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gao_HEHS-97-11 | gao_HEHS-97-11_0 | In addition, earlier enforcement of child support obligations for families not receiving AFDC would prevent such families from needing government support. Under the terms of most collection contracts, contractors are paid only if collections are made. Payments to contractors are often calculated as a percentage of collections—on both AFDC and non-AFDC cases. Growing Caseloads and Fiscal Constraints Encourage States to Privatize Collections
When states contract with private firms to provide child support collection services for portions of their caseloads, they often do so to help service their growing caseloads. On AFDC cases, the federal and state governments retained all collections of past-due support and all but $50 of current support collected up to the amount of each families’ monthly AFDC benefit. Consequently, under this contract, the federal government’s share of retained AFDC collections was not large enough to offset its share of contract costs and performance incentives paid to the state based on AFDC and non-AFDC collections. Furthermore, the pass-through to families of the first $50 of current support payments collected will no longer be mandatory. The legislation also affects the incentive payments that states receive. Scope and Methodology
Using contract cost and collection data provided by state and local CSE offices, we determined the financial outcomes for 11 collection contracts by calculating (1) collections distributed to families and retained by the federal and state governments and (2) net CSE financial revenues or costs for the federal and state governments. Child Support Enforcement: Credit Bureau Reporting Shows Promise (GAO/HEHS-94-175, June 3, 1994). 5, 1991). A recorded menu will provide information on how to obtain these lists. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on states' use of private agencies for the collection of child support payments, focusing on: (1) why states contract for these collection services; and (2) the factors affecting the financial outcomes of collection contracts for families and the federal and state governments.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) states contract with private agencies to collect past-due or hard-to-collect child support payments because they are finding it increasingly difficult to service their growing child support enforcement caseloads with available staff and budget resources; (2) under the terms of most collection contracts, states pay contractors only if collections are made, and contractor payments are often a fixed percentage of collections; (3) the federal and state governments retain most of the child support payments collected for families receiving Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) benefits, while non-AFDC families receive most of the support payments collected; (4) the federal government's share of the child support collections depends on how much it contributes to the state's welfare program and how much it pays in performance incentives and child support enforcement administrative costs; and (5) a review of 11 contracts showed that the federal government's financial outcomes ranged from a net cost of about $242,000 to revenues of $1.2 million. |
gao_GAO-14-397 | gao_GAO-14-397_0 | Mechanisms to Integrate DHS Analysis Activities to Support Departmental Intelligence Priorities Are Not Functioning as Intended but Help Reduce Overlap and Duplication
DHS has established mechanisms—including a governance board, intelligence framework, and analysis planning process—intended to better integrate analysis activities across the enterprise and help ensure that activities support strategic departmental intelligence priorities. Specifically, we identified two gaps in the implementation of these mechanisms that limit DHS’s assurance that component analytic activities support strategic departmental intelligence priorities:
The Framework does not establish strategic departmental priorities: The Framework does not establish strategic departmental intelligence priorities that can be used to inform annual intelligence planning decisions—such as what analytic activities to pursue and what level of investment to make, as called for in DHS guidance. According to I&A officials, it can be challenging for components to focus on both overall strategic departmental intelligence priorities and their more tactical intelligence priorities that support their specific operations and component customers. Customers Reported Mixed Views on the Usefulness of I&A Products and Services; I&A Is Taking Steps to Better Understand Customers’ Analytic Support Needs
Results from customer feedback surveys that are attached to I&A intelligence products indicate general satisfaction with these products, but the results have limitations that prevent I&A from drawing readership-wide conclusions. Our discussions with representatives of I&A’s five customer groups indicate that customers in two groups—DHS leadership and state and local officials at fusion centers—found I&A’s products to be useful, while customers in the other three groups—DHS components, the Intelligence Community, and private critical infrastructure sectors— generally did not. Selected Officials from Two of I&A’s Five Customer Groups Said Products Were Useful, and Officials from Four of the Five Groups Said Other Types of Analytic Services Were Useful
According to I&A’s strategic plan, because of resource constraints and other factors, I&A gives priority in its intelligence analysis efforts to the needs of DHS leadership and state and local customers. I&A has deployed analysts to fusion centers on a limited basis. To support this assessment, and in response to our September 2012 report, I&A initiated a survey in March 2014 to gain a better understanding of its customers’ satisfaction with and use of I&A intelligence products and services.survey covers the types of I&A products the customers read in 2013, including finished intelligence and current intelligence (e.g., alerts and Among other things, the warnings); the extent to which the products were useful in informing actions and decisions, such as in making resource investments; and satisfaction with I&A services, such as threat briefings and tradecraft assistance. I&A Has Taken Steps to Address Challenges It Faces in Maintaining a Skilled Workforce, but Assessing Results Could Help Strengthen Future Human Capital Efforts
I&A Has Taken Steps to Address Challenges Related to Recruiting, Hiring, and Professional Development
I&A has faced human capital challenges in recruiting and hiring the skilled workforce it needs and providing training and professional development opportunities that keep morale high and attrition low. Specifically, according to I&A’s recruitment strategy, I&A’s hiring authority under competitive service put it at a disadvantage compared with other organizations that were able to process hiring actions more quickly and For offer career advantages associated with excepted service status. I&A has also faced challenges in providing professional development opportunities for its workforce, and experienced low morale scores and high rates of attrition, particularly among its lower-level analysts. According to I&A officials, these mechanisms are not in place because I&A leadership was focused on other priorities. Consistent with this guidance, establishing mechanisms to monitor and evaluate workforce efforts, such as changes to I&A’s hiring authority and grade levels restructuring, could help the Office of Analysis determine if the efforts are achieving their intended results. In addition, using the results from these evaluations to determine any need for changes will help ensure that I&A is making sound workforce decisions. Recommendations for Executive Action
To help ensure that the intelligence analysis activities and resources throughout the enterprise align to an integrated set of strategic departmental intelligence priorities, we recommend that the Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis, Homeland Security take the following two actions: establish strategic departmental intelligence priorities in the Homeland Security Intelligence Priorities Framework that can be used to guide annual enterprise planning efforts, including intelligence analysis and resource management and ensure that once strategic departmental intelligence priorities are established, the Framework is used to inform the planned analytic activities of the DHS Intelligence Enterprise, as articulated in the Program of Analysis. With regard to the third recommendation, that I&A establish mechanisms to monitor and evaluate workforce initiatives and use results to determine any needed changes, DHS concurred and stated that I&A is developing specific performance indicators to monitor and evaluate workforce initiatives and plans to develop a complete set of measures by the end of fiscal year 2014. What challenges does I&A face in maintaining a skilled analytic workforce and what steps has it taken to address these challenges? We also met with representatives from four of the five I&A customer groups: DHS components; the Intelligence Community; state, local, tribal, and territorial governments; and the private sector. | Why GAO Did This Study
DHS plays a vital role in securing the nation, and its intelligence analysis capabilities are a key part of this effort. Within DHS, I&A has a lead role for intelligence analysis, but other operational components also perform their own analysis activities. GAO was asked to review the management of departmental analysis efforts.
This report addresses the extent to which (1) DHS intelligence analysis activities are integrated to support departmental intelligence priorities, (2) I&A customers find analytic products and services useful, and (3) I&A has addressed challenges in maintaining a skilled analytic workforce.
GAO examined mechanisms DHS used to coordinate analysis across components, I&A reports and feedback surveys, and human capital plans. GAO also interviewed officials from I&A, the five DHS components with intelligence analysis as a core function, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence who represent the Intelligence Community, 7 of 78 fusion centers (focal points within states that analyze and share information), and the private sector. The fusion center and sector interviews, chosen based on geographic location and other factors, are not generalizable, but provided insight on progress.
What GAO Found
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has established mechanisms—including an intelligence framework and an analytic planning process—to better integrate analysis activities throughout the department, but the mechanisms are not functioning as intended. For example, the framework does not establish strategic departmental intelligence priorities that can be used to inform annual planning decisions, such as what analytic activities to pursue and the level of investment to make, as called for in DHS guidance. According to officials from DHS's Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A), it can be challenging for DHS components to focus on developing both strategic priorities and more tactical priorities that support their specific operations. Absent strategic priorities, DHS used component subject matter experts and other information to develop key questions of common interest they would address through analysis. As a result, DHS does not have reasonable assurance that component analytic activities and resource investments are aligned to support departmental priorities. The mechanisms to integrate analysis, however, gave components insight into one another's work and helped them avoid unnecessary overlap and duplication.
I&A customers had mixed views on the extent to which its analytic products and services are useful. GAO's interviews with representatives of I&A's five customer groups indicate that two groups—DHS leadership and state, local, tribal, and territorial partners—found products to be useful, while three groups—DHS components, the Intelligence Community, and the private sector—generally did not. Representatives of four of the five groups said that they found other types of services, such as briefings, to be useful. Results from surveys that are attached to I&A products indicate that most customers were very satisfied with the products' usefulness, but the results are not generalizable because they reflect only the views of customers who chose to respond. To address this issue, I&A is conducting more comprehensive surveys and interviews with customers to evaluate the products and services that best meet their needs. I&A expects to complete this effort by the end of June 2014.
I&A has taken steps to address challenges it faced in maintaining a skilled workforce, but has not assessed whether its efforts are resolving the challenges. For example:
I&A faced challenges in recruiting and hiring analysts, in part because of its hiring authority, which put it at a disadvantage compared with other agencies that were able to process hiring actions more quickly. I&A's hiring authority was changed in 2013, a fact that could help ease these challenges.
I&A experienced low morale and high rates of attrition, particularly among its lower-level analysts. To help address these issues, I&A restructured its grade levels in 2012 to provide additional career advancement opportunities.
However, I&A has not established mechanisms to evaluate its efforts and use the results to make any needed changes because I&A leadership has focused on other priorities. Such mechanisms will help I&A evaluate if efforts are achieving their intended results of improving recruiting and hiring, bolstering morale, and reducing attrition. In addition, using the evaluation results to determine any needed changes will help ensure that I&A is making sound workforce decisions.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends, among other things, that DHS (1) establish strategic intelligence priorities and use them to inform analytic activities and (2) establish mechanisms to evaluate workforce initiatives and use results to determine any needed changes. DHS concurred with our recommendations. |
gao_HEHS-98-121 | gao_HEHS-98-121_0 | Surgeon General Rejects Council’s Recommendations
Notwithstanding the MEPC’s recommendations for closing GME programs at Bethesda, the Navy Surgeon General decided to close programs at Portsmouth. Moreover, about 5 months after announcing the Portsmouth GME closure decision, the Navy Surgeon General’s office completed a study of health care demographics and workload covering the Bethesda, San Diego, and Portsmouth areas, where it has major health care concentrations. No Agreement on Site Selection Criteria or Collaboration Among Those Affected
Surprised by the Portsmouth decision, medical center officials and their supporters, including a local active duty forces commander and congressional members, disagreed with the Navy’s basis for the Portsmouth GME closure decision, arguing that GME trainee losses would reduce services to active duty personnel and their dependents and other beneficiaries and would harm readiness. Army’s Closure Attempt Also Unsuccessful
While the Army’s GME sizing efforts—and the Air Force’s for that matter—are independent of the Navy’s, the services are subject to the same general policies and downsizing pressures. A few months after the Navy’s closure attempts, the Army Surgeon General acted on an internal recommendation to close all remaining GME programs at the Army’s William Beaumont Medical Center in El Paso. A representative from the Surgeon General’s office told us that the apparent proposal to concentrate GME in four geographic locations was not a factor in choosing William Beaumont. Parallels in Private Sector GME Downsizing
The private medical sector has faced and continues to face the need to reduce, close, or otherwise modify its GME programs at medical schools and hospitals. Recent Navy and Army GME program closure efforts, however, have not been successful, and the Air Force may face similar problems when it attempts closures. In deliberating closure alternatives, for example, the Navy’s MEPC did not know that (1) a change in position had occurred on preserving GME where active duty personnel are concentrated, (2) ongoing GME integration efforts were to be preserved, (3) there apparently were to be only four GME concentration centers, or (4) study results would be produced later in support of either Bethesda or Portsmouth. Recommendations
We recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs and the services’ surgeons general to collaboratively develop GME closure policy guidance and implementing criteria and processes covering such matters as key factors in identifying and winnowing potential sites, how to project and mitigate potentially adverse effects on beneficiary health care and readiness, how and when to involve those affected in the services and local areas in the decision-making process, how to reach program closure agreement, and how to communicate and implement the resulting decisions; provide in the guidance for the potential effects of such DOD and service initiatives as TRICARE, with its emphasis on cost control and primary care, that can affect GME decisions; and develop, obtain agreement on, and publish such policy guidance before any further GME closure decisions are made. Scope and Methodology
To assess the services’ experiences in downsizing their graduate medical education (GME) programs, particularly the Navy’s experiences, we examined the role of the Navy Medical Education Policy Council (MEPC) and the guidance and data the MEPC considered, evidence of the Navy’s need for GME reductions and of the expected advantages and disadvantages of closing GME programs at one location versus another, and evidence that the Navy can still achieve needed GME reductions in ways that comply with DOD guidance and that overcome the kinds of objections raised in their recent closure attempts. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO reviewed a Navy advisory council's recommendations for restructuring Navy graduate medical education (GME), focusing on: (1) why the Navy did not accept its council's recommendations for Bethesda GME closures and why its other closure attempts did not succeed; (2) whether the other services already have faced or may face similar experiences; and (3) what improvements may be needed if the services are to successfully make and implement their GME sizing decisions.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) in early 1997, the Navy Surgeon General decided to eliminate 162 GME positions to comply with lower projected wartime requirements and with Department of Defense (DOD) restrictions on the ratio of physicians in training to those deployable; (2) a Navy advisory council, lacking specific guidance but responding to the Navy Surgeon General's indications that GME should occur where active duty personnel are concentrated, recommended that such training be dropped at the Bethesda Medical Center; (3) the Navy Surgeon General, however, instead decided to close some of the Navy's Portsmouth Medical Center's programs following a then newly discussed agreement among DOD and the services' surgeons general to concentrate GME in four geographic locations that included Bethesda and San Diego but not Portsmouth; (4) lacking site selection guidance, the council submitted its recommendation to the Surgeon General without taking account of the agreement, which has never been formalized or acted on by the other services; (5) when announced, the Portsmouth closure decision surprised Navy command and medical center officials there, as well as local congressional representatives; (6) publicized arguments ensued that Portsmouth was as advantageous as Bethesda for concentrating GME and that losing Portsmouth's GME would reduce trainee-provided health care to active duty personnel and other beneficiaries and would harm Navy readiness; (7) although it was unsuccessful, the Surgeon General's office tried justifying the decision and later withdrew it for further study; (8) shortly thereafter and for the same ends, the Army Surgeon General's office sought to eliminate the 64 GME positions at the William Beaumont Medical Center in El Paso, Texas, also without site selection guidance and likewise failing to involve those who were affected; (9) while the Air Force also foresees the need for GME program closures, it has not yet attempted to make them; (10) but in the absence of closure policies and criteria and judging from the Navy's and Army's closure attempt experiences, GAO has no reason to believe that the Air Force would be any more successful in bringing about required GME program adjustments; and (11) while not a direct parallel to DOD GME with its readiness dimension, private-sector medical schools and hospitals have been downsizing their GME programs and in doing so have documented success factors that may provide a useful reference for DOD in developing guidance for its future sizing efforts. |
gao_GAO-03-160 | gao_GAO-03-160_0 | DeCA Officials Are Responsible for Product Selection Decisions
DeCA officials select the products that commissaries sell—the agency does not use its large suppliers to select products for commissaries. Commissaries Sale of Products from Small Businesses and Foreign Companies
Based on a statistical sample, we estimate that 53 percent of businesses producing products that DeCA sold are small businesses and that these businesses produced about 24 percent of the products (about 10,900 products, plus or minus 1,500) sold by commissaries from August 2000 through May 2001. In considering products for sale in commissaries, DeCA is bound by a provision of federal law that requires a name brand product to have been sold on a regional or national basis through grocery stores or other retail operations consisting of multiple outlets before DeCA may purchase these products on a non-competitive basis for resale. These increased distribution costs may affect the decision of a small business to sell products through commissaries. Private Label Products Might Reduce Commissary Prices and Provide Small Business Opportunity
Private label products are successful in the supermarket industry, providing quality products at low cost, but DeCA does not now offer private label products. DeCA’s Director’s said that a study may clarify whether a private label program would be in the best interests of commissary customers. Private label products, such as those sold by the major grocery retailers Kroger Co.; Albertson’s, Inc.; Safeway Stores; Wal-Mart; and Ahold USA have captured 20.7 percent of supermarket unit sales, and 16.2 percent of dollar sales according to industry data. Examples of private label brands include the Kroger Company’s “Big K” brand, Wal-Mart’s “Sam’s American Choice” brand, or Safeway Stores’ “Safeway” and “Lucerne” brands. More specifically, DeCA officials noted that the private label concept could be difficult for DeCA to initiate, and the DeCA’s major suppliers may respond by raising prices on products now sold through commissaries and withdraw the labor support that they now provide to commissaries. Due to these concerns, DeCA officials have not performed a thorough study of the potential for selling private label products. In discussing the potential offered by private label products, as well as the issues that would be involved, DeCA’s Director concluded that although there may be difficulties associated with the application of the private label concept to commissaries, it would be reasonable to perform a study to determine whether the sale of private label products could enhance the commissary benefit overall. Conclusions
The legal requirement that name brand products must first be introduced through multiple retail operations on at least a regional basis may preclude DeCA from purchasing some small business brand name products that it may desire to purchase. Nevertheless, a change in the requirement could at least open the opportunity for small businesses to make the case that their products deserve a place on commissary shelves. Recommendations for Executive Action
Because of the potential limitation on small businesses opportunity, GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense consult with the Administrator, U.S. Small Business Administration, on the provision of law restricting DeCA’s consideration of products that have not yet achieved regional distribution, and together inform the Congress if small business opportunity could be improved by removing or modifying the provision. Only company brands to be placed on company display equipment. 3. | Why GAO Did This Study
Some grocery supermarket companies have been charging food product manufacturers "slotting fees" to place products in stores and have involved large product manufacturers in making decisions about what products to sell. These practices have raised concerns about anticompetitive behavior and may be adversely affecting small businesses. GAO was asked (1) if the Defense Commissary Agency is using these practices in managing military commissaries; (2) what proportion of products sold by commissaries are produced by small businesses; and (3) if small businesses face barriers in selling products through commissaries and how opportunities for small business could be improved.
What GAO Found
The Defense Commissary Agency does not charge slotting fees, and agency staff, not product manufacturers, decide which products to sell and where they will be placed on commissary shelves. GAO estimates that slightly more than half of the companies producing products that the agency sold are small businesses. According to GAO estimates, these businesses produced about 24 percent, or about 10,900 of 45,200 products sold by commissaries from August 2000 through May 2001, generating about 7 percent of commissary sales during the period. Federal law requires that a name brand product must have been sold on a regional basis through grocery stores or other retail operations before the agency may purchase it for resale without competition. This requirement apparently poses a legal hurdle to small businesses whose name brand product distribution may be limited because the agency cannot accept their products for resale. GAO identified two ways in which opportunities for small businesses might be increased. First, the legal hurdle to purchasing name brand products that have limited distribution could be removed. Agency officials are capable of deciding which products to sell without this requirement. Second, the agency could sell private label products, such as the Kroger Company's "Big K" brand or Safeway Stores' "Safeway Select" brand and obtain these products from both large and small businesses. In 2001, private label products constituted over 20 percent of industry unit sales and 16 percent of dollar sales. Private label products are sold at lower prices than brand name products and could potentially increase savings for commissary customers. Agency officials recognize there could be some potential benefits if the agency were to offer private label products. However, the officials said it would be difficult to initiate and operate a private label program. Further, they are concerned that if the agency attempted to sell private label products, its current suppliers would increase their prices and withdraw some of the support they now provide commissaries, perhaps reducing the overall benefits of commissary shopping. GAO noted that the agency has not done a thorough study of the potential for private label products to serve commissary customers. The agency's Director agreed with GAO that a study of the benefits and costs of developing private label products would be reasonable to undertake to determine if such a program could enhance the commissary benefit. The Department of Defense concurred with GAO's recommendations and plans to implement them. |
gao_GAO-08-851 | gao_GAO-08-851_0 | TRANSCOM Efforts to Identify, Prioritize, and Assess Critical Transportation Assets Have Been Inconsistent with Guidance
According to ASD(HD&ASA) officials, TRANSCOM’s methodology for identifying, prioritizing, and assessing its critical transportation assets is inconsistent with the intent of DOD’s DCIP guidance and with the approach adopted by some of the other combatant commands and military services. TRANSCOM officials stated in May 2008 that they now plan to leverage the draft DOD Critical Asset Identification Process manual to reevaluate its currently identified critical transportation assets; however, a timeline to complete this reevaluation has not yet been established. Moreover, its memorandum of understanding with the Joint Staff to participate as transportation subject matter experts on Joint Staff DCIP vulnerability assessments is still in draft. Though contrary to DCIP guidance, TRANSCOM has been using its vulnerability assessments to identify specific critical assets rather than using the process outlined in DCIP guidance to identify specific critical assets. Until this reevaluation is completed, ASD(HD&ASA)’s ability to formulate a comprehensive Defense Critical Asset list that includes transportation assets and effectively targets spending for risk reduction efforts will be impeded. Most Installations Took Some Steps to Assure the Availability of Critical Transportation and Public Works Assets but Were Unaware of Asset Criticality and Lacked a DCIP Focus
Although DOD established DCIP to help assure the availability of mission- critical infrastructure—including transportation assets—installation personnel were often unfamiliar with DCIP and unaware of the critical role specific transportation assets play in TRANSCOM’s missions. However, these coordination efforts have been performed independent of DCIP and, therefore, focus on protecting people and not on assuring the availability of mission-critical transportation assets. Critical Transportation Asset Assurance Has Received Some Funding through DCIP and Has Benefited from Other Sources of Funding
DOD has allocated approximately $283.3 million for critical asset assurance through DCIP from fiscal years 2004 to 2008. In addition to these funds, critical transportation assets also have benefited indirectly from other DOD programs, such as the Antiterrorism Program, and from funding from foreign governments in countries where the United States maintains a military presence. Conclusions
Until now, TRANSCOM’s practice of designating entire air bases, seaports, and commercial airports as critical transportation assets has been inconsistent with DCIP guidance and the approach adopted by some of the other combatant commands and military services to identify specific mission-critical assets. While TRANSCOM officials have stated that they will discontinue the practice of using Transportation Infrastructure Vulnerability Assessments to identify specific critical transportation assets on the installations, they were not able to provide ASD(HD&ASA) or us with any documentation to confirm this decision officially. DOD stated that, consequently, TRANSCOM does not require additional ASD(HD&ASA) direction to do so. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To conduct our review of the Department of Defense’s (DOD) efforts to assure the availability of critical assets in the Transportation Defense Sector, we obtained relevant documentation and interviewed officials from the following DOD organizations: Office of the Secretary of Defense Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas’ Security Affairs (ASD)
Joint Staff, Directorate for Operations, Antiterrorism and Homeland Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Combat Support Assessments Department of the Army, Asymmetric Warfare Office, Critical Office of the Chief Information Officer Mission Assurance Division, Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren Division, Dahlgren, Virginia Department of the Air Force, Air, Space and Information Operations, Plans, and Requirements, Homeland Defense Division Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, Security Division, Critical Headquarters, U.S. Central Command, Critical Infrastructure Program Office, MacDill Air Force Base, Florida Headquarters, U.S. European Command, Critical Infrastructure Protection Program Office, Patch Barracks, Germany Headquarters, U.S. Pacific Command, Antiterrorism and Critical Infrastructure Division, Camp H.M. Smith, Hawaii U.S. To determine the extent to which DOD installation personnel have taken actions to help assure the availability of critical transportation assets, both within and independent of DCIP, we reviewed DOD guidance on risk management and other complementary programs. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Defense (DOD) established the Defense Critical Infrastructure Program (DCIP) to assure the availability of mission-critical infrastructure, including surface, sea, and air transportation assets to carry out its missions. GAO was asked to evaluate (1) the extent to which the U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) has identified, prioritized, and assessed critical transportation assets; (2) the extent to which DOD installation personnel have taken actions to help assure the availability of critical transportation assets, both within and independent of DCIP; and (3) how DOD is funding critical transportation asset assurance. GAO examined a nonprojectable sample of 22 critical transportation assets, reviewed relevant DOD guidance and documents, and interviewed cognizant officials.
What GAO Found
TRANSCOM has taken some actions to identify, prioritize, and assess its critical transportation assets but, according to officials from the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas' Security Affairs (ASD[HD&ASA]), its methodology for doing so, until recently, has been inconsistent with the intent of DOD's various DCIP guidance and with the approach adopted by some of the other combatant commands and military services. TRANSCOM considers entire installations--military air bases, seaports, and commercial airports--as critical assets, rather than identifying assets with greater specificity, such as individual runways, navigation aids, and fuel storage facilities. This methodology diminishes the reliability of the critical transportation asset list, a condition that impedes DOD's ability to prioritize its critical assets departmentwide and effectively target spending on risk-reduction efforts. Further, TRANSCOM was using its vulnerability assessments to identify specific critical transportation assets on the installations. This practice conflicts with DOD's DCIP guidance not to use vulnerability assessments to identify critical assets. Though TRANSCOM officials stated that they now plan to discontinue this practice, they were unable to provide ASD(HD&ASA) or GAO with any documentation to confirm that this decision had occurred officially. Further, TRANSCOM's memorandum of understanding with the Joint Staff to participate as transportation subject matter experts on the Joint Staff's vulnerability assessments with a DCIP module is still in draft. In May 2008, TRANSCOM officials told GAO that they now plan to use the draft DCIP critical asset identification process to reevaluate its 300 identified critical transportation assets; however, a timeline to complete this has not yet been determined. DOD installation personnel at the 22 sites GAO visited have taken actions to help assure the availability of critical transportation assets; however, these actions have routinely occurred independent of DCIP. Consequently, they do not consider the full spectrum of threats and hazards and they tend to focus on preventing mass personnel casualties instead of critical asset assurance. DCIP's impact at the installations where the assets are located was negligible because of the lack of service-specific guidance. This gap in guidance hinders installation personnel's ability to make informed risk management decisions based on asset criticality. Coordination efforts between installation personnel and non-DOD owners of critical transportation assets and supporting public works infrastructure were substantial, but have been focused on the protection of people and not on asset assurance. DOD has allocated approximately $283 million for DCIP from fiscal years 2004 to 2008, including $8.6 million to TRANSCOM for its combatant command and defense sector responsibilities. Critical infrastructure assurance efforts also have been funded through other DOD complementary programs, such as the Antiterrorism Program, and through foreign government contributions. Although existing DCIP funding does not include funding for remediating asset vulnerabilities, remediation has been funded from these other sources. |
gao_GAO-05-637 | gao_GAO-05-637_0 | Civilian Contractors Have Billions of Dollars in Unpaid Federal Taxes
Our analysis indicates that the failure to pay taxes among DOD contractors also exists among civilian agency contractors and totaled billions of dollars. Our analysis of FMS and IRS records indicates that during fiscal year 2004, FMS made payments on behalf of civilian agencies to about 33,000 federal contractors with over $3.3 billion in unpaid federal taxes as of September 30, 2004. We estimate that if there were no legal or administrative impediments to the levy program—if all unpaid federal taxes were considered and all payments to these 33,000 contractors with unpaid federal taxes were subjected to the 15 percent levy—FMS could have collected as much as $350 million in unpaid federal taxes from civilian contractors during fiscal 2004. However, employers are subject to civil and criminal penalties if they do not remit payroll taxes to the federal government. While Substantial, the Amount of Unpaid Taxes of Civilian Contractors Is Likely Understated
The amount of unpaid federal taxes we identified among civilian agency contractors—$3.3 billion—is likely understated for three main reasons: (1) we intentionally limited our scope to contractors with agreed-to federal tax debt for tax periods prior to 2004 that had substantial amounts of both unpaid taxes and payments from civilian agencies; (2) FMS disbursement files did not always contain the information we needed to determine whether the contractors owed federal taxes; and (3) the IRS taxpayer account database contains errors, and the database reflects only the amount of unpaid taxes either reported by the taxpayer on a tax return or assessed by IRS through its various enforcement programs. Figure 6 shows that slightly over half ($51 billion) of all policy exclusions are due to IRS’s determination that the tax debtor is in financial hardship. Further, because of a lack of proactive management, FMS did not send tens of billions of dollars more in payments to the levy program. FMS Did Not Include All Agency Payments in the Levy Program
FMS has not updated its TOP database to capture payments from about 150 agency paying stations, resulting in $40 billion of fiscal year 2004 civilian agency contractor payments being excluded from potential levy. For example, one contractor with unpaid taxes received from the State Department payments totaling over $400,000, which could not be levied because of the missing name. Examples of Abusive or Potentially Criminal Activity Related to the Federal Tax System by Businesses
Our audits and investigations of the 50 case study business contractors showed substantial abuse and potential criminal activity related to the tax system. IRS assessed a trust fund penalty on the officers of this company for willfully failing to remit payroll taxes withheld from their employees’ salaries. Although we found that payments to a number of contractors were not levied because IRS excluded their tax debts from TOP for at least a part of fiscal year 2004 for statutory or policy reasons, many others were not levied because of FMS’s lack of effective oversight or proactive management of the levy program. Further, it was FMS that did not identify and inform agencies to correct payment information for tens of billion of dollars in payments that did not have the basic information necessary for the payments to be matched against outstanding federal tax debt for potential levy. To identify payments to contractors disbursed through the government purchase card, we obtained from the Bank of America the database of purchase card payments made by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). We specifically included contractors from NASA and the Departments of Homeland Security (Transportation Security Administration), Justice, State, and Veterans Affairs. | Why GAO Did This Study
Tax abuses by contractors working for the Department of Defense, on which GAO previously reported, have led to concerns about similar abuses by those hired by civilian agencies. GAO was asked to determine if similar problems exist at civilian agencies and, if so, to (1) quantify the amount of unpaid federal taxes owed by civilian agency contractors paid through the Financial Management Service (FMS), (2) identify any statutory or policy impediments and control weaknesses that impede tax collections under the Federal Payment Levy Program (FPLP), and (3) determine whether there are indications of abusive or potential criminal activity by contractors with unpaid tax debts.
What GAO Found
FMS and IRS records showed that about 33,000 civilian agency contractors owed over $3 billion in unpaid federal taxes as of September 30, 2004. All 50 civilian agency contractors we investigated had abusive and potentially criminal activity. For example, businesses with employees did not forward payroll taxes withheld from their employees to IRS. Willful failure to remit payroll taxes is a felony under U.S. law. Further, several individuals own multiple businesses with unpaid federal taxes--one individual owns about 20 businesses that did not fully pay taxes related to over 300 returns. Some contractors purchased or owned millions of dollars of property while they did not remit payroll taxes. These activities were identified for contractors at the Departments of Justice, Homeland Security, and Veterans Affairs; the National Aeronautics and Space Administration; and others agencies. GAO's analysis indicates that if all tax debts owed by, and all payments made to, the 33,000 contractors were included in the FPLP, FMS could have collected hundreds of millions of dollars in fiscal year 2004. However, because only a fraction of all unpaid taxes and a portion of FMS payments are subjected to the levy program, FMS actually collected only $16 million from civilian contractors. For example, about $171 billion of unpaid federal taxes were not sent to the levy program to be offset against payments because of specific statutory requirements or IRS policy exclusions, such as debtors' claims of financial hardship or bankruptcy. Tens of billions of dollars in federal payments were not compared against tax debts for potential levy because FMS did not proactively manage and oversee the levy program. Until we brought it to FMS's attention, FMS did not know that it did not submit $40 billion of contractor payments from some civilian agencies for potential levy. FMS also did not identify payment files that did not contain contractor tax identification numbers, names, or both, resulting in $21 billion in payments to contractors that could not be levied. FMS also excluded billions of dollars from levy because of what it considered programming limitations without taking proactive steps to overcome those limitations. Further, civilian agency purchase card payments to contractors totaling $10 billion could not be levied. Improvements at FMS could result in tens of millions of dollars of additional levies annually. |
gao_GAO-07-859T | gao_GAO-07-859T_0 | Concerns arise when employers misclassify workers as independent contractors, who are excluded from certain worker protections. Number and Characteristics of Independent Contractors
In 2005, an estimated 7.4 percent of the total employed workforce were independent contractors. By comparison, 6.7 percent of the workforce were independent contractors in 1995. During this time period, the number of independent contractors grew from an estimated 8.3 million to 10.3 million workers in 2005. Independent contractors, in 2005, were on average 46 years old. Independent contractors were employed in a wide range of industries, but in 2005, 23 percent were employed in professional services and 22 percent were employed in construction. Misclassification of Employees Can Have Negative Outcomes for Workers and Government Programs
The tests used to determine whether a worker is an independent contractor or an employee are complex, subjective, and differ from law to law. Nevertheless, when employees are misclassified as independent contractors, they may be excluded from coverage under key laws designed to protect workers and may not have access to certain employer-provided benefits, such as health insurance coverage and pension plans. For example, misclassification could affect payment of taxes and payments into state workers’ compensation and unemployment insurance programs. Some of the key laws designed to protect workers but that only apply to “employees” include the following: Fair Labor Standards Act—establishes minimum wage, overtime, and child labor standards; Family and Medical Leave Act—requires employers to allow employees to take up to 12 weeks of unpaid, job-protected leave for medical reasons related to a family member’s or the employee’s own health; Occupational Safety and Health Act—requires employers to maintain a safe and healthy workplace for their employees and requires employers and employees to comply with all federal occupational health and safety standards; National Labor Relations Act—guarantees the right of employees to organize and bargain collectively; Unemployment Insurance—pays benefits to workers in covered jobs who become unemployed and meet state-established eligibility rules; and Workers’ Compensation—provides benefits to injured workers while limiting employers’ liability strictly to workers’ compensation payments. Employee Misclassification Can Affect Administration of Government Programs
Misclassification of employees can affect the administration of many federal and state programs, such as payment of taxes and pension benefits. DOL Detects and Addresses Employee Misclassification Through Investigations, but Offices We Studied Vary in How Often They Forward Misclassification Cases to Other Federal and State Agencies
DOL detects and addresses employee misclassification when enforcing the FLSA minimum wage and overtime pay provisions. DOL procedures require officials to share information with other federal and state agencies whenever investigators find possible violations of other laws. However, the district offices that we contacted vary in how often they forward misclassification cases as a possible violation of other agencies’ laws. Another form of outreach that DOL provides is its workplace poster. | Why GAO Did This Study
Some workers do not receive worker protections to which they are entitled because employers misclassify them as independent contractors when they should be classified as employees. Key worker protections include minimum hourly wage and overtime pay and access to unemployment insurance. The Department of Labor (DOL) enforces several labor laws to protect workers, including the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). Misclassification can also have a negative impact on tax collection for Social Security, unemployment insurance, and other programs. This testimony draws upon a previous GAO report and focuses specifically on (1) the number and characteristics of independent contractors, (2) the workforce protections and benefits provided to employees that typically are not available to independent contractors, and (3) the actions that DOL takes to detect and address employee misclassification.
What GAO Found
The number of independent contractors in the total employed workforce grew from 6.7 percent in 1995 to 7.4 percent in 2005. In 2005, there were 10.3 million independent contractors. Independent contractors, in 2005, had an average age of 46 years, were almost twice as likely to be male than female, and almost two-thirds had some college or higher education. Independent contractors were employed in a wide range of industries (such as professional services and construction) and occupations (including sales and management). When employees are misclassified as independent contractors, they may be excluded from coverage under key laws designed to protect workers and may not have access to employer-provided health insurance coverage and pension plans. Moreover, misclassification of employees can affect the administration of many federal and state programs, such as payment of taxes and payments into state workers' compensation and unemployment insurance programs. Notably, the tests used to determine whether a worker is an independent contractor or an employee are complex, subjective, and differ from law to law. DOL detects and addresses misclassification of employees as independent contractors by investigating complaints, but does not always forward misclassification cases to other federal and state agencies. DOL investigators detect and address employee misclassification primarily when responding to FLSA minimum wage and overtime pay complaints. DOL procedures require officials to share information with other federal and state agencies whenever investigators find possible violations of other laws. However, the district offices GAO contacted vary in how often they forward misclassification as a possible violation of other laws. As one form of outreach to workers, DOL has an FLSA workplace poster that explains the act, but it is missing key contact information. |
gao_GAO-16-74 | gao_GAO-16-74_0 | Implementation of EEOICPA
While the Division of Energy Employees Occupational Illness Compensation (DEEOIC) within DOL’s Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs has primary responsibility for administering the compensation program, other federal agencies, including the Department of Health and Human Services and Department of Energy, also have a role in implementing the program. DOL Generally Followed Its Procedures, but Was Deficient in Performing Some Steps When Preparing Correspondence and Developing Claims
Based on our review of a stratified random probability sample of 200 EEOICPA Part E claims filed from 2010 through 2014 by employees or their survivors, we found DOL claims examiners generally followed established adjudication procedures. Deficiencies in Quality of Correspondence to Claimants
Our claim file review found that most of the inconsistency with the Procedure Manual pertained to deficiencies in written correspondence to claimants, such as in Recommended and Final Decision letters, and in one instance, a letter requesting additional evidence. DOL officials said there is no national policy on performing such reviews and that they occur at the discretion of the district office. Reviews are one of DOL’s quality controls, but their inconsistent application may increase the likelihood of issues with the Recommended Decision, which in turn increases the potential for claimant confusion and delays in adjudication. As a result, none of the deficiencies we identified during our claim file review had led to the claim being remanded and corrected. For example, they estimated that from 2006 to 2015, the number of links between toxins and illnesses has increased from around 300 to over 3,000. Latest Linkages Must Be Applied during Adjudication but Lack of Documentation of This Step Hinders Monitoring
DOL provides limited notification to claims examiners and the public regarding new links between toxic substances and illnesses due to the large volume of information being continuously added to the SEM, according to officials. Therefore, it is usually incumbent upon claims examiners and the public to make themselves aware of new links. For that reason, DOL’s Procedure Manual instructs claims examiners to check the SEM for any updates just prior to issuing a Recommended Decision to deny a claim, however, documentation of that step is not always required. Moreover, it was not possible to determine whether any new causal links had been added because this information was not contained in the notice. DOL’s Monitoring Has Identified Some Ongoing Concerns With Claims Adjudication
DOL Continuously Monitors the Adjudication Process
In general, DOL’s monitoring from fiscal years 2010 through 2014 of how well EEOICPA Part E claims are adjudicated concluded that the process is working satisfactorily and meeting DOL’s established acceptability standards. DOL has Taken Steps to Address Deficiencies but Some Persist
DOL took steps to address the significant deficiencies identified in the Accountability Reviews from fiscal years 2010 through 2012, but determined that deficiencies in 2013 and 2014 were not significant enough to warrant corrective action. Nonetheless, according to DOL, the managers of the district and FAB offices followed up on specific errors to ensure that training or other actions were taken as appropriate. Conclusions
EEOICPA was enacted to compensate workers who carried out the nation’s nuclear weapons production. This gap in required documentation hinders the ability to monitor, consistent with federal internal control standards, whether claims examiners are performing a final check of the SEM to ensure that their decisions are based on the most up-to-date information. Recommendations for Executive Action
To enhance consistency with DOL policy and procedures in adjudicating EEOICPA Part E claims, we recommend that the Secretary of Labor strengthen internal controls by:
Requiring district offices to take steps to ensure that all claimant correspondence for Recommended and Final Decisions receives supervisory review;
Requiring district offices to document that the SEM was checked for updates just prior to issuing a Recommended Decision to deny a claim in cases in which the date of the last SEM update has not changed since the claims examiner’s prior check. Across all 200 claims, the number of conditions being claimed totaled 427. To determine how new links between toxic substances and diseases are captured and applied in the adjudication process, we reviewed adjudication guidance, including DOL’s EEOICPA Procedure Manual, Circulars, and Bulletins. In all, we reviewed 80 Circulars and 147 Bulletins and determined their relevance to our objective using two criteria: 1) those that pertained to the development and adjudication of Part E claims, and 2) those that provided guidance related to new links between toxic substances or radiological exposure, and diseases, or that provided guidance on whether the facility was covered under EEOICPA Part E.
In addition, we interviewed DOL officials and SEM contractor staff to obtain an understanding about how the SEM was created, what it contains, and DOL’s process for incorporating newly identified links into the SEM and making the information available to claims examiners and the public. Finally, we reviewed applicable federal laws and regulations. GAO-10-302. | Why GAO Did This Study
EEOICPA was enacted in 2000 to compensate employees and contractors of the Department of Energy whose illnesses are linked to their work in the nuclear weapons industry. Part E of the Act, enacted in 2004, compensates these contractor and subcontractor workers, or their eligible survivors, for medical expenses, impairments, and lost wages up to $250,000. GAO was asked to review DOL's management of this program.
GAO examined (1) the extent to which DOL follows its procedures to adjudicate Part E claims, (2) how DOL captures new links between toxic substances and diseases and applies them to adjudication, and (3) what DOL's monitoring indicates about the adjudication process and whether any corrective actions have been taken to address identified problems. GAO reviewed a generalizable stratified random sample of 200 Part E claims filed from 2010 through 2014; reviewed applicable federal laws, regulations, guidance, internal audit reports, and other agency documentation associated with internal monitoring; and interviewed DOL officials.
What GAO Found
The Department of Labor's (DOL) adjudication process for compensating Department of Energy contract workers or their survivors for illnesses linked to work in the nuclear weapons industry generally follows guidance and procedures implementing Part E of the Energy Employees Occupational Illness Compensation Program Act of 2000 (EEOICPA). Although GAO's analysis of a generalizable sample of 200 claims filed by workers from 2010 through 2014 found the adjudication process generally followed DOL's guidance and procedures, GAO identified some inconsistencies in an estimated 10 percent of the claims, including errors in correspondence to claimants and in development of claims. The procedure manual stipulates that written decisions should clearly convey information that led to the decision and that decisions are to be reviewed by the appropriate signatory. GAO found that decisions sometimes contained inaccurate, conflicting, or incomplete information, such as listing the wrong medical condition. DOL also did not always run accurate searches of its Site Exposure Matrices (SEM)—an online electronic database of facilities, toxic substances, and associated illnesses—when processing claims, or responding to requests for reopening claims. In addition, GAO found that supervisory review is at the discretion of each district office and, as a result, recommended decisions on claims were not always reviewed. This may increase the likelihood of poorly written decisions, which is inconsistent with procedures and which, in turn, increases the potential for claimant confusion and delays in adjudication.
DOL uses the SEM to, among other things, document newly identified causal links between toxins and diseases on the basis of medical research. According to DOL officials, since 2006 the number of such links listed in the SEM has increased from about 300 to over 3,000. They said that due to the large volume of information updates, DOL provides limited notification to claims examiners and the public when they occur. It has issued 10 notices specifically on new links since 2006. Therefore, it is usually incumbent on claims examiners and claimants to make themselves aware of new links by continuously checking the SEM for updates. As a result, new links are applied to claims largely to the extent these checks are performed. However, claims examiners are not always required to document that they checked whether the SEM had been updated prior to issuing a recommended decision to deny a claim. This gap in documentation hinders DOL's ability to monitor program performance, consistent with federal internal control standards.
According to DOL's monitoring, its process for adjudicating Part E claims is working satisfactorily, but persistent deficiencies remain. DOL conducted reviews from fiscal years 2010 through 2014 based on random sampling and found that the process for adjudicating claims met DOL's acceptability standards in any given year. Nonetheless, DOL consistently found deficiencies in certain adjudication steps across all years, including insufficient use of program resources to fully develop claims and improperly written decisions, as GAO also identified in its claim file review. DOL took corrective actions, such as training for claims examiners, to address deficiencies in 2010 through 2012, but determined that corrective actions were not warranted in 2013 and 2014.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOL take steps to ensure all decision letters receive supervisory review, and require that claims examiners document that they checked whether the SEM had been updated just prior to issuing a decision to deny a claim. DOL agreed with the recommendations and indicated it would take steps to implement them. |
gao_GAO-10-899 | gao_GAO-10-899_0 | State and Local Governments Face Increasing Fiscal Challenges in the Next 50 Years
State and Local Fiscal Model Simulations Show Sector Facing Long-Term Fiscal Challenges
Our March 2010 state and local fiscal model updates simulations showing that state and local governments’ long-term fiscal position will steadily decline through 2060 absent policy changes (see fig. These results confirm our recent finding that while states’ near- term revenue shortfalls have been cushioned by the temporary infusion of American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (Recovery Act) funds, as shown in the insert within figure 1, states will continue to be fiscally stressed. The primary driver of the fiscal pressure confronting the state and local sector is the continued growth in health-related costs. Historical Data Show Aggregate Shifts in State and Local Expenditures, Revenues, and Intergovernmental Grants
Over the last 30 years, health care spending has increased as a share of state and local spending, growing from 12 percent of overall state and local expenditures in 1978 to 20 percent in 2008 (see fig. State and Local Spending and Revenue Trends Varied Among the States for the Past 30 Years
The rates of growth in expenditures and revenues varied among the states during the past 30 years, both overall and within specific categories of expenditures and revenues. The state and local sector as a whole generally avoided operating deficits despite current spending growing faster than own-source revenues in part because the growth in federal grants for the purpose of funding current spending somewhat exceeded the growth in current spending. In addition, from 1995 to 2007, the sector increasingly financed capital purchases by issuing debt, rather than with revenues, which left more revenues available to pay for current expenditures. However, if the overall trend of expenditure growth in excess of revenue growth persists; state and local government expenditure growth will put increasing pressure on state and local governments going forward. The growth of intergovernmental revenue from the federal government (federal grants) was mixed. State and local current expenditures grew faster than federal grant revenues in more than half of the states (see fig. For the state and local government sector in the aggregate, federal grants grew as a share of state and local current expenditures from 1977 to 2007 for three of the four types of spending that we assessed—health and hospitals, education, and public welfare (which includes Medicaid spending). 3. Growth rates for public welfare expenditures during the same period ranged from 2.3 to 10.9 percent in individual states. Salaries and wages: State and local government spending on salaries and wages grew at an average annual rate of 2.9 percent between 1977 and 2007 and growth ranged from 0.4 percent to 5.5 percent for individual states during this time period. Fiscal Pressures Could Affect Delivery of Intergovernmental Programs
Given the nature of the partnership among levels of government in providing services to the public and the economic interrelationships among levels of government, understanding patterns in state and local government expenditures and revenues is crucial for identifying and analyzing potential fiscal pressures for the sector. The interconnectedness which defines intergovernmental programs requires that all levels of government remain aware of and ready to respond to fiscal pressures. These challenges have implications for a wide range of federal, state, and local programs, policies, and activities. Actions to address the nation’s long-term fiscal outlook will be needed at all government levels in coming years and the challenges cannot simply be shifted from one level of government to another. Specifically, we examined (1) the fiscal pressures facing state and local governments during the next several decades and the past expenditure and revenue trends that influence these pressures, (2) state and local government expenditure and revenue trends to identify patterns among states, and (3) what is known about the implications of long-term state and local government fiscal pressures for current and future federal policies. We then selected analogous categories in the U.S. Census Bureau data to analyze expenditure trends by category and state. | Why GAO Did This Study
State and local governments work in partnership with the federal government to implement numerous intergovernmental programs. Fiscal pressures for state and local governments may exist when spending is expected to outpace revenues for the long term. GAO was asked to examine (1) the long-term fiscal pressures facing state and local governments and historical spending and revenue trends, (2) spending and revenue trends to identify patterns among states, and (3) what is known about the implications of these fiscal pressures for federal policies. Using aggregate data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis's National Income and Product Accounts, this analysis draws on results from the March 2010 update to GAO's state and local government fiscal model. GAO's model uses historical data to simulate expenditures and revenues for the sector for the next 50 years. Data from the U.S. Census Bureau are used to analyze patterns of state and local government expenditures and revenues among the states from 1977 to 2007, the most recent 30-year period for which these data were available. A review of GAO and other reports synthesizes what is known about the implications of these long-term fiscal pressures for future federal policies.
What GAO Found
Understanding patterns in state and local government expenditures and revenues is crucial for identifying and analyzing potential future fiscal pressures for the sector. The March 2010 update to GAO's state and local fiscal model updates simulations that state and local governments' long-term fiscal position will steadily decline through 2060 absent policy changes. The primary driver of the fiscal pressure confronting the state and local sector is the continued growth in health-related costs. Over the last 30 years, health care spending has increased as a share of state and local spending, growing from 12 percent of overall state and local expenditures in 1978 to 20 percent in 2008. While the temporary infusion of funds from the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 helped cushion near-term revenue shortfalls, states will continue to be fiscally stressed. The rates of growth in expenditures and revenues varied among the states during the past 30 years, both overall and within specific categories. Current expenditures grew faster than own-source revenues in almost all states between 1977 and 2007. Average annual growth rates of state and local government expenditures and revenues varied substantially by category and among states. For example, public welfare (which includes Medicaid) was one of the fastest growing expenditure categories. In the aggregate, inflation-adjusted spending on public welfare grew at an average annual rate of 5.3 percent per year and growth rates in individual states ranged from 2.3 percent to 10.9 percent. The growth of intergovernmental revenue from the federal government (grants) also varied among the states. State and local current expenditures grew faster than federal grant revenues in more than half of the states. Despite these trends, the sector in the aggregate usually remained in surplus during this 30-year period. The sector avoided operating deficits, in part because of federal grant growth, and in part because, from 1995 to 2007, the sector increasingly financed capital purchases by issuing debt, rather than with revenues, which left more revenues available to pay for current expenditures. However, if the overall trend of state and local government expenditure growth in excess of revenue growth persists, this growth will put increasing pressure on state and local governments going forward. All levels of government face long-term fiscal challenges which could affect future federal funding of intergovernmental programs, as well as the potential capacity of state and local governments to help fund and implement these programs. The interconnectedness which defines intergovernmental programs requires that officials at all levels of government remain aware of and ready to respond to fiscal pressures. These pressures have implications for a wide range of federal, state, and local programs, policies, and activities, and include costs associated with health care, physical infrastructure, state and local employee pensions and retiree health benefits, and education, among other areas. Actions to address the nation's long-term fiscal outlook will be needed at all government levels in coming years and the challenges cannot be adequately met by shifting burdens from one level of government to another. GAO does not make recommendations in this report. |
gao_GAO-09-12 | gao_GAO-09-12_0 | Third, NFIP assumes all the risks for the policies it sells. FEMA sets rates on a nationwide basis, combining and averaging across many geographically diverse areas. Collectively, these factors increase the risk that premiums collected on full-risk rates do not accurately reflect the risks of flooding and therefore may not be sufficient to cover future losses. FEMA’s Rate-Setting Process Uses a Model That Is Based on Flood Risk and Expected Flood Damage
According to FEMA, rates that are based on the probability of a given level of flooding, damage estimates based on that level of flooding, and accepted actuarial principles are considered to be “full risk.” To set rates for flood insurance that accurately reflect risk, information about the differential risk of flooding is key, with greater flood risks resulting in higher rates. the Corps for a number of years. They have not been revisited or updated since that time. FEMA Does Not Track the Number or Location of Remapped Grandfathered Properties That Pay Less than Full-Risk Premiums
FEMA made a policy decision to grandfather into the program certain properties, that is, it allowed properties that have been remapped into riskier flood zones to keep their previous lower rates. As a result of the growth in the program, the rate classes may not accurately reflect the actual flood risk to individual properties and averaging may no longer accurately reflect differences in rates within zones. FEMA’s Process for Setting Subsidized Rates May Further Compromise the Ongoing Financial Stability of the Program
FEMA’s rate-setting process for subsidized properties, which depends in part on the accuracy of the full-risk rates, has evolved over time. Currently, to determine subsidized rates, FEMA first subtracts the total amount that it expects to collect on full-risk rate premiums from the average historical loss year target—the minimum amount of premiums the program needs to collect to cover at least average annual losses based on historical loss data. The amount remaining from this calculation is the aggregate target amount of subsidized premiums that the program needs to collect. Then to set individual subsidized rates, FEMA officials consider their knowledge of flood risks, previous rate increases for various areas, and statutory limits on rate increases. Currently, the annual amount that NFIP collects in both full-risk and subsidized premiums is not enough to cover its operating costs, claim losses, and principal and interest payments to the Department of the Treasury. NFIP’s Current Rate- Setting Processes Result in Premiums That Are Not Sufficient to Cover Current Debt and Future Claims
The processes and policies that FEMA uses to set both full-risk and subsidized premium rates have contributed to NFIP’s inability to generate enough in premiums to cover the program’s operating costs, claims losses, and debt to the Treasury. The 2005 hurricanes, especially Katrina, left the program with debt of more than $17.4 billion as of June 2008. First, potentially outdated and inaccurate data about flood probabilities, damage claims, and flood maps are increasing the risk that full-risk premiums do not reflect actual risk of flooding. Finally, FEMA’s rate-setting process for subsidized properties depends in part on the accuracy of full-risk rates, raising concerns about how these rates are calculated as well. The resulting subsidized premiums continue to be a financial strain on NFIP and contribute to its ongoing financial instability. However, any efforts to improve the accuracy of the premiums charged by the program will help reduce the financial risk to which the federal government and, ultimately, taxpayers are exposed from the flood insurance program. Second, FEMA said that the report does not accurately present the status of its map modernization efforts and their impact on premium rates. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To assess the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) rate- setting process and determine whether it produces rates that accurately reflect the risk of flooding for properties that do not receive subsidies, we reviewed and analyzed FEMA’s model for evaluating potential flood damage to properties as well as the methods used for assessing risk and setting premium rates for policyholders. | Why GAO Did This Study
Questions about the financial status of the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) have increased since the 2005 hurricanes, which left the program with an unprecedented $17.4 billion deficit--a debt that resulted in GAO placing NFIP on its high-risk list in March 2006. Among the concerns are the subsidized rates NFIP must provide for about 25 percent of the policies, mostly for older buildings in high-risk flood zones. And although fully risk-based rates are supposed to reflect actual flood risk, concerns have been raised that they do not. This report evaluates (1) the Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA) process for setting full-risk rates to determine whether it produces rates that accurately reflect the risk of flooding and (2) the process that FEMA uses to set subsidized rates and their effect on the financial condition of NFIP. To do this work, GAO evaluated the NFIP rate model, examined data from FEMA, surveyed relevant literature, and interviewed other relevant agencies and risk-modeling firms.
What GAO Found
FEMA's method for setting its full-risk rates may not ensure that the rates accurately reflect the actual risk of flood damage. The NFIP model combines estimated flood risk with expected flood damage, but a number of factors may affect the accuracy of the rates the model generates. First, some data inputs are outdated or inaccurate. FEMA relies on flood probabilities from the 1980s and damage estimates that do not fully reflect recent NFIP damage experience. Moreover, while FEMA has made updating its flood maps a priority, most of the maps used in rate setting have not yet been updated. Second, FEMA does not require all properties remapped into higher-risk areas to pay rates based on the new designation. This policy, known as grandfathering, erodes NFIP's ability to charge rates that reflect the risk of flooding. The policy is intended to increase participation, but FEMA does not track the number of grandfathered properties and cannot determine their financial impact on the program. Third, FEMA uses a nationwide rating system that combines flood zones across many geographic areas, so individual policies do not always reflect topographical features that affect flood risk. In fact, some patterns in historical claims and premium data suggest that NFIP's full-risk rates may not always reflect actual flood risk. Collectively, these factors increase the risk that premiums collected on full-risk policies may be insufficient to cover future losses, adding to concerns about NFIP's financial stability. FEMA's rate-setting process for subsidized properties depends in part on the accuracy of the full-risk rates, raising concerns about how these rates are calculated as well. To set subsidized rates, FEMA first subtracts the total amount it expects to collect in full-risk premiums from the average historical loss year--that is, the minimum (target) amount that the program needs to collect from all premiums to cover at least average annual losses, as determined by historical data. The remainder becomes the aggregate target amount the program must collect in subsidized premiums. To set individual subsidized rates, FEMA officials then consider their knowledge of flood risk, previous rate increases for various locations, and statutory limits on increases. The resulting subsidized premiums continue to be a financial strain on the NFIP and contribute to its ongoing financial instability. Evidence suggests that flooding is likely to become more severe in the future, resulting in increased risk exposure, the potential for more catastrophic losses, and ongoing financial instability for the program. Currently, the annual amount that NFIP collects in both full-risk and subsidized premiums is not enough to cover its operating costs, claim losses, and principal and interest payments to the Department of the Treasury, thereby exposing the federal government and ultimately taxpayers to ever-greater financial risks, especially in years of catastrophic flooding. |
gao_GAO-11-865T | gao_GAO-11-865T_0 | Critical infrastructure includes, among other things, banking and financial institutions, telecommunications networks, and energy production and transmission facilities, most of which are owned by the private sector. Because the private sector owns most of the nation’s critical infrastructures, forming effective partnerships between the public and private sectors is vital to successfully protect cyber-reliant critical assets from a multitude of threats, including terrorists, criminals, and hostile nations. Federal law and policy have established roles and responsibilities for federal agencies to work with the private sector and other entities in enhancing the cyber and physical security of critical public and private infrastructures. In addition, they establish the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) as the focal point for the security of cyberspace—including analysis, warning, information sharing, vulnerability reduction, mitigation efforts, and recovery efforts for public and private critical infrastructure and information systems. In May 1998, Presidential Decision Directive 63 (PDD-63) established critical infrastructure protection as a national goal and presented a strategy for cooperative efforts by the government and the private sector to protect the physical and cyber-based systems essential to the minimum operations of the economy and the government. Among other things, DHS was assigned with the following critical infrastructure protection responsibilities: (1) developing a comprehensive national plan for securing the key resources and critical infrastructures of the United States, (2) recommending measures to protect those key resources and critical infrastructures in coordination with other groups, and (3) disseminating, as appropriate, information to assist in the deterrence, prevention, and preemption of or response to terrorist attacks. Cyber-Reliant Critical Infrastructures Face a Proliferation of Threats
Threats to systems supporting critical infrastructure are evolving and growing. In February 2011, the Director of National Intelligence testified that, in the past year, there had been a dramatic increase in malicious cyber activity targeting U.S. computers and networks, including a more than tripling of the volume of malicious software since 2009. Different types of cyber threats from numerous sources may adversely affect computers, software, networks, organizations, entire industries, or the Internet itself. Intentional threats include both targeted and untargeted attacks from a variety of sources, including criminal groups, hackers, disgruntled employees, foreign nations engaged in espionage and information warfare, and terrorists. In June 2011, a major bank reported that hackers broke into its systems and gained access to the personal information of hundreds of thousands of customers. It targeted control systems used to operate industrial processes in the energy, nuclear, and other critical sectors. The Federal Government Has Taken Steps to Address Cyber Threats to Cyber Critical Infrastructure
Over the past 2 years, the federal government has taken a number of steps aimed at addressing cyber threats to critical infrastructure. In early 2009, the President initiated a review of the nation’s cyberspace policy that specifically assessed the missions and activities associated with the nation’s information and communication infrastructure and issued the results in May of that year. These included, among other things, that the President appoint a cybersecurity policy official for coordinating the nation’s cybersecurity policies and activities. Also in 2009, DHS issued an updated version of its National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP). The NIPP is intended to provide the framework for a coordinated national approach to addressing the full range of physical, cyber, and human threats and vulnerabilities that pose risks to the nation’s critical infrastructures. The NIPP relies on a sector partnership model as the primary means of coordinating government and private-sector critical infrastructure protection efforts. DHS has also coordinated several cyber attack simulation exercises to strengthen public and private incident response capabilities. Challenges in Protecting Cyber Critical Infrastructure Persist
Despite the actions taken by several successive administrations and the executive branch agencies, significant challenges remain to enhancing the protection of cyber-reliant critical infrastructures. Implementing actions recommended by the president’s cybersecurity policy review. Updating the national strategy for securing the information and communications infrastructure. Addressing global cybersecurity and governance. Securing the modernized electricity grid. Among other things, we identified six key challenges to securing smart grid systems. | Why GAO Did This Study
Increasing computer interconnectivity, such as the growth of the Internet, has revolutionized the way our government, our nation, and much of the world communicate and conduct business. However, this widespread interconnectivity poses significant risks to the government's and the nation's computer systems, and to the critical infrastructures they support. These critical infrastructures include systems and assets--both physical and virtual--that are essential to the nation's security, economic prosperity, and public health, such as financial institutions, telecommunications networks, and energy production and transmission facilities. Because most of these infrastructures are owned by the private sector, establishing effective public-private partnerships is essential to securing them from pervasive cyber-based threats. Federal law and policy call for federal entities, such as the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), to work with private-sector partners to enhance the physical and cyber security of these critical infrastructures. GAO is providing a statement describing (1) cyber threats facing cyber-reliant critical infrastructures; (2) recent actions the federal government has taken, in partnership with the private sector, to identify and protect cyber-reliant critical infrastructures; and (3) ongoing challenges to protecting these infrastructures. In preparing this statement, GAO relied on its previously published work in the area.
What GAO Found
The threats to systems supporting critical infrastructures are evolving and growing. In a February 2011 testimony, the Director of National Intelligence noted that there has been a dramatic increase in cyber activity targeting U.S. computers and systems in the last year, including a more than tripling of the volume of malicious software since 2009. Varying types of threats from numerous sources can adversely affect computers, software, networks, organizations, entire industries, or the Internet itself. These include both unintentional and intentional threats, and may come in the form of targeted or untargeted attacks from criminal groups, hackers, disgruntled employees, hostile nations, or terrorists. The interconnectivity between information systems, the Internet, and other infrastructures can amplify the impact of these threats, potentially affecting the operations of critical infrastructure, the security of sensitive information, and the flow of commerce. Recent reported incidents include hackers accessing the personal information of hundreds of thousands of customers of a major U.S. bank and a sophisticated computer attack targeting control systems used to operate industrial processes in the energy, nuclear, and other critical sectors. Over the past 2 years, the federal government, in partnership with the private sector, has taken a number of steps to address threats to cyber critical infrastructure. In early 2009, the White House conducted a review of the nation's cyberspace policy that addressed the missions and activities associated with the nation's information and communications infrastructure. The results of the review led, among other things, to the appointment of a national Cybersecurity Coordinator with responsibility for coordinating the nation's cybersecurity policies and activities. Also in 2009, DHS updated its National Infrastructure Protection Plan, which provides a framework for addressing threats to critical infrastructures and relies on a public-private partnership model for carrying out these efforts. DHS has also established a communications center to coordinate national response efforts to cyber attacks and work directly with other levels of government and the private sector and has conducted several cyber attack simulation exercises. Despite recent actions taken, a number of significant challenges remain to enhancing the security of cyber-reliant critical infrastructures, such as (1) implementing actions recommended by the president's cybersecurity policy review; (2) updating the national strategy for securing the information and communications infrastructure; (3) reassessing DHS's planning approach to critical infrastructure protection; (4) strengthening public-private partnerships, particularly for information sharing; (5) enhancing the national capability for cyber warning and analysis; (6) addressing global aspects of cybersecurity and governance; and (7)securing the modernized electricity grid, referred to as the "smart grid." In prior reports, GAO has made many recommendations to address these challenges. GAO also continues to identify protecting the nation's cyber critical infrastructure as a governmentwide high-risk area. |
gao_GAO-16-715 | gao_GAO-16-715_0 | In order to be transported, explosives must be assigned a classification. The classification, which includes a number that denotes the risk level of the explosive (from most to least hazardous), dictates associated transportation requirements, such as by which transportation modes the explosives can travel and how they are packaged. Unlike some other classes of hazmat that can be self-classified (meaning the shipper classifies the material), in order to be classified, explosives must be first examined by one of six PHMSA-approved third party test labs. 1). PHMSA’s Oversight Is Hindered by the Lack of a Systematic Approach to Guidance for Test Labs, While Stakeholders Have Mixed Views on PHMSA’s Oversight
PHMSA’s oversight of the classification of new explosives includes two key parts—(1) approving and monitoring the test labs and (2) reviewing and approving the manufacturers’ applications for classification of a new explosive and the labs’ test classification recommendations. PHMSA Has Improved Oversight of Test Labs, but Has Not Systematically Determined What Guidance to Provide Test Labs
PHMSA has several activities to approve and oversee test labs, but its efforts to ensure consistency are limited by PHMSA’s lack of a systematic approach to developing and issuing guidance for these labs. Likewise, we have previously reported that agencies benefit from procedures that continually reassess and improve guidance processes and documents to respond to the concerns of regulated entities. However, PHMSA officials told us they give test labs flexibility in how to apply these requirements on a case-by-case basis when testing new explosives to recommend classifications. Four of the six test labs we spoke to said written guidance from PHMSA could help address “unwritten rules” such as commonly used modifications to the test manual. 2). According to PHMSA officials, PHMSA’s role in approving classifications, which is outlined in regulation, is essential to fulfilling its role in regulating hazmat transportation in the U.S. According to PHMSA officials, its overarching goal in reviewing applications is to ensure that every new explosive is classified correctly, and as a result, application review processing times can vary greatly depending on many factors, such as the quality of the application; the complexity of the application and the explosive device; and the timeliness of test-lab response when PHMSA technical reviewers reach out with questions or requests for additional information. In contrast to some manufacturers’ views, other stakeholders, including carrier associations and test lab examiners, were supportive of PHMSA’s oversight role, including the review and approval of test labs’ classification recommendations. PHMSA’s Oversight Improvement Efforts Align with Goals, but PHMSA Faces Staffing and Data Challenges and Lacks Sufficient Data System Planning
PHMSA Has Outlined Improvement Efforts That Align with Its Goals
In its February 2016 memo, which cited manufacturers’ concerns with the approval process, PHMSA outlined improvement efforts that align with goals in PHMSA’s Office of Hazardous Materials Safety 2013-2016 strategic plan. These goals include increasing outreach, streamlining the regulatory system, and enhancing risk management. PHMSA Faces Staffing Challenges
Despite these recent reform efforts, PHMSA officials stated that limited staff resources create challenges for application turnaround. According to data provided by PHMSA, between 2006 and 2015, on average, PHMSA officials reviewed 1,700 applications for new explosive classifications annually. Internal control standards for the federal government state that management should design the entity’s information system to achieve objectives and respond to risks. PHMSA officials described several ongoing efforts to improve the agency’s data systems. Moreover, PHMSA officials stated that fiscal year 2016 funds have been designated to transition the FYI system to a PHMSA-wide portal to better capture information in applications and develop the ability to analyze information across applications. Similarly, while PHMSA officials stated that test labs’ quality and experience could affect the length of its review, PHMSA officials have not developed data fields that could highlight such information in applications and be incorporated into the new system, potentially improving PHMSA’s ability to analyze the quality and consistency both across test labs and the reviewers. This could help the agency target efforts to streamline its process. Conclusion
Although PHMSA has taken steps to strengthen its oversight of the explosives classification process that align with its strategic goals, PHMSA’s ability to be responsive to stakeholder concerns and to overcome challenges may be limited without a more systematic approach to improvements in two areas: guidance to test labs and information systems. In contrast, a carefully developed and implemented data plan could potentially help PHMSA respond to manufacturers’ concerns about the timeliness of PHMSA’s review process and mitigate PHMSA’s challenges related to limited staff resources while also helping it meet its goals related to outreach, transparency, and developing a risk-based approach. 2. Develop a written plan describing information requirements for PHMSA’s new data system. Agency Comments
We provided a draft of this product to the Department of Transportation (DOT) for comment. | Why GAO Did This Study
Explosives accounted for 4 million of the total 2.6 billion tons of hazardous materials transported in the U.S. in 2012. DOT's PHMSA is responsible for regulating the transport of explosives, which includes classifying new explosives prior to transportation. The classification denotes the risk level and requirements, such as which transportation modes can be used to transport the explosive. To be classified, an explosive must be examined by a PHMSA-approved third-party test lab. PHMSA must then approve the test lab's classification recommendation.
