posed by the individual financial assurance mechanisms; the agency’s capacity to effectively oversee the various financial assurance mechanisms—in particular, the expertise of staff (federal and state) and the number of staff; the information gaps the agency faces in overseeing the various financial assurances; and the concerns about certain financial assurances, such as the corporate financial tests, corporate guarantees, and captive insurance, that have been brought to the agency’s attention by state regulators, the EPA Inspector General, and others. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
GAO was asked to (1) determine how many businesses with liability under federal law for environmental cleanups have declared bankruptcy and how many such cases the Justice Department has pursued in bankruptcy court; (2) identify key challenges that EPA faces in holding bankrupt and other financially distressed businesses responsible for their cleanup obligations; and (3) identify actions EPA could take, if any, to better ensure that bankrupt and other financially distressed businesses pay the costs of cleaning up their contaminated sites to the maximum extent practicable. | Why GAO Did This Study
The burden of cleaning up Superfund and other hazardous waste sites is increasingly shifting to taxpayers, particularly since businesses handling hazardous substances are no longer taxed under Superfund and the backlog of sites needing cleanup is growing. While key environmental laws rely on the "polluter pays" principle, the extent to which liable parties cease operations or restructure--such as through bankruptcy--can directly affect the cleanup costs faced by taxpayers. GAO was asked to (1) determine how many businesses with liability under federal law for environmental cleanups have declared bankruptcy, and how many such cases the government has pursued in bankruptcy court; (2) identify challenges the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) faces in holding bankrupt and other financially distressed businesses responsible for their cleanup obligations; and (3) identify actions EPA could take to better ensure that such businesses pay for their cleanups.
What GAO Found
While more than 231,000 businesses operating in the United States filed for bankruptcy in fiscal years 1998 through 2003, the extent to which these businesses had environmental liabilities is not known because neither the federal government nor other sources collect this information. Information on bankrupt businesses with federal environmental liabilities is limited to data on the bankruptcy cases that the Justice Department has pursued in court on behalf of EPA. In that regard, the Justice Department initiated 136 such cases from 1998 through 2003. In seeking to hold liable businesses responsible for their environmental cleanup obligations, EPA faces significant challenges that often stem from the differing goals of environmental laws that hold polluting businesses liable for cleanup costs and other laws that, in some cases, allow businesses to limit or avoid responsibility for these liabilities. For example, businesses can legally organize or restructure in ways that can limit their future expenditures for cleanups by, for example, separating their assets from their liabilities using subsidiaries. While many such actions are legal, transferring assets to limit liability may violate federal law in some cases. However, such cases are difficult for EPA to identify and for the Justice Department to prosecute successfully. In addition, bankruptcy law presents a number of challenges to EPA's ability to hold parties responsible for their cleanup obligations, challenges that are largely related to the law's intent to give debtors a fresh start. Moreover, by the time a business files for bankruptcy, it may have few, if any, assets remaining to distribute among creditors. The bankruptcy process also poses procedural and informational challenges for EPA. For example, EPA lacks timely, complete, and reliable information on the thousands of businesses filing for bankruptcy each year. Notwithstanding these challenges, EPA could better ensure that bankrupt and other financially distressed businesses meet their cleanup obligations by making greater use of existing authorities. For example, EPA has not implemented a 1980 statutory mandate under Superfund to require businesses handling hazardous substances to demonstrate their ability to pay for potential environmental cleanups--that is, to provide financial assurances. EPA has cited competing priorities and lack of funds as reasons for not implementing this mandate, but its inaction has exposed the Superfund program and U.S. taxpayers to potentially enormous cleanup costs at gold, lead, and other mining sites and at other industrial operations, such as metal-plating businesses. Also, EPA has done little to ensure that businesses comply with its existing financial assurance requirements in cleanup agreements and orders. Greater oversight and enforcement of financial assurances would better guarantee that cleanup funds will be available if needed. Also, greater use of other existing authorities--such as tax offsets, which allow the government to redirect tax refunds it owes businesses to agencies with claims against them--could produce additional payments for cleanups from financially distressed businesses. |
gao_GAO-06-607 | gao_GAO-06-607_0 | Release of Income and Poverty Estimates Adhered to Most of the Bureau’s Data Dissemination Practices
While not all of the Bureau’s data dissemination practices are documented, we were able to determine through discussions with Bureau officials and review of available documentation, that the Bureau adhered to most of its long-standing data release practices. That said, under the Bureau’s documented data dissemination practices (1) there is no requirement for the Bureau to release this information at a particular location on a given day and, (2) no particular official is designated authority to choose the release date and location. The documented practices for disseminating the Income and Poverty Estimates are contained in a memo that is 21 years old so the Bureau is updating them, to among other things, reflect current technology. According to the Bureau, Several Factors Affected the Change in Location of the 2003 Release
According to a senior official we interviewed in the Bureau’s Public Information Office, the location of the 2003 Income and Poverty Estimates news conference was changed from the National Press Club in Washington, D.C., at the request of the Director of the Census Bureau, to help raise awareness of the Bureau’s new headquarters building, which was under construction. Governmentwide Guidance Is Being Developed That May Improve Statistical Agencies’ Data Dissemination Practices
Most of the 14 statistical agencies we reviewed reported general adherence to NRC’s guidance, important for (1) the wide dissemination of data, and (2) maintaining a strong position of independence, although there were some notable gaps. OMB, in concert with the statistical agencies, has developed draft guidance on the release and dissemination of statistical products that, according to OMB officials, parallel NRC’s guidance. To the extent it is comparable to NRC’s guidance and other widely accepted procedures for disseminating data, the proposed OMB directive could promote more consistent adherence to practices that promote broader dissemination of statistical data and enhance the data’s credibility. Further, 6 of the 14 agencies lacked dissemination policies that promote the regular and frequent release of major findings from an agency’s statistical program. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To address the extent to which the U.S. Bureau of the Census (Bureau) adhered to its dissemination practices for the release of the 2003 annual Income and Poverty Estimates and subsequent releases we asked Bureau officials (in the Housing and Household Economic Statistics Division and the Bureau’s Public Information Office, among others) to identify the Bureau and Department of Commerce officials who participated in the data dissemination decisions, and interviewed the identified officials to determine their role in the decision-making process, and whether they had prerelease access to the information. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 2003, the Bureau of the Census (Bureau) changed the day and location of the release of its Income and Poverty Estimates. Some data users believed the change was an effort to suppress unfavorable news and questioned the Bureau's data dissemination practices. GAO was asked to assess whether (1) the Bureau adhered to its dissemination practices for the 2003 and later releases, and (2) the Bureau and 13 other federal statistical agencies follow data release practices recommended by the National Research Council (NRC). GAO reviewed the Bureau's dissemination process for the 2003 thru 2005 Income and Poverty Estimates.
What GAO Found
While not all of the Bureau's data dissemination practices are documented, GAO was able to determine through discussions with Bureau officials and review of available documentation, that the Bureau adhered to most of its long-standing data release practices. However, the Bureau did depart from the traditional day and location for the release of the Income and Poverty Estimates report in 2003 and subsequent years. According to the Bureau, the day of the 2003 release was changed because of a delay in producing a companion report, and the location was changed from Washington, D.C., to Suitland, Maryland, in part, because the Director of the Census Bureau stated that he wanted to raise awareness that the construction of its new headquarters had just started. Some of the Bureau's documented practices, such as guidance on who has authority to choose the release date and location, lacked specificity. Also, the Bureau's documented Income and Poverty practices are outdated as they are contained in a 21-year-old memo. The Bureau is updating it, to among other things, reflect current technology. Most of the 14 statistical agencies in GAO's review generally adhered to NRC's guidance, important for (1) the wide dissemination of data, and (2) maintaining a strong position of independence. Still, there were some notable gaps. For example, 6 of the 14 agencies lacked dissemination policies (as recommended by NRC) that promote the regular and frequent release of major findings from an agency's statistical program. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB), in concert with other statistical agencies, is developing governmentwide guidance on the release and dissemination of statistical products that, according to OMB officials, parallels NRC's and other generally accepted release practices. OMB's guidance could foster more consistent adherence to practices that promote broader dissemination of statistical data and enhance its credibility, especially to the extent they address gaps GAO found between agencies' data dissemination practices and NRC's guidance. |
gao_T-AIMD-96-12 | gao_T-AIMD-96-12_0 | The goals of MTS are to better protect program funds from waste, fraud, and abuse; allow better oversight of Medicare contractors’ operations; improve service to beneficiaries and providers; and reduce administrative expenses. First, HCFA has not sufficiently followed sound practices in defining MTS project requirements. HCFA has not, however, implemented a formal process to assess and manage system-development risks. HCFA’s IV&V contractor also cited concerns about the lack of an integrated schedule baseline for MTS. The risks we see in the development of MTS can be substantially reduced if HCFA management implements some of the best practices that have been proven effective in other organizations: managing systems as investments, changing information management practices, creating line manager ownership, better managing resources, and measuring performance. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed the Health Care Financing Administration's (HCFA) approach to managing the Medicare Transaction System (MTS).
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) MTS is designed to unify the nine Medicare claims-processing systems, improve Medicare contractor oversight, improve services to beneficiaries and providers, reduce administrative expenses, and better protect Medicare program funds from waste, fraud, and abuse; (2) although HCFA plans to mitigate large scale problems by implementing MTS in increments and design MTS to allow for future modifications, the lack of an effective management approach exposes the system to undue risks; (3) HCFA has not adequately defined MTS project requirements, has not identified significant system-development overlap, and lacks reliable cost and benefit information; and (4) HCFA could substantially reduce MTS development risks by implementing some of the best practices that have been proven effective in other organizations, such as changing HCFA information management practices, creating line manager ownership, better managing MTS resources, and measuring MTS project performance. |
gao_GAO-15-373T | gao_GAO-15-373T_0 | We have categorized our concerns about VA’s ability to ensure the timeliness, cost-effectiveness, quality, and safety of the health care the department provides into five broad areas: (1) ambiguous policies and inconsistent processes, (2) inadequate oversight and accountability, (3) information technology challenges, (4) inadequate training for VA staff, and (5) unclear resource needs and allocation priorities. The recently enacted Veterans Access, Choice, and Accountability Act included a number of provisions intended to help VA address systemic weaknesses. It is also critical that Congress maintains its focus on oversight of VA health care. Improving the Management of IT Acquisitions and Operations
Although the executive branch has undertaken numerous initiatives to better manage the more than $80 billion that is annually invested in information technology (IT), federal IT investments too frequently fail or incur cost overruns and schedule slippages while contributing little to mission-related outcomes. We have previously testified that the federal government has spent billions of dollars on failed IT investments. These and other failed IT projects often suffered from a lack of disciplined and effective management, such as project planning, requirements definition, and program oversight and governance. As of January 2015, about 23 percent of the 737 recommendations had been fully implemented. Given current and emerging risks, we are expanding the Enforcement of Tax Laws area to include IRS’s efforts to address tax refund fraud due to identity theft (IDT), which occurs when an identity thief files a fraudulent tax return using a legitimate taxpayer’s identifying information and claims a refund. However, advances in technology which have dramatically enhanced the ability of both government and private sector entities to collect and process extensive amounts of Personally Identifiable Information (PII) pose challenges to ensuring the privacy of such information. The number of reported security incidents involving PII at federal agencies has increased dramatically in recent years. Capacity. Action plan. Demonstrated progress. Continued Progress
Since our last high-risk update in 2013, there has been solid and steady progress on the vast majority of the 30 high-risk areas from our 2013 list. Progress has been possible through the concerted actions and efforts of Congress and the leadership and staff in agencies and OMB. Of the 11 areas that have been on the High Risk List since the 1990s, 7 have at least met or partially met all of the criteria for removal and 1 area—DOD Contract Management—is 1 of the 2 areas that has made enough progress to remove subcategories of the high-risk area. Narrowing High Risk Areas
Since our 2013 update, sufficient progress has been made to narrow the scope of the following two areas. These actions have addressed this high-risk issue. Progress in Selected High-Risk Areas
In addition to the two areas that we narrowed—Protecting Public Health through Enhanced Oversight of Medical Products and DOD Contract Management—nine other areas met at least one of the criteria for removal from the High Risk List and were rated at least partially met for all four of the remaining criteria. Ensuring the Security of Federal Information Systems and Cyber Critical Infrastructure and Protecting the Privacy of Personally Identifiable Information
We added this high-risk area in 1997 and expanded it this year to include protection of PII. CMS made positive strides, but more needs to be done to fully meet our criteria. CMS should require a surety bond for certain types of at-risk providers and suppliers; publish a proposed rule for increased disclosures of prior actions taken against providers and suppliers enrolling or revalidating enrollment in Medicare, such as whether the provider or supplier has been subject to a payment suspension from a federal health care program; establish core elements of compliance programs for providers and improve automated edits that identify services billed in medically unlikely amounts; develop performance measures for the Zone Program Integrity Contractors who explicitly link their work to the agency’s Medicare FFS program integrity performance measures and improper payment reduction goals; reduce differences between contractor postpayment review requirements, when possible; monitor the database used to track Recovery Auditors’ activities to ensure that all postpayment review contractors are submitting required data and that the data the database contains are accurate and complete; require Medicare administrative contractors to share information about the underlying policies and savings related to their most effective edits; and efficiently and cost-effectively identify, design, develop, and implement an information technology solution that addresses the removal of Social Security numbers from Medicare beneficiaries’ health insurance cards. In support of Congress and to further progress to address high-risk issues, we continue to review efforts and make recommendations to address high- risk areas. | Why GAO Did This Study
The federal government is one of the world's largest and most complex entities; about $3.5 trillion in outlays in fiscal year 2014 funded a broad array of programs and operations. GAO maintains a program to focus attention on government operations that it identifies as high risk due to their greater vulnerabilities to fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement or the need for transformation to address economy, efficiency, or effectiveness challenges.
Since 1990, more than one-third of the areas previously designated as high risk have been removed from the list because sufficient progress was made in addressing the problems identified. The five criteria for removal are: (1) leadership commitment, (2) agency capacity, (3) an action plan, (4) monitoring efforts, and (5) demonstrated progress.
This biennial update describes the status of high-risk areas listed in 2013 and identifies new high-risk areas needing attention by Congress and the executive branch. Solutions to high-risk problems offer the potential to save billions of dollars, improve service to the public, and strengthen government performance and accountability.
What GAO Found
Solid, steady progress has been made in the vast majority of the high-risk areas. Eighteen of the 30 areas on the 2013 list at least partially met all of the criteria for removal from the high risk list. Of those, 11 met at least one of the criteria for removal and partially met all others. Sufficient progress was made to narrow the scope of two high-risk issues— Protecting Public Health through Enhanced Oversight of Medical Products and DOD Contract Management. Overall, progress has been possible through the concerted actions of Congress, leadership and staff in agencies, and the Office of Management and Budget.
This year GAO is adding 2 areas, bringing the total to 32.
Managing Risks and Improving Veterans Affairs (VA) Health Care. GAO has reported since 2000 about VA facilities' failure to provide timely health care. In some cases, these delays or VA's failure to provide care at all have reportedly harmed veterans. Although VA has taken actions to address some GAO recommendations, more than 100 of GAO's recommendations have not been fully addressed, including recommendations related to the following areas: (1) ambiguous policies and inconsistent processes, (2) inadequate oversight and accountability, (3) information technology challenges, (4) inadequate training for VA staff, and (5) unclear resource needs and allocation priorities. The recently enacted Veterans Access, Choice, and Accountability Act included provisions to help VA address systemic weaknesses. VA must effectively implement the act.
Improving the Management of Information Technology (IT) Acquisitions and Operations. Congress has passed legislation and the administration has undertaken numerous initiatives to better manage IT investments. Nonetheless, federal IT investments too frequently fail to be completed or incur cost overruns and schedule slippages while contributing little to mission-related outcomes. GAO has found that the federal government spent billions of dollars on failed and poorly performing IT investments which often suffered from ineffective management, such as project planning, requirements definition, and program oversight and governance. Over the past 5 years, GAO made more than 730 recommendations; however, only about 23 percent had been fully implemented as of January 2015.
GAO is also expanding two areas due to evolving high-risk issues.
Enforcement of Tax Laws. This area is expanded to include IRS's efforts to address tax refund fraud due to identify theft. IRS estimates it paid out $5.8 billion (the exact number is uncertain) in fraudulent refunds in tax year 2013 due to identity theft. This occurs when a thief files a fraudulent return using a legitimate taxpayer's identifying information and claims a refund.
Ensuring the Security of Federal Information Systems and Cyber Critical Infrastructure and Protecting the Privacy of Personally Identifiable Information (PII). This risk area is expanded because of the challenges to ensuring the privacy of personally identifiable information posed by advances in technology. These advances have allowed both government and private sector entities to collect and process extensive amounts of PII more effectively. The number of reported security incidents involving PII at federal agencies has increased dramatically in recent years.
What GAO Recommends
This report contains GAO's views on progress made and what remains to be done to bring about lasting solutions for each high-risk area. Perseverance by the executive branch in implementing GAO's recommended solutions and continued oversight and action by Congress are essential to achieving greater progress. |
gao_GAO-09-793T | gao_GAO-09-793T_0 | Background
With FCS, the Army embraced a new warfighting concept designed to replace most of its existing combat systems with a family of manned and unmanned vehicles and systems linked by an advanced information network. The Army determined it could not meet the challenges of the FCS scope and schedule with its workforce alone and with traditional management approaches. In 2003, the Army contracted with the Boeing Company as the lead systems integrator (LSI) to assist in defining, developing, and integrating FCS systems. Over the past several years, Congress, GAO, and other organizations have expressed numerous concerns about the management and acquisition strategy for the FCS program, including significant knowledge gaps, questionable costs and affordability, the relationship between the Army and the LSI, and the lack of oversight by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). Aspects of FCS that Should Be Considered for Inclusion in Future Efforts
There is no question the Army needs to ensure its forces are well- equipped. The Army has vigorously pursued FCS as the solution, a concept and an approach that is unconventional, yet with many good features that should be considered in future efforts. These features include a holistic, system-of-systems architectural vision, government insight into subcontractor selection and management, a focus on leveraging capabilities through an information network, and establishing organizations to train with and evaluate FCS-related spin-out technologies being provided to current forces. Aspects of FCS that were Problematic and Need Re-Examination
In our work, we found the greatest obstacle to the Army’s realizing its vision for FCS to be that the program was not executable within reasonable bounds of technical, engineering, time, or financial resources. The program was very immature when it began, never measuring up to DOD’s own standards for technology and design. Over time, adjustments were made such as adding development time and trading off requirements, but nonetheless, vehicle weights and software code grew substantially, key network systems were delayed, and technologies took longer to mature than planned. By 2009, whether FCS would work as planned remained undemonstrated. Oversight of FCS was extremely challenging given the program’s vast scope and the innovative, but close, partner-like relationship between the Army and the LSI. Oversight was further challenged by the pace of the program; the schedule for making decisions outpaced demonstrated knowledge to the extent that major production commitments were to be made before basic designs were to be demonstrated. Lessons from this experience should be applied to put future modernization efforts on the soundest footing possible for execution. OSD’s oversight did not compensate for these risks early in the program. While the Army and DOD are in the early stages of deciding how to proceed with modernization, it appears likely that rather than a single program like FCS going forward, several programs with more targeted objectives will emerge. Transparency and accountability for oversight: The emerging programs need to include sufficiently detailed and transparent reporting approaches to facilitate oversight. Beyond these principles, the Army will have to tailor its approaches to the needs of the individual programs that emerge, allowing for the different challenges they represent. The risks for the ground combat vehicle program will be different and will have to be addressed differently. Transition of FCS information network to current Army forces: Depending on how the Army proceeds with an information network, there are questions as to how it can be transferred to the current forces. Concluding Remarks
The Army’s experience with FCS has been productive. The key in going forward is to take the best from both kinds of lessons and applying them, in a tailored way, to the different modernization efforts that will succeed FCS. The Army and DOD should continue to be innovative as to concepts and approaches, but anchored in knowledge-based strategies when it comes to proposing a specific system development effort. | Why GAO Did This Study
Future Combat System (FCS) has been at the center of the Army's efforts to become a lighter, more agile, and more capable combat force by replacing existing combat systems with a family of manned and unmanned vehicles and systems, linked by an advanced information network. To meet the challenges of FCS's scope and schedule, the Army contracted with Boeing to be lead systems integrator (LSI), to help define, develop, and integrate FCS systems. Earlier this year, the Secretary of Defense proposed restructuring FCS to lower risk and address more near-term needs, shortly before FCS was to undergo a congressionally-mandated review to determine its future. The Department of Defense (DOD) and the Army have already begun to make programmatic and budgetary adjustments to FCS. This statement reviews aspects of FCS that should be considered for inclusion in future efforts, aspects that were problematic and need re-examination, and considerations for shaping future Army ground force modernization. The testimony is drawn from GAO's body of work on FCS management and acquisition strategy, including knowledge gaps, cost, affordability, oversight, and the Army/LSI relationship. GAO has made numerous recommendations aimed at managing FCS risks, but it is not making any new recommendations in this testimony.
What GAO Found
FCS has many good features that should be considered in future efforts, including a holistic vision of the future force, government insight into subcontractor selection and management, a focus on leveraging capabilities through an information network, and establishment of organizations to train with and evaluate technologies to be spun out to current forces. Other more difficult lessons from FCS must be also be used to put future modernization efforts on the soundest footing possible. FCS was not executable within reasonable bounds of technical, engineering, time, or financial resources. From the start, the program was immature and unable to meet DOD's own standards for technology and design. Although adjustments were made, including adding time and trading off requirements, vehicle weights and software code grew, key network systems were delayed, and technologies took longer to mature. By 2009, it was still not known that the FCS concept would work. Oversight has been extremely challenging, given the program's vast scope and the innovative, but close, partner-like relationship between the Army and the LSI. Oversight by the Office of the Secretary of Defense did not compensate for these risks early in the program. Oversight was further challenged by the fact that the planned schedule for making decisions outpaced demonstrated knowledge--major production commitments were to be made before basic designs were demonstrated. As the Army proceeds with a different approach to modernization, there will be a number of important factors to consider. Rather than a single FCS program going forward, several programs with more targeted objectives may emerge. These programs need to be based on principles such as knowledge-based acquisition, sound cost estimating, and transparency and accountability for oversight. Beyond these principles, the Army will have to tailor its approaches to the needs of the individual programs. For example, the acquisition approach for spinning out mature technologies to current forces would differ from the approach needed to develop an information network. Several issues with transitioning from FCS will have to be addressed, including: closing out or restructuring current contractual arrangements; transferring FCS knowledge to emergent programs; transitioning the FCS information network to current Army forces; placing early emphasis on key design considerations such as sustainability; and balancing investments between future capabilities and keeping fielded systems capable. The Army's experience with FCS has been productive. The key in going forward will be to take the best from both positive and negative lessons learned and apply them to the ground force modernization efforts that will succeed FCS. The Army and DOD should continue to be innovative as to concepts and approaches, but anchored in knowledge-based strategies when it comes to proposing a specific system development effort. |
gao_GAO-13-516 | gao_GAO-13-516_0 | Virtual currencies can be used entirely within a virtual economy, or can be used in lieu of a government-issued currency to purchase goods and services in the real economy. Ann may have earned taxable income from the sale of these virtual tools. Virtual Economies and Currencies Pose Various Tax Compliance Risks, but the Extent of Noncompliance Is Unknown
IRS, tax experts, academics, and others have identified various tax compliance risks associated with virtual economies and currencies, including underreporting, mischaracterization, and evasion. The tax compliance risks we identified for virtual economies and currencies are described below. The unsophisticated taxpayer may not properly identify income earned through virtual economies or currencies, such as virtual online game assets exchanged for real word currency, as taxable income. Some taxpayers may use virtual economies and currencies as a way to evade taxes. Because of the limited reliable data available on their size, it is difficult to determine how significant virtual economy and currency markets may be or how much tax revenue is at risk through their usage. Some experts with whom we spoke indicated that there is potential for growth in the use of virtual currencies. IRS Has Provided Some Guidance on Tax Reporting Requirements for Virtual Economies but Not for Virtual Currencies Used Outside of Virtual Economies
IRS has assessed the tax compliance risks from virtual economies and virtual currencies used within those economies, and developed a plan to address them in a manner consistent with internal control standards. However, in November 2009, based on EBEI having determined the need, IRS posted information on its website on the tax consequences of virtual economy transactions. IRS has not assessed the tax compliance risks of open-flow virtual currencies developed and used outside of virtual economies. Likewise, IRS has not issued guidance specific to virtual currencies used outside of virtual economies due to competing priorities and resource constraints, and because the use of virtual currencies is a relatively recent development that requires further consideration before guidance can be issued, according to IRS’s Office of Chief Counsel and compliance officials. By not issuing guidance, IRS may be missing an opportunity to address these compliance risks and minimize their impact and the potential for noncompliance. Given the uncertain extent of noncompliance related to virtual currency transactions, formal guidance, such as regulations, revenue rulings, or revenue notices, may not be warranted at this time. According to officials from IRS’s Office of Chief Counsel, these types of guidance require extensive review within IRS and the Department of the Treasury and, in some cases, public comment, which add to the time and cost of development. However, IRS may be able to develop informal guidance, which, according to Chief Counsel officials, requires less extensive agency review and can be based on other existing guidance. As such, IRS can develop informal guidance in a more timely and less costly manner than formal guidance, according to the officials. An example of such informal guidance is the information IRS provides to taxpayers on its website on the tax consequences of virtual economy transactions. Posting such information to its website would be consistent with IRS’s strategy for preventing and minimizing taxpayers’ noncompliance by helping them understand and meet their tax responsibilities, as outlined in IRS’s Taxpayer Assistance Blueprint. Recommendation for Executive Action
To mitigate the risk of noncompliance from virtual currencies, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue should find relatively low-cost ways to provide information to taxpayers, such as the web statement IRS developed on virtual economies, on the basic tax reporting requirements for transactions using virtual currencies developed and used outside virtual economies. | Why GAO Did This Study
Recent years have seen the development of virtual economies, such as those within online role-playing games, through which individual participants can own and exchange virtual goods and services. Within some virtual economies, virtual currencies have been created as a medium of exchange for goods and services. Virtual property and currency can be exchanged for real goods, services, and currency, and virtual currencies have been developed outside of virtual economies as alternatives to government-issued currencies, such as dollars. These innovations raise questions about related tax requirements and potential challenges for IRS compliance efforts.
This report (1) describes the tax reporting requirements for virtual economies and currencies, (2) identifies the potential tax compliance risks of virtual economies and currencies, and (3) assesses how IRS has addressed the tax compliance risks of virtual economies and currencies.
To accomplish these objectives, GAO reviewed tax laws, IRS guidance and program documents, federal program internal control guidance, and interviewed IRS officials and knowledgeable experts on the topics.
What GAO Found
Transactions within virtual economies or using virtual currencies could produce taxable income in various ways, depending on the facts and circumstances of each transaction. For example, transactions within a "closed-flow" virtual currency system do not produce taxable income because a virtual currency can be used only to purchase virtual goods or services. An example of a closed-flow transaction is the purchase of items to use within an online game. In an "openflow" system, a taxpayer who receives virtual currency as payment for real goods or services may have earned taxable income since the virtual currency can be exchanged for real goods or services or readily exchanged for governmentissued currency, such as U.S. dollars.
Virtual economies and currencies pose various tax compliance risks, but the extent of actual tax noncompliance is unknown. Some identified risks include taxpayers not being aware that income earned through virtual economies or currencies is taxable or not knowing how to calculate such income. Because of the limited reliable data available on their size, it is difficult to determine how significant virtual economy and currency markets may be or how much tax revenue is at risk through their usage. Some experts with whom we spoke indicated a potential for growth in the use of virtual currencies.
Beginning in 2007, IRS assessed the tax compliance risks from virtual economies, and in 2009 posted information on its website on the tax consequences of virtual economy transactions. However, IRS has not provided taxpayers with information specific to virtual currencies because of other priorities, resource constraints, and the need to consider the use of these recently-developed currencies, according to IRS officials. By not issuing guidance, IRS may be missing an opportunity to address virtual currency tax compliance risks. Given the uncertain extent of noncompliance with virtual currency transactions, formal guidance, such as regulations, may not be warranted. According to IRS officials, formal guidance requires extensive review, which adds to development time and cost. However, IRS may be able to develop more timely and less costly informal guidance, which, according to IRS officials, requires less extensive review and can be based on other existing guidance. An example is the information IRS provides to taxpayers on its website on the tax consequences of virtual economy transactions. Posting such information would be consistent with IRS's strategy for preventing and minimizing taxpayers' noncompliance by helping them understand and meet their tax responsibilities.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that IRS find relatively low-cost ways to provide information to taxpayers, such as on its website, on the basic tax reporting requirements for virtual currencies. In commenting on a draft of this report, IRS agreed with our recommendation. |
gao_GAO-05-984 | gao_GAO-05-984_0 | CDC’s activities include efforts to prevent and control diseases and to respond to public health emergencies. Initially for the 2004–05 influenza season, CDC in May 2004 recommended that about 188 million Americans receive a vaccination—about 85 million at high risk of severe complications and about 103 million in other priority groups, such as people in close contact with high-risk individuals, healthy people aged 50–64 years, and health care workers. Health Officials Took Steps to Vaccinate High-Risk Individuals and Others in Priority Groups
After the October 5, 2004, announcement of the sharp reduction in expected influenza vaccine supply, federal, state, and local health officials took steps to help ensure that those at high risk of severe complications from infection had access to influenza vaccine. CDC Devised a Plan to Distribute the Limited Supply of Influenza to High-Risk Individuals and to Others in Priority Groups
In October and November, working with representatives from national public health organizations and sanofi pasteur, CDC developed a plan to distribute sanofi pasteur’s unshipped vaccine. At the federal level, CDC held frequent press conferences beginning in early October 2004. Planning, Timely Action, and Communication Are Key to an Effective Response
Although the actions taken to address the influenza vaccine shortage helped achieve vaccination rates approaching past levels for certain priority groups (see fig. Lesson Learned: Unless Expedited, Actions to Boost Supply Are Likely to Have Little Effect
During the 2004–05 influenza vaccine shortage, federal, state, and local officials needed to continually adapt to changing vaccine supply and demand, to make decisions, and to take action quickly. For example, Minnesota tried to sell its available vaccine to other states seeking additional vaccine for their high-risk populations. Lesson Learned: Effective Response Requires Communication to Be Both Clear and Consistent
While part of the lesson learned about communication was positive, some aspects of this lesson pointed to need for improvement. These officials noted that many people in priority groups, including those aged 65 years and older who should have been vaccinated, stepped aside. Drawing from experiences during the 2004–05 shortage, CDC has taken a number of steps, including issuing interim guidelines in August 2005, to assist in responding to possible future shortages. It is too early, however, to assess the effectiveness of these efforts in coordinating actions of federal, state, and local health agencies and others who play a part in the annual influenza vaccination process. Agency Comments
In commenting on a draft of this report, HHS noted that the draft summarized in detail the activities undertaken by CDC and its public- and private-sector partners to deal with the influenza vaccine shortage of 2004–05, and the agency concurred with our finding that contingency planning will greatly improve response efforts. The agency also provided details on other actions, such as approval of additional influenza vaccines for the U.S. market, that were under way. | Why GAO Did This Study
In early October 2004, the nation lost about half its expected influenza vaccine supply when one of two major manufacturers announced it would not release any vaccine for the 2004-05 season because of potential contamination. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) had earlier recommended vaccination for 188 million individuals, including those at high risk of severe complications from influenza (such as seniors and those with chronic conditions), and other groups (such as their close contacts). Although health officials took actions to distribute the limited supply of influenza vaccine, reports persisted of high-risk individuals and others in priority groups who could not find a vaccination, including those who were turned away and never returned when supplies became available. Such reports raised questions about the adequacy of U.S. preparedness to respond to significant vaccine shortages. GAO was asked to examine actions taken at federal, state, and local levels to ensure that high-risk individuals had access to influenza vaccine during the shortage, including any lessons learned.
What GAO Found
Federal, state, and local health officials took several actions beginning in October 2004 to help ensure that individuals at high risk of severe complications from influenza had access to vaccine. Federal officials, for example, quickly revised vaccination recommendations to target available vaccine to high-risk individuals and to other priority groups. Additional actions were aimed to distribute vaccine expeditiously and to communicate with providers and the public as events unfolded and vaccine supplies changed. Beginning in mid-December, health officials took steps to distribute additional vaccine, broadening recommendations on who should be vaccinated. Although these actions helped achieve vaccination rates approaching past levels for certain priority groups, such as those aged 65 years and older, several lessons emerged, including some that could help with future shortages. First, unless planning for problems is already in place, action is delayed. CDC's lack of a contingency plan contributed to delays and uncertainty about how to ensure that high-risk individuals had access to vaccine. Second, when actions occur late in the influenza season, they are likely to have little effect. Third, effective response requires communication that is both clear and consistent. CDC has taken a number of steps, including issuing interim guidelines in August 2005, to respond to possible future shortages. It is too early, however, to assess the effectiveness of these efforts in coordinating actions of federal, state, and local health agencies and others. In commenting on a draft of this report, HHS concurred with GAO's finding that contingency planning would improve response efforts, and the agency indicated that additional preparations were under way. |
gao_T-RCED-96-157 | gao_T-RCED-96-157_0 | During its review of the draft, USDA officials again did not question the methodology of the work underlying the report. Noncompliance With Regulatory and Statutory Requirements
USDA’s subcontract with Lake Research was handled outside normal contracting practices. In our opinion, however, the work performed by Lake Research was outside the scope of the Global Exchange contract and therefore should have been the subject of a separate procurement action. That act requires agencies planning to collect information from 10 or more persons to obtain the review and approval of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) before the effort is undertaken. Problems With Methodology
The approach and methodology used in conducting this focus group research were inconsistent with achieving the desired purpose of the work as set forth in the contract documents—obtaining the general public’s and food stamp recipients’ perceptions of USDA’s reform initiatives for the Food Stamp Program. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed contracting problems involving a Department of Agriculture (USDA) subcontract for surveying the general public's and food stamp recipients' views of food stamp reform initiatives.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) USDA did not use normal contracting practices in procuring the subcontracted services; (2) USDA conducted price and scope of work negotiations prior to official contract negotiations and bypassed the appropriate contracting office; (3) USDA should have conducted a separate competitive procurement for the services, since the work done by the subcontractor was outside the scope of work of the original contract; (4) USDA failed to obtain required approval from the Office of Management and Budget before conducting its survey; (5) the approach and methodology used in conducting the survey were inconsistent with achieving the desired purpose of the work; and (6) the subcontractor appeared to target areas and groups of political significance and asked leading questions to produce biased results. |
gao_OCE-98-19 | gao_OCE-98-19_0 | Living standards, in turn, would at first stagnate and then fall. This report addresses the outlook for the budget over the longer term. The Balanced Budget Act of 1997, coupled with the strong recent performance of the economy, is expected to extend this recent progress by achieving a balanced budget in 2002 followed by several years of budget surpluses on a unified budget basis. As in our earlier work, a “no action” policy remains unsustainable over the long term. While the federal budget would be in surplus in the first decade of the 21st century, deficits would reemerge in 2012, soon after the baby boom generation begins to retire. Therefore, as we have noted in our past work, the “no action” simulation is not a prediction of what will happen in the future. As Social Security and health spending rise, their share of federal spending grows tremendously. Alternative Fiscal Policies Would Change Long-Term Economic Outcomes
Alternatives to a “no action” policy illustrate the fiscal and economic benefits associated with maintaining a sustainable course. Each of the alternative simulations would require some combination of policy or program changes that reduce spending and/or increase revenues. While consumption would be reduced in the short term, it would be increased over the long term. Early action would permit changes to be phased in and so give those affected by changes in, for example, Social Security or health care benefits, time to adjust. For both the federal government and the economy, any of the three alternative simulations indicates a vast improvement over the “no action” path. Currently, interest spending represents about 15 percent of federal spending, a relatively large share that is a consequence of the deficits of the 1980s and early 1990s. The economic benefits of a sustainable budget policy include increased saving and investment levels and faster economic growth, which results in higher living standards. Figure 9 compares the path of per capita GDP under “no action” to a balanced budget policy. Long-Term Commitments Not Adequately Reflected in Budget Reporting and Process
Long-term economic simulations are a useful tool for examining the balance between the government’s future obligations and expected resources. For example, in a recent report we concluded that supplemental reporting of accrual-based costs of insurance programs would improve recognition of the government’s commitments.Other options to refine the budget process or budget reporting to improve the focus on these commitments and prompt early action to address potential problems can be explored. Nonfederal and federal saving together constitute national saving, which influences private investment and the next period’s capital stock. Interest rate (average on the national debt)
Average effective rate implied by CBO’s interest payment projections through 2006; 5.1% thereafter (CBO’s 2006 implied rate)
Follows CBO’s budget surplus/deficit as a percentage of GAO’s GDP through 2006; GAO simulations thereafter CBO through 2006; increases at the rate of economic growth thereafter CBO through 2006; increases at HCFA’s projected rate thereafter Follows the Social Security Trustees’ Alternative II projections CBO’s assumed levels through 2006; increases at the rate of economic growth thereafter CBO’s assumed levels through 2006; in subsequent years, receipts equal 19.9% of GDP (2006 ratio)
We have made several modifications to the model, but the model’s essential structure remains the same as in our previous work. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO updated its previous simulations of the long-term economic impact of federal budget policy following passage of the Balanced Budget Act of 1997.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the balanced budget or surpluses that are projected in the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 would represent an enormous improvement in the federal government's fiscal position through the next 10 years; (2) the improvements in national saving and reduced debt and interest costs can be expected to produce tangible gains in economic growth and budgetary flexibility over the longer term as well; (3) as a result, the emergence of unsustainable deficits is substantially delayed under recently enacted fiscal policy; (4) if no further action were taken, GAO's simulations indicate that federal spending would grow faster than revenues soon after the baby boom generation begins to retire in 2008; (5) these higher spending levels would be driven would be driven by escalating health and Social Security costs; (6) rising interest costs would compound the deficit problem and take up an increasing share of the federal budget; (7) growing deficits, if unchecked, would eventually result in declining investment and capital stock and, inevitably, falling living standards; (8) over the long term, the "no action" scenario is unsustainable and timely policy action can avoid these economic consequences; (9) while a "no action" simulation is not a forecast of what will happen, it illustrates the nature of future fiscal challenges; (10) the alternative simulations illustrate the potential fiscal and economic benefits of achieving a sustainable budget policy; (11) a fiscal policy of balance through 2050 or extended periods of surplus, for example, could shrink the burden of federal interest costs considerably and also result in a larger economy over the long term; (12) all of these alternative policies would increase per capita GDP in 2050 by more than 35 percent over a "no action" policy, but they would require additional fiscal policy changes; (13) some changes would be difficult to achieve, but over the long term they would strengthen the nation's economy and overall living standards; (14) early action would permit changes in, for example, Social Security or health care benefits, time to adjust; (15) in considering what fiscal adjustments to make, policymakers need to be presented with more complete information on the costs of the government's existing long-term commitments; (16) the budget's current structure and reporting mechanisms have not focused attention on such commitment, nor has the budget process facilitated their explicit consideration; and (17) options to change budget reporting and process to improve recognition of these commitments and prompt early action warrant further exploration. |
gao_GAO-05-5 | gao_GAO-05-5_0 | State law also specifies which entities within the state can authorize the establishment of a charter school, such as state departments of education, state boards of education, local education agencies, institutions of higher education, and municipal governments. Some States Provided Flexibility by Allowing Charter Schools to Choose among Authorizers, and Most States Released Charter Schools from Traditional Public School Requirements
In school year 2002-03, states reported that they provided flexibility through the authorizers they established and through releasing charter schools from traditional public school requirements. Of the 39 charter school state agencies surveyed, 26 reported that they allowed appeals when authorizers denied applications. States Promoted Accountability for Charter School Performance and Financial Integrity through State Actions and through Authorizers
To promote charter school performance and financial integrity, states took various actions to oversee charter schools and provided oversight of and assistance to authorizers. Over half of the 39 states in our survey reported having responsibility for enforcing school improvement actions. NCLBA’s Provisions Apply to Charter Schools but Provide Some Flexibilities
Under NCLBA, charter schools are required to meet the same performance requirements as other public schools, but the law permits certain flexibilities where allowed by state law. Charter schools, like other public schools, are subject to the law’s requirements for the assessment of school performance and the implementation of actions required when schools do not meet state performance goals. NCLBA requires that oversight responsibility be performed in accordance with state law. In addition, while NCLBA requires certification for all other teachers to meet the highly qualified teacher requirement, the law exempts charter school teachers from this requirement where state law contains such an exemption. If charter schools receiving Title I funds do not meet annual performance goals, they must also implement the school improvement actions NCLBA requires. Of these 33 states, 21 reported that at least half of charter schools in the state achieved annual state performance goals in 2002-03, while 12 states indicated that fewer than half of their charter schools achieved annual performance goals. Education Provides Support to Charter Schools Directly and Indirectly through Several Federal Programs and Conducts Research on Charter Schools
As it does for all public schools, Education plays a role in accountability for charter schools through the resources it provides: it administers grant programs that provide funds to charter schools, including a program designed specifically to encourage the development of charter schools, and sponsors research on charter school accountability. The department must ensure that new and expanding charter schools receive timely payment of federal grant funds for which they are eligible. Education is in the process of developing new systems that are expected to provide both performance and financial reports for the department’s major grant programs, but the ability of the new systems to provide financial data for charter schools is questionable. However, Education’s OIG reported problems with the timeliness of Title I grant payments to charter schools. The study was framed around four questions: (1) how states allow charter schools flexibility in design and operation, (2) how states promote accountability for school performance and financial integrity in their charter school systems, (3) the implications of the No Child Left Behind Act (NCLBA) for charter schools, and (4) the role Education plays in charter school accountability for school performance and financial integrity. | Why GAO Did This Study
Charter schools are public schools that are granted increased autonomy by states in exchange for meeting specified academic goals. State law determines who approves the formation of a charter school, often the board of education. As public schools, charter schools are subject to the performance requirements of the No Child Left Behind Act (NCLBA) as well. In this environment, states' systems for allowing charter schools flexibility and ensuring school performance and financial integrity assume greater importance. GAO examined (1) how states allow charter schools flexibility, (2) how states promote accountability for school performance and financial integrity for charter schools, (3) the implications of NCLBA for charter schools, and (4) the role the Department of Education (Education) plays in charter school accountability. GAO surveyed the 39 states and jurisdictions with operating charter schools in 2002-03 and interviewed charter school experts and Education officials.
What GAO Found
In school year 2002-03, some states reported that they provided charter schools flexibility by allowing them to choose their authorizer. Authorizers--state education agencies, local education agencies, universities, and other nonprofit organizations--oversee the formation and operation of charter schools. Also, nearly all states provided flexibility by releasing charter schools from some traditional public school requirements, such as teacher hiring and termination practices, schedules, and collective bargaining agreements. To promote charter school performance and financial integrity, states reported that they took action to oversee charter schools and to oversee and provide assistance to authorizers. About half of the 39 states reported having primary responsibility for enforcing school improvement actions in charter schools not achieving annual school performance goals under NCLBA. Most states reported that they intervened when authorizers were not performing their responsibilities and conducted or required audits of authorizers' finances. About half of the states assisted authorizers with funding for their charter school oversight responsibilities or gave them fee collection authority. NCLBA requires charter schools to meet the same requirements as other public schools, but the law permits certain flexibilities where allowed by state law. Charter schools must be included in the statewide assessment system, and charter schools that receive NCLBA Title I funds must take school improvement actions if they do not meet state performance goals. However, NCLBA allows state law to determine the entity responsible for charter school oversight. In addition, while NCLBA requires certification for all other teachers to meet the highly qualified teacher requirement, the law exempts charter school teachers from this requirement where state law permits. As it does for all public schools, Education administers grant programs that provide funds to charter schools, monitors grant performance, and sponsors research on accountability for academic performance and financial integrity. Under NCLBA, the department and states must ensure that new and expanding charter schools receive timely payment of federal grant funds for which they are eligible and meet the act's academic achievement goals. However, in its monitoring and data collection, Education gathers little information on the timeliness of charter school grant payments or how well the schools perform. Moreover, Education's Office of the Inspector General (OIG) reported delays in states' Title I payments to charter schools. Education is in the process of developing new systems that are expected to provide both academic performance and financial reports for the department's major grant programs, but the ability of the new systems to provide financial reports for charter schools is uncertain. |
gao_GAO-07-113 | gao_GAO-07-113_0 | Intelligence Community Reports Uncertainties regarding Key Aspects of Chemical and Biological Threat
The intelligence community is struggling with the changing security environment, including gaining agreement on issues such as how best to provide decision makers with a more candid recognition of the significant uncertainties in its ability to assess the chemical and biological threat. Generally, the two primary chemical and biological threats facing DOD installations are from adversarial nations using missiles with chemical or biological warheads and from terrorists using explosive devices or other means to release and spread chemical or biological agents. Such uncertainty raises questions about the operational impact that might be sustained during an attack and the actual threat posed by our adversaries, and is thus critical information for officials making risk management decisions on investments to protect U.S. forces. However, while the intelligence community has been able to work together and issue a new 2006 National Intelligence Estimate assessing and recognizing the uncertainties in the biological warfare threat to help decision makers, it has not been able to issue a revised national intelligence estimate on the chemical warfare threat since 2002. For example, while DOD guidance encourages the use of collective protection, it does not prescribe specific criteria to guide strategic decisions on its use. Similarly, we also found collective protection equipment shortages and inconsistent guidance affected some major expeditionary warfighting assets, such as infantry units, naval vessels, and medical units. The intelligence uncertainties and vague and inconsistent guidance all combine to make it difficult for commanders to make clear risk management assessments of the need for collective protection and the risks of not providing it. Moreover, two-thirds of the critical sites in high threat areas did not receive collective protection. While collective protection was limited in all commands, it was also not consistently fielded in high threat areas. The Air Force provided all 10 of the critical sites on its air bases in this country with collective protection, but critical air bases in another nearby country did not have collective protection despite also being in range of missile attack by the hostile neighbor. 2). 3). In a 2004 report, we recommended that DOD designate a single authority with responsibility for unifying and coordinating installation protection policies. However, despite DOD’s agreement with that recommendation it has not yet implemented it. For example, the combatant commanders have no programs of their own to fund improvements at overseas facilities important to their warfighting needs. To ensure that the problems in the overall installation protection and collective protection policies and programs do not continue to place military personnel and operations at increased risk and undercut the efficiency and effectiveness of DOD resource allocations, we are recommending that the Secretary of Defense—as part of the ongoing reorganization—take the following four actions to ensure better coordination and integration of these activities and clearer guidance on key operating concepts. To help ensure clear and consistent guidance in the chemical and biological collective protection program, we are recommending that the Secretary of Defense direct the Joint Staff and military services to develop clear and consistent criteria to guide overarching strategic decisions on the use of collective protection at DOD facilities, including issues such as whether decisions on the need for collective protection should be prescribed or left to commanders’ discretion, the use of integrated overpressure and filtration systems versus portable structures, and what mission functions must be protected, and direct the Joint Staff and military services to review their current policies and, where appropriate, develop consistent requirements on when collective protection is required for medical units, and naval, ground, and air forces. We encourage DOD to make this recommendation directly to the Director of National Intelligence. Our method of quantifying the critical sites counted the number of individual buildings identified as critical sites on DOD installations, when identified separately by DOD officials. To determine the levels of collective protection provided to major expeditionary warfighting assets, such as ground forces, naval vessels, and aircraft, we reviewed DOD’s Annual Report on Chemical and Biological Defense Programs and interviewed contractors and officials from each service component, the Tank and Automotive Command, and the Joint Program Executive Office for Chemical and Biological Defense to obtain detailed listings of the type and amount of collective protection equipment currently fielded by each service component. To examine DOD’s framework for managing overall installation protection activities and for prioritizing critical installations for funding, we reviewed applicable regulations, policies, and prior GAO and DOD reports and interviewed officials from a variety of DOD offices responsible for program management and oversight. | Why GAO Did This Study
For the military to operate in environments contaminated by chemical and biological warfare agents, the Department of Defense (DOD) has developed collective protection equipment to provide a protected environment for group activities. GAO previously reported persistent problems in providing collective protection for U.S. forces in high threat areas overseas. In this report, GAO examined (1) current intelligence assessments of chemical and biological threats, (2) the extent to which DOD has provided collective protection at critical overseas facilities and major expeditionary warfighting assets, and (3) DOD's framework for managing installation protection policies and prioritizing critical installations for funding. In conducting this review, GAO developed criteria to identify critical sites in the absence of a DOD priority listing of such sites in overseas high threat areas--areas at high risk of terrorist or missile attack.
What GAO Found
The intelligence community is struggling with the changing security environment and communicating the uncertainties in the quality of chemical and biological threat information. Generally, the two key chemical and biological threats facing DOD forces are from hostile nations using missiles, or terrorist groups (e.g., Al Qaeda) using devices to release chemical or biological agents. DOD expects these threats to grow. The intelligence community has recognized the need to communicate more candidly about the uncertainties in intelligence regarding the type and amount of agents, the number of missiles likely armed with chemical and biological warheads, and the method of dissemination. Communicating these uncertainties helps in understanding the actual threat posed by our adversaries and in making risk management decisions on investments. However, while the intelligence community, under the Director of National Intelligence, has issued a new 2006 intelligence estimate regarding the uncertainties in the biological warfare threat, it has not issued an update on the chemical warfare threat since 2002 due to evolving assessment and communication policies. Despite the growing threat, collective protection at both critical overseas facilities and in some major expeditionary warfighting assets (e.g., infantry units, naval vessels, and medical units) is limited and inconsistent. Nearly 80 percent of overseas sites identified as critical by combatant commanders based on criteria GAO provided them, did not have collective protection equipment--including about two-thirds of the critical sites in high threat areas. At the same time, GAO found problems such as often vague and inconsistent guidance on the use of collective protection. DOD guidance encourages the use of collective protection but does not prescribe specific standards to guide strategic decisions on its use. Military service guidance, except the Air Force, was also vague and inconsistent on key issues such as (1) whether decisions on the need for the equipment should be left to local commanders' discretion, (2) when the various types of collective protection are most appropriate, and (3) what functions need to be protected. Thus, commanders have difficulty determining the need for collective protection. DOD's framework for managing collective protection and other related installation protection policies and activities is fragmented, which affects DOD's ability to ensure that collective protection resources are allocated efficiently and effectively. Prior GAO and DOD reports have highlighted continuing problems with fragmented policies and operating concepts among the many and varied programs and organizations involved. These problems result in unresolved conflict about issues, such as which critical facilities should receive priority for funding improvements, and make it difficult for DOD to balance competing warfighting and other needs and ensure that funding resources are prudently allocated. Previously, GAO and others have recommended DOD designate a single authority to integrate and coordinate installation protection policies and activities, and DOD agreed. However, despite a new ongoing reorganization, it has not yet done so. |
gao_GAO-12-676 | gao_GAO-12-676_0 | The process involves four main phases: the Medical Evaluation Board (MEB), the Physical Evaluation Board (PEB), transition out of military service (transition), and VA benefits. This phase involves four stages: (1) the servicemember is counseled by a DOD board liaison on what to expect during the IDES process; (2) the servicemember is counseled by a VA case manager on what to expect during the IDES process and medical exams are scheduled; (3) medical exams are conducted according to VA standards for exams for disability compensation by VA, DOD, or contractor physicians, and (4) exam results are used by the MEB to identify conditions that limit the servicemember’s ability to serve in the military.an impartial medical review by a physician not on the MEB, or both. 3). IDES Processing Times Increased Over Time, While Measures of Servicemember Satisfaction Have Shortcomings
Overall IDES Case Processing Times Steadily Increased Since the Start of IDES
IDES timeliness has worsened since the inception of the program. Since fiscal year 2008, the average number of days for servicemember cases to be processed and receive benefits increased from 283 to 394 for active duty cases (compared to the goal of 295 days) and from 297 to 420, for reserve component cases (compared to the goal of 305 days) (see fig. In fiscal year 2008, an average of 63 percent of cases for active duty servicemembers and 65 percent for reservists completed the process and received benefits within the timeliness goals; by fiscal year 2011 this was down to 19 and 18 percent respectively (see fig. Along with increasing average processing times, the percentage of cases meeting goals for most phases has generally declined (see fig. DOD officials recently told us that they will consider alternative survey eligibility requirements, including working with the Office of Management and Budget for permission to interview veterans. Recent Actions and Ongoing Initiatives May Improve IDES Performance, but It Is Too Early to Assess Their Overall Impact
DOD and VA Took Steps to Address Previously Identified IDES Challenges
DOD and VA have undertaken a number of actions to address IDES challenges—many of which we identified in our past work. Some actions—such as increased oversight and staffing—represent important steps in the right direction, but progress is uneven in some areas. The secretaries of DOD and VA have met several times since February 2011 to discuss progress in improving IDES timeliness and have tasked their agencies to find ways to streamline the process so that the timeliness goals can be shortened. The report also recommended that DOD and VA establish a committee to improve the accuracy of posttraumatic stress disorder ratings. Improving local IDES reporting capability: DOD and VA are implementing solutions to improve the ability of local military treatment facilities to track their IDES cases, but multiple initiatives may result in redundant work efforts. As a result, staff at IDES sites we visited reported having to enter the same data into multiple systems. Officials said this diagram would allow them to better understand and identify overlaps and gaps in data systems. Finally, DOD is also developing guidance to expand implementation of an expedited disability evaluation process for servicemembers with catastrophic, combat-related conditions by allowing it to be operated at more military treatment facilities. 2) To improve DOD’s ability to measure servicemembers’ satisfaction with the IDES process, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense develop alternative approaches for collecting more meaningful and representative information in a cost effective manner. Further, while VA concurred with our recommendation that it work with DOD to develop timeframes for completing the IDES business process review and implementing any resulting recommendations, VA stated that DOD is leading the business process review, and therefore should develop the timeframes for completing the review. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
In conducting our review of the Integrated Disability Evaluation System (IDES), our objectives were to examine (1) the extent to which the Departments of Defense (DOD) and Veterans Affairs (VA) are meeting IDES performance goals, and (2) steps DOD and VA are taking to improve IDES performance. Review of IDES Timeliness Data
To determine the extent to which IDES is meeting established timeliness goals, we analyzed data collected through VA’s Veterans Tracking Application (VTA) database. Appendix II: Additional Timeliness and Satisfaction Analyses
This appendix provides additional information on the timeliness of the IDES process and servicemember satisfaction with it. Overall IDES Timeliness: Processing Times and Percent of Cases Meeting Timeliness Goals
Average IDES processing times for completed cases resulting in benefits generally worsened since 2008, especially for active duty cases, regardless of whether cases are grouped by the fiscal year in which they were completed (fig. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since 2007, DOD and VA have jointly operated IDES--which is intended to expedite benefits for injured servicemembers. IDES replaced the departments' separate processes for evaluating servicemembers for fitness and disability. Initially a pilot at 3 military treatment facilities, IDES is now in place at military treatment facilities worldwide. In previous reports, GAO identified a number of challenges as IDES expanded to more facilities, including staffing shortages and difficultly meeting timeliness goals. In light of IDES' expansion, GAO was asked to examine: (1) the extent to which DOD and VA are meeting IDES timeliness and servicemember satisfaction performance goals, and (2) steps the agencies are taking to improve IDES performance. GAO analyzed IDES timeliness and customer satisfaction data, visited six IDES sites with varying performance, and interviewed DOD and VA officials.
What GAO Found
Case processing times under the Integrated Disability Evaluation System (IDES) have increased over time, and measures of servicemember satisfaction have shortcomings. Since 2008, annual average processing times for IDES cases have steadily climbed, while the percentage of cases meeting established timeliness goals declined. Average case processing times reached 394 and 420 days for active and reserve component members in fiscal year 2011--compared to goals of 295 and 305 days, respectively, and just 19 percent of active duty and 18 percent of guard or reserve servicemembers completed the process and received benefits within established goals. Of the four phases comprising IDES, the medical evaluation board phase increasingly fell short of timeliness goals, while the physical evaluation board phase, although meeting goals, was taking increasingly more time to complete. With respect to servicemember satisfaction with the IDES process, GAO found shortcomings in how these data are collected and reported, such as unduly limiting who is eligible to receive a survey and computing average satisfaction scores in a manner that may overstate them. Department of Defense (DOD) officials told GAO they are considering alternatives for gauging satisfaction with the process. DOD and Veterans Affairs (VA) are taking steps to improve IDES performance, but progress to date is uneven and it is too early to assess their overall impact. For example, VA increased resources for completing exams and disability ratings while the Army is hiring additional staff for its medical evaluation boards. VA has met exam timeliness goals in the past several months, but other resources have yet to translate into lower processing times. DOD and VA are pursuing system upgrades so that staff and managers at IDES facilities can better track and manage the progress of servicemembers' cases. IDES officials have been working with the military services to correct case data that were inaccurately entered into VA's IDES tracking system, but have not yet identified a permanent solution to improve the accuracy of data input. Finally, DOD, with VA's assistance, is in the early stages of an in-depth review of the entire IDES process and its supporting IT systems. This effort is intended to improve understanding of how each step contributes to overall processing times and identify opportunities to streamline the process and supporting systems. However, timeframes for completing the review or issuing recommendations have yet to be established.
What GAO Recommends
To improve monitoring of IDES timeliness and satisfaction, GAO recommends that DOD and VA work together to (1) develop plans for completing the ongoing business process review and implementing any resulting recommendations and (2) improve the accuracy of case information at the point of data entry; and that (3) DOD consider alternative approaches to measuring satisfaction. DOD and VA concurred with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-17-710 | gao_GAO-17-710_0 | FPS screens fee-for-service claims prior to payment in order to help identify and prevent improper and potentially fraudulent payments by performing two primary functions:
Develop leads for fraud investigations. In developing these leads, FPS is intended to help CMS prevent potentially fraudulent payments by furthering the agency’s ability to more quickly identify and investigate suspect providers, and take more timely corrective actions. Medicare Program Integrity
CMS uses contractors to support the agency’s program integrity activities, including program integrity contractors to identify and investigate providers engaged in potential Medicare fee-for-service fraud. FPS. Healthcare Fraud Prevention Partnership
HFPP is a voluntary public-private partnership established by HHS and the Department of Justice to facilitate collaboration in addressing healthcare fraud. HFPP began in 2012 with 20 members and, as of June 2017, had grown to 79 members. As of the end of calendar year 2016, CMS had cumulatively spent $30.3 million on HFPP. CMS Program Integrity Contractors Reported That FPS Speeds Up Certain Investigation Processes and Has Contributed to Program Savings
CMS Program Integrity Contractors Reported That FPS Speeds Up Certain Investigation Processes, and CMS Is Taking Steps to Track Data on Timeliness
ZPIC officials stated that FPS helps them identify suspect providers quickly. FPS leads provide specific information about the type of potential fraud identified, along with claims data and other supporting information. However, once an investigation is initiated, officials stated that FPS has generally not sped up the process for investigating providers. CMS has not tracked data to assess FPS’s effect on the timeliness of investigation processes. However, as of May 2017, CMS was in the process of implementing a new IT system that could be used to assess FPS’s effect on the timeliness of program integrity contractor investigation processes. In addition to tracking the corrective actions and savings associated with FPS, CMS also measures the extent to which investigations initiated from FPS leads result in actions against providers engaged in potential fraud. In fiscal year 2016, 38 percent of FPS-initiated investigations resulted in administrative actions, which did not meet the agency’s fiscal year goal of 45 percent. FPS Denies Payments Based on Medicare Rules or Policies and Not Fraud Risk
FPS prepayment edits screen individual claims to automatically deny payments that violate Medicare rules or policies. For example, some FPS edits deny claims that exceed coverage utilization limits for a service. FPS edits do not analyze individual claims to automatically deny payments based on risk alone or the likelihood that they are fraudulent. Although the prepayment edits in FPS are functionally similar to those in CMS’s claims processing systems, the FPS edits specifically target payments associated with potential fraud schemes. For example, CMS implemented an FPS edit that denies physician claims that improperly increase payments by misidentifying the location that the service was rendered. As of May 2017, CMS had implemented 24 edits in FPS. In fiscal year 2016, the edits denied nearly 324,000 claims and saved $20.4 million. Participants Reported That HFPP Efforts Furthered Their Ability to Address Health Care Fraud
Participants Reported That Information Sharing through HFPP Furthered Efforts to Address Fraud
HFPP participants we interviewed, including CMS officials, reported that sharing data and information within HFPP has been useful to their efforts to address health care fraud. The principal activity of HFPP is generating studies that pool and analyze multiple payers’ claims data to identify providers with patterns of suspect billing across multiple payers. As an example, one study used pooled data to identify providers who were cumulatively billing multiple payers for more services than could reasonably be rendered in a single day. CMS officials and one private payer we interviewed said that they used information from this study to conduct site visits of reportedly non-operational providers. Participants also reported that study results have helped them uncover payment vulnerabilities of which they might not otherwise have been aware. Participants reported that HFPP has also facilitated both formal and informal information sharing among payers, and indicated that it has helped them learn about fraud vulnerabilities and strategies for effectively addressing them. Agency Comments
GAO provided a draft of this report to HHS. HHS provided technical comments, which GAO incorporated as appropriate. | Why GAO Did This Study
CMS analyzes Medicare fee-for-service claims data to further its program integrity activities. In 2011, CMS implemented a data analytic system called FPS to develop leads for fraud investigations conducted by CMS program integrity contractors and to deny improper payments. In developing leads, FPS is intended to help CMS avoid improper payment costs by enabling quicker investigations and more timely corrective actions. Additionally, in 2012, CMS helped establish the HFPP to collaborate with other health care payers to address health care fraud. One of the key activities of the HFPP is to analyze claims data that are pooled from multiple payers, including private payers and Medicare.
