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gao_GAO-16-603 | gao_GAO-16-603_0 | Background
In June 2015, DHS delivered its CBRNE Functions Review Report to Congress which proposed consolidating the agency’s core CBRNE functions (see fig. As described in figure 2, the new CBRNE Office would be comprised of Chemical, Biological, Nuclear, and Explosives mission support divisions. DHS Considered Several Key Factors, but Has Limited Analyses and Documentation Underlying the Benefits and Limitations of Its CBRNE Consolidation Proposal
The CBRNE report and summaries provide some insights into factors considered, but did not include associated underlying data or methodological information, such as how benefits and costs were compared or the extent to which stakeholders were consulted. Specifically, DHS’s consolidation proposal: Identified strategic outcomes and goals and considered problems to be solved, but did not fully assess and document potential problems that could result from consolidation. For example, in a November 2014 letter from the Secretary of Homeland Security to a congressional committee chair, the Secretary states that consolidation will provide a clearer focal point for external and DHS component engagement on CBRNE issues, among other things. Did not conduct and document a comparison of benefits and costs. DHS conducted limited external stakeholder outreach in developing the consolidation proposal, and thus the proposal may not sufficiently account for stakeholder concerns. Additionally, attention to the key questions identified from our analysis of previous organizational consolidations would help provide DHS, Congress, and other stakeholders with assurance that important aspects of effective organizational change, including a consideration of the plan’s benefits and limitations, are addressed as part of the agency’s CBRNE reorganization decision-making process. Key Mergers and Organizational Transformation Practices Could Benefit DHS Moving Forward If Congress Approves the CBRNE Consolidation
Should Congress approve its plan to consolidate, DHS could benefit from incorporating change management approaches such as the key practices and implementation steps derived from organizational transformations undertaken by large private and public sector organizations identified in our previous work. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016, provides that none of the funds appropriated may be used to establish an Office of CBRNE Defense until Congress has authorized such establishment and, as of July 2016, Congress had not approved the proposed consolidation. As DHS was formed, we reported in July 2003 on key practices and implementation steps for mergers and organizational transformations. However, should DHS receive this approval to reorganize its CBRNE functions, consulting each of these practices would ensure that lessons learned from other organizations are considered. In addition, the practices will be helpful in a consolidated CBRNE environment. For example, overall employee morale differs among the components to be consolidated, as demonstrated by the difference in the 2015 employee satisfaction and commitment scores of DNDO and S&T, making employee involvement to gain their ownership for the transformation a key step to consider. Also, given the range of activities conducted by the consolidated entities, establishing a coherent mission and integrated strategic goals to guide the transformation will be important. Recommendations for Executive Action
To better provide Congress and affected stakeholders with assurance that important aspects of effective organizational change are addressed as part of the agency’s CBRNE reorganization decision-making process, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the Assistant Secretary for the Office of Policy to complete, document, and make available analyses of key questions related to its consolidation proposal, including: what problems, if any, consolidation may create; a comparison of the benefits and costs the consolidation may entail; a broader range of external stakeholder input including a discussion of how it was obtained and considered. If DHS’s proposed CBRNE program consolidation is approved by Congress, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the Assistant Secretary for the Office of Policy to use, where appropriate, the key mergers and organizational transformation practices identified in our previous work to help ensure that a CBRNE consolidated office benefits from lessons learned from other organizational transformations. Based on our review of DHS’s proposal, the department did not fully consider similar potential expenses or up-front costs in developing its proposal. However, according to DHS, the passage of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016 (P.L. | Why GAO Did This Study
Committee reports accompanying the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2013, directed DHS to undertake an in-depth review of the department's weapons of mass destruction programs, including potential consolidation of CBRNE mission functions. DHS conducted its review, and in June 2015 provided a report to Congress, including a proposal to consolidate the agency's core CBRNE functions. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016, prohibits DHS from using funds to establish a CBRNE office until Congress approves it.
GAO was asked to review the proposed consolidation of DHS's CBRNE programs. This report discusses: (1) the extent to which DHS's proposal assessed the benefits and limitations of consolidation and (2) GAO's key practices from past organizational transformations that could benefit DHS, should Congress approve the proposed consolidation.
What GAO Found
The Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) documentation related to its proposed consolidation of Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and Explosives (CBRNE) programs offers some insights into benefits and limitations considered, but the information provided to GAO did not include several key factors to consider when evaluating an organizational consolidation. While developing its consolidation plan, DHS identified strategic goals, such as eight near-term goals to be achieved within the first two years. DHS also considered problems its consolidation is intended to solve, including providing a clearer focal point for external and DHS component engagement on CBRNE issues. However, DHS:
Did not fully assess and document potential problems that could result from consolidation.
Did not include a comparison of benefits and costs.
Conducted limited external stakeholder outreach in developing the consolidation proposal and thus the proposal may not sufficiently account for stakeholder concerns.
Attention to the these key areas, identified from GAO's analysis of previous organizational consolidations, would help provide DHS, Congress, and other stakeholders with assurance that important aspects of effective organizational change are addressed as part of the agency's CBRNE reorganization decision-making process.
Key mergers and organizational transformation practices identified in previous GAO work could benefit DHS if Congress approves the proposed CBRNE consolidation. GAO reported in July 2003 on key practices and implementation steps for mergers and organizational transformations that range from ensuring top leadership drives the transformation to involving employees in the implementation process to obtain their ideas and gain their ownership for the transformation. In addition, the practices would be helpful in a consolidated CBRNE environment. For example, overall employee morale differs among the components to be consolidated, making the key practice of employee involvement to gain their ownership for the transformation a crucial step. Also, given the wide range of activities conducted by the consolidated entities, the key practice of establishing a coherent mission and integrated strategic goals to guide the transformation will be important. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016, prohibits DHS from using funds to establish a CBRNE office until Congress approves it, and, as of June 2016, Congress had not approved DHS's consolidation proposal. However, should DHS receive this approval, consulting GAO's key practices would help ensure that lessons learned from other organizations are considered.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DHS complete, document, and make available analyses associated with identifying: (1) unintended problems, if any, that consolidation may create; (2) a comparison of the consolidation's benefits and costs; and (3) a broader range of external stakeholder input. Although DHS did not concur, GAO continues to believe that findings documented in the report support the recommendation. DHS concurred with GAO's additional recommendation that should Congress approve DHS's plan, the department use key mergers and organizational transformation practices identified in previous GAO work. |
gao_GAO-10-651T | gao_GAO-10-651T_0 | SBInet Program Challenges, Management Weaknesses, and Cost, Schedule, and Performance Risks Exist
Since the inception of SBInet, we have reported on a range of issues regarding program design and implementation. For example, in October 2007, we testified that DHS had made some progress in implementing Project 28—the first segment of SBInet technology across the southwest border—but had fallen behind its planned schedule. In our September 2008 testimony, we reported that CBP had initially planned to deploy SBInet technology along the southwest border by the end of 2008, but as of February 2008, this date had slipped to 2011 and that SBInet would have fewer capabilities than originally planned. As of April 2010, SBInet’s promised technology capabilities are still not operational and delays continue to require Border Patrol to rely on existing technology for securing the border, rather than using the newer SBInet technology planned to overcome the existing technology’s limitations. Limitations in the system’s ability to function as intended as well as concerns about the impact of placing towers and access roads in environmentally sensitive locations have contributed to these delays. As of January 2010, program officials stated that the program was working to address system limitations, such as modifications to the radar. These recommendations included one regarding the need for future expenditure plans to include explicit and measurable commitments relative to the capabilities, schedule, costs, and benefits associated with individual SBI program activities. DHS concurred with this recommendation and implemented it as part of the fiscal year 2009 expenditure plan. In reviewing the fiscal year 2008 and 2009 expenditure plans, we have reported that, although the plans improved from year to year, providing more detail and higher quality information than the year before; the plans did not fully satisfy all the conditions set out by law. In particular, we reported in September 2008 that important aspects of SBInet were ambiguous and in a continued state of flux, making it unclear and uncertain what technological capabilities were to be delivered and when. We also reported at this time that the number of new system defects identified over a 17 month period while testing was underway was generally increasing faster than the number of defects being fixed—a trend that is not indicative of a maturing system that is ready for acceptance and deployment. Accordingly, we made additional recommendations and DHS largely agreed with them and has efforts underway to address them. Although we plan to report on the results of this review later this month, we briefed DHS on our findings in December 2009, and provided DHS with a draft of this report, including conclusions and recommendations in March 2010. In light of program shortcomings, continued delays, questions surrounding SBInet’s viability, and the program’s high cost vis-à-vis other alternatives, in January 2010, the Secretary of Homeland Security ordered a department assessment of the SBI program. SBI Has Completed Deploying Most of Its Planned Tactical Infrastructure and Has Begun Efforts to Measure Its Impact on Border Security
In addition to monitoring SBInet implementation, we also reported on the tactical infrastructure component of the SBI program. CBP reported that tactical infrastructure, coupled with additional trained agents, had increased the miles of the southwest border under control, but despite a $2.6 billion investment, it cannot account separately for the impact of tactical infrastructure. In our September 2009 report, we recommended that to improve the quality of information available to allocate resources and determine tactical infrastructure’s contribution to effective control of the border, the Commissioner of CBP conduct a cost-effective evaluation of the impact of tactical infrastructure on effective control of the border. DHS concurred with our recommendation and described actions recently completed, underway, and planned that it said will address our recommendation. In April 2010, SBI officials told us that the Homeland Security Institute was conducting an analysis of the impact of tactical infrastructure on border security. U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s Secure Border Initiative Fiscal Year 2009 Expenditure Plan. Department of Homeland Security: Better Planning and Assessment Needed to Improve Outcomes for Complex Service Acquisitions GAO-08-263. | Why GAO Did This Study
Securing the nation's borders from illegal entry of aliens and contraband, including terrorists and weapons of mass destruction, continues to be a major challenge. In November 2005, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) announced the launch of the Secure Border Initiative (SBI)--a multiyear, multibillion dollar program aimed at securing U.S. borders and reducing illegal immigration. Within DHS, the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) provides agents and officers to support SBI. As requested, this statement summarizes (1) the findings and recommendations of GAO's reports on SBI's technology, known as SBInet (including such things as cameras and radars), and DHS's recent actions on SBInet; and (2) the findings and recommendations of GAO's reports on tactical infrastructure, such as fencing, and the extent to which CBP has deployed tactical infrastructure and assessed its operational impact. This statement is based on products issued from 2007 through 2010, with selected updates as of April 2010. To conduct these updates, GAO reviewed program schedules, status reports and funding and interviewed DHS officials.
What GAO Found
Since the inception of SBInet, GAO has reported on a range of issues regarding design and implementation, including program challenges, management weaknesses, and cost, schedule, and performance risks; DHS has largely concurred with GAO's recommendations and has started to take some action to address them. For example, in October 2007, GAO testified that the project involving the first segment of SBInet technology across the southwest border had fallen behind its planned schedule. In a September 2008 testimony, GAO reported that CBP plans to initially deploy SBInet technology along the southwest border had slipped from the end of 2008 to 2011 and that SBInet would have fewer capabilities than originally planned. As of April 2010, SBInet's promised capabilities were still not operational. Limitations in the system's ability to function have contributed to delays. GAO has also reviewed CBP expenditure plans and found a lack of specificity on such things as planned activities and milestones. GAO made recommendations, including the need for future expenditure plans to include explicit and measurable commitments relative to the capabilities, schedule, costs, and benefits associated with individual SBI program activities. While DHS has concurred with GAO's recommendations, and its expenditure plans have improved from year to year in detail and quality, the plans, including the one for fiscal year 2009, did not fully satisfy the conditions set out by law. Further, in September 2008, GAO made recommendations to address SBInet technological capabilities that were ambiguous or in a state of flux. DHS generally concurred with them. In January 2010, GAO reported that the number of new system defects identified over an 17 month period while testing was underway was generally increasing faster than the number of defects being fixed, not indicative of a maturing system. Given the program's shortcomings, in January 2010, the Secretary of Homeland Security ordered an assessment of the program, and in March 2010, the Secretary froze a portion of the program's fiscal year 2010 funding. GAO plans to report in May 2010 on the SBInet solution and the status of its September 2008 recommendations. CBP has completed deploying most of its planned tactical infrastructure and has begun efforts to measure its impact on border security, in response to a GAO recommendation. As of April 2010, CBP had completed 646 of the 652 miles of fencing it committed to deploy along the southwest border. CBP plans to have the remaining 6 miles of this baseline completed by December 2010. CBP reported that tactical infrastructure, coupled with additional trained agents, had increased the miles of the southwest border under control, but despite a $2.6 billion investment, it cannot account separately for the impact of tactical infrastructure. In a September 2009 report, GAO recommended that to improve the quality of information available to allocate resources and determine tactical infrastructure's contribution to effective control of the border, the Commissioner of CBP conduct a cost-effective evaluation of the impact of tactical infrastructure. DHS concurred with our recommendation and, in April 2010, told GAO that the Homeland Security Institute had undertaken this analysis. |
gao_GAO-16-573 | gao_GAO-16-573_0 | 1). The requirements in the Uniform Guidance aim to protect against waste, fraud, and abuse in various ways, as follows. Budgets. To meet documentation requirements for purchases made with grant funds, grantees must maintain records detailing the procurement history for all purchases. Selected Administrative Requirements in Agency- Specific Guidance Generally Focus on Promoting the Quality and Effectiveness of Federally Funded Research
Funding agencies have established administrative requirements—in some cases, in response to directives from Congress and OSTP—to promote the selection and development of qualified researchers, protect against bias in the conduct of research, and improve access to research results. Selected Universities Identified Common Factors That Add to Their Workload and Costs for Complying with Selected Administrative Requirements
Selected universities and stakeholder organizations identified common factors that add to their administrative workload and costs for complying with selected requirements: (1) variation in agencies’ implementation of requirements, (2) detailed pre-award requirements for applicants to develop and submit documentation for grant proposals, and (3) increased prescriptiveness of certain requirements. Officials at four universities said they expect to hire staff to handle the added workload resulting from an increased volume of purchases subject to OMB’s revised purchasing competition and documentation requirements. These efforts have included (1) standardizing requirements across agencies, (2) streamlining pre-award requirements, and (3) in some cases allowing universities more flexibility to assess and manage risks for some requirements. Research Performance Progress Report. Such efforts could help ensure that agencies do not miss opportunities to reduce universities’ administrative workload and costs and to improve their oversight of funding and support of research quality. Funding Agency Efforts to Reduce Pre-Award Administrative Workload and Costs by Postponing Proposal Requirements Have Not Been Extended to All Applicable Grants or Requirements
DOE, NASA, NIH, and NSF have made efforts to reduce pre-award administrative workload and costs associated with proposal preparation by postponing certain requirements until after a preliminary decision about an applicant’s likelihood of funding. OMB and Funding Agency Efforts to Allow More Flexibility Have Not Addressed Some Requirements
OMB and funding agencies have made efforts, in accordance with federal goals, to reduce administrative workload and costs by allowing universities more flexibility to assess and manage risks related to certain administrative requirements. Executive Order 13563 calls for agencies to identify and consider regulatory approaches that reduce burdens and maintain flexibility for the public. Under RBM’s 2008 standard terms and conditions that implemented that guidance, DOE, NASA, NIH, and NSF waived many requirements for recipients to obtain prior approvals for budget revisions. To better target requirements on areas of greatest risk, while maintaining accountability over grant funds, the Secretary of Health and Human Services, as part of the planned evaluation of the HHS regulation governing financial conflicts of interest in NIH-funded research, should evaluate options for targeting requirements on areas of greatest risk for researcher conflicts, including adjusting the threshold and types of financial interests that need to be disclosed and the timing of disclosures, and the Director of OMB, as part of OMB’s planned evaluation of the Uniform Guidance, should evaluate options for targeting requirements for research grants to universities, including requirements for purchases and subrecipient monitoring, on areas of greatest risk for improper use of research funds. NSF and OMB did not comment on our recommendations. DOE, HHS, and NASA concurred with our first recommendation to coordinate through RBM to identify additional areas where they can standardize requirements. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report examines (1) the sources and goals of selected research grant requirements, (2) the factors that contribute to universities’ administrative workload and costs for complying with these requirements, and (3) efforts the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and research funding agencies have made to reduce the administrative workload and costs for complying with these requirements, and the results of these efforts. To address these objectives, we selected four agencies that fund research grants to universities and focused on nine categories of requirements associated with these agencies’ research grants:
The four funding agencies were the Department of Energy (DOE), National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), National Institutes of Health (NIH) within the Department of Health and Human Services, and National Science Foundation (NSF). According to NSF data, these four agencies provided about 83 percent of federal funding for research at universities and colleges in fiscal year 2015. To examine factors that contribute to universities’ administrative workload and costs for complying with selected requirements, we selected a nongeneralizable sample of six universities to conduct in-depth interviews of officials regarding each of the nine categories of requirements in our scope and to collect qualitative information on the types of administrative workload and costs resulting from the requirements—such as administrative staff costs, researcher time, and investments in systems and processes. | Why GAO Did This Study
The federal government obligated over $27 billion for university research in fiscal year 2015, according to NSF. To allow for oversight of these funds, Congress and research funding agencies established administrative requirements that universities must comply with as part of grants they apply for and receive. University stakeholders have studied and raised concerns about the workload and costs to comply with the requirements.
GAO was asked to review research grant requirements and their administrative workloads and costs. This report examines (1) the sources and goals of selected requirements, (2) factors affecting universities' administrative workload and costs for complying with the requirements, and (3) efforts by OMB and research funding agencies to reduce the requirements' administrative workload and costs, and the results of these efforts. GAO selected and examined in detail nine areas of administrative requirements at DOE, NASA, NIH, and NSF, and interviewed administrative staff and researchers from six universities. GAO selected agencies and universities that ranged in the amount and type of research funding provided or received.
What GAO Found
Administrative requirements for federal research grants include (1) Office of Management and Budget (OMB) government-wide grant requirements for protecting against waste, fraud, and abuse of funds and (2) agency-specific requirements generally for promoting the quality and effectiveness of federally funded research. For example, OMB requires grantees to maintain records sufficient to detail the history of procurement for all purchases made with grant funds, and the Department of Energy (DOE), National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), National Institutes of Health (NIH), and National Science Foundation (NSF) require applicants to develop and submit biographical sketches describing their professional accomplishments so agencies can consider researchers' qualifications when deciding which proposals to fund.
Officials from universities and stakeholder organizations GAO interviewed identified common factors that add to their administrative workload and costs for complying with selected requirements: (1) variation in agencies' implementation of requirements, (2) pre-award requirements for applicants to develop and submit detailed documentation for grant proposals, and (3) increased prescriptiveness of certain requirements. They said that these factors add to universities' workload and costs in various ways, such as by causing universities to invest in new electronic systems or in the hiring or training of staff. For example, university officials told GAO that new OMB requirements for purchases made with grant funds will result in added costs for hiring administrative staff to handle an increased volume of purchases that are subject to some form of competition.
OMB and research funding agencies have made continuing efforts to reduce universities' administrative workload and costs for complying with selected requirements, with limited results. These included efforts in three areas: (1) standardizing requirements across agencies; (2) postponing certain pre-award requirements until after making a preliminary decision about an applicant's likelihood of funding; and (3) in some cases, allowing universities more flexibility to assess and manage risks for some requirements. For example, funding agencies have developed a standard set of administrative terms and conditions for research grants and a standard form for research progress reports. Such efforts are in accordance with federal goals, such as those in a 2011 executive order that calls for agencies to harmonize regulations and consider regulatory approaches that reduce burdens and maintain flexibility. However, opportunities exist in each of the three areas to further reduce universities' administrative workload and costs. First, efforts to standardize requirements have not fully addressed variations in agency implementation of requirements, such as agencies' forms and systems for collecting project budgets and biographical sketches. Second, funding agencies have not fully examined pre-award requirements to identify those—such as requirements for detailed budgets—that can be postponed. Third, some requirements—such as those for obtaining multiple quotations for small purchases—limit universities' flexibility to allocate administrative resources toward oversight of areas at greatest risk of improper use of research funds. Further efforts to standardize requirements, postpone pre-award requirements, and allow more flexibility for universities could help ensure agencies do not miss opportunities to reduce administrative workload and costs.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that OMB, DOE, NASA, NIH, and NSF identify additional areas where requirements, such as those for budgets or purchases, can be standardized, postponed, or made more flexible, while maintaining oversight of federal funds. DOE, NASA, and NIH generally concurred, and OMB and NSF did not comment on the recommendations. |
gao_GAO-14-744 | gao_GAO-14-744_0 | According to the plan, FSIS intends to, among other things, (1) conduct food safety assessments at plants that produce ground and mechanically separated poultry products by the end of fiscal year 2014; (2) consider modifying the way it publishes the category status of poultry plants, such as by publishing on its website the names of plants in Category 1 and Category 2, in addition to those in Category 3, by the end of fiscal year 2014; (3) develop new enforcement strategies that take into account plants’ compliance history and Salmonella category under the standards, among other things, which, according to the plan, will take over a year to accomplish; and (4) host a meeting with APHIS and other stakeholders to focus on poultry farm practices that could help decrease Salmonella contamination on FSIS-regulated poultry products and use the information gathered to inform best practice guidelines, requiring the completion of additional actions prior to the meeting. According to FSIS’s final rule, modernizing poultry slaughter inspections will play a role in reducing Salmonella and other poultry pathogen contamination. In Assessing Its Actions, USDA Does Not Have Measures for All Poultry Pathogen Standards to Track Progress in Protecting Human Health and Relies on Data with Limitations
To help assess the effects of the agency’s actions on the incidence of human illnesses from Salmonella and Campylobacter contamination in poultry products, FSIS has developed performance measures and conducted research, but these efforts fall short in two ways: (1) the agency did not establish performance measures for certain commonly consumed poultry products or Campylobacter and (2) the agency has relied on data with limitations that affect their usefulness. FSIS’s Salmonella measure indicates whether agency actions to ensure compliance with the applicable standard are helping the agency meet its goal. The agency has not established performance measures even though the standards for young turkey carcasses have been in place since 2005, with a revision in 2011, and the standards for ground chicken and ground turkey have been in place for more than a decade. In July 2014, FSIS officials told us these plants are no longer in Category 3 based on recent testing. However, without performance measures and targets for compliance with standards for these pathogens in commonly consumed poultry products, FSIS cannot quantitatively gauge its progress in assessing the effects of its actions related to these standards toward meeting the agency’s goal of maximizing domestic compliance with food safety policies and, ultimately, protecting public health. contamination of poultry products. As a part of this approach, USDA’s FSIS has taken several actions to reduce Salmonella and Campylobacter contamination in poultry products to protect human health, including tightening existing standards for Salmonella contamination in young chicken and turkey carcasses, as well as developing a Salmonella Action Plan. Similarly, it has not developed performance measures for Campylobacter contamination in young chicken and turkey carcasses, or for Salmonella contamination in turkey carcasses. In the absence of performance measures and associated targets for these pathogens in commonly consumed poultry products, FSIS cannot quantitatively assess the effects of its actions related to these standards in meeting the agency’s goal of maximizing domestic compliance with food safety policies and, ultimately, protecting public health. In addition, USDA faces several challenges that could hinder its ability to reduce contamination in poultry products. To help overcome this challenge, the agency has developed guidelines on practices for controlling Salmonella and Campylobacter on farms, but the guidelines do not include information on the effectiveness for each practice, as recommended by an internal agency committee. Without providing this information in future revisions of the guidelines, USDA is not fully informing industry of the potential benefits of adopting these practices and encouraging implementation of such practices. In future revisions of the compliance guidelines on controlling Salmonella and Campylobacter, FSIS should ensure the inclusion of information on the effectiveness of each recommended farm practice to reduce these pathogens in live poultry. Our objectives for this report were to: (1) describe actions USDA has taken since 2006 to reduce Salmonella and Campylobacter contamination in poultry products that it regulates; (2) evaluate USDA’s efforts to assess the effects of these actions on the incidence of human illnesses from Salmonella and Campylobacter in poultry products; and (3) determine what challenges, if any, USDA faces in reducing these pathogens in poultry products. We also interviewed officials from USDA’s Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS),USDA. FSIS, and CDC to identify and describe any challenges facing We conducted a two-stage interview process with industry, consumer, and government employee stakeholder groups. These outbreaks are not generalizeable to all outbreaks from Salmonella and Campylobacter contaminated poultry products. We limited the scope of our review to four of the six most recent Salmonella outbreaks that had the highest number of confirmed illnesses that the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) investigated since 2009. | Why GAO Did This Study
USDA is responsible for ensuring the safety of poultry products. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) report the U.S. food supply is one of the safest in the world, yet estimate that Salmonella and Campylobacter contamination in food causes more than 2 million human illnesses per year. Poultry products contaminated with pathogens cause more deaths than any other commodity. GAO was asked to examine USDA's approach to reduce these pathogens in poultry products.
GAO's objectives were to (1) describe actions USDA has taken since 2006 to reduce Salmonella and Campylobacter contamination in poultry products, (2) evaluate USDA's efforts to assess the effects of these actions on the incidence of human illnesses from Salmonella and Campylobacter in poultry products, and (3) determine challenges USDA faces in reducing these pathogens in poultry products. GAO reviewed relevant regulations and documents and interviewed officials from USDA and CDC, as well as 11 industry, consumer, and government employee stakeholder groups selected based on knowledge of USDA's poultry slaughter inspections and food safety.
What GAO Found
Since 2006, the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) has taken a number of actions to reduce contamination from Salmonella and Campylobacter (disease-causing organisms, i.e., pathogens) in poultry (chicken and turkey) products. USDA's actions to reduce these pathogens include, for example, tightening existing standards limiting the allowable amount of Salmonella contamination in young poultry carcasses, implementing the first standards limiting Campylobacter contamination in young poultry carcasses in 2011, and developing an action plan detailing a priority list of actions, such as developing new enforcement strategies, to reduce Salmonella . More recently, in August 2014, USDA published its final rule to modernize poultry slaughter inspections, which according to the agency, will play a role in reducing Salmonella and other poultry pathogen contamination by allowing better use of agency resources, among other things.
To help assess the effects of these actions on the incidence of human illness from Salmonella and Campylobacter , USDA conducted research on the effects of agency actions to reduce these pathogens and developed performance measures for certain poultry products to help monitor progress toward agency goals. For example, USDA developed a measure to indicate whether agency actions to ensure compliance with the standard for Salmonella contamination in young chicken carcasses are helping the agency achieve its goal of maximizing domestic compliance with food safety policies. However, USDA has not developed measures for Salmonella contamination in ground poultry or young turkey carcasses, even though standards for such contamination have been in place since 1996 and 2005, respectively, or for Campylobacter contamination in young poultry carcasses. USDA believes it is not appropriate to establish measures for ground poultry until the agency has revised standards, or for Campylobacte r contamination until the agency has obtained more information on compliance levels—both of which the agency expects to do by the end of 2014. USDA officials stated that they will review the agency's strategic plan to determine what performance measures, if any, are needed. USDA does not believe a measure for young turkey carcasses is needed since historically data have shown that plants are meeting the standard but, in calendar year 2013, two plants did not meet it; USDA officials told GAO that these plants are no longer noncompliant. Without performance measures for these standards, USDA is not publicly reporting performance information and cannot assess the effects of its actions related to these standards in meeting the goal of maximizing domestic compliance with food safety policies and, ultimately, protecting public health.
GAO identified several challenges—based, in part, on the views of 11 stakeholder groups—that could hinder USDA's ability to reduce contamination in poultry products. For example, contamination of poultry products can be affected by practices on poultry farms. To help overcome this challenge, the agency developed guidelines in 2010 on practices for controlling Salmonella and Campylobacter on farms, but the guidelines did not include information on the effectiveness of each of these practices, consistent with a recommendation from an agency advisory committee. USDA did not confirm that it plans to include this information in future guidelines. Without providing this information in future guidelines, USDA is not fully informing the poultry industry of the potential benefits of adopting these practices and encouraging their implementation.
What GAO Recommends
Salmonella and Campylobacter on farms include information on the effectiveness of each practice. USDA agreed with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-03-682 | gao_GAO-03-682_0 | In fiscal year 2002, the depots reported that the total value of work performed was $1.5 billion. The extent to which Operation Iraqi Freedom will result in increases in future years is not clear. Future projections may not be a reliable indicator, since they change with changing conditions. In addition, the percentage of work performed for non-Army customers increased from fiscal year 1987 through fiscal year 2002 from 6 to 26 percent of the total hours for maintenance programs completed in those years. Army component and recapitalization workload is projected to be the majority of the depots’ work. According to an AMC official, the Army does not yet have a plan for managing the reconstitution, but one is being developed. Workload Efficiency and Sufficiency Issues
Army depots have had some efficiency problems, caused by several factors, including the loss of work to the private sector and field-level maintenance activities. Initiatives such as facility and equipment downsizing, depot partnerships, and “lean manufacturing” have been implemented to address depot inefficiencies. Trends in two key metrics— capacity utilization and employee productivity—-show that progress has been made in recent years, although further improvements are still desirable. Whether new systems work will be assigned to the depots is unclear, but depot officials believe that partnerships may offer the best potential for new systems work. Initiatives to Improve Depot Efficiency and Productivity
Initiatives that have been implemented to improve depot efficiency and productivity include “rightsizing” at realigned depots, depot partnerships designed to improve the efficiency and performance of depot operations, and lean manufacturing initiatives. Additional Workloads Possible and Essential for Depot Viability
Additional workloads could play a key role in further improving the cost- effectiveness of the Army depots and are essential for the depots’ long- term viability. Some of the weaknesses were that (1) the existing policy did not provide a forward look at new weapon systems and associated future maintenance capability requirements, (2) the existing policy did not link the core identification process to source-of-repair policies and procedures for new and upgraded systems, and (3) the various procedures and practices being used by the services to implement the existing policy, such as using “like” workloads to sustain core capabilities, were affecting the ability of the depots to establish core capabilities. Thus, we have not reviewed the methodology in detail and cannot be sure whether the new methodology will correct the weaknesses we identified in the core process. The Army has taken steps to develop a strategic plan for its depots, but it is not comprehensive or current and the Army has not yet implemented it. 4. Conclusions
Continuing issues about (1) the assignment of reduced workloads to Army maintenance depots, (2) deficiencies in the process of quantifying both core depot maintenance capabilities and the workload needed to ensure cost efficiency and technical competence and to preserve surge capability, and (3) strategic planning for depots raise significant questions about the long-term viability of Army depots. We have discussed these issues in the past, but they remain unresolved. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve the reliability of future maintenance workload projections in all DOD maintenance depots, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense through the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, require the Army Materiel Command in conjunction with the Army acquisition community to develop and implement standard business rules and procedures for identifying and reporting Army depot workload projections from the Army acquisition community and require the DOD depot maintenance community to develop and implement ways to improve the identification and reporting of depot inter-service workload projections across all the military services using standard business rules and procedures. To answer whether the Army has identified the depots’ core capability and provided its depots with workload to use that capability, we reviewed the Department of Defense and Army guidance for computing core capability requirements and associated workloads in December 1999 for fiscal year 2001 and compared the results with workloads assigned to the depots since fiscal year 1999. For the question of whether the Army has a long-range plan for the future viability of an efficient depot system, we relied upon prior work that shows that neither the department nor the Army had a comprehensive defense maintenance strategic plan. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Army's five maintenance depots produced work valued at $1.5 billion in fiscal year 2002, with the remaining 49 percent of the Army's depot work performed by contractors. GAO was asked to assess (1) the trends in and the reliability of depot workload projections; (2) whether workloads are sufficient for efficient depot operations, initiatives are under way to improve efficiency, and additional workloads are possible; (3) whether the Army has identified depots' core capability and provided workload to support that capability; and (4) whether the Army has a long-range plan for a viable, efficient depot system.
What GAO Found
The work assigned to Army maintenance depots has declined by 36 percent, although the cost of the Army's total maintenance program has increased since fiscal year 1987. Except for fiscal year 2003, projections for future work in the depots through fiscal 2008 show further decline. Depot work also changed from predominately overhauling Army end items to the increased repair of components. In addition, work from non-Army customers has increased from 6 to 26 percent. Army component and recapitalization work is projected to be the majority of depot work in the future. Depot planners generally do not have reliable projections of work requirements for non-Army customers. Because of this and other factors, including changing conditions, future projections have limitations. Potential increases in depot work resulting from the Iraq war are not yet clear. Various factors, including workload reductions and workload performance issues, have resulted in efficiency and productivity problems in Army depots. Such initiatives as facility and equipment rightsizing, depot maintenance partnerships, and "lean manufacturing" have been implemented. Trends in two metrics--capacity utilization and employee productivity--show that, while more needs to be done, efficiency and productivity improvements have been made. Additional workloads, particularly for new and upgraded systems, are essential for future depot viability. However, in the past most new work has gone to private contractors. Some new-systems work is being explored for depots, and depot managers believe that partnering with the private sector may be the best chance for getting such work. The Army has not identified its depots' core capability requirements using a revised DOD methodology meant to overcome weaknesses in the core process. At the same time, it is unclear whether the revised methodology, which is undergoing further changes, will correct weaknesses in the core process. Moreover, no one in the Army assesses the extent to which depot work compares with identified core capability requirements. Depot managers are concerned about the loss of work and the failure to obtain work necessary to support core capabilities. The Army does not have a comprehensive and current strategic plan for the depots and has not implemented the limited plan it developed. GAO concluded in a 1998 report that the Army had inadequate long-range plans for its depots and that such planning is essential if significant progress is to be made in addressing the complex, systemic problems facing the depots. Despite the time that has passed, the same issues remain. DOD has not implemented a comprehensive and current plan for resolving continuing issues about (1) reduced workloads being assigned to Army maintenance depots and (2) deficiencies in the process of quantifying both core depot maintenance capabilities and the workload needed to ensure cost efficiency and technical competence and to preserve surge capability. Without such a plan, the long-term viability of Army depots is uncertain. |
gao_GAO-08-355 | gao_GAO-08-355_0 | CTR Requirements Are Useful to Law Enforcement Efforts in a Variety of Ways, but Measuring Their Impact Is Difficult
Federal, state, and local law enforcement officials we interviewed and surveyed said that information in CTRs provided unique and reliable information essential to a variety of efforts and that recent advances in technology, along with FinCEN’s distribution of BSA data in bulk, have enhanced their ability to use and analyze CTR information. Linking law enforcement’s use of CTRs to specific outcomes is difficult, however, because agencies do not track their use of CTRs, which are typically one of many sources of information used to support investigations. FinCEN does not routinely publish any information on law enforcement’s use of CTR data as it does for other information that financial institutions provide under the BSA. This is because institutions must have processes and trained staff in place to identify when and if a CTR is required, including the ability to aggregate same-day cash transactions made by or on behalf of the same person, and to file CTRs correctly. While automation has made these tasks less difficult, many institutions reported that their processes still include “manual” steps. Institutions we contacted were generally unable to quantify their costs for meeting CTR requirements, in large part because they use the same processes and staff for meeting other BSA requirements or for other purposes. While Most Depository Institutions File CTRs, a Small Number of the Largest Institutions Account for the Majority
Our analysis of FinCEN’s data on the numbers of CTRs filed annually shows that, from 2004 to 2006, a relatively small number of the nation’s approximately 17,000 depository institutions accounted for the large majority of CTRs filed. Among the reasons cited by institutions was uncertainty about the documentation required to demonstrate that some customers are in fact eligible, accompanied by some concern that examiners from the federal banking regulators would deem the documentation insufficient and cite them for BSA noncompliance. Other factors discouraging use of exemptions were the cost and effort involved in meeting FinCEN’s regulatory requirements to (1) file an exemption form, and annually review and update the information, particularly for certain customers that are specifically exempted by statute, as appropriate; and (2) biennially file a form to document the continued eligibility of customers that have been exempted under the Phase II regulations—which as a practical matter duplicates the required annual review process for those customers. Further, in addition to supporting specific investigations, CTR requirements aid law enforcement by forcing criminals—who attempt to avoid reportable transactions—to act in ways that increase chances of detection through other methods. Increasing use of exemptions would help depository institutions avoid filing unnecessary CTRs, as well as reduce the government’s costs to process them. To encourage greater use of CTR exemption provisions and avoid the burden of filing CTRs that are likely to be of little or no value to law enforcement efforts, we recommend that the Secretary of the Treasury direct FinCEN to take the following five actions: Provide guidance for depository institutions and federal banking regulators on the documentation needed to demonstrate the portion of a business’s gross revenue that is derived from activities ineligible for the exemption. Provide Web-based material to help train and guide staff of depository institutions in determining eligibility for exemptions. Specifically, our objectives were to determine: (1) the usefulness of CTR requirements to federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies; (2) the costs to depository institutions of meeting CTR requirements; and (3) factors that affect depository institutions’ decisions to exempt or not exempt eligible customers, including opportunities for encouraging use of exemptions while maintaining the usefulness of CTR data to law enforcement agencies. However, on many occasions the persons deposited more than $10,000, and the depository institution filed CTRs. | Why GAO Did This Study
To aid law enforcement efforts against financial crimes, under the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) depository institutions must file the Treasury Department's Financial Crimes Enforcement Network's (FinCEN) currency transaction report (CTR) form on their customers' cash transactions of more than $10,000. While FinCEN's regulations allow institutions to exempt certain customers, over 15 million CTRs were filed in 2006. Public Law 109-351 directed GAO to report on (1) the usefulness of CTRs to law enforcement; (2) depository institutions' costs of meeting CTR requirements; and (3) ways to encourage use of exemptions to avoid unnecessary CTRs. Among other things, GAO obtained data from FinCEN on CTRs and exemptions from 2004 to 2006, surveyed 115 state and local law enforcement agencies and 680 depository institutions, held structured interviews with officials of federal agencies and depository institutions, and reviewed relevant laws and regulations.
What GAO Found
According to federal, state, and local law enforcement officials, CTRs provide unique and reliable information essential to a variety of efforts, and recent advances in technology have enhanced law enforcement agencies' ability to use CTR data by integrating it with other information. In addition to supporting specific investigations, CTR requirements aid law enforcement by forcing criminals attempting to avoid reportable transactions to act in ways that increase chances of detection through other methods. Linking law enforcement's use of CTRs to specific outcomes is difficult, however, because agencies do not track their use of CTRs, which are typically one of many information sources used in investigations. FinCEN does not routinely publish summary information on law enforcement uses of CTR data--as it does for other data required under the BSA--that could help depository institutions understand the value of CTRs. While fewer than 30 of the largest U.S. depository institutions accounted for over half of new CTRs filed during the period GAO examined, all of the nation's approximately 17,000 institutions incur some costs to meet CTR requirements. Institutions must have processes and staff in place to identify when and if a CTR is required, as well as the ability to aggregate same-day cash transactions by or on behalf of the same person; file CTRs correctly; and, if desired, establish and maintain exemptions for certain customers. Institutions GAO contacted were generally unable to quantify these costs, in large part because they use the same processes and staff for other purposes. While automation has made CTR tasks less difficult, almost all institutions reported that they have not completely automated all steps, such as reviews of CTRs by institution officials. GAO's work identified a number of factors that deter use of exemptions, as well as opportunities for increasing their use, thereby reducing the number of CTRs that are likely of little or no value to law enforcement efforts. As reasons for not exempting eligible customers, institutions cited uncertainty about the documentation required to demonstrate that some customers are in fact eligible, along with concern that federal banking regulators (who examine institutions for compliance with CTR requirements) would find fault. Institutions also cited as deterrents the need to meet FinCEN's regulatory requirements to (1) file an exemption form, and annually review the supporting data, particularly for hundreds of customers that are specifically exempted by statute; and (2) biennially renew eligibility for some customers--a process that as a practical matter duplicates the required annual reviews for those customers. Institution officials indicated that additional guidance from FinCEN, as well as Web-based material to help train their staff in making exemption determinations, could increase the use of exemptions. Removing regulatory deterrents and providing additional guidance and Web-based material could help depository institutions avoid filing unnecessary CTRs without harming law enforcement efforts. |
gao_RCED-98-241 | gao_RCED-98-241_0 | It plans to complete the selection of remedies for an additional 22 percent of these sites by the end of fiscal year 1999. Status of Remedy Selection
As of September 30, 1997, EPA had completed the selection of remedies at 926 (about 70 percent) of the 1,327 NPL sites listed as of that date that the Superfund program is expected to clean up. In addition, EPA had selected at least one remedy at another 222 sites. Remedy selection was not as far along at federal sites as at nonfederal ones. All remedies had been selected for about 76 percent of the nonfederal sites (890 of 1,169 sites) compared with about 23 percent of the federal sites (36 of 158 sites). EPA officials said that the slower pace of remedy selection at federal sites occurred because many were listed on the NPL after nonfederal sites and were larger and more complex. Remedies will have been selected for about 95 percent of nonfederal sites (1,109 of 1,169 sites) and for about 67 percent of federal sites (106 of 158 sites). To test the reliability of CERCLIS data regarding the cleanup phase reached at NPL sites, we selected a random sample of 98 NPL sites that had not reached the “construction complete” stage as of September 30, 1997, and sought confirmation from EPA’s regional offices of the most recent remedial activity reported by CERCLIS for each operable unit at the sites. Regions reported that at five sites CERCLIS incorrectly recorded the status of cleanup work. At two of these sites, one or more operable units had not reached the cleanup stage recorded in CERCLIS; at two other sites, an operable unit had progressed beyond the stage indicated by CERCLIS; and at the fifth site, an action that was recorded as a remedial action in CERCLIS was actually a removal action. On the basis of our sample results, we estimate that the cleanup status of NPL sites reported by CERCLIS, as of September 30, 1997, was accurate for 95 percent (plus or minus 4.4 percent) of these sites. EPA officials expect that about $100 million will be available to fund new cleanup actions by the end of the fiscal year, leaving a shortfall of about $163 million. Estimates of the funds available for cleanup and the identity and number of the sites ready for cleanup action are subject to revision as the year progresses. Scope and Methodology
To determine the progress the Superfund program has made in selecting remedies, we obtained a copy of the CERCLIS database dated December 15, 1997. V.
To verify the accuracy of the information in CERCLIS on sites’ cleanup progress, we selected a statistically random sample of 98 sites. On the basis of this survey, we estimated the accuracy of the CERCLIS data on site status. V.)
To determine the number of cleanup projects that cannot be started in fiscal year 1998 because of a lack of funding, we interviewed the chair of the National Prioritization Panel and other EPA officials, obtained lists of sites considered by the Panel for funding, and confirmed with regional officials that the listed sites were expected to be ready for new cleanup actions in fiscal year 1998. Federal and Nonfederal Sites for Which Final Remedies Will Be Selected After Fiscal Year 1999
Table VI.1: Nonfederal Sites for Which Final Remedies Will Be Selected After Fiscal Year 1999 Number of remedies selected as of 9/30/97 (continued)
Number of remedies selected as of 9/30/97 (continued)
Table VI.2: Federal Sites for Which Final Remedies Will Be Selected After Fiscal Year 1999 Number of remedies selected as of 9/30/97 (continued)
Number of remedies selected as of 9/30/97 (continued)
Sites Expected to Be Ready for Cleanup Action in Fiscal Year 1998 but Not Approved for Funding as of June 5, 1998
Table VII.1 shows sites that are expected to be ready for new cleanup actions requiring Superfund outlays in fiscal year 1998 and that had not been approved for funding as of June 5, 1998. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on the status of sites on the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) National Priorities List (NPL), focusing on the: (1) progress the Superfund program has made in selecting remedies at both federal and nonfederal sites; (2) accuracy of the information in the Superfund database on sites' cleanup progress; and (3) number of cleanup projects that cannot be started in FY 1998 because of a lack of funding.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) as of September 30, 1997, EPA had completed the selection of cleanup remedies at about 70 percent of the 1,327 NPL sites listed as of that date that were expected to require a Superfund remedy; (2) no remedies had been selected at 13 percent of the sites; (3) EPA had selected 1,925 remedies at NPL sites and planned to select another 828 remedies; (4) remedy selection at federal sites has lagged behind selection at nonfederal sites because, according to EPA officials, many of the federal sites present more complex cleanup problems and were added to the NPL after nonfederal sites; (5) at the end of FY 1997, EPA had completed remedy selection for about 76 percent of the nonfederal sites and for about 23 percent of the federal sites; (6) EPA plans to complete remedy selection at an additional 19 percent of nonfederal sites and an additional 44 percent of federal sites by the end of FY 1999; (7) if these plans are realized, EPA will have completed remedy selection at about 95 percent of the nonfederal sites and about 67 percent of the federal sites that were listed as of September 30, 1997; (8) GAO tested the accuracy of the data in EPA's Superfund database on the progress of sites through the cleanup process for a statistically random sample of 98 NPL sites; (9) GAO estimates that the cleanup status of NPL sites reported by the Superfund database as of September 30, 1997, was accurate for 95 percent of the sites; (10) GAO found that this database incorrectly recorded the status of cleanup work at five sampled sites; (11) two of these sites had not progressed as far as the database indicated, two other sites had progressed beyond the cleanup phase indicated by the database, and at the fifth site, an action had been classified incorrectly; (12) EPA identified 46 sites that could start cleanup actions requiring Superfund financing in FY 1998 at an estimated cost of about $263 million; (13) EPA officials expected to have about $100 million available for new actions, an amount that they said could fund up to 20 sites; (14) as a result of this anticipated funding shortfall, at least 26 sites could be ready for cleanup but have no work begun in FY 1998; and (15) the amount of funds that proves to be available for cleanup by the end of the fiscal year and the number and the identity of sites ready for funding could vary from EPA's estimates, depending on the funding demands of competing Superfund activities, the progress of sites toward completing cleanup design, and other factors. |
gao_GAO-02-141T | gao_GAO-02-141T_0 | Preparedness Efforts Include Multiple Actions
Federal departments’ and agencies’ preparedness efforts have included efforts to increase federal, state, and local response capabilities, develop response teams of medical professionals, increase availability of medical treatments, participate in and sponsor terrorism response exercises, plan to aid victims, and provide support during special events such as presidential inaugurations, major political party conventions, and the Superbowl. However, we found evidence that coordination remains fragmented. Departments and agencies use several approaches to coordinate their activities on terrorism, including interagency response plans, work groups, and formal agreements. Table 1 shows some of the federal programs providing assistance to state and local governments for emergency planning that would be relevant to responding to a bioterrorist attack. These concerns include insufficient state and local planning for response to terrorist events, a lack of hospital participation in training on terrorism and emergency response planning, questions regarding the timely availability of medical teams and resources in an emergency, and inadequacies in the public health infrastructure. Interagency Group for Equipment Standards. Bioterrorism: Federal Research and Preparedness Activities (GAO-01-915, Sept. 28, 2001). | Why GAO Did This Study
Federal research and preparedness activities related to bioterrorism center on detecting of such agents; developing new or improved vaccines, antibiotics, and antivirals; and developing performance standards for emergency response equipment. Preparedness activities include: (1) increasing federal, state, and local response capabilities; (2) developing response teams; (3) increasing the availability of medical treatments; (4) participating in and sponsoring exercises; (5) aiding victims; and (6) providing support at special events, such as presidential inaugurations and Olympic games. To coordinate their activities, federal agencies are developing interagency response plans, participating in various interagency work groups, and entering into formal agreements with each other to share resources and capabilities.
What GAO Found
However, GAO found that coordination of federal terrorism research, preparedness, and response programs is fragmented, raising concerns about the ability of states and localities to respond to a bioterrorist attack. These concerns include poor state and local planning and the lack of hospital participation in training on terrorism and emergency response planning. This report summarized a September 2001 report (GAO-01-915). |
gao_GAO-07-919 | gao_GAO-07-919_0 | Background
The Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) program is the federal government’s primary program specifically designed to provide assistance to workers who lose their jobs as a result of international trade. Labor Certified Two- Thirds of Petitions Investigated and Generally Processed Petitions in a Timely Manner
Labor certified two-thirds of petitions that it investigated over the past 3 fiscal years, certifying nearly 4,700 petitions, covering an estimated 400,000 workers (see table 1). Labor met the requirement to process petitions within 40 days for 77 percent of petitions it investigated during fiscal years 2004 to 2006 (see fig. Labor officials said that they are not always able to meet the 40-day time frame because they sometimes do not receive necessary information in a timely manner from company officials. In fiscal year 2006, the most common reason petitions were denied was that workers were not involved in producing an article, a basic requirement of the TAA program. For example, among the industries for which we could obtain complete data, we found that the number of additional workers eligible for TAA in those industries could more than double if no additional criteria were used or expand by less than 10 percent with relatively restrictive criteria. However, such an approach presents some design and implementation challenges. For example, designing the specific criteria an industry must meet to be certified could be challenging due to the possibility of making workers who lose their jobs for reasons other than trade eligible for TAA. In addition, it may be challenging to ensure that all workers in certified industries are notified of their potential eligibility for TAA, verify workers’ eligibility, and initiate the delivery of services to workers. For example, if over a 3-year period, an industry were required to have a 15 percent increase in the import share of the domestic market in 1 year, as well as increases in the import share during the 2 other years, we estimated that there would have been a 9 percent increase in the number of workers eligible for TAA in the 69 industries we analyzed. Verifying worker eligibility. Such an approach could expand eligibility because some trade remedies may cover areas in which there have been few or no certified TAA petitions. It is difficult to estimate the impact of this approach on eligibility because trade remedies are applied to specific products, and data on unemployment by product do not exist. For example, workers who did not lose their jobs due to international trade could be made eligible for TAA in part because trade remedy investigations are focused on injury to an industry as a whole and not principally on employment impacts. Potential Challenges Exist with Using Trade Remedies to Identify Trade-Related Job Losses
An approach using trade remedies presents some of the same challenges as an industry certification approach based on three petitions certified in 180 days. The verification process could be particularly challenging with an approach based on trade remedies because of the narrow product classifications of some trade remedy products. In firms that make multiple products, for example, more than one type of stainless steel pipe, it may be difficult to identify which specific workers worked on the products subject to trade remedies. The Department of Labor did not comment. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, & Methodology
Our objectives were to determine: (1) trends in Labor’s certification of Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) petitions, (2) the extent to which industry certification based on three petitions certified within 180 days would increase the number of workers eligible for TAA, and (3) the extent to which certification of industries subject to trade remedies would increase the number of eligible workers. Estimate of Extent to Which Industry Certification Based on Three Petitions Certified in 180 Days Would Increase Worker Eligibility
To estimate the extent to which industry certification based on three petitions certified in 180 days would increase the number of workers eligible for TAA, we first analyzed Labor’s data on petitions certified from calendar years 2003 to 2005 to identify which industries would have had three petitions certified in 180 days in that time frame. | Why GAO Did This Study
Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) is the nation's primary program providing job training and other assistance to manufacturing workers who lose their jobs due to international trade. For workers to receive TAA benefits, the Department of Labor (Labor) must certify that workers in a particular layoff have lost their jobs due to trade. Congress is considering allowing entire industries to be certified to facilitate access to assistance. GAO was asked to examine (1) trends in the current certification process, (2) the extent to which the proposed industry certification approach based on three petitions certified in 180 days would increase eligibility and identify potential challenges with this approach, and (3) the extent to which an approach based on trade remedies would increase eligibility and identify potential challenges. To address these questions, GAO analyzed data on TAA petitions, mass layoffs, trade, production, and trade remedies. GAO also interviewed Labor and ITC officials. GAO is not making recommendations at this time. Labor reviewed the report and did not provide comments. The ITC provided technical comments that have been incorporated as appropriate.
What GAO Found
During the past 3 fiscal years, Labor certified about two-thirds of TAA petitions investigated and generally processed petitions in a timely manner. Labor certified 4,700, or 66 percent, of the 7,100 petitions it investigated from fiscal years 2004 to 2006. Labor took on average 32 days to make a certification decision and processed 77 percent of petitions within the required 40-day time frame. According to Labor officials, they were not always able to meet the 40-day time frame because they sometimes did not receive information from company officials in a timely manner. In fiscal year 2006, 44 percent of the petitions that Labor denied were because workers were not involved in the production of an article. An industry certification approach based on three petitions certified in 180 days would likely increase the number of workers eligible for TAA but presents some design and implementation challenges. However, the extent of the increase in eligible workers depends on the additional criteria, if any, industries would have to meet to be certified. From 2003 to 2005, 222 industries had three petitions certified within 180 days. Based on our analysis of 69 of these industries for which we could obtain complete data, the number of eligible workers in these industries could more than double if no additional criteria were used, but would expand by less than 10 percent if industries had to meet more restrictive criteria, such as demonstrated increases in the import share of the domestic market over a 3-year period. Designing the criteria presents challenges due to the possibility of making workers who lose their jobs for reasons other than trade eligible for TAA. Implementation challenges include notifying all workers of their potential eligibility, verifying their eligibility, and linking them with services. Using trade remedies to certify industries could also expand eligibility for workers in some industries, but challenges exist. While basing industry certification on trade remedies could expand eligibility in areas where there have been no TAA petitions, some trade remedies are for products already covered by TAA petitions, such as iron and steel products. It is difficult to estimate the extent of the impact on worker eligibility because trade remedies are applied to specific products, and data on unemployment by product do not exist. This approach presents many of the same challenges as industry certification based on three petitions certified in 180 days. For example, workers who did not lose their jobs due to international trade could be made eligible for TAA because trade remedy investigations are not focused on employment. In addition, verifying workers' eligibility may be particularly challenging due to the narrow product classifications of some trade remedy products, such as carbazole violet pigment 23. In companies that make multiple products, it may be difficult to identify which specific workers made the product subject to trade remedies. |
gao_GAO-05-229 | gao_GAO-05-229_0 | The MAS program provides several advantages to both federal agencies and vendors. For example, in the mid-1990s, GSA had about 5,200 MAS contracts. Use of Price Negotiation Tools May Not Ensure Best Pricing on MAS Contracts
According to negotiators at the four acquisition centers we visited, a variety of tools are used to analyze vendor-supplied information and negotiate contract prices that nearly always were at least equal to the vendor’s most favored customer prices. However, our analysis of a recent GSA review of product and service contract files found that most lacked sufficient and reliable documentation to establish clearly that prices were effectively negotiated. In addition, we found that the use of pre-award and postaward audits of pricing information—two key price negotiation tools that, in the past, have helped GSA avoid or recover hundreds of millions of dollars in excessive pricing—have declined dramatically. However, GSA’s June 2004 file review of 62 MAS contracts awarded or extended during 2003 at GSA’s seven MAS acquisition centers found that 37 of the contracts—nearly 60 percent—lacked sufficient documentation to clearly establish that the contracts were effectively negotiated. While GSA’s June 2004 file review revealed weaknesses in the MAS contract negotiation process, it often did not identify the specific causes for the weaknesses. However, the use of these audits has dramatically declined in recent years. Despite the significant recoveries, postaward audits of pre-award pricing information have not been conducted since 1997—when GSA issued a final rule, changing its policy. However, the anticipated increased use of pre-award audits has not materialized. The Information Technology Center—which administered contracts with more than $18 billion, or 56 percent, of fiscal year 2004 MAS sales—has yet to conduct a clearance panel. Through its quality review initiative, GSA planned to select a representative sample of MAS contracts at each of the acquisition centers and assess the pre-award documentation—rating it as excellent, satisfactory, marginally acceptable, or unacceptable---in the following three pricing areas: Price negotiation documents are to clearly establish that the pricing information provided by the vendor was accurate, complete, and current; the information was relied upon during negotiations; adequate price analyses were conducted; reasonable negotiation objectives were established; the amount of the total government’s requirements was leveraged in negotiating prices; and the prices negotiated were fair and reasonable considering the prices offered by the vendor to their most favored customer. Moreover, reviewers did not determine the underlying causes for identified pricing deficiencies or develop plans to address the causes. We recommend that the Administrator of the General Services Administration ensure that pre-award audits are conducted when the threshold is met for both new contract offers and contract extensions, develop guidance to help contracting officers determine when postaward audits are needed, direct GSA program management to revise the Acquisition Quality Measurement and Improvement Program to measure and report on the performance of the prenegotiation clearance panels, and direct GSA program management to revise the Acquisition Quality Measurement and Improvement Program to broaden the scope of quality review initiative to (1) determine the underlying causes for contract pricing deficiencies and (2) develop appropriate plans to implement corrective actions. We also reported that the use of prenegotiation clearance panels, designed to ensure quality of significant contract negotiations, has been limited. Despite these opportunities to conduct pre-award audits, the number of pre-award audits has only increased from 14 in fiscal year 2003 to 40 in fiscal year 2004. 4. 8. Our review focused on how GSA negotiates most favored customer prices for MAS contracts and assesses the overall effectiveness of these price negotiations. 10. Technical revisions have been made. | Why GAO Did This Study
Federal agencies can directly purchase more than 8 million commercial products and services through the General Services Administration's (GSA) multiple award schedules (MAS) contracts. Over the past 10 years, MAS contract sales have increased dramatically--with sales jumping from $4 billion to $32 billion. In addition to simplifying the procurement process, the MAS program is designed to take advantage of the government's significant aggregate buying power. While GSA seeks to negotiate best pricing for its MAS contracts by analyzing vendor-provided information--such as discounts given to other customers and recent sales data for the same or similar items--past reports have found that GSA has not always used pricing tools effectively and that management controls for better ensuring fair and reasonable pricing had been reduced. This report discusses GSA's process for negotiating most favored customer prices for MAS contracts and its efforts to improve the overall quality of negotiations.
What GAO Found
Contract negotiators at the four MAS acquisition centers that GAO reviewed use a variety of tools for obtaining most favored customer pricing--that is, the prices vendors offer their best customers. However, the GAO analysis of GSA's review of selected fiscal year 2004 MAS contract files found that nearly 60 percent lacked the documentation needed to establish clearly that the prices were effectively negotiated. Specifically, the contract documentation did not establish that negotiated prices were based on accurate, complete, and current vendor information; adequate price analyses; and reasonable price negotiations. GSA's efforts to ensure most favored customer pricing have been hindered by the significant decline in the use of pre-award and postaward audits of pre-award pricing information, two independent pricing tools that have helped GSA avoid or recover hundreds of millions of dollars in excessive pricing. In fiscal year 1995, GSA conducted 154 pre-award audits; by 2004 the number of pre-award audits fell to 40. Postaward audits--which resulted in an average annual recovery of $18 million in the early 1990s--were discontinued in 1997 when GSA revised its MAS contract audit policies to increase the use of pre-award audits--an increase that has not materialized. In March 2003, GSA established the Acquisition Quality Measurement and Improvement Program, initiating the use of prenegotiation panels and postaward quality reviews of contracts. However, the effectiveness of these initiatives has been limited due to insufficient oversight. For example, three of the MAS acquisition centers that GAO visited had not reported the results of their 2003 prenegotiation panels--information needed by management to identify problems and make needed improvements. Moreover, the fourth acquisition center--which accounted for about 56 percent of the fiscal year 2004 MAS sales--has yet to hold a panel. While the postaward quality reviews--the second program initiative--have identified deficiencies in contract file documentation, they did not determine the underlying causes of these deficiencies or prescribe actions needed to address them. As a result of these weaknesses, GSA cannot be assured that fair and reasonable prices have been negotiated for its MAS contracts. |
gao_GAO-08-649T | gao_GAO-08-649T_0 | DTS Faced Numerous Challenges
Our reports and testimonies related to DTS have highlighted various management challenges that have confronted DOD in attempting to make DTS the standard end-to-end travel system for the department. The issues we have reported on include underutilization of DTS, weaknesses in DTS’s requirements management and system testing practices, and the adequacy of the economic analysis. More specifically, as discussed in our September 2006 report, we found that the department did not have reasonable quantitative metrics to measure the extent to which DTS was actually being used. The reported DTS utilization was based on a DTS Voucher Analysis Model that was developed in calendar year 2003 using estimated data, but over the years had not been completely updated with actual data. At the time, we found that the Air Force was the only military service that submitted monthly metrics to the PMO-DTS officials for use in updating the DTS Voucher Analysis Model. The lack of accurate and pertinent utilization data hindered management’s ability to monitor its progress toward the DOD vision of DTS as the standard travel system as well as to provide consistent and accurate data to Congress. The underutilization of DTS also adversely affected the estimated savings. As discussed in our September 2005 testimony there were at least 31 legacy travel systems operating within the department at that time. Requirements management and system testing. As noted in our September 2006 report, our analysis of the September 2003 economic analysis found that two key assumptions used to estimate cost savings were not based on reliable information. Two primary areas—personnel savings of $24.2 million and reduced commercial travel office fees of $31 million—represented the majority of the over $56 million of estimated annual net savings DTS was expected to realize. Air Force and Navy DTS program officials stated that they did not anticipate a reduction in the number of personnel with the full implementation of DTS, but rather shifting staff to other functions. Also, as part of the Navy’s overall evaluation of the economic analysis, program officials stated that “the Navy has not identified, and conceivably will not recommend, any personnel billets for reduction.” Finally, the Naval Cost Analysis Division’s October 2003 report on the economic analysis noted that it could not validate approximately 40 percent of the Navy’s total costs, including personnel costs, in the DTS life-cycle cost estimates because credible supporting documentation was lacking. We also reported in 2006 that according to DOD’s September 2003 economic analysis, it expected to realize annual net savings of $31 million through reduced fees paid to the commercial travel offices because the successful implementation of DTS would enable the majority of airline tickets to be acquired with either no or minimal intervention by the commercial travel offices. However, we found that the 70 percent assumption was not well supported. Rather, the sole support provided by the PMO-DTS was an article in a travel industry trade publication. The article was not based on information related to DTS, but rather on the experience of one private-sector company. Using commercial databases to identify unused airline tickets. Concluding Remarks
In our two reports we made 14 recommendations to help improve the department’s management and oversight of DTS and streamline DOD’s administrative travel processes. The implementation of our recommendations will be an important factor in DTS’s achieving its intended goals. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 1995, the Department of Defense (DOD) began an effort to implement a standard departmentwide travel system, the Defense Travel System (DTS). This testimony is based on previously issued GAO reports and testimonies that highlighted challenges confronted by DOD in the implementation of DTS. More specifically, today's testimony focuses on prior GAO reporting concerning (1) the lack of quantitative metrics to measure the extent to which DTS is actually being used, (2) weaknesses with DTS's requirements management and system testing, and (3) two key assumptions related to the estimated cost savings in the September 2003 DTS economic analysis were not reasonable. Today's testimony also highlights some actions that DOD could explore to help streamline its administrative travel processes such as using a commercial database to identify unused airline tickets.
What GAO Found
Overhauling the department's antiquated travel management practices and systems has been a daunting challenge for DOD. In several prior reports and testimonies, GAO identified several key implementation issues regarding DOD's ability to make DTS the standard travel system for the department. Specifically, GAO reported that DTS was not being used to the fullest extent possible, and DOD lacked comprehensive data to effectively monitor its utilization. At the time of GAO's 2006 review, DOD's utilization data were based on a model that was developed in calendar year 2003. However, the model had not been completely updated to reflect actual DTS usage at that time. The lack of up-to-date utilization data hindered management's ability to monitor progress toward the DOD vision of DTS as the standard travel system. Additionally, the continued use of the department's legacy travel systems resulted in the underutilization of DTS and adversely affected the expected savings that DTS could achieve. Furthermore, GAO previously reported weaknesses in DTS's requirements management and system testing practices. GAO found that DTS's requirements were still inadequate. GAO noted that until DOD improves DTS's requirements management practices, the department will not have reasonable assurance that DTS can provide the intended functionality. Additionally, GAO's 2006 report of the September 2003 DTS economic analysis found that the two key assumptions used to estimate annual net savings were not based on reliable information. Two cost components represented the majority of the over $56 million in estimated net savings--personnel savings and reduced commercial travel office fees. GAO's analysis found that $24.2 million in personnel savings related to the Air Force and the Navy were not supported. Air Force and Navy DTS program officials stated that they did not anticipate a reduction in the number of personnel, but rather the shifting of staff from the travel function to other functions. The Naval Cost Analysis Division stated that the Navy will not realize any tangible personnel cost savings from the implementation of DTS. In regard to the commercial travel office fees, GAO's 2006 reporting disclosed that the economic analysis assumed that 70 percent of all DTS airline tickets would either require no intervention or minimal intervention from the commercial travel offices resulting in an estimated annual net savings of $31 million. However, the support provided by the DTS program office was an article in a trade industry publication. The article was not based on information related to DTS, but rather on the experience of one private-sector company. In addition, GAO identified concepts that the department can adopt to streamline its travel management practices. |
gao_GAO-01-214 | gao_GAO-01-214_0 | Our case study analyses show that Treasury and the U.S. Executive Director have actively promoted U.S. policies related to sound banking principles, labor issues, and audits of military expenditures as required by the applicable legislative mandates, through their discussions with Fund and member country officials and formal statements to the Fund’s Executive Board. Furthermore, the Fund’s willingness to adopt policy positions that are consistent with U.S. legislatively mandated policies is affected by whether a majority of Fund members perceive a given policy to be part of the Fund’s core mission to promote monetary cooperation and currency exchange rate stability and to provide resources to Fund members experiencing balance-of-payments problems. Many of the mandates direct the Secretary of the Treasury to instruct the U.S. Executive Director to use its “voice” and “vote” at the IMF to pursue certain policies. However, the general support of other IMF members for sound banking principles makes it hard to discern the U.S.’ unique influence within the IMF. | Why GAO Did This Study
The core mission of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) is to promote monetary cooperation and exchange rate stability and provide resources to IMF member countries that experience balance-of-payment difficulties. Because it is an international organization, IMF is generally exempt from US law; however, Congress can seek to influence IMF policy by passing laws that direct the Secretary of the Treasury to direct the Executive Director to vote on certain issues within the Board of the Fund.