The Fixing America's Surface Transportation Act includes a provision for GAO to review DOT's oversight of this process. This report addresses: (1) PHMSA's oversight of the classification of new explosives and related stakeholder views and (2) PHMSA's efforts to improve the oversight process and any associated challenges. GAO collected PHMSA data on applications processed (2006-2015) and explosives incidents (2005-2015) and interviewed officials from PHMSA, all six approved test labs, carrier and explosive manufacturer associations, and five explosives manufacturers selected in part to represent a range of industries.
What GAO Found
The Department of Transportation's (DOT) Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration's (PHMSA) oversight of the labs that issue classification recommendations for new explosives is limited by a lack of guidance, and stakeholders have mixed views on PHMSA's oversight. To receive a classification for a new explosive, manufacturers must have an approved test lab examine the explosive and submit an application to PHMSA with the test lab's recommended classification. PHMSA's oversight includes: (1) approving and monitoring the test labs and (2) reviewing applications and classification recommendations. Although PHMSA has several activities to oversee test labs, its efforts to promote test lab consistency—one objective of its oversight—are hindered by the lack of a systematic approach to developing guidance. GAO has reported that agencies benefit from procedures to improve guidance to respond to regulated entities' concerns. PHMSA officials stated that they grant test labs flexibility on how to apply standards and regulations. However, four of the six test labs said guidance could explain “unwritten rules” such as common testing modifications. Without a systematic approach to determining what guidance is needed, PHMSA's ability to achieve consistency is limited.
Stakeholder views on PHMSA's oversight processes, in particular its process for approving classification recommendations, are mixed. PHMSA officials view their role as final approver of classifications as critical. However, some manufacturers stated that PHMSA's review process is time consuming and opaque and questioned whether it adds value. In contrast, other stakeholders such as carrier associations were supportive of PHMSA's oversight role. In 2015, PHMSA began taking steps to improve the transparency of its process by, for example, posting information online on average application processing times.
PHMSA has begun oversight improvement efforts that align with its strategic goals to increase outreach, streamline its classification application review process, and enhance risk management, but it faces staffing and data challenges. For example, PHMSA has eliminated one of two technical reviews for certain explosive classification applications. According to PHMSA officials, such streamlining could help PHMSA better manage its limited staff resources—7 PHMSA officials process an average of 1,700 new explosives annually, along with other duties—a workload that creates challenges for application turnaround. However, PHMSA's data challenges reduce its ability to strategically improve its process, and PHMSA lacks a plan for data system improvements under way. Internal control standards state that management should design the entity's information system to achieve objectives and respond to risks. Currently, PHMSA's data system does not allow the agency to aggregate or analyze most information across applications, limiting PHMSA's ability to analyze its processes or outcomes in order to achieve objectives or respond to risks. PHMSA officials stated that fiscal year 2016 funds have been designated to upgrade its system, but PHMSA does not have a plan documenting what fields or information needs are required for the system in order to reach agency goals. Without a plan to guide the development of the new data system, PHMSA may miss opportunities to use it to better manage staff resources, identify future and evaluate past reforms, and meet agency goals.
What GAO Recommends
To improve oversight of the classification of new explosives, PHMSA should (1) develop and implement a systematic approach for improving PHMSA's guidance for test labs; and (2) develop a written plan describing information requirements for its new data system. DOT concurred with the recommendations. |
gao_GAO-04-140T | gao_GAO-04-140T_0 | In the electric power industry they can manage and control the transmission and delivery of electric power, for example, by opening and closing circuit breakers and setting thresholds for preventive shutdowns. In October 1997, the President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection specifically discussed the potential damaging effects on the electric power and oil and gas industries of successful attacks on control systems. Moreover, in 2002, the National Research Council identified “the potential for attack on control systems” as requiring “urgent attention.” In February 2003, the President clearly demonstrated concern about “the threat of organized cyber attacks capable of causing debilitating disruption to our Nation’s critical infrastructures, economy, or national security,” noting that “disruption of these systems can have significant consequences for public health and safety” and emphasizing that the protection of control systems has become “a national priority.”
Several factors have contributed to the escalation of risk to control systems, including (1) the adoption of standardized technologies with known vulnerabilities, (2) the connectivity of control systems to other networks, (3) constraints on the implementation of existing security technologies and practices, (4) insecure remote connections, and (5) the widespread availability of technical information about control systems. According to the National Institute of Standards and Technology, cyber attacks on energy production and distribution systems—including electric, oil, gas, and water treatment, as well as on chemical plants containing potentially hazardous substances—could endanger public health and safety, damage the environment, and have serious financial implications, such as loss of production, generation, or distribution of public utilities; compromise of proprietary information; or liability issues. I will now discuss potential and reported cyber attacks on control systems. Current Cybersecurity Technologies Have Limitations in Securing Control Systems
A significant challenge in effectively securing control systems is the lack of specialized security technologies for these systems. Steps Can Be Taken to Strengthen Control System Security
Several steps can be considered when addressing potential threats to control systems, including:
Researching and developing new security technologies to protect control systems. Government and private industry have taken a broad look at the cybersecurity requirements of control systems and have initiated several efforts to address the technical, economic, and cultural challenges that must be addressed. | Why GAO Did This Study
Computerized control systems perform vital functions across many of our nation's critical infrastructures. For example, in natural gas distribution, they can monitor and control the pressure and flow of gas through pipelines; in the electric power industry, they can monitor and control the current and voltage of electricity through relays and circuit breakers; and in water treatment facilities, they can monitor and adjust water levels, pressure, and chemicals used for purification. In October 1997, the President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection emphasized the increasing vulnerability of control systems to cyber attacks. The House Committee on Government Reform, Subcommittee on Technology, Information Policy, Intergovernmental Relations, and the Census asked GAO to testify on potential cyber vulnerabilities. GAO's testimony focused on (1) significant cybersecurity risks associated with control systems; (2) potential and reported cyber attacks against these systems; (3) key challenges to securing control systems; and (4) steps that can be taken to strengthen the security of control systems, including current federal and private-sector initiatives.
What GAO Found
In addition to general cyber threats, which have been steadily increasing, several factors have contributed to the escalation of the risks of cyber attacks against control systems. These include the adoption of standardized technologies with known vulnerabilities, the increased connectivity of control systems to other systems, constraints on the use of existing security technologies for control systems, and the wealth of information about them that is publicly available. Control systems can be vulnerable to a variety of attacks, examples of which have already occurred. Successful attacks on control systems could have devastating consequences, such as endangering public health and safety; damaging the environment; or causing a loss of production, generation, or distribution of public utilities. Securing control systems poses significant challenges, including technical limitations, perceived lack of economic justification, and conflicting organizational priorities. However, several steps can be taken now and in the future to promote better security in control systems, such as implementing effective security management programs and researching and developing new technologies. The government and private industry have initiated several efforts intended to improve the security of control systems. |
gao_T-NSIAD-96-182 | gao_T-NSIAD-96-182_0 | On the other hand, the amount of cocaine seized and the number of drug-related arrests in Mexico have declined from 1993 to 1995 compared to those before U.S. assistance was terminated. Mexico’s efforts to stop the flow of drugs have been limited by numerous problems. Second, serious economic and political problems have limited Mexico’s counternarcotics effectiveness. Third, Mexico has lacked some basic legislative tools needed to combat drug-trafficking organizations, including the use of wiretaps, confidential informants, and a witness protection program. Fourth, the counternarcotics capabilities of the Mexican government to interdict drug-trafficking activities are hampered by inadequately equipped and poorly maintained aircraft. According to the State Department, U.S. efforts in Mexico are guided by an interagency strategy developed in 1992 that focused on strengthening the political commitment and institutional capability of the Mexican government, targeting major trafficking organizations, and developing operational initiatives such as drug interdiction. U.S. policy decisions have also affected drug control efforts in the transit zone and Mexico. The amount of U.S. funding for the transit zone declined from about $1 billion in fiscal year 1992 to about $569 million in fiscal year 1995—a decline of 43 percent. The 1993 change in the U.S. drug interdiction strategy reduced the detection and monitoring assets in the transit zone. Recent Efforts to Address Bilateral Drug Control Issues
Since our June 1995 testimony, a number of events have occurred that could affect future drug control efforts by the United States and Mexico. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed counternarcotics activities in Mexico, focusing on: (1) the nature of the drug-trafficking threat from Mexico; (2) Mexican government efforts to counter drug-trafficking activities; and (3) recent initiatives by the United States and Mexico to increase counternarcotics activities.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) U.S. and Mexican drug interdiction efforts have had little, if any, impact on the flow of illegal drugs from Mexico to the United States; (2) the amount of cocaine seized and the number of drug-related arrests have significantly declined since 1992; (3) widespread corruption, economic difficulties, and inadequate equipment and personnel training have hampered Mexico's capabilities to detect and interdict drug traffickers; (4) a substantial amount of Mexico's resources have been focused on economic concerns; (5) U.S. counternarcotics assistance has declined by 43 percent since 1992; (6) U.S. policy decisions and reductions in the counternarcotics program have also affected Mexican and U.S. drug control efforts; (7) Mexico lacks some important legislative tools for curbing drug-related activities; (8) drug interdiction funding declined from $1 billion in fiscal year (FY) 1992 to about $570 million in FY 1995; and (9) although staffing cutbacks have limited U.S. ability to monitor counternarcotics assistance to Mexico, the United States and Mexico have created a framework for increased cooperation and are developing a new binational drug control strategy. |
gao_GAO-06-120T | gao_GAO-06-120T_0 | VA Needs a System for Routinely Monitoring Variations Inherent in Deciding Disability Claims
Because adjudicators often must use judgment when deciding disability compensation claims, variations in decision making are an inherent possibility. Without measuring the effect of judgment on decisions, VA cannot provide reasonable assurance that consistency is acceptable. An example involving mental disorders also demonstrates how adjudicators sometimes must make judgments about the degree of severity of a disability. Because of the inherent possibility that different adjudicators could make differing decisions based on the same information pertaining to a specific impairment, we recommended in November 2004 that the Secretary of Veterans Affairs develop a plan containing a detailed description of how VA would (1) use data from a newly implemented administrative information system—known as Rating Board Automation 2000—to identify indications of decision-making inconsistencies among the regional offices for specific impairments and (2) conduct systematic studies of the impairments for which the data reveal possible inconsistencies among regional offices. Inconsistent Quality Of Disability Examination Reports Underscores Need to Monitor Consistency of Decisions
Because the existing medical records of disability claimants often do not provide VBA regional offices with sufficient evidence to decide claims properly, the regional offices often ask VHA medical centers to examine the claimants and provide exam reports containing the medical information needed to make a decision. To comply with the DeLuca decision’s requirements for joint and spine disability exam reports, VHA instructs its medical center clinicians to make not only an initial measurement of the range of motion in the impaired joint or spine but also to measure range of motion after having the claimant flex the impaired joint or spine several times. We reported earlier this month on the progress VA had made since 2002 in ensuring that its medical centers consistently prepare joint and spine exam reports containing the information required by DeLuca. We found that, as of May 2005, the percentage of joint and spine exam reports not meeting the DeLuca criteria had declined substantially from 61 percent to 22 percent. Moreover, in relation to the issue of consistency, the percentage of exam reports satisfying the DeLuca criteria varied widely across the 21 health care networks that manage VHA’s 157 medical centers—from a low of 57 percent compliance to a high of 92 percent. Conclusions
As a national program, VA’s disability compensation program must ensure that veterans receive fair and equitable decisions on their disability claims no matter where they live across the nation. Given the inherent risk of variation in disability decisions, it is incumbent on VA to ensure program integrity by having a credible system for identifying indications of inconsistency among its regional offices and then remedying any inconsistencies found to be unreasonable. | Why GAO Did This Study
The House Subcommittee on Disability Assistance and Memorial Affairs asked GAO to discuss its work on the consistency of disability compensation claims decisions of the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA). GAO has reported wide state-to-state variations in average compensation payments per disabled veteran, raising questions about decisional consistency. In 2003, GAO designated VA's disability programs, along with other federal disability programs, as high risk, in part because of concerns about decisional consistency. Illustrating this issue, GAO reported that inadequate information from VA medical centers on joint and spine impairments contributed to inconsistent regional office disability decisions.
What GAO Found
GAO's November 2004 report explained that adjudicators in the Department of Veterans Affairs often must use judgment in making disability compensation claims decisions. As a result, it is crucial for VA to have a system for routinely identifying the effect of judgment on decisional variations among its 57 regional offices to determine if the variations are reasonable and, if not, how to correct them. In 2002, GAO reported that state-to-state variations of as much as 63 percent in average compensation payments per disabled veteran indicated potential inconsistency. The nature of the criteria that adjudicators must apply in evaluating the degree of impairment due to mental disorders provides an example of the extent of judgment required. GAO's October 2005 report on decisions for joint and spine disabilities showed one important way to improve consistency. Specifically, regional offices often rely on VA's 157 medical centers to examine claimants and provide medical information needed to decide the claims. However, VA has found inconsistency among its medical centers in the adequacy of their joint and spine disability exam reports that regional offices need to decide these claims. As of May 2005, the percentage of exam reports containing the required information varied across the medical centers from a low of 57 percent to a high of 92 percent. This could adversely affect the consistency of disability claims decisions involving joint and spine impairments. Although VA has made substantial progress, more remains to be done to improve the level of consistency in the disability exam reports. |
gao_GAO-15-756 | gao_GAO-15-756_0 | Delivery Performance Information Has Expanded but Remains Incomplete, and PRC Has Not Fully Assessed Causes of Incomplete Data or the Effectiveness of USPS Actions
Measurement of Delivery Performance Has Expanded but Remains Incomplete
USPS’s measurement of on-time delivery performance has expanded greatly over the past 9 years, but remains incomplete because only about 55 percent of market-dominant mail volume is currently included in measurement. Notably, USPS implemented measurement systems for bulk First-Class Mail, Standard Mail, and Periodicals. PRC established a public inquiry docket (a type of proceeding) to review USPS’s proposal,which is still ongoing as of September 21, 2015. PRC Has Not Fully Assessed the Causes of USPS’s Incomplete Measurement Data and USPS’s Actions to Improve Data Quality
Although PRC reports have provided data on the amount of mail included in measurement of delivery performance, these reports have not fully assessed why these measurements were incomplete or whether USPS actions will achieve complete performance data. Complete information is vital for effective management, oversight, and accountability purposes. 1. While there is not a minimum threshold of mail that is to be included in measurement for it to be representative, the risk that measurement is not representative increases as more mail is not included in measurement because on-time delivery performance may be different for mail that is included in measurement from mail that is not included. USPS and PRC annual compliance reports provide delivery performance analysis, as legally required. This analysis, however, does not facilitate an understanding of results and trends below the national level, such as for USPS’s 67 districts, to identify variations and areas where improvements in performance may be needed. Rural Delivery Performance Information Is Not Required to Be Reported
USPS and PRC are not required to report—and do not report—delivery information for rural and non-rural areas, thus limiting effective oversight in these areas. However, USPS and PRC were not able to provide specific cost estimates related to having USPS measure and report on delivery performance in rural and urban areas. USPS and PRC annual and quarterly reports on delivery performance information are not as useful for oversight purposes beyond the annual compliance assessments because they do not include sufficient analysis that would facilitate holding USPS accountable for meeting its statutory mission to provide prompt, reliable, and efficient services in all areas of the nation, including rural areas. USPS believes that such an analysis would be costly, even though it does not know how much it would actually cost. Such cost information would be useful for Congress to have in order to assess whether developing this information would be appropriate. Matter for Congressional Consideration
To assist in determining whether to require USPS and PRC to report on delivery performance for rural and non-rural areas, Congress should direct USPS to provide cost estimates related to providing this information. To improve the usefulness and transparency of USPS’s and PRC’s reporting of delivery performance information, we recommend that:
The Postmaster General provide additional and readily available delivery performance information, such as trend data for on-time delivery performance for all 67 postal districts. PRC and USPS agreed with the recommendations addressed to them. Specifically, PRC agreed to hold a proceeding to address how USPS can improve the completeness of USPS’s delivery performance—after, as we reported, initially indicating it was opposed to such a proceeding. Postal Service’s (USPS) measurement of mail delivery performance and the Postal Regulatory Commission’s (PRC) oversight of this measurement and (2) USPS’s and PRC’s reporting of this information. | Why GAO Did This Study
USPS is in the difficult position of balancing cost-cutting actions to address its poor financial situation with efforts to provide prompt, affordable, and reliable mail service. GAO has previously reported that complete, useful, and transparent delivery performance information is essential for USPS and stakeholders to understand USPS's success in achieving this balance.
GAO was asked to review how USPS measures delivery performance and how PRC assesses this information. GAO assessed (1) USPS's measurement of mail delivery performance and related oversight by PRC and (2) USPS's and PRC's reporting of this information. GAO reviewed USPS and PRC delivery performance data for fiscal years 2010-2015, delivery service standards, and measurement system documents, as well as applicable laws and leading practices identified in GAO's prior work.
What GAO Found
U.S. Postal Service (USPS) measurement of on-time delivery performance has expanded greatly over the past 9 years, but remains incomplete because only 55 percent of market-dominant mail (primarily First-Class Mail, Standard Mail, Periodicals, and Package Services) is included (see fig.). The remaining 45 percent is excluded due to various limitations, such as not having barcodes to enable tracking. Incomplete measurement poses the risk that measures of on-time performance are not representative, since performance may differ for mail included in the measurement, from mail that is not. Complete performance information enables effective management, oversight, and accountability. In addition, the Postal Regulatory Commission (PRC) has not fully assessed why USPS data are not complete and representative. While PRC's annual reports have provided data on the amount of mail included in measurement, they have not fully assessed why this measurement was incomplete or whether USPS actions will make it so. PRC may initiate a public inquiry docket (a type of proceeding) to improve data quality and completeness, but has not done so. Such a proceeding could facilitate evaluating data quality and identifying areas for improvement, as well as actions and time frames to complete improvements.
USPS's and PRC's reports on delivery performance are not as useful as they could be for effective oversight because they do not include sufficient analysis to hold USPS accountable for meeting its statutory mission to provide service in all areas of the nation. USPS's and PRC's reports provide analysis, as legally required. However, this national-level analysis does not facilitate an understanding of results and trends below the national level, such as for USPS's 67 districts, to identify variations and areas where improvements are needed. Further, delivery performance information is not sufficiently transparent or readily available. USPS posts only the most recent quarterly report on its website making it difficult for stakeholders to access trend data. Also, USPS and PRC are not required to provide—and do not report—performance information for rural areas. While several Members of Congress have recently requested studies on rural delivery performance, USPS has stated that such analysis would be costly, even though it could not provide specific cost estimates. Such cost information would be useful for Congress to assess whether developing this information would be appropriate.
What GAO Recommends
To assist in determining whether to require USPS and PRC to report on delivery performance for rural areas, Congress should direct USPS to provide cost estimates related to providing this information. Further, GAO recommends that USPS and PRC take steps to improve the completeness, analysis, and transparency of delivery performance information. USPS and PRC agreed with the recommendations addressed to them, but disagreed with certain findings on which they are based. GAO believes these findings are valid, as discussed in this report. |
gao_GAO-06-501 | gao_GAO-06-501_0 | Key Efforts to Increase Small Business Contracts Focused on Expanding Contracting Opportunities, Finding More Qualified Small Businesses, and Improving Program Management and Oversight
DOE’s approach to increasing its prime contracting with small businesses focused on three main areas: (1) identifying more contracting opportunities for small businesses, (2) expanding small business development and outreach activities to create a larger pool of qualified small businesses, and (3) improving program management and oversight. Despite Increasing Its Contracting with Small Businesses, DOE Prime Contracting Achievement Continues to Fall Short of Its Annual Goal
Despite DOE’s efforts to strengthen its small business program, the department has not achieved its small business prime contracting goal in 4 of the past 5 years. Two Key Management Challenges Hinder DOE’s Efforts to Further Improve Its Small Business Contracting Performance
DOE faces two management challenges in further improving its small business prime contracting performance. Both types of practices are commonly associated with high- performing organizations and are consistent with principles contained in the Government Performance and Results Act. DOE does not, however, collect sufficient information to provide the department with insight on whether or how specific policies or processes should be changed to further increase small business prime contracting. Conclusions
DOE has made progress since 2001 not only in increasing the total dollars it awards to small businesses, but also in increasing the share of its procurement dollars awarded to such businesses. Periodically conduct a comprehensive evaluation of the department’s and program offices’ small business programs to determine if changes are needed and use these assessments to guide improvement efforts. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to (1) provide an update on the Department of Energy’s (DOE) key efforts to increase small business prime contracting opportunities and the results of these efforts to date and (2) identify the management challenges DOE faces in improving its small business prime contracting performance. In addition to these objectives, we are providing information on the management of small business programs by other federal agencies that either share certain characteristics with DOE’s largest program offices or that have components that share certain characteristics with these offices. To provide information on how other federal agencies address small business program management challenges, we obtained information on the practices of the small business offices of three other agencies that either share certain characteristics with DOE or have component organizations that share characteristics with DOE: the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, the Department of the Army (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers), and the Department of Health and Human Services (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention). | Why GAO Did This Study
Federal policy requires that small businesses receive the maximum practicable opportunity for providing goods and services to federal agencies through prime contracts--direct contracts between the government and a contractor. The Department of Energy (DOE) buys more than $20 billion in goods and services annually. GAO was asked to (1) discuss DOE's key efforts to increase small business prime contracting opportunities and (2) identify the management challenges DOE faces in improving its small business prime contracting performance. In addition to these objectives GAO is providing information on the management of small business programs by other federal agencies that either share certain characteristics with DOE's largest program offices or that have components that share certain characteristics with these offices.
What GAO Found
Key DOE efforts to increase small business prime contracting have included identifying more contracting opportunities for small businesses, expanding small business development and outreach activities, and increasing program management and oversight. The department has had some success in redirecting to small businesses portions of contracts to manage large DOE facilities, as well as in securing additional small business prime contracting opportunities from the department's other contracts. As a result, the total dollars awarded annually as prime contracts to small businesses have increased, and the share of procurement dollars awarded to small business in 2005 was DOE's second highest ever. Despite these gains, however, DOE was unable to meet its small business prime contracting goal in 4 of the past 5 years. DOE faces two key management challenges to improving its small business program. Addressing these challenges will bring DOE's small business program more in line with the practices associated with high-performing organizations and with principles contained in the Government Performance and Results Act. Specifically, DOE has not defined the concrete steps necessary to enable it to achieve its prime contracting goal and does not collect sufficient information to effectively assess its small business program efforts, identify problems, and implement changes that could further increase small business prime contracting. Other federal agencies with missions or agency components with missions similar to DOE periodically comprehensively evaluate their programs to determine effectiveness, identify problems and make changes intended to improve performance. GAO obtained information from the following three agencies: the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, the Department of the Army (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers), and the Department of Health and Human Services (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention). |
gao_GAO-01-428 | gao_GAO-01-428_0 | Impact of Providing Government Documents to the Public Solely in Electronic Format
Electronic dissemination of government documents offers the opportunity to reduce the costs of dissemination and make government information more usable and accessible. Feasibility of Transfer of the Depository Library Program to the Library of Congress
Both advantages and disadvantages are associated with transferring the depository library program to the Library. In studies conducted in 1993 and 1994, the Library concluded that the depository library program is not inconsistent with the mission and functions of the Library and that it might be appropriate for the Library to have responsibility for a program established to acquire government documents and distribute them to depository libraries. However, the Public Printer stated that the Library is not an appropriate home for the depository library program because the Library’s mission is inconsistent with a large-scale information dissemination program. These disadvantages included potential negative effects on public access to information and concern about the availability of funds to maintain the current program. If a decision is made to transfer the program, transition planning would be critical to determining how and when such a transfer should occur. | What GAO Found
Electronic dissemination of government documents can reduce distribution costs and make government information more usable and accessible. However, the transition to a paperless environment will require that several challenges be overcome. Transferring the depository library program to the Library of Congress entails both advantages and disadvantages. In studies done in 1993 and 1994, the Library concluded that the depository library program was not inconsistent with the mission and functions of the Library and that it might be appropriate for the Library to oversee this program. However, the Government Printing Office (GPO) believes that the Library is not an appropriate home for the depository library program because the Library's mission and operations are inconsistent with a large-scale information dissemination program. In addition, the studies and librarian organizations raised concerns about the potential negative effects of the transfer on public access to information and the availability of funds to maintain the current program. If a decision is made to transfer the depository library program, the concerns raised by library organizations and employee unions should be addressed. One option for addressing these issues is to form a GPO/Library transition team to develop appropriate strategies. |
gao_GAO-05-556 | gao_GAO-05-556_0 | However, such movements of funds often raised or aggravated concerns about the adequacy of funding for each of these areas or about how efficiently and effectively programs were executed during the year. While Historical Trends Show an Increase in BOS Funding, the Services Have Redesignated Other Funds to Meet BOS Services
Congress has designated increased funding for BOS in recent years, sometimes more than requested, but often to amounts that were lower than the cost of BOS services provided at installations, particularly in the Army. This has resulted in hundreds of millions of dollars originally designated for facilities maintenance being redesignated by the services to meet BOS needs. However, in fiscal year 2004, S/RM services were negatively affected by the Navy’s withholding of O&M funds otherwise intended to fund BOS and S/RM to help pay for the Global War on Terrorism. Additional details on funding trends for the Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force are included in appendix V.
Accurate Forecasts of BOS Requirements and Funding Needs Have Been Hampered by Several Factors
DOD and the military services’ ability to forecast BOS requirements and funding shortfalls have been hindered by the lack of a common terminology across the services for defining BOS functions, as well as by their lack of a mature analytic process for developing BOS requirements comparable to the one developed for facilities sustainment requirements. But while the services can tell Congress how much was spent in an area in the past, they do not necessarily know whether these services were provided at appropriate levels or how much it would or should cost to provide them in the future. According to office officials, DOD’s and the military services’ ability to forecast BOS requirements and funding needs has been hindered by the lack of a common terminology across the military services for defining BOS functions and the lack of common definitions impairs the development of a complete picture of total BOS requirements and can lead to differing expectations for services where multiple military services are collocated on a single installation. Specific time frames for developing the installations services models have not been established. Centralized Installation Management Has Many Benefits, but More Perspective Is Needed Before It Can Be Fully Evaluated
The Army’s and Navy’s creation of centralized installation management agencies has resulted some operating efficiencies, according to many officials at installations we visited, but their efforts to date have met with mixed results in terms of the quality, level of support, and flexibility needed to quickly respond to changing needs. Until more experience is gained under existing centralized approaches, with opportunities to address issues identified herein, it is difficult to recommend expanding the concept to the other military services. Until these problems are resolved, DOD will not have the management and oversight framework in place that it needs for identifying total BOS requirements, providing Congress with a clear basis for making funding decisions, and ensuring adequate delivery of services, particularly in a joint environment. Scope and Methodology
To determine the historical funding trends for base operations support (BOS) as contrasted with funding for facilities sustainment, restoration and modernization (S/RM), we reviewed financial data, such as budget requests, congressionally designated amounts as adjusted, and obligations for fiscal years 2001 through 2004 that we obtained from the Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps. (The Department of Defense (DOD) is currently seeking to restructure these accounts with improved tracking mechanisms.) To determine extent to which the Army and Navy reorganizations for managing installations have affected the quality and level of support provided to individual activities and installations and whether the Marine Corps and Air Force would benefit from similar reorganizations, we reviewed the guidance, procedures, and practices from the Army and Navy that specifically address reorganization, including comparisons to pre- reorganization data. We discussed the effects these changes have had on the planning and implementation of base operations support services as well as on the personnel and quality of life at the local level. Similar problems are reportedly occurring in fiscal year 2005. As we have previously reported, such problems adversely affect efforts to maintain facilities and provide base support services. | Why GAO Did This Study
Concerns have surfaced in Congress and various media regarding the adequacy of funding for base operations support (BOS) functions of military installations as well as the quality and level of support being provided. As requested, this report addresses (1) the historical funding trends for BOS as contrasted with funding for facilities sustainment, restoration and modernization (S/RM); (2) how effectively the Department of Defense (DOD) and the military services have been able to forecast BOS requirements and funding needs; and (3) how the Army's and Navy's reorganizations for managing installations have affected support services, and whether the Air Force and Marine Corps could benefit from similar reorganizations.
What GAO Found
Congress has designated increased funding for BOS programs in recent years, sometimes more than requested, but because those amounts were often less than the cost of BOS services provided at installations, hundreds of millions of dollars designated for S/RM and other purposes were redesignated by the military services to pay for BOS. As GAO has previously reported, such funding movements while permissible are disruptive to the orderly provision of services, contribute to the degradation of many installation facilities, and can adversely affect the quality of life and morale of military personnel. The problem appears to be greatest in the Army. Further, in fiscal year 2004, U.S. military installations faced additional pressures in managing available BOS and S/RM funding as the services redesignated varying amounts of these funds to help pay for the Global War on Terrorism. Similar problems are reportedly occurring in fiscal year 2005. While difficult to quantify, installation officials at the locations GAO visited voiced concerns about the potential for these conditions to adversely affect operations and readiness in the future. Moreover, such movements of funds add considerable uncertainty regarding actual BOS requirements and the extent of underfunding. The ability of DOD and its components to forecast BOS funding requirements has been hindered by the lack of a common terminology across the military services in defining BOS functions as well as the lack of a mature analytic process for developing credible and consistent requirements comparable to the model developed for facilities sustainment. The lack of common definitions among the services, particularly where one service resides as a tenant on an installation operated by another service, can lead to differing expectations for installation services, and it obscures a full understanding of the funding required for BOS services. Because the military services have often based future requirements estimates largely on prior expenditures, they do not necessarily know if BOS services were provided at appropriate levels. DOD and the military services have a strategic plan for installations and have multiple actions under way to address these problems, but they have not synchronized varying time frames for accomplishing related tasks. Until these problems are resolved, DOD will not have the management and oversight framework in place for identifying total BOS requirements, providing Congress with a clear basis for making funding decisions, and ensuring adequate delivery of services. While the Army's and Navy's creation of centralized installation management agencies can potentially create efficiencies and improve the management of the facilities through streamlining and consolidation, implementation of these plans has so far met with mixed results in quality and level of support provided to activities and installations. Until more experience yields perspective on their efforts to address the issues identified in this report, GAO is not in a position to determine whether the approach should be adopted by the other services. |
gao_GAO-17-83 | gao_GAO-17-83_0 | Beginning in the 1970s, Congress passed legislation that set minimum wages for certain industries in these two territories to equal the federal minimum wage and created a schedule of increases for minimum wages in the remaining industries to eventually equal the federal minimum wage. (See fig. When adjusted for inflation, the U.S.’ GDP rose by 15 percent, and its GDP per capita rose by 6 percent during the same period. 7). StarKist Co. has had a cannery in American Samoa for more than 50 years. In 2014, total American Samoa employment was about 4 percent lower than in 2007, while cannery employment was about 50 percent of its 2007 level. From 2007 to 2014, average annual inflation-adjusted earnings of American Samoa workers fell by about 11 percent. Both canneries announced plans to suspend canning operations in American Samoa in response to such challenges. American Samoa Government Sees Minimum Wage Increases Conflicting with Sustainable Economic Development
The American Samoa government, the territory’s largest employer, continues to report concerns about the economic impact of the scheduled minimum wage increases. Alternatives for Increasing American Samoa Minimum Wages to Keep Pace with the Cost of Living and Eventually Equal the Federal Minimum Wage
There are two basic approaches for increasing American Samoa’s minimum wages to (1) keep pace with the cost of living in the territory; and (2) eventually equal the federal minimum wage—the criteria included in the statutory provision for GAO to report on this issue. The first approach relies on adjustments indexed to changes in the cost of living, and the second relies on a schedule of adjustments within a specified timeframe. In addition, aspects of each approach may be combined with respect to the amount and timing of future increases to minimum wages. Other factors would also warrant consideration, including design options to safeguard against any negative effects that increasing minimum wages might have on American Samoa’s economy. Scheduled Increases in American Samoa Minimum Wages
The second approach—applying scheduled increases to American Samoa minimum wages—would establish a timeframe for ensuring that American Samoa’s minimum wages eventually equal the federal minimum wage, thus addressing the second criterion included in the provision for GAO to report on this issue. Whether based on an index, a schedule, or some combination of the two, increases to minimum wages could be reduced or suspended on the basis of one or more economic indicators that reflect the general health of the American Samoa economy or critical sectors. Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
We provided a draft of this report to the U.S. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report (1) relates the history of minimum wages in American Samoa, (2) examines the status of the territory’s economy, and (3) identifies alternative approaches that could be used to ensure that minimum wages in American Samoa keep pace with the cost of living in American Samoa and eventually equal the federal minimum wage. Our discussion of the American Samoa economy updates our previous reports on the impact of minimum wage increases in American Samoa, including changes in employment and earnings and changes in key industries since the most recent federal minimum wage increase and since the scheduled increases in American Samoa minimum wages began. To describe the status of the American Samoa economy, we reviewed relevant GAO reports and analyzed gross domestic product data from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis; tuna export data from the U.S. Census Bureau; tax data from the American Samoa government; and employment, earnings, and wage data gathered through a questionnaire that we submitted to the two tuna canneries currently operating in American Samoa—StarKist and Tri Marine. L. No. 114-61 for GAO’s review (see app. The federal minimum wage in the United States has been set through the passage of, and amendments to, the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA). GAO-14-381. | Why GAO Did This Study
The federal minimum wage, established by the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, has not been applied in American Samoa for many years. In 2007, Congress passed legislation to incrementally raise minimum wages in American Samoa to the federal level. Subsequent legislation postponed or reduced these increases.
Pub. L. No. 114-61, enacted in October 2015, included a provision for GAO to report on alternative ways of increasing minimum wages in American Samoa to keep pace with the territory's cost of living and eventually equal the federal minimum wage. In addition, Pub. L. No. 111-5, enacted in February 2009, included a provision for GAO to report periodically on the economic impact of minimum wage increases in the territory. This report examines (1) the history of minimum wage implementation in American Samoa; (2) the status of the American Samoa economy, including changes in employment, earnings, and key industries since scheduled minimum wage increases began in 2007; and (3) alternative approaches for increasing minimum wages in American Samoa to meet GAO's two reporting criteria in Pub. L. No. 114-61. GAO reviewed American Samoa local and federal earnings information; collected data from American Samoa employers in a key industry through a questionnaire; and reviewed methods used to set minimum wages in the United States and around the world.
Commenting on a draft of this report, the Department of the Interior suggested further study and the American Samoa government suggested creating a committee to set minimum wages in the territory.
What GAO Found
Federal legislation passed in 2007 created a schedule of periodic increases to minimum wages in American Samoa. During the previous 50 years, special industry committees had periodically recommended industry-specific minimum wages. Historically, minimum wages in the U.S. territory have generally remained below the federal minimum wage (see fig.). The current schedule of increases would raise all American Samoa minimum wages to the current federal hourly rate of $7.25 by 2036. However, any new increase in the federal rate will lengthen the time required to achieve convergence.
American Samoa's gross domestic product (GDP) per capita is less than a quarter of the U.S.'s GDP per capita and, adjusted for inflation, has declined over the past decade. Local government and tuna canneries are the largest employers, accounting in 2014 for 42 percent and 14 percent of the workforce, respectively. From 2007 to 2014, overall employment fell by 4 percent, and workers' average inflation-adjusted earnings fell by about 11 percent. During the same period, cannery employment decreased by 50 percent, and the minimum wage for cannery workers rose. Cannery officials reported labor costs and fisheries access among the challenges of operating in the territory, and one of the two canneries announced plans to suspend operations indefinitely in December 2016. The American Samoa government has expressed concern that continued minimum wage increases are at odds with sustainable economic development.
There are two basic approaches for increasing American Samoa's minimum wages to keep pace with the cost of living in American Samoa and to eventually equal the federal minimum wage—the criteria included in the provision for GAO to report on this issue. The first approach relies on indexing minimum wages to the cost of living. The second approach relies on using a schedule of future adjustments. Aspects of each approach could also be combined, as needed, with respect to the amount and timing of future increases to the territory's minimum wages. Given concerns about potential negative effects of increasing American Samoa's minimum wage on the territory's economy, other design options could be incorporated to safeguard against such effects. For example, minimum wage increases could be reduced or suspended based on economic indicators that reflect the general health of the American Samoa economy or critical sectors. |
gao_GAO-16-143T | gao_GAO-16-143T_0 | Given the criticality of satellite data to weather forecasts, concerns that problems and delays on the new satellite acquisition programs will result in gaps in the continuity of critical satellite data, and the impact of such gaps on the health and safety of the U.S. population, we concluded that the potential gap in weather satellite data is a high-risk area. We added this area to our High-Risk List in 2013 and it remained on the High-Risk List in 2015. The GOES-R series is the next generation of satellites that NOAA is planning; the satellites are planned to replace existing weather satellites. As of October 2015, the agency implemented 4 of these recommendations and is working on the remaining 8 recommendations. Since 2012, we have issued three reports on the JPSS program that highlighted technical issues, component cost growth, management challenges, and key risks. As of October 2015, the agency has implemented 2 recommendations and was working to address the remaining 9 recommendations. Prior Schedule Concerns Were Warranted; GOES-R Program Delayed Its Committed Launch Date and Faces Important Decisions on How to Proceed
As previously noted, we have issued a series of reports on the GOES-R program that highlighted schedule delays, management challenges, and the potential for a gap in backup satellite coverage. GOES-R Satellite Launch Date Delayed; NOAA Extends the Expected Lifespans of Current Satellites, but the Risk of a Gap in Backup Coverage Remains
In August 2015, NOAA decided to delay the planned launch date of the first GOES-R satellite from March 2016 to October 2016. Based on findings from our ongoing work, recent events have increased the risk of achieving the October 2016 launch date. Based on ongoing work, we found that NOAA recently decided to change its assumptions about the lifespan of the currently operational GOES satellites. Any further delays in the GOES-R launch date would increase this gap in backup coverage, which could mean a gap in coverage if one of the primary operational satellites were to fail. Timely implementation of our recommendations could help to mitigate program risks. Program officials believe that it would be best to develop and launch the GOES-T satellite as soon as possible to sustain NOAA’s policy of having two operational satellites and one spare satellite on-orbit and to obtain the enhanced functionality these satellites offer. We recommended that NOAA revise the polar satellite contingency plan to, among other things, include an assessment of available alternatives based on their costs and potential impacts, and ensure that the relevant entities provide monthly and quarterly updates on the progress on all mitigation projects and activities. NOAA Is Planning to Launch the JPSS-1 Satellite in 2017, but Continues to Face Schedule and other Risks
Based on our ongoing work, NOAA and the JPSS program continue to make progress towards the launch of the JPSS-1 satellite as a replacement for the currently on-orbit S-NPP satellite. While the launch date has not changed, the JPSS program has experienced technical issues that have affected internal schedule deadlines. The Possibility of a Gap in Polar Satellite Data Remains; JPSS Program Faces Key Risks, and Decisions Are Needed on Developing and Timing Future Satellites
We previously reported that NOAA is facing a potential near-term gap in polar data between the expected end of useful life of the S-NPP satellite and the launch of the JPSS-1 satellite. Should S-NPP last for 9 years, it could alleviate a potential near-term gap. Moving forward, NOAA also faces decisions on timing the development and launch of the remaining satellites in the JPSS program. In summary, we have made multiple recommendations to NOAA to improve management of the GOES-R and JPSS satellite programs and to address weaknesses in contingency plans in case of a gap in satellite coverage. The agency is now facing important decisions on how to achieve the new launch schedule and how to space out future satellites to ensure satellite coverage while minimizing costs. According to NOAA officials, it is also possible that JPSS-1 and -2 will last longer than anticipated. | Why GAO Did This Study
NOAA is procuring the next generation of polar and geostationary weather satellites to replace aging satellites that are approaching the end of their useful lives. GAO has reported that gaps in polar satellite coverage and in backup coverage for geostationary satellites are likely in the near future. Given the criticality of satellite data to weather forecasts, concerns that problems and delays on the new satellite programs will result in gaps in the continuity of critical satellite data, and the impact such gaps could have on the health and safety of the U.S. population, GAO added mitigating weather satellite gaps to its High-Risk List in 2013 and it remained on the list in 2015.
GAO was asked to testify, among other things, on the cause and impact of a recent launch delay on the GOES-R program, and the status and key remaining challenges on the JPSS program. To do so, GAO relied on prior reports issued from 2012 to 2015 as well as on ongoing work on both programs. That work included analyzing progress reports and interviewing officials.
What GAO Found
The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's (NOAA) $10.9 billion Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite-R (GOES-R) program recently delayed the planned launch of the first satellite in the new series from March 2016 to October 2016. Based on its ongoing work, GAO found that the decision to delay the launch was due to poor schedule performance over the last few years (losing more than 10 days a month on average), recent technical issues with key components, and little schedule margin as the program entered integration testing. The October 2016 launch date may also be delayed if additional technical challenges arise or if schedule performance remains poor.
NOAA recently changed assumptions about the expected lifespan of existing GOES satellites from 7 to 10 years based on the longevity of prior satellites. However, the analysis supporting this change is over 10 years old. Even with this extension, NOAA may fall short of its policy of having 2 operational satellites and 1 backup satellite in orbit. The agency faces an 11 month gap in backup coverage until GOES-R is operational, during which time there would be only 2 operational satellites (see figure). Any further delays in the GOES-R launch date could exacerbate that gap. NOAA is now facing important decisions on when to launch the remaining satellites in the GOES-R series to maximize satellite coverage while minimizing development and storage costs.
Based on its ongoing work, GAO found that NOAA's $11.3 billion Joint Polar Satellite System (JPSS) program is making progress toward the planned launch of the JPSS-1 satellite in March 2017. However, the program has experienced technical issues that have affected internal schedule deadlines, such as an issue with debris in an instrument's subsystem that delayed its delivery by approximately 8 months, and faces key risks in the remainder of development. NOAA is also facing the risk of a potential near-term gap in polar data prior to the launch of the JPSS-1 satellite. Similar to the decision on the GOES satellites, in April 2015, NOAA revised its assumptions about the expected life of the satellite that is currently in-orbit by adding up to 4 years, which would reduce the chance of a near-term gap. However, risks to the performance and health of the on-orbit satellite, and to development of the JPSS2 satellite could increase the risk of a gap. Also, NOAA faces key decisions on timing the development and launch of the remaining JPSS satellites to ensure satellite continuity while balancing the possibility that satellites could last much longer than anticipated.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is not making any new recommendations in this statement, but—since 2012—has made 23 recommendations to NOAA to strengthen its satellite acquisition programs and contingency plans. The department agreed with GAO's recommendations and is taking steps to implement them. To date, NOAA has implemented 6 recommendations and is working to address the remaining 17. Timely implementation of these recommendations will help mitigate program risks. |
gao_GAO-08-462T | gao_GAO-08-462T_0 | In addition, DOD shares responsibility for 7 governmentwide high-risk areas. DOD’s pervasive business systems and related financial management deficiencies adversely affect its ability to assess resource requirements; control costs; ensure basic accountability; anticipate future costs and claims on the budget; measure performance; maintain funds control; prevent and detect fraud, waste, and abuse; and address pressing management issues. DOD Has Made Progress in Addressing Its Business Transformation Challenges
DOD’s senior leadership has shown commitment to transforming the department’s business operations, and DOD has taken a number of positive steps to begin this effort. Critical Actions Are Needed to Provide Comprehensive, Integrated, and Strategic Planning and Focused, Sustained Leadership for DOD’s Overall Business Transformation Efforts
As we have testified and reported for years, a successful, integrated, departmentwide approach to addressing DOD’s overall business transformation requires two critical elements: a comprehensive, integrated, and enterprisewide plan and an individual capable of providing full-time focus and sustained leadership both within and across administrations, dedicated solely to the integration and execution of the overall business transformation effort. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 requires the Secretary of Defense, acting through the CMO, to develop a strategic management plan to include detailed descriptions of such things as performance goals and measures for improving and evaluating the overall efficiency and effectiveness of the business operations of the department, key initiatives to achieve these performance goals, procedures to monitor progress, procedures to review and approve plans and budgets for changes in business operations, and procedures to oversee the development, review, and approval of all budget requests for defense business systems. Clearly, Congress has recognized the need for executive-level attention to business transformation matters and has taken specific action in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 to codify CMO responsibilities at a high level in the department—assigning them to the Deputy Secretary of Defense—as well as other provisions, such as establishing a full-time Deputy CMO and designating CMO responsibilities within the military departments. We designated DOD’s business systems modernization program as high risk in 1995. DOD Has Largely Established Key Investment Management Structures, but Related Policies and Procedures at Both the Corporate and Component Levels Are Missing
The department has established and has begun to implement legislatively directed corporate investment review structures and processes needed to effectively manage its business system investments, but it has yet to do so in a manner that is fully consistent with relevant guidance, both at a corporate and component level. Accordingly, we made recommendations aimed at improving the department’s ability to better manage the billions of dollars it invests annually in its business systems and DOD largely agreed with these recommendations but added that while it intends to improve departmental policies and procedures for business system investments, each component is responsible for developing and executing investment management policies and procedures needed to manage the business systems under its tier of responsibility. DOD Has Made Progress in Establishing a Framework for Improving Financial Management Capabilities, but More Work Remains
DOD has taken steps toward developing and implementing a framework for addressing the department’s long-standing financial management weaknesses and improving its capability to provide timely, reliable, and relevant financial information for analysis, decisionmaking, and reporting, a key defense transformation priority. Specifically, this framework, which is discussed in both the department’s ETP and the FIAR Plan is intended to define and put into practice a standard DOD-wide financial management data structure as well as enterprise-level capabilities to facilitate reporting and comparison of financial data across the department. While these efforts should improve the consistency and comparability of DOD’s financial reports, a great deal of work remains before the financial management capabilities of DOD and its components are transformed and the department achieves financial visibility. Given the department’s dependency on the efforts of its components to address DOD’s financial management weaknesses, it is imperative that DOD ensure the sufficiency and reliability of (1) corrective actions taken by DOD components to support management attestations as to the reliability of reported financial information; (2) activities taken by DOD components and other initiatives to ensure that corrective actions are directed at supporting improved financial visibility capabilities, beyond providing information primarily for financial statement reporting, and are sustained until a financial statement audit can be performed; and (3) accomplishments and progress reported by DOD components and initiatives. DOD Refines Its Audit Strategy
In fiscal year 2007, DOD introduced key refinements to its strategy for achieving financial statement auditability. The purpose of these planned assessments is to identify auditability risks that, if not mitigated during the development of the system, may impede the component’s ability to achieve clean audit opinions on its financial statements. High-Risk Series: An Update. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Defense (DOD) has stewardship over an unprecedented amount of taxpayer money--with about $546 billion in discretionary budget authority provided thus far in fiscal year 2008, and total reported obligations of about $492 billion to support ongoing operations and activities related to the Global War on Terrorism from September 11, 2001, through September 2007. Meanwhile, DOD is solely responsible for 8 high-risk areas identified by GAO and shares responsibility for another 7 high-risk areas. GAO designated DOD's approach to business transformation as high risk in 2005. DOD's business systems modernization and financial management have appeared on the list since 1995. Deficiencies in these areas adversely affect DOD's ability, among other things, to assess resource requirements; control costs; ensure accountability; measure performance; prevent waste, fraud, and abuse; and address pressing management issues. Based on previously issued GAO reports and testimonies, this testimony focuses on the progress DOD has made and the challenges that remain with respect to overall business transformation, business systems modernization, and financial management capabilities improvements. GAO has made recommendations to improve DOD's business transformation efforts and DOD's institutional and program-specific management controls. DOD has largely agreed with these recommendations.
What GAO Found
DOD's senior leadership has shown a commitment to transforming DOD's business operations and taken steps that have yielded progress in many respects, especially during the past two years. To sustain its efforts, DOD still needs (1) a strategic planning process and a comprehensive, integrated, and enterprisewide plan or set of plans to guide transformation and (2) a full-time, term-based, senior management official to provide focused and sustained leadership. Congress has clearly recognized the need for executive-level attention and, through the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2008, has designated the Deputy Secretary of Defense as DOD's Chief Management Officer (CMO), created a Deputy CMO position, and designated a CMO for each military department. Among other things, DOD will need to clearly define roles and responsibilities, accountability, and performance expectations. However, DOD still faces the challenge of ensuring that its CMO can give the position full-time focus and continuity of leadership. In that respect, GAO continues to believe the CMO should be codified in statute as a separate position with the appropriate term to span administrations. To comply with legislative requirements aimed at improving business systems modernization, DOD continues to update its business enterprise architecture and has established and begun to implement corporate investment review structures and processes. However, DOD has not achieved the full intent of the legislative requirements. The business enterprise architecture updates are not complete enough to effectively and efficiently guide and constrain business system investments across all levels of DOD. Although DOD issued a strategy for "federating" or extending its architecture to the DOD components, the components' architecture programs are not fully mature to support this. With respect to investment review structures and processes, DOD lacks policies and procedures for aligning investment selection decisions and relevant corporate- and component-level guidance. For example, DOD's business systems investment policies and procedures do not link investment selection decisions with investment funding decisions. Meanwhile, DOD components continue to invest billions of dollars in thousands of new and existing business system programs. DOD has taken steps towards developing and implementing a framework for improving its capability to provide timely, reliable, and relevant financial information for analysis, decisionmaking, and reporting. Specifically, DOD is defining and implementing a standard DOD-wide financial management data structure and enterprise-level capabilities to facilitate reporting and comparison of financial data across DOD. In 2007, DOD refined its strategy for achieving auditable financial statements, emphasizing verification and validation of sustained improvements and assessments of new systems to identify risks that, if not mitigated, may impede the achievement of clean financial statement audit opinions. While these efforts may improve the consistency and comparability of DOD's financial reports, a great deal of work to ensure the reliability of the data itself remains before financial management transformation will be achieved. |
gao_GAO-13-654 | gao_GAO-13-654_0 | State’s Foreign Service promotion system follows an up-or-out principle, under which failure to gain promotion to higher rank within a specified period in a single salary class leads to mandatory retirement for personnel in certain occupational categories. The Foreign Service Promotion Process Includes Several Boards That Evaluate Promotion Candidates
State’s Foreign Service promotion process includes several types of boards that evaluate and rank order candidates for promotion, identify other candidates for possible separation from the Service, and address promotion process-related grievances. There are several mechanisms to resolve grievances relating to the promotion process, including through the convening of reconstituted boards. The boards first screen all candidate files, and sort them into one of three categories: promotion, mid-rank, or low- rank. First, HR officials told us they draw a “cut-line” on selection boards’ ranked lists of candidates recommended for promotion based on the number of available promotion slots. These offices respond indicating whether there are any outstanding issues concerning individual candidates, such as a pending investigation or other matter, that could lead to their removal from the promotion list. Performance standards boards convene each year to assess low-ranked candidates for possible separation from the Foreign Service. State Has Developed Procedural Changes to Address Identified Concerns with the Foreign Service Promotion Process
Prompted by concerns identified by the OIG and Foreign Service Grievance Board in 2010, State took a number of actions to strengthen procedures governing selection boards and reconstituted boards. In response, State implemented a requirement that each board member sign an oath to protect the confidentiality of board materials and report any improper introduction of information about a candidate. The revised language broadened the circumstances under which an individual under review may request a board member’s recusal. Updated Procedures for Reconstituted Boards
State updated its procedures for reconstituted boards in response to OIG and Foreign Service Grievance Board concerns about the operations of these boards. Additional State- Initiated Practices to Strengthen Promotion Process Safeguards
In addition to State’s actions taken in response to others’ identified concerns about the promotion process, we found that State initiated two additional documentation practices to strengthen promotion process safeguards. The first is to have selection board members, in addition to signing final board results, initial each page of the promotable, mid-rank, and low-rank lists in official board reports, thereby attesting to the accurate rank order of all candidates the selection board evaluated. State Complied with Many Updated Procedures in 2011 and 2012, but Some Documentation Gaps Existed
We found that selection boards, performance standards boards, and reconstituted boards complied with many updated procedures in the 2011 and 2012 Foreign Service promotion cycles; however, some selection boards and reconstituted boards had documentation gaps for certain internal controls. For example, all 41 selection board reports we reviewed included a memo certifying final results signed by board members or by proxy, and documentation indicating that a public member served on the board. For example, we found that many selection board member oaths were missing from 2012 selection board reports and some boards did not include documentation of recusal requests. In the absence of a fully documented system of controls, there is a risk that intentional or unintentional failures to implement safeguards, by board members or HR staff, will go undetected and uncorrected. A failure to implement safeguards, in turn, increases the risk that promotion results could be intentionally or inadvertently compromised. Recommendation for Executive Action
To improve and better document State’s compliance with key safeguards governing the Foreign Service promotion process, we recommend that the Secretary of State instruct the Director General of the Foreign Service and Director of the Human Resources Office of Performance Evaluation to take steps to ensure that selection board, performance standards board, and reconstituted board reports are complete and fully document compliance with internal controls, including but not limited to signed oaths and recusal memos. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report examines (1) the Department of State’s (State) process for ranking and promoting Foreign Service personnel, (2) procedural changes State has made to its Foreign Service promotion process in response to identified concerns, and (3) the extent to which updated procedures were consistently followed in 2011 and 2012 and whether any notable concerns about the promotion process remain. We also reviewed all Foreign Service Grievance Board filings related to the same universe of filed grievance cases. | Why GAO Did This Study
States Foreign Service promotion process follows an up-or-out principle, under which failure to gain promotion to higher rank within a specified time leads to mandatory retirement for personnel in certain occupational categories. States OIG and the Foreign Service Grievance Board identified procedural concerns relating to the process in 2010.
GAO was asked to review the Foreign Service promotion process. This report examines (1) States process for ranking and promoting Foreign Service personnel, (2) procedural changes State has made to its Foreign Service promotion process in response to identified concerns, and (3) the extent to which updated procedures were consistently followed in 2011 and 2012 and whether any notable concerns about the promotion process remain. GAO reviewed laws and procedures; analyzed selection, performance standards, and reconstituted board files as well as grievance case files for the 2011 and 2012 promotion cycles; interviewed State officials; and contacted 2011 and 2012 board members to offer them an opportunity to comment on the process.
What GAO Found
The Department of State's (State) Foreign Service promotion process includes convening several types of boards to evaluate candidates for promotion and identify other candidates for possible separation from the Service. State has a separate process to address related grievances. Selection boards review all candidates and sort them into one of three categories: promotable, mid-ranked, and low-ranked. The selection boards produce rank-ordered lists of those candidates recommended for promotion, and a "cut line" is subsequently determined based on the number of available promotion slots. Before announcing promotions, State vets all recommended candidates to determine whether there are outstanding issues, such as a pending investigation, that can lead to their removal from the promotion list. Subsequently, State convenes performance standards boards to assess low-ranked candidates for possible separation from the Service. There are several mechanisms to address grievances relating to the promotion process. For example, State may initiate reconstituted boards to reassess candidates if a board failed to follow the procedures or if the underlying performance information contained omissions or inaccuracies. Employees not satisfied with grievance outcomes can file an appeal with the Foreign Service Grievance Board.
In response to concerns identified by the Office of Inspector General (OIG) and Foreign Service Grievance Board in 2010, State has taken a number of actions to strengthen its Foreign Service promotion process internal controls. For example, in response to concerns about improper introduction of information about candidates, State instituted a requirement that board members sign an oath to adhere to the promotion criteria and protect the confidentiality of board materials. State also revised its procedures governing recusal requests, thereby broadening the provisions under which a candidate can request an individual board member's recusal from reviewing their file. In addition, State updated its reconstituted board procedures, outlining a set of required documents, such as signed board member score sheets, to be included in each board's official record. In addition to actions taken in response to others' identified concerns, State initiated other practices to strengthen promotion process safeguards, such as including selection board and reconstituted board member recusal memos in the final board report.
GAO found that Foreign Service selection boards, performance standards boards, and reconstituted boards complied with many of State's updated procedures in the 2011 and 2012 Foreign Service promotion cycles, but some board reports had documentation gaps for certain internal controls. For example, all 41 selection board reports we reviewed included a signed memo certifying final results. However, only 29 of 41 selection boards had signed oaths from all board members, and 45 of 122 required oaths were missing from 2012 selection board reports. In addition, some board reports lacked documentation of some recusal requests. The absence of a fully documented system of controls increases the risk that intentional or unintentional failures to implement safeguards, by board members or State Human Resources staff, may go undetected and uncorrected. Such a failure to implement safeguards, in turn, increases the risk that the integrity of promotion results could be intentionally or inadvertently compromised.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that State take actions to ensure full implementation of promotion process internal controls. State concurred with GAO's recommendation. |
gao_GGD-96-178 | gao_GGD-96-178_0 | We identified 40 articles on the cycle of sexual abuse issued between 1965 and 1996. Results Inconclusive About the Relationship Between Childhood Sexual Victimization and Adult Sexual Offending Against Children
There was no consensus among the studies we reviewed that being sexually abused as a child led directly to the victim’s becoming an adult sexual abuser of children. However, some studies did conclude that it might increase the risk that victims would commit sexual abuse later. A majority of the retrospective studies noted that most sex offenders had not been sexually abused as children, and the two prospective studies showed that the majority of victims of sexual abuse during childhood did not become sex offenders as adults. However, these studies varied considerably in the types of child sexual abusers studied, whether control or comparison groups were used, and if so, the types of individuals in these groups. Second, self-reports of childhood sexual abuse obtained from known sex offenders are of questionable validity. Sexually abused children were significantly more likely to have been arrested for prostitution, however. Most of the studies were retrospective in design; that is, they began with a sample of known sex offenders of children and sought to determine whether they were sexually abused during childhood. The two studies we reviewed that were prospective in design attempted to overcome this limitation by identifying samples of sexually victimized children and tracking them into adulthood to determine how many became sex offenders. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed research studies regarding the cycle of sexual abuse, focusing on the likelihood that individuals who are victims of sexual abuse as children will become sexual abusers of children in adulthood.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) there was no consensus among the 23 retrospective and 2 prospective studies reviewed that childhood sexual abuse led directly to the victim becoming an adult sexual abuser; (2) the retrospective studies, which sought to determine whether a sample of known sex offenders had been sexually abused as children, differed considerably in the types of offenders studied, use of control or comparison groups, and definition and reporting of childhood sexual abuse; (3) although some of the retrospective studies concluded that childhood sexual abuse may increase the risk that victims will commit sexual abuse later, most of the studies noted that the majority of sex offenders had not been sexually abused as children; (4) the prospective studies, which tracked sexually abused children into adulthood to determine how many became sex offenders, studied sample populations that may not be representative of the entire population of childhood sexual abuse victims; and (5) the prospective studies found that victims of childhood sexual abuse were not more likely than nonvictims to be arrested for sex offenses. |
gao_GAO-06-183T | gao_GAO-06-183T_0 | Available Insurance Coverage and Limitations Under the NFIP
The amount of insurance coverage available to homeowners under the NFIP is limited by requirements set forth in statute and regulation. As a result of these limitations, insurance payments to claimants for flood damage may not cover all the costs of repairing or replacing flood- damaged property. Thus, homes that might sustain more than $250,000 in damage cannot be insured to their full replacement cost. In addition, NFIP policies cover only direct physical loss by or from flood. Therefore, losses resulting primarily from a preexisting structural weakness in a home or prior water damage, and losses resulting from events other than flood, such as windstorms or or earth movements, are not covered by the NFIP. To meet its monitoring and oversight responsibilities, FEMA is to conduct periodic operational reviews of the 95 private insurance companies that participate in the NFIP. In addition, FEMA’s program contractor is to check the accuracy of claims settlements by doing quality assurance reinspections of a sample of claims adjustments for every flood event. As a result of limitations in the sampling processes, FEMA cannot project the results of these monitoring and oversight activities to determine the overall accuracy of claims settled for specific flood events or assess the overall performance of insurance companies and their adjusters in fulfilling their responsibilities for the NFIP—actions necessary for FEMA to meet our internal control standard that it have reasonable assurance that program objectives are being achieved and that its operations are effective and efficient. FEMA Has Not Fully Implemented NFIP Program Changes Mandated by the Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2004
As of September 2005, FEMA had not yet fully implemented provisions of the Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2004. The 6-month statutory deadline for implementing these changes was December 30, 2004. Nonetheless, without plans with milestones for completing its efforts to address the provisions of the act, FEMA cannot hold responsible officials accountable or ensure that statutorily required improvements are in place to assist victims of future flood events. We are recommending in today’s report that FEMA develop documented plans with milestones for implementing requirements of the Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2004 to provide policyholders a flood insurance claims handbook that meets statutory requirements, to establish a regulatory appeals process, and to ensure that flood insurance agents meet minimum NFIP education and training requirements. Some Broader Issues Facing the NFIP
The NFIP Pays Expenses and Claims with Premiums, but Its Financial Structure Is Not Designed to be Actuarially Sound
To the extent possible, the NFIP is designed to pay operating expenses and flood insurance claims with premiums collected on flood insurance policies rather than with tax dollars. However, as we have reported, the program, by design, is not actuarially sound because Congress authorized subsidized insurance rates to be made available for policies covering some properties to encourage communities to join the program. As a result, the program does not collect sufficient premium income to build reserves to meet the long-term future expected flood losses. Until the 2004 hurricane season, FEMA had been generally successful in keeping the NFIP on sound financial footing. As of August 2005, the program had borrowed $300 million to cover more than $1.8 billion in claims from the major disasters of 2004, including hurricanes Charley, Frances, Ivan, and Jeanne, which hit Florida and other East and Gulf Coast states. Following Hurricane Katrina in August 2005, legislation was enacted that increased FEMA’s borrowing authority from $1.5 billion to $3.5 billion through fiscal year 2008. FEMA has embarked on a multi- year effort to update the nation’s flood maps at a cost in excess of $1 billion. | Why GAO Did This Study
The disastrous hurricanes that have struck the Gulf Coast and Eastern seaboard in recent years--including Katrina, Rita, Ivan, and Isabel--have focused attention on federal flood management efforts. The National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP), established in 1968, provides property owners with some insurance coverage for flood damage. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) within the Department of Homeland Security is responsible for managing the NFIP. GAO issues a report earlier this week that was mandated by the Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2004. This testimony discusses findings and recommendations from that report and information from past GAO work. Specifically, the testimony discusses (1) the statutory and regulatory limitations on coverage for homeowners under the NFIP; (2) FEMA's role in monitoring and overseeing the NFIP; (3) the status of FEMA's implementation of provisions of the Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2004. It also offers observations on broader issues facing the NFIP including its financial structure and updating flood maps.