GAO was asked to review CMS's use of FPS and the activities of the HFPP. This report examines 1) CMS's use of FPS to identify and investigate providers suspected of potential fraud, 2) the types of payments that have been denied by FPS, and 3) HFPP efforts to further CMS's and payers' ability to address health care fraud. GAO reviewed CMS documents, including reports to Congress on FPS, contractor statements of work, and information technology system user guides, and obtained fiscal year 2015 and 2016 data on FPS fraud investigations and claim denials. GAO also interviewed CMS officials and CMS program integrity contractors regarding how they use FPS, and a non-generalizable selection of HFPP participants regarding information and data sharing practices, and anti-fraud collaboration efforts.
What GAO Found
Investigations initiated or supported by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services' (CMS) Fraud Prevention System (FPS)—a data analytic system—led to corrective actions against providers and generated savings. For example, in fiscal year 2016, CMS reported that 90 providers had their payments suspended because of investigations initiated or supported by FPS, which resulted in an estimated $6.7 million in savings. In fiscal year 2016, 22 percent of Medicare fraud investigations conducted by CMS program integrity contractors were based on leads generated by FPS analysis of Medicare claims data. Officials representing Medicare's program integrity contractors told GAO that FPS helps speed up certain investigation processes, such as identifying and triaging suspect providers for investigation. However, the officials said that once an investigation is initiated, FPS has generally not sped up the process for investigating and gathering evidence against suspect providers. CMS has not tracked data to assess the extent to which FPS has affected the timeliness of contractor investigation processes. However, CMS is implementing a new information technology system that tracks such data, and officials said that they plan to use the data to assess FPS's effect on timeliness.
FPS denies individual claims for payment that violate Medicare rules or policies through prepayment edits—automated controls that compare claims against Medicare requirements in order to approve or deny claims. FPS prepayment edits specifically target payments associated with potential fraud. For example, an FPS edit denies physician claims that improperly increase payments by misidentifying the place that the service was rendered, which helped address a payment vulnerability associated with millions in overpayments. FPS edits do not analyze individual claims to automatically deny them based on risk alone or the likelihood that they are fraudulent without further investigation. As of May 2017, CMS had implemented 24 edits in FPS. CMS reported that FPS edits denied nearly 324,000 claims and saved more than $20.4 million in fiscal year 2016.
The Healthcare Fraud Prevention Partnership (HFPP) is a public-private partnership that began in 2012 with the aim of facilitating collaboration among health care payers to address health care fraud. The HFPP had 79 participants as of June 2017. Participants, including CMS officials, stated that sharing data and information within HFPP has been useful to their efforts to address health care fraud. HFPP conducts studies that pool and analyze multiple payers' claims data to identify providers with patterns of suspect billing across payers. Participants reported that HFPP's studies helped them to identify and take action against potentially fraudulent providers and payment vulnerabilities of which they might not otherwise have been aware. For example, one study identified providers who were cumulatively billing multiple payers for more services than could reasonably be rendered in a single day. Participants also stated that HFPP has fostered both formal and informal information sharing among payers.
The Department of Health and Human Services provided technical comments on a draft of this report, which GAO incorporated as appropriate. |
gao_RCED-95-8 | gao_RCED-95-8_0 | Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Because of the documented growth of illegal commercial trade in wildlife and wildlife parts and products and the similarities in the work locations of FWS and Customs Service inspectors, the Chairman of the House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries and Representative Richard H. Lehman requested that we determine the (1) effectiveness of FWS’ wildlife inspection program, (2) potential impact of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) on wildlife trade and the inspection of wildlife shipments, and (3) advantages and disadvantages of moving the wildlife inspection program from FWS to the Customs Service. Our review focused on the field activities of FWS wildlife inspectors. They believed that Customs’ larger, more dispersed inspection force and the automated system it has for assessing shipments and determining which ones to inspect would enable Customs to provide greater wildlife inspection coverage than does FWS. Disadvantages of a Transfer to Customs
In terms of the disadvantages that would come from a transfer of the inspection program, some officials from FWS, Customs, APHIS, the Public Health Service, and wildlife conservation and trade organizations, as well as some wildlife inspectors, were concerned that (1) Customs would not emphasize wildlife protection; (2) Customs inspectors lack wildlife identification expertise; (3) difficulties might arise in coordinating Customs’ inspection efforts with FWS’ efforts to protect wildlife, including the implementation of CITES—functions that would most likely remain at FWS; and (4) some costs would be incurred. They did not look favorably on the idea of shifting the wildlife inspection program to their agency. FWS’ difficulties in accomplishing its inspection mission have caused some to suggest that other alternatives be explored, such as transferring the program to Customs, an agency with a larger, more widely dispersed inspection force. Proceed with plans to increase the user fees charged by the wildlife inspection program and apply the increased funding to those areas where resource needs have been identified. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Fish and Wildlife Service's (FWS) wildlife inspection program, focusing on the: (1) effectiveness of the wildlife inspection program; (2) potential impact of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) on wildlife trade and wildlife shipment inspections; and (3) advantages and disadvantages that might accrue from transferring the inspection program to the Customs Service.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) FWS has not fully met its wildlife inspection program mission of monitoring and intercepting illegal wildlife shipments despite recent budget increases; (2) the FWS inspection program needs more wildlife inspectors, safety equipment, and administrative support; (3) FWS does not have complete, accurate, and timely data on the inspection program; (4) FWS has proposed increasing user fees to produce additional program funding; (5) the government's failure to assess penalties, fines, and other punitive actions against violators does little to deter new offenses and lowers inspectors' morale; (6) budget cuts and downsizing efforts further jeopardize the program's inspection mission; (7) NAFTA is likely to increase wildlife trade among the treaty parties, which will increase the wildlife inspectors' workload; (8) FWS believes NAFTA will have the greatest impact at the Mexican border; (9) transferring the wildlife inspection program to Customs would provide greater inspection coverage due to Customs' larger, more dispersed inspection force and automated inspection system; and (10) the disadvantages of transferring the inspection program to Customs include Customs inspectors' lack of wildlife identification expertise, Customs' likely failure to emphasize wildlife inspection, difficulties in coordinating with FWS to protect endangered species, and potential increased costs. |
gao_GGD-95-192 | gao_GGD-95-192_0 | Their consolidated comments are discussed on p. 16 and presented in appendix V.
Almost One-Third of NIH Employees Alleged Sexual Harassment, but Few Filed Complaints
Approximately 32 percent of NIH employees reported that they were the recipients of some type of uninvited, unwanted sexual attention in the past year, and employees filed 32 informal complaints and 20 formal complaints with NIH’s OEO between October 1990 and May 1994. Over 96 percent of NIH employees who said they were sexually harassed reported that they decided not to file complaints or take some other personnel action. While Fewer Employees Alleged Sex Discrimination, Nonreporting Was Still a Significant Problem
Thirteen percent of NIH employees indicated to us that they believed they had experienced sex discrimination over the last 2 years. Between October 1990 and May 1994, 209 informal and 111 formal sex discrimination complaints were filed by female and male employees at NIH. 1.) Partly in response to these controversies, NIH management has, in recent years, taken actions aimed at improving the agency’s EEO climate. 2.) All 10 ICDs offered some form of sexual harassment prevention training. National Institutes of Health Employee Survey
Congress has requested that the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO), an independent agency of Congress, review the extent and type of sexual harassment and sex discrimination that may be happening at the National Institutes of Health (NIH). | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO examined the extent and nature of sexual harassment and sex discrimination at the National Institutes of Health (NIH).
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) 32 percent of NIH employees surveyed reported experiencing some form of sexual harassment in the past year, but 96 percent of these employees opted not to file an equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint or take other personnel action; (2) NIH employees filed 32 informal and 20 formal sexual harassment complaints between October 1990 and May 1994, however no determinations of sexual harassment were made in response to these complaints; (3) about 13 percent of NIH employees believed they had experienced sex discrimination over the last 2 years, but 90 percent of these employees chose not to file grievances or EEO complaints; (4) NIH employees filed 209 informal and 111 formal sex discrimination complaints between October 1990 and May 1994, however no determinations of sex discriminations were made in response to the formal complaints; and (5) although NIH has recently acted to improve its EEO climate, more could be done in the areas of timeliness, information, and training. |
gao_GAO-01-225 | gao_GAO-01-225_0 | NHTSA has not developed such standards because it has not identified significant problems with occupant restraint systems that could be addressed by state motor vehicle inspection programs. Although NHTSA has the authority to regulate aftermarket crash parts, the agency has not developed safety standards for them because it has not determined that any aftermarket crash parts contain safety-related defects. NHTSA has more limited authority to regulate the use of recycled airbags. NHTSA could elect to develop safety standards for occupant restraint systems under the used vehicle provisions of the Motor Vehicle Safety Act. These limitations may hamper NHTSA’s ability to detect safety-related trends through broad key-word searches of its complaint database and make it unlikely that NHTSA can identify all unsafe parts. In addition, the ability to recall unsafe aftermarket crash parts is limited because some parts are not stamped with the manufacturer’s name and there is no trail leading from the manufacturer to the ultimate user of the part. The two studies on the safety of recycled airbags that we identified concluded that they can be a potentially safe, economical alternative to new airbags as long as they are undamaged and properly handled and installed. However, the failure of some flood-damaged air bags to deploy correctly also demonstrates the potential for serious safety consequences. | What GAO Found
Although the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) has the authority to regulate aftermarket crash parts, the agency has not developed safety standards for them because it has not determined that any aftermarket crash parts contain safety-related defects. NHTSA has more limited authority to regulate the use of recycled air bags. NHTSA could elect to develop safety standards for occupant restraint systems under the used vehicle provision of the Motor Vehicle Safety Act. NHTSA has not developed such standards because it has not identified significant problems with occupant restraint systems that could be addressed by state motor vehicle inspection programs. The limitations of NHTSA's complaint system may hamper NHTSA's ability to detect safety-related trends through broad key-word searches of its complaint database and make it unlikely that NHTSA can identify all unsafe parts. In addition, the ability to recall unsafe aftermarket crash parts is limited because some parts are not stamped with the manufacturer's name and there is no trail leading from the manufacturer to the ultimate user of the part. Two studies on the safety of recycled airbags concluded that they can be a potentially safe, economical alternative to new airbags as long as they are undamaged and properly handled and installed. However, the failure of some flood-damaged airbags to deploy correctly also demonstrates the potential for serious safety consequences. |
gao_GAO-08-224T | gao_GAO-08-224T_0 | Background
FDA is responsible for overseeing the safety and effectiveness of human drugs that are marketed in the United States, whether they are manufactured in foreign or domestic establishments. Foreign establishments that market their drugs in the United States must register with FDA. Through this process, CDER annually prepares a prioritized list of domestic establishments and a separate, prioritized list of foreign establishments. FDA relies on multiple databases to manage the foreign drug inspection program. FDA Lacks Accurate Information to Effectively Manage the Foreign Drug Inspection Program
FDA does not know how many foreign establishments are subject to inspection; including the number of establishments that are registered and whose products are currently imported into the United States and establishments that are not required to register but whose products are ultimately used in drugs that are marketed here. Instead of maintaining a list of such establishments, FDA relies on information from several databases that were not designed for this purpose. According to OASIS, 6,760 foreign establishments manufactured drugs that were imported into the United States in fiscal year 2007. Because comparisons of the data and error identification are done manually, the databases are not conducive to routine data analysis. FDA officials told us that they have not generated an accurate count of the establishments whose drugs are imported into the United States. In addition, although FDA has implemented a risk-based process in selecting foreign establishments for GMP surveillance inspections, relatively few such inspections are conducted. Comparing this average number of inspections with FDA’s count of 3,249 foreign establishments it used to plan its fiscal year 2007 prioritized GMP surveillance inspections suggests that the agency inspects about 7 percent of foreign establishments in a given year. At this rate it would take FDA more than 13 years to inspect this group of establishments once, assuming that no additional establishments are subject to inspection. The Need to Conduct Preapproval Inspections Associated with NDAs and ANDAs Drives FDA’s Selection of Foreign Establishments
While enforcing GMP compliance through surveillance inspections is FDA’s most comprehensive program for monitoring the quality of marketed drugs, FDA’s inspections of most foreign establishments occur as part of the agency’s review of an NDA or ANDA. In fiscal year 2008, CDER submitted a list of 110 foreign establishments to ORA, with a negotiated target of at least 50 inspections. To help account for the differences in information available to FDA between foreign establishments that have and have not been inspected, the agency categorizes establishments into one of three groups for the purposes of examining risk scores: (1) those that have received a GMP surveillance inspection since fiscal year 2000; (2) those that have not received a GMP surveillance inspection since fiscal year 2000, but have received another type of inspection in that time (for example, a preapproval inspection or a veterinary drugs inspection); and (3) those that may never have received an inspection. These counts do not represent the number of individuals that actually conduct foreign inspections in a given year. FDA relies on investigators and laboratory analysts to volunteer to conduct foreign inspections. In addition, FDA does not have the same flexibility to extend the length of foreign inspection trips if problems are encountered as it does with domestic inspections because of the need to maintain the inspection schedule, which FDA officials told us typically involves inspections of multiple establishments in the same country. FDA officials also told us that language barriers can make foreign inspections more difficult to conduct than domestic inspections. The agency does not generally provide translators in foreign countries, nor does it require that foreign establishments provide independent interpreters. Instead, they may have to rely on an English-speaking representative of the foreign establishment being inspected, who may not be a translator by training, rather than rely on an independent translator. More than nine years ago we reported that FDA needed to make improvements in its foreign drug inspection program. We also recognize that FDA has taken steps to improve its management of the foreign drug inspection program by enhancing the risk-based process it uses to select establishments for GMP surveillance inspections. | Why GAO Did This Study
Many drugs marketed in the United States are manufactured in foreign countries and the value of such products entering the country is increasing. The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is responsible for overseeing the safety and effectiveness of human drugs that are marketed in the United States, whether they are manufactured in foreign or domestic establishments. Foreign establishments that market their drugs in the United States must register with FDA and FDA inspects foreign establishments to ensure that they meet the same standards that are required of domestic ones. GAO reported 9 years ago that FDA needed to improve its foreign drug inspection program (GAO/HEHS-98-21). Questions remain as to whether FDA has improved its management of the foreign drug inspection program. This statement discusses preliminary information on (1) the extent to which FDA has accurate data to manage the foreign drug inspection program, (2) the frequency of foreign inspections and factors influencing the selection of establishments to inspect, and (3) issues unique to conducting foreign inspections. To address these issues GAO interviewed FDA officials; reviewed pertinent statutes, regulations, and guidance; and analyzed information from FDA databases. Because of the preliminary nature of our work, we are not making recommendations at this time.
What GAO Found
FDA's effectiveness in managing the foreign drug inspection program continues to be hindered by weaknesses in its databases. FDA does not know how many foreign establishments are subject to inspection. Instead, FDA relies on databases that were not designed for this purpose. Further, these databases contain inaccuracies that FDA cannot easily reconcile. One database indicates there were about 3,000 foreign establishments registered to market drugs in the United States in fiscal year 2007, while another indicates that about 6,800 foreign establishments actually imported drugs in that year. FDA recognizes these flaws. Further, because the databases cannot exchange information, any comparisons of the data are performed manually, on a case-by-case basis. FDA officials told GAO that they have not generated an accurate count of foreign establishments whose drugs are imported into the United States. FDA inspects relatively few foreign establishments. Data from FDA suggest that the agency may inspect about 7 percent of foreign establishments in a given year. At this rate, it would take FDA more than 13 years to inspect each foreign establishment once, assuming that no additional establishments require inspection. However, FDA cannot provide an exact number of foreign establishments that have never been inspected. Most of the foreign inspections performed are conducted as part of a review associated with processing an application to market a new drug, rather than inspections for monitoring the quality of marketed drugs. Although FDA uses a risk-based process to develop a prioritized list of foreign establishments for inspections to monitor the quality of marketed drugs, few are completed in a given year. This prioritized list was used to select foreign establishments for inspection in fiscal year 2007. According to FDA, about 30 such inspections were completed in that year and at least 50 are targeted for inspection in fiscal year 2008. The foreign inspection process involves unique circumstances that are not encountered domestically. For example, FDA relies on staff that inspect domestic establishments to volunteer for foreign inspections. Unlike domestic inspections to monitor the quality of a marketed drug, FDA does not arrive unannounced at a foreign establishment. It also lacks the flexibility to easily extend foreign inspections if problems are encountered, due to the need to adhere to an itinerary that typically involves multiple inspections in the same country. Finally, language barriers can make foreign inspections more difficult than domestic ones. FDA does not generally provide translators to its inspection teams. Instead, they may have to rely on an English-speaking representative of the foreign establishment being inspected, rather than an independent translator. |
gao_GAO-12-1022 | gao_GAO-12-1022_0 | Agencies Use Interagency Collaborative Mechanisms to Meet a Range Of Purposes
Federal agencies have used a variety of mechanisms to implement interagency collaborative efforts, such as the President appointing a coordinator, agencies co-locating within one facility, or establishing interagency task forces. Mechanisms Are Frequently Used In Combination to Address Complex Issues
Additionally, in many cases, agencies use more than one mechanism to address an issue. For example, climate change is a complex, crosscutting issue, which involves many collaborative mechanisms. As we reported in 2011, these mechanisms include entities within the Executive Office of the President and interagency groups throughout government, including task forces and working groups. There are Many Issues to Consider When Collaborating
Although the mechanisms we list in figure 2 differ in complexity and scope, they all benefit from certain key features, which raise issues to consider when implementing these mechanisms. Outcomes and Accountability
Have short-term and long-term outcomes been clearly defined? Bridging Organizational Cultures
What are the missions and organizational cultures of the participating agencies? Have participating agencies agreed on common terminology and definitions? Clarity of Roles and Responsibilities
Have participating agencies clarified the roles and responsibilities of the participants? Participants
Have all relevant participants been included? Experts said that it is helpful when the participants in a collaborative mechanism have full knowledge of the relevant resources in their agency; the ability to commit these resources and make decisions on behalf of the agency; the ability to regularly attend all activities of the collaborative mechanism; and the knowledge, skills, and abilities to contribute to the outcomes of the collaborative effort. Written Guidance and Agreements
If appropriate, have the participating agencies documented their agreement regarding how they will be collaborating? Have participating agencies developed ways to continually update or monitor written agreements? Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To identify mechanisms that the federal government uses to lead and implement interagency collaboration as well as issues to consider when implementing these mechanisms we conducted a literature review of academic work, interviewed a number of experts in governmental collaboration, and analyzed a sample of our prior work. In order to reduce the size of the sample, we selected reports that met two or more of the following criteria: discussed collaboration between more than one federal department, included a mechanism for collaboration, and provided an in-depth discussion of the collaborative mechanism. Is there a way to track and monitor progress toward the short-term and long-term outcomes? If leadership will be shared between one or more agencies, have roles and responsibilities been clearly identified and agreed upon? How will leadership be sustained over the long-term? Resources
How will the collaborative mechanism be funded? | Why GAO Did This Study
Many of the meaningful results that the federal government seeks to achievesuch as those related to protecting food and agriculture, providing homeland security, and ensuring a well-trained and educated workforcerequire the coordinated efforts of more than one federal agency and often more than one sector and level of government. Both Congress and the executive branch have recognized the need for improved collaboration across the federal government. The Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA) Modernization Act of 2010 establishes a new framework aimed at taking a more crosscutting and integrated approach to focusing on results and improving government performance. Effective implementation of the act could play an important role in facilitating future actions to reduce duplication, overlap, and fragmentation.
GAO was asked to identify the mechanisms that the federal government uses to lead and implement interagency collaboration, as well as issues to consider when implementing these mechanisms. To examine these topics, GAO conducted a literature review on interagency collaborative mechanisms, interviewed 13 academic and practitioner experts in the field of collaboration, and reviewed their work. GAO also conducted a detailed analysis of 45 GAO reports, published between 2005 and 2012. GAO selected reports that contained in-depth discussions of collaborative mechanisms and covered a broad range of issues.
What GAO Found
Federal agencies have used a variety of mechanisms to implement interagency collaborative efforts, such as the President appointing a coordinator, agencies co-locating within one facility, or establishing interagency task forces. These mechanisms can be used to address a range of purposes including policy development; program implementation; oversight and monitoring; information sharing and communication; and building organizational capacity, such as staffing and training. Frequently, agencies use more than one mechanism to address an issue. For example, climate change is a complex, crosscutting issue, which involves many collaborative mechanisms in the Executive Office of the President and interagency groups throughout government.
Although collaborative mechanisms differ in complexity and scope, they all benefit from certain key features, which raise issues to consider when implementing these mechanisms. For example:
Outcomes and Accountability: Have short-term and long-term outcomes been clearly defined? Is there a way to track and monitor their progress?
Bridging Organizational Cultures: What are the missions and organizational cultures of the participating agencies? Have agencies agreed on common terminology and definitions?
Leadership: How will leadership be sustained over the long-term? If leadership is shared, have roles and responsibilities been clearly identified and agreed upon?
Clarity of Roles and Responsibilities: Have participating agencies clarified roles and responsibilities?
Participants: Have all relevant participants been included? Do they have the ability to commit resources for their agency?
Resources: How will the collaborative mechanism be funded and staffed? Have online collaboration tools been developed?
Written Guidance and Agreements: If appropriate, have participating agencies documented their agreement regarding how they will be collaborating? Have they developed ways to continually update and monitor these agreements? |
gao_GAO-03-611T | gao_GAO-03-611T_0 | Background
CFSA is responsible for protecting thousands of foster care children who have been at risk of abuse and neglect and ensuring that critical services are provided for them and their families. CFSA Undertook Actions to Address Most ASFA Requirements Reviewed and Met Half of the Selected Performance Criteria
CFSA took actions to address six of the nine ASFA requirements and met or exceeded four of the eight performance criteria we included in our study. Table 1 summarizes the ASFA requirements directly related to the safety and well-being of children and identifies whether CFSA met them. CFSA Has Established Many Foster Care Policies but Lacks Others, and the Extent of Implementation and Documentation Varies
CSFA has established many foster care policies but, caseworkers did not consistently implement the six we examined. In addition, CFSA’s automated system lacked data on policy implementation for 70 percent of its foster care cases. CFSA Has Enhanced Its Working Relationship With the D.C. Family Court by Working Collaboratively, But Hindrances Remain
CFSA has enhanced its working relationship with the Family Court through its commitment to promoting improved communication and by expanding its legal support services for court activities. CFSA participates in various planning committees with the Family Court, such as the Implementation Planning Committee, and assists in providing service referrals on site at the Family Court. These hindrances include scheduling conflicts between the court and CFSA, an insufficient number of caseworkers, caseworkers who are unfamiliar with cases that have been transferred to them, and the unclear roles and responsibilities of CFSA caseworkers, attorneys, and judges. | Why GAO Did This Study
The District of Columbia (DC) Child and Family Services Agency (CFSA) is responsible for protecting thousands of foster care children at risk of abuse and neglect and ensuring that critical services are provided for them and their families. Representative Tom Davis, Chairman of the House Committee on Government Reform, asked GAO to discuss the extent to which CFSA has taken actions to address the requirements of the Adoption and Safe Families Act (ASFA) of 1997 and other selected performance criteria, adopted and implemented child protection and foster care placement policies, and enhanced its working relationship with the D.C. Family Court.
What GAO Found
CFSA took actions to address six of the nine AFSA requirements related to the safety and well-being of children and met or exceeded four of the eight performance criteria GAO included in this study. CSFA has established many foster care policies, but caseworkers did not consistently implement the six GAO examined. In addition, CFSA's automated system lacked data on policy implementation for 70 percent of its foster care cases. CFSA has enhanced its working relationship with the Family Court. Frequent dialogue now occurs between CFSA's top management and the Family Court, CFSA has expanded its legal services to support court activities, and CFSA participates in various planning committees with the court. However, hindrances remain, such as scheduling conflicts between the two entities; unclear roles and responsibilities of caseworkers, attorneys, and judges; and caseworkers who are not familiar with cases that have been recently transferred to them. |
gao_NSIAD-98-43 | gao_NSIAD-98-43_0 | In accordance with the definition of outsourcing used in this report, these intra-organization arrangements are discussed as alternative strategies that nonfederal organizations have used to improve their financial operations. In addition, when considering outsourcing, an organization may focus on an entire function or portions of a function. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of our review are to develop information on (1) the extent to which selected private sector and nonfederal public organizations used outsourcing as a strategy to improve financial operations and reduce costs, (2) existing outsourcing vendor capacity to perform finance and accounting operations, and (3) factors associated with successful outsourcing. Representatives of all of the 15 organizations we spoke to said they had considered outsourcing as a management strategy for improving their financial management operations, and 12 organizations had outsourced portions of their finance and accounting functions. For example, officials from one company stated that their approach to improving financial management consisted of: (1) consolidating the accounting function into as few locations as possible and having each location move to a single system to accomplish the function, (2) simplifying existing processes, (3) developing systems that capture data at the point the transaction originated, regardless of the location within the organization, and (4) outsourcing all or parts of processes that could be done more efficiently or effectively by a third party. In addition, to the extent that cost reduction is an outsourcing goal, reductions in the number of an organization’s finance and accounting personnel does not in itself translate into reducing the organization’s overall costs because such reductions may be offset by increased outsourcing vendor contract costs. Some experts in the field have estimated that in 3 to 5 years, organizations with large, complex finance and accounting operations will be able to outsource their entire accounting or finance function. Factors Associated With Successful Outsourcing Decisions
Our work with outsourcing users, vendors, and consultants identified the following five key factors often associated with successful decisions to outsource finance and accounting operations. Identifying Deficiencies Through Benchmarking Is a Key Factor for Outsourcing Decisions
Benchmarking generally involves identifying organizations that have developed world-class processes and then, using applicable performance measures (such as cost per transaction, average processing time, or error rate), comparing an organization’s performance to that of the world-class organization. Market Research Needed to Determine Capacity and Quality of Outsourcing Vendors
As discussed previously, vendor capacity for large, complex accounting and finance functions is a consideration in the outsourcing decision process. These key factors are (1) maintaining sufficient expertise and controls to effectively oversee outsourced operations and (2) establishing a well-defined, results-based contract with the outsourcing vendor. The contract detailed performance expectations for the outsourced processes, including the timing of reports and the presentation, availability, and quality of accounting and finance information and established a related set of performance measures intended to help determine the extent to which the goals of the outsourcing arrangement were achieved. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on the use of outsourcing to achieve cost savings, management efficiencies, and operating flexibility in finance and accounting operations, focusing on: (1) the extent to which selected private-sector and nonfederal public organizations used outsourcing as a strategy to improve financial operations and reduce costs; (2) existing outsourcing vendor capacity to perform finance and accounting operations; and (3) factors associated with successful outsourcing.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) GAO's analysis of the experiences of 15 private-sector organizations coupled with discussions with industry experts and outsourcing vendor officials and a literature review revealed that nonfederal organizations use a variety of strategies to improve their financial operations and reduce costs; (2) while all the private-sector organizations GAO reviewed considered outsourcing as a financial improvement option, they have relied principally on other strategies, such as consolidating systems and operating locations or reengineering business processes, to achieve their financial improvement objectives; (3) to the extent that these private organizations have outsourced any portion of their finance and accounting operations, such outsourcing was generally limited to routine, mechanical tasks, such as check writing or payroll processing; (4) only 3 of the 15 organizations GAO contacted had outsourced an entire process within a finance and accounting function; (5) the existing limited capacity of outsourcing vendors to perform larger, more complex finance and accounting operations may have constrained wider use of outsourcing by these organizations; (6) experts in the outsourcing field have estimated that it may be 3 to 5 years before this type of capacity is widely available; (7) the experiences of the organizations in GAO's review and GAO's analysis of pertinent literature may provide some lessons for future federal agency outsourcing decisions; (8) factors considered as part of the outsourcing decision process and often associated with successful outsourcing were: (a) establishing an outsourcing policy that specifies what process and criteria to follow in making the outsourcing decision that will achieve the organization's overall goals; (b) performing a strategic analysis to determine the organization's core competencies; (c) benchmarking the organization's processes against those of world-class organizations to determine comparable costs and identify any deficiencies in its operations; (d) performing market research to determine whether a competitive market exists for the outsourcing services the organization needs; and (e) considering carefully the ramifications of potential job loss or other possible adverse personnel impacts that could occur as a result of outsourcing; and (9) after an organization decided to outsource, two key factors identified with successful outsourcing arrangements were: (a) maintaining sufficient expertise and control to effectively oversee the outsourcing vendor; and (b) establishing a results-oriented contract that included appropriate performance measures. |
gao_GAO-17-566T | gao_GAO-17-566T_0 | They are available to homeowners, renters, businesses of all sizes, and nonprofit organizations. SBA Implemented Most Provisions of the 2008 Act, but Has Not Yet Implemented New Disaster Loan Programs
SBA Implemented Most of the Provisions in 2008 Act
SBA has implemented most of the requirements of the 2008 Act, which comprises 26 provisions with substantive requirements for SBA, including requirements for disaster planning and simulations, reporting, and plan updates (see app. In June 2008, SBA appointed an official to head the agency’s newly created Executive Office of Disaster Strategic Planning and Operations. SBA has taken actions to fully address other provisions, such as those relating to augmenting infrastructure, information technology and staff as well as improving disaster lending. SBA also improved its Disaster Credit Management System, which the agency uses to process loan applications and make determinations for its disaster loan program, by increasing the number of concurrent users that can access it. SBA officials also told us that they performed initial outreach to lenders to obtain reactions to and interest in the programs. In 2014, we reported on the Disaster Loan Program (following Hurricane Sandy) and found that SBA had yet to pilot or implement the three programs for guaranteed disaster loans. Based on this action, we closed the recommendations for SBA to develop an implementation plan, formally evaluate lender feedback, and report to Congress on implementation challenges. SBA Made Improvements in Response to Our Recommendation to Further Enhance Disaster Planning after Hurricane Sandy
SBA made several changes to its planning documents in response to recommendations in our 2014 report about the agency’s response to Hurricane Sandy. While SBA created web- based loan applications to expedite the process and encouraged their use, the agency noted that it did not expect early receipt of such a high volume of loan applications early in its response and delayed increasing staffing. At the time of our 2014 report, SBA also had not updated its key disaster planning documents—the Disaster Preparedness and Recovery Plan and the Disaster Playbook—to adjust for the effects a large-volume, early surge in applications could have on staffing, resources, and forecasting models for future disasters. We therefore recommended that SBA revise its disaster planning documents to anticipate the potential impact of early application submissions on staffing, resources, and timely disaster response. SBA Took Some Actions to Improve Information for Business Loan Applicants but Could Improve Presentation of the Information
SBA Implemented Some Actions and Planned Others to Improve Information Resources for Business Loan Applicants
In our November 2016 report, we reviewed the actions SBA took or planned to take to improve the disaster loan program, as discussed in its Fiscal Year 2015 Annual Performance Report. SBA focused on promoting disaster preparedness, streamlining the loan process, and enhancing online application capabilities (see table 1). SBA Has Opportunities to Further Refine Its Presentation of Information on the Disaster Business Loan Process
Disaster Loan-Related Information Not Easily Accessible
As we found in our November 2016 report, SBA published information (print and electronic) about the disaster loan process, but much of this information is not easily accessible from the disaster loan assistance web portal. We concluded that absent better integration of, and streamlined access to, disaster loan-related information on SBA’s web portals, loan applicants—and SBDCs assisting disaster victims— may not be aware of key information for completing applications. However, SBA did not indicate that what actions it would take in response to our recommendation. We plan to follow up with SBA on whether the agency will take any action to ensure content is consistent across print and online resources, among other things. Therefore, we recommended that SBA define financial terminology on loan application forms (for example, by adding a glossary to the “help” feature on the web portal). Appendix I: Summary of Provisions in the Small Business Disaster Response and Loan Improvements Act of 2008
Appendix I: Summary of Provisions in the Small Business Disaster Response and Loan Improvements Act of 2008 This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. | Why GAO Did This Study
While SBA is known primarily for its financial support of small businesses, the agency also assists businesses of all sizes and homeowners affected by natural and other declared disasters through its Disaster Loan Program. Disaster loans can be used to help rebuild or replace damaged property or continue business operations. After SBA was criticized for its performance following the 2005 Gulf Coast hurricanes, the agency took steps to reform the program and Congress also passed the 2008 Act. After Hurricane Sandy (2012), questions arose on the extent to which the program had improved since the 2005 Gulf Coast Hurricanes and whether previously identified deficiencies had been addressed.
This statement discusses (1) SBA implementation of provisions from the 2008 Act; (2) additional improvements to agency planning following Hurricane Sandy; and (3) SBA's recent and planned actions to improve information resources for business loan applicants. This statement is based on GAO products issued between July 2009 and November 2016. GAO also met with SBA officials in April 2017 to discuss the status of open recommendations and other aspects of the program.
What GAO Found
The Small Business Administration (SBA) implemented most requirements of the Small Business Disaster Response and Loan Improvements Act of 2008 (2008 Act). For example, in response to the 2008 Act, SBA appointed an official to head the disaster planning office and annually updates its disaster response plan. SBA also implemented provisions relating to marketing and outreach; augmenting infrastructure, information technology, and staff; and increasing access to funds for nonprofits, among other areas. However, SBA has not yet implemented provisions to establish three guaranteed loan programs. In 2010, SBA received an appropriation to pilot one program and performed initial outreach to lenders. However, in 2014, GAO found that SBA had not implemented the programs or conducted a pilot because of concerns from lenders about loan features. GAO recommended that SBA evaluate lender feedback and report to Congress about implementation challenges. In response, SBA sought comments from lenders and sent a letter to Congress that explained remaining implementation challenges.
After Hurricane Sandy, SBA further enhanced its planning for disaster response, including processing of loan applications. In a 2014 report on the Disaster Loan Program, GAO found that while SBA encouraged electronic submissions of loan applications, SBA did not expect early receipt of a high volume of applications after Sandy and delayed increasing staffing. SBA also did not update key disaster planning documents to adjust for the effects of such a surge in future disasters. GAO recommended SBA revise its disaster planning documents to anticipate the potential impact of early application submissions on staffing and resources. In response, SBA updated its planning documents to account for such impacts.
SBA has taken some actions to enhance information resources for business loan applicants but could do more to improve its presentation of online disaster loan-related information. In 2016, GAO found that SBA took or planned to take various actions to improve the disaster loan program and focused on promoting disaster preparedness, streamlining the loan process, and enhancing online application capabilities. However, GAO found that SBA had not effectively presented information on disaster loans (in a way that would help users efficiently find it), had not consistently described key features and requirements of the loan process in print and online resources, or clearly defined financial terminology used in loan applications. Absent better integration of, and streamlined access to, disaster loan-related information, loan applicants may not be aware of key information and requirements for completing the applications. Therefore, GAO recommended that SBA (1) integrate disaster loan-related information into its web portals to be more accessible to users, (2) ensure consistency of content about the disaster loan process across information resources, and (3) better define financial terminology used in the loan application forms. In January 2017, SBA indicated it was working on a glossary for the application. GAO plans to follow up with SBA about the other two open recommendations. |
gao_GAO-11-836 | gao_GAO-11-836_0 | Specifically, they must sell outpatient drugs to covered entities at or below the statutorily determined price. 340B Revenue Generated by Covered Entities Varied, but All Entities Reported That the Program Was Used to Support or Expand Access to Services
About half of the covered entities we interviewed reported that they generated 340B program revenue that exceeded drug-related costs—the costs of purchasing and dispensing a drug—and revenue generation depended on several factors. Of the 16 remaining, 10 did not generate enough 340B revenue to cover all drug-related costs, and 6 covered entities were unable or did not report enough information for us to determine the extent to which they generated 340B revenue due, in part, to their inability to track 340B- specific financial information. Covered Entities Reported Using the 340B Program to Support or Expand Access to Services
Regardless of the amount of revenue generated through the program, all of the 29 covered entities we interviewed reported that the 340B program, including the up-front savings they realized on the cost of drugs, allowed them to support their missions by maintaining services and lowering medication costs for patients, which is consistent with the purpose of the program. In addition, the 13 covered entities that generated 340B revenue that exceeded drug-related costs were able to use this revenue to serve more patients and to provide services that they might not have otherwise provided, including additional service locations, patient education programs, and case management, which is also consistent with the purpose of program. For example, 36 of the 61 program stakeholders we interviewed did not report any effect on covered entities’ or non-340B providers’ access to drugs related to manufacturers’ distribution of drugs at 340B prices. These stakeholders represented a wide range of perspectives on the 340B program, including those representing manufacturers, covered entities, and non-340B providers. The remaining 25 program stakeholders—also representing a wide range of perspectives on the 340B program—reported that manufacturers’ distribution of drugs at 340B prices affected providers’ access to drugs primarily in two situations. The two situations were: (1) for intravenous immune globulin (IVIG), a lifesaving immune deficiency drug, the supply of which is inherently limited; and (2) when there was a significant drop in the 340B price of a drug, which may result in increased demand for the drug by covered entities. Stakeholders reported that manufacturers’ restricted distribution of IVIG at 340B prices resulted in 340B hospitals having to purchase some IVIG at higher, non-340B prices in order to meet their demand for the drug. Stakeholders reported that manufacturers’ distribution of drugs at 340B prices also affected providers’ access to drugs when the 340B prices dropped significantly. HRSA’s Oversight Is Inadequate to Ensure Participants’ Compliance with 340B Program Requirements
HRSA’s oversight of the 340B program is inadequate because it primarily relies on covered entities’ and manufacturers’ self-policing—that is, participants ensuring their own compliance with program requirements. HRSA’s guidance on key program requirements often lacks the necessary level of specificity to provide clear direction, making it difficult for participants to self-police or monitor others’ compliance and raising concerns that the guidance may be interpreted in ways that are inconsistent with its intent. Because of HRSA’s reliance on self-policing to oversee the 340B program as well as its nonspecific guidance, the agency cannot provide reasonable assurance that covered entities and drug manufacturers are in compliance with program requirements and is not able to adequately assess program risk. Hospitals’ participation in the 340B program has also grown markedly in recent years. The increasing number of hospitals participating in the 340B program has raised other concerns for some stakeholders we interviewed, such as drug manufacturers, including whether all of these hospitals are in need of a discount drug program. Nearly a third of all hospitals in the U.S. currently participate in the 340B program, and HRSA estimates that more may be eligible. According to HRSA, the agency largely relies on participants’ self-policing to ensure compliance with program requirements, and has never conducted an audit of covered entities or drug manufacturers. Therefore, we recommend that the Secretary of HHS instruct the administrator of HRSA to take the following four actions to strengthen oversight: conduct selective audits of 340B covered entities to deter potential diversion; finalize new, more specific guidance on the definition of a 340B patient; further specify its 340B nondiscrimination guidance for cases in which distribution of drugs is restricted and require reviews of manufacturers’ plans to restrict distribution of drugs at 340B prices; and issue guidance to further specify the criteria that hospitals that are not publicly owned or operated must meet to be eligible for the 340B program. 2 organizations representing non-340B providers, including 1 trade organization and 1 non-340B provider. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA), within in the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), oversees the 340B Drug Pricing Program, through which participating drug manufacturers give certain entities within the health care safety net--known as covered entities--access to discounted prices on outpatient drugs. Covered entities include specified federal grantees and hospitals. The number of covered entity sites has nearly doubled in the past 10 years to over 16,500. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) mandated that GAO address questions related to the 340B program. GAO examined: (1) the extent to which covered entities generate 340B revenue, factors that affect revenue generation, and how they use the program; (2) how manufacturers' distribution of drugs at 340B prices affects covered entities' or non-340B providers' access to drugs; and (3) HRSA's oversight of the 340B program. GAO reviewed key laws and guidance, analyzed relevant data, and conducted interviews with 61 340B program stakeholders selected to represent a range of perspectives, including HRSA, 29 covered entities, 10 manufacturers and representatives, and 21 others. Selection of stakeholders was judgmental and thus, responses are not generalizable.
What GAO Found
Thirteen of the 29 covered entities we interviewed reported that they generated 340B program revenue that exceeded drug-related costs, which includes the costs of purchasing and dispensing drugs. Of those remaining, 10 did not generate enough revenue to exceed drug-related costs, and 6 did not report enough information for us to determine the extent to which revenue was generated. Several factors affected 340B revenue generation, including drug reimbursement rates. Regardless of the amount of revenue generated, all covered entities reported using the program in ways consistent with its purpose. For example, all covered entities reported that program participation allowed them to maintain services and lower medication costs for patients. Entities generating 340B program revenue that exceeded drug-related costs were also able to serve more patients and to provide additional services. According to the 61 340B program stakeholders we interviewed, manufacturers' distribution of drugs at 340B prices generally did not affect providers' access to drugs. Specifically, 36 stakeholders, including those representing manufacturers, covered entities, and non-340B providers, did not report any effect on covered entities' or non-340B providers' access. The remaining 25, also representing a wide range of perspectives on the 340B program, reported that it affected access primarily in two situations: (1) for intravenous immune globulin (IVIG), a lifesaving drug in inherently limited supply; and (2) when there was a significant drop in the 340B price for a drug resulting in increased 340B demand. In both situations, manufacturers may restrict distribution of drugs at 340B prices because of actual or anticipated shortages. Stakeholders reported that restricted distribution of IVIG resulted in 340B hospitals having to purchase some IVIG at higher, non-340B prices. They also reported that restricted distribution when the 340B price of a drug dropped significantly helped maintain equitable access for all providers. HRSA's oversight of the 340B program is inadequate to provide reasonable assurance that covered entities and drug manufacturers are in compliance with program requirements--such as, entities' transfer of drugs purchased at 340B prices only to eligible patients, and manufacturers' sale of drugs to covered entities at or below the 340B price. HRSA primarily relies on participant self-policing to ensure program compliance. However, its guidance on program requirements often lacks the necessary level of specificity to provide clear direction, making participants' ability to self-police difficult and raising concerns that the guidance may be interpreted in ways inconsistent with the agency's intent. Other than relying on self-policing, HRSA engages in few activities to oversee the 340B program. For example, the agency does not periodically confirm eligibility for all covered entity types, and has never conducted an audit to determine whether program violations have occurred. Moreover, the 340B program has increasingly been used in settings, such as hospitals, where the risk of improper purchase of 340B drugs is greater, in part because they serve both 340B and non-340B eligible patients. This further heightens concerns about HRSA's current approach to oversight. With the number of hospitals in the 340B program increasing significantly in recent years--from 591 in 2005 to 1,673 in 2011--and nearly a third of all hospitals in the U.S. currently participating, some stakeholders, such as drug manufacturers, have questioned whether all of these hospitals are in need of a discount drug program.
What GAO Recommends
To ensure appropriate use of the 340B program, GAO recommends that HRSA take steps to strengthen oversight regarding program participation and compliance with program requirements. HHS agreed with our recommendations. |
gao_GAO-17-55 | gao_GAO-17-55_0 | These models are often referred to as alternative payment models. Small and Rural Physician Practices Face a Number of Challenges when Deciding Whether to Participate or when Participating in Value- based Payment Models
According to literature we reviewed and the 38 stakeholders we interviewed, small and rural physician practices face many challenges associated with deciding whether to participate, when to begin participating, or whether to continue participating in value-based payment models. Provide population health management services. | What GAO Found
Based on a review of literature and interviews with 38 stakeholders, GAO identified challenges faced by small and rural physician practices when participating in Medicare's new payment models. These models, known as value-based payment models, are intended to reward health care providers for resource use and quality, rather than volume, of services. The challenges identified are in five key topic areas. |
gao_GAO-04-457 | gao_GAO-04-457_0 | DOE Has Spent $823 Million at the Paducah Site; However, Billions of Dollars Will Be Required to Complete DOE Activities at the Site
From fiscal year 1988 through fiscal year 2003, DOE has spent $823 million (in 2002 dollars) for cleanup and related activities at Paducah. As figure 2 shows, 45 percent was spent on base operations, 36 percent on actions taken to clean up contamination and remove waste, and 19 percent on assessments. However, the $1.6 billion cleanup estimate does not represent DOE’s total responsibilities at the site. In addition to cleaning up the contamination from past activities at the site, DOE will (1) build and operate a facility to convert more than 38,000 cylinders of depleted uranium hexafluoride stored at the site to a more stable form; (2) carry out final decontamination and decommissioning of the uranium enrichment plant and associated infrastructure once USEC ceases plant operations; and (3) perform long-term environmental monitoring at the site, which includes activities such as monitoring groundwater and surface water for residual contamination. According to DOE estimates, completing these activities will cost almost $5 billion in 2002 dollars. This will bring the total cost of DOE activities at the site, including remaining cleanup costs and the $823 million already spent, to over $7 billion, in 2002 dollars. While DOE Has Achieved Some Progress, Much Remains to Be Done
Since 2000, DOE has made some progress in cleaning up the contamination and waste at Paducah, but much of the cleanup work remains to be done. Groundwater
After hazardous and radioactive contamination was found in the drinking water wells of residences near the Paducah plant in 1988, DOE discovered that plumes of groundwater contaminated with TCE and technetium-99 were moving toward the Ohio River. During the pilot test, about 1,500 gallons of TCE were removed from the largest source—about 99 percent of the TCE in the area treated. About 1.3 billion gallons have been treated this way since the program began. An estimated almost 50,000 tons of contaminated scrap metal remains to be removed from the site. While Two Previously Identified Challenges Have Been Mitigated, Uncertainty about the Cleanup Scope and Reaching Stakeholder Agreement on Cleanup Approach Remain the Current Principal Challenges
Two of the four challenges we identified in 2000—DOE’s plans to use untested technology and obtaining adequate funding for the cleanup—no longer pose the impediment to the cleanup effort they once did because of actions taken to mitigate their impact. The remaining two challenges— uncertainty over the scope of the cleanup and obtaining stakeholder agreement on the cleanup approach—are the principal challenges that remain for DOE to resolve to successfully complete the cleanup at Paducah. In fact, in fiscal year 2003, Congress appropriated more than DOE’s $100 million request. Until DOE decides when phase II will begin, any additional necessary actions, the costs of those actions, and the time frame for DOE to implement them are not known. As a result, their working relationship has deteriorated, slowing cleanup progress. The poor working relationship between DOE and the regulators has also prevented them from quickly reaching agreement on technical details of specific projects. For example, DOE, EPA, and Kentucky have been unable to agree on an overall cleanup approach and technical aspects of individual projects. Unless DOE and the regulators can reach and maintain agreement on key aspects of the cleanup and quickly resolve technical disagreements, progress at Paducah could continue to be hampered by delays. Recommendations for Executive Action
To help improve the likelihood that DOE and the regulators will reach timely agreement on the cleanup approach, we recommend that the Secretary of Energy direct the Assistant Secretary of the Office of Environmental Management to involve the Commonwealth of Kentucky and EPA early in the development of the annual site management plan and specific projects—before submitting formal cleanup proposals for regulatory approval—so that the parties can identify and resolve their concerns and reach consensus on cleanup decisions in a more timely manner, and in conjunction with Kentucky and EPA, identify and retain external technical peer review groups with environmental cleanup expertise to facilitate timely resolution of any future differences between DOE and the regulators. Scope and Methodology
To determine the amount of money DOE has spent on cleanup-related activities, the purposes for which the money has been spent, and the estimated total for the site, we interviewed officials from DOE’s Oak Ridge Operations Office, which is responsible for managing costs for the Paducah site, and reviewed budget documents including appropriation data related to the cleanup. Furthermore, EPA and Kentucky viewed this effort as a collaborative process. 4. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 1988, radioactive contamination was found in the drinking water wells of residences near the federal government's uranium enrichment plant in Paducah, Kentucky. In response, the Department of Energy (DOE) began a cleanup program. In 2000, GAO reported that DOE faced significant challenges in cleaning up the site and that it was doubtful that the cleanup would be completed as scheduled by 2010 and within the $1.3 billion cost projection. GAO was asked to determine (1) the amount of money DOE has spent on the site, the purposes for which it was spent, and the estimated total costs for the site; (2) the status of DOE cleanup efforts; and (3) the challenges GAO previously identified that continue to be issues for DOE.
What GAO Found
From fiscal year 1988 through 2003, DOE spent $823 million (in 2002 dollars) at the Paducah site. Of this total, DOE spent about $372 million (45 percent) for a host of operations activities, including general maintenance and security; $298 million (36 percent) for actions to clean up contamination and waste; and $153 million (19 percent) for studies to assess the extent of contamination and determine what cleanup actions were needed. DOE currently projects that the cleanup will take until 2019 and cost almost $1.6 billion to complete--9 years and about $300 million more than DOE's earlier projection. The $1.6 billion, however, does not include the cost of other DOE activities required at the site after the plant ceases operations, including final decontamination and decommissioning of the plant and longterm environmental monitoring. DOE estimates these activities will cost almost $5 billion and bring DOE's total costs at the site, including the $823 million already spent, to over $7 billion through 2070 (in 2002 dollars). DOE has made some progress in cleaning up contamination and waste at Paducah, but much of the work remains to be done. For example, while DOE has removed about 4,500 tons of scrap metal, almost 50,000 tons of contaminated scrap metal remain. Similarly, while DOE's pilot test of a new technology for removing the hazardous chemical trichloroethene (TCE) from groundwater at the site had promising results--removing about 99 percent of the TCE in the test zone--the technology will not be fully implemented for more than a year. Two of the four challenges GAO identified in 2000--DOE's plans to use untested technology and questionable assumptions that funding for the cleanup would increase--no longer pose the impediment to the cleanup they once did. Two others--uncertainty over the scope of the cleanup and difficulty obtaining timely stakeholder agreement on the cleanup approach--are the principal challenges that remain. First, the actual scope of the cleanup is not yet known. As a result, any additional cleanup actions, the costs of those actions, and the time frame for DOE to implement them are also unknown. Second, DOE and the regulators--the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and Kentucky--have had difficulty agreeing on an overall cleanup approach, as well as on the details of specific projects. Over time, these disagreements have undermined trust and damaged the parties' working relationship. After involving EPA and Kentucky early in the cleanup planning process, as it has done successfully at other sites, DOE officials discontinued this approach early in 2001, due in part to concerns about the growing cleanup scope, associated costs, and that the planned actions were excessive in relation to the risk. The result was an almost 2-year dispute that delayed progress. This poor working relationship has also prevented the parties from quickly reaching agreement on the technical details of specific projects. Unless DOE and the regulators can reach and maintain agreement on key aspects of the cleanup and quickly resolve technical differences, progress at Paducah could continue to be plagued by delays. |
gao_HEHS-00-148 | gao_HEHS-00-148_0 | An Estimated 3 Million Children of High School Age Are Uninsured, But the Extent to Which This Is a Barrier to Sports Programs Is Unknown
Of the 13 million children without basic health insurance, more than 3 million are of high school age (14- 18).Substantial differences in the uninsured rate among children of high school age exist across states. The extent to which any of these children are prevented from participating in high school sports is unknown. In our survey of high school athletic associations, officials were unaware of any instance in which a high school student was prohibited from playing high school sports due to a lack of health insurance. Some states and school districts require high school student athletes to have basic health insurance prior to and while participating in a sports program. Our survey of high school athletic association officials found that only 10 states and the District of Columbia have a statewide requirement that student athletes have health insurance to participate in a sports program. Some School Districts and Other Organizations Offer Insurance and Care Options to All High School Athletes
School districts and health care organizations in the locations we visited have developed strategies to make athletic accident insurance available to student athletes and to provide access to athletic accident-related care. Most school districts provided catastrophic athletic accident insurance to all student athletes regardless of their insurance status and also offered health insurance to student athletes free of charge or at low cost. In addition, in all 18 school districts we reviewed, including hospitals, medical centers, and sports assisted local school districts by offering free medical services to student athletes. In most of the school districts we contacted, this insurance coverage commences when the athlete’s medical bills reach $25,000. In addition to catastrophic injury insurance, 17 of the 18 school districts we reviewed either provide free supplemental athletic accident insurance to student athletes or offer athletic accident insurance to student athletes for a fee. Nine school districts we reviewed offer students the opportunity to purchase low-cost athletic accident insurance. In these districts, the student athlete may purchase an athletic accident policy through the school. However, school officials also reported that instances of uninsured students requiring athletic accident care were infrequent. Finally, some districts use local health providers to conduct pre- participation exams. We also sought to determine the number of uninsured high school students in the United States, the extent to which the lack of health insurance posed a barrier to participation in high school athletic programs, and the strategies health care organizations and school districts have developed to assist student athletes with health insurance or health care. All districts were among the largest in the nation. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO reviewed high school interscholastic athletics, focusing on the: (1) number of uninsured high school students in the United States and the extent to which the lack of health insurance poses a barrier to participation in high school athletic programs; and (2) strategies school districts have developed to provide health insurance and health care to high school sports participants.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) in 1998, an estimated 3.4 million uninsured children were of high school age; (2) among highly populated states, there were wide differences in the percentage of uninsured children of high school age; (3) GAO was unable to identify any national, state, or local information on the extent to which these high school students were prevented from participating in athletic programs because they lacked basic health insurance; (4) the officials of the 51 athletic associations GAO surveyed were unaware of any instance in which a high school student was prohibited from playing high school sports because he or she lacked health insurance; (5) however, according to these officials, while 10 states and the District of Columbia require high school students to have health insurance before joining a school's athletic program, the other 39 states leave this decision to the discretion of local school districts; (6) in 17 of the 18 large school districts, district policy required student athletes to have health insurance to participate in high school sports; (7) in addition, many of these districts required student athletes to document insurance coverage before participating in sports; (8) however, school officials in four of these large districts reported that they did not have the resources to monitor the accuracy of health insurance information before or during a sport's season; (9) 16 of the 18 school districts provided free catastrophic athletic accident insurance to all student athletes regardless of their insurance status; (10) in most cases, the catastrophic accident policy would cover all medical costs once a family's expenses exceeded $25,000; (11) further, in all school districts GAO reviewed, local schools have adopted strategies to provide access to low-cost athletic accident insurance to student athletes; (12) in eight school districts, free supplemental athletic accident insurance was automatically provided to all student athletes; (13) in nine districts, the families of student athletes were given the opportunity to purchase low-cost athletic accident insurance; (14) school officials in these districts reported that instances of uninsured student athletes requiring athletic accident care were addressed through such activities as accident trust funds established at the school district level and through direct community involvement; and (15) private organizations such as hospitals and clinics assisted local school districts by offering free medical services to student athletes for sports-related injuries and other services such as pre-participation physicals or injury evaluation. |
gao_GAO-13-353 | gao_GAO-13-353_0 | Facilities preliminarily placed in any one of these tiers are considered to be high risk, with tier 1 facilities considered to be the highest risk. ISCD Has Assigned Thousands of Facilities to Tiers, but ISCD’s Approach to Risk Assessment Does Not Reflect All Risk Elements
Since 2007, ISCD has assigned about 3,500 high-risk chemical facilities to final tiers and has taken action to identify and address problems with its risk-tiering approach. Moving forward, ISCD intends to measure the time it takes to complete parts of the new process and has recently implemented a plan to measure various aspects of the process. Security Plan Reviews Could Take Years to Complete, but ISCD is Examining How it Can Accelerate the Review Process
ISCD actions to revise its security plan reviews may result in improvements over the prior processes, but it could take years to review plans for thousands of facilities that have been assigned a final tier—a factor which ISCD hopes to address by examining how it can accelerate the review process. ISCD officials estimate that the first compliance inspections would commence in September 2013, which means that the CFATS regulatory regime would likely be fully implemented for currently tiered facilities (to include compliance inspections) in 8 to 10 years. ISCD Has Increased its Efforts to Communicate and Work with Facilities and May Have an Opportunity to Systematically Gather Feedback on Its Outreach Efforts
ISCD’s efforts to communicate and work with owners and operators to help them enhance security at their facilities have increased since the CFATS program’s inception in 2007, particularly in recent years. ISCD is currently developing a strategic communication plan which may create an opportunity for ISCD to explore how it can obtain systematic feedback on its outreach. Our query of selected trade associations also showed that they generally had mixed views about ISCD’s outreach on data collection requirements. They said that these discussions are intended to obtain input from industry officials on how CSAT can be improved. ISCD Does Not Seek Systematic Feedback on the Effectiveness of Its Outreach Efforts
ISCD seeks informal feedback on its outreach efforts but does not systematically solicit feedback to assess the effectiveness of outreach activities, and it does not have a mechanism to measure the effectiveness of ISCD’s outreach activities. After ISCD has developed and completed its efforts to enhance its risk assessment approach by using the results of the current expert panel’s efforts as well as incorporating the issues we identified along with the Sandia National Laboratories’ work on economic consequences, an independent peer review would provide better assurance that ISCD can appropriately identify and tier chemical facilities, better inform CFATS planning and resource decisions; and provide the greatest return on investment consistent with the NIPP and CFATS rule. While it could take years before ISCD can review and approve the site security plans currently in its queue, ISCD intends to explore ways that it can accelerate the process. Thus, we are not making recommendations at this time. Recommendations for Executive Action
To better assess risk associated with facilities that use, process, or store chemicals of interest consistent with the NIPP and the CFATS rule, we recommend the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the Under Secretary for NPPD, the Assistant Secretary for IP, and Director of ISCD to take the following two actions: develop a plan, with timeframes and milestones, that incorporates the results of the various efforts to fully address each of the components of risk and take associated actions where appropriate to enhance ISCD’s risk assessment approach consistent with the NIPP and the CFATS rule, and conduct an independent peer review, after ISCD completes enhancements to its risk assessment approach, that fully validates and verifies ISCD’s risk assessment approach consistent with the recommendations of the National Research Council of the National Academies. This report discusses the extent to which DHS has assigned chemical facilities to risk-based tiers and assessed its approach for doing so, revised the process to review security plans, and communicated and worked with facilities to help improve security. To determine the extent to which DHS has assigned chemical facilities to risk-based tiers and assessed its approach for doing so, we reviewed ISCD applications and documents including web-based Chemical Security Assessment Tools (CSAT) applications—such as the Top- Screen and security vulnerability assessment—used to collect security information from facilities, the ISCD risk assessment approach used to determine a facility’s risk tier, policies and procedures on tiering, as well as a sample copy of a facility’s Top Screen and security vulnerability assessment. The Chemical Sector Coordinating Council represents a significant majority of the owners and operators in the chemical sector. The information we obtained from the 11 trade associations that responded is not generalizable to the universe of chemical facilities covered by CFATS; however, it does provide insights into DHS efforts to perform outreach and seek feedback on the implementation of the CFATS rule. Critical Infrastructure Protection: Update to National Infrastructure Protection Plan Includes Increased Emphasis on Risk Management and Resilience. | Why GAO Did This Study
Facilities that produce, store, or use hazardous chemicals could be of interest to terrorists intent on using toxic chemicals to inflict mass casualties in the United States. As required by statute, DHS issued regulations that establish standards for the security of high-risk chemical facilities. DHS established the CFATS program to assess the risk posed by these facilities and inspect them to ensure compliance with DHS standards. ISCD, which manages the program, places high risk facilities in risk-based tiers and is to conduct inspections after it approves facility security plans. A November 2011 ISCD internal memorandum raised concerns about ISCD's ability to fulfill its mission.