What GAO Found
Through three case studies, GAO found that the Treasury and the U.S. Executive Director actively promoted U.S. policies related to (1) sound banking principles, (2) labor issues, and (3) audits of military expenditures. It is difficult to determine whether IMF's adoption of a policy is due solely to U.S. influence because other countries generally support the same policies. |
gao_GAO-06-266T | gao_GAO-06-266T_0 | (Appendix 1 describes each inspection program.) 2). Appendix II describes the industry partnership programs. FAA’s Safety Oversight System Focuses on Risk Identification and Mitigation Through System Safety, Leveraging of Resources, and Enforcement of Safety Regulations, but Benefits Are Not Being Fully Realized
In recent reports, we found that FAA’s safety oversight system has programs that focus on risk identification and mitigation through a system safety approach, the leveraging of resources, and enforcement of safety regulations, but that the benefits of these programs are not being fully realized. The inspection workload for non-legacy airlines is still heavily oriented to the NPG’s non- risk based activities. FAA also leverages its resources through its industry partnership programs. These partnership programs are designed to assist the agency in receiving safety information, including reports of safety violations. FAA’s enforcement process, which is intended to ensure industry compliance with safety regulations, is another important element of its safety oversight system. FAA Has Made Training an Integral Part of Its Safety Oversight System but Several Actions Could Improve Results
FAA’s use of a risk-based system safety approach to inspections requires inspectors to apply data analysis and auditing skills to identify, analyze, assess, and control potential hazards and risks. Therefore, it is important that inspectors are well-trained in this approach and have sufficient knowledge of increasingly complex aircraft, aircraft parts, and systems to effectively identify safety risks. FAA has made training an integral part of its safety inspection system and has established mandatory training requirements for its workforce as well as designees. We have reported that FAA has generally followed effective management practices for planning, developing, delivering, and assessing the impact of its technical training for safety inspectors, although some practices have yet to be fully implemented. However, FAA’s records show that FAA approves about 90 percent of these requests, and inspectors are making good progress in receiving training. FAA Has Evaluated Some Safety Programs, but the Lack of Evaluative Systems and Nationwide Data Impedes FAA’s Ability to Continuously Monitor Its Safety Programs
It is important for FAA to have effective evaluative processes and accurate nationwide data on its numerous safety oversight programs so that program managers and other officials have assurance that the safety programs are having their intended effect. Our most recent work has shown the lack of such processes and limitations with data for FAA’s inspection programs for non-legacy airlines, designee programs, industry partnership programs, and enforcement program. We also found that FAA lacked requirements or criteria for periodically evaluating its designee programs. FAA inspection offices maintain independent, site-specific databases because they do not find the nationwide enforcement database—the Enforcement Information System (EIS)—as useful as it could be because of missing or incomplete historical information about enforcement cases. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. | Why GAO Did This Study
The U.S. commercial aviation industry has an extraordinary safety record. However, when passenger airlines have accidents or serious incidents, regardless of their rarity, the consequences can be tragic. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) works to maintain a high level of safety through an effective safety oversight system. Keys to this system are to: (1) establish programs that focus resources on areas of highest safety risk and on mitigating risks; (2) provide training and communication to ensure that inspectors can consistently carry out the agency's oversight programs; and (3) have processes and data to continuously monitor, evaluate, and improve the numerous oversight programs that make up the safety oversight system. This statement focuses on these three key areas and is based on recent GAO reports on FAA's inspection oversight programs, industry partnership programs, enforcement program, and training program.
What GAO Found
FAA's safety oversight system includes programs that focus on risk identification and mitigation through a risk-based system safety approach, leveraging of resources through designee and partnership relationships, and enforcement of safety regulations, but the benefits of these programs are not being fully realized. For example, FAA's system safety approach includes the addition of a program that emphasizes risk identification to its traditional inspection program for overseeing some airlines, which is not based on risk. However, it is likely that the benefits of this approach could be enhanced if the inspection workload was not as heavily oriented to the traditional inspection program's non-risk based activities. FAA leverages its resources through its designee programs, in which designated individuals and organizations perform about 90 percent of certification-related activities, and through its industry partnership programs, which are designed to assist the agency in receiving safety information. An outgrowth of FAA's inspection process is its enforcement program, which is intended to ensure industry compliance with safety regulations. However, GAO has expressed concerns that this program may not be as effective as it could be in deterring violations. FAA has made training an integral part of its safety oversight system, but several actions could improve the results of its training efforts, including ensuring that inspectors are well-trained in FAA's system safety approach and have sufficient knowledge of increasingly complex aircraft and systems to effectively identify safety risks. FAA has established mandatory training requirements for its workforce and designees. We have reported that FAA has generally followed effective management practices for planning, developing, delivering, and assessing the impact of its technical training for safety inspectors. GAO has found inadequate evaluative processes and limitations with data for FAA's inspection programs, designee programs, industry partnership programs, and enforcement program. For example, FAA lacked requirements or criteria for evaluating its designee programs. In another example, FAA's nationwide enforcement database is not as useful as it could be because of missing or incomplete historical information about enforcement cases. |
gao_GGD-00-50 | gao_GGD-00-50_0 | A true cost-of-living index would measure the change in the cost of obtaining a fixed level of economic well- being or utility—something that is not clearly defined. In June 1995, out of concern that the CPI may have been inaccurately measuring cost-of-living increases, the U.S. Senate Finance Committee created the Advisory Commission to Study the Consumer Price Index. According to the Commission, because the price of a product often decreases after its introduction in the marketplace, delays in including new products in the CPI prevent the CPI from measuring these price decreases. To obtain the opinions of the five former Boskin Commission members on how much of the bias in the CPI that the Commission estimated in its December 1996 report remains after recent methodological changes to the CPI, we sent the Commission members a questionnaire. It asked for estimates of the extent to which the Commission’s estimate of bias could be reduced or increased as a result of each methodological change. Our questionnaire did not ask the former Commission members about methodological changes that took effect for the CPI calculation before December 1996 because (1) the Commission issued its final report in December 1996 and (2) its final report took into account methodological changes that had been made to the CPI since the Commission’s September 1995 Interim Report. Four former members of the Boskin Commission responded to our questionnaire. Methodological Changes to CPI Since Boskin Commission Report
Between December 1996, when the Boskin Commission issued its final report, and June 1999, when we began this review, BLS had made seven methodological changes that affected the calculation of the CPI. In addition, as of June 1999, BLS had announced three methodological changes that had not yet been implemented. Former Boskin Commission Members’ Responses on Remaining Bias in the CPI
All four former Boskin Commission members said that the methodological changes had reduced some of the bias in the CPI. However, they had different responses on the extent of the remaining bias. Total Remaining Bias
Of the estimates of remaining bias in the CPI, taking into consideration the seven methodological changes that were already effective as of June 1999, Dr. Jorgenson had the highest point estimate—0.9 percentage point—and the widest plausible range—from 0.6 to 1.4 percentage points. New Products/Quality Change Bias
The four former Boskin Commission members gave somewhat different responses regarding the details of changes related to new products/quality change bias. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on the Advisory Commission to Study the Consumer Price Index's (CPI) updated estimate of CPI bias, focusing on the: (1) methodological changes the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) made to the CPI since December 1996, when the Advisory Commission (also referred to as the Boskin Commission) issued its final report; and (2) opinions of the five former Boskin Commission members on how much of the bias in the CPI that the Commission estimated in its December 1996 report remains after recent methodological changes to the CPI.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) between December 1996, when the Boskin Commission issued its final report estimating that the CPI overstates the cost of living by 1.1 percentage points annually, and June 1999, when GAO began this review, BLS had made seven methodological changes that affected the calculation of the CPI; (2) in addition, as of June 1999, BLS had announced three methodological changes that had not yet been implemented; (3) four former members of the Commission responded to GAO's questions about the extent to which recent methodological changes in the CPI have reduced its overstatement of the changes in the cost of living--that is, bias--as defined in the Commission's December 1996 report; (4) although all four of these former Boskin Commission members said that the seven methodological changes made to the CPI have reduced some of the bias in the CPI, they had different responses regarding the extent of the remaining bias; (5) their point estimates of the remaining bias varied from 0.73 to 0.9 percentage points annually after taking into account those seven changes; (6) the former Boskin Commission members believe that most of the remaining bias is due to what the Commission referred to as "new products/quality change bias;" (7) according to the Commission, this type of bias occurs when new products are not included in the CPI or when they are included after a long delay, which results in the CPI not capturing price decreases that often occur after a product is introduced in the marketplace; and (8) according to the Commission, new products/quality change bias occurs when the CPI does not adequately measure the portion of a price increase that is due to an improvement in the quality of a product or service instead of to an increase in the cost of living. |
gao_GAO-02-330 | gao_GAO-02-330_0 | The beneficiary is responsible for a 20 percent copayment for DME and orthotics covered under part B.
HCFA’s Ruling Issued to Clarify Medicare Policy for Orthotics and DME
HCFA issued its orthotics ruling in September 1996 to clarify the distinction between certain DME and orthotics for Medicare part B billing purposes. Attached devices that brace individuals, such as items that attach to wheelchairs, would not be paid under Medicare’s orthotics benefit. HCFA’s Ruling Clarified the Distinction Between Orthotics and DME
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, HCFA and its contractors had become increasingly concerned about how certain suppliers were billing Medicare. HCFA’s ruling limited payment for orthotics under Medicare part B to leg, arm, back, and neck braces that can be used independently of other equipment. As a result of the ruling, attached bracing devices, such as OrthoConcepts’ items and other attached devices, were placed in the DME benefit category and could no longer be billed as orthotics. Furthermore, the court found that the interpretation in the ruling was wholly supportable and that the ruling’s treatment of seating systems as DME was consistent with congressional intent. HCFA’s Ruling Affects Beneficiaries Who Reside in Nursing Homes
As a result of HCFA’s ruling, attached bracing devices are now clearly classified as DME and cannot be billed as orthotics, which affects beneficiaries who live in nursing homes. Suppliers used these codes to bill for such items under Medicare’s orthotics benefit category and DMERCs paid such claims. 1.) Some suppliers—such as those providing OrthoConcepts’ products—were billing for attached bracing devices using codes for nonattached braces. Some beneficiaries who reside in SNFs and other institutions primarily engaged in providing skilled nursing care and need attached bracing devices that are not paid for through Medicare can obtain them through other sources. This is true even if the nursing facility could be considered the patient’s permanent residence.” CMS officials noted that DMERCs do not pay for DME in nursing homes because DMERCs presume that these facilities meet the criteria for being primarily engaged in providing skilled nursing care for DME part B payment purposes and, therefore, cannot be considered as a beneficiary’s home. It is difficult to predict with confidence how much Medicare payments might increase if the ruling were rescinded. Therefore, should the ruling be rescinded, additional controls would be needed. Practitioners reported that such uncertainty affects suppliers’ willingness to provide customized items to beneficiaries. Concluding Observations
HCFA’s 1996 ruling on orthotics more clearly delineated the circumstances under which Medicare would consider an item as an orthotic or DME for payment policy, and HCFA’s issuance of the ruling was found to be proper in court. | What GAO Found
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA), now called the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), became concerned that some suppliers were improperly billing Medicare for items that attach to wheelchairs and other equipment. Some suppliers were billing for such items using codes for orthodic devices, including arm, back, and neck braces that provide support for or immobilize weak or injured limbs, while others were billing using codes for durable medical equipment, which includes equipment such as wheelchairs and crutches that can withstand repeated use and is appropriate for home use. Whether an item is billed as an orthotic or DME device can affect whether such claims are paid. To clarify Medicare's payment policy on orthotics, HCFA issued a ruling stating that Medicare considered such items to be durable medical equipment rather than orthotics. HCFA issued Ruling 96-1 to clarify the circumstances under which certain items would be classified as orthotics or as DME for Medicare part B payment purposes. A federal appellate court found that HFCA had followed appropriate procedures to issue the rule as an interpretation of Medicare policy, the interpretation in the ruling was wholly supportable, and the treating of seating systems as DME was consistent with congressional intent. HCFA's ruling that attached bracing devices were in the DME benefits category and could no longer be billed as orthotics affects beneficiaries residing in Medicare-certified skilled nursing facilities and other institutions primarily engaged in providing skilled nursing care (SNF). Because Medicare part B does not cover DME in SNFs and other institutions primarily engaged in providing skilled nursing care, claims for such items are no longer paid for residents in nursing homes. This ruling affects residents of all nursing homes, not just SNFs. If HCFA's ruling were rescinded and Medicare's policy changed so that attached bracing devices were classified as orthotics, how much Medicare and Medicaid would spend for orthotics is uncertain. The increase in Medicare spending would depend on how extensively attached bracing devices would be provided to nursing home residents following the ruling's recission. The distinction between DME and orthotics would become less clear, which could lead to inappropriate billing. Therefore, if the ruling were rescinded, additional controls, such as closely monitoring billing and reviewing medical justification for customized items prior to payment, would be vital to help curb potentially inappropriate billing. |
gao_GAO-04-750 | gao_GAO-04-750_0 | DoC has a constitutional obligation to ensure that medical care is provided to inmates in its custody, and DoC’s contract with CCHPS requires CCHPS to provide comprehensive medical services to all inmates assigned to the Jail and the CTF and to establish a quality improvement program to monitor the quality of medical services it provides. A key component of this program is quarterly analyses of random samples of inmate medical records to measure how consistently CCHPS delivers required services to inmates. CCHPS Provides Screening and Treatment Services Required in Its Contract and Assists DoC in Obtaining Additional Services
As required by the contract, CCHPS provides a broad range of medical services to Jail and CTF inmates, including primary care services such as sick call and chronic care; mental health care; and specialty care, such as dental and orthopedic services. DoC Established Several Mechanisms to Oversee CCHPS’s Delivery of Medical Services
DoC has developed several mechanisms to oversee CCHPS’s delivery of medical services to inmates and enforce CCHPS’s compliance with the contract. For example, DoC’s contract with CCHPS gives DoC the authority to impose monetary damages if CCHPS fails to meet any of 12 requirements specified in the contract, most of which relate to CCHPS’s performance in providing key medical services. DoC also requires CCHPS to maintain accreditation of its services. Since August 2000, the independent reviewer has conducted 14 quarterly on-site reviews of CCHPS. CCHPS Generally Meets Contract Requirements, but DoC’s Oversight of CCHPS Is Incomplete
Most available evidence indicates that CCHPS has generally complied with the contract, but DoC has not exercised sufficient oversight to be assured that problems are not occurring or are quickly corrected. The independent reviewer has reported that CCHPS’s services meet the contract’s requirements for access to care and quality. Furthermore, although DoC has authority to impose monetary damages on CCHPS if it does not meet certain requirements included in the contract, DoC has not collected data needed to impose these damages or developed formal procedures for determining whether CCHPS has met these requirements and for imposing damages if CCHPS has not met them. For example, the contract requires that CCHPS provide timely follow-up services to inmates with abnormal chest x-ray results. Although CCHPS has recently improved its performance, the independent reviewer had repeatedly found that CCHPS did not always provide timely follow-up services to these inmates. In addition, CCHPS has not regularly submitted the required quarterly and annual progress reports providing information on quality problems and its actions to correct them. In addition, DoC has generally not enforced the contract requirement that CCHPS submit quarterly and annual progress reports describing quality problems and actions taken to correct them. These reports would allow DoC to obtain information on how CCHPS is addressing compliance or other performance problems identified by CCHPS’s own monitoring or the independent reviewer. The total cost to provide medical services to inmates at the Jail and the CTF in 2003 was about $15.8 million, an average of $13.28 per inmate. Cost of Medical Services at Jail Decreased, Despite Growth of Inmate Population
From initiation of the CCHPS contract in 2000 to 2003, the average daily per inmate cost of medical services at the Jail decreased by almost one- third, from about $19 a day to about $13 a day. 1.) 2.) 3.) Recommendations for Executive Action
To help ensure that CCHPS provides required medical services to inmates of the District of Columbia Jail and the CTF, we recommend that the Mayor require the Director of DoC to take the following two actions: Develop formal procedures—including collection of needed data—to regularly assess whether CCHPS’s performance meets the contract requirements that are linked to monetary damages and to impose these damages. Another contact and key contributors are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
We examined the medical services provided by the Center for Correctional Health and Policy Studies, Inc. (CCHPS) to inmates at the Jail and the Correctional Treatment Facility (CTF), including CCHPS’s internal monitoring; the District of Columbia Department of Corrections’ (DoC) oversight of those services; CCHPS’s contract compliance; and the cost of services under the contract. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since the end of a court-ordered receivership overseeing medical services at the District of Columbia Jail in September 2000, the Department of Corrections (DoC) has contracted with the Center for Correctional Health and Policy Studies, Inc. (CCHPS) to provide inmate medical services. GAO was asked to provide information on (1) the medical services DoC contracted with CCHPS to provide, including CCHPS's monitoring of its services; (2) mechanisms DoC established to oversee CCHPS's services; (3) CCHPS's contract compliance and DoC's efforts to ensure compliance; and (4) the cost of medical services. To collect this information, GAO analyzed documents and interviewed officials from District agencies, CCHPS officials, and an independent reviewer hired by DoC to monitor medical services.
What GAO Found
DoC has contracted with CCHPS to provide a broad range of medical services to inmates at the District of Columbia Jail and the Correctional Treatment Facility (CTF)--an adjacent overflow facility. Services include health screenings at intake; primary care services, including care for chronic conditions; mental health care; and specialty care. In addition, CCHPS assists DoC in helping inmates obtain services not included in the contract, such as specialty or emergency services that cannot be offered on-site. As part of the contract, CCHPS also established a quality improvement program to monitor its services. A key component of the program is a quarterly analysis of random samples of inmate medical records to measure how consistently CCHPS delivers required services. DoC established several mechanisms to oversee CCHPS's delivery of medical services to inmates. For example, DoC retained an independent reviewer to monitor the services provided by CCHPS on a quarterly basis. In addition, the contract gives DoC authority to impose monetary damages on CCHPS if it fails to meet any of 12 requirements specified in the contract, most of which relate to providing key services to a minimum percentage of inmates. The contract also requires CCHPS to submit quarterly and annual progress reports describing quality problems identified by the independent reviewer or its own monitoring and actions taken to correct them. Although available evidence indicates that CCHPS has generally complied with the terms of its contract, DoC has not exercised sufficient oversight to provide assurance that problems are not occurring or are quickly corrected. The independent reviewer has consistently found that CCHPS's services meet the contract's overall requirements for access to care and quality, but has also reported that CCHPS has not always met certain requirements. For example, while CCHPS recently improved its performance in providing timely follow-up services to inmates with abnormal chest x-ray results, the independent reviewer had repeatedly found problems in this area. DoC has not taken actions that would allow it to be assured of CCHPS's compliance with contract requirements linked to monetary damages. The agency has not collected data or developed a formal procedure to determine whether CCHPS has met the requirements, and it lacks a procedure to impose damages if warranted. Also, DoC has not regularly enforced the contract requirement that CCHPS submit quarterly and annual progress reports describing quality problems and corrective actions, and CCHPS has often not submitted these reports. From 2000 to 2003, the average daily cost of providing medical services to a Jail inmate decreased by almost one-third, from about $19 a day per inmate to about $13 a day. In 2003, DoC consolidated the services provided to inmates in the Jail and the CTF under one contract with CCHPS. In that year, during which 17,431 inmates were admitted to the Jail and the CTF, the total cost of providing medical services at both facilities was about $15.8 million. |
gao_GAO-17-511 | gao_GAO-17-511_0 | According to VA, more than 1.1 million U.S. service members have been deployed to the region since the start of the Persian Gulf War. Each of these categories includes many symptoms or illnesses that could qualify a veteran for benefits (see fig. For these two categories of Gulf War Illness claims, VBA Rating Veteran’s Service Representatives—claims raters—often rely on information from VHA medical examiners to support their decision on whether to grant or deny a claim. For all disability claims, VBA claim processing staff are required to explain the reason for each claim decision in a decision letter. In Recent Years, Completed Gulf War Illness Claims Have Risen, Included More Medical Issues, and Been Approved at Lower Rates Than Other Service-related Disabilities
The Number of Completed Gulf War Illness Claims Generally Increased from Fiscal Years 2010 - 2015
The number of Gulf War Illness claims VBA completed more than doubled from about 4,800 in fiscal year 2010 through 2015, increasing from to 11,400 during this time. We found that the approval rate for the group of potentially unidentified medically unexplained chronic multisymptom illness medical issues was nearly identical to the approval rate for those that VA had identified as Gulf War Illness medical issues. 4). These Gulf War Illness medical issues may be denied at a higher rate, in part, because according to VA officials, Gulf War Illness is not always well understood by VA staff, and veterans sometimes do not have the medical records to adequately support their claims. Accurate Processing of Gulf War Illness Claims Is Hampered by Confusion about the Gulf War General Medical Exam, and Claim Decision Letters Lack Key Information
VA Has Improved Some of Its Gulf War Illness Guidance, but Weaknesses Remain in Training on Conducting Gulf War General Medical Exams
Requesting a Gulf War General Medical Exam
The Gulf War general medical exam can be used to help determine a veteran’s entitlement to VA disability benefits. According to a VHA official, as of February 2017, VHA’s training data shows that only about 10 percent of its medical examiners had completed this optional Gulf War Illness course. Without training, medical examiners may not be able to reliably and consistently carry out their responsibilities with regard to conducting and reporting on Gulf War general medical exams and provide adequate information for decision-making to VBA’s claim rating staff. However, this effort does not include a review of the decision letters for Gulf War Illness claims. VA Considers Research When Identifying Additional Disabilities Related to Gulf War Service, but It Lacks a Plan to Guide Its Work on Key Research Goal
VA Has Used Research to Establish Presumptive Medical Conditions for Gulf War Veterans
VA’s research on Gulf War Illness is used in several ways including identifying symptoms, diagnosing those with illnesses, developing treatment, and finding methods to respond to similar illnesses that may arise among veterans in the future. Lack of a Plan to Establish a Single Case Definition of Gulf War Illness Hinders VA’s Progress toward Achieving This Goal
VA’s progress toward its goal of establishing a single case definition of Gulf War Illness is hindered by the lack of a plan to undertake this work. VA’s research advisory groups also noted the long-term need for VA to plan for future research that is likely to contribute to a single case definition. Federal internal control standards call for agencies to have documented plans that include specific action steps associated with their objectives. VA agreed with all of our recommendations and stated it has plans in place to address them. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of this report were to examine (1) the trends in Gulf War Illness disability claims in recent years, (2) challenges associated with accurately processing and clearly communicating decisions on Gulf War Illness disability claims, and (3) how the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) uses research on Gulf War Illness to inform its disability compensation program. Analysis of VA Data on Gulf War Illness Trends
To examine recent trends in Gulf War Illness disability claims, we obtained and analyzed administrative data from VBA’s Veterans Service Network Corporate Database for claims completed in fiscal years 2010 through 2015 (the most recent data available at the time of our review). Review of Gulf War Illness Claims Processing
To understand challenges associated with accurately processing and clearly communicating decisions on Gulf War Illness disability claims, we reviewed relevant federal laws, regulations, and VBA’s procedures manual. In addition, we reviewed a sample of 44 Gulf War Illness files for claims completed in fiscal year 2015 to provide illustrative examples of how VA evaluates claims for Gulf War Illness and communicates its decisions to veterans. | Why GAO Did This Study
VA estimates that 44 percent of veterans who served in the Persian Gulf War in 1990-91 have medical issues commonly referred to as Gulf War Illness and that those who have been deployed to Southwest Asia since then may suffer from similar medical issues. These medical issues may entitle a veteran to VA benefits. Recently, questions have been raised about whether VA is processing GWI claims correctly. GAO was asked to review VA's handling of these claims.
This report examines (1) recent trends in GWI disability claims, (2) challenges associated with accurately processing and clearly communicating decisions on GWI claims, and (3) how VA uses GWI research to inform the disability compensation program. GAO reviewed relevant federal laws, regulations, and guidance; analyzed VA data on GWI-related claim decisions from fiscal years 2010–2015 (the most recent data available); visited 4 of 58 regional offices, choosing those with high GWI caseloads; and interviewed headquarters and regional VA staff and key stakeholders. GAO also reviewed a non-generalizable sample of 44 claim files to provide illustrative examples of how VA evaluated and communicated decisions on GWI claims.
What GAO Found
The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) completed processing about 11,400 Gulf War Illness (GWI) claims in fiscal year 2015, which was more than double the 4,800 claims processed in fiscal year 2010. GWI is a collective term for certain medical conditions among veterans who have served in Southwest Asia since 1990. Symptoms of GWI can include joint pain, gastrointestinal problems, fatigue, and neurological problems. On average, GWI claims have twice as many medical issues per claim as other disability claims, and take 4 months longer to complete. During fiscal years 2010 through 2015, the most recent data available at the time of our review, approval rates for GWI claims were about three times lower than for all other claimed disabilities. Several factors may contribute to lower approval rates, including that—according to VA—GWI claims are not always well understood by VA staff and veterans sometimes file for benefits without medical records to adequately support their claim.
VA's ability to accurately process GWI claims is hampered by inadequate training, and its decision letters for denied claims do not communicate key information to veterans. VA claims rating staff often rely on VA medical examiners to assess a veteran's disability before a decision can be made on a claim. VA medical examiners told GAO that conducting Gulf War general medical exams is challenging because of the range of symptoms that could qualify as GWI. VA has developed elective GWI training for its medical examiners, but only 10 percent of examiners had taken the training as of February 2017. Federal internal control standards call for adequate training for staff so they can correctly carry out an agency's procedures. Medical examiners who do not take this GWI-specific training may not be able to provide information to VA staff to correctly decide whether to grant a veteran's claim. Once a determination is made, VA regulations also require clear explanations to veterans regarding claim decisions. GAO found that decision letters for GWI claims do not always include key information on why the claim was denied.
VA considers research when adding to the list of conditions it associates with Gulf War service, but it does not have a plan to develop a uniformly used case definition of GWI. In 2010, VA added nine infectious diseases to the list of GWI-related conditions. VA advisory groups noted, however, that researchers face obstacles in conducting GWI research, including the lack of a single case definition of the illness for research and treatment purposes. In its 2015 Gulf War Research Strategic Plan, VA included an objective to develop a single case definition, but an official told GAO that VA had no action plan in place to achieve it. Without a plan to achieve a single case definition, research on and treatment for GWI may continue to progress slowly.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that VA require GWI training for medical examiners, improve its decision letters, and develop a plan to establish a single GWI case definition. VA agreed with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-17-200 | gao_GAO-17-200_0 | Individuals with Disabilities Receive a Range of Disaster Assistance from FEMA and Other Entities, but FEMA Could Improve Its Support of Some Efforts
FEMA Assists Individuals with Disabilities by Promoting Inclusive Practices to Groups That Respond to Disasters
Since the Post-Katrina Act was enacted, FEMA has promoted inclusive practices for assisting disaster survivors with disabilities in several ways. To comply with the Post-Katrina Act requirement to appoint a Disability Coordinator, FEMA created the Office of Disability Integration and Coordination (ODIC) in 2010 to increase attention to disaster assistance that considers the needs of people with disabilities across FEMA and among groups responding to disasters, such as state and local emergency managers. Lack of Procedure Limits ODIC’s Potential Effectiveness with Regional Disability Integration Activities
Despite the progress made by FEMA to promote practices to address the needs of individuals with disabilities, these efforts may be hindered because, according to ODIC officials, there is no established procedure for involving ODIC in certain efforts related to regional disability integration staff. ODIC officials said that FEMA’s Regional Administrators—not ODIC—determine the reporting chain for these staff, and regions vary in the extent to which they consult with ODIC on disability integration issues. Internal control standards state that, in establishing an organizational structure, agencies should consider how their components interact and define reporting lines that allow the components to communicate information necessary to fulfill their respective responsibilities. However, given the number of local officials who play a role in disaster response, many state and local emergency managers have yet to take the training. Individuals with Limited English Proficiency Receive Disaster Information in Different Languages from FEMA and Other Stakeholders
FEMA Provides Translations of Written and Verbal Information about Its Programs to Individuals with Limited English Proficiency
FEMA provides information on its programs to individuals with limited English proficiency through written and oral translations in other languages and through additional resources, such as a coordinator and support team focused on limited English proficiency. State and Local Agencies and Voluntary Organizations in Selected Disasters Provided Health and Safety Information to Individuals with Limited English Proficiency
State, local, or voluntary organizations in all six disasters we reviewed disseminated information on evacuations and shelters using a range of communication methods and translation services to assist individuals with limited English proficiency in accessing resources. Following the need for reuniting children with their families and for other assistance for children highlighted during Hurricane Katrina, the Post-Katrina Act required that FEMA establish the National Emergency Child Locator Center, a child reunification call center operated by the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children (NCMEC). NCMEC also maintains the Unaccompanied Minors Registry, a national repository for information about children who may be separated from their families as a result of a disaster. Nevertheless, FEMA continues to work with NCMEC and other partners on maintaining reunification resources. For example, in 2015 FEMA renewed an agreement it has with NCMEC to provide funding for deploying NCMEC personnel onsite following disasters. Since the enactment of the Post-Katrina Act, FEMA has worked with governmental and non-governmental entities more generally to address the needs of families with children who are affected by disasters. The lack of established procedures for involving ODIC in the disability integration activities of the regional staff has resulted in misunderstood roles, a lack of awareness about potentially underperforming staff, and inconsistent communication between the regions and headquarters. To better ensure FEMA’s regional activities effectively support individuals with disabilities, the Secretary of Homeland Security should direct the FEMA Administrator to take steps to establish written procedures for how regions should involve the Office of Disability Integration and Coordination in clarifying disability integration staff’s roles, evaluating staff performance, and setting expectations for how staff communicate with headquarters and the regions. To help ensure its key training on incorporating access and functional needs into emergency planning reaches a sufficiently wide audience, the Secretary should direct the FEMA Administrator to collect information about the potential pool of participants, set general goals for the number of state and local emergency managers that will take this course, and implement the delivery methods needed to meet these goals. Actions Taken to Implement the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006, GAO-09-59R. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 2005, individuals with disabilities, individuals with limited English proficiency, and families with children were disproportionately affected by Hurricane Katrina. For example, some of those who had to abandon their wheelchairs could not evacuate because they were unable to wait in long lines for evacuation buses. The Post-Katrina Act required FEMA and other entities to take certain actions to assist these individuals, such as through the establishment of a Disability Coordinator within FEMA. GAO was asked to examine implementation of the Post-Katrina Act.
This report assesses the extent to which FEMA and other entities provide disaster services to individuals with disabilities, individuals with limited English proficiency, and children in need of family reunification. GAO examined federal, state, and local disaster assistance efforts for six major disasters that occurred from March 2014 through October 2015, where federal response and recovery efforts included assistance to the three target groups and that varied in location and type of disaster. GAO interviewed relevant officials, visited three of the six sites, and analyzed emergency operations plans and disaster summary reports.
What GAO Found
The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) has taken steps to improve its disaster services for people with disabilities and its support to other entities, such as state and local governments. FEMA established the Office of Disability Integration and Coordination (ODIC) following enactment of the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006 (Post-Katrina Act) to lead the agency's efforts to promote inclusiveness in disaster planning, response, and recovery. However, there is no established procedure for FEMA Regional Administrators, who oversee disability integration staff in the regions, to involve ODIC in the activities of these staff. As a result, regions vary in the extent to which they consult with ODIC, which has led to a lack of clarity in regional disability integration staff roles, a lack of awareness of potentially underperforming staff, and inconsistent communication between the regions and headquarters. Federal internal control standards state that organizational structures should allow the organization's components to communicate information necessary to fulfill their respective responsibilities. Communication gaps between ODIC and the regions may prevent regional disability integration staff from effectively supporting state and local governments in meeting the needs of individuals with disabilities affected by disasters. ODIC also has not established goals for how many state and local emergency managers should take its key training on integrating the needs of individuals with disabilities into disaster planning. Nor has ODIC evaluated alternative methods to deliver the training more broadly, such as virtually in addition to classroom training. As a result, state and local emergency managers may be ill-prepared to provide effective disaster services to those with disabilities.
FEMA and other entities assist individuals with limited English proficiency by translating information on disaster assistance programs. FEMA provides information about its assistance programs using print materials in other languages, bilingual staff, and a helpline with translators for more than 50 languages. State, local, and voluntary organizations also disseminate information on health and safety information, such as evacuations and sheltering: In five of the six disasters GAO reviewed where translation was needed, these entities reported using a range of services, from bilingual staff to multilingual helplines.
FEMA worked with the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children (NCMEC) to establish a national call center designed to field calls with information about children separated from their families during disasters. NCMEC also maintains a registry that serves as a web-based repository created to collect this information. However, according to FEMA officials, no disasters since Hurricane Katrina have required national child reunification support. Nevertheless, FEMA continues to work with NCMEC on maintaining reunification resources, such as by funding the deployment of NCMEC personnel following disasters.
What GAO Recommends
FEMA should establish written procedures for involving ODIC in regional activities; set goals for the number of state and local emergency managers who will take a key training on disability integration; and evaluate alternative delivery methods for the training. FEMA concurred with all of the recommendations. |
gao_GAO-07-1064T | gao_GAO-07-1064T_0 | The plan has three focus areas: requirements forecasting, asset visibility, and materiel distribution—issues that we have identified based on GAO audits since 1995 as critical to improving DOD supply chain management. Our decisions on removing supply chain management from the high-risk list will be guided by whether DOD (1) sustains top leadership commitment and long-term institutional support for the plan; (2) obtains necessary resource commitments from the military services, the Defense Logistics Agency, and other organizations; (3) makes substantial progress implementing improvement initiatives across the department; (4) establishes a program to demonstrate progress and validate the effectiveness of the initiatives; and (5) completes the development of a comprehensive, integrated strategy for guiding supply chain management improvement efforts across the department. DOD Has Made Progress in Developing and Implementing the Initiatives in Its Plan, but Current Performance Measures Do Not Fully Demonstrate Results
The most recent update to the plan in May 2007 shows that DOD, over the past year, has made progress in developing and implementing its improvement initiatives. The long- term time frames for many of these initiatives present challenges to the department in sustaining progress toward substantially completing their implementation. Since last July, DOD has not added new outcome-focused performance metrics to its plan. I will briefly highlight some of the results from these reviews, structured around the three focus areas covered by DOD’s plan. Requirements Forecasting Problems Exist in Managing Spare Parts and Prepositioned Stocks
In the area of requirements forecasting, the military services are experiencing difficulties estimating acquisition lead times to acquire spare parts for equipment and weapon systems. In a separate review of the Air Force’s inventory management practices, we found continuing problems hindering its ability to efficiently and effectively maintain its spare parts inventory for military equipment. Senior military commanders in Kuwait attributed these problems to a lack of interoperability among information technology systems that makes it difficult to obtain timely, accurate information on assets in the theater. Challenges Remain in Coordinating and Consolidating Distribution and Supply Support within a Theater
In our review of joint theater logistics, we found that DOD components have made progress developing and implementing joint theater logistics initiatives in the areas of distribution and supply support; however, the department faces a number of challenges that hinder its ability to fully realize the benefits of these efforts. Transforming and Improving Defense Business Operations Are Integral to Resolving Supply Chain Management Problems
DOD spends billions of dollars to sustain key business operations intended to support the warfighter, including systems and processes related to the supply chain and other business areas. As we have previously stated, progress in DOD’s overall approach to business transformation is needed to confront problems in other high-risk areas, including supply chain management. Because of the complexity and long-term nature of business transformation, we have stated that DOD needs a Chief Management Officer with significant authority, experience, and a term that would provide sustained leadership and the time to integrate DOD’s overall business transformation efforts. Improving Supply Chain Management May Involve Reexamining Fundamental Aspects of DOD’s Logistics Governance and Strategy
Our recent review of joint theater logistics raises concerns about whether DOD can effectively implement this initiative without reexamining fundamental aspects of the department’s logistics governance and strategy. In this respect, joint theater logistics may serve as a microcosm of some of the challenges DOD faces in resolving supply chain management problems. Moreover, in that report we recommended that DOD align its approach to joint theater logistics with ongoing actions the department is taking to reform its logistics governance and strategy, which are discussed below. Several recent studies of DOD logistics system have reached similar conclusions. Since 2003, a number of studies have recommended changes to DOD’s organizational structure for providing joint logistics and supply support to military operations. As I indicated earlier, a priority for the department as it moves forward should be to track and assess the outcomes achieved through its initiatives and the progress made in resolving supply chain management problems in the three focus areas of asset visibility, requirements forecasting, and materiel distribution. | Why GAO Did This Study
The availability of spare parts and other critical items provided through the Department of Defense's (DOD) supply chains affects the readiness and capabilities of U.S. military forces. Since 1990, GAO has designated DOD supply chain management as a high-risk area. In 2005, DOD developed a plan aimed at addressing supply chain problems and having GAO remove this high-risk designation. DOD's plan focuses on three areas: requirements forecasting, asset visibility, and materiel distribution. GAO was asked to provide its views on (1) DOD's progress in developing and implementing the initiatives in its plan, (2) the results of recent work relating to the three focus areas covered by the plan, and (3) the integration of supply chain management with efforts to improve defense business operations. GAO also addressed broader issues of logistics governance and strategic planning. This testimony is based on prior GAO reports and analysis. To determine whether to retain the high-risk designation for supply chain management, GAO considers factors such as whether DOD makes substantial progress implementing improvement initiatives; establishes a program to validate the effectiveness of the initiatives; and completes a comprehensive, integrated strategy.
What GAO Found
The most recent update to DOD's plan shows that DOD has made progress developing and implementing its supply chain management improvement initiatives. DOD is generally staying on track for implementing its initiatives, although there have been delays in meeting certain milestones. However, the long-term time frames for many of these initiatives present challenges to the department in sustaining progress toward substantially completing their implementation. The plan also lacks outcome-focused performance measures for many individual initiatives and the three focus areas, limiting DOD's ability to fully demonstrate the results achieved through its plan. Increasing DOD's focus on outcomes will enable stakeholders to track the interim and long-term success of its initiatives and help DOD determine if it is meeting its goals of more effective and efficient supply chain management. GAO's recent work has identified problems related to the three focus areas in DOD's plan. In the requirements area, the military services are experiencing difficulties estimating acquisition lead times to acquire spare parts for equipment and weapon systems, hindering their ability to efficiently and effectively maintain spare parts inventories for military equipment. Challenges in the asset visibility area include lack of interoperability among information technology systems, problems with container management, and inconsistent application of radio frequency identification technology, which make it difficult to obtain timely and accurate information on assets in theater. In the materiel distribution area, challenges remain in coordinating and consolidating distribution and supply support within a theater. Improving defense business operations is integral to resolving supply chain management problems. Progress in DOD's overall approach to business transformation is needed to confront problems in other high-risk areas, including supply chain management. Because of the complexity of business transformation, GAO has stated that DOD needs a Chief Management Officer with significant authority, experience, and a term that would provide sustained leadership and the time to integrate DOD's overall business transformation efforts. GAO's work, pending legislation, and other recent studies indicate a consensus that the status quo is no longer acceptable. GAO's recent review of joint theater logistics raises concerns about whether DOD can effectively implement this initiative without reexamining fundamental aspects of the department's logistics governance and strategy. In this respect, joint theater logistics may serve as a microcosm of some of the challenges DOD faces in resolving supply chain management problems. Moreover, GAO recommended in that report that DOD align its approach to joint theater logistics with ongoing actions the department is taking to reform its logistics governance and develop its logistics strategy. Several recent studies of DOD logistics systems have recommended changes to DOD's organizational structure for providing joint logistics and supply support to military operations. |
gao_GAO-13-187 | gao_GAO-13-187_0 | Background
Threats to systems supporting critical infrastructure and federal information systems are evolving and growing. We have identified the protection of federal information In 2003, this systems as a high-risk area for the government since 1997.high-risk area was expanded to include protecting systems supporting our nation’s critical infrastructure. Each year since that time, GAO has issued multiple reports detailing weaknesses in federal information security programs and making recommendations to address them. Number of Incidents Reported by Federal Agencies Continues to Rise, and Recently Reported Incidents Illustrate Potential Impact
Federal agencies have reported increasing numbers of cybersecurity incidents that have placed sensitive information at risk, with potentially serious impacts on federal operations, assets, and people. The increasing risks to federal systems are demonstrated by the dramatic increase in reports of security incidents, the ease of obtaining and using hacking tools, and steady advances in the sophistication and effectiveness of attack technology. These incidents illustrate the serious impact that cyber attacks can have on federal and military operations, critical infrastructure, and the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of sensitive government, private sector, and personal information. FISMA requires each agency to develop, document, and implement an information security program to include, among other things, periodic assessments of the risk and magnitude of harm that could result from the unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification, or destruction of information or information systems; policies and procedures that (1) are based on risk assessments, (2) cost-effectively reduce information security risks to an acceptable level, (3) ensure that information security is addressed throughout the life cycle of each system, and (4) ensure compliance with applicable requirements; security awareness training to inform personnel of information security risks and of their responsibilities in complying with agency policies and procedures, as well as training personnel with significant security responsibilities for information security; periodic testing and evaluation of the effectiveness of information security policies, procedures, and practices, to be performed with a frequency depending on risk, but no less than annually, and that includes testing of management, operational, and technical controls for every system identified in the agency’s required inventory of major information systems; and procedures for detecting, reporting, and responding to security incidents. Federal Strategy Has Evolved Over Time but Is Not Fully Defined
Although the federal strategy to address cybersecurity issues has been described in a number of documents, no integrated, overarching strategy has been developed that synthesizes these documents to provide a comprehensive description of the current strategy, including priority actions, responsibilities for performing them, and time frames for their completion. Among the items generally not included in cybersecurity strategy documents are mechanisms such as milestones and performance measures, cost and resource allocations, clear delineations of roles and responsibilities, and explanations of how the documents integrate with other national strategies. 8. However, no updated strategy document has been issued. Useful Strategies Should Include Desirable Characteristics
In 2004 we identified a set of desirable characteristics that can enhance the usefulness of national strategies as guidance for decision makers in allocating resources, defining policies, and helping to ensure accountability. Federal Cybersecurity Strategy Documents Have Not Always Included Key Elements of Desirable Characteristics
The government’s cybersecurity strategy documents have generally addressed several of the desirable characteristics of national strategies, but lacked certain key elements. The key elements that were generally missing from these documents include (1) milestones and performance measures, (2) cost and resources, (3) roles and responsibilities, and (4) linkage with other strategy documents. which represent only a portion of the national The lack of milestones and performance measures at the strategic level is mirrored in similar shortcomings within key government programs that are part of the government-wide strategy. Accordingly, the inspector general recommended that CS&C develop and implement performance measures to be used to track and evaluate the effectiveness of actions defined in its strategic implementation plan. For example, as already discussed, while the law gives OMB responsibility for oversight of federal government information security, OMB transferred several of its oversight responsibilities to DHS. For example, both DHS and OMB have issued annual FISMA reporting instructions to agencies, which could create confusion among agency officials. Further, the instructions vary in content. Mirroring these shortcomings, several GAO reports have likewise demonstrated that the roles and responsibilities of key agencies charged with protecting the nation’s cyber assets are inadequately defined. In an October 2012 report, we recommended that DOD update guidance on preparing for and responding to domestic cyber incidents to align with national-level guidance and that such guidance should include a description of DOD’s roles and responsibilities. The cybersecurity strategy documents we reviewed did not include any discussion of how they linked to or superseded other documents, nor did they describe how they fit into the overall national cybersecurity strategy. For example, in 2012, the administration determined that trusted Internet connections, continuous monitoring, and strong authentication should be cross-agency priorities, but no explanation was given as to how these three relate to priorities established in other strategy documents. Until an overarching strategy is developed that addresses these elements, progress in cybersecurity may remain limited and difficult to determine. Inspectors general for 8 of 22 major agencies reported compliance in 2011, while 13 of 24 inspectors general reported compliance the year before. DHS and sector-specific agencies have responsibilities for facilitating the adoption of cybersecurity protective measures within critical infrastructure sectors. Such exercises were to include critical infrastructure that could have an impact on government-wide processes. While DHS has made incremental progress in improving its information sharing and developing timely analysis and warning capabilities, these challenges remain. Difficulties in sharing and accessing classified information and the lack of a centralized information-sharing system continue to hinder DHS’s progress in sharing cyber-related incident data in a timely manner. According to DHS officials, a secure environment for sharing cybersecurity information, at all classification levels, intended to address these issues is scheduled to be fully operational in fiscal year 2018. To help improve the federal government’s analysis and warning capability, DHS has completed several actions. DHS plans to test tools for predictive analysis across federal agencies and private networks and systems by the first quarter of fiscal year 2013. In November 2011, we reported that while the NICE strategic plan described several ambitious outcomes, the departments involved in NICE had not developed details on how they were going to achieve the outcomes. Further, only three of the eight agencies had a department-wide training program for their cybersecurity workforce. In addition, to help federal agencies better identify their cybersecurity workforce and to improve cybersecurity workforce efforts, we recommended that OPM identify and develop government-wide strategies to address challenges federal agencies face in tracking their cybersecurity workforce; finalize and issue guidance to agencies on how to track the use and effectiveness of incentives for hard-to-fill positions, including cybersecurity positions; and maximize the value of the cybersecurity competency model by (1) developing and implementing a method for ensuring that the competency model accurately reflects the skill set unique to the cybersecurity workforce, (2) developing a method for collecting and tracking data on the use of the competency model, and (3) creating a schedule for revising or updating the model as needed. To achieve this goal, the plan recommended that the process include an awareness of the state of new technological developments; an ability to produce affordable R&D programs in critical infrastructure protection in a timely manner; a functioning, effective two-way interaction with the private sector, academia, and other countries to minimize R&D overlap and ensure that the needs of the private sector and government are met; and an innovative and flexible management structure that is responsive to rapid changes in the environment in terms of technology and threats. The NIPP also identified R&D as a key element in protecting the nation’s critical infrastructure. To help facilitate information sharing about ongoing and planned R&D projects, we recommended that OSTP, in conjunction with the Cybersecurity Coordinator, direct NITRD to (1) establish a mechanism, consistent with existing law, to keep track of all ongoing and completed federal cybersecurity R&D projects and associated funding; and (2) utilize the newly established tracking mechanism to develop an ongoing process to make federal R&D information available to federal agencies and the private sector. While progress has been made in identifying the importance of international cooperation and assigning roles and responsibilities related to it, the government’s approach for addressing international aspects of cybersecurity has not yet been completely defined and implemented. We have identified significant challenges within the federal government’s international cybersecurity efforts. the White House Cybersecurity Coordinator’s authority and capacity to effectively coordinate and forge a coherent national approach to cybersecurity, which were needed to lead near-term international goals and objectives from the President’s Cyberspace Policy Review, were still under development; the U.S. government had not documented a clear vision of how the international efforts of federal entities, taken together, supported overarching national goals; federal agencies had not demonstrated an ability to coordinate their international activities and project clear policies on a consistent basis; some countries had attempted to mandate compliance with their own cybersecurity standards in a manner that risked discriminating against U.S. companies or posed trade barriers to foreign companies that sought to market and sell their products to other countries; the federal government lacked a coherent approach toward participating in a broader international framework for responding to cyber incidents with global impact; the differences among laws of nations could impede U.S. and foreign efforts to enforce domestic criminal and civil laws related to cyberspace; and some federal agencies reported that they participated in efforts that may contribute to developing international norms, but agencies reported challenges such as, that this was a complicated and long- term process and that the absence of agreed-upon definitions for cyberspace-related terminology could impede efforts to develop international norms. However, the strategy does not fully specify outcome-oriented performance metrics, or time frames for completing activities. We continue to believe that the international strategy should specify outcome-oriented performance metrics, and time frames for completing activities. Many of these recommendations have not yet been fully addressed, leaving much room for more progress in addressing cybersecurity challenges. Clarifying oversight responsibilities is a topic that could be effectively addressed through legislation. Recommendations for Executive Action
In order to institute a more effective framework for implementing cybersecurity activities, and to help ensure such activities will lead to progress in cybersecurity, we recommend that the White House Cybersecurity Coordinator in the Executive Office of the President develop an overarching federal cybersecurity strategy that includes all key elements of the desirable characteristics of a national strategy, including milestones and performance measures for major activities to address cost, sources, and justification for needed resources to accomplish stated priorities; specific roles and responsibilities of federal organizations related to the strategy’s stated priorities; and guidance, where appropriate, regarding how this strategy relates to priorities, goals, and objectives stated in other national strategy documents. This strategy should also better ensure that federal departments and agencies are held accountable for making significant improvements in cybersecurity challenge areas, including designing and implementing risk- based programs; detecting, responding to, and mitigating cyber incidents; promoting education, awareness, and workforce planning; promoting R&D; and addressing international cybersecurity challenges. To address these issues, the strategy should (1) clarify how OMB will oversee agency implementation of requirements for effective risk management processes and (2) establish a roadmap for making significant improvements in cybersecurity challenge areas where previous recommendations have not been fully addressed. Matter for Congressional Consideration
To address ambiguities in roles and responsibilities that have resulted from recent executive branch actions, Congress should consider legislation to better define roles and responsibilities for implementing and overseeing federal information security programs and for protecting the nation’s critical cyber assets. The General Counsel of OSTP in the Executive Office of the President provided comments via e-mail in which the National Security Staff stated that the administration agrees that more needs to be done to develop a coherent and comprehensive strategy on cybersecurity and noted that a number of strategies and policies had been issued to address specific cybersecurity topics. The focus of our recommendation is to develop an overarching strategy that integrates the numerous strategy documents, establish milestones and performance measures, and better ensure that federal departments and agencies are held accountable for making significant improvements in cybersecurity challenge areas. More importantly, with these responsibilities now divided between the two organizations, it remains unclear how OMB and DHS are to share oversight of individual departments and agencies. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to (1) determine the extent to which the national cybersecurity strategy includes key desirable characteristics of effective strategies, and (2) identify challenges faced by the federal government in addressing a strategic approach to cybersecurity, including: (a) establishing a management structure to assess cybersecurity risks, developing and implementing appropriate controls, and measuring results; (b) detecting, responding to, and mitigating the effects of attacks on federal civilian and critical infrastructure; (c) enhancing awareness and promoting education; (d) promoting research and development; and (e) developing partnerships to leverage resources internationally. These agencies were: the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) (including officials from the Office of Cybersecurity and Communications, the National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center, the United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT), Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation, Federal Network Security Branch, and the Critical infrastructure Cyber Protection and Awareness Branch); the Department of Defense (DOD) (including officials from the National Security Agency and the Defense Information Systems Agency); the Executive Office of the President (including officials from OMB, the National Coordination Office, Office of Science and Technology Policy, and the National Security Staff); and the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). GAO-12-8. Information Security: State Has Taken Steps to Implement a Continuous Monitoring Application, but Key Challenges Remain. Critical Infrastructure Protection: Key Private and Public Cyber Expectations Need to Be Consistently Addressed. | Why GAO Did This Study
Cyber attacks could have a potentially devastating impact on the nation's computer systems and networks, disrupting the operations of government and businesses and the lives of private individuals. Increasingly sophisticated cyber threats have underscored the need to manage and bolster the cybersecurity of key government systems as well as the nation's critical infrastructure. GAO has designated federal information security as a government-wide high-risk area since 1997, and in 2003 expanded it to include cyber critical infrastructure. GAO has issued numerous reports since that time making recommendations to address weaknesses in federal information security programs as well as efforts to improve critical infrastructure protection. Over that same period, the executive branch has issued strategy documents that have outlined a variety of approaches for dealing with persistent cybersecurity issues.
GAO's objectives were to (1) identify challenges faced by the federal government in addressing a strategic approach to cybersecurity, and (2) determine the extent to which the national cybersecurity strategy adheres to desirable characteristics for such a strategy. To address these objectives, GAO analyzed previous reports and updated information obtained from officials at federal agencies with key cybersecurity responsibilities. GAO also obtained the views of experts in information technology management and cybersecurity and conducted a survey of chief information officers at major federal agencies.
What GAO Found
Threats to systems supporting critical infrastructure and federal operations are evolving and growing. Federal agencies have reported increasing numbers of cybersecurity incidents that have placed sensitive information at risk, with potentially serious impacts on federal and military operations; critical infrastructure; and the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of sensitive government, private sector, and personal information. The increasing risks are demonstrated by the dramatic increase in reports of security incidents, the ease of obtaining and using hacking tools, and steady advances in the sophistication and effectiveness of attack technology. The number of incidents reported by federal agencies to the U.S. Computer Emergency Readiness Team has increased 782 percent from 2006 to 2012.
GAO and inspector general reports have identified a number of key challenge areas in the federal governments approach to cybersecurity, including those related to protecting the nations critical infrastructure. While actions have been taken to address aspects of these, issues remain in each of these challenge areas, including:
Designing and implementing risk-based federal and critical infrastructure programs . Shortcomings persist in assessing risks, developing and implementing controls, and monitoring results in both the federal government and critical infrastructure. For example, in the federal arena, 8 of 22 major agencies reported compliance with risk management requirements under the Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA), down from 13 out of 24 the year before. In the critical infrastructure arena, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the other sectorspecific agencies have not yet identified cybersecurity guidance applicable to or widely used in each of the critical sectors. GAO has continued to make numerous recommendations to address weaknesses in risk management processes at individual federal agencies and to further efforts by sector-specific agencies to enhance critical infrastructure protection.
Detecting, responding to, and mitigating cyber incidents . DHS has made incremental progress in coordinating the federal response to cyber incidents, but challenges remain in sharing information among federal agencies and key private sector entities, including critical infrastructure owners, as well as in developing a timely analysis and warning capability. Difficulties in sharing and accessing classified information and the lack of a centralized information-sharing system continue to hinder progress. According to DHS, a secure environment for sharing cybersecurity information, at all classification levels, is not expected to be fully operational until fiscal year 2018. Further, although DHS has taken steps to establish timely analysis and warning, GAO previously reported that the department had yet to establish a predictive analysis capability and recommended that DHS expand capabilities to investigate incidents. According to the department, tools for predictive analysis are to be tested in fiscal year 2013.
Promoting education, awareness, and workforce planning . In November 2011, GAO reported that agencies leading strategic planning efforts for education and awareness, including Commerce, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), the Office of Personnel Management, and DHS, had not developed details on how they were going to achieve planned outcomes and that the specific tasks and responsibilities were unclear. GAO recommended, among other things, that the key federal agencies involved in the initiative collaborate to clarify responsibilities and processes for planning and monitoring their activities. GAO also reported that only 2 of 8 agencies it reviewed developed cyber workforce plans and only 3 of the 8 agencies had a department-wide training program for their cybersecurity workforce. GAO recommended that these agencies take a number of steps to improve agency and government-wide cybersecurity workforce efforts. The agencies generally agreed with the recommendations.
Promoting research and development (R&D) . The goal of supporting targeted cyber R&D has been impeded by implementation challenges among federal agencies. In June 2010, GAO reported that R&D initiatives were hindered by limited sharing of detailed information about ongoing research, including the lack of a repository to track R&D projects and funding, as required by law. GAO recommended that a mechanism be established for tracking ongoing and completed federal cybersecurity R&D projects and associated funding, and that this mechanism be utilized to develop an ongoing process to make federal R&D information available to federal agencies and the private sector. However, as of September 2012, this mechanism had not yet been fully developed.
Addressing international cybersecurity challenges . While progress has been made in identifying the importance of international cooperation and assigning roles and responsibilities related to it, the governments approach to addressing international aspects of cybersecurity has not yet been completely defined and implemented. GAO recommended in July 2010 that the government develop an international strategy that specified outcome-oriented performance metrics and timeframes for completing activities. While an international strategy for cyberspace has been developed, it does not fully specify outcome-oriented performance metrics or timeframes for completing activities.
The government has issued a variety of strategy-related documents over the last decade, many of which address aspects of the above challenge areas. The documents address priorities for enhancing cybersecurity within the federal government as well as for encouraging improvements in the cybersecurity of critical infrastructure within the private sector. However, no overarching cybersecurity strategy has been developed that articulates priority actions, assigns responsibilities for performing them, and sets timeframes for their completion. In 2004, GAO developed a set of desirable characteristics that can enhance the usefulness of national strategies in allocating resources, defining policies, and helping to ensure accountability. Existing cybersecurity strategy documents have included selected elements of these desirable characteristics, such as setting goals and subordinate objectives, but have generally lacked other key elements. The missing elements include:
Milestones and performance measures . The governments strategy documents include few milestones or performance measures, making it difficult to track progress in accomplishing stated goals and objectives. The lack of milestones and performance measures at the strategic level is mirrored in similar shortcomings within key government programs that are part of the government-wide strategy. The DHS inspector general, for example, recommended in 2011 that DHS develop and implement performance measures to be used to track and evaluate the effectiveness of actions defined in its strategic implementation plan. As of January 2012, DHS had not yet developed the performance measures but planned to do so.
Cost and resources . While past strategy documents linked certain activities to budget submissions, none have fully addressed cost and resources, including justifying the required investment, which is critical to gaining support for implementation. In addition, none provided full assessments of anticipated costs and how resources might be allocated to address them.
Roles and responsibilities . Cybersecurity strategy documents have assigned high-level roles and responsibilities but have left important details unclear. Several GAO reports have likewise demonstrated that the roles and responsibilities of key agencies charged with protecting the nations cyber assets are inadequately defined. For example, the chartering directives for several offices within the Department of Defense assign overlapping roles and responsibilities for preparing for and responding to domestic cyber incidents. In an October 2012 report, GAO recommended that the department update its guidance on preparing for and responding to domestic cyber incidents to include a description of its roles and responsibilities. In addition, it is unclear how OMB and DHS are to share oversight of individual departments and agencies. While the law gives OMB responsibility for oversight of federal government information security, OMB transferred several of its oversight responsibilities to DHS. Both DHS and OMB have issued annual FISMA reporting instructions to agencies, which could create confusion among agency officials because the instructions vary in content. Clarifying oversight responsibilities is a topic that could be effectively addressed through legislation.
Linkage with other key strategy documents . Existing cybersecurity strategy documents vary in terms of priorities and structure, and do not specify how they link to or supersede other documents, nor do they describe how they fit into an overarching national cybersecurity strategy. For example, in 2012, the administration determined that trusted Internet connections, continuous monitoring, and strong authentication should be cross-agency priorities, but no explanation was given as to how these three relate to priorities previously established in other strategy documents.
The many continuing cybersecurity challenges faced by the government highlight the need for a clearly defined oversight process to ensure agencies are held accountable for implementing effective information security programs. Further, until an overarching national cybersecurity strategy is developed that addresses all key elements of desirable characteristics, overall progress in achieving the government's objectives is likely to remain limited.
What GAO Recommends
To address missing elements in the national cybersecurity strategy, such as milestones and performance measures, cost and resources, roles and responsibilities, and linkage with other key strategy documents, GAO recommends that the White House Cybersecurity Coordinator develop an overarching federal cybersecurity strategy that includes all key elements of the desirable characteristics of a national strategy. Such a strategy would provide a more effective framework for implementing cybersecurity activities and better ensure that such activities will lead to progress in cybersecurity.
This strategy should also better ensure that federal departments and agencies are held accountable for making significant improvements in cybersecurity challenge areas, including designing and implementing risk-based programs; detecting, responding to, and mitigating cyber incidents; promoting education, awareness, and workforce planning; promoting R&D; and addressing international cybersecurity challenges. To address these issues, the strategy should (1) clarify how OMB will oversee agency implementation of requirements for effective risk management processes and (2) establish a roadmap for making significant improvements in cybersecurity challenge areas where previous recommendations have not been fully addressed.
Further, to address ambiguities in roles and responsibilities that have resulted from recent executive branch actions, GAO believes Congress should consider legislation to better define roles and responsibilities for implementing and overseeing federal information security programs and for protecting the nations critical cyber assets.
In its comments, the Executive Office of the President agreed that more needs to be done to develop a coherent and comprehensive strategy on cybersecurity but did not believe producing another strategy document would be beneficial. However, GAO believes an overarching strategy document that includes milestones and performance measures, cost and resources, roles and responsibilities, and linkage with other key strategy documents would provide a more effective framework for implementing cybersecurity activities. The Executive Office of the President also agreed that Congress should consider enhanced cybersecurity legislation. |
gao_RCED-99-23 | gao_RCED-99-23_0 | Some Basic Issues in Developing a Credit for Early Action Program
Efforts to develop a credit for early action program to reduce greenhouse gas emissions involve consideration of many issues before such a program could be implemented. We identified four issues, stated here as questions, that will have to be addressed in developing a credit for early action program. (2) How should emissions reduction ownership be determined? While these issues appear straightforward, in fact, they are complicated and will require difficult choices. DOE’s Energy Information Administration and the Environmental Defense Fund have pointed out that determining ownership and reporting responsibility would influence the size and scope of a credit for early action program. What Is the Reporting Level for an Emissions Reduction? Many Claims for Reductions Reported to the Voluntary Reporting Program Would Probably Be Ineligible for Credit Under a Program With More Restrictive Criteria
Many of the claims for reductions of greenhouse gas emissions submitted to the Voluntary Reporting Program would probably be ineligible for credit depending on the restrictive nature of the crediting mechanism. While the voluntary program was designed to encourage wide participation by allowing companies to submit emissions reduction claims under flexible alternative reporting criteria, it was not designed to automatically provide emissions credits to participants. A program to grant credits for early actions taken to reduce greenhouse gas emissions would probably require more restrictive reporting criteria to help ensure that the reductions claimed are real, not being double reported by others, and accurately determined. According to information from DOE’s Energy Information Administration, the issues of (1) how emissions reductions should be estimated and (2) whether the emissions reduction claims should be reported at the organization, project, or some other level illustrate why many reported claims would probably be ineligible for credit. How Emissions Reduction Claims That Are Reported to the Voluntary Reporting Program May Be Considered Under More Restrictive Reporting Criteria
The following examples of actual claims of greenhouse gas emissions reductions that companies have reported to the Voluntary Reporting Program serve to (1) further illustrate the four basic issues that will likely need to be addressed in designing a credit for early action program and (2) show how such claims may be evaluated if more restrictive reporting criteria were established. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on the Department of Energy's (DOE) proposal to develop a credit for an early action program promoting environmental cleanups, focusing on: (1) some of the basic issues that have to be addressed by any effort to develop a credit for early action program; and (2) how claims for reductions of greenhouse gas emissions that are reported to the Voluntary Reporting Program might fare under a credit for early action program that has less flexible reporting criteria.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) it identified four basic issues that will have to be addressed to develop a credit for early action program to reduce greenhouse gas emissions: (a) how emissions reductions should be estimated; (b) how emissions reduction ownership should be determined; (c) whether emissions reduction claims should be reported at the organization, project, or some other level; and (d) how emissions reduction claims should be verified; (2) on the surface, these issues appear straightforward; in fact, they are complicated and will require difficult choices; (3) furthermore, the resolution of these issues will likely influence the design of a credit for early action program; (4) the amount of flexibility such a program would provide on each of these issues would ultimately help to determine the extent of participation and the credit awarded; (5) many of the claims for reducing greenhouse gas emissions that have been submitted to the Voluntary Reporting Program would probably be ineligible for credit under a new program having more restrictive reporting criteria; (6) this is because the voluntary program was designed to encourage wide participation by allowing companies to submit emissions reduction claims under flexible reporting criteria and was not designed to automatically provide credit to participants for emissions reductions; (7) for example, the voluntary program, among other things, allowed companies discretion in determining the basis from which their emissions reductions were estimated and allowed companies to self-certify that their claims were accurate; and (8) according to DOE's Energy Information Administration and other organizations, such as the Edison Electric Institute and the Environmental Defense Fund, a credit for early action program could require more restrictive reporting criteria than the Voluntary Reporting Program to help ensure that emissions reduction claims are real, appropriately reviewed, and verified. |
gao_GAO-08-1099 | gao_GAO-08-1099_0 | Most Registered Lobbyists Could Provide Support for Their Filings and Newly Registered Lobbyists Largely Met Reporting Requirements
We estimate that lobbyists could provide accurate supporting information—in either written or verbal form—on income or expenses for at least 95 percent of all first quarter reports filed that required this information. Nonetheless, lobbyists were able to provide written or oral support for all required elements of individual reports we examined. However, the extent to which lobbyists could provide written documentation varied for different aspects of the reports. We estimate that lobbyists have written documentation to support income or expenses for approximately 91 percent of first quarter reports that required this information. Lobbyists had written documentation to support information about the individuals who acted as a lobbyist for 35 percent of reports. However, we could not identify corresponding first quarter reports of lobbying activity for 102 (approximately 7 percent) of the 1460 new registrations. Some Lobbyists Reported Challenges to Complying with the Act
Some lobbyists identified certain challenges to their compliance with the Act, including uncertainty about how to report various pieces of information about their organizations and lobbying activity. They did not know how much detail they needed to provide on the specific lobbying issues for each client. The United States Attorney’s Office for the District of Columbia Assigns Resources Based on Competing Demands and Has Sufficient Authorities to Enforce Lobbying Compliance
Officials from the United States Attorney’s Office for the District of Columbia (the Office) informed us that resources are assigned to lobbying compliance issues based on competing priorities within the Office. The Office has five staff members who work on lobbying noncompliance issues in addition to other duties: a deputy chief, three assistant U.S. Officials from the Office stated that they have sufficient civil and criminal statutory authorities to enforce the Act. Referrals have increased in recent years, and as a result, the Office’s workload relative to lobbying disclosure has increased. In commenting on a draft of this report, Office officials stated they have recently begun to redesign their computer database to more accurately track referrals and identify trends in past compliance matters in order to create a more structured approach for assigning its resources. Based on these observations, we believe that the lobbying community could benefit from creating an organization to share examples of best practices of the types of records maintained to support filings and use this information gathered over an initial period to formulate minimum standards for recordkeeping; provide training for the lobbying community on reporting and disclosure requirements, intended to help the community comply with the Act; and report annually to the Secretary of the Senate and the Clerk of the House on opportunities to clarify existing guidance and ways to minimize sources of potential confusion for the lobbying community. Such an approach should require the Office to track the referrals when they are made, record reasons for the referrals, record the actions taken to resolve them, and assess the results of actions taken. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Consistent with the requirements of the Honest Leadership and Open Government Act (HLOGA), our objectives were to determine the extent to which lobbyists can demonstrate compliance by providing support for information on registrations and reports filed in response to requirements of the amended Lobbying Disclosure Act (the Act); identify the challenges lobbyists cite in complying with the Act and suggestions for improving compliance; and describe the process of referring noncompliance cases to the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the resources and authorities available to DOJ in its role in enforcing compliance with the Act. We contacted each lobbyist in our sample and asked them to provide support for eight key elements in their reports, including the amount of money received for lobbying activities; the amount of money spent on lobbying activities; the specific issues on which they lobbied; the houses of Congress and federal agencies which they lobbied; the names of individuals who acted as lobbyists for the client listed on the report; the names of foreign entities with interest in the client; the names of individuals no longer acting as a lobbyist for the client; and the names of any member organizations of a coalition or association that actively participated in lobbying activities on behalf of the client. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Honest Leadership and Open Government Act (HLOGA) of 2007 amends the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995 by doubling the frequency of lobbyists' reporting and increasing criminal and civil penalties. This is GAO's first report in response to the Act's requirement for GAO to annually (1) determine the extent to which lobbyists can demonstrate compliance with the Act by providing support for information on their registrations and reports, (2) describe challenges identified by lobbyists to complying with the Act, and (3) identify the process for referring cases to the Department of Justice and the resources and authorities available to effectively enforce the Act. GAO reviewed a random sample of 100 reports filed by lobbyists during the first quarter of calendar year 2008. This methodology allowed GAO to generalize to the population of 17,801 reports filed. GAO also met with lobbyists regarding their filings and with Department of Justice officials regarding resources and authorities
What GAO Found
GAO estimates that lobbyists could provide accurate supporting information--in either written or verbal form--on income or expenses for at least 95 percent of all first quarter reports filed requiring this information. The legislation and guidance do not contain requirements for lobbyists to create or maintain documentation in support of the registrations or reports they file. Nonetheless, lobbyists were able to provide written or oral support for all required elements of individual reports GAO examined. However, the extent to which lobbyists could provide written documentation varied for different aspects of the reports. GAO estimates that lobbyists have written documentation to support income or expenses for approximately 91 percent of first quarter reports that required this information. In contrast, for a separate element listing the person who acted as a lobbyist, GAO estimates that lobbyists have written documentation for 35 percent of reports that required this information. Also, the majority of lobbyists newly registered with the Secretary of the Senate and Clerk of the House in the first quarter of 2008 also filed required disclosure reports for the period. However, for about 7 percent of the registrants, GAO could not identify a clear, corresponding report on file for their lobbying activity, likely because a report was not filed or because of a mismatch of information in reports that were filed. While a number of lobbyists felt that existing guidance for filing required registrations and reports was sufficient, others believed additional clarifications, such as on issue area activity codes and on how to report various pieces of information about their organizations and lobbying activity, were needed. Several lobbyists also expressed uncertainty about what constitutes reportable lobbying activity under the law and how much detail they needed to provide on the specific lobbying issues for each client. The Act included the sense of Congress that the lobbying community should create an organization to develop training and standards for lobbying. GAO's work reinforces that such an organization would be beneficial and could share best practices and provide training on the types of records to support filings and report annually on opportunities to clarify existing guidance. The United States Attorney's Office for the District of Columbia assigns its resources for lobbying compliance issues based on competing priorities within the Office. The Office has five staff members, including a Deputy Chief, three assistant U.S. attorneys, and one investigator who perform lobbying non-compliance follow-up, among other duties. Officials from the Office told us they have sufficient civil and criminal statutory authorities to enforce the Act. The department's lobbying compliance workload has increased in recent years. However, it currently lacks a structured approach for targeting its resources to the most significant noncompliance cases. Such an approach will require the Office to track the referrals when they are made, record reasons for the referrals, record the actions taken to resolve them, and assess the results of actions taken. The Office has recently begun to redesign its computer database to more accurately track referrals received in past years to identify trends in past compliance matters. |
gao_GAO-08-7 | gao_GAO-08-7_0 | State programs may also be postfunded through state general revenue funds and federal disaster relief payments. Second, homeowners may not receive appropriate price signals about the risk of living in catastrophe- prone locations. Homeowners do not purchase natural catastrophe insurance for a variety of reasons, including financial reasons. We estimate that the federal government made approximately $26 billion available for homeowners and renters who lacked adequate insurance in response to the 2005 hurricanes. Inaccurate Home Valuations Can Result in Underinsurance
Homes may be underinsured because replacement costs are not calculated accurately. The Comptroller General of the Unites States has repeatedly warned that the current fiscal path of the federal government is “imprudent and unsustainable.” In addition, we reported that, for state and local government sectors, large and growing fiscal challenges will begin to emerge within the next few years in the absence of policy changes. Options for Changing the Federal Role in Natural Catastrophe Insurance Attempt to Address Market Issues but May Not Limit Federal Exposure
We identified seven public policy options for changing the role of the federal government in natural catastrophe insurance (see fig. We examined the advantages and disadvantages of these policy options and evaluated them against four broad public policy goals. These goals are charging premium rates that fully reflect actual risks, encouraging private markets to provide natural catastrophe insurance, encouraging broad participation in natural catastrophe insurance limiting costs to taxpayers before and after a disaster. The first option—a mandatory all- perils homeowners insurance policy—would help create broad participation and could provide a private sector solution. A second option would involve providing federal reinsurance for state catastrophe funds—a change that could lead to greater private insurance market participation but that could also displace the private reinsurance market. These incentives offer some advantages, but could also represent ongoing costs to the federal government and taxpayers. Tax-Deferred Reserves for Insurance Companies Could Encourage Greater Private Sector Coverage but Could Be Costly for the Federal Government and Have Other Disadvantages
A fourth policy option would be to permit private insurers to establish tax- deferred reserves for future catastrophes. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives in this report were to examine (1) the rationale and funding of the federal and state programs that have supplemented, or substituted for, private natural catastrophe insurance; (2) the extent to which Americans living in areas of the United States that are at high risk for natural catastrophes are uninsured and underinsured, and the types and amounts of federal payments to such individuals since Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma; and (3) public policy options for revising the federal role in natural catastrophe insurance markets. We reviewed or analyzed documents on federal and state natural catastrophe insurance programs, the numbers of uninsured and underinsured and federal payments to them, options to redefine the federal role in natural catastrophe insurance, and principles on which change options can be based and evaluated. Selected State Natural Catastrophe Insurance Programs
State government natural catastrophe insurance programs, in most cases, have been created after disasters because homeowners insurance coverage for catastrophic events is often not available from private insurers at prices deemed affordable by state legislators and insurance regulators. Particularly in catastrophe-prone locations, government insurance programs have tended not to charge premiums that reflect the actual risks that homeowners face, resulting in financial deficits. After the 2005 hurricanes, for example, some of these state programs faced large accumulated deficits and required substantial public funding to continue operations. | Why GAO Did This Study
In recent years, much attention has been focused on the roles that the private sector and federal government play in providing insurance and financial aid before and after catastrophic events. In this context, GAO examined (1) the rationale for and resources of federal and state programs that provide natural catastrophe insurance; (2) the extent to which Americans living in catastrophe-prone areas of the United States are uninsured and underinsured, and the types and amounts of federal payments to such individuals since the 2005 hurricanes; and (3) public policy options for revising the federal role in natural catastrophe insurance markets. To address these questions, GAO analyzed state and federal programs, examined studies of uninsured and underinsured homeowners and federal payments to them, identified and analyzed policy options, and interviewed officials from private and public sectors in both high- and low-risk areas of the United States. GAO also developed a four-goal framework to help analyze the available options.