What GAO Found
The amount of insurance coverage available to homeowners under the NFIP is limited by requirements set forth in statute and FEMA's implementing regulations, which include FEMA's standard flood insurance policy. As a result of these limitations, insurance payments to claimants for flood damage may not cover all of the costs of repairing or replacing flood-damaged property. For example, homes that could sustain more than $250,000 in damage cannot be insured to their full replacement cost, thus limiting claims to this statutory ceiling. In addition, NFIP policies cover only direct physical loss by or from flood. Therefore, losses resulting primarily from a preexisting structural weakness in a home, or losses resulting from events other than flood such as windstorms, are not covered by NFIP policies. To meet its monitoring and oversight responsibilities, FEMA is to conduct periodic operational reviews of the 95 private insurance companies that participate in the NFIP, and FEMA's program contractor is to check the accuracy or claims settlements by doing quality assurance reinspections of a sample of claims adjustments for every flood event. FEMA did not use a statistically valid method for sampling files to be reviewed in these monitoring and oversight activities. As a result, FEMA cannot project the results of these reviews to determine the overall accuracy of claims settled for specific flood events or assess the overall performance of insurance companies and their adjusters in fulfilling responsibilities for the NFIP--actions necessary for FEMA to have reasonable assurance that program objectives are being achieved. FEMA has not yet fully implemented provisions of the Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2004 requiring the agency to provide policyholders with a flood insurance claims handbook that meets statutory requirements, to establish a regulatory appeals process, and to ensure that insurance agents meet minimum education and training requirements. The statutory deadline for implementing these changes was December 30, 2004. Efforts to implement the provisions are under way, but have not yet been completed. DEMA has not developed plans with milestones for assigning accountability and projecting when program improvements will be made, so that improvements are in place to assist victims of future flood events. As GAO has previously reported, the NFIP, by design, is not actuarially sound. The program does not collect sufficient premium income to build reserves to meet long-term future expected flood losses, in part because Congress authorized subsidized insurance rates to be made available for some properties. FEMA has generally been successful in keeping the NFIP on a sound financial footing, but the catastrophic flooding events of 2004 (involving 4 major hurricanes) required FEMA, as of August 2005, to borrow $300 million from the U.S. Treasury to help pay an estimated $1.8 billion on flood insurance claims. Following Hurricane Katrina in August 2005, legislation was enacted to increase FEMA's borrowing authority from $1.5 billion to $3.5 billion through fiscal year 2008. |
gao_NSIAD-96-25 | gao_NSIAD-96-25_0 | There are many digital systems to evaluate. The Army’s position is that, although these costs are relatively high, the resources are needed to demonstrate the utility of a digitized force. Digitization Plan Has Numerous Risks
The Army faces numerous technical, program, cost, and schedule risks in implementing its master plan for battlefield digitization. These risks are integration, software development, hardware costs, unknown quantity requirements, communications, and interoperability with other command and control systems. Marine Corps Funding Issues
Last year, Congress directed the Army to include the Marine Corps in its plans for the digital battlefield. This situation illustrates that the Marine Corps needs assured funding to solidify its participation and success in all of the Army’s digital battlefield experiments. Recommendations
To help ensure that resources are directed appropriately and the Army has the data it needs to determine whether it should (1) buy additional appliques and (2) proceed to the next level of experiments, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense require the Secretary of the Army to develop specific, measurable goals and exit criteria for each phase of digital battlefield experimentation. 3. 4. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO reviewed the Army's plans to digitize its battlefield operations.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) as part of its battlefield digitization plan, the Army plans to conduct a series of costly experiments from 1995 to 1997 to demonstrate the utility of a digitized force; (2) risks that the Army faces in implementing its digitization plan include integration, software development, hardware costs, unknown quantity requirements, communications, and interoperability with other command and control systems; (3) specific and measurable goals are needed to evaluate the achievements of each experiment, and these goals should be met before proceeding to the next experiment; (4) the Army is risking investments of almost $400 million for digital systems needed to conduct increasingly larger scale experiments through fiscal year 1999; (5) the investment required to digitize a 10-division Army could be as high as $4 billion; and (6) since Congress has directed the Army to include the Marine Corps in its digitization plan, the Department of Defense must identify funding for the Marine Corps to ensure its participation and success in the digitization program. |
gao_GAO-04-327 | gao_GAO-04-327_0 | Internal Controls over the Army’s Foreign Military Sales Are Not Adequate
The Army’s internal controls over foreign military sales using blanket orders are not adequate, placing classified spare parts, as well as unclassified items containing military technology, at risk of being shipped to foreign countries, who are not eligible to receive them. We found that the Army (1) lacked control edits in its system and allowed the substitution and release of classified spare parts under blanket orders for shipment to foreign countries, and that a written policy does not exist to determine the actions needed to recover these items; (2) lacks adequate control edits in its system to prevent the release of some unclassified spare parts and other items containing military technology, and that a written policy does not exist to determine the actions needed to recover these items; and (3) has not conducted periodic tests to validate that its system is accurately reviewing and approving blanket orders. The Army and DOD policies prohibit the release of classified spare parts, under blanket orders, to foreign countries. The item manager substituted 11 classified digital processors for the unavailable parts and then released these parts under blanket orders for shipment to a foreign country. According to Army officials, the foreign countries were not entitled to receive these items under blanket orders. Based on our review, the Army has modified the system to validate substituted parts selected by item managers. Within the 21,663 requisitions for unclassified items containing military technology that were shipped, we found the following requisitions were not identified and reviewed before they were released: (1) 17,175 requisitions were for 381,245 items such as circuit card assemblies, fire control units, and electron tubes that require their inherent military capability to be destroyed or demilitarized prior to their release to the public; and (2) 387 requisitions were for 2,267 items that foreign countries are prohibited from requesting using blanket orders because the spare parts require release authority from inventory control points. Therefore, according to the officials, in these particular cases there is no need to retrieve the items. GAO’s and the Office of Management and Budget’s internal control standards require that a system such as the Army’s be periodically validated and tested to ensure that it is working as intended and the ability to accurately review and approve requisitions is not compromised. Defense Security Assistance Development Center officials indicated that periodic tests of the Army’s system have not been conducted because, in October 1998, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency directed that no additional funds be used to expand the current system. However, Defense Security Cooperation Agency officials stated that this directive does not preclude the Army from periodically testing the system and its logic. According to DOD and Army officials, they have not tested the system’s logic for restricting requisitions since 1999 when they initially modified the system to cancel requisitions for classified spare parts under blanket orders. Also, the Army lacks control edits in its system to prevent the release of some unclassified items containing military technology to foreign countries. Recommendations for To improve internal controls over the Army’s foreign military sales Executive Action program and to prevent foreign countries from being able to obtain classified spare parts or unclassified items containing military technology that they are not eligible to receive under blanket orders, we are recommending that the Secretary of Defense instruct the Secretary of the Army to take the following two actions:
Modify existing policies and procedures, after consultation with the appropriate government officials, to cover items shipped in lieu of items ordered to also ensure the recovery of classified spare parts that have been shipped to foreign countries that may not be eligible to receive them under blanket orders. | Why GAO Did This Study
From 1993 through 2002, the Department of Defense (DOD) delivered over $150 billion in services and defense articles--including classified spare parts and unclassified items containing military technology--to countries through foreign military sales programs. GAO was asked to review whether the Army's key internal controls adequately restricted blanket orders for (1) classified spare parts and (2) unclassified items containing military technology. GAO was also asked to determine if periodic tests were conducted to validate the Army's system and its logic.
What GAO Found
The Army's internal controls over foreign military sales are not adequate, placing classified spare parts and unclassified items containing military technology at risk of being shipped to foreign countries that may not be entitled to receive such items under blanket orders. Foreign countries may request items using blanket orders, which are for a specific dollar value and are used to simplify supply actions on certain categories of items. The Army lacked control edits in its system and allowed the substitution and release of classified spare parts under blanket orders for shipment to foreign countries. The Army and DOD policies prohibit the release of classified items, under blanket orders, to foreign countries. GAO identified 3 requisitions in its review, where the item manager released 11 classified digital processors to foreign countries under blanket orders. Because the Army's system did not have control edits in place to validate the substituted parts, classified items were released to foreign countries. Also, the Army has no written policy to determine the actions needed to recover classified items that have been shipped to countries not eligible to receive them. Army officials indicated that the countries were not entitled to receive these items under blanket orders but they could obtain them under a different process; so there is no need to retrieve them, and GAO agreed with their decision. Also, the Army has modified the system to validate substituted parts selected by item managers. The Army lacks control edits in its system to prevent the release of some unclassified items containing military technology requisitioned under blanket orders. Within the 21,663 requisitions that were shipped without a review, GAO found that 387 requisitions were for 2,267 restricted items that foreign countries are prohibited from requesting using blanket orders because the parts require release authority from inventory control points. Also, the Army has no written policies to recover items that have been shipped to countries not eligible to receive them. Army officials said the countries were entitled to request these items, so there is no need to recover the items. The Army has not conducted periodic tests, as required, to validate that its system is accurately reviewing and approving blanket order requisitions. GAO's and the Office of Management and Budget's internal control standards require that a system such as the Army's be periodically tested to ensure that it is working as intended. According to DOD and Army officials, they have not tested the system's logic for restricting requisitions since 1999. Also, the officials stated that the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, in October 1998, directed that no additional funds be used to expand the current system. However, according to the agency, the Army is not prohibited from periodically testing the system. |
gao_T-HEHS-98-100 | gao_T-HEHS-98-100_0 | Also, as an employer, DOD offers health care services to 6.6 million non-active duty beneficiaries, including active duty members’ dependents and military retirees and their dependents. TRICARE Implementation Falling Short of DOD’s Expectations
In restructuring its health care program, DOD designed a program that has proven difficult to implement. As DOD implements TRICARE, it is also continuing to make significant changes to the program’s design. However, as of October 1997, only about half of the eligible beneficiaries using the military health care system had enrolled in TRICARE Prime. Thus, it appears that DOD could more fully and cost-effectively use its facilities before enrolling beneficiaries in civilian-provided care. DOD Not Adequately Assessing Progress in Achieving Program Goals
As we have noted, DOD’s goals in establishing TRICARE were to improve access while maintaining quality and controlling costs. DOD efforts to set goals and to measure access and quality are incomplete, however, and do not enable DOD or others to fully assess whether TRICARE has improved beneficiaries’ access to and quality of health care. Until this analysis is completed, questions will remain regarding the extent to which the legislative objective for TRICARE’s cost-effectiveness is being achieved. Ongoing and Planned Military Health System Changes Likely to Affect TRICARE
DOD’s efforts to fully implement TRICARE are occurring at a time when not only are changes being made in the organization to manage the program but other, perhaps more significant, changes are being contemplated for the military health care system itself. A second significant organizational change that may affect the future of TRICARE relates to the imminent retirement of the now Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense, who has served in Health Affairs for the past 9 years and has been a key force in the design and development of TRICARE. This would alter the potential cost-effectiveness of the program. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed the status of the Department of Defense's (DOD) implementation of its managed health care program, TRICARE, focusing on: (1) DOD's progress in implementing TRICARE; (2) whether DOD is adequately assessing TRICARE'S effects on military health care access, quality, and cost; and (3) the implications of ongoing and proposed changes in the military health care system itself for TRICARE's future.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) TRICARE was established in an era of military downsizing and rapidly escalating DOD health costs; (2) it was envisioned as a way to maintain beneficiary access to high-quality care while containing costs; (3) designing and implementing TRICARE to achieve these objectives, however, has proven to be a complex and difficult undertaking involving many stakeholders, including Congress, the individual services and their many facilities and contractors, and the more than 8 million beneficiaries of the military health care system; (4) DOD has taken steps to improve the program as it has evolved, but much remains to be done before TRICARE becomes the smooth-running and beneficiary-friendly endeavor envisioned by its developers; (5) moreover, many questions concerning its cost-effectiveness and ability to meet beneficiary access and quality of care concerns are still to be answered; (6) in addition to operational difficulties, TRICARE is likely to continue to be implemented amid many changes that could profoundly affect not only the program but the entire military health care system; and (7) the result of the continuing evolution of TRICARE and the collective effects of these individual changes on it remain to be seen. |
gao_GAO-05-300 | gao_GAO-05-300_0 | These documents are as follows. DHS Planning Has Made Progress, but Opportunities for Improvement Exist
DHS has made considerable progress in its planning efforts, but future efforts can be improved. While the strategic plan included five of the six GPRA-required elements, it did not describe the relationship of annual goals to long-term goals. Further, stakeholder involvement during the planning process is important to ensure DHS’s efforts and resources are aligned with other federal and nonfederal partners with shared responsibility for homeland security and that they are targeted at the highest priorities. Additionally, DHS’s planning documents describe areas where DHS needs to coordinate with stakeholders to implement its programs, achieve its goals and objectives, and meet its homeland security and non-homeland security responsibilities. Stakeholder consultation in strategic planning efforts can help create a basic understanding of the competing demands that confront most agencies, the limited resources available to them, and how those demands and resources require careful and continuous balancing. Finally, DHS had limited consultation with nonfederal stakeholders, such as state and local governments and the private sector, in its strategic planning process. We have reported that this linkage is critical for determining whether an agency has a clear sense of how it will assess progress toward achieving the intended results for its long-term goals. Although the Performance Budget Overview linked specific annual goals and performance measures to the long-term strategic goals, not including a description of how the annual goals relate to the long-term goals in the strategic plan makes it difficult for DHS and its stakeholders to identify how their roles and responsibilities contribute to DHS’s mission and potentially limits Congress’s and other key stakeholders’ ability to assess the feasibility of DHS’s long-term goals. Several of the GPRA-required elements addressed in DHS’s strategic plan could be further developed through the implementation of additional good strategic planning practices. In addition, the strategic plan generally describes strategies and approaches to achieve the long-term strategic goals but does not include the specific budgetary, human capital, or other resources needed. In addition, planning officials in DHS’s component agencies that address the non-homeland security mission said these responsibilities were fairly represented in the planning process and documents. Earlier and more comprehensive stakeholder involvement in DHS’s planning process is perhaps the most important area for improvement. While the body of DHS’s strategic planning documents address most of the required elements of GPRA, not having all of the required elements in its strategic plan limits Congress’s and other key stakeholders’ ability to assess the feasibility of DHS’s long-term goals. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of this report were to assess (1) the extent to which the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) planning process and documents address required elements of the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA) and reflect good strategic planning practices and (2) whether DHS’s planning process and documents reflect attention to homeland security and non-homeland security mission responsibilities. | Why GAO Did This Study
The creation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was the largest government reorganization in over 50 years, involving 170,000 employees and a $40 billion budget. Given the magnitude of this effort, strategic planning is critical for DHS to ensure that it meets the nation's homeland security challenges. GAO was asked to assess the extent to which DHS's planning process and documents (1) address required elements of the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA) and other good strategic planning practices and (2) reflect its homeland and non-homeland security mission responsibilities.
What GAO Found
DHS has made considerable progress in its planning efforts, releasing its first strategic plan in 2004 that details its mission and strategic goals. Nevertheless, opportunities for improvement exist. The creation of DHS brought together 22 agencies to coordinate the nation's homeland security efforts and to work with Congress and numerous other organizations, including federal agencies, state and local governments, and the private sector, to further this mission. Although DHS planning documents describe programs requiring stakeholder coordination to implement, stakeholder involvement in the planning process itself was limited. Involving stakeholders in strategic planning efforts can help create an understanding of the competing demands and limited resources, and how those demands and resources require careful and continuous balancing. As DHS updates its strategic plan, earlier and more comprehensive stakeholder consultation will help ensure that DHS's efforts and resources are targeted at the highest priorities and that the planning documents are as useful as possible to DHS and its stakeholders. While DHS's strategic plan addresses five of the six GPRA-required elements, it does not describe the relationship between annual and long-term goals. This linkage is crucial for determining whether an agency has a clear sense of how it will assess progress toward achieving the intended results for its long-term goals. While DHS's strategic planning documents address most of the required elements of GPRA, not including them in the strategic plan makes it difficult for DHS and its stakeholders to identify how their roles and responsibilities contribute to DHS's mission and potentially hinders Congress's and other key stakeholders' ability to assess the feasibility of DHS's long-term goals. Additionally, several of the GPRA-required elements addressed in the strategic plan could be further developed through the adoption of additional good strategic planning practices. For example, identifying the specific budgetary, human capital, and other resources needed to achieve its goals could demonstrate the viability of the strategies and approaches presented for achieving its long-term goals. Finally, although DHS's priority is its homeland security mission--which emphasizes deterring terrorism in the United States--DHS's planning documents clearly address its responsibility for non-homeland security mission programs as well, such as its response to natural disasters. In addition, DHS planning officials said that non-homeland security responsibilities were represented in the planning process and documents due, in part, to the commitment of top leadership. |
gao_GAO-12-591 | gao_GAO-12-591_0 | Scope and Methodology
To identify which isotopes are produced, sold, or distributed either by the Isotope Program or NNSA and how the two agencies make isotopes available for commercial and research applications, we reviewed the DOE Isotope Program’s information on available isotopes, isotope sales data, and information on NNSA’s isotopes. The isotopes sold by the Isotope Program can be categorized as (1) radioisotopes currently produced by the Isotope Program at DOE production sites; (2) stable isotopes from the Isotope Program’s inventory, which are no longer produced in the United States; and (3) isotopes generated or provided by NNSA as by-products of its nuclear weapons program (see table 3). In Providing Commercial Isotopes, DOE’s Isotope Program May Be Forgoing Revenue That Could Further Support Its Mission
To provide isotopes for commercial and research applications, the Isotope Program takes steps to determine the demand for isotopes, coordinate production across production sites, and set prices for isotopes, but the program is not using thorough assessments to establish prices for commercial isotopes. The Isotope Program has flexibility to set prices at market levels for isotopes sold for commercial applications but instead, for most isotopes where the program is the only domestic supplier, sets prices at the level necessary to recover its cost to produce them. According to program officials, direct costs include labor costs and costs for chemical processing, among others; indirect costs include facility maintenance costs and other infrastructure costs. For research applications, isotope prices are set to recover only direct costs. In Setting Prices for Most Commercial Isotopes, DOE’s Isotope Program May Be Forgoing Revenue That Could Further Support Its Mission
The Isotope Program generally charges full cost recovery for commercial isotopes, but the program has not fully assessed the pricing of most of the commercial isotopes it sells, as required by its current policy, such as assessing the value of the isotopes to the customer or prices of similar isotopes. To this end, the Isotope Program established a pricing policy in 1990 that provides latitude for establishing prices at full cost recovery or at market prices that are higher or lower than full cost recovery, but also states that when a market price already exists that is higher than full cost recovery, the market price should be used. The policy also states that prices should be assessed annually and that additional factors may be considered when establishing prices, including the number of suppliers, demand, competitors’ prices, and the value of the isotope to the customer. DOE’s Isotope Program Has Taken Some Actions to Identify and Manage Risks, but Its Efforts Are Not Comprehensive
The Isotope Program has begun taking some actions to identify and mitigate risks to achieving its mission of producing isotopes, such as the risk of relying on sales of a small number of commercial isotopes for a large percentage of its revenues, but without first establishing clear, consistent program objectives, the program’s risk assessment efforts are not comprehensive. DOE’s Isotope Program Is Taking Varied Actions to Identify and Mitigate Program Risks
The Isotope Program is taking some actions to assess risks to achieving its mission, including identifying high-priority isotopes and using its revolving fund to mitigate risks from unforeseen events. The Isotope Program also assesses risks to the program by identifying high-priority isotopes—those at risk of supply problems, either because the isotopes are already in short supply or are important to users. One of the federal standards for internal control—risk assessment— states that a precondition to risk assessment is the establishment of clear, consistent objectives. Without consolidating the multiple lists of high-priority isotopes, however, it is unclear which isotopes have greater priority than others. Thus, program managers may not be focusing limited resources on the most important isotopes. Furthermore, because the program does not have clear objectives, it cannot be assured that it is assessing and mitigating risks from all relevant external and internal sources. The program has not, however, defined what factors it will consider when it sets prices for isotopes sold commercially, including defining under what circumstances it will set prices for such isotopes at or above full cost recovery. Consolidate the lists of high-priority isotopes so the program can ensure that its resources are focused on the most important isotopes. In its written response, reproduced in appendix II, DOE explained that our recommendations will generally be addressed through the Isotope Program’s current efforts to update its pricing policy and develop a strategic plan. Appendix I: Isotopes Available from DOE’s Isotope Program
This table identifies the isotopes provided at the time of this report for sale by the Department of Energy’s (DOE) Isotope Development and Production for Research and Applications program (Isotope Program). | Why GAO Did This Study
DOE is the only domestic supplier for many of the over 300 different isotopes it sells that are critical to medical, commercial, research, and national security applications. Previous shortages of some isotopes, such as helium-3, an isotope used to detect radiation at seaports and border crossings, highlight the importance of managing supplies of and demand for critical isotopes. Prior reports by GAO and others highlighted risks and challenges faced by the Isotope Program, such as assessing demand for certain isotopes. GAO was asked to determine (1) which isotopes are produced, sold, or distributed either by the Isotope Program or NNSA and how the two agencies make isotopes available for commercial and research applications; (2) what steps the Isotope Program takes to provide isotopes for commercial and research applications; and (3) the extent to which DOE is assessing and mitigating risks facing the Isotope Program. GAO reviewed DOE and NNSA documents, visited Oak Ridge National Laboratory, and interviewed cognizant agency officials.
What GAO Found
The Department of Energys (DOE) Isotope Development and Production for Research and Applications program (Isotope Program) provides over 300 different isotopes for commercial and research applications. The Isotope Program is responsible for 243 stable isotopes that are no longer produced in the United States but are sold from the programs existing inventory and for 55 radioactive isotopes, called radioisotopes, that the program is able to produce at DOE facilities. An additional 10 isotopes sold by the Isotope Program are provided by the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), a separate agency within DOE, as by-products of its nuclear weapons program.
The Isotope Program may be forgoing revenue that could further its mission because of the manner in which it sets prices for commercial isotopes. The Isotope Program determines demand, coordinates production, and sets prices for commercial isotopes. To set prices for radioisotopes, the program considers the full cost of production, including direct costs (e.g., labor costs) and indirect costs (e.g., infrastructure costs). For research applications, isotope prices are set to recover direct costs to reduce prices and encourage research. For commercial applications, prices are set at full cost recoveryof both direct and indirect costsor at an isotopes market price when a market price higher than full cost recovery already exists. The program, however, has not fully assessed the pricing of most of these isotopes, as required by its 1990 pricing policy. This policy provides latitude for setting prices and states that prices should be assessed annually. Factors that may be considered when establishing prices include the value of an isotope to the customer, demand, and the number of suppliers. The program, however, has not assessed the value of isotopes to customers or defined what factors it will consider when it sets prices for commercial isotopes, including defining under what circumstances it will set prices at or above full cost recovery. As a result, the program does not know if its full-cost-recovery prices are set at appropriate levels so as not to distort the market, and it may be forgoing revenue that could further support its mission.
The Isotope Program has begun taking some actions to identify and manage risks to achieving its mission of producing isotopes, but because it has not established clear, consistent program objectives, the programs risk assessment efforts are not comprehensive. Actions the Isotope Program is taking include, among other things, identifying high-priority isotopes and using its revolving fund to mitigate risks from unforeseen events. For example, the Isotope Program has identified five lists of high-priority isotopesthose at risk of supply problems because they are already in short supply or are important to users. Isotope Program officials reported using these lists to set program priorities. The Isotope Program is taking these actions, however, without first establishing clear, consistent objectives. The federal standards for internal control state that a precondition to risk assessment is the establishment of clear objectives. Without clearly defined objectives, the program cannot be assured that it is assessing risks from all sources or that its efforts are focusing on the most significant risks to achieving its mission. Furthermore, without consolidating the multiple high-priority lists, Isotope Program managers may not be directing limited resources to the most important isotopes.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends, among other actions, that DOEs Isotope Program define what factors it considers when setting isotope prices, create clear objectives as a basis for risk assessment, and consolidate the lists of high-priority isotopes. DOE stated that it will address GAOs recommendations through the Isotope Programs current efforts to update its pricing policy and develop a strategic plan. |
gao_T-HEHS-96-147 | gao_T-HEHS-96-147_0 | Background
DI and SSI—the two largest federal programs providing cash and medical assistance to people with disabilities—grew rapidly between 1985 and 1994, with the enrollment of working-age people increasing 59 percent, from 4 million to 6.3 million, and the inflation-adjusted cost of cash benefits growing by 66 percent. Technological Advances and Social Change Foster Return to Work
While DI and SSI return-to-work outcomes have been poor, many technological and medical advances have created more opportunities for some individuals with disabilities to engage in work. Current Program Structure Impedes Return to Work
The cumulative impact of weaknesses in the design and implementation of the disability programs is to understate beneficiaries’ work capacity and impede efforts to improve return-to-work outcomes. Work incentives are not well understood by beneficiaries and program staff alike. About 70 percent of new awardees are eligible for disability because their impairments meet or equal the listings. Studies have shown that a meaningful portion of DI and SSI beneficiaries possess such characteristics. As mentioned, our review of the disability determination process shows that the work capacity of an individual found eligible for DI and SSI benefits may be understated. Supplemental Security Income: Growth and Changes in Recipient Population Call for Reexamining Program (GAO/HEHS-95-137, July 7, 1995). 2, 1995). | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed Social Security Disability Insurance (DI) and Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program weaknesses that impede the Social Security Administration (SSA) from requiring beneficiaries to work.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) between 1985 and 1994, the combined DI and SSI beneficiary population increased 70 percent and the cost of cash benefits grew 66 percent; (2) these increases were due to eligibility expansion, program outreach, fewer continuing disability reviews, economic factors, and demographic changes; (3) the beneficiary population is growing younger, and more beneficiaries have long-term impairments; (4) the development of effective return-to-work strategies for people with severe disabilities is challenging because individuals require various levels of support, remedial training, and education; (5) technological and medical advances and economic and social changes have created more potential for some individuals with disabilities to return to work; (6) the SSI and DI benefit structure further complicates disability and work capability determinations; and (7) although SSI and DI programs offer such work incentives as trial work periods, extended eligibility, earned income exclusion, work expense subsidies, continued health insurance coverage, and reentitlement, they are not appropriately designed or implemented to motivate beneficiaries to return to work. |
gao_T-AIMD-96-133 | gao_T-AIMD-96-133_0 | The second reason for the decline in real property tax revenue is a decrease in the assessed value of the District’s commercial and residential property. In fiscal year 1995, over 75 percent, or about $653 million, of the District’s operating grants were for health and welfare programs. The Federal Payment
The District has been receiving a federal payment since the 1800s. For example, it does not fully compensate the District for (1) the additional responsibilities it carries as a result of the federal government’s presence or (2) the loss of revenue due to federally imposed restrictions. The studies reported that the District’s inability to tax nonresident wages results in a loss of revenue because nearly $2 of every $3 earned in the District is earned by nonresidents. District’s Overall Expenditures
The general fund, at $4.2 billion, or 79 percent of the District’s $5.4 billion in gross expenditures/expenses for fiscal year 1995, far exceeded the expenditures and expenses of the other funds that comprise the District’s budget and, thus, is the primary focus of our analysis. Overall, expenditures/expenses increased from $5.5 billion in fiscal year 1993 to $6.0 billion in fiscal year 1994 and decreased to $5.4 billion in fiscal year 1995. The significant change from year to year was primarily due to shifts in Medicaid and employee benefits expenditures/expenses between the years. Today, the unfunded liability stands at $4.7 billion and is expected to increase to $7 billion in 2004. For example, in fiscal year 1994, the District delayed pension, vendor, and Medicaid payments and borrowed internally from its capital projects fund. In fiscal years 1995 and 1996, the District also borrowed short-term from the U.S. Treasury to finance operations and capital projects. According to New York City officials, the control boards made significant contributions. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed the financial and budget trends in the District of Columbia's revenues and expenses.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the District's revenues decreased from $2.9 billion in fiscal year (FY) 1993 to $2.7 billion in FY 1995, due to a one-time accounting change and a decrease in the assessed value of the District's commercial and residential property; (2) over 75 percent of the District's operating grants were for Medicaid reimbursements in FY 1995; (3) the District received a federal payment in FY 1995 totalling $660 million, but this payment did not adequately compensate the District for the additional responsibility it assumed or the loss of revenue due to federally imposed restrictions; (4) the District's inability to tax nonresident wages resulted in a loss of revenue; (5) the District's overall expenditures increased from $5.5 billion in FY 1993 to $6 billion in FY 1994, and decreased to $5.4 billion in FY 1995 due to shifts in Medicaid and employee benefits expenditures; (6) the District's unfunded pension liability stands at $4.7 billion and is expected to increase to $7 billion by 2004; (7) the District has delayed pension, vendor, and Medicaid payments, and borrowed short-term bonds from the Treasury to finance its operations; (8) the District Financial Responsibility and Management Assistance Authority has reviewed 1,562 contracts, developed a strategic plan, approved 10 privatization plans for FY 1996, and allocated reductions to several departments; and (9) the New York and Philadelphia financial control boards have taken numerous actions to reform their cities' accounting and budgeting practices. |
gao_GAO-01-579 | gao_GAO-01-579_0 | Financial and Human Capital Dedicated to the Partnership Program
The cost of the partnership program from October 1997 through September 2000 totaled about $142.9 million, or about 2 percent of the estimated $6.5 billion total cost for the 2000 Census. This is an average of about $1.19 for each of the 120 million households the Bureau estimates make up the nation. Partnership Program Staffing Levels
At its peak in fiscal year 2000, the Bureau staffed the partnership program with 594 full-time equivalent positions of which 560 positions were located in the field and 34 were in the Bureau’s headquarters (see table 1). As a result, the former local census office manager and AMFO ended up doing most of the outreach and promotion work.”
For their part, while the partnership specialists we spoke to generally agreed that the Bureau hired enough specialists to carry out partnership activities, they also reported that they could have used more clerical support to help alleviate some of the specialists’ administrative work, which included distributing thousands of posters and other promotional items to partner organizations and entering data into the Bureau’s partnership tracking system (each regional census center typically hired four to six partnership program support staff). Partnering Decisions and Logo Use Were Governed by Unwritten Guidelines and Criteria
As we noted in our October 2000 report, at the time of the census, decisions on which organizations the Bureau partnered with and what events the Bureau participated in were governed by unwritten guidelines and criteria. According to Bureau officials, partnering decisions were driven by (1) the Bureau’s desire to partner with virtually any organization that was willing to support the census and (2) the specific demographic, cultural, and other characteristics of each census region. The Bureau encouraged organizations to use the census logo to customize promotional and other literature, and made it available on its Internet site, but aside from stylistic guidelines, such as logo color restrictions and logo font requirements, the Bureau did not provide any guidance on what constituted proper and improper use. Although the written guidelines are a step in the right direction, they still do not address how partners may characterize their association with the Bureau, nor do they discuss how partners may use the Bureau’s logo. The Bureau did not detect many of these problems prior to the census in part because CPUMS was developed after the 1998 dress rehearsal for the 2000 Census and was not fully tested before it went operational. Develop regulations specifying how organizations may characterize their association with the Bureau and how they may use the Bureau’s logo. | Why GAO Did This Study
To take a more complete and accurate count of the nation's population in the 2000 Census, the Bureau of the Census partnered with other federal agencies, as well as with state, local, and tribal governments; religious, community, and social service organizations; and private businesses. According to the Bureau, about 140,000 organizations participated in the partnership program by assisting in such critical activities as reviewing and updating the Bureau's address list, encouraging people--especially hard-to-count populations--to participate in the census, and recruiting temporary census employees.
What GAO Found
GAO found that the Bureau spent about $142.9 million on its partnership program, or about two percent of the estimated $6.5 billion the Bureau allocated for the census and an average of about $1.19 for each of the 120 million households that the Bureau estimates are in the nation. The Bureau staffed the partnership program with 594 full-time positions, of which 560 were allocated to the field, while the remaining slots were located in the Bureau's headquarters. Decisions on which organizations to partner with and what events to attend were governed by unwritten guidelines and criteria and were driven by the Bureau's desire to collaborate with virtually any organization that would support the census. The Bureau made the census logo available on its Internet site and encouraged partners to use the logo to help promote the census. However, the Bureau did not have any written guidance on how partners could characterize their association with the Bureau or what constituted appropriate use of the census logo. The Bureau has since prepared written guidelines for making decisions on partnership engagements. However, the guidelines fall short in that they still do not address how partners may (1) characterize their associations with the Bureau and (2) use the Bureau's logo. Although the Bureau developed a monitoring system for tracking, planning, and analyzing partnership efforts throughout the nation, it was not fully tested before it went operational because of time constraints. As a result, several shortcomings went undetected until the system was implemented. |
gao_GAO-11-610T | gao_GAO-11-610T_0 | DOT administered most Recovery Act funds through existing transportation programs. For example, highway and transit funds were to be fully obligated by September 30, 2010. Most Recovery Act Transportation Funds Have Been Obligated, and Expenditures for Infrastructure Continue to Increase
According to DOT data, as of March 31, 2011, DOT had obligated more than $45 billion (about 95 percent) on over 15,000 projects and had expended more than $26 billion (about 59 percent) of the $48.1 billion it received under the Recovery Act (see table 1). States and other recipients continue to report using Recovery Act funds to improve the condition of the nation’s transportation infrastructure, as well as invest in new infrastructure. For example, according to DOT data, highway funds have been primarily used for pavement improvement projects, such as resurfacing, reconstruction, and rehabilitation of existing roadways, and public transit funds have been used primarily for upgrading transit facilities and purchasing new vehicles (see fig. 2). The Recovery Act Helped Fund Transportation Jobs, but Long-Term Benefits Are Unclear
Recovery Act funds helped pay for jobs across various transportation modes. According to the most recent recipient reported data, Recovery Act transportation projects supported about 50,000 FTEs from October 2010 through December 2010. 3). For the most recent reporting quarter, highway projects accounted for approximately two-thirds of the transportation FTEs reported, and the remaining one-third of FTEs were attributed to transit and all other transportation projects. Although recipients reported jobs funded, other long-term impacts of Recovery Act investments in transportation are unknown at this point. Specifically, in the near term, we recommended that FHWA and FTA determine the types of data and performance measures needed to assess the impact of the Recovery Act and the specific authority they may need to collect data and report on these measures. DOT has not committed to assessing the long-term benefits of Recovery Act investments in transportation. For Recovery Act high speed intercity passenger rail and TIGER grant programs, DOT has set broad performance goals and required recipients to identify potential project benefits. DOT is evaluating the best methods for measuring objectives and collecting data and is working collaboratively with applicants to weigh options for measuring performance. Maintenance of Effort and Economically Distressed Area Requirements Proved Challenging
Certain Recovery Act provisions not typically required under existing DOT programs proved challenging for some states to meet. We have reported that there were numerous challenges for DOT and states in implementing the transportation maintenance-of-effort provision in the Recovery Act. A January 2011 preliminary DOT report indicated that 29 states met their planned levels of expenditure, and 21 states did not. States had a monetary incentive to meet their certified planned level of spending in each transportation program area funded by the Recovery Act because those that fail will not be eligible to participate in the August 2011 redistribution of obligation authority under the Federal-Aid Highway Program. Better Documentation Could Reduce Challenges to the Integrity of Selection Decisions for High Speed Intercity Passenger Rail and TIGER Grant Programs
We have reported that allocating federal funding for surface transportation based on performance in general, and directing some portion of federal funds on a competitive basis to projects of national or regional significance in particular, can more effectively address certain challenges facing the nation’s surface transportation programs. In our recent reports on the high speed intercity passenger rail and TIGER programs, we found that while DOT generally followed recommended grantmaking practices, DOT could have documented more information about its award decisions. The Recovery Act and the Passenger Rail Investment and Improvement Act of 2008 required FRA to implement a plan to award and oversee billions of dollars for high speed intercity passenger rail grants. However, one area in which FRA could have done better is to develop clearer records for how it made final grant award decisions. Without a clear record of selection decisions, FRA is vulnerable to criticism about the integrity of its decisions. While DOT thoroughly documented the Evaluation Teams’ assessments and the Review Team’s memorandum recommending projects to the Secretary of Transportation for award described the strengths of projects recommended for award, it did not document the Review Team’s final decisions and its rationale for selecting recommended projects for half the awards over highly recommended ones. | Why GAO Did This Study
The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (Recovery Act) provided more than $48 billion to the Department of Transportation (DOT) to be distributed through existing programs and through two new competitive grant programs--high speed intercity passenger rail and the Transportation Investment Generating Economic Recovery (TIGER) program. As requested, this testimony addresses the (1) status and use of Recovery Act transportation funds, (2) outcomes and long-term benefits of Recovery Act transportation investments, and (3) lessons learned from DOT's and states' experiences implementing the Recovery Act. GAO reviewed prior and ongoing work, federal legislation, and guidance. GAO also analyzed Recovery Act data and interviewed federal, state, and local officials.
What GAO Found
As of March 31, 2011, more than $45 billion (about 95 percent) of Recovery Act transportation funds had been obligated for over 15,000 projects nationwide, and more than $26 billion had been expended. States and other recipients continue to report using Recovery Act funds to improve the nation's transportation infrastructure. Highway funds have been primarily used for pavement improvement projects and transit funds have been primarily used to upgrade transit facilities and purchase new vehicles. Recovery Act funds have also been used to rehabilitate airport runways and improve Amtrak's infrastructure. DOT continues to obligate funds for its high speed intercity passenger rail and TIGER grant programs. As of March 31, 2011, DOT had obligated nearly all of the $1.5 billion in TIGER funds for 51 surface transportation projects. The Recovery Act helped to fund transportation jobs, but long-term benefits are unclear. For example, according to available data, Recovery Act transportation projects supported about 50,000 full-time equivalents (FTE) in the three months from October through December 2010. The most recent data showed that highway projects accounted for about two-thirds of the transportation FTEs reported, and the remaining one-third of the FTEs were attributed to transit and other transportation projects. However, the impact of Recovery Act investments in transportation is unknown, and GAO has recommended that DOT determine the data needed to assess the impact of these investments. Although DOT has set broad performance goals for its high speed intercity passenger rail and TIGER programs--and is currently evaluating the best methods for measuring objectives and collecting data--it has not committed to assessing the long-term benefits of the Recovery Act investments in transportation. Certain Recovery Act provisions meant to stimulate the economy, but not typically required under existing DOT programs, proved challenging. For example, GAO has reported on numerous challenges DOT and states faced in implementing the transportation maintenance-of-effort requirement, which required states to maintain their planned levels of spending over approximately 18 months or be ineligible to participate in the August 2011 redistribution of obligation authority under the Federal-Aid Highway Program. A January 2011 preliminary DOT report found that 29 states met the requirement while 21 states did not. In this report, DOT also discussed how the maintenance-of-effort provision could be improved. With regard to the high speed intercity passenger rail and TIGER programs, GAO found that while DOT generally followed recommended grant-making practices, DOT could have better documented its award decisions. For example, the Federal Railroad Administration could have developed clearer records for how it made award decisions. Without a clear record of selection decisions, DOT is vulnerable to criticism about the integrity of its decisions. Likewise, DOT did not clearly document its final decisions and rationale for selecting recommended TIGER projects. This testimony does not include new recommendations. In our past work, GAO recommended that the Secretary of Transportation take several actions, such as directing the Federal Highway and Federal Transit administrations to determine the data needed to assess the impact of Recovery Act projects; we recently recommended that the Federal Railroad Administration and DOT better document decisions regarding their competitive grant programs. DOT has addressed some GAO recommendations, but others remain open. We will continue to track them. GAO provided a draft of this statement to DOT and incorporated its comments where appropriate. |
gao_GAO-16-448 | gao_GAO-16-448_0 | Credit unions. Servicing is a part of holding mortgage loans in portfolio, but the right to service a mortgage generally becomes a distinct asset—an MSR—when contractually separated from the loan if the loan is sold or securitized. 1). The Share of Mortgages Serviced by Community Lenders Has Increased Since 2008
Based on our analysis, the total share of all U.S. residential mortgages serviced by community lenders increased between 2008 and 2015. Nationwide, regional, and other banks continue to service more than half of the market. Many Community Lenders Reported Spending More in Response to Regulatory Requirements and Some Adjusted Business Activities, Potentially Affecting Customers
Many community lenders that we interviewed noted that they continued to service mortgages in their portfolio or to hold MSRs on loans sold to the secondary market in spite of increased compliance costs of mortgage- related requirements resulting from new rules instituted pursuant to the Dodd-Frank Act. Most Community Banks and Credit Unions Hold Limited MSRs and Have Sufficient Capital to Cover Them
Regardless of type or size, banks with large concentrations of MSRs may need to raise capital as a result of the new risk-based capital treatment of MSRs, but our analysis and most community banks we spoke with confirmed that these new rules were currently not an issue for them. Additionally, our analysis showed that about 19 percent of community banks held MSRs and about 1 percent made MSR-related deductions from capital due to the amount of these assets they held as of the third quarter of 2015 (see fig. Most community banks we interviewed confirmed that they did not need to make changes to their capital because of these rules, but those with large concentrations of MSRs were considering changes to their capital. Institutions with large concentrations of MSRs may choose to raise additional capital or sell MSRs to meet required minimum capital amounts, depending on banks’ holdings of other types of assets. One credit union told us that it was well capitalized and that the risk- based capital rule would likely not affect it. Regulators Estimated Impacts of New Rules Using Public Input and Data Analysis, but CFPB’s Plans for Reviewing Rules Have Limitations
CFPB used several methods to estimate the impact of its mortgage servicing rules prior to finalizing them in 2013, and banking regulators incorporated changes to the treatment of MSRs when they estimated the overall impact of new regulatory capital rules in 2013. CFPB also considered the potential costs and benefits for consumers and all banks and credit unions, as required by the Dodd-Frank Act. CFPB’s Plans for Conducting Retrospective Reviews of the Mortgage Servicing Rules Are Incomplete, and Banking Regulators’ Reviews of Capital Rules Are Ongoing
CFPB’s plans for retrospectively reviewing its mortgage servicing rules are incomplete, as the agency has not finalized its planned approach. CFPB officials said a specific plan for reviewing the mortgage servicing rules had not been completed because it was too soon to identify the relevant data and because the agency wanted the flexibility to design the most effective method to analyze the rules. However, we found in a 2007 report on retrospective reviews that agencies are better prepared to perform effective reviews if they identify potential sources of data and the measures that would be needed to assess effectiveness of the rules. In addition to these planned reviews, banking regulators said that they often conducted other informal reviews as needed to evaluate the effectiveness of rules. Conclusions
Mortgage servicing is a substantial business for many community banks and credit unions, and the value of their MSRs exceeded $3 billion as of September 30, 2015. For the mortgage servicing rules, this review must be completed by January 2019. Without a completed plan, CFPB risks not having enough time to perform an effective review. Recommendation for Executive Action
To enhance the effectiveness of preparations for conducting a retrospective review of its mortgage servicing regulations, the Director of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau should complete a plan to identify the outcomes CFPB will examine to measure the effects of the regulations, including the specific metrics, baselines, and analytical methods to be used. In its written comments, CFPB agreed to take steps to complete its plan for conducting a retrospective review of the mortgage servicing rules. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of our report were to examine (1) community lenders’ participation in the mortgage servicing market and potential effects of the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection (commonly known as the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau or CFPB) mortgage servicing rules on those lenders, (2) potential effects of the risk-based capital treatment of mortgage servicing rights (MSR) on decisions about holding or selling MSRs, and (3) the process regulators used to estimate the impact of regulations addressing mortgage servicing requirements and the risk-based capital treatment of MSRs. | Why GAO Did This Study
As of September 30, 2015, community lenders held about $3.1 billion in MSRs on their balance sheets. Servicing is a part of holding all mortgage loans, but an MSR generally becomes a distinct asset when the loan is sold or securitized. In response to the 2007–2009 financial crisis, regulators have implemented new rules related to mortgage servicing and regulatory capital to protect consumers and strengthen the financial services industry. GAO was asked to review the effect of these rule changes on U.S. banks and credit unions, particularly community lenders. This report examines (1) community lenders' participation in the mortgage servicing market and potential effects of CFPB's mortgage servicing rules on them, (2) potential effects of the treatment of MSRs in capital rules on community lenders' decisions about holding or selling MSRs, and (3) the process regulators used to consider impacts of these new rules on mortgage servicing and the capital treatment of MSRs.
GAO analyzed financial data, reviewed relevant laws and documents from regulatory agencies, and interviewed 16 community lenders selected based on size and volume of mortgage servicing activities, as well as industry, consumer groups, and federal officials.
What GAO Found
Community banks and credit unions (community lenders) remained active in servicing mortgage loans under the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau's (CFPB) new mortgage-servicing rules. Among other things, these rules are intended to provide more information to consumers about their loan obligations. The share of mortgages serviced by community lenders in 2015—about 13 percent—remained small compared to larger lenders, although their share doubled between 2008 and 2015. Large banks continue to service more than half of residential mortgages. Many lenders GAO interviewed said changes in mortgage-related requirements resulted in increased costs, such as hiring staff and updating systems. However, many also stated that servicing mortgages remained important to them for the revenue it can generate and their customer-focused business model.
Banking and credit union regulators' new capital rules changed how mortgage servicing rights (MSR) are treated in calculations of required capital amounts, but GAO found that these new rules appear unlikely to affect most community lenders' decisions to retain or sell MSRs. For example, GAO found that in the third quarter of 2015, about 1 percent of community banks had to limit the amount of MSRs that counted in their capital calculations due to the amount of these assets they held. This may result in some institutions choosing to raise additional capital or sell MSRs to meet required minimum capital amounts, depending on banks' holdings of other types of assets. A few banks with large concentrations of MSRs that GAO spoke with said they were considering selling MSRs or other changes to their capital but market participants told us that the MSR capital treatment was only one of several factors influencing their decisions. Separate capital rules for credit unions also are unlikely to affect most credit unions. For example, credit unions told GAO they did not expect to make changes to their MSR holdings and one credit union explained that it is because MSRs represented a small percentage of their overall capital.
Banking regulators and CFPB estimated the potential impacts of their new rules prior to issuing them by, for example, estimating potential costs of compliance. Banking regulators included the capital rules in a retrospective review of all their rules required by statute, although this review is to be completed before the MSR requirements are fully implemented by the end of 2018. Banking regulators also said they often conduct other informal reviews as needed to evaluate their rules' effectiveness. CFPB also has a statutory retrospective review requirement, but its plans for retrospectively reviewing its mortgage-servicing rules are incomplete. CFPB has not yet finalized a retrospective review plan or identified specific metrics, baselines, and analytical methods, as encouraged in Office of Management and Budget guidance. In addition, GAO found that agencies are better prepared to perform effective reviews if they identify potential data sources and the measures needed to assess rules' effectiveness. CFPB officials said it was too soon to identify relevant data and that they wanted flexibility to design an effective methodology. However, without a completed plan, CFPB risks not having time to perform an effective review before January 2019—the date by which CFPB must publish a report of its assessment.
What GAO Recommends
CFPB should complete a plan to measure the effects of its new regulations that includes specific metrics, baselines, and analytical methods to be used. CFPB agreed to take steps to complete its plan for conducting a retrospective review of the mortgage servicing rules and refine the review's scope and focus. |
gao_GAO-17-453 | gao_GAO-17-453_0 | For 2 of the 11 agencies, we could not determine compliance with the spending requirements because these agencies did not submit required obligations data to SBA. Most Agencies Submitted the Obligations Data Required to Determine Whether Spending Requirements Were Met, But Two Agencies Did Not Collect and Submit These Data
Nine of the 11 agencies participating in the SBIR program and 4 of the 5 agencies also participating in the STTR program submitted to SBA the extramural R&D obligations data required to determine whether they met the respective program spending requirements for fiscal year 2015. The Small Business Act requires agencies to spend a minimum percentage of their extramural R&D obligations on the SBIR and STTR programs annually. Officials at most agencies, including DOD and EPA, identified difficulties in using extramural R&D obligations data to determine spending requirements. Because of these difficulties, a working group of several participating agencies is considering proposing a recommendation to base spending requirements on extramural R&D budget authority, according to a Department of Energy (DOE) official involved in leading the effort. Participating Agencies Inconsistently Met Certain Reporting Requirements, and SBA Officials Report Having Taken Steps to Expedite Its Reporting to Congress
All of the agencies participating in the SBIR and STTR programs submitted methodology reports to SBA for fiscal year 2015, and about half of these agencies submitted them on time. While most agencies provided detailed information in their methodology reports, they did not consistently provide all of the information required by SBA’s policy directive. As of May 2017, SBA had not submitted its annual report on the programs to Congress for fiscal year 2015, but SBA officials said they have taken steps to expedite reporting. Basing Spending Requirements on Total R&D Budget Authority Would Have Increased Spending Requirements and Participation with Potential Benefits and Drawbacks
Changing the methodology for calculating SBIR and STTR spending requirements to use total R&D budget authority rather than extramural R&D obligations would have increased agencies’ spending requirements and the number of agencies required to participate in the programs for fiscal year 2015. Agency Officials Identified Potential Benefits and Drawbacks to Changing the Calculation Methodology to Total R&D Budget Authority
Officials at each of the participating agencies identified potential benefits or drawbacks to changing the calculation methodology for their SBIR and STTR spending requirements to use total R&D budget authority rather than extramural R&D obligations. Total Administrative Spending for Fiscal Year 2015 Is Unknown, but Nine Agencies Spent $33.9 Million on the Administrative Pilot Program
Total administrative spending for the SBIR and STTR programs for fiscal year 2015 is unknown because the agencies that participate in the programs generally do not—and are not required to—fully track these costs. Conclusions
Under the SBIR and STTR programs, federal agencies have awarded billions of dollars to small businesses to develop and commercialize innovative technologies. Until DOD and EPA find ways to provide the required data or until the spending requirements are changed or the identified data collection challenges are resolved, DOD and EPA will not know whether they have met the spending requirements, and SBA will be limited in its ability to accurately report that information to Congress. Recommendation for Executive Action
To ensure full compliance with SBIR and STTR spending and reporting requirements, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense and the EPA Administrator establish procedures to collect and submit obligations data or—through SBA, independently, or through a working group of agencies participating in the SBIR and STTR programs—propose to Congress an alternative methodology for calculating spending requirements for their agencies. In written comments, DOD and EPA agreed with the recommendation, and EPA stated that it will work with SBA to develop an alternative methodology for calculating spending requirements. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Agencies’ Spending and Spending Requirements for the Small Business Innovation Research Program for Fiscal Year 2015, According to Agency Data
Nine of the 11 agencies participating in the SBIR program submitted the extramural research or research and development (R&D) obligations data required to determine compliance with program spending requirements for fiscal year 2015. | Why GAO Did This Study
Through the SBIR and STTR programs, federal agencies have awarded contracts and grants totaling about $44 billion to small businesses to develop and commercialize innovative technologies. The Small Business Act requires agencies with extramural R&D obligations that meet certain thresholds—$100 million for SBIR and $1 billion for STTR—to spend a percentage of these funds on the programs. The agencies are to report on their activities to SBA and, in turn, SBA is to report to Congress.
The 2011 reauthorization of the programs includes a provision for GAO to review agencies' compliance with SBIR and STTR spending and reporting requirements and other program aspects. This report examines, for fiscal year 2015, (1) the extent to which participating agencies met spending requirements, (2) the extent to which agencies and SBA met certain reporting requirements, (3) the potential effects of basing spending requirements on total R&D budget authority instead of on extramural R&D obligations, and (4) what is known about the amounts agencies spent to administer the programs. GAO reviewed agency spending data and reports and interviewed program officials from SBA and the 11 participating agencies.
What GAO Found
Data submitted to the Small Business Administration (SBA) indicate that most of the agencies participating in the Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) and Small Business Technology Transfer (STTR) programs met spending requirements for fiscal year 2015. Nine of the 11 agencies participating in the SBIR program and 4 of the 5 agencies participating in the STTR program submitted the required data on obligations for extramural research or research and development (R&D)—which is generally conducted by nonfederal employees outside of federal facilities—needed to determine whether they met spending requirements. Of the agencies that submitted the required obligations data, 8 of 9 met SBIR spending requirements and all 4 met STTR spending requirements for fiscal year 2015. GAO could not determine compliance for 2 agencies—the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)—because these agencies did not submit the required obligations data. Officials at most agencies, including DOD and EPA, identified difficulties in using extramural R&D obligations data to calculate spending requirements and determine compliance. A working group of several participating agencies is considering proposing an alternative methodology to calculate spending requirements, according to an agency official involved in leading the effort. Until DOD and EPA find ways to provide obligations data or until the calculation methodology is changed, these 2 agencies will not know whether they have met the spending requirements, which limits SBA's reporting of that information to Congress.
Agencies inconsistently met certain requirements to report to SBA on their methodologies for calculating their extramural R&D budgets in fiscal year 2015, and SBA officials said they are taking steps to expedite SBA's required reporting to Congress. Five of the 11 agencies submitted their required methodology reports on time. Most agencies provided detailed information in these reports, but they did not consistently provide all of the information required. Regarding SBA's own reporting requirements, as of May 2017, SBA had not submitted its report for fiscal year 2015. GAO has previously made recommendations to SBA to address these issues, and SBA is in the process of implementing them.
GAO's analysis shows that basing SBIR and STTR spending requirements on an agency's total R&D budget authority instead of on its extramural R&D obligations for fiscal year 2015 would have increased spending requirements and the number of agencies required to participate in the programs. Officials from each of the participating agencies identified benefits or drawbacks of this potential change. For example, agency officials identified more awards to small businesses as a benefit, but officials from several agencies also stated that such a change could limit resources for other R&D programs.
Total administrative spending for the SBIR and STTR programs for fiscal year 2015 is unknown, but 9 agencies participating in an administrative pilot program—which permits agencies to fund new administrative activities—reported spending about $33.9 million on these activities for that year. Agencies are not required to and generally do not track their total administrative costs, so GAO could not determine total spending.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOD and EPA establish procedures to report obligations data or propose to Congress an alternative methodology for calculating spending requirements. DOD and EPA agreed with GAO's recommendation. |
gao_GAO-07-166 | gao_GAO-07-166_0 | Expected Environmental Cleanup Costs for the 2005 BRAC Round Are Not Yet Fully Known
Expected environmental cleanup costs for the 2005 BRAC round are not yet fully known, but they are likely to increase from current estimates. However, our prior work has indicated that as closures are implemented, more intensive environmental investigations occur and additional hazardous contamination may be uncovered resulting in higher cleanup costs. Cleanup Cost Estimates for BRAC 2005 Round Bases Are Not Fully Known and Likely to Increase
Although DOD data indicate that at least $950 million will be needed for cleanup of the major and minor base closures resulting from the 2005 BRAC round, this figure reflects preliminary amounts that are likely to increase as more information is collected during BRAC implementation on the extent of cleanup required to safely reuse property in communities where future land use decisions have yet to be made. These additional costs could add millions to the overall cost estimate. DOD’s Environmental Cleanup Reports Do Not Provide a Complete Picture of Environmental Cleanup Cost Information
Congress does not have complete visibility over the expected total cost of DOD’s cleanup efforts for the 2005 BRAC round or for the prior BRAC rounds because of a variety of reports that individually are incomplete and which collectively may present a confusing picture of costs. In order to provide a complete picture of the total cleanup costs at BRAC bases, specific information must be extracted from various reports, which we have done in order to present the total costs to clean up properties resulting from prior BRAC round decisions. As a result, the cost of cleaning up BRAC property lacks transparency and Congress does not have total visibility over this multibillion dollar BRAC environmental cleanup effort. However, environmental cleanup of contamination continues to be a key impediment to transferring the remaining properties. DOD Continues to Make Progress in Transferring Unneeded Properties
Since our last report on this subject in January 2005, DOD has made some progress in transferring remaining unneeded property, having transferred 78 percent, (about 390,300 acres) of the 502,500 total unneeded acres from prior BRAC rounds to federal and nonfederal entities—up from 72 percent (about 364,000 acres of the estimated 504,000 acres DOD reported at the end of fiscal year 2004) from 2 years ago. Prolonged negotiations between environmental regulators and DOD about compliance with environmental regulations and laws can delay property transfers. Opportunities Exist to Expedite Cleanup and Transfer of Unneeded BRAC Properties
Although opportunities exist to expedite the cleanup and transfer of unneeded BRAC 2005 properties, as well as untransferred properties from prior BRAC rounds, it is not clear to what extent each of these opportunities are considered for BRAC properties nor what successes or challenges were seen in their application since the services are not required to report their strategies for addressing unclean and untransferred properties to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). Over the years, Congress has provided DOD with a wide range of property transfer authorities to expedite the cleanup and transfer of unneeded BRAC property, including public sales and the so-called “Early Transfer Authority,” which allows property to be transferred before all necessary cleanup actions have been completed. Each of the military services has processes in place to monitor their progress to clean and transfer BRAC properties. 205,400 (65%) 13,300 (5%)
As shown in figure 3, low- and no-cost property conveyance mechanisms accounted for 65 percent (205,400) of all acres transferred—public benefit, conservation, and economic development conveyances were used in 17 percent, 19 percent, and 29 percent, respectively–whereas public and negotiated sales accounted for 5 percent (13,300) of all acres transferred. Numerous tools have been made available to DOD to help expedite the transfer of unneeded BRAC property to other users. As DOD seeks to use these tools for 2005 BRAC round bases, OSD could more effectively conduct its oversight responsibilities by requiring the services to periodically report on their progress to transfer properties and plans to take full advantage of the tools available to them. To address our second objective to examine DOD’s progress in transferring unneeded properties from the four prior BRAC rounds, we reviewed our prior BRAC reports and reports prepared by the Congressional Research Service and DOD on this subject. During the course of our review, we contacted the following offices with responsibility for oversight, management, and implementation of the environmental cleanup of military and specifically, BRAC bases: Office of the Secretary of Defense Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, Installations and Environment, Washington, D.C.
Office of the Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), Washington, D.C.
Army Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff of Installation Management, Base Realignment and Closure Division, Arlington, Virginia Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army, Environmental Safety and Occupational Health, Washington, D.C.
Army Installation Management Agency, Arlington, Virginia Army Materiel Command, Fort Belvoir, Virginia Army Environmental Center, Aberdeen, Maryland Army Corps of Engineers, Environmental Office for Formerly Used Defense Sites, Washington, D.C.
Army National Guard, Arlington, Virginia Navy BRAC Program Management Office Northeast, Philadelphia, Navy BRAC Program Management Office, West, San Diego, California Navy BRAC Environmental Office, Arlington, Virginia Air Force Real Property Agency, Arlington, Virginia Air Force Audit Agency, Washington, D.C. Air National Guard, Arlington, Virginia Air Force Office of the Civil Engineer, Environmental Division, Arlington, Virginia Federal Environmental Protection Agency, Federal Facilities Branch, Association of State and Territorial Solid Waste Management Officials, Washington, D.C.
State of California Environmental Protection Agency, Sacramento, Fort Ord Reuse Authority, Marina, California McClellan Local Reuse Authority, Sacramento, California Alameda Reuse and Redevelopment Authority, Alameda, California Umatilla Reuse Authority, Hermiston, Oregon Brunswick Local Redevelopment Authority, Brunswick, Maine Fort Monroe Reuse Authority, Hampton, Virginia We visited three bases closed during the prior BRAC rounds—chosen because they represent each of the three services and also have the three most expensive estimated costs to complete cleanups for sites currently undergoing cleanup: Fort Ord, Marina, California McClellan Air Force Base, Sacramento, California Alameda Naval Air Station, Alameda, California We also visited four bases scheduled for closure under the 2005 BRAC round—chosen to represent a variety of missions as well as geographic diversity: Fort Monroe, Hampton, Virginia Umatilla Chemical Depot, Hermiston, Oregon Brunswick Naval Air Station, Brunswick, Maine Mississippi Army Ammunition Plant, Picayune, Mississippi We conducted our work from January 2006 through November 2006 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. | Why GAO Did This Study
The cleanup of environmental contamination on unneeded property resulting from prior defense base realignment and closure (BRAC) rounds has been a key impediment to the transfer of these properties and could be an issue in the transfer and reuse of unneeded property resulting from the 2005 BRAC round. GAO's analysis of available data indicates that, when completed, the cleanup for the four prior BRAC rounds is expected to cost about $13.2 billion and additional costs will be needed for BRAC 2005 property. These costs reduce BRAC savings, especially in the short term. Because of broad congressional interest in BRAC, GAO prepared this report under the Comptroller General's authority to conduct evaluations on his own initiative. GAO's objectives were to examine costs to clean up 2005 BRAC properties, progress in transferring prior BRAC rounds properties to other users, and opportunities to expedite cleanups and transfers. To address these issues, GAO analyzed cleanup cost estimates, interviewed environmental officials and visited seven bases.
What GAO Found
While expected environmental cleanup costs for unneeded property arising from the 2005 BRAC round are not yet fully known, Department of Defense (DOD) data indicate that about $950 million will be needed to clean up these bases, adding to the estimated $13.2 billion total cleanup cost for the prior rounds. Although DOD's cleanup program has matured compared to prior BRAC rounds, there are still many unknowns and the cleanup estimate for the 2005 round should be considered preliminary. In fact, environmental cleanup costs are likely to increase as more intensive environmental investigations are undertaken, additional hazardous conditions are discovered, and future reuse plans are finalized. Furthermore, Congress does not have full visibility over the total cost of DOD's BRAC cleanup efforts because none of the four reports DOD prepares on various aspects of environmental cleanup present all types of costs--past and future--to complete cleanup at each base. Compiling a complete picture of all costs requires extracting information from multiple reports, as GAO has done to estimate the total cleanup cost for the four prior BRAC rounds. More complete and transparent cost information would assist Congress in conducting its oversight responsibilities for this multibillion dollar effort. While GAO's analysis shows that DOD continues to make progress in transferring over 502,500 acres of unneeded property from the four prior BRAC rounds--78 percent of the acres have now been transferred compared to 72 percent 2 years ago--over 112,300 acres remain untransferred. Comparatively, a total of about 102,000 acres are potentially transferable as a result of the 2005 BRAC round. Impediments to transfer continue to be related primarily to a variety of interrelated environmental cleanup issues, including limited technology to address unexploded ordnance and prolonged negotiations on compliance with environmental regulations. Opportunities exist to expedite the cleanup and transfer of unneeded 2005 BRAC properties compared with other BRAC rounds. Congress provided DOD with a wide range of property transfer authorities for prior BRAC rounds. In the past DOD did not use some tools as much as others out of deference to community land reuse plans. For example, low- and no-cost transfer tools accounted for 65 percent of all acres transferred, whereas public and negotiated sales accounted for 5 percent. DOD's March 2006 guidance now encourages the services to make full use of all tools for transferring properties resulting from both the 2005 and prior-year BRAC rounds. The services have processes in place to monitor their progress to clean up and transfer BRAC properties, but they are not required to report periodically to the Office of the Secretary of Defense on their successes and challenges in using various transfer authorities. Collectively, such lessons learned could help others expedite the cleanup and transfer of unneeded properties by maximizing the use of all available tools, thereby accelerating the economic benefits of property reuse to communities while also saving the ongoing caretaker costs being incurred by DOD for unneeded properties. |
gao_GGD-99-146 | gao_GGD-99-146_0 | We asked if on September 30, 1998, they had inmates who, through performing (1) work on correctional industry work program contracts that were either in progress or were agreed to but the work had not been started or (2) support work for the industry work program operations, had access to personal information or only names and addresses or telephone numbers; what prison procedures, statutes, regulations, pending legislation, or other guidelines provided guidance on (1) limiting which inmates perform work involving access to personal information and (2) preventing personal information from being retained by inmates or being transferred to unauthorized inmates or other persons; what the total gross income was for the correctional industry work program and the income generated by those contracts that resulted in inmates having access to personal information in the most recently completed fiscal year; and what incidents of misuse occurred as a result of inmates having access to the information through correctional industry work programs. The types of information to which the largest number of inmates had access were (1) names and dates of birth or (2) Social Security numbers. The federal government and seven states in which inmates had access to personal information were identified as having either enacted statutes or had bills pending that related to limiting which inmates could perform work involving personal information. The safeguards most frequently reported as being used when inmates had access to personal information were close supervision; selective hiring (e.g., excluding inmates convicted of sex offenses or fraud); confidentiality agreements; and security checks at the work area exits. Appendix III provides additional information on the safeguards cited by questionnaire respondents. For those states in which inmates had access to personal information, no more than 22 percent of any state’s gross fiscal year 1998 correctional industry income was generated from these contracts; six states reported that less than 1 percent of their gross correctional industry income was earned from these contracts. Extent to Which Inmates Had Access to Only Names and Addresses or Telephone Numbers
About 5,500 inmates, in BOP and 31 state prison systems, had access to only names and addresses or telephone numbers through correctional industry work programs. Over half of these inmates were in the custody of BOP. The most commonly used safeguards reported by states included close supervision while working, security checks at the exits from the work areas, selective hiring, and security checks at the entrances to the work areas. Our draft report said that of approximately 1.2 million inmates, about 1,400 in BOP and 19 state prison systems had access to personal information through correctional industry work programs. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of our study were to determine the extent to which inmates in the BOP and state prison systems had access to personal information through correctional industry work programs; identify prison safeguards and procedures, statutes and regulations, and proposed legislation that addressed correctional industry work programs involving personal information; determine the extent to which contracts that provided inmates access to personal information contributed to BOP’s and states’ correctional industry income; determine the extent to which inmates in the BOP and state prison systems had access to only names and addresses or telephone numbers through correctional industry work programs; and identify incidents of inmates misusing information obtained through a correctional industry work program, including how safeguards failed and what, if any, changes were made as a result of the incidents. Less than $1,000. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on: (1) the extent to which inmates in the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) and state prison systems had access to personal information through correctional industry work programs; (2) prison safeguards and procedures, statutes and regulations, and proposed legislation that addressed correctional industry work programs involving personal information; (3) the extent to which contracts that provided inmates access to personal information contributed to BOP's and states' correctional industry income; (4) the extent to which BOP and state prison inmates had access to only names and addresses or telephone numbers through correctional industry work programs; and (5) incidents of inmates misusing information obtained through correctional industry work programs, including how safeguards failed and what, if any, changes were made as a result of the incidents.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) on September 30, 1998, of approximately 1.2 million inmates, about 1,400 in BOP and 19 state prison systems had access to personal information through correctional industry work programs, based on the questionnaire responses from correctional industry officials; (2) of these 1,400 inmates, about 1,100 had access to names and dates of birth or Social Security numbers; (3) these inmates were performing work, such as data entry, for the federal, state, or local governments; (4) BOP and all the 19 states reported using a variety of safeguards to prevent inmates from misusing the information; (5) the safeguards cited by the largest number of states were close supervision, selective hiring (e.g., excluding inmates convicted of sex offenses or fraud), confidentiality agreements, and security checks at the exits from the work areas; (6) the federal government and seven states in which inmates had access to personal information were identified as having either enacted statutes or had bills pending that related to limiting which inmates could perform work involving personal information; (7) less than one-hundredth of 1 percent of BOP's and no more than 22 percent of any state's fiscal year 1998 gross correctional industry income was generated from contracts that resulted in inmates having access to personal information; (8) six states reported that less than 1 percent of their gross correctional industry income was earned from these contracts; (9) about 5,500 inmates in BOP and 31 state prison systems had access to only names and addresses or telephone numbers through correctional industry work program contracts or support work; (10) the three safeguards that the largest number of states and BOP reported using were similar to those used when inmates had access to personal information--close supervision, security checks at the exits from the work areas, and selective hiring; (11) questionnaire respondents described nine incidents in which inmates misused personal information or names and addresses or telephone numbers obtained from correctional industry work programs; (12) in four of the nine incidents, inmates removed information from the work areas, either physically or by memorization; and (13) in five of the incidents, the work programs were discontinued. |
gao_GAO-14-827 | gao_GAO-14-827_0 | In November 2013, we reported on quality shortfalls across Navy shipbuilding programs, including LCS. The Navy addressed some, but not all, of our recommendations in these different reports. The Navy also met FAR requirements related to responsibility for and place of acceptance and transfer of title, among other provisions. Under the cost- reimbursement contracts, the LCS 1 and LCS 2 prime contractors were only required to give their best efforts to complete quality-related activities—along with the other work specified in the contracts—up to each contract’s estimated cost. These efforts resulted in LCS 1 and LCS 2 not completing final contract trials, and LCS 2 not finishing its acceptance trials—resulting in increased knowledge gaps related to ship performance and deficiencies. In addition, the Navy did not achieve the quality standards on LCS 1 and LCS 2 that are outlined in its own ship acceptance policy, although the policy also contains several notable flexibilities to these standards. In particular, the policy recognizes situations where the Navy may defer work until after delivery and final acceptances and affords the Chief of Naval Operations the power to waive certain quality standards outlined in the policy. The Navy relied extensively on these waivers to facilitate its trials and acceptance processes for LCS 1 and LCS 2. Navy Acceptances of LCS 1 and LCS 2 Complied with FAR Acceptance Provisions, Largely Because of Contract Type
Although LCS 1 and LCS 2 contained numerous deficiencies—including areas of the ships that remained incomplete when the Navy took final acceptance—the Navy’s actions complied with section 46.501 of the FAR because these actions were consistent with the cost-reimbursement Under cost-reimbursement type terms of the respective contracts.contracts, the government generally reimburses the contractor for the costs it incurs in performing the contract. Navy Decisions to Accept Ships in Deficient Condition Driven by Cost and Fleet Needs, and Quality Problems Persist
Navy decisions to accept delivery of LCS 1 and LCS 2 in incomplete, deficient conditions were driven by a focus on near-term cost performance by shipbuilders, a desire to introduce the long-delayed ships to the fleet, and—in the case of LCS 1—environmental and treaty considerations associated with the location of that ship’s construction. In prioritizing these factors, the Navy shortchanged its quality assurance processes for both ships, which has caused it to devote considerably more time and money to resolving deficiencies post-delivery than anticipated. However, because the Navy did not establish clear deadlines for resolving ship deficiencies, corrections were allowed to lag, to the point that fleet operators inherited unresolved starred deficiencies on each seaframe. Further, these deficiencies have constrained recent shipboard operations. Consequently, we are not making recommendations in this report. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
This report evaluates the Navy’s acquisition of the first two Littoral Combat Ships (LCS). Specifically, we (1) assessed the extent to which the Navy complied with applicable federal regulations, contracts, and policies in accepting LCS 1 and LCS 2 and (2) evaluated the basis for and outcomes from the Navy’s decision to accept delivery of these ships. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO has reported extensively on LCS—an innovative Navy program, consisting of a ship and its mission packages. The Navy bought the first two ships using research and development funds, initially planning to experiment with them to test concepts and determine the best design. As GAO reported in July 2013, the Navy later opted to fund additional ships without having completed this planned period of discovery and learning. Further, LCS 1 and LCS 2 have experienced major cost growth and schedule delays. In August 2010, GAO reported that the ships were incomplete at delivery and in November 2013, GAO reported on significant quality problems with Navy ships, including LCS 1 and LCS 2, noting that the Navy regularly accepts ships with numerous open deficiencies.