GAO assessed the extent to which DHS has (1) assigned chemical facilities to tiers and assessed its approach for doing so, (2) revised its process to review facility security plans, and (3) communicated and worked with owners and operators to improve security. GAO reviewed DHS reports and plans on risk assessments, security plan reviews, and facility outreach and interviewed DHS officials. GAO also received input from 11 trade associations representing chemical facilities, about ISCD outreach. The results of this input are not generalizable but provide insights.
What GAO Found
Since 2007, the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Infrastructure Security Compliance Division (ISCD) has assigned about 3,500 high-risk chemical facilities to risk-based tiers under its Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS) program, but it has not fully assessed its approach for doing so. The approach ISCD used to assess risk and make decisions to place facilities in final tiers does not consider all of the elements of consequence, threat, and vulnerability associated with a terrorist attack involving certain chemicals. For example, the risk assessment approach is based primarily on consequences arising from human casualties, but does not consider economic consequences, as called for by the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) and the CFATS regulation, nor does it consider vulnerability, consistent with the NIPP. ISCD has begun to take some actions to examine how its risk assessment approach can be enhanced, including commissioning a panel of experts to assess the current approach, identify strengths and weaknesses, and recommend improvements. ISCD will need to incorporate the various results of these efforts to help them ensure that the revised risk assessment approach includes all elements of risk. After ISCD has incorporated all elements of risk into its assessment approach, an independent peer review would provide better assurance that ISCD can appropriately identify and tier chemical facilities, better inform CFATS planning and resource decisions, and provide the greatest return on investment consistent with the NIPP.
DHS's ISCD has revised its process for reviewing facilities' site security plans--which are to be approved by ISCD before it performs compliance inspections--but it did not track data on the prior process to measure differences. The past process was considered by ISCD to be difficult to implement and caused bottlenecks in approving plans. ISCD views its revised process to be a significant improvement because, among other things, teams of experts review parts of the plans simultaneously rather than sequentially, as occurred in the past. Moving forward ISCD intends to measure the time it takes to complete reviews, but will not be able to do so until the process matures. GAO estimated that it could take another 7 to 9 years before ISCD is able to complete reviews on the approximately 3,120 plans in its queue which means that the CFATS regulatory regime, including compliance inspections, would likely be implemented in 8 to 10 years. ISCD officials said that they are exploring ways to expedite the process such as reprioritizing resources and streamlining inspection requirements.
DHS's ISCD has also taken various actions to work with owners and operators, including increasing the number of visits to facilities to discuss enhancing security plans, but trade associations that responded to GAO's query had mixed views on the effectiveness of ISCD's outreach. ISCD solicits informal feedback from facility owners and operators on its efforts to communicate and work with them, but it does not have an approach for obtaining systematic feedback on its outreach activities. ISCD's ongoing efforts to develop a strategic communication plan may provide opportunities to explore how ISCD can obtain systematic feedback on these activities. A systematic approach for gathering feedback and measuring the results of its outreach efforts could help ISCD focus greater attention on targeting potential problems and areas needing improvement.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DHS enhance its risk assessment approach to incorporate all elements of risk, conduct a peer review after doing so, and explore opportunities to gather systematic feedback on facility outreach. DHS concurred with the recommendations. |
gao_GAO-01-592 | gao_GAO-01-592_0 | Concluding Observations
For agencies to successfully become high-performing organizations, their leaders need to foster performance-based cultures, find ways to measure performance, and use performance information to make decisions. At a fundamental level, results from our 2000 federal managers survey indicate wide differences among individual agencies’ levels of success in demonstrating a results-based climate. However, transforming organizational cultures is an arduous and long-term task. In addition, managers’ responses suggest that while some agencies are clearly showing signs of becoming high-performing organizations, others are not. The survey results provide important information that agency leadership can use to help identify key opportunities to build higher-performing organizations across the federal government. We will continue to work with senior leadership in the individual agencies to identify actions that can be taken to address the issues raised by their managers’ survey responses. Congress has a vital role to play as well. As part of its confirmation, oversight, authorization, and appropriation responsibilities, Congress also has the opportunity to use the information from our 2000 managers survey, as well as information from agencies’ performance plans and reports and our January 2001 Performance and Accountability Series and High-Risk Series, to emphasize performance-based management and to underscore Congress’ commitment to addressing long-standing challenges. | What GAO Found
For federal agencies to become high-performing organizations, top management needs to foster performance-based cultures, find ways to measure performance, and use performance information to make decisions. GAO's survey of federal managers found wide differences in how well individual agencies demonstrated a results-based climate. However, transforming organizational cultures is an arduous and long-term effort. Managers' responses suggest that although some agencies are clearly showing signs of becoming high-performing organizations, others are not. The survey provides important information that agency leadership can use to build higher-performing organizations throughout government. GAO will continue to work with senior leadership in the individual agencies to help address the issues raised by their managers in responding to the survey. Congress has a vital role to play as well. As part of its confirmation, oversight, authorization, and appropriation responsibilities, Congress could use the information from GAO's survey, as well as information from agencies' performance plans and reports and GAO's January 2001 Performance and Accountability Series and High-Risk Series, to emphasize performance-based management and to underscore Congress' commitment to addressing long-standing challenges. |
gao_GAO-10-933T | gao_GAO-10-933T_0 | Some TARP Programs Are Winding Down, but Others Require Continued Attention
Since TARP was authorized, Treasury has implemented a range of programs aimed at stabilizing the financial system and preserving homeownership. As of June 30, 2010, it had disbursed $385 billion for TARP loans and equity investments, and Treasury has already recouped some of these disbursements (table 1). Bank capital programs authorized under TARP, such as CPP, TIP, and the Capital Assistance Program (CAP), were established to help stabilize the financial system and ensure the flow of credit to businesses and consumers. In our past reports, we have made numerous recommendations to strengthen transparency and accountability of this key TARP program. For instance, we recommended that Treasury report whether financial institutions’ activities are generally consistent with the purposes of program. Since we last reported on the financial condition of the auto industry in November 2009, Chrysler and GM have shown some indications of progress towards returning to profitability. Thus far, according to Treasury officials, both companies are doing better than they and Treasury had initially projected in terms of revenues, operating earnings, and cash flow. While these steps indicate progress in the companies’ journey towards profitability, the extent to which the federal government will recoup its investment in the auto industry is uncertain, and the companies’ face several challenges in the coming years. As part of that ongoing work, we are also reviewing the status of the federal government’s efforts to assist workers and communities that have relied on the auto industry for their economic base. American International Group, Inc (AIG) Investments. Since early 2009, we have been monitoring the status of federal assistance to AIG and the company’s financial condition using GAO-developed indicators and we have issued two reports that include information on them. In the April 2010 report, our indicators showed that AIG’s financial condition had remained relatively stable largely due to the federal assistance from the Federal Reserve and Treasury. Similarly, the government’s ability to fully recoup the federal assistance is uncertain and will be determined by the long-term health of AIG, the company’s success in selling businesses as it restructures, and other market factors such as the performance of the insurance sectors and the credit derivatives markets that are beyond the control of AIG or the government. In June 2010, we issued a report that expanded on our March testimony and discussed Treasury’s actions to address the challenges that we had outlined in the March hearing. We reported that while Treasury had taken some steps to address these challenges it urgently needed to finalize and implement the various components of HAMP and ensure the transparency and accountability of these efforts. We will continue to monitor Treasury’s implementation and management of HAMP-funded programs as part of our ongoing oversight of TARP to ensure that these programs are appropriately designed and operating as intended. TARP was also intended to address problems in the securitization markets. We reported in February 2010 that TALF contained a number of features to help reduce the risk of loss to TARP funds. Treasury’s Framework for Deciding to Extend TARP Was Sufficient, but Could be Strengthened For Future Decisions
In anticipation of the upcoming decisions on the future of TARP, the need to unwind the extraordinary federal support across the board, and the fragile state of the economy, we made recommendations to Treasury in October 2009. As such, according to Treasury, new commitments through October 3, 2010 will be limited to programs, under the Making Home Affordable Program (MHA), including HAMP, and small business lending programs. The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, passed by both the House and Senate and expected to be signed by the President this week, would (1) reduce Treasury’s authority to purchase or insure troubled assets to $475 billion and (2) prohibit Treasury, under the act, from incurring any additional obligations for a program or initiative unless the program or initiative had already been initiated prior to June 25, 2010. However, we noted that the extent of coordination could be enhanced and formalized, specifically with the FDIC, for any upcoming decisions that would benefit from interagency collaboration. Because TARP will be unwinding concurrently with other important interventions by federal regulators, decisions about the sequencing of the exits from various federal programs will require bringing a larger body of regulators to the table to plan and sequence the continued unwinding of federal support. Finally, we recommended (1) formalizing coordination with FDIC for future TARP decisions and (2) improving the transparency and analytical basis for TARP program decisions. Though TARP will soon expire, Treasury will still need to work with other agencies to effectively conduct a coordinated exit from TARP and other government financial assistance. Indicators Suggest a Recovery in Credit Markets, but Isolating the Impact of TARP’s Foreclosure Mitigation and Small Business Lending Efforts Will Be Difficult
Many market observers have said that, taken together, the concerted actions by Treasury and others helped avert a more severe financial crisis, although some critics believe that the markets would have recovered without government support. In our October 2009 and February 2010 reports we noted that some of the anticipated effects of TARP on credit markets and the economy had materialized and that some securitization markets had experienced a tentative recovery. Indicators we have been monitoring suggest credit markets have been able to sustain their recovery despite the winding down of key programs initiated by the Federal Reserve, Treasury, FDIC and others. However, a slow recovery does not necessarily mean that TARP is ineffective, because in absence of TARP it is possible that foreclosure and delinquency rates would be higher. Given that any new TARP activity will be limited to home ownership preservation and small business lending programs, we will continue to monitor indictors such as foreclosure and delinquencies as potential measures of the efficacy of these programs. Financial Audit: Office of Financial Stability (Troubled Asset Relief Program) Fiscal Year 2009 Financial Statements. Troubled Asset Relief Program: Treasury Actions Needed to Make the Home Affordable Modification Program More Transparent and Accountable. | Why GAO Did This Study
This testimony discusses our work on the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), which Congress established on October 3, 2008 in response to the financial crisis that threatened the stability of the U.S. financial system and the solvency of many financial institutions. Under the original TARP legislation, the Department of the Treasury (Treasury) had the authority to purchase or insure $700 billion in troubled assets held by financial institutions. As we have seen, since TARP's inception Treasury has chosen to use those funds for a variety of activities, including injecting capital into key financial institutions, implementing programs to address problems in the securitization markets, providing assistance to the automobile industry and American International Group, Inc. (AIG), and working to help homeowners struggling to keep their homes. Today, some of these programs have been discontinued and others are winding down, but others--such as homeownership preservation programs--may continue for some time. Treasury has also seen some participating institutions repay their TARP funds as they recover their financial health. The prospect for repayment from some other institutions, both large and small, remains unclear. The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act (the act) that authorized TARP required GAO to report at least every 60 days on findings from our oversight of actions taken under the programs. We have been monitoring TARP programs since their inception and our reports have highlighted challenges facing many of these programs. To date, we have issued over 25 reports and testimonies related to TARP and made over 50 recommendations to improve the transparency and accountability of its operations. This statement today draws primarily on 7 reports we have issued since October 2009. Specifically, this statement focuses on (1) the nature and purpose of activities that have been initiated under TARP and ongoing challenges, (2) the process for making decisions related to unwinding TARP programs, and (3) indicators of credit conditions in markets targeted by TARP programs. To do our work, we reviewed our prior reports and other documents provided by Treasury's Office of Financial Stability (OFS) and conducted interviews with Treasury and OFS officials. In addition, we have updated the program's receipts and disbursements through June 30, 2010, and indicators of credit markets as of July 1, 2010. We conducted these performance audits between July 2009 and June 2010 and updated information in July 2010 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
What GAO Found
Treasury has initiated a number of programs under TARP, some of which have ended or are being unwound. Others will continue. Among the programs no longer making commitments are the Capital Purchase Program (CPP) and Targeted Investment Program (TIP), while the Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP) and new small business lending initiatives are expected to continue for some time. Although Treasury has received significant repayments of the funding it provided to financial institutions, some investments and loans could still result in substantial losses to the government. We have been monitoring TARP programs since their inception. In particular, Chrysler Group LLC and General Motors Company (GM) have shown some indications of progress toward returning to profitability, such as doing better than they and Treasury had initially projected in terms of revenues, operating earnings, and cash flow. However, the extent to which the federal government will fully recoup its investment in the auto industry is uncertain, and the companies face several challenges in the coming years. Since early 2009, we have also been monitoring the status of federal assistance to AIG and its financial condition using indicators we developed. In April 2010, we reported that our indicators showed that AIG's financial condition has remained relatively stable largely due to the federal assistance provided by the Federal Reserve and Treasury, but the extent to which the federal government will recoup its investment remains uncertain and will not only depend on the AIG's financial condition but also other market factors such as the performance of the insurance sectors and the credit derivatives markets that are beyond the control of AIG or the government. Many of our reports have also highlighted the challenges facing TARP programs and made recommendations to enhance transparency and accountability of its programs. We reported that while Treasury had taken some steps to address these challenges it urgently needed to finalize and implement the various components of HAMP and ensure the transparency and accountability of these efforts. We will continue to monitor these programs and have ongoing work on several facets of TARP, including those initiatives that have a small business focus. We have also reviewed Treasury's framework for deciding to extend TARP beyond December, 31, 2009, and found that the process was sufficient but could be strengthened for similar decisions that will need to be made in the future. Specifically, we found that the extent of coordination could be enhanced and formalized between Treasury and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and recommended that Treasury formalize coordination with FDIC for future decisions. Although the authority for TARP is set to expire soon, Treasury will continue to face decisions in winding down programs, and many of these decisions will require interagency coordination. Because TARP will be unwinding concurrently with other important regulatory interventions, decisions about the sequencing of the exits from the programs will require regulators to work closely together. We have noted in past reports that some of the anticipated effects of TARP on credit markets and the economy had materialized and that some securitization markets had experienced a tentative recovery. Indicators we have been monitoring suggest that credit markets have been able to sustain their recovery despite the winding down of key programs initiated by the Federal Reserve, Treasury, FDIC and others. However, a slow recovery does not necessarily mean that TARP is ineffective, because in absence of TARP it is possible that foreclosure and delinquency rates would be higher. Finally, because any new TARP activity will be limited to home ownership preservation and small business lending programs, we will also continue to monitor indicators such as foreclosure and delinquencies as potential measures of the programs' success. |
gao_GAO-12-285 | gao_GAO-12-285_0 | Ambassador) or under DOD’s combatant commander authority. In addition, representatives from State, other U.S. agencies under Chief of Mission authority, and U.S. Embassy Kabul participate in periodic interagency staffing reviews. that are organized, ready, trained, cleared, and equipped in a manner that enhances their availability to mobilize and respond urgently to expeditionary requirements now and in the future. Department of Defense Directive 1404.10, DOD Civilian Expeditionary Workforce (Jan. 23, 2009). civilians must complete. U.S. Agencies Reported Expanding Their Civilian Presence in Afghanistan and Took Steps to Improve Their Ability to Track That Presence
Since January 2009, U.S. agencies under Chief of Mission authority more than tripled their civilian presence and expanded outside Kabul in response to the President’s 2009 announcement. DOD both created new programs to build the security capacity of the Afghan government and reported expanding its overall civilian presence. Furthermore, according to federal internal control standards, program managers need operational data to determine whether they are meeting the goals of their agencies’ strategic and annual performance plans and accounting for the effective and efficient use of resources.Orientation and In-Processing (responsible for ensuring that interagency personnel meet all administrative, medical, and training requirements before deploying to Afghanistan) began using a data system called the Afghanistan Civilian Personnel Tracking System (ACPTS) in February 2011 to track Chief of Mission personnel’s locations and movements (e.g., movement from Kabul to a district support team) and to identify position-specific information (e.g., location, position title, appointment type or grade, vacancy status, and the strategic line of effort to which a position belongs). As shown in figure 3, DOD reported its civilian presence in Afghanistan grew from 394 civilians in January 2009 to 2,929 in December 2011. In addition, DOD established two programs to respond to the department’s mission to build the capacity of the Afghan government. DOD Took Preliminary Steps to Implement CEW Policy but Did Not Identify the Number and Types of Positions That Should Constitute the CEW
The Office of the Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness is responsible for overseeing implementation of the 2009 CEW directive, including developing policy and implementing procedural guidance for the CEW. However, the CEW program has not been fully developed and implemented. In particular, DOD components have not identified and designated the number and types of positions that should constitute the emergency-essential, non-combat essential, and capability-based volunteer segments of the CEW because guidance for making such determinations has not been provided by the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Office of the Secretary of Defense officials stated that once key assumptions regarding the size and composition of the CEW have been finalized, implementing guidance will be issued that will contain information on how the components are to identify and designate positions as emergency-essential, non-combat essential and capability- based volunteers. By not developing guidance that instructs the components on how to identify and designate the number and types of positions that will constitute the CEW, DOD may not be able to (1) make the CEW a significant portion of the civilian workforce as called for in DOD’s Fiscal (2) meet readiness Year 2009 Civilian Human Capital Strategic Plan,goals for the CEW as required in DOD’s Strategic Management Plan for Fiscal Years 2012-2013,missions. U.S. Agencies Established Afghanistan-Specific Predeployment Training Requirements, but DOD Faced Implementation Challenges
State Provided Required Training for Personnel Deploying to Afghanistan
State has established predeployment training requirements for all Chief of Mission personnel deploying to Afghanistan, including courses offered by State’s Foreign Service Institute, as well as key security training provided by State’s Diplomatic Security Bureau—the FACT course. Conclusions
The U.S. civilian presence in Afghanistan and the deployment of civilians to Afghan provinces and districts remain crucial to U.S. efforts to build the capacity of the Afghan government to provide essential services to its people with limited international support. While agencies present under Chief of Mission authority benefit from a centralized set of training requirements and internal controls, DOD’s civilian training process does not have the same level of oversight or centralized control. DOD concurred with our recommendation to establish a process to identify and approve pre-deployment training requirements for all DOD civilians. DOD concurred with our recommendation to establish a process to coordinate with key stakeholders such as the military services and subordinate commands to ensure that training requirements are synchronized among and within DOD components and with department- wide guidance. To examine the expansion of the U.S. civilian presence in Afghanistan, we obtained and analyzed staffing data from State and DOD regarding staffing requirements and fill rates for all civilian positions under Chief of Mission authority and key positions under combatant commander authority deployed in-country following the President’s March 2009 call to enhance support of Afghan national and subnational government institutions. However, the extent to which DOD staffing data in the Joint Personnel Status Report are reliable is unknown because previous reports have omitted or double counted personnel. To determine the extent to which U.S. agencies had provided required Afghanistan-specific training to their personnel before deployment, we reviewed predeployment training requirements established by the Department of State for all Chief of Mission personnel and the requirements set by various programs and components within the DOD. | Why GAO Did This Study
In March 2009, the President called for an expanded U.S. civilian presence under Chief of Mission authority to build the capacity of the Afghan government to provide security, essential services, and economic development. In addition, the Department of Defense (DOD) deploys civilians under combatant commander authority to Afghanistan to support both combat and capacity-building missions. DOD established the Civilian Expeditionary Workforce (CEW) in 2009 to create a cadre of civilians trained, cleared, and equipped to respond urgently to expeditionary requirements. As the military draws down, U.S. civilians will remain crucial to achieving the goal of transferring lead security responsibility to the Afghan government in 2014.
For this report, GAO (1) examined the expansion of the U.S. civilian presence in Afghanistan, (2) evaluated DODs implementation of its CEW policy, and (3) determined the extent to which U.S. agencies had provided required Afghanistan-specific training to their personnel before deployment. GAO analyzed staffing data and training requirements, and interviewed cognizant officials from the Department of State (State), other U.S. agencies with personnel under Chief of Mission authority in Afghanistan, and DOD.
What GAO Found
U.S. agencies under Chief of Mission authority and the Department of Defense (DOD) have reported expanding their civilian presence in Afghanistan and took steps to improve their ability to track that presence. Since January 2009, U.S. agencies under Chief of Mission authority more than tripled their civilian presence from 320 to 1,142. However, although State could report total Chief of Mission numbers by agency, in mid-2011 GAO identified discrepancies in States data system used to capture more-detailed staffing information such as location and position type. State began taking steps in the fall of 2011 to improve the reliability of its data system. Also, DOD reported expanding its overall civilian presence from 394 civilians in January 2009 to 2,929 in December 2011 to help assist U.S. efforts in Afghanistan. The extent to which DODs data is reliable is unknown due to omissions and double counting, among other things. In a 2009 report, GAO noted similar data issues and recommended DOD improve data concerning deployed civilians. DOD concurred with the recommendation and expects the issues will be addressed by a new tracking system to be completed in fiscal year 2012.
DOD has taken preliminary steps to implement its Civilian Expeditionary Workforce (CEW) policy, including establishing a program office; however, nearly 3 years after DODs directive established the CEW, the program has not been fully developed and implemented. Specifically, DOD components have not identified and designated the number and types of positions that should constitute the CEW because guidance for making such determinations has not been provided by the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Officials stated that once key assumptions regarding the size and composition of the CEW have been finalized, implementing guidance will be issued. Until guidance that instructs the components on how to identify and designate the number and types of positions that will constitute the CEW is developed, DOD may not be able to (1) make the CEW a significant portion of the civilian workforce as called for in DODs fiscal year 2009 Civilian Human Capital Strategic Plan, (2) meet readiness goals for the CEW as required in DODs Strategic Management Plan for fiscal years 2012-2013, and (3) position itself to respond to future missions.
U.S. agencies under Chief of Mission authority and DOD provided Afghanistan-specific, predeployment training to their civilians, but DOD faced challenges. State offered predeployment training courses to address its requirements for Chief of Mission personnel and designated a centralized point of contact to help ensure that no personnel were deployed without taking required training, including the Foreign Affairs Counter Threat course. While predeployment training requirements were established for Afghanistan by the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Combatant Commander, DOD relied on its various components to provide the training to its civilians. In some cases, DOD components offered duplicate training courses and did not address all theater requirements in their training because DOD did not have a process for identifying and synchronizing requirements and coordinating efforts to implement them, as called for in the Strategic Plan for the Next Generation of Training for the Department of Defense. Absent this process, DOD could not ensure that its civilians were fully prepared for deployment to Afghanistan and that training resources were used efficiently.
What GAO Recommends
GAOs recommendations to DOD include developing key assumptions and identifying the number and types of positions that should constitute the CEW, and establishing a process to identify and synchronize training requirements. DOD concurred with GAOs recommendations. |
gao_GAO-04-669 | gao_GAO-04-669_0 | Only 4 percent of the responses we received from CSRs were correct and complete. Our test suggested several factors that may account for poor performance, including fragmented information scattered among a variety of sources, confusing information that may be difficult for CSRs to understand and interpret, and difficulties in retaining CSRs. CSRs Almost Never Provided Correct and Complete Responses to Our Policy Questions
We found that CSRs provided incorrect, partially correct, or incomplete responses to 96 percent of the 300 policy-oriented test calls we made to carrier call centers. Twelve of the references were either incorrect or did not include all of the information needed to give a correct and complete answer. CMS’s Efforts Not Targeted to Supplying Policy- Oriented Information to CSRs
Although CMS is currently implementing two initiatives that may improve CSRs’ access to information, neither of these new tools is designed to support the CSRs who respond to providers’ policy-oriented questions. Moreover, there are no plans to publish articles for the majority of existing policies. Many of these centers triage incoming calls through a feature known as “skill-based routing.” Skill- based routing systems are designed to enhance customer service by allowing the call center to first identify the nature of an incoming call and to then distribute the call to the CSR who is best qualified to respond to the caller’s question. Call Center Oversight Does Not Adequately Assess CSRs’ Responses to Policy- Oriented Questions
CMS requires carriers to monitor the performance of their call centers. However, the performance standards that carriers are required to use, and the technology available to most of them, do not facilitate thorough assessments of whether CSRs provide correct and complete responses to policy-oriented questions. In addition, CMS’s own monitoring efforts— CPEs and remote monitoring of select calls—do not provide sufficiently detailed or meaningful information regarding CSR accuracy. In fiscal year 2002, only one carrier call center had a CPE covering provider telephone inquiries. Not one CPE was performed in fiscal year 2003. Now that CMS has been given new authority to contract with a variety of entities to assist it with managing the Medicare program, it should take the opportunity to improve its communications with providers. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To determine carriers’ effectiveness in providing correct and complete responses, we placed 300 calls to 34 carrier call centers. To determine the efforts CMS has made to provide oversight, we identified CMS requirements for carrier call center operations and discussed with CMS staff the agency’s oversight and monitoring of carrier call center activities. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 2002, GAO reported that the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) needed to improve its communications with providers who deliver medical care to beneficiaries. GAO reported that 85 percent of the responses it received to 61 calls made to call centers operated by Medicare carriers--contractors that help manage the Medicare program--were incorrect or incomplete. GAO also found that CMS's primary oversight tools were insufficient to ensure accuracy in communication. GAO was asked whether call centers now provide correct and complete information to providers. GAO (1) reviewed carriers' effectiveness in providing correct and complete responses to policy-oriented telephone inquiries and CMS's efforts to improve communications with providers and (2) evaluated CMS's efforts to provide oversight of carrier call centers.
What GAO Found
Only 4 percent of the responses GAO received in 300 test calls to 34 call centers were correct and complete. GAO posed four policy-oriented questions 75 times each to carrier call centers. The level of correct and complete responses for each individual billing question ranged from 1 to 5 percent. The majority of remaining responses were incorrect, or partially correct or incomplete. Several factors, including fragmented sources of information, confusing policy information, and difficulties in retaining the CSRs responding to calls appear to account for the lack of correct and complete answers. There are many call centers serving other industries that triage incoming calls by first identifying the nature of the call and then distributing it to the CSR who is best qualified to respond. Although CMS has not adopted this approach, it is currently implementing two other initiatives that may improve CSRs' access to information. However, neither initiative is specifically designed to support CSRs responding to policy-oriented questions. In addition, CMS's efforts to provide oversight of carrier call centers are inadequate. Although CMS requires carriers to monitor the performance of their call centers, the standards used and the technological resources available to evaluate performance do not allow carriers to thoroughly assess whether CSRs' responses are correct and complete. In addition, CMS's own monitoring efforts are too infrequent. CMS only performed one contractor performance evaluation related to carrier telephone services in fiscal year 2002 and none were performed in fiscal year 2003. Moreover, when performed, these evaluations did not provide sufficiently detailed information to assess CSRs' performance. |
gao_GAO-09-525T | gao_GAO-09-525T_0 | The Bureau designed its Integrated Communications Campaign to help increase census participation. As one example, the contractor worked with the Bureau to segment the population into distinct groups or “clusters” using socioeconomic, demographic, and other data from the 2000 Census that are correlated with a person’s likelihood to participate in the census. Key Practices Are Helping to Enhance the Effectiveness of the Partnership Program
To help promote the census and convince people to respond, the Bureau plans to partner with state, local, and tribal governments; religious, community, and social service organizations; and private businesses. According to the Bureau, it partnered with around 140,000 organizations during the 2000 Census. According to the Bureau, it will allocate the partnership staff among and within the Bureau’s 12 regions using a formula that incorporates the hard- to-count score, as well as other data, including population size, geographic information, language needs, and local knowledge. Officials emphasized that they are using census data to focus resources on hard-to-count populations. In addition to these best practices we also included several recommendations aimed at making the partnership program more accountable and performance-oriented—all of which the Bureau implemented. The Bureau reports that it has obtained partnership agreements with over 10,000 organizations as of February 2009. That said, as the Bureau monitors the progress of the partnership efforts, it will be important for the Bureau to develop specific performance metrics linked to the goals of the partnership program and the census itself. The Bureau Updated Its Paid Media and Public Relations Strategy to Meet a Changing Media Environment
The Bureau will use numerous paid media sources, such as TV, radio, the Internet, and magazines, to reach individuals from all clusters and ethnic audiences. The Bureau plans to devote 55 percent of its advertising resources to national media, which provide the broadest reach, and 45 percent to local media, which better target specific hard-to-count communities. However, the Bureau reduced the goal of the number of participating schools based on its conclusion following the 2000 census that the program is most effective and receives the greatest return on investment in hard-to-count areas and with younger grades (kindergarten through 8th). Stimulus Funds Provide Additional Money for Outreach to Hard-to-Count Populations, but Planning Is Not Yet Complete
The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 provided $1 billion in funding for the 2010 Decennial Census. Concluding Observations
The design of the Bureau’s communications campaign appears to be comprehensive and integrated. The Bureau also plans to track response rates in 2010 and quickly deploy resources to those areas in need of a boost. If each of the various components of the communications campaign is implemented as planned, they will help position the Bureau to improve participation in the census and address the differential undercount. While the communications campaign has made important steps forward, considerable work lies ahead in moving from the planning to the operational phases. Further, while money from the economic stimulus package could help augment marketing of the census, less clear is the extent to which these additional funds will improve response behavior or which component of the campaign will yield the best results. Moving forward, to help ensure a more accountable and results-oriented communications campaign, it will be important for the Bureau to continue to apply lessons learned from the 2000 Census to the implementation of the 2010 communications effort, as well as develop and meet specific performance goals. Moreover, consistent with the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, it will be important for the Bureau to first develop a spending plan for the money it receives under the act, identifying, among other things, (1) cost estimates of the activities being funded, (2) the objectives and outcome-related goals of the planned spending, and (3) how the spending will help achieve those goals. | Why GAO Did This Study
A complete and accurate census is becoming an increasingly daunting task, in part because the nation's population is growing larger, more diverse, and more reluctant to participate, according to the U.S. Census Bureau (Bureau). When the census misses a person who should have been included, it results in an undercount, and the differential impact on various subpopulations, such as minorities, is particularly problematic. This testimony provides an update on the Bureau's readiness to implement its Integrated Communications Campaign, one of several efforts aimed at reducing the undercount. GAO focused on the campaign's key components: partnerships with local and national organizations, paid advertising and public relations, and Census in Schools (designed to reach parents and guardians through their school-age children). GAO also discusses the extent to which the rollout of the campaign is consistent with factors important for greater accountability and successful results. This testimony is based on previously issued work, ongoing reviews of relevant documents, and interviews with key Bureau officials.
What GAO Found
The Bureau has made notable progress in rolling out key components of its communications campaign; if implemented as planned, the campaign will help position the Bureau to address the undercount. For example, to help promote the census and convince individuals--especially hard-to-count groups--to respond, the Bureau plans to partner with state, local, and tribal governments; religious, community, and social service organizations; and private businesses to secure a more complete count. According to the Bureau, it has thus far secured partnership agreements with more than 10,000 organizations for 2010. The Bureau intends to focus its efforts on hard-to-count communities using data from the 2000 Census, and additional funding made available from the recently enacted economic recovery legislation will enable the Bureau to greatly expand staffing for the partnership program. Future success will depend in part on how well the Bureau communicates with partners and incorporates other best practices from 2000, as well as on how well it monitors the progress of the partnership efforts and whether it uses results-oriented measures so as to deploy resources as needed. The Bureau updated its paid media and public relations strategy from 2000 to meet a changing media environment and plans to focus its efforts on hard-to-count populations. In addition to traditional outlets such as television and radio, the Bureau also intends to employ on line media, such as podcasts and blogs. Currently, the Bureau plans to devote 55 percent of its advertising resources to national media, which provides the broadest reach, and 45 percent to local media, which better targets specific hard-to-count communities. The Bureau has also completed research on factors affecting census participation, which could help the Bureau address the long-standing issue of converting awareness of the census into actual participation. The Census in Schools program is also moving forward. Like the other components of the communications campaign, the Bureau plans to target its efforts to those schools where data from the 2000 Census suggest that the program will have the most impact: school districts in hard-to-count communities and kindergarten through 8th grade. In general, the design of the Bureau's communications campaign appears to be comprehensive, integrated, shaped by the Bureau's experience in the 2000 Census, and targeted to hard-to-count populations. The programs GAO reviewed are in the planning or early implementation phases, and future success will depend on how well the Bureau moves from the design to operational phases. Further, while the extra money the Bureau received under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 will help augment its outreach efforts, it does not necessarily follow that additional activity will yield higher response rates. Therefore, consistent with the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act the Bureau will need to identify, among other things, (1) cost estimates of the activities being funded, (2) the objectives and outcome-related goals of the planned spending, and (3) how the spending will help achieve those goals. |
gao_GGD-95-35 | gao_GGD-95-35_0 | Proponents of a nationwide interstate banking and branching law believed that removing restrictions would strengthen the banking industry and benefit customers by (1) increasing competition and geographic diversification, (2) reducing the need for customers to maintain separate accounts in different states, and (3) offering a wider range of products and services that are generally associated with larger banking companies.Opponents feared such actions would lead to adverse effects such as excessively concentrating assets and deposits under large banks’ control, impairing smaller banks’ survival, and reducing small businesses’ access to credit. Smaller banks as a group were recapturing market share. This decline had more to do with Arizona’s “boom and bust” economy than with geographic deregulation, according to regulators and industry experts. In all three states, some markets lacked smaller banks. Senior officials from these banks viewed small businesses as belonging to a sector with opportunities for profit. Although the scoring system might protect the bank from defaults and increase the bank’s total amount of small business lending, it could result in the bank rejecting loan applications that could have been repaid by the would-be borrowers. New bank entry offset much, and in some years all, of the decline in the number of banks in the state. Nevertheless, by-products of in-state and interstate geographic deregulation, namely industry consolidation and standardized and centralized loan decisionmaking practices of large banks (which in Washington are interstate banks) led some small business experts, bankers, and government officials to have the following concerns:
Will small businesses become more dependent on large banks for credit as the industry continues to consolidate? These practices depersonalized the relationship between the loan applicant and the banker making the decision, thereby creating difficulty for certain businesses that did not meet the banks’ preestablished criteria. Branching is not permitted. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed three states' experiences with interstate banking deregulation.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) geographic banking deregulation has not resulted in significant consolidation in the banking industry; (2) the banking industry in the three states reviewed is already highly concentrated; (3) the large banks' experiences with geographic deregulation have been mixed; (4) although smaller banks continue to play an important role and frequently are among the most profitable banks, some small banks' market share has declined; (5) although the standardization of loan criteria may restrict small businesses' access to credit, depersonalize the loan officer-borrower relationship, and make it difficult for loan officers to analyze relevant credit information, large banks believe that geographic deregulation has enabled them to become more efficient and serve more small businesses; (6) some banking industry officials attribute credit difficulties in the three states to the decline in the number of small banks and the increased emphasis on consumer lending; (7) although small banks do not have a large presence in some inner cities and rural markets, industry officials view these banks as strong providers of credit; and (8) antitrust enforcement of the banking industry is needed to better meet the needs of small businesses and ensure that any adverse impacts of consolidation on the small business sector is minimized. |
gao_GAO-12-209 | gao_GAO-12-209_0 | Under the Global Settlement, the firms were required to reform their structures and practices to insulate equity analysts from investment banking pressures. SEC and FINRA have asserted that analyst conflicts can harm investors. Data and Stakeholders’ Views Suggest That Regulatory Actions Have Helped Address Conflicts Faced by Equity Analysts
We reviewed empirical studies, analyzed examination and enforcement action data, and interviewed market participants and observers to assess the extent to which regulatory actions have addressed equity analysts’ conflicts of interest. However, these results generally were mixed. In addition, FINRA officials and SEC staff told us that they view the regulatory reforms as effective—citing their examination findings and the limited number of enforcement actions involving conflicts between research and investment banking as evidence of the reforms’ effectiveness. Similarly, FINRA’s examination findings indicate that the Global Settlement firms generally have complied with the Global Settlement. SEC staff said that they do not have an examination module specifically designed to cover the SRO research analyst rules or the Global Settlement but have reviewed whether broker-dealers were complying with such requirements in some of their examinations of broker-dealers examined by FINRA. Specifically, the recommendations included: changing the definition of “research analyst,” “research report,” and other terms used in the rule, to codify exceptions set forth in previous interpretive material and to align with SEC Regulation Analyst Certification and the Global Settlement; eliminating a provision that permitted investment banking personnel to review research before publication (to verify factual information), because SRO staff believed that such a review raised concerns about the objectivity of the research and noted that such a review was not permitted under the Global Settlement’s terms; amending the disclosure rules to provide more effective disclosure by allowing, in lieu of disclosure in the research report itself, a prominent warning on the cover of research reports that conflicts exist and information about how investors could obtain more details about those conflicts of interest on the firm’s website, because staff were concerned that the volume of disclosures in the reports could obscure their overall message; and amending the provision that prohibited investment banking personnel from retaliating against research analysts as a result of unfavorable research to include all of a firm’s employees. According to FINRA officials, their tentative plan is to seek comment on a regulatory notice on a revised debt research proposal and then package the final debt and equity research rule proposals together and submit a single proposed consolidated research analyst rule to SEC in the first half of 2012. SEC and FINRA Have Not Formally Assessed and Documented Whether Any of the Global Settlement’s Remaining Terms Should Be Codified
Although the Global Settlement has been in place since 2003 and includes a provision that allows for it to be modified or superseded, SEC and FINRA have not proposed codifying the Global Settlement’s remaining terms. Although SEC staff and FINRA officials periodically have discussed and analyzed the Global Settlement’s terms, they have not formally determined and documented the benefits and costs of adopting rules based on the Global Settlement’s remaining terms. However, as long as the Global Settlement remains in effect, the Global Settlement firms continue to be subject to the requirements of the Global Settlement and the SRO research analyst rules, while other firms that provide the same services are subject only to the SRO research analyst rules. As a result, investors may not be provided the same level of protection. We have previously reported that a regulatory framework should include investor protection as part of its mission to ensure that market participants receive consistent, useful information, as well as consistent legal protections for similar financial products and services. In addition, NASD and NYSE encouraged firms to consider adopting industry-developed principles to address such conflicts. At the time, BMA did not support the adoption of SRO rules designed to address fixed-income conflicts. To the extent that any of the Global Settlement’s remaining terms provide an effective way of furthering investor protection, by not assessing their codification SEC may be missing an opportunity to provide consistent investor protection. Recommendation for Executive Action
To help ensure that investors consistently are protected from potential conflicts of interest between research analysts and investment bankers employed by the same broker-dealers, the Chairman of SEC should direct the appropriate divisions or offices to formally assess and document in a recommendation whether any of the Global Settlement’s remaining terms should be codified. SEC staff noted that the agency has been working to promote the objectivity and independence of securities research analysts. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Section 919A of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act requires us to identify and examine potential conflicts of interest between investment banking and research staff in the same firm.To address this mandate, we examined (1) what is known about the effectiveness of the regulatory actions taken to address research analyst conflicts of interest and (2) what additional actions, if any, could regulators take to further address research analyst conflicts. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 2003 and 2004, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), self-regulatory organizations (SRO), and others settled with 12 broker-dealers to address conflicts of interest between the firms research and investment banking personnel. The regulators alleged that the firms allowed their investment bankers to pressure equity research analysts in ways that could cause them to issue misleading research to the harm of investors. Under the Global Research Analyst Settlement (Global Settlement), the firms had to undertake reforms designed to sever links between research and investment banking. The SROs also adopted equity research rules to address analyst conflicts across the industry, but these rules were not as stringent in some areas as the Global Settlement. The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act required GAO to study these issues. This report discusses (1) what is known about the effectiveness of the regulatory actions taken to address analyst conflicts and (2) what further actions, if any, could be taken to address analyst conflicts. GAO reviewed empirical studies and SEC and SRO rules, examination findings, and enforcement actions. GAO interviewed SEC and Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) staff, and market participants and observers.
What GAO Found
Existing research and stakeholder views suggest that the Global Settlement and other regulatory actions have helped to address conflicts faced by equity research analysts. The results of the empirical studies that GAO reviewed generally suggest that the Global Settlement and equity research rules adopted by the SROs were associated with improvements in analysts stock recommendations. FINRA officials and SEC staff told GAO that the regulatory reforms have been effective, citing minor deficiencies in their examinations and the limited number of enforcement actions involving conflicts between research and investment banking as evidence of the reforms effectiveness. Independent monitors, which were required as part of the Global Settlement, also found that the 12 firms generally were complying with the Global Settlement. Finally, broker-dealers, institutional investors, and others told GAO that the regulatory actions have helped insulate equity research from investment banking influence, although some noted that not all conflicts can be eliminated and certain restrictions can be circumvented.
Although SEC and FINRA have been taking regulatory action to further address conflicts faced by research analysts, additional action is warranted. FINRA has been working to finalize a rule proposal designed to broaden the obligations of firms to identify and manage equity analyst conflicts and better balance the goals of helping ensure objective and reliable research with minimizing regulatory costs and burdens. FINRA also has been working to finalize another rule proposal that would address conflicts faced by debt research analysts. The current SRO research rules do not cover debt research analysts, although these analysts face conflicts of interests similar to those faced by their equity analyst counterparts. In the absence of an SRO debt research rule, the SROs have relied on antifraud statutes and SRO rules requiring ethical conduct. They also have encouraged firmswith limited successto comply voluntarily with industry-developed principles designed to address debt analyst conflicts. FINRA plans to package its two rule proposals together and submit them to SEC in the first half of 2012. In contrast, SEC and FINRA have not proposed codifying the Global Settlements remaining terms. At the request of the broker-dealers, a court modified the Global Settlement in 2010 and eliminated settlement terms where, for the most part, comparable SRO rules existed. Nonetheless, some of the Global Settlements terms that serve to protect investors have not been codified. As a result, the Global Settlement firms continue to be subject to the requirements of the Global Settlement and the SRO research analyst rules, while other firms that provide the same services are subject only to the SRO research analyst rules. As a result, investors may not be provided the same level of protection. GAO has previously reported that a regulatory framework should ensure that market participants receive consistent and useful information as well as consistent protections for similar financial products and services. SEC staff told GAO that they periodically have discussed and analyzed the Global Settlement terms but have not formally assessed and documented whether any of the Global Settlements remaining terms should be codified. By not formally assessing whether codifying any of the Global Settlements remaining terms provides an effective way of furthering investor protection, SEC may be missing an opportunity to provide the same level of protection for all investors.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that SEC formally assess and document whether any of the Global Settlements remaining terms should be codified. SEC agreed with the recommendation. |
gao_GAO-12-492 | gao_GAO-12-492_0 | Background
The LDA, as amended by HLOGA, requires lobbyists to register with the Secretary of the Senate and the Clerk of the House and file quarterly reports disclosing their lobbying activity. No specific requirements exist for lobbyists to generate or maintain documentation in support of the information disclosed in the reports they file. Documentation to Support Some LD-2 Report Elements Varied, but Most Newly Registered Lobbyists Met Disclosure Reporting Requirements
Most Lobbyists Provided Documentation for LD-2 Reports, but Documentation for Some Report Elements Did Not Match Their Disclosure Reports
As in our prior reviews, most lobbyists reporting $5,000 or more in income or expenses were able to provide documentation to varying degrees for the reporting elements in their disclosure reports. Lobbyists for an estimated 93 percent of LD-2 reports were able to provide documentation to support the income and expenses reported for the third and fourth quarters of 2010 and the first and second quarters of 2011. Lobbyists for an estimated 86 percent of LD-2 reports filed year-end 2010 or midyear 2011 LD-203 contribution reports for all of the lobbyists and lobbying firms listed on the report as required. Last year, 21 lobbying firms indicated they planned to amend their LD-2 reports. Some LD-203 Contribution Reports Omitted Political Contributions Listed in the FEC Database
We estimate that overall, a minimum of 4 percent of reports failed to disclose one or more contributions.contributions listed on lobbyists’ and lobbying firms’ LD-203 reports against those political contributions reported in the FEC database to identify whether political contributions were omitted on LD-2 reports in our sample. This is a match rate of 88 percent of registrations, which is consistent with our prior reviews. Compared to last year, fewer lobbyists told us that they found the quarterly reporting requirement difficult to meet. Table 2 summarizes the feedback we obtained from the lobbying firms in our sample of reports that rated the lobbying terms as either “not clear and understandable” or “somewhat clear and understandable.”
U.S. Attorney’s Office Actions to Enforce the LDA
The Office’s Authorities, Processes, and Resources to Enforce LDA Compliance
The Office stated that it has sufficient resources and authority to enforce compliance with LDA requirements, including imposing civil or criminal penalties for noncompliance. In addition, the Office hired one contract staff member in September 2010 to work on lobbying compliance issues on a full-time basis. As a result, the Office developed a system that allowed it To enforce LDA compliance, the Office has primarily focused on sending letters to lobbyists who have potentially violated the LDA by not filing disclosure reports as required. The Office has also received referrals from the Secretary of the Senate and the Clerk of the House for noncompliance with LD-203 reports. In November 2011, the Office settled its first enforcement case since the enactment of HLOGA in 2007 and reached a $45,000 settlement with a lobbying firm that had been referred to the Office repeatedly for failure to file disclosure reports. Agency Comments
We provided a draft of this report to the Attorney General for review and comment. We met with the Assistant U.S. Attorney for the District of Columbia, who on behalf of the Attorney General responded that Department of Justice had no comments of the draft of this report. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Consistent with the audit mandates in the Honest Leadership and Open Government Act (HLOGA), our objectives were to determine the extent to which lobbyists are able to demonstrate compliance with the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995 as amended (LDA) by providing documentation to support information contained on registrations and reports filed under the LDA; identify any challenges to compliance and potential improvements; and describe the resources and authorities available to the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of Columbia (the Office) and the efforts the Office has made to improve enforcement of the LDA, including identifying trends in past lobbying disclosure compliance. We used the House database for sampling LD-2 reports from the third and fourth quarters of calendar year 2010 and the first and second quarters of calendar year 2011, as well as for sampling year-end 2010 and midyear 2011 political contributions (LD-203) reports, and finally for matching quarterly registrations with filed reports. This allowed us to generalize to a population of 51,792 activity reports. To determine if the LDA’s requirement for registrants to file a report in the quarter of registration was met for the third and fourth quarters of 2010 and the first and second quarters of 2011, we used data filed with the Clerk of the House to match newly filed registrations with corresponding disclosure reports. | Why GAO Did This Study
HLOGA requires lobbyists to file quarterly lobbying disclosure reports and semiannual reports on certain political contributions. HLOGA also requires that GAO annually (1) determine the extent to which lobbyists can demonstrate compliance with disclosure requirements, (2) identify any challenges to compliance that lobbyists report, and (3) describe the resources and authorities available to the Office and the efforts the Office has made to improve its enforcement of the LDA. This is GAOs fifth report under the mandate. GAO reviewed a stratified random sample of 100 quarterly LD-2 reports filed for the third and fourth quarters of calendar year 2010 and the first and second quarters of calendar year 2011. GAO also reviewed two random samples totaling 160 LD-203 reports from year-end 2010 and midyear 2011. This methodology allowed GAO to generalize to the population of 51,792 disclosure reports with $5,000 or more in lobbying activity and 32,301 reports of federal political campaign contributions. GAO also met with officials from the Office regarding efforts to focus resources on lobbyists who fail to comply. GAO provided a draft of this report to the Attorney General for review and comment. The Assistant U.S. Attorney for the District of Columbia responded on behalf of the Attorney General that the Department of Justice had no comments on the draft of this report.
What GAO Found
Most lobbyists were able to provide documentation to demonstrate compliance with disclosure requirements. This finding is similar to GAOs results from prior reviews. There are no specific requirements for lobbyists to create or maintain documentation related to disclosure reports they file under the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995 as amended (LDA). Nonetheless, and similar to last years results, for two key elements of the reports (income and expenses), GAO estimates that lobbyists could provide documentation to support approximately 93 percent of the disclosure reports for the third and fourth quarters of 2010 and the first and second quarters of 2011. According to documentation lobbyists provided for income and expenses, GAO estimates that the amounts disclosed were properly reported and supported for 63 percent of the quarterly lobbying disclosure (LD-2) reports. For lobbyists and lobbying firms listed on the LD-2 report, an estimated 86 percent filed year-end 2010 or midyear 2011 reports of federal political campaign contributions (LD-203) reports as required. For LD-203 political contributions reports, GAO estimates that a minimum of 4 percent of all LD-203 reports omitted one or more reportable political contributions that were documented in the Federal Election Commission database. Fewer lobbyists17 this year versus 21 in the prior yearstated that they planned to amend their LD-2 report following GAOs reviews to make correction on one or more data elements. As of March 2012, 9 of 17 amended their disclosure reports.
Lobbyists are required to file LD-2 reports for the quarter in which they first register. The majority of lobbyists who newly registered with the Secretary of the Senate and Clerk of the House of Representatives in the third and fourth quarters of 2010 and first and second quarters of 2011 filed required disclosure reports for that period. GAO could identify corresponding reports on file for lobbying activity for 88 percent of registrants.
The majority of lobbyists felt that the terms associated with disclosure reporting were clear and understandable and the requirements were easy to meet. However, a few lobbyists reported challenges in complying with the LDA.
The U.S. Attorneys Office for the District of Columbia (the Office) stated that it has resources and authorities to pursue civil or criminal cases for noncompliance with LDA requirements. To enhance enforcement efforts and support the 17 staff who have been working on compliance issues on a part-time basis, the Office hired one contract staff member in September 2010 who works full-time on lobbying compliance issues. The Office has primarily focused on contacting lobbyists who have potentially violated the LDA by not filing disclosure reports. In November 2011, the Office settled its first enforcement case since the enactment of the Honest Leadership and Open Government Act of 2007 (HLOGA), and reached a $45,000 settlement with a lobbying firm that had been referred to the Office repeatedly for failure to file disclosure reports. More than half of the 561 lobbyists who were contacted for noncompliance with LD-2 requirements for calendar years 2009 and 2010 are now compliant. Approximately 1,081 lobbyists were referred by the Secretary of the Senate for noncompliance with LD-203 requirements for calendar year 2009. |
gao_GAO-14-707 | gao_GAO-14-707_0 | Section 806 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2012 required DOD to develop a strategy to ensure that evaluations in past performance databases used for making source selection decisions are complete, timely, and accurate.process was also to be revised so that contractor past performance evaluations are posted to the databases used for source selection decisions no more than 14 days after the performance information is provided to the contractor. OFPP’s Past Performance Strategy Relies on Enhanced Oversight and Guidance and Revised Acquisition Regulations
OFPP’s strategy to improve past performance information and respond to section 853 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2013 is to increase oversight of contractor performance evaluations, develop government-wide past performance guidance, and revise the FAR. Since 2009, OFPP has taken a number of actions, in conjunction with other organizations, to improve the amount and quality of past performance information available, including emphasizing reporting requirements; assessing the level of compliance and quality of evaluations; developing a compliance tracking tool; setting agency performance targets; consolidating systems used to enter past performance information; and developing government-wide past performance guidance. In addition, OFPP worked with the FAR Council to revise the FAR to implement provisions of the NDAAs for Fiscal Years 2012 and 2013 related to assigning responsibility and accountability; implementing standards for complete evaluations; and ensuring submissions are consistent with award fee evaluations. Revisions by OFPP and the FAR Council to the timing of the contractor comment process in accordance with the acts became effective in July 2014. In establishing these targets, OFPP reviewed the compliance rates of agencies and found that the level of compliance varied widely. The memo also highlighted training opportunities for agencies’ acquisition workforces on documenting contractor performance. Previously, contractors were allowed a minimum of 30 days to provide comments, rebuttals, or additional information. Compliance with the Reporting Requirement Varies Greatly by Agency
Although agencies have generally improved their level of compliance with the reporting requirements over the last year, that rate varies greatly by agency and most have not met the targets set by OFPP. As shown in table 2, all of the top 10 agencies, based on number of contracts or orders with an evaluation due in PPIRS, showed improvement in reporting compliance from 2013 to 2014, but the compliance rate varied from 13 percent to 83 percent as of April 2014. However, the official noted that some agencies report workforce shortages, work priorities, and time constraints as hindering better compliance. The OFPP official stated the office plans to continue its efforts to improve past performance information and strengthen reporting compliance, by taking the following actions: collaborating with agency senior procurement executives to increase management oversight and leadership; working with the FAR Council on the development of additional regulatory guidance, as necessary, to standardize reporting practices and improve agency consideration of past performance information; directing the Federal Acquisition Institute to develop useful training aids to ensure agencies know how to consider performance information prior to contract award and rate a contractor's performance during the post-award process; overseeing the General Services Administration’s Integrated Award Environment on system enhancements to ensure agencies have a practical reporting tool with useful performance metrics to manage and monitor not only reporting compliance but also quality reporting of performance information; and conducting outreach with internal and external stakeholders to garner their thoughts on ways to improve past performance information reporting. | Why GAO Did This Study
Having complete, timely, and accurate information on contractor performance allows officials responsible for awarding new federal contracts to make informed decisions. Agencies generally are required to document contractor performance on contracts or orders exceeding certain dollar thresholds.
Section 853 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 required the development of a strategy to ensure that timely, accurate, and complete information on contractor performance is included in past performance databases. The act also required a change to the timeframes allowed for contractors to provide comments, rebuttals, or additional information pertaining to past performance information. The act required GAO to report on the actions taken in response to these requirements. For this report, GAO identified (1) the OFPP strategy to improve the number and quality of contractor past performance evaluations and implement provisions of the act, and (2) changes in the compliance rates for required performance evaluations from April 2013 to April 2014 for selected agencies. GAO reviewed OFPP memos and reports, government-wide guidance, and recent changes to the Federal Acquisition Regulation and interviewed an OFPP official. GAO also reviewed past performance reporting compliance data for 2013 and 2014.
GAO is not making any recommendations. OFPP concurred with GAO's findings.
What GAO Found
The Office of Federal Procurement Policy's (OFPP) strategy to improve the reporting of past performance information relies on increased oversight and enhancements to guidance and acquisition regulations. Since 2009, OFPP has taken several actions to increase the number and quality of past performance submissions available to source selection officials, including:
emphasizing reporting requirements through memos to agency officials;
assessing and reporting on the level of compliance and quality of evaluations;
directing the development of a compliance tracking tool;
setting performance targets for certain agencies;
directing the consolidation of systems for entering past performance information; and
developing government-wide past performance guidance.
To implement provisions of the act, OFPP and the Federal Acquisition Regulatory Council (FAR Council) worked to enhance requirements for assigning responsibility and accountability; implement standards for complete evaluations; and ensure submissions are consistent with award fee evaluations. Recently, OFPP and the FAR Council revised the timelines for the contractor comment process in accordance with the 2013 statutory requirement.
Although agencies generally have improved their level of compliance with past performance reporting requirements, the rate of compliance varies widely by agency and most have not met OFPP targets. For the top 10 agencies, based on the number of contracts requiring an evaluation, the compliance rate ranged from 13 to 83 percent as of April 2014.
According to an OFPP official, some agencies placed greater emphasis on documenting contractor performance, but workforce shortages and work priorities may hinder better compliance. The official said that OFPP plans to continue its oversight and provide additional training and guidance. |
gao_GAO-06-593 | gao_GAO-06-593_0 | Background
Currently, DOD has five major unmanned aircraft systems in use: the Air Force’s Predator A and Global Hawk, the Marine Corps’ Pioneer, and the Army’s Hunter and Shadow. The Army’s classifies Warrior as a medium-altitude system, in the same category as its Hunter system, its Warrior prototype known as I- GNAT, and the Air Force’s Predator A. Warrior Capability Is Targeted to Support Army Commanders’ Needs
The Army has an operational requirement, approved by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council, for an unmanned aircraft system dedicated to direct operational control by Army field commanders. The technical features include: multi-role tactical common data link, ethernet, heavy fuel engine, automatic take-off and landing system, more weapons, interoperability with Army One System Ground Control Station, and dual-redundant avionics. The Army’s cost estimates for the Warrior are, of course, predicated on Army plans for successful development and testing. Warrior Acquisition Strategy Not Consistent with Best Practices
In terms of technology maturity, design stability, and a realistic schedule, the Army has not yet established a sound, knowledge-based acquisition strategy for Warrior that is consistent with best practices for successful acquisition. Two of the four critical technologies—ethernet and data link—were not mature at the time the Army awarded the Warrior system development and demonstration contract in August 2005, and in early 2006 remain immature at TRLs of 4. Nevertheless, some program risk is associated with these technologies as well. Concurrency—the overlapping of technology and product development, testing, and production schedules—is risky because it can lead to design changes that can be costly and delay delivery of a useable capability to the warfighter if testing shows design changes are necessary to achieve expected system performance. Two of these technologies are not yet mature (as of early 2006); none of the specific technologies as planned to be used on Warrior have previously been fully integrated onto an unmanned aircraft. The Warrior program office acknowledges that the schedule is high-risk. Conclusions
In concept, the Army has determined that the Warrior will meet its operational requirements better than available alternatives such as the Predator. DOD did not concur with the rest of our recommendation that, prior to approval of long-lead items for Warrior's low-rate initial production, the Secretary of the Army needed to ensure (a) critical Warrior technologies are fully mature and demonstrated and (b) fully-integrated Warrior developmental aircraft are fabricated and involved in development testing. Appendix: Comments from the Department of Defense | Why GAO Did This Study
Through 2011, the Department of Defense (DOD) plans to spend $20 billion on unmanned aircraft systems, including the Army's "Warrior." Because of congressional concerns that some systems have been more costly and taken more time to produce than predicted, GAO reviewed the Warrior program. This report (1) describes the Army's requirements underlying its decision to acquire Warrior instead of existing systems such as the Air Force's Predator, and (2) assesses whether the Army has established a sound acquisition strategy for the Warrior program.