What GAO Found
The federal government and some states have developed natural catastrophe insurance programs that supplement or substitute for private natural catastrophe insurance. These programs were created because homeowner coverage for catastrophic events is often not available from private insurers at prices deemed affordable by insurance regulators. Large losses associated with natural catastrophes are some of the biggest exposures that insurers face. Particularly in catastrophe-prone locations, government insurance programs have tended not to charge premiums that reflect the actual risks that homeowners face, resulting in financial deficits. After a resource-depleting disaster, the programs have postfunded themselves through, among other sources, payments from insurance companies and policyholders and appropriations from state and federal taxpayers. Large numbers of Americans are not insured for natural catastrophes. Homeowners may not purchase natural catastrophe insurance because doing so is voluntary and they may not believe that the risk justifies the expenditure. In addition, some homes may be underinsured--that is, not insured for the full replacement value. GAO estimates that the federal government made about $26 billion available to homeowners who lacked adequate insurance in response to the 2005 Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma. Given the unsustainable fiscal path of federal and state governments, they will be challenged to maintain their current fiscal role. As Congress reevaluates the role of the federal government in insuring for natural catastrophes, Congress is faced with balancing the often-competing goals of ensuring that citizens are protected and limiting taxpayer exposure. This report examines seven public policy options for changing the federal government's role, including establishing an all-perils homeowner insurance policy, providing reinsurance for state catastrophe funds, and creating a mechanism to provide federal loans for state catastrophe funds. Each option has advantages and disadvantages, especially when weighed against competing public policy goals. For example, establishing an all-perils homeowner policy is a private sector approach that could help create broad participation. But low-income residents living in parts of the United States with high catastrophe risk could require subsidies, resulting in costs to the government. Similarly, federal reinsurance for state programs could lead to broader coverage, but could displace private reinsurance. GAO also identified several policy options for tax-based incentives for insurance companies, homeowners, investors, and state governments. But these options, which could help recipients better address catastrophe risk, could also result in ongoing costs to taxpayers. While some options would address the public policy goals of charging risk-based rates, encourage broad participation, or promote greater private sector participation, these policy goals need to be balanced with the desire to make rates affordable. |
gao_GAO-15-539T | gao_GAO-15-539T_0 | In September 2013, we reported that BIE student performance on national and state assessments and graduation rates were below those of Indian students in public schools. Organizational Fragmentation and Poor Communication Undermine Indian Affairs’ Administration of BIE Schools
Indian Affairs’ administration of BIE schools—which has undergone multiple realignments over the past 10 years—is fragmented. Notably, when the Assistant Secretary for Indian Affairs was asked at a February 2015 hearing to clarify the responsibilities that various offices have over BIE schools, he responded that the current structure is “a big part of the problem” and that the agency is currently in the process of realigning the responsibilities various entities have with regard to Indian education, adding that it is a challenging and evolving process. Indian Affairs’ administration of BIE schools has also been undermined by the lack of a strategic plan for guiding its restructuring of BIE’s administrative functions and carrying out BIE’s mission to improve education for Indian students. We have previously found that key practices for organizational change suggest that effective implementation of a results-oriented framework, such as a strategic plan, requires agencies to clearly establish and communicate performance goals, measure progress toward those goals, determine strategies and resources to effectively accomplish the goals, and use performance information to make the decisions necessary to improve performance.We noted in our 2013 report that BIE officials said that developing a strategic plan would help its leadership and staff pursue goals and collaborate effectively to achieve them. For example, our previous work found that the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Management’s lack of knowledge about the schools’ needs and expertise in relevant education laws and regulations resulted in critical delays in procuring and delivering school materials and supplies, such as textbooks. In our 2013 report, we also found that poor communication among Indian Affairs offices and with schools about educational services and facilities undermines administration of BIE schools. In 2013, we recommended that Interior develop a communication strategy for BIE to update its schools and key stakeholders of critical developments. Staff Capacity to Support Schools Is Limited
Limited staff capacity poses another challenge to addressing BIE school needs. According to key principles of strategic workforce planning, the appropriate geographic and organizational deployment of employees can further support organizational goals and strategies and enable an organization to have the right people with the right skills in the right place. Consequently, in 2013 we recommended that Indian Affairs revise its strategic workforce plan to ensure that its employees providing administrative support to BIE have the requisite knowledge and skills to help BIE achieve its mission and are placed in the appropriate offices to ensure that regions with a large number of schools have sufficient support. Indian Affairs agreed to implement the recommendation but has not yet done so. For example, our preliminary analysis of Indian Affairs data shows that about 40 percent of BIA regional facility positions are currently vacant, including regional facility managers, architects, and engineers who typically serve as project managers for school construction and provide technical expertise. Without adequate staff and training, we reported that BIE will continue struggling to adequately monitor school expenses. Indian Affairs agreed with our recommendation but has not yet taken any action. Inconsistent Accountability Hampers Management of School Construction and Monitoring of School Spending
Our work has shown that another management challenge, inconsistent accountability, hinders Indian Affairs in the areas of (1) managing school construction and (2) monitoring overall school expenditures. At one BIE-operated school we visited, Indian Affairs managed a project in which a contractor completed a $3.5 million project to replace roofs in 2010, but the roofs have leaked since their installation, according to agency documents. Uneven Accountability for School Spending
In our 2014 report on BIE school spending, we found that BIE’s oversight did not ensure that school funds were spent appropriately on educational services, although external auditors had determined that there were serious financial management issues at some schools. However, Indian Affairs agreed but has not yet implemented this recommendation. While Indian Affairs generally agreed, it has not yet taken this action. Without a risk- based approach and written procedures to overseeing school spending— both integral to federal internal control standards—there is little assurance that federal funds are being used for their intended purpose to provide BIE students with needed instructional and other educational services. While Indian Affairs has generally agreed with these recommendations and reported taking some steps to address them, it has not yet fully implemented them. | Why GAO Did This Study
BIE is responsible for providing quality education opportunities to Indian students. It currently oversees 185 schools, serving about 41,000 students on or near Indian reservations. Poor student outcomes raise questions about how well BIE is achieving its mission. In September 2013, GAO reported that BIE student performance has been consistently below that of Indian students in public schools.
This testimony discusses Indian Affairs' management challenges in improving Indian education, including (1) its administration of schools, (2) staff capacity to address schools' needs, and 3) accountability for managing school construction and monitoring school spending.
This testimony is based on GAO reports issued in September 2013 and November 2014, as well as GAO's February 2015 testimony, which presents preliminary results from its ongoing review of BIE school facilities. A full report on school facilities will be issued later this year. GAO reviewed relevant laws and regulations; analyzed agency data; and conducted site visits to schools, which were selected based on their geographic diversity and other factors.
GAO has made several recommendations in its earlier reports; it is not making any new recommendations in this statement.
What GAO Found
GAO has reported for several years on how systemic management challenges within the Department of the Interior's Office of the Assistant Secretary–Indian Affairs (Indian Affairs) continue to hamper efforts to improve Bureau of Indian Education (BIE) schools. Over the past 10 years, Indian Affairs has undergone several organizational realignments, resulting in multiple offices across different units being responsible for BIE schools' education and administrative functions. Indian Affairs' fragmented organization has been compounded by frequent turnover in its leadership over a 13-year period and its lack of a strategic plan for BIE. Further, fragmentation and poor communication among Indian Affairs offices has led to confusion among schools about whom to contact about problems, as well as delays in the delivery of key educational services and supplies, such as textbooks. Key practices for organizational change suggest that agencies develop a results-oriented framework, such as a strategic plan, to clearly establish and communicate performance goals and measure their progress toward them. In 2013, GAO recommended that Interior develop a strategic plan for BIE and a strategy for communicating with schools, among other recommendations. Indian Affairs agreed with and reported taking some steps to address the two recommendations. However, it has not fully implemented them.
Limited staff capacity poses another challenge to addressing BIE school needs. According to key principles for effective workforce planning, the appropriate deployment of employees enables organizations to have the right people, with the right skills, in the right place. However, Indian Affairs data indicate that about 40 percent of its regional facility positions, such as architects and engineers, are vacant. Similarly, in 2014, GAO reported that BIE had many vacancies in positions to oversee school spending. Further, remaining staff had limited financial expertise and training. Without adequate staff and training, Indian Affairs will continue to struggle in monitoring and supporting schools. GAO recommended that Interior revise its workforce plan so that employees are placed in the appropriate offices and have the requisite knowledge and skills to better support schools. Although Indian Affairs agreed with this recommendation, it has not yet implemented it.
Inconsistent accountability hampers management of BIE school construction and monitoring of school spending. Specifically, GAO has found that Indian Affairs did not consistently oversee some construction projects. For example, at one school GAO visited, Indian Affairs spent $3.5 million to replace multiple roofs in 2010. The new roofs already leak, causing mold and ceiling damage, and Indian Affairs has not yet adequately addressed the problems, resulting in continued leaks and damage to the structure. Inconsistent accountability also impairs BIE's monitoring of school spending. In 2014, GAO found that BIE does not adequately monitor school expenditures using written procedures or a risk-based monitoring approach, contrary to federal internal control standards. As a result, BIE failed to provide effective oversight of schools when they misspent millions of dollars in federal funds. GAO recommended that the agency develop written procedures and a risk-based approach to improve its monitoring. Indian Affairs agreed but has yet to implement these recommendations. |
gao_GAO-17-90 | gao_GAO-17-90_0 | CNCS Has a Process for Assessing Grants Annually to Prioritize Various Monitoring Activities
CNCS program and grant officers are responsible for implementing the agency’s grant monitoring process, which includes activities from the time before the grant award is made to when the grant is closed out, as shown in figure 2. To illustrate CNCS’s process, we reviewed CNCS grant data for fiscal year 2015 (the most recent complete fiscal year of data available at the time of our review). As shown in figure 3, CNCS rated about 14 percent of these grants overall as high-priority for monitoring, with some variation across the agency’s grant programs. Most compliance visits were conducted with Senior Corps and VISTA grants (programs with the highest number of grants). CNCS’s Process Is Not Fully Aligned with Internal Controls for Risk Assessment, Control Activities, and Monitoring
CNCS’s grant monitoring process includes efforts to identify and mitigate risks but does not fully align with relevant internal control principles for risk assessment, control activities, and monitoring (see fig. 4). This is largely because the scoring model is designed to support CNCS’s monitoring policy by identifying grants due for a monitoring visit, rather than for specifically assessing risk and using this risk information to drive prioritization of monitoring activities. For example, this indicator includes open compliance findings, improper payment findings, and the potential for financial management problems. One indicator—”multiple awards”—was checked for nearly half the grants assessed. Without establishing and implementing a policy to ensure that all grants are assessed for potential vulnerabilities in the current year, CNCS may not be using its monitoring resources most effectively, focusing on the highest-risk grants. CNCS Conducts Limited Monitoring of Grantee Oversight of Subrecipients
CNCS conducts limited monitoring of grantees’ oversight of their subrecipients, despite the large amount of grant dollars involved and evidence indicating that subrecipient oversight is a key risk area. CNCS’s Monitoring Capacity Needs Are Unclear Because It Has Not Conducted Strategic Workforce Planning
CNCS has not conducted the strategic workforce planning necessary to determine whether it has the capacity—including both people and resources—to effectively monitor grantees’ compliance with grant program requirements. Without such a planning process, CNCS’s efforts to address gaps in staffing due to attrition have been ad hoc and reactive. According to the CNCS OIG, as a result of this attrition, as well as the departure of key OCRO staff members at the beginning of fiscal year 2016, this office had few, if any, staff members with sufficient training or experience in grant monitoring and improper payment assessments, among other responsibilities. In addition, we found that the planned monitoring workloads and responsibilities of program and grant officers varied across the agency, and that CNCS had not evaluated whether these differences reflect an appropriate deployment of resources to monitor grantees effectively. In the absence of a strategic workforce planning process that fully incorporates and is consistent with key principles for effective strategic workforce planning, CNCS’s efforts to address gaps in staffing and to deploy program and grant officers where they are most needed may continue to be ad hoc and reactive. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve CNCS’s efforts to move toward a risk-based process for monitoring grants and to improve its capacity for monitoring grantee compliance, we are making the following six recommendations to the Chief Executive Officer of the Corporation for National and Community Service: 1. Ensure that CNCS completes its efforts to benchmark its assessment criteria and scoring process to further develop a risk-based approach to grant monitoring and that information from this effort is used to (a) score the indicators so that the riskiest grants get the highest scores; (b) revise the assessment indicators to meaningfully cover all identifiable risks, including fraud and improper payments; and (c) document decisions on how indicators are selected and weighted. 2. 4. 5. Agency Comments
We provided CNCS a draft of this report for review and comment. | Why GAO Did This Study
Created in 1993, CNCS distributes about $750 million in grants annually to volunteer and national service programs for needs ranging from disaster recovery to improving education. A 2014 CNCS Office of Inspector General (OIG) report cited problems with grant management. GAO was asked to review CNCS's efforts to improve its grant monitoring.
This report examines (1) CNCS's process for grant monitoring; (2) the extent that this process aligns with relevant internal controls for identifying, analyzing, and responding to risk; and (3) the extent that CNCS has the capacity necessary to monitor grantees' compliance with grant requirements. GAO reviewed agency documents for fiscal years 2015 and 2016; analyzed fiscal year 2015 assessment and monitoring data (the most recent complete year of data available); interviewed agency officials and a nongeneralizable sample of program and grant officers who had experience with grants with negative outcomes, such as greater-than-expected monitoring needs or audit findings; and held discussion groups with a small nongeneralizable number of grantees attending two 2016 training conferences.
What GAO Found
The Corporation for National and Community Service (CNCS) assesses its grants before the beginning of each fiscal year and prioritizes its grant monitoring based on the scoring of certain indicators, such as potential performance or financial problems and the length of time since the last compliance visit. For fiscal year 2015, CNCS identified about 2,200 grants for assessment and prioritized 16.4 percent for compliance visits and 5.4 percent for other types of visits and financial reviews. In addition, each year CNCS selects a sample of grant records to review for improper payments.
CNCS's process for grant monitoring is not fully aligned with the internal controls for identifying, analyzing, and responding to risks (see fig.). Specifically, because CNCS's assessment process does not include all grants, risks may go unidentified. Further, the assessment process uses a scoring model of 19 indicators to analyze and prioritize grants for monitoring visits rather than to identify the highest-risk grants. For example, multiple financial risks are grouped together under one indicator, including for improper payments, and a grant found to have such risks would not be scored as high priority for monitoring based on this indicator alone. In addition, while nearly half of CNCS grant dollars are passed through to other organizations (referred to as subrecipients) and evidence indicates that subrecipient oversight is a key risk area, CNCS's monitoring of grantees' oversight of subrecipients is limited, leaving the agency's response to risk vulnerable in this area.
CNCS has not conducted the strategic workforce planning necessary to determine whether it has the people and resources to effectively monitor grantees' compliance with grant program requirements, as key principles for effective strategic workforce planning suggest. CNCS's workforce management activities to address vacancies have been largely ad-hoc, including vacancies in a key office responsible for grant monitoring, at senior levels across the agency, and among program and grant officers. Some of these vacancies reduced the number of fiscal year 2015 monitoring activities conducted. Further, program and grant officers' workloads varied across the agency, and CNCS has not evaluated whether staff have been deployed where they are most needed. Officials said they had not developed a strategic workforce planning process because of limited resources. Without such a process, CNCS's efforts to address workforce challenges may continue to be ad hoc and reactive.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is making six recommendations to CNCS, including to ensure that all grants are assessed for risk and that its scoring model prioritizes risk; to review its monitoring protocols; and to develop a strategic workforce planning process. CNCS and CNCS OIG provided technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate. |
gao_GAO-02-1011T | gao_GAO-02-1011T_0 | Many aspects of the proposed consolidation of homeland security programs are in line with previous recommendations and show promise towards reducing fragmentation and improving coordination. However, as the Comptroller General has recently testified,implementation of the new department will be an extremely complex task, and in the short term, the magnitude of the challenges that the new department faces will clearly require substantial time and effort, and will take additional resources to make it effective. In areas ranging from fire protection to drinking water to port security, the new threats are prompting a reassessment and shift of longstanding roles and responsibilities. However, until this time, proposed shifts in roles and responsibilities have been considered on a piecemeal and ad hoc basis without benefit of an overarching framework and criteria to guide this process. Current homeland security proposals recognize that the unique scale and complexity of these threats call for a response that taps the resources and capacities of all levels of government as well as the private sector. Given the need for a highly integrated approach to the homeland security challenge, national performance goals and measures may best be developed in a collaborative way involving all levels of government and the private sector. Appropriate Tools Need to Be Selected for Providing Assistance
The choice and design of the policy tools the federal government uses to engage and involve other levels of government and the private sector in enhancing homeland security will have important consequences for performance and accountability. The choice of policy tools will affect sustainability of efforts, accountability and flexibility, and targeting of resources. The national strategy acknowledges the shared responsibility of providing homeland security between federal, state, and local governments, and the private sector and recognizes the importance of using tools of government such as grants, regulations, and information sharing to improve national preparedness. The proposed department will clearly have a central role in the success of efforts to strengthen homeland security, and has primary responsibility for many of the initiatives in the national homeland security strategy. Combating Terrorism: Critical Components of a National Strategy to Enhance State and Local Preparedness. Chemical and Biological Defense: Improved Risk Assessments and Inventory Management Are Needed. | What GAO Found
The challenges posed by homeland security exceed the capacity and authority of any one level of government. Protecting the nation against these threats calls for a truly integrated approach, bringing together the resources of all levels of government. The proposed Department of Homeland Security will clearly have a central role in efforts to enhance homeland security. The proposed consolidation of homeland security programs has the potential to reduce fragmentation, improve coordination, and clarify roles and responsibilities. Realistically, the challenges that the new department faces will clearly require substantial time and effort, and it will take additional resources to make it effective. Moreover, formation of a department should not be considered a replacement for the timely issuance of a national homeland security strategy to guide implementation of the complex mission of the department. Appropriate roles and responsibilities within and between the levels of government and with the private sector are evolving and need to be clarified. New threats are prompting a reassessment and shifting of long-standing roles and responsibilities, but these shifts are being considered on a piecemeal basis without benefit of an overarching framework and criteria to guide the process. A national strategy could provide such guidance by more systematically identifying the unique capacities and resources of each level of government to enhance homeland security and by providing increased accountability within the intergovernmental system. The nation does not yet have performance goals and measures upon which to assess and improve preparedness and develop common criteria that can demonstrate success, promote accountability, and determine areas where additional resources are needed, such as improving communications and equipment interoperability. A careful choice of the most appropriate tools is critical to achieve and sustain national goals. The choice and design of policy tools, such as grants, regulations, and tax incentives, can enhance the capacity of all levels of government to target areas of highest risk and greatest need, promote shared responsibilities, and track progress toward achieving preparedness goals. |
gao_NSIAD-96-105 | gao_NSIAD-96-105_0 | However, in recent years, U.S. participation in peace operations has grown. Peace operations were the major reason for the increases, with smaller increases for joint activities. Over the same period, the Marine Corps increased the average of its force deployed from about 12 percent to 13 percent. Units in Short Supply Heavily Tasked
Increased deployments have fallen most heavily to a few types of units with unique skills in high demand, such as special forces, electronic warfare squadrons, Patriot air defense units, and military police. DOD is examining the need to increase the number of some high-deploying units. Peace Operations and Joint Activities Drive Increase in Deployments
In the high-deploying units we studied, most of the increased deployments were for peace operations, particularly those of Air Force and Army units. Program officials told us that many joint training exercises involve small groups of servicemembers, and they are attempting to reduce them by combining or canceling some exercises. About one-third of the Army units experienced reductions. However, DOD policy on PERSTEMPO is unclear in many areas. The services continuously monitor retention levels of individuals and job specialties, and the Army and the Air Force already have or plan to offer bonuses and increase the number of personnel in some high-deploying units, such as air defense artillery or airborne warning and control system units. However, deployments to combat training centers, which generally last about 3 weeks, are not counted. Recommendations
To provide the oversight and guidance needed for long-term management of PERSTEMPO, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense identify key indicators that provide the best measures of deployments’ impact on personnel readiness and adjust existing databases to allow research comparing these indicators in high PERSTEMPO units, skill groups, or weapon systems to other such groups and issue DOD regulations that guide service management of PERSTEMPO by (1) establishing a DOD-wide definition of deployment; (2) stating whether each service should have a goal, policy, or regulation stipulating the maximum amount of time units and/or personnel may be deployed; and (3) defining the minimum data on PERSTEMPO each service must collect and maintain. We then compared ratings below expected levels with unit explanations of degradations in readiness, supplementing this analysis with discussions at the major command level. Additional copies are $2 each. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO examined the United States' military readiness, focusing on the: (1) frequency of deployments in recent years; (2) effects of increased deployment on combat readiness; and (3) Department of Defense's (DOD) efforts to limit personnel temporary (PERSTEMPO) deployment.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) Army and Air Force deployments have increased among special forces, electronic warfare squadrons, and Patriot air defense, and military police units; (2) the percentage of personnel deployed from 1987 to 1995 has increased from 2 to 6 percent for the Air Force and 5 to 9 percent for the Army; (3) the Navy and Marine Corps traditionally deploy units at twice the rate of the other services and remain active for at least half of the year; (4) peace operations, along with smaller increases in joint activity, are the driving force behind increased deployments; (5) DOD believes that deployments can be reduced by eliminating redundant military training and combining or cancelling some exercises; (6) the Status of Resources and Training System reports less than one-third of frequently deploying units dropping below planned readiness levels; (7) DOD is concerned about the nature of frequently deploying units' personnel problems; (8) DOD statistics on personnel readiness are not useful because they are inconsistent and are only compiled at the major command level; and (9) high PERSTEMPO is likely to continue unless DOD directs the services to set up goals and policies to manage PERSTEMPO. |
gao_GAO-13-555 | gao_GAO-13-555_0 | Indeed, approximately $501 million (84 percent) of the $595 million identified by offices at Labor as having been appropriated or allocated specifically for green jobs activities since 2009 went toward efforts with training and support services as their primary objective.million, or 12 percent of the total amount of funding for green jobs In total, approximately $73 activities, was reported appropriated or allocated for data collection and reporting efforts. 2). The Recovery Act directed federal agencies to spend the funds it made available quickly and prudently, and Labor implemented a number of relatively brief but high-investment green jobs efforts simultaneously. As a result, in some cases, Recovery Act training programs were initiated prior to a full assessment of the demand for green jobs. Several of Labor’s Offices Coordinate on Implementing Green Jobs Efforts within Labor or with Other Federal Agencies
Although funding for green jobs efforts at Labor has shifted and green jobs efforts funded through the Recovery Act are winding down, a few of Labor’s ongoing programs or efforts continue to emphasize green jobs or skills, and Labor continues to incorporate green elements into existing programs by coordinating internally on an as-needed basis. Selected Grantees Broadly Defined Green Jobs and Generally Added Green Elements to Existing Training Programs
To identify the potential demand for green jobs in their communities, all (11 of 11) grantees we interviewed had broadly interpreted Labor’s green jobs definitional framework to include as green any job that could be linked, directly or indirectly, to a beneficial environmental outcome. All grantees we interviewed said they had worked closely with local employers to align their training program with the green skills needs of local employers. Outcomes of Green Jobs Training Remain Uncertain, with Grantees Citing Implementation Challenges
Outcomes of Green Jobs Training Programs Remain Largely Unknown Due to Data Lags
The overall impact of Labor’s green jobs training programs remains largely uncertain partly because some individuals are still participating in training and are not expected to have outcomes yet, and because final outcome data are submitted to Labor approximately 3 months after the grant period ends. Our analysis of data reported by Recovery Act-funded green jobs grantees with final outcome data shows that these grantees collectively reported enrolling and training more participants than they had proposed when setting their outcome targets. Grantees Highlighted Green Jobs Training Benefits and Challenges
The grantees we interviewed were generally positive about Labor’s green jobs training programs, with most speaking optimistically about the potential value of the green skills obtained by the program participants. This may be especially true in light of changing state and local energy policies. Labor Has Assisted and Monitored Grantees, but Has Provided Limited Guidance on Outcome Documentation Requirements
Labor Has Provided Various Forms of Technical Assistance to Support Green Jobs Grantees
Labor has provided all green jobs grantees with technical assistance to help them implement their grant programs and comply with relevant federal laws and regulations. While Labor officials have not issued additional guidance to GJIF grantees regarding how to document job placement and retention outcomes, they said they have taken other steps that address the OIG’s recommendation to improve the quality of grantee reported performance data and utilize lessons learned from Recovery Act-funded green jobs training programs for other discretionary grant programs. Conclusions
The Recovery Act funded multiple, substantial investments in training programs targeted to a specific emerging industry—energy efficiency and renewable energy. Recommendations for Executive Action
To enhance Labor’s ability to implement training programs in emerging industries, GAO recommends that the Secretary of Labor identify lessons learned from implementing the green jobs training programs. Labor agreed with our recommendation. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to determine: (1) what is known about the objectives and coordination of the Department of Labor’s (Labor) green jobs efforts, (2) what type of green jobs training grantees provided and how selected grantees aligned their training to meet employers’ green jobs needs, (3) what is known about program outcomes and what challenges, if any, grantees faced in implementing their programs, and (4) what Labor has done to assist and monitor its green jobs grantees. During each site visit we interviewed Labor’s green jobs training grant officials, training providers, local employers, and, to the extent possible, program participants. | Why GAO Did This Study
Labor received $500 million from the Recovery Act to help create, better understand, and provide training for jobs within the energy efficiency and renewable energy industries, commonly referred to as "green jobs." Since 2009, Labor has also "greened" existing programs and funded additional green jobs training grants and other efforts.
In light of the amount of funding targeted to green programs within Labor, GAO examined: (1) what is known about the objectives and coordination of Labor's green jobs efforts, (2) what type of green jobs training grantees provided and how selected grantees aligned their training to meet employers' green jobs needs, (3) what is known about program outcomes and what challenges, if any, grantees faced in implementing their programs, and (4) what Labor has done to assist and monitor its green jobs grantees. To conduct this work, GAO reviewed relevant federal laws and regulations; surveyed selected offices within Labor using two questionnaires--one for directly- funded green jobs efforts and one for other efforts; interviewed Labor officials and 11 out of 103 green jobs training grantees; and analyzed relevant Labor documents and data.
What GAO Found
Of the $595 million identified by Labor as having been appropriated or allocated specifically for green jobs activities since 2009, approximately $501 million went toward efforts with training and support services as their primary objective, with much of that funding provided by the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (Recovery Act). Because the Recovery Act directed federal agencies to spend funds quickly and prudently, Labor implemented a number of high-investment green jobs efforts simultaneously. As a result, in some cases, Recovery Act training programs were initiated prior to a full assessment of the demand for green jobs, which presented challenges for grantees. While Labor's internal agencies initially communicated with each other and with other federal agencies after the Recovery Act was passed, most Recovery Act grants have ended or are winding down.
Labor created its green jobs definitional framework to provide local flexibility, and grantees we interviewed broadly interpreted Labor's framework to include any job that could be linked, directly or indirectly, to a beneficial environmental outcome. Labor's training data show most participants were trained in construction or manufacturing. While the findings of our site visits are not generalizable, all grantees we interviewed said they had worked closely with local employers to align their training program with the green skills needs of local employers. Most grantees we interviewed also told us they had incorporated green elements into existing training programs aimed at traditional skills, such as teaching weatherization as part of a carpentry training program.
The outcomes of Labor's green jobs training programs remain uncertain, in part because data on final outcomes were not yet available for about 40 percent of grantees, as of the end of 2012. Analysis of grantees with final outcome data shows they collectively reported training slightly more individuals than they had projected, but job placements were at 55 percent of the target. Training-related job placement rates remain unknown because Labor's Office of Inspector General (OIG) found these data unreliable. Grantees we interviewed were generally positive about Labor's green job training programs, but most said they had faced challenges during implementation, including: (1) a lack of reliable green jobs labor market information, (2) insufficient time to meet grant requirements, (3) knowledge gaps surrounding green skills and changing energy policies, and (4) difficulty placing participants into green jobs, primarily due to the overall poor economy.
Labor has provided technical assistance and taken steps to monitor green jobs training grantees through on-site monitoring visits and quarterly reviews. During these visits and reviews, Labor officials assessed grantee performance, such as by comparing reported program outcomes, including job placements, to targeted performance levels. However, Labor provided only limited guidance on how to document reported job placements. Labor officials required grantees with lower than projected performance levels to implement corrective action plans. In addition, Labor officials told us they have taken steps to improve the quality of grantee reported data, such as by forming an internal workgroup to identify ways to improve the technical assistance they provide to grantees on reporting performance outcomes.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that Labor identify lessons learned from the green jobs training programs to enhance its ability to implement such programs in emerging industries. Labor agreed with our recommendation. |
gao_GAO-16-407T | gao_GAO-16-407T_0 | Background
According to DHS, the limitations in its human resources environment, which includes fragmented systems and duplicative and paper-based processes, were compromising the department’s ability to effectively and efficiently carry out its mission. To address these issues, in 2003, DHS initiated the HRIT investment, which is intended to consolidate, integrate, and modernize the department’s and its components’ human resources IT infrastructure. This was due to, among other things, limited coordination with and commitment from DHS’s components. Performance management. DHS Has Made Very Little Progress in Implementing HRIT; Investment Lacked Effective Management
DHS has made very limited progress in addressing the 15 strategic improvement opportunities and the 77 associated projects included in HRIT. However, as of November 2015, DHS had fully implemented only 1 of the strategic improvement opportunities, which included 2 associated projects. As a result of the executive steering committee not meeting, key governance activities were not completed on HRIT. As a result of the limited progress in implementing HRIT, DHS is unaware of when critical weaknesses in the department’s human capital environment will be addressed, which is, among other things, impacting DHS’s ability to carry out its mission. We recommended in our report that DHS’s Under Secretary for Management update the HRIT executive steering committee charter to establish the frequency with which the committee meetings are to be held, and ensure that the committee is consistently involved in overseeing and advising HRIT. Accordingly, we recommended that DHS develop a complete life-cycle cost estimate for the implementation of the HRIT investment. HRIT’s 2011 Blueprint May Not Be Valid and Reflective of DHS’s Current Priorities and Goals
According to the HRIT executive steering committee’s charter, the Under Secretary for Management (as the chair of the committee) is to ensure that the department’s human resources IT business needs are met, as outlined in the blueprint. Officials stated that the department is still committed to implementing the blueprint, but agreed that it should be re-evaluated. However, according to PALMS program management office officials, they did not develop a life-cycle cost estimate for PALMS. HRIT’s minimally involved executive steering committee during a time when significant problems were occurring was a key factor in the lack of progress. | Why GAO Did This Study
DHS's human resources information technology environment includes fragmented systems, duplicative and paper-based processes, and little uniformity of data management practices, which according to DHS, are compromising the department's ability to effectively carry out its mission. DHS initiated HRIT in 2003 to consolidate, integrate, and modernize DHS's human resources information technology infrastructure. In 2011, DHS redefined HRIT's scope and implementation time frames.
This statement summarizes GAO's report that is being released at today's hearing (GAO-16-253) on, among other objectives, the progress DHS has made in implementing the HRIT investment and how effectively it managed the investment.
What GAO Found
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has made very little progress in implementing its Human Resources Information Technology (HRIT) investment over the last several years. This investment includes 15 improvement areas; as of November 2015, DHS had fully implemented only 1.
HRIT's limited progress was due in part to the lack of involvement of its executive steering committee—the investment's core oversight and advisory body. Specifically, this committee was minimally involved with HRIT, such as meeting only once during a nearly 2-year period when major problems were occurring, including schedule delays and the lack of a life-cycle cost estimate. As a result, key governance activities, such as approval of HRIT's operational plan, were not completed. Officials acknowledge that HRIT should be re-evaluated. They have met to discuss it; however, specific actions and time frames have not yet been determined. Until DHS takes key actions to manage this neglected investment, it is unknown when its human capital management weaknesses will be addressed.
What GAO Recommends
In its report that is being released today, GAO made 14 recommendations to DHS to, among other things, address HRIT's poor progress and ineffective management. For example, GAO recommended that the HRIT executive steering committee be consistently involved in overseeing and advising the investment, and that DHS establish time frames for re-evaluating HRIT and develop a complete life-cycle cost estimate for the investment. DHS concurred with the 14 recommendations and provided estimated completion dates for implementing each of them. |
gao_GAO-07-1257T | gao_GAO-07-1257T_0 | Background
To address the potential threat of an influenza pandemic, the President and his HSC issued two planning documents. The Strategy was issued in November 2005 and is intended to provide a high-level overview of the approach that the federal government will take to prepare for and respond to an influenza pandemic. Federal Leadership Roles Are Unclear, Evolving, and Untested
Several federal leadership roles involve shared responsibilities for preparing for and responding to an influenza pandemic, including the Secretaries of Health and Human Services and Homeland Security, the Administrator of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), a national Principal Federal Official (PFO), and regional PFOs and Federal Coordinating Officers (FCO). Federal Leadership Roles and Responsibilities Are Unclear and Evolving
The Strategy and Plan do not clarify the specific leadership roles and responsibilities for a pandemic. Gaps in the National Strategy and Plan Limit Their Usefulness
Our work found that the Strategy and Plan do not address all of the characteristics of an effective national strategy as identified in our prior work. The extent to which these documents, that are to provide an overall framework to ensure preparedness and response to a pandemic influenza, fail to adequately address key areas could have critical impact on whether the public and key stakeholders have a clear understanding and can effectively execute their roles and responsibilities. The Strategy and Plan did not address one characteristic— resources, investments, and risk management—because they did not discuss the financial resources and investments needed to implement the actions called for and therefore, do not provide a picture of priorities or how adjustments might be made in view of resource constraints. State and local jurisdictions were not directly involved in developing the Strategy and Plan. Neither the Strategy nor Plan described the involvement of key stakeholders, such as state, local, and tribal entities, in their development, even though these stakeholders would be on the front lines in a pandemic and the Plan identifies actions they should complete. Relationships and priorities among action items are not always clear. Performance measures are focused on activities that are not always linked to results. The linkage of the Strategy and Plan with other key plans is unclear. The Plan does not contain a process for monitoring and reporting on progress. The Plan does not describe an overall framework for accountability and oversight. While the plan contains broad information on roles and responsibilities and describes coordination mechanisms for responding to a pandemic, it does not, as noted earlier, clarify how responsible officials would share leadership responsibilities. Procedures and time frames for updating and revising the Plan were not established. Initial actions may help limit the spread of an influenza virus, reflecting the importance of a swift and effective response. Therefore, the effective exercise of shared leadership roles and implementation of pandemic plans could have substantial consequences, both in the short and long term. Since no national pandemic exercises of federal leadership roles and responsibilities have been conducted since the release of the Plan in May 2006, and key leadership roles continue to evolve, rigorous testing, training, and exercising is needed. Consequently, in our August 2007 report, we recommended that the Secretaries of Homeland Security and Health and Human Services work together to develop and conduct rigorous testing, training, and exercises for pandemic influenza to ensure that the federal leadership roles are clearly defined and understood and that leaders are able to effectively execute shared responsibilities to address emerging challenges. Although the HSC publicly reported on the status of action items in December 2006 and July 2007, it is unclear when the next report will be issued or how much information will be released. Further, we stated that the Plan could be improved by including the following information in the next update: (1) resources and investments needed to complete the action items and where they should be targeted, (2) a process and schedule for monitoring and publicly reporting on progress made on completing the action items, (3) clearer linkages with other strategies and plans, and (4) clearer descriptions of relationships or priorities among actions items and greater use of outcome-focused performance measures. | Why GAO Did This Study
An influenza pandemic is a real and significant potential threat facing the United States and the world. Pandemics are unlike other emergencies because they are not a singular event nor discretely bounded in space and time. This testimony addresses (1) federal leadership roles and responsibilities for preparing for and responding to a pandemic, (2) our assessment of the Strategy and Plan, and (3) opportunities to increase clarity of federal leadership roles and responsibilities and improve pandemic planning. GAO used its characteristics of an effective national strategy to assess the Strategy and Plan. The issues discussed in the testimony are based primarily on the GAO report, Influenza Pandemic: Further Efforts Are Needed to Ensure Clearer Federal Leadership Roles and an Effective National Strategy (GAO-07-781). In this report, GAO recommended that (1) The Secretaries of Homeland Security and Health and Human Services develop rigorous testing, training, and exercises for pandemic influenza to ensure that federal leadership roles and responsibilities are clearly defined, understood and work effectively and (2) HSC set a time frame to update the Plan, involve key stakeholders, and more fully address the characteristics of an effective national strategy. The Departments of Homeland Security and Health and Human Services concurred. The HSC did not comment.
What GAO Found
The administration has taken an active approach to this potential disaster by, among other things, issuing a National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza (Strategy) in November 2005, and a National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza Implementation Plan (Plan) in May 2006. However, much more needs to be done to ensure that the Strategy and Plan are viable and can be effectively implemented in the event of an influenza pandemic. Key federal leadership roles and responsibilities for preparing for and responding to a pandemic continue to evolve and will require further clarification and testing before the relationships of the many leadership positions are well understood. Most of these leadership roles involve shared responsibilities and it is unclear how they will work in practice. Because initial actions may help limit the spread of an influenza virus, the effective exercise of shared leadership roles and responsibilities could have substantial consequences. However, only one national, multi-sector pandemic-related exercise has been held, and that was prior to issuance of the Plan. The Strategy and Plan do not fully address the characteristics of an effective national strategy and contain gaps that could hinder the ability of key stakeholders to effectively execute their responsibilities. Specifically, some of the gaps include (1) The Strategy and Plan do not address resources, investments, and risk management and consequently do not provide a picture of priorities or how adjustments might be made in view of limited resources. (2) State and local jurisdictions were not directly involved in developing the Plan, even though they would be on the front lines in a pandemic. (3) Relationships and priorities among action items are not always clear. (4) Performance measures are focused on activities that are not always linked to results. (5) The linkage of the Strategy and Plan with other key plans is unclear. (6) The Plan does not contain a process for monitoring and reporting on progress. (7) The Plan does not describe an overall framework for accountability and oversight and does not clarify how responsible officials would share leadership responsibilities. (8) Procedures and time frames for updating and revising the Plan were not established. These gaps can affect the usefulness of these planning documents for those with key roles to play. Also, the lack of mechanisms for future updates or progress assessments limit opportunities for congressional decision makers and the public to assess the extent of progress being made or to consider what areas or actions may be need additional attention. Although the Homeland Security Council (HSC) publicly reported on the status of action items in December 2006 and July 2007, it is unclear when the next report will be issued or how much information will be released. |
gao_GAO-08-115T | gao_GAO-08-115T_0 | In commenting on our draft 2005 report, EPA disagreed with the four recommendations we made, saying it was already paying appropriate attention to environmental justice. A year later, in its August 24, 2006 letter to the Comptroller General, EPA responded more positively to our recommendations and committed to taking a number of actions to address these issues. As we testified in July 2007, EPA’s actions to date were sufficiently incomplete that measurable benchmarks are needed to achieve environmental justice goals and hold agency officials accountable for making meaningful progress on environmental justice issues. EPA’s TRI Rulemaking Deviated From Key Internal Guidelines, Including Some Related to Environmental Justice
As I discussed in our February 2007 testimony, EPA deviated from key internal guidelines in developing the TRI Burden Reduction Rule. EPA’s Action Development Process provides a sequence of steps designed to ensure that scientific, economic, and policy issues are adequately addressed at the appropriate stages of rule development and to ensure cross-agency participation until the final rule is completed. Nevertheless, we identified several significant differences between the guidelines and the process that EPA followed in developing the TRI rule. The first two options allowed facilities to use Form A in lieu of Form R for PBT chemicals, provided the facility had no releases to the environment. Second, we found problems with the extent to which the agency sought input from internal stakeholders. Third, our review of EPA’s rule development process found that the agency did not conduct an environmental justice analysis to substantiate its assertion that the TRI rule would not have environmental justice impacts. In its proposed rule, EPA stated that it had “no indication that either option [changing reporting requirements for non-PBT and PBT chemicals] will disproportionately impact minority or low-income communities.” EPA concluded that it “believes that the data provided under this proposed rule will continue to provide valuable information that fulfills the purposes of the TRI program…” and that “the principal consequence of finalizing today’s action would be to reduce the level of detail available on some toxic chemical releases or management.” However, the reason EPA said it had no indication about environmental justice impacts is because the agency did not complete an environmental justice assessment before it published the rule for comment in the Federal Register. (Compare table 1, columns B and C.) EPA argued that “while there is a higher proportion of minority and low-income communities in close proximity to some TRI facilities than in the population generally, the rule does not appear to have a disproportionate impact on these communities, since facilities in these communities are no more likely than elsewhere to become eligible to use Form A as a result of the rule.” However, EPA’s analysis indicates that TRI facilities are in communities that are one-third more minority and one- quarter more low-income, on average, than the U.S. population as a whole. However, the agency did not explain or provide support for this assumption. Our analysis shows that EPA’s TRI rule could, by increasing the number of facilities that may use Form A, significantly reduce the amount of information currently available to many communities about toxic chemicals used, transported, or released into their environment. However, to understand the potential impact of EPA’s changes to TRI reporting requirements more locally, we used 2005 TRI data to estimate the number of detailed Form R reports that would no longer have to be submitted in each state and found that nearly 22,200 Form R reports (28 percent) could convert to Form A under EPA’s new Form A thresholds. Although the facility’s releases totaled about 5,000 pounds, it released less than 2,000 pounds of each chemical, and therefore would no longer have to file Form Rs for them. | Why GAO Did This Study
A 1994 Executive Order sought to ensure that minority and low-income populations are not subjected to disproportionately high and adverse health or environ-mental effects from agency activities. In a July 2005 report, GAO made several recommendations to improve the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) adherence to these environmental justice principles. The Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986 (EPCRA) requires certain facilities that use toxic chemicals to report their releases to EPA, which makes the information available in the Toxics Release Inventory (TRI). Since 1995, facilities may submit a brief statement (Form A) in lieu of the more detailed Form R if releases of a chemical do not exceed 500 pounds a year. In January 2007, EPA finalized the TRI Burden Reduction Rule, quadrupling to 2,000 pounds what facilities can release before having to disclose details using Form R. Congress is considering codifying the Executive Order and requiring EPA to implement GAO's environ-mental justice recommendations. Other legislation would amend EPCRA to, among other things, revert the Form A threshold to 500 pounds or less. In this testimony, GAO discusses (1) EPA's response to GAO's environmental justice recommendations, (2) the extent to which EPA followed internal guidelines when developing the TRI rule and (3) the impact of the rule on communities and facilities.
What GAO Found
EPA initially disagreed with GAO's July 2005 environmental justice recommendations, saying it was already paying appropriate attention to the issue. GAO called on EPA to improve the way it addresses environmental justice in its economic reviews and to better explain its rationale by providing data to support the agency's decisions. A year later, EPA responded more positively to the recommendations and committed to a number of actions. However, based on information that EPA has subsequently provided, GAO concluded in a July 2007 testimony that EPA's actions to date were incomplete and that measurable benchmarks were needed to hold agency officials accountable for achieving environmental justice goals. In developing the TRI rule, EPA did not follow key aspects of its internal guidelines, including some related to environmental justice. EPA did not follow guidelines to ensure that scientific, economic, and policy issues are addressed at appropriate stages of rule development. For example, EPA asserted that the rule would not have environmental justice impacts; however, it did not support this assertion with adequate analysis. The omission is significant because many TRI facilities that no longer have to submit Form R reports are located in minority and low-income communities; and the reduction in toxic chemical information could disproportionately affect them. EPA's TRI rule will reduce the amount of information about toxic chemical releases without providing significant savings to facilities. A total of nearly 22,200 Form R reports from some 3,500 facilities are eligible to convert to Form A under the rule. While EPA says the aggregate impact of these conversions will be minimal, the effect on individual states and communities may be significant, as illustrated below. Although making significantly less information available to communities, GAO estimated that the rule would save companies little--an average of less than $900 per facility. |
gao_GAO-16-607 | gao_GAO-16-607_0 | Third, federal regulations require operators to report monthly oil and gas production to Interior on the OGOR. Interior’s Guidance to Operators on Reporting Requirements Has Limitations That May Hinder the Extent to Which It Can Account for Natural Gas Emissions
Interior’s limited guidance to operators on how to report natural gas emissions on the OGOR may hinder the extent to which it can account for such emissions. Third, Interior’s guidance does not specify which activities are to be reported under OGOR categories for natural gas emissions. Without specific instructions from BLM on how to develop estimates of natural gas emissions, it may also be difficult for BLM’s production accountability staff to determine which method operators are using to estimate natural gas emissions and to verify their accuracy during periodic records reviews. Although some BLM field office officials we spoke with told us they felt that the OGOR volume estimates were fairly reliable, without consistent accounting, Interior does not have the information it needs to have reasonable assurance that it is minimizing waste on federal oil and gas leases. As a result of this uncertainty with the data, Interior may not have a clear accounting of natural gas emissions, which could limit Interior’s ability to ensure that lessees pay royalties in the proper amounts and minimize waste of natural gas. In its proposed regulations, BLM has not provided additional guidance to operators on which activities should be included under the natural gas emissions reporting categories on the OGOR. BLM Has Not Consistently Followed Its Existing Guidance in Managing Operators’ Venting or Flaring Requests
BLM has approved operators’ requests to vent or flare gas royalty-free without having the documentation its guidance requires. Field offices have also applied BLM’s guidance differently, which has resulted in some field offices requiring royalty payments on flared gas while other field offices do not. Generally, venting or flaring on a short-term basis in temporary or emergency circumstances is described in NTL-4A as “authorized venting or flaring of gas.” Alternatively, venting or flaring requests that are more long term in nature—described in NTL-4A as “other venting or flaring” of gas—may be approved if operators submit documentation that consists of (1) an evaluation report providing an economic and a geologic justification to flare or (2) an action plan that will eliminate venting or flaring of the gas within 1 year from the date of application. We estimate that nearly all of the requests that BLM approved royalty-free did not include the documentation required for long-term venting or flaring. Selected Field Offices Have Applied BLM Guidance Differently to Venting or Flaring Requests
Officials in the six field offices we reviewed interpreted NTL-4A differently with respect to charging royalties on approved venting or flaring, which may have resulted in the operators seeking to vent or flare not receiving consistent treatment across offices. As discussed above, Interior officials we spoke with told us that BLM plans to finalize the proposed regulations by the end of calendar year 2016, and they told us that finalizing the proposed regulations is an Administration priority. Since Interior has historically focused on royalty-bearing oil and gas production and has limited guidance on how to report natural gas emissions, it cannot yet consistently account for these emissions on federal leases. Appendix II: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report examines (1) the extent to which the Department of the Interior (Interior) can account for natural gas emissions from onshore federal leases and (2) how selected Bureau of Land Management (BLM) field offices have managed requests to vent or flare natural gas emissions on onshore leases. Specifically, we interviewed BLM officials in BLM headquarters; BLM’s National Operations Center in Lakewood, Colorado; and six BLM field offices we selected primarily based on (1) the volume of flared gas emitted in that region, (2) the amount of lease use gas consumed in that region, and (3) the volume of vented gas in that region in fiscal year 2014, the most recent year for which complete data were available. To examine the guidance BLM provides to operators regarding reporting flared volumes on the OGOR, we reviewed BLM’s existing guidance on venting and flaring—Notice to Lessees and Operators of Onshore Federal and Indian Oil and Gas Leases (NTL-4A)—and interviewed officials from our selected field offices on how such volumes are to be reported on the OGOR. Fiscal year 2014 was the most recent year for which BLM could provide complete data. To better understand the rationale behind BLM’s acceptance or rejection of these requests, we selected a simple random sample of 100 of the 1,281 venting or flaring requests for further review. | Why GAO Did This Study
Interior's BLM oversees and accounts for onshore oil and gas production on federal lands. Interior generally collects royalties for this oil and gas, but its guidance, which was issued over 30 years ago, may exempt gas that is vented, flared, or used to operate equipment on the lease. Increased oil production in recent years has resulted in a rise in flared gas in certain regions where there is limited infrastructure to transport or process gas associated with oil production. BLM has proposed updating its venting and flaring regulations to clarify how such emissions are to be managed.
GAO was asked to review Interior's management of natural gas emissions onshore. This report examines (1) the extent to which Interior can account for these emissions and (2) how BLM field offices have managed requests to vent or flare. GAO analyzed Interior data, including a simple random sample of venting or flaring requests from fiscal year 2014, the most recent year for which data were available; reviewed Interior documents; and interviewed officials from a nongeneralizable sample of six BLM field offices selected based on increased natural gas emissions in recent years. GAO also interviewed operators with leases managed by two BLM field offices.
What GAO Found
The Department of the Interior's (Interior) guidance to oil and gas operators on its reporting requirements has limitations that may hinder the extent to which it can account for natural gas emissions on onshore federal lands (leases). Interior is required to ensure that oil and gas operations are conducted in a manner that minimizes waste. As part of its oversight activities, Interior requires operators to submit monthly Oil and Gas Operations Reports (OGOR). Interior uses these reports to track volumes of oil and gas produced on federal lands, including gas that may be exempt from royalties, such as gas released into the air (vented), burned (flared), or used to power equipment on the lease (lease use). Historically, Interior's focus has been on collecting data from royalty-bearing oil and gas production, and thus it has provided limited guidance on how operators are to report natural gas emissions. For example, Interior
does not provide specific instructions on how to estimate natural gas emissions, which results in operators using varying estimation methods that may be difficult to verify;
does not specify which natural gas emissions activities should be reported, resulting in operators not reporting some emissions (e.g., from storage tanks).
As a result of these limitations, Interior may not have a consistent accounting of natural gas emissions from onshore federal leases, and does not have the information it needs to reasonably ensure it is minimizing waste on these leases.
The Bureau of Land Management's (BLM) field offices have not consistently followed BLM's existing guidance in managing operators' venting or flaring requests. GAO found that BLM field offices have approved venting or flaring requests that did not include the documentation BLM's guidance requires. Specifically, in fiscal year 2014, GAO found that BLM received 1,281 venting or flaring requests from operators. GAO reviewed the documentation for a random sample of 100 of those requests and, based on this sample, estimates that 90 percent (+/-8) of the requests to BLM did not provide the documentation required by BLM guidance. GAO also estimates that BLM approved 70 percent (+/-9) of these venting or flaring requests and, for nearly half of the approvals, allowed operators to flare gas royalty-free. Further, GAO found that selected BLM field offices have applied BLM guidance differently to venting or flaring requests. For example, officials in two BLM field offices GAO reviewed said they used their authority under the existing guidance to charge royalties on flared gas, while a third field office was considering doing so. The other three field offices GAO reviewed have interpreted BLM guidance as allowing all venting or flaring requests in their regions to be approved royalty-free. BLM's proposed update to its regulations, if finalized, would clarify how BLM will manage future venting or flaring requests. Interior officials told GAO that they expect to finalize the proposed update to its regulations by the end of calendar year 2016 and that finalizing the regulations is an Administration priority.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is making four recommendations to Interior, including providing additional guidance on how operators are to report natural gas emissions. Interior generally concurred with these recommendations. |
gao_GAO-10-508T | gao_GAO-10-508T_0 | The cumulative development cost for the 10 programs we reviewed increased by over $3 billion, or 37 percent, from initial estimates. As detailed in table 2, overall procurement unit costs increased by 12 percent on average, with three programs experiencing unit cost growth of 25 percent of more. The Reaper and Shadow had unit cost growth despite increased quantities. Four programs had experienced delays of 1 to nearly 4 years in achieving initial operational capability. For example, early demonstration and production Global Hawks were rushed into operational service. Efforts to Collaborate and Identify Commonality Were Successful in Some Cases, While Not in Others
Consistent with DOD’s framework for acquiring unmanned systems, some of the tactical and theater-level unmanned aircraft acquisition programs we reviewed had identified areas of commonality to leverage resources and gain efficiencies. By forgoing any service-unique modifications in order to achieve a high level of commonality, the Marine Corps avoided the costs of developing the Shadow. Since the Sky Warrior is a variant of the Predator, the two aircraft are assembled in the same production facility. Service-Centric Acquisition Processes and Ineffective Collaboration Have Reduced Opportunities for Commonality
While several of the unmanned aircraft programs we examined had achieved commonality at the airframe level, service-centric acquisition processes and ineffective collaboration resulted in service-unique subsystems, payloads, and ground control stations. Despite DOD’s efforts to encourage a joint approach to identifying and prioritizing warfighting needs and to emphasize the need for commonality among the programs, we noted that the individual services continued to drive requirements and make independent resource allocation decisions. However, OSD had not quantified the potential costs or benefits of pursuing various alternatives, including commonality. OSD repeatedly directed the Army and Air Force to collaborate on their Sky Warrior and Predator programs, but the services continued to pursue unique systems. Congress and OSD took additional action in 2009 aimed at increasing collaboration and commonality among unmanned aircraft programs. DOD Continues to Increase Its Emphasis on and Funding For Unmanned Aircraft Systems
Since July 2009 when our report was issued, DOD has made several key investment decisions regarding unmanned aircraft systems that will likely impact those estimates. In general, these decisions reflect increased emphasis on developing more advanced unmanned aircraft capabilities and acquiring larger numbers of specific systems, but they do not appear to focus on increasing collaboration or commonality among systems. As part of those adjustments, OSD: Directed the Army to stop development and initial fielding of its Fire Provided the Air Force an additional $344 million from FY2011 to FY2015 to develop, procure, and integrate counter-communication and counter-improvised explosive device jamming pods onto 33 MQ-9 Reaper aircraft, and directed the Air Force to present its assessment of platforms for this capability by June 1, 2010; Provided an additional $1.8 billion from FY2011 through FY2015 to purchase an additional 74 MQ-9 Reaper aircraft; Added $2 billion to the Navy budget from FY2013 to FY2015 to define requirements and develop unmanned carrier based capability, and directed the Navy to develop an execution plan by March 30, 2010; Added $201.6 million to the Global Hawk procurement budget to procure 19 Block 40 aircraft by 2015, and 22 total; Added $270.5 million for development and procurement of Global Hawk satellite communication terminals; Added $2.4 billion over the Future Years Defense Program to the Army’s Extended Range Multi-Purpose (Sky Warrior) Aircraft budget to procure an additional 12 aircraft and 5 ground stations (one company) per year from 2011 through 2015. Many of DOD’s larger unmanned aircraft acquisition programs have experienced cost growth, schedule delays, and performance shortfalls, while not enough have achieved the efficiencies one might expect from commonality. DOD recognizes that to more effectively leverage its acquisition resources, it must achieve greater commonality among the military services’ various unmanned system programs. Therefore, in our July 2009 report we recommended that DOD (1) direct an objective, independent examination of unmanned aircraft requirements and report a strategy to Congress for achieving greater commonality among systems and subsystems, and (2) require future unmanned aircraft programs to take an open systems approach to product development and to clearly demonstrate that potential areas of commonality have been analyzed and identified. Table 4 contains the combined total development and procurement funding DOD has requested in its fiscal year 2011 budget submission for each of the programs. | Why GAO Did This Study
For the last several years, the Department of Defense (DOD) has planned to invest billions of dollars in development and procurement of unmanned aircraft systems. In its fiscal year 2011 budget request the department indicated a significant increase in these investments, expecting to need more than $24 billion from 2010 through 2015. DOD recognizes that to leverage its resources more effectively, it must achieve greater commonality among the military services' unmanned aircraft system acquisition programs. This testimony is based primarily on GAO's July 2009 report (GAO-09-520) which examined 10 unmanned aircraft acquisition programs: eight unmanned aircraft systems--Global Hawk, Reaper, Shadow, Predator, Sky Warrior, Fire Scout, Broad Area Maritime Surveillance, and Unmanned Combat Aircraft System-Demonstration; and two payload development programs--Multi-Platform Radar Technology Insertion Program, and Airborne Signals Intelligence Payload. The testimony focuses on: 1) the cost, schedule, and performance progress of the 10 programs as of July 2009; 2) the extent to which the military services collaborated and identified commonality among the programs; 3) factors influencing the effectiveness of the collaboration; and, 4) recent DOD investment decisions related to these acquisitions.
What GAO Found
Most of the 10 programs reviewed had experienced cost increases, schedule delays, performance shortfalls, or some combination of these problems. The programs' development cost estimates increased by more than $3 billion collectively, or 37 percent, from initial estimates. Procurement funding requirements for most programs also increased, primarily because of increases in numbers of aircraft being procured, changes in system requirements, and upgrades and retrofits to fielded systems. Procurement unit costs increased by an average of 12 percent, with three aircraft programs experiencing unit cost increases of 25 percent or more. Four programs reported delays of 1 year or more in delivering capability to the warfighter. Global Hawk, Predator, Reaper, and Shadow had been used in combat operations with success and lessons learned, but had been rushed into service in some cases, leading to performance issues and delays in development and operational testing and verification. Programs collaborated and identified areas of commonality to varying degrees. The Marine Corps was able to avoid the cost of initial system development and quickly deliver useful capability to the warfighter by choosing to procure existing Army Shadow systems. The Navy expected to save time and money on Broad Area Maritime Surveillance (BAMS) by using Air Force's Global Hawk airframe, and payloads and subsystems from other programs. However, Army and Air Force had not collaborated on their Sky Warrior and Predator programs, and might have achieved greater savings if they had, given that Sky Warrior is a variant of Predator and being developed by the same contractor. DOD encouraged more commonality between these programs. Although several programs achieved airframe commonality, service-driven acquisition processes and ineffective collaboration were key factors that inhibited commonality among subsystems, payloads, and ground control stations, raising concerns about potential inefficiencies and duplication. Despite DOD's efforts to emphasize a joint approach to identifying needs and commonality among systems, most of the programs assessed continued to pursue service-unique requirements. The services also made independent resource allocation decisions to support their unique requirements. DOD had not quantified the costs and benefits associated with pursuing commonality among these programs, and efforts to collaborate had produced mixed results. However, in order to maximize acquisition resources and meet increased demand, Congress and DOD have continued to push for more commonality. Since July 2009, DOD has made several investment decisions regarding unmanned aircraft systems, which in general, reflect increased emphasis on developing advanced capabilities and acquiring larger numbers of specific systems. However, the decisions do not appear to focus on increasing collaboration or commonality among the programs. |
gao_GAO-04-891 | gao_GAO-04-891_0 | The ORBIT Act, enacted in March 2000, was designed to promote a competitive global satellite communication services market. It did so primarily by calling for INTELSAT to be fully privatized. Such commitments resulted in member countries agreeing to open markets to telecommunications services, such as global satellite communications services. Most INTELSAT Privatization Steps Have Taken Place and Stakeholders Stated That Implementation of the ORBIT Act Was Not Inconsistent with U.S. The Congress and FCC have extended this date three times and the current deadline for the IPO is June 30, 2005. Because Intelsat has not yet completed the IPO, some competing satellite companies have stated that the privatization is not fully complete. Some parties have pointed out that there was a possibility that implementation of the ORBIT Act could have given rise to action arguably inconsistent with commitments that the United States made in international trade agreements. However, we were told that actual implementation avoided such outcomes and no disputes arose. Most companies and experts that we interviewed believe that, to date, Intelsat’s privatization has been in accordance with the ORBIT Act’s requirements, and some of these companies and experts that we interviewed believe that FCC is fulfilling its duties to ensure that the privatization is consistent with the act. Stakeholders Note Potential for Inconsistencies between ORBIT Act and International Trade Agreements, but Stated That Implementation of the Act Was Not Inconsistent with Those Agreements
We were told that there were potential inconsistencies between the ORBIT Act and obligations the United States made in international trade agreements. Stakeholders Attribute Recent Improvements in Market Access to Global Trade Agreements and Privatization Trends, Rather Than the ORBIT Act
According to most stakeholders and experts we spoke with, access to non- U.S. satellite markets has generally improved during the past decade. All five satellite companies that we spoke with indicated that access to non-U.S. satellite markets has generally improved. Most stakeholders that we spoke with attributed the improved access in non-U.S. satellite markets to the WTO and global trade agreements and the trend towards privatization in the global telecommunications industry, rather than to the ORBIT Act. Additionally, two of the satellite companies and one expert told us that the trend towards privatization in the telecommunications industry—such as governments privatizing state- controlled telephone companies—has helped improve market access. According to several stakeholders, market access was already improving when the ORBIT Act was passed. Some Companies Say That Market Access Challenges Remain and Suggest More FCC Action under the ORBIT Act to Address These Issues
Some satellite companies have stated that some market access problems still exist, which they attribute to foreign government policies that limit or slow entry. However, some other companies have a different view on whether Intelsat has any preferential or exclusive market access advantages. Some Satellite Companies and FCC Differ on FCC’s Responsibilities under the ORBIT Act
Some of the companies we spoke with believe that FCC should take a more proactive role in improving access for satellite companies in non-U.S. markets. GAO response: The ORBIT Act’s requirement for an IPO does not specifically state “equity IPO,” but states that Intelsat must hold an “IPO of securities.” Nevertheless, in the context of Inmarsat’s required IPO, which is also required under the ORBIT Act, FCC is currently reviewing this very issue—that is, whether the IPO must be an offering of equity securities. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 2000, the Congress passed the Open-market Reorganization for the Betterment of International Telecommunications Act (ORBIT Act) to help promote a more competitive global satellite services market. The ORBIT Act called for the full privatization of INTELSAT, a former intergovernmental organization that provided international satellite services. GAO agreed to provide federal officials' and stakeholders' views on (1) whether the privatization steps required by the ORBIT Act have been implemented and whether there were potential inconsistencies between ORBIT Act requirements and U.S. obligations made in international trade agreements; (2) whether access by global satellite companies to non-U.S. markets has improved since the enactment of the ORBIT Act and, if so, to what is this generally attributed; and (3) if any market access problems remain, what role does the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) have in addressing those problems under the ORBIT Act.