Congress mandated that GAO review the Navy's compliance with federal regulations in accepting LCS 1 and LCS 2. This report (1) assesses the extent to which the Navy complied with applicable federal regulations, policies, and contracts and (2) evaluates the basis for and outcomes from decisions to accept these ships. To conduct this work, GAO analyzed applicable federal regulations, policies, contracts, and program documentation, and spoke with relevant Department of Defense (DOD) and contractor officials.
What GAO Found
Navy decisions to accept the first two littoral combat ships (LCS)—LCS 1 and LCS 2—in incomplete, deficient conditions complied with the Federal Acquisition Regulation's (FAR) acceptance provisions, largely due to the cost-reimbursement type contracts in place to construct these ships. The Navy also met FAR requirements related to responsibility for and place of acceptance, among other provisions, by using an authorized Navy representative to accept each ship at its respective contractor's facility. Under the cost-reimbursement contracts, the LCS 1 and LCS 2 prime contractors were only required to give their best efforts to complete quality-related activities—along with the other work specified in the contracts—up to each contract's estimated cost. These efforts resulted in both ships not completing all required sea trials—tests that evaluate ships' overall quality and performance against contractual requirements—including acceptance and final contract trials, as shown in the table below.
Not completing these trials increased knowledge gaps related to ship performance and deficiencies. In addition, LCS 1 and LCS 2 did not meet the quality standards outlined in the Navy's ship acceptance policy, although the policy also contains several notable flexibilities to these standards. In particular, the policy recognizes situations where the Navy may defer work until after delivery and final acceptances and affords the Chief of Naval Operations the authority to waive certain quality standards outlined in the policy. The Navy relied extensively on these waivers to facilitate its trials and acceptance processes for LCS 1 and LCS 2.
Navy decisions to accept delivery of LCS 1 and LCS 2 in incomplete, deficient conditions were driven by a focus on near-term cost performance by shipbuilders, a desire to introduce the long-delayed ships to the fleet, and—in the case of LCS 1—environmental and treaty considerations associated with constructing that ship adjacent to the Great Lakes. The Navy prioritized these factors over its quality assurance processes for both ships, which has caused it to devote considerably more time and money to resolving deficiencies after delivery than anticipated. However, because the Navy did not establish clear deadlines for resolving ship deficiencies, corrections were allowed to lag, to the point that fleet operators inherited unresolved deficiencies on each ship. These deficiencies have constrained recent shipboard operations.
What GAO Recommends
Because the opportunity to implement acquisition changes to these two ships has passed, GAO is not making any new recommendations in this report, but has made prior recommendations to improve LCS acquisition. DOD has acted on some, but not all, of these. |
gao_GAO-06-720 | gao_GAO-06-720_0 | These employers are required to additionally attest that: (1) they did not displace a U.S. worker within the period of 90 days before and 90 days after filing a petition for an H-1B worker; (2) they took good faith steps prior to filing the H-1B application to recruit U.S. workers and that they offered the job to a U.S. applicant who was equally or better qualified than an H-1B worker; and (3) prior to placing the H-1B worker with another employer, they inquired and have no knowledge as to that employer’s action or intent to displace a U.S. worker within the 90 days before and 90 days after the placement of the H-1B worker with that employer. Labor Has Limited H-1B Authority, but the Agency Could Improve Its Oversight of Employers’ Compliance with Program Requirements
Labor’s H-1B authority is limited in scope, but the agency could improve its oversight of employers’ compliance with program requirements. While Labor’s review of employers’ applications to hire H-1B workers is timely, it lacks quality assurance controls and may overlook some inaccuracies, such as applications containing employer identification numbers with invalid prefix codes. Our analysis of Labor’s data found that of the 960,563 applications that Labor electronically reviewed from January 2002 through September 2005, 99.5 percent were certified, as shown in table 1. Approximately one-third of the applications were for workers in computer system analysis and programming occupations, with the next most frequent request, for college and university education workers, at 7 percent. Labor’s review of the application is limited by law to identifying omissions or obvious inaccuracies. For example, although the overall percentage was small, we found 3,229 applications that were certified even though the wage rate on the application was lower than the prevailing wage for that occupation in the specific location. While the number of H-1B complaints and violations has increased from fiscal year 2000 through fiscal year 2005, the overall numbers remain small and may have been affected by changes to the program. In fiscal year 2000, 226 H-1B workers were found to be due back wages of $1.2 million, by fiscal year 2005 the number had increased to 604 workers with back wages due of $5.2 million. In addition to investigating complaints, Labor’s Wage and Hour Division has recently begun randomly investigating employers who have willfully violated the program’s requirements. Labor and Homeland Security Face Challenges Sharing Information
Labor, Homeland Security, and Justice all have responsibilities under the H-1B program, but Labor and Homeland Security could better address the challenges they face in sharing information. In addition to Homeland Security, Labor also shares enforcement responsibilities with Justice, which pursues charges filed by U.S. workers who allege that they were not hired, or were displaced, so that an H-1B worker could be hired instead. Labor and Homeland Security Coordinate to Process Employers’ Requests to Hire H-1B Workers, but Do Not Use Certain Information to Investigate Possible Violations
Homeland Security’s USCIS reviews Labor’s certified application as part of the adjudication process; however, it lacks the ability to easily verify whether employers have submitted petitions for more workers than originally requested on the application. During the process of reviewing employers’ petitions, USCIS may find evidence the employer is not meeting the requirements of the H-1B program, but current law precludes the Wage and Hour Division from using this information to initiate an investigation of the employer. USCIS staff told us they have reviewed petitions where the wage on the W-2 form was less than the wage the employer indicated it would pay on the original Labor application. However, if the employer is unable to adequately explain the discrepancy, USCIS said it may deny the petition but generally does not report these employers to Labor for investigation. USCIS does not have a formal process for reporting the discrepancy to Labor. From 2000 through 2005, Justice found discriminatory conduct in 6 out of the 97 investigations closed. Justice assessed a total of $7,200 in penalties in three of the six cases, all in 2003. | Why GAO Did This Study
The H-1B visa program assists U.S. employers in temporarily filling certain occupations with highly-skilled foreign workers. There is considerable interest regarding how Labor, along with Homeland Security and Justice, is enforcing the requirements of the program. This report describes: (1) how Labor carries out its H-1B program responsibilities; and (2) how Labor works with other agencies involved in the H-1B program. We interviewed officials and analyzed data from all three agencies.
What GAO Found
While Labor's H-1B authority is limited in scope, the agency could improve its oversight of employers' compliance with program requirements. Labor's review of employers' applications to hire H-1B workers is timely, but lacks quality assurance controls and may overlook some inaccuracies. From January 2002 through September 2005, Labor electronically reviewed more than 960,000 applications and certified almost all of them. About one-third of the applications were for workers in computer systems analysis and programming occupations. By statute, Labor's review of the applications is limited to searching for missing information or obvious inaccuracies and it does this through automated data checks. However, our analysis of Labor's data found certified applications with inaccurate information that could have been identified by more stringent checks. Although the overall percentage was small, we found 3,229 applications that were certified even though the wage rate on the application was lower than the prevailing wage for that occupation. Additionally, approximately 1,000 certified applications contained erroneous employer identification numbers, which raises questions about the validity of the application. In its enforcement efforts, Labor's Wage and Hour Division (WHD) investigates complaints made against H-1B employers. From fiscal year 2000 through fiscal year 2005, Labor reported an increase in the number of H-1B complaints and violations, and a corresponding increase in the number of employer penalties. In fiscal year 2000 Labor required employers to pay back wages totaling $1.2 million to 226 H-1B workers; by fiscal year 2005, back wage penalties had increased to $5.2 million for 604 workers. Program changes, such as a higher visa cap in some years, could have been a contributing factor. In April 2006, WHD began the process of randomly investigating willful violators of the program's requirements. Labor, Homeland Security, and Justice all have responsibilities under the H-1B program, but Labor and Homeland Security could better address the challenges they face in sharing information. Homeland Security reviews Labor's certified application but cannot easily verify whether employers submitted petitions for more workers than originally requested on the application because USCIS's database cannot match each petition to Labor's application case number. Also, during the process of reviewing petitions, staff may find evidence that employers are not meeting their H-1B obligations. For example, Homeland Security may find that a worker's income on the W-2 is less than the wage quoted on the original application. Homeland Security may deny the petition if an employer is unable to explain the discrepancy, but it does not have a formal process for reporting the discrepancy to Labor. Additionally, current law precludes the Wage and Hour Division from using this information to initiate an investigation of the employer. Labor also shares enforcement responsibilities with Justice, which pursues charges filed by U.S. workers who allege they were displaced by an H-1B worker. From 2000 through 2005, Justice found discriminatory conduct in 6 out of the 97 investigations closed and assessed $7,200 in penalties. |
gao_GAO-11-252 | gao_GAO-11-252_0 | Tribes We Visited Reported Challenges in Adjudicating Crime in Indian Country; Various Federal Efforts Exist to Help Address Those Challenges
Selected Tribes Face Difficulties in Adjudicating Crime in Indian Country
All 12 tribes we visited reported challenges that have made it difficult for them to adjudicate crime in Indian country including: (1) limitations on criminal jurisdiction and sentencing authority, (2) delays in receiving timely notification about the status of investigations and prosecutions from federal entities, (3) lack of adequate detention space for offenders convicted in tribal court, (4) perceived encroachment upon judicial independence by other branches of the tribal government, and (5) limited resources for day-to-day court operations. Tribes Often Rely on the Federal Government to Prosecute Crime in Indian Country because of Limited Sentencing Authority, Tribal Jurisdiction, and Resources
Tribal courts only have jurisdiction to prosecute crimes committed by Indian offenders in Indian country, and their ability to effectively promote public safety and justice is curtailed by their limited sentencing authority and jurisdiction. Officials from 6 of the 12 tribes that we visited noted that it is not uncommon for the tribe to receive notification of USAO declination letters after the tribe’s statute of limitations has expired, which, ranges from 1 to 3 years. Multiple Federal Efforts Exist to Help Address Some of the Challenges That Tribes Face in Adjudicating Criminal Matters
Various federal efforts exist that could help to address some of the challenges that tribes face in effectively adjudicating crime in Indian country. Attorneys (SAUSA), including the appointment of tribal prosecutors to assist in prosecuting federal offenses committed in Indian country; (3) requires that federal entities coordinate with appropriate tribal law enforcement and justice officials on the status of criminal investigations terminated without referral or declined prosecution; and (4) requires BOP to establish a pilot program to house, in federal prison, Indian offenders convicted of a violent crime in tribal court and sentenced to 2 or more years imprisonment. BIA and DOJ Have Taken Action to Coordinate Their Efforts on Tribal Justice Issues, but Should Strengthen Coordination on Tribal Courts by Establishing Information Sharing Mechanisms
BIA and DOJ Components Have Taken Action to Coordinate Their Efforts to Support Tribal Court and Detention Initiatives
According to BIA and DOJ officials, the two agencies have begun to establish interagency coordinating bodies intended to facilitate the agencies’ efforts to coordinate on tribal court and detention initiatives. According to BIA, there have been instances where they were unaware of DOJ’s plans to award grant funds to tribes to construct tribal detention facilities, which could result in new facilities remaining vacant until BIA is able to secure funding to operate the facility. At the program level, in 2009, BIA and DOJ established task forces to address key issues including tribal judicial systems and tribal detention, among other issues. By Strengthening Information Sharing, BIA and DOJ Could Help Ensure Efficient Use of Limited Resources and Enhance the Capacity of Tribal Courts
To meet their respective responsibilities to support tribal courts, BIA and DOJ provide funding, training, and technical assistance to tribal courts; however, the two agencies do not leverage each other’s resources—one of the eight collaboration practices that we have identified—by sharing certain relevant information that could benefit each agency’s efforts to enhance the capacity of tribal courts to effectively administer justice in Indian country. Developing mechanisms for identifying and sharing information and resources related to tribal courts could yield potential benefits in terms of leveraging efforts already underway and minimizing the potential for unnecessary duplication in federal agencies’ efforts to support tribal courts. Recommendation for Executive Action
To maximize the efficiency and effectiveness of each agency’s efforts to support tribal courts by increasing interagency coordination and improving information sharing, we recommend that the Attorney General and the Secretary of the Interior direct DOJ’s Office of Justice Programs and BIA’s Office of Justice Services, respectively, to work together to develop mechanisms, using GAO collaboration practices as a guide, to identify and share information and resources related to tribal courts. What challenges do tribes face in adjudicating Indian country crimes and what federal efforts exist to help address those challenges? To what extent have the Department of the Interior (DOI) and Department of Justice (DOJ) components collaborated with each other to support tribal justice systems? We selected the tribes based on several considerations. To determine the extent that DOI and DOJ collaborate with each other to support public safety and justice in tribal communities, we first compared the agencies’ efforts against criteria in Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government which holds that agencies are to share information with external stakeholders that can affect the organization’s ability to achieve its goals. Further, complete copies of the Tribal Law and Order Code are made available through the court. Katherine Davis provided assistance in report preparation. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Justice (DOJ) reports from the latest available data that from 1992 to 2001 American Indians experienced violent crimes at more than twice the national rate. The Department of the Interior (DOI) and DOJ provide support to federally recognized tribes to address tribal justice issues. Upon request, GAO analyzed (1) the challenges facing tribes in adjudicating Indian country crimes and what federal efforts exist to help address these challenges and (2) the extent to which DOI and DOJ have collaborated with each other to support tribal justice systems. To do so, GAO interviewed tribal justice officials at 12 tribes in four states and reviewed laws, including the Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010, to identify federal efforts to assist tribes. GAO selected these tribes based on court structure, among other factors. Although the results cannot be generalized, they provided useful perspectives about the challenges various tribes face in adjudicating crime in Indian country. GAO also compared DOI and DOJ's efforts against practices that can help enhance and sustain collaboration among federal agencies and standards for internal control in the federal government.
What GAO Found
The 12 tribes GAO visited reported several challenges in adjudicating crimes in Indian country, but multiple federal efforts exist to help address some of these challenges. For example, tribes only have jurisdiction to prosecute crimes committed by Indian offenders in Indian country. Also, until the Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010 (the Act) was passed in July 2010, tribes could only sentence those found guilty to up to 1 year in jail per offense. Lacking further jurisdiction and sentencing authority, tribes rely on the U.S. Attorneys' Offices (USAO) to prosecute crime in Indian country. Generally, the tribes GAO visited reported challenges in obtaining information on prosecutions from USAOs in a timely manner. For example, tribes reported they experienced delays in obtaining information when a USAO declines to prosecute a case; these delays may affect tribes' ability to pursue prosecution in tribal court before their statute of limitations expires. USAOs are working with tribes to improve timely notification about declinations. DOI and the tribes GAO visited also reported overcrowding at tribal detention facilities. In some instances, tribes may have to contract with other detention facilities, which can be costly. Multiple federal efforts exist to help address these challenges. For example, the Act authorizes tribes to sentence convicted offenders for up to 3 years imprisonment under certain circumstances, and encourages DOJ to appoint tribal prosecutors to assist in prosecuting Indian country criminal matters in federal court. Federal efforts also include developing a pilot program to house, in federal prison, up to 100 Indian offenders convicted in tribal courts, given the shortage of tribal detention space. DOI, through its Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), and DOJ components have taken action to coordinate their efforts to support tribal court and tribal detention programs; however, the two agencies could enhance their coordination on tribal courts by strengthening their information sharing efforts. BIA and DOJ have begun to establish task forces designed to facilitate coordination on tribal court and tribal detention initiatives, but more focus has been given to coordination on tribal detention programs. For example, at the program level, BIA and DOJ have established procedures to share information when DOJ plans to construct tribal detention facilities. This helps ensure that BIA is prepared to assume responsibility to staff and operate tribal detention facilities that DOJ constructs and in turn minimizes potential waste. In contrast, BIA and DOJ have not implemented similar information sharing and coordination mechanisms for their shared activities to enhance the capacity of tribal courts to administer justice. For example, BIA has not shared information with DOJ about its assessments of tribal courts. Further, both agencies provide training and technical assistance to tribal courts; however, they are unaware as to whether there could be unnecessary duplication. Developing mechanisms to identify and share information related to tribal courts could yield potential benefits in terms of minimizing unnecessary duplication and leveraging the expertise and capacities that each agency brings.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the Secretary of the Interior and the Attorney General direct the relevant DOI and DOJ programs to develop mechanisms to identify and share information related to tribal courts. DOI and DOJ concurred with our recommendation. |
gao_GAO-12-556 | gao_GAO-12-556_0 | DOD Has Taken Steps to Establish Its Concept for Conducting Security Force Assistance, Including Broadly Defining the Term and Identifying Actions Needed to Plan for and Prepare Forces to Execute It
DOD has taken steps to establish its concept for conducting security force assistance, including broadly defining the term and identifying actions needed to plan for and prepare forces to execute security force assistance activities. For example, DOD issued an instruction that broadly defines security force assistance and outlines responsibilities for key stakeholders. This effort identified tasks to address these gaps and called on DOD to develop a document, referred to as the Lexicon Framework, to clarify the term security force assistance and its relationship to other key terms. DOD Has Identified Tasks to Address Gaps in Implementing Security Force Assistance and Developed a Lexicon Framework Intended to Clarify the Meaning of Security Force Assistance
DOD conducted a capabilities-based assessment to identify gaps in key areas of doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities, related to the implementation of security force assistance across the department. In November 2011, DOD published the Security Force Assistance Lexicon Framework. Geographic Combatant Commands Face Challenges That Limit Their Ability to Plan for and Track Security Force Assistance as a Distinct Activity
The geographic combatant commands are conducting activities to build partner nation capacity and capability, but face challenges planning for and conducting security force assistance as a distinct activity, including the following: (1) a lack of common understanding of security force assistance which may limit their ability to plan for it as OSD intends; (2) limitations in the system where security force assistance activities are to be tracked; and (3) the ability to develop and execute long-term security force assistance plans within existing legislative authorities. Notwithstanding DOD’s efforts to present security force assistance as a distinct and potentially expansive activity beyond existing security cooperation efforts, geographic combatant commands lack a common understanding of security force assistance, and therefore some are unclear as to the additional efforts that may be needed on their part to meet the department’s intent for security force assistance and do not see the value in distinguishing security force assistance from other security cooperation activities. The plan does include information on the need to develop partner nation capacity and capability. However, some geographic combatant command and service officials familiar with the framework said that they found some of the distinctions within the document to be confusing and others cited the need for additional guidance that provides greater clarity on what is required to plan for and conduct security force assistance as OSD intends. Our prior work on key practices for successful organizational transformations shows the necessity to communicate clear objectives for what is to be achieved. Without additional clarification from OSD, the geographic combatant commands will continue to lack a common understanding of security force assistance, which may hinder the department in meeting its strategic goals. These statutory authorities are specific in nature and some contain limitations and restrictions on the types of activities that can be conducted under these authorities. The Services Are Developing General Purpose Forces with Capabilities to Conduct Security Force Assistance to Meet Current Requirements but Lack Clarity on Future Requirements
The services are taking steps and investing resources to organize and train general purpose forces that are capable of conducting security force assistance and tracking uniformed military personnel with related experience and training. As previously discussed, the department’s emphasis on security force assistance is indicative of its expectation that the geographic combatant commands will conduct more security force assistance activities, such as organizing, training, and advising partner nation security forces to build their capacity and capability, and officials stated that they expect requirements for forces capable of conducting security force assistance activities outside of Afghanistan to increase in the future. Recommendations for Executive Action
To instill a common understanding of security force assistance throughout DOD and therefore better guide the geographic combatant commands’ and services’ efforts to plan for and prepare forces to execute security force assistance, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, direct the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict and the Chief of Staff, Joint Staff J-5, in their positions as cochairs of the Security Force Assistance Steering Committee, to develop or modify existing guidance that further defines the department’s intent for security force assistance and what additional actions are required by the geographic combatant commands to plan for and conduct security force assistance beyond their existing security cooperation efforts. For example, DOD could include more-specific direction as to how to determine which activities should be considered security force assistance, how they should be discussed in plans, and whether an increased level of effort, such as increased scope, nature, or frequency of activities, is required. Therefore, we continue to believe that more specific guidance is necessary. To identify what steps the services have taken to organize and train general purpose forces to be capable of conducting security force assistance, and what challenges, if any, they face, we met with officials from the U.S. Army, U.S. Marine Corps, U.S. Navy, and U.S. Air Force who were responsible for implementing security force assistance within each service, including officials from each service’s headquarters, force providers and training commands, and other service organizations related to security force assistance. | Why GAO Did This Study
DOD is emphasizing security force assistance (e.g., efforts to train, equip, and advise partner nation forces) as a distinct activity to build the capacity and capability of partner nation forces. In anticipation of its growing importance, DOD has identified the need to strengthen and institutionalize security force assistance capabilities within its general purpose forces. Accordingly, a committee report accompanying the Fiscal Year 2012 National Defense Authorization Act directed GAO to report on DODs plans. GAO evaluated: (1) the extent to which DOD has established its concept for conducting security force assistance, including defining the term and identifying actions needed to plan for and prepare forces to execute it; (2) the extent to which the geographic combatant commands have taken steps to plan for and conduct security force assistance, and what challenges, if any, they face; and (3) what steps the services have taken to organize and train general purpose forces capable of conducting security force assistance, and what challenges, if any, they face. GAO reviewed relevant documents, and interviewed officials from combatant commands, the services, and other DOD organizations.
What GAO Found
The Department of Defense (DOD) has taken steps to establish its concept for conducting security force assistance, including broadly defining the term and identifying actions needed to plan for and prepare forces to execute these activities. For example, in October 2010, the department issued an instruction that broadly defines security force assistance and outlines responsibilities for key stakeholders, including the geographic combatant commands and military services. DOD also identified gaps in key areas of doctrine, organization, and training related to the implementation of security force assistance and tasks needed to address those gaps. The tasks include reviewing joint and service-level doctrine to incorporate security force assistance as needed and developing measures to assess progress in partner nations. Citing a need to clarify the definition of security force assistance beyond the DOD Instruction, DOD published a document referred to as a Lexicon Framework in November 2011 that included information to describe how security force assistance relates to other existing terms, such as security cooperation.
The geographic combatant commands conduct activities to build partner nation capacity and capability, but face challenges planning for and tracking security force assistance as a distinct activity. Notwithstanding DODs efforts to present security force assistance as a distinct and potentially expansive activity and clarify its terminology, the commands lack a common understanding of security force assistance, and therefore some were unclear as to what additional actions were needed to meet DODs intent. Specifically, officials interviewed generally viewed it as a recharacterization of some existing activities, but had different interpretations of what types of activities should be considered security force assistance. Further, some command officials stated that they were not clear as to the intent of DODs increased focus on security force assistance and whether any related adjustments should be made in their plans and scope or level of activities. As a result, they do not currently distinguish security force assistance from other security cooperation activities in their plans. DOD intended the Lexicon Framework to provide greater clarity on the meaning of security force assistance and its relationship to security cooperation and other related terms. However, some officials said that they found the distinctions to be confusing and others believed that additional guidance was needed. GAOs prior work on key practices for successful organizational transformations states the necessity to communicate clear objectives for what is to be achieved. Without additional clarification, the geographic combatant commands will continue to lack a common understanding, which may hinder the departments ability to meet its strategic goals. Moreover, the system that the commands are directed to use to track security force assistance activities does not include a specific data field to identify those activities. The commands also face challenges planning for and executing long-term, sustained security force assistance plans within existing statutory authorities, which contain some limitations on the types of activities that can be conducted.
The services are taking steps and investing resources to organize and train general purpose forces capable of conducting security force assistance based on current requirements. For example, to conduct activities with partner nation security forces, the Army and the Air Force are aligning certain units to geographic regions, and the Marine Corps has created tailored task forces. However, the services face certain challenges. Due to a lack of clarity on how DODs increased emphasis on security force assistance will affect future requirements, they are uncertain whether their current efforts are sufficient or whether additional capabilities will be required. Further, services face challenges in tracking personnel with security force assistance training and experience, particularly in identifying the attributes to track.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends DOD clarify its intent for security force assistance, including how combatant commands should adjust their current planning efforts and provide a means to track activities. DOD partially concurred, stating that recent guidance addresses planning requirements. GAO continues to believe that more specific direction is needed. |
gao_GAO-07-387 | gao_GAO-07-387_0 | Each block is intended to provide the Ballistic Missile Defense System with capabilities that will enhance the development and overall performance of the system. These goals identify the composition of the block (the elements in development and those planned for fielding), the type and quantity of assets to be fielded, the cost associated with element development and fielding (including operation and sustainment activites), and the performance expected of fielded assets. To provide a basis for holding MDA accountable for delivering within estimated resources and to ensure the success of future MDA development efforts, we recommended that the Secretary of Defense implement a knowledge-based acquisition strategy for all the BMDS elements, assess whether the current 2-year block strategy was compatible with the knowledge-based development strategy, and adopt more transparent criteria for reporting each element’s quantities, cost, and performance. Cost Increases Lead to Revised Block 2006 Cost Goal
MDA’s cost goal for Block 2006 has increased by approximately $1 billion. However by March 2006, it had grown by about $1 billion. Increasing Costs Are Causing MDA to Reduce Scope of Block 2006
MDA is making some progress toward achieving its revised Block 2006 goals, but the number of fielded assets and their overall performance will be less than planned when MDA submitted its Block 2006 goals to Congress in March 2005. MDA made progress in fielding additional BMDS assets in 2006 and is generally on track to meet most of its revised block goals. If the agency reports the cost of deferred work as it has in the past, the cost of Block 2006 will not include all work that benefits the block and the cost of the future block will be overstated. This intercept was particularly noteworthy because it was the first successful intercept attempt for the program since 2002. Also, although the test was for only one engagement scenario, it was notable because it was GMD’s first end-to-end test. The program planned to conduct five flight tests during fiscal year 2006, but was only able to execute four. Although MDA revised its goal downward, insufficient data exists to assess whether MDA is on track to meet its new goal. On the other hand, MDA operates with considerable autonomy to change goals and plans, making it difficult to reconcile outcomes with original expectations and to determine the actual cost of each block and of individual operational assets. Acquisition Laws Promote Program Transparency
Past Congresses have established a framework of laws that make major defense acquisition programs accountable for their planned outcomes and cost, give decision makers a means to conduct oversight, and ensure some level of independent program review. The BMDS has not entered into system development and demonstration because it is being developed outside DOD’s normal acquisition cycle. Once approved, major acquisition programs are required to measure their program against the baseline or to obtain approval from a higher-level acquisition executive before making significant changes. This has contributed to the difficulty in assessing MDA’s progress toward expected outcomes. While it is possible to reconstruct planned unit costs from budget documents, the planned unit cost of some assets—for example, GMD interceptors—is not easy to determine because the research and development funds used to buy the interceptors are spread across 3 to 5 budget years. These efforts include a teaming approach designed to restore the reliability of MDA’s suppliers, regular quality inspections to quickly identify and find resolutions for quality problems, and award fees with an increased emphasis on quality assurance. According to MDA, by 2005, these changes began to produce results. The fielding of additional assets, the ability to put BMDS on alert status, and the first end-to-end test of GMD were notable accomplishments during fiscal year 2006. The recommendations that follow build upon those we made in last year’s report on missile defense. Also, if the contractor’s cost performance continues to decline as it did in fiscal year 2006, we estimate that at completion the contract could overrun its budget by about $112.1 million to $248.3 million. | Why GAO Did This Study
Over the next 5 years, the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) expects to invest $49 billion in the BMD system's development and fielding. MDA's strategy is to field new capabilities in 2-year blocks. In January 2006, MDA initiated its second block--Block 2006--to protect against attacks from North Korea and the Middle East. Congress requires GAO to assess MDA's progress annually. This year's report addresses MDA's progress during fiscal year 2006 and follows up on program oversight issues and the current status of MDA's quality assurance program. GAO assessed the progress of each element being developed by MDA, examined acquisition laws applicable to major acquisition programs, and reviewed the impact of implemented quality initiatives.
What GAO Found
During fiscal year 2006, MDA fielded additional assets for the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS), enhanced the capability of some assets, and realized several noteworthy testing achievements. For example, the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) element successfully conducted its first end-to-end test of one engagement scenario, the element's first successful intercept test since 2002. However, MDA will not meet its original Block 2006 cost, fielding, or performance goals because the agency has revised those goals. In March 2006, MDA: reduced its goal for fielded assets to provide funds for technical problems and new and increased operations and sustainment requirements; increased its cost goal by about $1 billion--from $19.3 to $20.3 billion; and reduced its performance goal commensurate with the reduction of assets. MDA may also reduce the scope of the block further by deferring other work until a future block because four elements incurred about $478 million in fiscal year 2006 budget overruns. With the possible exception of GMD interceptors, MDA is generally on track to meet its revised quantity goals. But the deferral of work, both into and out of Block 2006, and inconsistent reporting of costs by some BMDS elements, makes the actual cost of Block 2006 difficult to determine. In addition, GAO cannot assess whether the block will meet its revised performance goals until MDA's models and simulations are anchored by sufficient flight tests to have confidence that predictions of performance are reliable. Because MDA has not entered the Department of Defense (DOD) acquisition cycle, it is not yet required to apply certain laws intended to hold major defense acquisition programs accountable for their planned outcomes and cost, give decision makers a means to conduct oversight, and ensure some level of independent program review. MDA is more agile in its decision-making because it does not have to wait for outside reviews or obtain higher-level approvals of its goals or changes to those goals. Because MDA can revise its baseline, it has the ability to field fewer assets than planned, defer work to a future block, and increase planned cost. All of this makes it hard to reconcile cost and outcomes against original goals and to determine the value of the work accomplished. Also, using research and development funds to purchase operational assets allows costs to be spread over 2 or more years, which makes costs harder to track and commits future budgets. MDA continues to identify quality assurance weaknesses, but the agency's corrective measures are beginning to produce results. Quality deficiencies are declining as MDA implements corrective actions, such as a teaming approach, designed to restore the reliability of key suppliers. |
gao_GAO-08-372 | gao_GAO-08-372_0 | Many Countries Have Reformed Entitlement Programs and Reform Efforts Continue
Since the 1980s, many OECD countries have enacted reforms to politically sensitive and popular entitlement programs such as public pensions, disability, unemployment, social welfare (social assistance) programs, and health care. Efforts to reform pensions are continuing. Long-term concerns about population aging and economic competitiveness are commonly cited as prompting reforms, especially of pension programs. Supranational factors such as a desire to meet the fiscal criteria needed for entry into the European Monetary Union have also been cited as constituting pressures for reform. Many reform efforts began or accelerated in an environment of economic and fiscal crisis. Stage 2: Proposal Development
In the three case study reform efforts we reviewed, once reform was on the agenda, proposals were developed by commissions established by governments with a strong commitment to reform. Commissions that developed proposals were generally small, but their composition varied, as did their charters. Whether ad hoc or standing, commissions or other specially established groups are commonly used to develop reform specifics because they can take divisive and controversial issues out of the usual political process, facilitate consultation and negotiation, and help to insulate policymakers from political risks inherent in supporting a reform package. Reform is difficult. Leadership is needed to bring this about. As experts have noted, the tension is to build a broad coalition to assure the permanency of the reform, while preserving the main policy initiatives sought in the reform process. In some cases adjustments were needed to address emerging implementation challenges. In 2001 as part of its reform changes Sweden enacted an automatic balancing mechanism to adjust benefits if other reform changes prove insufficient to keep the pension program in fiscal balance. Germany’s 2004 pension reform included a “sustainability factor” as recommended by the Rurup Commission. Pension reforms in Japan, Italy, Canada and other countries have also included automatic adjustment mechanisms. Countries more advanced in population aging and facing greater demographic challenges than ours have undertaken reforms of major entitlement programs. In many countries, reform occurred despite political processes that made it difficult. Consensus had to be built in coalition governments, and leaders had to work across parties to achieve a broad consensus for reform. The experiences of other countries also underline that for reform to be enacted and sustained, it needs broad-based support that reaches across parties and groups. For reform to occur and be sustained, the public and policymakers in other countries were ultimately persuaded that reform was necessary and urgent. Taken as a whole, reform processes were generally complex and often conflict-ridden before they ultimately succeeded in enacting legislation. To analyze how reform proposals were developed and to supplement our analysis of the other objectives, we selected three reform efforts for more in-depth review. The Netherlands’ disability reform was an example of an iterative process of reform of a non-pension program and as an example of entitlement reform in a country that has undertaken reform of multiple entitlements in recent years. In these countries we interviewed government officials knowledgeable about the reform process, at least one commission participant or commission staffer, and independent experts. Pension reform: 1998. Deficit in the pension system and unfavorable projections for the future solvency of the system. 4). | Why GAO Did This Study
Looking to the future, our nation faces large and growing structural deficits and escalating federal debt due primarily to rising health care costs and known demographic trends. Slowing the growth of entitlements is an essential part of the solution to these challenges. GAO was asked to identify useful insights from the entitlement reform processes in other countries. Specifically, GAO was asked to analyze (1) other countries' major efforts to reform entitlement programs, (2) the pressure(s) that led countries to undertake the reforms, (3) how reform proposals were developed, and (4) to what extent enacted reforms built in triggers requiring future actions under certain conditions; and where such trigger mechanisms did not exist, whether some adjustments nonetheless occurred. GAO conducted a literature review focusing on developed, high-income Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) countries facing similar fiscal challenges. To gain a more in-depth understanding of reform process, GAO selected three efforts for further study: Sweden's pension reform in 1998, Germany's pension reform in 2004, and the Netherlands' disability reform in 2005. For these cases GAO interviewed government officials, reform participants, and experts knowledgeable about the reforms. GAO is making no new recommendations in this report.
What GAO Found
Other countries' experiences suggest that reform of entitlement programs is difficult but also possible. Several countries more advanced in population aging and facing greater demographic challenges than ours have successfully undertaken reforms of major entitlement programs. Since the 1980s, almost all of the OECD countries have restructured their public pension programs; disability, unemployment, and other programs have also been reformed. Many reform efforts began or accelerated in an environment of economic and fiscal crisis. Other prompts included longer term concerns about population aging and economic competitiveness, and supranational factors such as a desire to meet the fiscal criteria for entry into the European Union. In many countries, reform occurred despite political processes that made it difficult. Consensus had to be built in coalition governments, and leaders had to work across parties to achieve a broad consensus for reform. Commissions were generally used to develop proposals, but this was only one stage in the reform process. Leaders needed to define the problem, persuading others that reform was needed and urgent. The challenge was to build a broad coalition to assure the reform's permanency while preserving the main policy initiatives sought in the reform process. In some reform efforts political leaders used the "bully pulpit" to educate the public but in some cases commissions also helped. Achieving a broad consensus across parties and groups was key to enacting and sustaining reform. Proposals were generally developed by ad hoc commissions established by governments with a strong commitment to reform. Commissions in case study efforts that developed proposals were small, with varying composition. They removed divisive issues from the usual political process, facilitating consultation and negotiation needed to devise a reform package. Commissions also helped to insulate policymakers from political risk. Reform processes were generally complex and often conflict-ridden before they ultimately succeeded in enacting legislation. Many reforms were iterative. Following reform enactment, a need for additional changes sometimes emerged. In some countries standing commissions were established to monitor pension systems and make recommendations for change. Some recent pension reforms have included mechanisms to automatically adjust benefits if adopted reforms prove insufficient to make programs sustainable. |
gao_GAO-08-400 | gao_GAO-08-400_0 | The Federal Role in Surface Transportation Has Expanded to Include Broader Goals, More Programs, and a Variety of Program Structures
Although most surface transportation funds are still directed to highway infrastructure, the federal role in surface transportation has broadened over the past 50 years to incorporate goals beyond highway construction, and federal surface transportation programs have grown in number and complexity. 3). 4). 5). Over $2 billion of these additional funds will have the same broad eligibility requirements and transfer provisions of the Surface Transportation Program. While program goals are numerous, they are sometimes conflicting and often unclear—which contributes to a corresponding lack of clarity in the federal role. Furthermore, surface transportation programs often do not employ the best tools and approaches available, such as rigorous economic analysis for project selection and a mode-neutral approach to planning and investment. The largest transit and safety programs also lack links to performance. Federal rules for transferring funds between highway programs are so flexible that the distinctions between individual programs have little meaning. Programs Do Not Employ the Best Tools and Approaches to Ensure Effective Investment Decisions
In some areas, federal surface transportation programs do not use the best tools and approaches available. Tools to make better use of existing infrastructure have not been deployed to their full potential, in part because their implementation is inhibited by the current structure of federal programs. Officials from three state departments of transportation also noted that inflexibilities in the use of congressionally directed funds limit the states’ ability to implement projects and efficiently use transportation funds by, for example, providing funding for projects that are not yet ready for implementation or providing insufficient funds to complete particular projects. Establish and clearly define the federal role in achieving each goal. Ensure fiscal sustainability. When a national competition is not feasible, Congress could require a competitive selection process at the state or local level, such as those required for the Job Access and Reverse Commute Program. Finally, given the scope of needed transformation, the shifts in policies and programs may need to be done incrementally or on a pilot basis to gain practical lessons for a coherent, sustainable, and effective national program and financing structure to best serve the nation for the 21st century. Matter for Congressional Consideration
To improve the effectiveness of the federal investment in surface transportation, meet the nation’s transportation needs, and ensure a sustainable commitment to transportation infrastructure, Congress should consider reexamining and refocusing surface transportation programs to be responsive to these principles so that they: have well-defined goals with direct links to an identified federal interest institute processes to make grantees more accountable by establishing more performance-based links between funding and program outcomes, institute tools and approaches to that emphasize the return on the federal investment, and address the current imbalance between federal surface transportation revenues and spending. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
We were asked to (1) provide an historical overview of the federal role in surface transportation and the goals and structures of federal surface transportation programs funded by the Highway Trust Fund, (2) summarize conclusions from our prior work on the structure and performance of these and other federal programs, and (3) identify principles to help assess options for focusing the future federal role and the structure of federal surface transportation programs. Highway safety and motor carrier safety grant programs are similarly organized. Most of these discretionary grants provide states with financial incentives for meeting specific performance or safety activity criteria. Once the federal interest and goals have been identified, the federal role in relation to state and local governments can be clearly defined. | Why GAO Did This Study
Surface transportation programs need to be reexamined in the context of the nation's current unsustainable fiscal path. Surface transportation programs are particularly ready for review as the Highway Trust Fund faces a fiscal imbalance at a time when both congestion and travel demand are growing. As you requested, this report (1) provides an overview of the federal role in surface transportation and the goals and structures of federal programs, (2) summarizes GAO's conclusions about the structure and performance of these programs, and (3) provides principles to assess options for focusing future surface transportation programs. GAO's study is based on prior GAO reports, stakeholder reports and interviews, Department of Transportation documents, and the views of transportation experts.
What GAO Found
Since federal financing for the interstate system was established in 1956, the federal role in surface transportation has expanded to include broader goals, more programs, and a variety of program structures. To incorporate additional transportation, environmental and societal goals, federal surface transportation programs have grown in number and complexity. While some of these goals have been incorporated as new grant programs in areas such as transit, highway safety, and motor carrier safety, others have been incorporated as additional procedural requirements for receiving federal aid. Broad program goals, eligibility requirements, and transfer provisions give states and local governments substantial discretion for allocating most highway infrastructure funds. For transit and safety programs, broad basic grant programs are augmented by programs that either require a competitive selection process or use financial incentives to directly target federal funds toward specific goals or safety activities. Many current programs are not effective at addressing key transportation challenges such as increasing congestion and freight demand. They generally do not meet these challenges because federal goals and roles are unclear, many programs lack links to needs or performance, and the programs often do not employ the best tools and approaches. The goals of current programs are numerous and sometimes conflicting. Furthermore, states' ability to transfer highway infrastructure funds among different programs is so flexible that some program distinctions have little meaning. Moreover, programs often do not employ the best tools and approaches; rigorous economic analysis is not a driving factor in most project selection decisions and tools to make better use of existing infrastructure have not been deployed to their full potential. Modally-stovepiped funding can impede efficient planning and project selection and, according to state officials, congressionally directed spending may limit the states' ability to implement projects and efficiently use transportation funds. A number of principles can help guide the assessment of options for transforming federal surface transportation programs. These principles include: (1) ensuring goals are well defined and focused on the federal interest, (2) ensuring the federal role in achieving each goal is clearly defined, (3) ensuring accountability for results by entities receiving federal funds, (4) employing the best tools and approaches to emphasize return on targeted federal investment, and (5) ensuring fiscal sustainability. With the sustainability and performance issues of current programs, it is an opportune time for Congress to more clearly define the federal role in transportation and improve progress toward specific, nationally-defined outcomes. Given the scope of needed transformation, it may be necessary to shift policies and programs incrementally or on a pilot basis to gain practical lessons for a coherent, sustainable, and effective national program and financing structure to best serve the nation for the 21st century. |
gao_GAO-06-627 | gao_GAO-06-627_0 | OCS visited nine states in fiscal years 2003 through 2005. We also found that OCS did not systematically use or collect available information that would allow it to assess states’ CSBG management risks. In addition, OCS has not issued reports to Congress annually, as required by law. The state programs that we visited had different views on what they must do to meet federal requirements to monitor local agencies at least once during each 3-year period, and OCS had not issued guidance clarifying the time frames states should use when conducting on-site visits. Specifically, officials in two states conducted the on-site visits at least once between 2003 and 2005, but officials in the other three states visited their local agencies less frequently. While states varied in their frequency of monitoring visits, all five states offices visited local agencies with identified problems more often. States Made Efforts to Provide Additional Oversight of Local Agencies
The states that we visited provided oversight in addition to on-site monitoring through such activities as reviewing reports, coordinating with other federal and state programs, and providing formal training and technical assistance. OCS Designated $1 Million or Less of Its Annual Training and Technical Assistance Funding to Assist Local Agencies with Problems but Does Not Know if These Funds Addressed the Greatest Needs
In fiscal years 2002 through 2005, OCS designated $1 million or less of its annual $10 million training and technical assistance funds to assist local agencies with problems, but it had no way to determine whether this money was allocated in a way that addressed the greatest needs of state and local agencies. Limited Data on the Results of the Assistance Showed That Some Local Agencies Had Improved
Information on the results of OCS grant programs that targeted local agencies with problems was limited. Establish policies and procedures to help ensure that its on-site monitoring is focused on states with highest risk. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
To gain a better understanding of oversight efforts undertaken by state and federal program offices to monitor the Community Services Block Grant (CSBG) program and ensure the accountability of funds, we examined (1) the extent to which the Department of Health and Human (HHS) oversight of states efforts to monitor local agencies complied with federal laws and standards, (2) the efforts selected states have made to monitor local agencies’ compliance with fiscal requirements and performance standards, and (3) the extent to which HHS targeted federal CSBG training and technical assistance funds to efforts to assist local agencies with financial or management problems and what is known about the results of the assistance. GAO-06-373R. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Community Services Block Grant (CSBG) provided over $600 million to states in fiscal year 2005 to support over 1,000 local antipoverty agencies. The Department of Health and Human Services's (HHS) Office of Community Services (OCS) is primarily responsible for overseeing this grant; states have oversight responsibility for local agencies. At the request of Congress, GAO is providing information on (1) HHS's compliance with federal laws and standards in overseeing states, (2) five states' efforts to monitor local agencies, and (3) federal CSBG training and technical assistance funds targeted to local agencies with problems and the results of the assistance. States were selected based on varying numbers of local agencies and grant amounts and recommendations from associations, among other criteria.
What GAO Found
In a February 2006 letter (GAO-06-373R), GAO notified OCS that it lacked effective policies, procedures, and controls to help ensure that it fully met legal requirements for monitoring states and internal control standards. At that time, GAO also offered recommendations for improvements. OCS has responded that it intends to take actions to address each of those recommendations. In addition, GAO found that OCS did not routinely collect key information, such as results of state monitoring reports, or systematically use available information, such as state performance data, to assess the states' CSBG management risks and target monitoring efforts to states with the highest risk. All five states we visited conducted on-site monitoring of local agencies with varying frequency and performed additional oversight efforts. Two state offices visited each local agency at least once between 2003 and 2005, while the other three states visited local agencies less frequently. State officials we visited had different views on what they must do to meet the statutory requirement to visit local agencies at least once during each 3-year period, and OCS has not issued guidance interpreting this requirement. Officials in all five states also provided oversight in addition to monitoring through such activities as reviewing reports and coordinating with other federal and state programs. OCS targeted some training and technical assistance funds to local grantees with financial or management problems, but information on the results of this assistance is limited. In fiscal years 2002 through 2005, OCS designated between $666,000 and $1 million of its annual $10 million training and technical assistance funds to local agencies with problems, but had no process for strategically allocating these funds to areas of greatest need. In addition, the final reports on awarded grants indicated that some local agencies had improved, but the reports provided no information on the outcomes of assistance for nearly half of the 46 local agencies that GAO identified as being served. |
gao_GAO-15-817 | gao_GAO-15-817_0 | Health data standards are technical requirements used to, among other things, facilitate health information exchange and interoperability of systems, including EHR systems. Such standards consist of terminology and technical specifications that, when adopted by multiple entities, facilitate the exchange and interoperability of health information. Some of these requirements include the exchange of health information, which is a component of interoperability. Initiatives Described a Variety of Approaches for Addressing Interoperability and Are Generally Works in Progress Selected Initiatives Vary in a Number of Ways, Including Their Products or Services and Membership
The initiatives we reviewed vary in their efforts to achieve or facilitate interoperability, including (1) the primary products or services they offer (e.g., a network or guidance for implementing standards), (2) the types of electronic systems the initiatives are working to make interoperable, (3) the cost of the initiatives’ products or services, (4) the geographic areas served by the initiatives, (5) the extent to which initiatives facilitate patient access to their health information, (6) the stakeholder groups that are members of the initiatives, and (7) the sources of funding for the initiatives. Most of the Selected Interoperability Initiatives Are Relatively New and Still Undergoing Development
The majority of the initiatives we selected are works in progress, meaning that they are relatively new and therefore still in the process of developing, or encouraging others to adopt, their products or services. Representatives from 6 of the initiatives said that their primary products or services were available in some areas or available on a limited scale; however, according to the representatives, none of their products or services were widely available or widely used at the time of our review. Initiative representatives also identified other issues beyond the scope of their initiatives that they say need to be addressed in order to move nationwide EHR interoperability forward. Stakeholders and Initiative Representatives Described Five Key Challenges to EHR Interoperability
Stakeholders and representatives from the selected EHR initiatives described five key challenges to achieving EHR interoperability: (1) insufficiencies in standards for EHR interoperability, (2) variation in state privacy rules, (3) accurately matching patients’ health records, (4) costs associated with interoperability, and (5) need for governance and trust among entities. For example, as the next section describes, certain agreements may need to be established as a precondition to interoperability. Each Key Interoperability Challenge Is in the Process of Being Addressed by at Least Some Initiatives
Representatives from all 18 of the initiatives we reviewed said they are working to address these key challenges using different approaches (see table 1). Costs Associated with Interoperability
Sixteen of the 18 initiatives are working to address the challenge of the reported high costs associated with interoperability. Six initiative representatives said that improvements to EHR systems—such as enhancements that improve providers’ workflow or clinical decision-making—are needed to increase the extent to which an EHR system, and the information contained within it, is a valuable tool for health care providers. Agency Comments
We provided a draft of this report to HHS for comment. HHS provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. Appendix I: Selected Nonfederal Initiatives GAO Reviewed
We identified nonfederal organizations that have ongoing initiatives that are working to facilitate electronic health record (EHR) interoperability. | Why GAO Did This Study
EHR interoperability is viewed by many health care stakeholders as a necessary step toward improving health care. However, interoperability has remained limited. Although the federal government plays a key role in guiding movement toward interoperability, many of the actions are to be completed by nonfederal stakeholders.
GAO was asked to review the status of efforts by entities other than the federal government to develop infrastructure that could lead to nationwide interoperability of health information. This report describes the (1) characteristics of selected nonfederal initiatives intended to facilitate EHR interoperability, and (2) key challenges related to EHR interoperability and the extent to which selected nonfederal initiatives are addressing these challenges. GAO interviewed representatives from 18 selected nonfederal initiatives that were frequently mentioned by stakeholders GAO interviewed, and reflected a range of approaches. GAO reviewed documents from these initiatives as well as other published research.
What GAO Found
Representatives from the 18 nonfederal initiatives GAO reviewed described a variety of efforts they are undertaking to achieve or facilitate electronic health record (EHR) interoperability, but most of these initiatives remain works in progress. EHR interoperability is the ability of systems to exchange electronic health information with other systems and process the information without special effort by the user, such as a health care provider. These initiatives' efforts include creating guidance related to health data standards, encouraging the adoption of certain health data standards or policies that facilitate interoperability, and operating networks that connect EHR systems to enable interoperability. The initiatives varied in a number of other ways, including the types of electronic systems the initiatives are working to make interoperable, the cost of their products or services, the geographic area served, patient use of the products or services, and their organizational structures. For example, GAO found that while some initiatives are making their products or services available at no cost, others are charging a fee for their products or services based on the type of entity using the product or service (e.g., individual physician or hospital) or the amount of data exchanged. Similarly, over half of the initiatives were using varying approaches to facilitate patient access to and control over their health information. The majority of the initiatives GAO selected are still in the process of developing, or encouraging others to adopt, their products or services. Most of the initiatives' products or services were not widely available at the time of GAO's review, but initiative representatives anticipated greater availability of their products or services in the next 2 years.
Stakeholders and initiative representatives GAO interviewed described five key challenges to achieving EHR interoperability, which are consistent with challenges described in past GAO work. Specifically, the challenges they described are (1) insufficiencies in health data standards, (2) variation in state privacy rules, (3) accurately matching patients' health records, (4) costs associated with interoperability, and (5) the need for governance and trust among entities, such as agreements to facilitate the sharing of information among all participants in an initiative. Representatives from the 18 initiatives GAO reviewed said they are working to address these key challenges using different approaches. Each key challenge is in the process of being addressed by some initiatives. To move interoperability forward, initiative representatives noted, among other issues, that providers need to see an EHR system as a valuable tool for improving clinical care.
The Department of Health and Human Services provided technical comments on a draft of this report, which GAO incorporated as appropriate. |
gao_GAO-14-111 | gao_GAO-14-111_0 | 2. 3. CMS also requires ZPICs to support HHS OIG, the Department of Justice (DOJ), and other law enforcement entities with their Medicare fraud investigations. ZPICs reported spending most of their fee-for-service funding in 2012 on fraud case development, primarily for investigative staff. In 2012, ZPICs reported that their investigations included 3,600 beneficiary interviews, 777 onsite inspections, prepayment reviews of 190,000 suspended claims and postpayment reviews of 32,000 paid claims. ZPICs Reported More than $250 Million in Savings and Other Actions, Primarily from Reactive Sources, but CMS Lacks Information on Whether More Could Be Saved
In calendar year 2012, ZPICs reported more than $250 million in savings to Medicare by stopping payment on suspect claims and recouping money from overpayments. For example, in 2012 ZPICs reported implementing more than 160 revocations and deactivations. According to CMS, ZPICs are to take immediate action to protect Medicare funds, but CMS may be missing opportunities for additional savings to Medicare because the agency lacks information on the timeliness of certain ZPIC actions. However, CMS does not track information on the swiftness of these actions, such as the length of time between a ZPIC’s receipt of a complaint about a suspect provider and the ZPIC’s visit to that provider, or between identifying a potentially fraudulent provider and initiating an administrative action. CMS Generally Gave ZPICs Good Reviews, but Does Not Link ZPIC Performance to Agency Program Integrity Measures
Based on CMS’s annual reviews, five of the six operating ZPICs were eligible for some portion of their contracts’ available award fees, and ZPICs received almost 70 percent of all fees for their most recent periods of performance.the annual reviews—elements that measure aspects of quality of service, cost control, business relations, and timeliness of certain activities— ranged from satisfactory to exceptional, meeting the award fee eligibility requirement of at least a satisfactory rating in all four of these elements. CMS follows some best practices for its oversight of ZPICs, but does not clearly link ZPIC performance to agency performance measures and goals. Moreover, these performance measures do not connect ZPIC work to agency performance measures that are linked to its goals, which is another best practice. Federal standards state that entities should link performance measurements to goals and objectives, and previous GAO work found that leading organizations try to link the goals and performance measures for each organizational level to successive levels and ultimately to the organization’s strategic goals.none of the ZPICs’ performance measures link to the agency’s measures of increasing the percentage of administrative actions taken against high- risk providers, or to the other Medicare fee-for-service program integrity performance measure of reducing improper payments. ZPICs, which are central to that strategy, reported that their efforts have yielded positive results, such as savings greater than their contract costs and multiple other actions that helped protect Medicare from potentially fraudulent providers, such as referring suspect providers to law enforcement. In addition, as CMS attempts to achieve its agencywide program integrity goal of fighting fraud and eliminating improper payments in the Medicare program, it would benefit from knowing how ZPICs are contributing to efforts to achieve this goal. Recommendations
To help ensure that CMS’s fraud prevention activities are effective and that CMS is comprehensively assessing ZPIC performance, the Administrator of CMS should take the following two actions:
Collect and evaluate information on the timeliness of ZPICs’ investigative and administrative actions, such as how soon investigations are initiated after ZPICs identify potential fraud and how swiftly ZPICs initiate administrative actions after identifying potentially fraudulent providers. Agency Comments
We requested comments from HHS, but none were provided. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To determine Zone Program Integrity Contractors’ (ZPIC) contract costs and how ZPICs use those funds, we examined data from CMS’s Analysis, Reporting, and Tracking System (ARTS), an online system ZPICs use to submit invoices and report workload statistics and which CMS uses to track and analyze ZPIC workload, performance, and production. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO has designated Medicare as a high-risk program, in part because its size and complexity make it particularly vulnerable to fraud. To help detect and prevent potential Medicare fraud, CMS--the agency within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) that administers the Medicare program--contracts with ZPICs. These contractors are to identify potential fraud, investigate it thoroughly and in a timely manner, and take swift action, such as working to revoke suspect providers' Medicare billing privileges and referring potentially fraudulent providers to law enforcement.
GAO examined (1) ZPIC contract costs and how ZPICs use those funds, (2) the results of ZPICs' work, and (3) the results of CMS's evaluations of ZPICs' performance and aspects of CMS's evaluation practices. To do this, GAO examined ZPIC funding, contracts, and related documents; data on ZPICs' workloads, investigations, and results; and CMS evaluations of ZPICs as well as federal standards for performance measurement. GAO also interviewed CMS and ZPIC officials.
What GAO Found
The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) paid its Zone Program Integrity Contractors (ZPIC) about $108 million in 2012. ZPICs reported spending most of this funding on fraud case development, primarily for investigative staff, who in 2012 reported conducting about 3,600 beneficiary interviews, almost 780 onsite inspections, and reviews of more than 200,000 Medicare claims.
ZPICs reported that their actions resulted in more than $250 million in savings to Medicare in calendar year 2012 from actions such as stopping payment on suspect claims. ZPICs also reported taking other actions to protect Medicare funds, including having more than 130 of their investigations accepted by law enforcement for potential prosecution, and working to stop more than 160 providers from receiving additional Medicare payments in 2012. However, CMS lacks information on the timeliness of ZPICs' actions--such as the time it takes between identifying a suspect provider and taking actions to stop that provider from receiving potentially fraudulent Medicare payments--and would benefit from knowing if ZPICs could save more money by acting more quickly.
ZPICs generally received good ratings in annual reviews, with five of six eligible for incentive awards. CMS follows some best practices for ZPICs' oversight, but the agency does not clearly link ZPIC performance to agency program integrity goals. The majority of the measures CMS uses to evaluate ZPICs relate to the quality of their work because, according to CMS officials, quality is the most important element. However, evaluation of such measures, while a best practice, does not connect ZPIC work to agency performance measures. For example, CMS aims to increase the percentage of actions taken against certain high risk Medicare providers--work central to ZPICs--but does not explicitly link ZPICs' work to the agency's progress toward that goal, another best practice that would allow the agency to better assess the ZPICs' support of CMS's fraud prevention efforts.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that CMS collect and evaluate information on the timeliness of ZPICs' investigative and administrative actions, and develop ZPIC performance measures that explicitly link ZPICs' work to Medicare program integrity performance measures and goals. GAO requested comments from HHS on the draft report, but none were provided. |
gao_GAO-02-185 | gao_GAO-02-185_0 | Earlier this year, FAA issued the Operational Evolution Plan (OEP), which is designed to give more focus to some of the diverse initiatives under way. Most of these initiatives were ongoing or long-term projects. The OEP’s operational solutions incorporate most of the separate initiatives identified by the stakeholder groups. FAA acknowledged that the OEP was not meant to be an end-all that would solve all delay problems, but was instead a more limited document dealing with near-term operational solutions. Overcoming barriers to building new runways. Capacity to Be Added in Next 10 Years Will Likely Have Limited Effect in Keeping Delays From Rising to Previous Levels
If fully implemented, the actions to be taken under the OEP will add substantially to the system’s capacity but are unlikely to keep delays from rising again unless air traffic remains at substantially lower levels than anticipated over the long term. If the recovery is less robust, the system still will have difficulty because a number of delay-prone airports have limited ability to expand their capacity to meet even modest increases in demand. The first category involves various other measures for adding airport infrastructure besides adding runways to existing airports, such as building new airports or using nearby underdeveloped regional airports. The second category involves approaches to better manage and distribute air traffic demand within the system’s existing capacity. The third category includes developing alternative modes of intercity travel other than air transportation, such as high-speed rail. For the most part, these efforts are currently on hold in the aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attacks because FAA has focused its immediate efforts on other matters. A blueprint for effectively addressing capacity issues and reducing delays in the nation’s air transport system. Appendix II: Initiatives by DOT, FAA, and Selected Airlines and Airports to Address Flight Delays
Initiative sponsor and description Federal government procedures and technology - Department of Transportation Study of demand management techniques
A presidential directive issued on 12/7/00 directed the Department of Transportation (DOT) and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to (1) study market-based congestion pricing and other demand management solutions to reduce delays and (2) undertake a policy analysis of how these solutions might be implemented, their potential impact, and any statutory impediments. The new runway is in the early planning stage. | What GAO Found
Initiatives to address flight delays include adding new runways to accommodate more aircraft and better coordinating efforts to adjust to spring and summer storms. Although most of these efforts were developed separately, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has incorporated many of them into an Operational Evolution Plan (OEP), which is designed to give more focus to these initiatives. FAA acknowledges that the plan is not intended as a final solution to congestion and delay problems. The plan focuses on initiatives that can be implemented within 10 years and generally excludes approaches lacking widespread support across stakeholder groups. The current initiatives, if successful, will add substantial capacity to the nation's air transport system. Even so, these efforts are unlikely to prevent delays from becoming worse unless the reduced traffic levels resulting from the events of September 11 persist. One key reason is that most delay-prone airports have limited ability to increase their capacity, especially by adding new runways--the main capacity-building element of OEP. The air transport system has long-term needs beyond the initiatives now under way. One initiative would add new capacity--not by adding runways to existing capacity-constrained airports, but rather by building entirely new airports or using nearby airports with available capacity. Another would manage and distribute demand within the system's existing capacity. A third would develop other modes of intercity travel, such as, but not limited to, high-speed rail where metropolitan areas are relatively close together. Because of increasing demands on the air transport system or because of the need to meet security and other concerns prompted by the recent terrorist attacks, the federal government will need to assume a central role. |
gao_GAO-14-398T | gao_GAO-14-398T_0 | Background
As table 1 shows, at the end of fiscal year 2013, USPS had about $100 billion in unfunded liabilities for pension, retiree health, and workers’ compensation benefits as well as outstanding debt. In addition, USPS’s outstanding debt to the U.S. Treasury increased from $2.1 billion at fiscal year-end 2006 to its current statutory borrowing limit of $15 billion.and unfunded liabilities have become a large and growing burden— increasing from 83 percent of USPS’s revenues in fiscal year 2007 to 148 percent of revenues in fiscal year 2013. USPS’s Funding of Its Benefit Liabilities Varies by Program
The extent to which USPS has funded its benefit liabilities varies as a result of different statutory funding requirements specific to each benefit program as well as USPS’s financial means to make funding payments. For example, prefunding of USPS’s pension benefits has been required over decades, and as a result, USPS’s pension liability is over 90 percent funded. Prefunding USPS’s retiree health benefits began in 2007, and at a fairly aggressive pace, and the liability is about half funded at present. Also, as discussed further below, the ongoing prefunding requirements—i.e., the rules for calculating the amount that USPS must pay each year—differ among the pension, retiree health, and workers’ compensation programs. The unfunded liabilities, in order of decreasing size, are $48 billion for retiree health, $19 billion for pensions, and $17 billion for workers’ compensation. USPS’s pension and retiree health liabilities are estimated using demographic and pay-increase assumptions developed for the federal workforce as a whole, rather than assumptions developed for the USPS workforce in particular. These separate rules include variations in amortization periods, recognition of any surpluses, use of actuarially determined versus fixed payments, and actuarial assumptions. Retiree Health
Unlike its pension liability, prior to 2007 USPS had been funding its retiree health liability on a pay-as-you-go basis—an approach in which USPS paid its share of premiums for existing retirees, with no prefunding for any future premiums expected to be paid on behalf of current retirees and employees. Impact of Unfunded Benefit Liabilities Absent Actions by Congress to Address Them and Key Considerations
Without congressional action to address USPS’s benefit funding issues and better align its costs and revenues, USPS faces continuing low liquidity levels, insufficient revenues to make annual prefunding payments, and increasing benefit liabilities. In addition, we have reported that Congress needs to modify USPS’s retiree health prefunding payment in a fiscally responsible manner, and that USPS should prefund any unfunded retiree health liability to the maximum extent that its finances permit. For USPS, this is about equity between current and future postal ratepayers. Providing greater benefit security to employees, retirees, and their beneficiaries. Prefunding decisions also involve trade-offs between USPS’s current financial condition and its long-term prospects. In our prior reports, we have identified funding issues related to USPS’s unfunded liabilities that remain unresolved and have identified potential methods for addressing these issues:
Actuarial assumptions: We support making the most accurate measurements possible of USPS’s benefit liabilities, and support the development and use of assumptions specific to USPS’s population of plan participants.assumptions are used, that the assumptions should continue to be recommended by an independent body, such as OPM’s Board of Actuaries. Such a reduction would have the effect of carrying a permanent unfunded liability equal to roughly 20 percent of USPS’s liability, which could be a significant amount. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. | Why GAO Did This Study
USPS continues to be in a serious financial crisis, with insufficient revenue to cover its expenses and financial obligations as the volume of USPS's most profitable product, First-Class Mail, continues to decline. At the end of fiscal year 2013, USPS had about $100 billion in unfunded liabilities: $85 billion in unfunded liabilities for benefits, including retiree- health, pension, and workers' compensation liabilities, and $15 billion in outstanding debt to the U.S. Treasury—the statutory limit. These unfunded liabilities are a large and growing financial burden, increasing from 83 percent of USPS revenues in fiscal year 2007 to 148 percent of revenues in fiscal year 2013. Unfunded benefit liabilities represent estimated future benefit payments to current and retired employees for which USPS has not set aside sufficient money to pay. This testimony discusses (1) the extent to which USPS's benefit liabilities are unfunded and (2) the potential impacts of USPS's unfunded benefit liabilities absent action by Congress to address them and key policy issues for consideration. This testimony is based primarily on GAO's work over the past 4 years and updated USPS financial information for fiscal year 2013.