What GAO Found
The Army determined the Warrior is its best option for an unmanned aircraft system directly controlled by field commanders, compared with existing systems such as the Air Force's Predator A. The Army believes that using the Warrior will improve force capability through teaming with other Army assets; using common ground control equipment; and allowing soldiers in the field to operate it. Warrior's key technical features include a heavy fuel engine; automatic take-off and landing system; faster tactical common data link; ethernet; greater carrying capacity for weapons; and avionics with enhanced reliability. The Army projects that Warrior will offer some cost savings over Predator A. In terms of technology maturity, design stability, and a realistic schedule, the Army has not yet established a sound, knowledge-based acquisition strategy for Warrior. Two of four of the Warrior's critical technologies were immature at the contract award for system development and demonstration and remain so in early 2006, and the mature technologies still have some risk associated with them because neither has previously been fully integrated onto an unmanned aircraft. The Warrior schedule allows 32 months from award of the development and demonstration contract to the initial production decision. Achieving this schedule will require concurrency of technology and product development, testing, and production. Once developmental aircraft are available for testing, the Army plans to fund procurement of long-lead items in August 2007. Experience shows that these concurrencies can result in design changes during production that can prevent delivery of a system within projected cost and schedule. The Warrior program faces these same risks. |
gao_GAO-01-992T | gao_GAO-01-992T_0 | Severe Flooding Has Sometimes Resulted in Sustained Losses to the Program
Annual operating losses or net revenues from the National Flood Insurance Program’s operations have varied significantly from year to year. The financial improvement experienced by the program since fiscal year 1995 was primarily due to three reasons. Also, from October 1, 1968, through September 30, 2000, the program paid about $10 billion in insurance claims, primarily from policyholder premiums that otherwise would, to some extent, have increased taxpayer-funded disaster relief. FEMA Has Developed Strategies To Reduce The Impact of Repetitive Flood Losses
Repetitive loss properties have a major disproportionate impact on the National Flood Insurance Program, according to FEMA’s fiscal year 2000 performance report. Related GAO Products
Federal Emergency Management Agency: Status of Achieving Key Outcomes and Addressing Major Management Challenges (GAO-01-832, July 9, 2001). | What GAO Found
Floods have been, and continue to be, the most destructive natural hazard in terms of economic loss to the nation, according to the Federal Emergency Management Agency. From fiscal years 1969 through 2000, the National Flood Insurance Program--a major federal effort to provide flood disaster assistance paid about $10 billion in insurance claims, primarily from premiums collected from program policy holders. This testimony discusses (1) the financial results of the program's operations since fiscal year 1993, (2) the actuarial soundness of the program, and (3) the impact of repetitive losses and FEMA's strategies for reducing those losses. |
gao_GAO-10-191T | gao_GAO-10-191T_0 | USPS’s Financial Condition and Outlook Remain Challenging
USPS’s financial condition and outlook continue to be challenging despite recent congressional action that relieved USPS of $4 billion in mandated payments to prefund postal retiree health benefits by September 30, 2009. Preliminary results from the end of fiscal year 2009 and USPS’s outlook include: In fiscal year 2009, mail volume declined about 28 billion pieces, or about 14 percent, from the prior fiscal year, when volume was about 203 billion pieces; revenue declined from about $75 billion to about $68 billion. A looming cash shortfall necessitated last-minute congressional action to reduce USPS’s mandated payments to prefund retiree health benefits from $5.4 billion to $1.4 billion. In the absence of this congressional action, USPS was on track to lose about $7 billion. 1). USPS debt at the end of fiscal year 2009 increased by the annual statutory limit of $3 billion, bringing outstanding debt to $10.2 billion. If debt continues to increase by $3 billion annually, USPS will reach its total statutory debt limit of $15 billion in fiscal year 2011. Looking forward, USPS has projected annual deficits exceeding $7 billion in fiscal years 2010 and 2011, and continuing large cash shortfalls. 2). 2). Legal Changes Provided USPS with Greater Flexibility to Generate Revenues
PAEA and implementing Postal Regulatory Commission (PRC) regulations provided USPS with greater flexibility to set prices, test new postal products, and retain earnings so that it can finance needed capital investments and repay its debt. Under the new structure, USPS has broad latitude to announce rate changes that are implemented in a streamlined process unless PRC determines these rates would violate legal requirements. USPS Actions to Generate Revenue since PAEA Have Generally Achieved Limited Results
In the short time since PAEA was enacted, with the exception of annual rate increases, revenue-generation actions have generally achieved limited results compared to USPS’s deficits. We commend USPS for taking action to use its pricing flexibility to address the pressing need for additional revenue. Although these actions generated some revenues, their positive impacts were overwhelmed by the recession—with its cutbacks in consumer spending and corporate advertising—and ongoing diversion of mail to electronic alternatives. USPS Revenue- Generation Options Involving Postal Products and Services Appear More Promising than Venturing into New Risky Areas
Looking forward, USPS has opportunities to continue pursuing the flexibilities provided by PAEA to help generate additional revenue from postal products and services. However, results from USPS revenue-generation efforts will continue to be constrained by the economic climate and by changing use of the mail. USPS has asked Congress to change the restrictions established by PAEA so that it could offer new nonpostal products and services such as banking and insurance. Allowing USPS to compete more broadly with the private sector would raise risks and concerns. As with USPS’s nonpostal ventures before PAEA was enacted, new nonpostal ventures could lose money; and even if they were to make money, issues related to unfair competition would need to be considered. On the other hand, increasing postal rates may provide a short-term revenue boost but would risk depressing mail volume and revenues in the long term, in part by accelerating diversion of payments, communications, and advertising to electronic alternatives. In conclusion, when we recently added USPS’s financial condition to our high-risk list, we stated that USPS urgently needs to restructure to achieve short-term and long-term financial viability. USPS has not been able to cut costs fast enough or generate sufficient revenue to offset the accelerated decline in mail volume and revenue. USPS restructuring will require aligning its costs with revenues, generating sufficient earnings to finance capital investment, and managing its debt. Mail volume has typically returned after past recessions, but much of the recent volume decline may not return. | Why GAO Did This Study
The U.S. Postal Service's (USPS) financial condition and outlook deteriorated significantly during fiscal year 2009. USPS was not able to cut costs fast enough to offset declining mail volume and revenues resulting from the economic downturn and changing mail use. Facing an unprecedented cash shortfall, USPS stated that it would have insufficient cash on hand to make its mandated $5.4 billion payment to prefund postal retiree health benefits that was due by the end of the fiscal year. In July, 2009, GAO added USPS's financial condition to the list of high-risk areas needing attention by Congress and the executive branch to achieve broad-based transformation. GAO stated that USPS urgently needs to restructure to address its current and long-term financial viability. GAO also stated that USPS needs to use its flexibility to generate revenue through new or enhanced products. This testimony will (1) update USPS's financial condition and outlook, (2) describe changes made by the Postal Accountability and Enhancement Act (PAEA) of 2006 that provided USPS with greater flexibility to generate revenues, (3) outline USPS's revenue-generation actions and results using this flexibility, and (4) discuss options for USPS to generate increased revenues in the future. This testimony is based on GAO's past and ongoing work.
What GAO Found
USPS's financial condition for fiscal year 2009 and its financial outlook continue to be challenging: (1) In fiscal year 2009, mail volume declined about 28 billion pieces, or about 14 percent, from the prior fiscal year, when volume was about 203 billion pieces; revenue declined from about $75 billion to about $68 billion. (2) A looming cash shortfall necessitated last-minute congressional action to reduce USPS's mandated payments to prefund retiree health benefits by $4 billion. In the absence of congressional action, USPS was on track to lose about $7 billion. (3) USPS debt increased at the end of fiscal year 2009 by the annual statutory limit of $3 billion, bringing outstanding debt to $10.2 billion. At this rate, USPS will reach its total $15 billion statutory debt limit in fiscal year 2011. (4) USPS projects annual deficits over $7 billion in fiscal years 2010 and 2011, and continuing large cash shortfalls. PAEA and implementing regulations gave USPS more flexibility to set prices, test new postal products, and retain earnings. USPS has broad latitude to set rates that take effect unless the Postal Regulatory Commission finds the rates would violate legal requirements, such as a price cap that generally limits rate increases for most mail to the rate of inflation. Except for annual rate increases, USPS revenue-generation actions since PAEA was enacted have generally achieved limited results compared to USPS's deficits. To its credit, USPS has taken actions to use its pricing flexibility to address the pressing need for additional revenue. These actions generated some revenues, although their positive impacts were overwhelmed by the recession--with its cutbacks in consumer spending and corporate advertising--and ongoing diversion of mail to electronic alternatives. Looking forward, USPS has opportunities to continue pursuing the flexibilities provided by PAEA to help generate additional revenue from postal products and services. However, results will continue to be constrained by the economic climate and by changing use of the mail. Mail volume has typically returned after past recessions, but much of the recent volume decline may not return. Increasing postal rates may provide a short-term revenue boost but would risk depressing mail volume and revenues in the long-term, in part by accelerating diversion of mail to electronic alternatives. USPS has asked Congress to change the restrictions established by PAEA so that it could offer new nonpostal products and services such as banking and insurance. Allowing USPS to compete more broadly with the private sector could lose money, and fair competition issues would need to be considered. Thus, in addition to its revenue-generation initiatives, USPS will need to continue making significant reductions in its workforce and network costs. When we recently added USPS's financial condition to our high-risk list, we said that restructuring will require USPS to align its costs with revenues, generate sufficient earnings to finance capital investment, and manage its debt. |
gao_GAO-08-483 | gao_GAO-08-483_0 | Such differences impact the degree to which GNEP’s objectives would be addressed—for example, by the degree to which recycling of spent nuclear fuel would extend the technical capacity of a geologic repository to accommodate the remaining high-level radioactive waste (or, conversely, by the number of geologic repositories needed to dispose of the waste). The advanced technologies would also mitigate proliferation risks relative to existing technologies. However, the engineering-scale approach lacked industry participation, potentially reducing the prospects for eventual commercialization of advanced technologies. Furthermore, the approach included building an engineering- scale reprocessing plant before conducting R&D that could help determine the plant’s design requirements. Advanced Recycling Technologies Envisioned under DOE’s Original Approach to GNEP Pose Lower Proliferation Risks Than Existing Recycling Technologies
While advanced technologies for recycling spent nuclear fuel would pose a greater risk of proliferation in comparison with direct disposal in a geologic repository, they would reduce the risk of proliferation relative to existing reprocessing technologies that separate out plutonium. Separation of cesium and strontium would nonetheless create waste management challenges while also increasing the cost and complexity of a reprocessing plant. The R&D Facility and Advanced Reactor Would Enable DOE to Develop the Advanced Recycling Technologies Envisioned under Its Original Approach to GNEP
Under DOE’s original approach to GNEP, the R&D facility and fast reactor would enable the DOE national laboratories to increase the maturity of advanced recycling technologies and to conduct the required R&D that existing DOE facilities have limited capability to support. DOE’s Accelerated Approach Would Likely Rely on Technologies That Fall Short of Meeting GNEP’s Objectives
Two of the four industry consortia that DOE has funded under its accelerated approach to GNEP have proposed using unproven evolutions of current technologies—particularly the recycling of MOX fuel in existing reactors—that would reduce waste and mitigate proliferation risks to a much lesser degree than anticipated from the advanced technologies envisioned under DOE’s original approach. In contrast, the other two consortia proposed technologies that would address GNEP’s waste reduction and nonproliferation objectives; however, the technologies are not mature enough for commercial deployment and would therefore not allow DOE to accelerate design and construction of commercial-scale facilities. Under any of the proposals, DOE is unlikely to meet its goal of deploying the facilities in a way that will not require a large amount of government funding. DOE officials recognize these limitations and instead point to other benefits of its accelerated approach. Two Other Industry Consortia Proposed to Address GNEP’s Objectives by Using Technologies That Are Not Mature Enough for Commercial Deployment
DOE would not be able to accelerate deployment of commercial-scale facilities using technologies proposed by the remaining two industry consortia that received DOE funding. As explained in the GNEP strategic plan, one of DOE’s goals in working with industry is to avoid the need for engineering-scale facilities and to increase the speed of arriving at a commercially operated system of prototype recycling facilities. While the GNEP strategic plan suggests that such facilities would need little government financial support, industry proposals suggest the opposite. If DOE decides to pursue design and construction of engineering-scale facilities for demonstrating advanced technologies, we further recommend that the Secretary of Energy take the following two actions: Revise the schedule for an engineering-scale reprocessing plant so that the plant is built after an R&D facility and advanced reactor have conducted sufficient testing and development of recycled fuel to ensure that the output of the reprocessing plant can be fabricated into recycled fuel and used in an advanced reactor. Our report acknowledges that such a MOX program could allow DOE to begin recycling spent fuel sooner and on a larger scale than more advanced but less mature technologies. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To evaluate the Department of Energy’s (DOE) original engineering-scale approach to implementing the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP), we analyzed (1) how DOE had selected the advanced spent nuclear fuel recycling technologies on which to focus its research and development (R&D), (2) the department’s assessment of the maturity of those technologies, and (3) the plan for developing them: We analyzed DOE’s selection of advanced technologies by reviewing the department’s annual Advanced Fuel Cycle Initiative comparison reports, which assess alternative recycling technologies against waste reduction, nonproliferation, and other criteria. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Energy (DOE) proposes under the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP) to build facilities to begin recycling the nation's commercial spent nuclear fuel. GNEP's objectives include reducing radioactive waste disposed of in a geologic repository and mitigating the nuclear proliferation risks of existing recycling technologies. DOE originally planned a small engineering-scale demonstration of advanced recycling technologies being developed by DOE national laboratories. While DOE has not ruled out this approach, the current GNEP strategic plan favors working with industry to demonstrate the latest commercially available technology in full-scale facilities and to do so in a way that will attract industry investment. DOE has funded four industry groups to prepare proposals for full-scale facilities. DOE officials expect the Secretary of Energy to decide on an approach to GNEP by the end of 2008. GAO evaluated the extent to which DOE would address GNEP's objectives under (1) its original engineering-scale approach and (2) the accelerated approach to building full-scale facilities. GAO analyzed DOE plans and industry proposals and interviewed DOE and industry officials concerning the pros and cons of both approaches.
What GAO Found
DOE's original approach of building engineering-scale facilities would meet GNEP's objectives if the advanced technologies on which it focused can be successfully developed and commercialized. The advanced technologies would reduce waste to a greater degree than existing technologies by recycling radioactive material that a geologic repository has limited capacity to accommodate. The advanced technologies would also mitigate proliferation risks relative to existing technologies by increasing the difficulty of theft or diversion of weapons-usable nuclear material from recycling facilities. Nonetheless, DOE's engineering-scale approach had two shortcomings. First, it lacked industry participation, potentially reducing the prospects for eventual commercialization of the technologies. In particular, the approach included some technologies that may introduce unnecessary costs and technical challenges while creating waste management challenges; industry representatives have questioned whether such technologies could be commercialized. Second, DOE's schedule called for building one of the recycling facilities (a reprocessing plant for separating reusable materials from spent nuclear fuel and fabricating recycled fuel) before conducting R&D on recycled fuel that would help determine the plant's design requirements. This schedule unnecessarily increased the risk that the spent fuel would be separated in a form that cannot be recycled. The other two facilities DOE had planned to build (an advanced reactor for using recycled fuel and an R&D facility) would allow DOE to conduct R&D that existing DOE facilities have limited capability to support. DOE's accelerated approach of building full-scale facilities would likely require using unproven evolutions of existing technologies that would reduce radioactive waste and mitigate proliferation risks to a much lesser degree than anticipated from more advanced technologies. Two of the four industry groups that have received funding under GNEP proposed evolutionary technologies for recycling spent fuel in existing reactors even though the GNEP strategic plan ruled out such technologies. While the evolutionary technologies could allow DOE to begin recycling a large amount of spent fuel sooner than under its original approach, fully meeting GNEP's waste reduction and nonproliferation objectives would require a later transition to more advanced technologies. Two other industry groups proposed technologies that would address GNEP's waste reduction and nonproliferation objectives by using technologies that are not mature enough to allow DOE to accelerate construction of full-scale recycling facilities. Under any of the proposals, DOE is unlikely to attract enough industry investment to avoid the need for a large amount of government funding for full-scale facilities. For example, the industry groups have proposed that DOE fund an advanced reactor, which DOE and industry officials expect would at least initially be more expensive than existing reactors to build and operate and thus not be commercially competitive. DOE acknowledges the limitations of its accelerated approach but cites other benefits, such as the potential to exert more immediate international influence on nonproliferation issues. |
gao_GAO-03-646 | gao_GAO-03-646_0 | HHS is responsible for setting standards and monitoring the nation’s child welfare programs. CFSA Undertook Actions to Implement Most ASFA Requirements Reviewed and Met Half of the Selected Performance Criteria for Child Safety and Well-Being
CFSA undertook actions to implement six of the nine ASFA requirements we reviewed and met or exceeded four of the eight performance criteria included in our study, but as of March 2003, its plans to improve its performance did not include all ASFA requirements not fully implemented or selected performance criteria. CFSA Has Established Many Foster Care Policies but Lacks Others, and the Extent of Implementation and Documentation Varies
CSFA has established many foster care policies, but caseworkers did not consistently implement the six we selected. In addition, CFSA’s automated system lacked data on four of the six policies we examined for at least 70 percent of its active foster care cases. CFSA Has Enhanced Its Working Relationship with the D.C. Family Court by Working Collaboratively, but Hindrances Remain
CFSA has enhanced its working relationship with the D.C. Family Court by working more collaboratively, but several factors have hindered these relationships. For example, although CFSA caseworkers are responsible for identifying and arranging services needed for children and their families, some caseworkers said that some Family Court judges overruled their service recommendations. CFSA officials and Family Court judges have been working together to address some of the hindrances that constrain their working relationship. Recommendations
To improve CFSA’s performance and outcomes for foster care children in the District of Columbia, we recommend that the Mayor require the Director of CFSA to (1) develop plans to fully implement all ASFA requirements; (2) establish procedures to ensure that caseworkers consistently implement foster care policies; and (3) document in FACES all activities related to active foster care cases, including information from paper case files related to the history of each active foster care case. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To provide a comprehensive assessment of the Child and Family Services Agency’s (CFSA) performance relative to Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 (ASFA) requirements and selected foster care performance criteria, we relied on several sources of information and analyses. | Why GAO Did This Study
The District of Columbia (D.C.) Child and Family Services Agency (CFSA) is responsible for protecting children at risk of abuse and neglect and ensuring that services are provided for them and their families. GAO was asked to discuss the extent to which CFSA has (1) met requirements of the Adoption and Safe Families Act (ASFA) of 1997 and other selected performance criteria, (2) adopted and implemented child protection and foster care placement policies, and (3) enhanced its working relationship with the D.C. Family Court. To address these questions, GAO analyzed data from CFSA's child welfare information system, known as FACES; reviewed laws, regulations, and reports; examined case files; and interviewed officials.
What GAO Found
CFSA's performance relative to three sets of measures--nine ASFA requirements, eight selected performance criteria and six of the agency's foster care policies--has been mixed. The agency took actions to implement six of the nine ASFA requirements related to the safety and well-being of foster children and met or exceeded four of the eight selected foster care performance criteria, but its plans did not address all requirements not fully implemented and unmet performance criteria. CSFA has established many foster care policies, but caseworkers did not consistently implement the six GAO examined. In addition, FACES lacked data related to four of the policies reviewed for at least 70 percent of its active foster care cases. CFSA has enhanced its working relationship with the D.C. Family Court, but several factors hindered this relationship. For example, CFSA's top management and Family Court judges talk frequently about foster care case issues. However, differing opinions among CFSA caseworkers and judges about their responsibilities have hindered the relationships. CFSA officials and Family Court judges have been working together to address these hindrances. |
gao_AIMD-98-86 | gao_AIMD-98-86_0 | Profile of Navy Financial Management Executives
Table 1 provides information on the formal education, careers, and professional certifications of the Department of the Navy’s four executives included in our review. All four held bachelor’s degrees and three also held master’s degrees. The Assistant Secretary had spent 27 years at DOD and 5 years in the private sector. The other three executives’ DOD careers ranged from 23 to 32 years. About 23 percent of the 194 respondents were military officers. The 44 officers served mainly as comptrollers at major commands and installations, and the 150 civilians served most often as comptrollers and budget officers at installations. Five of the 166 respondents holding bachelor’s degrees reported more than one major. A review of the profiles showed that 47 managers, or about 28 percent of these respondents, reported accounting majors, 73 managers reported other business-related majors, and 48 managers reported that one or more of their majors were not business related. Professional Work Experience Acquired
A review of the profiles showed that the 44 officers’ careers ranged from 4 to 33 years, averaging 21 years, while the 150 civilians’ careers ranged from 8 to 55 years, averaging 27 years. Training Completed During 1995 and 1996
During 1995 and 1996, about 64 percent of the officers and 88 percent of the civilians reported completing some training in one or more of the categories included in our review. Professional Certifications Held
About 22 percent of the 194 respondents reported holding one or more professional certifications. The four senior executives in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Financial Management and Comptroller) (ASN/FM&C) included the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Financial Management and Comptroller); the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Financial Management and Comptroller); the Director, Office of Financial Operations; and the Director, Office of Budget. One manager held a master’s degree in accounting and another manager reported a business-related major. As shown in table III.4, 31 respondents also held master’s degrees, with 3 reporting more than one major. Seven of these managers majored in accounting, while 10 managers reported other business-related majors. Additional copies are $2 each. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO provided information on the qualifications and experience of the Department of Defense's (DOD) financial management workforce, focusing on the Navy's and the Marine Corps' key financial managers.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the four Navy financial management executives included in this review are the Assistant Secretary of the Navy; the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy; the Director, Office of Financial Operations; and the Director, Office of Budget; (2) each of the executives had attained bachelor's degrees and three of the four executives also held master's degrees; (3) the Assistant Secretary had spent 27 years at DOD and 5 years in the private sector; (4) the other three executives had DOD careers ranging from 23 to 32 years, with two of these executives also spending part of their careers in another government agency or the private sector; (5) about 23 percent were military officers, serving mainly as comptrollers at major commands and installations, and 77 percent were civilian personnel serving mainly in comptroller and budget officer positions at installations; (6) all 44 officers and 122 of the 150 civilians reported holding bachelor's degrees, with 5 of these respondents reporting more than one major; (7) about 28 percent of these 166 managers majored in accounting, while approximately 43 percent reported degrees in business-related majors other than accounting; (8) eighty respondents also reported holding master's degrees, with 8 of these respondents reporting more than one major; (9) six of these 80 managers held master's degrees in accounting, while about 78 percent reported degrees in business-related majors other than accounting; (10) the officers' careers ranged from 4 to 33 years while civilians' careers ranged from 8 to 55 years; (11) 166 respondents reported completing training in one or more of the categories included in GAO's review during 1995 and 1996; (12) about 22 percent of the 94 respondents reported holding one or more professional certifications; and (13) the 42 managers in this group reported holding accounting and other financial-related certifications. |
gao_GAO-08-492 | gao_GAO-08-492_0 | Initial Steps to Define a Structure and Approach to Implement the ISE Have Been Taken, but Work Remains to Define What the ISE Is to Include, to Design How It Will Operate, and to Outline Measurable Steps and Time Frames to Achieve Implementation and Desired Results
To guide the design and implementation of the ISE, the Program Manager has issued an implementation plan, completed a number of tasks contained in it, and other independent and ongoing information-sharing initiatives have been integrated into the ISE, but the plan does not include some important elements needed to implement the ISE. The plan provides an initial structure and approach for ISE design and implementation, as well as describes a two-phased approach for implementing the ISE by June 2009. Completed activities include, among other things, development of proposed common terrorism information sharing standards (CTISS) for sharing terrorism-related information. In addition, other federal, state, and local initiatives to enhance information sharing across the government have been or are being incorporated into the ISE. However, the action items do not address all the activities that must be completed to implement the ISE, according to officials at the Office of the Program Manager, and several activities identified in the implementation plan will not be implemented as identified in the plan. Although they were created primarily to improve information sharing within the state or local area, the implementation plan identifies the creation of an integrated national network of fusion centers to promote two-way sharing with the federal government, as discussed earlier. However, work remains in, among other things, defining and communicating the scope and desired results to be achieved by the ISE, the specific milestones to be attained, and the individual projects—or initiatives—and execution sequence needed to achieve these results and implement the ISE. Fundamentally, the Program Manager and stakeholders are still trying to fully define the scope and design of the ISE, and a more complete set of activities needed to achieve it than those that were included in the implementation plan, including, for example all of the terrorism-related information that should be a part of the ISE; what types of terrorism-related information ISE participants have and where such information resides; how the information can be put into a “shared space” so that a cross- sector of users can easily access and study information from different agencies; how this access can be provided while still protecting sensitive information and privacy interests; what information systems and networks will be integrated as part of the ISE and how; and methods for motivating agencies to invest in the ISE, be held accountable for ensuring that all relevant information is made available to ISE stakeholders, and identifying and implementing the specific projects needed to ensure the ISE runs effectively. Without such a road map, the Program Manager and stakeholders risk not being able to effectively manage and implement the ISE. The Program Manager Has Issued the First Annual Report and Is Developing Initial Performance Measures, but Neither Can Yet Be Used to Determine How Much Progress Has Been Made and What Remains
To describe progress in implementing the ISE to date, the Program Manager issued an annual report—in response to the Intelligence Reform Act’s requirement for a yearly performance management report—in September 2007 that highlighted individual accomplishments and included annual performance goals and has since developed some performance measures, but neither effort shows how much measurable progress has been made toward implementing the ISE and how much remains to be done. In keeping with federal guidance, our work, and the work of others in strategic planning, performance measurement, and program management, the annual report contained four performance goals for 2008. While not reflected in the first annual report, the Program Manager and agencies have begun to develop performance measures to improve future reporting on progress in implementing the ISE and information sharing overall, but these measures focus on counting activities accomplished rather than results achieved to show the extent of ISE implementation and attaining the ISE’s strategic goals. The performance measures include, for example, the number of ISE organizations with a procedure in place for acquiring and processing reports on suspicious activities potentially related to terrorism, but not how the reports are used and what difference they are making in sharing to help prevent terrorist attacks. We acknowledge that creating such measures is difficult, particularly since the program is still being designed, but until these measures are refined to account for and communicate progress and results, future attempts to measure and report on progress will be hampered. | Why GAO Did This Study
The attacks on 9/11 underscored the federal government's need to facilitate terrorism-related information sharing among government, private sector, and foreign stakeholders. In response, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 mandated the creation of the Information Sharing Environment (ISE), which is described as an approach for the sharing of terrorism-related information. A presidentially appointed Program Manager oversees ISE development with assistance from the Information Sharing Council (ISC), a forum for 16 information sharing officials from federal agencies and departments. GAO was asked to report on (1) what actions have been taken to guide the design and implementation of the ISE and (2) what efforts have been made to report on progress in implementing the ISE. To perform this work, GAO reviewed related laws, directives, guidance, and ISE planning and reporting documents and interviewed officials from the Program Manager's office and key agencies who serve on the ISC.
What GAO Found
To guide ISE design and implementation, the Program Manager has issued an implementation plan, completed a number of tasks therein, and included other information sharing initiatives in the ISE, but the plan does not include some important elements to implement the ISE. The plan provides an initial structure and approach for ISE design and implementation. For example, the plan includes steps toward protecting information privacy and describes a two-phased approach for implementing the ISE by June 2009 consisting of 89 action items. Completed activities include, among others, development of proposed common terrorism information sharing standards. In addition, other federal, state, and local initiatives to enhance information sharing across the government are being incorporated in the ISE. These initiatives include partnering with state and local area fusion centers--created primarily to improve information sharing within a state or local area--to develop a national network of these centers. Nevertheless, Office of the Program Manager officials said that the 89 action items do not address all the activities that must be completed to implement the ISE. Work remains, including defining and communicating the ISE's scope, such as determining all terrorism-related information that should be part of the ISE, and communicating that information to stakeholders involved in the development of the ISE. In addition, the desired results to be achieved by the ISE, that is, how information sharing is to be improved, the specific milestones, and the individual projects--or initiatives--to achieve these results have not yet been determined. Defining the scope of a program, desired results, milestones, and projects are essential in providing a road map to effectively implement a program. Without such a road map, the Program Manager and stakeholders risk not being able to effectively manage implementation of the ISE. To report on progress in implementing the ISE, the Program Manager issued an annual report in September 2007, which highlighted individual accomplishments and included several annual performance goals, and has since begun to develop performance measures, but neither effort provides for an assessment of overall progress in ISE implementation and of how much work remains. Some individual accomplishments contributing to the ISE occurred under the implementation plan; others, prior to and separate from ISE creation efforts. In keeping with federal guidance, GAO's work, and the work of others in strategic planning, performance measurement, and program management, the implementation plan contained six strategic goals and the annual report four performance goals for 2008. Also, the Program Manager has begun to develop some performance measures, but they focus on counting activities accomplished rather than results achieved. For example, the measures include the number of ISE organizations with a procedure in place for suspicious activity reports, but not how the reports are used and what difference they are making in sharing to help prevent terrorist attacks. GAO acknowledges that creating such measures is difficult, particularly since the program is still being designed, but until these measures are refined, future attempts to measure and report on progress will be hampered. |
gao_GAO-10-1062 | gao_GAO-10-1062_0 | Three of those states paid $11,702 in childcare subsidies to our fraudulent providers, and two states allowed the providers to over bill for services beyond their approved limit. The system detected the discrepancy and successfully prevented payment for these hours. Department of Human Services lost the fictitious parent’s faxed application. Michigan, Texas, and Washington conducted relative provider background checks using only state conviction data, creating the possibility that a provider with a criminal history in one state could be approved to care for children simply by moving to another state. This creates the possibility that criminals, including registered sex offenders, using stolen identities could obtain federal subsidies to care for children. Case Studies Indicate That Child Care Assistance Programs Are Vulnerable to Fraud
Similar to our fictitious applications, we identified five closed criminal cases in which parents and providers defrauded the CCDF program. The parents and providers in these cases used similar methods to our proactive testing including falsifying documentation to claim eligibility, billing the state for fictitious children, and colluding to obtain payment for services that were never provided. Both were sentenced to 2 years in a state department of corrections jail. The five women billed for fictitious children and children who attended school during the hours the women claimed to be caring for them. During the daughter’s sentencing, the judge noted that the program “was a joke with little if any oversight.”
Eligible Children May Not Receive Child Care Services in Some States Because of Significant Waitlists
Not all eligible families that want to receive CCDF assistance are currently able to receive it for a variety of reasons, and fraud and abuse in the program may further reduce the availability of CCDF funds. This lack of child care assistance forces some families to cut back on spending for daily needs, working hours, and education. Of the 41 waitlisted parents we interviewed, 16 described multiple hardships—facing financial difficulties, quitting their job or education program, and worrying about negative impacts on their children’s development. These applicants expressed issues common to many of the parents we interviewed. Mississippi used Recovery Act funds to process all of the children on their waiting list, eliminating 7,000 individuals from the waiting list in April 2009. We suggested a number of actions that HHS and states should consider to reduce fraud and abuse in CCDF programs, including: Require applicants, household members, and providers to submit Social Security numbers in order to receive child care assistance. However, in some cases, officials cited concerns about the cost and legal implications of increased verification. For example, Texas expressed concern that conducting fingerprint criminal history checks on providers would impose additional costs on the program. Responding to our findings, HHS commented that they have recently taken actions to address issues of CCDF integrity. The guidance also highlighted on-site visits to providers to review attendance and enrollment records. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To proactively test selected states’ fraud prevention controls, we identified 26 states that received more than $100 million from the Child Care and Development Fund (CCDF) for fiscal year 2009. Relative providers cared for 12 percent of children in the CCDF program in 2008, while other types of providers accounted for the rest. As such, our results cannot be applied to licensed child care providers, such as child care centers, nor can our results be projected to all state CCDF programs. To examine the impact of being unable to obtain child care on low-income parents, we contacted officials in states and counties with active child care assistance waiting lists to obtain names of parents currently eligible for child care assistance. States’ CCDF implementation plans for fiscal year 2008 to 2009 identified 25 states that have processes to maintain some type of waiting list when demand exceeds available funds. | Why GAO Did This Study
Through the Child Care and Development Fund (CCDF), the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) subsidizes child care for low-income families whose parents work or attend education or training programs. In fiscal year 2009, the CCDF budget was $7 billion. States are responsible for determining program priorities and overseeing funds. Providers--who range from child care centers to relatives--bill the state for caring for approved children. Unregulated relatives represent 12 percent of providers in the CCDF program. In response to program fraud and abuse, GAO (1) proactively tested selected states' fraud prevention controls, (2) examined closed case studies of fraud and abuse, and (3) interviewed parents waitlisted for child care about the effect of this lack of assistance on their families. To do this, GAO investigators posed as parents and unregulated relative providers in 10 scenarios in five states with no waiting lists that each received more than $100 million in CCDF funding for fiscal year 2009. These states did not require fingerprint criminal history checks or site visits. For case studies of past program fraud, GAO reviewed criminal court records and interviewed agency officials. GAO spoke with parents on waiting lists in six states for their perspectives on the effect of being unable to obtain childcare. Results cannot be projected beyond these states or unregulated relative providers.
What GAO Found
The five states GAO tested lacked controls over child care assistance application and billing processes for unregulated relative providers, leaving the program vulnerable to fraud and abuse. Posing as fictitious parents and relative providers, GAO successfully billed for $11,702 in child care assistance for fictitious children and parents. In most cases, states approved GAO's fictitious parents who used Social Security numbers of deceased individuals and claimed to work at nonexistent companies. One state also approved a fictitious child care provider with a deceased person's Social Security number, creating the possibility that a criminal using a stolen identity could obtain federal subsidies to care for children. In two other states, GAO successfully billed for hours exceeding those authorized without submitting proof of additional hours worked. One state successfully prevented both fictitious applicants from being accepted, but had weak payment controls. GAO identified five recent closed criminal cases in which parents and providers defrauded the CCDF program. These cases involved parents falsifying eligibility documentation, providers billing states for fictitious children, and collusion between parents and providers to obtain payment for services that were never provided. Fraudulent payments reduce program funds available for eligible parents who depend on child care assistance to maintain employment or attend education programs. In some states, waiting lists are 1 to 2 years long. Parents on waiting lists said that without child care, they contend with multiple hardships--facing financial difficulties, quitting their job or education program, and worrying about negative effects on their children's development. In response, many of the states tested noted that they have plans to implement new controls, but expressed concern about associated cost and legal implications. HHS officials commented they have recently taken actions to address issues of CCDF integrity, including issuing program guidance on verification procedures and conducting conference calls on program integrity. |
gao_GAO-14-41 | gao_GAO-14-41_0 | It may be possible for agencies to reduce their space needs when this mobility is combined with hoteling, which means that employees give up their individual, permanent space and use shared, nonpermanent workspaces when they are in the office.more of an organization’s space to collaborative areas, such as conference rooms, team rooms, and informal meeting rooms. Selected Agencies Are Using Workforce Mobility to Increase Their Use of Alternative Work Arrangements and Reduce Their Space Needs
Officials at the five agencies we reviewed told us they are exploring or taking actions to reduce their space needs and achieve space efficiencies. However, some agency officials we spoke with pointed out that actions such as increasing telework participation or implementing a hoteling program may not be appropriate in all instances. Some employees, for example, may not want to telework for personal reasons or be unable to telework due to the requirements of their work—these include employees who work with sensitive or classified documents, or who interact with members of the public as part of the jobs. With respect to the agencies we reviewed: USPTO has been taking steps to reduce its space needs as a result of increased workforce mobility for more than a decade. Further, we note that there are indications that USPTO has avoided real estate costs as a result of its efforts. For example, in 2012, the Department of Commerce reported, that as a result of USPTO’s Patent Hoteling Program, USPTO has avoided almost $17 million in In real estate costs annually since 2006 when the program started.addition, an analysis of the costs and benefits of USPTO’s Patent Hoteling Program that USPTO conducted for fiscal year 2012 indicates that USPTO’s estimated savings could be larger. USDA set agency-wide goals for increasing the number of its employees with approved telework agreements as well as its overall telework participation rates for fiscal year 2013. However, this estimate does not include the costs for its headquarters renovation, which has not yet been completed. GSA Offers General Guidance and Customized Programs to Help Agencies Address Their Changing Space Needs
Since the late 1990s, GSA has issued several reports that provide general guidance to assist with agencies’ space-planning efforts in an environment of increased workforce mobility. In its reports, GSA has provided examples of how various federal agencies have achieved space efficiencies, including reducing their space needs, through reconfiguring the layout of existing workstations and implementing various alternative work arrangements, such as hoteling and increased use of telework. For example, since 2011 GSA has offered two customized programs known as Client Portfolio Planning and National Engagements for Workplace Services. In part, these programs are designed to help agencies explore mobility and achieve space efficiencies and also determine the type of workplace configuration that best supports the accomplishment of the agency’s mission. If an agency chooses to act upon GSA’s recommendations, it could take years to realize savings due to factors such as the timing of leases, the cost of reconfiguration, and negotiation with employee organizations. According to GSA, the information obtained by participating in this program can help guide an agency’s space-planning efforts and mobility initiatives and provide a business case for making changes. Accurate Data and Organizational Support Were Viewed as Important to Achieving Space Efficiencies in an Environment of Increased Workforce Mobility
Our discussions with officials from the five selected agencies and five private sector organizations identified two factors as particularly important to achieving space efficiencies in an environment of increased workforce mobility: acquiring information about how office space is currently used and gaining management and employee support. By measuring how existing space is being used, organizations are better positioned to determine how much space they really need. Officials from all of the agencies and the private sector organizations we contacted described redesigning space to reflect mobility as a significant change. To implement changes, agencies we reviewed, as well as private sector organizations we contacted, have taken a number of actions to gain support. Representatives from the private sector told us their organizations took similar steps. In their opinion, organizations that have tried to impose such change are less likely to succeed. ATF and OMB did not have comments on the report. Appendix I: Comments from the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office
Appendix II: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
GAO Contact
David J. | Why GAO Did This Study
New technologies and the adoption of alternative work arrangements have increasingly enabled employees to perform some aspects of their work outside of the traditional office environment. As requested, GAO examined how aspects of mobility have affected agencies' space needs. This report identifies (1) actions selected agencies have taken as a result of increased workforce mobility to reduce their space needs; (2) the assistance GSA provides federal agencies that are exploring reducing their space needs, at least partly in response to increased workforce mobility; and (3) factors selected agencies and private sector organizations viewed as important to achieving space efficiencies in an environment of increased workforce mobility. GAO focused its review on five agencies: GSA, the Department of Agriculture, the Internal Revenue Service, the Department of Commerce's USPTO, and the Department of Justice's Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives. Altogether, these five agencies reported holding or leasing more than 400-million square feet of office space in fiscal year 2011. GAO reviewed agency-specific guidance and other documents related to space planning and conducted interviews with key officials from the selected agencies. GAO also interviewed representatives from five private sector organizations to obtain their perspectives on how the private sector plans for its future space needs.
What GAO Found
The five selected agencies GAO reviewed are either exploring or taking actions such as increasing "telework" participation and implementing a "hoteling" program--which means that employees give up their individual, permanent space and use shared, nonpermanent workspaces when they are in the office-- to reduce their space needs. For example, as part of its headquarters renovation, the General Services Administration (GSA) is making use of open, collaborative work environments and implementing a hoteling program for all employees. In addition, the Department of Agriculture set agency-wide goals for increasing the number of its employees with approved telework agreements as well as its overall telework participation rates for fiscal year 2013. The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) has taken steps to reduce its space needs as a result of increased workforce mobility for more than a decade, and there are indications that USPTO has avoided real estate costs as a result of its efforts. However, GAO was unable to obtain sufficient information to determine the accuracy and validity of USPTO's estimated cost savings. Beyond USPTO, the agencies GAO reviewed have not yet realized space reductions or cost savings because their efforts are too new. In addition, officials at the selected agencies pointed out that increasing telework participation or implementing a hoteling program may not be appropriate in all instances, such as for employees who work with sensitive or classified documents or who interact with members of the public.
GSA offers general guidance as well as customized programs to help guide agencies' space-planning efforts in an environment of increased workforce mobility. In this guidance, GSA has shown that agencies can achieve space efficiencies by reconfiguring the layout of existing workstations and implementing various alternative work arrangements. While agencies may take steps on their own to address their changing space needs, GSA has offered two customized programs since 2011 to assist agencies. These programs are designed to help agencies explore mobility and achieve space efficiencies; however, GSA's client agencies determine whether to act on GSA's recommendations, and it may take years to realize savings due to factors such as the timing of leases and the cost of reconfiguration.
GAO's discussions with officials from the selected agencies and private sector organizations identified two factors--acquiring information about the current utilization of office space, and gaining the support of management and employees--that were frequently viewed as important for an organization to achieve space efficiencies in an environment of increased workforce mobility. By measuring how existing space is being used, organizations are better positioned to determine their future space needs. Similarly, by taking steps to obtain the support of leadership and employees, organizations can help facilitate the acceptance of mobility initiatives. Officials described the loss of dedicated workspace resulting from increased mobility as a significant change in the workplace and indicated that organizations that try to impose such changes are less likely to succeed than those that build organizational support.
What GAO Recommends
GAO makes no recommendations in this report. USPTO commented on the estimated cost savings of its hoteling programs, as discussed in this report. |
gao_NSIAD-95-51 | gao_NSIAD-95-51_0 | Force Drawdown Has Increased Challenge of Responding to Peace Operations
The continuing force drawdown has compounded challenges for the U.S. military in responding to extended peace operations. We examined (1) the impact that peace operations have on U.S. military forces, (2) force structure limitations that may affect the military’s ability to respond to other national security requirements while engaged in peace operations, and (3) options for increasing force flexibility and response capability. These operations heavily stress some U.S. military capabilities, including certain Army support forces such as quartermaster and transportation units and specialized Air Force aircraft, while having less impact on other forces, such as Army armored combat divisions and general purpose Air Force combat aircraft outside Europe. If the Army’s early-deploying support units were needed for war, the Army would supplement the units with people and equipment from other active and reserve units. These capabilities would be needed in a major regional conflict. Disengaging these forces from a peace operation and redeploying them to the MRC quickly may be difficult. Although planners have been able to minimize the use of these forces in peace operations, they have had to use a large portion of some of the Army’s CFP 1-3 support forces in large-scale and/or multiple peace operations because there is a limited number of such forces in the active component. We agree that most combat forces would be readily available to respond to a MRC. Finally, some of the forces would need training, supplies, and equipment before deploying to another major operation. Options for Easing the Strain of Peace Operations
There are options available to allow DOD to meet the demands of participation in numerous and/or sizable sustained peace operations on military forces while maintaining the capability to rapidly respond to MRCs. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on the impact of peace operations on the U.S. military forces' capability to respond to regional conflicts, focusing on the: (1) force structure limitations that affect the military's ability to respond to other national security requirements while engaged in peace operations; and (2) options available for increasing force flexibility and response capability.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) peace operations have heavily stressed some U.S. military capabilities, including Army support forces and specialized Air Force aircraft; (2) because there are relatively few support forces in the military's active force, some of these units and personnel have been deployed to consecutive operations, the tempo of operations has increased, and the time available to prepare for combat missions has been reduced; (3) extended participation in multiple or large scale peace operations could impede the services' ability to timely respond to major regional conflicts (MRC); (4) disengaging support units and specialized aircraft from a peace operation and redeploying them to MRC could be more difficult than estimated because some of these units need training and supplies before deploying to another major operation; (5) the options available to DOD to meet the demands of peace operations while maintaining the capability to respond to MRC include changing the mix of active and reserve forces and making greater use of reserves and contractors; and (6) the United States needs to determine the resources it needs and degree of risk it is prepared to take if it wishes to continue participating in sizeable peace operations for extended periods and still maintain the capability needed to rapidly respond to simultaneous MRC. |
gao_GAO-08-364 | gao_GAO-08-364_0 | Background
Tax-exempt bonds are valid debt obligations of state and local governments. This means that the interest paid to bondholders is generally not included in their gross income for federal income tax purposes. While both governmental and qualified private activity bonds reached historically high levels recently, the amount of governmental bonds issued annually has fluctuated to a greater extent. Tax-exempt bond issuers tend to issue more debt when interest rates decline. The Estimated Revenue Loss from Outstanding Tax-Exempt Bonds Is One of the Largest Federal Tax Expenditures
Because the interest earned by investors who purchase tax-exempt bonds is generally excluded from federal income taxes, the federal government incurs a revenue loss each year. Tax-Exempt Bonds Are Used to Finance a Wide Range of Facilities and Activities
Tax-exempt governmental and private activity bonds are used to finance a wide range of facilities and activities, primarily in support of the entity responsible for paying the bond debt service. Although Study Results Varied, Most Studies Generally Found That Competitive Bond Sales Have Lower Interest Costs after Controlling for Other Factors
Researchers have attempted to determine whether the method of sale (i.e., competition between underwriters or negotiation with underwriters) has an effect on the interest costs that bond issuers pay investors. Some Qualified Private Activity Bond Issuers Reported Issuance Costs Exceeding Legal Limits, and Issuance Costs Vary Depending on Bond Characteristics
IRS requires qualified private activity bond issuers to report issuance costs paid from bond proceeds on the Form 8038, and for most types of private activity bonds, issuance costs that can be paid from bond proceeds are limited to 2 percent of bond proceeds. Median issuance costs as a percentage of bond proceeds for governmental bonds issued for amounts greater than $100 million were about 0.6 percent from 2002 to 2005. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of this report were to (1) describe recent trends in the dollar volume of tax-exempt bonds; (2) provide information on the types of facilities and activities that are financed with tax-exempt bonds, in particular, information on hotels and municipal golf courses that were recently financed with tax-exempt bonds; and (3) provide information on borrowing costs that bond issuers pay when issuing bonds by summarizing relevant research on whether bond interest costs vary by the method of sale, considering characteristics of the bond and bond issuer and provide information on how bond issuance costs vary between governmental and private activity bonds, including the extent to which private activity bond issuers exceed the statutory limit for issuance costs as a percentage of bond proceeds. We used SOI data from 1991 through 2005, the most recently available data, to provide information on the overall volume of tax-exempt bonds issued, the volume of governmental and private activity bonds issued, and the volume of new money versus refunding bonds issued. IRS publishes descriptive statistics from these forms. | Why GAO Did This Study
The outstanding amount of state and local government tax-exempt bonds has increased over the years. Congress is interested in whether the bonds are used for appropriate purposes since the federal government forgoes billions in tax revenues annually by excluding the bonds' interest from investors' federal gross income. Questions also exist over the bonds' borrowing costs as they can divert funds from the funded projects. This report (1) describes recent trends in tax exempt bonds, (2) provides information on the types of facilities financed with tax-exempt bonds, and (3) discusses borrowing costs considering the methods of selling bonds and compares issuance costs paid from bond proceeds for governmental and qualified private activity bonds. In addition to interviewing relevant officials, we analyzed IRS's Statistics of Income (SOI) data and data from Thomson Financial to address these objectives.
What GAO Found
In recent years, the volume of tax-exempt bonds issued annually for both governmental and private activity bonds has reached historically high levels. Generally, the volume of new money bond issues has been greater than bonds issued for refunding purposes. The volume of tax-exempt bonds issued, particularly bonds issued for refunding, tends to be highest when interest rates decline. Because the interest earned by investors who purchase tax bonds is generally excluded from federal income taxes, the federal revenue losses amount to billions of dollars annually. Tax-exempt governmental and private activity bonds are used to finance a wide range of projects and activities, with bonds issued for "educational purposes" generally being the largest category of governmental bonds annually. Nonprofit organizations are the largest issuers of qualified private activity bonds. Previous legislation prohibited using qualified private activity bonds for certain facilities, including professional sports stadiums, hotels, and private golf courses. However, many of these types of facilities are still being financed with tax-exempt governmental bonds. Congress has held hearings on this issue primarily focusing on sports stadiums. Although the evidence is not definitive, studies have generally shown that interest costs are lower for bonds sold when competition between underwriters exists compared to when bond sales are negotiated with underwriters after controlling for other factors. About half of all issuers of qualified private activity bonds reported paying issuance costs from bond proceeds from 2002 to 2005. IRS's guidance does not indicate what to report when no issuance costs are paid from bond proceeds. Of those reporting issuance costs, some private activity bond issuers reported paying issuance costs from bond proceeds that exceed statutory limits. |
gao_GAO-01-551 | gao_GAO-01-551_0 | The Business Opportunity Development Reform Act of 1988 amended the Small Business Act to require the President to establish an annual government-wide goal of awarding not less than 20 percent of prime contract dollars to small businesses. SBA is responsible for coordinating with executive branch agencies to ensure that the federal government meets the mandated goal. Department of Energy Was Directed to Change Its Method of Calculating Small Business Achievements
In a memorandum to the agencies, the SBA Associate Deputy Administrator cited a significant change in the way the Department of Energy calculates its small business achievements as a key reason for the difficulties in setting the fiscal year 2000 goal and a primary justification for SBA’s decision to unilaterally assign goals. SBA officials explained that the excluded contracts fall into three broad categories of contract actions: (1) those for which small businesses’ chances to compete are limited or nonexistent, (2) those using non-appropriated funds, and (3) those made by agencies that are not subject to the Federal Acquisition Regulation or are otherwise exempt from federal procurement regulations. Exclusions Represent About 10 Percent of Total Procurements
From fiscal year 1998 through 2000, the excluded contracts that we could quantify accounted for about 10 percent of all federal procurement dollars. The vast majority of the exclusions are for Department of Defense contracts for foreign sales and contracts performed outside the United States. SBA Guidance Is Unclear and Incomplete
Although SBA’s annual guidance on goal-setting lists the types of contracts that FPDC excludes in its annual calculations of small business achievements, the guidance is confusing and incomplete. The guidance is the only source of information available to Congress, the small business community, and federal agencies on the contracts excluded from the small business achievement calculations. SBA’s failure to document the reasons for excluding certain types of contracts precludes a clear picture of how small business achievements are calculated. The General Services Administration’s Office of Enterprise Development concurred with our findings and recommendations. Scope and Methodology
To identify the process by which small business prime contract goals are established, we reviewed the Small Business Reauthorization Act of 1997 and other pertinent legislation; guidance issued by the Office of Federal Procurement Policy, SBA, and FPDC; prior GAO reports; and FPDC’s final reports on small business achievements for fiscal years 1998, 1999, and 2000. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Small Business Reauthorization Act of 1997 directed the President to set a goal of awarding not less than 23 percent of the federal government's prime contracting dollars to small business for each fiscal year. The Small Business Administration (SBA) is charged with working with federal agencies to ensure that agency goals, in the aggregate, meet or exceed the overall goal. To help SBA determine if agency goals are being met, the Federal Procurement Data Center (FPDC)--part of the General Services Administration--collects data on all federal contract actions and calculates the government's annual small business achievements on the basis of procurement information received from the agencies. This report reviews (1) SBA's process for establishing annual small business prime contract goals and the reasons for recent changes to the process; (2) the types of contracts that are excluded when achievements are calculated, as well as SBA's rationale for excluding them; and (3) the dollar value of the excluded contracts.
What GAO Found
GAO found that in fiscal year 2000, SBA began assigning goals directly to individual agencies because the goals that agencies proposed did not in the aggregate reach the mandated 23-percent governmentwide goal. When calculating the percentage of federal procurements awarded to small businesses, FPDC must exclude (a) those contracts for which small businesses' chances to compete are limited or nonexistent, (b) those using non-appropriated funds, and (c) those made by agencies which are subject to the Federal Acquisition Regulation or are otherwise exempted by statute. The excluded contracts total about 10 percent of federal procurement dollars and are usually military contracts for foreign sales and contracts performed outside the United States. SBA's annual guidance is the only source of information to which federal agencies, the small business community, and Congress can turn for information on the contracts that are excluded from the small business baseline. However, the guidance is unclear and incomplete, precluding a clear picture of the universe of contracts reflected in FPDC's annual reports of small business achievements. |
gao_GAO-11-767 | gao_GAO-11-767_0 | Federal and tribal CHS programs in each of these areas pay for services from external providers if services are not available directly through IHS-funded facilities, if patients meet certain requirements, and if funds are available. IHS’s Oversight of Data Collection Does Not Ensure the Accuracy of the Data Used for Estimating CHS Program Need
Due to deficiencies in IHS’s oversight of data collection, the unfunded services data on deferrals and denials that IHS used to estimate program need are incomplete and inconsistent. Of the 103 tribal CHS programs that responded to our survey, 30 indicated that they collected data on unfunded services and submitted these data to their area offices in response to IHS’s annual request in fiscal year 2009. IHS officials told us that both deferral and denial data were used in IHS’s needs assessment. IHS has initiated steps to examine these weaknesses in its current data and explore other sources of data to estimate CHS program need. Officials indicated that they expected the Workgroup to issue a final report to the Director for approval by the end of calendar year 2011. However, as of September 2011, IHS officials told us that the agency had not determined whether it would make improvements to the collection of deferral and denial data because it had not determined how such data would be used if the FDI method is adopted. In addition, some federal CHS programs reported using problematic funds management practices. Federal CHS programs we spoke with reported using a variety of strategies to help patients receive services outside of the CHS program in order to maximize the care that they could purchase. For example, strategies noted by some CHS programs included helping patients locate free or low-cost health care or negotiating reduced rates with providers on the patient’s behalf. They also suggest significant inconsistencies in the administration of federal CHS programs. Most Tribal CHS Programs Reported That They Did Not Have CHS Funds Available to Pay for All Services but Many Used Other Strategies to Expand Access to Care
Of the 103 tribal CHS programs that responded to our survey, most reported they did not have CHS funds available to pay for all services for patients who otherwise met eligibility and administrative requirements, with 73 reporting that they depleted their CHS funds at some point during fiscal year 2009. Forty-six of the 103 tribal CHS programs that responded to our survey reported supplementing their CHS programs’ funding with tribal funds—funds earned from tribal businesses or enterprises. Providers stated that these challenges contributed to patient and provider burdens. IHS officials said that denials may occur for a patient who has a referral if the patient presented for care at the external provider before the referral was approved by the CHS program committee. Eighteen providers noted challenges receiving communications from IHS about CHS policies and procedures related to payment, including having had few, if any, formal meetings with program staff and a lack of training and guidance. Conclusions
IHS’s CHS program serves as an important resource for American Indian and Alaska Native individuals who need health care services not available at IHS-funded federal and tribal facilities. As acknowledged by IHS officials, the complexity of the CHS program makes this communication particularly important. Recommendations for Executive Action
To develop more accurate data for estimating the funds needed for the CHS program and improving IHS oversight, we recommend that the Secretary of Health and Human Services direct the Director of IHS to take the following eight actions: ensure that area offices submit data on unfunded services from all conduct outreach and technical assistance to tribal CHS programs to encourage and support their efforts to voluntarily provide data that can be used to better estimate the needs of tribal CHS programs; develop an annual data reporting template that requires area offices to report available deferral and denial counts for each federal and tribal CHS program; develop a plan and timeline for improving the agency’s deferral and develop written guidance, provide training, and conduct oversight activities necessary to ensure unfunded services data are consistently and completely recorded by federal CHS programs; develop a written policy documenting how IHS evaluates need for the CHS program and disseminate it to area offices and CHS programs to ensure they understand how unfunded services data are used to estimate overall program needs; provide written guidance to CHS programs on a process to use when funds are depleted and there is a continued need for services, and monitor to ensure that appropriate actions are taken; and develop ways to enhance CHS program communication with providers, such as providing regular trainings on patient eligibility and claim approval decisions to providers. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
In this report, we examined (1) the extent to which the Indian Health Service (IHS) ensures the data it collects on unfunded services are accurate to determine a reliable estimate of contract health services (CHS) program need, (2) the extent to which federal and tribal CHS programs report having funds available to pay for contract health services, and (3) the experiences of external providers in obtaining payment from the CHS program. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Indian Health Service (IHS), an agency in the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), provides health care to American Indians and Alaska Natives. When care at an IHS-funded facility is unavailable, IHS's contract health services (CHS) program pays for care from external providers if the patient meets certain requirements and funding is available. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act requires GAO to study the adequacy of federal funding for IHS's CHS program. To examine program funding needs, IHS collects data on unfunded services--services for which funding was not available--from the federal and tribal CHS programs. GAO examined (1) the extent to which IHS ensures the data it collects on unfunded services are accurate to determine a reliable estimate of CHS program need, (2) the extent to which federal and tribal CHS programs report having funds available to pay for contract health services, and (3) the experiences of external providers in obtaining payment from the CHS program. GAO surveyed 66 federal and 177 tribal CHS programs and spoke to IHS officials and 23 providers.
What GAO Found
Due to deficiencies in IHS's oversight of data collection, the data on unfunded services that IHS uses to estimate CHS program need were not accurate. Specifically, the data that IHS collected from CHS programs were incomplete and inconsistent. For example, 5 of the 66 federal and 30 of the 103 tribal CHS programs that responded to GAO's survey reported that they did not submit these data to IHS in fiscal year 2009. Also, the format of IHS's annual request has not provided the agency with complete information to determine which programs submitted these data. In addition, individual CHS programs reported inconsistencies in how they recorded information about a specific type of unfunded service that IHS uses in its assessment of need. A reliable estimate of need will require complete and consistent data from each of the individual CHS programs. In November 2010, IHS created a workgroup to examine weaknesses in its current data and explore other sources of data to estimate need. IHS officials expect the workgroup to make a recommendation to the IHS Director by the end of calendar year 2011 that IHS adopt a new method of estimating need. As of September 2011, IHS was continuing to develop this new method and officials indicated that deferral and denial data would continue to be collected until it makes further decisions about its needs assessment methodology. Sixty of the 66 federal and 73 of the 103 tribal CHS programs that responded to GAO's survey reported that in fiscal year 2009 they did not have CHS funds available to pay for all services for which patients otherwise met requirements. Some federal CHS programs reported continuing to approve services for patients when sufficient funds were not available; IHS officials told us they were unaware this practice was occurring. In contrast, other federal CHS programs reported using a variety of strategies to help patients receive services outside of the CHS program in order to maximize the care that they could purchase. For example, some federal CHS programs reported helping patients locate free or low-cost health care. Tribal CHS programs reported using a variety of strategies not available to federal CHS programs. For example, 46 of 103 tribal CHS programs that responded to GAO's survey reported supplementing their CHS programs' funding with tribal funds, which are earned from tribal businesses or enterprises. Most external providers that GAO interviewed described challenges in the CHS program payment process. For example, when patients presented for emergency services, 13 of 23 providers reported challenges determining which services would be approved for payment because, unlike other payers, they cannot check a patient's eligibility electronically. Eighteen providers noted challenges receiving communications from IHS about CHS policies and procedures related to payment, including having had few, if any, formal meetings with program staff and a lack of training and guidance. IHS officials acknowledged that the complexity of the CHS program makes provider education important. Most providers said that these challenges contributed to patient and provider burden.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that HHS direct IHS to ensure unfunded services data are accurately recorded, CHS program funds management is improved, and provider communication is enhanced. HHS noted how IHS would address the recommendations; describing the proposed new method to estimate need. IHS's steps will address some recommendations, but immediate steps are needed to improve the collection of unfunded services data to determine program need. |
gao_RCED-98-58 | gao_RCED-98-58_0 | To identify legal and other barriers that may preclude the Forest Service from implementing similar efforts on its lands, we relied extensively on prior GAO reports and testimonies. While not always attaining financial self-sufficiency, these nonfederal land managers are employing a variety of sometimes innovative approaches and techniques to generate revenue or reduce costs from the sale or use of natural resources on their lands. Rather than applying a one-size-fits-all approach or technique, the managers have (1) usually tailored their efforts to meet either a clear mission to make a profit over time or an incentive to generate revenue for other mission-related goals and objectives and (2) often been delegated the discretion and flexibility to make choices while being held accountable for their expenditures and results. Nonfederal Land Managers Are Using Innovative Approaches and Techniques
Although most of the nonfederal land managers whose efforts we reviewed are attempting to increase revenue and/or decrease costs from the sale or use of natural resources on their lands, their success in becoming financially self-sufficient has varied and their revenue has not always covered the costs of providing the goods or services. Accompanying Flexibility With Accountability for Expenditures and Results
Virtually all of the nonfederal land managers whose efforts we reviewed have the discretion and flexibility to (1) explore innovative entrepreneurial ideas or conduct research to increase profits and (2) choose where and when to apply the results. Requirements in environmental and planning laws and their judicial interpretations have increasingly required the Forest Service to shift its emphasis from uses that generate revenue to those that do not. Finally, certain congressional expectations and revenue-sharing provisions serve as disincentives to either increasing revenue or decreasing costs. These barriers—which limit the Forest Service’s ability to move toward financial self-sufficiency and limit managers’ flexibility to make choices—include (1) language in federal statutes implying that maximizing revenue should not be the overriding criterion in managing the national forests, (2) requirements in environmental and planning laws necessitating a shift in the Forest Service’s management emphasis to uses that do not generate revenue, (3) legislative and administrative decisions setting aside an increasing percentage of Forest Service lands for conservation, (4) requirements that the agency continue to provide certain goods and services at less than their fair market value, and (5) disincentives embedded in laws and congressional expectations. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed: (1) the efforts by nonfederal land managers to generate revenue or become financially self-sufficient from the sale or use of natural resources on their lands; and (2) legal and other barriers that may preclude the Forest Service from implementing similar efforts on its lands.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the nonfederal land managers whose efforts GAO reviewed--while not always attaining financial self-sufficiency--are using a variety of sometimes innovative approaches and techniques to generate revenue or reduce costs from the sale or use of natural resources on their lands; (2) none of the approaches or techniques are legislatively mandated or otherwise required; (3) rather, the land managers have: (a) usually tailored their efforts to meet either a clear mission to make a profit over time or an incentive to generate revenue for other mission-related goals and objectives; and (b) often been delegated the discretion and flexibility to explore innovative entrepreneurial ideas or conduct research to increase profits and to choose where and when to apply the results while being held accountable for their expenditures and performance; (4) generating revenue and reducing costs are not mission priorities for the Forest Service; (5) in keeping with its existing legislative framework, the agency is moving away from, rather than toward, financial self-sufficiency; (6) increasingly, legislative and administrative decisions--such as setting aside an increasing percentage of Forest Service lands for conservation as wilderness, wild and scenic rivers, and national monuments--and judicial interpretations of statutory requirements have required the Forest Service to shift its emphasis from uses that generate revenue to those that do not; and (7) furthermore: (a) the agency is required to continue providing certain goods and services--such as recreational sites, hardrock minerals, and livestock grazing--at less than their fair-market value; and (b) certain congressional expectations and legislative provisions--including those that require sharing revenue before deducting the costs of providing the goods or services--serve as disincentives to either increasing revenue or decreasing costs. |
gao_GAO-05-350T | gao_GAO-05-350T_0 | High-Risk Designations Removed
For this 2005 high-risk update, we determined that three high-risk areas warranted removal from the list because of progress made. Thus, while FSA needs to continue its progress and take additional steps to fully address some of our recommendations, we are removing the high-risk designation from student financial aid programs. While the cost accounting system is still under development, progress has been made. Based on our criteria for removing a high-risk designation, which includes a demonstrated strong commitment, corrective action plan, and progress in addressing deficiencies, we believe the Forest Service’s overall improvement in financial management since our January 2003 high-risk update has been sufficient for us to remove Forest Service financial management from the high-risk list at this time. New High-Risk Areas
Our use of the high-risk designation to draw attention to the challenges associated with the economy, efficiency, and effectiveness of government programs and operations in need of broad-based transformation has led to important progress. We will also continue to identify high-risk areas based on the more traditional focus on fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement. For 2005, we have designated the following four new areas as high risk: Establishing Appropriate and Effective Information-Sharing Mechanisms to Improve Homeland Security, Department of Defense (DOD) Approach to Business Transformation, DOD Personnel Security Clearance Program, and Management of Interagency Contracting. The ability to share security-related information can unify the efforts of federal, state, and local government agencies, as well as the private sector as appropriate, in preventing or minimizing terrorist attacks. Accordingly, we are designating information sharing for homeland security as a governmentwide high-risk area because this area, while receiving increased attention, still faces significant challenges. For years, we have reported on inefficiencies and the lack of adequate transparency and appropriate accountability across DOD’s major business areas, resulting in billions of dollars of wasted resources annually. Although the Secretary of Defense and senior leaders have shown commitment to business transformation, as evidenced by individual key initiatives related to acquisition reform, business modernization, and financial management, among others, little tangible evidence of actual improvement has been seen in DOD’s business operations to date. However, DOD has not taken the steps it needs to take to achieve and sustain business reform on a broad, strategic, departmentwide, and integrated basis. Problems with DOD’s personnel security clearance process can have repercussions throughout the government because DOD conducts personnel security investigations and adjudications for industry personnel from 22 other federal agencies, in addition to performing such functions for its own service members, federal civilian employees, and industry personnel. These contracts are designed to leverage the government’s aggregate buying power and provide a much-needed simplified method for procuring commonly used goods and services. However, the challenges associated with these contracts, recent problems related to their management, and the need to ensure that the government effectively implements measures to bolster oversight and control so that it is well positioned to realize the value of these contracts, warrants designation of interagency contracting as a new high-risk area. There are several causes of the deficiencies we and others have found in the use of interagency contracts, including the increasing demands on the acquisition workforce, insufficient training, and in some cases inadequate guidance. The Congress and the administration have taken several steps to address the challenges of interagency contracting. Internal controls and appropriate performance measures help ensure that policies and processes are implemented and have the desired outcomes. Making these investments has the potential to improve the government’s ability to acquire high-quality goods and services in an efficient and effective manner, resulting in reduced costs, improved service delivery, and strengthened public trust. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO's audits and evaluations identify federal programs and operations that, in some cases, are high risk due to their greater vulnerabilities to fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement. Increasingly, GAO also is identifying high-risk areas to focus on the need for broad-based transformations to address major economy, efficiency, or effectiveness challenges. Since 1990, GAO has periodically reported on government operations that it has designated as high risk. In this 2005 update for the 109th Congress, GAO presents the status of high-risk areas identified in 2003 and new high-risk areas warranting attention by the Congress and the administration. Lasting solutions to high-risk problems offer the potential to save billions of dollars, dramatically improve service to the American public, strengthen public confidence and trust in the performance and accountability of the federal government, and ensure the ability of government to deliver on its promises.