What GAO Found
Most of INTELSAT's privatization steps have taken place and a variety of stakeholders told us that implementation of the ORBIT Act was not inconsistent with the commitments that the United States made in international trade agreements. In July 2001, INTELSAT transferred its satellite and financial assets to a private company. FCC determined that this and other actions satisfied the ORBIT Act requirements for INTELSAT's privatization but noted that the company must hold an initial public offering (IPO) of securities by a required date. The current deadline for the IPO is June 30, 2005. Because Intelsat has not completed the IPO, some satellite companies assert that privatization is not fully complete. Some parties have pointed out that there was a possibility that implementation of the ORBIT Act could have given rise to action arguably inconsistent with commitments that the United States made in international trade agreements. However, we were told that actual implementation avoided such outcomes and no disputes arose. Most stakeholders and experts that GAO spoke with believe that access to non-U.S. satellite markets has improved, but few attribute this improvement to the ORBIT Act. These stakeholders and experts said that global trade agreements, such as the WTO's basic telecommunications commitments, and the global trend towards privatization of telecommunications companies have improved access in non-U.S. markets. Several stakeholders and experts told GAO that improvements in market access were already underway when the Congress passed the ORBIT Act and that the act has complemented ongoing trends towards more open satellite markets. Some satellite companies report continuing market access problems, but there are disagreements regarding whether FCC should investigate and resolve these problems. Some satellite companies that GAO spoke with report problems with access to non-U.S. satellite markets, which they attribute to countries with policies that favor domestic and regional satellite companies, countries exercising control over content, bureaucratic processes in various countries, and long-term business relationships between INTELSAT and various telecommunications companies. Most companies GAO spoke with report that Intelsat does not take active steps to acquire preferential or exclusive market access, and Intelsat itself stated that it does not seek nor, if offered, would accept preferential market access. Finally, some companies suggest that FCC should take a more proactive role in investigating market access problems, rather than assuming an adjudicative role. FCC said that evidence provided to the agency has not been sufficient to warrant action and also suggested that trade disputes are more appropriately addressed by the United States Trade Representative. |
gao_GAO-11-448T | gao_GAO-11-448T_0 | DHS Has Ended the SBInet Program But Not the Contract or Key Technology Capability Which Users Consider Useful
After an internal assessment initiated in January 2010, the Secretary of Homeland Security announced in January 2011 that she had directed CBP to end the SBInet program as originally conceived. According to DHS, the Secretary’s decision was informed by an independent analysis of cost- effectiveness, a series of operational tests and evaluations, and Border Patrol input. In addition, the Secretary’s decision to end the SBInet program limited Block 1 deployments to the Tucson and Ajo stations in the Tucson Sector, but did not affect the current SBInet Block 1 capability, which was developed based on updated requirements from the Border Patrol. The Block 1 capability consists of 15 sensor towers (with day/night cameras and radar) and 10 communication towers, which transmit surveillance signals to the Common Operating Pictures (COP) at station command centers. Alternative (Southwest) Border Technology Is Slated for Deployment, but Cost- and Operational Effectiveness and Suitability of the Integrated Fixed Tower System Are Not Yet Clear
DHS is implementing a new approach for acquiring and deploying border security technology called “Alternative (Southwest) Border Technology” to replace the SBInet program. As part of this approach DHS is to deploy a mix of technologies, including RVSS, MSS, and hand-held equipment for use by Border Patrol agents. It also is to include a new Integrated Fixed Tower system that is slated for deployment along the border where the Border Patrol deems it appropriate, beginning with five high-risk areas in Arizona at an estimated cost of $570 million. However, due to the questions we have about how the Analysis of Alternatives (AOA) analyses and conclusions were factored into planning and budget decisions, the basis for DHS’s technology deployment plan is not yet clear. Further, the results of independent analyses were not complete at the time of the Secretary’s decision to end the SBInet program, thus any results on SBInet’s operational effectiveness could not inform the decisions to proceed with a possibly similar Integrated Fixed Tower system. According to OTIA and Border Patrol officials, depending on the availability of funding, the deployments of the Integrated Fixed Tower system component of the Arizona technology plan are expected to begin around March 2013 and be completed by the end of 2015 (or possibly early 2016), with other sector deployments sequentially following the Arizona sector. In this regard, the President’s fiscal year 2012 DHS budget request for BSFIT calls for $242 million to fund the first three Integrated Fixed Tower system deployments for Arizona, which include 36 sensor towers. DHS Has Initiated Actions to Acquire an Integrated Fixed Tower System Capability
In one of its first actions following the Secretary of Homeland Security’s announcement to end SBInet, DHS issued a Request for Information (RFI) in January 2011 to industry regarding the commercial availability of surveillance systems based on the Integrated Fixed Tower system concept, consistent with its stated intent to acquire future border technologies in its new plan through full and open competitions. In February 2011, DHS conducted an “Industry Day” to provide potential vendors with a better understanding of Border Patrol’s technology needs on the southwest border and collect information about potential capabilities. As we continue our work for the committee, we plan to examine each of the following areas in detail to obtain additional insights into DHS’s decision making regarding the cost-effectiveness of a range of border technology options. Specifically, It is not clear how DHS used the AOA results to determine the appropriate technology plans for Arizona. Further, we have questions about how the AOA analyses and conclusions were factored into planning and budget decisions regarding the optimal mix of technology deployments in Arizona. Specifically, according to OTIA and Border Patrol officials, the AOA was used to develop the Arizona technology deployment plan and related procurement plans and to provide cost data to be used for the Border Patrol’s operational assessment and the fiscal year 2012 budget request for Integrated Fixed Tower systems. Independent Evaluation of Test Results to Determine Operational Effectiveness and Suitability Not Yet Completed
The Army Test and Evaluation Command (ATEC) was to independently test SBInet’s Block 1 capability and evaluate the results to determine its operational effectiveness and suitability (i.e., the extent to which the system fits it its operational environment and is useful to Border Patrol to meet the agency’s mission). This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. | Why GAO Did This Study
Securing the nation's borders from illegal entry of aliens, contraband, terrorists and weapons of mass destruction, is a long-term challenge. In November 2005, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) launched the Secure Border Initiative network (SBInet)--a program which was to provide the Border Patrol, within DHS's U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), with the tools to detect breaches and make agent deployment decisions by installing surveillance systems along the border. Alternative (Southwest) Border Technology is DHS's new plan to deploy a mix of technology to protect the border. This testimony is based on GAO's ongoing work conducted for the House Committee on Homeland Security and provides preliminary observations on (1) the status of SBInet and user views on its usefulness, and (2) the Alternative (Southwest) Border Technology plan and associated costs. GAO reviewed planning, budget, and system documents, observed operations along the southwest border, and interviewed DHS officials.
What GAO Found
In January 2011, the Secretary of Homeland Security directed CBP to end the SBInet program as originally conceived because it did not meet cost-effectiveness and viability standards, and to instead focus on developing terrain- and population-based solutions utilizing existing, proven technology, such as camera-based surveillance systems, for each border region. According to DHS, the Secretary's decision on SBInet was informed by (1) an independent analysis of alternatives (AOA) to determine the program's cost-effectiveness; (2) a series of operational tests and evaluations by the U.S. Army's Test and Evaluation Command (ATEC) to determine its operational effectiveness and suitability; and (3) an operational assessment by the Border Patrol to provide user input. The Secretary also stated that while the Alternative (Southwest) Border Technology plan should include elements of the former SBInet program where appropriate, she did not intend for DHS to use the current contract to procure any technology systems under the new plan, but rather would solicit competitive bids. SBInet's current surveillance capability continues to be used in Arizona. Specifically, there are 15 sensor towers (with cameras and radar) and 10 communication towers (which transmit the sensor signals to computer consoles for monitoring), currently deployed in the Border Patrol's Tucson Sector. In addition, on the basis of user feedback, the Border Patrol considers the current SBInet capability to be useful, including providing continuous surveillance in border areas where none existed before and enhancing agent safety when responding to potential threats. There are certain shortcomings including coverage gaps and radar performance limitations in adverse weather. The Alternative (Southwest) Border Technology plan is to incorporate a mix of technology, including an Integrated Fixed Tower surveillance system similar to that used in the current SBInet capability, beginning with high-risk areas in Arizona. But, due to a number of reasons, the cost-effectiveness and operational effectiveness and suitability of the Integrated Fixed Tower system is not yet clear. First, the AOA cited a range of uncertainties, and it is not clear how the AOA analyses and conclusions were factored into planning and budget decisions regarding the optimal mix of technology deployments in Arizona. Second, the ATEC independent analyses were not complete at the time of the Secretary's decision, thus any results on SBInet's operational effectiveness and suitability could not inform the decisions to proceed with the Integrated Fixed Tower system. The President's fiscal year 2012 budget request calls for $242 million to fund three of five future deployments of the Integrated Fixed Tower systems in Arizona, although, depending on funding, the earliest DHS expects the deployments to begin is March 2013 with completion anticipated by 2015 or later. Consistent with its intent to solicit competitive bids, CBP has initiated a new acquisition cycle, asking industry for information about the commercial availability of the Integrated Fixed Tower system. GAO will continue to assess this issue and report the final results later this year.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is not making any new recommendations in this statement but has made prior recommendations to strengthen SBInet. While DHS generally agreed most information in this statement, it did not agree with GAO's observations on the AOA and the potential usefulness of ATEC's analyses. GAO continues to believe its observations are valid. DHS also provided technical comments which were incorporated, as appropriate. |
gao_GAO-03-657 | gao_GAO-03-657_0 | Title XI was created to help promote growth and modernization of the U.S. merchant marine and U.S. shipyards by enabling owners of eligible vessels and shipyards to obtain long-term financing on terms and conditions that might not otherwise be available. MARAD Has Not Fully Complied with Some Key Title XI Program Requirements
MARAD has not fully complied with some key Title XI program requirements. We found that MARAD generally complied with requirements to assess an applicant’s economic soundness before issuing loan guarantees. While realizing that MARAD does not operate for profit, it could benefit from the internal control practices employed by the private sector to more effectively utilize its limited resources and to enhance its ability to accomplish its mission. Also, MARAD may not have the resources to properly implement credit reform. If the overall pattern of recent default and recovery experiences were to continue, MARAD would have significantly underestimated the costs of the program. Consequently, the Title XI program could be vulnerable to waste, fraud, abuse, and mismanagement. Specifically, to better comply with Title XI loan guarantee program requirements and manage financial risk, MARAD should establish a clear separation of duties among the loan application, project monitoring, and default management functions; establish a systematic process that ensures independent judgments of the technical, economic, and financial soundness of projects during loan guarantee approval; establish a systematic process that ensures the findings of each contributing office are considered and resolved prior to approval of loan guarantee applications involving waivers and exceptions made to program requirements; systematically monitor and document the financial condition of borrowers and link the level of monitoring to the level of project risk; base the borrower’s equity down payment requirement on a reasonable estimate of the total cost of the project, including total guarantee fees expected to be incurred over the life of the project; make apparent the amount of equity funds a shipowner or shipyard owner establish a system of controls, including automated controls, to ensure that disbursements of loan funds are not made prior to a shipowner or shipyard owner meeting the equity fund requirement; create a transparent, independent, and risk-based process for verifying and documenting the progress of projects under construction prior to disbursing guaranteed loan funds; review risk ratings of loan guarantee projects at least annually; and establish minimum requirements for the management and disposition of defaulted assets, including a requirement for an independent evaluation of asset value. In addition, MARAD did not appropriately incorporate these higher default rates and lower recovery rates into its cash flow models. To determine how MARAD’s practices of managing financial risk compare to those of selected private-sector maritime lenders, we interviewed two leading worldwide maritime lenders, and one leading maritime lender in the Gulf Coast region. To assess MARAD’s implementation of credit reform, we analyzed MARAD’s subsidy cost estimation and reestimation processes and examined how the assumptions MARAD uses to calculate subsidy cost estimates compare to MARAD’s actual program experience. | Why GAO Did This Study
Title XI of the Merchant Marine Act of 1936, as amended, is intended to help promote growth and modernization of the U.S. merchant marine and U.S. shipyards by enabling owners of eligible vessels and shipyards to obtain financing at attractive terms. The program has committed to guarantee more than $5.6 billion in ship construction and shipyard modernization costs since 1993, but it has experienced several large-scale defaults over the past few years. Because of concerns about the scale of recent defaults, GAO was asked to (1) determine whether MARAD complied with key program requirements, (2) describe how MARAD's practices for managing financial risk compare to those of selected private-sector maritime lenders, and (3) assess MARAD's implementation of credit reform.
What GAO Found
The Maritime Administration (MARAD) has not fully complied with some key Title XI program requirements. While MARAD generally complied with requirements to assess an applicant's economic soundness before issuing loan guarantees, MARAD did not ensure that shipowners and shipyard owners provided required financial statements, and it disbursed funds without sufficient documentation of project progress. Overall, MARAD did not employ procedures that would help it adequately manage the financial risk of the program. MARAD could benefit from following the practices of selected private sector maritime lenders. These lenders separate key lending functions, offer less flexibility on key lending standards, use a more systematic approach to loan monitoring, and rely on experts to estimate the value of defaulted assets. With regard to credit reform implementation, MARAD uses a simplistic cash flow model to calculate cost estimates, which have not reflected recent experience. If this pattern of recent experience were to continue, MARAD would have significantly underestimated the cost of the program. MARAD does not operate the program in a businesslike fashion. Consequently, MARAD cannot maximize the use of its limited resources to achieve its mission, and the program is vulnerable to fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement. Also, because MARAD's subsidy estimates are questionable, Congress cannot know the true costs of the program. |
gao_GAO-09-934 | gao_GAO-09-934_0 | Special rules may exist that tax certain shareholders, such as a parent corporation, currently on the income of certain subsidiaries in order to protect the domestic tax base. Study Countries Vary in the Types of Foreign-Source Income Exempted from Domestic Tax and in the Rules Governing Those Exemptions
Our study countries—Australia, Canada, France, Germany, and the Netherlands—have hybrid tax systems that exempt some types of foreign- source income and tax others. In general, these rules are intended to protect the domestic tax base by preventing taxpayers from avoiding domestic tax on passive or other specific types of income by moving to or holding these types of income in a foreign country. Study Countries Face Areas of Compliance Risk and Burden Known to Exist in the United States
Differences in tax rates across countries and differences in the taxation of different types of income may create incentives to avoid tax by shifting income from a high tax jurisdiction to a lower taxed jurisdiction or by converting income from a taxable type to tax-exempt type. Tax experts identified four areas as sources of compliance risk or taxpayer compliance burden in our study countries. Similarly, many business representatives said complying with transfer pricing rules was often the most burdensome aspect of international taxation. The changing nature of international trade, particularly the growing trade in intangibles, is making international transactions more susceptible to transfer pricing abuse. All Study Countries Use Advanced Pricing Agreements to Address Compliance Risks
All of the study countries have developed advanced pricing agreement (APA) programs that allow taxpayers and tax agencies to resolve transfer pricing issues before tax returns are filed and without the need for time consuming and expensive audits. While the Netherlands does not have specific CFC rules, taxpayers and tax officials stated that the compliance burden associated with other anti- avoidance rules can be significant. Exemption of Foreign- Source Income Reduces the Need for Foreign Tax Credits, but They Can Still Serve as a Compliance Risk
The study countries all have FTC systems; however, according to both tax agency officials and tax practitioners FTCs play less of a role in these countries than in the United States because of the extent to which foreign- source income is exempt. For exempt income, taxpayers do not have to track and report foreign taxes paid. Some tax experts that we spoke to generally agreed that tracing would be ineffective. Study Countries and the United States Do Not Regularly Report Basic Information about the Revenues Generated by Taxing Foreign-Source Corporate Income
In addition to lacking data about compliance and compliance burden for their foreign tax rules, our study countries lack data on the amount of tax revenues generated from the foreign activities of domestic corporations. This is also the case for the United States. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of this report were to (1) describe, for select case study countries that take a territorial approach, what types of foreign-source income the countries exempt and the rules governing those exemptions; and (2) describe, to the extent information is available, the compliance risks and taxpayer compliance burdens that the taxation of foreign-source corporate income presents for each of these countries. We collected and analyzed data on the countries and their systems for taxing foreign-source corporate income, including tax policies, administrative mechanisms, compliance activities, and taxpayer reporting and documentation requirements. Contemporaneous documentation required for cross border, related party transactions. | Why GAO Did This Study
A debate is underway about how the United States should tax foreign-source, corporate income. Currently, the United States allows domestic corporations to defer tax on the earnings of their foreign subsidiaries and also gives credits for foreign taxes paid, while most other developed countries exempt the active earnings of their multinational corporations' foreign subsidiaries from domestic tax. The debate has focused on economic issues with little attention to tax administration. GAO was asked to describe for a group of study countries with exemption systems: (1) the rules for exempting foreign-source income, and (2) the compliance risk and taxpayer compliance burden, such as recordkeeping, of the rules. The study countries, selected to provide a range of exemption systems, are Australia, Canada, France, Germany, and the Netherlands. For these countries GAO reviewed documents; interviewed government officials, academic experts, and business representatives; and compared tax policies, compliance activities and taxpayer reporting requirements.
What GAO Found
The study countries exempt some corporate income, such as dividends received from foreign subsidiaries, from domestic tax. However, the study countries tax other types of foreign-source income such as royalties. Multinational corporations present a compliance risk because they can use subsidiaries to convert taxable income into tax-exempt or lower taxed income, eroding the domestic tax base. Although quantitative estimates of noncompliance do not exist, tax experts interviewed by GAO identified sources of compliance risk and taxpayer burden in each of the study countries. These issues, particularly the ones below, have also been identified as sources of compliance risk and burden in the United States. Transfer prices--the prices for transactions between related parties--can be manipulated to shift profits. Tax experts in the study countries said the growing importance of intangible property such as trademarks and patents is making international transactions more susceptible to transfer pricing abuse. In response, the study countries have all increased their scrutiny of transfer prices, including increased demands for documentation and more audits, resulting in increased compliance burden for taxpayers. Cooperative efforts between taxpayers and tax agencies to reduce audits, such as Advanced Pricing Agreements, received mixed reviews in the study countries. Anti-avoidance rules prevent taxpayers from moving passive income (interest and royalties are often passive income) to a foreign subsidiary in order to avoid domestic tax. Generally, the rules make such passive income, even if moved, taxable. Tax agencies and taxpayers reported difficulties in obtaining information from other countries to make complex determinations about whether the anti-avoidance rules apply or not. The United States does not report taxes paid on foreign-source income. Treasury officials said it would be feasible to do so. Such reporting would make more explicit the role international tax rules play in raising revenues and protecting the domestic tax base. All experts we spoke with on this topic agreed. |
gao_GAO-10-311 | gao_GAO-10-311_0 | Significant Adjustments Made to Missile Defense in Fiscal Year 2009
The new administration proposed significant changes to the BMDS program in 2009 including program terminations and changes to some of the BMDS elements we reported on in the past, as well as changes to plans for missile defense in Europe. This rebalancing included shifting technology development efforts from boost-phase intercept technologies to early intercept technologies (or ascent phase). Progress Made in Fiscal Year 2009
In fiscal year 2009, MDA achieved several noteworthy accomplishments. For example, MDA revised its testing approach to better align tests with modeling and simulation needs and is undertaking a new targets development effort to resolve long-standing problems supplying sufficient and reliable targets. The agency also demonstrated increased levels of performance for some of its BMDS elements through flight and ground testing. MDA testing achievements during the year indicate an increased level of interoperability among multiple elements, improving both system- level performance and advancing the validation of BMDS models and simulations needed to predict performance. In addition, the agency delivered most of the assets as planned by the end of fiscal year 2009. MDA delivered 34 of these assets or 83 percent. Significant Challenges Remain in Developing the BMDS
While there was progress in addressing concerns about test planning and target development as well as in delivering assets, all BMDS elements experienced delays in conducting tests, were unable to accomplish all planned objectives, and experienced performance challenges. Poor target performance continued to be a problem causing several test delays and leaving several test objectives unfulfilled. The test problems also precluded the agency from gathering key knowledge through tests specified by the MDA Director that were originally planned to be completed in fiscal year 2008. MDA’s efforts to develop advanced algorithms and its efforts to demonstrate homeland defense were also affected by target issues. These shortfalls in testing continued to delay validation of the models and simulations used to assess the overall performance of the BMDS. Consequently, comprehensive assessments of the capabilities and limitations of the BMDS are still not possible. MDA also redefined its schedule baseline, eliminating goals for delivering integrated capabilities so we were not able to assess MDA’s progress in this key area. Since our first MDA report in 2004, we have repeatedly found that MDA’s approach for building its cost, schedule, and performance goals hindered transparency and limited accountability of the BMDS development effort. Since 2004, we have also made recommendations to develop baselines and report variances to those baselines to promote a higher level of transparency and accountability for the agency; to adjust its block strategy to ensure that it was knowledge-based and aligned with agency goals; and to strengthen oversight by, for example, having the Missile Defense Executive Board (MDEB) consider the extent to which MDA could adapt and adopt aspects of DOD’s standard acquisition policies to enhance oversight. For example, in 2007, the House Appropriations Committee directed MDA to “develop a system-wide plan to report according to the spirit of existing acquisition laws to improve accountability and transparency of its program.” More recently, in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, Congress required MDA to establish acquisition cost, schedule, and performance baselines for each system element that has entered the equivalent of the systems development and demonstration phase of acquisition or is being produced or acquired for operational fielding. MDA is not yet fully compliant with this requirement. New MDA Initiatives Provide Opportunity to Increase Transparency and Accountability
Although key controls and mechanisms needed to establish a sound acquisition process for MDA are still lacking, MDA has initiatives underway that could improve the transparency, accountability, and oversight of the acquisition of the BMDS. These initial steps are promising, but it will take time to fully implement them and once implemented they will need to be sustained and the tools consistently used in order to establish accountability. | Why GAO Did This Study
By law, GAO is directed to assess the annual progress the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) made in developing and fielding the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS). GAO also assessed MDA's progress toward improving accountability and transparency in agency operations, management processes, and its acquisition strategy. To accomplish this, GAO reviewed asset fielding schedules, test plans and reports, as well as pertinent sections of Department of Defense (DOD) policy to compare MDA's current level of accountability with that of other DOD programs. GAO's fiscal year 2009 assessment of MDA's cost, schedule, and performance progress is more limited than previous assessments because MDA removed key components of schedule and performance goals from its annual report of goals. In addition, though it had committed to, MDA did not report total cost estimates in 2009.
What GAO Found
Fiscal year 2009 was an unprecedented year of transition for MDA as it experienced its first change of administration, its third MDA Director, shifts in plans for missile defense in Europe as well as a shift in focus for technology development from intercepting missiles during the boost phase to the early intercept phase. Such changes present new challenges for MDA but also opportunities to strengthen acquisition approaches. (1) Progress: MDA achieved several accomplishments. For example, MDA revised its testing approach to better align tests with modeling and simulation needs and undertook a new targets development effort to resolve longstanding problems supplying sufficient and reliable targets. The agency also demonstrated increased levels of performance for some elements through flight and ground testing. Fiscal year 2009 testing indicates an increased level of interoperability among multiple elements, improving both system-level performance and advancing the BMDS models and simulations needed to predict performance. In addition, the agency delivered 83 percent of the assets it planned to deliver by the end of fiscal year 2009. (2) Challenges: While there was progress, all BMDS elements had delays in conducting tests, were unable to accomplish all planned objectives, and experienced performance challenges. Poor target performance continued to be a problem, causing several test delays and leaving several test objectives unfulfilled. The test problems also precluded MDA from gathering key knowledge and affected development of advanced algorithms and homeland defense. These test problems continued to affect the models and simulations used to assess the overall performance of the BMDS. Consequently, comprehensive assessments of its capabilities and limitations are still not possible. MDA also redefined its schedule baseline, eliminating goals for delivering integrated capabilities so we were not able to assess progress in this area. Despite these problems, MDA proceeded with production and fielding of assets. (3) Transparency, Accountability, and Oversight: In 2009, the significant adjustments MDA made to its acquisition approach--terminating the block structure; reducing, eliminating, or not reporting key baselines; and terminating its capability declaration process--and adjustments to the material reported to Congress reduced the transparency and accountability MDA had begun to build. However, MDA is beginning to implement several initiatives--including the adoption of key principles of DOD acquisition regulations--that could improve transparency and accountability and lay the foundation needed for oversight. If these initiatives are implemented in accordance with knowledge-based acquisition principles, an opportunity exits to improve the BMDS acquisition by ensuring MDA programs begin with realistic, transparent plans and baselines. While these initial steps hold promise, they will take time to fully implement and once implemented they will need to be sustained over time and consistently applied. |
gao_GAO-17-343 | gao_GAO-17-343_0 | TVA must charge rates for power that will produce gross revenues sufficient to provide funds for its costs including operating, administrative and maintenance costs. TVA Plans to Reduce about $4 Billion in Debt by Raising Rates, Limiting the Growth of Operating Expenses, and Reducing Capital Expenditures
To meet its goal to reduce its debt from about $26 billion in fiscal year 2016 to about $22 billion by fiscal year 2023, TVA plans to increase revenue through rate increases, limit the growth of operating expenses, and reduce capital expenditures. TVA’s plans assume the completion of capital projects will occur on time and within budget. TVA increased rates each fiscal year from 2014 through 2017. In fiscal year 2016, TVA’s O&M expenses totaled about $2.8 billion—a reduction of about 18 percent from $3.4 billion in fiscal year 2013. By completing construction of this unit in 2016, a key assumption underlying TVA’s debt reduction plans was met. Given historical trends in nuclear construction, TVA’s estimated capital costs may be optimistic and could increase. TVA Has Not Reported Required Performance Information on Its Debt Reduction Plans and Its Performance Goals Do Not Address Billions in Unfunded Pension Liabilities
TVA’s debt reduction plans and performance information are not reported in a manner consistent with GPRAMA requirements. TVA identifies managing debt and its unfunded pension liabilities as major management challenges but TVA has not reported required performance information in its annual performance plan or report on these challenges. Although TVA established a goal to reduce its debt, it has not documented in its annual performance plan or report strategies for how it will meet its goal, as required by GPRAMA, thereby reducing transparency and raising questions about how the agency will meet its goal. As of September 30, 2016, TVA’s pension plan was about 54 percent funded with a funding shortfall of about $6 billion (plan assets totaled $7.1 billion and liabilities $13.1 billion). While TVA’s debt has remained relatively flat, its unfunded pension liabilities have steadily increased over the past 10 years (see fig. Several Factors Could Affect TVA’s Ability to Meet Its Debt Reduction Goal, and No Mechanism Is in Place to Ensure TVA Addresses Unfunded Pension Liabilities
Several factors could affect TVA’s ability to meet its debt reduction goal, including regulatory pressures, changes in demand for electricity, technological innovations, or unforeseen events. Without a mechanism that ensures TVA’s contributions will adequately adjust for actual plan experience, unfunded liabilities could remain, and future ratepayers may have to fund the pension plan even further to pay for services provided to prior generations of ratepayers. TVA aims to eliminate $6 billion in unfunded pension liabilities within 20 years, according to TVA officials, but factors such as market conditions could affect TVA’s progress and no mechanism is in place to ensure the pension plan is fully funded. The TVARS Rules do not adjust TVA’s required contributions to ensure pension liabilities will be fully funded and TVA plans to contribute no more than the rules require and to defer the remaining pension liability. propose, and work with the TVARS board to adopt, funding rules designed to ensure the plan’s full funding. TVA neither agreed nor disagreed with our second recommendation. We continue to believe that the action we recommended is needed and, as discussed in the report, that the open amortization period used in the TVARS Rules to determine TVA’s minimum contribution requirement does not ensure TVA’s contributions will adequately adjust for plan experience and, therefore, does not ensure full funding of the pension liabilities. | Why GAO Did This Study
TVA, the nation's largest public power provider, is a federal electric utility with revenues of about $10.6 billion in fiscal year 2016. TVA's mission is to provide affordable electricity, manage river systems, and promote economic development. TVA provides electricity to more than 9 million customers in the southeastern United States. TVA must finance its assets with debt and operating revenues. TVA primarily finances large capital investments by issuing bonds but is subject to a statutorily imposed $30 billion debt limit. In fiscal year 2014, TVA established a debt reduction goal.
GAO was asked to review TVA's plans for debt reduction. This report examines (1) TVA's debt reduction goal, plans for meeting its goal, and key assumptions; (2) the extent to which TVA reports required performance information; and (3) factors that have been reported that could affect TVA's ability to meet its goal. GAO analyzed TVA financial data and documents and interviewed TVA and federal officials and representatives of stakeholder and industry groups.
What GAO Found
To meet its goal to reduce debt by about $4 billion—from about $26 billion in fiscal year 2016 to about $22 billion by fiscal year 2023—the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) plans to increase rates, limit the growth of operating expenses, and reduce capital expenditures. For example, TVA increased rates each fiscal year from 2014 through 2017 and was able to reduce operating and maintenance costs by about 18 percent from fiscal year 2013 to 2016. TVA's plans depend on assumptions that future capital projects will be completed on time and within budget, but TVA's estimated capital costs may be optimistic and could increase.
TVA's debt reduction plans and performance information are not reported in a manner consistent with the GPRA Modernization Act of 2010. Specifically, TVA identifies managing its debt and its unfunded pension liabilities as major management challenges but has not reported required performance information in its performance plans or reports on these challenges, thereby reducing transparency and raising questions about how it will meet its goal. As of September 30, 2016, TVA‘s pension plan was about 54 percent funded (plan assets totaled about $7.1 billion and liabilities $13.1 billion). While TVA's debt has remained relatively flat, its unfunded pension liabilities have steadily increased over the past 10 years, as shown below.
Tennessee Valley Authority's Debt and Unfunded Pension Liabilities, Fiscal Years 2006 through 2016
Several factors could affect TVA's ability to meet its debt reduction goal, including regulatory pressures, changes in demand for electricity, technological innovations, or unforeseen events. Also, TVA aims to eliminate its unfunded pension liabilities within 20 years, according to TVA officials. However, factors such as market conditions could affect TVA's progress, and no mechanism is in place to ensure it fully funds the pension liabilities if, for example, plan assets do not achieve expected returns. The TVA retirement system rules that determine TVA's required annual pension contributions do not adjust TVA's contributions to ensure full funding and TVA does not plan to contribute more than the rules require. Without a mechanism that ensures TVA's contributions will adequately adjust for actual plan experience, unfunded liabilities could remain and future ratepayers may have to fund the pension plan even further to pay for services provided to prior generations of ratepayers.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that TVA (1) better communicate its plans and goals for debt reduction and reducing unfunded pension liabilities in its annual performance plan and report and (2) take steps to have its retirement system adopt funding rules designed to ensure the pension plan's full funding. TVA agreed with the first recommendation and neither agreed nor disagreed with the second. GAO believes that action is needed as discussed in the report. |
gao_GAO-02-626 | gao_GAO-02-626_0 | Among the conditions State uses to determine hardship pay are poor medical facilities,substandard schools for children, severe climate, high crime, political instability, and physical isolation. Recently, State has begun recognizing the lack of spousal employment opportunities as another factor in determining hardship. Our discussions with former and current ambassadors, senior post officials, and the regional bureaus indicate that this is a widespread problem that weakens diplomatic programs and management controls and impedes posts’ ability to carry out U.S. foreign policy objectives effectively. While Foreign Service employees are expected to be available to serve worldwide, few bid on positions at some hardship posts, and very few— excluding junior officers, whose assignments are directed—are forced to take assignments they have not bid on. Without a comprehensive, strategic approach to marshaling and managing State’s human capital, there is little assurance that State will be able to place the right people in the right posts at the right time. Recommendations for Executive Action
In light of our findings that State’s assignment system has not been effective in addressing staffing requirements at hardship posts, including many of strategic importance, we recommend that the Secretary of State: improve personnel and assignment data so that they will (1) allow State to fully assess its human capital capabilities and limitations and enhance the department’s workforce planning efforts, and (2) enable State to take a fact-based, performance-oriented approach to human capital management that would involve analyzing bidding and assignment data to determine its success in addressing staffing needs at all posts, including hardship posts and posts of strategic importance to the United States; rigorously and systematically determine priority positions that must be filled worldwide as well as positions that will not be filled during each assignments cycle, based on the relative strategic importance of posts and positions and realistic assumptions of available staff resources; consider a targeted hiring strategy, with measurable goals, designed to specifically address critical shortfalls, such as employees who are proficient in certain foreign languages; are interested in those particular positions, functional specialties, or career tracks that are in short supply; and are interested in serving in hardship locations; and develop a package of incentives and implement appropriate actions to steer employees toward serving at hardship posts. Our recommendations, if implemented, would help ensure that the staffing needs of hardship posts, including those critical to U.S. interests, are met. Hardship Burden
To measure how the hardship burden is shared by Foreign Service employees (fig. | What GAO Found
Foreign service employees often experience difficult environmental and living conditions while assigned to U.S. embassies and consulates that are designated as "hardship posts." These conditions include inadequate medical facilities, few opportunities for spousal employment, poor schools, high levels of crime, and severe climate. Because the State Department is understaffed, both in terms of the number and types of employees, it is difficult to ensure that it has the right people in the right place at the right time. The impact of these staffing shortfalls is felt most strongly at hardship posts, some of which are of strategic importance to the United States. As a result, diplomatic programs and management controls at hardship posts could be vulnerable and the posts' ability to carry out U.S. foreign policy objectives effectively could be weakened. State's assignment system is not effectively meeting the staffing needs of hardship posts. Although American Foreign Service employees are obligated to serve anywhere in the world, State rarely directs employees to serve in locations for which they have not shown interest by bidding on a position. Because few employees bid on these positions, State has difficulty filling them. |
gao_GAO-08-1061T | gao_GAO-08-1061T_0 | Navy Unlikely to Execute DDG 1000 Program within Current Cost and Schedule Estimates
The DDG 1000 program has from the onset faced a steep challenge framed by demanding mission requirements, stealth characteristics, and a desire to reduce manning levels by more than half that of predecessor destroyers. However, notwithstanding these efforts, significant challenges remain in developing the ship’s design and a number of key components—in particular, the deckhouse, volume search radar, and the integrated power system. Although the initial phases of the design are complete, the shipbuilders will be pressed to complete a large amount of design work by October 2008 when lead ship construction begins. To maintain the start of ship construction in 2008 while continuing to develop the ship’s technologies, the Navy recently realigned the program’s schedule. As a result, the integrated power system will not be demonstrated until a year after the power systems have been produced and installed on the two lead ships—an approach that increases exposure to cost and schedule risk in production. As a result of changes in the software development schedule, the Navy eliminated this margin. DDG 1000 Costs Likely to Exceed Budget
Costs of the DDG 1000 ships are likely to exceed current budgets. Program Execution Challenges Have Required the Navy to Make Trade-Offs In Its Long-Range Shipbuilding Goals
The challenges facing DDG 1000 are not unique among Navy shipbuilding programs nor to Department of Defense acquisition programs at large. Across the shipbuilding portfolio, the Navy has not been able to execute programs within cost and schedule estimates, which has, in turn, led to disruptions in its long-range construction plans. Because fleet requirements remain steady at 313 ships, the Navy must compensate for near term construction deferrals by increasing ship construction in the out-years. Achieving this plan, however, will require significant funding increases in the future, which will likely be difficult to obtain. These near term trade-offs could have long- term consequences for balancing mission, presence, industrial base, and manning tensions. The Navy Consistently Underestimates the Effort Required to Successfully Execute Its New Shipbuilding Programs
Cost growth and schedule delays are persistent problems for shipbuilding programs as they are for other weapon systems. 1 and 2). LCS is a recent example. Future success in shipbuilding depends on understanding why the weaknesses in the DDG 1000 business case, which now seem to threaten the program, did not prompt a similar re-examination several years ago. Over time, the business case for DDG 1000 eroded. The primary mission of DDG 1000—and the foundation for its business case— was land attack. The reconsideration of the DDG 1000 buy reflects poorly on the requirements, acquisition, and funding processes that produced the ship’s business case. Unless some attempt is made to examine the root causes of decisions that hope for the best and result in poor outcomes, shipbuilding programs seem destined to the same fate: despite the best efforts to manage, the scope of the program will outstrip the cost and schedule budget. This examination must begin with an honest self-appraisal of what each player in the shipbuilding acquisition process demands of programs in terms of requirements, technologies, design, industrial base, quantities, and cost. GAO-08-13. Defense Acquisitions: Challenges Associated with the Navy’s Long-Range Shipbuilding Plan. | Why GAO Did This Study
The U.S. Navy is about to begin construction of the first Zumwalt-class destroyer (DDG 1000) amid considerable uncertainties and a high likelihood of cost and schedule growth. Significant cost growth and schedule delays are persistent problems that continue to compromise the Navy's shipbuilding goals. This testimony focuses on (1) the challenges faced by the DDG 1000 program and (2) the strain such challenges portend for long term shipbuilding plans.
What GAO Found
From the outset, DDG 1000 has faced a steep challenge framed by technical sophistication, demanding mission requirements, and a cost and schedule budget with little margin for error. The Navy has worked hard to manage the program within these competing goals. Yet recently, the Navy has discussed canceling construction of the remaining five DDG 1000 ships. Although a cancellation may stem from fiscal necessity, it reflects poorly on the acquisition, requirements, and funding processes that produced the DDG 1000 business case. Future success in shipbuilding depends on understanding why the weaknesses in the DDG 1000 business case, which now seem to threaten the program, did not prompt a similar re-examination several years ago. The current program of record faces significant execution risks. The Navy will be pressed to complete a large amount of design work in time for the start of construction in October 2008. Demonstration of key components--particularly, the deckhouse, the volume search radar, and the integrated power system--have fallen behind. Despite restructuring the construction schedule, margins between several major events are gone. For example, land-based tests of the integrated power system are now scheduled after installation on the lead ships. Software development has also proven challenging; the Navy certified the most recent software release before it met about half of its requirements. Further, the full costs of constructing the two lead ships have not been entirely recognized or funded. The complexity and unique features of DDG 1000, along with the design work, testing, and actual construction experience to come, make cost growth beyond budgeted amounts likely. The challenges confronted by DDG 1000 are not unique. Across the shipbuilding portfolio, executing programs within cost and schedule estimates remains problematic, largely because of unexecutable business cases that allow programs to start with a mismatch between scope and resources. Collectively, problems in individual programs erode the buying power of the Navy's long-range construction budget. The Navy compensates for near-term construction deferrals by increasing construction in the out-years, but this will require significant funding increases in the future, which are unlikely. Near-term tradeoffs could have long-term consequences for maintaining a rational balance between mission capability, presence, industrial base, and manning. The Navy's consideration of cutting the DDG 1000 program back comes after over 10 years of development and $13 billion have been invested. Clearly, changes are needed in how programs are conceptualized and approved. Although the elements needed for success are well known, unrealistic compromises are made to make business cases conform to competing demands. An examination of the root causes of unexecutable business cases must be done or shipbuilding programs will continue to produce unsatisfactory outcomes. This examination must begin with an honest appraisal of the competing demands made on new programs early in the acquisition process and how to strike a better balance between them. |
gao_GAO-05-416T | gao_GAO-05-416T_0 | IRS’s Budget Request Continues to Shift Priority from Taxpayer Service to Enforcement, but the Short- and Long-term Impacts on Taxpayers Are Unclear
IRS’s fiscal year 2006 budget request reflects a continuing shift in priorities by proposing reductions in taxpayer service and increases in enforcement activities. Because of budget constraints and the progress IRS has made improving the quality of taxpayer services, this is an opportune time to reconsider the menu of services IRS offers. IRS Is Proposing $39 Million Less for Taxpayer Service, but the Impact on Taxpayers Is Unclear
The budget request provides some detail on how IRS plans to absorb cost increases in the taxpayer service budget. Table 3 provides further detail on how IRS is proposing to reduce funding and resources for taxpayer service. Cuts in selected services could be offset by the new and improved services. In particular, the BSM program remains at high risk and has a long history of significant cost overruns and schedule delays. BSM is critical to supporting IRS’s taxpayer service and enforcement goals. Since our testimony before this subcommittee on last year’s budget request, IRS has deployed initial phases of several modernized systems under its BSM program. IRS has also identified, and is addressing, other major management challenges in areas such as requirements, contract, and program management. It is too early to tell what effect the budget reductions will ultimately have on the BSM program. However, the significant adjustments that IRS is making to the program to address these reductions are not without risk, could potentially impact future budget requests, and will delay the implementation of certain functionality that was intended to provide benefit to IRS operations and the taxpayer. There are risks associated with this decision. The BSM program is based on visions and strategies developed in 2000 and 2001. The age of these plans, in conjunction with the significant delays already experienced by the program and the substantive changes brought on by budget reductions, indicate that it is time for IRS to revisit its long- term goals, strategy, and plans for BSM. According to this official, IRS is redefining and refocusing the BSM program, and he expects this effort to be completed by the end of this fiscal year. Although progress has been made in implementing best practices in the development of the IT operations and maintenance budget, until these actions are completely implemented IRS will not be able to ensure that its request is adequately supported. So Far This Filing Season IRS Has Generally Maintained or Improved Performance, Including Telephone Accuracy, with Less Funding
Results to date show IRS has generally maintained or improved its 2005 filing season performance in key areas compared to last year despite a decrease in the 2005 budget for taxpayer service. However, because the filing season is not over, the extent to which IRS will achieve efficiency gains and the full impact of reductions on taxpayers in this or future filing seasons is not yet known. Although CSR level of service is about the same as last year, down one percentage point, there are other indications of slippage in telephone access. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has been shifting its priorities from taxpayer service to enforcement and its management of Business Systems Modernization (BSM) from contractors to IRS staff. Although there are sound reasons for these adjustments, they also involve risks. With respect to the fiscal year 2006 budget request, GAO assessed (1) how IRS proposes to balance its resources between taxpayer service and enforcement programs and the potential impact on taxpayers, (2) the status of IRS's efforts to develop and implement the BSM program, and (3) the progress IRS has made in implementing best practices in developing its Information Technology (IT) operations and maintenance budget. For the 2005 filing season, GAO assessed IRS's performance in processing returns and providing taxpayer service.
What GAO Found
IRS's fiscal year 2006 budget request of $10.9 billion proposes increased funding for enforcement, but reduced funding for taxpayer service and BSM. However, the potential impact of these changes on taxpayers in either the short- or long-term is unclear, because IRS has not provided details of proposed taxpayer service reductions, and although it is developing longterm goals, they are not yet finalized. Because of the proposed reductions and new and improved taxpayer services in recent years, this is an opportune time to examine the menu of services IRS provides. It may be possible to maintain the overall level of service to taxpayers by offsetting reductions in some areas with new and improved service in other areas. Taxpayers and IRS are seeing some payoff from the BSM program, with the deployment of initial phases of several modernized systems in 2004. Nevertheless, the BSM program continues to be high-risk, in part, because projects have incurred significant cost increases and schedule delays and the program faces major challenges in areas such as human capital and requirements management. As a result of budget reductions and other factors, IRS has made major adjustments. It is too early to tell what effect these adjustments will have on the program, but they are not without risk and could potentially impact future budgets. Further, the BSM program is based on strategies developed years ago, which, coupled with the delays and changes brought on by budget reductions, indicates that it is time for IRS to revisit its long-term goals, strategy, and plans for BSM. Because of these challenges, IRS is redefining and refocusing the BSM program. IRS has generally maintained or improved its filing season performance in 2005. Processing is more efficient, the accuracy of answers provided by telephone assistors is improved, and telephone access is relatively comparable to last year. This is particularly noteworthy, because IRS received less funding for taxpayer service in 2005 than it spent in 2004. Because the filing season is not over, the full impact on taxpayers and IRS operations is not yet known. However, there are indications of slippage in telephone access such as more abandoned calls and longer wait times. |
gao_GAO-13-760 | gao_GAO-13-760_0 | 1.) From 2002 to 2012, NIH Indirect Cost Reimbursements to Universities Increased Faster than for Direct Costs, with Most Going to a Small Number of Universities
From fiscal year 2002 to fiscal year 2012, NIH reimbursements to universities for indirect costs associated with NIH-funded extramural research increased at a slightly faster rate than those for direct costs, and during some portions of this period indirect cost growth increased notably faster than direct cost growth. Higher indirect cost rates tended to be associated with universities located in high-cost-of-living areas and privately owned universities. As a result, from fiscal year 2003 to 2012 indirect costs increased 16.9 percent, from about $3.9 billion to $4.6 billion, while direct costs increased 11.7 percent, from about $10.3 billion to $11.5 billion. 2 for more details on the annual change in costs.) For example, during the most recent 5 years (fiscal year 2008 to fiscal year 2012), NIH’s total funding for extramural research conducted at universities increased about 5 percent, whereas it had increased about 21 percent in the 5 previous years (fiscal year 2002 to fiscal year 2007). In 2012 the 50 Universities with the Largest Research Programs Received Most of the Indirect Cost Reimbursements
In fiscal year 2012, almost 70 percent of NIH indirect cost reimbursement to universities was provided to about 10 percent of the universities (50 of a total of about 500) receiving NIH funding for extramural research. Stakeholders Identified Factors Related to Facilities and Administrative Costs That May Increase Reimbursements for Indirect Costs, but NIH Has Not Assessed Their Potential Impact
Stakeholders—university officials, DCA officials, and others—whom we interviewed identified several key factors that may lead to increases in reimbursements for indirect costs provided to universities. They explained that reimbursements for the facilities component of indirect costs—such as the amount of reimbursable square footage, operations and maintenance, building depreciation, and interest costs—help to support research innovation by providing funding for the development and maintenance of state-of-the-art research facilities. DCA officials stated that the uncapped facilities component of the indirect cost rate provides universities few, if any, incentives for controlling these potentially increasing costs. For example, DCA officials noted that there is no limit on reimbursement for interest costs under the facilities component. DCA officials stated that while reimbursements for interest costs may allow universities to support needed renovations or construction of new facilities, the fact that these reimbursements are not capped may also encourage universities to borrow money to build new facilities, which could lead to the building of more new space than is necessary for research needs. Administrative Cap Controls Potential Increases in Cost Reimbursement due to Growth in Administrative Costs Incurred by Universities
Some stakeholders noted that while the cap on the reimbursement rate for administrative costs—26 percent—helps to control reimbursements for indirect costs, it does not account for the recent increases in administrative costs reportedly incurred by universities. Among research grants to universities specifically, NIH’s indirect costs are increasing at a faster rate than direct costs. NIH has not made plans for options that might address these trends—in part because it views increases in indirect costs as having been modest. However, indirect costs already represent one-fifth of NIH’s overall budget and about one-quarter of NIH’s budget for extramural research. NIH has experienced small but consistent increases in indirect costs, and factors suggest that indirect costs could increase more quickly over time in the future. Recommendation
To help address the uncertainty NIH faces related to the potential impact of increasing indirect costs on its funding of future research, we recommend that the Director of NIH assess the impact of growth in indirect costs on its research mission, including, as necessary, planning for how to deal with potential future increases in indirect costs that could limit the amount of funding available for total research, including the direct costs of research projects. HHS indicated that it agreed with our recommendation and that NIH had already taken steps to implement it, but HHS disagreed with a number of our conclusions. While the draft report acknowledged that indirect costs have remained a stable percentage of NIH’s overall research costs, it also noted that, for universities—which received almost two-thirds of NIH’s funding for extramural research—indirect costs increased notably faster than direct costs during some recent periods. We remain convinced that increases in indirect costs could have an effect over the long term on the number and size of research grants that could be funded, thus posing a risk to scientific discoveries and knowledge. At that time, we will send copies of this report to the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services, the Director of the National Institutes of Health, and other interested parties. | Why GAO Did This Study
NIH reimburses universities for both the direct and indirect costs of conducting research. Indirect costs cover general facility and administrative expenses, and are paid as a percentage, or rate, of certain direct costs of awarded grants. GAO was asked to look at the indirect costs of NIH-funded research. This report (1) identifies changes in reimbursements by NIH to universities for indirect costs of NIH-funded research; and (2) examines key factors affecting NIH reimbursement to universities for indirect costs and what assessment NIH has done to address any impact of these costs on NIH's research mission. GAO analyzed NIH data and interviewed officials at NIH, six universities, and other stakeholders. Universities were selected based on the number of grants and amount of funding received from NIH and their negotiated indirect cost rates.
What GAO Found
From fiscal year 2002 to fiscal year 2012, indirect cost reimbursements from the National Institutes of Health (NIH) to universities increased slightly faster than those for direct costs, but increased notably faster during some periods. Specifically, from fiscal years 2002 to 2012, indirect costs increased 28.1 percent while direct costs increased 27.0 percent. However, for the fiscal years 2003 to 2012, indirect costs increased notably faster than direct costs, at 16.9 percent and 11.7 percent, respectively. In more recent years, annual changes were generally small but consistent. This increase occurred during a time when growth in NIH's budget for extramural research slowed to 5 percent from fiscal years 2008 to 2012, compared to about 21 percent from fiscal years 2002 to 2007. In fiscal year 2012, about 10 percent of the universities (50 out of about 500) receiving NIH extramural research funding received almost 70 percent of all indirect cost reimbursement provided to universities. Higher indirect cost rates tended to be associated with universities located in high-cost-of-living areas and privately owned universities.
Stakeholders--university officials, Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) officials, and others--whom GAO interviewed identified several key factors that may lead to increases in reimbursements for indirect costs provided to universities. Some stakeholders reported that reimbursements for one part of indirect costs--the facilities component--help to support research innovation by providing funding for the development and maintenance of state-of-the-art research facilities. However, officials in HHS's Division of Cost Allocation, which is responsible for determining indirect cost rates, stated that the uncapped facilities component of the indirect cost rate provides universities with few, if any, incentives for controlling these costs. For example, these officials noted that there is no limit on reimbursement for interest costs under the facilities component. This may encourage universities to borrow money to build new facilities, which could lead to building more new space than is necessary for research. Some stakeholders also noted that a 26 percent cap on the reimbursement rate for administrative costs--a second component of indirect costs--helps to control reimbursements for those costs; however, they reported it does not account for the recent increases in costs, such as those for regulatory reporting requirements and changing research needs that require advanced medical and information technologies that are considered administrative.
The combination of these trends and factors results in indirect costs growing at a faster rate than direct costs. Indirect costs are one-fifth of NIH's total budget--or $6.2 billion in fiscal year 2012--but NIH officials reported that they have not taken steps to assess the significance of future indirect cost growth for universities, or planned for options that might address these trends or factors--in part because they view increases in indirect costs as having been modest. However, factors suggest that indirect costs could increase more quickly in the future. Over the long term, they could lead to a reduction in the number of research grants that could be funded, thus potentially affecting scientific discoveries and knowledge.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that NIH assess the impact of growth in indirect costs on its mission, including, as necessary, planning for how to deal with potential future increases in indirect costs that could limit the amount of funding available for total research. HHS agreed with GAO's recommendation but disagreed with a number of GAO's conclusions, stating that risk to NIH's mission is low because indirect costs remain a stable percentage of NIH's budget. Due to indications that indirect costs for universities may increase in the future, GAO believes that continually assessing and planning for the impact of growth over the long term is important. |
gao_GAO-16-88 | gao_GAO-16-88_0 | DOD’s First Strategy for Improving DOD Asset Visibility
In January 2014, DOD issued its Strategy for Improving DOD Asset Visibility. We discuss the status of these recommendations later in this report. DOD’s 2014 Strategy Fully Addresses Several of the Statutory Elements, and DOD’s 2015 Strategy and Implementation Plans Fully Address Most of the Remaining Elements
DOD’s 2014 Strategy and accompanying implementation plans fully address six and partially address five of the statutory elements set forth in the Fiscal Year 2014 National Defense Authorization Act; and DOD’s 2015 Strategy and accompanying implementation plans address additional information for most of the statutory elements, including fully addressing four of the five elements that were partially addressed in the 2014 Strategy. DOD has implemented 16 of its original 22 implementation plans and has identified in its 2015 Strategy new plans that link to the overarching goals and objectives in the 2015 Strategy. Specifically, the following 5 elements were partially addressed in the 2014 Strategy: (1) an estimate of the costs associated with executing the plan, and the sources and types of resources and investments required to meet the goals and objectives; (2) a description of key factors external to DOD and beyond its control that could significantly affect achievement of the long-term goals contained in the strategy; (3) steps to be undertaken to facilitate collaboration with industry designed to capture best practices, lessons learned, and any relevant technical matters; (4) a description of how improved asset tracking and in-transit visibility could enhance audit readiness, reduce counterfeit risk, enhance logistical processes, and otherwise benefit DOD; and (5) an operational security assessment designed to ensure that all DOD assets are appropriately protected during the execution of the strategy and implementation plan. In addition to assessing DOD’s 2014 Strategy and accompanying implementation plans to determine the extent to which DOD satisfied its mandate, we also reviewed DOD’s 2015 Strategy, which was issued in October 2015, to determine changes that had been made between 2014 and 2015. Officials from the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Supply Chain Integration told us that the components did not include the cost estimates for the three implementation plans, pointing out that the funding for these plans is embedded within the overall program funding and it is impossible for the components to estimate the portion of total program funding associated with the plans. In October 2015, officials stated that DOD plans to provide direction in the next annual update to the Strategy on how to explain and document these cases, although they commented that there will be cases where the components may not be able to isolate the costs associated with an implementation plan. However, it is not always clear what progress DOD has made against the original milestones set in its 2014 Strategy. DOD officials agreed that it is not clear what progress has been made in meeting the milestones for fiscal years 2013 and 2014 for updating the military services’ automated information systems and have added legends to the milestone charts and language in the Strategy to clarify the progress that has been made. We have previously concluded that milestones provide decision makers with the information they need to assess progress and estimate realistic completion dates. While DOD’s establishment of milestones for its IUID implementation efforts is a positive step, the utility of those milestones will be limited if it is unclear with each update of the Strategy what progress DOD has made in achieving its previous milestones and how that is affecting timelines in its 2015 Strategy. DOD Continues to Implement Many of the Initiatives Identified in Its 2014 Strategy, and Has Identified New Initiatives in Its 2015 Strategy While Linking Them to Its Overarching Goals and Objectives
Since issuing its 2014 Strategy, DOD has implemented 16 of its original 22 implementation plans included in its 2014 Strategy. The Strategy also contains overarching goals and objectives for improving asset visibility. By creating a clear link between the goals and objectives in the Strategy and the implementation plans intended to implement the Strategy, as well as identifying measures of performance and effectiveness, DOD should be better positioned to monitor progress toward the implementation of its plans and achievement of its overarching goals and objectives for asset visibility. Agency Comments
We are not making recommendations in this report. We provided a draft of this report to DOD for advance review and comment. DOD did not provide any comments to include in this report. Appendix II: Scope and Methodology
To assess the extent to which the Department of Defense (DOD) satisfied its mandate to provide Congress a comprehensive strategy for improving asset tracking and in-transit visibility that includes each of the 11 statutory elements, we reviewed DOD’s October 2014 Report to Congress on the Strategy to Improve Asset Tracking and In-Transit Visibility, which incorporated its January 2014 Strategy for Improving DOD Asset Visibility and accompanying implementation plans. To understand enhancements made to the 2014 Strategy, including any efforts to more fully address those elements that were partially addressed, we reviewed DOD’s 2015 Strategy and discussed with officials future plans for addressing those items not fully addressed in the 2015 Strategy. To determine what steps DOD has taken to incorporate industry best practices related to automated information and data-capture technologies and to implement Item Unique Identification (IUID), we reviewed DOD’s 2014 Strategy to identify the information DOD included about industry best practices and IUID. GAO-11-569. GAO-10-929T. | Why GAO Did This Study
DOD's 2014 Strategy states that to achieve a seamless and effective supply chain, DOD needs to have end-to-end visibility of its assets from acquisition to disposal and all points between. The Fiscal Year 2014 NDAA required DOD to submit to Congress a comprehensive strategy and plans for improving asset tracking and in-transit visibility, including 11 statutory elements that were specified in the mandate. The NDAA also included a provision that GAO assess the extent to which DOD's strategy and accompanying implementation plans include the 11 statutory elements; incorporate industry best practices related to automated information and data-capture technology; effectively execute DOD's IUID policies; and contain initiatives that align with DOD's overarching goals and objectives, and that have been implemented.
This report discusses the extent to which DOD's Strategy , plans and other documentation address the items specified by the mandate. GAO assessed DOD's 2014 Strategy and accompanying implementation plans submitted to Congress in response to the mandate, interviewed cognizant officials, and reviewed DOD's October 2015 Strategy.
What GAO Found
The Department of Defense's (DOD's) 2014 S trategy for Improving DOD Asset Visibility ( Strategy) and accompanying implementation plans fully address 6 of the 11 statutory elements required by the Fiscal Year 2014 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) and partially address the remaining 5. For example, the Strategy fully addressed asset visibility goals and objectives, and roles and responsibilities for overseeing its strategy, as required by the mandate. However, the Strategy did not fully address elements such as including an estimate of costs associated with executing its asset visibility implementation plans. In October 2015, DOD published its 2015 Strategy for Improving DOD Asset Visibility (2015 Strategy ) in which it more fully addressed 4 of the 5 elements that were partially addressed in the 2014 Strategy. For example, the 2015 Strategy fully addresses steps DOD is taking to facilitate collaboration with industry to capture best practices, as required by the mandate. However, with the 2015 Strategy , DOD has not fully addressed the cost estimates element for three of its 2014 implementation plans as GAO recommended in January 2015. DOD officials said that they did not include the cost estimates for three of the implementation plans because the funding for these plans was embedded within the overall program funding and in these cases components could not isolate detailed cost estimates. DOD officials said they plan to amend their guidance before the next update to the Strategy, expected in fall 2016, to instruct the components on how to explain and document such cases.
DOD has also taken other actions as GAO recommended in May 2012 that GAO was required to assess with respect to asset visibility. For example, DOD's 2014 Strategy established milestones for implementing Item Unique Identification (IUID) to better track assets. In its 2015 Strategy , DOD updated these milestones. However, it is not always clear what progress DOD has made against all of the milestones set in its 2014 Strategy . For example, the milestones associated with updating automated information systems in the 2015 Strategy do not reflect progress made to date for each of the military services. GAO has previously reported that milestones provide decision makers with the information they need to assess progress and estimate realistic completion dates. If the updates to the Strategy do not clarify what progress DOD has made in meeting its previous milestones, the utility of these milestones will be limited. Officials agreed and commented they plan to take further action in the next update to the Strategy to ensure that progress that has been made is more easily understood. Finally, DOD's 2014 Strategy contains 22 implementation plans, which outline initiatives intended to improve DOD's asset visibility. GAO reported in January 2015 that 6 of those 22 plans had been implemented but that it was not clear how the plans linked to the goals and objectives in the Strategy . Since it issued the 2014 Strategy , DOD has implemented an additional 10 of its original 22 implementation plans, and has added information to its 2015 Strategy linking each of the ongoing plans to the overarching goals and objectives in the 2015 Strategy . By creating a clear link between the goals and objectives in the Strategy and implementation plans, DOD should be better positioned to monitor progress toward the implementation of its initiatives and achievement of its overarching goals and objectives for asset visibility.
What GAO Recommends
GAO made recommendations to DOD in its prior work to strengthen asset visibility. DOD agreed and has taken or is planning on taking action to address them. Consequently, GAO is not making any new recommendations in this report. GAO provided a draft of this report to DOD for advance review and comment. DOD did not provide any comments to include in this report. |
gao_GAO-03-22 | gao_GAO-03-22_0 | Although they did not cite a specific percentage, they described shipments of undeclared dangerous goods as “very rare” and “a handful.” The numbers are believed to be similarly small for the Postal Service—officials estimated that declared dangerous goods represent less than one-tenth of 1 percent of their shipments, and the percentage of these shipments that is undeclared is “very small.” The Volpe Center reported in a 1999 threat assessment that undeclared dangerous goods shipments made up about 0.05 percent of the shipments of several large cargo carriers, but this estimate was based on the recollections of the carriers of how many incidents they typically report to RSPA. The Postal Service may inspect Parcel Post packages. The Federal Government Depends on Regulations, Research, and Outreach to Prevent Problems
Federal regulations provide a framework for transporting dangerous goods safely by air. Major Carriers Rely on Known Shipper Policies, Other Restrictions, Training, and Sanctions to Prevent Undeclared Shipments
To prevent undeclared dangerous goods shipments, major carriers limit their business to known shippers and may impose other restrictions. While the Postal Service cannot limit its business to known shippers, it accepts fewer dangerous goods for shipment than DOT authorizes to travel by air. Specifically, by requiring customers to bring packages that weigh 16 ounces or more to a post office for shipment, Postal Service employees can inspect packages, ask questions about their contents to determine whether they contain anything prohibited, and ensure proper handling for packages containing dangerous goods that may be mailed. Our analysis of FAA’s enforcement case files found that FAA is not always documenting its assessments. III for more information about FAA’s and DOT’s incident and enforcement databases.) Conclusions
Without statistically valid, generalizable data on the nature and frequency of undeclared dangerous goods in air transport, DOT does not know to what extent such goods pose a threat to aviation safety, or what resources should be allocated to address that threat. A change in the law requiring that shippers consent to the inspection of packages shipped by air might help to accomplish these objectives. However, the distinctions between air and the other modes that justify more stringent regulations for transporting dangerous goods by air, along with the potential benefits to aviation safety that could accrue from better data on undeclared air shipments, might warrant the development of a proposal that would enable DOT to obtain such data. Until it fully documents the reasons for its assessments, or for changes to its initial assessments, as its guidance requires, it cannot provide assurance that the penalties are appropriate or that it has handled similar cases consistently. Such a proposal would not only enhance FAA’s inspection authority but would also enable FAA to obtain statistically valid, generalizable data on the nature and frequency of undeclared air shipments of dangerous goods. Scope and Methodology
To determine what DOT, the Postal Service, and others involved in the air transport of dangerous goods know about undeclared shipments, we identified relevant studies and interviewed DOT, Postal Service, industry, and industry association officials. To determine what DOT and the Postal Service do to foster compliance with federal regulations for shipping dangerous goods by air, we interviewed agency officials and reviewed reports and documents. These enforcement data are used to monitor and enforce compliance with DOT’s dangerous goods regulations. | Why GAO Did This Study
When shipments of dangerous goods (hazardous chemical substances that could endanger public safety or the environment, such as flammable liquids or radioactive materials) are not properly packaged and labeled for air transport, they can pose significant threats because there is little room for error when something goes wrong in flight. To better understand the risks posed by improper ("undeclared") air shipments, we assessed what is known about their nature and frequency, what key mechanisms are in place to prevent their occurrence, and what the Department of Transportation (DOT) and the Postal Service do to enforce federal regulations for shipping dangerous goods by air.
What GAO Found
Little is known about the nature and frequency of undeclared shipments of dangerous goods. While major carriers and the Postal Service believe such shipments are rare, their belief is based mainly on inspections of problem shipments, such as those that leak. Statistically valid, generalizable data are not available and would be difficult to obtain, not only because more inspections would entail costly delays for carriers but also because Constitutional protections limit DOT's and the Postal Service's inspection authority. DOT is seeking greater authority to open potentially problematic shipments for inspection, but its efforts are not limited to air transport and would not enable DOT's Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to obtain statistically valid, generalizable data on the nature and frequency of undeclared air shipments. A change in the law requiring that shippers consent to the opening of packages for inspection might be appropriate for air transport and would enable FAA to obtain such data. FAA could then identify the resources and actions needed to address the problem. Federal regulations create a framework for transporting dangerous goods safely, and outreach to shippers and carriers helps to prevent undeclared shipments. Private industry does business primarily with "known shippers" (those that have shown they comply with the regulations). The Postal Service cannot restrict its business to known shippers, but it requires customers to bring packages weighing 16 ounces or more to a post office for screening. Carriers and the Postal Service both train their employees to screen for undeclared shipments. The Postal Service and FAA monitor and enforce compliance with federal regulations for transporting dangerous goods by air. However, the Postal Service cannot fine violators and seldom takes criminal action, since most violations are inadvertent. FAA's enforcement guidance calls for documenting the reasons for any changes in the fines its inspectors initially propose. GAO's review of enforcement case files indicates that the reasons for changes were not always documented. FAA attributes some changes to the results of penalty negotiations. Because FAA is not always following its guidance, it cannot ensure that its fines are appropriate or consistent. |
gao_GAO-06-692 | gao_GAO-06-692_0 | 1). As of March 2006, Russia had destroyed about 1,158 metric tons of blister agents, about 3 percent of its stockpile. Until destroyed, chemical weapons remain a proliferation threat. In addition, Congress has conditioned funding for the Shchuch’ye facility on the Secretary of Defense’s certification that, among other conditions, Russia has allocated at least $25 million to eliminating its chemical weapons and has developed a practical plan for destroying its chemical weapons stockpile. Construction Has Progressed, but Project Is behind Schedule and Faces Substantial Challenges
Since our last visit to the Shchuch’ye site in 2003, we found that Parsons and DOD had made progress in constructing the facility. However, key buildings had fallen behind schedule, affecting the facility’s overall cost and schedule. Furthermore, the failure of Parsons to develop and implement a usable EVM system has limited DOD’s efforts to oversee project schedule and cost. Since October 2005, Parsons has incurred costs for personnel salaries, rent, and transportation of more than $3 million per month, which will continue until the subcontract is awarded. The delay in awarding the contract for the remainder of Building 101 has impacted the overall schedule for completing the facility’s construction. Cost and Schedule Subject to Uncertain Progress of Russian Construction, an Unpredictable Russian Operating Environment, and System Testing Issues
The cost and schedule of the Shchuch’ye facility are subject to continuous risks. Parsons was expected to have a validated EVM system by March 2005. DOD has not yet conducted an IBR for the Shchuch’ye project and does not plan to do so until after Parsons awards the subcontract to complete Building 101, possibly in June 2006. In 2000, the Russian government spent about $16 million for chemical weapons destruction. needed to support the facility’s operations. The Russian government will need continued international assistance to complete destruction of its chemical weapons stockpile. The Russian government estimates it will need about $5.6 billion to eliminate its entire stockpile. Conclusion
Until destroyed, Russia’s stockpile of chemical weapons—especially nerve agents contained in small munitions, such as those stored at Shchuch’ye— remain a proliferation threat, vulnerable to diversion and theft. Although progress has been made on the physical construction of the facility over the past 3 years, DOD continues to encounter numerous challenges that affect the completion of the Shchuch’ye CWDF. Parsons’ EVM system, implemented to help manage the schedule and cost of the Shchuch’ye project, contains unreliable and inaccurate data; thus, DOD cannot use it as a management tool. Even with significant international assistance at Shchuch’ye and other destruction facility sites, the Russian government will likely fail to destroy its entire chemical weapons stockpile by the CWC extended deadline of 2012. We traveled to the Russian Federation to observe construction of the CTR- funded chemical weapons destruction facility at Shchuch’ye. | Why GAO Did This Study
Until destroyed, Russia's stockpile of chemical weapons remains a proliferation threat, vulnerable to theft and diversion. Since 1992, Congress has authorized the Department of Defense (DOD) to provide more than $1 billion for the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program to help the Russian Federation construct a chemical weapons destruction facility (CWDF) at Shchuch'ye to eliminate about 14 percent of its stockpile. Over the past several years, DOD has faced numerous challenges that have increased the estimated cost of the facility from about $750 million to more than $1 billion and delayed the facility's operation from 2006 until 2009. DOD has attributed the increase cost and schedule to a variety of factors. In this report, we (1) assess the facility's progress, schedule, and cost and (2) review the status of Russia's efforts to destroy all of its chemical weapons.