GAO has previously reported that a comprehensive package of legislative actions is needed so that USPS can achieve financial viability and assure adequate benefits funding for more than 1 million postal employees and retirees. GAO has also previously identified various approaches Congress could consider to restructure the funding of USPS retiree health benefits and pensions.
What GAO Found
The extent to which the U.S. Postal Service (USPS) has funded its liabilities varies due to different statutory funding requirements specific to each benefit program and USPS's financial means to make payments. For example, USPS has been required to prefund its pension benefit liability over decades, and as shown in the table below, its pension liability is 94 percent funded. Prefunding USPS's retiree health benefits began in 2007, and the liability is about half funded. In contrast, USPS funds its workers' compensation benefits on a pay-as-you-go basis, and the entire liability is unfunded. The largest unfunded liabilities, in order of decreasing size, are $48 billion for retiree health, $19 billion for pensions, and $17 billion for workers' compensation. The rules for calculating the amount that USPS must fund each year differ among the pension and retiree health programs, including variations in amortization periods, recognition of any surpluses, use of actuarially determined versus fixed payments, and actuarial assumptions.
Reasons for prefunding include fairly allocating costs between current and future ratepayers, protecting USPS's future viability, providing greater benefit security to employees and retirees, and protecting potential third parties.
Prefunding decisions involve trade-offs between USPS's current financial condition and its long-term prospects.
Congress needs to modify USPS's retiree health prefunding payments in a fiscally responsible manner, and USPS should prefund any unfunded retiree- health benefits liability to the maximum extent that its finances permit.
Lowering the retiree health funding target from 100 to 80 percent would have the effect of carrying a permanent unfunded liability.
USPS liabilities are estimated using assumptions for the federal workforce as a whole, rather than USPS-specific assumptions. GAO supports the use of the most accurate actuarial assumptions available, and if USPS-specific assumptions are used, that they be recommended by an independent body. |
gao_GAO-10-490 | gao_GAO-10-490_0 | 1). NOAA Followed Key Planning Practices and Generally Included Critical Components in Developing Its Tsunami Programs’ Strategic Plans
The planning processes NOAA used to develop its Tsunami Program and NTHMP strategic plans followed the three key practices leading organizations use to create effective strategic plans. The plans also generally include the critical components of effective plans—such as mission statements and long-term goals—and are closely linked through their goals and strategies, but some components of the plans have not been fully developed. NOAA adopted strategic plans in 2008 for the Tsunami Program and in 2009 for NTHMP. We found that the Tsunami Program and NTHMP strategic plans generally include most of the critical components of effective strategic plans. Specifically, for the Tsunami Program’s strategic plan, we found that it identifies the program’s mission, nine long-term goals for meeting its mission, strategies to achieve most of the goals, activities to implement the strategies, and some performance measures to assess progress. For example, although the plan identifies eight long-term goals, it does not identify performance measures, milestones, or who is responsible for achieving the goal of developing understandable and effective tsunami warning center communications, such as tsunami warning messages for communities. NOAA Has Expanded and Strengthened Its Tsunami Programs, but Some Challenges Remain
Since our 2006 report, NOAA has made progress in expanding and strengthening its tsunami warning and mitigation capabilities, but maintaining a reliable DART detection buoy network and increasing community participation in the TsunamiReady program have proven to be challenging. In addition, NOAA’s initial failure to follow its agencywide research transition policy contributed to about a 2-year delay in moving a new tsunami forecast system from research to application in the warning centers, and NOAA has not complied with the Tsunami Warning and Education Act’s requirement that it develop and execute a plan for the transfer of technology from ongoing research into the tsunami forecasting and warning program. For example, in fiscal year 2009, NOAA allocated nearly $12 million—about 28 percent of NOAA’s total tsunami budget—to DART operation and maintenance. NOAA Has Expanded and Reorganized Its Hazard Mitigation Program, but Community Participation in TsunamiReady Remains Limited
To improve its mitigation capabilities, NOAA significantly expanded NTHMP’s membership and reorganized the program to better focus its activities toward achieving tsunami mitigation goals. In 2005, NOAA expanded NTHMP membership from five Pacific Coast states into a nationwide program including all 29 at-risk coastal U.S. states and territories. The number of communities recognized as TsunamiReady has increased from 27 (at the time of our 2006 report) to 74 communities located in 10 states, Puerto Rico, and the Pacific territories, as of February 2010. Despite this progress, overall community participation remains relatively low. For example, the 74 communities that NOAA has recognized as TsunamiReady account for less than 10 percent of the more than 760 communities identified as at risk for a tsunami (see table 2). NOAA has not conducted a formal assessment to identify barriers to or possible incentives for participating in the TsunamiReady program, as we recommended in 2006. Because NOAA’s existing policy and procedures, which predated the act, do not provide a plan specifically for the transfer of tsunami research into the Tsunami Program, and because NOAA has not created a separate plan for the transfer of tsunami research, we believe that NOAA has not fully complied with the act’s requirement for a transition plan for tsunami research. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve national tsunami preparedness and ensure that NOAA fulfills its responsibilities under the Tsunami Warning and Education Act, we are recommending that the Secretary of Commerce direct the Administrator of NOAA to take the following two actions: Revise the Tsunami Program’s and NTHMP’s strategic plans to ensure that all the components are fully developed, in particular, that they include effective strategies and performance measures for all goals, including those for the TsunamiReady program. | Why GAO Did This Study
In June 2006, GAO reported a number of concerns about the level of U.S. tsunami preparedness. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) leads U.S. efforts through three key programs: the Tsunami Program, which focuses on detection and warning activities; the National Tsunami Hazard Mitigation Program (NTHMP), which is a partnership with federal and state agencies focusing on hazard assessment and mitigation; and TsunamiReady, which is a partnership with at-risk communities focusing on education and emergency planning. The Tsunami Warning and Education Act of 2006 directed improvements in NOAA's warning and mitigation efforts and mandated GAO to report on its progress. This report addresses (1) the extent to which NOAA developed effective strategic plans for its tsunami programs and (2) the status of NOAA's efforts to strengthen and expand the programs and move tsunami research to application. GAO analyzed NOAA documents and interviewed federal, state, and local officials responsible for tsunami planning and preparedness efforts.
What GAO Found
NOAA adopted strategic plans for the Tsunami Program in 2008 and NTHMP in 2009, which it developed by following key planning practices and including most of the critical components of strategic plans identified by leading organizations, but some components have not been fully developed. GAO found that NOAA's planning process followed practices critical to creating effective strategic plans, such as involving stakeholders. Both plans also include most of the components of effective strategic plans--such as mission statements and long-term goals--but other necessary components were missing or incomplete. For example, in the Tsunami Program's strategic plan, NOAA identified nine long-term goals but did not identify strategies and performance measures for three of them. Similarly, in the strategic plan for NTHMP, NOAA identified eight long-term goals but did not identify performance measures, milestones, or who is responsible for achieving one of the goals. Although the strategic plan for NTHMP includes a goal for the TsunamiReady program, it does not identify strategies for achieving the goal. Since 2005, NOAA has made progress in expanding and strengthening its tsunami warning and mitigation capabilities but faces challenges in both areas, as well as in moving its tsunami research to application. To enhance its warning capabilities, NOAA has, among other actions, deployed 39 tsunami detection buoys. Operating and maintaining the buoys, however, has been difficult and costly, consuming about 28 percent of the fiscal year 2009 Tsunami Program budget. NOAA is exploring ways to reduce maintenance costs by improving buoy reliability. To enhance its tsunami hazard mitigation efforts, NOAA expanded NTHMP membership from the 5 Pacific Coast states to all 29 at-risk coastal U.S. states and territories, changed how it funds mitigation projects in states and territories, and restructured NTHMP to better meet its program goals. NOAA's efforts to mitigate tsunami impacts through its TsunamiReady program, however, have been hampered by limited community participation. Although the number of TsunamiReady communities has increased from 27 in 2006 to 74 as of February 2010, overall participation in this voluntary program remains relatively low among the more than 760 communities identified as at risk for a tsunami. In this regard, GAO recommended in 2006 that NOAA conduct an assessment to identify potential barriers to program participation. Although NOAA has not yet conducted this assessment, GAO continues to believe that such an assessment is needed to help inform the agency's strategic planning efforts. Finally, NOAA has not complied with the Tsunami Warning and Education Act's requirement to develop and execute a plan for the transfer of technology from research into the Tsunami Program. Furthermore, NOAA's initial failure to follow its agencywide research transition policy contributed to a 2-year delay in moving the new tsunami forecasting system from research to application in its tsunami warning centers. Only after NOAA developed a transition plan in 2009 that was consistent with the agencywide policy did the transition of the system begin to move forward more efficiently. |
gao_HEHS-96-35 | gao_HEHS-96-35_0 | State- and Privately Funded Programs Improved Children’s Coverage
Beginning in 1985, states and private entities began to fund programs that provided insurance for children who were ineligible for or not enrolled in Medicaid and did not have private or comparable insurance coverage.The programs we visited varied in several respects, but all were limited in how many children they could cover by the size of their budgets, which depended on their funding sources. In 1994, these programs enrolled from 39 to 98,538 children and had budgets ranging from about $240,000 to about $71.5 million. The Caring Programs, which served more than 41,000 children in 1994, ranged in size from 400 to almost 6,000 enrolled children and had budgets from $100,000 to $4.3 million. Much of the state programs’ funding came from state general revenues, cigarette or tobacco taxes, or health care provider taxes; counties; and foundations and other private-sector entities. 1.) 2.) In addition to limiting services, state and private programs used other strategies to manage costs, such as sharing costs with patients and using competitive bidding and managed care. Costs to provide coverage for children varied from $20 to $70.60 per month, partly because of the kinds of services covered and the limitations on those services. 3.) 4.) The programs used existing billing systems and generally had reimbursement levels that approximated market rates—factors that were attractive to providers. The programs guaranteed access to a provider network, used simple enrollment procedures, and in many ways appeared similar to private insurance, which helped the programs avoid the stigma of welfare. Most notably, the state- and privately funded programs we visited covered some children who would not otherwise have been covered; complemented existing Medicaid coverage; kept per child costs to a minimum; provided preventive and primary care services—the services children are most likely to need; offered a wide network of providers; required families to share part of the cost; used HMOs frequently to manage children’s health care; and used existing administrative systems of state, nonprofit, and private organizations. Despite these state and private efforts, many children remained uninsured. I.1.) The program’s budget for 1994 was approximately $1.7 million, and the estimated budget for 1995 is approximately $2 million. Children on the waiting lists may participate in the program by paying an at-cost premium. Enrollment procedures vary somewhat among insurers. Access to Health Insurance: State Efforts to Assist Small Businesses (GAO/HRD-92-90, May 14, 1992). | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed state and private efforts to insure children who are not eligible for Medicaid and whose parents cannot purchase private insurance, focusing on: (1) enrollment, costs, funding sources, and annual budgets of these state and private programs; (2) state strategies to manage costs while providing children access to health care; and (3) program design elements that have facilitated program implementation.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) by 1995, 14 states and at least 24 private-sector entities had programs to increase health care access for uninsured children; (2) the number of children enrolled in the state programs reviewed ranged from 5,000 to over 100,000 children and state budgets ranged from $1.7 million to $55 million; (3) private-sector programs enrolled up to 6,000 children and had budgets of $100,000 to $4.3 million; (4) state program funding sources included state general revenues, donations, and small insurance premiums and copayments; (5) budget limitations have reduced the number of Medicaid-eligible children served and have forced these programs to cap enrollment and place eligible children on waiting lists; (6) the programs' per-child costs ranged from $20 to $70.60 per-month; (7) state programs have attempted to reduce costs by limiting eligibility and covered services, relying on Medicaid to provide inpatient care, and using patient cost-sharing, managed care, and competitive bidding among insurers; (8) state efforts to attract providers included using insurers' existing payment systems and physician networks and paying near-market reimbursement rates, while their efforts to attract families included guaranteeing patient access to providers, having simple enrollment procedures, and avoiding the appearance of a welfare program; and (9) surveys showed that families were generally satisfied with state insurance programs, since the programs increased childrens' access to appropriate health care services. |
gao_GAO-09-819T | gao_GAO-09-819T_0 | Through it, about 8 million federal employees, retirees, and their dependents received health coverage—including for prescription drugs—in 2008. Medicare—the federal health insurance program that serves about 45 million elderly and disabled individuals—offers an outpatient prescription drug benefit known as Medicare Part D. This benefit was established by the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003 (MMA) beginning January 1, 2006. The VA pharmacy benefit is provided to eligible veterans and certain others. Medicaid, a joint federal-state program, finances medical services for certain low-income adults and children. Drug coverage depends on the manufacturer’s participation in the federal Medicaid drug rebate program, through which manufacturers pay rebates to state Medicaid programs for covered drugs used by Medicaid beneficiaries. FEHBP Uses Competition between Health Plans to Control Prescription Drug Costs
FEHBP uses competition among health plans as the primary measure to control prescription drug spending and other program costs. Similar to most private employer-sponsored or individually purchased health plans, most FEHBP plans contract with pharmacy benefit managers (PBMs) to help them administer the prescription drug benefit and control drug spending. In a 2003 report reviewing the use of PBMs by three plans representing about 55 percent of total FEHBP enrollment, we found that the PBMs used three key approaches to achieve savings for the health plans: negotiating rebates with drug manufacturers and passing some of the savings to the plans; obtaining drug price discounts from retail pharmacies and dispensing drugs at lower costs through mail-order pharmacies operated by the PBMs; and using other intervention techniques that reduce utilization of certain drugs or substitute other, less costly drugs. While OPM does not play a role in negotiating prescription drug prices or discounts, it does attempt to limit prescription drug spending through its leverage with participating health plans in annual premium and benefit negotiations. Other Federal Programs Use a Range of Approaches to Control Prescription Drug Spending
Medicare Part D uses a competitive model similar to FEHBP, while other federal programs use other methods, such as statutorily mandated prices or direct negotiations with drug suppliers. VA and DOD Use Statutorily Mandated Prices and Negotiate Directly with Drug Suppliers
While FEHBP and Medicare Part D use competition between health plans to control prescription drug spending, VA and DOD rely on statutorily mandated prices and discounts and further negotiations with drug suppliers to obtain lower prices for drugs covered on their formularies. VA and DOD have access to a number of prices to consider when purchasing drugs, paying the lowest available. Federal Supply Schedule (FSS) prices. Additionally, si to FEHBP and Medicare Part D, DOD uses utilization management methods to limit drug spending including prior authorization, dispensin limitations, and higher cost sharing for nonformulary drugs and drugs dispensed at retail pharmacies. Medicaid Uses Aggrega Payment Limits, Drug Pricing Guidelines Required Rebates
Unlike VA and DOD, Medicaid programs do not negotiate drug prices with il manufacturers to control prescription drug spending, but reimburse reta pharmacies for drugs dispensed to beneficiaries at set prices. Under the drug rebate program, drug manufacturers are required to provide quarterly rebates for covered outpatient prescription drugs purchased by state Medicaid programs. Under the rebate program, states take advantage of the prices manufacturers receive for drugs in the commercial market that reflect the results of negotiations by private payers such as discounts and rebates. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this testimony. Federal Employees Health Benefits Program: Premiums Continue to Rise, but Rate of Growth Has Recently Slowed. Prescription Drugs: Oversight of Drug Pricing in Federal Programs. GAO-07-481T. Prescription Drugs: An Overview of Approaches to Negotiate Drug Prices Used by Other Countries and U.S. Private Payers and Federal Programs. GAO-07-358T. | Why GAO Did This Study
Millions of individuals receive prescription drugs through federal programs. The increasing cost of prescription drugs has put pressure to control drug spending on federal programs such as the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program (FEHBP), Medicare Part D, the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), the Department of Defense (DOD), and Medicaid. Prescription drug spending within the FEHBP in particular, which provides health and drug coverage to about 8 million federal employees, retirees, and their dependents, has been a significant contributor to FEHBP cost and premium growth. The Office of Personnel Management (OPM), which administers the FEHBP, predicted that prescription drugs would continue to be a primary driver of program costs in 2009. GAO was asked to describe approaches used by the FEHBP to control prescription drug spending and summarize approaches used by other federal programs. This testimony is based on prior GAO work, including Prescription Drugs: Oversight of Drug Pricing in Federal Programs (GAO-07-481T) and Prescription Drugs: An Overview of Approaches to Negotiate Drug Prices Used by Other Countries and U.S. Private Payers and Federal Programs (GAO-07-358T) and selected updates from relevant literature on drug spending controls prepared by other congressional and federal agencies.
What GAO Found
FEHBP uses competition among health plans to control prescription drug spending, giving plans an incentive to rein in costs and leverage their market share to obtain favorable drug prices. Most FEHBP plans contract with pharmacy benefit managers (PBMs) to help administer the prescription drug benefit. In a 2003 report, GAO found that the PBMs reduced drug spending by: negotiating rebates with drug manufacturers and passing some of the savings to the plans; obtaining drug price discounts from retail pharmacies and dispensing drugs at lower costs through mail-order pharmacies operated by the PBMs; and using other techniques that reduce utilization of certain drugs or substitute other, less costly drugs. While OPM does not negotiate drug prices or discounts for FEHBP, it attempts to limit spending through annual premium and benefit negotiations with plans, including the encouragement of spending controls such as generic substitution. Other federal programs use a range of approaches to control prescription drug spending. (1) Medicare--the federal health insurance program for the elderly and disabled--offers an outpatient prescription drug benefit known as Medicare Part D that uses competition between plan sponsors and their PBMs to limit drug spending, in part through the ability to negotiate prices and price concessions with drug manufacturers and pharmacies. Plans are required to report these negotiated price concessions to the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), to help CMS determine the extent to which they are passed on to beneficiaries. (2) VA and DOD pharmacy benefit programs for veterans, active duty military personnel, and others may use statutorily mandated discounts as well as negotiations with drug suppliers to limit drug spending. VA and DOD have access to a number of prices to consider when purchasing drugs--including the Federal Supply Schedule prices that VA negotiates with drug manufacturers--paying the lowest of all available prices. (3) The Medicaid program for low-income adults and children is subject to aggregate payment limits and drug payment guidelines set by CMS. Medicaid does not negotiate drug prices with manufacturers, but reimburses retail pharmacies for drugs dispensed to beneficiaries at set prices. An important element of controlling Medicaid drug spending is the Medicaid drug rebate program, under which drug manufacturers are required by law to provide rebates for certain drugs covered by Medicaid. Under the rebate program, states take advantage of prices manufacturers receive for drugs in the commercial market that reflect discounts and rebates negotiated by private payers. In addition, Part D, VA and DOD, and Medicaid use techniques similar to FEHBP to limit drug spending, such as generic substitution, prior authorization, utilization review programs, or cost-sharing requirements. |
gao_GAO-14-25 | gao_GAO-14-25_0 | CMS has had a long-standing requirement that states report overpayments and the return of the federal share on the CMS-64. States Recovered $9.8 Million in Medicaid Overpayments, but Did Not Clearly Report the Overpayments and the Return of the Federal Share to CMS
Federal audits conducted from June 2007 through February 2012 initially identified $20.4 million in potential Medicaid overpayments across 19 states, an amount that was reduced by $7.1 million, primarily due to successful provider appeals and settlements. Of the remaining $13.3 million in net overpayments, states recovered $9.8 million in overpayments as of March 2013, and state officials told us that they are in the process of recovering the remaining $3.5 million. (Appendix I summarizes the potential Medicaid overpayments identified by federal audits, net overpayments, and state recoveries.) States should have reported the return of the federal share for $13.3 million on line 5 of the CMS-64, the line designated for overpayments identified by federal audits. Based on data we collected from the states, we found that states made multiple errors reporting the return of the federal share for overpayments identified by federal audits, as detailed below. Instead of reporting $13.3 million, states reported the return of the federal share for $12.4 million, and did not report the return of the federal share for the remaining $855,000. Within the $12.4 million that was reported by states, $6.6 million was correctly reported on line 5 of the CMS-64, while the remaining $5.8 million was reported in the CMS-64, but not on line 5. CMS Generally Reviewed States’ Reporting of Overpayments, but Was Not Always Aware of Incomplete Reporting
All 7 of the CMS regional offices we spoke with indicated that reviewing state reporting of the return of the federal share of overpayments was a routine part of their quarterly review of the CMS-64. For 59 of the 89 audits we reviewed, states reported the return of the federal share of the overpayment within 1 year as required by federal law. However, in some cases, regional offices were not always aware that states’ reporting was incomplete. However, given the errors we identified on the CMS-64, checking the status of state reporting of overpayments based on the reported CMS-64 data would not always yield a clear picture of states’ reporting of the federal share of overpayments. Additionally, a full accounting of federal audit recoveries is an important gauge for measuring the effectiveness of CMS’s efforts to reduce improper payments, but states’ reporting of overpayments and the return of the federal share are not always clear or complete. Recommendations
To ensure the timely return of the federal share of Medicaid overpayments, the CMS Administrator should increase efforts to ensure that states are clearly reporting overpayments identified by federal audits on the designated location of the CMS-64 form. | Why GAO Did This Study
While states and certain federal entities have had long-standing roles identifying Medicaid improper payments, the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 expanded CMS's role in identifying improper payments. As a result, CMS created a national audit program, which uses federal contractors to audit state Medicaid claims and identify overpayments--payments that should not have been made or were higher than allowed--to providers. States are responsible for recovering any identified overpayments and reporting the return of the federal share of those overpayments to CMS.
GAO was asked to examine states' efforts to recover and report overpayments identified by federal audits, and examine CMS's review of state reporting. This report assesses the extent to which: (1) states recovered Medicaid overpayments identified by federal audits and reported the return of the federal share, and (2) CMS reviewed states' reporting of Medicaid overpayments related to these federal audits. GAO obtained overpayment and recovery data from all states with an identified overpayment and compared this with CMS data; reviewed relevant laws, regulations, and CMS guidance; and interviewed CMS and state officials.
What GAO Found
States recovered $9.8 million in Medicaid overpayments, but they did not clearly report the overpayments and the return of the federal share to the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). Federal audits initially identified about $20.4 million in potential Medicaid overpayments across the 19 states with identified overpayments from June 2007 through February 2012. Of the $13.3 million in net overpayments shown below, states recovered $9.8 million and were in the process of recovering the remaining $3.5 million. States should have reported the return of the federal share for $13.3 million on the line designated for overpayments identified by national audit program contractors on the CMS-64--the form that states fill out quarterly to obtain federal reimbursement for Medicaid services. However, states made multiple reporting errors. Specifically:
instead of reporting $13.3 million, states reported the return of the federal share for $12.4 million and did not report the return of the federal share for the remaining $855,000; and
within the $12.4 million that was reported by states, $6.6 million was correctly reported on the CMS-64, while the remaining $5.8 million was reported on the CMS-64, but not on the correct line.
CMS generally reviewed states' reporting of overpayments but was not always aware of incomplete reporting. All 7 of the CMS regional offices GAO spoke with indicated that reviewing states' reporting of the return of the federal share of overpayments was a routine part of their quarterly review of the CMS-64 and helped ensure the timely return of the federal share of overpayments in 59 of the 89 audits GAO reviewed. In some cases, though, regional offices were not always aware that states' reporting was incomplete. CMS's Medicaid Integrity Group may review data from these audits on the designated line of the CMS-64, which can be an important gauge for measuring the effectiveness of CMS's efforts to reduce improper payments. However, reviewing these data would not yield a clear picture of the return of the federal share of overpayments given the errors GAO identified in state reporting.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the CMS Administrator increase efforts to ensure that states are clearly reporting overpayments identified by federal audits in the designated location of the CMS-64 form. HHS concurred with this recommendation. |
gao_RCED-97-20 | gao_RCED-97-20_0 | According to EPA, this increase is due largely to the backlog of sites referred to the agency for evaluation, additional processing requirements, and a reduction in the number of sites added annually to Superfund. No nonfederal sites were listed on the NPL in fiscal years 1988 and 1992. In 1996, EPA took an average of 9.4 years to list nonfederal sites and, in 1995, 8.3 years to list federal sites. SARA’s goal was for EPA to evaluate nonfederal sites for listing, when warranted, within 4 years of their discovery. EPA made decisions about listing nonfederal sites within 4 years of their discovery for 43 percent of the 8,931 sites discovered from fiscal year 1987 through fiscal year 1991. According to EPA officials, decisions not to list sites are now being made faster than during the period from 1987 through 1991, when many listing decisions were delayed pending a revision of the standards for evaluating hazardous waste sites. In 1996, cleanup completions averaged 10.6 years for nonfederal operable units and 6.6 years for federal operable units. For fiscal year 1993, however, EPA set an expectation for its regions to complete a cleanup within 5 years of a site’s listing. At nonfederal sites listed from 1986 through 1990, 10 percent of the operable units were cleaned up within 5 years of their site’s listing. EPA officials attributed this decrease to EPA’s effort to reduce the time for completing preliminary assessments following the passage of the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA). In 1996, inspections took 6.5 years to complete, on average, from the time of site discovery. These numbers suggest that a substantial portion of the time between discovery and listing elapses while a site is awaiting the next step in the process. Time Taken to Accomplish the Principal Steps in the Process of Cleaning Up Sites
In addition to measuring the total time taken from the placement of a site on the NPL to the completion of its cleanup, we examined the time taken to complete two of the principal intermediate steps—the preparation of the record of decision, which documents the final remedy selected after completing the remedial investigation and feasibility study (RI/FS), and the remedial design, which includes the technical drawings and specifications for the selected remedy. The average time taken to select a remedy at federal sites has also increased over the years, from an average of 2 years in 1990 to an average of 6.3 years in 1996. He specifically asked that we examine trends in the time taken to (1) evaluate hazardous waste sites for possible placement on the NPL and (2) clean up the sites following their listing. For this part of the analysis, we examined data for three principal stages of the cleanup process: (1) from the site’s placement on the NPL to the selection of a remedy, (2) from the site’s listing to the completion of the remedial design, and (3) from the site’s listing to the completion of the cleanup. 4. 5. 7. 8. 9. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) Superfund cleanup efforts, focusing on trends in the time taken to: (1) evaluate and process hazardous waste sites for possible placement on the National Priorities List (NPL); and (2) clean up these sites following their listing.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) EPA took an average of 9.4 years, calculated from the date of each site's discovery, to evaluate and process the nonfederal sites it added to the NPL in 1996; (2) while this evaluation and processing time shows some improvement over 1995, when listing took an average of 11.4 years after discovery for nonfederal sites, it is generally longer than for prior years; (3) the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA) requires EPA to evaluate nonfederal sites for listing, when warranted, within 4 years of their discovery; (4) listing decisions were made within 4 years of discovery for 43 percent of the 8,931 nonfederal sites discovered from 1987 through 1991; (5) the average time between discovery and listing for federal sites has also increased over the years, rising from about 6.5 years for sites listed in 1990 to 8.3 years for sites listed in 1995; (6) much of the increase in the time taken to list both federal and nonfederal sites has occurred in the latter stages of the evaluation process, after sites have been inspected and before final decisions about the need to list them are made; (7) EPA officials attributed the increases to a number of factors, including the large numbers of sites initially referred to the agency for evaluation and EPA's emphasis on completing work on already listed sites; (8) long waits for listing may continue because a large number of sites are potentially eligible for Superfund and a limited number of sites are being added to the program each year; (9) nonfederal cleanup projects completed from 1986 through 1989 were finished, on average, 3.9 years after sites were placed on the NPL; (10) by 1996, however, nonfederal cleanup completions were averaging 10.6 years; (11) SARA did not set deadlines for completing cleanups within a certain number of years, but EPA set an expectation for 1993 for its regions to complete a cleanup within 5 years of a site's listing; (12) ten percent of the cleanup projects at nonfederal sites listed from 1986 through 1990 were finished within 5 years of a site's listing; (13) federal agencies took, on average, 6.6 years from the date of listing to finish the cleanup projects they completed in fiscal year 1996; (14) much of the time taken to complete cleanups is spent during the early planning phases of the cleanup process, when cleanup remedies are selected; (15) less time has been spent on actual construction work at sites than on the selection of remedies; and (16) EPA officials attributed the increases in the time taken to complete cleanups to the growing complexity of the cleanup problems at sites. |
gao_GAO-16-306 | gao_GAO-16-306_0 | FEMA Faces IT Management and Workforce Challenges
FEMA faces a number of challenges in ensuring that its IT systems adequately support the agency’s ability to respond to major disasters. Specifically, the agency has not (1) established a sufficient framework for providing governance and oversight of its IT investments, (2) developed adequate plans for modernizing its IT environment to reduce its reliance on duplicative and outdated systems, and (3) taken sufficient steps to address gaps in its IT workforce. Establishing and implementing policies and procedures for selecting and reselecting IT investments that meet the agency’s needs, and integrate these with funding and selection decisions. Without clearly defined roles and responsibilities, FEMA has less assurance that investments will be reviewed by those with the appropriate authority and aligned with agency goals. Establishing policies and procedures for providing investment oversight. FEMA has strategic planning efforts under way to guide its IT modernization, but the plans are not current and not yet complete. For example, the IT strategic plan describes the CIO’s mission, goals, and objectives for fiscal year 2013 through 2016, but has not been updated since 2013, even though the plan calls for an annual update. While the CIO has begun to develop a draft IT modernization plan that includes the scope of its efforts, an implementation strategy, and schedule of its overall modernization effort, it is not yet complete. Without complete and up-to-date planning documents, including the strategic and modernization plans, FEMA will be unable to move toward its ultimate goal of modernizing and eliminating duplicative IT investments. Similarly, while the agency has taken initial steps to assess the needs of its IT workforce, it has not yet established time frames for completing workforce planning efforts and it lacks an understanding of its regional IT workforce. For example, as discussed earlier, the agency has not yet established time frames for completing key IT strategic planning activities, such as updating the strategic plan or workforce gap reviews. None of the Three Selected Emergency Management Programs Had Fully Implemented Key IT Management Controls
The three selected major emergency management programs that we reviewed had not consistently implemented IT management controls in four key areas: (1) risk management, (2) requirements development, (3) project planning, and (4) systems integration and testing. These weaknesses stemmed in part from gaps in FEMA policy for implementing these controls. However, the program office’s mitigation plans for identified risks were not adequate. According to all three program offices and OCIO officials, FEMA policy guidance for requirements management does not exist. The three selected programs varied in the extent to which they implemented these practices. Recommendations for Executive Action
To ensure that FEMA’s IT systems can adequately support its ability to respond to major disasters, we are recommending that the Secretary of DHS direct the FEMA Administrator to take the following actions:
Ensure that the IT Governance Board has fully defined and implemented its roles and responsibilities for key boards, working groups, and individuals, and procedures for selecting and overseeing IT investments. In the comments, DHS concurred with our recommendations. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to (1) identify challenges associated with ensuring the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) information technology (IT) systems adequately support the agency’s ability to respond to major disasters and (2) assess the extent to which FEMA has implemented key IT management controls for selected emergency management systems. To address our first objective, we obtained and analyzed FEMA documentation (e.g., FEMA’s Hurricane Sandy After-Action Report), prior GAO reports, and Department of Homeland Security (DHS) inspector general (IG) reports. We selected these key IT management control areas because they are consistent with the requirements of the Post-Katrina Act for FEMA to take steps to improve its IT systems, including: ensuring that the information technology systems of the agency have the capacity to track disaster response personnel, mission assignments task orders, commodities, and supplies used in response to a natural disaster, act of terrorism, or other man-made disaster; ensuring that the multiple IT systems of the agency are, to the extent practicable, fully compatible and can share and access information, as appropriate, from each other; ensuring technology enhancements reach the headquarters and regional offices of the agency in a timely fashion, to allow seamless integration; and developing and maintaining a testing environment that ensures that all system components are properly and thoroughly tested before their release. | Why GAO Did This Study
FEMA, a component agency of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), leads federal efforts to mitigate, respond to, and recover from disasters. In the wake of Hurricane Katrina, the largest natural disaster in U.S. history, Congress passed the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006. This act required FEMA to address shortcomings identified in the preparation for and response to Katrina, including improving the agency's IT programs, which are critical to its ability to respond to natural disasters and other emergencies.
GAO was asked to review FEMA's IT system improvement efforts. This report (1) identifies challenges to ensuring the agency's IT systems adequately support its disaster response efforts and (2) assesses the extent to which FEMA has implemented key IT management controls for selected emergency management programs. GAO analyzed FEMA documentation (e.g., FEMA's Hurricane Sandy After-Action Report), interviewed officials, and assessed its implementation of IT management best practices for three selected programs.
What GAO Found
The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) faces the following challenges in ensuring that its information technology (IT) programs adequately support the agency's ability to respond to major disasters:
Governance and oversight: FEMA established an investment review board to select and oversee IT investments, as called for by leading practices. But the board has not fully defined roles and responsibilities of key members, working groups, and individuals, and it does not have clearly defined procedures for selecting and overseeing investments. As a result, the agency lacks adequate visibility into and oversight of IT investment decisions and activities.
IT modernization: FEMA has begun to take steps to modernize its IT environment, but key planning documents are not current and complete. For example, the agency has an IT strategic plan and is currently drafting its modernization plan; however, the plans do not reflect the agency's current goals and objectives. Further, the IT strategic plan describes the Chief Information Officer's (CIO) mission, goals, and objectives through fiscal year 2016, but has not been updated since 2013. In addition, while the Office of the CIO is currently drafting the agency's IT modernization plan, including an implementation strategy and an overall schedule, it is not yet final. As a result, the agency is limited in its ability to move toward its goal to modernize its systems and eliminate duplicative IT investments.
Workforce planning: The agency has not yet established time frames to address long-standing workforce management challenges. For example, while it conducted a workforce assessment to identify skill levels of employees in the agency's Office of the CIO, it has not completed recommended actions called for by this assessment. In addition, its workforce planning efforts have not included an assessment of the many IT staff located in the agency's regions and other offices. Consequently, FEMA has less assurance that its IT workforce will have the skills needed to successfully manage its programs.
None of the three emergency management programs GAO selected for this review had fully implemented key IT management controls in the areas of risk management, requirements development, project planning, and systems testing and integration. Specifically, the three selected emergency management programs inconsistently implemented these practices by, for example, not always developing adequate risk mitigation plans, establishing processes for requirements management, developing and updating schedules and cost estimates, and ensuring complete and adequate system testing along with systems integration plans. These weaknesses were due, in part, to a lack of FEMA policies to guide programs in implementing these key IT management controls. Until FEMA fully establishes and implements such policies and controls, it has limited assurance that these programs will cost-effectively support its disaster response efforts.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that FEMA fully define its investment board's roles and responsibilities and procedures for selecting and overseeing investments, update its strategic plan and complete plans for IT modernization, and establish time frames for completing workforce planning efforts. FEMA should also establish policies and guidance for implementing key IT management controls. DHS concurred with the recommendations. |
gao_GAO-06-706 | gao_GAO-06-706_0 | DOD’s Information Security Program Lacks Oversight and Consistent Implementation
A lack of oversight and inconsistent implementation of DOD’s information security program are increasing the risk of misclassification. DOD’s information security program is decentralized to the DOD component level, and OUSD(I) involvement in, and oversight of, components’ information security programs is limited. Also, while some DOD components and subordinate commands appear to manage their programs effectively, we identified weaknesses in others’ training, self-inspections, and security classification guide management. Also, OUSD(I) does not conduct or oversee self-inspections, nor does it confirm whether self-inspections have been performed or review self-inspection findings. Security classification guides identify what information needs protection and the level of classification; the reason for classification, to include citing the applicable categories in the Executive Order; and the duration of classification. Of the 13 components and subordinate commands we reviewed that possess multiple classification guides: 10 maintain paper or electronic copies of classification guides in a central location, or are in the process of doing so; 8 track the currency of more than half of their combined classification guides to facilitate their review, to ensure that they are updated at least every 5 years, in accordance with the ISOO directive; and 8 either have made or are in the process of making their classification guides available to authorized users electronically. Results of OSD Document Review Show Some Questionable Classification Decisions and Numerous Marking Errors
In our review of a nonprobability sample of 111 classified OSD documents we questioned DOD officials’ classification decisions for 29 documents— that is, 26 percent of the sample. We also found that 93 of the 111 documents we examined (84 percent) had at least one marking error, and about half had multiple marking errors. While the results from this review cannot be generalized across DOD, they are indications of the lack of oversight and inconsistency that we found in DOD’s implementation of its information security program. Beginning with the fiscal year 2005 estimates, OUSD(I) will scrutinize the classification decision estimates of its components before consolidating and submitting them to ISOO. Properly conducted, OUSD(I)’s review could improve the accuracy of these estimates, if methodological inconsistencies are reduced. Adopting a consistent methodology across the department and from year to year should improve the reliability and accuracy of this estimate that is reported to the President. To examine whether DOD’s implementation of its information security management program in the areas of training, self-inspections, and security classification guide management effectively minimizes the risk of misclassification, we compared the DOD components’ and subordinate commands’ policies and practices with federal and DOD requirements, including Executive Order 12958, Classified National Security Information, as amended; Information Security Oversight Office (ISOO) Directive 1, Classified National Security Information; and DOD Information Security Program regulation 5200.1-R. Additionally, we visited the Defense Security Service Academy in Linthicum, Maryland, to discuss DOD training issues, and the Defense Technical Information Center at Fort Belvoir, Virginia, to discuss the availability of current security classification guides. To assess the extent to which DOD personnel in five offices of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) followed established procedures for classifying information, to include correctly marking classified information, we examined 111 documents classified from September 22, 2003 to June 30, 2005. To assess the reliability of DOD’s annual classification decisions estimate and the existence of material inconsistencies, we compared the guidance issued by ISOO and the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence on methods to derive this estimate with how DOD components and subordinate commands implemented this guidance. | Why GAO Did This Study
Misclassification of national security information impedes effective information sharing, can provide adversaries with information to harm the United States and its allies, and incurs millions of dollars in avoidable administrative costs. As requested, GAO examined (1) whether the implementation of the Department of Defense's (DOD) information security management program, effectively minimizes the risk of misclassification; (2) the extent to which DOD personnel follow established procedures for classifying information, to include correctly marking classified information; (3) the reliability of DOD's annual estimate of its number of classification decisions; and (4) the likelihood of DOD's meeting automatic declassification deadlines.
What GAO Found
A lack of oversight and inconsistent implementation of DOD's information security program are increasing the risk of misclassification. DOD's information security program is decentralized to the DOD component level, and the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (OUSD(I)), the DOD office responsible for DOD's information security program, has limited involvement with, or oversight of, components' information security programs. While some DOD components and their subordinate commands appear to manage effective programs, GAO identified weaknesses in others in the areas of classification management training, self-inspections, and classification guides. For example, training at 9 of the 19 components and subordinate commands reviewed did not cover fundamental classification management principles, such as how to properly mark classified information or the process for determining the duration of classification. Also, OUSD(I) does not have a process to confirm whether self-inspections have been performed or to evaluate their quality. Only 8 of the 19 components performed self-inspections. GAO also found that some of the DOD components and subordinate commands that were examined routinely do not submit copies of their security classification guides, documentation that identifies which information needs protection and the reason for classification, to a central library as required. Some did not track their classification guides to ensure they were reviewed at least every 5 years for currency as required. Because of the lack of oversight and weaknesses in training, self-inspection, and security classification guide management, the Secretary of Defense cannot be assured that the information security program is effectively limiting the risk of misclassification across the department. GAO's review of a nonprobability sample of 111 classified documents from five offices within the Office of the Secretary of Defense shows that, within these offices, DOD personnel are not uniformly following established procedures for classifying information, to include mismarking. In a document review, GAO questioned DOD officials' classification decisions for 29--that is, 26 percent of the sample. GAO also found that 92 of the 111 documents examined (83 percent) had at least one marking error, and more than half had multiple marking errors. While the results from this review cannot be generalized across DOD, they are consistent with the weaknesses GAO found in the way DOD implements its information security program. The accuracy of DOD's classification decision estimates is questionable because of the considerable variance in how these estimates are derived across the department, and from year to year. However, beginning with the fiscal year 2005 estimates, OUSD(I) will review estimates of DOD components. This additional review could improve the accuracy of DOD's classification decision estimates if methodological inconsistencies also are reduced. |
gao_GAO-17-168 | gao_GAO-17-168_0 | In addition to the GPA, the United States has 14 FTAs with 20 countries, 4 of which (Canada, Israel, Singapore, and South Korea) are also parties to the GPA. Available 2010 Data Show Covered Procurement Reported by the United States Was Twice the Combined Amount Reported by the Next Five Largest GPA Parties
Data available from the WTO for 2010 show that the United States reported more than twice as much GPA-covered government procurement as the next five largest GPA parties combined, although total U.S. government procurement is less than the combined total for the other five parties. 2.) According to USTR officials, limited tendering is considered to be covered procurement under the GPA. These statistics provide transparency—one of the GPA’s main goals, according to the WTO—about parties’ implementation of the GPA as well as the agreement’s benefits. Parties have not provided data for all entities covered by the agreement, as required. Inconsistencies in reporting. U.S. Agencies’ Approach to Reporting GPA- Covered Procurement Does Not Ensure Timeliness, Accuracy, and Comparability
U.S. agencies’ approach to statistical reporting of covered government procurement to the WTO does not ensure the timeliness, accuracy, or comparability of the reported data. In addition, USTR lacks a methodology for reporting states’ and other government entities’ GPA-covered procurement, as the GPA requires, and instead reports estimated total government procurement, which exceeds covered procurement. Revised U.S. As a result, the United States did not report procurement data to the WTO for 5 years, despite the 1994 GPA requirement to report annual statistics. In addition, it is inconsistent with federal standards for internal control that call for U.S. agencies to issue relevant, accurate, and reliable information and to record and communicate the information within a time frame that enables entities to carry out their responsibilities. Conclusions
Government procurement constitutes a significant potential market for international trade that the U.S. government has sought to open through the GPA and FTAs. Moreover, recent data on procurement covered by U.S. FTAs are not available— NAFTA parties last exchanged such data in 2005, and the government procurement chapters of the U.S. FTAs we reviewed do not require statistical reporting of covered government procurement. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve the quality and transparency of statistical reporting of international government procurement by GPA and U.S. FTA parties to fulfill their commitments under these agreements, we recommend that the U.S. Trade Representative take the following two actions:
Prepare and submit a proposal to the WTO GPA working group on statistical reporting established by the Committee on Government Procurement that aims to improve the quality of statistical reporting by WTO parties to address the weaknesses we identified. Ensure that calculations using U.S. procurement statistics and other data are reviewed for accuracy before reporting them to the WTO. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
For this report, we (1) broadly compared covered government procurement reported by the United States and other parties to the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA) and U.S. free trade agreements (FTA); (2) assessed the usefulness of GPA and U.S. FTA parties’ statistical reporting for more detailed comparisons of—and transparency regarding—their covered government procurement; and (3) examined the extent to which U.S. agencies’ approach to reporting statistical data on covered government procurement to the WTO ensures timeliness, accuracy, and comparability. These limitations include the absence of U.S. statistical notifications to the WTO for years after fiscal year 2010; the lack of timeliness, completeness, and consistency in GPA parties’ reporting; the lack of common understanding and practice among GPA parties regarding reporting of procurement data; the 2009 change in the U.S. methodology for reporting federal procurement; and the failure of U.S. notifications to distinguish covered from noncovered government procurement for the states. 6.) | Why GAO Did This Study
Globally, government procurement, estimated at $4.4 trillion annually, constitutes a significant market for international business. However, according to officials from the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR), which is responsible for reporting to the WTO, government procurement markets are often closed to foreign competition. GAO was asked to review U.S. participation in international procurement agreements, which seek to ensure fair and open competition on a reciprocal basis. This report (1) broadly compares GPA-covered government procurement reported to the WTO by the United States and other parties; (2) assesses the usefulness of statistical reporting of government procurement data by GPA and U.S. FTA parties for more detailed comparisons; and (3) examines the extent to which the U.S. approach to reporting such data ensures timeliness, accuracy, and comparability. GAO analyzed WTO and U.S. documents and data pertaining to the GPA and U.S. FTAs and interviewed officials in Washington, D.C., and Geneva, Switzerland.
What GAO Found
Under the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA), the United States has reported opening more procurement covered by the agreement to foreign firms than have other parties to the agreement. For example, U.S. data for 2010—the most recent available—show that the United States reported $837 billion in GPA-covered procurement. This amount is about twice as large as the approximately $381 billion reported by the next five largest GPA parties—the European Union, Japan, South Korea, Norway, and Canada—combined, even though total U.S. procurement is less than that of the other five parties combined. (See figure.)
Deficiencies in the statistical reporting of government procurement by GPA and U.S. free trade agreement (FTA) parties, including the United States, limit detailed comparisons as well as transparency—one of the GPA's stated goals. For example, the GPA parties' reports that GAO reviewed were not always submitted on time and often lacked certain required data. Also, a lack of common understanding of key terms' definitions led to inconsistencies in GPA parties' reporting. Moreover, while parties to the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) are required to exchange government procurement data annually, NAFTA's parties have not done so since 2005; other U.S. FTAs GAO reviewed do not require reporting of government procurement data. As a result, policymakers and others have limited information with which to monitor the agreements or assess their financial benefits.
The U.S. approach to statistical reporting of GPA-covered government procurement to the WTO does not ensure the data's timeliness, accuracy, and comparability. For instance, while a recent revision of the methodology for calculating covered U.S. federal procurement improves accuracy, it creates a 6-year reporting delay. In contrast, the GPA requires the reporting of annual procurement statistics within 2 years. In addition, U.S. agencies have not developed a methodology for reporting states' covered government procurement, as the GPA requires. Instead, the United States reports total state-level procurement, which GAO estimated may exceed covered procurement by about 10 percent. Further, the expertise needed to report government procurement data to the WTO is fragmented among the four agencies involved, leading to inconsistencies, errors, and deficiencies. Federal standards for internal control call for U.S. agencies to issue relevant, accurate, and reliable information within a time frame that enables entities to carry out their responsibilities.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is making six recommendations to USTR to improve statistical reporting of government procurement under the GPA and U.S. FTAs, including working with GPA parties to enhance their reporting, resuming the required data exchange with NAFTA parties, improving U.S. federal and state procurement data reported to the WTO, and ensuring that U.S. statistical notifications to the WTO are well documented and reviewed for accuracy. USTR did not provide official comments. |
gao_GAO-10-60 | gao_GAO-10-60_0 | Pervasive Deficiencies in Control Procedures at the Contract Level Increase the Risk of Improper Payments or Waste
We found pervasive deficiencies in internal control over contracting and payments to contractors. These deficiencies were due in part to a lack of agency-specific policies and procedures to ensure that FAR requirements and other control objectives were met. These internal control deficiencies are a manifestation of CMS’s weak overall control environment, which is discussed later. As a result of our work, we estimate that at least 84.3 percent of FAR- based contract actions made by CMS in fiscal year 2008 contained at least one instance in which a key control was not adequately implemented. We also estimate that at least 37.2 percent of FAR-based contract actions made in fiscal year 2008 had three or more instances in which a key control was not adequately implemented. We estimate that for at least 59.0 percent of fiscal year 2008 contract actions, the project officer did not always certify the invoices. CMS’s control environment is characterized by the lack of strategic planning to identify necessary staffing and funding, a lack of reliable data for effectively carrying out contract management responsibilities, very limited actions taken on the recommendations we made in 2007 related to contracting and payments to contractors, and a lack of procedures for managing contract audits which are essential to managing and overseeing the growing value of contracting activities. Without accurate data, CMS program managers do not have adequate information to identify and monitor areas that pose a high risk of improper payments or waste. Roles and responsibilities for implementation of CFA responsibilities not clearly defined. In 2007, we reported that CMS did not timely perform contract closeout procedures resulting in a backlog of 1,300 contracts, of which 407 were overdue for closeout as of September 30, 2007. The continuing weaknesses in contracting activities and limited progress in addressing known deficiencies raise questions concerning whether CMS management has established an appropriate “tone at the top” regarding contracting activities. It is imperative that CMS take immediate action to address its serious contract-level control deficiencies and take action on our previous recommendations to improve contract-level and overall environment controls or CMS will continue to place billions of taxpayer dollars at risk of fraud, or otherwise improper contract payments. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To determine the extent to which the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) implemented effective internal control procedures over contract actions, we focused on contracts that were generally subjected to the Federal Acquisition Regulation. We selected 11 internal controls over contracting and payments to contractors to test for this report, ranging from ensuring contractors had adequate accounting systems prior to the use of a cost reimbursement contract to certifying invoices for payment. 2. | Why GAO Did This Study
As a result of internal control deficiencies discussed in GAO's 2007 report on certain contracts at the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), GAO was asked to identify the extent to which CMS (1) implemented effective control procedures over contract actions, and (2) established a strong control environment for contract management. GAO used a statistical random sample of 2008 CMS contract actions (including contract awards and modifications) to assess CMS internal control procedures. The results were projected to the population of 2008 CMS contract actions. GAO also determined the extent to which CMS implemented recommendations GAO made in 2007 to improve internal control over contracting and payments to contractors. GAO reviewed contract file documentation and interviewed senior acquisition management officials.
What GAO Found
Pervasive deficiencies in CMS contract management internal controlincrease the risk of improper payments or waste. Specifically, based on our statistical random sample of 2008 CMS contract actions, GAO estimates that at least 84.3 percent of fiscal year 2008 contract actions contained at least one instance where a key control was not adequately implemented. GAO also estimates that at least 37.2 percent of fiscal year 2008 contract actions had three or more instances in which a key control was not adequately implemented. The contract actions GAO evaluated were generally subject to the Federal Acquisition Regulation. For example, CMS used cost reimbursement contracts without first ensuring that the contractor had an adequate accounting system. Also, project officers did not always certify invoices for payment. These deficiencies were due in part to a lack of agency-specific policies and procedures to help ensure proper contracting expenditures. These control deficiencies also stem from a weak overall control environment as characterized primarily by inadequate strategic planning for staffing and funding resources. CMS also did not accurately capture data on the nature and extent of its contracting, which hinders CMS's ability to manage its acquisition function by identifying areas of risk, due to a lack of quality assurance procedures over data entry. CMS also has not substantially addressed seven of the nine recommendations made by GAO in 2007 to improve internal control over contracting and payments to contractors. For example, CMS has not made progress in clarifying the roles and responsibilities for implementing certain contractor oversight responsibilities and, as of July 2009, CMS still had a backlog of contacts that were overdue for closeout, putting CMS at increased risk of not identifying or recovering improper payments or waste. The continuing weaknesses in contracting activities and limited progress in addressing known deficiencies will continue to put billions of taxpayer dollars at risk of improper payments or waste. |
gao_GAO-10-950 | gao_GAO-10-950_0 | A Comprehensive Estimate of the Business Nonfiling Tax Gap May Be Infeasible, but IRS Operational Data Could Provide Partial Information
According to IRS, the primary challenge for IRS in developing a business tax gap estimate is a lack of data. A partial estimate could be based on IRS’s inventory of over 40 million potential nonfiler cases. IRS does not know what share of its inventory represents instances of actual nonfiling. The BMF CCNIP represents a significant modernization of IRS’s business nonfiler compliance program. However, IRS does not have all the information it needs to know how well the new initiative is working. IRS Has Performance Information for Its Individual Nonfiler Program but Not for Its Business Nonfiler Program
In addition to measures specific to the BMF CCNIP, IRS has also developed four Servicewide performance and outcome measures for IRS’s nonfiler activities overall. However, it is not clear whether the meeting will include setting a deadline for developing such measures. IRS Is Monitoring the Use of Selection Codes but Does Not Yet Have a Formal Plan to Evaluate Them
Selection codes are a key feature of the BMF CCNIP because they distill the business information that IRS has on a case into a prioritized code. Selection codes are readily available on the computer screens that IRS collections staff use to research cases and record case closings. IRS has faced several challenges in its business nonfiler program. IRS generally identifies more potential nonfilers than it can thoroughly investigate, and many of those it does investigate turn out not to owe the return IRS expects based on its records. This initiative should help IRS choose cases to work, but without an estimate of the business nonfiler tax gap, IRS does not have a data-driven basis for allocating resources to its business nonfiler efforts. IRS could also explore adding non-IRS data to the BMF CCNIP. Identifying Additional Actions to Help Achieve the Goal of Fewer Unproductive Cases Add closing codes that would better indicate all known causes for “not liable to file” determinations and use this information to analyze causes of unproductive cases and use them as appropriate to identify any actions IRS could take either administratively or through education and outreach that could reduce the number of business nonfiler cases where the filing requirement in IRS’s records is not applicable. Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
We provided a draft of this report to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. IRS agreed that identifying and pursuing active business nonfilers is key to enforcement efforts and acknowledged that our recommendations could assist these efforts. IRS agreed with four of our eight recommendations and indicated as discussed below some steps it would take to address the other four. Our recommendation was that IRS draw a sample of potential business nonfilers and thoroughly investigate those cases to estimate the number of actual business nonfilers in IRS’s business nonfiler inventory. With respect to our recommendation that IRS should study the feasibility and cost-effectiveness of using private sector business activity data and federal contract data, IRS agreed to evaluate the effectiveness of data mining using the Central Contractor Registration database but did not agree to study the feasibility of using private sector data. IRS stated that a federal contractor with an unfiled employment tax return is a high priority in the case selection process. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
The objectives of this report were to assess (1) the data challenges of estimating the business nonfiler tax gap, (2) how recent program changes in the Internal Revenue Service’s (IRS) processes and procedures have affected its capacity to identify and pursue business nonfilers, and (3) what opportunities exist for IRS to improve its use of third-party information returns or other sources to identify and pursue business nonfilers. We analyzed Business Master File Case Creation Nonfiler Identification Process (BMF CCNIP) inventory data to determine the number of potential business nonfilers IRS identifies and analyzed IRS’s fiscal year 2009 Collection Activity Reports to determine the number of business nonfiler cases IRS closed as not liable to file returns. To test whether information return income could be useful in making case closure decisions under BMF CCNIP, we matched IRS’s calendar year 2007 Aggregated Information Return (AIR) file, which is used in BMF CCNIP and contained summaries of information returns that were received by IRS, to IRS’s Nonfiler Measurement file that contained data on all tax year 2007 cases that were closed as not liable to file partnership (Form 1065) and corporation (Form 1120) returns. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) does not know how many businesses failed to file required returns, nor does it have an estimate of the associated lost tax revenue--the business nonfiling tax gap. Many cases it does investigate are unproductive because the business does not owe the return IRS expects. GAO was asked to assess (1) the data challenges of estimating the business nonfiler tax gap, (2) how recent program changes have affected IRS's capacity to identify and pursue business nonfilers, and (3) additional opportunities for IRS to use third-party data. GAO reviewed IRS's tax gap estimates, nonfiler program processes and procedures, and matched closed nonfiler cases with various other data.
What GAO Found
IRS cannot develop a comprehensive estimate of the business nonfiling rate and associated tax gap because it lacks data about the population of all businesses. However, IRS could develop a partial estimate using its business nonfiler inventory. IRS identifies several million potential business nonfilers each year, more than it can thoroughly investigate. IRS could take a random sample of its inventory, thoroughly investigate those cases, and use the results to estimate the proportion of actual nonfilers in its inventory of potential nonfilers. Until recently IRS has not had a way to prioritize cases in its large inventory. IRS modernized its business nonfiler program in 2009 by incorporating income and other data in its records indicating business activity. Active businesses generally have an obligation to file a return. IRS's Business Master File Case Creation Nonfiler Identification Process (BMF CCNIP) now assigns each case a code based on this data. IRS uses the code to select cases to work with the goal of securing tax returns from nonfilers and collecting additional revenue. This is a significant modernization, but IRS lacks a formal plan to evaluate how well the codes are working. IRS has performance information on its individual nonfiler program but less on its business nonfiler program. Key management reports needed to provide program data are under development but no deadline has been set. IRS could also use more information on why many nonfiler cases are unproductive. This could potentially lead IRS to identify actions that could reduce IRS resources used on these cases and associated taxpayer burden. GAO identified several opportunities including the following to enhance IRS's identification and pursuit of business nonfilers. (1) The new BMF CCNIP selection codes provide a quick way to verify taxpayer statements that a business has ceased operations and does not need to file a return. Collections staff have been instructed to use the codes when making case closure decisions. They were previously instructed to use other income data but GAO's analysis indicated this may not have been done in all cases. (2) Non-IRS data on businesses including federal contractors could be used to verify taxpayer statements about whether a tax return should have been filed. GAO's analysis of cases in two states that were closed as not liable to file a return found 7,688 businesses where non-IRS data showed business activity as measured by sales totaling $4.1 billion. GAO also found cases closed as not liable to file a return involving 13,852 businesses on the federal contractor registry. GAO's analyses illustrated the potential value of non-IRS data but GAO did not assess which non-IRS data would be most useful nor examine the capacity of IRS's systems to use such data on a large scale.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the Commissioner of Internal Revenue develop a partial business nonfiler rate estimate; set a deadline for developing performance data; develop a plan for evaluating the selection codes; reinforce the need to use income data and selection codes in verifying taxpayer statements; and study the feasibility and cost-effectiveness of using non-IRS data to verify taxpayer statements. In written comments on a draft of this report IRS agreed that identifying and pursuing active business nonfilers is key to enforcement efforts and acknowledged that our recommendations could assist these efforts. IRS agreed with four of GAO's recommendations and indicated some steps it would take to address the other four. |
gao_GAO-13-275 | gao_GAO-13-275_0 | Critical Protocols Supporting the Internet
The nation’s communications infrastructure also provides the networks that support the Internet. Agencies Have Taken Action to Address Security of Communications Networks
While the private sector owns and operates the nation’s communications networks and is primarily responsible for protecting these assets, federal law and policy establish regulatory and support roles for the federal government in regard to the communications networks. As part of their efforts in support of the security of communications networks, FCC, DHS, DOD, and Commerce have taken a variety of actions, including ones related to developing cyber policy and standards, securing Internet infrastructure, sharing information, supporting national security and emergency preparedness (NS/EP), and promoting sector protection efforts. To fulfill DHS’s cyber-critical infrastructure protection and NS/EP-related missions, the Office of Cybersecurity and Communications within the National Protection and Programs Directorate is responsible for, among other things, ensuring the security, resiliency, and reliability of the nation’s cyber and communications infrastructure, implementing a cyber-risk management program for protection of critical infrastructure, and planning for and providing national security and emergency preparedness communications to the federal government. However, DHS and its partners have not yet developed outcome-based metrics related to the cyber-protection activities for the core and access networks, DNS functionality, and Internet routing services. Though Reporting Mechanisms Are in Place, FCC and DHS Have Not Received Reports of Cyber- Related Incidents Affecting the Nation’s Core and Access Networks
No cyber incidents affecting the core and access networks have been reported by communications networks owners and operators through three established reporting mechanisms from January 2010 to October 2012. To report incidents involving the core and access communications networks to the federal government, communication networks operators can use reporting mechanisms established by FCC and DHS to share information on outages and incidents:
FCC’s Network Outage Reporting System is a web-based filing system that communications providers use to submit detailed outage reports to FCC. Officials within FCC and the private sector attributed the lack of incidents to the fact that the communications networks provide the medium for direct attacks on consumer, business, and government systems—and thus these networks are less likely to be targeted by a cyber attack themselves. Attributes of Defense Industry Cybersecurity Pilot Programs Could Be Applied to the Communications Sector
DOD, in its role as the sector-specific agency for the defense industrial base critical infrastructure sector, established two pilot programs to enhance the cybersecurity of sector companies and better protect unclassified department data residing on those company networks. The pilot programs undertaken by DOD with its defense industrial base partners exhibit several attributes that could apply to the communications sector and help private sector entities more effectively secure the communications infrastructure they own and operate. As DHS develops procedures for expanding this program, considering these attributes could inform DHS’s efforts. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to (1) identify the roles of and actions taken by key federal entities to help protect the communications networks from cyber- based threats, (2) assess what is known about the extent to which cyber- incidents affecting the communications networks have been reported to the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and (3) determine if the Department of Defense’s (DOD) pilot programs to promote cybersecurity in the defense industrial base can be used in the communications sector. | Why GAO Did This Study
Ensuring the effectiveness and reliability of communications networks is essential to national security, the economy, and public health and safety. The communications networks (including core and access networks) can be threatened by both natural and human-caused events, including increasingly sophisticated and prevalent cyber-based threats. GAO has identified the protection of systems supporting the nation's critical infrastructure--which includes the communications sector--as a government-wide high-risk area.
GAO was asked to (1) identify the roles of and actions taken by key federal entities to help protect communications networks from cyber-based threats, (2) assess what is known about the extent to which cyber incidents affecting the communications networks have been reported to the FCC and DHS, and (3) determine if Defense's pilot programs to promote cybersecurity in the defense industrial base can be used in the communications sector. To do this, GAO focused on core and access networks that support communication services, as well as critical components supporting the Internet. GAO analyzed federal agency policies, plans, and other documents; interviewed officials; and reviewed relevant reports.
What GAO Found
While the primary responsibility for protecting the nation's communications networks belongs to private-sector owners and operators, federal agencies also play a role in support of their security, as well as that of critical components supporting the Internet. Specifically, private-sector entities are responsible for the operational security of the networks they own, but the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and the Departments of Homeland Security (DHS), Defense, and Commerce have regulatory and support roles, as established in federal law and policy, and have taken a variety of related actions. For example, FCC has developed and maintained a system for reporting network outage information; DHS has multiple components focused on assessing risk and sharing threat information; Defense and DHS serve as co-chairs for a committee on national security and emergency preparedness for telecommunications functions; and Commerce has studied cyber risks facing the communications infrastructure and participates in standards development. However, DHS and its partners have not yet initiated the process for developing outcome-based performance measures related to the cyber protection of key parts of the communications infrastructure. Outcome-based metrics related to communications networks and critical components supporting the Internet would provide federal decision makers with additional insight into the effectiveness of sector protection efforts.
No cyber-related incidents affecting core and access networks have been recently reported to FCC and DHS through established mechanisms. Specifically, both FCC and DHS have established reporting mechanisms to share information on outages and incidents, but of the outages reported to FCC between January 2010 and October 2012, none were related to common cyber threats. Officials within FCC and the private sector stated that communication networks are less likely to be targeted themselves because they provide the access and the means by which attacks on consumer, business, and government systems can be facilitated.
Attributes of two pilot programs established by Defense to enhance the cybersecurity of firms in the defense industrial base (the industry associated with the production of defense capabilities) could be applied to the communications sector. The department's pilot programs involve partnering with firms to share information about cyber threats and responding accordingly. Considering these attributes can inform DHS as it develops procedures for expanding these pilot programs to all critical infrastructure sectors, including the communications sector.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DHS collaborate with its partners to develop outcome-oriented measures for the communications sector. DHS concurred with GAO's recommendation. |
gao_GAO-10-312T | gao_GAO-10-312T_0 | Most Highway Recovery Act Funding Has Been Obligated, and DOT and the States Are Taking Steps to Meet the Act’s Requirements
Most Highway Funds Have Been Obligated, and Reimbursements Are Increasing
Three quarters of Recovery Act funds provided for highway infrastructure investment has been obligated nationwide and in the 16 states and the District that are the focus of our review. For example, as of November 16, 2009, $20.4 billion of the funds had been obligated for just over 8,800 projects nationwide and $4.2 billion had been reimbursed. As of November 16, 2009, $4.2 billion had been reimbursed nationwide by the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA), including $1.9 billion reimbursed to the 16 states and the District. States Continue to Dedicate Most Recovery Act Highway Funds for ut Pavement Projects, b Use of Funds Varies Depending on State Transportation Goals
Almost half of Recovery Act highway obligations nationally have bee pavement improvements—including resurfacing, rehabilitating, and reconstructing roadways—consistent with the use of Recovery Act fundin our previous reports. Construction of new roads and bridges accounted for 6 percent and 3 percent of funds obligated, respectively. Officials at FHWA and state department of transportation officials in the states we reviewed generally believe that these states are on track to meet the March 2010 1-year deadline. First, many state and local governments are awarding contracts for less than the original estimated cost. This allows states to use the savings from lower contract awards for other projects, but additional projects funded with deobligated funds must be identified quickly. A second factor that may affect some states’ ability to meet the 1-year requirement is that obligations for projects in suballocated areas, while increasing, are generally lagging behind obligations for statewide projects in most states and lagging considerably behind in a few states. FTA Reports That the Majority of Transit Funds Have Been Obligated, with Most Funding Being Used for Transit Facilities, Bus Fleets, and Preventive Maintenance
For Recovery Act transit funds, we focused our review on the Transit Capital Assistance Program and the Fixed Guideway Infrastructure Investment program, which received approximately 91 percent of the Recovery Act transit funds, and on seven selected states that received funds from these programs. Almost 88 percent of Recovery Act Transit Capital Assistance Program obligations are being used for upgrading transit facilities, improving bus fleets, and conducting preventive maintenance. The remaining obligations have been used for rail car purchases and rehabilitation, leases, training, financing costs, and, in some limited cases, operating expenses—all of which are eligible expenditures. In responding to our recommendation, DOT said it had conducted outreach, including providing technical assistance training and guidance, to recipients and will continue to assess the need to provide additional information. Through our ongoing audit work, we continued to find confusion among recipients about how to calculate the numbers of jobs created and saved that is required by DOT and OMB for their reporting requirements. First, a number of transit agencies continue to express confusion about calculating the number of jobs resulting from Recovery Act funding, especially with regard to using Recovery Act funds for purchasing equipment, such as new buses. The second area of confusion we found involved the methodology recipients were using to calculate full-time equivalents for the recipient reporting requirements. In section 5.2 of the June 22 guidance, OMB states that “the estimate of the number of jobs required by the Recovery Act should be expressed as FTE, which is calculated as the total hours worked in jobs retained divided by the number of hours in a full-time schedule, as defined by the recipient.” Further, “the FTE estimates must be reported cumulatively each calendar quarter.” In addition to issuing guidance, OMB and DOT provided several types of clarifying information to recipients as well as opportunities to interact and ask questions or receive help with the reporting process. For example, in Pennsylvania, each of four transit entities we interviewed used a different denominator to calculate the number of full-time equivalent jobs they reported on their recipient reports for the period ending September 30, 2009. In the weeks ahead, FHWA and the states have the opportunity to exercise diligence to both promptly seek deobligation of known savings and to identify projects that make sound use of Recovery Act funding. We have previously recommended that OMB work with recipients to enhance understanding of the reporting process and that DOT continue its outreach to state departments of transportation and transit agencies to ensure recipients of Recovery Act funds are adequately fulfilling their reporting requirements. | Why GAO Did This Study
The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (Recovery Act) included more than $48 billion for the Department of Transportation's (DOT) investment in transportation infrastructure, including highways, rail, and transit. This testimony--based on Government Accountability Office (GAO) report GAO-10-231 , issued on December 10, 2009, in response to a mandate under the Recovery Act--addresses (1) the uses of Recovery Act highway funding, including the types of projects states have funded and efforts by DOT and the states to meet the requirements of the act, and (2) the uses of Recovery Act transit funding and how recipients of Recovery Act funds are reporting information on the number of jobs created and retained under section 1512. In GAO-10-231 , GAO continues to examine the use of Recovery Act funds by 16 states and the District of Columbia (District), representing about 65 percent of the U.S. population and two-thirds of the federal assistance available through the act. GAO also obtained data from DOT on obligations and reimbursements for the Recovery Act's highway infrastructure and public transportation funds. GAO updates the status of agencies' efforts to implement previous GAO recommendations to help address a range of accountability issues as well as a matter for congressional consideration. No new recommendations are being made at this time. The report draft was discussed with federal and state officials, who generally agreed with its contents.