What GAO Found
In January 2003, GAO identified 25 high-risk areas; in July 2003, a 26th highrisk area was added to the list. Since then, progress has been made in all areas, although the nature and significance of progress varies by area. Federal departments and agencies, as well as the Congress, have shown a continuing commitment to addressing high-risk challenges and have taken various steps to help correct several of the problems' root causes. GAO has determined that sufficient progress has been made to remove the high-risk designation from three areas: student financial aid programs, FAA financial management, and Forest Service financial management. Also, four areas related to IRS have been consolidated into two areas. This year, GAO is designating four new high-risk areas. The first new area is establishing appropriate and effective information-sharing mechanisms to improve homeland security. Federal policy creates specific requirements for information-sharing efforts, including the development of processes and procedures for collaboration between federal, state, and local governments and the private sector. This area has received increased attention but the federal government still faces formidable challenges sharing information among stakeholders in an appropriate and timely manner to reduce risk. The second and third new areas are, respectively, DOD's approach to business transformation and its personnel security clearance program. GAO has reported on inefficiencies and inadequate transparency and accountability across DOD's major business areas, resulting in billions of dollars of wasted resources. Senior leaders have shown commitment to business transformation through individual initiatives in acquisition reform, business modernization, and financial management, among others, but little tangible evidence of actual improvement has been seen in DOD's business operations to date. DOD needs to take stronger steps to achieve and sustain business reform on a departmentwide basis. Further, delays by DOD in completing background investigations and adjudications can affect the entire government because DOD performs this function for hundreds of thousands of industry personnel from 22 federal agencies, as well as its own service members, federal civilian employees, and industry personnel. OPM is to assume DOD's personnel security investigative function, but this change alone will not reduce the shortages of investigative personnel. The fourth area is management of interagency contracting. Interagency contracts can leverage the government's buying power and provide a simplified and expedited method of procurement. But several factors can pose risks, including the rapid growth of dollars involved combined with the limited expertise of some of agencies in using these contracts and recent problems related to their management. Various improvement efforts have been initiated to address this area, but improved policies and processes, and their effective implementation, are needed to ensure that interagency contracting achieves its full potential in the most effective and efficient manner. |
gao_AIMD-96-7 | gao_AIMD-96-7_0 | We found that the Navy’s fiscal year 1994 consolidated financial reports did not disclose obligation and disbursement problems. Lack of Basic Internal Controls and Discipline Cause Financial Reporting Problems
A root cause of the Navy’s financial reporting deficiencies is the lack of basic internal controls and well-disciplined financial operations. Does not have sufficient personnel experienced in Navy operations. To follow through and determine whether all provisions of the new policy are enforced and effectively implemented, or whether refinements are necessary, it is important for the DOD Comptroller to establish time frames within which to achieve results from the clarified roles and responsibilities, and establish milestones for assessing progress toward financial management improvement; designate specific offices or positions to be held accountable for actions to improve the Navy’s financial management and reports; and discipline managers for failing to improve the Navy’s financial management operations and to meet the CFO Act’s requirements to enhance financial systems. Recommendations
We recommend that the DOD Comptroller and the Navy’s Assistant Secretary for Financial Management and Comptroller jointly act to improve the credibility of the Navy’s financial reports and to adequately position the Navy and DFAS to prepare auditable financial statements for the Navy, beginning with those for fiscal year 1996, and periodically report to the Secretary of Defense the status of their results. We examined the overall reliability of the Navy’s fiscal year 1994 financial reports, and the adequacy of the processes and controls the Navy and DFAS used to prepare them; the adequacy of the Navy’s and DFAS’s financial management planning, staffing, and systems; and the effectiveness of accountability for ensuring the reliability of the Navy’s financial reporting. GAO Comments
1. 2. 3. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO reviewed the Navy's fiscal year (FY) 1994 consolidated financial reports, focusing on how the Navy and the Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) can: (1) improve the credibility of the Navy's FY 1995 financial reports; and (2) enhance their ability to prepare the Navy's FY 1996 annual financial statements.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) the Navy's FY 1994 consolidated financial reports were not reliable and could not be used to assess the results of the Navy' operations, stewardship over assets, and use of budgetary resources; (2) the unreliability of the Navy financial reports adversely affects the reliability of the government's consolidated financial reports; (3) all aspects of the reports had inaccurate financial information, including omissions or misrecordings of assets and costs and failure to make required disclosures; (4) the Navy's financial reporting deficiencies are due to long-standing internal control weaknesses and the lack of accounting discipline; (5) in September 1995, DFAS directed its centers to pay closer attention to internal control problems, which may help correct the Navy's and other departments' deficiencies; (6) the joint DFAS and Navy Chief Financial Officers (CFO) Project Plan to improve the Navy's financial reporting is inadequate; (7) DFAS and the Navy will have to monitor and enforce efforts to improve financial control procedures and increase emphasis on preparing and executing improvement plans, assessing the skills, experience, and number of financial personnel needed, and improving financial systems; and (8) the Department of Defense (DOD) Comptroller needs to enforce the November 1995 DOD policy on DFAS and the Navy's financial management roles and responsibility. |
gao_NSIAD-96-94 | gao_NSIAD-96-94_0 | We were asked to describe (1) the potential capability of export-oriented agricultural STEs to distort trade and (2) the specific potential of the Canadian Wheat Board (CWB), the Australian Wheat Board (AWB), and NZDB to engage in trade-distorting activities, based on their status as STEs. As a result, it is necessary to consider STEs on a case-by-case basis to understand their potential effects. Nonetheless, some changes in subsidies and CWB control, as well as ongoing reviews of the CWB’s monopoly status, may have the effect of reducing the CWB’s ability to potentially distort trade. The CWB’s control of domestic sales for human consumption sales and monopoly over export sales of wheat and barley provide it with the potential ability to charge a higher domestic price for these commodities and use these proceeds to lower export prices, particularly in the case of barley exports. CWB Given Partial Monopoly Authority Over Canadian Wheat and Barley
The CWB’s 1993-94 annual report states that “the CWB’s monopoly is its single greatest asset” and concludes that “the economic benefits that accrue to Prairie farmers from this marketing strength would be greatly diminished were the CWB to operate in tandem with a private system.” CWB has the sole authority to market for export and for domestic human consumption wheat and barley grown in the western prairie provinces of Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Alberta, and British Columbia. Pool deficits have also increased in recent years. One indirect subsidy to CWB and Canadian wheat and barley producers, though a direct subsidy to the Canadian railroad, existed in the form of transportation subsidies. Among other things, the final report also recommended that (1) Canada and the United States undertake regular and structured consultative process concerning grain policy issues with the goal of reducing trade-distorting policies and (2) a bilateral producer/industry-based Consultative Committee be established to handle short-term cross-border issues as an “early warning system for trade difficulties.”
AWB Enjoys Indirect Government Subsidies, but Ability to Distort Trade Is Limited
AWB has limited capability to distort international wheat markets. Because of this guarantee, it most likely receives favorable interest rates on its loans. AWB-Government Relationship: Both Direct and Indirect Government Subsidies Help AWB
Besides its monopoly on Australian wheat exports, AWB benefits from several forms of assistance. Additionally, AWB’s single-desk seller status gives it a sure source of supply for its export sales. New Zealand Dairy Trade Significant
NZDB operates within the terms of the Dairy Board Act of 1961, as amended. Domestic Market Deregulated, but Small
New Zealand’s domestic dairy market has been deregulated since the late 1980s. NZDB-Government Relationship: Government Assistance Is Limited
Even though NZDB has sole export authority for New Zealand dairy products, it has not received direct government subsidies since 1984, when a governmentwide reform removed most agricultural subsidies. NZDB benefits from a good credit rating, which may be related to its status as a government-established STE. NZDB’s exclusive authority and size translate into market power for NZDB in certain world dairy markets. NZDB can take advantage of the difference between world and U.S. prices by selling its goods through wholly owned subsidiaries in the United States. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed three state trading enterprises (STE), the Canadian Wheat Board (CWB), the Australian Wheat Board (AWB), and the New Zealand Dairy Board (NZDB) focusing on: (1) the potential capability of export-oriented agricultural STEse to distort trade; and (2) the specific potential capability of CWB, AWB, and NZDB to engage in trade-distorting activities based on their status as STEs.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) it is necessary to consider STEs on a case-by-case basis to understand their potential to distort trade; and (2) the three STEs reviewed have varying capabilities to potentially distort trade in their respective commodities, although in each case these capabilities have generally been reduced over recent years due to lower levels of government assistance. CWB benefits from: (1) the Canadian government's subsidies to cover CWB's periodic operational deficits, (2) monopoly over both the domestic human consumption and export wheat and barley markets which may allow for cross-subsidization, and (3) pricing flexibility through delayed producer payments. Canada's elimination of transportation subsidies in 1995 has reduced some of the indirect government support going to its wheat and barley producers, and ongoing Canadian reviews of its agricultural policies may reduce the control of CWB in the future. AWB has not received direct government subsidies in several years but enjoys a government guarantee on its payments to producers. It also enjoys indirect subsidies in the form of favorable interest rates and an authority to collect from producers for investment. The deregulation of Australia's domestic grain trade and the decline of direct government assistance have lessened the possibile trade-distorting policies of AWB. Recent studies have challenged the premise behind a single selling authority, but AWB's monopoly over wheat exports still provides it with a sure source of supply. NZDB is relatively subsidy free but benefits from its monopoly over New Zealand dairy exports and its extensive subsidiary structure worldwide. NZDB's size and exclusive purchasing authority for export also translate into market power for NZDB in certain world dairy markets. Its subsidiaries allow it to keep profits from foreign sales within the organization and take advantage of the difference between world prices and those of the country in which it is selling the goods, such as the United States. NZDB's potential to distort trade due to direct government subsidies was eliminated during the 1980s when New Zealand deregulated the domestic dairy market and stopped offering dairy farmers direct government subsidies. |
gao_GAO-05-305 | gao_GAO-05-305_0 | The Victoria 19 case has been cited by ICE as representing a new model for fighting alien smuggling—a model that ICE (1) subsequently used to launch a multi-agency task force (Operation ICE Storm) in the Phoenix (Arizona) metropolitan area and (2) reportedly was using to develop ICE’s national “Antismuggling/Human-Trafficking Strategy.”
ICE’s Strategy for Combating Alien Smuggling Not Yet Issued
Although its development was announced as early as June 2003, a national strategy for combating alien smuggling had not been finalized and implemented by ICE as of April 2005. Also, ICE and CBP— two DHS components with complementary antismuggling missions— signed a memorandum of understanding in November 2004 to address their respective roles and responsibilities, including provisions to ensure proper and timely sharing of information and intelligence. Currently, however, there is no mechanism in place for tracking the number and the results of referrals or leads made by CBP to ICE for investigation, including even whether ICE declined to act on the referrals. ICE and CBP Agreement (November 2004)
In November 2004, ICE and CBP signed a second memorandum of understanding, which acknowledged that the missions of the two DHS components “are intricately connected and complementary.” The memorandum stated, for instance, that ICE’s Office of Investigations has primary responsibility for all investigations, while the Border Patrol has primary responsibility for all interdictions between ports of entry. ICE officials noted, however, that establishment of a tracking mechanism would help ICE ensure that appropriate action is taken on referrals. Prosecutions and Convictions Pursued in Alien-Smuggling Cases; Asset Seizures Expected to Increase
About 2,400 criminal defendants were convicted in federal district courts in fiscal year 2004 under the primary alien-smuggling statute. In this regard, for the first 6 months of fiscal year 2005, ICE reported seizures of $7.8 million from alien-smuggling investigations. Justice officials told us in April 2005, however, that the department does not have a legislative proposal on this subject pending before Congress because the department’s legislative policy resources have been focused on other priorities. Conclusions
Creation of DHS in March 2003 has provided new opportunities to more effectively combat alien smuggling, particularly in reference to using financial investigative techniques to target and seize the monetary assets of smuggling organizations. Having clearly defined roles and responsibilities for these components is important, given their complementary antismuggling missions. If a tracking mechanism were in place, CBP could continue pursuing certain leads if ICE—for lack of available resources or other reasons—does not take action on the referrals. According to Justice and ICE, the absence of civil forfeiture authority for real property used to facilitate the smuggling of aliens is inappropriate because law enforcement is unable in many cases to seize stash houses where smugglers hide aliens while awaiting payment and travel arrangements to final destinations throughout the nation. Rather, ICE was in the process of adjusting the draft strategy to focus on the southwest border and encompass all aspects of smuggling, aliens as well as drugs and other contraband. Also, we obtained information about Operation ICE Storm, a multi-agency task force launched in October 2003 to crack down on migrant smuggling and related violence in Arizona by, among other means, targeting the monetary assets of smuggling organizations (see app. In particular, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement—the largest investigative component of DHS—integrates the legal authorities and investigative tools of the legacy Immigration and Naturalization Service and the Treasury Department’s U.S. Customs Service, which has extensive experience in combating money laundering and other financial crimes. Appendix VII: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security | Why GAO Did This Study
Globally, alien smuggling generates billions of dollars in illicit revenues annually and poses a threat to the nation's security. Creation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in March 2003 has provided an opportunity to use financial investigative techniques to combat alien smugglers by targeting and seizing their monetary assets. For instance, the composition of DHS's largest investigative component--U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)--includes the legacy Customs Service, which has extensive experience with money laundering and other financial crimes. Another DHS component, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has primary responsibility for interdictions between ports of entry. In summer 2003, ICE announced that it was developing a national strategy for combating alien smuggling. Among other objectives, GAO determined the implementation status of the strategy and investigative results in terms of convictions and seized assets.
What GAO Found
As of April 2005, ICE had not finalized its strategy for combating alien smuggling. ICE was adjusting the draft strategy to focus on the southwest border and encompass all aspects of smuggling, aliens as well as drugs and other contraband. In adjusting the strategy, ICE officials stressed the importance of incorporating lessons learned from ongoing follow-the-money approaches such as Operation ICE Storm, a multi-agency task force launched in October 2003 to crack down on migrant smuggling and related violence in Arizona. Also, the strategy's effectiveness depends partly on having clearly defined roles and responsibilities for ICE and CBP, two DHS components that have complementary antismuggling missions. In this regard, ICE and CBP signed a memorandum of understanding in November 2004 to address their respective roles and responsibilities, including provisions for sharing information and intelligence. Currently, however, there is no mechanism in place for tracking the number and the results of referrals made by CBP to ICE for investigation. CBP and ICE officials acknowledged that establishing a tracking mechanism could have benefits for both DHS components. Such a mechanism would help ICE ensure that appropriate action is taken on the referrals. Also, CBP could continue to pursue certain leads if ICE--for lack of available resources or other reasons--cannot take action on the referrals. In fiscal year 2004, about 2,400 criminal defendants were convicted in federal district courts under the primary alien-smuggling statute, and ICE reported seizures totaling $7.3 million from its alien-smuggling investigations. For the first 6 months of fiscal year 2005, ICE reported $7.8 million in seizures from alien-smuggling investigations. A concern raised by ICE and the Department of Justice is the lack of adequate statutory civil forfeiture authority for seizing real property, such as "stash" houses where smugglers hide aliens while awaiting payment and travel arrangements to final destinations throughout the nation. However, Justice does not have a legislative proposal on this subject pending before Congress because the department's legislative policy resources have been focused on other priorities. |
gao_HEHS-97-27 | gao_HEHS-97-27_0 | More significantly, the number of veterans aged 75 and older, the heaviest users of nursing home care, is increasing rapidly. All veterans with a medical need for nursing home care are eligible to receive such care in VA nursing homes and community nursing homes under contract to VA. VA also pays a portion of the cost of care for veterans served in state veterans nursing homes. Overall, VA reports that nursing home obligations have grown from about $710 million in 1985, serving 72,889 veterans, to $1.6 billion in 1995, serving 79,373 veterans as shown in table 1. Patient Distribution in Types of Nursing Homes Has Shifted
The distribution of veterans in the three types of nursing homes differs greatly from VA’s target of 30 percent in VA homes, 40 percent in community homes, and 30 percent in state homes. According to VA-reported costs for fiscal year 1995, VA’s daily patient cost was $213.17 for veterans in VA nursing homes, $118.12 for veterans in community nursing homes, and $35.37 for veterans in state veterans homes (where only a portion of costs are funded by VA). Several Factors Affect VA’s Use of Community and State Nursing Homes
VA’s use of community nursing home beds is affected by (1) a shortage of beds in some parts of the country, (2) veteran and family preferences to use VA nursing homes, and (3) VA’s inability to compete with other purchasers of community nursing home services in some locations because of lower reimbursement rates. On the other hand, VA’s use of state veterans nursing homes is limited because of the number of such beds available and because VA has little control over who gets admitted to these facilities. To make informed nursing home resource management decisions, VA needs reliable demand and capacity data. On the basis of our review of selected quality indicators, the homes we visited appeared to provide comprehensive and appropriate care to veterans. VA Homes Had Fewer Quality-of-Care Issues Than Other Types of Homes
We visited 2 VA, 10 community, and 5 state veterans nursing homes, where we reviewed the care provided to 95 veterans. The patients were randomly selected for a representative sample at the VA and state veterans homes. Care provided in the state homes we visited generally met quality standards. However, without (1) accurate and complete information on nursing home costs, (2) better information on the availability of community nursing home beds, and (3) information on the competitiveness of VA reimbursement rates, VA has inadequate assurance that it is using the nursing home resources at its disposal to the best of its ability to serve veterans in need of such care. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on the Department of Veterans Affairs' (VA) nursing home programs, focusing on: (1) the distribution of veterans in VA, community, and state veterans nursing homes; (2) the costs to VA for VA, community, and state veterans nursing homes; (3) the factors affecting VA's use of community and state veterans nursing homes; and (4) whether VA, community, and state veterans homes provide comparable quality care.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) the number of veterans receiving VA-financed or -provided nursing home care increased from 72,889 in 1985 to 79,373 in 1995, though the costs of these services increased from about $710 million to $1.6 billion in the same period; (2) among veterans currently receiving VA-financed or -provided nursing home care, 40 percent receive such care in VA nursing homes, 36 percent in state veterans nursing homes, and 24 percent in community nursing homes; (3) VA records for fiscal year 1995 indicate that VA's daily per patient cost was $213.17 for veterans in VA nursing homes, $118.12 for veterans in community nursing homes, and $35.37 for veterans in state veterans homes; (4) some of the cost differences are attributable to differing patient mix and staffing patterns among the facility types, but the precise cost differences cannot be determined because of weaknesses in VA's cost data; (5) several factors influence VA decisions on where to place nursing home patients; (6) VA's use of state veterans homes is limited by the number of such beds available and by some states' criteria for admitting veterans to these homes; (7) the VA nursing homes GAO visited appeared to provide more comprehensive care to veterans than most of the community and state veterans nursing homes GAO visited; (8) although the care provided in the community and state homes GAO visited generally met quality standards, GAO identified quality-of-care issues at both types of homes; and (9) although VA has initiated efforts to improve its data on the cost of providing and purchasing nursing home care, the availability of nursing home beds in local markets, and the adequacy of VA reimbursement rates to purchase quality nursing home care for veterans, better information is still needed for VA to make informed resource management decisions. |
gao_GAO-09-399 | gao_GAO-09-399_0 | TSA Has Taken Steps to Assess Threats and Vulnerabilities for Airport Security, but Has Not Conducted a Comprehensive Risk Assessment to Help Identify Priorities and Allocate Resources
While TSA has taken steps to assess risk, it has not conducted a comprehensive risk assessment based on assessments of threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences. For example, consistent with the Explanatory Statement, TSA piloted several methods to screen workers accessing secured areas, but clear conclusions could not be drawn because of significant design limitations, and TSA did not develop or document an evaluation plan to guide design and implementation of the pilot. In addition, TSA has expanded its requirements for conducting worker background checks. TSA officials hired a contractor—HSI, a federally funded research and development center—to assist with the design, implementation, and evaluation of the data collected. In addition to the limitations recognized by HSI, TSA and HSI did not document key aspects of the design and implementation of the pilot program. Because of the significance of the pilot program limitations reported by HSI, as well as the lack of documentation and detailed information regarding the evaluation of the program, the reliability of the resulting data and any subsequent conclusions about the potential impacts, costs, benefits, and effectiveness of 100 percent worker screening and other screening methods cannot be verified. Developing milestones for implementing a biometric system could help ensure that TSA addresses statutory requirements. A national strategy to guide and integrate the nation’s airport security activities could strengthen decision making and accountability for several reasons. TSA officials also told us that they have not yet identified or estimated costs to the aviation industry for implementing airport security requirements, such as background checks for their workers, or capital costs—such as construction and equipment—that airport operators incur to enhance the security of their facilities. TSA officials said that decisions to allocate random worker screening resources between passenger and worker screening are made at the local airport level by FSDs. However, a well-developed and documented evaluation plan, with well-defined and measurable objectives and standards as well as a clearly articulated methodology and data analysis plan, can help ensure that a pilot program is implemented and evaluated in ways that generate reliable information to inform future program development decisions. These various actions, however, have not been fully integrated and unified toward achieving common outcomes and effectively using resources. Recommendations for Executive Action
To help ensure that TSA’s actions in enhancing airport security are guided by a systematic risk management approach that appropriately assesses risk and evaluates alternatives, and that it takes a more strategic role in ensuring that government and stakeholder actions and resources are effectively and efficiently applied across the nationwide network of airports, we recommend that the Assistant Secretary of TSA work with aviation stakeholders to implement the following five actions: Develop a comprehensive risk assessment for airport perimeter and access control security, along with milestones (i.e., time frames) for completing the assessment, that (1) uses existing threat and vulnerability assessment activities, (2) includes consequence analysis, and (3) integrates all three elements of risk—threat, vulnerability, and consequence. Specifically, DHS contends that it is not accurate to state that TSA “has not conducted vulnerability assessments for 87 percent of the nation’s 450 commercial airports” because this statement does not recognize that TSA uses other activities to assess airport vulnerabilities, and that these activities are conducted for every commercial airport. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report evaluates to what extent the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has assessed the risk to airport security consistent with the National Infrastructure Protection Plan’s (NIPP) risk management framework; implemented protective programs to strengthen airport security, and evaluated its worker screening pilot program; and established a national strategy to guide airport security decision making. To evaluate the extent to which TSA has assessed risks for airport perimeter and access control security efforts, we relied on TSA to identify risk assessment activities for these areas, and we then examined documentation for these activities, such as TSA’s 2008 Civil Aviation Threat Assessment, and interviewed TSA officials responsible for conducting assessment efforts. To determine the extent to which TSA evaluated its worker screening pilot program, we analyzed TSA’s final report on it worker screening pilot program, including conclusions and limitations cited by the contractor—the Homeland Security Institute (HSI)—TSA hired to assist with the pilot’s design, implementation, and evaluation. | Why GAO Did This Study
Incidents of airport workers using access privileges to smuggle weapons through secured airport areas and onto planes have heightened concerns regarding commercial airport security. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA), along with airports, is responsible for security at TSA-regulated airports. To guide risk assessment and protection of critical infrastructure, including airports, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) developed the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP). GAO was asked to examine the extent to which, for airport perimeters and access controls, TSA (1) assessed risk consistent with the NIPP; (2) implemented protective programs, and evaluated its worker screening pilots; and (3) established a strategy to guide decision making. GAO examined TSA documents related to risk assessment activities, airport security programs, and worker screening pilots; visited nine airports of varying size; and interviewed TSA, airport, and association officials.
What GAO Found
Although TSA has implemented activities to assess risks to airport perimeters and access controls, such as a commercial aviation threat assessment, it has not conducted vulnerability assessments for 87 percent of the nation's approximately 450 commercial airports or any consequence assessments. As a result, TSA has not completed a comprehensive risk assessment combining threat, vulnerability, and consequence assessments as required by the NIPP. While TSA officials said they intend to conduct a consequence assessment and additional vulnerability assessments, TSA could not provide further details, such as milestones for their completion. Conducting a comprehensive risk assessment and establishing milestones for its completion would provide additional assurance that intended actions will be implemented, provide critical information to enhance TSA's understanding of risks to airports, and help ensure resources are allocated to the highest security priorities. Since 2004, TSA has taken steps to strengthen airport security and implement new programs; however, while TSA conducted a pilot program to test worker screening methods, clear conclusions could not be drawn because of significant design limitations and TSA did not document key aspects of the pilot. TSA has taken steps to enhance airport security by, among other things, expanding its requirements for conducting worker background checks and implementing a worker screening program. In fiscal year 2008 TSA pilot tested various methods to screen airport workers to compare the benefits, costs, and impacts of 100 percent worker screening and random worker screening. TSA designed and implemented the pilot in coordination with the Homeland Security Institute (HSI), a federally funded research and development center. However, because of significant limitations in the design and evaluation of the pilot, such as the limited number of participating airports--7 out of about 450--it is unclear which method is more cost-effective. TSA and HSI also did not document key aspects of the pilot's design, methodology, and evaluation, such as a data analysis plan, limiting the usefulness of these efforts. A well-developed and well-documented evaluation plan can help ensure that pilots generate needed performance information to make effective decisions. While TSA has completed these pilots, developing an evaluation plan for future pilots could help ensure that they are designed and implemented to provide management and Congress with necessary information for decision making. TSA's efforts to enhance the security of the nation's airports have not been guided by a unifying national strategy that identifies key elements, such as goals, priorities, performance measures, and required resources. For example, while TSA's various airport security efforts are implemented by federal and local airport officials, TSA officials said that they have not identified or estimated costs to airport operators for implementing security requirements. GAO has found that national strategies that identify these key elements strengthen decision making and accountability; in addition, developing a strategy with these elements could help ensure that TSA prioritizes its activities and uses resources efficiently to achieve intended outcomes. |
gao_HEHS-95-244 | gao_HEHS-95-244_0 | Chapter 3 discusses the quality of medical education obtained by military physicians and how physicians from each accession source are prepared to meet the special needs of military medicine. Considerable debate exists about whether other (non-DOD) federal support for medical education should be considered in the cost of obtaining military physicians. Our supplemental analysis showed that when an estimate of additional federal dollars that support civilian medical education is included in the analysis, the University is more costly on a per graduate basis, but on an expected year of service basis, the University is nearly equal the cost of the regular scholarship program and less costly than the deferred scholarship program. In addition to their graduate medical education, military physicians are required to have basic officer training, regardless of their accession source. Compensation costs are estimated to be highest for graduates of the University because, on average, they are expected to remain in the service longer and to earn retirement benefits at a rate higher than either their deferred or regular scholarship program peers. Traditional measures of quality place the University’s program within the midrange of medical schools nationwide and its graduates at or above other military physicians. These fall generally into two major categories: (1) education and training activities and (2) research, consultation, and archival activities. Education and Training Activities
The University provides medical education beyond that provided by the School of Medicine and also conducts training and education for other health care and related professions. The longer expected retention of University graduates is consistent with the legislative intent of providing long-term military medical officers. If the University is closed and DOD continues to need experienced career military physicians, DOD will need to find alternative ways to extend the careers of some military physicians while enhancing their exposure to military readiness training. Both the Assistant Secretary and University officials were concerned, however, about several presentational issues including what they viewed as • a focus in our comparative cost analysis on the cost per graduate of each program, rather than on the total cost to the taxpayer per staff year of DOD service, which they believe is the appropriate measure of cost; • a lack of emphasis on the activities of the University, which results in cost-avoidance for other DOD components; and • a lack of emphasis on the University’s unique contribution to providing military physicians schooled in militarily unique medical subjects and our failure to acknowledge the “acculturation process” provided by the University in meeting the needs of military medicine. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO reviewed the Department of Defense's (DOD) Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences (USUHS) and Health Profession Scholarship Program (HPSP), focusing on: (1) the cost of obtaining military physicians from all sources; (2) the quality of medical education provided by the University; (3) how physicians are trained to meet military medical needs; and (4) retention rate patterns among USUHS and HPSP.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) by most measures, USUHS is the most expensive source of military physicians; (2) HPSP provides the majority of military physicians; (3) when all federal costs are considered, USUHS nearly equals the cost of the regular scholarship program and is less costly than the deferred scholarship program; (4) USUHS graduates are expected to have longer military careers, and USUHS receives less non-DOD federal support than civilian medical schools and graduate training programs; (5) the quality of USUHS medical education compares well with that of all medical schools and its graduates' abilities are at or above those of other military physicians; (6) although USUHS graduates appear to be better trained in military medicine than their civilian peers, the significance of their additional readiness training is unclear; (7) if USUHS is closed, USUHS officials believe that DOD would need to continue funding other USUHS services, such as academic affiliation for several military graduate medical education programs, training and education for other health care and related professions, and research, consultation, and archival activities; (8) on average, USUHS graduates, particularly those in critical military medical specialties, tend to remain longer in the services than civilian-educated physicians; and (9) because its changing physician needs are not known, DOD needs to assess whether alternative strategies for obtaining certain experienced, long-term physicians at less cost are available. |
gao_GAO-06-916 | gao_GAO-06-916_0 | Background
The occupants of other vehicles are several times more likely to die in crashes involving large commercial trucks than the occupants of the trucks. Known as Ticketing Aggressive Cars and Trucks (TACT), it combined education and law enforcement activities in an effort to reduce aggressive driving between passenger vehicles and trucks. Another objective of the pilot was for NHTSA to show FMCSA staff how to operate similar initiatives in the future. Lastly, educational initiatives that were a part of STRS in 2003 were pursued by FMCSA, although not funded under NHTSA in 2004 and 2005. 2.) Specifically, TACT was modeled after NHTSA’s Click It or Ticket campaign. With TACT, there are a number of behaviors that may constitute aggressive driving, including tailgating, speeding, and unsafe merging. Previous STRS Initiatives Were Not Funded under NHTSA
In fiscal years 2004 and 2005, STRS did not fund initiatives that were a part of the program in 2003. Evaluation of TACT Demonstrated Positive Results and Was Generally Well- Designed
DOT and Washington State officials conducted an evaluation of TACT that demonstrated the initiative’s success and was generally well-designed. The evaluation did not assess changes in crashes, but increased driver awareness and improved driver behavior should logically lead to reduced crashes, injuries, and fatalities. Also, TACT’s design of combining education outreach with law enforcement better lent itself to reaching STRS goals than previous initiatives that were purely educational. This conclusion is supported by the evaluation of past initiatives to change driver behavior, particularly of efforts to increase safety belt use. FMCSA Plans Expanded Development of High- Visibility Law Enforcement Campaigns Similar to TACT, but Lacks a Clear Strategy and Expertise
Following the success of TACT in Washington State, FMCSA is developing plans encouraging states to adopt similar initiatives in other states; however, its strategy for expanding TACT and its ability to manage these initiatives remain unknown. Program planning documents state that FMCSA has decided to transition STRS to focus on developing initiatives similar to TACT in other states, but FMCSA plans to invest just $150,000 of its $500,000 fiscal year 2006 STRS budget to do this. FMCSA’s Short-term Plans Focus on Initiatives That Do Not Include Enforcement and That Have Not Been Shown to Be Effective
FMCSA plans to spend the majority of its 2006 STRS funds on updating the STRS Web site and producing outreach materials. FMCSA’s plans for future aggressive driving initiatives are still evolving, but the agency is currently developing a second pilot in Pennsylvania and has a goal of rolling out TACT-like initiatives nationwide in 2009. Recommendations for Executive Action
To ensure that the Share the Road Safely program continues to improve driver behavior around commercial vehicles, thereby potentially reducing fatalities, we recommend that the Secretary of Transportation direct the Administrators of the appropriate agencies to take the following three steps: develop a comprehensive strategy describing how FMCSA will implement and fund an expansion of TACT-like initiatives from several pilots into a nationwide program and detail how STRS initiatives contribute to this goal; complete and execute plans to evaluate STRS outreach activities that are purely educational and discontinue activities with no demonstrable impact on behavior; and monitor whether FMCSA has sufficient staff and expertise to successfully develop and administer future high-visibility law enforcement campaigns, and, if it does not, determine the best methods for DOT to use its resources and expertise to modify driver behavior and address the problem of aggressive driving around trucks. Scope And Methodology
To address our first objective and describe what the Department of Transportation (DOT) has done with the Share the Road Safely (STRS) program since 2003, we interviewed DOT officials to determine the changes made in the program since May 2003. Additionally, we interviewed officials from the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA), the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), and the Washington State Traffic Safety Commission to report on the implementation and administration of Washington State’s Ticketing Aggressive Cars and Trucks (TACT) pilot project. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 2004, over 5,000 people died on our nation's roads in crashes involving large trucks. The Department of Transportation's (DOT) Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) operates truck safety programs, including Share the Road Safely (STRS), which has a goal to improve driving behavior around large trucks. At congressional direction, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) assumed responsibility for funding STRS in 2004, but returned STRS to FMCSA in 2006. The current transportation authorization bill requested GAO to update its 2003 evaluation of STRS. This report (1) describes the STRS initiatives DOT has implemented since 2003 and their design, (2) reviews evaluations of STRS initiatives, and (3) assesses DOT's plans for the future of STRS. GAO interviewed DOT and state officials, and reviewed program plans and evaluations.
What GAO Found
During 2004 and 2005, Share the Road Safely funding was used to implement one initiative, a pilot in Washington State that focused on aggressive driving behaviors near or by large trucks. Known as Ticketing Aggressive Cars and Trucks (TACT), it combined education, such as highway message signs, and high-visibility law enforcement to reduce aggressive driving. TACT received about $892,000 in federal and state funds. TACT was generally modeled on successful behavior modification programs, including Click It or Ticket (a program to encourage safety belt use), but was more complex to implement than past initiatives since many behaviors constitute aggressive driving and Washington State lacked a single aggressive driving law. In addition, NHTSA sought to demonstrate to FMCSA staff how to operate similar initiatives in the future. To this end, FMCSA sent a liaison to NHTSA as requested by Congress. Lastly, initiatives that were a part of STRS in 2003 were still pursued by FMCSA, but were not funded. DOT and Washington State officials conducted an evaluation of TACT that demonstrated that the initiative was successful and well-designed. The evaluation found that TACT significantly reduced the number and severity of unsafe driving acts near or by trucks. While the evaluation did not assess changes in crashes, improved driver behavior should logically lead to fewer crashes, injuries, and fatalities. GAO found that TACT's design of combining education with law enforcement better lent itself to reaching agency goals of fatality reduction than previous STRS initiatives that were purely educational. FMCSA plans to expand development of new TACT-like initiatives, but lacks resources and experience to do so. In addition, FMCSA plans to spend most of its 2006 STRS funds on educational initiatives, which lack information showing whether they improve driver behavior. In terms of TACT expansion, FMCSA is currently developing a TACT-like pilot in Pennsylvania and plans to roll out initiatives similar to TACT nationally by 2009. FMCSA, however, has few people dedicated to education and outreach and lacks NHTSA's experience with behavior modification initiatives. While FMCSA designated a liaison to learn about TACT-like initiatives, GAO continues to have concerns about FMCSA's limited experience with these initiatives. NHTSA has considerable experience with such initiatives, but its role in STRS is still evolving. Finally, FMCSA plans to spend the majority of its fiscal year 2006 STRS funds on initiatives that do not have evaluations showing their impacts. |
gao_GAO-05-788T | gao_GAO-05-788T_0 | Agencies Undertake Three Types of IPR Efforts
The efforts of U.S. agencies to protect U.S. intellectual property overseas fall into three general categories—policy initiatives, training and technical assistance, and U.S. law enforcement actions. Training and Technical Assistance
In addition, most of the agencies involved in efforts to promote or protect IPR overseas engage in some training or technical assistance activities. U.S. Law Enforcement Efforts
A small number of agencies are involved in enforcing U.S. intellectual property laws, and the nature of these activities differs from other U.S. government actions related to intellectual property protection. Such actions are initial efforts to address recommendations that can be further implemented over time. Several Mechanisms Coordinate IPR Efforts, but Their Usefulness Varies
Several interagency mechanisms exist to coordinate overseas law enforcement efforts, intellectual property policy initiatives, and development and assistance activities, although these mechanisms’ level of activity and usefulness vary. National Intellectual Property Law Enforcement Coordination Council (NIPLECC)
NIPLECC, created by the Congress in 1999 to coordinate domestic and international intellectual property law enforcement among U.S. federal and foreign entities, seems to have had little impact. The law also provides additional direction regarding NIPLECC’s international mission, providing that NIPLECC shall (1) establish policies, objectives, and priorities concerning international intellectual property protection and intellectual property law enforcement; (2) promulgate a strategy for protecting American intellectual property overseas; and (3) coordinate and oversee implementation of items (1) and (2) by agencies with responsibilities for intellectual property protection and intellectual property law enforcement. Strategy Targeting Organized Piracy (STOP!) The most visible new effort undertaken as a part of STOP! Enforcement Overseas Remains Weak and Challenges Remain
U.S. efforts such as the annual Special 301 review have contributed to strengthened foreign IPR laws, but enforcement overseas remains weak. Weak Enforcement Overseas
The efforts of U.S. agencies have contributed to the establishment of strengthened intellectual property legislation in many foreign countries, however, the enforcement of intellectual property rights remains weak in many countries, and U.S. government and industry sources note that improving enforcement overseas is now a key priority. For example, according to DHS and Justice officials, U.S. efforts to investigate IPR violations overseas are complicated by a lack of jurisdiction as well as by the fact that U.S. officials must convince foreign officials to take action. Further, the impact of U.S. activities is affected by a country’s own domestic policy objectives and economic interests, which may complement or conflict with U.S. objectives. Many economic factors complicate and challenge U.S. and foreign governments’ efforts, even in countries with the political will to protect intellectual property. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. | Why GAO Did This Study
Although the U.S. government provides broad protection for intellectual property domestically, intellectual property protection in parts of the world is inadequate. As a result, U.S. goods are subject to piracy and counterfeiting in many countries. A number of U.S. agencies are engaged in efforts to improve protection of U.S. intellectual property abroad. This testimony, based on a prior GAO report as well as recent work, describes U.S. agencies' efforts, the mechanisms used to coordinate these efforts, and the impact of these efforts and the challenges they face.
What GAO Found
U.S. agencies undertake policy initiatives, training and assistance activities, and law enforcement actions in an effort to improve protection of U.S. intellectual property abroad. Policy initiatives include identifying countries with the most significant problems--an annual interagency process known as the "Special 301" review. In addition, many agencies engage in assistance activities, such as providing training for foreign officials. Finally, a small number of agencies carry out law enforcement actions, such as criminal investigations and seizures of counterfeit merchandise. Agencies use several mechanisms to coordinate their efforts, although the mechanisms' usefulness varies. The National Intellectual Property Law Enforcement Coordination Council, established in 1999 to coordinate domestic and international intellectual property law enforcement, has struggled to find a clear mission, has undertaken few activities, and is generally viewed as having little impact despite recent congressional action to strengthen the council. The Congress's action included establishing the role of Coordinator, but the position has not yet been filled (although the selection process is underway). The Administration's October 2004 Strategy Targeting Organized Piracy (STOP!) is intended to strengthen U.S. efforts to combat piracy and counterfeiting. Thus far, the initiative has resulted in some new actions and emphasized other ongoing efforts. U.S. efforts have contributed to strengthened intellectual property legislation overseas, but enforcement in many countries remains weak, and further U.S. efforts face significant challenges. For example, competing U.S. policy objectives such as national security interests take precedence over protecting intellectual property in certain regions. Further, other countries' domestic policy objectives can affect their "political will" to address U.S. concerns. Finally, many economic factors, as well as the involvement of organized crime, hinder U.S. and foreign governments' efforts to protect U.S. intellectual property abroad. |
gao_GAO-07-1004 | gao_GAO-07-1004_0 | NASA’s Strategic Human Capital Framework Is Generally Aligned with Its Strategic Mission, Outcomes, and Programmatic Goals but Some Improvements in Workforce Planning Can be Made
NASA’s strategic human capital planning framework is generally aligned with its strategic mission, outcomes, and programmatic goals. These linkages allow NASA to assess and understand the extent to which its workforce contributes to achieving the overarching mission. Other examples of some key policies and plans that guide NASA’s human capital efforts include the following: development of the Strategic Management and Governance Handbook and policy directives that set forth principles by which NASA manages itself and identifies the specific requirements that drive NASA’s strategic planning process; development of a workforce strategy in April 2006 that identified three underlying workforce principles: building and sustaining 10 healthy centers, maximizing the use of NASA’s current human capital capabilities, and evolving to a more flexible workforce that permits NASA’s human capital efforts to help carry out the Vision for Space Exploration and science and aeronautics research; and the creation of NASA’s Workforce Integrated Product Team—which consists of human capital office division directors and selected human resource directors—for day-to-day implementation and tracking of progress and results of human capital initiatives. NASA’s principal workforce challenge will be faced in the transition to the next generation of human space flight systems. The Center had difficulty recruiting and maintaining employees in this area, so it piloted a 2-year program that offered additional training and retention bonuses with 1-year service agreements. Human Capital Challenges in Retiring the Space Shuttle Program and Transitioning to Constellation Activities
The gap between the scheduled retirement of the Space Shuttle in 2010 and the resumption of human space flight currently scheduled for 2015 will pose a unique set of challenges. Concluding Observations
NASA has placed considerable emphasis on human capital management and addressing challenges that the agency has been facing in recruiting, retaining, and developing critical personnel. Separately, NASA provided technical comments, which have been addressed in the report, as appropriate. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To assess the alignment of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s (NASA) human capital framework with its strategic mission and programmatic goals, we analyzed a broad range of NASA’s policy, planning, and implementation documents; reviewed budget documents and performance and accountability reports; and interviewed officials in NASA’s Office of Human Capital Management, Office of the Chief Financial Officer, Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation, Office of the Chief Engineer, Office of Diversity and Equal Opportunity, Office of Education, the Aeronautics Research Mission Directorate, and the Space Operations Mission Directorate and attended NASA Advisory Council meetings. To assess NASA’s efforts to effectively recruit, develop, and retain critically skilled science and engineering staff we applied our five strategic workforce planning principles. In doing so, we analyzed NASA’s (1) demographics data; (2) critical skills information; (3) NASA’s policy, procedures and guidance for recruiting and hiring; (4) implementation of information systems, programs, and processes that support human capital management and planning. | Why GAO Did This Study
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is engaged in efforts to replace the Space Shuttle with the next generation of human space flight systems and implement the President's space exploration policy. To do this, NASA must recruit, develop, and retain certain critical skills in its workforce, guided by its strategic human capital management plan. GAO was asked to examine the extent to which NASA (1) has aligned its human capital planning framework with its strategic mission and programmatic goals and (2) is recruiting, developing, and retaining critically skilled personnel, given future workforce needs. To address these objectives, GAO reviewed NASA's policies, planning, and implementation documents; reviewed budget documents and performance and accountability reports; and interviewed cognizant agency officials. To assess NASA's efforts to recruit, develop, and retain critically skilled personnel, we analyzed demographics data, and critical skills information; NASA's policy, procedures and guidance for recruiting and hiring; and implementation of information systems programs, and processes that support human capital management and planning. We are not making any recommendations in this report.
What GAO Found
NASA's strategic human capital framework is generally aligned with its strategic mission, outcomes, and programmatic goals. NASA's leaders have set its overall direction and goals and involved its mission directorates and centers in implementing human capital strategy and providing feedback to headquarters. Recently, NASA has been improving its workforce planning information technology matching program requirements with human capital resources. Some centers have been critical of the systems' performance, but others find these tools useful. NASA attracts and retains critical personnel by using tools such as recruiting and retention bonuses. Recently, NASA has asked Congress for additional human capital flexibilities to help manage its workforce. The centers also have their own programs that address their critical skills shortfalls by training and developing employees. NASA recognizes that critical skills now present in the civil service and contractor Space Shuttle workforce are needed to complete present and future mission objectives, but also understands that additional capability will also be needed in certain areas. Given this, NASA is looking ahead and considering how best to mitigate any potential loss of skills and knowledge that could take place in the period between the Space Shuttle's retirement in 2010 and the resumption of human space flight in 2015. |
gao_GAO-06-349 | gao_GAO-06-349_0 | Background
The EFV is the Corps’ number-one priority ground system acquisition program and is the successor to the Marine Corps’ existing amphibious assault vehicle. In addition, the EFV accounts for a substantial portion of the Marine Corps’ total acquisition budget for fiscal years 2006 through 2011, as figure 2 shows. Cost, Schedule, and Other Problems Have Reduced EFV Buying Power
Since entering SDD in December, 2000, the EFV program’s total cost has grown by about $3.9 billion, or 45 percent. Cost per vehicle has increased from $8.5 million to $12.3 million. During the same period, the EFV’s development schedule has grown by about 4 years, or 35 percent. EFV reliability—a key performance parameter—has been reduced from 70 hours of continuous operation to 43.5 hours. Difficulty of Demonstrating Design Maturity Was Underestimated
The program’s development schedule did not allow enough time to demonstrate maturity of the EFV design during SDD. The original SDD schedule of about 3 years proved too short to conduct all necessary planning and to incorporate the results of tests into design changes. Specifically, the program experienced problems with the HEU, bow flap, system hydraulics, and reliability. Risks Remain for Demonstrating Design and Production Maturity
Three areas of risk remain for demonstrating design and production maturity, which have potential cost and schedule consequences—risks to the EFV business case. Second, the EFV program will transition to initial production without the knowledge that software capabilities are mature. Third, two key performance parameters— reliability and interoperability—are not scheduled to be demonstrated until the initial operational test and evaluation phase in fiscal year 2010, about 4 years after low-rate initial production has begun. The program office has developed plans to resolve performance challenges and believes it will succeed. Current EFV program plans are to enter low-rate initial production without requiring the contractor to ensure that all key EFV manufacturing processes are under control, i.e., repeatable, sustainable, and capable of consistently producing parts within the product’s tolerance and standards. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Marine Corps' Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV) is the Corps' number-one priority ground system acquisition program and accounts for 25.5 percent of the Corps' total acquisition budget for fiscal years 2006 through 2011. It will replace the current amphibious assault craft and is intended to provide significant increases in mobility, lethality, and reliability. We reviewed the program under the Comptroller General's authority to examine (1) the cost, schedule, and performance of the EFV program during system development and demonstration; (2) factors that have contributed to this performance; and (3) future risks the program faces as it approaches production.
What GAO Found
Although the EFV program had followed a knowledge-based approach early in development, its buying power has eroded during System Development and Demonstration (SDD). Since beginning this final phase of development in December 2000, cost has increased 45 percent. Unit costs have increased from $8.5 million to $12.3 million. The program schedule has grown 35 percent or 4 years, and its reliability requirement has been reduced from 70 hours of continuous operation to 43.5 hours. Program difficulties occurred in part because not enough time was allowed to demonstrate maturity of the EFV design during SDD. The SDD schedule of about 3 years proved too short to conduct all necessary planning and to incorporate the results of tests into design changes, resulting in schedule slippages. In addition, several significant technical problems surfaced, including problems with the hull electronic unit, the bow flap, and the hydraulics. Reliability also remains a challenge. Three areas of significant risk remain for demonstrating design and production maturity that have potential significant cost and schedule consequences. First, EFV plans are to enter low-rate initial production without requiring the contractor to demonstrate that the EFV's manufacturing processes are under control. Second, the EFV program will begin low-rate initial production without the knowledge that software development capabilities are sufficiently mature. Third, two key performance parameters--reliability and interoperability--are not scheduled to be demonstrated until the initial test and evaluation phase in fiscal year 2010--about 4 years after low-rate initial production has begun. |
gao_NSIAD-96-40 | gao_NSIAD-96-40_0 | In 1990, NED began funding political organizing and trade union development work by three of its core institutes. Democracy Projects Have Had Mixed Results
Independent Media
The U.S.-funded independent media program in Russia has helped raise the quality of print and broadcast journalism and contributed to Russia’s movement toward an independent, self-sustaining local television network. They also conducted civic education and grassroots organizing programs for Russians at the national and local level. It is too soon to evaluate the effectiveness of the contractor’s efforts to support reform of the core legal institutions; however, officials from USAID, the State Department, and the Russian government said that systemic changes in Russia’s legal institutions will be a long-term process, given that the needs in this area are vast and complex. Although the Center’s projects may have contributed to democratic reforms, the primary focus of the Center’s projects was to promote privatization and promarket reforms, two areas outside the scope of our review. Our scope was limited to an evaluation of projects in the areas of independent media, rule of law, political party development, trade union development, electoral assistance, and civil-military relations. U.S. Democratic Development Assistance to Russia (Fiscal Years 1990 to 1994)
U.S. democracy assistance to Russia includes projects funded or implemented by a number of agencies, including the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID); the Department of Defense (DOD); and the U.S. Information Agency (USIA) through its annual grants to the National Endowment for Democracy (NED). Independent Media
The purpose of the U.S.-funded independent media program in Russia is to ensure the quality and self-sufficiency of nongovernment or independent media organizations so that the Russian people have access to truthful information and a forum for open expression. They also financed specific media projects that provide a prodemocracy angle to Russia’s economic and political reform process. GAO’s Comments
1. 3. 2. 4. 5. 6. Thus, we continue to view these programs as political party development. 7. 9. 10. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed U.S.-funded democracy programs of the Agency for International Development (AID), U.S. Information Agency (USIA), Department of State, and the Department of Defense, focusing on whether democracy programs in Russia were meeting their developmental goals and contributing to political reform from fiscal years 1990 through 1994.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) U.S.-funded democracy projects have demonstrated support for and contributed to Russia's democracy movement; (2) organizations and institutions at the center of the democratic reform process have been identified and supported, as have thousands of Russian activists working at these organizations at the national, regional, and local levels; (3) those assisted include prodemocracy political activists and political parties, proreform trade unions, court systems, legal academies, officials throughout the government, and members of the media; (4) the democracy projects that GAO reviewed, however, had mixed results in meeting their stated developmental objectives; (5) Russian reformers and others saw U.S. democracy assistance as generally valuable, but in only three of the six areas GAO reviewed did projects contribute to significant changes in Russia's political, legal, or social system; (6) AID and USIA media projects largely met their objective of increasing the quality and self-sufficiency of nongovernment or independent media organizations, although the weak economy continues to threaten the sustainability of an independent media; (7) U.S. efforts to help develop a democratic trade union movement and improve Russia's electoral system also contributed to systemic changes, although more needs to be done; (8) however, projects in the areas of political party development, rule of law, and civil-military relations have had limited impact; (9) GAO's analysis indicated that the most important factors determining project impact were Russian economic and political conditions; (10) project implementation problems contributed to the limited results achieved from the rule of law project; and (11) State and AID officials acknowledged that democratic reforms in Russia may take longer to achieve than they initially anticipated. |
gao_T-RCED-98-112 | gao_T-RCED-98-112_0 | We found, in fact, that since deregulation, substantial regional differences have existed in fare and service trends, particularly among small and medium-sized community airports. In particular, we noted that most low-fare airlines that began interstate air service after deregulation, such as Southwest Airlines and Reno Air, had decided to enter airports serving communities of all sizes in the West and Southwest because of these communities’ robust economic growth. Large communities, in general, and communities of all sizes in the West and Southwest had experienced a substantial increase in the number of departures and available seats as well as improvements in such service quality indicators as the number of available nonstop destinations and the amount of jet service. Airline Barriers to Entry Persist and Predominantly Affect Competition in the East and Upper Midwest
We reported in October 1996 that operating barriers at key hub airports in the upper Midwest and the East, combined with certain marketing strategies of the established carriers, had two effects on competition. The operating barriers and marketing strategies deterred new entrant airlines and fortified established carriers’ dominance of those hub airports and routes linking those hubs with nearby small- and medium-sized-community airports. In the upper Midwest, there is limited competition in part because two airlines control nearly 90 percent of the takeoff and landing slots at O’Hare, and one airline controls the vast majority of gates at the airports in Minneapolis and Detroit under long-term, exclusive-use leases. Perimeter rules at LaGuardia and National further limit the ability of airlines based in the West to compete in those markets. Slots
To reduce congestion, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has limited since 1969 the number of takeoffs and landings that can occur at O’Hare, National, LaGuardia, and Kennedy. By allowing new airlines to form and established airlines to enter new markets, deregulation increased the demand for access to these airports. These exemptions should help to enhance service in the East and upper Midwest. The vast majority of gates at each airport are exclusively leased, usually to one established airline. As a result, it is extremely difficult to gain competitive access to these airports, according to executives at many airlines that started after deregulation. Range of Initiatives Will Likely Be Needed to Address Air Service Problems
Because a variety of factors has contributed to higher fares and poorer service that some small and medium-sized communities in the East and upper Midwest have experienced since deregulation, a coordinated effort involving federal, regional, local, and private-sector initiatives may be needed. Recent efforts by DOT and proposed legislation are aimed at enhancing competition. Airline Deregulation: Barriers to Competition in the Airline Industry (GAO/T-RCED-89-65, Sept. 20, 1989). | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed the air service problems that some communities have experienced since the deregulation of the airline industry in 1978.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) not all communities have benefited from airline deregulation; (2) certain airports--particularly those serving small and medium-sized communities in the East and upper Midwest--have experienced higher fares and poorer service since deregulation; (3) there are several reasons for the substantial regional differences in fare and service trends, including the dominance of routes to and from these airports by one or two traditional hub-and-spoke airlines and operating barriers, such as long-term exclusive-use gate leases at hub airports; (4) the more widespread entry of new airlines at airports in the West and Southwest since deregulation has stemmed largely from the greater economic growth in those regions as well as from the absence of dominant market positions of incumbent airlines and barriers to entry; (5) operating barriers continue to block entry at key airports and contribute to fare and service problems in the East and upper Midwest; (6) to minimize congestion and reduce flight delays, the Federal Aviation Administration has set limits since 1969 on the number of takeoffs or landings that can occur during certain periods of the day at four congested airports; (7) a few airlines control most of these slots at these airports, which limits new entrants; (8) in 1996 GAO reported that the vast majority of gates at six airports in the East and Upper Midwest were exclusively leased to usually one airline, making it very difficult to gain competitive access to these airports; (9) perimeter rules at two major airports limit the ability of airlines based in the West to compete at those airports; (10) these operating barriers, combined with certain marketing strategies by established carriers, have deterred new entrant airlines while fortifying established carriers dominance at key hubs in the East and upper Midwest; (11) increasing competition and improving air service at airports serving communities that have not benefited from deregulation will likely entail a range of federal, regional, local, and private-sector initiatives; (12) the Department of Transportation is undertaking several efforts to enhance competition; (13) recently proposed legislation would address several barriers to competition: slot controls, the perimeter rule, and predatory behavior by air carriers; (14) recent national and regional conferences exemplify efforts to pool available resources to focus on improving the airfares and quality of air service to such communities; and (15) other steps--such as improving the availability of gates--may also be needed to further ameliorate current competitive problems. |
gao_GAO-01-1141T | gao_GAO-01-1141T_0 | However, our ongoing review of the quality of CMS’ communications with physicians participating in the Medicare program shows that the information given to providers is often incomplete, confusing, out of date, or even incorrect. For example, it calls on CMS to centrally coordinate the educational activities provided through Medicare contractors, to appoint a Medicare Provider Ombudsman, and to offer technical assistance to small providers through a demonstration program. This type of contract reimburses contractors for necessary and proper costs of carrying out Medicare activities, but does not specifically provide for contractor profit or other incentives. Several key provisions of MRCRA would address these elements of contracting reform. MRCRA would establish a full and open procurement process that would provide CMS with express authority to contract with any qualified entity for claims administration, including entities that are not health insurers. MRCRA would also encourage CMS to use incentive payments to encourage quality service and efficiency. Concluding Observations
The scope and complexity of the Medicare program make complete, accurate, and timely communication of program information necessary to help providers comply with Medicare requirements and appropriately bill for their services. | Why GAO Did This Study
Complete, accurate, and timely communication of program information is necessary to help Medicare providers comply with program requirements and appropriately bill for their services. Information provided to physicians about billing and payment policies is often incomplete, confusing, out of date, or even incorrect.