What GAO Found
Although DOD has made visible progress over the past 2 years in constructing the chemical weapons destruction facility at Shchuch'ye, it continues to face numerous challenges that threaten the project's schedule and cost. Primarily, key buildings on the site have fallen behind schedule due to difficulties working with Russian subcontractors. Such delays have been costing DOD more than $3 million per month since October 2005 and will continue until the award of a crucial subcontract, possibly in June 2006. Uncertain progress of Russian construction on the site, unpredictable Russian regulatory requirements, and various technical issues, such as testing the facility, could cause further schedule delays and increase costs. Also, DOD lacks a reliable earned value management (EVM) system to record, predict, and monitor the project's progress. DOD allocated $6.7 million to the project's contractor in September 2004 to establish an EVM system and expected to have a validated EVM system in place by March 2005. DOD cannot use the current EVM system to assess the final schedule and cost for completing the Shchuch'ye facility because it contains flawed and unreliable data. In addition, the contractor has not yet conducted an IBR of the Shchuch'ye project. Furthermore, it remains uncertain whether the Russian government can destroy its entire chemical weapons stockpile by the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) extended deadline of 2012. As of March 2006, Russia had destroyed about 3 percent of its 40,000 metric tons of chemical weapons at two completed destruction facilities. To eliminate the remainder of its chemical weapons over the next six years, the Russian government must construct and operate five additional destruction facilities, including Shchuch'ye. The Russian government has indicated that it will need continued international assistance to destroy the remaining stockpile. |
gao_GAO-11-698 | gao_GAO-11-698_0 | Among other things, the study recommended that SBA and participating agencies improve the collection of data that track participation in the SBIR program by businesses owned by disadvantaged individuals and women, develop targeted outreach to such businesses that is based on an analysis of factors that affect their participation, and improve documentation of commercialization success. Agencies Addressed SBIR’s Purposes through Solicitations, Technical Assistance, Matching Funds Programs, and Outreach
For fiscal years 2008 through 2011, the five participating agencies we reviewed addressed the SBIR purposes of using small business to meet federal R&D needs and stimulating technological innovation through their solicitations. To address the remaining program purpose—encouraging participation in technological innovation by small businesses owned by disadvantaged individuals and women—agencies relied mainly on outreach activities aimed at a broader audience. To provide the assistance, the agencies contracted with vendors and consultants who have experience in bringing technologies to market. With the exception of NASA, the agencies supported the technical assistance at least in part through the use of SBIR funds. Through matching funds programs, agencies provide additional SBIR funds to award recipients that obtain monetary commitments above certain thresholds from outside investors. Evaluation of the effectiveness of agencies’ outreach efforts is hindered by a lack of accurate and complete data. Comparable Data Are Not Available across Participating Agencies to Evaluate Progress in Increasing Commercialization of SBIR Technologies
SBA has not yet developed the government-use portion of its database for collecting comparable commercialization data on SBIR technologies, but it is taking steps to do so. In the interim, agencies have, for their own purposes, independently gathered commercialization data that are not comparable; the accuracy of these data is largely unknown. SBA officials told us that they have worked with participating agencies to develop common metrics for commercialization data, as well as a standardized data collection instrument that will accommodate the various types of SBIR technologies the agencies fund to meet their different missions. Other agencies, such as DOD, may continue to require applicants and recipients to submit commercialization data directly to the agencies, which would then upload the data into the database. While SBA has worked with SBIR agencies to identify best practices in other areas of SBIR program management, it has not identified best practices for agencies to use in verifying the accuracy of commercialization data. Conclusions
DOD, DOE, NASA, NIH, and NSF have designed their SBIR solicitations to address the program’s purposes of using small businesses to meet federal R&D needs, stimulating technological innovation, and increasing commercialization of innovations derived from federal R&D efforts, and they have further addressed commercialization by providing technical assistance or matching funds to award recipients. DOD has adopted practices for verifying the accuracy of commercialization data it collects from prior award recipients, but most of the participating agencies we reviewed did not verify the accuracy of commercialization data from their prior award recipients, and SBA has not identified best practices for participating agencies to use in doing so. Recommendations for Executive Action
To build upon efforts to implement a government-use database for program evaluation, we recommend that the Administrator of the Small Business Administration work with participating SBIR agencies to take the following two actions: collect data on the number of applications submitted by small businesses owned by disadvantaged individuals and women, and identify best practices for verifying the accuracy of data related to progress in increasing commercialization. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
In conducting this study, we reviewed Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) program-related activities of the Small Business Administration (SBA) and 5 of the 11 SBIR participating agencies—the Department of Defense (DOD), Department of Energy, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Department of Health and Human Services’ National Institutes of Health (NIH), and National Science Foundation (NSF). | Why GAO Did This Study
Federal agencies with a budget of at least $100 million for research and development (R&D) conducted by others must participate in the Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) program. SBIR has four purposes: meet federal R&D needs; stimulate technological innovation; increase commercialization (e.g., sales) of innovations based on federal R&D; and encourage participation in innovation by small businesses owned by disadvantaged individuals and women. The Small Business Administration (SBA) oversees the efforts of participating agencies, which make awards to small businesses using SBIR funds. Congress directed SBA to develop a database with commercialization data for government use in evaluating the program. GAO was asked to determine (1) how agencies have addressed SBIR's purposes and (2) the extent of data available to evaluate progress in increasing commercialization. GAO analyzed program documents and interviewed officials at SBA and five agencies that accounted for about 96 percent of SBIR awards.
What GAO Found
For fiscal years 2008 through 2011, the participating agencies GAO reviewed--the Department of Defense (DOD), the Department of Energy (DOE), the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, the Department of Health and Human Services' National Institutes of Health, and the National Science Foundation (NSF)--addressed SBIR's purposes through solicitations for award applications, technical assistance or matching funds programs, and outreach. In particular, the agencies addressed SBIR purposes related to meeting federal R&D needs and stimulating technological innovation through their solicitations, which included research topics that were designed to meet agencies' respective R&D or mission needs. Agencies also addressed commercialization of innovations through solicitations, as well as through technical assistance for award recipients or through matching funds programs. To provide technical assistance, the agencies contracted with vendors and consultants for help in developing business plans and identifying potential customers for SBIR award recipients, among other things. Agency matching funds programs provided additional SBIR funds to award recipients that obtained commitments from outside investors. Agencies generally addressed the remaining SBIR purpose, encouraging participation by small businesses owned by disadvantaged individuals and women, through outreach activities aimed at a broader audience, such as sharing information on Web sites. However, the effectiveness of these efforts is difficult to evaluate, in part because SBA does not collect data on the number of SBIR applications submitted by such businesses, thus hindering analysis of trends in their submission of applications. Comparable data are not available across participating agencies to evaluate progress in increasing commercialization of SBIR technologies. SBA has not yet expanded an existing database to include commercialization data for program evaluation, but the agency has hired a contractor and allocated funds to develop the expanded database by August 2011. SBA has also worked with participating agencies to develop common metrics for commercialization. In the absence of the expanded database, agencies have independently gathered commercialization data for their own use that are not comparable. In collecting these data, agencies differed in the types of data collection instruments used, dates the instruments were administered, award recipient populations queried, and types of data requested. Furthermore, with the exception of DOD, agencies that GAO reviewed did not generally take steps to verify commercialization data they collected from award recipients, so the accuracy of the data is largely unknown. SBA has worked with SBIR agencies to identify best practices in other areas of program management but has not identified best practices for agencies to use in verifying the accuracy of commercialization data. Implementing the expanded database should improve the comparability of commercialization data available, but a lack of consistent practices for verifying the accuracy of these data may limit their usefulness for programwide evaluation.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that SBA work with participating agencies to (1) collect data on applications from small businesses owned by disadvantaged individuals and women and (2) identify best practices for verification of commercialization data. SBA, DOE, and NSF generally agreed with these recommendations; the other agencies GAO reviewed neither agreed nor disagreed. |
gao_GAO-04-604 | gao_GAO-04-604_0 | By 2001, the facility was allowed to accept all types of class A waste. Since 1999 LLRW Disposal Availability and Federal Oversight Have Changed
We identified a number of important changes that have occurred since our 1999 report that have had or might have significant effects on future disposal availability for these wastes and federal oversight of LLRW management by the states. The remaining changes affect federal agency guidance and oversight of LLRW management by the states. They added that while storage is presently safe, they are concerned about the future safety and security of the increasing volumes of LLRW stored by thousands of licensees who have decided not to pay high disposal fees today, and who might not have disposal options for class B and C wastes in the future. Annual LLRW Disposal Volumes Have Increased, but Future Volumes Are Uncertain
Annual LLRW disposal volumes have increased significantly in recent years, primarily the result of cleaning up of DOE sites and decommissioning nuclear power plants. We chose to rely on disposal volume data from the three commercial disposal facility operators because the MIMS database does not include DOE waste volumes sent to commercial disposal, it is not as up to date, and it has other deficiencies. There are several reasons cited for this difficulty: records from “legacy” sites—former nuclear weapons production sites that DOE is cleaning up—have not proven to be reliable; the decay rate of known buried radioactive wastes have often been higher than expected so wastes that were expected to need disposal as LLRW can instead be legally classified as radioactive waste mixed with nonradioactive but hazardous wastes and sent to less expensive disposal facilities; contractors have become more innovative and skilled in sorting and segregating hazardous and mixed wastes from LLRW so that a higher percentage of wastes can be disposed of as hazardous or mixed wastes rather than LLRW; and some debris and material from site cleanup projected to be LLRW has no appreciable radioactivity when generated and can therefore be disposed in sanitary landfills or other non-LLRW disposal facilities. No Other Widespread Effects Detected of Shortfall in LLRW Disposal Availability
Notwithstanding the cost of minimizing and storing LLRW, we did not detect widespread national impacts on LLRW generators that have resulted or might result from any disposal shortfalls. However, DOE and NRC have reduced their oversight of LLRW management by the states. This option to maintain the status quo, as discussed in our 1999 report, may no longer be tenable if there are no assured safe, reliable, and cost-effective disposal options put forward to address a potential shortfall in disposal availability for class B and C wastes after mid-2008. Establishing federal responsibility for disposal of at least the class B and C wastes would be similar to federal responsibilities for greater-than-class C waste, transuranic, and high-level waste. GAO Comment
1. As long as NRC places no time limits on LLRW storage and provides assurance that it is safe and secure, any shortfalls in disposal capacity would be manageable in the short-term. 2. 3. 4. | Why GAO Did This Study
Low-level radioactive waste (LLRW) management concerns persist despite enactment of the LLRW Policy Act of 1980, as amended, which made states responsible for providing for disposal of most LLRW. It also enumerated guidance and oversight responsibilities for DOE and NRC. When GAO last reported on LLRW disposal, in 1999, the only existing facility accepting the more highly radioactive types of LLRW (known as class B and C waste) from most states was expected to be full within 10 years. In this context, GAO examined (1) changes in LLRW conditions since 1999, (2) recent annual LLRW disposal volumes and potential future volumes, (3) any current or anticipated shortfalls in disposal availability, and (4) potential effects of any such shortfall.
What GAO Found
GAO identified several changes in LLRW disposal availability and federal agency oversight since its 1999 report that have had or might have significant impacts on LLRW management by the states. For example, while one disposal facility plans to close to most states and new options are evolving that may counteract this shortfall, federal guidance and oversight of LLRW management has virtually ended. Annual LLRW disposal volumes increased 200 percent between 1999 and 2003, primarily due to LLRW shipped to commercial disposal by DOE. GAO identified this increase using data from the three commercial disposal facility operators because GAO determined that data from the national LLRW database, maintained by DOE to assist the LLRW community in managing LLRW, were unreliable. The uncertain timing and volume of future waste shipments from DOE and nuclear utilities make it difficult to forecast disposal needs for all classes of LLRW. At current LLRW disposal volumes, disposal availability appears adequate until at least mid-2008 for class B and C wastes. There are no expected shortfalls in disposal availability for class A waste. If disposal conditions do not change, however, most states will not have a place to dispose of their class B and C wastes after 2008. Nevertheless, any disposal shortfall that might arise is unlikely to pose an immediate problem because generators can minimize, process, and safely store waste. While these approaches are costly, GAO did not detect other immediate widespread effects. NRC places no limit on stored waste and presently does not centrally track it. However, as LLRW storage volume and duration increase in the absence of reliable and cost-effective disposal options, so might the safety and security risks. |
gao_GAO-07-144 | gao_GAO-07-144_0 | The Army’s April 2006 Report to Congress Addressed the Areas Required, But the Army’s Strategy is Evolving
The Army’s April 2006 report to Congress on the status of its prepositioned program addressed the areas required by Congress, but the Army has significantly shifted its prepositioning strategy since then. According to the Army, this shift was based on insights gained from the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review, but Army officials told us that recent budget reprogramming decisions and worsening Army-wide equipment shortfalls also influenced the reexamination. As a result, the Army’s 2006 report was outdated soon after its publication and should not be used by Congress or DOD for funding decisions. The Army Faces Major Strategic and Management Challenges As It Revises and Implements Its Prepositioning Program
The future success of the Army’s prepositioning program depends not only on how well the Army aligns its efforts with those of the department as a whole, but also on how well long-standing management issues are addressed as the new strategic plan is implemented. While continuing to rely on stocks in South Korea, the proposed strategy includes significant changes to the program—among them, less reliance on heavy combat equipment afloat and expanded reliance on heavy equipment in Kuwait, Qatar, and Italy. The Army plans to have this task completed by late December 2006. In fact, DOD anticipates that when the DOD-wide strategy is issued the Army will have to modify its service-specific prepositioning strategy to align with the new requirements. Finally, since prepositioning is interconnected with airlift, sealift, and overseas basing, the Army’s decisions will have an as-yet undetermined effect on lift requirements and basing. Without sound requirements, the Army cannot reliably assess the readiness of its programs. Army Lacks a Comprehensive Prepositioning Storage and Maintenance Facilities Plan
Although the Army reported maintenance and storage facility shortages to Congress, it lacks a comprehensive plan for maintenance and storage facilities for prepositioned stocks. Consequently, facility requirements are uncertain. The Army took steps to revise its prepositioning strategy in the latter part of 2006; however, its efforts are not fully synchronized with the evolving DOD-wide strategy. Setting and aligning broad strategies, however, will not be enough to ensure success in the Army’s program over the longer term. Once the strategic direction is aligned with the DOD strategy, we recommend that the Secretary of the Army develop an implementation plan that completes ongoing reevaluation of the secondary item and operational project stock requirements as well as establishes systematic readiness measurement and reporting of secondary items and operational project stock programs, identifies the optimal mix of storage and maintenance facilities at each location to support the emerging strategy, and prescribes oversight requirements for the maintenance of prepositioned equipment to ensure that equipment is ready for combat. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To assess whether the Army’s report comprehensively addressed the required reporting areas in Public Law 109-163, we reviewed the Army’s prepositioned stocks program. We interviewed officials from the Department of the Army, the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Policy, the Department of Defense Joint Staff, the Army Materiel Command, and the Army Sustainment Command and its subordinate units at prepositioning locations in Europe, South Korea, South Carolina, and Kuwait. U.S. Appendix II: Past Products Identifying Challenges Facing the Army and DOD Regarding Prepositioning Programs
The Army’s prepositioning program has faced a number of long-standing challenges including inadequate oversight and management; equipment and facility excesses and shortfalls; and invalid, inaccurate, poorly defined, and otherwise questionable requirements. 2. | Why GAO Did This Study
Prepositioned military equipment and supplies on ships and overseas on land have become an integral part of the U.S. defense strategy. However, the Army's program has faced long-standing management challenges, including equipment excesses and shortfalls, invalid or poorly defined requirements, and maintenance problems. In Public Law 109-163, Congress required the Army to conduct an assessment of its prepositioning programs and required GAO to assess (1) whether the Army's report addressed the areas required by Congress, and (2) the major challenges the Army continues to face in its prepositioning program. GAO analyzed the Army's report and other information it obtained from the Joint Staff, the Army, and its subordinate commands to identify the issues affecting the Army's prepositioning program. GAO also visited prepositioned equipment sites in South Carolina, Europe, South Korea, and Kuwait.
What GAO Found
The Army's April 2006 report on the status of its prepositioning program addressed the areas required by Congress; for example, it included descriptions of operational capabilities, as well as inventory shortfalls expressed in terms of procurement costs. However, the Army significantly shifted its prepositioning strategy in the latter part of 2006, since that report was issued. According to the Army, this shift was based on insights gained from the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review, but Army officials told us that budget reprogramming decisions and worsening Army-wide equipment shortfalls also influenced the expedited strategy revision. The Army's revised strategy proposes less reliance on heavy combat equipment afloat and the expansion of heavy equipment in Kuwait and Italy. As a result, the Army's April 2006 report to Congress is outdated, and neither Congress nor DOD should base funding decisions on it. The Army faces several major strategic and management challenges as it revises and implements its prepositioning program. From a strategic perspective, the Army cannot gauge how well its emerging strategy will align with DOD plans currently under development. The Army plans to begin implementing its revised strategy by the end of 2006. DOD has a departmentwide prepositioning study underway intended to set strategy and joint doctrine, but this will not be completed for several months and it anticipates that the Army will have to modify its prepositioning strategy when the DOD-wide strategy is issued. As a result, the Army is at risk of resourcing requirements that may be superseded by the DOD strategy. Moreover, because prepositioning is linked to airlift, sealift, and basing, the Army's decisions will have an as-yet undetermined effect on these areas. In addition to these strategic concerns, the Army faces three key management challenges. First, the Army has yet to determine sound secondary item and operational project stock requirements, and to systematically measure and report readiness. While the Army has been taking steps to address long-standing requirements-determination problems in certain parts of its program, the effort was not finished when GAO completed its work. Without accurate requirements and systematic readiness reporting, Army managers are not able to determine the extent to which the existing inventory reflects what the Army needs. Second, the Army lacks a comprehensive plan for maintenance and storage facilities for prepositioned stocks, resulting in uncertain future facility requirements. In the interim, prepositioned stocks are being stored outside, resulting in higher maintenance costs. Finally, inadequate maintenance oversight of the Army's prepositioning program has raised concerns about the true condition of the equipment at some locations. Until these strategic and management challenges are addressed, the Army will face uncertain risks should new conflicts occur. |
gao_GAO-08-27 | gao_GAO-08-27_0 | 2):1. 3. These factors include: challenges in manufacturing a new vaccine each year; limitations in the production capacity of manufacturers; and demand for vaccine by providers and patients that fluctuates throughout the season. Manufacturing Challenges May Limit the Quantity of Seasonal Influenza Vaccine Produced or Delay When Vaccine Reaches Providers
Manufacturing challenges inherent to the production of a new seasonal influenza vaccine each year include the necessity of adhering to a relatively inflexible and sequential process involving multiple players, difficulties growing new virus strains, and problems associated with maintaining safety and quality-control practices to produce a sterile vaccine. Distribution Routes May Affect When Seasonal Influenza Vaccine Reaches Individual Providers
In addition to the timing of the production and shipment of vaccine from the manufacturer, the distribution route that the vaccine takes from the manufacturer to a provider can also affect how much time elapses before the vaccine reaches individual providers who have ordered it. Issues Related to Vaccine Distribution May Affect Vaccine Availability for High- Risk and Other Target Groups
Issues related to making vaccine available for high-risk and other target groups include the locations where these groups are vaccinated, how vaccine is distributed to the providers who administer vaccinations, and the timing of vaccine distribution to different types of providers. According to data from CDC, individuals in high-risk and other target groups have received influenza vaccinations at various locations where different types of providers administer vaccine. National data collected by CDC for the 2006–07 influenza season indicated that in aggregate most types of providers, including private providers such as physicians, received vaccine in similar time frames. CDC officials acknowledged that individual providers’ experiences at the local level could vary. In an effort to help state and local health officials manage the availability of vaccine for high-risk or other target groups, CDC and state health officials have undertaken several efforts, including the creation of monitoring tools and the implementation of a state-specific vaccine distribution program. For example, one medical supply distributor stated that it fills vaccine orders in the order in which it received the orders. CDC Data Indicate State and Local Health Departments Generally Received a Smaller Amount of Vaccine Than Other Providers in Early Fall
In recent years, certain types of providers, such as physicians and state and local health departments, reported they received their vaccine orders after other types of providers, such as mass immunizers that provide vaccinations at retail stores. CDC and Others Have Produced Public Health Messages, and CDC Has Taken Some Steps to Assess Its Messages
CDC and others have produced a variety of public health messages designed to promote influenza vaccination, including messages to encourage preferential vaccination of certain high-risk and other target groups during times of vaccine delay or shortage. CDC and Others Have Produced and Disseminated Influenza- Related Public Health Messages
CDC has produced and disseminated public health messages designed to promote seasonal influenza vaccination. Elements Important for Producing Effective Public Health Messages Face Impediments to Implementation
Although no comprehensive evaluations have been conducted to assess the impact of influenza-related public health messages on vaccination, CDC and other officials identified elements they believe, based on their experience, are important to producing public health messages regarding seasonal influenza vaccination that will have an impact on promoting vaccination. However, there are impediments to effectively implementing these elements. Clear and consistent messages. Agency Comments
We provided a draft of this report to HHS for comment. The department provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
In conducting this study, we reviewed relevant documents and interviewed officials from the Department of Health and Human Services’s (HHS) Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and manufacturers of all five seasonal influenza vaccines licensed for the U.S. market for the 2007–08 season as of August 31, 2007. Appendix III: Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP) Recommendations
In spring or summer each year, ACIP, after consulting with CDC, makes recommendations on which population groups should be targeted for annual influenza vaccination. The spreadsheet contains variables for which manufacturers and medical supply distributors submitted data. | Why GAO Did This Study
Annual vaccination is the main method for preventing seasonal influenza, which typically occurs in the United States from late fall to early spring. Manufacturers produce vaccine through a lengthy and complex process. Manufacturers and medical supply distributors then ship vaccine to providers such as physicians. Each year, the Department of Health and Human Services's (HHS) Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) recommends who should be targeted for vaccination, including those at higher risk for influenza-related complications or medical care--for example, adults aged 50 years and older, young children, and some individuals with chronic medical conditions. CDC bases its recommendations on those made by the agency's Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP). GAO examined: (1) factors that affect the quantity of vaccine produced and when it reaches providers, (2) issues related to making vaccine available to high-risk and other target groups, and (3) public health messages produced and disseminated by CDC and others to promote vaccination. GAO reviewed relevant documents and interviewed officials from CDC, other public health entities, manufacturers, and medical supply distributors, and examined data on vaccine doses produced and shipped.
What GAO Found
Several factors affect the quantity of vaccine produced for a given influenza season and when it reaches providers who administer the vaccine. One factor is the difficulty of manufacturing a new vaccine each year, which includes adherence to a relatively inflexible and sequential process, challenges of growing new virus strains, and maintaining safety and quality control practices to produce a sterile vaccine. Other factors include limitations in the production capacity of manufacturers and demand for vaccine throughout the influenza season. In addition, the distribution route the vaccine takes from the manufacturer to the provider can also affect how much time elapses before the vaccine reaches individual providers. Issues related to making vaccine available to high-risk and other target groups recommended by CDC and ACIP include the locations in which these individuals receive vaccinations, how vaccine is distributed to providers, and the timing of vaccine distribution to different types of providers. According to data from CDC, individuals in high-risk and other target groups have received influenza vaccinations at various locations where different types of providers administer the vaccine, including physicians' offices, workplaces, clinics, or other settings. Certain types of providers, such as physicians, reported that they received their vaccine orders after other types of providers, such as mass immunizers that provide vaccinations at retail stores. Available data for the 2006-07 influenza season indicated, however, that most types of providers received vaccine in similar time frames. CDC officials acknowledged that individual providers' experiences at the local level could vary. In an effort to help state and local health officials manage the availability of vaccine for high-risk or other target groups, CDC and state health officials have undertaken several efforts, including the creation of monitoring tools and the implementation of a state-specific vaccine distribution program. CDC and others have produced and disseminated public health messages--such as press releases and public service announcements--designed to promote seasonal influenza vaccination. These include messages designed to maintain public demand for vaccination later in the influenza season and to encourage preferential vaccination of certain groups during times of vaccine shortage or delay. CDC has taken steps to assess its influenza-related public health messages before disseminating them to the public and has conducted limited data collection afterwards. Although no comprehensive evaluations have been conducted to assess the impact of influenza-related messages after dissemination, CDC and other officials GAO interviewed identified key elements, such as clear and consistent messages, that they believe are important to producing effective public health messages. However, there are impediments to effectively implementing these elements, such as the need to modify messages during the season as circumstances change. We provided a draft of this report to HHS for comment. The department provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. |
gao_GGD-97-119 | gao_GGD-97-119_0 | In addition, while the total number of relocations authorized and the total number of relocations made fluctuated yearly across the organizations that reported data for all 5 fiscal years, there was moderate overall change between fiscal years 1991 and 1995. Reported Civilian Employee Relocations Authorized
Ninety-seven federal organizations that responded to our survey reported that they authorized 132,837 civilian employees to relocate at the government’s expense from fiscal year 1991 through fiscal year 1995.However, the total number of relocations authorized is probably understated because 7 of the 97 organizations did not, for various reasons, provide this relocation information for all 5 fiscal years. Overall, total relocations made increased about 12.5 percent from fiscal year 1991 to fiscal year 1995. Federal Organizations Reported Billions in Costs to Relocate Civilian Employees
Most of the federal organizations that responded to our survey reported obligating over $3 billion for relocations and the other organizations reported expending over $350 million for relocations during fiscal years 1991 through 1995. Across the organizations that provided data for all 5 fiscal years, total relocation obligations and total relocation expenditures varied yearly. Overall, total relocation obligations increased about 16 percent from fiscal year 1991 to fiscal year 1995. This increase was not greatly influenced by one organization or a small group of organizations. Overall, total relocation expenditures increased about 88 percent from fiscal year 1991 to fiscal year 1995. The Navy accounted for this increase because its reported relocation expenditures more than quadrupled during this period. Excluding the Navy from the total expenditures, the 21 remaining organizations’ total reported relocation expenditures decreased by less than 1 percent, from $34.7 million in fiscal year 1991 to $34.6 million in fiscal year 1995. Number of Federal Organizations Reporting Mandatory Rotational Policies
Fifteen federal organizations reported that they had rotational policies that required some of their civilian employees to relocate on a prescribed schedule. Among these organizations, their estimated annual percentages ranged from 100 to less than 1. These relocations made—triggered by rotational policies—accounted for about 6.9 percent of the total relocations made that were reported by the organizations we surveyed. Fish and Wildlife Service (continued)
Offices, boards, and divisions National Highway Traffic Safety Administration Research and Special Programs Administration Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms Bureau of Engraving and Printing Bureau of the Public Debt Federal Law Enforcement Training Center Office of the Comptroller of the Currency Departmental Offices and Office of the Inspector General Department of Housing and Urban Development (continued)
Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
As agreed, our objectives were to provide information for the executive branch departments and largest independent agencies on (1) the total number of civilian employees who were relocated at the federal government’s expense, (2) the total cost of these relocations to the government, and (3) the agencies that had rotational policies requiring their civilian employees to relocate. As a result, for the number of relocations, 97 organizations reported relocations that they authorized and the other 23 organizations reported the relocations that they made. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on the number of civilian employees relocated during fiscal years (FY) 1991 and 1995 and the associated costs of these relocations, focusing on: (1) the total number of civilian employees who were relocated at the federal government's expense; (2) the total cost of these relocations to the government; (3) the agencies that had rotational policies requiring their civilian employees to relocate; and (4) trends for the number and cost of civilian employee relocations during this period.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that, for FY 1991 through 1995: (1) 97 federal organizations reported authorizing about 132,800 relocations, and 23 other organizations reported making about 40,200 relocations; (2) a small number of organizations accounted for the bulk of the relocations authorized or made; (3) while the total numbers of relocations authorized and made fluctuated yearly across the organizations that provided data for all 5 fiscal years, there was moderate change in these totals between FY 1991 and 1995; (4) across the organizations that provided data for all 5 fiscal years, the total number of relocations authorized decreased by less than 1 percent (89 organizations) and the total number of relocations made increased by about 12.5 percent (19 organizations) from FY 1991 to 1995; (5) 97 federal organizations reported obligating about $3.4 billion for relocations, and 23 other organizations reported expending about $363 million for relocations; (6) a small number of organizations accounted for the bulk of the relocation obligations or expenditures; (7) across the organizations that provided data for all 5 fiscal years, total relocation obligations varied and total relocation expenditures increased yearly; (8) there was noticeable change in these totals between FY 1991 and 1995; (9) in constant 1995 dollars, total relocation obligations increased about 16 percent (83 organizations) and total relocation expenditures increased about 88 percent (22 organizations) from FY 1991 to 1995; (10) for the 22 organizations, this increase was due to the Department of the Navy's expenditures; (11) excluding the Navy's expenditures, the 21 remaining organizations' total expenditures decreased by less than 1 percent during the period; (12) 15 federal organizations reported that they had mandatory rotational policies requiring some of their employees to rotate on a prescribed schedule; (13) most of these organizations attributed their policies to federal regulations that limit overseas tours of duty; and (14) based on data provided by these 15 organizations, GAO estimated that these rotational policies accounted for about 19 percent of the total relocations reported as authorized and about 7 percent of the total relocations reported as made during this period. |
gao_RCED-96-144 | gao_RCED-96-144_0 | Commuter and freight railroads that operate over the Amtrak-owned portion of the corridor pay access fees to Amtrak for the use of its tracks. Commuter railroads account for about 91 percent of the passenger train movements on the corridor. From 1988 through 1993, commuter railroads used an annual average of $105.3 million in revenues and operating subsidies to pay for operating and maintenance expenditures on the corridor. Amtrak provided for about 42 percent of the average annual capital expenditure during this time period, using funds from its Northeast Corridor Improvement Program (NECIP) and general capital subsidies. The Proportion of Amtrak and Non-Amtrak Funding Varies Widely on Various Segments of the Corridor
As figure 6 shows, the relative portion of average annual expenditures for the corridor’s operations and maintenance from 1988 through 1993 funded by Amtrak and non-Amtrak sources varied substantially from segment to segment. Additional Annual Expenditures May Be Required to Maintain a State of Good Repair and Continue Improvements
Information provided by Amtrak and other corridor users indicates that about $677 million will be needed annually over the next 15 years to operate and maintain the infrastructure of the corridor, return it to a state of good repair, and continue existing improvement programs. To determine the relative usage of the corridor and the sources of funding among Amtrak and commuter and freight railroads, we requested train-mile, expenditure, and funding source data for 1988 through 1993. GAO’s Comments
1. GAO’s Comments
1. 2. 3. 4. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on the use of the Northeast Corridor by Amtrak and other commuter and freight railroads, focusing on: (1) sources of funding for the corridor's expenditures; and (2) annual funding required to operate and maintain the corridor's infrastructure.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the Northeast Corridor is used daily by 100 Amtrak trains, 1,100 commuter trains, and a few freight trains; (2) about 91 percent of the trains using the corridor are commuter trains; (3) Amtrak and commuter and freight railroads provide the bulk of the funding needed for operating and maintaining the corridor; (4) from 1988 through 1993, commuter railroads provided an average of $105.3 million in revenues and operating subsidies for the corridor's operation and maintenance expenditures and Amtrak funded approximately 42 percent of the corridor's average annual capital expenditures; (5) Amtrak and other users spent an average of $497 million annually on the corridor's operation, maintenance, and capital improvements; (6) an additional $2.7 billion will be needed over the next 15 years to upgrade the corridor's infrastructure; (7) Amtrak and non-Amtrak funding varies widely on various segments of the corridor; and (8) Amtrak needs to improve the quality of its service to protect its revenue. |
gao_AIMD-96-78 | gao_AIMD-96-78_0 | Reviews by GAO, the NASA Office of the Inspector General (OIG), and NASA itself have identified various problems, including a lack of strong leadership, authority, and oversight; fragmented and overlapping responsibilities; redundant operations; unintegrated planning and budgeting processes; poorly managed systems development efforts; nonstandard and obsolescent systems; and multiple communications networks. NASA Limited the Power and Authority of Its CIO
While recognizing the need for a CIO to address long-standing IRM problems and to promote streamlining of IRM functions, NASA has been reluctant to limit the authority of its field centers and program offices to make independent decisions about how best to use information technology to carry out their space and aeronautics missions. CIO Initiatives to Date Represent First Steps Toward More Effective IRM
Despite the limitations imposed on his authority, the NASA CIO has taken some important first steps to improve IRM at NASA. Initiatives in this area include instituting software and hardware standards and developing a technical architecture to achieve interoperability among administrative systems at the desktop and file server levels. Opportunities to Strengthen the CIO Position and IRM Program
Standardization and consolidation efforts undertaken so far have been to some degree successful. Thus, Goddard would be allowed to continue to independently maintain its mission-related systems. These opportunities could result in significant savings, especially given the fact that NASA spends as much as 91 percent of its IT budget on mission-related activities. Funding for administrative and institutional IT is spread among these individual budgets and cannot be accurately consolidated, given the nonstandard funding categories that the various program offices use. Instituting an effective IT resource tracking system will be an essential step toward ensuring the effectiveness of IT investments and meeting the requirements of ITMRA and related legislation. GAO Comments
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) efforts to implement a chief information officer (CIO) position, focusing on: (1) CIO initiatives to improve information resources management (IRM); and (2) opportunities for NASA to strengthen the CIO position and improve its IRM program.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) NASA CIO has taken some action to address longstanding IRM problems including the lack of strong leadership, authority, and oversight, fragmented and overlapping responsibilities, redundant operations, unintegrated planning and budgeting processes, multiple communications networks, and poorly managed systems development efforts; (2) although NASA recognizes the need to address these IRM problems, it has been reluctant to limit the authority of its field centers and program offices to make independent decisions on how best to use information technology (IT) to carry out their missions; (3) despite these limitations, NASA CIO is instituting software and hardware standards to achieve interoperability among administrative systems, integrating IRM planning and budgeting processes, and revising IRM policies to reflect organizational changes; (4) strengthening the CIO position would enable NASA to achieve efficiencies and savings among mission-related systems; (5) agencywide investments in mission-related systems and related contractor services constitute as much as 91 percent of the annual NASA IRM budget; (6) funding for IT investments cannot be accurately consolidated given the nonstandard funding categories that various program offices use; and (7) instituting an effective IT resource tracking system is essential to ensuring the effectiveness of IT investments. |
gao_NSIAD-98-93 | gao_NSIAD-98-93_0 | First, such assignments are required to perform work at locations where no local public or private sector shipyards have the required ship repair capabilities. Second, the Navy believes that using temporarily excess shipyard workers on temporary duty assignments is cost-effective, even when there is a local private sector capability. The Navy performs work at locations without a naval shipyard to comply with its homeporting policy and when it is not practical to perform the work at public or private shipyards. For example, because San Diego does not have nuclear repair capability, all nuclear submarine repair work is performed by naval shipyard workers at San Diego. Navy’s Homeporting Policy Impacts TDY Assignments
The Navy’s policy to perform all ship repair work of 6 months or less at the ship’s homeport substantially increased the amount of TDY ship repair work performed in locations without a naval shipyard. In those cases where there is a local private sector capability, the cost-effectiveness rationale for TDY assignments is valid to the extent that naval shipyard personnel are temporarily excess. The Navy believes that it needs to retain its current shipyard capacity and associated personnel levels to meet anticipated future requirements. However, for TDY assignments to homeports without required ship repair capabilities, other practical alternatives may warrant consideration, such as making greater use of the private sector. Factors Affecting the Future Use of TDY Assignments
A reduction in the number of planned labor-intensive refuelings of nuclear attack submarines and the homeporting of up to three nuclear aircraft carriers in San Diego could substantially increase future TDY assignments. Other factors that could affect the extent of future TDY assignments include potential reductions in the number of Navy ships, the regionalization of the Navy’s ship maintenance, and another round of base closures. Since fiscal year 1993, the Navy has reduced planned submarine refuelings. Further reductions in the number of planned refuelings would substantially decrease the on-site workloads planned for three naval shipyards, especially Portsmouth. Conclusions
The Navy’s rationale for using temporarily excess naval shipyard personnel is generally sound from a cost and operational standpoint. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
As required by section 366 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998, we reviewed the Department of the Navy’s practice of using temporary duty (TDY) assignments of naval shipyard personnel to perform ship maintenance and repair work at homeports not having naval shipyards. Specifically, the act required us to review (1) the rationale supporting the Navy’s practice, (2) the cost-effectiveness of these assignments, and (3) the factors affecting future requirements for the practice. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO reviewed the Navy's practice of using temporary duty assignments of naval personnel to perform ship maintenance and repair work at homeports without nearby naval shipyard capability, focusing on the: (1) rationale supporting the Navy's practice; (2) cost-effectiveness of these assignments; and (3) factors affecting future requirements for the practice.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the Navy's rationale for temporary duty assignments is twofold; (2) such assignments are required to perform work at locations where no local public or private shipyards have the required depot-level maintenance capability; (3) most temporary duty assignments are for this reason; (4) the Navy performs work at such locations to comply with its policy to perform ship repairs of six months or less at the ship's homeport and when it is not practical to bring ships to the shipyard; (5) the Navy believes that using temporarily excess naval shipyard workers on temporary duty assignment is cost-effective, even when there is local private-sector capability because these workers will be needed in the future to perform ship repair work; (6) the Navy's rationale for sending temporarily excess naval shipyard personnel on temporary duty assignments appears reasonable from a cost and operational standpoint; (7) however, in some cases, other approaches may be more cost-effective; (8) the Navy is currently retaining some temporarily excess shipyard personnel to ensure that it can handle the planned refuelings of nuclear attack submarines for fiscal year (FY) 1999 and beyond; (9) retaining the personnel for these purposes appears reasonable, since the Navy has a need for the personnel; (10) it is following the same practice to perform nuclear ship repair work at San Diego because local private shipyards do not have nuclear capability; (11) however, other approaches, such as making greater use of the private sector, may warrant consideration; (12) possible changes to future ship repair workloads could affect the requirement for future temporary duty assignments and retention of current naval shipyard personnel levels; (13) for example, the Navy has cancelled 17 planned nuclear attack submarine refuelings since FY 1993; (14) further reductions in the number of planned refuelings would substantially decrease the on-site workloads planned for three naval shipyards, especially Portsmouth; (15) a proposal to homeport three nuclear aircraft carriers in San Diego, California, which does not have a local naval shipyard, could substantially increase temporary duty assignments; and (16) other factors that could affect the amount of future temporary duty assignments include: (a) further reductions in the number of Navy ships; (b) full implementation of the Navy's Regional Maintenance Program; and (c) a new round of base closures. |
gao_GAO-05-241 | gao_GAO-05-241_0 | Depending upon the IFQ Program, Management Costs Were Higher or Lower Than Pre-IFQ Costs
Estimated IFQ management costs for fiscal year 2003 varied by program and, according to fishery managers, when compared with pre-IFQ management costs, were higher for the halibut and sablefish program and lower for the surfclam/ocean quahog program. Also, according to fishery managers, both the fishery management councils and NMFS incurred additional costs associated with the development and implementation of the halibut and sablefish and surfclam/ocean quahog IFQ programs. IFQ Management Costs Varied by Program
We aggregated cost estimates for each IFQ program on the basis of information provided by various organizations and estimated that the management costs for fiscal year 2003 ranged from a high of at least $3.2 million for the halibut and sablefish program to a low of $7,600 for the wreckfish program. While NMFS does not systematically track IFQ management costs and cost data on fishery management activities prior to the IFQ program are incomplete, fishery managers said the overall costs of managing the halibut and sablefish fisheries were higher under the IFQ program than under the previous management system. NMFS Has Not Recovered IFQ Management Costs as Required
In 1996, the Magnuson-Stevens Act was amended by the Sustainable Fisheries Act, requiring NMFS to collect a fee to recover the “actual costs directly related to the management and enforcement of any individual fishing quota program” and limiting the fee to 3 percent of the ex-vessel value of the fish harvested. However, at the time of our review, NMFS had not implemented cost recovery for the surfclam/ocean quahog and wreckfish IFQ programs. According to NMFS officials, they had not recovered surfclam/ocean quahog or wreckfish management costs as required under the act, because (1) cost recovery has not been a priority for the surfclam/ocean quahog program and (2) very few people were fishing wreckfish, and they believe that recovering program management costs would be an economic burden for these fishermen. However, NMFS has interpreted the term to be limited to the costs that would not have been incurred but for the IFQ program (i.e., the incremental costs). However, there is another way to interpret “actual costs directly related to” an IFQ program, that is, full costs. Under a “full cost” approach, NMFS could have recovered more than the $3.2 million recovered for fiscal year 2003. Several Methods Are Used for Sharing Costs between Government and Industry
Several methods are used for sharing IFQ management costs between government and industry; each method has advantages and disadvantages. These methods principally fall into three categories—user fees, quota set-asides, and devolution of services from government to industry. Quota Set-Asides
Under the quota set-aside method, the government sets aside (i.e., does not allocate) a certain amount of quota each year, leases it to fishermen, and then uses the revenue to pay for IFQ program management costs. Finally, since the Magnuson-Stevens Act does not define “actual costs directly related to the management and enforcement” of an IFQ program and NMFS has interpreted the term to mean incremental costs, NMFS may be recovering fewer costs than the Congress intended. For this report, we reviewed domestic quota programs to (1) determine the costs of managing (i.e., administering, monitoring, and enforcing) IFQ programs and how these costs differ from pre-IFQ management costs; (2) determine what, if any, IFQ management costs are currently being recovered by the Department of Commerce’s National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS); and (3) assess ways to share the costs of IFQ programs between government and industry. | Why GAO Did This Study
Overfishing may have significant environmental and economic consequences. One tool used to maintain fisheries at sustainable levels is the individual fishing quota (IFQ), which sets individual catch limits for eligible vessel owners or operators. This is GAO's third study on IFQ programs. For this study, GAO determined (1) the costs of managing (i.e., administering, monitoring, and enforcing) IFQ programs and how these costs differ from pre-IFQ management costs; (2) what, if any, IFQ management costs are currently being recovered by the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS); and (3) ways to share the costs of IFQ programs between government and industry.
What GAO Found
Fiscal year 2003 management costs varied considerably among IFQ programs. According to fishery managers, halibut and sablefish program costs were higher and surfclam/ocean quahog program costs were lower, when compared with pre-IFQ management costs. Although complete cost information was not available, GAO aggregated cost estimates from information provided by NMFS and other organizations involved in IFQ-related activities and estimated that fiscal year 2003 IFQ management costs were at least $3.2 million for the Alaska halibut and sablefish program, $274,000 for the surfclam/ocean quahog program, and $7,600 for the wreckfish program. While NMFS does not systematically track the costs of managing IFQ programs and does not have complete information on pre-IFQ management costs, fishery managers said management costs were greater under the halibut and sablefish IFQ program than under pre-IFQ management, in part, because of the IFQ program's complex rules. In contrast, fishery managers said costs were less under the surfclam/ocean quahog IFQ program than under pre-IFQ management, in part, because the simplicity of the program's design made it easier to monitor compliance. Moreover, according to fishery managers, NMFS incurred additional costs for the development and initial implementation of both programs. NMFS is not recovering management costs as required by the Magnuson- Stevens Act for two of the three IFQ programs. Under the act, as amended by the 1996 Sustainable Fisheries Act, NMFS is required to recover the "actual costs directly related to the management and enforcement" of all IFQ programs. NMFS has implemented cost recovery for the halibut and sablefish program, but it has not done so for the surfclam/ocean quahog or wreckfish programs. NMFS officials said that cost recovery for the surfclam/ocean quahog program has been a low priority and very few people were fishing wreckfish. Also, the Magnuson-Stevens Act does not define "actual costs directly related to the management and enforcement" of an IFQ program. NMFS has interpreted the term to mean those costs that would not have been incurred but for the IFQ program (i.e., the incremental costs). However, another way to interpret the term "actual costs directly related to" is full costs. Under a "full cost" approach, NMFS could have recovered more costs of managing the IFQ program. Several methods are used for sharing IFQ management costs between government and industry. These methods principally fall into three categories: user fees, quota set-asides, and devolution of services. Under user fees, government recovers costs by collecting a fee from the quota holder or fisherman. Under a quota set-aside, government can set aside (i.e., not allocate) a certain amount of quota each year, lease the set-aside quota to fishermen, and use the revenue to pay for program management costs. Finally, under devolution of services, management services previously performed by government, such as monitoring compliance with individual catch limits, are transferred to industry. |
gao_GAO-06-193 | gao_GAO-06-193_0 | DOD defines a joint exercise as the interaction of joint forces and/or joint staffs conducted under a joint headquarters according to joint doctrine that prepares forces/staffs to respond to operational requirements. Consensus Has Not Been Reached on DOD’s Joint Urban Operations Training Strategy
Since 2002, DOD has made limited progress in developing an overall joint strategy for urban operations training and related facility and training requirements. In response to direction from the Senate Armed Services Committee in May 2002, Joint Forces Command, designated as DOD’s executive agent for urban operations training, contracted for a study, completed in early 2005, to identify facility and training requirements. In May 2005, the committee directed DOD to establish joint urban operations facility requirements and a training requirements baseline by November 1, 2005. In May 2005, Joint Forces Command began working with the services to review the study’s results and develop the detailed facility and training requirements needed to form the basis for a joint training strategy. While the services have identified some facility needs, Joint Forces Command and service representatives have been unable to reach consensus on the level or types of joint training necessary to prepare troops for urban operations. As a result, Joint Forces Command has been unable to finalize the strategy or the facility and joint training requirements that will form the baseline for measuring capabilities within each service and across DOD. DOD officials told us they will not be able to deliver the baseline as required by November 1, 2005, and instead plan to provide criteria for the Congress to use in evaluating service facility plans. Because of the lack of consensus in the draft joint urban operations training strategy and related requirements, DOD has not yet developed joint training requirements to use as a baseline against which to measure capabilities within and across the services. Despite DOD’s Goals, Few Opportunities Exist for Forces to Train Together for Joint Urban Operations
Despite DOD’s increasing emphasis on the importance of training for joint urban operations before deployment, few opportunities currently exist for joint urban operations training that places troops from different services on the ground working under a joint headquarters. Various factors account for the lack of joint urban operations training, such as the services’ focus on training service-specific skills, and the lack of an overall strategy requiring joint urban operations training, specific joint urban operations training requirements, and a formal mechanism for scheduling joint urban operations training at service-owned facilities. Without a training strategy, defined requirements, and a joint scheduling mechanism, DOD cannot be assured that joint urban operations training will occur or that DOD will maximize the joint usage of urban operations training facilities. While DOD Has Incorporated Lessons Learned, Troops and Training Personnel Suggested Further Training Enhancements
While DOD has taken steps to incorporate lessons learned from ongoing operations into its training program, training and troop personnel we interviewed offered suggestions, based on their own operational experience, for further enhancing training. One of DOD’s training goals is to train as it expects to fight. Personnel identified enhancements such as the need for additional live-fire capability, adding more civilian role players in exercises and providing additional information gathering and cultural awareness training, and having newly fielded equipment available to train with at the training centers. While DOD plans additional improvements, until it develops a strategy and specific facility and training requirements, it will lack a solid basis to evaluate suggestions and make improvements and investment decisions. Conclusions
DOD has continually emphasized the importance of joint training, including to prepare U.S. forces to conduct joint military operations in urban environments. As discussed in our report, until Joint Forces Command develops an overall strategy for joint urban operations training and related requirements, neither the Secretary of Defense nor the Congress will have a sound basis for evaluating service facility and training plans, and related funding requests. | Why GAO Did This Study
DOD emphasizes the need for joint training to prepare U.S. forces to conduct joint operations in urban terrain. It defines joint training as exercises involving the interaction of joint forces and/or joint staffs under a joint headquarters. To guide the services' plans to train forces for urban operations and construct related facilities, in May 2002, the Senate Armed Services Committee directed DOD to establish facility requirements and, in May 2005, the committee directed DOD to complete its efforts and provide a requirements baseline for measuring training capabilities within the services and across DOD by November 1, 2005. Due to DOD's focus on joint urban operations and congressional interest in synchronizing service training and facility plans, GAO, on the authority of the Comptroller General, reviewed the extent to which (1) DOD has developed a joint urban operations training strategy and related requirements, (2) exercises offer opportunities for joint urban operations training, and (3) DOD has incorporated lessons learned from ongoing operations into its training.
What GAO Found
Since 2002, DOD has made limited progress in developing an overall joint strategy for urban operations training and related facility and training requirements. In response to congressional direction, Joint Forces Command, designated as DOD's executive agent for urban operations training, contracted for a study, completed in early 2005, to identify facility and training requirements. In May 2005, the Command began working with the services to review the study's results and to develop the detailed facility and training requirements needed to form the basis for a joint training strategy. While the draft strategy identifies some facility needs, as of October 2005, the Command and services have not reached consensus on the level or types of joint training exercises needed to prepare troops for urban operations. As a result, the Command has been unable to finalize the strategy or the facility and joint training requirements that will form the baseline for measuring capabilities within each service and across DOD. DOD officials told us they will not be able to deliver the required baseline on time and instead plan to provide criteria for the Congress to use in evaluating service facility plans. Until the Command develops an overall strategy for joint urban operations training and related requirements, neither the Secretary of Defense nor the Congress will have a sound basis for evaluating service training and facility plans, and related funding requests. Despite DOD's increasing emphasis on the importance of training for joint urban operations before deployment, few opportunities currently exist for training that places troops from different services on the ground working under a joint headquarters. Joint and service doctrine both require forces to be prepared to operate jointly across the full range of military operations. Various factors account for the lack of joint training opportunities, such as the services' focus on service-specific skills, and the lack of an overall strategy requiring joint urban operations training, specific training requirements, and a formal mechanism to schedule joint training at service facilities. Without a strategy, defined requirements, and a joint scheduling mechanism, DOD cannot be assured that joint urban operations training will occur or that it will maximize the joint usage of training facilities. While DOD has taken steps to incorporate lessons learned from ongoing operations into its training program, training and troop personnel GAO interviewed offered suggestions, based on their own operational experience, for further enhancing training. One of DOD's training goals is to train as it expects to fight. Based on feedback from ongoing operations, DOD has made several adjustments, including constructing urban structures, using civilian role players, and adding training on techniques to counter emerging enemy tactics. Persons GAO interviewed cited the need for more live-fire capability, larger numbers of role players, information gathering and cultural awareness training, and training with newly fielded equipment. While DOD plans more improvements, until it develops a strategy and specific requirements as discussed above, it lacks a solid basis to evaluate suggestions, and guide its improvement efforts and investment decisions. |
gao_GAO-05-878 | gao_GAO-05-878_0 | Estimates of compliance costs are uncertain because taxpayers generally do not keep relevant records documenting their time and money spent complying with the tax system and many important elements of the costs are difficult to measure because, among other things, federal tax requirements often overlap with recordkeeping and reporting that taxpayers do for other purposes. Consequently, if one wishes to define the compliance costs attributable to the federal tax system as only those costs that would not exist in the absence of that system, then one needs to assume what the requirements of state and local tax systems, as well as those of financial accounting systems, would look like in the absence of the current federal tax system and make sure that none of the costs of complying with those requirements are included in the estimate of federal compliance cost. Studies we found that focus on the compliance costs of businesses estimate them to be between about $40 billion and $85 billion per year. The Extent to Which Compliance Costs Could be Reduced Depends Upon the Details of a Redesigned Tax System
The estimates presented above do not represent the potential cost savings to be gained by replacing the current federal tax system. Efficiency Costs Arising from Tax- Induced Changes in Behavior Are Likely to Be Large but Can Only Be Modeled with Considerable Uncertainty
Economic efficiency costs occur when tax rules cause individuals to change their work, savings, consumption, and investment behavior in ways that ultimately leave them with a combination of consumption and leisure (now and in the future) that they value less than the combination they would have obtained under a tax system that did not distort their behavior. Estimating efficiency costs is very challenging because the tax system has such extensive and diverse effects on behavior. However, the efficiency cost of the current tax system may not fall within that range because of uncertainty surrounding taxpayer’s behavioral responses to tax rules, changes in the tax code and the economy since the mid-1990s, and the studies do not cover all of the sources of efficiency costs. Estimates of Efficiency Costs Are Highly Uncertain Because the Tax System Has Such Extensive and Diverse Effects on Behavior
Estimating the efficiency costs of the federal tax system is an enormous, complicated, and uncertain task, given the complexity of existing tax rules, the breadth and diversity of the U.S. economy and population, and the limited empirical evidence available regarding how individuals and businesses change their behavior in response to tax rules. While No Comprehensive Estimates of the Tax System’s Efficiency Costs Exist, Available Partial Estimates Suggest Those Costs Are Large
None of the studies we reviewed provides a comprehensive estimate of the efficiency cost of the U.S. federal tax system since the tax reform of 1986. The more comprehensive studies we found show costs on the order of 2 to 5 percent of GDP each year (as of the mid-1990s). Applying this percentage to federal corporate and personal income tax collections in 1997 would yield efficiency costs of about $200 billion or, roughly, 2.5 percent of GDP in that year. These changes could have decreased the efficiency cost for individuals. 1. GAO. GAO. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 2005, Americans will pay about $2.1 trillion in combined federal taxes, including income, payroll, and excise taxes, or about 16.8 percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). However, the amount of taxes paid does not reflect the total cost to taxpayers of the federal tax system. In addition to taxes paid, taxpayers also bear compliance costs and efficiency costs. Understanding the magnitude of these additional costs is important because every dollar spent on compliance and lost due to inefficiency represents a dollar that society could have spent for other purposes. In response to a congressional request for information on the magnitude of the compliance and efficiency costs of the current federal tax system, this study describes the nature of these costs, presents the difficulties associated with estimating them, and summarizes existing estimates of their magnitude. GAO did not make independent estimates of compliance or efficiency costs nor did we replicate any of the studies. GAO is not making any recommendations in this report.
What GAO Found
Complying with the federal tax system costs taxpayers time and money. Estimating total compliance costs is difficult because neither the government nor taxpayers maintain regular accounts of these costs and federal tax requirements often overlap with recordkeeping and reporting that taxpayers do for other purposes. Although available estimates are uncertain, taken together, they suggest that total compliance costs are large. For example, combining the lowest available estimates for the personal and corporate income tax yields a total of $107 billion (roughly 1 percent of GDP) per year. As noted, whether this is a definitive lower bound for compliance costs is uncertain. The tax system also results in economic efficiency costs because tax rules cause individuals to change their behavior in ways that ultimately leave them with lower-valued combinations of consumption and leisure than they would have obtained if the tax system did not affect their behavior. Estimating efficiency costs is very challenging because the tax system has such extensive and diverse effects on behavior. In fact, we found no comprehensive estimates of the efficiency costs of the current federal tax system. The two most comprehensive studies we found suggest that these costs are large--on the order of magnitude of 2 to 5 percent of GDP each year (as of the mid-1990s). However, the actual efficiency costs of the current tax system may not fall within this range because of uncertainty surrounding taxpayers' behavioral responses, changes in the tax code and the economy since the mid-1990s, and the fact that the two studies did not cover the full scope of efficiency costs. The goal of tax policy is not to eliminate compliance and efficiency costs. The goal of tax policy is to design a tax system that produces the desired amount of revenue and balances the minimization of these costs with other objectives, such as equity, transparency, and administrability. In addition, whether compliance and efficiency costs could be reduced by redesigning the tax system and, if so, by how much would depend critically upon the detailed characteristics of the new tax system. |
gao_RCED-97-228 | gao_RCED-97-228_0 | From the start of fiscal year 1990 through the end of fiscal year 1993, the Salvage Sale Fund’s balance more than doubled, from $111 million to a high of $247 million (see table 1). Declines through fiscal year 1996 lowered the balance to $186 million, a drop of 25 percent. Several Management Practices Affect How the Fund Is Replenished
Several management practices that affect the flow of salvage sale receipts into the fund need to be improved to ensure more consistency in the salvage sale program. Specifically, these practices include how regions and forests (1) establish priorities for distributing salvage sale receipts, (2) establish estimates of costs to be recovered, (3) review salvage sale plans for completeness and accuracy, and (4) satisfactorily correct deficiencies. The Forest Service said that the report accurately and fairly presented the information about the fund’s balance and the management practices affecting the replenishment of the fund. To obtain information on the current status of the Salvage Sale Fund’s balance, we requested information on fiscal year 1996 receipts, expenditures, and the fund’s ending balance and reviewed the Forest Service’s fiscal year 1997 projections for salvage sale deposits and obligations. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the status of the Salvage Sale Fund's balance and the management practices affecting the replenishment of the fund.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) after reaching a high of $247 million at the end of fiscal year (FY) 1993, the Salvage Sale Fund's balance declined 25 percent to $186 million at the end of FY 1996; (2) the decline occurred for a variety of reasons, and the fund's balance appears to be stabilizing in FY 1997; (3) if the Forest Service's estimates are correct, the Salvage Sale Fund's balance will total about $182 million at the end of FY 1997, a balance the Forest Service believes is sufficient to meet the estimated obligations for FY 1998; (4) several management practices that affect the flow of salvage sale receipts into the Salvage Sale Fund need to be improved; and (5) specifically, these practices include how regions and forests: (a) establish priorities for distributing salvage timber sale receipts; (b) establish estimates of the costs to recovered; (c) review salvage sale plans for completeness and accuracy; and (d) satisfactorily correct deficiencies. |
gao_GAO-13-13 | gao_GAO-13-13_0 | FMCSA Controls for Commercial Drivers Include Medical Exams, Drug and Alcohol Testing, and Roadside Inspections
FMCSA has established a number of key controls that are designed to prevent CDL holders from operating commercial vehicles while impaired that generally cover three areas. First, drivers are required to undergo regular medical exams by a certified medical examiner to determine if a driver is physically qualified to operate a commercial vehicle. Second, employers are responsible for drug testing employees at various points of employment. Third, state and federal roadside-inspection programs are intended to identify impaired drivers and perform other safety checks. While our review did not evaluate whether these controls were working as intended, in prior work we have found that these controls were vulnerable to abuse or manipulation. DOT is required to issue implementing regulations by July 2014. In the instance of a driver who fails to renew his medical certificate on time, the States are required to downgrade the individual’s CDL so that he must not operate a commercial motor vehicle until a valid medical certificate has been submitted to the State licensing agency. When implemented, these requirements could help improve the control vulnerabilities identified in our prior work by ensuring that proper medical reviews are conducted and medical certificates are prepared by qualified medical examiners. Specifically, the law requires DOT to establish, operate, and maintain a national clearinghouse with records relating to the results of positive drug and alcohol tests of commercial drivers or instances of refused tests. By conducting these sweeps, FMCSA has taken positive steps to help remove drivers that pose a risk to public safety from the road. Examples of Commercial Drivers with Disqualifying Impairments Related to Epilepsy, Drugs, or Alcohol
We identified instances of drivers who operated—and sometimes crashed—commercial vehicles despite having medical conditions such as epilepsy. We also found instances of state licensing agencies issuing or reissuing CDLs to commercial drivers with epilepsy or drug or alcohol dependence noted in their medical histories. Thirty-one of the 230 individuals we identified were involved in accidents while driving a commercial vehicle during this time. However, because DOT’s database of crashes does not identify whether the driver’s medical condition may have contributed to the accident, we could not determine the extent to which the epilepsy impairment actually caused the accident. CDLs Were Issued or Reissued to Drivers with Impairments Related to Epilepsy, Drugs, and Alcohol
From our random selection of 100 CDL holders, we identified 22 CDL holders who received SSA disability benefits where epilepsy, alcohol addiction, or drug dependence was a listed medical impairment and had CDLs issued or renewed after becoming eligible for those benefits. According to SSA documentation, the driver reported suffering from seizures as recent as 2008. He suffered from seizures and unconsciousness. States Could Not Provide Medical Examination Certificates
Since most state driver’s licensing agencies do not require a medical examination report to be presented to them, according to DOT, they were unable to provide these reports or medical certificates that we requested for 29 of the 30 individuals who had CDLs issued or renewed after becoming eligible for SSA benefits. As mentioned earlier, as of January 30, 2012, FMCSA requires states to electronically store medical certificates for new and renewing CDL applicants and are required to electronically post this information for all CDL holders to the state’s CDLIS driver records. Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
We provided a draft copy of this report to SSA and DOT. SSA did not have any comments. DOT’s Director of Audit Relations, Office of the Secretary of Transportation, provided technical comments on the report, which have been incorporated as appropriate. | Why GAO Did This Study
Commercial vehicles such as tractor trailers and school buses must be operated by skilled drivers who are mentally and physically capable of performing their jobs safely. Prior GAO work has shown weaknesses in DOTs oversight of CDLs, such as inadequate medical certifications for commercial drivers, potentially putting the public at risk.
GAO was asked to update its work on impaired commercial drivers. This report describes (1) key controls designed to prevent medically unfit or impaired commercial drivers from operating commercial vehicles and (2) examples of commercial drivers with potentially disqualifying impairments related to epilepsy, drugs, or alcohol.
To identify key controls, GAO reviewed FMCSA policies and regulations, and interviewed officials. Cases were identified on the basis of FMCSA roadside-inspection data, DOTs Commercial Driver License Information System (CDLIS), a national database of all commercial drivers, and SSA disability insurance files. From this analysis, GAO identified commercial drivers who were driving with an epilepsy diagnosis. GAO also randomly selected 100 individuals to determine whether the driver was receiving SSA disability benefits when the state issued or renewed the drivers CDL. These cases cannot be generalized beyond those presented.
GAO provided a draft of this report to SSA and DOT. SSA did not have any comments. DOT provided technical comments, which have been addressed in the report, as appropriate.
What GAO Found
The Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA), part of the Department of Transportation (DOT), has established a number of key controls designed to prevent commercial drivers license (CDL) holders from operating commercial vehicles while impaired. First, drivers are required to undergo regular medical exams by a certified medical examiner. Second, employers are responsible for drug testing employees at various points of employment. Third, state and federal roadside-inspection programs are in place to identify impaired drivers and perform other safety checks. If these key controls are operating effectively, they will help identify commercial drivers who are not capable of driving safely. However, GAOs prior work has found that these controls were vulnerable to abuse or manipulation. The Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act, enacted in July 2012, will require additional measures to ensure that disqualified drivers do not operate commercial vehicles, and could help address some of these vulnerabilities. For example, the law requires DOT to implement a national clearinghouse of commercial-driver controlled-substance and alcohol test results by July 2014. DOT has also taken some actions, and now requires CDL holders to provide a copy of their medical certificates to the State licensing agency.
Matching CDL holders with Social Security Administration (SSA) disability files produced 204 commercial drivers who drove a commercial vehicle as recently as 2011 despite having epilepsy, a disqualifying medical condition characterized by sudden seizures and unconsciousness. Thirty-one of these drivers were involved in accidents, demonstrating the threat to public safety posed by medically impaired drivers. GAO also identified 23 cases where state licensing agencies issued or renewed CDLs for drivers after they were, according to SSA records, diagnosed with epilepsy or had drug or alcohol dependence noted, which could also disqualify them from driving under DOT regulations.
However, because DOT did not require state licensing agencies to maintain drivers medical certifications at the time of GAOs review, it is unlikely that states knew of the drivers conditions. In fact, they were unable to provide medical certifications for any of the 23 individuals. States are now required to electronically store medical certificates for new and renewing CDL applicants and will be required to electronically maintain this information for all CDL holders by January 2014. Doing so could help prevent ineligible drivers from obtaining or renewing CDLs in the future. |
gao_GAO-13-460 | gao_GAO-13-460_0 | reporting on PEPFAR results. Data Indicate Progress in Achieving Treatment Program Results, but Some Indicators Have Limitations
From fiscal year 2010 through 2012, OGAC reported PEPFAR results in terms of three primary indicators: (1) the number of people currently on treatment directly supported by PEPFAR (PEPFAR direct number of people on treatment), (2) the percentages of eligible people receiving treatment in partner countries (national treatment coverage rates), and (3) the percentage of adults and children known to be alive and on treatment 12 months after starting treatment (PEPFAR direct treatment retention rates). Regarding the first indicator, although the number of people on treatment directly supported by PEPFAR has increased significantly, this indicator alone does not provide complete information needed for assessing PEPFAR’s contributions to partner countries’ treatment programs. 1). The data are not always complete. Second, PEPFAR implementing agencies conducted data quality assessments in three PEPFAR countries. However, OGAC has not established a common set of indicators to assess results of these activities. PEPFAR country teams fulfill many M&E functions at facilities where PEPFAR supports direct treatment services, and they assist partner countries in carrying out their M&E responsibilities by providing staff, training, and technical assistance and other support. Partner countries’ M&E systems often are unable to produce complete and timely data, thus limiting their usefulness for patient, clinic, or program management. OGAC’s 2010 Next Generation Indicators Reference Guide recommends several indicators for tracking partner-country outcomes related to strengthening health systems, such as the existence of M&E plans and the percentage of health facilities with record-keeping systems for In addition, OGAC’s technical guidance monitoring HIV/AIDS programs.to country teams for developing partner countries’ M&E systems identifies a number of key efforts, such as developing M&E leadership and organizations, improving the policy environment, and ensuring the advancement and sustainability of technical capacity in PEPFAR partner countries. However, OGAC has not issued guidance identifying minimum standards that data generated by partner countries’ M&E systems should meet—such as standards related to completeness and timeliness—in order for PEPFAR country teams to assess, together with partner countries and other donors, whether the systems are ready for use in PEPFAR program management and results reporting. This limits the usefulness of PEPFAR’s direct treatment indicator for assessing progress toward expanding partner-country treatment programs. Furthermore, OGAC has not yet established a common set of indicators to measure the results of PEPFAR technical assistance and other support intended to improve the quality of treatment programs. Global AIDS Coordinator to take the following three actions in collaboration with PEPFAR implementing agencies: develop a method that better accounts for PEPFAR’s contributions to establish a common set of indicators to measure the results of treatment program quality improvement efforts; and establish a set of minimum standards for data generated by partner countries’ M&E systems, to enable PEPFAR country teams to assess those systems’ readiness for use in treatment program management and reporting. Responding jointly with CDC and USAID, State provided written comments (see app. In its written comments, State generally agreed with our three recommendations. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
In this report, we examine the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief’s (PEPFAR) (1) treatment program results and how the Department of State’s (State) Office of the U.S. Global AIDS Coordinator (OGAC) measures them and (2) assistance to improve partner countries’ monitoring and evaluation (M&E) systems. We interviewed officials from OGAC, the Department of Health and Human Services’ (HHS) Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) in Washington, D.C., and Atlanta, Georgia. GAO-12-673. GAO-10-836. | Why GAO Did This Study
PEPFAR, first authorized in 2003, has supported significant advances in HIV/AIDS prevention, treatment, and care in more than 30 countries. In reauthorizing the program in 2008, Congress directed OGAC to continue to expand the number of people receiving care and treatment through PEPFAR while also making it a major policy goal to help partner countries develop independent, sustainable HIV programs. As a result, PEPFAR began shifting efforts from directly providing treatment services toward support for treatment programs managed by partner countries. GAO was asked to review PEPFAR treatment programs. GAO examined (1) PEPFAR treatment program results and how OGAC measures them and (2) PEPFAR assistance to improve partner countries' M&E systems. GAO reviewed PEPFAR plans, performance reports, and guidance and interviewed officials from OGAC, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). GAO also synthesized findings of treatment program studies and conducted fieldwork in three countries.