What GAO Found
Three-quarters of Recovery Act highway funds have been obligated, and reimbursements from the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) are increasing. As of November 16, 2009, $20.4 billion had been obligated for just over 8,800 highway projects nationwide and $4.2 billion had been reimbursed nationwide by FHWA. States continue to dedicate most Recovery Act highway funds for pavement projects, but use of funds may vary depending on state transportation goals. Almost half of Recovery Act highway obligations nationally have been for pavement improvements--including resurfacing, rehabilitating, and reconstructing roadways. About 10 percent of funds has been obligated to replace and improve bridges, while 9 percent has been obligated to construct new roads and bridges. States are taking steps to meet Recovery Act highway requirements; for example, both state and federal officials believe the states are on track to obligate all highway funds by the March 2010 1-year deadline. However, two factors may affect some states' ability to meet the requirement. First, many states are awarding contracts for less than the original cost estimates; this allows states to have funds deobligated and use the savings for other projects, but additional projects must be identified quickly. Second, obligations for projects in suballocated areas, while increasing, are generally lagging behind obligations for statewide projects in most states and lagging considerably behind in a few states. In the weeks ahead, FHWA and the states have the opportunity to exercise diligence to both promptly seek deobligation of known savings and to identify projects that make sound use of Recovery Act funding. The Federal Transit Administration reports that the majority of transit funds have been obligated. As of November 5, 2009, almost $6 billion of the $6.9 billion appropriated for the Transit Capital Assistance Program had been obligated nationwide. Almost 88 percent of these obligations are being used for transit facilities, bus fleets, and preventive maintenance. The remaining funds are being used for rail car purchases, leases, and training, among other things--all of which are eligible expenses. Through our ongoing audit work, GAO continued to find confusion among recipients about how to calculate the numbers of jobs created and saved that is required by Recovery Act reporting requirements. First, a number of transit agencies continue to express confusion about calculating the number of jobs resulting from Recovery Act funding, especially with regard to using Recovery Act funds for purchasing equipment, such as new buses. The second area of confusion GAO found involved the methodology recipients were using to calculate full-time equivalents for the recipient reporting requirements. For example, in one state, four transit entities used a different denominator to calculate the number of full-time equivalent jobs they reported on their recipient reports for the period ending September 30, 2009. In its September 2009 report, GAO recommended that DOT continue its outreach to transit agencies regarding reporting requirements and provide additional guidance, as appropriate. DOT officials stated that they are continuing outreach to transit agencies and will continue to assess the need to provide additional information. |
gao_GAO-04-301T | gao_GAO-04-301T_0 | At least 17 federal agencies, led by USTR, are involved in developing and implementing U.S. trade policy. The Department of Commerce has a relatively broad role with respect to trade agreement activities, with three units in the International Trade Administration performing the key trade functions: The Import Administration helps enforce U.S. trade laws; Market Access and Compliance is responsible for ensuring that other nations live up to their trade agreements; and Trade Development focuses on advocacy for U.S. companies, export promotion services, support for trade negotiations, and market analysis. 2). The Increased Importance of Security Has Significant Implications for Human Capital Strategies and Trade Functions
After September 11, 2001, combating terrorism became the priority mission for the U.S. Customs Service and remained so when the Customs Service was transferred to the Department of Homeland Security and incorporated into CBP. As part of its focus on terrorism, CBP has implemented new programs to screen high-risk containers for weapons of mass destruction at overseas ports and to improve security in the private sector’s global supply chain. USTR has also asked for additional staff to address the increased workload. In addition to the WTO and the FTAA negotiations, USTR has notified Congress of its intent to pursue free trade agreements (FTA) with a number of countries and has started negotiations toward this end. For example, we recently reported that the United States has become the most frequent defendant in WTO trade dispute resolution proceedings, particularly in the trade remedy area. In each of these cases, the shifting global forces require the United States to respond, and an effective response requires a clear link between the trade agencies’ human capital strategies and the goals of the agencies in that changing environment. For example, the trade policy advisory committee system performs an important function through which private sector committee members are able to provide input to trade agencies to help them negotiate, monitor, and enforce trade agreements; however, our September 2002 report found that the structure and composition of the trade advisory committee system had not been fully updated to reflect changes in the U.S. economy and U.S. trade policy. Growing Importance of China Creates Range of Human Capital Challenges for Trade Agencies
China’s rapid expansion in the world economy presents U.S. trade agencies with significant human capital challenges as they strive to monitor and enforce compliance with trade agreements. Commerce has also increased the number of staff involved in the agency’s compliance efforts on the ground in China by creating a Trade Facilitation Office within the U.S. embassy in Beijing. Conclusions
As we have reported in numerous studies and testimonies before this Subcommittee and others, effective alignment between federal agencies’ human capital approaches and their current and emerging strategic and programmatic goals is critical to the ability of agencies to economically, efficiently, and effectively perform their missions. In other cases, such as the U.S.’s ambitious trade negotiating agenda, human capital resources may be a constraint on the ability of the trade agencies to carry out their negotiations at the multilateral, regional, bilateral, and subregional level. | Why GAO Did This Study
Recent developments in global trade have created human capital challenges for U.S. trade agencies. At least 17 federal agencies, with the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) as the lead, negotiate, monitor, or enforce trade agreements and laws. These agencies' strategies for effectively aligning their current and emerging needs in handling international trade functions and their human capital resources are critical to improving agency performance. GAO was asked to summarize its recent studies to illustrate important human capital challenges arising from current trade developments as U.S. trade agencies strive to negotiate, monitor, and enforce existing trade agreements and laws. For this testimony, GAO discussed the challenges that USTR, the Commerce Department, and the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection are facing in light of three recent developments in international trade: (1) the increased importance of security, (2) the ambitious U.S. negotiating agenda, and (3) the shifting global trade environment.
What GAO Found
The importance of international trade to the U.S. economy has grown in the last decade, as have the responsibilities of federal agencies involved in implementing international trade functions. For example, the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks have heightened the need for increased focus on security within the global trade environment. In response, the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection has implemented new programs to improve the security of the global supply chain. These new programs require greater attention to human capital strategies to ensure that they achieve their goals of facilitating trade while preventing terrorist acts. In addition, the administration has continued to pursue multilateral negotiations within the World Trade Organization and with the Free Trade Area of the Americas countries as well as a series of new, bilateral and subregional trade negotiations. The increase in the number of initiatives has strained available human capital, leading to a USTR request for additional staff. Finally, the shifting global trade environment has complicated efforts to monitor and enforce trade agreements. For example, the United States has become the most frequent defendant in World Trade Organization trade dispute proceedings. Furthermore, as the U.S. economy has shifted toward services and high-tech industries, the industry advisory committees that provide trade advice to the U.S. government have required structural realignment to reflect these changes. Also, China's growing influence in international trade has resulted in new challenges to its trading partners. These changing global forces require U.S. trade agencies to continuously ensure that their human capital strategies closely link to the nation's strategic trade functions. |
gao_GAO-15-372 | gao_GAO-15-372_0 | I, II, and III for maps of the A/B, DME, and Home Health and Hospice MAC jurisdictions that were operational as of February 2015.) Because of uncertainty about the amount of costs MACs would likely incur during the initial implementation of the MAC contracts, CMS opted to structure the MAC contracts as a cost-plus- award-fee contract, which is a type of cost-reimbursement contract that allows an agency to provide financial incentives to contractors if they achieve specific performance goals. Consistent with the FAR, CMS develops a quality assurance surveillance plan to outline performance standards that all MACs are expected to meet, in accordance with their statements of work. For example, DME MACs are not responsible for enrolling medical equipment suppliers in the Medicare program, whereas the A/B MACs have the responsibility of enrolling providers and suppliers. Most of MACs’ Reported Costs Were Accounted for by Certain Key Responsibilities, Such as Claims Processing and Provider Customer Service
Although there were some differences between A/B MACs’ and DME MACs’ reported costs, most of the reported costs for both the A/B MACs and the DME MACs were for a few key responsibilities. Additionally, on average, the DME MACs reported a higher portion for appeals than did the A/B MACs. CMS and MACs Have Identified Lessons Learned to Improve MAC Operations, but Also Challenges for Continued Improvements Since the Implementation of Contracting Reform, CMS and the MACs Have Identified Lessons Learned and Made Improvements to Increase Operational Efficiency and Effectiveness
Officials from CMS and the MACs we interviewed agreed that they have learned many lessons since the initial implementation of the MAC contracts, and together, they have implemented improvements to increase the MACs’ operational efficiency and effectiveness. MAC officials said that this has reduced their expenditures on resources devoted to telephone-based provider customer service. CMS Has Informally Considered Some Alternative Contracting Approaches but Could Do More to Assess Whether They Could Enhance MAC Performance
While CMS has made modifications to its cost-plus-award-fee structure for MAC contracts—such as revising the metrics included in MACs’ award fee plans and adjusting the distribution of award fees across the metrics to promote performance in high-priority areas and areas where MACs have performed poorly in the past—the agency has not formally revisited its MAC contracting approach since the implementation of contracting reform. Moreover, CMS indicated in its 2007 acquisition strategy that once a baseline cost and level of effort had been established, the agency would reassess whether the cost-plus-award-fee contract structure was still appropriate for the MACs. However, CMS’s assessment of alternative contracting approaches since the implementation of contracting reform has been limited. While CMS’s decision to continue using the cost-reimbursement contract structure for the MAC contracts may be appropriate, there are a number of other contracting approaches that could be introduced within or in addition to the cost-reimbursement structure. Without formally assessing the potential benefits and risks of alternative contracting approaches, CMS lacks assurance that the current contract structure is the optimal method for incentivizing MACs’ performance, and CMS may be missing opportunities to enhance MACs’ efficiency and effectiveness. The FAR states that certain contracting approaches may be more appropriate later in the course of a series of contracts or a long-term contract than they were at the outset, and CMS indicated in its 2007 acquisition strategy that it would revisit its contracting approach once it had collected baseline information. Recommendation for Executive Action
We recommend that CMS conduct a formal analysis, using its experience and data it has collected since the implementation of the first MAC contracts, to determine whether alternative contracting approaches could be used—even if only for selected MAC contract responsibilities—to help promote improved contractor performance. Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
We provided a draft of this report to HHS and received written comments, which are reprinted in appendix V. In its comments, HHS concurred with this recommendation and said it plans to analyze alternative contracting approaches for MACs. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003 (MMA) required CMS to select claims administrative contractors through a competitive process and to do so in accordance with the FAR. In fiscal year 2013, MACs processed almost 1.2 billion claims totaling more than $363 billion in Medicare payments.
GAO was asked to assess CMS's implementation of contracting reform and examine whether CMS could do more to increase MACs' effectiveness. This report evaluates (1) differences in responsibilities among MACs and the costs associated with these responsibilities, including any changes since the implementation of contracting reform; (2) lessons learned, if any, since CMS implemented contracting reform that could be used to increase MAC efficiency and effectiveness; and (3) alternative contracting approaches that CMS could use to enhance contractor performance. To do this work, GAO reviewed the FAR and CMS documents—including contracting documentation and MAC cost reports—and interviewed officials from CMS and selected MACs. GAO also reviewed the FAR to identify alternative contracting approaches.
What GAO Found
As of February 2015, 16 Medicare Administrative Contractors (MAC) administered claims submitted by Medicare providers and suppliers. Twelve were A/B MACs that administered Medicare Part A and Part B claims for inpatient hospital care, outpatient physician and hospital services, and home health and hospice care, among other services, in specific jurisdictions. Four other MACs administered claims for durable medical equipment (DME).
GAO found that the A/B and DME MACs are typically expected to carry out similar key responsibilities, a few of which—including claims processing and customer service—have accounted for most of their reported costs. Since the implementation of contracting reform, beginning in 2006, the key responsibilities included in MACs' statements of work have generally remained consistent, with limited exceptions. Further, while similar key responsibilities accounted for the majority of A/B MACs' and DME MACs' costs, there were some differences between A/B MACs and DME MACs in the shares of total costs that were accounted for by certain responsibilities. For example, the DME MACs spent a higher portion on appeals, on average, than did the A/B MACs.
Officials from the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) and the MACs that GAO interviewed have identified lessons learned since the implementation of contracting reform, and they have made improvements to increase operational efficiency and effectiveness. For example, MACs have developed Internet-based provider portals to reduce expenditures on telephone-based provider customer service. However, both CMS and MAC officials identified challenges for continued improvements in MAC efficiency and effectiveness, such as MACs' desire to protect their competitive advantage by not sharing certain innovations or operational improvements with other MACs.
CMS selected a cost-plus-award-fee contract structure for the MACs when it initially implemented contracting reform. This is a type of cost-reimbursement contract that allows the agency to provide financial incentives for achieving specific performance goals. While CMS has made modifications to its cost-plus-award-fee structure for MAC contracts—such as revising the performance metrics included in MACs' award fee plans and adjusting the distribution of award fees across the metrics to promote performance in areas where MACs have performed poorly in the past—the agency has not formally revisited its MAC contracting approach since the implementation of contracting reform. Moreover, its assessment of alternative contracting approaches has been limited. The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) states that changing circumstances may make different contracting approaches more appropriate later in the course of a series of contracts or a long-term contract than they were at the outset. Further, CMS indicated in its 2007 MAC acquisition strategy that once a baseline cost and level of effort had been established, the agency would reassess whether the cost-plus-award-fee contract structure was still appropriate for the MACs. There are a number of other contracting approaches that could be introduced within or in addition to the cost-reimbursement structure. Without formally assessing the potential benefits and risks of alternative contracting approaches, CMS may be missing opportunities to enhance MACs' efficiency and effectiveness.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that CMS conduct an analysis to determine whether alternative contracting approaches could be used to help promote improved contractor performance. In its comments, the Department of Health and Human Services concurred with this recommendation and said it plans to analyze alternative contracting approaches for MACs. |
gao_GAO-12-332 | gao_GAO-12-332_0 | Scope and Methodology
To describe the process and criteria AHRQ used to award its $474 million in Recovery Act CER funds, we reviewed relevant statutes as well as documentation on the process and criteria AHRQ uses to (1) determine the scientific and technical merit of grant applications and contract proposals, and (2) select grant recipients and contractors. We reviewed spending plans, which outline AHRQ’s and HHS’s plans for spending Recovery Act funds. We interviewed AHRQ and other HHS officials to learn about the processes and criteria they used to select the grantees and contractors that received awards funded with the $474 million in Recovery Act CER funds and to coordinate these awards with other HHS agencies that also received Recovery Act CER funds. We also interviewed AHRQ officials and a contractor to understand how the agency plans to disseminate the results of CER funded with Recovery Act funds and to obtain information on plans AHRQ has for assessing the effectiveness of its dissemination efforts. CER and the Recovery Act
The Recovery Act provided a significant amount of funding for AHRQ to conduct CER activities. Of the total amount of $474 million in Recovery Act funds available to AHRQ for CER, $300 million of these funds were appropriated to the agency and, therefore, supported the agency’s seven CER priority areas. AHRQ has established a standard competitive process that is governed by federal law to select According to AHRQ officials, this multistep process grant recipients.includes: (1) an initial review of received applications; (2) preliminary scoring of applications; (3) review and final scoring of applications at a peer review panel meeting; (4) the development of preliminary funding recommendations; (5) review by a senior leadership team within AHRQ; and (6) a final determination of funding by the agency director. This process for selecting contract proposals for award is governed by the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) and the Public Health Service Act (PHSA) and implementing regulations.opportunities, which occurs through different types of solicitations, varies depending on the type of contracting mechanism used. In addition, AHRQ primarily used its standard contracting processes and criteria to select contract proposals and enter into 34 contracts for CER using Recovery Act funding, totaling approximately $161 million. AHRQ Used Its Standard Competitive Review Process and Criteria to Select Grant Recipients and Award 110 CER Grants
Between February 2009 and September 2010, AHRQ used its standard, competitive grant review process to select grant recipients and ultimately award 110 CER grants using approximately $311 million in Recovery Act CER funds. $311 million in grants AHRQ awarded supported HHS’s departmentwide and AHRQ’s agency-specific CER priorities. According to AHRQ officials, a review panel, composed of external experts and AHRQ staff, evaluated all Recovery Act CER contract proposals using the standard criteria that are tailored to the specific needs of each contract solicitation. AHRQ Also Reported Taking Steps to Coordinate Recovery Act CER Awards with Other HHS Agencies to Avoid Unnecessary Duplication
AHRQ officials reported that they used five mechanisms in order to coordinate with other HHS agencies to avoid unnecessary duplication when creating FOAs for grants and solicitations for contracts and when awarding Recovery Act CER funds. AHRQ Plans to Use Its Existing Mechanisms and Develop Additional Strategies to Disseminate CER Results
AHRQ plans to use a range of existing mechanisms, such as written products, training, social media tools, and its website, to disseminate results of CER funded through the Recovery Act. In addition, AHRQ awarded four contracts using Recovery Act CER funds to develop and implement innovative approaches for disseminating CER results, including Recovery Act- funded CER. Regional Dissemination and Partnership Offices. AHRQ provided technical comments, which we incorporated where appropriate. AHRQ, formerly known as the Agency for Health Care Policy and Research, is 1 of 12 agencies within the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). | Why GAO Did This Study
The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (Recovery Act) provided $1.1 billion to the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) for comparative effectiveness research (CER), which is research that compares different interventions and strategies to prevent, diagnose, treat, and monitor health conditions. Of this amount, HHSs Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) received $474 million to support and disseminate the results of CER. GAO was asked to describe issues including the (1) process and criteria AHRQ used to award Recovery Act funds for CER, including steps to coordinate CER awards with other HHS entities in order to avoid unnecessary duplication of effort; and (2) plans AHRQ has for disseminating the results of CER it funded under the Recovery Act.
To address these objectives, GAO reviewed relevant documentation, including AHRQs policies and procedures for selecting the recipients of grants; internal documents that describe the award of Recovery Act grants and contracts; and Recovery Act contractors work plans. GAO also analyzed AHRQ data on the number and type of grants and contracts awarded Recovery Act CER funds. GAO interviewed AHRQ officials on the selection of Recovery Act CER grantees and contractors, including coordination with other HHS agencies that received Recovery Act CER funds, and the plans the agency has to disseminate the results of CER funded by the Recovery Act. AHRQ provided technical comments, which GAO incorporated as appropriate.
What GAO Found
AHRQ used its standard, competitive review processes and criteria to select the recipients of CER grants and contracts using Recovery Act funds. Specifically, to select the recipients of Recovery Act CER grants, AHRQ used its standard review process that includes peer review of grant applications, the development of funding recommendations by a team of senior officials within AHRQ, and final funding determination by the agencys director. As part of this process, AHRQ used its standard criteria to evaluate grant applications, as well as additional requirements that were specific to each funding opportunity. To select contractors who would receive Recovery Act funds, AHRQ used its standard contracting processes and criteria that are governed by the Federal Acquisition Regulation, which establishes uniform policies for acquisition of supplies and services by executive agencies, and the Public Health Service Act. These processes included an evaluation of all contract proposals using standard criteria adapted to the specific needs of each project. Between February 2009 and September 2010, AHRQ awarded $311 million of its $474 million in Recovery Act CER funds through 110 grants. AHRQ also awarded $161 million of its Recovery Act CER funding through 34 contracts. The contracts and grants AHRQ awarded supported both AHRQs agency-specific and HHSs departmentwide CER priority areas. In an effort to avoid unnecessary duplication of CER awards, AHRQ participated in HHS working groups, developed a CER spending plan, and queried HHS databases to check for duplicative awards.
According to AHRQ officials, the agency plans to disseminate the results of Recovery Act-funded CER using a range of existing mechanisms. These mechanisms include written products, training programs, social media tools, and AHRQs website. AHRQ is also developing additional strategies to disseminate CER results. AHRQ awarded four contracts using Recovery Act funds totaling approximately $42.3 million to promote innovative approaches for disseminating CER results. A variety of efforts are conducted under these contracts, including efforts to educate clinicians and develop regional dissemination offices. |
gao_GAO-04-842 | gao_GAO-04-842_0 | However, these plans are not integrated and do not consistently demonstrate the elements of integrated IT project planning. Until the FBI completes these and other efforts to introduce an integrated approach to IT project planning, there is increased risk that the bureau’s IT systems will be unnecessarily duplicative, will later require expensive rework to be integrated, and will thus hamper organizational transformation efforts. The FBI has such policies and procedures for managing IT human capital; however, it does not yet have a documented and consistent approach for acquisition and investment management. The state of the FBI’s acquisition and investment management policies and procedures is due to a number of factors, including diffused and decentralized IT management authority, past inattention to IT management, and lack of sustained IT leadership. Until this is completed, the bureau will be challenged in its ability to effectively manage all of its systems modernization projects, and thus is at increased risk of acquiring systems that do not adequately satisfy mission needs on schedule and within budget, which could hamper the bureau’s systems modernization and organizational transformation. The bureau’s efforts to define IT investment policies and procedures are evolving slowly toward alignment with best practices. According to bureau officials, including the current CIO, the slowly evolving state of investment management is due in part to the fact that the bureau CIO position, which is responsible for developing the requisite policies and procedures, has had a high rate of turnover. Recommendations for Executive Action
Until the bureau’s IT management foundation is completed and available to effectively guide and constrain the hundreds of millions of dollars it is spending on IT investments, we recommend that the Director direct the heads of the divisions to limit spending on their respective IT investments to cost-effective efforts that take advantage of near-term, relatively small, low-risk opportunities to leverage technology in satisfying a compelling bureau need; support operations and maintenance of existing systems critical to the FBI’s mission; or support establishment of the FBI’s IT management foundation, including the development of a modernization blueprint (enterprise architecture), initiation of integrated project planning, and development of IT management policies and procedures for systems acquisition and investment selection and control. To address the first objective—determining whether the FBI had an integrated plan or set of plans for modernizing its IT systems—we reviewed program plans, IT capital asset plans and business cases (commonly called Exhibit 300s), and other supporting documentation from each of the six divisions, as well as the bureau’s strategic plan, draft IT strategic plan, and information sharing strategy, and then compared this documentation with Office of Management and Budget (OMB) planning guidance and our research and past experience on federal systems modernizations to determine the extent to which the plans exhibited an integrated approach to managing IT projects, including addressing project interdependencies. In addition, we interviewed the CIO and FBI division officials who were responsible for IT systems acquisition management to (1) verify and clarify our understanding of division-level policies and procedures in each of the five control areas; (2) identify planned and ongoing initiatives to, among other things, improve systems acquisition management across the bureau, including the definition and implementation of a bureauwide systems life cycle management process that is to include systems acquisition management policies and procedures consistent with best practices; (3) determine why divisions varied in their use of best practices; and (4) determine the effects of not having these practices in place on ongoing and planned systems modernization initiatives. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) is investing more than a billion dollars over 3 years to modernize its information technology (IT) systems. The modernization is central to the bureau's ongoing efforts to transform the organization. GAO was asked to determine whether the FBI has (1) an integrated plan for modernizing its IT systems and (2) effective policies and procedures governing management of IT human capital, systems acquisition, and investment selection and control.
What GAO Found
Although improvements are under way and planned, the FBI does not currently have an integrated plan for modernizing its IT systems. Each of the bureau's divisions and other organizational units that manage IT projects performs integrated planning for its respective IT projects. However, the plans do not provide a common, authoritative, and integrated view of how IT investments will help optimize mission performance, and they do not consistently contain the elements expected to be found in effective systems modernization plans. FBI officials attributed the state of modernization planning to, among other things, the bureau's lack of a policy requiring such activities, which is due in part to the fact that the responsibility for managing IT--including modernization planning--has historically been diffused and decentralized. The FBI's CIO recognizes these planning shortfalls and has initiated efforts to address them. Until they are addressed, the bureau risks acquiring systems that require expensive rework to be effectively integrated, thus hampering organizational transformation. The FBI has established policies and procedures governing IT human capital that are consistent with best practices used by leading private and public organizations. However, the bureau's policies and procedures governing systems acquisition, which are developed on a decentralized basis by the divisions and other units that manage IT projects, include some but not all best practices. In addition, the bureau's investment management policies and procedures, which started in 2001, have been evolving and progressing slowly toward alignment with best practices. According to FBI officials, the state of the bureau's acquisition and investment management policies and procedures is due to a number of factors, including diffused and decentralized IT management authority. The CIO recognizes these problems and has efforts planned and under way to strengthen policies and procedures. Until these efforts are completed, the bureau increases the risk that it will experience problems delivering promised IT investments on time and within budget, which, in turn, could adversely affect systems modernization and organizational transformation. |
gao_GAO-11-605 | gao_GAO-11-605_0 | Web 2.0 technologies also include social media services, which allow individuals or groups of individuals to create, organize, edit, comment on, and share content. As of April 2011, 23 of 24 major federal agencies had established accounts on Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube. GAO Has Identified Challenges in Agencies’ Use of Social Media
In July 2010, we testified that while the use of Web 2.0 technologies, including social media technologies, can transform how federal agencies engage the public by allowing citizens to be more involved in the governing process, agency use of such technologies can also present challenges related to records management, privacy, and security. Agencies may face challenges in assessing whether the information they generate and receive by means of these technologies constitutes federal records. In addition, attackers may use social media to collect information and launch attacks against federal information systems. While Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube offer unique ways for agencies to interact with the public, we identified several distinct ways that federal agencies are using the three social media services. Despite varying features of the three platforms, agency interactions can be broadly categorized by the manner in which information is exchanged with the public, including reposting information already available on an agency Web site, posting original content not available on agency Web sites, soliciting feedback from the public, responding to comments, and linking to non-government Web sites. Facebook was used to post content such as pictures and descriptions of officials on tours or inspections. YouTube was often used to publish videos of officials discussing topics of interest to the public. Twenty-two of 23 agencies used social media to solicit comments from the public. Agencies used Facebook to respond to comments received on their Facebook pages. Federal Agencies Have Made Mixed Progress in Developing Policies and Procedures for Managing and Protecting Information Associated with Social Media Use
Federal agencies have made mixed progress in developing records management guidance and assessing privacy and security risks associated with their use of commercially provided social media services. Specifically, 12 of the 23 major federal agencies that use Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube have developed and issued guidance to agency officials that outlines (1) processes and policies for how social media records are identified and managed and (2) record-keeping roles and responsibilities. Further, 12 agencies have updated their privacy policies to describe whether they use personal information made available through social media. However, the widespread use of social media technologies also introduces risks, and agencies have made mixed progress in establishing appropriate policies and procedures for managing records, protecting the privacy of personal information, and ensuring the security of federal systems and information. Specifically, regarding our recommendation that the department conduct and document a security risk assessment to assess security threats associated with agency use of commercially provided social media services and identify security controls that can be used to mitigate the identified threats, he stated that the department shared GAO’s concern regarding the security of information in commercially provided social media but that since the department had already determined that its use of social media sites would be limited to providing the public with “low-impact” information, no further risk assessment or certification and accreditation was required. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to: describe how agencies are currently using commercially provided social determine the extent to which federal agencies have developed and implemented policies and procedures for managing and protecting information associated with the use of commercially provided social media services. These categories were (1) reposting information available on agency Web sites; (2) posting content not available on agency Web sites; (3) soliciting comments; (4) responding to comments on posted content; and (5) providing links to non-government Web sites. We interviewed officials at each of these agencies to discuss recent efforts to oversee the development of social media policies and procedures and assess risks. Environmental Protection Agency
To ensure that appropriate privacy and security measures are in place when commercially provided social media services are used, we recommend that the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency take the following two actions: Conduct and document a privacy impact assessment that evaluates potential privacy risks associated with agency use of social media services and identifies protections to address them. | Why GAO Did This Study
Federal agencies increasingly use recently developed Internet technologies that allow individuals or groups to create, organize, comment on, and share online content. The use of these social media services-- including popular Web sites like Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube-- has been endorsed by President Obama and provides opportunities for agencies to more readily share information with and solicit feedback from the public. However, these services may also pose risks to the adequate protection of both personal and government information. GAO was asked to (1) describe how federal agencies are currently using commercially provided social media services and (2) determine the extent to which agencies have developed and implemented policies and procedures for managing and protecting information associated with this use. To do this, GAO examined the headquarters-level Facebook pages, Twitter accounts, and YouTube channels of 24 major federal agencies; reviewed pertinent policies, procedures, and guidance; and interviewed officials involved in agency use of social media..
What GAO Found
Federal agencies have been adapting commercially provided social media technologies to support their missions. Specifically, GAO identified several distinct ways that 23 of 24 major agencies are using Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube. These include reposting information available on official agency Web sites, posting information not otherwise available on agency Web sites, soliciting comments from the public, responding to comments on posted content, and providing links to non-government sites. For example, agencies used Facebook to post pictures or descriptions of the activities of agency officials and to interact with the public. Agencies used Twitter to provide information in an abbreviated format and to direct the public back to official agency sites. YouTube was used to provide alternate means of accessing videos available on official agency sites, share videos of agency officials discussing topics of interest, or to solicit feedback from the public. The use of these services can pose challenges in managing and identifying records, protecting personal information, and ensuring the security of federal information and systems. However, the 23 major agencies that GAO identified as using social media have made mixed progress in developing and implementing policies and procedures to address these challenges: (1) Records management: 12 of the 23 agencies have developed and issued guidance that outlines processes and policies for identifying and managing records generated by their use of social media and record-keeping roles and responsibilities. (2) Privacy: 12 agencies have updated their privacy policies to describe whether they use personal information made available through social media, and 8 conducted and documented privacy impact assessments to identify potential privacy risks that may exist in using social media given the likelihood that personal information will be made available to the agency by the public. (3) Security: 7 agencies identified and documented security risks (such as the potential for an attacker to use social media to collect information and launch attacks against federal information systems) and mitigating controls associated with their use of social media. In several cases, agencies reported having policies in development to address these issues. In other cases, agencies reported that there was no need to have policies or procedures that specifically address the use of social media, since these are addressed in existing policies. However, social media technologies present unique challenges and risks, and without establishing guidance and assessing risks specific to social media, agencies cannot be assured that they are adequately meeting their responsibilities to manage and preserve federal records, protect the privacy of personal information, and secure federal systems and information against threats.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that agencies ensure that appropriate records management, privacy, and security measures are in place. Most of the agencies agreed with GAO's recommendations. Three agencies did not agree with recommendations made to them; GAO maintains that the actions are necessary. |
gao_GAO-14-207 | gao_GAO-14-207_0 | Certified EHR technology. For example, a Medicare professional that first demonstrated meaningful use in 2011 must report the Stage 1 meaningful use measures for 2011, 2012, and 2013 to receive incentive payments for those years and must report the Stage 2 meaningful use measures beginning in 2014 to receive The Stage 3 requirements have not an incentive payment for that year.yet been developed but are expected to be finalized in 2015 and to apply beginning in 2017. Clinical quality measures (CQM). For example, one CQM for professionals measures the use of high-risk medications in the elderly. Participation in the EHR Programs Has Increased, but Program Changes Make It Difficult to Estimate Future Participation
Participation in CMS’s EHR programs increased substantially from 2011 to 2012, but some providers who participated in 2011 did not continue in 2012. For hospitals, participation increased from 45 percent of those eligible for 2011 to 64 percent of those eligible for 2012. For professionals, participation increased from 21 percent of those eligible for 2011 to 48 percent of those eligible for 2012. 4.) The increased stringency of these Stage 2 requirements for demonstrating meaningful use may slow participation in the EHR programs. Providers Exceeded Meaningful Use Requirements for Most Stage 1 Measures, but May Face Challenges with Certain More Stringent Stage 2 Measures
The meaningful use measures reported by providers for 2011 and 2012 indicate that providers used their certified EHR systems more often than required and suggest that many providers who have already reported certain Stage 1 measures will be able to meet most of the more stringent reporting thresholds for similar measures in Stage 2. For both 2011 and 2012, Medicare hospitals reported using computerized provider order entry for medication orders for over 84 percent of patients—about 2.8 times the required threshold for Stage 1. Other measures not related to the electronic exchange of information may also be problematic for providers. HHS Lacks a Comprehensive Strategy to Help Ensure Reliability of EHR Data Collected to Improve Quality of Care
The lack of a comprehensive strategy limits HHS’s ability to ensure that the department can reliably use the CQMs collected in certified EHRs for quality measurement activities. providers may report CQMs based on and tested to different requirements. However, although HHS, CMS, and ONC have established important performance measures for the goals related to adoption and meaningful use of EHRs, they have not established measures linked to the second category of goals, which would help them to track program outcomes such as health care quality, efficiency, and patient safety. CMS and ONC may lack critical information necessary to establish program priorities and subsequently make program adjustments based on progress toward these outcomes. We describe several issues regarding the reliability of CQM data—for example, providers may be reporting CQMs based on and tested to different specifications. CMS and ONC lack a comprehensive strategy that would allow them to ensure the reliability of CQM data collected using EHRs, in accordance with the internal control standard requiring an agency to have relevant and reliable information to achieve its mission and goals. Although HHS expects that EHRs can help achieve improved outcomes as well as support various other health care reform efforts that are also intended to improve care, that result is not yet assured. To ensure that CMS and ONC can effectively monitor the effect of the EHR programs and progress made toward goals, the Secretary of Health and Human Services should direct the agencies to take the following two actions:
Develop performance measures to assess outcomes of the EHR programs—including any effects on health care quality, efficiency, and patient safety and other health care reform efforts that are intended to work toward similar outcomes—and
Use the information these performance measures provide to make program adjustments, as appropriate, to better achieve program goals. HHS agreed that data reliability and performance monitoring are important, but neither agreed nor disagreed with our recommendations. Appendix I: Effect of the HITECH Act on Health Insurance Premiums
The Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health (HITECH) Act mandates us to report on, among other things, the impact of the HITECH Act on health insurance premiums. Analysis of participation in the Medicare and Medicaid EHR programs. Appendix V: Strategic Goals and Associated Performance Measures Relevant to the EHR Programs
We reviewed Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), and Office of the National Coordinator for Health Information Technology (ONC) strategic goals and categorized them into one of two major categories particularly relevant to the Electronic Health Record (EHR) programs—(1) adoption and meaningful use of EHRs; and (2) improving quality, efficiency, and patient The first category of goals is focused on program processes, and safety.the second is focused on program outcomes. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health (HITECH) Act established the EHR programs, which provide incentive payments for—and later are expected to apply penalties to—certain providers, such as hospitals and professionals, to encourage them to demonstrate meaningful use of certified EHR technology and meet other program requirements. For example, one measure of meaningful use requires providers to implement checks for potential drug interactions with patients' other drugs and allergies.
As mandated by the HITECH Act, GAO (1) assessed the extent of current and expected participation in the EHR programs, (2) examined information reported by providers and others to measure meaningful use in the EHR programs, (3) evaluated HHS efforts to ensure that EHR data can be reliably used to measure quality of care, and (4) evaluated HHS efforts to assess the effect of the EHR programs on program goals related to adoption and meaningful use of EHRs and improved outcomes. GAO analyzed data from CMS and other sources; reviewed applicable statutes, regulations, and guidance; and interviewed officials from HHS and stakeholder groups.
What GAO Found
Based on the number of providers awarded incentive payments, participation in the Department of Health and Human Services' (HHS) Medicare and Medicaid Electronic Health Record (EHR) programs increased substantially from their first year in 2011 to 2012. For hospitals, participation increased from 45 percent of those eligible for 2011 to 64 percent of those eligible for 2012. For professionals, such as physicians, participation increased from 21 percent of those eligible for 2011 to 48 percent of those eligible for 2012. While increases occurred, a substantial percentage of providers that participated in 2011 did not participate in 2012. Officials who oversee the programs at the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) noted there could be several reasons for this, such as challenges in demonstrating meaningful use, and are monitoring the issue. Various program changes make future participation difficult to estimate. For example, increased stringency of requirements for the programs' second phase beginning in 2014—Stage 2—may slow participation, while the introduction of penalties in 2015 for some providers may motivate participation.
Reporting on meaningful use for 2011 and 2012 indicates that providers who have already participated in the programs' first phase—Stage 1—used their certified EHR systems more often than required. For example, for both 2011 and 2012, Medicare hospitals reported using computerized provider order entry for over 84 percent of patients—in excess of the required threshold for Stage 1 of 30 percent. However, some meaningful use measures may be more challenging for providers, including measures involving the electronic exchange of information. For example, less than 15 percent of professionals reported on an optional Stage 1 measure to provide a summary of care document at each care transition or referral, which is mandatory in Stage 2. A CMS official said the agency is taking steps to help providers prepare for Stage 2 meaningful use measures.
The lack of a comprehensive strategy limits HHS's ability to ensure the department can reliably use the clinical quality measures (CQM) collected in certified EHRs for quality measurement activities. Reliability issues persist, although CMS and HHS's Office of the National Coordinator for Health Information Technology (ONC) have made efforts to address concerns. For example, different providers may report CQMs based on and tested to different requirements depending on whether their EHRs have incorporated technical updates. Without a comprehensive strategy, efforts to address reliability issues (in accordance with the internal control standard requiring relevant and reliable information) and improve quality and efficiency may be limited.
Consistent with law and GAO guidance on assessing agency performance, HHS, CMS, and ONC have established some performance measures for the EHR programs that are tied to strategic goals regarding adoption and meaningful use of EHRs; however, they have not established measures that would help them to track progress toward program outcomes such as health care quality, efficiency, and patient safety. Although HHS expects that the use of EHRs can help achieve improved outcomes and support other efforts that are also intended to improve care, that result is not yet assured. CMS and ONC may lack critical information necessary to establish program priorities and subsequently make program adjustments based on progress toward outcomes.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that HHS develop a comprehensive strategy to better ensure the reliability of CQM data collected using EHRs and develop and use outcome-oriented performance measures to monitor progress toward goals. HHS agreed data reliability and performance monitoring are important but neither agreed nor disagreed with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-07-64 | gao_GAO-07-64_0 | In June 2006, Congress passed the Emergency Act which, among other things, amends the HBCU Capital Financing Program to assist hurricane- affected HBCUs in their recovery efforts. HBCUs Reported Substantial Capital Project Needs, but Only About Half of Available Program Funds Have Been Borrowed
HBCU officials we interviewed reported extensive and diverse capital project needs, including construction and renovation of facilities and addressing deferred maintenance, yet just over half of the available program loan capital has been borrowed. Education has collected and reported limited information on the program’s utilization and has not established performance measures or goals to gauge program effectiveness, though Education officials noted that they are currently working on developing such measures and goals. 1). Specifically, 23 HBCUs, according to Education, have taken steps to participate in the program, and 14 became borrowers, with loans totaling just over $200 million—below the program’s $375 million total limit. The Program Provides Needed Access to Low-Cost Capital Financing, but Certain Loan Terms and Conditions Discourage Participation
The HBCU loan program provides access to low-cost capital financing and flexibilities not always available elsewhere, but some loan terms and conditions discourage participation, though school officials said they remain interested in the program. The low interest rate and long repayment period were regarded favorably by participants and nonparticipants alike, and the program makes funds available for a broader range of needs than some federal grant programs. However, the pooled escrow arrangement, monthly repayment terms, and the extent to which some loans have been collateralized could discourage participation. Education Has Taken Some Steps to Improve the Program, but Weaknesses in Management Control Exist
While Education has taken limited steps to improve the program, we found significant weaknesses in management controls that compromise the extent to which Education can ensure program objectives are being achieved effectively and efficiently. Education has recently provided schools the choice of fixed or variable interest rates, allowed for larger loan amounts, and afforded more opportunity for schools to negotiate loan terms, which appealed to schools. Compliance with Program and Budget Laws and Federal Financial Accounting Standards
Education has not complied with certain statutory requirements relating to the program’s operations and how federal agencies are to account for the government’s cost of federal loan programs. HBCUs Affected by Hurricanes Expressed Satisfaction with Special Loan Provisions and Concerns with Application Deadline, while Education Officials Said They Would Evaluate Loan Processes
Officials from four HBCUs in the Gulf Region we spoke with (Dillard University, Southern University at New Orleans, Xavier University, and Tougaloo College) told us that, in light of the extensive hurricane damage to their campuses, they were pleased with the emergency loan provisions but concerned that the 1-year authorization would not provide sufficient time for them to take advantage of the special program features. School officials from each of the four schools noted that their institutions had incurred physical damages caused by water, wind, and, in the case of one institution, fire, and that the actual financial impact of the hurricanes may remain unknown for years. Although Education officials told us that they have not yet determined the extent to which the department would make use of its authority to waive or modify program provisions for hurricane- affected institutions, the department would be prepared to provide loans to hurricane-affected HBCUs. To ensure that it obtains the relevant, reliable, and timely communication that could help ensure that program objectives are being met efficiently and effectively, and to meet statutory requirements, we recommend that the Secretary of Education regularly convene and consult with the HBCU Advisory Board. | Why GAO Did This Study
Historically Black Colleges and Universities (HBCU), which number around 100, undertake capital projects to provide appropriate settings for learning, but many face challenges in doing so. In 1992, Congress created the HBCU Capital Financing Program to help HBCUs fund capital projects by offering loans with interest rates near the government's cost of borrowing. We reviewed the program by considering (1) HBCU capital project needs and program utilization, (2) program advantages compared to other sources of funds and schools' views on loan terms, (3) the Department of Education's (Education) program management, and (4) certain schools' perspectives on and Education's plan to implement loan provisions specifically authorized by Congress in June 2006 to assist in hurricane recovery efforts. To conduct our work, we reviewed applicable laws and program materials and interviewed officials from federal agencies and 34 HBCUs.
What GAO Found
HBCU officials we interviewed reported extensive and diverse capital project needs, yet just over half of available loan capital ($375 million) has ever been borrowed. About 23 HBCUs have taken steps to participate in the program, and 14 have become borrowers. Education has collected and reported limited data on the program's utilization and has not established performance measures or goals to gauge program effectiveness, though Education officials noted they are developing measures and goals. The HBCU loan program provides access to low-cost capital financing and flexibilities not always available elsewhere, but some loan terms and conditions discourage participation, though school officials said they remain interested in the program. The low interest rate and 30-year repayment period were regarded favorably by participants and nonparticipants alike, and the program makes funds available for a broader range of needs than some federal grant programs. However, the requirement to place in a pooled escrow 5 percent of loan proceeds--an insurance mechanism that reduces federal program costs due to any program borrower's potential delinquency or default--monthly payments versus semiannual ones traditionally available from private sources of loans, and the extent to which some loans have been collateralized could discourage participation. While Education has taken steps to improve the program, significant weaknesses in its management control could compromise the program's effectiveness and efficiency. Education has recently provided schools with both fixed and variable interest rate options, allowed for larger loans, and afforded more opportunities to negotiate loan terms. Also, Education has increased its marketing efforts for the program. However, Education has not established effective management control to ensure that it is (1) communicating with schools in a useful and timely manner, (2) complying with statutory requirements to meet twice each year with an advisory board composed of HBCU experts and properly account for the cost of the program, and (3) monitoring the performance of the program's contractor. Officials from 4 HBCUs in Louisiana and Mississippi told us that in light of the extensive 2005 hurricane damage to their campuses, they were pleased with certain emergency loan provisions but concerned that there would not be sufficient time to take advantage of Education's authority to waive or modify the program provisions. School officials from the 4 schools noted that their institutions had incurred extensive physical damage that was caused by water, wind, and, in one case, fire, and that the full financial impact of the hurricanes may remain unknown for years. Although Education officials told us that they have not yet determined the extent to which the authority under the emergency legislation to waive or modify program provisions for hurricane-affected institutions would be used, the department would be prepared to provide loans to hurricane-affected HBCUs. |
gao_GAO-01-881T | gao_GAO-01-881T_0 | Concluding Observations
FNS and the states have taken actions to reduce fraud, waste, and abuse in the Food Stamp Program. Our past work has found that FNS and the states need to make better use of electronic data to track individuals and storeowners who may be trafficking in food stamp benefits. We also found that financial sanctions and enhanced funding have been at least partially successful in focusing states’ attention on minimizing payment errors. However, this “carrot and stick” approach can accomplish only so much. Food stamp regulations for determining eligibility and benefits are extremely complex and their application is inherently error-prone and costly to administer. Furthermore, this approach, carried to extremes, can create incentives for states to take actions that may inhibit achievement of one of the agency’s basic missions—providing food assistance to those who are in need. For example, increasing the frequency with which recipients must report income changes could decrease errors, but it could also have the unintended effect of discouraging participation by the eligible working poor. This would run counter not only to FNS’ basic mission but also to an overall objective of welfare reform—helping people move successfully from public assistance into the workforce. Simplifying the Food Stamp Program’s rules and regulations offers an opportunity to reduce payment error rates and promote program participation by eligible recipients. FNS has begun to look at options for simplifying requirements for determining benefits. However, in view of the upcoming reauthorization, it is critical that FNS follow through with this process and develop options that strike an appropriate balance between the sometimes competing objectives of ensuring program integrity and encouraging eligible individuals to participate. To be successful, this process must include a continuing dialogue with all appropriate stakeholders, including congressional members and state officials, and must ensure that actions are taken to streamline the program while at the same time improving program integrity. | What GAO Found
The Food and Nutrition Service (FNS) and the states have taken steps to reduce fraud, waste, and abuse in the Food Stamp Program. GAO's past work has found that FNS and the states need to make better use of electronic data to track individuals and storeowners who may be trafficking in food stamps. GAO also found that financial sanctions and enhanced funding have been at least partially successful in focusing states' attention on minimizing payment errors. However this "carrot and stick" approach can accomplish only so much. Food stamp regulations for determining eligibility and benefits are extremely complex and their application is inherently error-prone and costly to administer. Furthermore, this approach, carried to extremes, can create incentives for states to take actions that may inhibit achievement of one of the agency's basic missions--providing food assistance to needy persons. For example, requiring recipients to report income changes more frequently could decrease errors, but it could also have the unintended effect of discouraging participation by the eligible working poor. This would run counter not only to FNS' basic mission but also to an overall objective of welfare reform--helping people move successfully from public assistance into the workforce. Simplifying the Food Stamp Program's rules and regulations could reduce payment error rates and promote program participation by eligible recipients. FNS has begun to look at ways to simplify requirements for determining benefits. However, in view of the upcoming reauthorization, it is critical that FNS follow through with this process and develop options that strike an appropriate balance between the sometimes competing objectives of ensuring program integrity and encouraging eligible individuals to participate. To be successful, this process must include a continuing dialogue with all appropriate stakeholders, including Congress and state officials, and must ensure that steps are taken to streamline the program while at the same time improving program integrity. |
gao_GAO-12-491 | gao_GAO-12-491_0 | For example, the Interagency Council must develop and annually update a federal strategic plan to end review all federal activities and programs to assist homeless individuals; take actions that may be necessary to reduce duplication among federal homelessness programs and activities; monitor, evaluate, and recommend improvements in programs and activities to assist homeless individuals conducted by federal agencies, state and local governments, and private voluntary organizations; provide professional and technical assistance to states, local governments, and other public and private nonprofit organizations; encourage the creation of State Interagency Councils on Homelessness and the formulation of jurisdictional 10-year plans to end homelessness at state, city, and county levels; obtain from federal agencies resources for which persons experiencing homelessness may be eligible and improvements to ensure access and develop mechanisms to ensure access by persons experiencing homelessness to programs for which they are eligible, and verify collaboration among entities within communities; conduct research and evaluation related to its functions; develop joint federal agency and other initiatives to fulfill the goals of the agency and collect and disseminate information relating to homeless individuals; prepare annual reports; develop constructive alternatives to criminalizing homelessness; and convene a meeting of experts to discuss all issues relevant to the definitions of “homeless” and the extent to which the differences in such definitions create barriers for individuals in accessing services and issue transcripts and recommendations. Homelessness Programs Address a Variety of Needs, but Result in Fragmentation and Overlap of Services
Eight agencies—HHS, HUD, the Departments of Education (Education), Labor (Labor), Justice (Justice), Veterans Affairs (VA), the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and the General Services Administration (GSA)—administered 26 targeted homelessness programs in fiscal year 2011. However, three agencies—HHS, HUD, and VA—were responsible for the majority of these programs (22 of 26). Fragmentation and overlap in some programs have been caused in part by their legislative creation as separate programs under the jurisdiction of several agencies. 2). For example, while HUD has taken steps to manage most of its homelessness programs under the same administrative unit and limit the amount of supportive services it provides, HHS and VA separately manage programs that provide similar services under different units. During our site visits, several local providers told us that managing multiple applications and reporting requirements was burdensome, difficult, and costly. Moreover, according to providers, persons experiencing homelessness have difficulties navigating services that are fragmented across agencies. According to our questionnaire results, 2 of 26 targeted programs reported having a program evaluation to assess efficiency or effectiveness within the last 5 years. While performance information can be helpful for monitoring whether programs were achieving desired results, program evaluations allow for comprehensive assessments. Thus, the limited evaluations of recent years make it difficult to fully assess what is working and how improvements can be made in programs addressing homelessness. Understanding program performance and effectiveness is key to determining in which programs and interventions to strategically invest limited federal funds. While Federal Coordination Efforts Have Increased, Strategic Plan Could Be Improved
Interagency Council Has Taken Steps to Enhance Coordination
The Interagency Council has taken several actions to enhance coordination and promote initiatives across government agencies. Coordinated at the state and local levels. Took steps to develop a common vocabulary. Opportunities Exist to Further Improve the National Strategy
The federal strategic plan to prevent and end homelessness has served as a useful and necessary first step in increasing agency coordination and focusing attention on ending homelessness, but lacks some key characteristics desirable in a national strategy. For each of the objectives, the plan identifies federal leadership, but does not include priorities for each agency and does not provide actions or activities that the agencies should take to help achieve the goals and objectives. Specifically, we found that HUD, HHS, Labor, and VA have multiple programs that offer similar services to similar beneficiaries. Recommendations for Executive Action
Based on our review, we are making two recommendations: The Interagency Council and the Office of Management and Budget––in conjunction with the Secretaries of HHS, HUD, Labor, and VA––should consider examining inefficiencies that may result from overlap and fragmentation in their programs for persons experiencing homelessness. As a starting point, the agencies could use the program information from this report to further analyze the degree and effects of overlap and fragmentation. To help prioritize, clarify, and refine efforts to improve coordination across agencies, and improve the efficiency and effectiveness of federal homelessness programs, the Interagency Council, in consultation with its member agencies, should incorporate additional elements into updates to the national strategic plan or other planning and implementation documents to help set priorities, measure results, and ensure accountability. HHS, HUD, and Labor did not explicitly agree or disagree with this recommendation. However, the council was unable to provide us with documentation that these activities were occurring. Therefore, we did not revise our second recommendation because these additional implementation efforts must also be transparent to help ensure accountability and measure the plan’s progress. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of our report were to determine (1) the number of and funding levels for federal homelessness programs and the extent to which fragmentation, overlap, and duplication exists; (2) whether the programs have been evaluated; and (3) actions of the U.S. Interagency Council on Homelessness (Interagency Council) and federal agencies to coordinate federal efforts and the extent to which the federal strategic plan to prevent and end homelessness is an effective strategy. | Why GAO Did This Study
Federal programs for those experiencing or at risk for homelessness generally are designed to provide housing assistance and other services such as health care, job training, or food assistance. This report responds to the statutory requirement that GAO identify federal programs, agencies, offices, and initiatives that have duplicative goals or activities and addresses (1) the number of and funding levels for federal homelessness programs and the extent to which fragmentation, overlap, and duplication exists; (2) whether the programs have been evaluated; and (3) actions of the Interagency Council and federal agencies to coordinate efforts and the extent to which the federal strategic plan to prevent and end homelessness is an effective strategy. To address these objectives, GAO sent questionnaires to10 federal agencies and obtained and analyzed data for a range of programs.
What GAO Found
Homelessness programs are fragmented across multiple agencies and some show evidence of overlap. In fiscal year 2010, eight federal agencies obligated roughly $2.8 billion to administer 26 homelessness programs. Three agenciesthe Departments of Health and Human Services (HHS), Housing and Urban Development (HUD), and Veterans Affairs (VA)are responsible for the majority of programs and dollars, 22 of 26 programs, and 89 percent of total funds. GAO found that these agencies and the Department of Labor (Labor) have multiple programs that offer similar services to similar beneficiaries. Fragmentation of services and overlap in some programs is partly due to their legislative creation and partly due to programs evolving to offer services that meet the variety of needs of persons experiencing homelessness. Fragmentation and overlap can lead to inefficient use of resources. For example, both HHS and VA have programs that provide similar services, but each agency separately manages its programs under different administrative units. In addition, some local service providers told us that managing multiple applications and reporting requirements was burdensome, difficult, and costly. Moreover, according to providers, persons experiencing homelessness have difficulties navigating services that are fragmented across agencies.
While almost all targeted programs maintain performance information (including data on the number of homeless served), few targeted programs have conducted evaluations to assess how effectively the programs are achieving their objectives. While performance information can be helpful for monitoring whether programs were achieving desired results, evaluations allow for comprehensive assessments. According to GAOs questionnaire, 2 of the 26 programs reported they had a program evaluation within the last 5 years. Information from program evaluations can help agencies fully assess what is working and how improvements can be made. Moreover, understanding program performance and effectiveness is key to determining in which programs and interventions to strategically invest limited federal funds.
The U.S. Interagency Council on Homelessness (Interagency Council) is required to coordinate the federal response to homelessness and has taken several steps to coordinate efforts and promote initiatives across federal agencies. Federal coordination efforts have increased in recent years and included issuing the first federal strategic plan, increasing coordination at the state and local levels by focusing on the creation of state interagency councils on homelessness, and taking steps to develop a common vocabulary for discussing homelessness and related terms. The strategic plan serves as a useful and necessary step in increasing agency coordination and incorporates some elements of an effective strategy, but lacks key characteristics desirable in a national strategy. For example, the plan does not list priorities or milestones and does not discuss resource needs or assign clear roles and responsibilities to federal partners. In order for the Interagency Council and its members to effectively translate the goals and objectives of the plan into actions and measure their own progress in implementing them, these elements must be made transparent to help ensure accountability and measure the plans progress.
What GAO Recommends
The Interagency Council and the Office of Management and Budgetin conjunction with HHS, HUD, Labor, and VA, should further analyze the degree and effects of overlap and fragmentation. VA agreed with this recommendation. HHS, HUD, Labor, and the Council did not explicitly agree or disagree. We also recommended that the Council incorporate additional elements into updates to the federal strategic plan or in implementation and planning documents. The Council stated it has been setting priorities and measuring progress, but was unable to provide documentation. GAO maintains its position and that the implementation of the federal strategic plan be made more transparent. |
gao_GAO-03-495T | gao_GAO-03-495T_0 | A major element of the President’s management agenda was establishment of the Quicksilver Task Force, which was charged with identifying (1) systematic barriers that had blocked the deployment of e-government advances and (2) electronic government projects that could deliver significant productivity and performance gains across government. The selected initiatives would achieve their results by simplifying and unifying agency work processes and information flows, providing one-stop services to citizens, and enabling information to be collected on line once and reused, rather than being collected many times. The initiatives are aimed at providing a wide variety of services. Recreation One-Stop is one such example, a Web portal for a single point of access to information about parks and other recreation venues at the federal, state, and local levels. Other initiatives strive for more ambitious services that may not necessarily rely on the Internet for delivery. The e-Payroll initiative is intended to consolidate the federal government’s many incompatible payroll systems into just two that would service all government employees. Government to government. When we reviewed project-planning documentation collected by OMB from each of the initiatives, we found indications that important aspects of some of the initiatives had not been addressed and that, for many of them, funding strategies and milestones were in a state of flux. The task force reviewed the mini business cases and the final selections were made in October. Collaboration across agencies and other organizations is likewise a key component of most of the initiatives, and therefore a discussion of strategies for collaboration is essential to a complete e-government business case. Spring 2002 Project Plans Revealed Cost and Schedule Uncertainties
OMB required the managing partners of the e-government initiatives to prepare and submit work plans and funding plans in May 2002. However, other best practice elements were not included in some of the plans. The updated information we obtained from project managers in September 2002 on estimated costs revealed significant changes—changes of more than 30 percent—for about half of the initiatives. These updated business cases should provide not only indications of whether key topics such as collaboration and customer focus are now being addressed, but also updated cost and schedule information. In summary, e-government offers many opportunities to better serve the public, make government more efficient and effective, and reduce costs. However, our review of the initial planning documents associated with the projects led us to conclude that important aspects—such as collaboration and customer focus—had not been thought out for all the projects, and major uncertainties in funding and milestones were not uncommon. Electronic Government— General
Electronic Government: Selection and Implementation of the Office of Management and Budget’s 24 Initiatives. | Why GAO Did This Study
A key element of the President's Management Agenda is the expansion of electronic government (e-government) to enhance access to information and services, particularly through the Internet. In response, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) established a task force that selected a strategic set of initiatives to lead this expansion. GAO previously reviewed the completeness of the information used for choosing and overseeing these initiatives, including business cases and funding plans.
What GAO Found
E-government offers many opportunities to better serve the public, make government more efficient and effective, and reduce costs. To achieve these goals, the 25 e-government initiatives selected by OMB's Quicksilver task force focus on a wide variety of services, aiming to simplify and unify agency work processes and information flows, provide one-stop services to citizens, and enable information to be collected on line once and reused, rather than being collected many times. For example, Recreation One-Stop is a Web portal for a single point of access to information about parks and other federal, state, and local recreation areas. Other initiatives are being pursued that do not necessarily rely on the Internet, such as the e-Payroll initiative to consolidate federal payroll systems. GAO's review of the initial planning documents for the initiatives highlights the critical importance of management and oversight to their success. Important aspects--such as collaboration and customer focus--had not been addressed in early program plans for many of the projects, and major GAO's review of the initial planning documents for the initiatives highlights the critical importance of management and oversight to their success. Important aspects--such as collaboration and customer focus--had not been addressed in early program plans for many of the projects, and major uncertainties in funding and milestones were not uncommon. As shown by GAO's comparison of the content of the initiatives' business cases with best practices, all the business cases included key information, but many elements were missing. In particular, fewer than half addressed collaboration and customer focus, despite the importance of these topics to e-government strategy and goals. Similarly, the accuracy of estimated costs in the funding plans was questionable: between May and September 2002, these estimates for 12 of the initiatives changed significantly--by more than 30 percent. Accurate cost, schedule, and performance information is essential to ensure that projects are on schedule and achieve their goals. |
gao_RCED-95-214 | gao_RCED-95-214_0 | In 1994, HUD issued regulations implementing legislation that has expanded FHA’s nursing home program to include mortgage insurance for the refinancing of non-FHA-insured projects and for assisted living facilities. The nursing home program has not been targeted to serve specific populations or communities, and HUD does not collect and analyze information on whom the program is serving. 1.) Both Programs Appear to Have Incurred Losses to Date
HUD has not done any complete assessments of the financial performance of the nursing home and retirement service center programs. Available data indicate that the terminated retirement service center program has incurred losses as well. Moreover, recent legislative changes may result in the growth of the nursing home program and potentially riskier loans, placing additional strains on HUD’s management capacity. However, it is unclear what all of these actions will involve and how soon some of them will be completed. However, we still have concerns about HUD’s ability to effectively manage the nursing home and retirement service center programs in the near future. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO evaluated the Federal Housing Administration's (FHA) nursing home, retirement service center, and hospital insurance programs, as well as the Department of Housing And Urban Development's (HUD) ability to manage these programs.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) the nursing home program has not been targeted to serve specific populations or communities, and HUD does not collect or analyze information on whom the program is serving; (2) FHA has not done any complete assessments of the financial performance of the nursing home and retirement service center programs and it is unlikely that HUD will be able to effectively manage the nursing home and retirement service center programs in the future; (3) it is unclear whether HUD consolidation of its multifamily underwriting and asset management responsibilities will be implemented; and (4) HUD has implemented legislative changes that authorize FHA mortgage insurance for assisted living facilities, which may result in the nursing home program's growth and in potentially riskier loans. |
gao_GAO-12-573T | gao_GAO-12-573T_0 | Background
Improper Payments Information Act of 2002
Fiscal year 2011 marked the eighth year of implementation of the Improper Payments Information Act of 2002 (IPIA), as well as the first year of implementation for the Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery Act of 2010 (IPERA). IPIA requires executive branch agencies to annually review all programs and activities to identify those that are susceptible to significant improper payments, estimate the annual amount of improper payments for such programs and activities, and report these estimates along with actions taken to reduce improper payments for programs with estimates that exceed $10 million. IPERA, enacted July 22, 2010, amended IPIA by expanding on the previous requirements for identifying, estimating, and reporting on programs and activities susceptible to significant improper payments and expanding requirements for recovering overpayments across a broad range of federal programs. OMB and Agencies Reported Progress in Estimating and Reducing Improper Payments
Federal agencies reported improper payment estimates totaling $115.3 billion in fiscal year 2011, a decrease of $5.3 billion from the revised prior year reported estimate of $120.6 billion. The decrease in the fiscal year 2011 estimate—when compared to fiscal year 2010—is attributed primarily to decreases in program outlays for the Department of Labor’s (Labor) Unemployment Insurance program, and decreases in reported error rates for fiscal year 2011 for the Department of the Treasury’s (Treasury) Earned Income Tax Credit program, and HHS’s Medicare Advantage program. According to OMB, the $115.3 billion in estimated federal improper payments reported for fiscal year 2011 was attributable to 79 programs spread among 17 agencies. Specifically, these 10 programs accounted for about $107 billion or 93 percent of the total estimated improper payments agencies reported for fiscal year 2011. Governmentwide Challenges to Estimating and Evaluating Improper Payments
Despite reported progress in reducing estimated improper payment amounts and error rates for some programs and activities during fiscal year 2011, the federal government continues to face challenges in determining the full extent of improper payments. Specifically, some agencies have not yet reported estimates for all risk-susceptible programs, and some agencies’ estimating methodologies need to be refined. For example, our case study of the Foster Care program found that although ACF had established a process to calculate a national improper payment estimate, the estimate was not based on a statistically valid methodology and consequently did not reflect a reasonably accurate estimate of the extent of Foster Care improper payments. The weaknesses we identified in ACF’s methodology to estimate improper payments in the Foster Care program also impaired its ability to reliably assess the extent to which its corrective actions reduced Foster Care program improper payments. Current and Possible Strategies to Move Forward in Reducing Improper Payments
A number of actions are under way across the federal government to help advance improper payment reduction goals. Completing these initiatives, as well as designing and implementing enhanced strategies in the future, will be needed to effectively reduce the federal government’s improper payments. Proactively preventing improper payments increases public confidence in the administration of benefit programs and avoids the difficulties associated with the “pay and chase”aspects of recovering improper payments. Beginning in fiscal year 2011, according to OMB’s guidance, agencies were required to classify the root causes of estimated improper payments into three general categories for reporting purposes: (1) documentation and administrative errors, (2) authentication and medical necessity errors, and (3) verification errors.information on the root causes of the current improper payment estimates is necessary for agencies to target effective corrective actions and implement preventive measures. Of the 79 programs with improper payment estimates in fiscal year 2011, we found that agencies reported the root cause information using the required categories for 42 programs in their fiscal year 2011 PARs and AFRs. Preventive controls may involve a variety of activities, such as up-front validation of eligibility, predictive analytic tests, training programs, and timely resolution of audit findings, as described below. Up-front eligibility validation through data sharing. Implementing Effective Detective Controls to Identify and Recover Overpayments
Although strong preventive controls remain the frontline defense against improper payments, agencies’ improper payment reduction strategies could also consider actions to establish additional effective detection techniques to quickly identify and recover those improper payments that do occur. Data mining. Recovery auditing. Another area for further exploration for agencies’ improper payment reduction strategies is the broader use of incentives for states to implement effective detective controls. | Why GAO Did This Study
Over the past decade, GAO has issued numerous reports and testimonies highlighting improper payment issues across the federal government as well as at specific agencies. Fiscal year 2011 marked the eighth year of implementation of the Improper Payments Information Act of 2002 (IPIA), as well as the first year of implementation for the Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery Act of 2010 (IPERA). IPIA requires executive branch agencies to annually identify programs and activities susceptible to significant improper payments, estimate the amount of improper payments for such programs and activities, and report these estimates along with actions taken to reduce them. IPERA amended IPIA and expanded requirements for recovering overpayments across a broad range of federal programs.