What GAO Found
GAO found that the rules governing Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) contracts with its claims processors lack incentives for efficient operations. Medicare contractors are chosen without full and open competition from among health insurance companies, rather from a broad universe of potential qualified entities, and CMS almost always uses cost-only contracts, which pay contractors for costs incurred but generally do not offer any type of performance incentives. To improve Medicare contractors' provider communications, CMS must develop a more centralized and coordinated approach consistent with the provisions of the Medicare Regulatory and Contracting Reform Act (MRCRA) of 2001. MRCRA would require that CMS (1) centrally coordinate contractors' provider education activities, (2) establish communications performance standards, (3) appoint a Medicare Provider Ombudsman, and (4) create a demonstration program to offer technical assistance to small providers. MRCRA would also broaden CMS authority so that various types of contractors would be able to compete for claims administration contracts and their payment would reflect the quality of the services they provide. |
gao_NSIAD-98-71 | gao_NSIAD-98-71_0 | The staff projections, however, are based on assumptions about what a standardized cataloging process might look like rather than on actual plans for reengineered processes. Until DOD completes its planning on a design for the new cataloging process and develops a cost estimate for the new standardized system, it has no firm basis for projecting staff requirements and savings from centralizing and consolidating cataloging operations. Its projection that 753 full-time equivalent employees will be needed for a centralized and consolidated operation is an estimate based on the assumption that the new standardized process will not differ markedly from some of the best practices currently in use and that these best practices can be adopted by the other services and agencies. These studies will document how (1) each of the services’ and agencies’ existing processes work and (2) cataloging processes would be separated from other materiel management processes. With the demise of PCTSS, DOD will need a new development effort for a standardized cataloging system. DOD Faces Significant Challenges in Centralizing and Consolidating Operations
Although DOD has not yet developed a standardized cataloging process or determined how it will meet its needs for a standardized cataloging system, it has decided to relocate catalogers to Battle Creek, and reduce the number of catalogers to be relocated to a level envisioned after the processes and systems are standardized. According to the business case analysis, centralizing catalogers under one command will increase the likelihood of catalogers adopting to the new processes and procedures. Questions Exist About Separating Cataloging From Other Functions
Senior officials at the two DLA and two military service cataloging sites we visited expressed concerns about consolidating cataloging operations without a clearly defined business process to guide the consolidation. A DOD official stated that, in the short term, centralizing cataloging personnel before reengineering cataloging processes could result in inefficiencies and added costs. Until a standardized process for cataloging is developed, however, it is not possible to determine the reasonableness of either DOD’s or the employee groups’ staffing projections. Conclusions
Many uncertainties exist regarding what personnel reductions and savings will occur from DOD’s planned centralization and consolidation of its cataloging operations. DOD partially concurred with our recommendation that a clearly defined plan for standardizing the cataloging processes should be developed before cataloging personnel are moved to Battle Creek and did not concur with our recommendation that it should develop a full assessment of the costs and savings of consolidation. Most importantly, system development cost data needs to be assessed. Our information on the proposals made by two employee groups that state that DOD could achieve even greater personnel reductions and savings by consolidating cataloging operations in other locations (instead of Battle Creek, Michigan) was obtained from employees at the Navy Inventory Control Point, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; the Defense Industrial Supply Center, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; the Defense Personnel Support Center, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; and the Defense Supply Center, Columbus, Ohio. Copies will be made available to others upon request. 3. 5. Comments From the Department of Defense
GAO Comments
1. Our draft report included statements by Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) officials that they have begun developing plans that address these risks. 2. DOD’s plans are those discussed in comment 1. DOD does not currently intend to complete this plan until after catalogers are centralized, but not consolidated, in Battle Creek. 3. 4. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Department of Defense's (DOD) decision to centralize and consolidate DOD cataloging operations in Battle Creek, Michigan, focusing on: (1) the likelihood that DOD's decision will result in the estimated personnel reductions and savings; (2) challenges DOD may face when implementing the consolidation effort; and (3) proposals made by two employee groups that state that DOD could achieve even greater personnel reductions and savings by centralizing and consolidating cataloging operations in other locations.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) it is uncertain that the estimated personnel reductions and savings will occur; (2) DOD's estimates are based on several assumptions that either will not necessarily occur or have changed since DOD made the estimates; (3) DOD based the estimates, for example, on an assumption of what a standardized cataloging process may look like but has not settled on an actual design of the centralized and consolidated system; (4) detailed studies to document existing cataloging processes are still ongoing and will be important for determining how cataloging processes can be separated from other materiel management functions; (5) DOD also assumed that an ongoing system development project to develop a standardized cataloging system would be successful and thus did not consider any system development costs in estimating savings; (6) however, DOD has since halted work on that system, and costs to develop a new one are uncertain; (7) DOD faces significant challenges in implementing the consolidation; (8) prior DOD cataloging consolidation efforts incurred problems that will need to be taken into consideration in developing detailed implementation plans for consolidation; (9) separating cataloging from other service provisioning and materiel management functions may be difficult and could negatively affect cataloging operations during the transition; (10) DOD may lose much of its cataloging experience because of the reluctance of experienced catalogers to relocate; (11) a Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) official stated that DLA has begun developing plans that address these risks and that no cataloging functions will be transferred to Battle Creek until these plans are complete; (12) planning for the new standardized cataloging process and the necessary standardized cataloging system will not be completed until after catalogers are moved to Battle Creek; (13) DOD also plans, in conjunction with the move, to reduce the number of catalogers to levels envisioned only after process reengineering and consolidation of cataloging have occurred; (14) DOD officials believe the move will increase the likelihood of catalogers adapting to the as yet unplanned new processes and systems; (15) however, senior officials responsible for service cataloging operations have expressed concerns about the risks inherent in proceeding without detailed plans to guide the consolidation; and (16) until a standardized cataloging process is developed, it is not possible to determine the reasonableness of the employee groups' proposals concerning further staff reductions. |
gao_GAO-10-469 | gao_GAO-10-469_0 | A Significant Portion of DLA’s Secondary Inventory Did Not Align with Current Requirements and Had Limited Demand
Our analysis of DLA secondary inventory data for the 3-year period we examined showed that, on average, about half (52 percent) of DLA’s total inventory was not needed to meet current requirements (the requirements objective) and more than one-third (37 percent) was not needed to meet the approved acquisition objective—the requirements objective plus 2 years of estimated future demand. About $7.1 Billion, or 52 Percent, of DLA’s On- Hand and On-Order Inventory Value Exceeded the Requirements Objective Each Year
Our analysis of DLA secondary inventory data showed that, for the 3 fiscal years 2006 through 2008, an average of about $6.5 billion (48 percent) of the total annual inventory value was needed to meet the requirements objective, whereas $7.1 billion (52 percent) was not needed for these requirements. These factors involve deficiencies in (1) accurately forecasting customer demands, (2) estimating lead times for acquiring parts, (3) meeting the services’ estimated additional requirements for spare parts, (4) improving communications among stakeholders to ensure purchase decisions are based on accurate and timely data, (5) modifying or canceling planned purchases of items that may no longer be needed to meet currently estimated requirements, (6) determining whether inventory being stored as contingency retention stock is still needed, and (7) assessing and tracking the overall cost efficiency of its inventory management. The first three factors relate to determining how many parts to buy. The next three factors relate to DLA initiatives that, while showing promise for reducing the acquisition and retention of parts not needed to meet requirements, do not appear to be achieving their full potential due to limits on their implementation. Inaccurate Demand Forecasts May Result in Acquiring More Spare Parts Than Needed to Meet Requirements
DLA faces challenges in aligning inventory levels with requirements due, in part, to inaccurate demand forecasting for the parts it manages. DLA Has Not Resolved Problems with Estimating Lead Times Needed to Acquire Spare Parts
DLA has not resolved problems in accurately estimating acquisition lead times for the parts it acquires. For fiscal years 2006 through 2008, parts needed for lead time requirements had an annual average value of $2.7 billion (20 percent) of the $13.7 billion in total inventory value. DODIG found the buy-back program to be effective at reducing procurement quantities, and thereby minimized investment for some inventory. Some of this inventory may no longer be needed. As a result, DLA does not know whether it is meeting inventory requirements at least cost. The Secretary of Defense’s comprehensive plan is to include (among other things): (1) a plan for a comprehensive review of demand forecasting procedures to identify and correct any systematic weaknesses in such procedures, including the development of metrics to identify bias toward over-forecasting and adjust forecasting methods accordingly; (2) a plan to reduce the average level of on-order secondary inventory that is excess to requirements, including a requirement for the systemic review of such inventory for possible contract termination; (3) a plan for the review and validation of methods used by the military departments and DLA to establish economic retention requirements; (4) a plan for an independent review of methods used by the military departments and DLA to establish contingency retention requirements; and (5) a plan for a comprehensive assessment of inventory items on hand that have no recurring demands, including metrics to track years of no demand for items in stock and procedures for ensuring the systemic review of such items for potential reutilization or disposal. Conclusions
Our review showed that DLA can enhance its efforts to manage spare parts more effectively primarily by focusing on the front end of the process when decisions are being made on what items to buy and how many in response to requirements. Acquiring inventory for which demand is much lower than expected reduces the amount of funding available for other military needs. We used DLA stratification data to determine the extent to which the DLA’s inventory of spare parts reflected the amount needed to support requirements. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) procures and manages large supplies of spare parts to keep military equipment ready and operating. At a time when U.S. military forces and equipment are in high demand and the nation faces long-term fiscal challenges, it is critical that DLA ensure that the warfighter is supplied with the right items at the right time and exercise good stewardship over the billions of dollars invested in its inventories. GAO has identified supply chain management as a high-risk area due in part to high levels of inventory beyond what is needed to support requirements and problems in accurately forecasting demand for spare parts. GAO's objectives were to (1) determine the extent to which DLA's inventory of spare parts reflects the amount needed to support requirements; and (2) identify causes, if applicable, for DLA's having spare parts inventory that does not align with requirements. GAO analyzed DLA inventory data for fiscal years 2006 through 2008.
What GAO Found
GAO's review showed that DLA can enhance its efforts to manage spare parts more effectively primarily by focusing on the front end of the process when decisions are being made on what items to buy and how many in response to requirements. GAO's analysis of DLA data showed the agency had significantly more spare parts secondary inventory than was needed to meet current requirements in fiscal years 2006 through 2008. Current requirements include all the requirements used by DLA to determine when to order new parts, which Department of Defense (DOD) guidance refers to as the "requirements objective." The average annual value of the inventory for the 3 years reviewed was about $13.7 billion. Of this total, about $7.1 billion (52 percent) was beyond the amount needed to meet the requirements objective, and about $5.1 billion (37 percent) was not needed to meet the requirements objective plus 2 years of estimated future demand. Of the $5.1 billion, DLA had an average of $4.1 billion in retention stock (materiel for possible contingencies or materiel deemed to be more economical to keep than to dispose of) and had identified $1 billion as potential excess (for reutilization or disposal). Although DOD policy requires that DLA minimize investment in inventory while also meeting requirements, at least seven factors are continuing to cause DLA to order and stock parts that do not align with requirements. Three factors relate to how many parts to buy: inaccurate demand forecasting for parts, unresolved problems with accurately estimating lead times needed to acquire spare parts, and challenges in meeting the military services' special requests to DLA for future spare parts support for weapon systems. Three more factors relate to DLA initiatives that, while showing promise for reducing the acquisition and retention of parts not needed to meet requirements, do not appear to be achieving their full potential: closing gaps in providing accurate, timely data to inventory managers as input into purchase decisions; modifying or canceling planned purchases that may no longer be needed to meet currently estimated requirements; and reducing contingency retention stock that may no longer be needed. Lastly, DLA is not tracking the overall cost efficiency of its inventory management. Although DLA has recognized and begun to address many of these factors, its current efforts may not be fully effective at reducing the significant mismatches GAO identified between spare parts inventory levels and requirements. Acquiring inventory for which demand is much lower than expected reduces the amount of funding available for other military needs. |
gao_GAO-11-892 | gao_GAO-11-892_0 | Limited Identification of Non-DAWIA Personnel with Acquisition-related Roles and Responsibilities
Non-DAWIA personnel are assigned responsibilities in critical phases of the acquisition process, but no DOD organization has systematically identified these personnel and the acquisition-related competencies they require or been designated the responsibility of overseeing this group—as has been done for the personnel who are members of the DAWIA workforce. Identifying non-DAWIA personnel with acquisition-related responsibilities is challenging, but DOD is working to identify a portion of this population—requirements personnel for major weapon systems—and provide specific training. DOD is not required to identify non-DAWIA personnel with acquisition-related responsibilities, and senior officials stated that DOD has not established criteria or a process to do so across the department or among organizations in DOD that have a role in helping to manage issues focused on services acquisitions. DAU data suggest that demand for training has increased, but DOD has limited metrics to gauge the current size and future demand for training of the population in the long term or the effectiveness of current training that is available. In 2006, 2008, and 2010 DOD recognized the importance of some non-DAWIA personnel with acquisition-related responsibilities in several memoranda requiring that CORs be properly trained and appointed before contract performance begins on a services acquisition to address weaknesses in this key function that the DODIG and we identified. DOD Has Taken Some Steps to Address Previous Recommendations
DOD has made some progress in implementing the outstanding recommendations from the Panel on Contacting Integrity, our previous reports, and other reports that raised issues related to training for non- DAWIA personnel. DOD concurred with the four relevant recommendations, has fully implemented three, and has taken action on the other. Finally, the House Armed Services Committee and the Defense Science Board recently issued reports including recommendations related to training for those who are responsible for requirements development for services acquisitions and non-DAWIA personnel with acquisition-related responsibilities but the recommendations were made too recently for us to assess the status of implementation. For example, in March 2010, the House Armed Services Committee Panel on Defense Acquisition Reform Report reported that DOD was not ensuring that personnel with responsibilities for acquisition outcomes acquire the skills, training, and experience needed to properly write, award, and oversee performance of services acquisitions, which could pose a different set of challenges than those associated with the procurement of goods. Challenges in identifying non-DAWIA personnel with acquisition-related responsibilities exist, in part, because the personnel are dispersed throughout the department, come from a variety of career fields, and are often involved in acquisitions as a secondary duty. Recommendations for Executive Action
To help ensure that training and development efforts for non-DAWIA personnel with acquisition-related responsibilities are deliberate and contribute to successful services acquisitions—meaning DOD buys the right thing, the right way, while getting the desired outcomes—we recommend the Secretary of Defense take the following three actions: establish criteria and a time frame for identifying non-DAWIA personnel with acquisition-related responsibilities, including requirements officials; assess what critical skills non-DAWIA personnel with acquisition- related responsibilities might require to perform their role in the acquisition process and improve acquisition outcomes; and designate an organization that has the responsibility to track DOD’s progress in identifying, developing, and overseeing non-DAWIA personnel with acquisition-related responsibilities to help ensure they have the skills necessary to perform their acquisition function. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 included a provision requiring that GAO report on the Department of Defense’s (DOD) training for its acquisition and audit workforce.1 Our October 2010 report addressed training provided by the Defense Acquisition University (DAU) to the DAWIA workforce.2 In addition to that report, we agreed to review training provided to non-DAWIA personnel with acquisition-related responsibilities in a noncontingency environment. To accomplish this, we assessed the extent to which (1) DOD knows the composition of the population of non-DAWIA personnel with acquisition-related responsibilities, (2) non-DAWIA personnel with acquisition-related responsibilities are taking acquisition training, and (3) selected recommendations related to non-DAWIA personnel with acquisition- related responsibilities from previous reviews have been implemented. The COR represents and is nominated by the requiring organization and designated by the contracting officer. In 17 of 29 contracts, there was more than one COR assigned. We differentiated between recommendations that specifically mention training from those that did not, as well as recommendations in which training was involved in the implementation of the recommendation. | Why GAO Did This Study
In fiscal year 2010, more than half of the $367 billion dollars the Department of Defense (DOD) spent on contracts was spent on services. Buying services is fundamentally different than buying weapon systems, yet most acquisition regulations, policies, processes, and training remain structured for acquiring weapon systems. Over the last decade, reports from GAO, DOD, and Congress have raised issues about services acquisitions and have also highlighted the importance of acquisition training. GAO previously reported on the training provided to the acquisition workforce as defined by the Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA). This report addresses personnel working on services acquisitions who were outside the DAWIA acquisition workforce--termed non-DAWIA personnel with acquisition-related responsibilities--and the extent to which (1) DOD knows the composition of this population, (2) this population is taking acquisition training, and (3) DOD has implemented past recommendations related to this population. To complete this work, GAO reviewed a nongeneralizable sample of 29 service contracts, relevant policies, and recommendations from previous reports and met with key DOD officials.
What GAO Found
Non-DAWIA personnel with acquisition-related responsibilities represented more than half of the 430 personnel involved in the 29 services acquisition contracts in this review. Several organizations have been tracking and managing the DAWIA workforce, but no DOD organization has systematically identified non-DAWIA personnel with acquisition-related responsibilities, the competencies they need to conduct their acquisition duties, or been designated responsibility for overseeing this group. DOD is not required to identify these personnel and has not established a process to do so. Identifying this population is challenging, partly because, as DOD officials noted, it is a transient one that is dispersed across many DOD organizations. Additionally, these people come from a variety of career fields and are often involved in acquisitions as a secondary duty. DOD has taken action to identify part of this population and provide them training--requirements personnel for major weapon systems--but has not done this for all non-DAWIA personnel with acquisition-related responsibilities. Most non-DAWIA personnel with acquisition-related responsibilities in GAO's sample received some acquisition training. The required training was varied and limited and applied largely to contracting officer's representatives (CORs) and not to other non-DAWIA personnel such as requirements officials, technical assistants, or multifunctional team members. For example, the Air Force required two Air Force-specific phases of training, while the Navy and Marine Corps policy did not specify what training was required. Demand for acquisition training courses by non-DAWIA personnel with acquisition-related responsibilities has been increasing in the past few years at the Defense Acquisition University, but DOD has limited information to gauge the current and future demand for training this population in the long term or the effectiveness of the current training that is available. DOD has taken short-term actions to require training and provide resources for some non-DAWIA personnel with acquisition-related responsibilities. For example, DOD recognized the importance of CORs in several memoranda requiring that they be properly trained and appointed before contract performance begins on services acquisitions. DOD has made some progress in implementing the recommendations of reports from the Panel on Contracting Integrity and GAO that related to management and training of the COR--a portion of non-DAWIA personnel with acquisition-related responsibilities. For example, for the four relevant GAO recommendations--which are related to training, assignment, and oversight of the CORs--DOD fully concurred with all of them, has fully implemented three, and is implementing a COR tracking system to address the remaining recommendation. The House Armed Services Committee and the Defense Science Board issued reports since 2009 that made recommendations that were relevant to this population but were made too recently for GAO to assess their implementation. For example, the House Armed Services Committee Panel on Defense Acquisition Reform report recommended DOD reform the services requirements process in order to address the different set of challenges services acquisitions pose compared to the procurement of goods. Among other things, GAO recommends that DOD establish criteria for identifying non-DAWIA personnel with acquisition-related responsibilities and assess the critical skills needed to perform their role in the acquisition process. DOD concurred with the recommendations. |
gao_GAO-15-131 | gao_GAO-15-131_0 | These developments led to changes in the government’s role throughout the period and ultimately to a significant increase in that role. The share of the primary market insured or guaranteed by the federal government grew and the share of mortgages backing MBS securitized by the enterprises also grew, reaching highs in 2009 of about 25 and 67 percent, respectively. Specifically, the share of government-insured or - guaranteed mortgages—those directly supported by the government—fell from 11 percent in 2000 to less than 3 percent of the value of all new mortgage originations in 2006. The government’s role has also changed as a result of placing the enterprises into conservatorship in 2008. Treasury had completed the sale of its MBS investments in fiscal year 2012. Market Developments since 2000 Have Challenged the Single-Family Housing Finance System
Market developments since 2000 have challenged the single-family housing finance system and revealed some key weaknesses in that system, including misaligned incentives, an overall lack of reliable information or transparency, and excessive risk taking. For example, prior to the financial crisis:
Originators’ incentives were not aligned with the long-term interests of borrowers because originators did not retain credit risk. In addition, complex financial products such as credit default swaps, which were designed to reduce the risk associated with MBS for investors, spread risk throughout the financial markets and contributed to the onset of the financial crisis. The rapid growth of nonprime mortgage lending and private-label MBS in the early part of the decade led to increased market competition among private-label issuers and the enterprises. Representatives of market participants have said that they faced uncertainties because some regulations had not been implemented and that these uncertainties could limit the return of private capital to the secondary market. A Framework for Assessing Potential Changes to the Housing Finance System
We have identified the role played by the federal government in the housing finance system as a high-risk area for the government and have also noted that the Dodd-Frank Act did not fully address weaknesses in the housing finance system. We sought the input of a broad range of government officials, experts from academia and research organizations, consumer advocates, and industry representatives on this framework and have included their comments related to the nine elements as appropriate. Applying the elements of this framework would help policymakers identify the relative strengths and weaknesses of any proposals they are considering. In addition, proposals will need to take into consideration certain characteristics—transparency, accountability, aligned incentives, and efficiency and effectiveness—associated with appropriate controls and high-quality government performance that run through each element. Flexibility and adaptability may be particularly important during a transition from the current system to a new housing finance system. Proposals to change the housing finance system address capacity to manage risk in a number of ways. As discussed earlier in this report, misalignment of incentives in the securitization market occurred when, for example, originators lowered underwriting standards but did not retain the risk and passed on the risks of these mortgage loans to the secondary market. Further, specifying goals and trade-offs is essential to holding federal agencies and the private sector accountable. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
To help policymakers assess various proposals for changing the single- family housing finance system and consider ways in which it could be made more effective and efficient, we prepared this report under the authority of the Comptroller General. Specifically, this report (1) describes market developments since 2000 that have led to changes in the federal government’s role in single-family housing finance; (2) analyzes whether and how these market developments have challenged the housing finance system; and (3) presents an evaluation framework for assessing potential changes to the housing finance system. To meet these objectives, we reviewed literature, including existing GAO reports on housing finance and housing market developments, as well as prior GAO reports presenting frameworks for reform in the financial sector and reports that contain criteria for appropriate controls and high-quality government performance. These agencies included the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Federal Reserve), Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection known as the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Departments of Agriculture (USDA), Housing and Urban Development, Treasury and Veterans Affairs (VA), Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Federal Housing Finance Agency, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, and Securities and Exchange Commission. To describe changes in market participants and products in the primary and secondary markets, we calculated the percentage of the dollar value of mortgage originations supported by the Federal Housing Administration, VA, and USDA and the percentage supported by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac from 2000 through 2013. To address our second objective, which describes weaknesses revealed by developments in the housing finance market beginning in 2000, we used information from our literature review and interviews. We then shared this draft framework with government officials, researchers, and other relevant parties at our discussion groups. Regulation of the Enterprises
During the 1990s the federal government continued to restructure the enterprises and put in place a new regulatory structure for them. Response to Financial Crisis
The 2007-2009 financial crisis, which according to many researchers, was triggered by losses in the mortgage market, led the federal government to significantly increase the federal role in the housing finance markets. | Why GAO Did This Study
Housing finance played a major role in the 2007-2009 financial crisis, and the housing sector continues to show considerable strains. The federal government's role in the single-family housing finance system has also grown substantially. As a result, policymakers and others have made proposals to change the system. To help policymakers assess various proposals and consider ways to make it more effective and efficient, this report (1) describes market developments since 2000 that have led to changes in the federal government's role in the single-family housing finance system; (2) analyzes whether and how these market developments have challenged the housing finance system; and (3) presents an evaluation framework for assessing potential changes to the system.
GAO reviewed literature on housing finance and housing market developments as well as prior GAO reports presenting frameworks for reform in the financial sector and criteria for improving government performance. GAO also met with officials from a number of federal agencies. Based on the literature review and interviews, GAO developed a draft framework that it shared with seven discussion groups composed of government officials, experts from academia and research organizations, and interested parties such as consumer advocates and industry representatives. The discussants provided input on market developments and the framework.
What GAO Found
Developments in the single-family housing finance market from 2000-2013 led to changes in the federal government's role in the housing finance system and ultimately to a significant increase in that role. For example,
Before the 2007-2009 financial crisis, the market share of nonprime mortgages—loans often made to borrowers with high-risk characteristics and funded by mortgage backed securities (MBS) issued by private institutions without a federal guarantee (private-label MBS)—grew but fell dramatically during the crisis.
As this market segment grew the share of new mortgage originations (refinances and purchase loans) insured by federal entities—the Federal Housing Administration and the Departments of Veterans Affairs and Agriculture—fell from 11 percent in 2000 to less than 3 percent of the value of new originations in 2006 but, with the onset of the crisis, the market share of these mortgages rose as high as 25 percent before declining to 20 percent of the market in 2013.
The market share of new mortgages backing MBS guaranteed by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (the enterprises) fell from 36 percent in 2000 to 27 percent in 2006 but stood at 61 percent in 2013.
In 2008, when the enterprises' weakened financial condition led to their being placed into conservatorship, the federal government's support for them became explicit .
In 2013 the federal government was providing support either directly or indirectly for 81 percent of the value of all new mortgages. In addition, during the crisis, the Federal Reserve System and the Department of the Treasury began purchasing MBS issued by the enterprises. The Federal Reserve System began reducing these purchases in January 2014, and Treasury completed the sale of its MBS investments in fiscal year 2012.
Developments in mortgage markets since 2000 have challenged the housing finance system and revealed or led to weaknesses in that system including misaligned incentives, an overall lack of reliable information or transparency, and excessive risk taking. For example
Originators' and private-label securitizers' incentives were not aligned with those of borrowers and investors, because originators and private-label securitizers generally did not retain credit risk.
Some borrowers lacked reliable and relevant information to adequately understand the risks of mortgage products because originators were not required to share certain information.
A loosening of underwriting standards prior to the financial crisis likely led to excessive risk taking by borrowers.
Limitations in federal oversight of housing market participants exacerbated these weaknesses, though Congress has taken some steps designed to address these limitations. The Federal Housing Finance Agency and Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection (known as the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau) were
created to address regulatory gaps, including oversight of the enterprises and consumer protection. These agencies have taken steps designed to oversee the enterprises, protect consumers, and provide better information to the public. However, representatives of market participants said that they faced uncertainties because some regulations had not been implemented, and Congress was considering further changes to the system.
In light of the substantial increase in federal support of the single-family housing finance system and weaknesses revealed during and after the financial crisis, some experts believe the U.S. housing finance system warrants reform. In addition, GAO has identified the federal role in housing finance as a high risk area. GAO is providing a framework to help assess proposed changes in the housing finance system. This framework is comprised of nine elements (see table), and certain characteristics—transparency, accountability, aligned incentives, and efficiency and effectiveness—need to be addressed throughout the elements. Applying the elements of this framework should help reveal the relative strengths and weaknesses of any proposal for change and identify what are likely to be significant trade-offs among competing goals and policies. Similarly, the framework could be used to craft new proposals. Finally, the framework should help policymakers understand the risks associated with transitioning to a new housing finance system. |
gao_GAO-07-582T | gao_GAO-07-582T_0 | Ministry of Defense Has Approved a Logistical Concept, but Its Implementation Faces Numerous Challenges
Several challenges remain in the implementation of MOD’s logistics system. Second, the policies and procedures to facilitate implementation of the logistics concept have not been effectively disseminated. Third, the training of Iraqi logisticians has been affected by a lack of fuel, electricity, and personnel support for the training academy. Finally, the maintenance of the Iraqi military’s vehicles is complicated by the diversity of MOD’s fleet, the lack of trained mechanics, and the failure to budget for and maintain an authorized stockage level for equipment. Underdeveloped National and Regional Logistics Centers and the Failure to Disseminate Policies and Procedures Hinder Iraqi Logistical Self-Sufficiency
The creation of national and regional logistics centers has lagged behind that of lower echelon unit-level organizations because preference has been given to the generation of lower echelon logistics organizations, specifically Headquarters and Service Companies and Motorized Transport Regiments. For example, the establishment of the National Depot has been plagued by manpower shortages, security issues, inadequate fuel stocks, and poor maintenance. In its supplemental Fiscal Year 2007 Security Forces Fund request, DOD has asked for a total of $339.2 million to build and develop maintenance, warehouse, and base support facilities at the National Depot. In its supplemental Fiscal Year 2007 Security Forces Funds request, DOD has asked for $73 million to build and outfit 58 dining facilities on GSUs and RSUs. Coalition logisticians have emphasized to us that the development of all echelons of the logistics concept is crucial in order for MOD to become capable of independently sustaining its forces. According to the statement of work, the command’s intent was to contract the services of a maintenance contractor to support the sustainment of the vehicles and equipment issued to the Iraqi Armed Forces and to assist the Iraqi Armed Forces in becoming self-sufficient. Ministry of Interior Has Drafted a Logistics Concept, but It Is Not Self- Sufficient in Logistics
As of December 2006, the Ministry of Interior had not approved the draft logistics concept that has been proposed by the Coalition. The reason for this is unclear. What is clear, however, is that since the summer of 2006, the Ministry has experienced significant challenges in its warehousing and supply, and maintenance activities. Because of these challenges, the Ministry is dependent on Coalition support for much of its logistics requirements. MOI’s Warehousing and Supply Infrastructure Requires Continued Coalition Support and Funding
In December 2006, DOD reported that the MOI warehouse system consists of five warehouses operated by the Coalition, one that is planned for MOI operation in late December 2006, and several additional warehouses at the headquarters of both the Ministry and its Department of Border Enforcement. For example, in July 2006, not only was the Coalition procuring and distributing equipment, vehicles, and weapons for MOI, it was also funding a contractor to run the supply distribution warehouses and provide the transportation assets needed to get the supplies from the warehouses to MOI facilities. These challenges have continued, and MOI remains dependent on the Coalition to operate its warehouse system. Although MOI was supposed to assume responsibility for running these warehouses, this has not happened. DOD states that MOI requires approximately $175 million from the supplemental Fiscal Year 2007 Security Forces Fund for the construction and sustainment of warehouses and maintenance depots. In addition, MOI personnel were unable to maintain a certain type of American truck supplied by the Coalition because its personnel were unable to work with the vehicles’ computerized systems. As of August 2006, MOI had 1,179 trucks of this type on hand. For instance, according to a December 2006 DOD update, Iraqi mechanics remain unfamiliar with the computerized systems which are found in most of the MOI’s vehicles. For instance, according to Coalition officials the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq has established the $130 million Baghdad Area Maintenance Contract to repair National Police vehicles. DOD states that without this infrastructure the Ministry will not be able to maintain its vehicle fleet. | Why GAO Did This Study
The National Strategy for Victory in Iraq, issued in November 2005, implies a conditions-based linkage between the development of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and the size and shape of the U.S. presence there. The Department of Defense (DOD) reported to Congress in November 2006 that although the Iraqi Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior had about 323,000 trained and equipped forces, there was a serious shortcoming for both Ministries in the planning and executing of their logistics and sustainment requirements. According to DOD, without a developed logistical system the ISF will require continued Coalition support. Today's testimony addresses (1) the current state of the ISF's logistical capabilities, and (2) the challenges the ISF is facing to achieve logistical self-sufficiency. This testimony contains unclassified portions of a classified report that was issued on March 7, 2007. GAO's preliminary observations are based on audit work performed from January 2006 through March 2007.
What GAO Found
Although the Ministry of Defense has an approved logistics concept in place, the implementation of that concept has been hampered by numerous challenges. For example, the development of national and regional logistics centers has lagged behind the development of other logistics formations because of manpower shortages, security issues, inadequate fuel stocks, poor maintenance, and funding procurement issues. DOD has asked for a total of $339.2 million to build and develop maintenance, warehouse, and base support facilities at the National Depot and for $73 million to build and outfit 58 dining facilities on Garrison Support Units and Regional Support Units. Coalition logisticians have emphasized to us that the development of all echelons of logistics units is crucial in order for the Ministry of Defense to become capable of independently sustaining its forces. Furthermore, the policies and procedures intended to guide implementation of the logistics concept have not been effectively distributed. In addition, the training of Iraqi logisticians and mechanics has been hindered by an insufficiency in the supply of Arabic-literate students, of fuel needed to power generators, and of cadre qualified to serve as faculty at the logistics schools. Finally, maintenance of the vehicle fleet poses challenges because of its diversity, the shortage of trained mechanics, and the Ministry's failure to budget for and maintain an authorized stockage level for equipment. As of December 2006, the Ministry of Interior has not approved the draft logistics concept that has been proposed by the Coalition. The reason for this is unclear. What is clear, however, is that since the summer of 2006, the Ministry has experienced significant challenges in its warehousing and supply, and maintenance activities. For instance, in July 2006, the Coalition was procuring and distributing equipment, vehicles, and weapons for the Ministry, in addition to funding a contractor to run warehouses and transport supplies to the Ministry's facilities. These challenges have continued, and the Ministry remains dependent on the Coalition to operate its warehouse system. In February, the Ministry was supposed to assume responsibility for running its warehouses. However, this has not happened. Moreover, in its fiscal year 2007 supplemental, DOD is requesting approximately $175 million for the construction and sustainment of Ministry warehouses and maintenance depots. Another example of the Ministry's continuing logistical challenges is vehicle maintenance. In August 2006 Ministry personnel were unable to maintain a certain type of American truck supplied to the ministry by the Coalition because its personnel were unable to work with the vehicles' computerized systems. In August 2006, the Ministry had 1,179 trucks of this type on hand. As of December 2006, Iraqi mechanics remained unfamiliar with these computerized systems which are found in most of the ministry's vehicles. Because the Iraqi National Police are not able to maintain their vehicles, the Coalition has let and funded a $130 million Baghdad Area maintenance contract to repair these vehicles. |
gao_GAO-08-596 | gao_GAO-08-596_0 | The Corps Lacks a Current Human Capital Plan to Guide Its Workforce Planning Efforts
The Corps’ 2002 strategic human capital plan is out of date and not aligned with the agency’s most recent strategic plan, developed in 2005. However, the human capital plan has not been revised since 2002 to reflect the Corps’ new strategic direction as outlined in the agency’s most current strategic plan, developed in June 2005, and other recent events. For example, to fulfill its annual reporting requirements to OPM, the Corps provides a list of completed human capital activities, such as “Community of Practice Conference Workshop held,” and activities to be undertaken, such as “Identify Fiscal Year 2008 Intern Requirements.” However, we found that these updates are not an adequate substitute for the Corps’ human capital plan because they do not represent a coherent framework of the agency’s human capital policies, programs, and practices, and they do not include any of the components of an effective human capital plan, such as goals, strategies, and a system for measuring how successfully the strategies have been implemented. For example, some division and district officials told us that they are still using the 2002 human capital plan to guide their activities; others said they relied instead on guidance they receive from headquarters. The Corps Lacks the Necessary Agencywide Data on Critical Skills to Identify and Assess Its Workforce Needs
The Corps does not have comprehensive agencywide data on critical skills to identify and assess current and future workforce needs. Effective workforce planning requires consistent agencywide data on the critical skills needed to achieve current and future programmatic results. However, the Corps does not have a process for collecting comprehensive and consistent agencywide data, and headquarters has not provided guidance to its divisions and districts on how to collect this information. Consequently, we believe that the lack of this information hampers the Corps’ ability to develop effective approaches to recruiting, developing, and retaining personnel. However, it is too early to evaluate the Corps’ overall progress on this effort. Oftentimes if this approval is not received, he has had trouble hiring experienced scientists and engineers and has had to hire less experienced staff instead. However, this is not the case with the Corps because it does not have a current human capital plan that is aligned with its strategic plan. Finally, although the Corps uses a number of human capital tools to address the challenges it faces, such as an aging workforce and competition from the private sector for qualified applicants, it lacks a process to assess the effectiveness of these tools. Without such a process, the Corps has no way to determine either the overall costs and benefits of the tools it uses to recruit and retain employees or whether additional approaches are needed to develop and maintain its workforce for the future. Recommendations for Executive Action
To help the Corps better manage its workforce planning efforts, we are recommending that the Secretary of Defense direct the Commanding General and Chief of Engineers of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to take the following three actions: Develop a human capital plan that is directly linked to the Corps’ current strategic plan and that contains all the key components of an effective plan as outlined by the Office of Personnel Management. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
We were asked to examine the (1) extent to which the Corps has aligned its human capital plan with its strategic plan, (2) extent to which the Corps has the information necessary to identify and meet current and future workforce needs, and (3) challenges the Corps faces in meeting its workforce needs. To assess the extent to which the Corps is collecting the information necessary to meet current and future workforce needs, we visited and interviewed Corps officials at two divisions (the North Atlantic and South Pacific divisions) and three districts (New York, San Francisco, and Sacramento) to obtain information about their strategic workforce planning strategies and their human capital initiatives related to recruitment, development, and retention of staff. We used the information obtained from the visits to develop a structured interview that we administered to the Corps’ eight divisions and a purposeful sample of 14 of the Corps’ 38 districts that conduct work in the United States. | Why GAO Did This Study
With a workforce of about 35,000, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (the Corps) provides engineering services for civil works and military programs in the United States and overseas. Recently, the Corps' focus has shifted to also support contingency operations, such as responding to natural disasters. To meet its mission and emerging priorities, the Corps must have effective human capital planning processes to ensure that it can maintain its workforce. In this context, GAO was asked to examine the (1) extent to which the Corps has aligned its human capital plan with its strategic plan, (2) extent to which the Corps has the information necessary to identify and meet current and future workforce needs, and (3) challenges the Corps faces in meeting its workforce needs. To address these issues, GAO reviewed agency human capital and strategic planning documents, conducted structured interviews with eight Corps divisions and a purposeful sample of 14 of its districts, and interviewed other Corps officials.
What GAO Found
The Corps' strategic human capital plan is outdated; is not aligned with the agency's most recent strategic plan, which was developed in 2005; and is inconsistently used across the agency. Specifically, the human capital plan has not been revised since it was developed in 2002, and it is therefore not aligned with the Corps' current strategic plan. Headquarters officials told GAO they "abandoned" the use of the plan and replaced it with the human capital updates required under a presidential initiative. While these updates list the Corps' human capital activities and milestones for completing them, they do not contain key components of an effective human capital plan, such as goals, strategies, and a system for measuring performance. Moreover, the outdated human capital plan is being used inconsistently across the agency. Some divisions and districts are still using the 2002 plan to guide their human capital efforts, while others are relying on guidance from headquarters or the Office of Personnel Management or developing their own guidance. Without a current, consistently implemented human capital plan that is aligned with its strategic plan, the Corps' ability to effectively manage its workforce is limited. The Corps lacks the necessary agencywide information on critical skills to identify and assess current and future workforce needs and therefore cannot effectively perform its workforce planning activities. Effective workforce planning depends on consistent agencywide data on the critical skills needed to achieve the agency's mission. However, the Corps does not have a process for collecting consistent agencywide data, and headquarters has not provided guidance to the divisions and districts on how to gather this information systematically. Without guidance, some divisions and districts have collected this information independently, using varying methods, leaving the Corps with inconsistent and incomplete data with which to assess the agency's overall workforce needs. As a result, the Corps' ability to determine effective approaches to recruiting, developing, and retaining personnel is limited. Realizing the need for consistent information on critical skills, the Corps recently began an effort to systematically collect these data. However, it is too early to assess the Corps' progress on this effort. The Corps faces several challenges to its workforce planning efforts, such as competition from the private sector and others to hire qualified staff. To address these challenges, the Corps uses human capital tools such as recruitment and retention incentives. However, the Corps' use of some tools has sharply decreased recently. For example, in fiscal year 2002 the Corps awarded $750,000 in recruitment bonuses, but in 2006 this dropped to $24,000. One official told GAO he has had to hire less qualified staff because he has been unable to offer sufficient incentives. Moreover, the Corps lacks a process for assessing the effectiveness of the tools it uses. Consequently, the Corps can neither determine the overall costs and benefits of using these tools nor decide whether additional methods are needed to recruit, develop, and retain its current and future workforce. |
gao_T-GGD-98-123 | gao_T-GGD-98-123_0 | IRS’ Year 2000 Efforts: Status and Risks
Madam Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: We are pleased to be here today to discuss the results of our work to date on the Internal Revenue Service’s (IRS) efforts to have its information systems function correctly when processing dates beyond December 31, 1999. telecommunications is at the highest risk for not being completed by January 31, 1999. In addition to converting systems, IRS is undertaking two major system replacement projects as part of its Year 2000 efforts. Both of these projects have encountered some schedule delays. The first was the lack of a master conversion and replacement schedule. However, we remain concerned that IRS’ current approach to contingency planning does not address the likelihood that system failures could occur once systems are implemented. Conversion of Existing Systems
According to IRS, before January 1999, it needs to complete 12 steps of its 14-step process for converting (1) the applications for its existing systems; (2) telecommunications networks; and (3) systems software and/or hardware for mainframes, minicomputers/file servers, and personal computers. IRS has made more progress in converting its applications than in converting its information systems infrastructure. IRS has completed its assessment of the hardware and systems software for its mainframe computers. IRS Is Taking Actions to Develop a Master Conversion and Replacement Schedule
In our January briefing to your office, we identified two major risk areas for IRS’ Year 2000 effort: (1) the lack of an integrated master conversion and replacement schedule and (2) a limited approach to contingency planning. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed the results of its work to date on the Internal Revenue Service's (IRS) efforts to have its information systems function correctly when processing dates beyond December 31, 1999.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) for its existing systems, IRS has made more progress in converting application software than converting its information systems infrastructure, which includes hardware, systems software, and telecommunications; (2) despite its progress on converting applications, IRS fell short of its goal to have the applications for 66 of the 127 systems that it considers mission-critical converted by January 1998; (3) IRS is still assessing or in the early stages of converting its hardware and systems software for two of its three levels of computing operations--minicomputers/file servers and personal computers; (4) of all the infrastructure areas, according to IRS' tracking systems, telecommunications is at the highest risk for not being completed by January 31, 1999; (5) in addition to converting systems, IRS is undertaking two major system replacement projects as part of its year 2000 efforts; (6) both of these projects have encountered some schedule delays; (7) GAO identified two significant risk areas to IRS' year 2000 efforts; (8) the first was the lack of a master conversion and replacement schedule; (9) the second was a limited approach to contingency planning; (10) IRS is taking actions to address GAO's concerns regarding the lack of a master conversion and replacement schedule; and (11) however, GAO remains concerned that IRS' current approach to contingency planning does not address the likelihood that system failures could occur once systems are implemented. |
gao_GAO-04-871 | gao_GAO-04-871_0 | Background
In addition to the 50-50 requirement in 10 U.S.C. Recurring Weaknesses in Data Preclude Determinations of Compliance in Prior-Years Report with Precision
Recurring weaknesses in DOD’s data gathering, reporting processes, and financial systems prevented us from determining with precision whether the services were in compliance with the 50-50 reporting requirement for fiscal years 2002 and 2003. DOD’s prior-years report for fiscal years 2002 and 2003 as submitted to the Congress in February 2004 shows the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force to be below the 50 percent funding limitation on private-sector workloads for both years. Increase in Depot Maintenance Funding Did Not Result in Large Increase in Work at Army Depots
While there was an over $700 million increase in depot maintenance funding in the Army from fiscal year 2002 to fiscal year 2003, this increase did not translate into a significant increase in the amount of work performed in Army depots. Navy Reported Private-Sector Funding below 50 Percent Limit
Although the Navy (including the Marine Corps) reported that its private-sector funding was below the 50 percent limit for both fiscal years, we found errors in the Navy’s and Marine Corps’ data, and we found that the total dollar amount of errors affected the data for the private sector more than the public sector. Correcting for the errors we found increased the percentage share in fiscal year 2003 for the private sector from 44.5 percent to 47.9 percent—a gain of 3.4 percent. Future-Year Projections Do Not Provide Reasonable Estimates of Public- and Private-Sector Funding
As in the past, DOD’s latest future-years report does not provide reasonable estimates of public- and private-sector depot maintenance funding allocations for fiscal years 2004 through 2008 because the future-year projections were based on (1) incorrect data and questionable assumptions and (2) internal and external factors, which create fluctuations in reported data. Services Moving Closer to Threshold for Private- Sector Funding
While the reported data have limitations that affect their usefulness as a predictor of actual funding allocations, our analysis of DOD’s 50-50 data for fiscal years 2004-8 shows that the services are predicting that they would not reach the threshold for private-sector funding. But changes, errors, or omissions could change this trend. Proposed Legislation Would Require a Single Report
Because of the limitations of the future-years report as an accurate predictor of depot maintenance funding allocation, we recommended last year that the Congress consider amending 10 U.S.C. 2466 to require only one 50-50 report. The single report would cover a 3-year period (prior year, current year, and budget year), for which data are more reliable and the potential affects more immediate. Several Key Limitations Affect the Quality of DOD’s 50-50 Reporting
DOD’s improvements in 50-50 guidance and operating processes have not advanced significantly in recent years, and key limitations remain in the 50-50 process that affect the quality of DOD’s 50-50 reporting. First, three of the four military services did not have an independent review and validation of their 50-50 data prior to submission to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, while the fourth had only a limited review. Third, management emphasis regarding the need for accurate and complete reporting was lacking. 2466. Limited and sporadic training for those responsible for collecting, aggregating, and reporting 50-50 data and the lack of management attention regarding the need for accurate and complete reporting present continued challenges to the services in their ability to make significant improvements to their collection, documentation, and reporting processes. Regarding its partial concurrence with our recommendation that would require the military departments, within 30 days of reporting 50-50 data within 2 percent of exceeding the 50 percent threshold, to submit a plan to the Office of the Secretary of Defense identifying actions the military departments shall take to ensure continued compliance with the 50-50 reporting requirements, DOD agreed that the 2 percent threshold is a reasonable trigger point for additional oversight and management to ensure compliance with the 50 percent threshold. Depot Maintenance: Action Needed to Avoid Exceeding Threshold on Contract Workloads. | Why GAO Did This Study
Under 10 U.S.C. 2466, the military departments and defense agencies can use no more than 50 percent of annual depot maintenance funding for work performed by private-sector contractors. DOD also must submit two reports to the Congress annually on the division of depot maintenance funding between the public and private sectors--one about the percentage of funds spent in the previous 2 fiscal years (prior-years report) and one about the current and 4 succeeding fiscal years (future-years report). As required, GAO reviewed the two DOD reports submitted in early 2004 and is, with this report, submitting its views to the Congress on whether (1) the military services met the so-called "50-50 requirement" for fiscal years 2002-3 and (2) the projections for fiscal years 2004-8 are reasonable estimates. GAO also identified key limitations in the 50-50 process that affect the department's ability to comply with the 50-50 requirement.
What GAO Found
Recurring weaknesses in DOD's data gathering, reporting processes, and financial systems prevented GAO from determining with precision if the military services complied with the 50-50 requirement in fiscal years 2002-3. DOD data show all the services to be below the 50 percent funding limit on private-sector work. However, as before, GAO found errors in the data that, if corrected, would overall increase funding of the private sector and move each service closer to the limit on contract maintenance. For example, for fiscal year 2003, the Navy did not include about $410 million in private-sector maintenance work on aircraft carriers and surface ships. Correcting for these and other errors would increase the Navy's percentage of private-sector depot maintenance funds for that year from the 44.5 percent reported to 47.9 percent. DOD reported significant increases in depot maintenance funding from 2002 to 2003, but these did not result in significant increases in the amount of work performed in DOD depots during that period. Because some data errors and omissions in DOD's prior-years report are carried into future years, and changing depot maintenance requirements and fluctuations in budget estimates make projecting out-year data difficult, the future-years report does not represent reasonable estimates of public- and private- sector maintenance funding for fiscal years 2004-8, thereby limiting its usefulness to congressional and DOD decision makers. GAO recommended last year that the Congress consider amending 10 U.S.C. 2466 to require only one report that would cover 50-50 data for the prior year, current year, and budget year. In 2004 the Armed Services Committees proposed changes in title 10 that would adopt GAO's recommendation. Despite the limitations in the 50-50 data, the trend for this period shows that the services are moving close to the 50 percent threshold, yet they have no plan of action in place to prevent exceeding it. Such a plan would allow for timely actions to be taken to mitigate the potential for exceeding the 50 percent limit for private-sector funding. Several limitations in the 50-50 process affect the quality of DOD's 50-50 reporting. First, three of the four military services did not have an independent review and validation of their 50-50 data. Second, training for those who are responsible for collecting, aggregating, and reporting 50-50 data was limited and sporadic. Third, management emphasis regarding the need for accurate and complete 50-50 reporting was lacking. |
gao_GAO-01-183 | gao_GAO-01-183_0 | Conclusions
Over the past 3½ years, VA has made significant progress in establishing its national formulary, which has generally met with prescriber acceptance. Prescribers reported that veterans are generally receiving the drugs they need and that veterans rarely register complaints concerning prescription drugs. VA has not provided sufficient oversight, however, to ensure that VISNs and medical centers comply with formulary policies and that the flexibility given to them does not unduly compromise VA’s goal of formulary standardization. Contrary to VA formulary policy, some facilities omitted national formulary drugs or modified the closed drug classes. While adding a limited number of drugs to supplement the national formulary is permitted, as more drugs are added by VISNs, formulary differences among facilities are likely to become more pronounced, decreasing formulary standardization. While VA recognizes the trade-off between local flexibility and standardization, it lacks criteria for determining the appropriateness of adding drugs to supplement the national formulary. Consequently, VA cannot determine whether the resulting decrease in standardization is acceptable. | What GAO Found
During the last three years, the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) has made significant progress in establishing its national drug formulary, which has generally met with the prescriber acceptance. Most veterans are receiving the drugs the need and rarely register complaints about prescription drugs. However, VA has not been sufficient to ensure that the Veterans Integrated Service Networks (VISN) and medical centers comply with formulary policies and that the flexibility given to them does not compromise VA's goal of formulary standardization. Contrary to VA formulary policy, some facilities omitted national formulary drugs or modified the closest drug classes. Although a limited number of drugs to supplement the national formulary is permitted, formulary differences among facilities are likely to become more pronounced, as more drugs are added by VISNs, decreasing formulary standardization. VA recognizes the trade-off between local flexibility and standardization, but it lacks criteria for determining the appropriateness of adding drugs to supplement the national formulary and therefore may not be able to determine whether the decrease in standardization is acceptable. |
gao_HEHS-95-116 | gao_HEHS-95-116_0 | Extent of Fraudulent Applications by Non-English-Speaking Immigrants Using Middlemen Is Unknown
Although some ineligible non-English-speaking immigrants obtain SSI benefits by using middlemen, the actual number of people who do so is unknown. In comparison, during the same period, the number of immigrants receiving SSI disability benefits rose from 45,000 to 267,000—approximately a sixfold increase. Moreover, the cost to the government could be higher than just the SSI payments, because in most states, Medicaid benefits and food stamps are automatically provided to SSI recipients. In addition, SSA has a shortage of bilingual staff to handle non-English-speaking applicants. SSA Monitoring of Applicants’ Use of Middlemen Is Limited
Despite recent changes in some SSA procedures, SSA’s monitoring of middlemen is limited. In California, for example, an investigation initiated by the state and assisted by the HHS OIG yielded information that, when passed on to SSA, led to SSA’s identification of 1,981 SSI recipients associated with potentially fraudulent claims involving middlemen. Routine coordination of efforts with state Medicaid agencies could enhance SSA’s ability to identify potentially fraudulent SSI claims. SSA Needs a More Comprehensive Programwide Strategy for Keeping Ineligible Non-English-Speaking Applicants Off SSI
SSA has tried a few approaches for handling some of the individual factors that contribute to SSI’s vulnerability to fraud, but needs to develop and implement a more comprehensive, programwide strategy for ensuring that only eligible applicants receive SSI benefits. SSA Initiatives
SSA established a task force in April 1993 to combat middleman fraud. Another task force effort has resulted in SSA plans to review possibly fraudulent cases involving middlemen for which benefits are already being paid. These terminations are subject to appeal, and thus far about 60 percent have been appealed. SSA is trying several approaches to reduce the use of middlemen as interpreters. 103-296)
The federal crime of SSI fraud has been elevated from a misdemeanor to a felony. Initiatives by the Social Security Administration
SSA plans to develop a nationwide database to help SSA and disability determination services (DDS) offices monitor middlemen. Related GAO Products
Supplemental Security Income: Growth and Changes in Recipient Population Call for Reexamining Program (GAO/HEHS-95-137, July 7, 1995). 2, 1995). | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed fraudulent claims for disability benefits under the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program, focusing on: (1) the extent of fraudulent applications submitted by non-English speaking immigrants using middlemen; (2) factors that contribute to SSI vulnerability to such fraudulent applications; and (3) government initiatives to combat such fraudulent activities.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) although the Social Security Administration (SSA) has been aware of allegations of SSI fraud related to the use of middlemen since 1990, the number of applicants who have obtained SSI benefits illegally through the use of middlemen is unknown; (2) the number of immigrants receiving SSI disability benefits rose from 45,000 in 1983 to 267,000 in 1993; (3) in California, about 6,000 potentially fraudulent applications have been identified, of which about 30 percent represent SSI claims being paid; (4) ineligible SSI recipients can receive about $113,000 in SSI, Medicaid, and Food Stamp benefits by the time they are 65 years old; and (5) SSA has established a task force in California to combat fraudulent applications involving middlemen and has terminated benefits for 207 recipients, as of April 1995. In addition, GAO found that SSI is vulnerable to fraudulent applications involving middlemen because SSA: (1) management practices and bilingual staff shortages enable applicants to use middlemen; (2) performs only limited monitoring of middlemen; (3) has limited funds for investigations; (4) has not coordinated its efforts to monitor middlemen with state Medicaid agencies; and (5) needs a better strategy to keep ineligible applicants from ever being accepted on SSI rolls. |
gao_AIMD-98-137 | gao_AIMD-98-137_0 | Conversely if caseloads and costs increase, federal funds per recipient would be lower. For example, if revenues fall during an economic downturn, a state’s enacted budget can fall into deficit. However, unless there are reserves specifically earmarked for low-income family assistance programs, these programs will have to compete for “rainy day” fund resources with all other programs in a state’s general fund in times of budgetary stress. States Have Additional Budgetary Resources to Finance Their Low-Income Family Assistance Programs
A combination of the decline in caseload levels, the higher federal grant levels, and the MOE requirement for states’ contributions to their programs means that most states have more budgetary resources available for their low-income family assistance programs since enactment of welfare reform than under prior law. Aside from the nominal changes in funding, another way of viewing resources available for welfare is to compare total federal and state resources available under the block grant with what comparable federal-state spending would have been for 1997 caseloads under prior law. Overall, we calculated that under the block grant, 46 states wouldhave more total resources—state and federal—for their new welfare programs than they would have had under the old welfare programs—with a median increase of 22 percent—or about $4.7 billion more nationwide. Text Box 2: Examples of States’ Use of Federal TANF Funds to Achieve Budgetary Savings The combination of additional budgetary resources and lower caseloads has permitted states to achieve state budgetary savings which were reallocated to other state fiscal priorities. These officials said that a future downturn could reduce funds available for benefits at a time when they are most needed. Allowing for more transparency and information regarding states’ contingency budgets and the nature of the balances left in reserve in the U.S. Treasury could provide states with an opportunity to clarify their longer term fiscal plans for the program. States Are Unlikely to Make Extensive Use of PRWORA’s Contingency Fund or Loan Fund
Officials in most of the states we visited indicated that they would not use the Contingency Fund for State Welfare Programs (Contingency Fund) nor the Federal Loan Fund for State Welfare Programs (Loan Fund) even if they became eligible to do so. Officials in some states indicated that borrowing specifically for social welfare spending in times of fiscal stress would not receive popular support. States currently have more resources available for these programs under TANF than would have been available under the old financing system, but future fiscal demands are uncertain. The fixed nature of the TANF block grant, the potential volatility of welfare caseloads and program spending along with the “pro-cyclical” budgetary pressures states face under their balanced budget requirements highlight the importance of both the states’ own funding for contingencies as well as PRWORA’s provisions for contingencies—allowing states to save unused TANF funds for future years’ use and the two safety net mechanisms, the Contingency Fund and the Loan Fund. In our recent report on state program restructuring, we described how states are moving away from a welfare system that focused on entitlement to assistance to one that emphasizes finding employment as quickly as possible and becoming more self-sufficient. This is primarily the result of a combination of three interrelated factors: (1) the unprecedented declines in caseloads, (2) the new federal financing mechanism, or block grant, that provides resources to the states without regard to the numbers of people states’ welfare programs serve, and (3) the maintenance of effort requirement on states that establishes a minimum, or floor, funding level for their state welfare programs. GAO Comments
1. 2. 3. 5. 6. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the states' fiscal decisions for the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) block grant and whether states are taking steps to prepare for the effects of future economic downturns on their welfare programs, focusing on: (1) how state budgetary resources, including federal aid, have been allocated since states have had access to TANF funds; (2) what plans states are making to ensure programmatic stability in times of fiscal and economic stress; and (3) the extent to which states have used, or plan to use, the program's federal Contingency Fund for State Welfare Programs and the Federal Loans for State Welfare Programs (Loan Fund) which are available for downturns or other emergencies affecting states.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) more federal and state resources are available for states' low-income family assistance programs since welfare reform passed in 1996 than would have been available under the previous system of financing welfare programs consolidated in the TANF block grant; (2) GAO's estimates showed that, taking caseload declines into account, 46 states would have more total resources--both state and federal--for their low-income family assistance programs than they would have had under the previous welfare programs; (3) states are transforming the nation's welfare system into a work-focused, temporary assistance program for needy families and generally chose to spend these resources to expand programs and benefits by shifting the emphasis from entitlement to self-sufficiency, enhancing support services, and increasing work participation rates; (4) states also have achieved budgetary savings by reducing state funds to the statutory maintenance-of-effort level of 75 or 80 percent of previous state spending levels; (5) while states have gained greater resources under the block grant, they also take greater responsibilities for fiscal risks should program costs increase in the future; (6) most states, including 7 of the 10 GAO visited, also have a general fund budget stabilization or rainy day funds that could be used to augment program spending during an economic downturn, but welfare programs would have to compete for these resources with other state funding priorities; (7) the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) includes features that could provide federal funding to cover future increases in program needs; (8) states can carry forward unused TANF funds without fiscal year limitation; (9) as of September 30, 1997, states had left about $1.2 billion in unspent balances in their accounts with the U.S Treasury, or about 9 percent of the total grant; (10) it is unclear whether these balances will remain, shrink, or increase as states gain experience with the problem; (11) PRWORA also creates two federal safety-net mechanisms--the Contingency Fund and the Loan Fund--that were designed to provide states with access to additional funds during times of economic downturn or fiscal stress; (12) as of February 1998, neither the Contingency nor the Loan Funds had been used by any state; (13) officials in states GAO visited said they did not view the Contingency Fund as a viable source of additional resources; and (14) officials in many states GAO visited indicated they did not believe their states would borrow from the Loan Fund during an economic downturn. |
gao_GAO-13-610T | gao_GAO-13-610T_0 | TWIC Reader Pilot Results Are Not Sufficiently Complete, Accurate, and Reliable for Informing Congress and the TWIC Card Reader Rule
Our review of the pilot test identified several challenges related to pilot planning, data collection, and reporting, which affected the completeness, accuracy, and reliability of the results. For example, the independent test agent reported that the logs from the TWIC readers and related access control systems were not detailed enough to determine the reason for errors, such as biometric match failure, an expired TWIC card, or that the TWIC was identified as being on the list of revoked credentials. Baseline data, which were to be collected prior to piloting the use of TWIC with readers, were to be a measure of throughput time, that is, the time required to inspect a TWIC card and complete access-related processes prior to granting entry. Specifically, TSA and the independent test agent did not require pilot participants to document when individuals were granted access based on a visual inspection of the TWIC, or deny the individual access as may be required under future regulation. In addition to these challenges, the independent test agent identified the lack of a database to track and analyze all pilot data in a consistent manner as an additional challenge to data collection and reporting. Reporting
As required by the SAFE Port Act and the Coast Guard Authorization Act of 2010, DHS’s report to Congress on the TWIC reader pilot presented several findings with respect to technical and operational aspects of implementing TWIC technologies in the maritime environment. Given that the results of the pilot are unreliable for informing the TWIC card reader rule on the technology and operational impacts of using TWIC cards with readers, we recommended that Congress should consider repealing the requirement that the Secretary of Homeland Security promulgate final regulations that require the deployment of card readers that are consistent with the findings of the pilot program; and that Congress should consider requiring that the Secretary of Homeland Security complete an assessment that evaluates the effectiveness of using TWIC with readers for enhancing port security. These results could then be used to promulgate a final regulation as appropriate. GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
For questions about this statement, please contact Steve Lord at (202) 512-4379 or [email protected]. Key contributors for the previous work that this testimony is based on are listed within each individual product. | Why GAO Did This Study
This testimony discusses GAO's work examining the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC) program. Ports, waterways, and vessels handle billions of dollars in cargo annually, and an attack on our nation's maritime transportation system could have serious consequences. Maritime workers, including longshoremen, mechanics, truck drivers, and merchant mariners, access secure areas of the nation's estimated 16,400 maritime-related transportation facilities and vessels, such as cargo container and cruise ship terminals, each day while performing their jobs.