What GAO Found
The Department of State's (State) Office of the U.S. Global AIDS Coordinator (OGAC) has reported on President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) treatment program results primarily in terms of (1) numbers of people on treatment directly supported by PEPFAR, (2) percentages of eligible people receiving treatment, and (3) percentages of people alive and on treatment 12 months after starting treatment. However, these indicators do not reflect some key PEPFAR results. First, although the number of people on treatment directly supported by PEPFAR grew from about 1.7 million to 5.1 million in fiscal years 2008 through 2012, this indicator alone does not provide complete information needed for assessing PEPFAR's contributions to partner countries' treatment programs. Second, although 10 PEPFAR country teams reported that percentages of people alive and on treatment after 12 months exceeded 80 percent, data for this indicator are not always complete and have other limitations. To improve these data, according to OGAC officials, OGAC clarified its guidance and conducted data quality assessments. However, OGAC has not yet established a common set of indicators to monitor the results of PEPFAR's efforts to improve the quality of treatment programs.
As PEPFAR partner countries assume greater responsibility for managing their treatment programs, fully functioning monitoring and evaluation (M&E) systems are critical for tracking results and ensuring treatment program effectiveness. PEPFAR country teams assist partner countries in carrying out their M&E responsibilities by providing staff, training, technical assistance, and other support. With this assistance, partner countries have made some progress in expanding and upgrading these M&E systems. Nevertheless, partner countries' M&E systems often are unable to produce complete and timely data, thus limiting the usefulness of these data for patient, clinic, or program management. OGAC has not yet established minimum standards for partner countries' M&E systems, particularly relating to data completeness and timeliness, in order for PEPFAR country teams to assess those systems' readiness for use in treatment program management and results reporting.
What GAO Recommends
The Secretary of State should direct OGAC to (1) develop a method that better accounts for PEPFAR's contributions to partner-country treatment programs, (2) establish a common set of indicators to measure the results of treatment program quality improvement efforts, and (3) establish a set of minimum standards for data generated by partner countries' M&E systems. Commenting jointly with CDC and USAID, State generally agreed with the report's recommendations. |
gao_NSIAD-96-126 | gao_NSIAD-96-126_0 | RM&A Evaluation Was Less Demanding Than Originally Planned
The C-17 met or exceeded 10 of the 11 RM&A evaluation contract specification requirements. The decrease weakened the link between the evaluation as executed and the RM&A measurement criteria. In addition, the evaluation was less demanding because the number of airdrops and landings on small austere airfields was decreased and lighter average cargo loads than called for in the contract specifications were carried. Command officials were also concerned that the 1992 draft plan would not demonstrate the aircraft’s wartime surge utilization rates included in the C-17 Operational Requirements Document. In July 1994, the Air Force issued the revised RM&A evaluation plan. The impact of these changes was longer duration wartime sorties and a reduced ratio of sorties to flying hours, resulting in less stress on the RM&A aircraft than originally planned. However, the evaluation was not intended to provide a statistically valid basis for predicting the C-17’s ability to meet its wartime surge rate. Aircraft Could Not Perform Formation Personnel Airdrop or Aeromedical Evacuation Missions
According to the C-17 development contract, the RM&A incentive fee was to be based on the degree that the contractor met each of 11 individual RM&A parameter goals. In our opinion, none of the aircraft should have been considered full mission capable during the evaluation. First, the Air Force, based on the results of developmental testing, had restricted the aircraft from executing the formation personnel airdrop mission under operational conditions for safety reasons. Comparison of C-17 30-Day RM&A Evaluation With Results of Operational Test and Evaluation
RM&A evaluation July 7 to August 5, 1995 MTBM(i)
MTBM(c)
Mission capable (capable to perform at least one mission) Full mission capable (capable to perform all missions) Mission completion success probability (complete mission objectives without experiencing failure or performance degradation due to equipment problems) Mean time between maintenance-inherent (mean flight hours between unscheduled, on-equipment, inherent maintenance actions) Mean time between maintenance-corrective (mean flight hours between unscheduled corrective actions) Mean time between removal (mean flying hours between removal of any repairable equipment) Maintenance man hours per flying hour (total maintenance hours expended for each flight hour) Mean man hours to repair (the mean maintenance man hours required to complete a corrective maintenance action) Built-in-test fault detection (percentage of occurrences in which BIT correctly detects a malfunction) Built-in-test fault isolation (percentage of occurrences in which BIT correctly isolates a detected malfunction to the failed equipment item) Built-in-test false fault indication (percentage of occurrences in which BIT indicated a malfunction when none existed)
Comparision of Flight Hours, Sorties, and Average Sortie Time Between Original RM&A Plan, Revised Plan, and Actual
Revised plan (July 1994)
Original plan (October 1992)
Difference between revised and original (36) (17) (32) (15) (0.16) (05)
Comparison of Actual RM&A C-17 Aircraft Cycles/Sorties With Estimated Cycles/Sorties Using Average Sortie Times Contained in Original Plan
RM&A Evaluation Incentive Award Fee Calculation
MTBM (I)
MTBM (C)
Comments From the Department of Defense
Major Contributors to This Report
National Security and International Affairs Division, Washington, D.C.
Los Angeles Field Office
Noel J. Lance Dorian R. Dunbar Larry J. Bridges The first copy of each GAO report and testimony is free. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Air Force's reliability, maintainability, and availability (RM&A) evaluation of the C-17 aircraft, focusing on: (1) RM&A planning, preparation, execution, and results; and (2) whether the evaluation demonstrated the aircraft's wartime surge rate.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) the Air Force reported that the C-17 aircraft met or exceeded 10 of the 11 contract requirements during its RM&A evaluation, but the evaluation was less demanding than originally planned; (2) although the revised RM&A evaluation plan increased total flying hours, the number of sorties, and average wartime sortie duration, it decreased the ratio of sorties to flying hours, which weakened the application of RM&A measurement criteria and lessened the stress on the aircraft; (3) the RM&A evaluation also had fewer airdrops and austere airfield landings than originally planned, and the aircraft flew cargo loads that averaged less than one-half the weight projected in contract specifications; (4) three years of operational testing show that the aircraft generally met RM&A requirements with the exception of those related to built-in-test parameters; (5) the RM&A evaluation was not a statistically valid test for determining C-17 fleet wartime utilization rates because the test's duration was too short; and (6) the incentive fee should have been reduced, since the aircraft could not perform the formation personnel airdrop mission under operational conditions, or the aeromedical evacuation mission. |
gao_GAO-01-429 | gao_GAO-01-429_0 | IPP seeks to employ weapons scientists in several countries of the former Soviet Union, including Russia and some of its nuclear cities. Note 2: Travel includes travel of U.S. personnel within the United States and Russia. The Congress and DOE have set goals for increasing the amount of NCI program funds spent in Russia. (See app. It also poses a daunting challenge. The nuclear cities are geographically and economically isolated, access is restricted for security reasons, and weapons scientists are not accustomed to working for commercial businesses. Thus, Western businesses are reluctant to invest in the nuclear cities. Recommendations for Executive Action
We recommend that the Administrator, National Nuclear Security Administration, improve efforts targeted at the nuclear cities by evaluating all of the ongoing NCI projects, particularly those that focus on community development activities, and eliminate those that do not support DOE’s stated objectives of creating jobs in the nuclear cities and downsizing the Russian nuclear weapons complex; establishing quantifiable goals and milestones for jobs creation and downsizing the weapons complex that will more clearly gauge progress in the nuclear cities and use this information to help assess future program expansion plans and potential costs; and strengthening efforts to reduce national laboratories’ costs to implement the program in an effort to place more NCI funds in Russia. | Why GAO Did This Study
TThe United States and Russia began an ambitious nonproliferation program, the Nuclear Cities Initiative (NCI), to create sustainable job opportunities for weapons scientists in Russia's closed nuclear cities and to help Russia accelerate the downsizing of its nuclear weapons complex in in 1998. The program, however, poses a daunting challenge. The nuclear cities are geographically and economically isolated, access is restricted for security reasons, and weapons scientists are not accustomed to working for commercial businesses. Thus, Western businesses are reluctant to invest in the nuclear cities. This report reviews (1) the costs to implement NCI, including the amount of program funds spent in the United States and Russia, as well as planned expenditures; (2) the impact of NCI projects; and (3) the status of the European Nuclear Cities Initiative.
What GAO Found
GAO summarized this report in testimony before Congress; see: Nuclear Nonproliferation: DOE's Efforts to Secure Nuclear Material and Employ Weapons Scientists in Russia, by Gary L. Jones, Director Natural Resources and Environment, before the Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities, Senate Committee on Armed Services. GAO-01-726T , May 15 (10 pages). |
gao_T-HEHS-96-149 | gao_T-HEHS-96-149_0 | SSA has overall responsibility for the SSI program. Some legal immigrants are admitted to the country under the financial sponsorship of a U.S. resident. Refugees and asylees do not need to demonstrate they will be self-sufficient to reside in the United States. It also provides that any noncitizen who receives more than 12 months’ worth of federal, state, or local needs-based benefits within 5 years of becoming a lawful permanent resident (with several exceptions) would be considered deportable as a “public charge.”
Overview of Noncitizen SSI Recipients
From 1986 through 1994, the number of aged or disabled noncitizen SSI recipients grew an average of 15 percent annually. Figure 1 gives past and projected numbers of noncitizens on SSI. Increased immigration has probably contributed to the growth in noncitizen SSI caseloads. Aged Recipients and Affidavits of Support
Nearly 70 percent of noncitizens on SSI are at least 65 years old. Nearly 60 percent of aged noncitizen SSI recipients have been in the country fewer than 5 years. Disabled Recipients and Translator Fraud
While disabled recipients constitute a smaller share of noncitizen cases than aged recipients, their number is growing faster, averaging 19 percent growth annually from 1986 through 1993. Some ineligible non-English-speaking applicants have obtained SSI benefits illegally with the help of translators. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed the rapid increase in the number of noncitizens receiving Supplemental Security Income (SSI) benefits.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) between 1986 and 1994, the percentage of noncitizen SSI recipients grew from 6 percent to 12 percent; (2) program outreach and eligibility expansion, limited eligibility review, and limited employment assistance for the disabled have contributed to the growth of noncitizen and citizen SSI recipients; (3) immigration provisions that do not require refugees or asylees to be sponsored or supported by a U.S. resident have also contributed to the growth of noncitizen SSI recipients; (4) almost 70 percent of noncitizen SSI recipients are at least 65 years old; (5) disabled noncitizen SSI recipients are the fastest growing recipient group, averaging 19 percent growth annually between 1986 and 1993; (6) although an exact number is not known, some non-English-speaking noncitizen SSI recipients have obtained SSI benefits illegally with the help of translators; and (7) translator fraud may have contributed to the growth in the number of disabled noncitizen recipients. |
gao_GAO-02-643T | gao_GAO-02-643T_0 | In recent years, coverage through these sources has become more expensive and less widely available. According to a recent survey, in the fall of 1999, nearly two-thirds of Medicare beneficiaries had some form of drug coverage from a supplemental insurance policy, health plan, or public program. Employer-sponsored health plans provide drug coverage to the largest segment of the Medicare population with coverage. However, there are signs that this coverage is eroding. The drug benefits the plans do offer have become less generous, increasing enrollees’ out-of-pocket costs and limiting their total drug coverage. The difference in expenditures and use between the two groups suggests that the lack of drug coverage may impose barriers to health care. Bleak Outlook for Medicare’s Long-Term Sustainability Increases Urgency for Program Reform
Without meaningful reform, the long-term financial outlook for Medicare is bleak. Although the leading prescription drug coverage proposals share certain key design features, they differ in important details, such as the amount of required cost sharing and the limit on beneficiary out-of-pocket costs. Expanding access to prescription drugs could ease the significant financial burden some Medicare beneficiaries face because of outpatient drug costs. | What GAO Found
The lack of outpatient prescription drug coverage may leave Medicare's most vulnerable beneficiaries with high out-of-pocket costs. Recent estimates suggest that, at any given time, more than a third of Medicare beneficiaries lack prescription drug coverage. The rest have some coverage through various sources--most commonly employer-sponsored health plans. Recent evidence indicates that this coverage is beginning to erode. The short- and long-term cost pressures facing Medicare will require substantial financing and programmatic reforms to put future Medicare on a sustainable footing. In the absence of a drug benefit, many Medicare beneficiaries obtain coverage through health plans, public programs, and the Medigap insurance market. The price, availability, and level of such coverage varies widely, leaving substantial gaps and exposure to high out-of-pocket costs for thousands. Despite pressures to adopt a prescription drug benefit, the rapidly rising cost of current obligations argues for careful deliberation and extreme caution in expanding benefits. GAO's long-term simulations show that the aging of the baby boomers and rising per capita health care spending will, absent meaningful reform, lead to massive fiscal challenges in future years. |
gao_GAO-02-34 | gao_GAO-02-34_0 | FOIA requests are specifically excluded under Section 1085 and the DOD regulations implementing the User Charge Statute. Section 1085 permits each of the four archives to develop its own fee schedule provided that the fees charged do not exceed the costs of providing the information. One of the factors affecting Section 1085 implementation decisions by the four archives is that they were already authorized under both the User Charge Statute and FOIA to charge for information provided to the public. However, neither of these statutes authorizes the military archives to retain fees collected in providing general information to the public to defray costs. Archives’ Fees Not in Accordance With DOD Mandated Fees
All of the four primary archives charge fees for providing historical information to requesters. As with User Charges, DOD fee schedules for charges under FOIA are not current. Conclusions
Because of DOD’s inconsistent use of authority to charge fees and use of outdated fees schedules, the archives and other providers of public information throughout DOD have not collected a million dollars or more annually in user fees and have treated public requesters inconsistently. | What GAO Found
The National Defense Authorization Act for 2001 authorized the military archives to (1) charge fees to persons requesting information and (2) retain collected fees to help defray costs of providing the information. Although none of the archives has yet implemented a fee, one archive plans to do so by October 2001. The Department of Defense's (DOD) archives and other offices are also authorized under both the User Charge Statute and the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) to charge for information provided to the public. However, neither of these statutes authorizes an agency to retain those fees. The four designated archives are charging fees to public requesters but are not using the fee schedule mandated by the DOD regulation implementing the User Charge Statute. Similarly, DOD's fee schedules for charges under FOIA are outdated. DOD's inconsistent use of the authority to charge fees and the use of outdated DOD fees schedules result in uncollected fees of a million dollars or more annually and inconsistent handling of public requests for historical information. |
gao_GAO-10-456 | gao_GAO-10-456_0 | NOAA, NASA, and DOD are currently developing the next generation of operational polar-orbiting environmental satellites, called NPOESS. In contrast, climate data records identify longer term variations in the climate and include observations of the land, ocean, and atmosphere. These interagency working groups are overseen by offices within the Executive Office of the President. These restructuring efforts involved removing selected climate and space weather instruments. On the GOES-R program, NOAA removed an advanced instrument that was important to the weather and climate community. The agencies have not yet made any plans to restore the capabilities of a sixth NPOESS instrument, and NOAA has not yet made plans to restore the capabilities of the GOES-R instrument. Federal Efforts to Ensure the Long-term Provision of Satellite Climate Data Are Insufficient
For over a decade, the climate community has clamored for an interagency strategy to coordinate agency priorities, budgets, and schedules for environmental satellites over the long term—and the governance structure to implement that strategy. However, the report does not include costs, schedules, or plans for the long-term provision of satellite data. Without Landsat or a similar Until an interagency strategy for earth observation is established, and a clear process for implementing it is in place, federal agencies will continue to procure their immediate priorities on an ad hoc basis, the economic benefits of a coordinated approach to investments in earth observation may be lost, and the continuity of key measurements may be lost. This will hinder our nation’s ability to understand long-term climate changes. Federal Agencies Lack a Strategy for the Long-term Provision of Space Weather Data
While key federal agencies have taken steps to plan for continued space weather observations in the near term, they lack a strategy for the long- term provision of space weather data. However, this plan has not yet been implemented. However, OSTP officials do not have a schedule for approving or releasing the reports. Until OSTP releases the reports, it will not be clear whether they provide a clear strategy to ensure the long-term provision of space weather data—or whether the current efforts are simply ad hoc attempts to ensure short- term data continuity. Without a comprehensive long-term strategy for the provision of space weather data, agencies may make ad hoc decisions to ensure continuity in the near term and risk making inefficient decisions on key investments. Conclusions
Almost 4 years after key climate and space weather instruments were removed from the NPOESS and GOES-R satellite programs, there are still significant gaps in future satellite coverage. While individual agencies have taken steps to restore selected capabilities in the near term, gaps in coverage ranging from 1 to 11 years are expected beginning as soon as 2015. Recommendations for Executive Action
In order to effectively address our country’s need for sustained environmental observations, we recommend that the Assistant to the President for Science and Technology, in collaboration with key Executive Office of the President entities (including the Office of Science and Technology Policy, the Office of Management and Budget, the Council on Environmental Quality, and the National Science and Technology Council), take the following four actions: Establish a firm deadline for the completion and release of three key reports on environmental observations: USGEO’s report on near-term priorities and opportunities in earth observations, called the Strategic Assessment Report; The National Space Weather Program’s report on how to address the loss of the Advanced Composition Explorer capabilities; and The National Space Weather Program’s report on how to address the space weather capabilities that were removed from the NPOESS program. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to (1) assess plans to restore capabilities that were originally planned for, but then removed from, the National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS) and Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite-R series (GOES-R) satellites; (2) evaluate the adequacy of federal efforts to establish a strategy for the long- term provision of satellite-provided climate data; and (3) evaluate the adequacy of federal efforts to establish a strategy for the long-term provision of satellite-provided space weather data. | Why GAO Did This Study
Environmental satellites provide data on the earth and its space environment that are used for forecasting the weather, measuring variations in climate over time, and predicting space weather. In planning for the next generation of these satellites, federal agencies originally sought to fulfill weather, climate, and space weather requirements. However, in 2006, federal agencies restructured two key satellite acquisitions, the National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS) and the Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite-R series (GOES-R). This involved removing key climate and space weather instruments. GAO was asked to (1) assess plans for restoring the capabilities that were removed from the two key satellite acquisitions, (2) evaluate federal efforts to establish a strategy for the long-term provision of satellite-provided climate data, and (3) evaluate federal efforts to establish a strategy for the longterm provision of satellite-provided space weather data. To do so, GAO analyzed agency plans and reports.
What GAO Found
After key climate and space weather instruments were removed from the NPOESS and GOES-R programs in 2006, federal agencies decided to restore selected capabilities in the near term. However, neither the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) nor the Department of Defense (DOD) has established plans to restore the full set of NPOESS capabilities over the life of the program. Further, NOAA has not made any plans to restore the advanced climate capabilities of the instrument that was removed from GOES-R. Expected gaps in coverage for the instruments that were removed range from 1 to 11 years, and begin as soon as 2015. Until these capabilities are in place, the agencies will not be able to provide key environmental data that are important for sustaining climate and space weather measurements. For over a decade, federal agencies and the climate community have clamored for a national interagency strategy to coordinate agency priorities, budgets, and schedules for environmental satellite observations over the long-term-- and the governance structure to implement that strategy. In mid-2009, a White House-sponsored interagency working group drafted a report that identifies and prioritizes near-term opportunities for environmental observations; however, the plan has not been approved by key entities within the Executive Office of the President and there is no schedule for finalizing it. In addition, the report does not address costs, schedules, or the long-term provision of satellite data, and there is no process or time frame for implementing it. Without a strategy for continuing environmental measurements over the coming decades and a means for implementing it, agencies will continue to independently pursue their immediate priorities on an ad hoc basis, the economic benefits of a coordinated approach to investments in earth observation may be lost, and our nation's ability to understand climate change may be limited. While federal agencies have taken steps to plan for continued space weather observations in the near-term, they lack a strategy for the long-term provision of space weather data. NOAA and DOD plan to replace aging satellites, and an interagency space weather program drafted two reports on how to mitigate the loss of key satellites and instruments. These reports were submitted to the Executive Office of the President's Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) in the fall of 2009. However, OSTP has no schedule for approving or releasing the reports. Until OSTP approves and releases the reports, it will not be clear whether the reports provide a strategy to ensure the long-term provision of space weather data--or whether the current efforts are simply attempts to ensure short-term data continuity. Without a comprehensive longterm strategy for the provision of space weather data, agencies may make ad hoc decisions to ensure continuity in the near term and risk making inefficient investment decisions. |
gao_GAO-09-760T | gao_GAO-09-760T_0 | Coordination Mechanisms Mechanisms and networks for collaboration and coordination on pandemic preparedness between federal and state governments and the private sector exist, but they could be better utilized. Efforts Are Underway to Improve the Surveillance and Detection of Pandemic-Related Threats in Humans and Animals, but Targeting Assistance to Countries at the Greatest Risk Has Been Based on Incomplete Information
International disease surveillance and detection efforts serve as an early warning system that could prevent the spread of an influenza pandemic outbreak. A portion of the $5.62 billion that Congress appropriated in supplemental funding to HHS for pandemic preparedness in 2006—$600 million—was allocated for state and local planning and exercising. We have also reported on the need for more guidance from the federal government to help states and localities in their planning. Further Actions Are Needed to Address the Capacity to Respond to and Recover from an Influenza Pandemic
Improving the nation’s response capability to catastrophic disasters, such as an influenza pandemic, is essential. An outbreak will require additional capacity in many areas, including the procurement of additional patient treatment space and the acquisition and distribution of medical and other critical supplies, such as antivirals and vaccines for an influenza pandemic. Federal Agencies Have Provided Considerable Guidance and Pandemic-Related Information, but Could Augment Their Efforts
The National Pandemic Implementation Plan emphasizes that government and public health officials must communicate clearly and continuously with the public throughout a pandemic. Performance Monitoring and Accountability For Pandemic Preparedness Needs Strengthening
While the National Pandemic Strategy and Implementation Plan identify overarching goals and objectives for pandemic planning, the documents are not altogether clear on the roles, responsibilities, and requirements to carry out the plan. Moreover, the National Pandemic Strategy and Implementation Plan do not provide information on the financial resources needed to implement them, which is one of six characteristics of an effective national strategy that we have identified. Concluding Observations
The recent outbreak of H1N1 influenza virus should serve as a powerful reminder that the threat of a pandemic influenza, which seemed to fade from public awareness in recent years, never really disappeared. While federal agencies have taken action on many of our recommendations, almost half the recommendations that we have made over the past 3 years are still not fully implemented. Likewise, DHS should continue to work with other federal agencies and private sector members of the critical infrastructure coordinating councils to help address the challenges of coordination and clarify roles and responsibilities of federal and state governments. While the current H1N1 outbreak seems to have been relatively mild, it could return in a second wave this fall or winter in a more virulent form. Given this risk, the administration and federal agencies should turn their attention to filling in some of the gaps our work has pointed out, while time is still on our side. Influenza Pandemic: DOD Has Taken Important Actions to Prepare, but Accountability, Funding, and Communications Need to be Clearer and Focused Departmentwide. | Why GAO Did This Study
As the recent outbreak of the H1N1 (swine flu) virus underscores, an influenza pandemic remains a real threat to our nation and to the world. Over the past 3 years, GAO has conducted a body of work to help the nation better prepare for a possible pandemic. In a February 2009 report, GAO synthesized the results of this work, pointing out that while the previous administration had taken a number of actions to plan for a pandemic, including developing a national strategy and implementation plan, much more needs to be done, and many gaps in preparedness and planning still remain. This statement is based on the February 2009 report which synthesized the results of 11 reports and two testimonies covering six thematic areas: (1) leadership, authority, and coordination; (2) detecting threats and managing risks; (3) planning, training, and exercising, (4) capacity to respond and recover; (5) information sharing and communication; and (6) performance and accountability.
What GAO Found
(1) Leadership roles and responsibilities for an influenza pandemic need to be clarified, tested, and exercised, and existing coordination mechanisms, such as critical infrastructure coordinating councils, could be better utilized to address challenges in coordination between the federal, state, and local governments and the private sector in preparing for a pandemic. (2) Efforts are underway to improve the surveillance and detection of pandemic-related threats in humans and animals, but targeting assistance to countries at the greatest risk has been based on incomplete information, particularly from developing countries. (3) Pandemic planning and exercising has occurred at the federal, state, and local government levels, but important planning gaps remain at all levels of government. (4) Further actions are needed to address the capacity to respond to and recover from an influenza pandemic, which will require additional capacity in patient treatment space, and the acquisition and distribution of medical and other critical supplies, such as antivirals and vaccines. (5) Federal agencies have provided considerable guidance and pandemic-related information to state and local governments, but could augment their efforts with additional information on state border closures and other topics. (6) Performance monitoring and accountability for pandemic preparedness needs strengthening. For example, the May 2006 National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza Implementation Plan does not establish priorities among its 324 action items and does not provide information on the financial resources needed to implement them. The recent outbreak of the H1N1 influenza virus should serve as a powerful reminder that the threat of a pandemic influenza, which seemed to fade from public awareness in recent years, never really disappeared. While federal agencies have taken action on 13 of GAO's 23 recommendations, 10 of the recommendations that GAO has made over the past 3 years are still not fully implemented. With the possibility that the H1N1 virus could return in a more virulent form in a second wave in the fall or winter, the administration and federal agencies should turn their attention to filling in the planning and preparedness gaps GAO's work has pointed out. |
gao_HEHS-95-138 | gao_HEHS-95-138_0 | Health Centers Participating in Managed Care Continue to Provide Medical and Enabling Services to Their Communities
Changes in the health care delivery environment are impacting community health centers as more and more health centers participate in prepaid managed care arrangements. This is due to revenue increases from a variety of sources, such as federal funding other than health center grants. Using another measure to determine financial vulnerability—cash balances—all 10 centers had limited cash balances. For centers with more than 15 percent of their total revenue from prepaid managed care, low cash balances could be a problem if they encounter significant unexpected expenses resulting from inadequate capitation rates or assumption of risk for nonprimary care services. 1.) 2). In addition to agreeing to provide primary care services, four health centers have assumed financial responsibility for referrals, hospitalization, or both in return for a higher capitation rate. 4). Between 1989 and 1993, 7 of the 10 health centers increased their spending on subsidized low-income care; that is, the amount of spending for free care and the remaining portion of care that uninsured low-income patients are unable to cover (see fig. 5). 6). Medicaid prepaid managed care income also contributed modestly to fund balance increases. In 1993, three centers reported losses of up to $124,000 from prepaid managed care. During the same year, six centers reported excess prepaid managed care revenues of up to $100,000 after paying the cost of care for medical services and administrative expenses. Lessons Learned From Health Center Experience With Prepaid Managed Care
While the health centers we visited are now providing medical and enabling services to their communities, some initially faced several problems that are likely to confront other health centers as states expand Medicaid managed care. Today’s debate over possible changes in federal and state health programs—including Medicaid and other health grant programs, important funding streams for health centers, and the lack of available cash at all 10 centers—heightens the concern over the financial vulnerability of centers participating in prepaid managed care. To determine whether health centers were encountering financial difficulties while engaged in prepaid managed care operations, we compiled data on their financial positions. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO reviewed the effects of managed health care on community health centers, focusing on: (1) whether centers participating in prepaid managed care have been able to provide medical services without jeopardizing their financial position; (2) lessons learned from centers' experiences in prepaid managed care; and (3) whether the Bureau of Primary Health Care (BPHC) prepares community health centers to operate under prepaid managed care systems.
What GAO Found
GAO found that by 1993: (1) almost 500,000 community health center patients were covered by prepaid managed care arrangements; (2) the 10 centers surveyed were able to continue to provide full services to their vulnerable clients in part due to other revenue sources; (3) all 10 centers increased their patient load and spending for a variety of services, while 7 centers also increased their spending for uncompensated care; (4) all 10 centers improved their financial condition due to increased revenues from a variety of sources; and (5) 3 centers had losses of up to $124,000, while 6 centers had excess revenues of up to $100,000 from prepaid managed care. GAO also found that: (1) the centers may be financially vulnerable if they depend on Medicaid prepaid managed care for a sizeable portion of their revenues, have inadequate capitation rates, and have financial responsibility for other than primary care services or rely on other federal and state funding sources; (2) lessons learned from centers' experiences with prepaid managed care include the likely loss of patients if the centers fail to participate, low capitation rates, assumption of too much financial risk, and the lack of managed care skills; and (3) to encourage centers' participation in prepaid managed care, BPHC has implemented an initiative to fund centers' efforts to develop delivery networks with other health providers for managed care operations. |
gao_GAO-13-265 | gao_GAO-13-265_0 | FCC manages spectrum use for nonfederal users, including commercial, private, and state and local government users. Selected Manufacturers and Commercial Licensees Have Taken a Variety of Actions to Improve Receiver Performance
To improve receiver performance, manufacturers and commercial licensees have developed voluntary standards that are used to design and procure receiver equipment for some services. Voluntary Industry Standards
Some industry-led organizations have adopted voluntary standards for receivers. For example, the National Institute of Standards and Technology—in partnership with other industry representatives, the public safety community, and other government agencies—has a testing process for public-safety land mobile radios. The Federal Government Has Used Standards, Procurement, and Other Actions to Improve Receiver Performance
To improve receiver performance, federal spectrum users have mandated use of industry standards for receivers, specified system requirements to procure equipment, and negotiated with other spectrum users to resolve interference concerns. NTIA has mandated the use of standards for many federal spectrum users while FCC has not done so for nonfederal spectrum users, but both spectrum management agencies have taken actions to resolve specific cases of interference and conducted research to improve receiver performance. FCC has not set mandatory receiver standards for nonfederal spectrum users. Therefore, FCC has generally relied on the marketplace to incentivize nonfederal licensees and manufacturers to produce receivers that can reject unwanted signals and limit interference. These challenges include the lack of coordination across industries when developing receiver standards, the lack of incentives to improve receivers, and the difficulty accommodating a changing spectrum environment. Lack of Coordination among Those Developing Standards
Standards are often developed for a single industry operating within a defined area of spectrum, such as the cellular industry. As one industry researcher explained, there are no incentives for manufacturers to build more robust receivers, primarily because the manufacturers will not receive the benefits. As FCC attempts to accommodate new services and users, the Commission often alters how licensees can use spectrum bands. Moreover, several stakeholders we interviewed also said that it would be difficult and could take considerable time to upgrade or replace receivers and equipment currently in use once deployed. Stakeholders and Reports Identified Standards, Interference Limits, and Other Options to Improve Receiver Performance
Given the challenges that exist to improving receiver performance, stakeholders we interviewed identified options that could be taken or led by FCC and NTIA, with the aim of increasing spectrum efficiency. In fact, many stakeholders we interviewed indicated that each case of adjacent-band interference is unique, so a one-size-fits-all solution is likely not desirable or possible. FCC, NTIA, and others have studied many of these options, and at a conceptual level, the advantages and disadvantages are well known. Therefore, the practical effects of each option, that is, what would happen if the option is implemented, are not well known. Additional Information on Spectrum Use
Many stakeholders we interviewed said that additional transparency and sharing of information on spectrum use and system characteristics by FCC and NTIA could help mitigate interference problems involving receivers by facilitating greater understanding of the systems already in place and thus the potential for interference to arise from the deployment of a new system in adjacent spectrum. Several options have not been implemented, such as safe harbor standards and interference limits, and others, such as mandatory standards, have only been implemented for certain federal users, and it is unclear how these experiences would translate to nonfederal users. Recommendation for Executive Action
To improve receiver performance and spectrum efficiency, we recommend that the Chairman of the Federal Communications Commission consider collecting information on the practical effects of various options to improve receiver performance, including consideration of small-scale pilot tests of these options. In particular, the report provides information on (1) actions taken by selected manufacturers and commercial licensees to improve receiver performance; (2) actions taken by the federal government to improve receiver performance; (3) challenges, if any, to improving receiver performance; and (4) options identified by stakeholders and reports to improve receiver performance. Scope and Methodology
To address the engagement’s objectives, we reviewed relevant statutes and regulations, and Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) documents related to spectrum management, interference, and transmission systems, with a focus on receivers. | Why GAO Did This Study
The growth of commercial wirelessbroadband services and government missions, including public safety and defense, has increased demand for radio-frequency spectrum. FCC and NTIA attempt to meet this demand while protecting existing users from harmful interference that can arise as new services and users come on line. To manage harmful interference, FCC and NTIA have historically focused on transmitters—the equipment that emitssignals. But, receivers also play a role. Congress and others are considering if further action to improve receiver performance to reduce harmful interference could help enhance spectrum efficiency and meet the growing demand for spectrum.
The Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2012 directed GAO to study spectrum efficiency and receiver performance; GAO studied four areas related to improving receiver performance, including (1) actions taken by manufacturers and commercial licensees, (2) actions taken by the federal government, (3) challenges, and (4) options identified by stakeholders. GAO reviewed federal regulations and reports prepared by FCC, NTIA, industry stakeholders, and other researchers, and interviewed spectrum users, industry associations, and other stakeholders.
What GAO Found
Manufacturers and commercial licensees have taken a variety of actions to improve receiver performance. For some services, industry associations-- comprised of manufacturers, commercial licensees, and others--have developed voluntary standards that are often used to design and procure receivers, such as those in cell phones and televisions, and to help improve receiver performance. Stakeholders also reported privately negotiating to resolve interference problems and sharing of information as having helped improve receiver performance.
The federal government has used standards and taken other actions to improve receiver performance. Some federal spectrum users, like the Coast Guard and Department of Transportation, have specified or mandated use of industry standards for receivers using certain agency spectrum-based services. The National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA), which manages the federal government's use of spectrum, has also mandated receiver standards for many federal spectrum assignments, such as those for land mobile radios used by emergency responders and radar systems. The Federal Communications Commission (FCC), which manages commercial and other nonfederal spectrum use, believes it lacks general authority to impose receiver standards and rather relies on the marketplace to improve receiver performance. In specific cases, FCC has provided incentives for nonfederal spectrum users to improve receivers. Both NTIA and FCC have taken additional actions to improve receiver performance, like undertaking studies and hosting public workshops.
Although industry and government have taken actions, stakeholders identified three challenges to improving receiver performance:
Lack of coordination across industries when developing voluntary standards: Standards are often developed for a single industry and not coordinated with those using adjacent spectrum.
Lack of incentives for manufacturers or spectrum users to incur costs associated with using more robust receivers: The benefits of improved receiver performance, namely freed-up spectrum for new services and users, often accrue to others and not those incurring the costs to improve receivers.
Difficulty accommodating a changing spectrum environment: When spectrum is repurposed for a new use, upgrading or replacing receivers currently in use to mitigate interference can be difficult and take considerable time.
In addition to greater use of voluntary industry standards, stakeholders GAO interviewed identified several other options to improve receiver performance. For example, interference limits would explicitly set a level of interfering signals that a receiver must tolerate before a user could seek government action to resolve interference problems. Each option entails trade-offs, and many stakeholders noted that a one-size-fits-all solution is likely not desirable or possible. Further, some options, such as interference limits, have not been implemented, and others, such as mandatory standards, have only been implemented for a limited number of users, primarily federal users. Therefore, the practical effects of these options--that is, what would happen if these options were individually or collectively implemented--are not well known, particularly for nonfederal users.
What GAO Recommends
FCC should consider collecting information on the practical effects of options to improve receiver performance. FCC replied that it had initiated such a fact-gathering process; GAO believes FCC's process to date may not provide information on the practical effects of these options. |
gao_GAO-11-289 | gao_GAO-11-289_0 | The FSWG Has Taken Steps Designed to Improve Collaboration among Federal Agencies but Has Not Developed a Comprehensive Governmentwide Performance Plan for Food Safety
Creation of the FSWG by the President in March 2009 elevated food safety as a national priority, demonstrated strong commitment and top leadership support, and was designed to foster interagency collaboration on this crosscutting issue. However, the FSWG has not developed a governmentwide performance plan that provides a comprehensive picture of the federal government’s food safety efforts. Nevertheless, through the FSWG, federal agencies have taken steps designed to increase collaboration in some areas that cross regulatory jurisdictions––in particular, improving produce safety, reducing Salmonella contamination, and developing food safety performance measures. When we added food safety oversight to our high-risk list in 2007, we said that what remains to be done is to develop a governmentwide performance plan for food safety that is mission based, results oriented, and provides a cross-agency perspective. Officials from OMB, FDA, and USDA told us the FSWG’s July 2009 “key findings” represent the governmentwide plan for food safety. Our prior work has identified results oriented goals and performance measures as standard elements of performance plans. In addition, the key findings do not include information about the resources that are needed to achieve the FSWG’s goals. We and Others Have Identified Options to Reduce Fragmentation and Overlap in Food Safety Oversight, but They Have Not Been Analyzed in Detail
We, the National Academy of Sciences, the Produce Safety Project, and the former President’s Council on Food Safety have identified options to reduce fragmentation and overlap in food safety oversight in the form of alternative organizational structures (see app. III), but a detailed analysis of their advantages and disadvantages and the potential challenges that could arise if they are implemented has yet to be conducted. In 2001, we first suggested that Congress consider commissioning the National Academy of Sciences or a blue ribbon panel to conduct a detailed analysis of alternative organizational structures for food safety and reiterated the suggestion over the years, most recently in the 2011 high-risk list update. Some of the alternative organizational structures that we and others have identified include: Single food safety agency. Food safety inspection agency. Data collection and risk analysis center. Coordination mechanism. We recognize that reorganizing federal food safety responsibilities would be a complex process. We and other organizations have regularly paired proposals for alternative food safety organizations with calls for comprehensive, unified, risk-based food safety legislation. While the new food safety law strengthens a major part of the food safety system and expands FDA’s oversight authority, it does not apply to the federal food safety system as a whole or create a new risk- based food safety structure. However, without an annually updated governmentwide performance plan for food safety that contains results-oriented goals and performance measures and a discussion of strategies and resources used by the agencies with food safety responsibilities, decision makers do not have a comprehensive picture of the federal government’s performance on this crosscutting issue. The performance plan should include results-oriented goals and performance measures for food safety oversight throughout the federal government, as well as a discussion about strategies and resources. OMB declined to comment on the draft report. USDA and Health and Human Services provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
A new statutory requirement mandates that GAO identify programs, agencies, offices, and initiatives with duplicative goals and activities within departments and governmentwide. Under that mandate this review examines: (1) steps, if any, that the Food Safety Working Group (FSWG) has taken to increase collaboration among federal food safety agencies, and (2) options we and others have identified to reduce fragmentation, overlap, and potential duplication in food safety oversight. To complete our work we reviewed food safety reports and legislation, and interviewed officials from the Department of Agriculture (USDA), the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). | Why GAO Did This Study
For more than a decade, GAO has reported on the fragmented nature of federal food safety oversight and how it results in inconsistent oversight, ineffective coordination, and inefficient use of resources. In 2007, GAO added this issue to its high-risk list. In March 2009, the President established the Food Safety Working Group (FSWG) to coordinate federal efforts and establish food safety goals to make food safer. Section 21 of Public Law 111-139 mandated that GAO identify programs, agencies, offices, and initiatives with duplicative goals and activities. This review examines: (1) steps, if any, that the FSWG has taken to increase collaboration among federal food safety agencies, and (2) options we and others have identified to reduce fragmentation, overlap, and potential duplication in food safety oversight. GAO reviewed information about the FSWG and alternative organizational structures for food safety, and conducted interviews.
What GAO Found
Creation of the FSWG elevated food safety as a national priority, demonstrated strong commitment and top leadership support, and was designed to foster interagency collaboration on this cross-cutting issue. The FSWG includes officials from the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and other federal agencies. Through the FSWG, federal agencies have taken steps designed to increase collaboration in some areas that cross regulatory jurisdictions--in particular, improving produce safety, reducing Salmonella contamination, and developing food safety performance measures. However, the FSWG has not developed a governmentwide performance plan for food safety that provides a comprehensive picture of the federal government's food safety efforts. When GAO added food safety oversight to its high-risk list in 2007, it said that what remains to be done is to develop a governmentwide performance plan for food safety that is mission based, results oriented, and provides a cross-agency perspective. Officials from OMB, FDA, and USDA told us that the FSWG's July 2009 "key findings" represent the governmentwide plan for food safety. However, most of the goals outlined in the key findings are not results oriented and do not include performance measures. Further, the FSWG has not provided information about the resources that are needed to achieve its goals. Our prior work has identified results oriented goals and performance measures and a discussion of strategies and resources as standard elements of performance plans. GAO and other organizations have identified options to reduce fragmentation and overlap in food safety oversight in the form of alternative organizational structures, but a detailed analysis of their advantages, disadvantages, and potential implementation challenges has yet to be conducted. GAO has suggested that Congress consider commissioning the National Academy of Sciences or a blue ribbon panel to conduct a detailed analysis of alternative organizational structures for food safety. Some of the alternative organizational structures include a single food safety agency, a food safety inspection agency, a data collection and risk analysis center, and a coordination mechanism led by a central chair. GAO recognizes that reorganizing federal food safety responsibilities would be a complex process that could have short-term disruptions and transition costs. GAO and other organizations have regularly paired proposals for alternative food safety organizations with calls for comprehensive, unified, risk-based food safety legislation. New food safety legislation that was signed into law in January 2011 strengthens a major part of the food safety system; however, it does not apply to the federal food safety system as a whole or create a new risk-based food safety structure.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the Director of OMB, in consultation with the federal food safety agencies, develop a governmentwide performance plan for food safety that includes results oriented goals and performance measures for food safety oversight and a discussion about strategies and resources. OMB declined to comment on a draft of this report. USDA and Health and Human Services provided technical comments. |
gao_RCED-99-102 | gao_RCED-99-102_0 | The range of these caribou is restricted to a relatively small area in southeastern British Columbia and extreme northeastern Washington and northern Idaho. These included collecting information on and managing caribou habitat, determining caribou population characteristics, maintaining the population through various efforts to reduce caribou mortality, and informing and involving the public and agency personnel about caribou and caribou management. An Estimated $4.7 Million Has Been Spent for Caribou Recovery
From 1984, when woodland caribou were listed as endangered under ESA, through 1998, federal and state agencies in the United States and British Columbia’s Ministry of Environment, Lands and Parks spent an estimated $4.7 million on efforts to recover the southern Selkirk population. FWS’ Expenditures
FWS estimated that its expenditures on the woodland caribou recovery program totaled about $3.2 million. The Idaho Department of Fish and Game and the Washington Department of Fish and Wildlife performed the recovery work using the grants primarily to fund activities related to augmenting the existing southern Selkirk population, including monitoring the distribution, movement, and survival of the transplanted caribou. Forest Service’s Expenditures
The Forest Service estimated that it spent about $781,000 on caribou recovery efforts from 1984 through 1998. This limitation is due to a lack of historical program expenditure records. Although the recovery program has not succeeded in establishing two new self-sustaining herds in the United States as planned, it has mapped caribou habitat in the recovery zone, developed habitat management guidelines, and completed research on certain aspects of caribou ecology. Because so many transplanted and some resident caribou have died, the increase in the overall size of the southern Selkirk population is relatively small. However, predation, mainly by cougars, is the most common known cause of death. The remaining Idaho transplants have died, left the southern Selkirk Mountains, or congregated with the core population centered around Stagleap Provincial Park. Program’s Limited Impact on Land Use
According to recovery program officials, the impact on land use due specifically to caribou recovery efforts has been relatively minor. Specifically, some restrictions have been placed on timber harvesting within the recovery zone, and a small portion of the recovery zone has been closed to snowmobiling. However, the availability of caribou for further augmenting the population, if needed, is uncertain. However, an overriding concern of the officials involved in these planning efforts is whether adequate funding will be available from the cooperating agencies to accomplish these high-priority tasks. Accordingly, a study of cougar predation has already been initiated. In commenting on our report, the British Columbia Ministry of Environment, Lands and Parks stated that it supports the following priorities for caribou recovery in the southern Selkirks: (1) ensure a commitment to maintain funding for future recovery tasks; (2) produce a consolidated map of caribou habitat for British Columbia, Idaho, and Washington; (3) establish agreements for zoning and protecting critical winter habitats; (4) minimize recreational disturbance within those habitats; (5) proceed with a caribou/cougar morality study, including an action plan to deal with cougars identified as killing caribou; and (6) expand information and education programs to obtain public support for caribou recovery. They received $140,000 and $96,000, respectively. To determine the results of the recovery program, including the outcome of augmentation efforts and the impact of recovery efforts on land use, we interviewed officials from agencies participating in caribou recovery efforts. 1. 2. 3. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on the Caribou Recovery Program, focusing on the: (1) amount and source of funds expended on the woodland caribou recovery program; (2) results of the program, including the outcome of efforts to augment the population and the impact of the recovery efforts on land use; and (3) future direction of the recovery program.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the United States and British Columbia spent an estimated $4.7 million on efforts to restore the woodland caribou population from 1984 through 1998; (2) the Fish and Wildlife Service provided the majority of these funds, spending about $3.2 million; (3) these funds were used primarily for increasing the existing caribou population by transplanting other caribou to the southern Selkirk Mountains and conducting follow-up monitoring; (4) the Forest Service and British Columbia estimated that they spent about $781,000 and $31,000, respectively, on caribou recovery efforts; (5) the caribou recovery program has achieved modest gains; (6) however, despite these efforts, the overall size of the southern Selkirk population has increased by only about 18 animals, to a total of about 48; (7) the recovery program also has not achieved its goal of establishing two new self-sustaining herds, one in Idaho and another in Washington; (8) this limited population increase is due to high mortality among transplanted caribou and the deaths of some resident caribou; (9) although the cause of death is unknown for many caribou, researchers believe that predation, mainly by cougars, is the most common cause; (10) the recovery program has succeeded in mapping caribou habitat, developing caribou habitat management guidelines, completing research on various aspects of caribou ecology, developing information and education programs, providing law enforcement, and monitoring the caribou population; (11) the impact on land use due specifically to caribou recovery efforts has been relatively minor; (12) according to the Forest Service, some restrictions have been placed on timber harvesting and a small portion of the caribou habitat has been closed to snowmobiling; (13) officials involved in planning future caribou recovery efforts agreed that, for the immediate future, the program's highest priority is to maintain the core population of caribou centered around Stagleap Provincial Park; (14) the range of this population includes northeastern Washington and northern Idaho, as well as southeastern British Columbia; (15) however, the availability of caribou for further augmenting the population is uncertain; (16) another high-priority task will be to investigate the causes of and manage caribou mortality; (17) the cooperating agencies recently initiated a study of cougar populations and their predation on caribou in the southern Selkirks; and (18) an overriding concern of officials involved in planning future recovery efforts is whether there will be adequate funding for the program. |
gao_GAO-13-72 | gao_GAO-13-72_0 | In the United States, coal is primarily used to generate electricity—over 90 percent of coal was used to generate about 42 percent of electricity in 2011. Two broad trends—recent environmental regulations and changing market conditions—are affecting power companies’ decisions related to coal-fueled electricity generating units. The majority of coal produced in the United States is used domestically, though exports represent a small but recently growing fraction of U.S. coal production. Some of these scenarios are especially relevant to the question of coal’s future, because they address factors currently affecting the industry, such as the prices of coal and natural gas—a fuel that competes with coal—and possible future policies to address climate change. Retirements, Retrofits, and New Construction May Result in a Smaller but Cleaner Coal- Fueled Electricity Generating Fleet
The nation’s fleet of coal-fueled electricity generating units may have less total generating capacity in the future, and the fleet may be capable of emitting lower levels of pollutants, according to available information. Power Companies Are Planning to Retire a Significant Number of Older, Smaller, More Polluting Units
According to forecasts we reviewed, power companies may retire a significant number of coal-fueled units in the future. To assess the types of units that may be retired, we analyzed data on current power company plans to retire coal-fueled units. Based on our statistical analysis of these plans, power companies are more likely to plan to retire units that are older, smaller, and more polluting. Many Units May Be Retrofitted with Pollution Control Equipment
As we reported in July 2012, power companies may retrofit many coal- fueled electricity generating units with new or upgraded pollution control equipment in response to new environmental regulatory requirements.Though the requirements and deadlines these regulations may establish for generating units are somewhat uncertain at this time, EPA’s analyses and two other studies we reviewed in our prior report suggest that one- third to three-quarters of all coal-fueled capacity could be retrofitted or upgraded with some combination of pollution control equipment, including scrubbers and other technologies to reduce SO, mercury, and other emissions. The total capacity of coal-fueled electricity generating units in the United States may decline in the future as less capacity is expected to be built than is expected to retire. Coal's share of total electricity generating capacity was about 30 percent in 2011. Coal Likely to Remain a Key Fuel Source, but Future Use May Be Affected by Fuel Prices, Environmental Regulations, and Other Factors
Coal is likely to continue to be a key fuel source for electricity generation in the United States, but its share as a source of electricity is expected to decline, and the future use of coal to generate electricity in the United States may be affected by several key factors that include the price of natural gas and other competing fuels, environmental regulations, and the demand for electricity, among others. Coal Likely to Continue to Be a Key Source of Electricity in the Future, though Its Share Is Generally Expected to Decline in the United States
According to stakeholders we interviewed and projections by EIA, IEA, and IHS Global Insight, coal is likely to continue to be a key fuel source for U.S. electricity generation, but its share as a source of electricity is generally expected to decline in the future. Furthermore, in its reference scenario, EIA estimates that coal will represent 38 percent of U.S. electricity generation in 2035 under current policies––down from 42 percent in 2011.amount of electricity generated using coal is expected to remain relatively constant over this same period under EIA’s reference scenario, growing by 0.1 percent annually. However, the amount of electricity generated using some other fuel sources, for example, natural gas and renewables, will increase at higher annual rates—1.4 percent and 2.3 percent respectively—diminishing coal’s total share of electricity generation. EPA's Office of Air and Radiation did provide technical comments and stated that the report contained a very good description of many of the changes going on in coal and electricity markets that are affecting the use of coal to generate electricity. Appendix I: Analysis of Characteristics of Coal-Fueled Generating Units That Power Companies Plan to Retire
This appendix describes our statistical analysis of characteristics of coal- fueled electricity generating units, such as age and size, that are likely to affect power companies’ plans to retire certain units. Analysis Indicates Units Power Companies Likely to Consider Retiring
The next step in our analysis was to use the resulting logit regression equation to estimate the number and generating capacity of other coal- fueled units that companies are likely to consider retiring among units belonging to companies that have not, as of yet, announced plans to retire coal-fueled units. If we add these units to those that power companies have announced for retirement, the total of coal-fueled retirements could range from 264 to 312 units by 2020, amounting to from 46,100 to 55,600 MW of capacity and average annual generation of 241 to 301 million MWh.percentage terms, this would be 15 to 18 percent of the capacity and 13 to 16 percent of the generation of the current coal-fueled fleet of generating units. Coal Power Plants: Opportunities Exist for DOE to Provide Better Information on the Maturity of Key Technologies to Reduce Carbon Dioxide Emissions. | Why GAO Did This Study
Coal is a key domestic fuel source and an important contributor to the U.S. economy. Most coal produced in the United States is used to generate electricity. In 2011, 1,387 coal-fueled electricity generating units produced about 42 percent of the nation's electricity. After decades of growth, U.S. coal production and consumption have fallen, primarily due to declines in the use of coal to generate electricity.
According to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), using coal to generate electricity is associated with health and environmental concerns such as emissions of sulfur dioxide, a pollutant linked to respiratory illnesses, and carbon dioxide, a greenhouse gas linked to climate change. In response to recent environmental regulations and changing market conditions, such as the recent decrease in the price of natural gas, power companies may retire some units, which could affect the coal fleet's generating capacity--the ability to generate electricity--and the amount of electricity generated from coal. Power companies may also retrofit some units by installing controls to reduce pollutants.
GAO was asked to examine (1) how the fleet of coal-fueled electricity generating units may change in the future in terms of its generating capacity and other aspects and (2) the future use of coal to generate electricity in the United States and key factors that could affect it. GAO conducted a statistical analysis of plans for retiring coal-fueled units, interviewed stakeholders, and reviewed information on industry plans and long-term forecasts by EIA and others. GAO is not making any recommendations in this report.
What GAO Found
Retirements of older units, retrofits of existing units with pollution controls, and the construction of some new coal-fueled units are expected to significantly change the coal-fueled electricity generating fleet, making it capable of emitting lower levels of pollutants than the current fleet but reducing its future electricity generating capacity. Two broad trends are affecting power companies' decisions related to coal-fueled generating units--recent environmental regulations and changing market conditions, such as the recent decrease in the price of natural gas. Regarding retirements, forecasts GAO reviewed based on current policies project that power companies may retire 15 to 24 percent of coal-fueled generating capacity by 2035--an amount consistent with GAO's analysis. GAO's statistical analysis, examining data on power companies that have announced plans to retire coal-fueled units, found that these power companies are more likely to retire units that are older, smaller, and more polluting. For example, the units companies plan to retire emitted an average of twice as much sulfur dioxide per unit of fuel used in 2011 as units that companies do not plan to retire. Based on the characteristics of the units companies plan to retire, GAO estimated additional capacity that may retire. In total, GAO identified 15 to 18 percent of coal-fueled capacity that power companies either plan to retire or that GAO estimated may retire--an amount consistent with the forecasts GAO reviewed. Regarding retrofits, the coal-fueled generating fleet may also become less polluting in the future as power companies install controls on many remaining units. Regarding new coal-fueled units, these are likely to be less polluting as they must incorporate advanced technologies to reduce emissions of regulated pollutants. Coal-fueled capacity may decline in the future as less capacity is expected to be built than is expected to retire.
According to stakeholders and three long-term forecasts GAO reviewed, coal is generally expected to remain a key fuel source for U.S. electricity generation in the future, but coal's share as a source of electricity may continue to decline. For example, in its forecast based on current policies, the Energy Information Administration (EIA) forecasts that the amount of electricity generated using coal is expected to remain relatively constant through 2035, but it forecasts that the share of coal-fueled electricity generation will decline from 42 percent in 2011 to 38 percent in 2035. Available information suggests that the future U.S. use of coal may be determined by several key factors, including the price of natural gas and environmental regulations. For example, available information suggests that the price of coal compared with other fuel sources will influence how economically attractive it is to use coal to generate electricity. EIA assessed several scenarios of future fuel prices and forecasts that coal's share of U.S. electricity generation will fall to 30 percent in 2035 if natural gas prices are low or 40 percent if natural gas prices are high. In addition, some stakeholders told GAO that the future use of coal could be significantly affected if existing environmental regulations become more stringent or if additional environmental regulations are issued. For example, EIA forecasts that two hypothetical future policies that reduce carbon dioxide emissions from the electricity sector by 46 percent and 76 percent would result in coal's share of U.S. electricity generation falling to 16 and 4 percent in 2035, respectively.
EPA provided technical comments that were incorporated as appropriate. |
gao_GAO-15-701 | gao_GAO-15-701_0 | Factors That Can Affect Trade Preference Program Performance
Various factors can affect the performance of a trade preference program. AGOA Has Differences from and Similarities to Other Countries’ Trade Preference Programs and Differences Have Affected Program Performance
AGOA has several notable differences from and similarities to other countries’ nonreciprocal trade preference programs, including programs in Canada, China, the EU, and India. Available studies of AGOA and the EU’s preference programs suggest that these differences have affected program performance in terms of creating new trade flows (trade creation), increasing the range of products that are traded (diversification), and program utilization. AGOA and Other Countries’ Programs Offer Fairly Comprehensive Duty-Free Coverage of Products, But Exclude Some Important SSA Exports
The United States, Canada, the EU, and Japan’s preference programs provide comprehensive duty-free coverage for almost all products that enter their country or region from eligible LDC beneficiaries, including most SSA countries. 2). Others, such as Japan’s, have restrictive cumulation rules. Some developed countries have made efforts to make cumulation rules less restrictive. Trade Creation
The USITC identified several studies that found that when compared with the United States, the EU has had greater overall success in increasing trade with Africa. Insights from Recent Trade Negotiations between SSA Countries and the EU Could Inform the Direction of Future Trade Negotiations
The negotiations between SSA countries and the EU that have resulted in EPAs indicate that achieving the goal of transitioning from unilateral trade preference programs to reciprocal trade agreements with SSA countries may require many years to finalize and implement, the establishment of time frames to end access to trade preference programs, a willingness to consider limiting the initial scope of the agreements, an acknowledgment that aspects of the agreements may have trade- offs and could constrain SSA countries’ ability to integrate into the global economy. For example, although full or expanded access to EU markets may help SSA countries integrate more fully into the global economy, EPAs may diminish SSA countries’ leverage in future negotiations with other trading partners, according to trade experts. Recent Multilateral Trade Negotiations Involving SSA Countries Provide Insights That Could Inform Future Negotiations
An examination of the involvement of SSA countries in recent multilateral negotiations at the WTO yields insights about impediments to SSA country participation in multilateral negotiations, efforts to overcome those impediments, and what impact SSA country participation could have in future WTO negotiations. In part as a result, SSA country participation at the WTO has been expanding. The legislation reauthorizing AGOA states that, among other things, it is in the interest of the United States to boost trade between the United States and SSA countries and that it is a U.S. goal to stimulate economic development in Africa and diversify sources of growth in sub-Saharan Africa. The Senate report accompanying the legislation reauthorizing AGOA stated that the United States should seek all opportunities to deepen and expand its ties with SSA countries through accession by SSA countries to the WTO. Agency Comments
We are not making any recommendations in this report. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
In conducting our work, we identified and reviewed documents, data, and literature on the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) and other countries’ trade preference programs, trade agreements with AGOA countries, and sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries’ participation in multilateral trade negotiations. We selected countries and regions for comparison that are major export markets for sub-Saharan Africa, including the European Union (EU), China, and India. The information on those programs and agreements is based on interviews and both World Trade Organization (WTO) and other official sources. and representatives from think tanks To examine how selected countries’ trade preference programs compare with AGOA in terms of key characteristics and performance, we focused on those countries that had the highest levels of trade in dollar- denominated nominal terms—not adjusted for inflation—with AGOA countries and for which trade preference program information was available from official sources including the WTO, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), and country provider government documents. Country eligibility. Product coverage and exclusions. Rules of origin. Some countries that had been eligible for preferences offered by the European Union (EU) have transitioned from the EU’s preference programs to Economic Partnership Agreements. | Why GAO Did This Study
AGOA was signed into law in 2000 to offer SSA countries trade preferences that stimulate export-led economic growth and facilitate their integration into the global economy. This legislation was recently reauthorized, and the accompanying Senate report stated that the United States should seek all opportunities to deepen and expand its ties with SSA countries through accession by SSA countries to the WTO and negotiation of bilateral trade agreements. GAO was asked to identify lessons learned from other countries' trade preference programs and SSA countries' recent trade negotiation experiences.
This report (1) compares AGOA with selected countries' trade preference programs in terms of key characteristics and performance, and (2) examines AGOA countries' participation in trade negotiations. GAO reviewed and analyzed documents and data, including information from the WTO to determine what portion of the imports from AGOA countries to major trade partners could enter under preference programs. GAO also interviewed officials from U.S. government agencies, African and other foreign governments, and international organizations. GAO selected countries and regions for comparison that are major export markets for sub-Saharan Africa, including the EU, China, India, and Japan.
What GAO Found
The United States' African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) has differences from and similarities to 26 trade preference programs offered by other developed and developing countries in three key areas that can affect program performance in increasing and diversifying trade.
Country eligibility. AGOA is unique in that it focuses eligibility on sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries. Most other countries' trade preference programs do not restrict eligibility to SSA countries.
Product coverage. AGOA and some other countries' trade preference programs provide fairly comprehensive coverage of products, but exclude some agricultural and other products that are important SSA exports.
Rules of origin. Like other countries' trade preference programs, AGOA has rules of origin that determine which products qualify for coverage. Some countries, including the United States have recently made their rules of origin less restrictive, to make it easier for beneficiary countries to take greater advantage of these programs.
In 2014, the United States International Trade Commission reviewed studies comparing the performance of trade preference programs and found that the European Union's (EU) preference programs have had overall greater success in increasing trade with Africa and that AGOA had more success in increasing diversification in the range of products exported from Africa. Research on China's and India's trade preference programs suggests that their fairly new programs could have significant impacts on SSA trade and that they are among the biggest and fastest growing markets for sub-Saharan exports.
As the United States continues to pursue expanded trade and a more two-way trade relationship with African partners at the World Trade Organization (WTO) and elsewhere; SSA countries' recent participation in bilateral and multilateral trade negotiations provides insights that can inform future U.S. negotiations. For example, years of bilateral negotiations between SSA countries and the EU have recently resulted in Economic Partnership Agreements with 32 SSA countries. Trade experts and SSA and EU officials GAO spoke with provided information about these negotiations that indicates that transitioning from non-reciprocal trade preference programs, such as AGOA, to two-way trade agreements like the Economic Partnership Agreements with SSA countries may require:
many years to finalize and implement,
the establishment of timeframes to end access to trade preference programs,
a willingness to consider limiting the initial scope of the agreements, and
an acknowledgment that aspects of the agreements may have tradeoffs and could constrain SSA countries' ability to integrate into the global economy.
The involvement of SSA countries in recent multilateral negotiations at the WTO also yields important insights for U.S. agencies when negotiating with these countries. SSA and WTO officials told GAO that several Impediments, such as inadequate funding and staffing, can hamper SSA countries' ability to participate fully in multilateral negotiations. However, recent bilateral and multinational funded training and other efforts have helped expand SSA country participation at the WTO.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is not making any recommendations in this report. Agencies' technical comments on GAO's draft were incorporated into this report. |
gao_GAO-14-739 | gao_GAO-14-739_0 | However, few of the properties that HUD has determined to be suitable and were available for homeless assistance since the program’s inception received applications from homeless assistance service providers. In most cases, properties screened and determined as suitable and available may not have actually been practical for homeless service providers to use. For example, our analysis of HUD’s annual reports from 2008 through 2013 found most of the properties published as suitable and available were for off-site use only—meaning that a provider would need to physically move the property in order to use it. Homeless Assistance Providers Currently Use 81 Title V Properties for a Range of Services across the Country
The Title V homeless assistance program has provided properties with useful facilities. As of March 2014, of the 122 properties transferred since the program’s inception in 1987, 81 properties are currently in use by providers. 3). HUD officials told us that they would prefer that agencies not be required to report certain types of properties at all because they may not be useful to assist the homeless. Requiring agencies to report all properties that fall within the four broad categories—excess, surplus, underutilized, and unutilized—may not be effective for certain types of properties. Excluding certain types of properties such as “off-site use only properties” could enable HUD officials to focus on the suitable and available properties that may be more likely to assist the homeless and could help address issues of landholding agencies not reporting certain properties. Homeless Assistance Providers Expanded Services, but Some Reported Encountering Challenges in Identifying, Applying for, and Using Real Property
Of the 11 homeless assistance providers we interviewed, the eight case study providers that acquired property cited benefits from the Title V program, such as expanding services and obtaining real property at no cost. For example, although HUD reports properties in the Federal Register multiple times a year, and USICH provides links to them on its website, many homeless assistance providers may be unaware of the availability of properties. Further, HUD’s Federal Register reports list many of the same properties more than once. This may make listings even less user-friendly to providers. Homeless assistance providers and advocates we interviewed identified a number of actions that could address these challenges. Nonetheless, according to national homeless advocates, many providers remain unaware of the availability of properties. In the past, some in Congress and the executive branch have expressed concern about reporting requirements; the basic concern has been that some requirements result in reports that may be unnecessarily burdensome to produce or, in some instances, not very useful. While HUD lists information on the properties it evaluates in the Federal Register multiple times each year, as required by law, many of the listings are duplicative, and many service providers are not even aware of the Title V homeless assistance program. Matter for Congressional Consideration
To ensure that properties determined as suitable and available are more likely to be practical for homeless assistance and that Federal Register reporting is not redundant, Congress should revisit the scope of properties to be reported to HUD with respect to the types of properties that may be less likely to be useful to assist the homeless and the frequency of Federal Register reporting. However, the McKinney-Vento Homeless Assistance Act, as amended, required GSA, HHS, and HUD to promulgate implementing regulations. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To determine what is known about the identification and transfer of federal real properties for homeless assistance under Title V, we reviewed the requirements of Title V of the Act as they apply to the General Services Administration (GSA), the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), and the United States Interagency Council on Homelessness (USICH). To determine the benefits and challenges selected homeless assistance providers and national advocacy organizations reported in identifying, acquiring and using federal real property, and the potential actions that could help address those challenges, we selected eight homeless assistance organizations that acquired federal real property under the program. | Why GAO Did This Study
Title V of the McKinney-Vento Homeless Assistance Act enacted in 1987 created a program to assist the homeless, in part, by identifying unused federal real property and making it available to homeless assistance providers.
GAO was asked to review the implementation of Title V of the McKinney-Vento Homeless Assistance Act. This report examines: (1) the identification and transfer of federal real property to homeless assistance providers and (2) the benefits and challenges homeless assistance providers and national advocacy organizations reported in identifying, acquiring, and using federal real property, and the potential actions that could help to address these challenges. GAO obtained information and data from HUD and the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) on the properties reported since the program's inception and interviewed officials from GSA, HHS, and HUD. GAO also obtained views on the program from officials at (1) nine federal agencies, representing a range of size in their real property portfolios; (2) eleven homeless assistance providers (including eight that received property), representing a range of locations, size of property, and services provided; and (3) national homeless-advocacy organizations.