This testimony addresses (1) federal agencies reported progress in estimating and reducing improper payments; (2) challenges in meeting current requirements to estimate and evaluate improper payments, including the results of GAOs case study of the estimation methodology and corrective actions for the Foster Care program; and (3) possible strategies that can be taken to move forward in reducing improper payments. This testimony is primarily based on prior GAO reports, including the report released today on improper payment estimates in the Foster Care program. It also includes unaudited improper payment information recently presented in federal entities fiscal year 2011 performance and accountability reports and agency financial reports.
What GAO Found
Federal agencies reported an estimated $115.3 billion in improper payments in fiscal year 2011, a decrease of $5.3 billion from the prior year reported estimate of $120.6 billion. According to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), the $115.3 billion estimate was attributable to 79 programs spread among 17 agencies. Ten programs accounted for about $107 billion or 93 percent of the total estimated improper payments agencies reported. The reported decrease in fiscal year 2011 was primarily related to 3 programsdecreases in program outlays for the Unemployment Insurance program, and decreases in reported error rates for the Earned Income Tax Credit program and the Medicare Advantage program. Further, OMB reported that agencies recaptured $1.25 billion in improper payments to contractors and vendors.
The federal government continues to face challenges in determining the full extent of improper payments. Some agencies have not reported estimates for all risk-susceptible programs, while other agencies estimation methodologies were found to be not statistically valid. For example, GAOs recently completed study of Foster Care improper payments found that the Administration for Children and Families (ACF) had established a process to calculate a national improper payment estimate for the Foster Care program, which totaled about $73 million for fiscal year 2010, the year covered by GAOs review. However, the estimate was not based on a statistically valid methodology and consequently did not provide a reasonably accurate estimate of the extent of Foster Care improper payments. Further, GAO found that ACF could not reliably assess the extent to which corrective actions reduced Foster Care improper payments.
A number of strategies are under way across government to help advance improper payment reduction goals. For example,
Additional information and analysis on the root causes of improper payment estimates will assist agencies in targeting effective corrective actions and implementing preventive measures. Although agencies were required to report the root causes of improper payments in three categories beginning in fiscal year 2011, of the 79 programs with improper payment estimates that year, 42 programs reported the root cause information using the required categories.
Implementing strong preventive controls can help defend against improper payments, increasing public confidence and avoiding the difficult pay and chase aspects of recovering improper payments. Preventive controls involve activities such as up-front validation of eligibility using data sharing, predictive analytic technologies, and training programs. Further, addressing program design issues, such as complex eligibility requirements, may also warrant further consideration.
Effective detection techniques to quickly identify and recover improper payments are also important to a successful reduction strategy. Detection activities include data mining and recovery auditing. Another area for further exploration is the broader use of incentives to encourage states in efforts to implement effective detective controls.
Continuing work to implement and enhance these strategies will be needed to effectively reduce federal government improper payments. |
gao_GAO-04-219 | gao_GAO-04-219_0 | Over the years, CDC’s mission and scope of work have continued to expand in concert with public health needs. 1.) 2.) 3.) A positive OD change made in 2003 was the assignment of an OD official other than the agency’s Director to provide oversight authority for the agency’s operations units, such as financial management and information technology. Another positive change made in 2003 was to align OD management team positions with broad agency mission themes that cut across individual programs and organizational units. However, despite the intention for the themes to foster collaboration among CDC’s 11 centers and with its external partners, clear connections between the management team’s deputy positions, the mission themes, and agency mission activities have not been made. However, no similar position or combination of positions has been established in OD to oversee the programs and activities of the centers, as no one below the Director on OD’s management team has direct line authority for the centers’ programmatic work. Associate Director for Terrorism Preparedness and Response. 5.) Whether this structural arrangement can support effective oversight of the agency’s programmatic work is uncertain, given the growth in the demands on the CDC Director’s time along with the likely change in directors over time. OD Has Improved Oversight of Public Health Emergencies, but Concerns Remain about Oversight of Ongoing Agency Activities
OD has implemented several changes in its approach to managing the agency’s response to public health emergencies, including the creation within OD of an emergency operations office that, during the SARS outbreak, successfully coordinated the response efforts of CDC’s various centers and staff offices. OD Has Improved Its Ability to Oversee the Agency’s Response to Public Health Emergencies
In recognition of past problems, OD initiated several structural and procedural changes that improved its ability to oversee the agency’s response to public health emergencies. Typically, the attention of OD’s top officials has been focused on emergent public health issues, such as infectious disease outbreaks, leaving little time for focusing on nonemergency public health work and agency operations. Previously, scrutiny of these expenditures was at the discretion of center management. OD Efforts to Foster Collaboration among Centers Are Incomplete
While OD has taken steps to improve the centers’ ability to effectively collaborate during emergencies, more needs to be done for collaboration on nonemergency public health work. Planning Tools That OD Needs to Manage Agency Priorities and Human Capital Challenges Are Not Yet Operational
In recent years, CDC’s OD has operated without an up-to-date agencywide planning strategy with which to set agency mission priorities and unify the work of its various centers. Strategic Planning Process Recently Initiated
In June 2003, OD initiated an agencywide strategic planning process called the Futures Initiative, which is intended to involve all levels of staff and some of the agency’s partners in developing long-range goals and associated performance measures. A human capital plan was initiated in April 2003, but this effort has been postponed while the strategic planning process gets under way. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve OD’s management of CDC’s nonemergency mission priorities, we recommend that the CDC Director take the following three actions: realign and clarify oversight responsibility for the centers’ programmatic work at a level below the Director, including clarifying the roles of OD’s deputy directors; ensure that reporting requirements and tracking systems are developed for OD to routinely monitor the centers’ operations and programmatic activities; and develop incentives to foster center collaboration as a standard agency practice. We also recommend that the CDC Director take the following two actions: ensure that the agency’s new strategic planning process will involve CDC employees and external partners to identify agencywide priorities, align resources with these priorities, and facilitate the coordination of the centers’ mission-related activities and ensure that the agency’s human capital planning efforts receive appropriate leadership attention, including resuming human capital planning, linking these efforts to the agency’s strategic plan, and linking senior executives’ performance contracts with the strategic plan. To evaluate OD’s approach to managing the agency’s response to public health emergencies, we looked at CDC’s emergency infrastructure and communication processes. Appendix II: Comments from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention | Why GAO Did This Study
The scope of work at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) has evolved since 1946 from a focus on communicable diseases, like malaria, to a wide and complex range of public health responsibilities. The agency's Office of the Director (OD) faces considerable management challenges to ensure that during public health crises the agency's nonemergency but important public health work continues apace. In 2002, the agency's OD began taking steps aimed at organizational change. GAO has observed elsewhere that major change management initiatives can take at least 5 to 7 years. In this report, GAO examined the extent to which organizational changes have helped balance OD's oversight of CDC's emergent and ongoing public health responsibilities. Specifically, GAO examined OD's (1) executive management structure, (2) approach to overseeing the agency's work, and (3) approach to setting the agency's priorities.
What GAO Found
The management team in CDC's top office--OD--is undergoing a structural change designed to provide a new approach to managing the agency's public health work. Through this effort, CDC has taken steps that have merit. For example, OD established a Chief Operating Officer position with clear oversight authority for the agency's operations units, such as financial management and information technology. However, a significant oversight weakness remains: there is no position or combination of positions on OD's management team below the Director's level to oversee the programs and activities of 11 centers that perform the bulk of the agency's public health work. Only CDC's Director has line authority for the centers, and the extraordinary demands on the Director's time associated with public health emergencies and other external events make the practicality of this oversight arrangement uncertain. Another of OD's structural initiatives was to align OD management team positions with broad mission "themes," or goals, that cut across the centers' institutional boundaries. The intent was to foster among the 11 independent centers a more integrated approach to performing the agency's mission. This purpose may be difficult to realize, however, as connections between certain themes and associated OD positions are not sufficiently clear. OD has made improvements in its ability to oversee the agency's response to public health emergencies--including the creation of an emergency preparedness and response office and the development of an emergency communication system--but concerns remain about OD's oversight of nonemergency public health work. OD's efforts to monitor the activities of the centers are not sufficiently systematic. For example, few formal systems are in place to track the status of centers' operations and programmatic activities. Although OD has a process for center officials to elevate important issues of concern, the information flow under this process is largely center-driven, as the subjects discussed are typically raised at the discretion of the center officials. Similarly, OD's efforts to foster coordination among the centers fall short of institutionalizing collaboration as standard agency practice. The planning tools that OD needs to set agency priorities and address human capital challenges are under development. In recent years, OD has operated without an up-to-date agencywide planning strategy with which to set mission priorities and unify the work of CDC's various centers. In June 2003, OD initiated an agencywide strategic planning process. In a separate planning effort initiated in April 2003, CDC began working on a human capital plan for meeting the agency's current and future staffing needs. This effort has been suspended while the strategic planning process gets under way, and no time frames have been established for resuming its development. At the same time, agency attrition and future limits on workforce growth suggest that agency leadership may be needed to ensure that workforce planning occurs expeditiously. |
gao_GAO-09-408T | gao_GAO-09-408T_0 | Background
As you know, Mr. Chairman, the decennial census is a critical national effort mandated by the Constitution. Census data are used to apportion seats in Congress, redraw congressional districts, allocate billions of dollars in federal assistance to state and local governments, and for numerous other public and private sector purposes. The Bureau estimates that the 2010 Census will cost more than $14 billion over its life-cycle, making it the most expensive census in our nation’s history. Providing Reliable Cost Estimates and Justifications for Spending as 2010 Approaches Presents a Major Challenge for the Bureau
Accurate cost estimates are essential to a successful census because they help ensure that the Bureau has adequate funds, and so that Congress, the administration, and the Bureau itself can have reliable information on which to base or advise decisions. However, as we have reported before, the Bureau has insufficient policies and procedures and inadequately trained staff for conducting high-quality cost estimation for the decennial census. The Bureau goes to great lengths to develop a quality address list and maps, working with the U.S. The Bureau will send thousands of temporary census workers, known as listers, into the field to collect and verify address information and update maps on-site, including verifying address updates provided through the LUCA program. Performance of Handheld Computers Has Improved in Field Testing, but More Information Is Needed to Evaluate Readiness for Address Canvassing
A nationwide address canvassing operation for the 2010 Census is scheduled to begin this spring, when listers will use handheld computers for the first time to collect address data. From our observations of the December 2008 field test and interviews with Bureau officials, the Bureau appears to have addressed many of the handheld computer performance issues, as well as the problems with the work management software, observed during the dress rehearsal. Nonetheless, more information is needed to determine the Bureau’s overall readiness for address canvassing as the field test was not an end- to-end systems evaluation, did not validate all address canvassing requirements, such as training and help desk support, and did not include urban areas. Bureau Needs to Finalize Field Data Collection Plans
The Bureau’s largest and most costly field operation is nonresponse follow-up. In May 2008, the Bureau issued a plan that covered major components of the paper-based nonresponse follow-up. Because this plan serves as a road map for monitoring the development and implementation of nonresponse follow-up, it will be important for the Bureau to complete this plan. Although the Bureau has carried out a paper-based follow-up operation in past decennials, the 2010 Census includes new procedures and system interfaces that have not been tested under census-like conditions because they were dropped from the dress rehearsal. Bureau officials acknowledged the importance of testing new and modified nonresponse follow-up activities and system interfaces in order to reduce risk but have not yet developed detailed testing plans. The Bureau has strengthened aspects of its risk management process. However, the Bureau has not yet determined when these plans will be completed. 3). Managing and Testing Information Technology Systems Remain a Concern
Since 2005, we have reported on weaknesses in the Bureau’s management of its IT acquisitions, and we remain concerned about the Bureau’s IT management and testing of key 2010 Census systems. At your request, we reviewed the status and plans of testing of key 2010 Census systems. As stated in our report, which we are releasing today, we found that the Bureau has made progress in conducting systems, integration, and end-to-end testing, but critical testing still remains to be performed before systems will be ready to support the 2010 Census, and the planning, execution, and monitoring of its testing needs much improvement. In summary, little more than a year remains until Census Day. 2010 Census: The Bureau’s Plans for Reducing the Undercount Show Promise, but Key Uncertainties Remain. | Why GAO Did This Study
The decennial census is a constitutionally-mandated activity that produces data used to apportion congressional seats, redraw congressional districts, and allocate billions of dollars in federal assistance. In March 2008, GAO designated the 2010 Census a high-risk area in part because of problems with the performance of handheld computers used to collect data. The U.S. Census Bureau has since strengthened its risk management efforts and made other improvements; however, the Bureau curtailed a dress rehearsal scheduled for 2008 and was unable to test key operations under census-like conditions. This testimony discusses the Bureau's readiness for 2010 and covers: (1) the importance of reliable cost estimates; (2) building a complete and accurate address list; (3) following up on missing and conflicting responses to ensure accuracy; (4) targeting outreach to undercounted populations; and (5) designing, testing, and implementing technology for the census. The testimony is based on previously issued and ongoing GAO work.
What GAO Found
The Bureau estimates the 2010 Census will cost more than $14 billion over its life-cycle, making it the most expensive census in the nation's history, even after adjusting for inflation. Accurate cost estimates help ensure that the Bureau has adequate funds, and that Congress, the administration, and the Bureau itself have reliable information on which to base advice and decisions. However, as GAO has reported before, the Bureau has insufficient policies and procedures and inadequately trained staff for conducting high-quality cost estimation for the decennial census. A successful census requires a complete and accurate address list. The Bureau sends thousands of census workers (listers) into the field to collect and verify address information, and this year for the first time, listers will use handheld computers to collect data. During the dress rehearsal, there were significant technical problems. A small-scale field test showed that these problems appear to have been addressed; however, the test was not carried out under full census-like conditions and did not validate all address canvassing requirements. Nonresponse follow-up, the Bureau's largest and most costly field operation, was initially planned to be conducted using the handheld computers, but was recently changed to a paper-based system due to technology issues. The Bureau has not yet developed a detailed road map for monitoring the development and implementation of nonresponse follow-up under the new design. Such a plan is essential to conducting a successful nonresponse follow-up. Furthermore, the system that manages the flow of work in field offices is not yet developed. Lacking plans for the development of both nonresponse follow-up and this management system, the Bureau faces the risk of not having them developed and fully tested in time for the 2010 Census. In an effort to reduce the undercount, the Bureau is implementing a program of paid advertising integrated with other communications strategies, such as partnerships with state, local, and tribal governments and community organizations. Moving toward 2010, the Bureau faces long-standing challenges with the nation's linguistic diversity and privacy concerns, which can contribute to the undercounting of some groups. Since 2005, we have reported concerns with the Bureau's management and testing of key IT systems. We have reviewed the status and plans for the testing of key 2010 Census systems. The Bureau has made progress in conducting systems, integration, and end-to-end testing, but critical testing still remains to be performed before systems will be ready to support the 2010 Census, and the planning for the testing needs much improvement. In short, while the Bureau has made some noteworthy progress in gearing up for the enumeration, with just over a year remaining until Census Day, uncertainties surround the Bureau's overall readiness for 2010. |
gao_NSIAD-95-213 | gao_NSIAD-95-213_0 | The largest changes from one year to the next in the 1996 FYDP occur during the last 2 years of the plan when the budget is projected to increase by about $10 billion from 1999 to 2000 and by another $10.4 billion from 2000 to 2001. According to the Secretary of Defense, the 1996 FYDP emphasizes readiness and quality-of-life programs. The budgeted amounts for many operation and maintenance programs changed from the 1995 to the 1996 FYDP resulting in the net increase of $10 billion during the 4 common years, 1996-99. DOD decreased the procurement account in the 4 common years by stretching out the planned buys for some systems to the year 2000 and beyond and by reducing the total acquisition quantities for others. According to the Secretary of Defense, future modernization funds will come from savings achieved through infrastructure reductions and acquisition reforms and from larger future Defense budgets. Specifically, procurement funding estimates are 15 and 24 percent greater in 2000 and 2001 compared with 1999. Congressional action may result in increasing near-term funding for defense, which could mitigate the need for DOD to increase out-year budgets. The June 1995 Concurrent Resolution on the Budget for Fiscal Year 1996 includes over $24 billion more for defense than the President’s budget for fiscal years 1996-2001. The additional funds are expected, in part, to lessen the need for DOD to reduce or defer weapon modernization programs to meet other near-term readiness requirements. Assuming the funds are appropriated, Congress will specify how defense is to spend some of the added funds, but DOD may have an opportunity to restore some programs that were reduced or deferred in the 1996 FYDP. Family Housing
Table 7 shows that, over the common years of the 1995 and 1996 FYDPs, the family housing account increases by about $2.5 billion. Our analysis of the 1996 FYDP shows that savings that have accrued or are expected to accrue from the base closings and force reductions appear to have been offset by increased infrastructure funding requirements primarily for base operations and management headquarters functions and quality-of-life programs. The net effect of these adjustments is a $24.2-billion increase over the period. . . a future-years defense program . | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO compared the Department of Defense's (DOD) fiscal year (FY) 1996 Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) with its FY 1995 FYDP, focusing on: (1) what major program adjustments DOD made from FY 1995 to FY 1996; (2) the implications of these changes for the future; and (3) whether the FY 1996 FYDP complies with statutory requirements.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) the FY 1996 FYDP, which covers FYs 1996-2001, is considerably different from the 1995 FYDP, which covers FYs 1995-99; (2) the total program increased by about $12.6 billion in the 4 common years of both plans (FYs 1996-99); (3) approximately $27 billion in planned weapon system modernization programs for these 4 years have been eliminated, reduced, or deferred to the year 2000 and beyond; (4) the military personnel, operation and maintenance, and family housing accounts increased by over $21 billion during the common period and continue to increase to 2001 to support Defense's emphasis on readiness and quality-of-life programs; (5) the net effect is a more costly defense program, despite substantial reductions in DOD's weapon modernization programs between 1996 and 1999; (6) Defense plans to compensate for the decline in procurement during the early years of the 1996 FYDP by substantially increasing procurement funding in 2000 and 2001; (7) the Secretary of Defense plans to pay for the increased future modernization with a combination of savings from infrastructure reductions and acquisition reforms and from real budget growth; (8) GAO's analysis shows that the 1996 FYDP does not reflect reduced infrastructure costs, primarily because of funding increases for base operation and management headquarters functions and quality-of-life programs; however, the Concurrent Resolution on the Budget for Fiscal Year 1996 includes over $24 billion more for Defense than requested in the President's budget for FYs 1996-2001; (9) the additional budget amounts are expected, in part, to lessen the need for Defense to reduce or defer weapon modernization programs to meet other near-term readiness requirements; (10) assuming the funds are appropriated, Congress will specify how Defense is to spend some of the added funds; however, DOD may have an opportunity to restore some programs that were reduced or deferred to 2000 and beyond; and (11) the additional near-term funding could mitigate the need for DOD to increase out-year budgets. |
gao_GAO-15-713 | gao_GAO-15-713_0 | PCS Per-Move Costs Have Increased Since 2001, and DOD Has Not Evaluated the Factors Contributing to This Increase
DOD has experienced an overall increase in PCS per-move costs since 2001, but it does not have complete, consistent data on the program and has not evaluated the specific factors contributing to per-move cost growth. Our analysis of DOD budget data shows that average PCS per- move costs, after accounting for inflation, increased by 28 percent from fiscal year 2001 to fiscal year 2014. However, we found that the services have not reported complete, consistent PCS data, thereby limiting the extent to which DOD can identify and evaluate changes within the PCS program. Program changes and other factors affect PCS costs, but the specific factors driving the overall growth in per-move costs are unclear, and DOD does not know whether the PCS program is efficiently supporting requirements to assign personnel in new locations. 1). 3). More specifically, when we compared the data reported to Congress in each of the services’ budget justification materials from fiscal years 2010 to 2014, we found that the services did not report complete and consistent data for non-temporary storage costs, temporary lodging expenses, or tour extension incentive payments (see table 2). 2014. DOD guidance specifies time-on- station lengths for U.S. and overseas locations and also allows for personnel to move prior to reaching these lengths if they qualify for an exception or obtain a waiver. However, DOD does not have complete and consistent data on the reasons why PCS moves occur prior to reaching specified lengths, because the services (1) do not maintain required data on their usage of exceptions, and (2) do not have a requirement to maintain data on their usage of waivers. Moreover, service data on time- on-station lengths are limited. For example, each service had different years of available data. In addition, one service provided time-on-station data for officers and enlisted personnel separately, and these data covered different time periods. For more detail on our analysis of the services’ time-on-station data, see appendix V.
OSD’s Report on Increasing Time-on- Station Addressed the Elements in Congressional Direction and Used Approaches Consistent with Generally Accepted Research Standards, but Could Have Contained Additional Information
In its September 2014 report on increasing time-on-station, OSD addressed the elements that were specifically identified in congressional direction. OSD also used approaches consistent with generally accepted research standards in preparing its report. Furthermore, DOD does not conduct periodic evaluations of the PCS program and is not in a position to identify and evaluate changes that may be occurring over time in PCS per-move costs and the factors driving such changes, nor is it in a position to take steps to manage and control cost growth. OSD stated in its September 2014 report to Congress that it is planning to take actions aimed at extending servicemembers’ time- on-station—actions that OSD believes could reduce PCS costs. However, in the absence of more complete and consistent data on both PCS costs and the use of exceptions and waivers, DOD does not have the information it needs for evaluating whether the implementation of its planned actions are effective in extending time-on-station lengths and reducing PCS costs. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve the availability of information needed for effective and efficient management of the PCS program, including program costs and time-on- station requirements, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following four actions:
Direct the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), in coordination with the military services, to improve the completeness and consistency of PCS data in service budget materials. To evaluate the extent to which military personnel are meeting time-on- station requirements by either reaching minimum time-on-station lengths or receiving exceptions and waivers to make a PCS move earlier than planned, we obtained and analyzed available data from the military services on time-on-station lengths and associated waivers and exceptions. To determine the extent to which OSD’s September 2014 report on time- on-station addressed the elements identified in Senate Report 112-196, we used a scorecard methodology. 4. | Why GAO Did This Study
PCS involves moving military personnel to new locations and is a key tool used by the military services to fill assignments both in the United States and overseas. In fiscal year 2014, DOD obligated $4.3 billion for approximately 650,000 servicemember PCS moves.
Senate Report 113-176 included a provision for GAO to report on aspects of the PCS program. This report evaluates the extent to which (1) PCS per-move costs have changed since 2001, (2) military personnel are meeting time-on-station requirements, and (3) OSD's September 2014 study on increasing time-on-station addressed the elements in Senate Report 112-196 and used approaches consistent with generally accepted research standards.
GAO analyzed PCS cost and move data for fiscal years 2001 through 2014 using fiscal year 2014 dollars; obtained and analyzed available time-on-station data; reviewed OSD's September 2014 report to Congress on increasing time-on-station; and interviewed OSD and service officials.
What GAO Found
The Department of Defense (DOD) has experienced an overall increase in Permanent Change of Station (PCS) per-move costs since 2001. GAO's analysis of DOD budget data shows that average PCS per-move costs, after accounting for inflation, increased by 28 percent from fiscal years 2001 to 2014. However, GAO's review of the services' annual budget materials found that the services have not reported complete and consistent PCS data, thereby limiting the extent to which DOD can identify and evaluate changes occurring within the PCS program. For example, the services did not completely or consistently report budget data on non-temporary storage costs, temporary lodging expenses, or tour extension payments. Program changes and factors outside the program can affect PCS costs. The specific factors driving the growth in per-move costs are unclear, however, because DOD does not periodically evaluate whether the PCS program is efficiently supporting requirements to relocate personnel. DOD therefore is not in a position to identify and evaluate changes that may be occurring over time in PCS per-move costs, or to take steps to manage and control cost growth.
DOD does not have information for determining whether personnel are meeting time-on-station requirements. DOD guidance specifies time-on-station lengths for U.S. and overseas locations and also allows for personnel to move prior to reaching these lengths if they qualify for an exception or obtain a waiver. However, DOD does not have complete or consistent data on the reasons why PCS moves occur prior to reaching specified lengths, because the services (1) do not maintain required data on their usage of exceptions and (2) do not have a requirement to maintain data on their usage of waivers. Moreover, availability of service data on time-on-station lengths is limited and varies by service. For example, each service has different years of available data. In addition, one service provided time-on-station data for officers and enlisted personnel separately, and these data covered different time periods.
In its September 2014 report to Congress on increasing time-on-station, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) addressed the elements that were specifically identified in congressional direction. OSD also used approaches consistent with generally accepted research standards in preparing its report. Nonetheless, OSD could have included additional information, such as more explicitly discussing constraints and information about the model used to develop cost savings estimates, and thereby improved the utility of the report for decision makers. The report stated that DOD plans to take actions aimed at extending servicemembers' time-on-station, which OSD believes could reduce PCS costs. However, without more complete and consistent data on both PCS costs and the use of exceptions and waivers, DOD does not have the information it needs for evaluating whether the implementation of its planned actions will be effective in extending time-on-station lengths and reducing PCS costs.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOD, in coordination with the services, take actions to report complete and consistent PCS budget data; conduct periodic evaluations of the PCS program; and address limitations on the availability of data on exceptions and waivers for PCS moves that occur prior to reaching minimum time-on-station lengths. DOD generally agreed with the recommendations. |
gao_GAO-16-52 | gao_GAO-16-52_0 | However, the Foundation did not have formal written policies related to the hiring and separation of employees. Design of internal controls over employee hiring and separations. Foundation officials stated that they had not yet documented these internal control policies and procedures because they focused their efforts during fiscal year 2015 on (1) developing formal written internal control policies and procedures that were identified by the FLT’s risk assessment survey and (2) implementing control activities in areas in which the Foundation has not yet had the opportunity to develop formal written internal control policies and procedures. Conclusions
Since the release of GAO’s report in December 2013, the Foundation has made significant progress in improving its internal control environment, risk assessment, and monitoring activities; designing and implementing internal control activities over certain of its personnel and contracting practices; and designing and implementing internal control activities over its receipts and disbursements activity. In addition, the Foundation had not fully updated and finalized formal written internal control policies and procedures for its contracting practices, including all key internal control activities, such as evidence of management’s receipt and review of contractors’ invoices, and had not established a date by which it planned to complete the action to finalize its policies and procedures for its contracting practices. Until the Foundation fully documents its internal control policies and procedures for certain of its personnel practices, and updates and finalizes its draft guidance for its contracting practices, there is an increased risk that procedures in these areas may not be consistently carried out, which in turn increases the risk that (1) employees could be hired or separated improperly and applicable laws and implementing regulations may not be consistently followed and (2) the Foundation may pay for erroneous amounts billed. Recommendations for Executive Action
We recommend that the Foundation’s Executive Director take the following two actions:
Fully document the Foundation’s internal control policies and procedures related to the hiring and separation of employees. Update the Foundation’s draft written policies and procedures over its contracting practices to include all key internal control activities, issue them in final form, and establish a date by which these actions will be completed. Agency Comments
We provided a draft of this report to the Foundation for comment. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to determine the extent to which the Morris K. Udall and Stewart L. Udall Foundation (Foundation) has (1) made progress in improving its internal control environment, risk assessment, and monitoring activities; (2) designed and implemented effective internal control over certain of its personnel and contracting practices; and (3) designed and implemented effective internal control over its receipts and disbursements activity (consisting of payroll, contracting, and other expense transactions). We also obtained, analyzed, and summarized the Foundation’s written internal control policies and procedures related to receipts and disbursements activity for the 9-month period July 1, 2014, through March 31, 2015, and compared them to the criteria in Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government to determine whether these key control activities were consistent with federal internal control standards. | Why GAO Did This Study
In December 2013, GAO issued a report that described the Foundation's actions to improve its internal control assessment process and its controls over personnel and contracting.
A fiscal year 2015 congressional directive includes a provision for GAO to conduct a follow-up evaluation of the Foundation's internal controls. This report examines the extent to which the Foundation has (1) made progress in improving its internal control environment, risk assessment, and monitoring activities; (2) designed and implemented effective internal control over certain of its personnel and contracting practices; and (3) designed and implemented effective internal control over receipts and disbursements activity.
For the 9-month period July 1, 2014, through March 31, 2015, GAO reviewed relevant Foundation documents, interviewed Foundation management, reviewed key processes, performed observations, and tested transactions for key internal control activities.
What GAO Found
The Morris K. Udall and Stewart L. Udall Foundation (Foundation), an executive branch agency, provides educational opportunities related to environmental policy and Native American health care and tribal policy and assists in resolving environmental disputes that involve federal agencies. Since GAO's 2013 report, the Foundation has made significant improvements to several key areas as detailed below.
The Foundation also has made significant progress designing and implementing internal control activities over certain of its personnel and contracting practices. However, the Foundation has not, as called for under federal internal control standards, (1) fully documented its policies and procedures related to the hiring and separation of employees and (2) updated and finalized its policies and procedures over its contracting practices to include all key internal control activities, such as providing evidence of management's receipt and review of contractors' invoices. Foundation officials stated that they had not yet performed these actions as they have focused their efforts during fiscal year 2015 on developing formal written internal control policies and procedures in areas that were previously identified by Foundation management as significant risks. However, the Foundation's Corrective Action Plan does not include steps to document hiring and separation policies and does not have a completion date for finalizing its contracting policies. Until this is addressed, there is an increased risk that procedures in these areas may not be consistently carried out, which in turn increases the risk that (1) employees could be hired or separated improperly and applicable laws and implementing regulations may not be consistently followed and (2) the Foundation may pay for erroneous amounts billed.
The Foundation also effectively designed and implemented internal controls over its receipts and disbursements activity. The Foundation designed formal written internal control policies and procedures in these areas consistent with federal internal control standards. Based on tests of randomly selected statistical samples of transactions, GAO found that the Foundation effectively implemented key internal control activities over the processing of its receipts and disbursements activity.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the Foundation (1) fully document its internal control policies and procedures related to the hiring and separation of employees and (2) update its draft written policies and procedures over its contracting practices to include all key internal control activities, issue them in final form, and establish a date for completion. In commenting on a draft of this report, the Foundation concurred with the recommendations and stated that they will be included in its 2016 Corrective Action Plan. |
gao_HEHS-98-28 | gao_HEHS-98-28_0 | In August 1997, the Congress amended title I of ERISA to protect plan participants in 401(k) plans that require that employee contributions be invested in employer securities and real property. A 401(k) plan is exempt if the fair market value of the assets of all the defined contribution plans the employer maintains is no more than 10 percent of the fair market value of the assets of all the employer’s pension plans. Employer-directed plans covered 1.4 million participants and had $12.3 billion invested in employer securities and real property. 1.) Most 401(k) Plan Participants Directed Investment of Their Own Contributions
Important to the issue of the need for protections for 401(k) plan investments are the number of 401(k) plans that are employer directed and the number of participants in those plans. Many Participants Have No Control Over Investments in Employer-Directed Plans
Despite the concentration of participants and employer securities and real property in participant-directed supplemental plans, 756 employer- directed plans in 1993 had almost 1.4 million participants and about $12.3 billion invested in employer securities and real property. 2.) The 10-percent limitation rule alone, however, cannot prevent a plan from investing employee contributions in employer securities and real property whose value is declining. In addition, certain information needed to implement and enforce the section 1524 provisions is not readily available. Changes have been proposed to the Form 5500, which, if implemented, may remedy some of the data deficiencies we identified before section 1524 goes into effect in 1999. Extent of Employer Securities and Real Property Investments Cannot Be Readily Identified
Although the section 1524 provisions apply to 401(k) plans that require that employee contributions be invested in employer securities and real property, it may be difficult to determine the amount of employer securities and real property owned by these plans. Two mechanisms— enhanced reporting and disclosure and prescribed education programs— identified during our review could be administratively implemented under existing authority provided in title I of ERISA. Two other mechanisms— adoption of the diversification requirement used for ESOPs and use of independent fiduciaries to examine investment decisions—would require the Congress to add or amend statutory requirements. To examine the protections provided by and any potential problems associated with the recent amendments to ERISA, we discussed the amendments with officials of the Departments of Labor and Treasury. A recorded menu will provide information on how to obtain these lists. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on: (1) the extent to which 401(k) plan assets are invested in employer securities and real property; (2) the protection and any possible problems associated with the recent amendments to title I of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA); and (3) alternate mechanisms that might safeguard the retirement benefits of participants in 401(k) plans in which the employer decides how to invest assets.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) only 2,449 of about 160,000 401(k) plans owned employer securities or real property in 1993; (2) these plans owned $53 billion of employer securities and real property and covered 5.3 million plan participants; (3) in most of these plans, plan participants directed the investment of their own contributions; (4) plans for which the employer solely decided how to invest assets totalled 756; (5) in these plans, employees exercised no control over how their 401(k) plan assets were invested and the employer made all the investment decisions; (6) these plans covered 1.4 million participants and had $12.3 billion invested in employer securities and real property; (7) in August 1997, the Congress amended title I of ERISA to provide that not more than 10 percent of employee contributions be invested in employer securities and real property by defined contribution 401(k) plans requiring that employee contributions be invested in this way; (8) this change increases protection for 401(k) plan participants; (9) the 10-percent limitation rule alone does not, however, prevent plans from investing employee contributions in employer securities and real property whose value is declining; (10) some of the information needed to implement and enforce the new legislation is not readily available; (11) proposed changes to the Department of Labor's Form 5500, if implemented, may remedy some of the data deficiencies; (12) other mechanisms are available to policymakers if alternate safeguards are needed in the future; and (13) these mechanisms include enhanced reporting and disclosure, prescribed education programs, adoption of the diversification requirement used for employee stock option ownership plans, and use of independent fiduciaries to examine investment decisions. |
gao_GAO-03-706 | gao_GAO-03-706_0 | The DMRT effort, focused on deficiencies in depot maintenance processes. More than 300 barriers to depot maintenance operational and financial performance were identified and consolidated into more than 40 major issues organized around 8 overarching focus areas. All 24 of the spare parts related initiatives have been started. This lack of alignment with the Air Force Strategic Plan’s performance measures and targets means that the service cannot measure the contribution of the actions it takes in response to the subordinate plans toward overcoming spare parts shortages and be assured that implementing the subordinate plans will mitigate critical spare parts shortages and give the Air Force its greatest readiness return on investment. Initiatives Might Help Mitigate Spare Parts Shortages, but Their Potential Effectiveness Is Limited
Key logistics initiatives being implemented by the Air Force may help to mitigate spare parts shortages, but their potential effectiveness is limited for several reasons. The Air Force also chose not to use the results of one of its initiatives, which identified a new consolidated requirement for spare parts; consequently, additional spare parts shortages could occur. Lastly, management problems identified by an Air Force review team in 2002 have hampered implementation of the initiatives, and its new directorate, established in February 2003, has not established a plan or priorities to address these problems. Air Force Has Not Started All Initiatives
In 2001, the Air Force identified 43 initiatives to improve processes related to spare parts shortages—19 as part of the Spares Campaign and 24 as part of the DMRT. The remaining 12 initiatives have not been started because the Air Force said it did not have the needed personnel and funding. Most Initiatives Lack Output-Related Performance Measures and Targets
Twenty-three of the 31 Air Force initiatives that have been started lack output-related performance measures and targets. However, in its fiscal year 2004 budget the service chose to only request $5.3 billion. However, the Air Force cautioned that increased supply availability does not automatically result in increased mission capable (readiness) rates because other factors, such as maintenance and transportation, affect these rates. By not adopting specific performance measures and targets related to mitigating the critical spare parts shortages into subordinate plans and initiatives, following through on initiatives to address the causes of parts shortages and determine spare parts requirements, and resolving program management deficiencies, the Air Force has little assurance that its program emphasis and initiatives will improve spare-parts-related readiness. To determine whether the strategic plans address the mitigation of spare parts shortages, we reviewed the Air Force Strategic Plan, its two subordinate plans—Logistics Support Plan and Supply Strategic Plan— as well as other strategic planning documents and interviewed officials to determine whether these plans included key actions targeted at mitigating critical spare parts shortages and improving readiness. Major contributors to this report are included in appendix V.
Appendix I: Air Force Projected Aircraft Supply Availability Rates for Fiscal Year 2004
In response to a recommendation in the Inventory Management Study of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Air Force included supply availability rates for its weapons systems in its fiscal year 2004 budget submission. As shown in table 4, the Air Force projected aircraft supply availability rates ranging from 73 percent to 100 percent based on requested funding of approximately $5.3 billion. Continue to assess impact of data systems on 1st level supervisor’s time. | Why GAO Did This Study
Despite reporting $10.5 billion in appropriations spent on spare parts since fiscal year 2000, the Air Force continues to report shortages of spare parts. The service has taken numerous actions to address these shortages. GAO examined whether the Air Force's strategic plan addresses the mitigation of spare parts shortages, whether key initiatives are likely to mitigate the shortages, and the impact on readiness identified from increased investments for spare parts.
What GAO Found
The Air Force Strategic Plan generally provides an appropriate framework for mitigating spare parts shortages. However, one of two subordinate plans does not contain performance measures and targets linked to the strategic plan, and the other does not contain any performance targets. Therefore, the Air Force is not in a position to determine if the actions taken pursuant to its subordinate plans overcome spare parts shortages and provide assurance that it is getting the greatest readiness return on its spare parts investment. Key logistics initiatives under the Spares Campaign and Depot Maintenance Reengineering and Transformation (DMRT) efforts may help to mitigate spare parts shortages, but the initiatives' potential effectiveness is limited because of some key problems. First, the Air Force is not starting all identified initiatives that relate to the causes of shortages because it did not have needed personnel and funding. It assessed its logistics processes and identified more than 80 initiatives to solve more than 300 deficiencies; 43 initiatives were to improve processes that affect spare parts shortages, with about half relating to depot maintenance and the other half to supply. Although all depot maintenance-related initiatives have been started, 12 of the supply related initiatives have not been started. Second, 23 of the 31 initiatives lack both output-related performance measures and targets. Without output-related measures and targets to assess the initiatives' impact, the Air Force has little means of determining the extent to which it has successfully mitigated spare parts shortages and improved readiness. Third, the Air Force chose not to use the results of one of its initiatives, which identified a new total spares requirement as the basis for its fiscal year 2004 budget request. This decision resulted in a $578 million unfunded spare parts requirement. Finally, management problems--including failure to articulate the need for change, a lack of top-level commitment, and failure to address organizational issues--have hampered implementation of the initiatives. In February 2003, the Air Force established the Innovation and Transformation Directorate to address these problems, but its plans and priorities have not been set. The Air Force can estimate the impact of increased funding on individual weapon systems' supply availability and has done so. Based on its approximately $5.3 billion fiscal year 2004 spare parts budget request, the Air Force reported that aircraft supply availability would range from 73 to 100 percent. However, it cautioned that higher supply availability does not automatically result in higher mission capable rates because of other factors. |
gao_GAO-11-34 | gao_GAO-11-34_0 | For onshore federal leases, operators reported to OGOR that about 0.13 percent of the natural gas produced was vented and flared, while EPA estimates showed the volume to be about 4.2 percent, and estimates based on WRAP data showed it to be as high as 5 percent. Similarly, for offshore federal leases, operators reported to OGOR that 0.5 percent of the natural gas produced was vented and flared, while data in BOEMRE’s GOADS system––a database that focuses on the impacts of offshore oil and gas exploration, development, and production on air quality in the Gulf of Mexico region––showed that volume to be about 1.4 percent, and estimates from EPA showed it to be about 2.3 percent. With these additional sources, EPA’s estimates are around 30 times higher than the volumes operators reported to OGOR. Available Technologies Could Reduce About 40 Percent of Natural Gas Estimated to Be Lost to Venting and Flaring on Onshore Federal Leases, Potentially Increasing Federal Royalty Payments and Reducing Greenhouse Gas Emissions
Data from EPA, supported by information obtained from technology vendors and our analysis of WRAP data, suggest that about 40 percent of natural gas estimated to be vented and flared on federal onshore leases could be economically captured with currently available control technologies, although some barriers to their increased use exist. Such captures could increase federal royalty payments and reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Although EPA does not have a direct regulatory role with respect to managing federal oil and gas leases, its Natural Gas STAR program has helped to reduce vented gas on federal leases according to EPA and industry participants. BLM and BOEMRE Have Taken Steps to Minimize Venting and Flaring on Federal Leases, but Their Oversight Has Several Limitations
As part of their oversight responsibilities, Interior’s BLM and BOEMRE are charged with minimizing the waste of federal resources, and, to that end, both agencies have issued regulations and guidance that limit venting and flaring of gas during routine procedures such as liquid unloading and well completions. However, their oversight has several limitations, namely (1) the regulations and guidance do not address new capture technologies or all sources of lost gas; (2) the agencies do not assess options for reducing venting and flaring in advance of oil and gas production for purposes other than addressing air quality; and (3) the agencies have not developed or do not use information regarding available technologies that could reduce venting and flaring. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to (1) examine available estimates of vented and flared natural gas on federal leases; (2) estimate the potential to capture additional vented and flared natural gas with available technologies and the associated potential increases in royalty payments and reductions in greenhouse gas emissions and; (3) assess the federal role in reducing venting and flaring of natural gas. To examine available estimates of vented and flared natural gas on federal leases, we collected data from the Department of the Interior’s (Interior) Bureau of Land Management (BLM), Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement (BOEMRE), including BOEMRE’s Minerals Revenue Management (MRM) program; the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA); and the Western Regional Air Partnership (WRAP). We also interviewed staff from these agencies and oil and gas producers operating on federal leases regarding venting and flaring data collection, analysis, and reporting. EPA adjusted its estimates to account for the industry’s efforts to control some venting and flaring emissions. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of the Interior (Interior) leases public lands for oil and natural gas development, which generated about $9 billion in royalties in 2009. Some gas produced on these leases cannot be easily captured and is released (vented) directly to the atmosphere or is burned (flared). This vented and flared gas represents potential lost royalties for Interior and contributes to greenhouse gas emissions. GAO was asked to (1) examine available estimates of the vented and flared natural gas on federal leases, (2) estimate the potential to capture additional gas with available technologies and associated potential increases in royalty payments and decreases in greenhouse gas emissions, and (3) assess the federal role in reducing venting and flaring. In addressing these objectives, GAO analyzed data from Interior, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and others and interviewed agency and industry officials.
What GAO Found
Estimates of vented and flared natural gas for federal leases vary considerably, and GAO found that data collected by Interior to track venting and flaring on federal leases likely underestimate venting and flaring because they do not account for all sources of lost gas. For onshore federal leases, operators reported to Interior that about 0.13 percent of produced gas was vented or flared. Estimates from EPA and the Western Regional Air Partnership (WRAP) showed volumes as high as 30 times higher. Similarly, for offshore federal leases, operators reported that 0.5 percent of the natural gas produced was vented and flared, while data from an Interior offshore air quality study showed that volume to be about 1.4 percent, and estimates from EPA showed it to be about 2.3 percent. GAO found that the volumes operators reported to Interior do not fully account for some ongoing losses such as the emissions from gas dehydration equipment or from thousands of valves--key sources in the EPA, WRAP, and Interior offshore air quality studies. Data from EPA, supported by information obtained from technology vendors and GAO analysis, suggest that around 40 percent of natural gas estimated to be vented and flared on onshore federal leases could be economically captured with currently available control technologies. According to GAO analysis, such reductions could increase federal royalty payments by about $23 million annually and reduce greenhouse gas emissions by an amount equivalent to about 16.5 million metric tons of CO2--the annual emissions equivalent of 3.1 million cars. Venting and flaring reductions are also possible offshore, but data were not available for GAO to develop a complete estimate. As part of its oversight responsibilities, Interior is charged with minimizing vented and flared gas on federal leases. To minimize lost gas, Interior has issued regulations and guidance that limit venting and flaring during routine procedures. However, Interior's oversight efforts to minimize these losses have several limitations, including that its regulations and guidance do not address some significant sources of lost gas, despite available control technologies to potentially reduce them. Although EPA does not have a role in managing federal leases, it has voluntarily collaborated with the oil and gas industry through its Natural Gas STAR program, which encourages oil and gas producers to use gas saving technology, and through which operators reported venting reductions totaling about 0.4 percent of natural gas production in 2008.
What GAO Recommends
To reduce lost gas, increase royalties, and reduce greenhouse gas emissions, GAO recommends that Interior improve its venting and flaring data and address limitations in its regulations and guidance. Interior generally concurred with these recommendations. |
gao_GAO-03-1110T | gao_GAO-03-1110T_0 | The Rural Development Act and Other Federal Location Policies
When considering areas in which to locate, RDA directs the heads of all executive departments and agencies of the government to establish and maintain departmental policies and procedures giving first priority to the location of new offices and other facilities in rural areas. Agencies Generally Locate in Urban Areas and Lack Policies and Procedures for Considering RDA
In 1990, we reviewed whether federal agencies give rural areas first priority in location decisions as required by RDA and whether any changes in federal location policies were warranted. We reported that RDA had not been an important factor in federal facility location decisions. We concluded that there were multiple laws and regulations guiding federal agencies in selecting facility locations, but they do not always provide for consideration of the best financial interest of the government as a factor in the decision-making process. The percentage of federal employees located in nonmetropolitan statistical areas in 2000 remained virtually unchanged from 1989, at about 12 percent. Agencies said they selected urban areas primarily because of the need to be near agency clients and related government and private sector facilities to accomplish their missions. The agencies that selected rural areas said they did so because of lower real estate costs. For rural areas, barriers included the lack of public transportation, location far from other agency facilities, and insufficient infrastructure for high-speed telecommunications. The functions that were located predominantly in rural areas in that period were research and development, supply and storage, automated data processing, and finance and accounting. These actions responded to all of our July 2001 recommendations with the exception of one. However, the departments said that in spite of not having written policies or procedures, they had located many of their facilities in rural areas. The IG reported that of the 270 locations established in the last 5 years, 197 (73 percent) were located in rural areas. The Justice IG cited the GSA regulation requiring agencies to give first priority to the location of new offices and other facilities in rural areas. Attorneys Offices and the U.S. The Bureau of Prisons is located in rural areas to decrease land costs and increase security. Federal Telework Efforts are Improving but Limited
Telework could be used to allow federal workers who live in rural areas to work in or near their homes, at least on a part-time basis. For over a decade, telework, also called telecommuting or flexiplace, has gained popularity because it offers the potential to benefit employers, including the federal government, by reducing traffic congestion and pollution, improving the recruitment and retention of employees, increasing productivity, and reducing the need for office space. Congress has enacted legislation that has promoted the use of telework in several ways, including authorizing GSA telework centers, requiring each agency to consider using alternate workplace arrangements when considering whether to acquire space for use by employees, requiring each agency to establish a policy under which eligible employees may participate in telecommuting to the maximum extent possible, and encouraging the deployment of high-speed Internet access in rural areas. In July 2003 we reported on the federal government’s progress in implementing telework programs. We recommended that OPM and GSA improve the coordination of their efforts to provide federal agencies with enhanced support and guidance related to telework and to assist agencies in implementing 25 key practices we identified. Nevertheless, technological issues, such as not being able to access to high-speed Internet connections, could have a detrimental effect on the ability of some federal workers in rural areas to take advantage of telework. In August 2000, FCC concluded that advanced telecommunications capability was being deployed in a reasonable and timely fashion overall, although rural, minority, low-income, inner city, tribal, and U.S. territory consumers were particularly vulnerable to not receiving service in a timely fashion. According to CRS, about 85 percent of households have access to broadband. | Why GAO Did This Study
The location of an organization's facilities has far reaching and long-lasting impacts on its operational costs and ability to attract and retain workers. The Rural Development Act of 1972 has required federal agencies to give first priority to locating new offices and other facilities in rural areas. Rural areas generally have lower real estate and labor costs, but agency missions often require locations in urban areas. Telework, also called telecommunicating or flexiplace, is a tool that allows employees to work at home or another work location other than a traditional office. Benefits of telework include reducing traffic congestion, improving the recruitment and retention of workers, and reducing the need for office space. Telework could allow federal workers who live in rural areas to work in or near their homes, at least some of the time. This testimony summarizes and updates work GAO has previously done on the progress in and barriers to the federal government's efforts to locate its operations and workers, when possible, in rural areas.
What GAO Found
Even though federal agencies have been required since 1972 to develop policies and procedures to give priority to locating new offices and other facilities in rural areas, this requirement has not been an important factor in location decisions. In September 1990 we reported that there were multiple laws and regulations to guide federal agencies in selecting facility locations, but they did not always provide for consideration of the best financial interest of the government as a factor in the decision-making process. In July 2001 we reported that many agencies had not issued policies and procedures to give rural areas priority when considering the location of new facilities. Only about 12 percent of federal workers were located in nonmetropolitan statistical areas, a percentage that remained unchanged from 1989 to 2000. Agencies said the need to be near clients, primarily in urban areas, dictated the location of most operations in urban areas. In spite of not having policies to give priority to rural areas, agencies sometimes locate their operations in rural areas to serve clients in those areas. Also, some functions, such as research and development, supply and storage, automated data processing, and finance and accounting, can be located in rural areas. Rural areas can offer lower real estate costs, improved security, reduced parking and traffic congestion problems, and better access to major transportation arteries. Potential barriers to locating in rural areas include the lack of public transportation, lack of available labor, location far from some other agency facilities, and sometimes insufficient infrastructure for high-speed telecommunications. In our July 2001 report, we made several recommendations to the General Services Administration and Congress to improve location decisionmaking. Congress and the General Services Administration subsequently took action to stress the requirements of the Rural Development Act. Congress has promoted telework in several ways, including authorizing of telework centers in the Washington, D.C., area, requiring agencies to establish a policy under which employees may participate in telecommuting to the maximum extent possible, and encouraging the development of high-speed Internet access in rural areas. However, only about 5 percent of the federal workforce is currently teleworking. In our July 2003 report, we recommended that the General Services Administration and the Office of Personnel Management improve their coordination and provide agencies with more consistent guidance on telework and assist agencies in implementing key practices we identified. The agencies generally agreed with our recommendations and committed to implement them. In addition, the Congressional Research Service reported in July 2003 that about 85 percent of U.S. households have broadband access, although rural, minority, low-income, inner city, tribal, and U.S. territory consumers are particularly vulnerable to not receiving this service. Technological barriers, such as the lack of access to high-speed Internet connections, could have a detrimental effect on the ability of some federal workers in rural areas to take advantage of telework. |
gao_GAO-13-809 | gao_GAO-13-809_0 | Together, USAID and the U.S. FTF partner agencies allocated $7 billion for global food security programs in fiscal years 2010 through 2013. USAID Has Made Progress in Coordinating with U.S. FTF Partner Agencies through Its Whole-of-Government Approach
USAID has made progress in applying FTF’s whole-of-government approach by coordinating and integrating U.S. FTF partner agencies’ knowledge and expertise at three levels: at headquarters in Washington, D.C.; in each of the 19 FTF focus countries; and between the countries and headquarters. For example, our survey of U.S. FTF representatives in 19 FTF focus countries shows that 93 percent of the U.S. FTF partner agency representatives reported coordinating with USAID and approximately 80 percent of all U.S. FTF representatives reported coordinating with their headquarters office. In reports issued in 2008 and 2010, we found that vulnerabilities in U.S. food security efforts included the lack of government-wide efforts such as an integrated strategy for food security, data management systems, and leveraging knowledge and expertise through coordination efforts such as food security working groups. USAID and the FTF partner agencies agreed on this centralized system and common indicators for tracking food security programs and progress across agencies. USAID Has Taken Steps to Facilitate a Country-Led Approach
We found that USAID has taken steps to facilitate a country-led approach. In our survey of U.S. FTF agency representatives in the 19 FTF focus countries, USAID and partner agency representatives reported that multiple stakeholders were included in the planning and implementation of FTF: host governments, nonprofit organizations, donors, and for-profit entities. In our March 2010 report, we found that the country-led approach was vulnerable to a number of risks, including the weak capacity of host governments to meet funding commitments for agriculture and difficulties aligning host government and donor strategies due to differences in policy priorities. USAID Did Not Systematically Assess Risks Related to the Country-Led Approach in Its Multiyear Country Strategies
Although USAID has made some progress at the headquarters level to monitor and address risks to the country-led approach, we found that USAID’s FTF multiyear country strategies did not systematically assess these risks. We found that fewer than half of the risks identified had corresponding discussions of mitigation strategies. Without requirements for FTF country staff to identify and mitigate risks associated with the country-led approach, the U.S. government’s ability to achieve its goals for improving global food security could be limited. Progress achieved in U.S. interagency coordination and engagement with country stakeholders can enhance U.S. efforts in FTF countries to improve agriculture productivity and reduce malnutrition among children. Although USAID guidance documents indicate that country teams must assess risks associated with USAID’s development objectives, the agency does not require FTF country teams to systematically assess and mitigate risks to the FTF’s country-led approach. Recommendations for Executive Action
To ensure that risks related to the country-led approach are systematically assessed, we recommend that the USAID Administrator take the following two actions: require FTF country staff to conduct periodic risk assessments associated with pursuing a country-led approach and require FTF country staff to develop plans to mitigate any risks identified as part of its periodic risk assessments. This report specifically examines (1) the extent to which the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) has applied a whole-of-government approach and (2) how USAID has facilitated a country-led approach for the Feed the Future (FTF) initiative. To determine the extent to which USAID and FTF partner agency representatives believe that they were implementing a whole-of- government approach and country-led approach in planning and implementing FTF, we conducted interviews with officials in Washington, D.C., from USAID, Department of State (State), Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), Department of the Treasury (Treasury), Department of Agriculture (USDA), the Peace Corps, U.S. African Development Foundation (USADF), Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), and the Office of Management and Budget. | Why GAO Did This Study
In fiscal years 2010 through 2013, the U.S. government allocated $7 billion to implement global food security programs implemented under the FTF initiative by USAID and its U.S. FTF partner agencies, which include the Departments of Agriculture, State, and the Treasury, and the Millennium Challenge Corporation. To enhance FTF efforts to increase agricultural productivity and reduce malnutrition in 19 chronically food insecure countries, USAID has outlined two approaches: an FTF whole-of-government approach, which aims to improve coordination and integrate expertise and resources of all FTF partner agencies, and a country-led approach to build country capacity to sustain U.S. efforts by including the host government and other stakeholders in planning and implementation.
GAO was asked to study the FTF initiative. GAO examined (1) the extent to which USAID has implemented a whole-of-government approach and (2) how USAID has facilitated a country-led approach. GAO analyzed FTF-related agency documents, conducted a survey of all USAID and U.S. FTF partner agency representatives implementing FTF in 19 focus countries, and interviewed FTF agency officials in Washington, D.C.
What GAO Found
The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) has made progress in coordinating with U.S. partner agencies through the whole-of-government approach for the Feed the Future (FTF) initiative that began in 2010. According to USAID documents, this approach involves coordination and integration of expertise and resources across U.S. partner agencies with global food security programs. In reports issued in 2008 and 2010, GAO found that U.S. agency food security efforts were fragmented and uncoordinated. Under FTF, GAO found that USAID leads the whole-of-government approach by better coordinating and integrating partner agencies' knowledge and expertise at three levels: at headquarters in Washington, D.C.; in each of the 19 FTF focus countries; and between the countries and headquarters. In headquarters, USAID and FTF partner agencies established joint strategies and new data management systems to track funding and results across the U.S. government. At the country level, in GAO's survey of U.S. FTF partner agency representatives in 19 FTF focus countries, 93 percent reported coordinating with USAID.
USAID has facilitated a country-led approach but has not systematically assessed risks associated with this approach. USAID has facilitated the approach by providing assistance to the host governments in developing country plans and coordinating on FTF with country stakeholders, including nonprofit and for-profit organizations. U.S. FTF partner agency representatives answering GAO's survey reported working with multiple country stakeholders on FTF. In its March 2010 report, GAO found that the country-led approach was vulnerable to a number of risks, including insufficient capacity of host governments to meet funding commitments for agriculture. USAID has since made some progress in monitoring these risks, including tracking the number of focus countries that increase public expenditure for agriculture. However, GAO's current study found that USAID's FTF multiyear country strategies did not systematically assess risks to the country-led approach. For example, 12 of the 19 strategies did not contain sections discussing assessments of risks such as the host government's insufficient capacity and policies that inhibit private sector investment. GAO also found that fewer than half of the risks identified had corresponding discussions of mitigation strategies. Although USAID country guidance documents indicate that country teams must assess risks associated with USAID's development objectives, the agency does not require country teams to systematically assess and mitigate risks to the country-led approach. Without requirements for FTF country staff to identify and mitigate risks associated with the country-led approach, the U.S. government's ability to achieve its goals for improving global food security could be limited.
What GAO Recommends
The USAID Administrator should require FTF country staff to conduct periodic risk assessments associated with pursuing a country-led approach and to develop plans to mitigate the risks identified. USAID concurred with the recommendations. |
gao_RCED-95-14 | gao_RCED-95-14_0 | This resulted in facilities and equipment being distributed in a fairly equal manner among FAA’s nine regional offices on the basis of the priority assigned by each regional office and the availability of the regional office’s work force to implement the projects. However, we found that FAA generally did not rank locations numerically from a national perspective, use benefit-cost analysis as a tool for ranking eligible locations, and document the factors used to select certain locations over others. Opportunities to Improve FAA’s Process for Locating Facilities and Equipment
While we found that FAA’s process for selecting locations for facilities and equipment generally complied with the agency’s current guidance, we believe that it could be improved if FAA ranked locations numerically from a national perspective, considered the results of benefit-cost analyses as a key factor when appropriate, and documented the rationale for its decisions. Current FAA guidance does not require a numerical ranking of locations on a national basis, define what emphasis should be given to location-specific benefit-cost analyses and other factors, or specify what documentation is required when evaluating and selecting locations. This would allow FAA to rank eligible locations from a national perspective and help ensure that scarce facilities and equipment resources are targeted to the highest-priority needs. The officials said that given budget constraints, congressionally directed locations, and limited regional office work forces, FAA does a good job in allocating facilities and equipment to high-priority locations. Description and Funding History for Three Terminal Modernization Projects
The following are general descriptions and funding histories for the three Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) terminal modernization projects that we reviewed. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) process for selecting locations for its three terminal area projects, focusing on how FAA: (1) prioritizes locations; (2) analyzes the costs and benefits of its decisions; (3) documents its location decisions; and (4) could improve its decisionmaking process.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) FAA has funded the three projects in accordance with its own guidance and has fairly distributed facilities and equipment among its nine regional offices on a priority basis; (2) although FAA bases its project funding decisions on the availability of regional staff to implement the projects, it generally does not rank locations nationally or numerically, use cost-benefit analyses to rank eligible locations, or document the factors used to prioritize certain locations; (3) FAA believes that its approach for locating facilities and distributing equipment ensures that its limited resources are targeted to high-priority needs; (4) FAA believes that ranking each location on a national basis would be cost-prohibitive, create tensions among regional offices, favor large airports, and exclude safety factors that outweigh economic considerations; (5) current FAA guidance does not include provisions that specify how prospective locations will be evaluated; (6) FAA needs to develop a more analytically based decisionmaking process for ranking eligible locations; and (7) improved selection guidance could help FAA better ensure that it is making the best use of available resources in allocating facilities and equipment to high-priority locations. |
gao_GAO-13-853T | gao_GAO-13-853T_0 | Development and implementation of a biometric exit capability has been a long-standing challenge for DHS. Since 2004, we have issued a number of reports on DHS’s efforts to implement a biometric entry and exit system. In July 2013, we reported that, according to DHS officials, the challenges DHS identified in October 2010 continue to affect the department’s ability to implement a biometric air exit system. For example, at the time of our 2006 report, DHS officials stated that implementing a biometric exit system at land ports of entry would require new infrastructure and would produce major traffic congestion because travelers would have to stop their vehicles upon exit to be processed. As a result, as of April 2013, according to DHS officials, the department’s planning efforts focus on developing a biometric exit capability for airports, with the potential for a similar solution to be implemented at seaports, and DHS’s planning documents, as of June 2013, do not address plans for a biometric exit capability at land ports of entry. Our July 2013 report found that since April 2011, DHS has taken various actions to improve its collection and use of biographic data to identify potential overstays. departure from the United States, DHS will be able to use Canadian entry data as proxies for U.S. departure records. In May 2012, DHS reported internally on the results of S&T’s analysis of previous air exit pilot programs and assessment of available technologies, and the report made recommendations to support the planning and development In that report, DHS concluded that the of a biometric air exit capability.building blocks to implement an effective biometric air exit system were available. In summary, we concluded in our July 2013 report that without robust planning that includes time frames and milestones to develop and implement an evaluation framework for this assessment, DHS lacks reasonable assurance that it will be able to provide this assessment to Congress for the fiscal year 2016 budget cycle as planned. Furthermore, any delays in providing this information to Congress could further affect possible implementation of a biometric exit system to address statutory requirements. Therefore, we recommended that the Secretary of Homeland Security establish time frames and milestones for developing and implementing an evaluation framework to be used in conducting the department’s assessment of biometric exit options. DHS concurred with this recommendation and indicated that its component agencies plan to finalize the goals and objectives for biometric air exit by January 31, 2014, and that these goals and objectives will be used in the development of an evaluation framework that DHS expects to have completed by June 30, 2014. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. | Why GAO Did This Study
This testimony discusses the status of the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) efforts to implement a biometric exit system. Beginning in 1996, federal law has required the implementation of an entry and exit data system to track foreign nationals entering and leaving the United States. The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 required the Secretary of Homeland Security to develop a plan to accelerate implementation of a biometric entry and exit data system that matches available information provided by foreign nationals upon their arrival in and departure from the United States. In 2003, DHS initiated the U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US-VISIT) program to develop a system to collect biographic data (such as name and date of birth) and biometric data (such as fingerprints) from foreign nationals at U.S. ports of entry. Since 2004, DHS has tracked foreign nationals' entries into the United States as part of an effort to comply with legislative requirements, and since December 2006, a biometric entry capability has been fully operational at all air, sea, and land ports of entry.
However, GAO has identified a range of management challenges that DHS has faced in its effort to fully deploy a corresponding biometric exit capability to track foreign nationals when they depart the country. For example, in November 2009, GAO found that DHS had not adopted an integrated approach to scheduling, executing, and tracking the work that needed to be accomplished to deliver a biometric exit system. In these reports, GAO made recommendations intended to help ensure that a biometric exit capability was planned, designed, developed, and implemented in an effective and efficient manner. DHS generally agreed with our recommendations and has taken action to implement a number of them. Most recently, in July 2013, GAO reported on DHS's progress in developing and implementing a biometric exit system, as well as DHS's efforts to identify and address potential overstays--individuals who were admitted into the country legally on a temporary basis but then overstayed their authorized period of admission.
This statement is based on GAO's July 2013 report and, like that report, discusses the extent to which DHS has made progress in developing and implementing a biometric exit system at air ports of entry, which is DHS's priority for a biometric exit capability.