The TWIC program is intended to provide a tamper-resistant biometric credential to maritime workers who require unescorted access to secure areas of facilities and vessels regulated under the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 (MTSA). TWIC is to enhance the ability of MTSA-regulated facility and vessel owners and operators to control access to their facilities and verify workers' identities. Under current statute and regulation, maritime workers requiring unescorted access to secure areas of MTSA-regulated facilities or vessels are required to obtain a TWIC, and facility and vessel operators are required by regulation to visually inspect each worker's TWIC before granting unescorted access. Prior to being granted a TWIC, maritime workers are required to undergo a background check, known as a security threat assessment.
What GAO Found
This statement today highlights the key findings of a report GAO released yesterday on the TWIC program that addressed the extent to which the results from the TWIC reader pilot were sufficiently complete, accurate, and reliable for informing Congress and the TWIC card reader rule. For the report, among other things, GAO assessed the methods used to collect and analyze pilot data since the inception of the pilot in August 2008. GAO analyzed and compared the pilot data with the TWIC reader pilot report submitted to Congress to determine whether the findings in the report are based on sufficiently complete, accurate, and reliable data. Additionally, we interviewed officials at DHS, TSA, and USCG with responsibilities for overseeing the TWIC program, as well as pilot officials responsible for coordinating pilot efforts with TSA and the independent test agent (responsible for planning, evaluating, and reporting on all test events), about TWIC reader pilot testing approaches, results, and challenges. |
gao_GAO-03-1169T | gao_GAO-03-1169T_0 | These are now the 25 OMB- sponsored initiatives. This structure includes five portfolios: “government to citizen,” “government to business,” “government to government,” “internal efficiency and effectiveness,” and “cross-cutting.” Each of the 25 initiatives is assigned to one of these portfolios, according to the type of results the initiative is intended to provide. Its goal is to have 77,000 courses completed and 48 sites developed. OPM Faces Significant Challenges in Implementing Its e-Government Initiatives
OPM’s portfolio of e-gov initiatives represents an ambitious attempt to transform the way human capital functions and services are carried out in the federal government. In implementing the initiatives, OPM faces a number of challenges that, if not fully met, could erode support for the initiatives or prevent OPM from meeting its objectives and realizing the improvements and dollar savings that the agency has projected. One of the criteria for OMB’s selection of its e-government initiatives was the potential for the project to be completed “within 18–24 months.” In order to meet the demand for quick results, significant alterations have been made to the acquisition plans for several initiatives. In its decision to continue with its awarded contract for Recruitment One-Stop, despite a successful bid protest by Symplicity Corporation, OPM officials perceived the need to implement an e-government initiative as quickly as possible to be one factor outweighing the importance of issues that we raised concerning the conduct of the procurement. Achieving Governmentwide Consolidation of Common Electronic Functions
Each of OPM’s five initiatives aims to ultimately create a single system or Web-based service to support a specific human capital function across the federal government. Effective change management and communication will be critical, as agencies may be required to take positive action to both to shut down existing redundant systems and invest in new technology to connect with OPM’s standardized systems. OPM faces a significant challenge in realistically estimating the financial savings to be derived from its e-government initiatives. In many cases, estimated cost savings associated with process improvements are only loosely based on measures that are inherently abstract, such as the average cost of performing a certain function across the government. Cost savings from eliminating redundant systems is also a factor—though a smaller one—in savings projected for Recruitment One-Stop and e-Training. To be truly effective in meeting the goals set out in OMB’s e-government strategy, agencies need to establish complete, meaningful, and quantitative measures of cost savings. Electronic Government: Selection and Implementation of the Office of Management and Budget’s 24 Initiatives. Federal Rulemaking: Agencies’ Use of Information Technology to Facilitate Public Participation. | Why GAO Did This Study
Electronic government (e-government) refers to the use of information technology (IT), including Web-based Internet applications, to enhance access to and delivery of government information and services, as well as to improve the internal efficiency and effectiveness of the federal government. The Office of Personnel Management (OPM) is managing five e-government initiatives whose goal is to transform the way OPM oversees the government's human capital functions. These 5 initiatives are among 25 identified by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) as foremost in the drive toward egovernment transformation. The 25 initiatives have ambitious goals, including eliminating redundant, nonintegrated business operations and systems and improving service to citizens by an order of magnitude. Achieving these results, according to OMB, could produce billions of dollars in savings from improved operational efficiency. In today's testimony, among other things, GAO identifies the challenges facing OPM as it moves forward in implementing the five human capital initiatives.
What GAO Found
OPM's five e-government initiatives are an ambitious attempt to transform the way human capital functions and services are carried out in the federal government. OPM faces several challenges that, if not fully met, could prevent it from meeting its objectives and realizing projected improvements and dollar savings. For instance, in order to meet a perceived need for quick results, alterations have been made to the acquisition plans for several of the 25 OMBsponsored e-government initiatives, including OPM's Recruitment One-Stop initiative. In OPM's recent decision to continue with its awarded contract for Recruitment One-Stop, despite a successful bid protest by Symplicity Corporation, agency officials perceived the need for quick results to be one factor outweighing the importance of issues raised by GAO concerning the conduct of the procurement. However, by taking this course, OPM risks alienating potential supporters of its initiative. Further, managing the migration from agency-specific systems to consolidated systems will be a challenge, because agencies may be required to take positive action to shut down existing systems and invest in additional or updated technology to use the new, consolidated systems resulting from OPM's five initiatives. Consequently, it will be crucial for OPM to implement effective change management and communication policies. In addition, technical integration across agencies to support consolidation, including the development of standards, is a formidable task. Finally, OPM also faces a significant challenge in realistically estimating the cost savings to be derived from these initiatives. In many cases, estimates of cost savings are only loosely based on measures that are difficult to quantify, such as the average cost of performing a certain function across the government. To be truly effective in meeting its goals, OPM needs to establish complete, meaningful, and quantitative measures of cost savings. |
gao_GAO-13-246 | gao_GAO-13-246_0 | CMS Currently Relies on Each Accrediting Organization to Establish Its Own Standards
CMS did not establish minimum national standards for ADI accreditation, and instead required each accrediting organization to establish its own specific standards for quality and safety of ADI services. CMS drafted more specific standards for the accreditation of ADI suppliers in 2010, but did not publish these standards or propose adopting them. Representatives from the three approved accrediting organizations—as well as 9 of the 11 organizations with imaging expertise from which we obtained information—recommended that CMS adopt minimum national standards, which would help to ensure that all accredited ADI suppliers meet a minimum level of quality and safety. In addition, prior to granting accreditation, both ACR and IAC evaluate suppliers’ patient images (called “clinical images”) to ensure that images meet specific criteria, as recommended by 8 of the 11 organizations with imaging expertise. CMS’s Current Oversight Is Limited
CMS’s oversight efforts have focused primarily on ensuring that only accredited suppliers’ claims are paid; the agency does not have a systematic oversight process for other aspects of the ADI accreditation requirement. CMS Has Not Developed an Oversight Framework for Evaluating Accrediting Organization Performance
Although CMS is responsible for evaluating the performance of accrediting organizations, and CMS officials have indicated that its goal is to improve the quality of ADI services, it has not developed an oversight framework that would enable it to monitor and measure performance. A CMS official knowledgeable about the accreditation requirement stated that the requirement had been in effect for less than 1 year at the time of our review, and acknowledged that the agency’s oversight process was not as robust as it could be. This official reported that primary responsibility for oversight of the accreditation requirement was in the process of being transferred from CMS’s Center for Program Integrity to the Center for Clinical Standards and Quality. We found that as of January 2013, CMS had not yet established specific performance expectations or developed plans for conducting validation audits of accredited suppliers, which are one of the most effective techniques CMS has for collecting information about accrediting organization performance. CMS Guidance on Mid- Cycle Audits and Identification of Serious Care Problems Is Limited
Although CMS requires accrediting organizations to conduct mid-cycle audits of accredited suppliers—including unannounced site visits—to help ensure they maintain compliance for the duration of the accreditation cycle, CMS does not specify minimum expectations for this task, such as the minimum number or percentage of audits required or the types of supplier activities that should be assessed during such audits. In addition, CMS guidance is not sufficient to ensure that accrediting organizations consistently identify and report serious care problems that pose immediate jeopardy to Medicare beneficiaries or suppliers’ staff. However, there are significant differences among the accrediting organizations, which arise from CMS’s lack of minimum national standards. As a result, important aspects of imaging, such as qualifications of technologists and medical directors and the quality of clinical images, are difficult for CMS to monitor and assess. Recommendations for Executive Action
To help ensure that ADI suppliers provide consistent, safe, and high- quality imaging to Medicare beneficiaries, we recommend that the Administrator of CMS take the following three actions: determine the content of and publish minimum national standards for the accreditation of ADI suppliers, which could include specific qualifications for supplier personnel and requiring accrediting organization review of clinical images; develop an oversight framework for evaluating accrediting organization performance, which could include collecting and analyzing information on accreditation results and conducting validation audits; and develop more specific requirements for accrediting organization mid- cycle audit procedures and clarify guidance on immediate-jeopardy deficiencies to ensure consistent identification and timely correction of serious care problems for the duration of accreditation. The three accrediting organizations also reviewed and provided comments on a draft of this report. ACR and IAC concurred with the report’s findings and recommendations. Rather, because our study is focused on imaging in particular, we determined whether the three CMS-selected accrediting organizations use standards specific to imaging that were recommended by organizations with expertise in this area. We indicate in the report that the standards the 11 organizations identified do not represent the full range of possible standards for the accreditation of ADI suppliers, but rather provide a framework for comparing the standards used by the accrediting organizations selected by CMS. While our report assessed the standards currently in use for ADI accreditation, it is ultimately CMS’s responsibility to determine the content of minimum national standards for ADI accreditation. | Why GAO Did This Study
MIPPA required that beginning January 1, 2012, suppliers that produce the images for ADI services, such as physician offices and independent diagnostic testing facilities, be accredited by an organization approved by CMS. MIPPA directed GAO to conduct a preliminary report on the accreditation requirement in 2013 and a final report in 2014.
In this report, GAO assessed (1) CMSs standards for accreditation of ADI suppliers, and (2) CMSs oversight of the accreditation requirement. To assess CMSs standards and oversight, GAO reviewed CMS regulations related to MIPPA, interviewed and reviewed information from CMS and CMS-approved accrediting organizations, and reviewed information on recommended standards for ADI accreditation from 11 organizations with imaging expertise.
What GAO Found
The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) did not establish minimum national standards for the accreditation of suppliers of advanced diagnostic imaging (ADI) services, which cover the production of images for computed tomography, magnetic resonance imaging, and nuclear medicine services. While CMS adopted the broad criteria from the Medicare Improvements for Patients and Providers Act of 2008 (MIPPA) for ADI accreditation, it relied on the three accrediting organizations it selected to establish their own standards for quality and safety. To establish a framework for assessing the ADI standards currently in use, GAO developed a list of nine standards based on recommendations from 11 organizations with imaging expertise from which GAO obtained information. Two of the three accrediting organizations that CMS selected use all nine standards, while the third organization uses six of the nine standards. For example, while two of the organizations evaluate suppliers' patient images, the third said that it instead assesses suppliers' compliance with other standards necessary to maintain image quality, such as those related to inspection and testing of imaging equipment. As a result of these significant differences among the accrediting organizations, which arise from the lack of minimum national standards, important aspects of imaging, such as qualifications of technologists and medical directors and the quality of clinical images, are difficult for CMS to monitor and assess. Nine of the 11 organizations with imaging expertise and representatives from all three accrediting organizations recommended that CMS adopt minimum national standards. CMS drafted standards in 2010, but did not publish them because the agency was focused on other priorities.
CMS's current oversight for the accreditation requirement is limited, as the agency focused its initial oversight efforts on ensuring that claims were paid only to accredited suppliers. Although CMS is responsible for evaluating the performance of accrediting organizations, the agency has not developed an oversight framework that would enable it to monitor and measure performance. CMS has not established specific performance expectations or developed plans for the validation audits of accredited suppliers as described in its regulations. Our previous work has shown that such independent evaluations are one of the most effective techniques CMS has to collect information about whether serious deficiencies are being identified. In addition, CMS's guidance to accrediting organizations on mid-cycle audits and serious care problems is limited. For example, CMS requires accrediting organizations to conduct mid-cycle audits to help ensure accredited suppliers maintain compliance for the 3-year accreditation cycle, but did not specify minimum expectations for this task, such as the minimum number or percentage of audits required or the types of supplier activities that should be assessed. In addition, two of the three accrediting organizations reported that CMS's guidance on identifying and reporting deficiencies that pose immediate jeopardy to Medicare beneficiaries or suppliers' staff was unclear. A CMS official stated that the accreditation requirement had been in operation for less than 1 year at the time of GAO's review, and reported that responsibility for oversight of the accreditation requirement was in the process of being transferred to another group within the agency.
What GAO Recommends
To help ensure that ADI suppliers provide safe and high-quality imaging to Medicare beneficiaries, GAO recommends that the Administrator of CMS determine the content of and publish minimum national standards for the accreditation of ADI suppliers; develop an oversight framework for evaluating accrediting organization performance; and develop more specific requirements for accrediting organization audits and clarify guidance on immediate-jeopardy deficiencies. The Department of Health and Human Services, which oversees CMS, concurred with GAOs recommendations. |
gao_GAO-13-774 | gao_GAO-13-774_0 | BIE provides funding on the same terms to tribally-operated schools as it does to BIE-operated schools based on the number of students attending the schools, among other factors. BIE Students Score Consistently Below Indian Students in Public Schools on National Assessments and Have Relatively Low Graduation Rates
Students in BIE schools have performed consistently below Indian students enrolled in public schools on national assessments administered by the National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP) between 2005 and 2011. For example, in 2011, 4th grade estimated average reading scores were 22 points lower for BIE students than for Indian students attending public schools. Figure 1 shows the trend in the estimated average 4th grade reading and math scores for students in BIE schools as compared to Indian students in public schools and the national average for non-Indian students. Specifically, the graduation rate for BIE students for the 2010-2011 school year was 61 percent—placing BIE students in the bottom half among graduation rates for Indian students in states where BIE schools are located. BIE Has Difficulty Complying with Various Assessment Requirements and Collaborating with Education, but is Working to Address Certain Challenges
BIE’s administrative and internal control weaknesses have resulted in difficulty assessing the academic progress of its students and AYP for its schools as required under ESEA. As a result of BIE’s guidance, 21 of BIE’s 42 schools in New Mexico administered an alternative assessment that Education was unable to use to hold schools accountable for student performance under ESEA. Under an Interior regulation, BIE schools are generally required to administer the same academic assessments used by the 23 respective states where the schools are located. In addition to not obtaining Education’s approval of the assessment, BIE made this critical decision without the appropriate level of review by the Secretary of the Interior or his designee. BIE Did Not Inform Schools about Adequate Yearly Progress in a Timely Manner
BIE did not notify schools of their AYP status for the 2011-12 school year before the start of the 2012-13 school year. BIE Faces Fragmented Administrative Services
Until July 2013, Indian Affairs’ DAS-M was responsible for BIE’s administrative functions, including handling school contracting needs, facilities, and budget issues. In addition, there is a lack of communication between Indian Affairs’ leadership and schools. Indian Affairs’ recent realignment—approved by the cognizant congressional committees in late May 2013—is intended to improve efficiency in the delivery of services to Indian Affairs stakeholders, including BIE schools. Indian Affairs officials acknowledged that the office has not established a strategic plan with specific goals and measures for itself or for BIE or a strategy for communicating with stakeholders. planning include: (1) aligning an organization’s human capital program with its current and emerging mission and programmatic goals and (2) developing long-term strategies for acquiring, developing, and retaining staff to achieve programmatic goals. However, the extent to which Interior is effectively meeting its responsibilities is questionable considering students’ relatively poor academic performance and BIE’s myriad administrative and management challenges. Also, given the significant challenges BIE and Indian schools face in improving student academic performance, it is critical that Interior leverage existing resources and opportunities to improve communication. Unless BIE collaborates with partner agencies and provides schools information that affects student instruction in a timely and consistent manner, it will be difficult for BIE to be well-positioned to improve student academic performance in the future. While Indian Affairs has undertaken another realignment of its administrative functions, it is unclear to what extent, if at all, the changes will result in improved services for BIE and schools. In addition, it has not updated its workforce plan or assessed Indian Affairs’ realignment and its impact on BIE to ensure it has the right people in place with the right skills to effectively meet the needs of BIE schools. Recommendations for Executive Action
We recommend that the Secretary of the Interior direct the Assistant Secretary-Indian Affairs to take the following five actions:
Develop and implement decision-making procedures for BIE that specify who should be involved in the decision-making process for key decisions that affect BIE and its schools to ensure that BIE has effective management controls, is accountable for the use of federal funds, and comports with federal laws and regulations. Interior concurred with all of our recommendations. In response to our recommendation that BIE develop a strategic plan, Interior stated that it has established a committee—composed of key Indian Affairs offices—to develop a comprehensive communication plan for BIE. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 2012, the federal government provided over $850 million to 185 BIE schools that serve about 41,000 Indian students living on or near reservations. BIE is part of Indian Affairs within the Department of the Interior, and BIE's director is responsible for managing education functions at all BIE schools. BIE's mission is to provide quality education opportunities to Indian students.
GAO was asked to study the extent to which BIE is achieving its mission. GAO examined (1) how student performance at BIE schools compares to that of public school students; (2) what challenges, if any, BIE schools face assessing student performance; and (3) what management challenges, if any, affect BIE and its mission.
For this work, GAO reviewed agency documents and relevant federal laws and regulations; analyzed student assessment data from 2005-2011; and conducted site visits to BIE schools and nearby public schools in four states based on location, school and tribal size, and other factors.
What GAO Found
Students in Bureau of Indian Education (BIE) schools perform consistently below Indian students in public schools on national and state assessments. For example, based on estimates from a 2011 study using national assessment data, in 4th grade, BIE students on average scored 22 points lower for reading and 14 points lower for math than Indian students attending public schools. The gap in scores is even wider when the average for BIE students is compared to the national average for non-Indian students. Additionally, the high school graduation rate for BIE students in 2011 was 61 percent, placing BIE in the bottom half among graduation rates for Indian students attending public schools in states where BIE schools are located.
BIE's administrative weaknesses have resulted in it experiencing difficulty assessing the academic progress of its students and adequate yearly progress (AYP) for its schools as required by federal law. Department of the Interior (Interior) regulations generally require BIE schools to administer the same academic assessments used by the 23 respective states where the schools are located. However, in the 2011-12 school year, at the direction of BIE officials, 21 schools did not administer their state assessment. These schools administered an alternative assessment that had not been approved for assessing AYP. BIE made this critical decision without the appropriate level of review at Interior or the Department of Education (Education) because it does not have procedures specifying who should be involved in making key decisions. Further, BIE did not provide its schools their AYP status for the 2011-12 school year prior to the start of the next school year, hindering school officials' ability to develop appropriate strategies to improve student performance. Unless BIE provides schools information that affects student instruction in a timely and consistent manner, it will be difficult for BIE to be well-positioned to improve student academic performance in the future.
Fragmented administrative services and a lack of clear roles for BIE and Indian Affairs' Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Management (DAS-M)--that until July 2013 was responsible for BIE's administrative functions--contributed to delays in schools acquiring needed materials, such as textbooks. In July, Indian Affairs underwent a realignment, which assigned another office in Indian Affairs the responsibility for most of BIE's administrative functions. The realignment is intended to improve efficiency in delivering services to Indian Affairs stakeholders, including BIE schools. However, it is unclear to what extent, if at all, the changes will result in improved services for BIE schools. For example, Indian Affairs had not conducted a recent analysis before implementing the realignment to determine if it has the right people in place with the right skills doing the right jobs. Such workforce planning is critical given Indian Affairs' recent realignment and employee buy-out and early-out initiatives. Similarly, Indian Affairs has not developed a strategic plan with specific goals and measures for itself or BIE, or a strategy for communicating with stakeholders. Such a strategic workforce plan and performance measures could help improve operations and align the organization's human capital program with its current and emerging mission and programmatic goals.
What GAO Recommends
Among other things, GAO recommends that Indian Affairs develop and implement decision-making procedures and a communications protocol to ensure that BIE has effective management controls and comports with federal laws and regulations. To improve BIE's management of its schools, GAO also recommends that Indian Affairs develop a strategic plan that includes goals and measures for BIE and a revised strategic workforce plan. Interior concurred with all of our recommendations. |
gao_GAO-03-969T | gao_GAO-03-969T_0 | SEC Plans to Spend Most of Its Budgetary Increase on Staffing and Information Technology
In March 2002, we reported that SEC’s workload and staffing imbalances had challenged SEC’s ability to protect investors and maintain the integrity of securities markets. We also reported that SEC tended to develop its annual budget request based on the previous year’s appropriation rather than on what it would actually need to fulfill its mission. A Significant Portion of SEC’s Budget Increase Has Been Allocated to New Staff Positions
SEC’s planned allocations appear to be consistent with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which mandated that the $776 million authorization be used to: fund pay parity, allowing SEC to set salaries for certain staff positions at levels comparable to those at other federal financial regulators; fund information technology, security enhancements, and recovery and mitigation activities in light of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001; and fund no fewer than 200 additional professional staff to increase oversight of auditors and audit services in order to improve SEC’s investigative and disciplinary efforts as well as additional professional support staff necessary to strengthen existing program areas. For example, between 2002 and 2004, the full disclosure program is slated to receive the largest percentage increase in positions 39 percent. This new legislation is designed to enable SEC to expedite the hiring of accountants, economists, and examiners so that the agency can more quickly fill the 842 positions created. SEC’s lack of a current strategic plan may also affect other aspects of SEC’s operations as strategic plans are the starting point for each agency’s performance measurement efforts and should provide the basis for strategic human capital planning. As stated in SEC’s 2000 plan, “Our strategic plan is a living document, one that must be continually reexamined and modified to assure it remains responsive and relevant in an ever-changing environment.” In addition to the changing external environment, a number of internal processes and organizational efforts within SEC hinge on SEC completing a new strategic plan, including developing more outcome- oriented performance measures to gauge the effectiveness of its regulatory operations in fulfilling its statutory mission and formalizing its strategic human capital plan. An Agencywide Strategic Plan is Vital to a Strategic Human Capital Plan
We are also reviewing the status of SEC’s strategic human capital planning. We also identified a number of nonpay issues that threatened to impair SEC’s ability to carry out its mission and thus warranted SEC management’s attention. However, we have found that SEC has not yet developed a formal strategic human capital plan that articulates how it intends to align its human capital approaches with its organizational goals. Although SEC has begun to take a number of important steps aimed at addressing its operational and human capital challenges, additional work is needed to ensure that it has appropriately positioned itself to operate more efficiently and effectively in the 21st century. | Why GAO Did This Study
In February 2003, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) received the largest budget increase in the history of the agency. The increased funding was designed to better position SEC to address serious issues identified in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and to better enable SEC to address numerous operational and human capital management challenges discussed in the GAO report entitled SEC Operations: Increased Workload Creates Challenges (GAO-02-302). To help ensure that SEC spends its budgetary resources in an efficient and effective manner, GAO was asked to review the SEC's efforts to address the issues raised in the 2002 report and to report on how SEC intends to utilize its new budgetary resources. GAO's final report on these matters is expected to be completed this Fall. This testimony provides requested information on the status of SEC's current spending plan and preliminary observations on SEC's strategic and human capital planning efforts.
What GAO Found
In GAO's 2002 operations report, GAO identified a number of operational challenges facing SEC stemming from an increasing workload (e.g., filings, applications, and examinations) and staffing imbalances that threatened to impair SEC's ability to fulfill its mission. SEC's workload had grown at a much higher rate than its staffing since the mid- 1990s. In response to congressional concerns involving a number of highprofile corporate failures and accounting scandals, SEC's funding was increased 45 percent in 2003. SEC plans to spend most of its 2003 and 2004 budget increases to fund 842 new staff positions and double its information technology budget. However, given the late appropriation and hiring challenges, SEC has to date filled few of these positions, and it is unlikely that SEC will be able to utilize all of its 2003 funds. GAO also found that SEC recognizes the need to develop a new strategic plan and that such a plan is a vital component of its staff allocation and human capital planning processes. A new strategic plan is also vital to SEC's ability to develop performance-oriented, outcome-based performance measures. GAO found that while SEC has not updated its strategic plan, it has begun efforts to overhaul its performance measures to make them more outcome-oriented. This effort seems premature given its lack of a new strategic plan. Moreover, while GAO found that SEC has completed certain aspects of a strategic human capital plan, including development of a new pay structure comparable to other federal financial regulators, greater flexibility to expedite the hiring of certain critically needed professions, plans for more training, and implementation of agencywide-worklife programs, the lack of a new strategic plan inhibits SEC's ability to develop a formal human capital plan. |
gao_GAO-17-549 | gao_GAO-17-549_0 | Most of the 24 CFO Act Agencies Exhibited Weaknesses in All Major Categories of Controls
Our reports, agency reports, and inspectors general assessments of information security controls during fiscal year 2016 revealed that most of the 24 agencies covered by the CFO Act had weaknesses in each of the five major categories of information system controls: access controls—the policies and practices that limit or detect access to computer resources (data, programs, equipment, and facilities), thereby protecting them against unauthorized modification, loss, and disclosure; configuration management controls—the policies and practices that are intended to prevent unauthorized changes to information system resources (e.g., software programs and hardware configurations) and to assure that software is current and known vulnerabilities are patched; segregation of duties—the policies, practices, and organizational structure that prevent an individual from controlling all critical stages of a process by splitting responsibilities between two or more organizational groups; contingency planning—the policies, plans, and practices that help avoid significant disruptions in computer-dependent operations; and agencywide security management—the policies, processes, and practices that provide a framework for ensuring that risks are understood and that effective controls are selected, implemented, and operating as intended. We have made hundreds of recommendations to agencies to address these security control deficiencies, but many have not yet been fully implemented. Inspectors General Determined That Federal Agencies Generally Did Not Have Effective Information Security Program Functions
Inspectors general evaluations of agency information security programs, including their respective agencies’ policies and practices, determined that most agencies did not have effective information security program functions in fiscal year 2016. Agencies Acted to Fulfill Their FISMA- defined Roles, but Did Not Sufficiently Plan to Evaluate the Effectiveness of Their Efforts
As required in FISMA, OMB, DHS, NIST, and the agencies’ inspectors general have ongoing and planned initiatives to support the act’s implementation across the federal government. OMB, among other things, oversaw and reported to Congress on agencies’ implementation of information security policies, standards, and guidelines. NIST Continues to Provide Information Security Guidance to Agencies
According to FISMA, NIST is to develop information security standards and guidelines, in coordination with OMB and DHS. However, the fiscal year 2017 guidance does not include a plan or schedule to determine whether using the security capability maturity model will provide useful results that are consistent and comparable. Until an evaluative component is incorporated into the implementation of the maturity model, OMB will not have reasonable assurance that the inspectors general evaluations of agency information security programs will have consistent and comparable results across all federal agencies as intended. Recommendation for Executive Action
We recommend that the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, in consultation with the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the Chief Information Officers Council, evaluate whether the full implementation of the capability maturity model developed by the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency ensures that consistent and comparable results are achieved across all federal agencies. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to evaluate (1) the adequacy and effectiveness of federal agencies’ information security policies and practices and (2) the extent to which agencies with governmentwide responsibilities have implemented their requirements under the Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002 as amended by the Federal Information Security Modernization Act of 2014 (FISMA). As appropriate, we also interviewed officials from OMB, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO first designated federal information security as a governmentwide high-risk area 20 years ago. First enacted in 2002, FISMA required federal agencies to develop, document, and implement information security programs and have independent evaluations of those programs and practices. As amended in 2014, FISMA assigns responsibilities to OMB, DHS, and NIST.
FISMA also includes a provision for GAO to periodically report to Congress on agencies' information security. The objectives of this review are to evaluate (1) the adequacy and effectiveness of agencies' information security policies and practices and (2) the extent to which agencies with governmentwide responsibilities have implemented their requirements under FISMA. GAO categorized information security-related weaknesses reported by the 24 CFO Act agencies, their IGs, and OMB according to the control areas defined in the Federal Information System Controls Audit Manual; reviewed prior GAO work; examined OMB, DHS, and NIST documents; and interviewed agency officials.
What GAO Found
During fiscal year 2016, federal agencies continued to experience weaknesses in protecting their information and information systems due to ineffective implementation of information security policies and practices. Most of the 24 Chief Financial Officers Act (CFO) agencies had weaknesses in five control areas—access controls, configuration management controls, segregation of duties, contingency planning, and agencywide security management (see figure). GAO and inspectors general (IGs) evaluations of agency information security programs, including policies and practices, determined that most agencies did not have effective information security program functions in fiscal year 2016. GAO and IGs have made hundreds of recommendations to address these security control deficiencies, but many have not yet been fully implemented.
The Office of Management and Budget (OMB), Department of Homeland Security (DHS), National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), and IGs have ongoing and planned initiatives to support implementation of the Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002 as amended by the Federal Information Security Modernization Act of 2014 (FISMA) across the federal government. OMB, in consultation with other relevant entities, has expanded the use of a maturity model developed by the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency and used to evaluate additional information security performance areas each year. However, OMB and others have not developed a plan and schedule to determine whether using the security capability maturity model will provide useful results that are consistent and comparable. Until an evaluative component is incorporated into the implementation of the maturity model, OMB will not have reasonable assurance that agency information security programs have been consistently evaluated.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that OMB, in consultation with DHS and others, develop a plan and schedule to evaluate whether the full implementation of the capability maturity model developed by the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency ensures that consistent and comparable results are achieved across all federal agencies. OMB generally concurred with our recommendation. |
gao_GAO-11-49 | gao_GAO-11-49_0 | Scope and Methodology
To address our research objectives, we selected a judgmental sample of 15 IDSs that clinically integrate primary, specialty, and acute care and serve uninsured and medically underserved populations. The 15 IDSs vary in many aspects, including the degree to which they are integrated, specific organizational features, and payer mix (e.g., extent to which they serve Medicare and Medicaid beneficiaries and the uninsured) (see app. We administered a structured interview protocol with chief medical officers (or other system officials, as appropriate) to obtain information on organizational features that IDSs use to support strategies to improve patient care; approaches IDSs use to facilitate access to care for underserved populations; and challenges IDSs encounter in providing care, including care provided to underserved populations. IDSs Reported That Using Electronic Health Records, Operating Health Insurance Plans, and Employing Physicians Support Strategies to Improve Patient Care
The 15 IDSs in our sample collectively reported that organizational features such as using electronic health records (EHR), operating health insurance plans, and employing physicians all support various strategies for improving patient care, including care coordination, disease management, and use of care protocols. Operating a Health Insurance Plan Was Reported to Support Patient Care Strategies by Providing Resources and Increasing the Availability of Data on Patients in the Plan
Officials from IDSs in our sample reported that operating a health insurance plan can support patient care strategies by providing to the IDS both financial resources, such as savings resulting from reducing avoidable hospitalizations for health plan members, and data on health insurance plan members. IDS officials reported that financial resources could be used to fund services such as care coordination—which many insurers do not reimburse—and the data could be used as a basis for implementing strategies such as disease management. Accountability for Quality of Care
Employment of physicians was reported to facilitate physician accountability for quality of care because physicians who are employed by the IDS are expected to meet certain performance indicators, and the IDSs collect data on and review physician performance. Mitigation of Physician Concerns Related to Payment
Officials from several IDSs told us that employment of physicians can facilitate provision of care to underserved populations because compensation from IDSs can mitigate physicians’ concerns that they may not receive payment from uninsured patients. IDSs Use Community- Based Settings and Other Approaches to Facilitate Access to Care for Underserved Populations
The IDSs in our sample discussed several approaches that they use to facilitate access to care for underserved populations. These include providing community-based care, conducting outreach, helping patients apply for coverage programs, providing financial assistance, integrating mental health and primary care services, and collaborating with community organizations. Some IDSs, such as Denver Health and Parkland, operate FQHCs within their systems. At two other IDSs—Seton and Henry Ford—there are no FQHCs among the clinics in their system, but both IDSs collaborate with local FQHCs that are not part of their system. Integrating Mental Health and Primary Care Services
To improve access to mental health care services for patients, including for underserved populations, some IDSs integrate mental health and primary care services by providing mental health screenings in primary care locations or collocating mental health providers in primary care settings. IDSs May Face Various Operational Challenges in Providing Care
IDSs in our sample reported facing various operational challenges in providing care, including care for underserved populations. Some reported that not receiving reimbursement from health care insurance companies for the care coordination services they provide to patients is a financial challenge. Other operational challenges IDSs reported included finding specialty care for underserved patients, including mental health care; sharing information with providers outside the system; and changing management and physician cultures to adapt to organizational change. | Why GAO Did This Study
Health care delivery in the United States often lacks coordination and communication across providers and settings. This fragmentation can lead to poor quality of care, medical errors, and higher costs. Providers have formed integrated delivery systems (IDS) to improve efficiency, quality, and access. The Health Care Safety Net Act of 2008 directed GAO to report on IDSs that serve underserved populations--those that are uninsured or medically underserved (i.e., facing economic, geographic, cultural, or linguistic barriers to care, including Medicaid enrollees and rural populations). In October 2009, GAO provided an oral briefing. In this follow-on report, GAO describes (1) organizational features IDSs use to support strategies to improve care; (2) approaches IDSs use to facilitate access for underserved populations; and (3) challenges IDSs encounter in providing care, including to underserved populations. GAO selected a judgmental sample of 15 private and public IDSs that are clinically integrated across primary, specialty, and acute care; they vary in their degree of integration, specific organizational features, and payer mix (e.g., extent to which they serve Medicare and Medicaid beneficiaries and the uninsured). GAO interviewed chief medical officers or other system officials at all 15 IDSs and conducted site visits at 4 IDSs, interviewing system executives and clinical staff.
What GAO Found
IDSs in GAO's sample reported that using electronic health records (EHR), operating health insurance plans, and employing physicians all support strategies to improve patient care. An EHR contains patient and care information, such as progress notes and medications. Some IDSs said that using EHRs supports their patient care strategies such as care coordination, disease management, and use of care protocols by increasing the availability of individual patient and patient population data and by improving communication among providers. IDSs also reported that operating a health insurance plan can support patient care strategies by providing to the IDS both financial resources, such as savings from reducing avoidable hospitalizations for health insurance plan members, and data on plan members. For example, financial resources could be used to fund services such as care coordination--which many insurers do not reimburse--and the data could assist with strategies such as disease management. Employment of physicians was reported to facilitate physician accountability for quality of care because physicians who are employed by the IDS must meet certain performance indicators, and the IDSs collect data on and review physician performance. Employment of physicians was also reported to increase adherence to care protocols and to facilitate provision of care to underserved populations through compensation that mitigates physicians' concerns that they might not receive payment from uninsured patients. IDSs in the sample discussed several approaches they use to facilitate access to care for underserved populations. These approaches include using community-based settings, such as school-based health centers and federally qualified health centers (FQHC); conducting outreach; helping patients apply for coverage programs such as Medicaid; providing financial assistance; and collaborating with community organizations, including faith-based organizations. For example, some IDSs operate FQHCs within their system, and others collaborate with local FQHCs that are not part of their system. In addition, to improve access to mental health care services for patients, including those in underserved populations, some IDSs integrate mental health and primary care services. IDSs in the sample reported facing various operational challenges in providing care, including care for underserved populations. Some reported that not receiving reimbursement from health care insurance companies for the care coordination services they provide to patients is a financial challenge. Other operational challenges IDSs identified included finding specialty care for underserved patients, including mental health care; sharing clinical information in patients' EHRs with providers outside the system; and changing management and physician cultures to adapt to organizational change. The Department of Health and Human Services reviewed a draft of this report and provided technical comments, which GAO incorporated as appropriate. |
gao_GAO-14-290 | gao_GAO-14-290_0 | The Corps Has Taken Actions to Address Our 2003 Recommendations but Does Not Collect All of the Recommended Data
The Corps Collects Recommended Data on Urgent or Emergency Dredging but Does Not Consistently Collect Data on Certain Solicitations
In response to our 2003 recommendation to obtain and analyze baseline data needed to determine the appropriate use of its hopper dredge fleet, the Corps established a tracking log as part of its raise the flag procedure to maintain and review urgent or emergency work its hopper dredges carry out, but it does not consistently collect certain solicitation information that we recommended. But by tracking and analyzing no-bid and high-bid solicitation data, the Corps may be better positioned to identify gaps in industry’s ability to fulfill certain dredging needs—such as during certain times of the year, in particular geographic areas, or for particular types of projects—and avoid or address any gaps identified. In our review of the Corps’ dredging database, we found that one district office entered data on no-bid and high-bid solicitations. However, they have not provided written direction to the district offices to help ensure data on these solicitations are consistently entered into the database. The Corps Reviewed Data and Procedures for Performing Cost Estimates, but Some Information Remains Outdated
In response to our recommendation to assess the data and procedures used to perform the cost estimate used when contracting dredging work to the hopper dredging industry, the Corps took several actions to improve its cost estimates, but some of the information it relies on remains outdated, such as its dredge equipment cost information dating back to the late 1980s. The Corps, however, has no plans for conducting such a study. Statutory Restrictions on Corps Hopper Dredges Have Resulted in Additional Costs to the Corps, but Effects on Industry Competition Are Unclear
Since 2003, statutory restrictions on the use of the Corps’ hopper dredges have resulted in additional costs, but it is unclear whether the restrictions Restrictions have affected competition in the hopper dredging industry.effectively limiting the number of days that Corps dredges can work have resulted in additional costs to the Corps, such as costs to maintain the ready reserve vessels while idle. On the other hand, the restrictions help ensure the Corps’ ability to respond to urgent and emergency dredging needs when industry dredges may be unavailable. The extent to which restrictions on the use of the Corps’ hopper dredges have affected competition in the dredging industry—as measured by the number of companies with hopper dredges and the number of bidders and winning bid prices for Corps projects—is unclear, based on our analysis of data on industry bids per Corps solicitation and other factors. First, since 2003, the number of companies with hopper dredges in the United States has not changed, although the number of industry hopper dredges and the total size of these dredges have decreased. The Corps Faces Challenges Regarding the Fiscal Sustainability and the Future Composition of Its Hopper Dredge Fleet
Key challenges the Corps faces in managing its hopper dredge fleet are (1) ensuring the fiscal sustainability of its hopper dredges and (2) making decisions about the future of its hopper fleet composition, including the utilization of its existing fleet, changes to its existing fleet—including repairs, and the replacement or retirement of any vessels—and the utilization of any new replacement vessels. In a 2012 study the Corps conducted on the fiscal condition of its hopper dredges, it identified increasing ownership and operating costs for its four hopper dredges, among other things, as a cause for concern and stated that the dredges would become unaffordable unless actions were taken. For example, based on the study, a corresponding July 2012 implementation memorandum, and our discussions with Corps officials, the Corps increased the daily rates all four of the Corps’ hopper dredges charge to projects that use the dredges, beginning in fiscal year 2012; increased funding in fiscal years 2013 and 2014 budgets for projects that use its hopper dredges to compensate for the vessels’ corresponding increases in daily rates; and formed a team to conduct a hopper dredge operating cost review including, among other things, an evaluation of the affordability of two hopper dredges, the Wheeler and the Yaquina, by June 30, 2014. Additionally, the Corps made attempts to update the industry cost data it uses to prepare its cost estimates for hopper dredging contracts. Recommendations for Executive Action
We recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Corps of Engineers to take the following two actions: To ensure the Corps of Engineers has the information it needs to analyze and make informed decisions regarding future hopper dredging work, provide written direction to its district offices on the importance of and need to accurately and consistently populate the data fields in its dredging database that track solicitations that receive no bids or where all the bids received exceeded the Corps’ cost estimate by more than 25 percent. We agree that obtaining reliable and up-to-date data are important for developing sound cost estimates, and our report recommends that the Corps develop a written plan for conducting a study to obtain and periodically update data on hopper dredging costs for its cost estimates. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report examines (1) the actions the Corps has taken to address our 2003 recommendations for improving the information needed to manage its hopper dredging program and develop cost estimates for industry contracts; (2) the effects since 2003, if any, of the statutory restrictions placed on the use of the Corps’ hopper dredges; and (3) key challenges, if any, the Corps faces in managing its hopper dredge fleet. "The Corps has made no such determination. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Corps is responsible for dredging sediment from waterways to maintain shipping routes important for commerce. One dredge type, a hopper dredge, performs much of the dredging in ports and harbors, and the Corps uses its own fleet of hopper dredges and contracts with industry to carry out the work. In 2003, GAO examined the Corps' hopper dredging program and made recommendations to improve its management. GAO was asked to review changes to the program.
This report examines (1) actions the Corps has taken to address GAO's 2003 recommendations for improving the information needed to manage its hopper dredging program and develop cost estimates for industry contracts; (2) effects since 2003, if any, of the statutory restrictions placed on the use of the Corps' hopper dredges; and (3) key challenges, if any, the Corps faces in managing its hopper dredge fleet. GAO reviewed laws, regulations, and policies governing the Corps' use of hopper dredges, and related Corps reports. GAO analyzed dredging contract and financial data for fiscal years 2003-2012, assessed the reliability of these data, and interviewed Corps and dredging stakeholders.
What GAO Found
The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) has taken actions to address GAO's 2003 recommendations for improving information related to hopper dredging, but some data gaps remain. First, in response to GAO's recommendation to obtain and analyze data needed to determine the appropriate use of its hopper dredge fleet, the Corps established a tracking log to document urgent or emergency work its dredges carry out. The Corps also modified its dredging database to track solicitations for industry contracts that received no bids and bids exceeding the Corps' cost estimate by more than 25 percent, referred to as high bids. Corps district offices, however, do not consistently enter data on these solicitations, and Corps headquarters has not provided written direction to the district offices to ensure data are consistently entered. Tracking and analyzing no-bid and high-bid solicitation data could enable the Corps to identify and address gaps in industry's ability to fulfill certain dredging needs as the Corps plans its future hopper dredging work. Second, in response to GAO's recommendation, the Corps took action to assess the data and procedures it used for developing cost estimates when soliciting industry contracts. However, certain industry cost data the Corps relies on remain outdated. For example, some of the data it uses on hopper dredge equipment date back to the late 1980s. A senior Corps official stated that a study could be conducted to update the data, but the Corps has no plans to conduct such a study. Having a plan for obtaining updated data is important for developing sound cost estimates.
Statutory restrictions on the use of the Corps' hopper dredges since 2003 have resulted in costs to the Corps, but the effect on competition in the hopper dredging industry is unclear. Restrictions limiting the number of days that Corps dredges can work have resulted in additional costs such as costs to maintain certain Corps dredges while they are idle; the Corps incurs many of the costs for owning and operating its hopper dredges regardless of how much they are used. The restrictions, however, help ensure the Corps has the ability to use these dredges to respond to urgent or emergency dredging needs when industry dredges are unavailable. It is not clear to what extent restrictions have affected competition in the dredging industry. The number of U.S. companies with hopper dredges has not changed, but the number and size of these dredges have decreased since 2003. In addition, GAO did not find evidence of increased competition based on the number of bidders and winning bid prices for Corps hopper dredging projects since 2003.
Key challenges facing the Corps in managing its hopper dredge fleet are (1) ensuring the fiscal sustainability of its hopper dredges and (2) determining the fleet's appropriate future composition. In 2012, the Corps determined that because of increasing ownership and operating costs, among other things, its hopper dredges would become unaffordable unless actions were taken, including increasing the daily rates charged to projects using the Corps' dredges. Factors such as the aging of the Corps' fleet and the effect on industry of possible changes to the Corps' fleet make it difficult for the Corps to determine the best fleet composition. In studies it conducted in 2011 and 2012, the Corps identified actions that could help address these challenges, such as reviewing the operating costs of hopper dredges to evaluate the affordability of certain dredges.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends the Corps provide written direction to its district offices on consistently populating its database with no-bid and high-bid solicitations and develop a written plan for a study to obtain and periodically update certain hopper dredging cost data for its cost estimates. The Department of Defense concurred with the recommendations. |
gao_RCED-98-4 | gao_RCED-98-4_0 | As a result, waste associated with cleanups (often referred to as remediation waste) must be managed under RCRA if it contains a hazardous component. Ultimately, applying the three requirements to remediation waste has led parties to base their choice of some cleanup remedies not on the risks posed by the waste, but on considerations of how to meet, minimize, or avoid the requirements, according to EPA and state cleanup officials. However, much remediation waste is lightly contaminated. Because these technological requirements were designed for facilities that manage waste from ongoing industrial operations (called process waste), they may be more stringent than necessary for some remediation waste, according to EPA and the majority of the state cleanup managers we interviewed. Consequently, parties may try to avoid triggering the permit requirement. Cleanup program managers from several states echoed these concerns. To allay these concerns, in 1996, EPA proposed new rules to more comprehensively reform RCRA’s requirements as they apply to remediation waste. Permit waivers do not apply to RCRA or state voluntary cleanups. Although Alternatives Provide Some Relief From RCRA’s Requirements, Managers Found Them Burdensome and Inefficient to Use
While most of the state managers we interviewed described these alternatives, such as the CAMU rule, as useful during cleanups, some managers were not aware of or did not understand all of the alternatives, questioned whether they were legally defensible, or found them burdensome and inefficient. Several industry and state cleanup managers acknowledged that they are somewhat uncomfortable applying these alternatives for fear that EPA or a third party may view the cleanup as not being in full compliance with RCRA’s requirements and may initiate a legal challenge. EPA estimated that these options could save parties conducting cleanups up to $2.1 billion in cleanup costs a year over the next few years. Therefore, EPA anticipates that any approach to comprehensive regulatory reform would result in prolonged legal battles that would delay cleanups. Conclusion
Three of RCRA’s hazardous waste management requirements, in particular—land disposal restrictions, minimum technological requirements, and requirements for permits—may be unduly stringent for a significant portion of the remediation waste that poses a lesser risk to human health and the environment. EPA has concluded that because stakeholders disagree on the extent to which waste should be exempt from RCRA’s requirements, as well as on EPA’s legal authority under current law to exempt waste from the requirements, the agency could not easily achieve comprehensive reform through the regulatory process. Scope and Methodology
To provide information on the requirements of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) that pose barriers to managing remediation waste and the policies that the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has developed to mitigate those barriers, we reviewed applicable laws and numerous EPA documents, policies, and regulations. We also interviewed managers in charge of hazardous waste cleanup programs in EPA, nine states, and industry to obtain their views both on RCRA’s requirements and on the actions EPA has taken to mitigate barriers presented by the requirements. This group represents private waste managers. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on: (1) the ways, according to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and selected state program managers and industry representatives, that the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act's (RCRA) requirements, when applied to waste from cleanups (often referred to as remediation waste), affect cleanups; and (2) the actions EPA has taken to address any impediments.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) three key requirements under RCRA that govern hazardous waste management--land disposal restrictions, minimum technological requirements, and requirements for permits--can have negative effects when they are applied to waste from cleanups; (2) the requirements have been successful at preventing further contamination from ongoing industrial operations, according to EPA cleanup managers; (3) however, when the requirements are applied to remediation waste, they can pose barriers to cleanups; (4) because much remediation waste does not pose a significant threat to human health and the environment, subjecting it to these three requirements in particular can compel parties to perform cleanups that are more stringent than EPA, the states, industry, or national environmental groups believe are necessary to address the level of risk; (5) consequently, EPA and state program managers and industry representatives maintain, parties often try to avoid triggering the requirements by containing waste in place or by abandoning cleanups entirely; (6) in the late 1980s, when establishing national Superfund guidance, EPA recognized that these three requirements would make some cleanups more difficult and began developing policy and regulatory alternatives to give parties more flexibility in dealing with the requirements; (7) however, these alternatives do not address all of the impediments to cleanups, and some state cleanup managers were not always aware of or did not fully understand the alternatives, while others found them cumbersome to use and inefficient; (8) industry representatives were also concerned that because of the ways that some states are using these alternatives, EPA or a third party may challenge whether the cleanup fully meets RCRA requirements; (9) to allay these concerns, in 1996, EPA proposed a new rule to comprehensively reform remediation waste requirements; (10) the rule included a range of options to exempt some or all remediation waste from hazardous waste management requirements and to give states more waste management authority; (11) EPA had estimated that these options could save up to $2.1 billion a year in cleanup costs; (12) however, EPA recently decided that because stakeholders disagree over whether the agency can exempt remediation waste from the requirements, the agency would face a prolonged legal battle over the new rule; and (13) although areas of disagreement may still need to be addressed, EPA has concluded that the best way to achieve comprehensive reform is to change the underlying cleanup law. |
gao_T-AIMD-96-169 | gao_T-AIMD-96-169_0 | To transmit this power, Southwestern and Western have their own transmission facilities. Southeastern relies on the transmission services of other utilities. Rates Do Not Recover All Power-Related Costs
The Reclamation Project Act of 1939 and the Flood Control Act of 1944 generally require that the PMAs recover through power rates the costs of producing and marketing federal hydropower. In the aggregate, we estimate that the annual unrecovered costs for the three PMAs was about $83 million for fiscal year 1995 for the five main power-related activities identified above. A financing subsidy exists because the interest expense incurred by Treasury on its debt is higher than the interest income Treasury receives from the PMAs for their appropriated debt. As shown in table 2, we estimate that the PMA financing subsidy for fiscal year 1995 was about $228 million. Federal Subsidies and Inherent Advantages of PMAs Result in Low Cost Power
PMAs market low cost wholesale electricity. As shown in figure 2, in 1994 the PMAs’ average revenue per kWh for wholesale sales was more than 40 percent lower than investor-owned utilities (IOUs) and publicly owned generating utilities (POGs) in the primary North American Electric Reliability Council (NERC) regions in which the PMAs operate. Except for several rate-setting systems at Western, and one at Southeastern, the PMAs’ power production costs appear to be stable and well below the costs for nonfederal utilities in their respective areas of the country. Some of the difference in average revenue per kWh between the three PMAs and nonfederal utilities is attributable to the PMAs’ unrecovered power-related costs and federally subsidized debt financing discussed earlier. Second, PMAs, as federal agencies, generally do not pay taxes, whereas other utilities pay federal and state income taxes, property taxes, and other taxes, or payments in lieu of taxes. Another factor that could impact the PMAs is the increasing influence of low cost independent (nonutility) power producers (IPPs). | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed the Southeastern, Southwestern, and Western Power Administrations, focusing on: (1) the three power marketing administrations' (PMA) recovery of their power-related costs; (2) federal subsidies for financing power-related capital projects; and (3) differences between PMA and nonfederal utilities on power production costs.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the three PMA do not fully recover all power-related costs in the areas of employee health and retirement benefits, project construction or operation, capital costs for incomplete facilities, environmental mitigation costs, and deferred operations and maintenance and interest expense payments; (2) the annual unrecovered cost for these activities in fiscal year 1995 was about $83 million; (3) a federal financing subsidy of about $228 million exists because interest expense on the Treasury debt is higher than the interest income Treasury receives from PMA; (4) in 1994, the average PMA revenue for wholesale electricity sales was more than 40 percent lower than nonfederal utilities; (5) PMA production costs were generally well below the costs for nonfederal utilities, primarily because PMA rely on low-cost means of electricity generation and generally do not pay taxes; and (6) increased competition and access to transmission lines and the increasing influence of low-cost independent producers could affect PMA costs and revenues in the future. |
gao_GAO-10-766 | gao_GAO-10-766_0 | Post-Employment Restrictions for Former Federal Officials and Disclosure Laws Related to Foreign Representation and Lobbying
Post-employment restrictions in the Revolving Door law prohibit federal employees from engaging in certain conduct with the intent to influence government officials for a specified period of time after leaving federal employment. In contrast to post-employment restrictions for former government officials, the disclosure laws in FARA and LDA are not specific to former government employees. FARA and LDA do not prohibit any activities; rather, they require individuals engaging in certain foreign representation and lobbying activities to make these activities public. These former senior and very senior employees are also banned for 1 year from representing, aiding, or advising foreign entities with the intent to influence a decision of a government official, and former U.S. Trade Representatives and Deputy Trade Representatives are banned for life from such activity. Level of pay and certain designated positions are used to categorize employees as “senior” or “very senior.” Senior employees include employees whose rate of pay is specified in or fixed according to the Executive Schedule, as well as certain other employees who hold specific appointed positions or who meet a specific financial threshold—86.5 percent of Executive Schedule Level II. USTR, ITA, and USITC Ethics Officials Train Current Employees and Advise Former Employees on Revolving Door Restrictions
Ethics officials at USTR, ITA, and USITC described a variety of activities they use to inform senior employees of the post-employment restrictions, such as conducting training programs and providing counseling to former employees. Justice officials said they viewed the Revolving Door law as being more useful as a preventative measure rather than a tool for prosecution; they believed that guidance from agency ethics officials deterred most violations. Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA)
FARA is a disclosure law that requires all individuals acting as agents of foreign principals to register their activities with Justice, unless exempt by law. Lobbyist registration requirements apply to all individuals conducting lobbying activities, not only to former federal officials. We also provided a draft to staff at the Clerk of the House of Representatives and the Secretary of the Senate. This information includes data on the number of senior officials who separated from the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR), the Department of Commerce’s International Trade Administration (ITA), and the United States International Trade Commission (USITC) from 2004 through 2009, as well as information on the number of these officials who registered under FARA or LDA. § 207, referred to as the “Revolving Door” law in this report, the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA), and the Lobbying Disclosure Act (LDA), as amended. All former federal employees who participated personally and substantially in an ongoing treaty negotiation are prohibited for 1 year from aiding or advising any other person in that treaty negotiation, if the employee had access to certain covered information. | Why GAO Did This Study
Congress has enacted laws to safeguard against former federal employees, including former trade officials, from using their access to influence government officials. These former officials' post-employment activities are restricted by a federal conflict of interest law, known as the "Revolving Door" law. Two other laws--the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA) and the Lobbying Disclosure Act (LDA)--are disclosure statutes that do not prohibit any activities per se, but require individuals conducting certain representation activities to publicly disclose them. FARA and LDA are not specific to former federal officials; they apply to all individuals. GAO was asked to provide a summary of the Revolving Door law, FARA, and LDA. GAO reviewed these laws, as well as guidance from the Office of Government Ethics (OGE). GAO interviewed ethics officials at three agencies whose missions focus on trade--the United States Trade Representative (USTR), the International Trade Administration (ITA), and the International Trade Commission (USITC)--and collected data on the number of senior officials who separated from these agencies from 2004 through 2009. In addition, GAO interviewed Department of Justice (Justice) officials concerning enforcement of these laws. GAO makes no recommendations in this report.
What GAO Found
Post-employment restrictions in the Revolving Door law, codified at 18 U.S.C. 207, prohibit some federal employees from engaging in certain activities, such as communicating with their former agency with the intent to influence government action, for a specified period of time after leaving federal service. The restrictions include a ban, for 1 year, on all former senior and very senior employees of federal agencies from representing, aiding, or advising a foreign government or political party with the intent to influence a government official, including the President, Vice President, and members of Congress. Level of pay and certain designated positions are used to categorize employees as "senior" or "very senior." A life-time ban on representing or advising foreign entities in this capacity applies to former U.S. Trade Representatives and Deputy Trade Representatives. In addition, all former federal employees who participated personally and substantially in an ongoing treaty negotiation are prohibited for 1 year from aiding any other person in that negotiation, if the employee had access to certain nonpublic information. Ethics officials at USTR, ITA, and USITC reported that they counsel current, as well as former, employees on post-employment restrictions. Justice officials said they viewed the Revolving Door law as being more useful as a preventative measure rather than a tool for prosecution; they believed that guidance from agency ethics officials deterred most violations. In contrast to post-employment restrictions specific to former government officials, FARA and LDA are disclosure laws that require all individuals, unless exempt, to publicly disclose certain foreign representation or lobbying activity. Individuals who act as agents of foreign governments or foreign political parties must register with Justice's Registration Unit. Individuals who conduct a certain amount of lobbying must register with the Secretary of the Senate and the Clerk of the House of Representatives. Both FARA and LDA disclosure information is publicly available. |
gao_GAO-17-63 | gao_GAO-17-63_0 | In July 2016, OMB updated its Circular No. Updated ERM Framework Provides Assistance to Agencies as They Implement ERM
To assist agencies in better assessing challenges and opportunities from an enterprise-wide view, we have updated our risk management framework first published in 2005 to more fully include recent experience and guidance, as well as specific enterprise-wide elements. We identified six essential elements to assist federal agencies as they move forward with ERM implementation. Assemble a comprehensive list of risks, both threats and opportunities, that could affect the agency from achieving its goals and objectives. Subject matter specialists noted that a good practice includes continuously monitoring and managing risks. Emerging Good Practices Are Being Used at Selected Agencies to Implement ERM
We identified six good practices that nine agencies are implementing that illustrate ERM’s essential elements. Below in table 1, we identify the essential elements of ERM and the good practices that support each particular element that agencies can use to support their ERM programs. One that provides for an integrated view of risk across the entire Federal Student Aid organization; aligns strategic risks with the organization’s goals and objectives; ensures that risk issues are integrated into the strategic decision making process; and manages risk to further the achievement of performance goals.”
During the initial implementation of FSA's ERM program, the ERM strategic goals were to: 1. provide for an integrated view of risks across the organization, 2. ensure that strategic risks are aligned with strategic goals and 3. develop a progressive risk culture that fosters an increased focus on risk and awareness of related issues throughout the organization, and 4. improve the quality and availability of risk information across all levels of the organization, especially for executive management. For example, PIH has two risk management dashboards, which it uses to monitor and review risks. Agency Comments and GAO Responses
We provided a draft of this report to Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the 24 Chief Financial Officer (CFO) Act agencies for review and comment. OMB staff provided us with oral comments and stated they generally agreed with the essential elements and good practices as identified in this report. They also provided technical comments that we incorporated as appropriate. | Why GAO Did This Study
Federal leaders are responsible for managing complex and risky missions. ERM is a way to assist agencies with managing risk across the organization. In July 2016, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) issued an updated circular requiring federal agencies to implement ERM to ensure federal managers are effectively managing risks that could affect the achievement of agency strategic objectives.
GAO's objectives were to (1) update its risk management framework to more fully include evolving requirements and essential elements for federal enterprise risk management, and (2) identify good practices that selected agencies have taken that illustrate those essential elements.
GAO reviewed literature to identify good ERM practices that generally aligned with the essential elements and validated these with subject matter specialists.
GAO also interviewed officials representing the 24 Chief Financial Officer (CFO) Act agencies about ERM activities and reviewed documentation where available to corroborate officials' statements. GAO studied agencies' practices using ERM and selected examples that best illustrated the essential elements and good practices of ERM.
GAO provided a draft of this report to OMB and the 24 CFO Act agencies for review and comment. OMB generally agreed with the report. Of the CFO act agencies, 12 provided technical comments, which GAO included as appropriate; the others did not provide any comments.