What GAO Found
Since inception in 1987, the nationwide Title V homeless-assistance program has transferred 122 properties from federal agencies to homeless assistance providers. Of these properties, 81 are currently being used to provide a range of homeless assistance services nationwide. Such services include transitional housing, referral services, and emergency shelter. However, few of the properties that the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) has listed as suitable and available since the program's inception received applications from homeless assistance providers. In most cases, the properties may not have actually been practical for homeless service providers to use. For example, in 2013 about 80 percent of these properties were for off-site use only—meaning that a provider would need to physically move the property in order to use it. HUD officials told us that they would prefer that agencies not be required to report certain types of properties at all, such as those for off-site use only. The current statutory requirement for agencies to report all properties that fall within four broad categories—excess, surplus, underutilized, and unutilized—may not be effective for certain types of properties. Such exclusion could allow HUD officials to focus on the suitable and available properties that may be more likely to assist the homeless.
Of the 11 homeless assistance providers we interviewed, the eight case study providers that acquired property cited benefits from the Title V homeless assistance program, such as expanding services and obtaining real property at no cost. These benefits notwithstanding, the providers identified challenges, such as identifying available properties. These findings are consistent with reports from national homeless advocacy organizations. HUD reports properties in the Federal Register multiple times a year as required. The United States Interagency Council on Homelessness (USICH), which plays a coordination role, provides a link on its website to the HUD reports. Nonetheless, according to national homeless advocates, many homeless assistance providers remain unaware of the availability of properties because the Federal Register is not user-friendly. Further, HUD lists many of the same properties more than once in the Federal Register , as required, even though they may not be useful to homeless assistance providers. In the past, some in Congress and the executive branch have raised issues about reporting requirements; the basic issue has been that some requirements result in reports that may be burdensome to produce, or not very useful. Modifying reporting requirements to reduce the frequency of reporting related to properties that are less likely to be useful to homeless providers could help, while also allowing HUD to continue to fulfill its responsibilities.
What GAO Recommends
Congress should consider changing (1) the scope of properties to be reported to HUD with respect to the types of properties that may be less likely to be useful to assist the homeless and (2) the frequency of Federal Register reporting. |
gao_GAO-10-68 | gao_GAO-10-68_0 | One method of assessing postmarket drug safety is through the collection and analysis of reports of adverse events associated with drug use. We also found in 2006 that FDA faced constraints in its access to data that allow it to monitor the safety of marketed drugs. Changes to FDA’s Postmarket Drug Safety Authority and Funding
The Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007 (FDAAA) provided the agency with additional responsibilities intended to improve its oversight of postmarket drug safety. However, as part of the MOA, FDA has transferred authority for one regulatory responsibility related to premarket drug safety from OND to OSE and plans to transfer authority for two postmarket responsibilities, but has not set a time frame for doing so. Agency officials added that coordinating some elements of the remaining responsibilities will be more complex and OSE still needs to increase its staff to assume these additional responsibilities. OSE and OND employees in our small group interviews generally identified positive outcomes from FDA’s initiatives, although most OSE employees indicated that OND still has more authority in the postmarket decision-making process. With regard to OSE’s influence in the postmarket decision-making process, 75 percent (39 of 52) of OND and OSE employees who completed our DCI indicated that OSE’s influence has increased since 2006. An employee also said that turnover among the safety project manager positions has made it difficult for the individuals holding those positions to gain experience. FDA Is Revising Its Program for Resolving Scientific Disputes but the Changes Have Not Sufficiently Addressed the Independence of the Process
FDA is revising CDER’s program for resolving scientific disputes raised by individual employees, but the changes do not sufficiently address our prior recommendation for improving the independence of the process. FDA Plans to Implement New Adverse Event Systems and Is Increasing Access to External Sources of Drug Safety Data
FDA plans to improve its identification of drug safety issues by developing new adverse event systems to collect and store adverse event reports and by increasing access to external sources of data. FDA Increased Funding for External Data Acquisition and Is Beginning to Access Data from Federal Sources
FDA increased funding for acquiring the external data that it uses to examine drug safety issues from about $5 million in fiscal year 2007, to about $28 million in fiscal year 2008. FDA Is in the Early Stages of Developing a Network of External Data Providers Intended to Enhance Its Drug Safety Surveillance
FDA is also taking steps to improve identification of safety issues by creating a network of external drug safety data providers, but the agency is in the early stages of developing it. FDA Reports That New Postmarket Drug Safety Responsibilities Have Increased Its Workload and That It Is Challenged by Competing Priorities
FDA reports that new postmarket drug safety responsibilities and other factors have led to an increased workload for which FDA has identified a need for increased staff. OND medical reviewers described challenges meeting their premarket and postmarket responsibilities. FDA indicated that since the start of fiscal year 2008, OND increased its staff from 736 to 928 and OSE increased its staff from 114 to 193. Given the estimated workload increases identified in the FDA contractor’s December 2008 review, OSE may be challenged to hire staff quickly enough to meet its increasing workload. FDA Faces Technological and Staffing Challenges That Limit Its Capacity to Conduct a Growing Number of Postmarket Safety Studies
FDA officials said that they lack adequate computational capacity and enough staff to make full use of external sources of data for drug safety studies, and FDA expects the number of such studies to grow. An official said the agency is reviewing approximately 43 candidates for potential conflicts of interest, with the goal of filling the DSaRM vacancies as soon as possible. As one of its efforts to enhance postmarket decision making, the agency plans to transfer additional authorities from OND to OSE. Transferring these authorities could help FDA better align decision-making responsibilities with the division of expertise between the two offices. Specifically, we recommended that FDA: 1. revise and implement its draft policy on major postmarket drug safety 2. clarify the Office of Surveillance and Epidemiology’s (OSE) role in FDA’s scientific advisory committee meetings involving postmarket drug safety issues, 3. improve the Center for Drug Evaluation and Research’s (CDER) dispute resolution process by revising the pilot program for resolving differing professional opinions (DPO) to increase its independence, and 4. establish a mechanism for systematically tracking OSE’s recommendations and subsequent safety actions. This manual does not specifically address the role of presentations by OSE staff in those advisory committee meetings. | Why GAO Did This Study
There have been long-standing concerns regarding the Food and Drug Administration's (FDA) oversight of postmarket drug safety. In 2006, GAO reported that FDA had not clearly defined the roles of two offices involved in making decisions about postmarket safety--the Office of New Drugs (OND) and the Office of Surveillance and Epidemiology (OSE). GAO and others reported additional concerns such as limitations in the data FDA relies on to identify postmarket drug safety issues and the systems it uses to track such issues. At that time, GAO made recommendations, including that FDA improve the independence of its program for resolving scientific disputes related to postmarket drug safety. In 2007, legislation further expanded FDA's postmarket responsibilities. This report examines the steps that FDA is taking to (1) enhance its processes for making decisions about the safety of marketed drugs, (2) improve access to data that help the agency identify drug safety issues, and (3) build its capacity to fulfill its postmarket drug safety workload. GAO reviewed FDA policies and planning documents, and interviewed FDA officials.
What GAO Found
FDA is beginning to address previously identified weaknesses in its oversight of postmarket drug safety issues, but challenges remain. The agency is changing its postmarket decision-making process as part of its Safety First Initiative, which includes formalizing interactions between OND and OSE and providing OSE with added responsibilities. The one authority FDA transferred from OND to OSE is a premarket review responsibility. FDA officials said the agency plans to transfer authority for two postmarket responsibilities for reviewing certain types of drug safety studies, but the agency does not have a time frame for their transfer. Officials said that OSE must still gain experience leading the one transferred responsibility and expand its staff before it can assume these additional responsibilities. While most of the OSE and OND employees GAO interviewed indicated that OSE's role in managing safety issues has increased since 2006, most OSE employees GAO interviewed said that OND's perspective still carries more weight in decision making. OND recently created safety management positions in each of its 17 divisions; OSE expanded its similar positions from 9 to 25, although an employee said turnover has made it difficult for the OSE managers to gain experience. FDA is also revising its program for resolving scientific disputes, but these changes have not increased its independence, as GAO recommended. FDA plans to implement new data systems and is increasing access to external data to assist with drug safety decisions. FDA plans to implement new systems in 2010 to improve the timeliness, quality, and analysis of reports of adverse events associated with human drug use. FDA has also increased funding for contracts with private companies and is in the early stages of forming partnerships with federal data holders to access external data. As mandated in the 2007 legislation, FDA is developing the Sentinel System, a network of external data providers intended to enhance drug safety surveillance, but the agency is in the early stages of developing it. FDA faces challenges meeting an expanding workload. The agency indicated that expanded responsibilities resulting from the 2007 legislation increased its workload, and both OND and OSE employees described difficulties meeting their responsibilities. FDA indicated that since fiscal year 2008, OND staff increased from 736 to 928 and OSE staff increased from 114 to 193. However, an agency review suggests that OSE may still need to more than double its staff of 193 by fiscal year 2011 to meet its new responsibilities. Although OSE has increased its staff, officials cited hiring challenges, such as competition from the private sector, that may make it difficult to hire staff quickly enough to meet the increasing workload. FDA also expects to complete a growing number of drug safety studies, but technological and staffing challenges limit its capacity to conduct these studies. To assist its decision making, FDA has increasingly sought advice from members of its external drug safety advisory committee. However, the agency has encountered difficulty filling several committee vacancies. An official said FDA is reviewing candidates with the goal of filling these vacancies as soon as possible. |
gao_GAO-11-768T | gao_GAO-11-768T_0 | Gold Reserves of the United States
The holdings of gold reserves of the United States are presented in various financial reports, including the United States Mint’s (Mint) Schedule of Custodial Deep Storage Gold and Silver Reserves (Mint’s Custodial Schedule), the Mint’s financial statements, and Treasury’s departmentwide financial statements. As of September 30, 2010, most, or approximately 95 percent, of the reported gold reserves of the United States were in the custody of the Mint. The gold reserves in the custody of the Mint are comprised of deep storage and working stock gold. Deep storage gold, which consists primarily of gold bars, represented nearly all of the gold reserves in the custody of the Mint and was maintained in three locations: the United States Bullion Depository at Fort Knox, Kentucky; the Mint at Denver, Colorado; and the Mint at West Point, New York. Working stock— which consists of bars, blanks, unsold coins, and condemned coins— represented about 1 percent of the reported gold reserves in the custody of the Mint and can be used as the raw material for minting coins. The remaining reported holdings of gold reserves of the United States were in the custody of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. Past and Current Audit Efforts Regarding Gold Reserves of the United States
In 1974, in response to congressional interest and in conjunction with the Mint, GAO assisted in the planning and observed the inventory of gold reserves of the United States maintained by the United States Bullion Depository at Fort Knox. GAO selected 3 of the 13 compartments at this depository to be audited. The audit procedures included observing and participating in a physical inventory of the entire contents of the three compartments. GAO did not report any differences between the gold stored in these compartments and the Fort Knox depository’s records. In addition, GAO’s procedures included observing the assaying of a sample of gold bars. The results of the assays indicated that the recorded finenesses were within the tolerances the Mint established. In connection with this audit, GAO recommended that the Secretary of the Treasury request the Director of the Mint to annually perform a cyclical inventory of its gold holdings to ensure that the gold holdings in all compartments would be inventoried over a specified period of years. Acting on this recommendation, Treasury established the Committee for Continuing Audits of United States Government-owned Gold (Committee for Continuing Audits) in 1975 to oversee and provide guidelines and general direction for continuing audits. The objectives of the continuing audits were to verify the accuracy of the inventory of gold and the adequacy of related accounting records and internal controls in accordance with Treasury audit policies. Independent Public Accountants’ Audits Covering Gold Reserves in the Custody of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and the Mint
The gold reserves of the United States on Treasury’s departmentwide financial statements consist of the gold reserves in the custody of the Mint and those in the custody of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. Requirements of H.R. 1495
H.R. 1495 provides for the Secretary of the Treasury to conduct and complete a full assay, inventory, and audit of gold reserves of the United States and an analysis of the sufficiency of the measures taken for the security of such reserves. In considering the provisions of H.R. 1495, it will be important to consider the cost, benefit, and timing of actions needed to implement the proposed requirements. H.R. 1495, if enacted, may result in duplication of certain past and current efforts, especially with regard to inventorying and auditing the gold reserves of the United States. Nevertheless, GAO would be capable of carrying out the required review of the results of the Secretary of the Treasury’s actions called for by the bill, should it be enacted. GAO’s review would include visits to the facilities at which the gold reserves of the United States are held to selectively observe the inventorying and auditing of the gold reserves and examinations of various documentation supporting the required assay, inventory, and audit. H.R. 1495 also provides for GAO to prepare and transmit to the Congress, not later than 9 months after enactment of the act, a report of GAO’s findings from such review together with the results of the assay, inventory, audit, and analysis conducted by the Secretary of the Treasury. | Why GAO Did This Study
This testimony discusses H.R. 1495, the Gold Reserve Transparency Act of 2011. This proposed legislation, which was recently referred to the Subcommittee on Domestic Monetary Policy and Technology, House Committee on Financial Services, provides for an audit of the gold reserves of the United States. Specifically, the bill calls for the Secretary of the Treasury to conduct and complete, not later than 6 months after passage of the act, a full assay, inventory, and audit of gold reserves of the United States at the place or places where such reserves are kept, together with an analysis of the sufficiency of the measures taken for the security of such reserves. The bill also calls for the Government Accountability Office (GAO) to review the results of such assay, inventory, audit, and analysis and, not later than 9 months after passage of the act, prepare and transmit to the Congress a report of GAO's findings together with the results of the work performed by the Secretary of the Treasury. This testimony focuses on (1) the reported holdings of gold reserves of the United States as of September 30, 2010; (2) past and current audit efforts regarding gold reserves of the United States, including those of the Department of the Treasury's (Treasury) Office of Inspector General (OIG); and (3) the requirements of H.R. 1495.
What GAO Found
The holdings of gold reserves of the United States are presented in various financial reports, including the United States Mint's (Mint) Schedule of Custodial Deep Storage Gold and Silver Reserves (Mint's Custodial Schedule), the Mint's financial statements, and Treasury's departmentwide financial statements. As of September 30, 2010, most, or approximately 95 percent, of the reported gold reserves of the United States were in the custody of the Mint. The gold reserves in the custody of the Mint are comprised of deep storage and working stock gold. Deep storage gold, which consists primarily of gold bars, represented nearly all of the gold reserves in the custody of the Mint and was maintained in three locations: the United States Bullion Depository at Fort Knox, Kentucky; the Mint at Denver, Colorado; and the Mint at West Point, New York. Working stock--which consists of bars, blanks, unsold coins, and condemned coins--represented about 1 percent of the reported gold reserves in the custody of the Mint and can be used as the raw material for minting coins. The remaining reported holdings of gold reserves of the United States were in the custody of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. In 1974, in response to congressional interest and in conjunction with the Mint, GAO assisted in the planning and observed the inventory of gold reserves of the United States maintained by the United States Bullion Depository at Fort Knox. GAO selected 3 of the 13 compartments at this depository to be audited. The audit procedures included observing and participating in a physical inventory of the entire contents of the three compartments. GAO did not report any differences between the gold stored in these compartments and the Fort Knox depository's records. In addition, GAO's procedures included observing the assaying of a sample of gold bars. The results of the assays indicated that the recorded finenesses were within the tolerances the Mint established. In connection with this audit, GAO recommended that the Secretary of the Treasury request the Director of the Mint to annually perform a cyclical inventory of its gold holdings to ensure that the gold holdings in all compartments would be inventoried over a specified period of years. Acting on this recommendation, Treasury established the Committee for Continuing Audits of United States Government-owned Gold (Committee for Continuing Audits) in 1975 to oversee and provide guidelines and general direction for continuing audits.5 The objectives of the continuing audits were to verify the accuracy of the inventory of gold and the adequacy of related accounting records and internal controls in accordance with Treasury audit policies. H.R. 1495 provides for the Secretary of the Treasury to conduct and complete a full assay, inventory, and audit of gold reserves of the United States and an analysis of the sufficiency of the measures taken for the security of such reserves. In considering the provisions of H.R. 1495, it will be important to consider the cost, benefit, and timing of actions needed to implement the proposed requirements. H.R. 1495, if enacted, may result in duplication of certain past and current efforts, especially with regard to inventorying and auditing the gold reserves of the United States. Nevertheless, GAO would be capable of carrying out the required review of the results of the Secretary of the Treasury's actions called for by the bill, should it be enacted. GAO's review would include visits to the facilities at which the gold reserves of the United States are held to selectively observe the inventorying and auditing of the gold reserves and xaminations of various documentation supporting the required assay, inventory, and audit. |
gao_GAO-03-537T | gao_GAO-03-537T_0 | The Internet Has Emerged as the Principal Tool for Exchanging Child Pornography
Historically, pornography, including child pornography, tended to be found mainly in photographs, magazines, and videos. According to experts, pornographers have traditionally exploited—and sometimes pioneered—emerging communication technologies—from the dial-in bulletin board systems of the 1970s to the World Wide Web—to access, trade, and distribute pornography, including child pornography. Web sites. In another study, focused on the availability of pornographic video files on peer-to-peer sharing networks, a sample of 507 pornographic video files retrieved with a file-sharing program included about 3.7 percent child pornography videos. Several Agencies Have Law Enforcement Responsibilities Regarding Child Pornography on Peer-to-Peer Networks
Table 2 shows the key national organizations and agencies that are currently involved in efforts to combat child pornography on peer-to-peer networks. Two organizations in the Department of Justice have responsibilities regarding child pornography: the FBI and the Justice Criminal Division’s Child Exploitation and Obscenity Section (CEOS). Our analysis of 1,286 titles and file names identified through KaZaA searches on 12 keywords showed that 543 (about 42 percent) of the images had titles and file names associated with child pornography images. Of the remaining files, 34 percent were classified as adult pornography, and 24 percent as nonpornographic (see fig. The ease of access to child pornography files was further documented by retrieval and analysis of image files, performed on our behalf by the Customs CyberSmuggling Center. These results are consistent with the observations of NCMEC, which has stated that peer-to-peer technology is increasingly popular for the dissemination of child pornography. In 2002, peer-to-peer referrals increased more than fourfold, from 156 to 757, reflecting the increased popularity of file-sharing programs. Juvenile Users of Peer-to-Peer Applications May Be Inadvertently Exposed to Pornography
Juvenile users of peer-to-peer networks face a significant risk of inadvertent exposure to pornography when searching and downloading images. In a search using innocuous keywords likely to be used by juveniles searching peer-to-peer networks (such as names of popular singers, actors, and cartoon characters), almost half the images downloaded were classified as adult or cartoon pornography. To document the risk of inadvertent exposure of juvenile users to pornography, the Customs CyberSmuggling Center performed KaZaA searches using innocuous keywords likely to be used by juveniles. We determined that 61 images contained adult pornography (34 percent), 24 images consisted of cartoon pornography (14 percent), 13 images contained child erotica (7 percent), and 2 images (1 percent) contained child pornography. Federal Law Enforcement Agencies Are Beginning to Focus Resources on Child Pornography on Peer- to-Peer Networks
Because law enforcement agencies do not track the resources dedicated to specific technologies used to access and download child pornography on the Internet, we were unable to quantify the resources devoted to investigations concerning peer-to-peer networks. These agencies (including the FBI, CEOS, and Customs) do devote significant resources to combating child exploitation and child pornography in general. Law enforcement officials told us, however, that as tips concerning child pornography on the peer-to-peer networks increase, they are beginning to focus more law enforcement resources on this issue. The increase in reports of child pornography on peer-to-peer networks suggests that this problem is increasing. | Why GAO Did This Study
The availability of child pornography has dramatically increased in recent years as it has migrated from printed material to the World Wide Web, becoming accessible through Web sites, chat rooms, newsgroups, and now the increasingly popular peer-to-peer file-sharing programs. These programs enable direct communication between users, allowing users to access each other's files and share digital music, images, and video. GAO was requested to determine the ease of access to child pornography on peer-to-peer networks; the risk of inadvertent exposure of juvenile users of peer-to-peer networks to pornography, including child pornography; and the extent of federal law enforcement resources available for combating child pornography on peer-to-peer networks. GAO's report on the results of this work (GAO-03-351) is being released today along with this testimony. Because child pornography cannot be accessed legally other than by law enforcement agencies, GAO worked with the Customs Cyber-Smuggling Center in performing searches: Customs downloaded and analyzed image files, and GAO performed analyses based on keywords and file names only.
What GAO Found
Child pornography is easily found and downloaded from peer-to-peer networks. In one search, using 12 keywords known to be associated with child pornography on the Internet, GAO identified 1,286 titles and file names, determining that 543 (about 42 percent) were associated with child pornography images. Of the remaining, 34 percent were classified as adult pornography and 24 percent as nonpornographic. In another search using three keywords, a Customs analyst downloaded 341 images, of which 149 (about 44 percent) contained child pornography. These results are consistent with increased reports of child pornography on peer-to-peer networks; since it began tracking these in 2001, the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children has seen a fourfold increase--from 156 reports in 2001 to 757 in 2002. Although the numbers are as yet small by comparison to those for other sources (26,759 reports of child pornography on Web sites in 2002), the increase is significant. Juvenile users of peer-to-peer networks are at significant risk of inadvertent exposure to pornography, including child pornography. Searches on innocuous keywords likely to be used by juveniles (such as names of cartoon characters or celebrities) produced a high proportion of pornographic images: in our searches, the retrieved images included adult pornography (34 percent), cartoon pornography (14 percent), child erotica (7 percent), and child pornography (1 percent). While federal law enforcement agencies--including the FBI, Justice's Child Exploitation and Obscenity Section, and Customs--are devoting resources to combating child exploitation and child pornography in general, these agencies do not track the resources dedicated to specific technologies used to access and download child pornography on the Internet. Therefore, GAO was unable to quantify the resources devoted to investigating cases on peer-to-peer networks. According to law enforcement officials, however, as tips concerning child pornography on peer-to-peer networks escalate, law enforcement resources are increasingly being focused on this area. |
gao_RCED-98-209 | gao_RCED-98-209_0 | Facing increasing opposition to the proposed project over concerns for the park’s water quality and other resources, in August 1996 Crown Butte and the federal government agreed to exchange Crown Butte’s New World property for up to $65 million in federal assets (subject to an appraisal that the property has a fair market value of at least this amount). These standards state that the government should appraise a property to be acquired at the fair market value. He derived these estimates from sales prices and reserve estimates for the properties. The appraiser then made two adjustments that reduced the $72 million value to the appraised value of $69,076,000. Key Assumptions Used
In estimating the fair market value of the proposed mine, the appraisal relied on several assumptions that could have tended to overstate the appraised value. The key assumptions made in the appraisal were that (1) mineral rights associated with the private property have no value because the conservation easement prevents mineral development; (2) the mine would have been issued permits to commence operations in a timely manner; (3) hazardous waste conditions would not affect the property’s value; and (4) Crown Butte’s revised estimate of gold reserves is valid. Government Assumed Mine Operations Would Have Been Issued Permits
The appraisal also relied on the assumption that the New World mine would have received the required governmental permits and been able to commence operations in a timely manner—or, in the words of the appraisal, it assumed that permits were a “non-factor.” Mine operators are required to apply for and receive various permits prior to mining, including mine and water quality permits. We believe the net present value of future income from the mine would have been lower if delays had occurred. Observations
In our review of the Crown Butte appraisal we did not identify areas in which the appraisal deviated from federal appraisal standards. Although we could not determine how much the assumptions affected the value, they tended to increase the value in comparison to the value that would have been estimated using different assumptions. However, given the imprecision involved with appraising mineral properties, we did not find that the use of these assumptions was unreasonable. However, it expressed concern about the wording and possible misinterpretation of the assumption made by the appraiser that mineral rights for the portion of the Crown Butte property under a conservation easement have no value. We discussed both the standards and the appraisal with the Chief Appraiser and a field review appraiser of the Forest Service and the contract appraiser who conducted the appraisal. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO reviewed the appraisal of Crown Butte Mines, Incorporated's New World property, focusing on: (1) whether it complied with federal appraisal standards and and how the value of the appraisal was derived; and (2) key assumptions used in the appraisal.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) GAO did not identify any areas in which the appraisal of Crown Butte Mines' New World property interests deviated from federal appraisal standards; (2) federal appraisal standards state that the government should appraise a property to be acquired at its fair-market value; (3) the appraiser relied on two approaches to derive this fair-market value: (a) evaluating comparable sales; and (b) estimating the gross income from future mining operations and adjusting this amount to the present value of the reserves in the ground; (4) following these standards led the appraiser to estimate the value of the property at $72 million and reduce this amount by about $3 million to account for reserved mining royalty interests granted by Crown Butte to a third party and a conservation easement limiting mining on parts of the property; (5) GAO's work found that four key assumptions made during the appraisal process tended to raise the value of the appraisal; and if other assumptions were used, the appraised value might have been lower; (6) GAO does not, however, question the reasonableness of the assumptions made; (7) in particular, the appraisal assumed that: (a) mineral rights associated with a portion of the property subject to a conservation easement have no value because the easement will prevent mineral development; (b) the mining operations that Crown Butte had planned would have been issued permits by state and federal agencies in a timely manner; (c) known hazardous waste conditions would not affect the property's value; and (d) Crown Butte's estimate of gold reserves is valid; (8) GAO did not estimate the specific monetary impact of these assumptions; (9) however, GAO believes these assumptions could have tended to increase the appraised value in comparison with the value that would have been estimated using others; (10) for example, if permits had been delayed for a year, the present appraised value would have been lower; (11) the appraiser noted that the appraisal could not have been completed without making assumptions to address these issues; and (12) GAO does not believe that use of these assumptions invalidates the appraisal estimate. |
gao_GAO-08-79 | gao_GAO-08-79_0 | Role of IT in the Decennial Census
The Bureau estimates that it will spend about $3 billion on automation and IT for the 2010 Census, including four major systems acquisitions that are expected to play a critical role in improving its coverage, accuracy, and efficiency. Decennial IT Acquisitions Are at Various Stages of Development and Show Mixed Progress against Schedule and Cost Baselines
Three key systems acquisitions for the 2010 Census are in process, and a fourth contract was recently awarded. As a result, Dress Rehearsal operational testing will not address the full complement of systems and functionality that was originally planned, and the Bureau has not yet finalized its plans for further system tests. Delaying functionality increases the importance of system testing after the Dress Rehearsal operational testing to ensure that the decennial systems work as intended. The project life-cycle costs have already increased. The contract was awarded in September 2007. For example, three of the four project teams had developed strategies to identify the scope of the risk management effort. However, three project teams had weaknesses in identifying risks, establishing adequate mitigation plans, and reporting risk status to executive-level officials. Three project teams (MTAIP, FDCA, and DADS II) developed mitigation plans that were often untimely or included incomplete activities and milestones for addressing the risks. The Bureau’s project teams for each of the four acquisitions have implemented many practices associated with establishing sound and capable risk management processes, but they are not always consistent: the teams have not always identified risks, developed complete risk mitigation plans, or briefed senior-level officials on risks and mitigation plans. Until the project teams and the Decennial Management Division implement appropriate risk management activities, they face an increased probability that decennial systems will not be delivered on schedule and within budget or perform as expected. To strengthen risk management activities for the decennial census acquisitions, the Secretary should also direct the Director of the Census Bureau to ensure that project teams identify and develop a comprehensive list of risks for the acquisitions, particularly those for system interfaces and mobile computing devices, and analyze them to determine probability of occurrence and appropriate mitigating actions; develop risk mitigation plans for the significant risks, including defining the mitigating actions, milestones, thresholds, and resources; and provide regular briefings on significant risks to senior executives, so that they can play a role in mitigating these risks. In addition, the project identified systems interfaces as a risk. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to (1) determine the status and plans, including schedule and costs, for four key information technology (IT) acquisitions, and (2) assess whether the Census Bureau is adequately managing the risks facing these key system acquisitions. | Why GAO Did This Study
Automation and information technology (IT) are expected to play a critical role in the 2010 decennial census. The Census Bureau plans to spend about $3 billion on automation and technology that are to improve the accuracy and efficiency of census collection, processing, and dissemination. The Bureau is holding what it refers to as a Dress Rehearsal, during which it plans to conduct operational testing that includes the decennial systems. In view of the importance of IT acquisitions to the upcoming census, GAO was asked to (1) determine the status and plans for four key IT acquisitions, including schedule and cost, and (2) assess whether the Bureau is adequately managing associated risks. To achieve its objectives, GAO analyzed acquisition documents and the projects' risk management activities and compared these activities to industry standards.
What GAO Found
Three key systems acquisitions for the 2010 Census are in process, and a fourth contract was recently awarded. The ongoing acquisitions show mixed progress in meeting schedule and cost estimates. Currently, two of the projects are not on schedule, and the Bureau plans to delay certain functionality. The award of the fourth contract, originally scheduled for 2005, was awarded in September 2007. In addition, one project has incurred cost overruns and increases to its projected life-cycle cost. As a result of the schedule changes, the full complement of systems and functionality that were originally planned will not be available for the Dress Rehearsal operational testing. This limitation increases the importance of further system testing to ensure that the decennial systems work as intended. The Bureau's project teams for each of the four IT acquisitions have performed many practices associated with establishing sound and capable risk management processes, but critical weaknesses remain. Three project teams had developed a risk management strategy that identified the scope of the risk management effort. However, not all project teams had identified risks, established mitigation plans, or reported risks to executive-level officials. For example, one project team did not adequately identify risks associated with performance issues experienced by mobile computing devices. In addition, three project teams developed mitigation plans that were often untimely or included incomplete activities and milestones for addressing the risks. Until the project teams implement key risk management activities, they face an increased probability that decennial systems will not be delivered on schedule and within budget or perform as expected. |
gao_HEHS-97-163 | gao_HEHS-97-163_0 | An Effective Program Includes a Core Set of Elements
Experts, available literature, and officials at our case study facilities generally agreed that, to be effective, an ergonomics program should include a core set of elements or provisions to ensure management commitment, employee involvement, identification of problem jobs, development of controls for problem jobs, training and education for employees, and appropriate medical management. Facilities Have Implemented Core Elements in a Variety of Ways
Each of the facilities we visited displayed all of the core elements of an effective ergonomics program, but the facilities implemented them in a variety of ways that reflected their unique characteristics, such as their different industries and product lines, corporate cultures, and experiences during program evolution. Finally, facilities typically implemented what they called “low-tech” controls, those solutions that did not require significant investment or resources, as opposed to more complex controls that drastically changed jobs or operations. Ergonomic Programs Bring Benefits, Although Measurement Problems Exist
Officials at all the facilities we visited believed their ergonomics programs brought benefits, including reductions in workers’ compensation costs associated with MSDs. These facilities could also show reductions in facilitywide overall injury and illness incidence rates, and in the number of days injured employees were away from work, although some facilities reported an increase in the number of days employees were on restricted job assignments. Facility officials also reported improved worker morale, productivity, and quality, although evidence of this was sometimes anecdotal. However, measuring program performance—assessing these outcomes in light of program efforts—was complicated by uncertainties associated with determining which injuries should be included as MSDs and with tracking changes in those injuries in light of complicating factors. 1). 3.) 4). Case Study Experiences Highlight Employers’ Success in Reducing MSDs
These private sector experiences highlight that employers can achieve positive results through simple, informal, site-specific efforts, with a lower level of effort to identify and analyze problem jobs than that generally reflected in the safety and health literature or in OSHA’s draft ergonomics standard. Federal and state-operated OSHA programs’ current efforts to reduce MSDs in the absence of a standard provide employers this kind of flexibility; however, questions exist about whether current efforts alone are sufficient to address MSDs. To identify how these elements were operationalized at the local level and determine whether these programs have proven beneficial, we interviewed and obtained data from experts known for their research on the costs and benefits of these programs to obtain information on how employers can measure effectiveness of programs, interviewed Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) officials about their efforts to track injuries and costs of those injuries, and obtained information on workers’ compensation costs; selected facilities of five employers that experts believed to have fully implemented programs and that had achieved reductions in workers’ compensation costs resulting from MSDs and conducted case studies between January and February 1997 to obtain information about their experiences implementing these programs; administered a results survey to the selected facilities to collect data used by these facilities to measure their success, such as data used to track program progress and information pertinent to the evaluation of these data, such as workforce size (we did not independently validate these data); and, following a detailed protocol that obtained information on how core elements were implemented and that identified results achieved, difficulties in implementing the programs, barriers faced, lessons learned by the employers from their experiences, and employers’ views of OSHA and others’ roles to reduce MSDs, visited each of these facilities and interviewed facility management, other officials responsible for or involved with the ergonomics program, and staff-level employees; obtained additional results information in order to corroborate information gained during interviews, as well as documentation of the program, training provided, and information provided to employees about the program; and interviewed pertinent officials from the corporate headquarters about the selected facilities’ experiences compared with those of the employers’ other facilities. AEFA officials also said there is some question about what types of injuries should be considered MSDs. 3). 2). In some cases, the ergonomic hazard cannot be totally eliminated. 2). | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on ergonomics programs to reduce work-related musculoskeletal disorders (MSDs), focusing on: (1) the core elements of effective ergonomics programs and how these elements are operationalized at the facility level; (2) whether these programs have proven beneficial to the employers and employees that have implemented them; and (3) the implications of these employers' experiences for other employers and the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA).
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) experts, research literature, and officials at GAO's case study facilities generally agreed that effective ergonomics programs must have the following core set of elements to ensure that ergonomic hazards are identified and controlled to protect workers: (a) management commitment; (b) employee involvement; (c) identification of problem jobs; (d) development of solutions (that is, controls) for problem jobs; (e) training and education for employees; and (f) appropriate medical management; (2) although the ergonomics programs at all of the case study facilities displayed each of these elements, there was often significant variety in how they were implemented; (3) this variety typically resulted from factors such as differences in the facilities' industries and product line, corporate culture, and experiences during the programs' evolution; (4) the processes used by the case study facilities to identify and control problem jobs were typically informal and simple and generally involved a lower level of effort than was reflected in the literature; (5) controls did not typically require significant investment or resources and did not drastically change the job or operation; (6) officials at all the facilities GAO visited believed their ergonomics programs yielded benefits, including reductions in workers' compensation costs associated with MSDs; (7) these facilities could also show reductions in overall injuries and illnesses as well as in the number of days injured employees were out of work; in some cases, however, the number of restricted workdays increased as a result of an increased emphasis on bringing employees back to work; (8) facility officials also reported improved worker morale, productivity, and product quality, although evidence of this was often anecdotal; (9) demonstrating overall program performance was complicated by uncertainties associated with determining what types of injuries should be considered MSDs and analyzing the program's effect on injuries in light of other complicating factors, such as limited information collected by employers on the costs to implement the programs; (10) GAO's work revealed that positive results can be achieved through an approach incorporating certain core elements that are implemented in a simple, informal, site-specific manner; and (11) federal and state-operated OSHA programs have undertaken a number of initiatives that can provide employers flexibility, consistent with these case study experiences; however, questions remain as to whether these efforts alone are sufficient to protect employees from ergonomic hazards. |
gao_GAO-16-169 | gao_GAO-16-169_0 | Agencies Conducted Required Regulatory Analysis and Reported Coordinating as Required on Dodd- Frank Act Rulemakings
In the Federal Register releases of the 26 Dodd-Frank Act rules that we identified and reviewed, the issuing federal agencies conducted the regulatory analyses required by RFA and PRA. The agencies also addressed key elements in OMB’s Circular A-4 for six of the rules that were identified to be major, that is, they resulted or are likely to result in an annual impact on the economy of $100 million or more, a major increase in costs or prices, or significant adverse effects on competition, employment, investment, productivity, innovation, or on the ability of U.S.- based enterprises to compete with foreign-based enterprises in domestic or export markets. Community Banks and Credit Unions Cited a Cumulative Compliance Burden Associated with Dodd-Frank Act Rules
Representatives of community banks and credit unions and industry associations with whom we spoke noted an increased compliance burden associated with implementation of Dodd-Frank Act rules. The results of surveys conducted by regulators, industry associations, and academics on the impact of the Dodd-Frank Act on small banks suggest that there have been moderate to minimal initial reductions in the availability of credit among those responding to the various surveys, and regulatory data to date have not confirmed a negative impact on mortgage lending. Representatives from credit unions, community banks, and industry associations we interviewed said several of these new rules have increased their overall compliance burden—training staff, allocating time for regulatory compliance matters, and updating compliance systems—and in some cases, have begun to affect mortgage lending. However, the report also stated that the results here do not necessarily rule out the possibility that effects may arise in the future. Regulators Face Challenges Determining the Cumulative Impact of Dodd-Frank Act Rules on Community Banks and Credit Unions
Regulators told us that it is still too early to assess the full impact of Dodd- Frank Act rulemakings on community banks and credit unions, and while they have heard concerns about the increase in compliance burden, they have not been able to quantify compliance costs. For example, the indicators do not identify causal links between changes in SIFI characteristics and the act. In this regard, our indicators provide baselines against which to compare future trends. Thus, the current values of our indicators are baselines against which to compare future trends as more rules for designated nonbanks are implemented. An increase in collateral as a percentage of credit exposure suggests that holding companies have required their counterparties to post a greater amount of collateral against their credit exposure due to derivatives contracts overall, which would be consistent with the purposes of the act’s swap reforms. Rather, the set of indicators tracks changes in collateralization since the act’s passage to examine if the changes were consistent with the act’s goals for increasing collateralization. The regulators also provided technical comments, which we have incorporated, as appropriate. This report examines regulatory analyses conducted by the federal financial regulators and the Department of the Treasury (Treasury) in their Dodd-Frank Act rulemakings, including their assessments of which rules they considered to be major rules, and coordination between and among federal regulators on these rulemakings; possible impact of promulgated Dodd-Frank Act provisions on community banks and credit unions and their business activities; and possible impact of selected Dodd-Frank Act provisions and their implementing regulations on financial market stability. To examine the regulatory analyses and coordination conducted by the federal financial regulators and Treasury, we focused our analysis on the final rules issued pursuant to the Dodd-Frank Act that became effective from July 23, 2014, through July 22, 2015, a total of 26 rules (see app. We used the same data to construct indicators associated with business lines that may be affected by Dodd-Frank Act regulations, including residential mortgage lending as a percentage of assets. As such, we added new indicators associated with the size, interconnectedness, leverage, and liquidity of these institutions. In addition, some rules implementing bank SIFI-related provisions have not yet been finalized or fully implemented. Appendix VI: Econometric Analyses of the Impact of Enhanced Regulation and Oversight on Systemically Important Financial Institutions
We updated our econometric analysis assessing the impacts of new requirements in the Dodd- Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act) for bank holding companies with total consolidated assets of $50 billion or more—bank systemically important financial institutions or bank SIFIs—as they relate to (1) the funding costs for bank SIFIs and (2) indicators of their safety and soundness. We obtained these data from the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago and the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. | Why GAO Did This Study
The 2010 Dodd-Frank Act requires or authorizes various federal agencies to issue rules to implement reforms intended to strengthen the financial services industry. The act, as amended, includes a provision for GAO to annually study these regulations. This report examines (1) the regulatory analyses federal agencies conducted in Dodd-Frank Act rulemakings and interagency coordination in the rulemaking process; (2) the possible impact of selected Dodd-Frank Act provisions and related rules on community banks and credit unions; and (3) the possible impact of selected Dodd-Frank Act provisions and their implementing rules on financial market stability.
GAO reviewed Federal Register releases for 26 Dodd-Frank Act rules that became effective July 23, 2014-July 22, 2015 to determine if agencies conducted the required regulatory analyses and coordination. Separately, GAO examined nine Dodd-Frank Act rules that were effective as of October 2015 for their impact on community banks and credit unions. GAO chose these rules because regulators and others expected them to affect these institutions. GAO analyzed data on community banks and credit unions from 2010 to 2015, reviewed studies, and interviewed staff from federal financial agencies and market participants. Additionally, GAO developed indicators on the impact of systemic risk-related provisions and rules and conducted an economic analysis to assess the act's impact on large bank holding companies.
Regulators provided technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate.
What GAO Found
Federal financial agencies conducted required regulatory analyses for rules issued pursuant to the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act) and also reported required coordination. These agencies also addressed key elements of Office of Management and Budget guidance for conducting cost-benefit analyses for rules considered major—rules likely to result in an annual impact on the economy of $100 million or more, among other things.
With regard to select Dodd-Frank Act rules expected to have impacts on community banks and credit unions, community banks, credit unions, and industry associations GAO interviewed cited an increase in compliance burden associated with these rules. This included increases in staff, training, and time allocation for regulatory compliance and updates to compliance systems. Some of these industry officials also reported a decline in specific business activities, such as loans that are not qualified mortgages, due to fear of litigation or not being able to sell those loans to secondary markets. The results of surveys we reviewed suggest that there have been moderate to minimal initial reductions in the availability of credit among those responding to the various surveys and regulatory data to date have not confirmed a negative impact on mortgage lending. However, these results do not necessarily rule out significant effects or the possibility that effects may arise in the future. Federal financial regulators are conducting retrospective analyses of Dodd-Frank Act rules on small entities. GAO developed indicators associated with resources used to comply with regulations and with business lines that may be affected by Dodd-Frank Act regulations to provide baselines against which to monitor future trends. For example, GAO's indicators suggest that residential mortgage loans as a fraction of assets have generally grown for banks of all sizes and for some smaller credit unions but have decreased for larger credit unions. However, changes in GAO's indicators may reflect factors other than the influence of Dodd-Frank Act rules, such as consumer demand for credit.
The full impact of the Dodd-Frank Act remains uncertain because many of its rules have yet to be implemented and insufficient time has passed to evaluate others. Using recently released data, GAO updated indicators from its prior reports that monitor key risk characteristics of large U.S. bank holding companies, and added new indicators that monitor interconnectedness. Although changes in the indicators are not evidence of causal links to the act's provisions, some indicators suggest companies' leverage generally decreased and liquidity generally improved since the act's passage. GAO's updated regression analysis suggests that the act has had little effect on the funding costs of these companies and may be associated with improvements in some measures of their safety and soundness. Indicators associated with the act's swap reforms suggest that holding companies have been requiring their counterparties to post a greater amount of collateral against derivatives contracts. GAO also developed indicators to monitor key risk characteristics of nonbank financial companies designated for supervision by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. Because few rules for these companies have been finalized or implemented, these indicators provide a baseline against which to monitor future trends. |
gao_GAO-03-1021 | gao_GAO-03-1021_0 | That report also includes information on semipostals issued by foreign postal administrations. In August 2003, Service officials said that they plan to reexamine their BCRS regulations and, as soon as practicable, provide Congress with current BCRS data and analyses. Full BCRS Program Costs Unknown
Although the full cost of the BCRS program is not known, the Service reported that the bulk of the program’s costs, from inception through May 16, 2003, were about $9.5 million. Service’s Approach to Cost Recovery Has Evolved
In response to a recommendation in our April 2000 BCRS report, the Service issued BCRS cost-recovery regulations in July 2000, which it subsequently amended in 2001. BCRS Cost-Recovery Regulations May Not Allow the Service to Identify and Recoup All Costs Attributable to the BCRS
The Stamp Out Breast Cancer Act specifically recognizes that printing, sales, and distribution costs attributable to the BCRS are among the types of reasonable costs the Service should recover from the BCRS’ surcharge revenue. However, we are concerned that the regulations the Service issued to implement this requirement can be interpreted as not requiring the Service to provide baseline comparisons for certain BCRS costs, e.g., printing, sales, and distribution, although the Stamp Out Breast Cancer Act specifically states that reasonable costs in these areas attributable to the BCRS should be recouped from the BCRS’ surcharge revenue. The Service Has Not Yet Met Its Commitment to Congress to Provide It with BCRS Cost Data and Analyses
In our April 2000 BCRS report, we recommended that the Service make available the data and analysis showing which BCRS costs have been recovered through the First-Class postage rate to provide assurance that postal ratepayers are not involuntarily contributing funds to breast cancer research. Effectiveness of the BCRS as a Fund-Raiser
The BCRS has continued to be an effective means of raising funds for breast cancer research. The BCRS Remains Voluntary and Convenient and Has Raised Millions of Dollars for Research
The BCRS has remained voluntary and convenient, as provided for by the act, and has raised over $30 million for breast cancer research since it was issued in July 1998. Appropriateness of Using Semipostals as a Means of Fund-Raising
Most of the key stakeholders we spoke with and the public believe it is appropriate for the Postal Service to sell the BCRS, as well as other semipostals, to raise funds for worthwhile causes. Without these baselines, the Service lacks assurance that it is identifying and recouping excess costs from the BCRS’ surcharge revenue. Therefore, establishing annual reporting requirements for NIH and DOD, similar to the statutory reporting requirements established for any agency that would receive funds from semipostals issued under the Semipostal Authorization Act, would prove valuable by providing information on the amount of funds received, how the funds were used, and any accomplishments resulting from the use of those funds, should Congress decide to further extend the BCRS sales period. Bodai, lobbied Congress to pass legislation creating the BCRS. | Why GAO Did This Study
In America, breast cancer is reported as the second leading cause of cancer deaths among women. Given this statistic, the importance of finding a cure cannot be overemphasized. To supplement the billions of federal dollars being spent on breast cancer research, Congress passed legislation creating the Breast Cancer Research Semipostal (BCRS) to increase public awareness of the disease and allow the public to participate directly in raising funds for such research. Since the BCRS was the first semipostal issued by the Postal Service, Congress mandated, and GAO issued, a report in April 2000 on the BCRS' cost, effectiveness, and appropriateness as a fund-raiser. After the report, Congress extended the BCRS sales period through 2003. As mandated, this report updates GAO's prior work as Congress considers another extension to the BCRS sales period.
What GAO Found
Although the U.S. Postal Service (the Service) has not tracked or estimated all costs associated with the BCRS program, it reported that the bulk of BCRS costs, from inception through May 16, 2003, were about $9.5 million. In April 2000, GAO recommended that the Service issue BCRS cost-recovery regulations and make available cost data and analyses to provide postal ratepayers assurance they were not involuntarily subsidizing BCRS costs. The Service issued regulations in July 2000, but it has not yet submitted the recommended data and analyses to Congress. Service officials attributed the lack of providing Congress with this information to administrative oversight and other factors, but said they would provide Congress with this information as soon as practicable. In 2001, the Service amended its BCRS regulations stating that cost-recovery determinations would be made using baseline costs for comparable commemorative stamps. GAO, however, is concerned that the regulations can be interpreted as not requiring the Service to provide for baseline comparisons for certain BCRS costs, e.g., printing, sales, and distribution, although the Stamp Out Breast Cancer Act states that reasonable costs attributable to the BCRS in these areas should be recouped. The Service has not established baseline costs for these categories. Without these baselines, the Service lacks assurance that it is identifying and recouping excess costs from BCRS surcharge revenue. The BCRS continues to be an effective means of raising funds for breast cancer research. Sales have fluctuated, but the BCRS has raised over $30 million for research since it was issued in July 1998. NIH and DOD--recipients of research funds generated by the BCRS--are not subject to the same statutory reporting requirements as agencies that are to receive funds generated by semipostals issued under the Semipostal Authorization Act. Such agencies are required to submit an annual report to Congress on the amount of funds received, how the funds were used, and accomplishments. The public and key stakeholders GAO spoke with believe it is appropriate for the Service to issue semipostals. |
gao_GAO-05-585 | gao_GAO-05-585_0 | We found that VHA has assigned responsibility for succession planning and management initiatives to a dedicated subcommittee, while DOL, the Census Bureau, and EPA have councils or boards that are responsible for human capital more broadly, including succession efforts. VHA has established a subcommittee and high-level positions that are directly responsible for succession planning and management. VHA and the Census Bureau specifically mention succession planning and management in their executives’ performance plans. Agencies Have Begun to Link Succession Efforts to Their Strategic Goals
Leading organizations use succession planning and management as a strategic planning tool that focuses on current and future needs and develops pools of high-potential staff in order to meet the organization’s mission over the long term. For example, DOL plans to shift from a historical enforcement role to compliance assistance and consultation, requiring stronger skills in communication and analysis. To attract and retain employees with such skills, DOL launched the MBA Fellows program in 2002, which it considers one of its major succession development programs. VHA, EPA, and DOL have identified gaps in occupations or competencies in their mission-critical workforce to achieve their goals, have undertaken strategies to address these gaps, and plan to or are taking steps to monitor their progress. Enhanced Coordination and Evaluation of Training and Development Programs Could Help Leverage Scarce Resources
Effective training and development programs can enhance the federal government’s ability to achieve results. Recognizing this, leading agencies look for opportunities to coordinate and share their efforts and create synergies through benchmarking with others, achieving economies of scale, limiting duplication of efforts, and enhancing the effectiveness of programs, among other things. Performance Measures Can Help Agencies Assess Programs’ Effects on Organizational Capacity
Decision makers need credible information to justify training and development programs’ value. All of the selected agencies have recognized the importance of diversity to a successful workforce and use succession planning and management efforts to enhance their workforce diversity. Conclusions
The Census Bureau, DOL, EPA, and VHA have all implemented succession planning and management efforts that collectively are intended to strengthen organizational capacity. By not monitoring more closely and at a higher level than line managers, the Bureau may not know how to best focus its succession planning efforts, and ultimately how well it is prepared for major tasks, such as the 2010 Decennial Census. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
To review how federal agencies are implementing succession planning and management efforts, we selected the Department of Labor (DOL), the Veterans Health Administration (VHA), the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and the Census Bureau for our review. These agencies represent an array of organizational structures, missions, and succession challenges. | Why GAO Did This Study
As the federal government confronts an array of challenges in the 21st century, it must employ strategic human capital management, including succession planning, to help meet those challenges. Leading organizations go beyond a succession planning approach that focuses on replacing individuals and engage in broad, integrated succession planning and management efforts that focus on strengthening current and future organizational capacity. GAO reviewed how the Census Bureau, Department of Labor (DOL), the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Veterans Health Administration (VHA) are implementing succession planning and management efforts.
What GAO Found
The Census Bureau, DOL, EPA, and VHA have all implemented succession planning and management efforts that collectively are intended to strengthen organizational capacity. However, in light of governmentwide fiscal challenges, the agencies have opportunities to enhance some of their succession efforts. While all of the agencies have assigned responsibility for their succession planning and management efforts to councils or boards, VHA has established a subcommittee and high-level positions that are directly responsible for its succession efforts. Also, VHA and the Census Bureau specifically mention succession planning and management as performance expectations in their executives' performance plans. The four agencies have begun to link succession efforts to strategic planning. For example, DOL plans to shift from a historical enforcement role to a compliance assistance and consulting role, requiring stronger skills in communication and analysis. To attract and retain employees with such skills, DOL launched the Masters in Business Administration Fellows program in 2002, which it considers one of its major succession training and development programs. Monitoring mission-critical workforce needs helps make informed planning decisions. DOL, EPA, and VHA have identified gaps in occupations or competencies, have undertaken strategies to address these gaps, and are planning or are taking steps to monitor their progress in closing these gaps. The Census Bureau could strengthen the monitoring of its mission-critical occupations more closely and at a higher level to ensure it is prepared for the 2010 Decennial Census. Effective training and development programs can enhance the federal government's ability to achieve results. All of the agencies' succession efforts include training and development programs at all organizational levels. However, in the current budget environment, there are opportunities to coordinate and share these programs and create synergies through benchmarking with others, achieving economies of scale, limiting duplication of efforts, and enhancing the effectiveness of programs, among other things. Performance measures for these programs can also help agencies evaluate these programs' effects on organizational capacity and justify their value. Finally, agencies have recognized the importance of diversity to a successful workforce and use succession planning and management to enhance their workforce diversity. |
gao_GAO-08-16 | gao_GAO-08-16_0 | For fiscal year 2006, DOD reported $8.5 billion was obligated for travel. Fiscal Year 2006 Improper Payments Reporting and Estimate for the DOD Travel Program Were Incomplete
In its fiscal year 2006 PAR, DOD estimated approximately $8 million in travel program improper payments, reported as reflecting about 1 percent of reported program payments. While this estimate would indicate the program was not at risk of significant improper payments under OMB guidance, we found that DOD’s travel improper payments disclosures for fiscal year 2006 were incomplete as to the full extent of total travel payments made by DOD. The estimate information reported by DOD, which DOD used to assess the travel program’s risk of significant improper payments, only included payments from one system, DTS, which processed an estimated 10 percent of DOD’s travel. Nonetheless, DOD’s 2006 PAR describes a travel postpayment review process that may mislead the reader to believe that the reported travel improper payment estimate represents more than DTS-processed travel. Further, the travel improper payment estimate excluded the largest user of DTS, the Army, which would likely have increased DOD’s estimate by over $4 million. Finally, the statistical sampling methodology and process used by DOD to estimate DTS improper payments as reported for fiscal year 2006 had several weaknesses and did not result in statistically valid estimates of travel improper payments. DOD Faces Challenges in Plans to More Fully Assess Travel Improper Payments
As discussed in the previous section, DOD’s process for estimating and reporting improper payments for its travel program for inclusion in its fiscal year 2006 PAR was significantly flawed. To address reporting issues identified in its fiscal year 2006 auditor’s report, DOD has established a Program Officer for Improper Payment and Recovery Auditing. Further, the department is establishing an improper payment working group and held a “Department of Defense Improper Payments Information Act Conference.”
Improper Payments Survey Results Unreliable Due to Limited Guidance and Oversight by the Office of the Comptroller
DOD assesses its programs, including travel, for improper payments, based on its departmentwide annual Improper Payments Survey. Our review indicated several weaknesses in the survey and reported results, including weaknesses in the guidance regarding the estimation of travel improper payments and lack of oversight and review of the survey and its results. The exclusion of such a significant portion of travel payments in the survey decreases its effectiveness as an improper payments assessment tool and indicates inadequate monitoring of the survey process by the Office of the Comptroller. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To assess the completeness and accuracy of the Department of Defense’s (DOD) fiscal year 2006 Improper Payments Information Act of 2002 (IPIA) disclosure for travel improper payments, we reviewed the IPIA disclosures in its performance and accountability reports (PAR) for fiscal years 2003, 2004, 2005, and 2006. To assess DOD’s planned efforts to improve and refine its processes for estimating and reporting on travel improper payments we met with staff from the Office of the Comptroller. | Why GAO Did This Study
Fiscal year 2006 was the first year that the Department of Defense (DOD) reported improper payment information for its travel program under the Improper Payments Information Act of 2002 (IPIA). For fiscal year 2006, DOD reported obligations of approximately $8.5 billion for travel. Congress mandated that GAO assess the reasons why DOD is not fully in compliance with IPIA related to travel expenditures. In May 2007, GAO issued an initial report in response to this mandate. To further respond, GAO assessed (1) the completeness and accuracy of DOD's fiscal year 2006 IPIA travel disclosure in its performance and accountability report (PAR), and (2) DOD's planned efforts to improve and refine its processes for estimating and reporting on travel improper payments. To complete this work, GAO reviewed DOD's IPIA reporting, IPIA, Office of Management and Budget's (OMB) IPIA implementing guidance, and met with cognizant DOD officials.
What GAO Found
In its fiscal year 2006 PAR, DOD reported an estimate of approximately $8 million in travel improper payments, reflecting about 1 percent of reported travel payments. While this estimate would indicate the program was not at risk of significant erroneous payments under OMB guidance, DOD's improper payment travel disclosure for fiscal year 2006 was incomplete. The DOD travel payment data used to assess the program's risk of significant improper payments only included payments processed by the Defense Travel System (DTS)--approximately 10 percent of the $8.5 billion of DOD travel obligations reported for fiscal year 2006. Further, DOD's 2006 PAR described a travel postpayment review process that may mislead readers to believe that the reported travel improper payment estimate represents more than DTS-processed travel. The travel improper payment estimate also excluded the largest user of DTS, the Army, which would likely have increased DOD's estimate by over $4 million. Finally, the statistical sampling methodology and process used by DOD to estimate DTS improper payments as reported for fiscal year 2006 had several weaknesses and did not result in statistically valid estimates of travel improper payments. DOD is taking steps to more fully assess and report on its travel program for improper payments for future IPIA reporting. DOD's planned assessment is to be based on an annual Improper Payments Survey conducted by the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense (Comptroller). However, GAO's review identified several weaknesses with the survey and reported results, including limited guidance on how to estimate travel improper payments and a lack of oversight and review over implementation of the survey and its results. As shown in the figure below, there were substantial discrepancies among the travel populations reported in the PAR, improper payment survey, and fiscal year 2006 travel obligations. The exclusion of such a significant portion of travel expenditures in the survey decreases its effectiveness as an improper payments assessment tool. DOD has also established a Program Officer for Improper Payment and Recovery Auditing, an improper payment working group, and held a "Department of Defense Improper Payments Information Act Conference." |
gao_GAO-08-83T | gao_GAO-08-83T_0 | Over the last several years, funding for nonemergency U.S. food aid programs has declined. U.S. food aid programs also have multiple legislative and regulatory mandates that affect their operations. Multiple Challenges Hinder the Efficiency of U.S. Food Aid Programs
Multiple challenges in logistics hinder the efficiency of U.S. food aid programs by reducing the amount, timeliness, and quality of food provided. Factors that increase logistical costs and lengthen time frames include uncertain funding processes and inadequate planning, ocean transportation contracting practices, legal requirements, and inadequate coordination in tracking and responding to food delivery problems. While U.S. agencies are pursuing initiatives to improve food aid logistics, such as prepositioning food commodities and using a new transportation bid process, their long-term cost-effectiveness has not yet been measured. In addition, the current practice of selling commodities to generate cash resources for development projects—monetization—is an inherently inefficient yet expanding use of food aid. Furthermore, some impediments to improving the nutritional quality of U.S. food aid, including lack of interagency coordination in updating food aid products and specifications, may prevent the most nutritious or appropriate food from reaching intended recipients. Despite these concerns, USAID and USDA do not sufficiently monitor food aid programs, particularly in recipient countries, as they have limited staff and competing priorities and face legal restrictions on the use of food aid resources. U.S. As a result, agencies may not be accomplishing their goal of getting the right food to the right people at the right time. To improve the efficiency of U.S. food aid—in terms of its amount, timeliness, and quality—we recommended in our previous report that the Administrator of USAID and the Secretaries of Agriculture and Transportation (1) improve food aid logistical planning through cost- benefit analysis of supply-management options; (2) work together and with stakeholders to modernize ocean transportation and contracting practices; (3) seek to minimize the cost impact of cargo preference regulations on food aid transportation expenditures by updating implementation and reimbursement methodologies to account for new supply practices; (4) establish a coordinated system for tracking and resolving food quality complaints; and (5) develop an information collection system to track monetization transactions. To improve the effective use of food aid, we recommended that the Administrator of USAID and the Secretary of Agriculture (1) enhance the reliability and use of needs assessments for new and existing food aid programs through better coordination among implementing organizations, make assessments a priority in informing funding decisions, and more effectively build on lessons from past targeting experiences; (2) determine ways to provide adequate nonfood resources in situations where there is sufficient evidence that such assistance will enhance the effectiveness of food aid; (3) develop a coordinated interagency mechanism to update food aid specifications and products to improve food quality and nutritional standards; and (4) improve monitoring of food aid programs to ensure proper management and implementation. Furthermore, U.S. agencies do not electronically collect data on monetization revenues, without which their ability to adequately monitor the degree to which revenues cover costs is impeded. | Why GAO Did This Study
The United States is the largest global food aid donor, accounting for over half of all food aid supplies to alleviate hunger and support development. Since 2002, Congress has appropriated an average of $2 billion per year for U.S. food aid programs, which delivered an average of 4 million metric tons of food commodities per year. Despite growing demand for food aid, rising business and transportation costs have contributed to a 52 percent decline in average tonnage delivered between 2001 and 2006. These costs represent 65 percent of total emergency food aid, highlighting the need to maximize its efficiency and effectiveness. This testimony is based on a recent GAO report that examined some key challenges to the (1) efficiency of U.S. food aid programs and (2) effective use of U.S. food aid.
What GAO Found
Multiple challenges hinder the efficiency of U.S. food aid programs by reducing the amount, timeliness, and quality of food provided. Factors that cause inefficiencies include (1) insufficiently planned food and transportation procurement, reflecting uncertain funding processes, that increases delivery costs and time frames; (2) ocean transportation and contracting practices that create high levels of risk for ocean carriers, resulting in increased rates; (3) legal requirements that result in awarding of food aid contracts to more expensive service providers; and (4) inadequate coordination between U.S. agencies and food aid stakeholders in tracking and responding to food and delivery problems. U.S. agencies have taken some steps to address timeliness concerns. USAID has been stocking or prepositioning food domestically and abroad, and USDA has implemented a new transportation bid process, but the long-term cost effectiveness of these initiatives has not yet been measured. The current practice of using food aid to generate cash for development projects--monetization--is also inherently inefficient. Furthermore, since U.S. agencies do not collect monetization revenue data electronically, they are unable to adequately monitor the degree to which revenues cover costs. Numerous challenges limit the effective use of U.S. food aid. Factors contributing to limitations in targeting the most vulnerable populations include (1) challenging operating environments in recipient countries; (2) insufficient coordination among key stakeholders, resulting in disparate estimates of food needs; (3) difficulties in identifying vulnerable groups and causes of their food insecurity; and (4) resource constraints that adversely affect the timing and quality of assessments, as well as the quantity of food and other assistance. Furthermore, some impediments to improving the nutritional quality of U.S. food aid may reduce its benefits to recipients. Finally, U.S. agencies do not adequately monitor food aid programs due to limited staff, competing priorities, and restrictions on the use of food aid resources. As a result, these programs are vulnerable to not getting the right food to the right people at the right time. |
gao_GAO-11-575T | gao_GAO-11-575T_0 | Progress Reported in Estimating and Reducing Improper Payments
Federal agencies reported improper payments of an estimated $125.4 billion in fiscal year 2010. The $125.4 billion estimate is an increase of $16.2 billion from federal agencies’ prior year reported estimate of $109.2 billion. The $125.4 billion in estimated federal improper payments reported for fiscal year 2010 was attributable to over 70 programs spread among 20 agencies. Since the implementation of IPIA in 2004, federal agencies have consistently identified new programs or activities as risk-susceptible and reported estimated improper payment amounts. In addition, federal agencies have reported progress since 2004 in reducing improper payment amounts and payment error rates in some programs and activities. From the initial implementation of IPIA in 2004 through 2010, 28 programs have consistently reported estimated improper payment error rates for each year. Of these 28, 17 agency programs reported reduced error rates in comparison with their initial or baseline error rates reported in fiscal year 2004. Challenges Remain in Meeting Legislative Requirements to Fully Report Improper Payment Information
Despite reported progress in reducing estimated improper payment amounts and error rates for some programs and activities during fiscal year 2010, federal agencies’ reporting indicates the federal government still faces challenges in this area. Agency reporting highlighted challenges that remain in meeting the requirements of IPIA, including determining the full extent of improper payments across the federal government and in reasonably assuring that effective actions are taken to reduce improper payments. Specifically, some federal agencies’ fiscal year 2010 reporting did not include information demonstrating that (1) risk assessments were conducted on all of their programs and activities, and (2) improper payment estimates were developed and reported for all risk-susceptible programs. Further, IPIA required agencies to estimate improper payments for each program identified as susceptible to significant improper payments during the risk assessment process. However, three agencies did not report estimated improper payment amounts for fiscal year 2010 for seven risk- susceptible programs with significant amounts of outlays. Recent Efforts to Address Improper Payments
During fiscal year 2010, a number of actions were taken intended to strengthen the framework for reducing and reporting improper payments. First, in November 2009, the President issued Executive Order 13520, Reducing Improper Payments. This order was intended to focus on increasing transparency and accountability for reducing improper payments and creating incentives for reducing improper payments. The President also issued two memoranda in March and June 2010, intended to expand agency efforts to recapture improper overpayments using recapture audits, and directing the establishment of a Do Not Pay List to help prevent improper payments to ineligible recipients, respectively. This legislation was intended to enhance reporting and the reduction of improper payments. In addition to amending the IPIA improper payment estimation requirements, IPERA established additional requirements related to (1) federal agency management accountability; (2) recovery auditing aimed at identifying and reclaiming payments made in error; (3) compliance and noncompliance determinations based on an inspector general’s assessment of an agency’s adherence to IPERA requirements and reporting that determination; and (4) an opinion on internal controls over improper payments. We view the recent actions taken by Congress and the administration as positive steps toward improving transparency over and reducing improper payments. However, it is too soon to determine whether the activities called for in the Executive Order, Presidential memoranda, and IPERA will achieve their goal of reducing improper payments while continuing to ensure that federal programs serve and provide access to intended beneficiaries. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO's work over the past several years has highlighted long-standing, widespread, and significant problems with improper payments in the federal government. Fiscal year 2010 marked the 7th year of implementation of the Improper Payments Information Act of 2002 (IPIA). IPIA requires executive-branch agencies to identify programs and activities susceptible to significant improper payments, estimate annual amounts improperly paid, and report these estimates and actions taken to reduce them. On July 22, 2010, the Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery Act of 2010 (IPERA) was enacted. IPERA amended IPIA and expanded requirements for recovering overpayments across a broad range of federal programs. This testimony addresses (1) progress federal agencies have reported in estimating and reducing improper payments in fiscal year 2010, (2) challenges that continue to hinder full reporting of improper payment information, and (3) recent efforts by Congress and the executive branch intended to improve transparency and accountability for reporting, reducing, and recovering improper payments. This testimony is primarily based on prior GAO reports. GAO summarized available fiscal year 2010 improper payment information reported by federal executive-branch agencies and actions taken by the executive branch and Congress intended to improve transparency over, accountability for, and reduction of improper payments.