What GAO Found
GAO concluded in its July 2013 report that without robust planning that includes time frames and milestones to develop and implement an evaluation framework for this assessment, DHS lacks reasonable assurance that it will be able to provide this assessment to Congress for the fiscal year 2016 budget cycle as planned. Furthermore, any delays in providing this information to Congress could further affect possible implementation of a biometric exit system to address statutory requirements. Therefore, GAO recommended that the Secretary of Homeland Security establish time frames and milestones for developing and implementing an evaluation framework to be used in conducting the department's assessment of biometric exit options. DHS concurred with this recommendation and indicated that its component agencies plan to finalize the goals and objectives for biometric air exit by January 31, 2014, and that these goals and objectives will be used in the development of an evaluation framework that DHS expects to have completed by June 30, 2014. |
gao_RCED-95-67 | gao_RCED-95-67_0 | States Are Making Slow Progress on Developing New Disposal Facilities
As of January 1995, 11 states had plans to develop disposal facilities for commercially generated low-level waste, and the state of Washington planned to continue operating its existing disposal facility. Slow Progress Is Due to Controversy Over Disposal Facilities
The limited progress states have made in developing new facilities for disposing of commercially generated low-level waste appears to be fundamentally due to the controversial nature of such facilities. Currently, 11 new facilities are planned in addition to the state of Washington’s existing facility. Studies by DOE and others that examine economic aspects of low-level radioactive waste facilities have concluded that fewer larger new facilities could accommodate current waste volumes at less cost than a larger number of small facilities. In the initial years (1963 to 1971) of commercially generated low-level waste disposal, the volume of waste and the number of sites increased. 3.1.) California has licensed a facility, but environmental concerns remain unresolved. According to the director, alternatives to the current approach would have to come from the states themselves. Second, states with substantial federal lands have opposed efforts to place waste disposal facilities within their borders. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed state efforts to dispose of the low-level radioactive waste that is generated commercially within their borders.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) 11 states plan to develop commercially generated low-level waste disposal facilities and the state of Washington plans to continue operating its existing disposal facility; (2) 4 states plan to complete facilities between 1997 and 2002, but the remaining states have yet to develop plans for their disposal facilities; (3) the slow progress of development is due to the controversial nature of nuclear waste disposal; (4) a smaller number of larger new facilities could accommodate the current volume of waste at less cost than a greater number of smaller facilities, but the volume of low-level waste could increase in the near future; (5) although new facilities will be necessary to store the waste in 33 states, the environmental effects of having 11 new facilities are unclear; and (6) shifting disposal responsibility from the states to the federal government could present significant challenges, and could undermine state progress in implementing the existing state approach. |
gao_GGD-99-14 | gao_GGD-99-14_0 | Also, 10 of the 41 small agencies and independent entities expressed these concerns.These organizations’ concerns generally fall into the categories of difficulty in recruiting and retaining internal staff and in obtaining contractor support. Full Extent and Severity of Year 2000 Workforce Issue Is Unclear
Although a significant number of agencies are reporting concerns with the availability of qualified Year 2000 staff, it is not possible to determine the full extent or severity of personnel shortages from these concerns because they are often anecdotal. Executive Councils and OPM Have Begun to Respond to Reported Year 2000 Personnel Issues
OPM, the Conversion Council, and the CIO Council have various initiatives underway to address Year 2000 personnel issues: OPM has provided tools to assist agencies in dealing with Year 2000 workforce issues; the Conversion Council is identifying solutions to personnel shortages in both the government and the private sector; and the CIO Council has initiated a broad study of information technology workforce issues in the government and private sector. Recommendations
Given the likelihood that critical government operations will cease if key systems are not made Year 2000 compliant, we recommend that the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, as part of the agency’s monitoring responsibilities for the government’s Year 2000 program, determine if recent OPM initiatives have satisfactorily addressed agencies’ reported personnel problems. Scope and Methodology
To determine the nature and extent of the Year 2000 personnel issues being reported by federal agencies, we reviewed and analyzed the Year 2000 progress reports submitted to OMB by 24 large agencies in February, May, and August 1998, by 40 of the 41 small agencies and entities in April and May 1998, and by 9 of those same small agencies and entities that were requested to report in August 1998. To identify what is being done to address personnel shortages related to the Year 2000 problem, we evaluated the Year 2000 personnel efforts of OPM, the Human Resources Technology Council, and the CIO Council’s Education and Training and Year 2000 Committees. We provided a draft of this report to the Chair of the President’s Council on Year 2000 Conversion, the Chair of the CIO Council, and OPM and OMB management and incorporated their comments as appropriate. The department reported that it continues to experience difficulties in finding and hiring qualified information technology personnel. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed workforce issues associated with the year 2000 computing crisis, focusing on: (1) the nature and extent of year 2000 personnel issues being reported by federal agencies; and (2) what is being done by the government to address reported federal personnel shortages related to the year 2000 problem.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) about half of the 24 large agencies and a quarter of the 41 small agencies and independent entities reporting to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) expressed concerns that the personnel needed to resolve the year 2000 problem would not be available; (2) generally, these concerns fall into the categories of difficulty in finding and keeping qualified government personnel, and difficulty in obtaining contractors; (3) while a significant number of agencies are raising these concerns, their comments are largely anecdotal and a comprehensive analytical assessment of the issue has not yet been made; (4) as a result, the full extent and severity of the year 2000 workforce issue across the government is not known; (5) the President's Council on Year 2000 Conversion, the Chief Information Officers (CIO) Council, and the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) have various initiatives under way to address reported year 2000 personnel issues; (6) for example, OPM has recently developed additional human resources management aids to assist agencies in dealing with year 2000 workforce issues; (7) while such initiatives have provided agencies with important options to help address reported year 2000 personnel problems, it is not yet clear that recent actions have enabled agencies to successfully resolve all perceived personnel issues; (8) accordingly, it is essential that OMB, as part of its monitoring responsibilities for the government's year 2000 program, continue to solicit from agencies whether they have any remaining year 2000 personnel problems and to help provide specific assistance to individual agencies; and (9) moreover, OMB should work with the CIO Council to expedite evaluations of the full extent and scope of information technology personnel issues to help formulate effective solutions. |
gao_AIMD-98-240 | gao_AIMD-98-240_0 | The first letter was sent to approximately 1,600 manufacturers on September 9, 1997. According to VHA officials, most of the manufacturers that reported one or more of their biomedical equipment products as noncompliant cited incorrect display of date and/or time as problems. VHA officials have informed us that they will be relying on the biomedical equipment manufacturers to validate, test, and certify that replacement equipment is Year 2000 compliant. Uncertainty Over Year 2000 Compliance Status Increases Risk
Despite VHA’s progress in implementing its Year 2000 strategy, as of July 29, 1998, it still did not know the full extent of the Year 2000 problem on its biomedical equipment because it has not received compliance and cost information from 27 percent of the manufacturers on its list of suppliers, as well as from nearly 100 additional manufacturers that are no longer in business. Among the manufacturers that had not yet responded or completed their assessments as of July 29, 1998, is one that supplies high-dollar value equipment, such as radiology systems and electronic imaging systems equipment, to VHA. Specifically, the VISNs and facilities reported to the Year 2000 Project Office the number of noncompliant and/or conditional-compliant equipment items in their inventories and the replacement or repair cost for this equipment using information provided to VHA by the manufacturers and posted on its intranet web site in January 1998. As of July 30, 1998, FDA had received 1,975 responses from biomedical equipment manufacturers and posted them on its web site. VHA Plans to Make Compliance Information Available to the Public
In contrast to FDA, VHA had not been making information obtained from biomedical equipment manufacturers on the Year 2000 compliance status of their products available to the public through an Internet World Wide Web site. VHA has not yet done so because (1) when VHA requested this information from the manufacturers, VHA did not tell them that it intended to release the information outside the federal government and (2) VHA said that it had concerns regarding whether it would be proper for it to release some of the information provided by the manufacturers because the information may be proprietary. Although VHA has made progress in assessing its biomedical equipment, it does not yet know the full extent of the Year 2000 problem with this equipment and the associated costs to address this problem because it has not received compliance information from many of the manufacturers. Comments From the Department of Veterans Affairs
The following are GAO’s comments on the Department of Veterans Affairs’ letter dated August 25, 1998. 3. 4. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on the status of the Veterans Health Administration's (VHA) and the Food and Drug Administration's (FDA) Year 2000 biomedical equipment programs.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) VHA has made progress in implementing its year 2000 strategy for biomedical equipment, which relies on compliance information from the manufacturers; (2) as of July 29, 1998, VHA had received information on biomedical equipment compliance from 73 percent of the 1,490 manufacturers on its list of suppliers; 701, or 47 percent, of these manufacturers reported that their products are year 2000 compliant; (3) in spite of this, VHA does not yet know the full extent of the year 2000 problem on its biomedical equipment and the associated costs to address this problem; (4) among the manufacturers that had yet to respond or complete their assessments is one that supplies high-dollar value equipment, such as radiology systems and electronic imaging systems equipment, to VHA; (5) according to VHA's Year 2000 Project Manager, most of the manufacturers reporting that they had noncompliant equipment cited incorrect display of date or time as problems; (6) date or time display problems should not present a risk to patient safety because health care providers can work around them; (7) however, some manufacturers cited problems that could pose a risk to patient safety; (8) to the extent that noncompliant biomedical equipment has to be replaced or repaired, the cost estimate reported by the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) to the Office of Management and Budget is incomplete; (9) to assist health care facilities in the public and private sectors, FDA issued a letter in January 1998 to biomedical equipment manufacturers, requesting information on products affected by this computer problem; (10) in contrast to VHA, as of July 30, 1998, FDA had only received responses from 1,975, or about 12 percent, of the approximately 16,000 biomedical equipment manufacturers to which its letter was sent; (11) FDA has made information from biomedical equipment manufacturers available through a world wide web site; (12) VHA, however, has not yet done so because: (a) when VHA requested the information from the manufacturers, VHA did not tell them that it intended to release the information outside the federal government; and (b) VHA said it had concerns regarding whether it would be proper for it to release some of the information provided by the manufacturers because the information may be proprietary; and (13) VHA, on the advice of VA's Acting General Counsel, informed manufacturers in June 1998 that it plans to release information that the manufacturers said was not confidential commercial information. |
gao_GAO-09-397T | gao_GAO-09-397T_0 | 1). These market events and the estimated size of the CDS market have raised concerns about the risks that CDS and similar financial products may pose to the stability of the financial system. While U.S. federal financial regulators do not have authority over CDS as a product, in the United Kingdom, which has a CDS market comparable in size to the U.S. market, FSA has authority over most CDS products. However, its regulatory efforts have generally been pursued in collaboration with U.S. regulators. Banking regulators’ oversight of CDS activity is largely limited to activity that is deemed to pose risks to the safety and soundness of the institutions they regulate. Federal Regulators’ Approach to Monitoring Systemic Risk from CDS Has Hinged on Collaborative Efforts
Federal financial regulators have sought to address potential systemic threats arising from CDS activities mainly through collaborative efforts with other supervisors and market participants. However, it is unclear to what extent the activities of unregulated subsidiaries or other unregulated market participants were also being reviewed as part of these initiatives. However, some market participants and observers noted that the current regulatory structure did not enable any one regulator to monitor all market participants and assess potential systemic risks from CDS and other types of complex products. Risks and Challenges Presented by CDS and Other Financial Products
Risks to financial institutions and markets from CDS include counterparty credit risk, operational risk, concentration risk, and jump-to-default risk. More specifically, CDS referencing ABS and CDOs, particularly those related to mortgages, were identified as posing greater risks to institutions and markets than other types of CDS. Regulators and market participants noted that some OTC derivatives may share similar risks. Equity derivatives specifically were identified as the OTC derivatives that were most similar to CDS in terms of the risks and challenges that they presented. CDS Can Also Pose a Number of Other Risks and Challenges
Other risks and challenges from CDS identified by market participants, observers, and regulators include a lack of transparency in the CDS market, the potential for manipulation related to the use of CDS as a price discovery mechanism, and the use of CDS for speculative purposes. However, other regulators and market participants disagree and note that speculators in the CDS market provide liquidity to the market and facilitate hedging. Regulators and the Industry Have Undertaken a Number of Initiatives Recently to Address Risks Posed By CDS and Other Financial Products
Financial regulators and the industry have initiated several efforts to begin addressing some of the most important risks posed by CDS and similar products, particularly operational and counterparty credit risks. These efforts include improving the operational infrastructure of CDS markets, implementing a clearinghouse or central counterparty to clear CDS trades, and establishing a central trade registry for CDS. If implemented effectively and sustained, the recent initiatives could begin to address some of the risks related to the use of CDS. And second, the efforts would not include the more customized and highly structured CDS that can include CDS on complex reference entities that may pose significant risks to institutions and financial markets. These include mandatory clearing or restricting CDS trades. Finally, OTC derivatives that share some of the risks related to CDS could benefit from similar efforts to mitigate their impact. However, a central trade repository that contains information on all CDS trades will allow regulators to monitor large positions of market participants and identify large and concentrated positions that may warrant additional attention. Second, TIW currently has no regulatory oversight to ensure the quality of the data, and regulators lack the authority to require that all trades be included in TIW, particularly those of nonbanks. Bank regulators may have some insights into the activities of their supervised banks that act as derivatives dealers, but CDS, like OTC derivatives in general, are not regulated products, and the transactions are generally not subject to regulation by SEC, CFTC, or any other U.S. financial regulator. | Why GAO Did This Study
The U.S. financial system is more prone to systemic risk today because (1) the current U.S. financial regulatory system is not designed to adequately oversee today's large and interconnected financial institutions, (2) not all financial activities and institutions fall under the direct purview of financial regulators, and (3) market innovations have led to the creation of new and sometimes complex products that were not envisioned as the current regulatory system developed. Credit default swaps (CDS) are one of the products that have assumed a key role in financial markets. My statement will discuss (1) the extent to which U.S. financial regulators and the UK regulator oversee CDS, (2) risks and challenges that CDS present to the stability of financial markets and institutions and similar concerns that other products may pose, and (3) the recent steps that financial regulators and the industry have taken to address risks pose by CDS and similar efforts that may be warranted for other financial products. GAO reviewed research studies and congressional testimonies. We interviewed financial regulators and a variety of financial market participants. In January 2009, GAO designated the financial regulatory system as a high-risk area in need of congressional attention. Issues involving systemic risk regulation in general and CDS in particular should be considered as part of that effort.
What GAO Found
The current regulatory structure for CDS does not provide any one regulator with authority over all participants in the CDS market, making it difficult to monitor and manage potential systemic risk. Federal oversight of CDS trading and monitoring of the CDS market are largely conducted through the banking regulators' safety and soundness oversight of supervised banks that act as CDS dealers. The Securities and Exchange Commission and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission lack the authority to regulate CDS broadly as financial products. Regulators have sought to address potential systemic risks arising from CDS activities mainly through collaborative efforts with other supervisors and key market participants. However, the extent to which regulators routinely monitor the CDS activity of unregulated market participants is unclear. The Financial Services Authority in the United Kingdom has authority over most CDS products and can collect information about the CDS market, but it has pursued most of its regulatory efforts in collaboration with U.S. regulators. CDS pose a number of risks to institutions and markets, many of which are not unique. These include counterparty credit, operational, concentration, and jump-to-default risks. Market participants and observers noted that CDS referencing asset-backed securities (ABS) and collateralized debt obligations (CDOs), particularly those related to mortgages, currently pose greater risks to institutions and markets than other types of CDS. Other risks and challenges from CDS relate to the lack of transparency in CDS markets, the potential for manipulation related to the use of CDS as a price discovery mechanism, and the use of CDS for speculative purposes. Regulators and market participants noted that over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives, to varying degrees, may pose some similar risks and a few identified equity derivatives as the OTC derivatives that were most similar to CDS. Financial regulators and market participants have initiated several efforts to mitigate these risks. These efforts target primarily operational and counterparty credit risks and include improving the operational infrastructure of CDS markets, creating a clearinghouse or central counterparty process to clear CDS trades, and establishing a central trade registry for CDS. If effectively implemented and sustained, these initiatives couldbegin to address some of the risks noted. But the effectiveness of these recent initiatives could be limited because participation is voluntary and regulators lack the authority to require all market participants to report their trades to a repository. Moreover, customized and highly structured CDS, which can include CDS with complex reference entities that may present additional risks, generally lack the standardization necessary for centralized clearing. Other ideas to reform CDS markets, such as mandatory clearing or limiting some types of trades, have important limitations that would need to be addressed. Finally, many participants and observers agreed that OTC derivatives other than CDS generally share some of the same risks and could benefit from similar efforts to mitigate their impact. |
gao_GAO-17-135 | gao_GAO-17-135_0 | The 2012 act authorized FCC to conduct an incentive auction for broadcast television spectrum. After the auction concludes, FCC reported it intends to reorganize the television broadcast band on a smaller range of channels to free up a portion of the spectrum; FCC refers to this reorganization as “repacking.” Relocating the remaining stations on lower channels allows for new, flexible-use spectrum licenses suitable for providing mobile broadband services. Additionally, FCC indicated in the incentive auction report and order that it anticipated there would be at least one channel in all areas throughout the country not assigned to a television station that could be used by unlicensed devices. The Consumer Electronics Association reported in 2014 that devices using unlicensed spectrum generate approximately $62 billion annually in retail-level sales and that further estimated growth in the market for devices that rely on unlicensed spectrum was “extremely strong.”
LPTV and Translator Stations Provide Programming and Information That Might Not Be Available to Over-the- Air Viewers after the Auction
LPTV and Translator Stations Are Diverse in Their Programming and Owned by Various Types of Entities
Through analysis of FCC data, our survey of LPTV and translator station representatives, and meetings with stakeholders as discussed below, we obtained information on LPTV and translator stations, including (1) the number of such stations and their communities of license, (2) types of programming and hours of broadcasting, and (3) ownership. According to one broadcast industry association we interviewed, LPTV stations serve a wide range of diverse audiences, including those in both rural counties with limited access to full-power stations and in large urban areas. The Incentive Auction Could Affect Viewers’ Ability to Receive LPTV and Translator Stations’ Programming and Televised Emergency Information
We found LPTV and translator station viewers may lose access to programming or emergency alert information through several possible ways, including the following:
Alternatives to broadcast programming are cost-prohibitive or unavailable: Many LPTV and translator station viewers are economically or geographically disadvantaged and may not be able to afford other options for accessing programming such as for satellite television or broadband Internet, according to two broadcast industry associations we interviewed and six survey respondents, among others. As noted previously, FCC has acknowledged that the incentive auction will potentially displace some LPTV and translator stations. Selected Stakeholders View FCC’s Actions as Having Limited Usefulness and Have Proposed Additional Actions to Mitigate the Auction’s Effects
Selected Stakeholders View FCC’s Actions as Helpful in Some Circumstances but Insufficient
According to FCC officials, FCC’s actions to mitigate the effects of the incentive auction include: (1) channel sharing, (2) the digital transition deadline, (3) FCC’s optimization software, and (4) cross-border coordination. While broadcast industry associations generally expressed support for these measures in comments to FCC, some representatives of these groups told us and stated in comments to FCC that the actions will not do much to mitigate the effects of the incentive auction on LPTV and translator stations. The broadcast industry associations and station ownership groups generally opposed the proposal, while the technology companies, the technology industry association, and the public interest group were proponents of the proposal. For example, a representative from one broadcast industry association told us the vacant channel proposal will force existing LPTV and translator stations off the air because there will be one less channel where a displaced LPTV or translator station can relocate and that many rural and underserved communities will likely lose access to the broadcast stations on which they rely. One of these proponents also added that this could help extend coverage to people who might not have affordable access to the Internet. They noted that this use of spectrum is currently occurring and that preserving a vacant channel could help lower costs and improve the technology, thus improving and expanding broadband in rural areas. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report focuses on the possible effects of the Federal Communication Commission’s (FCC) spectrum incentive auction on low power television (LPTV) and translator stations and their viewers. Specifically, our objectives were to examine (1) what is known about LPTV and translator stations and how FCC’s spectrum incentive auction might affect viewers’ access to the stations’ services, (2) selected stakeholder views on actions has proposed or taken to mitigate the possible effects of the incentive auction on LPTV and translator stations, and additional stakeholder proposals for doing so, and (3) selected stakeholder views on the expected outcomes of preserving a vacant channel for unlicensed use of the television broadcast spectrum. These responses represent 535 of the 2,063 LPTV stations, and 1,515 of the 3,660 translator stations in the U.S. and its territories. To identify selected stakeholder views on the expected outcomes of preserving a vacant channel for unlicensed use of the television broadcast spectrum, we reviewed FCC’s June 2015 notice of proposed rulemaking where FCC proposes to preserve one vacant channel in the ultra high frequency television band for use by white space devices and wireless microphones, and we reviewed selected comments and other filings association with this proceeding. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 2012, Congress authorized FCC to conduct an incentive auction of broadcast television spectrum whereby eligible broadcasters can voluntarily relinquish their spectrum usage rights in return for compensation. This auction will make spectrum available for new uses such as mobile broadband and will also potentially affect LPTV and translator stations. In addition to conducting the auction, FCC proposed preserving at least one vacant television channel in all areas that could be used by unlicensed devices to ensure the public continues to have access to the benefits associated with these devices.
GAO was asked to review the possible effects of the auction on LPTV and translator stations and their viewers. This report examines: (1) LPTV and translator stations and how FCC's incentive auction might affect their viewers, (2) selected stakeholders' views on actions FCC has proposed to mitigate the possible effects of the auction on such stations, and (3) selected stakeholders' views on the expected outcomes of preserving a vacant television channel for unlicensed use. GAO reviewed relevant FCC proceedings and comments associated with those proceedings; surveyed a non-generalizable sample of 330 LPTV and translator station representatives with available e-mail addresses; and interviewed officials from FCC and industry stakeholders selected to represent various types of organizations, such as broadcast industry associations and technology companies. GAO provided FCC with a draft of this report. FCC's technical comments have been incorporated.
What GAO Found
As of May 2016, there were 2,063 low power television (LPTV) stations and 3,660 translator stations in the United States and its territories, serving diverse communities. However, some LPTV and translator stations may be displaced and need to find a new channel or discontinue operation after the Federal Communications Commission's (FCC) ongoing incentive auction of broadcast television spectrum. By statute, these stations were not designated as eligible to participate in the auction; consequently, they cannot voluntarily relinquish their spectrum usage rights in return for compensation. LPTV stations may serve rural communities with limited access to full-power stations and niche communities in urban areas, whereas translator stations retransmit the programming of other stations, mostly to viewers in rural areas who cannot otherwise receive television signals. After the auction, FCC intends to reorganize the television stations remaining on the air so that they will occupy a smaller range of channels, thus freeing up spectrum for other uses. LPTV and translator stations are not guaranteed a channel during the reorganization. FCC has acknowledged that the auction and channel reorganization may negatively affect an unknown number of LPTV and translator stations and that some viewers will lose service, and concluded the success of the auction outweighs these concerns. Broadcast industry associations and others have raised concerns about viewers' losing access to programming and emergency alert information these stations provide.
Selected stakeholders viewed FCC's actions to mitigate the effects of the incentive auction on LPTV and translator stations as helpful in some circumstances, but overall as insufficient. FCC's actions include using its software to identify channels that will be available for displaced stations following the auction and allowing channel sharing. While broadcast industry associations generally supported these measures in comments to FCC, some representatives told GAO that the actions will not do much to mitigate the effects of the incentive auction on LPTV and translator stations. Moreover, in response to GAO's non-generalizable survey, representatives of LPTV and translator stations generally indicated FCC's actions have limited usefulness.
According to selected stakeholders, FCC's proposal to preserve a vacant television channel in all areas throughout the country for unlicensed use, such as Wi-Fi Internet, could result in the loss of some existing broadcast service, but could have various benefits. Of the stakeholders GAO contacted, the broadcast industry associations generally opposed the proposal, while the technology companies supported it. According to a broadcast industry association, the proposal will force some LPTV and translator stations off the air because there will be one less channel where a displaced station can relocate, and many rural and underserved communities will likely lose access to the broadcast stations on which they rely. On the other hand, technology companies and other supporters of the vacant channel proposal maintain that preserving at least one vacant channel for unlicensed use will contribute to innovation and the development of new technologies. Proponents also said that preserving a vacant channel could help expand Wi-Fi more thoroughly giving people and businesses greater connectivity and could help extend coverage to people who might not have affordable access to the Internet. |
gao_NSIAD-98-225 | gao_NSIAD-98-225_0 | Expected Restructuring Savings
DOD expects that it will save $3.3 billion between 1993 and 2000 as a result of restructuring activities carried out by the seven business combinations we examined. Table 1 shows total projected restructuring savings and DOD’s share of these savings for each of the seven business combinations. As a result, the seven business combinations used a variety of estimating methods. DOD realizes benefits from restructuring when its contract prices are lower than they would have been if restructuring had not occurred. Restructuring Activities Lowered Contractors’ Operating Costs
Restructuring activities have enabled contractors to reduce their projected operating costs by hundreds of millions of dollars. Impact of Restructuring on Contract Prices Is Difficult to Determine
Determining the impact that restructuring activities had on a contract price requires isolating the effect of restructuring from nonrestructuring- related factors, such as changes in quantities or improvements in manufacturing efficiencies. DOD noted that it is not feasible to precisely isolate the impact of restructuring from the impact of these other factors. To assess the impact of restructuring activities on the contractors’ operational costs, we reviewed restructuring activities at 10 contractor business segments, including at least 1 segment from each business combination. We generally selected those business segments with the largest projected amount of restructuring savings. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on seven defense contractor business combinations to determine whether the Department of Defense (DOD) is realizing savings as a result of such restructuring activities, focusing on: (1) the amount of restructuring savings expected by DOD from the seven business combinations; (2) the impact of selected restructuring activities on the contractors' cost of operations; and (3) whether savings could be traced to contract prices.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) for the seven business combinations GAO reviewed, DOD expects that it will save about $3.3 billion from contractor restructuring activities, such as laying off workers, closing facilities, and relocating employees and equipment; (2) GAO's assessment of selected restructuring activities showed that they had lowered the cost of operations at the seven business combinations by hundreds of millions of dollars; (3) such reductions benefited DOD because the costs of defense contracts were lower than they would have been if the restructuring activities had not occurred; (4) determining the precise impact of restructuring on specific contract prices requires isolating the impact of these activities from nonrestructuring-related factors, such as changes in business volume, quantities purchased, and accounting practices; and (5) DOD, selected business segments, and GAO were generally not able to isolate the effects of restructuring from those of other factors. |
gao_GAO-05-810T | gao_GAO-05-810T_0 | Although the number of workers for every elderly person in the U.S. has been relatively stable over the past few decades, it has already fallen substantially in other developed countries. Several countries are preparing to pay future benefits by either supplementing or replacing their PAYG programs. For example, some have set aside and invested current resources in a national pension reserve fund to partially pre-fund their PAYG program. National pension reserve funds. These are set up to partially pre-fund PAYG national pension programs. Individual accounts. We are applying GAO’s Social Security reform criteria to the experiences of countries that are members of the OECD as well as Chile, which pioneered individual accounts in 1981. For example, Hungary and Poland were undergoing large political and economic transformations as they reformed their national pension systems. In addition to the adjustments that countries have made to their existing PAYG systems, many countries have undergone other changes as well, indicating that change may not be a one-time experience. Adjustments to Existing PAYG Programs Show Importance of Sustainability, Safety Nets, and Incentives to Work and Save
The experiences of the countries that have adjusted their existing PAYG national pension programs highlight the importance of considering how modifications will affect the program’s financial sustainability, its distribution of benefits, the incentives it creates, and the extent to which the public understands the new provisions. PAYG Adjustments Prove Important to Financial Sustainability
To reconcile PAYG program revenue and expenses, nearly all the countries we studied have decreased benefits and most have also increased contributions, often in part by increasing retirement ages. Maintenance of a Safety Net and Work and Saving Incentives Proved Important
All of the countries have included in their reforms provisions to ensure adequate benefits for lower-income groups and put into place programs designed to ensure that all qualified retirees have a minimum level of income. Implementation, Administration, and Public Education Are Important
The extent to which new provisions are implemented, administered, and explained to the public may affect the outcome of the reform. Early Action and Effective Management Help Make National Pension Reserve Funds Successful
Another type of pension reform is the accumulation of reserves in national pension funds, which can contribute to the system’s financial sustainability depending on when the funds are created or reformed and how they are managed. These resources are expected to make significant contributions to the long-term finances of national pension programs. Individual Account Reforms Show the Importance of Funding Decisions and Ensuring Benefit Adequacy
Countries that have adopted individual account programs—which may also help pre-fund future retirement income—offer lessons about financing the existing PAYG pension program as the accounts are established. Some countries manage this transition period by expanding public debt, building up budget surpluses in advance of implementation, reducing or eliminating the PAYG program, or some combination of these. Approach to Funding Individual Accounts Affects Sustainability of National Pension System
It is important to consider how different approaches to including individual accounts may affect the short-term and long-term financing of the national pension system and the economy as a whole. These guarantees may, however, result in limited investment diversification with a potentially negative impact on returns. In the UK, for example, regulations capping fees may have discouraged some providers from offering pension funds. Some countries have done a better job of providing fund performance information than others. Though one common goal behind reform efforts everywhere is to improve financial sustainability, countries have adopted different approaches depending on their existing national pension system and the prevailing economic and political conditions. Although some pension reforms were undertaken too recently to provide clear evidence of results, the experiences of other countries may suggest some lessons for U.S. deliberations on Social Security reform. | Why GAO Did This Study
Many countries, including the United States, are grappling with demographic change and its effect on their national pension systems. The number of workers for each retiree is falling in most developed countries, straining the finances of national pension programs, particularly where contributions from current workers fund payments to current beneficiaries--known as a "pay-as-you-go" (PAYG) system. Although demographic and economic challenges are less severe in the U.S. than in many other developed countries, projections show that the Social Security program faces a long-term financing problem. Because some countries have already undertaken national pension reform efforts to address demographic changes similar to those occurring in the U.S., we may draw lessons from their experiences. The Chairman of the Subcommittee on Social Security of the House Committee on Ways and Means asked GAO to testify on preliminary results of ongoing work on lessons learned from other countries' experiences reforming national pension systems. GAO focuses on (1) adjustments to existing PAYG national pension programs, (2) the creation or reform of national pension reserve funds to partially pre-fund PAYG pension programs, and (3) reforms involving the creation of individual accounts.
What GAO Found
Based on preliminary work, all countries in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), as well as Chile, have, to some extent, reformed their national pension systems, consistent with their different economic and political conditions. While reforms in one country may not be easily replicated in another, their experiences may nonetheless offer lessons for the U.S. Countries' experiences adjusting PAYG national pension programs highlight the importance of considering how modifications will affect the program's financial sustainability, its distribution of benefits, the incentives it creates, and public understanding of the new provisions. Nearly all of the countries we are studying reduced benefits, and most have also increased contributions, often by increasing statutory retirement ages. Countries included provisions to ensure adequate benefits for lower-income groups, though these can lessen incentives to work and save for retirement. Also, how well new provisions are implemented, administered, and explained to the public may affect the outcome of the reform. Countries with national pension reserve funds designed to partially pre-fund PAYG pension programs provide lessons about the importance of early action and sound governance. Funds that have been in place for a long time provide significant reserves to strengthen the finances of national pension programs. Countries that insulate national reserve funds from being directed to meet other social and political objectives are better equipped to fulfill future pension commitments. In addition, regular disclosure of fund performance supports sound management and administration, and contributes to public education and oversight. Countries that have adopted individual account programs--which may also help pre-fund future retirement income--offer lessons about financing the existing PAYG pension program as the accounts are established. Countries that have funded individual accounts by directing revenue away from the PAYG program while continuing to pay benefits to PAYG program retirees have expanded public debt, built up budget surpluses in advance, cut back or eliminated the PAYG programs, or some combination of these. Because no individual account program can entirely protect against investment risk, some countries have adopted individual accounts as a relatively small portion of their national pension system. Others set minimum rates of return or provide a minimum benefit, which may, however, limit investment diversification and individuals' returns. To mitigate high fees, which can erode small account balances, countries have capped fees, centralized the processing of transactions, or encouraged price competition. Although countries have attempted to educate individuals about reforms and how their choices may affect them, some studies indicate that many workers have limited knowledge about their retirement prospects. |
gao_GAO-15-162 | gao_GAO-15-162_0 | Background
Private, public, and nonprofit employers can use information from criminal history records for non-criminal-justice purposes, such as screening an individual’s suitability for working with children, the elderly, or other vulnerable populations. 1). Most States Conduct FBI Record Checks for Selected Employment Sectors, but Lack of State Agencies to Review Check Results Remains a Challenge
Most states that responded to our nationwide survey reported that they conduct FBI record checks for individuals working with vulnerable populations and other employment sectors we reviewed. States not conducting such checks reported lacking designated state agencies to review the check results, among other challenges. DOJ and Others Have Recommended Expanding Access to FBI Checks, but Concerns Remain about Securing Data and Protecting Personal Information
Recommendations for Expanding Access to FBI Record Checks
In 2005 and 2006, the Attorney General and others recommended expanding employer and third-party access to FBI criminal history record checks as a way to overcome barriers presented by the need for a state agency to adjudicate record check results. States Have Improved the Completeness of Criminal History Records with DOJ’s Assistance, but Continue to Face Challenges
States Reported Progress in Providing Complete Records to the FBI, but Incomplete Records That Can Delay Criminal Record Checks and Affect Applicants Still Exist
According to BJS surveys of state criminal history information systems, from 2006 through 2012, states reported making progress in providing complete criminal history records to the FBI—records that include the arrest and the final disposition of the arrest. For example, BJS surveys show that the number of states that reported providing more than 75 percent of their arrest records with final dispositions increased from 16 states in 2006 to 20 states in 2012, as shown in figure 3. Disposition Task Force: The FBI’s Advisory Policy Board formed the Disposition Task Force in 2009 to address issues related to the completeness, accuracy, and availability of criminal record dispositions from courts and prosecutors and develop a national strategy for improving the quality of disposition reporting. The task force, however, did not have a plan with time frames or milestones for either completing the best practices guide or achieving the remaining goals, which could also lead to a national strategy—an original 2009 objective for the task force. DOJ’s grant funding and other assistance programs have helped states address these challenges. Private Company Criminal Record Checks Increasing; Companies Face Challenges in Obtaining Complete and Accurate Records
Number of Private Companies Conducting Criminal Record Background Checks Appears to Be Increasing because of Employer Demand
The exact number of private companies that conduct criminal record checks, the number of checks conducted each year, and the number of employers and industries requesting checks are generally unknown, but appear to be increasing. To what extent have states made progress in improving the completeness of criminal history records and what challenges remain that federal agencies can help mitigate? We received a response rate of 94 percent—47 states and the District of Columbia—which we collectively refer to as states throughout this report. We also analyzed federal regulations and procedures for conducting criminal record checks and evaluated previously published reports from SEARCH, the Department of Justice (DOJ), and other organizations regarding the national availability of FBI background checks, solutions proposed to address access challenges, and what challenges remain.supplement information obtained through our national survey and our analysis of previously published reports, we conducted semistructured interviews with management officials from repositories and courts that maintain criminal history information in 4 case study states—California, Florida, Idaho, and Washington—to determine the extent to which they conduct FBI checks, any challenges faced with conducting checks, and actions taken to address those challenges. | Why GAO Did This Study
Authorized employers use information from FBI criminal history record checks to assess a person's suitability for employment or to obtain a license. States create criminal records and the FBI facilitates access to these records by other states for nationwide checks. GAO was asked to assess efforts to address concerns about incomplete records, among other things.
This report addresses to what extent (1) states conduct FBI record checks for selected employment sectors and face any challenges; (2) states have improved the completeness of records, and remaining challenges that federal agencies can help mitigate; and (3) private companies conduct criminal record checks, the benefits those checks provide to employers, and any related challenges.
GAO analyzed laws and regulations used to conduct criminal record checks and assessed the completeness of records; conducted a nationwide survey, which generated responses from 47 states and the District of Columbia; and interviewed officials that manage checks from the FBI and 4 states (California, Florida, Idaho, and Washington). GAO selected states based on geographic location and other factors.
What GAO Found
Most states that responded to GAO's nationwide survey reported conducting Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) criminal history record checks for individuals working with vulnerable populations—such as children and the elderly—and other employment sectors that GAO reviewed (see fig. below). States that did not conduct FBI record checks said this was because the state lacked a designated agency to review check results, among other challenges. In 2006, the Attorney General proposed that nongovernmental entities also serve in this role but noted that this would require considerations about securing data and protecting personal information.
States have improved the completeness of criminal history records used for FBI checks—more records now contain both the arrest and final disposition (e.g., a conviction)—but there are still gaps. Twenty states reported that more than 75 percent of their arrest records had dispositions in 2012, up from 16 states in 2006. Incomplete records can delay checks and affect applicants seeking employment. The Department of Justice has helped states improve the completeness of records through grant funding and other resources, but challenges remain. For example, the FBI's Advisory Policy Board—which includes representatives from federal, state, and local criminal justice agencies—created a Disposition Task Force in 2009 to address issues regarding disposition reporting, among other things. The task force has taken actions to better measure the completeness of state records and identify state requirements for reporting disposition information. However, the task force does not have plans with time frames for completing remaining goals, such as examining and recommending improvements in national standards for collecting and reporting disposition information.
According to stakeholders GAO contacted, the use of private companies to conduct criminal history record checks appears to be increasing because of employer demand and can provide benefits, such as faster response times. Federal agencies regulate these companies and have settled complaints, such as in cases where the wrong records were sent to employers. Private companies can face challenges in obtaining complete and accurate records, in part because not all states make their criminal record information accessible for private companies to search.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends, among other things, that the FBI establish plans with time frames for completing the Disposition Task Force's remaining goals. The Department of Justice concurred with all of GAO's recommendations. |
gao_HEHS-99-97 | gao_HEHS-99-97_0 | Labor Has Initiated, but Not Completed, Efforts to Improve the Wage Determination Process
In response to the conference report directive, Labor is currently testing a number of efforts under two tracks that it believes will improve the wage determination process. It expects that wage determinations would more accurately reflect prevailing wages if the wage survey process was improved through efforts that would, for example, increase survey participation and the timeliness of data collection and analysis. The earliest of these efforts began in 1996, with most scheduled for completion in fiscal year 2000. Efforts under the redesign track seek to (1) improve survey data collection by, for example, redesigning the WD-10 survey form, making the form more accessible through a specially designated Internet web site, and using alternative methods to identify contractors and distribute surveys; and (2) enhance data analysis through such means as verifying wage data and developing technology to help identify inaccuracies in the data. Although the conference report did not set a deadline for Labor to complete these efforts, Labor officials said they will decide which track—or combination of efforts under both tracks—to select in fiscal year 2001. Labor’s Efforts Have Potential to Improve Accuracy and Timeliness of Wage Determinations
On the basis of our review of Labor’s efforts and our past work on the Davis-Bacon Act, we believe that a number of Labor’s efforts under both tracks, if successfully implemented, have the potential to improve the accuracy and timeliness of wage determinations. To achieve more accurate and timely wage determinations under either track, Labor officials said the process must promote greater survey participation, improve the accuracy of data submissions and Labor’s ability to verify them, and increase the efficiency of data collection and analysis. However, Labor officials said they will need to address a number of unresolved issues in both tracks that could limit the potential of these efforts to achieve the desired results. Labor officials also said that they need to develop clear plans about how to ensure that the track or efforts they choose are the best options to improve the timeliness and accuracy of wage determinations. Accordingly, they have established general performance measures that the officials said will be used to gauge Labor’s process improvements and guide the final decision about which track to select. Also, given that WHD has little useful information on the time needed to issue a wage determination, the accuracy of wage determinations, or survey participation rates, it is not clear how this information will allow WHD to assess the extent to which the tracks improve the process. Finally, Labor has begun to identify other key factors, such as cost, that will need to be addressed as part of its decision-making process, but it has not yet set priorities or assigned weights to these factors. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO provided information on: (1) the status of the Department of Labor's efforts to improve the Davis-Bacon Act wage determination process; and (2) whether the changes Labor is making are likely to address the timeliness and accuracy of wage determinations.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) in response to the conference report directive, Labor is testing a number of efforts that are aimed at improving the process for determining prevailing wage rates; (2) the alternatives being tested fall under two tracks: (a) redesigning Labor's Wage and Hour Division's (WHD) existing survey process, including revising survey forms to obtain data more efficiently and using technology to more quickly and accurately analyze the survey data obtained; and (b) using data from surveys conducted by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) to determine prevailing wage rates; (3) the earliest efforts began in 1996 and most efforts under both tracks are scheduled for completion by fiscal year (FY) 2000; (4) given these timeframes and the need to analyze the results, Labor officials said they will decide in FY 2001 which track best promotes a wage determination process that will result in accurate, timely wage determinations; (5) efforts under either track, if successfully implemented, have the potential to improve the timeliness and accuracy of wage determinations; (6) redesigning the survey form and making it more accessible and understandable to survey participants could increase survey participation and improve the timeliness of data submitted, potentially leading to more accurate and timely wage determinations; (7) however, Labor officials identified several key issues that they will need to address for efforts under either track to achieve the intended results; (8) these issues include concerns about: (a) WHD's ability to deal with potentially significant increases in the volume of survey data collected under a revised process; and (b) limitations of BLS data as a tool in setting prevailing wage rates; (9) Labor officials also acknowledged that they need to develop a clear plan to make an informed decision about which track, or combination of efforts under both tracks, to implement; (10) Labor has established general performance measures that officials say will guide Labor's efforts; (11) additionally, it has started to collect limited baseline data to assess progress made under both tracks but such data may be of limited use; and (12) Labor has also recognized that other factors, such as cost, will need to be considered when officials decide which efforts would most improve the accuracy and timeliness of wage determinations, but officials have not yet specified how these other factors will be analyzed. |
gao_GAO-06-970 | gao_GAO-06-970_0 | FFMIA requires the departments and agencies covered by the CFO Act to implement and maintain financial management systems that comply substantially with (1) federal financial management systems requirements, (2) applicable federal accounting standards, and (3) the SGL at the transaction level. The agencies selected for visits included the 5 agencies where auditors provided negative assurance of FFMIA compliance in fiscal year 2005 (Commerce, Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), National Science Foundation (NSF), Office of Personnel Management (OPM), and Social Security Administration (SSA)); the agency where auditors provided an opinion, or positive assurance, of FFMIA compliance in fiscal year 2005 (Labor); the 2 agencies where auditors provided negative assurance of FFMIA compliance in fiscal year 2004 but reported those agencies as noncompliant in fiscal year 2005 (the Department of Energy (Energy) and the General Services Administration (GSA)); and 4 of the agencies with the largest net costs as reported in the fiscal year 2005 Financial Report of the United States Government. In contrast, the number of CFO Act agencies receiving unqualified opinions on their financial statements has increased significantly since 1997, when FFMIA reporting began. In fiscal year 2005, auditors for 18 of the CFO Act agencies reported that the agencies’ financial management systems do not substantially comply with at least one of the three FFMIA requirements. From our perspective, FFMIA requires auditors to provide positive assurance, which is an opinion, because section 803 (b)(1) of FFMIA requires auditors to “report whether the agency financial management systems comply with the requirements of .” Auditors provide negative assurance when they state that nothing came to their attention during the course of their planned procedures to indicate that the agency’s financial management systems did not meet FFMIA requirements. Given OMB’s explicit instruction to provide negative assurance, some auditors also indicated that a change in OMB’s guidance on FFMIA reporting would be necessary in order for them to provide an opinion on FFMIA compliance. We share concerns about the added cost, but want to make our view quite clear that the focus needs to be on the ultimate end goal of having financial management systems able to routinely produce reliable, useful, and timely financial information. 4, Managerial Cost Accounting Concepts and Standards for the Federal Government. Federal Financial Management System Initiatives Continue to Evolve
Agencies have a number of efforts under way to address their existing financial management systems problems. However, establishing good financial management throughout the federal government will also require changing the organizational culture of some federal agencies; therefore, the sustained leadership and support of the Congress has been and continues to be essential to the reform of financial management in the federal government. VI) on a draft of this report, OMB generally agreed with our assessment that while federal agencies continue to make progress in addressing financial management systems weaknesses, many agencies still need to make improvements to produce the information needed to efficiently and effectively manage day-to-day operations. This bulletin did not substantially revise the FFMIA audit guidance included in Bulletin No. Moreover, core financial systems certification does not mean that agencies that install these packages will have financial management systems that are compliant with FFMIA. | Why GAO Did This Study
The ability to produce the financial information needed to efficiently and effectively manage the day-today operations of the federal government and provide accountability to taxpayers continues to be a challenge for most federal agencies. To help address this challenge, the Federal Financial Management Improvement Act of 1996 (FFMIA) requires the Chief Financial Officers (CFO) Act agencies to implement and maintain financial management systems that comply substantially with (1) federal financial management systems requirements, (2) federal accounting standards, and (3) the U.S. Government Standard General Ledger at the transaction level. FFMIA also requires GAO to report annually on the implementation of the act.
What GAO Found
While the number of CFO Act agencies receiving unqualified opinions on their financial statements has increased significantly since 1997, the number of CFO Act agencies that did not substantially comply with FFMIA has remained fairly constant as shown below. Although agencies have made improvements and have other enhancements under way, the systems deficiencies that have prompted unfavorable FFMIA assessments indicate that the financial management systems of many agencies are still not able to routinely produce reliable, useful, and timely financial information. GAO views the continuing lack of compliance with FFMIA and the associated problems with agency financial systems to be significant challenges to improving the management of the federal government. For fiscal year 2005, auditors for five agencies provided negative assurance that agency systems substantially complied with FFMIA as allowed by the Office of Management and Budget's (OMB) current audit guidance. This means that nothing came to their attention to indicate that agency financial management systems did not substantially comply with FFMIA requirements. GAO continues to believe that this type of reporting is not sufficient for reporting under the act. In addition, negative assurance may provide the false impression that the auditors are reporting that the agencies' systems are compliant. In contrast, auditors for the Department of Labor (Labor) provided positive assurance, which is an opinion, by reporting that Labor's financial management systems substantially complied with FFMIA requirements--a reporting practice that adds more value. Auditors have expressed concern about providing positive assurance because of the need to clarify the meaning of substantial compliance. In addition, some auditors stated that a change in OMB's guidance that permits negative assurance would be necessary for them to provide an opinion on FFMIA compliance. To help address financial management systems deficiencies, OMB continues to move ahead on initiatives to enhance financial management in the federal government. Moreover, the continuing leadership and support of Congress will be crucial in reforming financial management in the federal government. |
gao_GAO-07-852T | gao_GAO-07-852T_0 | VA and DOD Have Been Working to Exchange Health Information Since 1998
For almost a decade, VA and DOD have been pursuing ways to share data in their health information systems and create comprehensive electronic records. However, the departments have faced considerable challenges, leading to repeated changes in the focus of their initiatives and target dates for accomplishment. As shown in figure 1, the departments’ efforts have involved a number of distinct initiatives, both long-term initiatives to develop future modernized solutions, and short-term initiatives to respond to more immediate needs to share information in existing systems. A longer term initiative was to develop a common health information architecture that would allow the two-way exchange of health information. These were two demonstration projects: the Laboratory Data Sharing Interface, aimed at allowing VA and DOD facilities to share laboratory resources, and the Bidirectional Health Information Exchange (BHIE), aimed at allowing both departments’ clinicians access to records on shared patients (that is, those who receive care from both departments). In the long-term project to develop modernized health information systems, the departments have begun to implement the first release of the interface between their modernized data repositories, among other things. In addition, the two departments have undertaken ad hoc activities to accelerate the transmission of health information on severely wounded patients from DOD to VA’s four polytrauma centers. VA and DOD Have Begun Deployment of a Modernized Data Interface
In their long-term effort to share health information, VA and DOD have completed the development of their modernized data repositories, agreed on standards for various types of data, and begun to populate the repositories with these data. In addition, they have now implemented the first release of the CHDR interface, which links the two departments’ repositories, at seven sites. Besides being a milestone in the development of the departments’ modernized systems, the interface implementation provides benefits to the departments’ current systems. Although implementing this interface is an important accomplishment, the departments are still a long way from completion of the modernized health information systems and comprehensive longitudinal health records. DOD, in addition to converting current records from its multiple systems, must also address medical records that are not automated. DOD has been using FHIE to transfer information to VA since 2002. Through their efforts on these long- and near-term initiatives, VA and DOD are achieving exchanges of various types of health information (see attachment 1 for a summary of all the types of data currently being shared and those planned for the future, as well as cost data on the initiatives). DOD staff also pointed out that this laborious process is feasible only because the number of polytrauma patients is small (about 350 in all to date); it would not be practical on a large scale. Although these various efforts to transfer medical information on seriously wounded patients are working, and the departments are to be commended on their efforts, the multiple processes and laborious manual tasks illustrate the effects of the lack of in health information systems and the difficulties of exchanging information in their absence. However, the exchanges are as yet limited, and significant work remains to be done to fully achieve the goal of exchanging interoperable, computable data, including agreeing to standards for the rem aining categories of medical information, populating the data repositories with all this information, completing the development of HealtheVet VistA and AHLTA, and transitioning from the legacy systems. Further, it is not clear how all the initiatives we have described today are to be incorporated into an overall strategytoward achieving the departments’ goal of comprehensive, seamless exchange of health information. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) and the Department of Defense (DOD) are engaged in ongoing efforts to share medical information, which is important in helping to ensure high-quality health care for active-duty military personnel and veterans. These efforts include a long-term program to develop modernized health information systems based on computable data: that is, data in a format that a computer application can act on--for example, to provide alerts to clinicians of drug allergies. In addition, the departments are engaged in near-term initiatives involving existing systems. GAO was asked to testify on the history and current status of these long- and near-term efforts to share health information. To develop this testimony, GAO reviewed its previous work, analyzed documents, and interviewed VA and DOD officials about current status and future plans.
What GAO Found
For almost a decade, VA and DOD have been pursuing ways to share health information and create comprehensive electronic medical records. However, they have faced considerable challenges in these efforts, leading to repeated changes in the focus of their initiatives and target dates. Currently, the two departments are pursuing both long- and short-term initiatives to share health information. Under their long-term initiative, the modern health information systems being developed by each department are to share standardized computable data through an interface between data repositories associated with each system. The repositories have now been developed, and the departments have begun to populate them with limited types of health information. In addition, the interface between the repositories has been implemented at seven VA and DOD sites, allowing computable outpatient pharmacy and drug allergy data to be exchanged. Implementing this interface is a milestone toward the departments' long-term goal, but more remains to be done. Besides extending the current capability throughout VA and DOD, the departments must still agree to standards for the remaining categories of medical information, populate the data repositories with this information, complete the development of the two modernized health information systems, and transition from their existing systems. While pursuing their long-term effort to develop modernized systems, the two departments have also been working to share information in their existing systems. Among various near-term initiatives are a completed effort to allow the one-way transfer of health information from DOD to VA when service members leave the military, as well as ongoing demonstration projects to exchange limited data at selected sites. One of these projects, building on the one-way transfer capability, developed an interface between certain existing systems that allows a two-way view of current data on patients receiving care from both departments. VA and DOD are now working to link other systems via this interface and extend its capabilities. The departments have also established ad hoc processes to meet the immediate need to provide data on severely wounded service members to VA's polytrauma centers, which specialize in treating such patients. These processes include manual workarounds (such as scanning paper records) that are generally feasible only because the number of polytrauma patients is small. These multiple initiatives and ad hoc processes highlight the need for continued efforts to integrate information systems and automate information exchange. In addition, it is not clear how all the initiatives are to be incorporated into an overall strategy focused on achieving the departments' goal of comprehensive, seamless exchange of health information. |
gao_GAO-17-344 | gao_GAO-17-344_0 | All licensing actions across NRC offices, however, include the submission of an application. When the NRC review team has the information needed to ensure a fully informed, technically correct, and legally defensible decision, it will either approve or deny the license application. Individual NRC Offices Have Their Own Guidance to Issue RAIs and Are Updating It in an Effort to Improve the RAI Process
Each NRC office that issues RAIs has its own guidance, and the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, the Office of New Reactors, and some divisions in the Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards have efforts underway to update guidance intended to improve oversight of RAIs. Guidance for developing and issuing RAIs is generally the same across individual offices that issue them but also reflects each office’s own specific responsibilities and procedures. This updated guidance includes an increased focus on ensuring staff compliance with the process through managerial review. For example, the expectations memorandum elevates the issuance of additional questions on the same topic to divisional management to discuss the need for an additional round of RAIs before submitting them to a licensee. NRC Offices Do Not Track the Number of RAIs They Issue, and Certain Activities Often Elicit RAIs
NRC offices do not track the number of RAIs and do not know how many they have issued over the past 5 years, and there is no legal requirement for NRC to track the number of RAIs it issues. Offices Do Not Track the Number of RAIs That NRC Issues, and There Is No Legal Requirement to Do So
NRC offices that issue RAIs do not specifically track the number of RAIs that they issue, and there is no legal requirement for the agency to track the number of RAIs. Some NRC offices have been working to update their internal tracking systems for licensing actions. RAIs Are Not Unusual, and Certain Activities Often Elicit RAIs
NRC officials told us that receiving RAIs as part of a licensing action is not unusual, and officials and licensees we interviewed said that RAIs are often issued for the following activities and circumstances: complex licensing actions, activities for which regulations are unclear, new activities, and when the initial application does not contain adequate information or detail. NRC officials and licensees said that a request for an exception can occur, for example, when a licensee asks NRC for a license to use a construction material that is not referenced in regulatory guidance. Licensees We Interviewed Were Generally Satisfied with the RAI Process and Identified Certain Strengths
Many of the licensees we interviewed expressed satisfaction with NRC’s current process to develop and issue RAIs and acknowledged the role of RAIs in the licensing process. Some said that they viewed them as a natural part of interacting with a regulator. Licensees we interviewed also identified NRC’s openness to communication and engagement as a strength of the RAI process. Licensees Identified Two Common Weaknesses in the RAI Process, Which NRC Has Made Recent Efforts to Address
Licensees and NRC officials that we interviewed identified weaknesses in the RAI process, including two commonly mentioned ones: (1) a gap between NRC’s expectations and licensees’ understanding of what should be included in a license application and (2) staff departure from guidance that leads to RAI questions that appear to be redundant or beyond the scope of the review. According to NRC officials, such inconsistencies can lead to reviewers’ using RAIs to gather the information needed to make a licensing decision. The Office of New Reactors, the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, and the Division of Spent Fuel Management in the Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards have made recent efforts to address inconsistencies between NRC’s expectations and licensees’ understanding by emphasizing greater communication between review staff and licensees. | Why GAO Did This Study
NRC issues RAIs to obtain information in licensing requests to ensure that officials can make a fully informed, technically correct, and legally defensible regulatory decision. RAIs are necessary when the information was not included in an applicant's initial submission, is not contained in any other docketed correspondence, or cannot reasonably be inferred from the information available to agency staff. NRC's use of RAIs has come under scrutiny in the past. For example, NRC's Inspector General, in a 2015 report, cited concerns about RAIs, including the amount of time it took to complete the RAI process and the resources required to do so.
GAO was asked to review how NRC uses RAIs. This report examines (1) NRC's guidance for developing and issuing RAIs and how it differs across offices; (2) how many RAIs NRC has issued over the past 5 years and the kinds of activities that elicit RAIs; and (3) strengths and weaknesses of NRC's processes to develop RAIs identified by NRC and licensees and the actions NRC is taking to address concerns. GAO examined agency guidance documents and selected licensing actions containing RAIs. GAO interviewed NRC officials and selected licensees. GAO randomly selected licensing actions and licensees from a sample of recent licensing actions that included cases from each of NRC's RAI-issuing offices.
What GAO Found
At the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), individual offices that issue requests for additional information (RAI) each have their own guidance that is generally the same across the offices. NRC offices have some efforts underway to update their guidance. These efforts are intended to improve oversight of RAIs and include an increased focus on oversight of RAIs and on staff compliance through managerial review. For example, one of the offices that issues RAIs calls for management to discuss the need to send a licensee additional questions on the same topic before doing so.
NRC offices that issue RAIs do not specifically track the number of RAIs that they have issued and do not have a comprehensive accounting for the last 5 years, although one office has a system capable of tracking the number of RAIs. Information from NRC officials and licensees GAO interviewed suggests that certain activities and circumstances often elicit RAIs. There is no legal requirement for the agency to track the number of RAIs; however, offices are updating their internal tracking systems in order to improve information on their licensing activities. Receiving RAIs is not unusual, particularly for certain activities such as complex licensing actions and activities for which regulations are unclear, according to officials. In such cases, increased coordination between NRC and the licensee may be required to resolve certain issues.
Licensees GAO interviewed were generally satisfied with the RAI process, identifying strengths and two common weaknesses, and NRC has made recent efforts intended to address these weaknesses. Some licensees noted that they see RAIs as a natural part of interacting with a regulator and identified NRC's openness to communication and engagement as a strength of the RAI process. Two common weaknesses that licensees cited are a gap between NRC's expectations and licensees' understanding of what to include in their applications, and staff departure from guidance. NRC offices have made recent efforts to address these issues. For example, to address inconsistencies between NRC's expectations and licensees' understanding, NRC offices are emphasizing greater communication between review staff and licensees.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is not making any recommendations. NRC generally agreed with GAO's findings. |
gao_GAO-13-784T | gao_GAO-13-784T_0 | In addition to the technology needed to view the COP, the Coast Guard has also developed technology to further enhance the information within the COP and its use to improve mission effectiveness. This has occurred in part through its former Deepwater Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) program system improvements. The Coast Guard Has Made Progress in Adding Data Sources and the Availability of COP Information to Users
In April 2013, we reported that since the COP became operational in 2003, the Coast Guard has made progress in adding useful data sources and in increasing the number of users with access to the COP. In general, the COP has added internal and external data sources and types of vessel-tracking information that enhance COP users’ knowledge of the maritime domain. In 2006, the ability to track the location of Coast Guard assets, including small boats and cutters, was also added to the COP. This capability—also known as blue force tracking—allows COP users to locate Coast Guard vessels in real time and establish which vessels are in the best position to respond to mission needs. According to Coast Guard officials, in addition to adding information to the COP, the Coast Guard has also made the information contained in the COP available on more computers and on more systems, which, in turn, has increased the number of users with access to the COP. The Coast Guard Has Experienced Challenges in Developing and Implementing COP- related Systems
We previously reported that the Coast Guard has experienced challenges with COP-related technology acquisitions that resulted from the Coast Guard not following its own information technology acquisition guidance and processes. These challenges included poor usability and the inability to share information as intended, and ultimately resulted in the Coast Guard not meeting its goals for multiple COP-related systems. However, in July 2011, we reported that the Coast Guard had not met its goal of building the $2.5 billion C4ISR system. Specifically, we reported that the Coast Guard had repeatedly changed its strategy for achieving C4ISR’s goal of building a single fully interoperable command, control, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance system across the Coast Guard’s new vessels and aircraft. Further, we found that not all aircraft and vessels were operating the same C4ISR system, or even at the same classification level, and hence could not directly exchange data with each other. This approach could increase the time it takes for COP information, for example, gathered by a vessel operating with a classified system to be shared with an aircraft operating with an unclassified system. The IOCs were originally designed to gather data from sensors and port partner sources to provide situational awareness to Coast Guard sector personnel and to Coast Guard partners in state and local law enforcement and port operations, among others. In February 2012, we reported that the Coast Guard had increased access to its WatchKeeper software by allowing access to the system for Coast Guard port partners. However, the Coast Guard had limited success in improving information sharing between the Coast Guard and local port partners and did not follow its established guidance during the development of WatchKeeper—a major component of the $74 million Interagency Operations Center acquisition project. Specifically, prior to the initial deployment of WatchKeeper, the Coast Guard had made limited efforts to determine port partner needs for the system. Coast Guard Enterprise Geographic Information System (EGIS). The Coast Guard concurred with the recommendation and reported that it planned to mitigate the risks of potential implementation challenges of future technology developments for the COP by issuing proper guidance and clarifying procedures regarding the applicability of the SDLC. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. | Why GAO Did This Study
To facilitate its mission effectiveness through greater maritime situational awareness, the Coast Guard developed its COP--a map-based information system shared among its commands. The COP displays vessels, information about those vessels, and the environment surrounding them on interactive digital maps. COP information is shared via computer networks throughout the Coast Guard to assist with operational decisions. COP-related systems include systems that can be used to access, or provide information to, the COP.
This statement summarizes GAO's work on (1) the Coast Guard's progress in increasing the availability of data sources and COP information to users and (2) the challenges the Coast Guard has experienced in developing and implementing COP-related systems. This statement is based on GAO's prior work issued from July 2011 through April 2013 on various Coast Guard acquisition and implementation efforts related to the COP, along with selected updates conducted in July 2013. To conduct the selected updates, GAO obtained documentation on the Coast Guard's reported status in developing COP-related acquisition planning documents.
What GAO Found
The Coast Guard, a component of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), has made progress in developing its Common Operational Picture (COP) by increasing the information in the COP and increasing user access to this information. The Coast Guard has made progress by adding internal and external data sources that allow for better understanding of anything associated with the global maritime domain that could affect the United States. The COP has made information from these sources available to more COP users and decision makers throughout the Coast Guard. For example, in 2006, the ability to track the location of Coast Guard assets, including small boats and cutters, was added to the COP. This capability--also known as blue force tracking--allows COP users to locate Coast Guard vessels in real time and establish which vessels are in the best position to respond to mission needs. In addition to adding information to the COP, the Coast Guard has also made the information contained in the COP available on more computers and on more systems, which, in turn, has increased the number of users with access to the COP.
The Coast Guard has also experienced challenges in developing and implementing COP-related systems and meeting the COP's goals for implementing systems to display and share COP information. These challenges have affected the Coast Guard's deployment of recent COP technology acquisitions and are related to such things as the inability to share information as intended and systems not meeting intended objectives. For example, in July 2011, GAO reported that the Coast Guard had not met its goal of building a single, fully interoperable Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance program (C4ISR) system--a $2.5 billion project intended to enable the sharing of COP and other data among its new offshore vessels and aircraft. Specifically, GAO noted that the Coast Guard: (1) repeatedly changed its strategy for achieving the goal of the C4ISR system and (2) that not all vessels and aircraft were operating the same C4ISR system, or even at the same classification level and hence could not directly exchange data with one another as intended. GAO found similar challenges with other Coast Guard COP-related systems not meeting intended objectives. For example, in February 2012, GAO reported that the intended information-sharing capabilities of the Coast Guard's WatchKeeper software--a major part of the $74 million Interagency Operations Center project designed to gather data to help port partner agencies collaborate in the conduct of operations and share information, among other things--met few port agency partner needs, in part because the agency failed to determine these needs when developing the system. Further, in April 2013, GAO reported that, among other things, the Coast Guard experienced challenges when it deployed its Enterprise Geographic Information System (EGIS), a tool for viewing COP information that did not meet user needs. The challenges Coast Guard personnel experienced with EGIS included system slowness and displays of inaccurate information.
What GAO Recommends
GAO has made recommendations in prior work to enhance the Coast Guard's development and implementation of its COP-related systems. DHS generally concurred with the recommendations and has reported actions under way to address them. |
gao_GAO-07-1000 | gao_GAO-07-1000_0 | GSA Delegated Most Types of Real Property Authority but Did Not Have Consistent or Complete Data for Certain Delegated Activities
GSA delegated authority for operations and maintenance, utility services, lease management, administrative contracting officer activities, repair and alterations, and real estate leasing to its tenant agencies. Additionally, GSA officials said they had not seen a pattern of problems that would indicate a need for more oversight of these delegations. In addition, PBS did not collect data on categorical and special purpose delegations. GSA officials told us that they believe the lack of complete data for delegations of repair and alteration project authority up to $100,000 was not problematic. Federal agencies using these delegations may lack experience in acquiring office space, which could result in offices being housed in substandard buildings and the government not receiving the best deal. GSA officials acknowledged the need to update the delegations desk guide and the customer guide and said the updates are in process. The lack of updated guidance could limit GSA’s ability to manage its delegations effectively. GSA Did Not Always Use Mandated Criteria When Deciding to Delegate Certain Real Property Activities, and the Procedures Used Were Not Always Included in Written Guidance
GSA did not always use mandated cost-effectiveness criteria when delegating activities, as shown in table 4. All of the agencies we interviewed that received real property delegations said their decisions to seek delegations were not based on a lack of satisfaction with GSA’s performance in the given service but rather were useful in certain circumstances where GSA’s knowledge and expertise were less critical. GSA is currently implementing several changes to improve its data collection for lease delegations and will issue separate oversight procedures that include a requirement to reconcile the two sources of lease delegation data. However, it is unclear when the oversight procedures will be issued. While GSA officials said updates to some of the guidance are in process, it is unclear when these updates will be finalized. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve GSA’s ability to oversee the various delegated authorities, we recommend that the Administrator of GSA take the following two actions: develop written procedures for reviewing the different sources of its lease delegation data to identify and determine an accurate count of the leases awarded using all three types of leasing delegations and update the guidance for managing delegations, including procedures for assessing the cost-effectiveness of individual repair and alteration delegations above $100,000, operations and maintenance delegations, general purpose leasing delegations, and special purpose leasing delegations that exceed 2,500 square feet. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Given your interest in the General Services Administration’s (GSA) use of real property delegations of authority, we determined (1) what real property authority GSA has delegated to its tenant agencies, (2) what policies and procedures GSA uses to manage delegated real property authority, and (3) reasons the tenant agencies requested delegated authority. To determine what real property authority GSA delegated to its tenant agencies and the criteria GSA used when deciding to delegate those activities, we reviewed, among other materials, the law, the Federal Management Regulation, and the Federal Acquisition Regulation related to GSA’s authority to delegate real property functions; existing policies and procedures for managing the delegations, including internal Public Buildings Service (PBS) guidance on delegations of real estate leasing authority and PBS’s “Standard Operating Procedures for Operation and Maintenance of Delegated Real Property;” previous Office of Governmentwide Policy reviews of delegations of real estate leasing authority; PBS summaries of the lease delegation program; and data on the number of delegations by type and agency from fiscal years 1996 to 2006. | Why GAO Did This Study
The General Services Administration (GSA) issues different types of delegations, whereby agencies may request authority to perform certain real property activities, such as leasing space and maintaining property. Effective management of the program is critical to ensuring that federal dollars are well spent and adequate workspace is provided. GAO was asked to determine (1) what real property authority GSA has delegated to its tenant agencies, (2) what policies GSA used to manage delegated authority, and (3) reasons the tenant agencies requested delegated authority. GAO reviewed the law, federal regulations, and GSA policies relating to six types of delegated authority and interviewed GSA officials and officials from six select tenant agencies. GAO analyzed GSA data on delegations issued from fiscal years 1996 to 2006.
What GAO Found
GSA delegated authority for operations and maintenance, utility services, lease management, administrative contracting officer, repair and alteration activities, and real estate leasing to its tenant agencies. However, GSA did not have complete or consistent data for key delegations. GSA officials believe the lack of complete data for repair and alteration delegations up to $100,000 was not problematic because they involve relatively small projects with limited program risk, and GSA has not noticed a pattern of problems that would warrant increased oversight. Regarding delegations of authority for real estate leasing, two offices within GSA collected separate sets of data. One office collected data on the number of general purpose lease delegations issued while another collected data on the number of lease delegations exercised for three different types of lease delegations (including general purpose, categorical, and special purpose). One office said its data are likely an undercount, and the different sets of data have not been reconciled. GSA is currently implementing several changes to improve its data collection for lease delegations and will issue separate oversight procedures that include a requirement to reconcile the two sources of lease delegation data. However, it is unclear when the oversight procedures will be issued. It is important to have accurate data on lease delegations because these delegations appear to be used more frequently than other delegation types. Federal agencies using these delegations may lack experience in acquiring office space, which could result in the government not receiving the best deal. We found that GSA had written policies and procedures for managing the six types of delegations we reviewed, but the guidance was not always current. GSA officials acknowledged the need to update some of its guidance and said the updates are in process, but it is unclear when these updates will be finalized. Further, GSA officials stated they did not always use mandated cost-effectiveness criteria when deciding to delegate authority for certain delegations due, in part, to staffing constraints. In addition, the procedures used for assessing cost-effectiveness were not always included in written guidance. The lack of updated guidance and limited use of mandated criteria inhibits GSA's ability to manage its delegations and determine if they are in the best interests of the government. According to the six tenant agencies we interviewed, the main reasons agencies sought delegations were the ability to complete their delegated real property activities in a timely manner and prioritize their own service requests, particularly in those cases where GSA's knowledge and expertise were less critical. Most of the six agencies we contacted plan to seek delegations in the future. |
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