What GAO Found
Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) is a forward-looking management approach that allows agencies to assess threats and opportunities that could affect the achievement of its goals. While there are a number of different frameworks for ERM, the figure below lists essential elements for an agency to carry out ERM effectively. GAO reviewed its risk management framework and incorporated changes to better address recent and emerging federal experience with ERM and identify the essential elements of ERM as shown below.
GAO has identified six good practices to use when implementing ERM. |
gao_GAO-11-423T | gao_GAO-11-423T_0 | Strategies Are Still Needed to Ensure Effective Use of Wildland Fire Management Funds
In our 2009 testimony, we reported that the Forest Service, working with the Department of the Interior, had taken steps to help manage perhaps the agency’s most daunting challenge—protecting lives, private property, and federal resources from the threat of wildland fire—but that it continued to lack key strategies needed to use its wildland fire funds effectively. In a series of reports dating to 1999, we have recommended that the Forest Service and Interior agencies develop a cohesive wildland fire strategy identifying potential long-term options for reducing fuels and responding to fires, as well as the funding requirements associated with the various options. The agencies continue to take steps to improve FPA, but it is not clear how effective these steps will be in correcting the problems we have identified, and therefore we believe that the agencies will continue to face challenges in this area. Incomplete Data on Program Activities Remain a Concern
Our 2009 testimony noted shortcomings in the completeness and accuracy of Forest Service data on activities and costs. Although we have not comprehensively reviewed the quality of all Forest Service data, we have encountered shortcomings during several recent reviews that reinforce our concerns. For example, during our review of appeals and litigation of Forest Service decisions related to fuel reduction projects, we sought to use the agency’s Planning, Appeals, and Litigation System, which was designed to track planning, appeals, and litigation information for all Forest Service decisions. Even with Improvements, Some Financial and Performance Accountability Shortcomings Persist
In 2009, we testified that the Forest Service had made sufficient progress resolving problems we identified with its financial management for us to remove the agency from our high-risk list in 2005 but that concerns about financial accountability remained. Echoing these concerns about internal control weaknesses, Agriculture reported in its 2010 Performance and Accountability Report that the Forest Service needed to improve controls over its expenditures for wildland fire management and identified the wildland fire suppression program as susceptible to significant improper payments. The Forest Service Faces Additional Challenges Related to Program Oversight and Strategic Planning
In addition to the management challenges we discussed in our 2009 testimony, several of our recent reviews have identified additional challenges facing the Forest Service—challenges that highlight the need for more effective program oversight and better strategic planning. However, in our 2009 report on the Forest Service’s land exchange program, we found that, although the agency had taken action to address most of the problems we had previously identified, it needed to take additional action to better oversee and manage the land exchange process so as to ensure that land exchanges serve the public interest and return fair value to taxpayers. Without more clearly aligning its workforce plans with its strategic plan, and monitoring and evaluating its progress in workforce planning, as we recommended in that report, the Forest Service remains at risk of not having the appropriately skilled workforce it needs to effectively achieve its mission. Workforce planning is of particular concern in the area of wildland firefighting. In 2010, we issued reports examining different aspects of the Forest Service’s response to illegal activities occurring on the lands it manages, including human and drug smuggling into the United States. For example, we reported that the Forest Service, like other federal land management agencies, lacks a risk-based approach to managing its law enforcement resources and concluded that without a more systematic method to assess risks posed by illegal activities, the Forest Service could not be assured that it was allocating scarce resources effectively. In light of these shortcomings, and to better protect resources and the public, we recommended that the Forest Service adopt a risk-based approach to better manage its law enforcement resources and, in conjunction with the Department of the Interior and the Department of Homeland Security, take steps to improve communication and coordination between the agencies. Wildland Fire Management: Federal Agencies Have Taken Important Steps Forward, but Additional, Strategic Action Is Needed to Capitalize on Those Steps. Hardrock Mining: Information on State Royalties and the Number of Abandoned Mine Sites and Hazards. Forest Service: Emerging Issues Highlight the Need to Address Persistent Management Challenges. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Forest Service, within the Department of Agriculture, manages over 190 million acres of national forest and grasslands. The agency is responsible for managing its lands for various purposes--including recreation, grazing, timber harvesting, and others--while ensuring that such activities do not impair the lands' long-term productivity. Numerous GAO reports examining different aspects of Forest Service programs--including a testimony before this Subcommittee in 2009--have identified persistent management challenges facing the agency. In light of the federal deficit and long-term fiscal challenges facing the nation, the Forest Service cannot ensure that it is spending its limited budget effectively and efficiently without addressing these challenges. This testimony highlights some of the management challenges facing the Forest Service today and is based on recent reports GAO has issued on a variety of the agency's activities.
What GAO Found
In 2009, GAO highlighted management challenges that the Forest Service faced in three key areas--wildland fire management, data on program activities and costs, and financial and performance accountability. The Forest Service has made some improvements, but challenges persist in each of these three areas. In addition, recent GAO reports have identified additional challenges related to program oversight and strategic planning. Strategies are still needed to ensure effective use of wildland fire management funds. In numerous previous reports, GAO has highlighted the challenges the Forest Service faces in protecting the nation against the threat of wildland fire. The agency continues to take steps to improve its approach, but it has yet to take several key steps--including developing a cohesive wildland fire strategy that identifies potential long-term options for reducing hazardous fuels and responding to fires--that, if completed, would substantially strengthen wildland fire management. Incomplete data on program activities remain a concern. In 2009, GAO concluded that long-standing data problems plagued the Forest Service, hampering its ability to manage its programs and account for its costs. While GAO has not comprehensively reviewed the quality of all Forest Service data, shortcomings identified during several recent reviews reinforce these concerns. For example, GAO recently identified data gaps in the agency's system for tracking appeals and litigation of Forest Service projects and in the number of abandoned hardrock mines on its lands. Even with improvements, financial and performance accountability shortcomings persist. Although its financial accountability has improved, the Forest Service continues to struggle to implement adequate internal controls over its funds and to demonstrate how its expenditures relate to the goals in the agency's strategic plan. For example, in 2010 Agriculture reported that the agency needed to improve controls over its expenditures for wildland fire management and identified the wildland fire suppression program as susceptible to significant improper payments. Additional challenges related to program oversight and strategic planning have been identified. Several recent GAO reviews have identified additional challenges facing the Forest Service, which the agency must address if it is to effectively and efficiently fulfill its mission. Specifically, the agency has yet to develop a national land tenure strategy that would protect the public's interest in land exchanges and return fair value to taxpayers from such exchanges. In addition, it has yet to take recommended steps to align its workforce planning with its strategic plan, which may compromise its ability to carry out its mission; for example, it has not adequately planned for the likely retirement of firefighters, which may reduce the agency's ability to protect the safety of both people and property. Finally, the Forest Service needs a more systematic, risk-based approach to allocate its law-enforcement resources. Without such an approach it cannot be assured that it is deploying its resources effectively against illegal activities on the lands it manages.
What GAO Recommends
GAO has made a number of recommendations intended to improve the Forest Service's management of wildland fires, strengthen its collection of data, increase accountability, and improve program management. The Forest Service has taken steps to implement many of these recommendations, but additional action is needed if the agency is to make further progress in rectifying identified shortcomings. |
gao_GAO-15-296 | gao_GAO-15-296_0 | To address this issue, in March 2012, OMB launched the PortfolioStat initiative, which requires 26 agencies to conduct an annual review of their commodity IT portfolio to, among other things, achieve savings by identifying opportunities to consolidate investments or move to shared services. 2. In March 2013, OMB initiated the second round of PortfolioStat. Specifically, while agencies initially planned to save at least $5.8 billion between fiscal years 2013 and 2015, they decreased their estimates to approximately $2 billion as of January 2015. Estimates for Revised Planned Savings Are Understated
While agencies reported revised savings plans, the new estimates of the total amount they expect to save are understated—likely by hundreds of millions of dollars—because agencies have not consistently included planned savings for their data center consolidation initiatives as directed by OMB. Most Agencies Reported Lower Achieved PortfolioStat Savings than Planned, but Actual Results Are Difficult to Determine Due to Inconsistent Reporting
As of January 2015, agencies reported having achieved approximately $1.1 billion in PortfolioStat-related savings during fiscal years 2013 and 2014. However, only 9 of 26 agencies met or exceeded their revised planned savings goals. Although agencies reported to us that they saved $1.1 billion in fiscal years 2013 and 2014, inconsistencies in how these savings have been reported make it difficult to determine actual progress. Selected Agencies Explained How PortfolioStat Savings Were Reinvested but Were Not Always Able to Provide Supporting Documentation
One of the goals for PortfolioStat articulated by OMB in its fiscal year 2013 guidance is the reinvestment of savings achieved through eliminating unnecessary and lower-value investments, and reducing Consistent with this goal, the three selected agencies operating costs.we reviewed—DHS, the Department of Agriculture, and the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA)—explained how they reinvested the PortfolioStat savings for their two initiatives that were expected to yield the highest savings in fiscal year 2013. Specifically:
DHS reported achieving approximately $176 million in savings from its Data Center Consolidation and Enterprise Licensing Agreements initiatives. However, they did not provide documentation to support this. Of the 86 incomplete action items, about 78 percent do not have any associated time frames or due dates for completion. He stated he did not believe time frames were needed to follow up on the status of the action items, particularly in cases when time frames established in policy have already passed (such as for the implementation of the Internet Protocol version 6). Recommendations for Executive Action
To better ensure that the PortfolioStat initiative improves governmental efficiency and achieves cost savings, the Director of OMB should direct the Federal CIO to ensure that its reports to Congress about the results of IT reform efforts accurately reflect savings generated from all PortfolioStat initiatives, including those associated with FDCCI; track agencies’ planned savings and use them as a baseline for measuring reported actual savings; require agencies to document specifically how the cost savings achieved from PortfolioStat have been reinvested; and establish time frames for completing assigned PortfolioStat action items and hold agencies accountable for meeting those time frames. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to (1) assess agencies’ plans for achieving PortfolioStat savings; (2) determine agencies’ progress in achieving planned savings; (3) describe the extent to which selected agencies have reinvested PortfolioStat savings; and (4) describe action items resulting from the PortfolioStat process and determine the extent to which agencies have addressed them. To describe action items resulting from the PortfolioStat process and determine the extent to which agencies had addressed them, we reviewed agencies’ action item memoranda resulting from the PortfolioStat sessions, and analyzed them to identify the action items, their status (whether completed or not), and specific time frames that each agency and OMB had agreed to as part of the PortfolioStat process. | Why GAO Did This Study
In March 2012, OMB launched an initiative, referred to as PortfolioStat, which requires agencies to conduct annual reviews of their IT investments and make decisions on eliminating duplication, among other things. In March 2013, OMB launched the second iteration of this initiative, with the goal of eliminating duplication and achieving savings through specific actions and time frames.
GAO was asked to review the implementation of the second iteration of PortfolioStat. GAO's specific objectives were to (1) assess agencies' plans for achieving PortfolioStat savings, (2) determine agencies' progress in achieving planned savings, (3) describe the extent to which selected agencies have reinvested PortfolioStat savings, and (4) describe action items resulting from the PortfolioStat process and determine the extent to which agencies have addressed them. To do so, GAO determined planned savings amounts for fiscal years 2013 through 2015, evaluated whether initiatives have yielded anticipated savings, analyzed data from three agencies based on expected savings for fiscal year 2013, and identified the status and time frames of action items.
What GAO Found
Agencies decreased their planned PortfolioStat savings by at least 68 percent from what they reported to GAO in 2013. Specifically, while agencies initially had planned to save at least $5.8 billion between fiscal years 2013 and 2015, these estimates were decreased to approximately $2 billion. The Departments of Defense and Homeland Security accounted for most of the difference (see fig. below). Further, although the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) made its data center consolidation initiative part of PortfolioStat in 2013, agencies have not consistently included planned savings from this initiative in their PortfolioStat reporting. As a result, the total amount that agencies expect to save through fiscal year 2015 is understated.
As of January 2015, agencies reported having achieved approximately $1.1 billion in PortfolioStat-related savings during fiscal years 2013 and 2014. However, only 9 of 26 agencies met or exceeded their revised planned savings goals. Further, inconsistencies in OMB and agencies' reporting make it difficult to reliably measure progress in achieving PortfolioStat savings: (1) OMB included fiscal year 2012 savings in reporting against the fiscal years 2013 to 2015 goal, and (2) agencies had additional cost-savings initiatives they reported to GAO but not to OMB, and vice versa.
Three selected agencies explained how they reinvested their PortfolioStat savings, but did not always provide supporting documentation. For example, the Department of Homeland Security reported reinvesting the $176 million from its data center consolidation and enterprise licensing agreements initiatives in multiple efforts, but did not provide supporting documentation.
Agencies completed 26 of 112 action items resulting from the 2013 PortfolioStat process, such as improve project delivery. However, almost 80 percent of the 86 incomplete items did not have associated time frames for completion. During our review, OMB stated they did not believe time frames were needed to monitor the status of the action items. However, establishing such time frames would increase agencies' accountability for completing the activities.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is making recommendations to OMB and Defense aimed at improving the reporting of achieved savings, documenting how savings are reinvested, and establishing time frames for PortfolioStat action items. OMB agreed and Defense partially agreed. GAO modified the recommendation to Defense based on its response. |
gao_HEHS-97-178 | gao_HEHS-97-178_0 | VERA Improves Resource Allocation to Regional Networks
VERA shows promise for improving the equity of veterans’ access to care because it makes VA’s allocation of resources to networks more equitable. If fully implemented in fiscal year 1999 as planned, VERA could substantially shift regional allocations. High-priority veterans— commonly referred to as Category A veterans—are those with service-connected disabilities, low incomes, or special health care needs. VERA provides more comparable levels of resources to each network for each high-priority veteran served than the process it replaced, which allocated resources primarily on the basis of facilities’ historical budgets.VERA provides more comparable levels of resources by classifying patients on the basis of the cost of their health care into two workload groups— basic care and special care. VA Continues to Explore Ways to Improve VERA Allocations
VA is exploring several options for improving allocations. As a result, it is difficult for VA to ensure that VERA’s capacity to allocate resources equitably is not compromised and that veterans receive appropriate health care. For example, VA has not been monitoring changes in the number of one-time users of VA health care. VA headquarters is considering improving the timeliness and detail of indicators used for monitoring changes in allocations and VA health care delivery, officials said. VISN resource allocation methods are crucial to veterans’ equitable access to services. Furthermore, headquarters has done little to monitor network efforts to improve veterans’ equitable access to services. VA has not established an adequate monitoring system, however, to identify changes in workload and medical practices that could compromise VERA’s ability to allocate resources in the future or affect the appropriateness of services delivered. VISNs are using various methods to allocate their resources in fiscal year 1997. Recommendations
We recommend that the Secretary for Veterans Affairs direct the Under Secretary for Health to develop more timely and detailed indicators of changes in key VERA workload measures and medical care practices to maintain VERA’s ability to equitably allocate resources in the future and help ensure that veterans receive the most appropriate care and improve oversight of VISNs’ allocation of resources to their facilities by (1) developing criteria for use in designing VISN resource allocation methods, (2) reviewing and approving these methods, and (3) monitoring the impact of the methods on veterans’ equitable access to care. First, we examined how VA allocates resources through the Veterans Equitable Resource Allocation (VERA) system to the 22 Veterans Integrated Services Networks (VISN). | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO assessed the Department of Veterans Affairs' (VA): (1) implementation of the Veterans Equitable Resource Allocation System (VERA); (2) monitoring of changes in health care delivery resulting from VERA; and (3) oversight of the network allocation process used to give veterans equitable access to services.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) VERA shows promise for correcting long-standing regional funding imbalances that have impeded veterans' equitable access to services; (2) specifically, VERA allocates more comparable amounts of resources to the 22 networks for high-priority VA health service users--those with service-connected disabilities, low incomes, or special health care needs--than the resource allocation process it has replaced; (3) as a result, if fully implemented as planned, VERA could substantially shift funding among regions by fiscal year (FY) 1999; (4) in addition, VA continues to explore ways to improve VERA's capacity to more equitably allocate resources in the future; (5) among the improvements being considered are better measures of network workloads and adjustments for justifiable differences in network costs for providing health services; (6) although it is early in VERA's implementation, VA headquarters has not established an adequate monitoring system to identify changes in workload and medical practices that could negatively affect allocation equity and the appropriateness of care that veterans receive; (7) in addition, VA headquarters lacks the information to adequately review networks' planned facility services; (8) Veterans Integrated Service Networks (VISN) that GAO contacted are using varying methods to allocate resources to facilities; (9) for example, some VISNs allocate resources on the basis of the number of veterans using a facility; others negotiate changes in funding for programs or services from the preceding fiscal year to reach a new allocation; (10) VISNs, however, lack criteria on how to develop methods to give veterans equitable access; (11) to address these deficiencies, GAO has identified corrective actions for VA to take to enhance its ability to ensure that resources are allocated to improve veterans' equitable access to health care services and ensure that the care received is appropriate; and (12) these actions include improving the timeliness and thoroughness of overseeing changes in health care delivery resulting from the allocation process to the networks and to the facilities. |
gao_GAO-02-10 | gao_GAO-02-10_0 | 1). More Innovation and Better Coordination Can Improve Visitor Services
Being innovative is an important goal of the fee demonstration program. While some of the sites surveyed experimented with innovative types of fees and fee collection methods, room for improvement exists— particularly in the area of fee collection and coordination. 2). 3). According to fee-demonstration program managers, the agencies have shared information on best practices through informal methods such as attendance at conferences and email communications. Second, 80 percent of fees collected must be used at the site where they were collected, and thus, sites that collect most of the revenue use it to meet their local needs even if these needs are minor in comparison with those at other locations where funding is not as plentiful. Recommendations for Executive Action
In order to improve the performance and effectiveness of the program, we recommend that the Secretaries of the Interior and Agriculture require the agency head for each of the participating agencies to develop specific program performance expectations and measurable performance criteria agencywide and for each participating site; develop and implement a process for conducting systematic evaluations of the program to identify which fee designs, collection methods, and coordination practices work best; and to disseminate the information to all participating sites; and develop an effective interagency mechanism to oversee and coordinate the program among the four agencies and resolve such interagency issues as developing standard definitions of “entrance” versus “user” fees. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To determine the extent to which the National Park Service, Forest Service, Bureau of Land Management, and Fish and Wildlife Service used innovative fees and fee collection practices and coordinated their approaches in managing the Recreational Fee Demonstration Program, we developed an automated survey instrument that we posted on GAO’s Web site. | What GAO Found
Congress authorized the Recreational Fee Demonstration Program to help federal land management agencies provide high-quality recreational opportunities to visitors and protect resources. The program focuses on recreational activities at the following four land management agencies: the National Park Service, the Fish and Wildlife Service, the Bureau of Land Management, and the Forest Service. Under the fee demonstration program, participating agencies can collect fees at several sites and use them to (1) enhance visitor services, (2) address a backlog of needs for repair and maintenance, and (3) manage and protect resources. The agencies applied "entrance fees" for basic admission to an area and "user fees" for specific activities such as camping or launching a boat. Under the law, 80 percent of program revenue must be used at the site where it was collected. The rest may be distributed to other sites that may or may not be participating in the demonstration program. Some of the sites GAO surveyed experimented with innovative fee designs and collection methods, such as reducing fees during off-peak seasons and allowing visitors to use credit cards, but room for additional innovation exists, particularly in the areas of fee collection and coordination. The agencies also need to make improvement in three program management areas: evaluating their managers' performance in administering the fee program, developing information on which fee-collection and coordination practices work best, and resolving interagency management issues. |
gao_GAO-17-484 | gao_GAO-17-484_0 | When agencies do not report the required information, Congress may lack the information necessary to monitor the implementation of IPERA and take action to address problematic programs in a timely manner. Some IGs reported compliance based on the presence or absence of the required analysis or reporting (hereafter referred to as a pass/fail determination by the IG), regardless of whether the IGs identified flaws, whereas other IGs reported agencies as noncompliant based on the IGs performing some degree of evaluative procedures to determine whether the agencies’ analyses or reports were substantively adequate (hereafter referred to as a determination based on evaluative procedures). While we recognize that the severity of the issues may have resulted in the IGs’ reporting noncompliance for some agencies, we found, as noted in some of the examples below, the types of issues identified for both the compliant and noncompliant agencies were similar. Lastly, the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency (CIGIE) stated that although it provided general guidance to the IGs in fiscal year 2011, it has not provided the IGs with any guidance regarding how compliance determinations should be made. Majority of CFO Act Agency IGs Reported Performing One or More Optional Procedures during Their Fiscal Year 2015 IPERA Compliance Reviews
We reviewed the IGs’ fiscal year 2015 IPERA compliance reports and found that 20 of the 24 agencies’ IGs reported that they performed at least one procedure beyond what is required by IPERA and IPIA, as amended by IPERIA. Specifically, we found that 15 of the 24 IGs reported that they evaluated the accuracy and completeness of their agencies’ reporting on improper payments. Conclusions
The total amount of estimated improper payments reported government- wide has been estimated to total over $1.2 trillion from fiscal year 2003 through fiscal year 2016. Five years after the implementation of IPERA, 15 of the 24 CFO Act agencies were reported as noncompliant under IPERA for fiscal year 2015. OMB guidance and IPERA do not specify what, if any, evaluative procedures should be conducted as part of the IGs’ compliance determinations. CIGIE, which represents the IGs, has also not issued such guidance. In addition, IGs reported programs at 7 agencies as noncompliant for 3 or more consecutive years as of the end of fiscal year 2015, and as a result, the agencies were required to submit certain information to Congress. However, USDA had not submitted the required information despite prior recommendations from its IG and GAO. Recommendations for Executive Action
We are making the following two recommendations: To help ensure that government-wide compliance under IPERA is consistently determined and reported, we recommend that the Director of OMB coordinate with CIGIE to develop and issue guidance, either jointly or independently, to specify what procedures should be conducted as part of the IGs’ IPERA compliance determinations. The extent to which the 24 agencies listed in the Chief Financial Officers Act of 1990, as amended (CFO Act), complied with the criteria listed in the Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery Act of 2010 (IPERA), for fiscal years 2011 through 2015 as reported by their inspectors general (IG); the criteria and programs that the IGs concluded were responsible for instances of agency noncompliance and the number of programs at the 24 CFO Act agencies that were reported as noncompliant under IPERA criteria by their IGs for 3 or more consecutive years as of fiscal year 2015: and the extent to which the responsible agencies submitted the required information to Congress. 2. 3. The extent to which the IGs’ fiscal years 2011 through 2015 IPERA compliance reports included recommendations and the status of these recommendations as of December 31, 2016, and for the open recommendations associated with noncompliant agencies, the extent to which the recommendations were designed to address agencies’ noncompliance with one or more of the six IPERA criteria. We corroborated our findings with OMB and all 24 CFO Act agencies and IGs. Appendix IV: Reported Improper Payment Estimates by Agency and Program/Activity for Fiscal Year 2015
Table 3 lists the Office of Management and Budget (OMB)-reported improper payment estimates by agency and program or activity for fiscal year 2015, which relate to fiscal year 2015 compliance determinations of the CFO Act agency inspectors general (IG) as discussed in this report. | Why GAO Did This Study
Fiscal year 2015 marked the fifth year of the implementation of IPERA, which requires IGs to annually assess and report on whether executive branch agencies complied with six IPERA criteria related to the estimation of improper payments. Improper payments have been estimated to total over $1.2 trillion government-wide from 2003 through 2016.
This report examines (1) the extent to which the 24 CFO Act agency IGs reported that agencies complied with the six IPERA criteria for fiscal years 2011 through 2015 and the programs reported as noncompliant for 3 or more consecutive years; (2) the extent to which the IGs reported that they performed optional procedures during their fiscal year 2015 reviews; and (3) the number and status of the IGs' fiscal years 2011 through 2015 IPERA compliance review recommendations. To conduct this work, GAO analyzed the IGs' fiscal years 2011 through 2015 IPERA compliance reports and corroborated the findings with OMB and all 24 CFO Act agencies and their IGs.
What GAO Found
Five years after the implementation of the Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery Act of 2010 (IPERA), 15 of the 24 Chief Financial Officers Act of 1990 (CFO Act) agencies were reported by their inspectors general (IG) as noncompliant under IPERA for fiscal year 2015. The programs associated with these 15 agencies accounted for $132 billion (or about 96 percent) of the reported $136.7 billion government-wide improper payment estimate for fiscal year 2015. In addition, the inconsistent IG compliance determinations in the IGs' fiscal year 2015 IPERA compliance reports may present potentially misleading information. Specifically, certain IGs reported compliance based on the presence or absence of the required analysis or reporting, regardless of whether the IGs identified flaws, whereas certain other IGs reported agencies as noncompliant based on their performance of some degree of evaluative procedures to determine whether the analysis or reporting that the agency produced was substantively adequate. While the severity of the IGs' findings may have resulted in the IGs reporting noncompliance for some agencies, similar findings were identified for both the compliant and noncompliant agencies. IPERA and Office of Management and Budget (OMB) guidance does not specify what, if any, evaluative procedures should be conducted as part of the IGs' compliance determinations. The Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency (CIGIE), which represents the IGs, has also not issued such guidance.
IGs reported programs at 7 agencies as noncompliant for 3 or more consecutive years as of the end of fiscal year 2015 and, as a result, were required to submit certain information to Congress. However, the Department of Agriculture had not submitted the required information, despite prior recommendations from its IG and GAO. When agencies do not submit the required information, Congress may lack the information necessary to effectively monitor the implementation of IPERA and take action to address problematic programs in a timely manner.
The IGs' IPERA compliance reviews serve a key function: to reasonably assure that federal dollars are not misspent and that improper payment estimates are accurate, reliable, and complete. To that end, 20 of the 24 IGs reported in their fiscal year 2015 IPERA compliance reports that they also performed one or more optional procedures, which included evaluating the accuracy and completeness of their agencies' reporting. The IGs made 425 recommendations in their fiscal years 2011 through 2015 IPERA compliance reports, and 320 of these recommendations were closed as of December 31, 2016.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the (1) Director of OMB coordinate with CIGIE to develop and issue guidance, either jointly or independently, to specify what procedures should be conducted as part of the IGs' IPERA compliance determinations and (2) Department of Agriculture submit a proposal to Congress, as required in response to 3 years of IPERA noncompliance. In response to the draft report, OMB had no comments and CIGIE stated that it would coordinate with OMB. Also, the Department of Agriculture concurred with the recommendation to it. |
gao_GAO-07-1073T | gao_GAO-07-1073T_0 | In addition, the BEACH Act required EPA to (1) complete studies on pathogens in coastal recreational waters and how they affect human health, including developing rapid methods of detecting pathogens by October 2003, and (2) publish new or revised water quality criteria by October 2005, to be reviewed and revised as necessary every 5 years thereafter. EPA Has Implemented Some But Not All of the BEACH Act Provisions
EPA has made progress implementing the BEACH Act’s provisions but has missed statutory deadlines for two critical requirements. Of the nine actions required by the BEACH Act, EPA has taken action on the following seven: Propose water quality standards and criteria—The BEACH Act required each state with coastal recreation waters to incorporate EPA’s published criteria for pathogens or pathogen indicators, or criteria EPA considers equally protective of human health, into their state water quality standards by April 10, 2004. EPA initiated marine studies in Biloxi, Mississippi, in the summer of 2005, 3 years past the statutory deadline for beginning this work, but the work was interrupted by Hurricane Katrina. EPA initiated two additional marine water studies in the summer of 2007. However, since EPA has not completed the studies on which these criteria were to be based, this task has been delayed. EPA’s BEACH Act Grant Formula Does Not Adequately Reflect States’ Monitoring Needs
While EPA distributed approximately $51 million in BEACH Act grants between 2001 and 2006 to the 35 eligible states and territories, its grant distribution formula does not adequately account for states’ widely varied beach monitoring needs. EPA determined that initially $2 million would be distributed equally to all eligible states to cover the base cost of developing water quality monitoring and notification programs. EPA intended that the beach season factor would provide the base funding and would be augmented by the beach use and beach mile factors. Experiences of the Great Lakes and Other Eligible States in Implementing BEACH Act Grants
States’ use of BEACH Act grants to develop and implement beach monitoring and public notification programs has increased the number of beaches being monitored and the frequency of monitoring. However, states vary considerably in the frequency in which they monitor beaches, the monitoring methods used, and the means by which they notify the public of health risks. Specifically, 34 of the 35 eligible states have used BEACH Act grants to develop beach monitoring and public notification programs; and the remaining state, Alaska, is in the process of setting up its program. However, these programs have been implemented somewhat inconsistently by the states which could lead to inconsistent levels of public health protection at beaches in the United States. In addition, while the Great Lakes and other eligible states have been able to increase their understanding of the scope of contamination as a result of BEACH Act grants, the underlying causes of this contamination usually remain unresolved, primarily due to a lack of funding. Some Great Lakes states are monitoring their high-priority beaches almost daily, while other states monitor their high- priority beaches as little as one to two times per week. Most of the Great Lakes states and localities use similar sampling methods to monitor water quality at local beaches. According to EPA, depth is a key determinant of microbial indicator levels. Public notification. For example, we determined that local officials at 67 percent of Great Lakes’ beaches did not know the sources of bacterial contamination causing water quality standards to be exceeded during the 2006 beach season and EPA officials confirmed that the primary source of contamination at beaches nationwide is reported by state officials as “unknown.” For example, because state and local officials in the Great Lakes states do not have enough information on the specific sources of contamination and generally lack funds for remediation, most of the sources of contamination at beaches have not been addressed. Local officials from these states indicated that they had taken actions to address the sources of contamination at an estimated 14 percent of the monitored beaches. EPA has concluded that BEACH Act grant funds generally may be used only for monitoring and notification purposes. | Why GAO Did This Study
Waterborne pathogens can contaminate water and sand at beaches and threaten human health. Under the Beaches Environmental Assessment and Coastal Health (BEACH) Act, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) provides grants to states to develop water quality monitoring and public notification programs. This statement summarizes the key findings of GAO's May 2007 report, Great Lakes: EPA and States Have Made Progress in Implementing the BEACH Act, but Additional Actions Could Improve Public Health Protection. In this report GAO assessed (1) the extent to which EPA has implemented the Act's provisions, (2) concerns about EPA's BEACH Act grant allocation formula, and (3) described the experiences of the Great Lakes states in developing and implementing beach monitoring and notification programs using their grant funds.
What GAO Found
EPA has taken steps to implement most BEACH Act provisions but has missed statutory deadlines for two critical requirements. While EPA has developed a national list of beaches and improved the uniformity of state water quality standards, it has not (1) completed the pathogen and human health studies required by 2003 or (2) published the new or revised water quality criteria for pathogens required by 2005. EPA stated that the required studies are ongoing, and although some studies were initiated in the summer of 2005, the work was interrupted by Hurricane Katrina. EPA subsequently initiated two additional water studies in the summer of 2007. According to EPA, completion of the studies and development of the new criteria may take an additional 4 to 5 years. Further, although EPA has distributed approximately $51 million in BEACH Act grants from 2001-2006, the formula EPA uses to make the grants does not accurately reflect the monitoring needs of the states. This occurs because the formula emphasizes the length of the beach season more than the other factors in the formula--beach miles and beach use. These other factors vary widely among the states, can greatly influence the amount of monitoring a state needs to undertake, and can increase the public health risk. Thirty-four of the 35 eligible states have used BEACH Act grants to develop beach monitoring and public notification programs. Alaska is still in the process of developing its program. However, because state programs vary they may not provide consistent levels of public health protection nationwide. GAO found that the states' monitoring and notification programs varied considerably in the frequency with which beaches were monitored, the monitoring methods used, and how the public was notified of potential health risks. For example, some Great Lakes states monitor their high-priority beaches as little as one or two times per week, while others monitor their high-priority beaches daily. In addition, when local officials review similar water quality results, some may choose to only issue a health advisory while others may choose to close the beach. According to state and local officials, these inconsistencies are in part due to the lack of adequate funding for their beach monitoring and notification programs. The frequency of water quality monitoring has increased nationwide since passage of the Act, helping states and localities to identify the scope of contamination. However, in most cases, the underlying causes of contamination remain unknown. Some localities report that they do not have the funds to investigate the source of the contamination or take actions to mitigate the problem, and EPA has concluded that BEACH Act grants generally may not be used for these purposes. For example, local officials at 67 percent of Great Lakes beaches reported that, when results of water quality testing indicated contamination at levels exceeding the applicable standards during the 2006 beach season, they did not know the source of the contamination, and only 14 percent reported that they had taken actions to address the sources of contamination. |
gao_GAO-02-849 | gao_GAO-02-849_0 | Last year, about 6.8 million recipients were paid about $33 billion in SSI benefits. To determine whether recipients remain financially eligible for SSI benefits after the initial assessment, SSA also periodically conducts redetermination reviews to verify eligibility factors such as income, resources, and living arrangements. Overpayment Deterrence and Detection Are Receiving Additional Emphasis but Some Weaknesses Remain
Since 1998, SSA has demonstrated a stronger management commitment to SSI program integrity issues. In response to our recommendations, SSA has taken numerous actions to verify recipient reported information and better detect and prevent SSI payment errors. With NDNH, SSA field staff now have access to more comprehensive and timely employment and wage information essential to verifying factors affecting SSI eligibility. SSA’s efforts to expand direct access to additional states’ data are ongoing. SSA also only recently required staff to use NDNH when conducting post entitlement reviews of individuals’ continued eligibility for benefits. In fiscal year 2001, SSI benefit payments represented about 6 percent of benefits paid under all SSA-administered programs, but the SSI program accounted for 31 percent of the agency’s administrative resources. Accordingly, SSA has taken action over the last several years to strengthen its overpayment recovery processes. 1). 2). Recommendations
In order to further strengthen SSA’s ability to deter, detect and recover SSI overpayments, we recommend that the Commissioner of Social Security take the following actions: Sustain and expand the range of SSI program integrity activities underway and continue to develop additional tools to improve program operations and management. This would include increasing the number of SSI redeterminations conducted each year and fully implementing the overpayment detection and recovery tools provided in recent legislation. Supplemental Security Income: Additional Actions Needed to Reduce Program Vulnerability to Fraud and Abuse. | What GAO Found
The Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program is the nation's largest cash assistance program for the poor. The program paid $33 billion in benefits to 6.8 million aged, blind, and disabled persons in fiscal year 2001. Benefit eligibility and payment amounts for the SSI population are determined by complex and often difficult to verify financial factors such as an individual's income, resource levels, and living arrangements. Thus, the SSI program tends to be difficult, labor intensive, and time consuming to administer. These factors make the SSI program vulnerable to overpayments. The Social Security Administration (SSA) has demonstrated a stronger commitment to SSI program integrity and taken many actions to better deter and detect overpayments. Specifically, SSA has (1) obtained legislative authority in 1999 to use additional tools to verify recipients' financial eligibility for benefits, including strengthening its ability to access individuals' bank account information; (2) developed additional measures to hold staff accountable for completing assigned SSI workloads and resolving overpayment issues; (3) provided field staff with direct access to state databases to facilitate more timely verification of recipient's wages and unemployment information; and (4) significantly increased, since 1998, the number of eligibility reviews conducted each year to verify recipient's income, resources, and continuing eligibility for benefits. In addition to better detection and deterrence of SSI overpayments, SSA has made recovery of overpaid benefits a high priority. Despite these efforts, further improvements in overpayment recovery are possible. |
gao_GAO-14-136 | gao_GAO-14-136_0 | Surplus lines insurers must sell their insurance through a broker. They are responsible for (1) selecting an eligible surplus lines insurer, (2) reporting the surplus lines transaction to insurance regulators, (3) remitting the premium tax due on the transaction to state tax authorities, and (4) assuring compliance with all the requirements of the surplus lines state regulations. Surplus Lines Insurers’ Premiums Written Increased Modestly and Companies Have Generally Remained Profitable
From 2008 to 2012 premiums written by surplus lines insurers grew by 1.6 percent (from $24.8 billion to $25.2 billion) and remained around 5 percent of the property casualty market as a whole. Over this time, even though insurers’ claims and underwriting expenses generally exceeded premiums, their net investment income allowed them to remain profitable. As a result, surplus lines insurers also saw growth in capital holdings. NRRA Implementation Has Begun in Most States and Appears to Have Had Little Effect on the Pricing and Availability of Coverage
Almost all states have begun to implement NRRA, which our review of the legislative history shows that Congress passed in 2010 to make it easier for surplus lines insurers and brokers conducting business across states. According to surplus lines insurers, brokers, and representatives of industry associations, the act has simplified the collection of premium taxes for multistate risks. We found that the states had largely adopted a definition of the home state that closely matched the term as defined in NRRA—that is, the state in which the insured maintains its principal place of business or residence or, if all the risk resides outside that state, the state to which the greatest percentage of taxable premium is allocated for that insurance contract. Rather, these states tax and retain 100 percent of premium when they are the home state of the insured, as discussed above. To Assess Eligibility, Some States Are Making Additional Requests of Nonadmitted Insurers
Section 524 of NRRA establishes nationwide criteria for determining whether insurers are eligible to sell in states where they are not domiciled. NRRA Appears to Have Had Little, If Any, Effect on Prices and Availability of Coverage
According to surplus lines insurers and brokers and representatives of the industry associations that we contacted, NRRA has had little, if any, effect on the price and availability of coverage in the admitted and surplus lines markets. According to market participants, any changes in coverage would be due to the insurance cycle rather than NRRA and there has been little noticeable shifting in coverage between the admitted and surplus lines markets as a result of NRRA. NAIC provided technical comments, which we incorporated, as appropriate. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of this report were to (1) describe the size and condition of the surplus lines insurance market and (2) examine actions states have taken to implement the Nonadmitted and Reinsurance Reform Act’s (NRRA) provisions and the effects of the act, if any, on the price and availability of surplus lines coverage. Appendix II: National Association of Insurance Commissioner’s Alien Insurers
Section 524 of the Nonadmitted and Reinsurance Reform Act of 2010 (NRRA), as part of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (the Dodd-Frank Act), says that states may not prohibit a surplus lines broker from placing nonadmitted insurance with, or procuring nonadmitted insurance from, a nonadmitted insurer domiciled outside the United States (also called an alien insurer) that is listed in National Association of Insurance Commissioner’s (NAIC) International Insurers Department (IID) Quarterly Listing of Alien Insurers. | Why GAO Did This Study
Surplus lines insurers are critical to ensuring that businesses and individuals with difficult-to-insure risks can manage those risks. These insurers provide coverage for risks that the traditional, or admitted, insurance market is unwilling or unable to cover. Historically, insurance brokers who sell such coverage have found it to be time consuming and often difficult to allocate state taxes brokers collect and remit on insurance premiums on behalf of policyholders when the risks covered reside in multiple states. To help address this issue, Congress passed NRRA as part of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act.
The act mandates GAO study changes in the surplus lines insurance market. This report (1) describes the size and condition of the surplus lines insurance market and (2) examines actions states have taken to implement NRRA's provisions and the effects of the act, if any, on the price and availability of coverage. To address these questions, GAO analyzed end-of-year financial data for 2008 through 2012 for insurers who sold surplus lines insurance in 2012 and interviewed insurance regulators from states with a large number of surplus lines insurers, industry associations representing interests in the surplus lines market, and large insurers and brokers. GAO also reviewed related studies and analyses.
In commenting on a draft of the report, the National Association of Insurance Commissioners provided technical comments, which GAO incorporated as appropriate.
What GAO Found
Surplus lines insurers' premiums written have increased modestly and the companies have generally remained profitable. From 2008 through 2012 premiums written by surplus lines insurers, who sell property/casualty insurance through brokers in states where they are not licensed, grew slightly from $24.8 billion to $25.2 billion and remained stable at around 5 percent of the property casualty market as a whole. Over this time, surplus lines insurers' premiums generally exceeded their claims and underwriting expenses and they remained profitable. Surplus lines insurers also saw capital gains over this period.
Almost all states have modified their laws to implement at least portions of the Nonadmitted and Reinsurance Reform Act of 2010 (NRRA). In 2010, Congress passed the act, which supporters argued would make it easier for surplus lines insurers and brokers conducting business across states. Under NRRA, only the "home state" of the insured--the state where the insured maintains its principal business or residence or, if the risk is 100 percent outside that state, the state to which the greatest percentage of the insured's taxable premium is allocated--may tax or regulate surplus lines insurance transactions. According to market participants GAO interviewed, the changes in states' laws have simplified compliance for multistate risks. While most home states are collecting and retaining 100 percent of premium taxes, a few states are participating in a tax-sharing agreement, as permitted under NRRA. According to industry associations, including those whom GAO interviewed, some states are making additional requests of surplus lines insurers beyond the requirements specified in NRRA. The National Association of Insurance Commissioners formed a subgroup to address this issue and in August 2013 issued options for improving compliance. Market participants said that NRRA has had little, if any, effect on the prices or availability of coverage, as this was not an intent of the act. The participants said that the insurance business cycles are primarily responsible for any changes in prices and availability. According to surplus lines insurers that GAO contacted, NRRA has caused little noticeable shifting in coverage between the admitted and surplus lines markets. |
gao_GAO-11-634 | gao_GAO-11-634_0 | Specifically, with regard to IT management, the CIO is responsible for implementing and enforcing applicable governmentwide and agency IT management policies, principles, standards, and guidelines; assuming responsibility and accountability for IT investments; assuming responsibility for maximizing the value and assessing and managing the risks of IT acquisitions through a process that, among other things, is integrated with budget, financial, and program management decisions, and provides for the selection, management, and evaluation of IT investments; establishing goals for improving the efficiency and effectiveness of agency operations through the effective use of IT; developing, maintaining, and facilitating the implementation of a sound, secure, and integrated IT architecture; and monitoring the performance of IT programs and advising the agency head whether to continue, modify, or terminate such programs. Current Agency CIOs Do Not Have Responsibility for All Assigned Areas
Similar to 2004, we found that the CIOs are not consistently responsible for all of the 13 areas assigned by statute or identified as critical to effective IT management; however, they are more focused on IT management than on the management of agency information. In this regard, the CIOs reported being responsible for activities in managing IT that include the following: managing capital planning and investment management processes to ensure that they were successfully implemented and integrated with the agency’s budget, acquisition, and planning processes; developing, maintaining, and facilitating the implementation of sound and integrated enterprise architectures; designating a senior department official who will have responsibility for departmentwide information security; developing IT strategic plans to emphasize the role that IT can play in effectively supporting the department’s operations and goals; developing, maintaining, and improving systems acquisition managing e-government requirements and ensuring compliance with developing strategies for development of a skilled IT workforce combined with strong succession planning. Specifically, CIOs reported they devote over two-thirds of their time to the seven IT management areas, which they generally viewed as more important to accomplishing their mission. By contrast, the CIOs reported spending less than one-fifth of their tim the six information management areas. These additional areas of responsibility included addressing infrastructure issues, participating in agencywide boards, or participating in external organizations, such as the federal CIO Council. Despite this, the views of agency CIOs and others suggested that a variety of reporting relationships between an agency head and the CIO can be effective. Additionally, many of the agency CIOs who did not report directly to the agency head indicated having influence on IT management decisions within their agency because they had relationships with other senior agency officials. Tenure at the CIO position has remained almost the same since we last reported. Federal Law Provides Adequate Authority, but Limitations Exist in Implementation for IT Management
As previously discussed, a major goal of the Clinger-Cohen Act was to establish CIOs to advise and assist agency heads in managing IT investments. In order to carry out these responsibilities, CIOs should be positioned within their agencies to successfully exercise their authority. IT workforce: CIOs also face limitations in their ability to provide input into hiring component-level senior IT managers and other IT staff. Without addressing CIOs’ lack of influence over IT workforce planning, the government will continue to face challenges in this area, risking further inefficiencies. More recently, OMB has taken additional steps to increase the effectiveness of agency CIOs by clarifying their roles and authorities under the current law. Federal agencies have begun to contribute by submitting examples depicting best practices relating to a range of topics including vendor communication and contract management; the consolidation of multiple systems into an enterprise solution through the use of cloud services; and program manager development. Recommendations for Executive Action
To ensure that CIOs are better able to carry out their statutory role as key leaders in managing IT, we recommend the Director of OMB take the following three actions: Issue guidance to agencies requiring that CIOs’ authorities and responsibilities, as defined by law and by OMB, are fully implemented, taking into account the issues raised in this report. However, as discussed earlier, most of the agencies in our study reported that they had not established processes for documenting internal lessons learned. However, the CIO also stated that, while our report did not identify legislative changes needed to enhance current CIOs’ authority and generally felt that existing law provides sufficient authority, the department believes there are legislative opportunities to clarify and strengthen CIO authorities that should be pursued, such as overlap in responsibilities between the CIO and other officials. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives wer of federal agency Chief Information Officers (CIO) in managing information and technology; (2) determine what poten tial modifications to the Clinger-Cohen Act and related laws could be made to enhance CIOs’ authority and effectiveness; and (3) identify key lessons learned by federal agency CIOs in managing information and technology. Additionally, we assessed the CIOs’ reported time spent in the 13 IT and information management areas of responsibility and the importance of each area to them, as well as their views on changes needed to improve their authorit y and effectiveness. | Why GAO Did This Study
The federal government invests billions in information technology (IT) each year to help agencies accomplish their missions. Federal law, particularly the Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996, has defined the role of Chief Information Officer (CIO) as the focal point for IT management within agencies. Given the longstanding challenges the government faces in managing IT and the continued importance of the CIO, GAO was asked to (1) determine the current roles and responsibilities of CIOs, (2) determine what potential modifications to the Clinger-Cohen Act and related laws could be made to enhance CIOs' authority and effectiveness, and (3) identify key lessons learned by CIOs in managing IT. To do this, GAO administered a questionnaire to 30 CIOs, compared responses to legislative requirements and the results of a 2004 GAO study, interviewed current CIOs, convened a panel of former agency CIOs, and spoke with the Office of Management and Budget's (OMB) Federal CIO.
What GAO Found
CIOs do not consistently have responsibility for 13 major areas of IT and information management as defined by law or deemed as critical to effective IT management, but they have continued to focus more attention on IT management-related areas. Specifically, most CIOs are responsible for seven key IT management areas: capital planning and investment management; enterprise architecture; information security; IT strategic planning, "e-government" initiatives; systems acquisition, development, and integration; and IT workforce planning. By contrast, CIOs are less frequently responsible for information management duties such as records management and privacy requirements, which they commonly share with other offices or organizations within the agency. In this regard, CIOs report spending over two-thirds of their time on IT management responsibilities, and less than one-third of their time on information management responsibilities. CIOs also report devoting time to other responsibilities such as addressing infrastructure issues and identifying emerging technologies. Further, many CIOs serve in positions in addition to their role as CIO, such as human capital officer. In addition, tenure at the CIO position has remained at about 2 years. Finally, just over half of the CIOs reported directly to the head of their respective agencies, which is required by law. The CIOs and others have stressed that a variety of reporting relationships in an agency can be effective, but that CIOs need to have access to the agency head and form productive working relationships with senior executives across the agency in order to carry out their mission. Federal law provides CIOs with adequate authority to manage IT for their agencies; however, some limitations exist that impede their ability to exercise this authority. Current and former CIOs, as well as the Federal CIO, did not identify legislative changes needed to enhance CIOs' authority and generally felt that existing law provides sufficient authority. Nevertheless, CIOs do face limitations in exercising their influence in certain IT management areas. Specifically, CIOs do not always have sufficient control over IT investments, and they often have limited influence over the IT workforce, such as in hiring and firing decisions and the performance of component-level CIOs. More consistent implementation of CIOs' authority could enhance their effectiveness in these areas. OMB has taken steps to increase CIOs' effectiveness, but it has not established measures of accountability to ensure that responsibilities are fully implemented. CIOs identified a number of best practices and lessons learned for more effectively managing IT at agencies, and the Federal CIO Council has established a website to share this information among agencies. Agencies have begun to share information in the areas of vendor communication and contract management; the consolidation of multiple systems into an enterprise solution through the use of cloud services; and program manager development. However, CIOs have not implemented structured agency processes for sharing lessons learned. Doing so could help CIOs share ideas across their agencies and with their successors for improving work processes and increasing cost effectiveness.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is recommending that OMB update its guidance to establish measures of accountability for ensuring that CIOs' responsibilities are fully implemented and require agencies to establish internal processes for documenting lessons learned. In commenting on a draft of this report, OMB officials generally agreed with GAO's findings and stated that OMB had taken actions that they believed addressed the recommendations. |
gao_HEHS-99-56 | gao_HEHS-99-56_0 | Access to Home Oxygen Equipment Is Substantially Unchanged
Preliminary information indicates that access to home oxygen equipment remains largely unchanged, despite the 25-percent Medicare payment reduction that took effect in January 1998. This trend is observed in the aggregate data, which show that claims for liquid stationary systems declined by approximately 12 percent between the first half of 1997 and the first half of 1998. For example, claims data do not identify the types of portable tanks provided to beneficiaries. The hospital discharge planners and suppliers we talked with said they were able to make arrangements with suppliers for all patients with high-liter-flow needs. Overall, the number of Medicare home oxygen suppliers has declined by about 6.5 percent since the January 1998 payment reduction. HCFA Is Not Doing All It Can to Assess and Ensure Access to Home Oxygen
In a November 1997 report, we made several recommendations to HCFA about its implementation of the BBA provisions, including that it monitor trends in Medicare beneficiaries’ access to the various types of home oxygen equipment; restructure the modality-neutral payment, if warranted; educate prescribing physicians about their right to specify the home oxygen systems that best meet their patients’ needs; and establish service standards for home oxygen suppliers. HCFA Has Contracted for an Evaluation of Access to Home Oxygen
As required by the BBA, HCFA has contracted with a PRO to evaluate access to and quality of home oxygen equipment and services provided to Medicare patients. Changes in supplier practices will be an indicator of the impact of the payment reduction. Results from the PRO study are not expected until January 2000. Service standards would define what Medicare is paying for and what beneficiaries should expect from suppliers. Standards are even more important as suppliers respond to reduced payment rates. The PRO study HCFA has contracted for will provide a more in-depth look at this issue. Recommendations
We recommend that the Administrator of HCFA do the following: monitor complaints about and analyze trends in Medicare beneficiaries’ use of and access to home oxygen equipment, paying special attention to patients who live in rural areas, are highly active, or require a high liter flow; on the basis of this ongoing review, as well as the results of the PRO study, consider whether to modify the Medicare payment method to preserve access; and make development of service standards for home oxygen suppliers an agency priority in accordance with the BBA’s requirement to develop such standards. HCFA acknowledged that it has not developed specific service standards for the home oxygen benefit as required by law. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO provided information on Medicare beneficiaries' access to home oxygen equipment, focusing on: (1) changes in access to home oxygen for Medicare patients since the payment reduction mandated by the Balanced Budget Act (BBA) of 1997 took effect; and (2) actions taken by the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) to fulfill the BBA requirements and respond to GAO's November 1997 recommendations.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) preliminary indications are that access to home oxygen equipment remains substantially unchanged, despite the 25-percent reduction in Medicare payment rates that took effect in January 1998; (2) the number of Medicare beneficiaries using home oxygen equipment has been increasing steadily since 1996, and this trend appears to have continued in 1998; (3) while Medicare claims for the first 6 months of 1998 showed a decrease in the proportion of Medicare patients using the more costly stationary liquid oxygen systems, this decline was consistent with the trend since 1995; (4) hospital discharge planners and suppliers GAO talked with said that even Medicare beneficiaries who are expensive or difficult to serve are able to get the appropriate systems for their needs; (5) further, suppliers accepted the Medicare allowance as full payment for over 99 percent of the Medicare home oxygen claims filed for the first half of 1998; (6) although these indicators do not reveal access problems caused by the payment reductions, issues such as sufficiency of portable tank refills and equipment maintenance could still arise; (7) HCFA has responded to only one BBA requirement; (8) as required by the BBA, HCFA has contracted with a peer review organization (PRO) for an evaluation of access to, and quality of, home oxygen equipment; (9) results from this evaluation are not expected before 2000; (10) meanwhile, HCFA has not implemented an interim process to monitor changes in access for Medicare beneficiaries--a process that could alert the agency to problems as they arise; (11) although not required by the BBA, such monitoring is important because of the life-sustaining nature of the home oxygen benefit; (12) until HCFA gathers more in-depth information on access and the impact of payment reductions, HCFA cannot assess the need to restructure the modality-neutral payment; (13) HCFA has not yet implemented provisions of the BBA that require service standards for Medicare home oxygen suppliers to be established as soon as practicable; and (14) service standards would define what Medicare is paying for in the home oxygen benefit and what beneficiaries should expect from suppliers. |
gao_GGD-95-21 | gao_GGD-95-21_0 | Most trust assets were in custodial or other accounts for which the bank did not provide investment management service. 1 and 2.) Evidence on the Investment of Trust Assets in Proprietary Mutual Funds
While it was not possible to quantify the exact extent to which assets in trust accounts had been invested in bank proprietary mutual funds, some inferences could be drawn from the information that was available. Finally, industry and regulatory officials said that most of the trust assets that had been converted into proprietary mutual funds had come from employee benefit accounts. Most banks that offered pooled trust investment funds in 1986 continued to do so in 1993. The $24 billion represented about 15 percent of the $161 billion in total assets invested in proprietary mutual funds at the end of 1992. This practice is generally referred to as charging double fees. part 9 requirement that fees be reasonable. Given the limited number of examinations we reviewed and the general nature of the trust examination manuals, we have no basis for judging the effectiveness of trust examinations in detecting and controlling unresolved conflicts of interest when investing trust assets in proprietary mutual funds. Although the data on trust assets and the mutual funds data did not document the extent to which banks have invested trust assets in proprietary mutual funds, we were able to gain some insight into this question by comparing these data sources. To determine disclosure and consent requirements and whether double fees are permitted, we reviewed the federal laws and regulations that are generally relevant to the investment of trust assets and in particular to the investment of such assets in proprietary mutual funds. They also provided their views regarding potential fiduciary conflicts of interest, fees, disclosure, and customer consent when trust assets are invested in proprietary mutual funds. For these assets, banks are to provide investment management services. These factors include (1) the profitability of continuing to offer both pooled trust investment funds and proprietary mutual funds, especially since proprietary mutual funds can be offered to a wider range of customers; (2) changes in federal tax laws to allow capital gains accrued in common trusts to be deferred in a conversion; and (3) changes in federal regulation, such as that which has been proposed by OCC for a number of years to allow banks to advertise the performance of their pooled trust investment funds. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on the extent to which banks have invested trust assets into proprietary mutual funds, focusing on: (1) the disclosure and consent requirements that apply when trust assets are invested into these funds; (2) whether double fees on invested trust assets are legal; and (3) the regulatory controls that prevent banks from acting in their own self-interest.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) most banks have not invested trust assets in proprietary mutual funds; (2) the majority of funds invested in bank proprietary mutual funds are from non-trust assets; (3) by the end of 1992, about $24 billion in trust assets had been used to start up proprietary mutual funds which represented about 15 percent of the total assets in these funds; (4) the bank industry believed the trust asset investments were understated because the estimates did not take into account conversions and new trust investments; (5) in 1993, about $45 billion in employee benefit and personal trust assets were invested in short-term money market mutual funds; (6) industry and regulatory officials believe that trust investments are becoming more attractive to investors for tax reasons; (7) investment disclosure requirements vary by state and most states that allow proprietary mutual fund investments do not require beneficiary consent; (8) although 8 states are in compliance with the double fee prohibitions on employee accounts, 27 states allow double fees to be charged; (9) most banks lack incentives to charge double fees because of competition and the possibility of federal penalties and beneficiary lawsuits; (10) when investing trust assets, banks are prohibited from acting in their own self-interest, must justify their investments, and are subject to federal review; and (11) the effectiveness of trust examinations could not be determined, since the number of examinations are limited and use of proprietary mutual funds in trusts is new. |
gao_AIMD-97-37 | gao_AIMD-97-37_0 | On the basis of subsequent discussions with subcommittee staff, our specific objectives were to assess: (1) the agency’s strategy for procuring continuation series satellites, (2) what steps the agency should be taking now to prepare for the next generation series of satellites, and (3) whether the potential exists for improving the system and reducing costs in the long term. Issues in NOAA’s Planning to Ensure Continuous GOES Coverage
Based on the best available analysis, the potential for a gap in geostationary satellite weather coverage will be significant in the early years of the next century if procurement of new satellites does not begin soon. Accordingly, NOAA plans to procure at least two “continuation series” spacecraft that will carry the same meteorological instruments as the current spacecraft and incorporate only limited technical improvements. We identified several shortcomings in NOAA’s spacecraft planning process that, if remedied, could lead to better planning in the future. Conclusions
Given the importance of maintaining continuous geostationary weather coverage, NOAA’s decision to immediately begin procuring two to four continuation series spacecraft through a competitively bid, firm fixed-price contract is reasonable. Current usage of GOES data by weather forecasters suggests that a reexamination of the GOES satellite architecture is warranted. Before a decision can be made about what kind of follow-on satellite system to build, an updated analysis of user needs is necessary. Several new approaches and technologies for geostationary satellite meteorology have been suggested in recent years by government, academic, and industry experts. Identifying and evaluating options will require thorough engineering analysis. In addition, past NOAA experience shows that developing new technologies is done most efficiently as a separate line of effort, outside of the operational satellite program. Such an effort would benefit from greater collaboration with NASA, whose expertise and support have, in the past, significantly contributed to the development of NOAA’s weather satellite systems. NOAA Has Studied Only Incremental Enhancements to the Current Architecture
Based on the President’s fiscal year 1998 budget, NOAA does not plan to begin a follow-on GOES program until fiscal year 2003 at the earliest. Clearly, there are drawbacks to the small satellite architecture as well as advantages. This analysis should be provided to the Congress for its use in considering options for the future of the GOES program. Furthermore, the longer that NOAA continues without actively considering other options for a future system, the more it risks having to procure additional continuation series satellites, because the availability date for a fully developed new satellite system will slip farther into the future. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's (NOAA) management of the Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite (GOES) Program, focusing on: (1) NOAA's strategy for procuring satellites in the GOES continuation series; (2) what steps NOAA should be taking now to prepare for the next generation series of satellites; and (3) whether the potential exists for improving the system and reducing costs in the long term.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) based on the best available analysis, the potential for a gap in geostationary satellite coverage will be significant in the early years of the next century if procurement of new satellites does not begin soon; (2) to prevent this problem, NOAA plans to competitively procure two to four continuation series spacecraft that will carry the same meteorological instruments as the current spacecraft and incorporate modest technical improvements; (3) the satellites are planned for launch beginning in 2002; (4) given the importance of maintaining continuous geostationary weather coverage, NOAA's plans are reasonable; (5) however, there are inherent difficulties in determining exactly when and how many of the continuation series spacecraft will be needed; (6) despite these difficulties, GAO identified several specific shortcomings in NOAA's spacecraft planning process that, if remedied, could improve planning in the future; (7) based on the President's fiscal year (FY) 1998 budget, NOAA does not plan to begin a follow-on GOES program until FY 2003 at the earliest; (8) given that the opportunity now exists to consider alternatives for a follow-on system, current usage of GOES data by weather forecasters suggests that a reexamination of the GOES satellite architecture is warranted; (9) before a decision can be made about what kind of follow-on satellite system to build, an updated analysis of user needs must be completed; (10) several new approaches and technologies for geostationary satellite meteorology have been suggested in recent years by government, academic, and industry experts, however, identifying and evaluating the full range of options will require thorough engineering analysis; (11) in addition, past NOAA experience shows that developing new technologies is done most efficiently as a separate line of effort, outside of the operational satellite program; (12) such an effort would benefit from greater collaboration with the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, whose expertise and support have, in the past, significantly contributed to the development of NOAA's weather satellite systems; (13) the longer that NOAA continues without actively considering other options for a future system, the more it risks having to procure additional continuation series satellites, because the availability date for a fully developed new satellite system will slip farther into the future; and (14) the potential advantages of advanced technologies and small satellite constellations as well as questions about changing user requirements suggest that alternatives to the present architecture should be seriously considered. |
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