What GAO Found
Federal agencies reported an estimated $125.4 billion in improper payments for fiscal year 2010. The $125.4 billion estimate of improper payments federal agencies reported in fiscal year 2010 was attributable to over 70 programs spread among 20 agencies. Federal agencies' fiscal year 2010 estimated improper payment amount is an increase of $16.2 billion from federal agencies' prior year reported estimate of $109.2 billion. (1) Progress Reported in Estimating and Reducing Improper Payments. Since the initial implementation of IPIA in fiscal year 2004, federal agencies have consistently identified new programs or activities as risk-susceptible and reported estimated improper payment amounts. In addition, federal agencies have reported progress in reducing improper payments and payment error rates in some programs and activities. From fiscal years 2004 through 2010, 28 programs have consistently reported estimated improper payment error rates for each year. Of these 28, 17 agency programs reported reduced error rates in comparison with their initial or baseline error rates reported in fiscal year 2004. (2) Challenges Remain in Meeting Legislative Requirements to Fully Report Improper Payments Information. Agency reporting highlighted challenges that remain in meeting the requirements of IPIA, including determining the full extent of improper payments across the federal government and in reasonably assuring that effective actions are taken to reduce improper payments. Specifically, two agencies did not report on risk assessments of their programs and activities and three agencies did not develop and report on improper payments estimates for seven risk-susceptible programs with significant amounts of outlays. (3) Recent Efforts to Address Improper Payments. During fiscal year 2010, a number of changes and initiatives were put in place that are intended to strengthen the framework for reducing and reporting improper payments. For example, the President issued Executive Order 13520, Reducing Improper Payments. The President also issued two memoranda intended to expand agency efforts to recapture overpayments and directed that a Do Not Pay List be established to help prevent improper payments. Further, IPERA was enacted. In addition to amending the IPIA existing requirements, IPERA establishes additional requirements, among others, related to (1) federal agency management accountability; and (2) recovery auditing aimed at identifying and reclaiming payments made in error. We view these actions as positive steps; however, it is too soon to determine whether these activities will achieve their goal of reducing improper payments while continuing to ensure that federal programs serve and provide access to intended beneficiaries. |
gao_GAO-16-238 | gao_GAO-16-238_0 | Under Medicare, NEMT services are allowed to be delivered via ambulance transport to scheduled nonemergency medical services for some beneficiaries. Medicaid Key Features
Under Medicaid, states must ensure NEMT for beneficiaries who have no other means of transportation to needed medical services—such as doctors’ appointments and various types of therapies—and can provide NEMT in a variety of ways. While the modes of transportation used for NEMT across states were similar, state officials reported using a variety of models to administer NEMT, including paying for NEMT on a fee-for-service basis; contracting with managed care health plans to provide health care services, including NEMT, for a per- member, per-month fee; and contracting with transportation brokers to manage all or some aspects of NEMT on states’ behalf. See table 2 for examples of states’ models for administering NEMT. Under Medicaid, CMS uses a range of regular oversight activities to oversee states’ operations of their NEMT programs, including reviewing and approving state Medicaid plans and amendments; issuing guidance; conducting a range of program integrity activities, such as claims and state program integrity reviews; and offering technical assistance upon request. CMS Uses Regular Oversight Activities to Monitor NEMT
Medicare NEMT
CMS oversees Medicare NEMT through CMS’s regular program integrity activities. CMS Issues Guidance on Medicaid NEMT, but Some Guidance Is Outdated or May Be Otherwise Limited
Although CMS periodically issues NEMT guidance, some guidance is outdated or may be otherwise limited because legislative and other changes have affected Medicaid and states’ NEMT programs. However, this guidebook contains outdated information. However, these materials are targeted for patients and providers rather than state Medicaid programs. State Medicaid agencies rely on it when designing and administering their NEMT programs to help ensure compliance with federal requirements while incorporating current practices to meet beneficiaries’ needs. Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government states that management should ensure that there are adequate means of communicating with, and obtaining information from, external stakeholders that may have a significant impact on the agency’s ability to achieve its goals. Effective communication can take many forms such as through guidance, training, or publication of best practices. Selected States Have Taken Steps to Address Some Medicaid NEMT Challenges, and Information on State NEMT Practices Is Available
Through our work, we identified a range of challenges related to providing NEMT and steps taken by some states to address these challenges. Challenges and steps identified were related to maintaining program integrity, contracting with and overseeing vendors, and accessing NEMT. Containing Costs
Officials from selected states and stakeholders reported challenges containing Medicaid NEMT costs due to increased utilization and certain trip factors. CMS and state auditor reports, officials from selected states, and stakeholders also identified other program integrity challenges that could make NEMT vulnerable for fraud, waste, and abuse, including:
Enrolling providers: In annual summary reports of comprehensive program integrity reviews, CMS identified one state that did not require and collect key information needed for effective oversight, such as criminal conviction information from NEMT providers, making the state vulnerable to enrolling problem providers in its NEMT program. Other organizations have or are in the process of collecting information on states’ approaches to administer their Medicaid NEMT programs. CMS officials reported that the agency is considering assessing whether additional NEMT guidance is needed, but has not set any timeframes for conducting that assessment. Recommendations
To ensure states have appropriate and current guidance to assist them in designing and administering Medicaid NEMT, we recommend the Secretary of HHS direct CMS to assess current Medicaid NEMT guidance and update that guidance as needed. HHS concurred with our recommendation and provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report addresses non-emergency medical transportation (NEMT) under Medicare and Medicaid and examines: 1) the key features of NEMT services under Medicare and Medicaid and how services are administered; 2) steps that the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid (CMS) have taken to oversee NEMT under Medicare as well as Medicaid; and 3) the challenges that exist in providing NEMT under Medicaid and steps that selected state Medicaid agencies have taken to address those challenges. We also reviewed key reports, such as Medicare Payment Advisory Commission, Department of Health and Human Services-Office of Inspector General (HHS-OIG), and Transit Cooperative Research Program (TCRP) reports, and prior GAO reports. In addition, for Medicaid, we interviewed officials from 15 selected state Medicaid agencies. | Why GAO Did This Study
Medicare and Medicaid provide NEMT services to eligible beneficiaries who need transportation to scheduled nonemergency care. CMS administers Medicare NEMT benefits and is responsible for overseeing Medicaid at the federal level. Spending on NEMT under these programs was $2.7 billion in 2013—$1.2 billion for Medicare and $1.5 billion for Medicaid. Increased demand for NEMT because of increased Medicaid enrollment has led states to seek ways to more efficiently operate NEMT.
GAO was asked to review NEMT under Medicare and Medicaid. This report examines 1) key features of NEMT services under Medicare and Medicaid and how these services are delivered; 2) steps CMS has taken to oversee NEMT under Medicare as well as Medicaid; and 3) the challenges that exist in providing NEMT under Medicaid and steps that selected state Medicaid agencies have taken to address those challenges.
GAO reviewed key documents and interviewed officials from CMS; 15 selected states that range in terms of Medicaid enrollment and geography; and stakeholders, including transportation brokers, health plans, and health care and transportation industry groups.
What GAO Found
The nonemergency medical transportation (NEMT) benefits offered by Medicare and Medicaid differ. Medicare provides NEMT via ambulance only when other means of transportation, such as a taxi or wheelchair van, would jeopardize the health of the beneficiary. Medicaid NEMT is generally available for beneficiaries who have no other means of transportation to medical services. States are responsible for the daily operations of their Medicaid programs and have discretion in how they deliver NEMT. Officials from 15 selected states reported using a variety of models to administer NEMT, including transportation brokers, which are entities that contract with states to administer NEMT services.
The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), oversees Medicare and Medicaid at the federal level, but this oversight varies by program. CMS generally uses regular program integrity activities—such as claims reviews—to oversee Medicare NEMT. Under Medicaid, CMS also uses regular oversight activities, and these include overseeing states' program integrity activities and periodically issuing guidance. However, some of CMS's guidance is outdated or may be of limited use because of legislative and other changes that affect Medicaid and states' NEMT programs. For example, a 1998 guidebook on NEMT contains outdated information on implementing NEMT transportation broker programs. Other more recent guidance is targeted for patients and providers rather than state Medicaid programs. However, these programs also benefit from updated guidance on strategies to ensure compliance with federal requirements while incorporating current practices to meet beneficiaries' needs. Guidance for state Medicaid programs is particularly important because NEMT is at high risk for fraud and abuse; some selected states and stakeholders GAO interviewed reported that updated guidance could be helpful. Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government states that management should ensure adequate means of communicating with stakeholders. Effective communications can take many forms, including guidance. CMS officials reported that the agency is considering assessing whether additional NEMT guidance is needed, but has not set time frames for conducting this assessment.
GAO identified four types of challenges related to Medicaid NEMT and several steps taken by states to address some of these challenges. Challenges reported related to containing costs, maintaining program integrity, contracting with and overseeing vendors, and accessing NEMT. For example, states reported challenges containing NEMT costs due to increased NEMT utilization and reported implementing practices to help address these challenges. Such practices include setting fixed provider reimbursement fees that remained relatively constant in recent years. Officials from 7 of the 15 selected states and 6 stakeholders GAO interviewed reported that having information on how states administer NEMT and ways to address challenges could be helpful to states. Some of this information is available; for example, CMS reported collecting information on states' approaches through state Medicaid plans and posting this information on CMS's website. Other organizations, such as the Transit Cooperative Research Program, have or are in the process of collecting such information.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the Secretary of HHS direct CMS to assess current Medicaid NEMT guidance and update it as needed. HHS concurred with our recommendation and provided technical comments which we incorporated as appropriate. |
gao_GAO-07-83 | gao_GAO-07-83_0 | DOJ components in our review use a number of sensitive but unclassified designations, such as Law Enforcement Sensitive, For Official Use Only, and Limited Official Use, to identify information as sensitive but unclassified. Such information at DOJ could include that which is critical to a criminal prosecution. This has been a long- standing problem in the program, as our prior work shows, but DOJ reported that it is seeking additional resources from an administrative fund in fiscal year 2007. However, it has not assessed the optimum resources it needs or developed a strategy to use available resources most effectively to resolve remaining deficiencies. DOJ Took Action on 5 of the 10 ISOO Recommendations for Its Classification Management Program
ISOO made 10 recommendations to DOJ in July 2004 aimed at resolving deficiencies in DOJ’s classification management program, and, at the time of our review, the department had completed or partially addressed half of the recommendations, as table 1 shows. DOJ does have security program managers at each of its components to provide training and program oversight for that component that helps to supplement departmental activity. In addition, SEPS does not have a strategy that lays out how it can best use anticipated resources to address the remaining deficiencies ISOO identified in ways that reduce the most risks to protecting national security information, such as whether to focus on addressing training, oversight, or other program gaps first. As of August 2006, the FBI officials did not know when these issues would be resolved. DOJ Components Lack Specific Guidance, Training, and Oversight to Ensure Proper Designation of Sensitive but Unclassified Information
The five components we reviewed had orders and directives in place to identify the various types of categories of sensitive but unclassified information they used and to describe how information should be handled and protected. At the other components, however, any employee at any level is authorized to make these decisions. Depending on the component, different offices communicate with requesters. FBI was taking action on almost all of ISOO’s recommendations, and if it completes them, this will help to lower program risk, since FBI makes 98 percent of the classification decisions at DOJ. This is important because DOJ sets policy, provides training, and conducts oversight of classification management across the department and its components. Moreover, without policies and procedures to provide specific guidance, training, and oversight for managing sensitive but unclassified information, DOJ cannot have reasonable assurance that this information is properly restricted or disclosed. Although DOJ is waiting for the results of the interagency working group before proceeding with additional changes to its program, it is important that DOJ ensures that its sensitive but unclassified designation practices provide its employees with the tools they need to apply designations appropriately. Recommendations for Executive Action
To strengthen DOJ’s management of classified information, we recommend that the Attorney General direct the SEPS director to take the following two actions: determine the resource level needed to ensure that it can effectively carry out the office’s responsibilities, including full implementation of the ISOO recommendations; and devise a strategy for making resources available and for using them most effectively to address remaining deficiencies in ways that reduce the most risk to proper management of classified information, such as determining whether to address training, oversight, or other program deficiencies first. In addition, to help ensure that sensitive but unclassified designations are correctly and consistently applied, we recommend that once the interagency working group has determined the standard set of sensitive but unclassified designations for the federal government, the Attorney General ensure that the department and its various components take the following three actions: establish specific guidance for applying the designations they will ensure that all employees authorized to make the designations have the necessary training before they can designate documents, and set internal controls for overseeing sensitive but unclassified designations to help ensure that they are properly applied. 2. To what extent has the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) implemented ISOO’s recommendations? To determine the extent of changes DOJ and the FBI have made to implement ISOO’s recommendations, published in July 2004 and April 2005, we reviewed the results of ISOO’s audits; obtained supporting documents, when available, such as DOJ and FBI policy directives, orders, and guidance; and interviewed DOJ and FBI managers responsible for implementing and overseeing these programs. We selected the five DOJ components included in this review—Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives; Criminal Division; Drug Enforcement Administration; the FBI; and U.S. | Why GAO Did This Study
The September 11 attacks showed that agencies must balance the need to protect and share sensitive information to prevent future attacks. Agencies classify this information or designate it sensitive but unclassified to protect and limit access to it. The National Archives' Information Security Oversight Office (ISOO) assesses agencies' classification management programs, and in July 2004 and April 2005 recommended changes to correct problems at the Justice Department (DOJ) and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). GAO was asked to examine (1) DOJ's and FBI's progress in implementing the recommendations and (2) the management controls DOJ components have to ensure the proper use of sensitive but unclassified designations. GAO reviewed ISOO's reports and agency documentation on changes implemented and controls in place, and interviewed security program managers at DOJ, its components, and ISOO to examine these issues.
What GAO Found
At the time of GAO's review, DOJ and FBI had made progress implementing ISOO's recommendations aimed at correcting deficiencies in their programs to properly classify information. FBI had taken action on 11 of 12 recommendations, including issuing security regulations governing its program and updating most of the classification guides that employees use to help them decide what information should be classified. FBI is also correcting deficiencies in its training and oversight activities. If FBI completes all recommendations, this will help to lower program risk since it makes 98 percent of DOJ's classification decisions. DOJ had taken action on 5 of 10 recommendations, including fixing problems with outdated and insufficient training and insufficient monitoring of components' programs. DOJ, however, has taken no action on the most important recommendation, addressing its staff shortages, which continue to place its program at risk given that it sets policy, provides training, and oversees classification practices departmentwide. DOJ said it did not have staff resources to address other shortcomings in its training and oversight activities that ISOO recommended it correct. DOJ is trying to address its resource constraints, a long-standing problem that GAO identified as early as 1993, by requesting additional funds from an administrative account in fiscal year 2007. However, DOJ does not know the optimum number of staff it needs for the program because it has not assessed its needs. It also does not have a strategy that identifies how it will use additional resources to address remaining deficiencies so as to reduce the highest program risks, such as whether to first address training, oversight, or other program gaps. For sensitive but unclassified information, the five components in our review--Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives; Criminal Division; Drug Enforcement Administration; FBI; and U.S. Marshals Service--had orders and directives that identified and defined the various designations components were using, such as Law Enforcement Sensitive, to protect information, such as information critical to a criminal prosecution. But the components did not have specific guides, with examples, to help employees decide whether information merits a sensitive but unclassified designation. Furthermore, none of the components had training to help employees make these decisions or oversight of their designation practices. Without these controls, DOJ cannot reasonably ensure that information is properly restricted or disclosed and that designations are consistently applied. GAO recently identified similar problems at several other agencies and recommended that they implement such controls, and the agencies agreed to do so. According to security officials, DOJ is waiting for the results of an interagency working group established to set governmentwide standards for sensitive but unclassified information before considering additional changes in its sensitive but unclassified practices or those of its components. The final results from the working group are due by the end of December 2006. Once standardization is realized, it is important for DOJ to ensure that sensitive but unclassified practices across the agency provide employees with the tools they need to apply designations appropriately. |
gao_GAO-03-301 | gao_GAO-03-301_0 | Over the years, PBGC operations have grown significantly as pension plan terminations have increased. The annual appropriations acts have not defined the types of costs to be included as “administrative expenses.” In fiscal years 1989 and 1991, however, the appropriations acts identified certain PBGC contractual and other expenses to be excluded from the administrative expense limitation, thus narrowing the activities and expenses subject to the administrative expense limitation. This limitation applied to all of PBGC’s operational and administrative expenses for fiscal year 1985, which covered PBGC’s entire operational and administrative budget. PBGC’s Application of the Statutory Limitation Is Not Reliable
During our review, we found significant problems with the way PBGC developed its budget estimates for its administrative expense limitation. As a result, PBGC does not have a meaningful basis for reporting and tracking its compliance with the limitation. Conclusions
PBGC’s budget proposals for its administrative expense limitation, along with its reporting of the amounts spent under the expense limitation, are not based on actual data and thus are not meaningful or effective in controlling administrative costs. PBGC does not have a reliable basis for estimating its budget for activities subject to the legislative limitation. As we stated in our report, we found significant problems with the way PBGC developed its budget estimates for activities covered by the administrative expense limitation as well as with PBGC’s reporting of actual expenses covered by the limitation. As we stated in our report, for reporting on administrative expenses that fall under the administrative expense limitation, PBGC uses its budgeted amount for the administrative expense limitation as a basis for allocating and reporting actual costs for those activities. As discussed in the body of our report, this PBGC process merely results in force fitting reported expenses so that they equal or come close to the budgeted amount for the statutory limitation, and accordingly, does not provide reliable cost data related to actual activities or a meaningful basis for reporting and tracking compliance with the limitation. We are also sending copies to the Executive Director of the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation. | Why GAO Did This Study
Concerned about the increasing proportion of the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation's (PBGC) operational and administrative budget that is outside the annual administrative expense limitation, the Ranking Minority Member of the Senate Special Committee on Aging asked GAO to review PBGC's (1) application of the limitations set forth in its appropriations in developing its budget estimates and (2) methodology for allocating and reporting its operational and administrative expenses falling under the statutory limitation.
What GAO Found
As part of PBGC's fiscal year 1985 appropriation, Congress limited the amount of PBGC's appropriated revolving funds available for "administrative expenses." In later years, PBGC requested and Congress approved certain types of expenses to be excluded from the administrative expense limitation. PBGC requested the exclusions in order to gain flexibility in dealing with several major pension plan terminations. The exclusions, combined with PBGC's application of the limitation, have resulted in only 5 percent of PBGC's administrative and operational expenses being included in the limitation for fiscal year 2002. GAO found significant problems with the way PBGC develops its proposed budget estimates for activities covered by its administrative expense limitation. PBGC does not have a reliable basis for estimating its administrative expenses subject to the legislative limitation. As a result, PBGC's estimates for its activities covered by the limitation are not meaningful and thus are ineffective in controlling administrative costs. In addition, PBGC does not have a meaningful basis for reporting adherence to the limitation, since it does not accumulate and allocate actual expenses for activities subject to the limitation. PBGC uses its budgeted amount for the administrative expenses limitation as a basis for allocating and reporting actual costs for those activities. This amounts to force fitting reported expenses so that they equal or come close to the budgeted amount for the limitation, and accordingly, does not provide reliable cost data related to actual activities or a meaningful basis for reporting and tracking compliance with the limitation. |
gao_GAO-06-747T | gao_GAO-06-747T_0 | DOD’s Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence has overall responsibility for DOD clearances, and its responsibilities also extend beyond DOD. Longstanding delays in completing hundreds of thousands of clearance requests for servicemembers, federal employees, and industry personnel as well as numerous impediments that hinder DOD’s ability to accurately estimate and eliminate its clearance backlog led us to declare the program a high-risk area in January 2005. The act included milestones for reducing the time to complete clearances, general specifications for a database on security clearances, and requirements for greater reciprocity of clearances (the acceptance of a clearance and access granted by another department, agency, or military service). Among other things, the executive order resulted in the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) taking a lead role in preparing a strategic plan to improve personnel security clearance processes governmentwide. Using this context for understanding the interplay between DOD and OPM in DOD’s personnel security clearance processes, my statement addresses two objectives in this statement: (1) key points of a billing dispute between DOD and OPM and (2) some of the major impediments affecting clearances for industry personnel. Unexpected Volume of Clearance Requests and Funding Constraints Delay Security Clearances for Industry Personnel Further
DOD stopped processing applications for clearance investigations for industry personnel on April 28, 2006, despite an already sizeable backlog. The dispute stems from the February 2005 transfer of DOD’s personnel security investigations function to OPM. One cost, an adjustment to the rates charged to agencies for clearance investigations, provides that “OPM may charge DOD for investigations at DOD’s current rates plus annual price adjustments plus a 25 percent premium to offset potential operating losses. Information from the two agencies indicates that in response to DOD’s request, OMB has directed them to continue to work together to resolve the matter. The inability to accurately estimate the number of future clearance requests and the expiration of the previously mentioned executive order that resulted in high-level involvement by OMB could adversely affect the timeliness of eligibility determinations for all types of employee groups. In contrast, an increased demand for top secret clearances for industry personnel and the lack of reciprocity would primarily affect industry personnel. As we noted in our May 2004 testimony before this committee, DOD’s longstanding inability to accurately project its security clearance workload makes it difficult to determine clearance-related budgets and staffing requirements. Another potential impediment that could slow improvements in personnel security clearance processes in DOD—as well as governmentwide—is the July 1, 2006, expiration of Executive Order No. 13381. Because there has been no indication that the executive order will be extended, we are concerned about whether such progress will continue without OMB’s high-level management involvement. These reasons include (1) the governmentwide plan lists many management challenges facing OPM and the Associate Director of its investigations unit, such as establishing a presence to conduct overseas investigations and adjusting its investigative workforce to the increasing demand for clearances; (2) adjudication of personnel security clearances and determination of which organizational positions require such clearances are outside the current emphases for OPM; and (3) agencies’ disputes with OPM—such as the current one regarding billing—may require a high-level third party to mediate a resolution that is perceived to be impartial. Increased Demand for High-level Clearances and the Lack of Reciprocity Are Previously Identified Problems for Industry Personnel
As we have previously identified, an increase in the demand for top secret clearances could have workload and budgetary implications for DOD and OPM if such requests continue to occur. In addition to having a negative effect on the employee and the employer, the lack of reciprocity has adverse effects for the government, including an increased workload for the already overburdened staff who investigate and adjudicate security clearances. Problems with reciprocity of clearances or access, particularly for industry personnel, have continued to occur despite the establishment in 1997 of governmentwide investigative standards and adjudicative guidelines. The Reciprocity Working Group, which helped to prepare information for the governmentwide plan to improve the security clearance process, noted that “a lack of reciprocity often arises due to reluctance of the gaining activity to inherit accountability for what may be an unacceptable risk due to poor quality investigations and/or adjudications.” Congress enacted reciprocity requirements in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of December 2004, and OMB promulgated criteria in December 2005 for federal agencies to follow in determining whether to accept security clearances from other government agencies. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Defense (DOD) is responsible for about 2 million active personnel security clearances. About one-third of the clearances are for industry personnel working on contracts for DOD and more than 20 other executive agencies. Delays in determining eligibility for a clearance can heighten the risk that classified information will be disclosed to unauthorized sources and increase contract costs and problems attracting and retaining qualified personnel. On April 28, 2006, DOD announced it had stopped processing security clearance applications for industry personnel because of an overwhelming volume of requests and funding constraints. GAO has reported problems with DOD's security clearance processes since 1981. In January 2005, GAO designated DOD's program a high-risk area because of longstanding delays in completing clearance requests and an inability to accurately estimate and eliminate its clearance backlog. For this statement GAO addresses: (1) key points in the billing dispute between DOD and OPM and (2) some of the major impediments affecting clearances for industry personnel.
What GAO Found
The costs underlying a billing dispute between DOD and OPM are contributing to further delays in the processing of new security clearance requests for industry personnel. The dispute stems from the February 2005 transfer of DOD's personnel security investigations function to OPM and associated costs for which DOD agreed to reimburse OPM. Among other things, the two agencies' memorandum of agreement for the transfer allows OPM to charge DOD annual price adjustments plus a 25 percent premium, in addition to the rates OPM charges to other federal government agencies. A January 20, 2006, memorandum from the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) questioned the continued need for the premiums and requested mediation from OMB. According to DOD and OPM, OMB has directed the two agencies to continue to work together to resolve the matter. The inspectors general for both DOD and OPM are expected to report on the results of their investigations into the dispute this summer. Other impediments, if not effectively addressed, could negatively affect the timeliness of clearance-eligibility determinations for one or more of the following employee groups: industry personnel, servicemembers, and civilian government employees. All three groups are affected by DOD's longstanding inability to accurately estimate the size of its security clearance workload. Inaccurate estimates of the volume of clearances needed make it difficult to determine clearance-related budgets and staffing requirements. Similarly, the July 1, 2006, expiration of Executive Order 13381, which delegated responsibility for improving the clearance process to OMB, could potentially slow improvements in personnel security clearance processes DOD-wide as well as governmentwide. GAO has been encouraged by OMB's high level of commitment to activities such as the development of a government plan to improve personnel security clearance processes governmentwide but is concerned about whether such progress will continue after the executive order expires. In contrast, demand for top secret clearances for industry personnel and the lack of reciprocity (the acceptance of a clearance and access granted by another department, agency, or military service) are impediments that mainly affect industry personnel. A previously identified increase in the demand for top secret clearances for industry personnel has workload and budgetary implications for DOD and OPM if such requests continue to occur. Finally, the lack of reciprocity has a negative effect on employees and employers, and increases the workload for already overburdened investigative and adjudicative staff. Reciprocity problems have occurred despite the issuance of governmentwide investigative standards and adjudicative guidelines in 1997. |
gao_GAO-03-836 | gao_GAO-03-836_0 | Among the tort reform measures enacted by states, caps on noneconomic damage awards that include pain and suffering have been the focus of particular interest. Implications of Rising Malpractice Premiums on Access to Health Care
Actions taken by health care providers in response to rising malpractice premiums have contributed to reduced access to specific services on a localized basis in the five states reviewed with reported problems. We confirmed instances where physician actions in response to malpractice pressures have resulted in decreased access to services affecting emergency surgery and newborn deliveries in scattered, often rural areas of the five states. For example, our analysis of Medicare utilization data suggests that reported reductions in certain high-risk services, such as some orthopedic surgeries and mammograms, have not widely affected consumer access to these services. Some Reported Provider Actions Were Not Substantiated or Did Not Widely Affect Access to Health Care
Despite some confirmed reductions in ER on-call surgical coverage and newborn delivery services that were related to physicians’ concerns about malpractice pressures and affected access to health care, we also identified reports of provider actions taken in response to malpractice pressures—such as reported physician departures and hospital unit closures—that were not substantiated or that did not widely affect access to health care. Physicians Reportedly Practice Defensive Medicine, but Prevalence and Costs of Such Practices Are Not Reliably Measured
Several recently published surveys report that physicians practice defensive medicine in response to malpractice pressures. However, because the surveys generally had low response rates and were not precise in measuring the prevalence of these practices, and because the studies examined physician practice behavior in only narrowly specified clinical situations, the results cannot be used to reliably estimate the overall prevalence or costs of defensive medicine practices. Studies Cannot Be Generalized to Reliably Estimate Defensive Medicine Prevalence and Costs
Although available research suggests that defensive medicine may be practiced in specific clinical situations, the findings are limited and cannot be generalized to estimate the prevalence and costs of defensive medicine nationwide. For states that have adopted certain tort reforms, especially caps on noneconomic damages, other studies have also found associations with lower claims payments. We could not determine the extent to which differences in premium rates and claims payments across states were attributed only to damage caps or also to these additional factors. External Comments and Our Evaluation
We received comments on a draft of this report from three independent health policy researchers and from AMA. In its written comments, AMA questioned our finding that rising malpractice premiums have not contributed to widespread health care access problems, expressing concern that the scope of our work limited our ability to fully identify the extent to which malpractice-related pressures are affecting consumers’ access to health care. Appendix II: Scope and Methodology
In response to concerns about rising malpractice premiums, we examined how health care provider responses to rising premiums have affected access to health care, what is known about how rising premiums and fear of litigation cause health care providers to practice defensive medicine, and how rates of growth in malpractice premiums and claims payments compare across states with varying levels of tort reform laws. Five of the states—Florida, Mississippi, Nevada, Pennsylvania, and West Virginia—are among those cited as “crisis” or “problem” states by the American Medical Association (AMA) and other health care provider organizations based on such factors as higher than average increases in malpractice insurance premium rates, reported difficulties obtaining malpractice coverage, and reported actions taken by providers in response to their concerns about rising premiums and malpractice litigation. Four of the states—California, Colorado, Minnesota, and Montana—are not cited by provider groups as experiencing malpractice-related problems. Such actions were reported only in the five states with reported problems. Malpractice Premium Rate and Claims Payments Growth
To assess the growth in medical malpractice premium rates and claims payments across states, we compared trends in states with tort reforms that include noneconomic damage caps (4 states with a $250,000 cap and 8 states with a $500,000 or less cap) to the 11 states (including the District of Columbia) with limited reforms and the average for all states. | Why GAO Did This Study
The recent rising cost of medical malpractice insurance premiums in many states has reportedly influenced some physicians to move or close practices, reduce high-risk services, or alter their practices to preclude potential lawsuits (known as defensive medicine practices). States have revised tort laws under which malpractice lawsuits are litigated to help constrain malpractice premium and claims costs. Some of these tort reform laws include caps on monetary penalties for noneconomic harm, such as for plaintiffs' pain and suffering. Congress is considering legislation similar to some states' tort reform laws. GAO examined how health care provider responses to rising malpractice premiums have affected access to health care, whether physicians practice defensive medicine, and how growth in malpractice premiums and claims payments compares across states with varying tort reform laws. Because national data on providers' responses to rising premiums are not reliable, GAO examined the experiences in five states with reported malpractice-related problems (Florida, Nevada, Pennsylvania, Mississippi, and West Virginia) and four states without reported problems (California, Colorado, Minnesota, and Montana) and analyzed growth in malpractice premiums and claims payments across all states and the District of Columbia.
What GAO Found
Actions taken by health care providers in response to rising malpractice premiums have contributed to localized health care access problems in the five states reviewed with reported problems. GAO confirmed instances in the five states of reduced access to hospital-based services affecting emergency surgery and newborn deliveries in scattered, often rural, areas where providers identified other long-standing factors that also affect the availability of services. Instances were not identified in the four states without reported problems. In the five states with reported problems, however, GAO also determined that many of the reported provider actions were not substantiated or did not affect access to health care on a widespread basis. For example, although some physicians reported reducing certain services they consider to be high risk in terms of potential litigation, such as spinal surgeries and mammograms, GAO did not find access to these services widely affected, based on a review of Medicare data and contacts with providers that have reportedly been affected. Continuing to monitor the effect of providers' responses to rising malpractice premiums on access to care will be essential, given the import and evolving nature of this issue. Physicians reportedly practice defensive medicine in certain clinical situations, thereby contributing to health care costs; however, the overall prevalence and costs of such practices have not been reliably measured. Studies designed to measure physicians' defensive medicine practices examined physician behavior in specific clinical situations, such as treating elderly Medicare patients with certain heart conditions. Given their limited scope, the study results cannot be generalized to estimate the extent and cost of defensive medicine practices across the health care system. Limited available data indicate that growth in malpractice premiums and claims payments has been slower in states that enacted tort reform laws that include certain caps on noneconomic damages. For example, between 2001 and 2002, average premiums for three physician specialties--general surgery, internal medicine, and obstetrics/gynecology--grew by about 10 percent in states with caps on noneconomic damages of $250,000, compared to about 29 percent in states with limited reforms. GAO could not determine the extent to which differences in premiums and claims payments across states were caused by tort reform laws or other factors that influence such differences. In commenting on a draft of this report, three independent reviewers with expertise on malpractice-related issues generally concurred with the report findings, while the American Medical Association (AMA) commented that the scope of work was not sufficient to support the finding that rising malpractice premiums have not contributed to widespread health care access problems. While GAO disagrees with AMA's point of view, the report was revised to better clarify the methods and scope of work for this issue. |
gao_GAO-04-165 | gao_GAO-04-165_0 | Officials in the large gateway ports we visited cited numerous examples of how congestion affects the movement of freight in and around the ports and surrounding urban areas. Access in and out of ports represents perhaps the highest potential for conflict between these two goals. Second, the planning process often lacks a comprehensive evaluation approach, such as a cost-benefit framework, that might result in the selection and implementation of freight improvements and to better ensure that systemwide, multimodal solutions—as opposed to a focus on a single transportation mode—are considered and adopted where appropriate. More focused federal direction and support for states and MPOs could better ensure that sound evaluation approaches are incorporated into the local investment decision-making process for freight projects and that meaningful data are collected and used. For example, an intermodal connector linking a port to an intermodal rail yard has no clear sponsor. The first strategy addresses planning limitations, and the second strategy addresses financing limitations. These include promoting efficiency by embracing “user pay” principle, maximizing a performance- based program, and aligning the incentives for planning agencies and other decision makers to focus on efficiency and results. Using Financing Mechanisms or Developing New Revenue Sources to Ensure a Blending of Public and Private Funds to Match Public and Private Costs and Benefits
Many stakeholders have argued that the level of transportation funding is insufficient to adequately address the challenges to freight mobility described earlier in this report. The U.S. Treasury has drawn similar conclusions. Our work has also led us to identify sound principles that, if integrated into the transportation planning and financing strategies and provisions of the new legislation, would better assure that the freight infrastructure system provides the level of capacity and performance that makes the greatest contribution to the nation’s economic well-being. Establish performance measures and expectations and build in accountability. Align incentives for planning agencies to adopt best practices and to achieve expectations. Taken together, these strategies offer a balanced approach to enhancing freight mobility. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of this report were to identify (1) the national challenges to freight mobility and how these challenges were evident at selected container ports and surrounding areas, (2) the existing limitations to effectively addressing these challenges, and (3) strategies that may help public decision makers improve freight mobility, including a discussion of relevant provisions of selected proposals related to reauthorization of federal surface transportation programs. Proposals to Address the Limitations with Existing Funding/Financing Programs American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials proposed (1) the use of existing innovative finance tools and new financing mechanisms for investments in freight transportation infrastructure such as lowering the Transportation Infrastructure Financing and Innovation Act (TIFIA) project dollar threshold, expanding the eligibility of freight projects and relaxing repayment requirements, allowing pooling of modal funds, expanding the state infrastructure bank (SIB) program to all states, creating tax incentives for freight rail and intermodal infrastructure investment, and exploring the utility of a Transportation Finance Corporation as a financing mechanism for freight projects; (2) tailoring existing and proposed innovative financing techniques to make increased investment in intermodal connectors possible in combination with increases in core Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century (TEA-21) programs; (3) focusing the National Corridor Planning and Development Program and the Coordinated Border Infrastructure Program more tightly on freight corridors and augmenting funding from the Highway Trust Fund with innovative financing; (4) clarifying the eligibility of freight projects for Congestion Mitigation and Air Quality (CMAQ) funding; (5) increasing the funding for the highway rail grade crossing program (section 130) proportionate to the increase in the overall highway program; and (6) expanding and reforming the Rail Revitalization and Improvement Funding Program (RRIF). | Why GAO Did This Study
The strong productivity gains in the U.S. economy have hinged in part on transportation networks working more efficiently. The nation's ports, which handle 95 percent of overseas freight tonnage, are a key link in this network, and efficient intermodal links between ship, rail, and highways are vital to continued productivity gains. GAO was asked to address (1) the challenges to freight mobility, (2) the limitations key stakeholders have encountered in addressing these challenges, and (3) strategies that may aid decision makers in enhancing freight mobility. GAO's work was based on a synthesis of previous studies and a review of conditions at 10 ports and surrounding areas that handle almost two-thirds of all containers moving in and out of the country.
What GAO Found
The major challenges to freight mobility share a common theme--congestion. National studies point to such problems as overcrowded highways and freight-specific "chokepoints" that stifle effective intermodal transfer of cargoes. All 10 ports GAO studied faced similar congestionrelated problems. For example, many of the ports are in dense urban areas, limiting the ability to expand rail yards, roadways, and other infrastructure. Increased port security measures may exacerbate congestion if new controls drastically slow the movement of goods. Stakeholders encounter two main limitations in addressing freight mobility challenges. The first relates to the limited visibility that freight projects receive in the process for planning and prioritizing how transportation dollars should be spent. The planning process often lacks a comprehensive evaluation approach, such as a cost-benefit framework that might result in the implementation of freight improvements to better ensure that systemwide, multimodal solutions are considered and adopted where appropriate. The second relates to limitations of federal funding programs, which tend to dedicate funds to a single mode of transportation or a nonfreight purpose. Two strategies may help address these limitations. One is to ensure that transportation planning cuts across modes and individual jurisdictions, includes coordination with freight stakeholders representing an intermodal perspective, and includes sound analytical approaches and meaningful data needed to compare the benefits of freight and passenger projects. The second is to develop a multifaceted funding approach that includes improved access of freight projects to existing funding sources and support for programs that emphasize better use of existing infrastructure. If integrated in these strategies, three principles could better assure that the freight infrastructure system provides the level of capacity and performance that makes the greatest contribution to the nation's economic well-being. These principles include promoting efficiency by embracing a "user pay" approach, establishing performance measures, and aligning incentives for planning agencies to adopt best practices. |
gao_GAO-02-74 | gao_GAO-02-74_0 | The regulation requires all 50 states, the District of Columbia, and eight insular areas to (1) have in effect and enforce laws that prohibit the sale and distribution of tobacco products to people under 18 years of age, (2) conduct annual random, unannounced inspections, using a valid probability sample of outlets that are accessible to youth, of all tobacco outlets within the state to estimate the percentage of retailers who do not comply with the laws, and (3) report the retailer violation rates to the Secretary of HHS in their annual SAPT block grant applications. Although SAMHSA approved states’ sample designs, inspection protocols, and inspection results, the quality of the estimated statewide violation rates reported for fiscal years 1998 and 1999 is undermined because of several factors: First, some states used inaccurate and incomplete lists from which to select samples of tobacco outlets to inspect. As a result, using minors younger than 16 could bias the outcome of state inspections by lowering the violation rate. However, SAMHSA relied on the states to assess the quality of the data they used to develop their rates, even though the potential 40-percent reduction in a state’s block grant for not meeting annual violation rate goals could provide an incentive for some states to report artificially low violation rates. Penalties Have Been Used By States as an Enforcement Tool
A little more than half the states reported in their fiscal year 1999 block grant applications that violators of youth tobacco access laws were penalized as part of the state’s enforcement strategy. Research shows that enforcement strategies that include the assessment of penalties are successful at reducing minors’ access to tobacco products. These penalties included fines against retailers and sales clerks and the suspension or revocation of retailers’ licenses. Seven states reported that they took other law enforcement actions against violators, such as issuing warning letters or citations. Conclusions
The goal of the Synar amendment is to help reduce the sale of tobacco products to minors through state laws that make it illegal for retailers to sell them tobacco products. Recommendations for Executive Action
To help ensure the quality of states’ estimates of tobacco retailer violation rates under the Synar amendment and to make the rates more comparable across states, we recommend that the Secretary of HHS direct the Administrator of SAMHSA to help states improve the validity of their samples by working more closely with them in developing ways to increase the accuracy and completeness of the lists of tobacco outlets from which they draw random samples for inspections; revise the inspection protocol guidance to better reflect research results, particularly regarding the ages of minor inspectors, and work with states to develop a more standardized inspection protocol consistent with state law, and more uniform implementation across states; and ensure that all states’ retailer violation rates exclude invalid inspections, particularly those in which the ages of minors and outcomes of inspections are unknown. | Why GAO Did This Study
Every day, about 3,000 young people become regular smokers. It is estimated that one-third of them will die from smoking-related diseases. If children and adolescents can be prevented from using tobacco products they are likely to remain tobacco-free for the rest of their lives. In 1992, Congress enacted legislation, known as the Synar amendment, to reduce the sale and distribution of tobacco products to individuals under the age of 18. States are required to enforce laws that prohibit tobacco sales to minors, conduct random inspections of tobacco retail or distribution outlets to estimate the level of compliance with Synar requirements, and report the results of these efforts to the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). The Synar amendment and regulation are the only federal requirements that seek to prohibit the sale and distribution of tobacco products to minors.
What GAO Found
GAO found that weaknesses in the states' implementation of Synar and in HHS oversight may be adversely affecting the quality and comparability of state-reported estimates of the percentage of retailers that violate laws prohibiting tobacco sales to minors. First, some states used inaccurate and incomplete lists of over-the-counter and vending machine tobacco outlets from which to select samples for inspection, which affect the estimated statewide violation rate. Second, states allowed the use of minors younger than 16 as inspectors, even though research suggests that using such minors can artificially lower violation rates. Third, HHS approved a few states' reported violation rates even though the rates included inspection results that were invalid because of the ages of the inspectors and the outcomes of the inspections were unknown. Fourth, HHS relied on states to validate their own inspection results with limited verification of the accuracy of state data even though the potential reduction in a state's block grant award for not meeting annual violation-rate goals could be an incentive for states to report artificially low rates. A little more than half the states reported for fiscal year 1999 that they used fines and suspension or revocation of retailers' licenses to penalize violators of youth tobacco access laws as part of their enforcement strategy. States also reported issuing warning letters and citations. HHS requires states to report evidence of actions taken to enforce state laws but does not require the use of penalties as an enforcement tool. Research shows that penalties reduce minors' access to tobacco products. |
gao_GAO-02-205 | gao_GAO-02-205_0 | The number of the most complex individual income tax returns filed on paper—standard Form 1040s—essentially stayed the same. The number of paper individual income tax returns received by IRS during the peak filing period stayed relatively the same from 1997 through 2000, and peak processing needs drive the resources needed to process individual paper returns. Volume of Returns Received During Peak Filing Period Drives Resource Needs; Peak Volume Stayed About the Same From 1997 Through 2000
Another filing trend that limited the impact of electronic filing on processing costs was the increase in the number of paper returns filed by individuals during the peak filing period—the 2 weeks of the year when the most individual income tax returns are filed. Demands Placed on Paper Processing Staff Were Expanded
Another factor that limited the impact of electronic filing on the resources devoted to paper processing was the increase in demands placed on paper processing staff from 1997 through 2000. These increased demands included the following:
Numerous processing changes increased the workload for units responsible for (a) reviewing returns for completeness and coding them for data entry, (b) transcribing data, and (c) correcting errors. Because most electronic filers submitted a paper signature document, the work done by paper processing staff was not totally eliminated when taxpayers filed electronically and the volume of that work increased as electronic filing increased. Front-line employees spent increasing amounts of time on activities, including training, not specifically related to processing returns. 80 percent of individual returns filed electronically. To address this objective, we interviewed several Internal Revenue Service (IRS) officials responsible for submission processing and electronic tax administration. Our second objective was to determine the prospects for future reductions in submission processing costs. | What GAO Found
From fiscal years 1997 through 2000, the number of individual and business tax returns filed electronically increased from 23 million to 41 million. During the same period, the Internal Revenue Service's (IRS) expenditures for submission processing grew from $795 million to $924 million, an increase of 16 percent. Because it costs less to process an electronic return than a paper return, a growth in processing costs seemed improbable. Interviews with IRS officials and an analysis of relevant documentation identified several factors that limited the impact of electronic filing. Specifically, (1) the overall number of individual and business tax returns filed increased, and the resources needed to process that increase partially offset the resources saved by processing more electronic returns; (2) the number of the most costly to process individual income tax returns filed on paper essentially stayed the same; and (3) the number of individual income tax returns filed on paper and received during the peak filing period stayed relatively the same, and peak processing needs drive the resources needed to process individual paper returns. Although electronic filing increased, so did the demands placed on paper processing staff. In particular, (1) processing changes increased the workload for units responsible for reviewing returns for completeness and coding them for entry data, and correcting errors; (2) because most electronic filers still sent a paper signature document to IRS, the work done by paper processing staff was not entirely eliminated when taxpayers filed electronically; and (3) front-line paper processing staff spent increasing amounts of time on activities, including training, not specifically related to processing returns. Future reductions in processing costs as a result of electronic filing are possible. |
gao_GAO-05-534 | gao_GAO-05-534_0 | This report focuses primarily on ranges used for training purposes. Degraded Conditions at Military Training Ranges Adversely Affect Training Activities
Our visits to eight training ranges, along with DOD’s own assessments, show that military training ranges have been generally deteriorating over time and lack modernized capabilities. These degraded conditions have adversely affected training, placed the services at risk of not meeting DOD’s transformation goals, and jeopardized the safety of military personnel who use the ranges. Without adequately maintained and modernized ranges, the department not only compromises the opportunity to achieve its training transformation goal of sustainable and capable training ranges but also assumes the risk that its forces will be less prepared for its missions and subjected to safety hazards. 1). 2). Also, its communication system is inadequate. Various Factors Affect DOD’s Progress in Improving Training Range Conditions
While OSD and the military services have undertaken a number of management actions that could improve the conditions of their training ranges, progress in overall improvements has been limited, due in part to the lack of a comprehensive approach to manage their training ranges. Also, both the DOD-wide and Navy headquarters-level sustainable range working groups are primarily focused on encroachment issues and not on other issues that impact ranges and training, such as maintenance and modernization. DOD reports and officials identified the following as factors in the funding shortages: Training ranges typically have a lower funding priority than many other installation activities. OSD and the Services Have Not Fully Implemented Previously Recommended Actions
Although policy, management guidance, reports, and plans have either recommended or required specific actions, OSD and the services have not fully implemented these previously recommended actions. Conclusions
DOD training ranges are important national assets that have not been adequately maintained or modernized to meet today’s needs. DOD needs to ensure that OSD’s comprehensive strategic plan, the services’ implementation plans, DOD’s training transformation plan, DOD policies, and identified recommendations include all relevant officials, clearly define their roles and responsibilities, comprehensively address all sustainability issues, including the maintenance and modernization of military training ranges, and are fully implemented to ensure the long-term viability of these national assets. A variety of factors, such as ranges having a lower priority in funding, contributes to or exacerbates funding limitations. Defined training range requirements and a systematic process to annually assess the conditions of training ranges and their consequent impact on training, including whether the ranges are able to meet the specific training requirements of the service and combatant commanders. Forces for Combat in Urban Areas. | Why GAO Did This Study
Military training ranges are important national assets and play a critical role in preparing military forces for their wartime mission. The Department of Defense (DOD) has reported for years that it faces increasing difficulties in carrying out realistic training at its ranges due to various constraints. While encroachment issues have had high visibility within DOD and the Congress, much less attention has been given to the overall conditions of training ranges, which can also have an adverse impact on training activities. This report, prepared under the Comptroller General's authority, discusses (1) the condition of military training ranges and their impact on training activities, and (2) what factors are affecting DOD's progress in improving training range conditions.
What GAO Found
GAO's visits to eight training ranges, along with DOD's own assessments show that ranges are deteriorating and lack modernization. This adversely affects training activities and jeopardizes the safety of military personnel. To ensure readiness, servicemembers must have access to capable ranges--a key DOD transformation goal--that enables them to develop and maintain skills for wartime missions. However, GAO observed various degraded conditions at each training range visited, such as malfunctioning communication systems, impassable tank trails, overgrown areas, and outdated training areas and targets. Whenever possible, the services work around these conditions by modifying the timing, tempo, or location of training, but officials have expressed concern that workarounds are becoming increasingly difficult and costly and that they compromise the realism essential to effective training. Without adequate ranges, DOD compromises the opportunity to achieve its transformation goal and assumes the risk that its forces will be less prepared for missions and subjected to hazards. DOD's progress in improving training range conditions has been limited and is partially attributable to a lack of a comprehensive approach to ensure that ranges provide the proper setting for effectively preparing its forces for warfare. First, while the services have individually taken a varying number of key management improvement actions, such as developing range sustainment policies, these actions lack consistency across DOD or focus primarily on encroachment without including commensurate efforts on other issues, such as maintenance and modernization. Second, even though the services cannot precisely identify the funding required and used for their ranges, identified range requirements have historically been inadequately funded, as evidenced by conditions GAO saw, and inadequately addressed. Service officials identified a variety of factors that have exacerbated funding limitations, such as ranges having a lower priority in funding decisions. Third, although DOD policy, reports, and plans have either recommended or required specific actions, DOD has not fully implemented such actions. |
gao_GAO-14-73 | gao_GAO-14-73_0 | The Federal Government Has Made Efforts to Facilitate Demand- Response Activities, Including Expanding Their Use in Wholesale Markets
Since 2004, the federal government has undertaken efforts to facilitate demand-response activities. FERC has also reported that electricity markets are more effective when retail rates vary with the cost of serving consumers. The baseline—that is, the estimated amount of electricity a consumer would have used if not participating in demand-response activities—is key to determining the amount of electricity reduction for which a demand-response provider will be compensated. Further, FERC has, in some limited instances, made certain adjustments after these data are collected and before making them available to the public but does not fully document these adjustments or the reasons for making them. FERC Has Taken Steps to Collect and Report Data on Demand-Response Activities
In accordance with the Energy Policy Act of 2005, FERC has collected data used to develop annual reports—FERC’s Assessment of Demand Response and Advanced Metering—about the extent to which advanced meters are used and consumers’ demand-response activities in the United States. FERC Has Not Reviewed the Scope of Its Data Collection and Reporting
Since it initially designed its survey 8 years ago, FERC has considered some potential improvements to the survey, but it has not comprehensively reviewed the scope of its data collection and reporting efforts to address certain data limitations and changes in electricity markets over this period. We have previously reported that evaluation can play a key role in program management and oversight—including evaluation of activities with an identifiable purpose. As a result, information that could assist regulators in determining how to focus their oversight efforts—data on the impact of demand-response activities; the extent to which progress has been made in addressing barriers to expanding demand-response activities, such as the limited number of retail consumers paying prices that vary with the cost of serving them; and trends in consumer participation—may not be readily available. Best practices for data management advise that key steps to modify data be documented. Specifically, according to data reported in FERC’s 2012 Assessment of Demand Response and Advanced Metering report, the extent of demand-response activities reported by utilities and other entities responding to FERC’s survey more than doubled from a total of 29,653 MW of potential reduction in peak demand in 2005 to 66,351 MW in 2011, or about 8.5 percent of the peak U.S. demand in 2011. In wholesale markets, FERC data indicate that demand-response activities more than tripled from 2005 through 2011, but the extent of demand-response activities has varied by RTO region over time and by the services provided. Specifically, data from FERC’s 2012 Assessment of Demand Response and Advanced Metering report indicate that the extent of retail demand-response activities has increased 81 percent overall from a reported 20,754 MW of potential reduction in peak demand in 2005 to a reported 37,543 MW in 2011. In its 2012 Assessment of Demand Response and Advanced Metering report, FERC reported data that show that the extent of wholesale demand-response activities has increased overall, more than tripling from a reported 8,899 MW of potential reduction in peak demand in 2005 to 28,807 MW of potential reduction in peak demand in 2011. Demand-Response Efforts Have Resulted in Benefits, but Current Efforts Continue to Pose Challenges in Wholesale Markets
According to stakeholders, current demand-response efforts provide benefits for consumers, including increasing reliability, lower prices, and delaying the need to develop new power plants and transmission lines. FERC’s Efforts to Remove Barriers and Encourage Demand-Response Activities Have Made Wholesale Markets More Complex and Introduced Challenges, and It Is Too Soon to Evaluate Steps to Address Challenges
FERC’s efforts to remove barriers and to encourage demand-response activities in wholesale markets have added complexity to these markets by introducing administrative functions that, according to stakeholders, have led to challenges. The stakeholders we spoke with disagreed on the value of demand-response activities relative to electricity generation and how to compensate consumers for their demand- response activities. First, FERC has not reviewed the scope of its data collection and reporting efforts to determine whether they could be improved to better reflect changes in electricity markets and participation in demand- response activities. We believe in the importance of fully implementing these recommendations. Specifically, this report assesses: (1) the federal government’s efforts to facilitate demand-response activities; (2) Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) efforts to collect and report data on demand- response activities; (3) changes, if any, in the extent of demand-response activities in retail and wholesale markets; and (4) key benefits and challenges, if any, of current demand-response efforts. | Why GAO Did This Study
Electricity demand fluctuates throughout the day and year and, as GAO has reported, electricity is generated first at U.S. power plants with the lowest operating costs, and, as demand rises, at more costly plants. Prior to being sold to retail consumers such as households and businesses, electricity is traded in wholesale markets. Regulation of electricity markets is divided; states oversee retail markets, and FERC oversees wholesale markets. In 2004, GAO reported on the benefits of encouraging consumers to reduce demand when the cost to generate electricity is high. These activities are known as “demand-response activities,” which can reduce the costs of producing electricity, improve market functions, and enhance reliability.
GAO was asked to examine demand-response activities. This report provides an update since 2004 and discusses: (1) federal efforts to facilitate demand-response activities, (2) FERC efforts to collect and report data on demand-response activities, (3) changes in the extent of demand-response activities, and (4) key benefits and challenges of current efforts. GAO reviewed documents and conducted interviews with government officials and industry stakeholders with demand-response expertise.
What GAO Found
Since 2004, the federal government has made efforts to facilitate demand-response activities, including expanding their use in wholesale electricity markets. Among these efforts, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) issued regulatory orders affecting Regional Transmission Organizations (RTO)—entities that operate the transmission system and administer wholesale markets in some parts of the country. For example, FERC issued orders approving RTO rules for quantifying the extent of demand-response activities and compensating consumers for their demand-response activities.
FERC collects and reports data on demand-response activities in accordance with the Energy Policy Act of 2005, but these efforts have limitations. Electricity markets and demand-response activities have changed since FERC began collecting and reporting this data in 2006, but FERC has not reviewed the scope of its efforts to determine whether they could better reflect changes in electricity markets and demand-response activities. For example, FERC has reported that the limited number of retail consumers paying rates that vary with the cost of serving them is a barrier to expanding demand-response activities, but its report provides limited data on the number of consumers doing so. GAO has reported that evaluation of programs or efforts with a specific focus—such as FERC's demand-response data collection efforts—can play a key role in management and oversight. FERC, in some cases, adjusts the data it collects before making them available to the public—using its judgment to improve the data's consistency, for example—but does not fully document these adjustments. Best practices for data management advise that data modifications be documented. By not addressing these limitations, FERC is missing opportunities to make its data more informative and transparent to users for analysis of trends in demand-response activities and the extent to which progress has been made in addressing barriers.
Since GAO's 2004 report, FERC data show that the extent of demand-response activities has increased, with demand-response activities in wholesale and retail markets more than doubling from a total of 29,653 megawatts (MW) of potential reduction in peak demand in 2005 to more than 66,350 MW in 2011—about 8.5 percent of total peak demand. Demand-response activities in retail markets have increased 81 percent from a reported 20,754 MW of potential reduction in 2005 to a reported 37,543 MW in 2011. In wholesale markets, demand-response activities more than tripled from 2005 through 2011—increasing from 8,899 MW of potential reduction in 2005 to 28,807 MW of potential reduction in 2011—but the extent of demand-response activities has varied by RTO region.
According to stakeholders, current demand-response efforts provide benefits for consumers, including increasing reliability and lowering prices, but these efforts also pose a number of challenges for wholesale markets. For example, FERC's efforts to encourage demand-response activities in the markets it oversees have made these markets more complex by introducing administrative functions that, according to stakeholders, have led to challenges. Challenges include the need to develop estimates of the amount of electricity a consumer would have used in order to quantify the reduction in electricity use from demand-response activities. FERC has taken some steps to address these challenges, but it is too soon to tell whether these steps will be effective.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends FERC review the scope of its data collection and improve the transparency of its reporting efforts. In commenting on a draft of this report, FERC stated that it would take the report's recommendations and findings under advisement. GAO believes in the importance of fully implementing these recommendations. |
gao_GAO-15-279 | gao_GAO-15-279_0 | Background
MODA in Afghanistan and Global Expansion
The MODA program started in Afghanistan in July 2010. Using this authority, DOD created the Global MODA program. For most of fiscal year 2014, however, DOD had only 2 advisors abroad in Kosovo and Montenegro for 1-year assignments. For more information on DOD’s first 2 Global MODA deployments, see app. 2). According to DOD officials, the reasons DOD did not meet its goal of 12 advisors in place by the end of fiscal year 2014 are unique to each of the countries and advisors selected. These officials noted there can be delays in the country approval process, or with the recruitment or training of the advisor. DOD Has Not Met All Legislative Requirements for the MODA Program
The fiscal year 2012 and 2014 NDAAs established requirements for the Global MODA program, including that DOD (1) obtain concurrence from the Secretary of State in assigning advisors to foreign ministries of defense; (2) report annually on activities under the program during the preceding fiscal year and include 6 elements on the status of the program in its reports; and (3) update the policy guidance for the MODA program. Specifically, DOD obtained concurrence on deployments from the Secretary of State, but its most recent annual report to Congress only included 4 of the 6 required elements for the Global MODA program, and it has not developed a policy for the program. DOD Met Most but Not All NDAA Reporting Requirements and Could Provide More Information on the Status of the Program
In the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2012, Congress required that DOD’s annual reports on the status of the MODA program include 6 elements: (1) a list of the defense ministries to which civilian employees were assigned; (2) the number of advisors assigned to these ministries; (3) the duration of the advisors’ assignments; (4) a brief description of the activities carried out by advisors; (5) a description of the criteria used to select the foreign defense ministries and civilian advisors for the program; (6) the cost of each assignment. Additionally, it did not provide information on the extent to which actual costs compared with planned funding allocations. While DOD is not required by law to report on this information, Congress has required DOD to report on the number, duration, and cost of advisors assigned, and additional information in these areas beyond what is required could be useful to Congress. We have also reported that information on a program’s progress in meeting its objectives, as well as program-level linkages between resources, strategies, and goals, can be useful to Congress. Such information could help ensure that Congress can more fully assess the program’s efforts and status. Establish a time frame for updating the required policy for the MODA program. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2012, as amended by the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2014, mandated GAO to report on the effectiveness of the advisory services provided by civilian employees under the Department of Defense’s (DOD) Ministry of Defense Advisors (MODA) program. To determine the extent to which DOD met NDAA requirements, we reviewed the fiscal year 2012 and 2014 NDAAs to identify requirements, interviewed DOD and State officials, and reviewed DOD and State documentation, including DOD’s annual reports to Congress. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 2012, Congress authorized DOD to create a program to assign civilian DOD employees as advisors to foreign ministries of defense. DOD created the Global MODA program, an expansion of a program started in Afghanistan in 2010, which partners DOD civilian experts with foreign defense and security officials to build core competencies in key areas such as strategy and policy, human resources management, acquisition and logistics, and financial management. The NDAA, as amended, required that DOD (1) obtain concurrence on the program from the Secretary of State; (2) provide an annual report to Congress including 6 elements on the status of the program; and (3) update the policy for the program. Congress also required GAO to report on the effectiveness of the program.
GAO assessed (1) DOD's progress in expanding MODA globally and (2) the extent to which DOD met NDAA requirements. GAO reviewed MODA program plans, reports, and other documents and interviewed DOD and State officials in Washington, D.C., as well as in Kosovo and Montenegro—the locations to which the first 2 advisors were deployed.
What GAO Found
The Department of Defense (DOD) has expanded the Global Ministry of Defense Advisors (MODA) program more slowly than planned. It had 2 advisors in the field in Kosovo and Montenegro for most of fiscal year 2014, short of its goal of deploying 12 advisors by the end of fiscal year 2014. DOD deployed advisors to 2 additional countries just before the end of fiscal year 2014 (see figure). According to DOD officials, reasons it has taken longer than expected to expand globally include delays in the country approval process and with advisor recruitment and training.
DOD has met most but not all legislative requirements for the MODA program. As required by the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2012, DOD obtained concurrence on its proposed deployments from the Department of State (State). DOD's most recent annual report to Congress included 4 of the 6 required elements, but did not include information on the cost or duration of each Global MODA deployment, which could help Congress assess the value of the program in relation to other capacity-building efforts (see figure). Additionally, DOD has not provided information on the program's performance, such as linking actual performance to goals. Although DOD is not required by law to include this information, GAO has previously reported that such information can be useful to decision makers. Finally, DOD has not updated the policy for the program as required in the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2014.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOD (1) include all required information in its annual reports to Congress; (2) consider providing Congress with additional information on the program's performance; and (3) develop a time frame for updating the policy for the MODA program. DOD concurred with these recommendations. |
gao_GAO-11-514 | gao_GAO-11-514_0 | While facility investigation is under way, interim measures may be needed to control or abate ongoing risks to human health and the environment. During the Past Decade, EPA Established Goals and Issued Guidance to Expedite Cleanup under the Corrective Action Program
As part of its effort to focus and streamline the RCRA corrective action program, EPA has since 1997 set a series of progressively more ambitious performance goals and identified which facilities must meet them. While directing attention to high-priority facilities, EPA was also working to establish what it considered a long-range vision for the corrective action program—that by the year 2020, cleanup of contamination at an expanded universe of RCRA facilities would be largely complete. The agency also set long-range goals for 2020: controlling human exposures to contaminants at 95 percent of 3,747 facilities, controlling the migration of contaminated groundwater at 95 percent of these facilities, and completing final remedy construction at 95 percent of these facilities. EPA has established a formal process for its regions and authorized states to follow to determine whether facilities undergoing cleanup have controlled human exposures to contaminants and the migration of contaminated groundwater. EPA, States, and Facilities Have Made Considerable Progress in Meeting Corrective Action Performance Goals, but Meeting Long- Term Cleanup Goals May Be Difficult
EPA, states, and facilities have taken a variety of actions to streamline the cleanup process, and the vast majority of high-priority facilities have made considerable progress in meeting EPA’s performance goals to control contamination. EPA officials in several regions also reported assisting states with facilities. 2). As the figure shows, by the end of fiscal year 2010, 283 (8 percent) of the 3,747 facilities had not yet begun the cleanup process. It Will Be Difficult for EPA, States, and Facilities to Meet EPA’s 2020 Goal for Constructing Final Cleanup Remedies
Given EPA’s progress to date in meeting its goals and the progress it needs to make to meet them, it will be difficult to meet the goal of constructing final remedies at not only high-priority facilities but also at the medium- and low-priority facilities included in EPA’s expanded universe covered by the 2020 goals. The majority of officials from EPA regions and states we interviewed agreed that while controlling human exposures to contaminants and controlling the migration of contaminated groundwater were achievable at most facilities by fiscal year 2020, constructing final remedies at 95 percent of the facilities by fiscal year 2020 was unlikely to be achieved. EPA Regions, the States, and Industry Representatives Collectively Identified Resource Constraints and Groundwater Remediation as Key Challenges to Meeting Future Cleanup Goals
Officials in EPA regions and the states identified fiscal and human resource constraints as the preeminent challenge for achieving the 2020 goals on time. We acknowledge the complexities associated with a definitive and detailed analysis of the program’s costs, given the number and complexity of cleanups required and the varied federal, state, and industry sources that fund it. Recommendation for Executive Action
To sustain progress in the RCRA corrective action program and better align the 2020 program goals with resources it will take to attain them, we recommend that the EPA Administrator direct cognizant officials to assess the agency’s remaining corrective action workload, determine the extent to which the program has the resources it needs to meet these goals, and take steps to either reallocate its resources to the program or revise the goals. Key contributors to the report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: U.S. States and Territories Authorized to Manage a Corrective Action Program
Appendix II: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to determine (1) the actions the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has taken to establish goals for the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) corrective action program and to expedite cleanup; (2) the progress EPA, the states, and facilities have made in meeting performance goals; and (3) the challenges, if any, that EPA, the states, and facilities may face in meeting future cleanup goals. We also reviewed the procedures established to evaluate whether facilities have met the goals. To determine the current status of the program toward meeting the 2020 goals, we collected and analyzed data from EPA’s national program management and inventory system of hazardous waste handlers, RCRAInfo. | Why GAO Did This Study
Years of industrial development generated hazardous waste that, when improperly disposed of, poses risks to human health and the environment. To mitigate these risks, Congress passed the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA). Subtitle C of RCRA, as amended, requires owners or operators to take corrective actions to clean up contamination at facilities that treat, store, or dispose of hazardous waste. The corrective action program is administered by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) or states authorized by EPA. GAO was asked by Representative Markey, in his former capacity as Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Energy and Environment, to assess this program. This report discusses (1) actions EPA has taken to establish goals for the program and expedite cleanup; (2) the progress EPA, states, and facilities have made in meeting these goals; and (3) the challenges EPA, states, and facilities face, if any, in meeting future cleanup goals. GAO reviewed and analyzed EPA documents and data and interviewed EPA and state agency officials and stakeholder groups.
What GAO Found
To focus and streamline the RCRA corrective action program, EPA has over the past decade set a series of progressively more ambitious performance goals and identified which facilities must meet them. Its first set of performance goals, for example--to be achieved in fiscal year 2005--were to control human exposures to contamination and migration of contaminated groundwater at 95 percent of 1,714 "high-risk" facilities. EPA also established a long-range vision for the program, going beyond controlling contamination to cleaning it up. Hence, it targeted 2020 as the year by which 95 percent of 3,747 facilities (expanded from 1,714 to include low- and medium-risk facilities) would have completed construction of all cleanup remedies. EPA also (1) established a process for its regions and authorized states to follow in determining whether facilities undergoing cleanup have met major milestones toward controlling human exposure and preventing the spread of contaminated groundwater and (2) issued guidance to assist in streamlining the corrective action process, maximize program flexibility, and expedite cleanup. EPA, states, and facilities have made considerable progress in meeting corrective action performance goals to control and contain contamination at high-risk facilities. Each of the five EPA regional offices GAO visited cited efforts to improve information on state program status, better estimate remaining work, and identify actions taken to meet the 2020 goals. Several also directly assisted states in assessing whether facilities had controlled contamination. Regional and state offices also reported streamlining reporting requirements and compliance procedures. EPA data show that by the end of fiscal year 2005, the vast majority of high-risk facilities had controlled human exposure to hazards and the migration of contaminated groundwater. Importantly, the EPA data also highlight the challenge facing EPA, states, and facilities in meeting the 2020 goal of constructing final cleanup remedies for 95 percent of the expanded universe of 3,747 facilities. For example, almost three-quarters of these facilities have yet to construct final cleanup remedies. Most EPA and state officials interviewed agreed that the 2020 goal was unlikely to be met. EPA, states, and facilities identified fiscal and human resource constraints and groundwater cleanup as key challenges for achieving the 2020 goals on time. Program cuts resulting from states' fiscal problems and facilities' funding difficulties resulting from the economic downturn have exacerbated resource constraints. Technical complexity associated with groundwater remediation may also impede progress, and disagreements between industry and regulators over groundwater cleanup standards may perpetuate delays. To date, however, EPA has not performed a rigorous analysis of its remaining corrective action workload, including the resources it needs to meet its 2020 goals and the complexity and cost of what remains to be done. Without such an assessment, EPA cannot determine the extent to which the program has the resources it needs to meet these goals.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that EPA assess the remaining corrective action workload, determine the extent to which the program has resources needed to meet 2020 goals, and take steps to either reallocate its resources or revise its goals. EPA agreed with the recommendation. |
gao_GAO-15-469 | gao_GAO-15-469_0 | Some key recommendations that we have made in the past to improve DOD’s acquisition process include the following:
Require that systems engineering that is needed to evaluate the sufficiency of available resources be conducted before weapon system requirements are formalized;
Require, as a condition for starting a new weapon system program, that sufficient evidence exists to show there is a match between a weapon’s system requirements and the resources the program manager has to develop that weapon;
Require program officials to demonstrate that they have captured appropriate knowledge at program start (Milestone B), which includes ensuring that requirements for the product are informed by the systems engineering process, and establishing cost and schedule estimates on the basis of knowledge from preliminary design using system engineering tools;
Have contractors perform more detailed systems engineering analysis to develop sound requirements before DOD selects a prime contractor for the systems development contract; and
Define a shipbuilding approach that calls for (1) demonstrating balance among program requirements, technology demands, and cost considerations by preliminary design review, and (2) retiring technical risk and closing any remaining gaps in design requirements before a contract for detail design is awarded. Military Service Chiefs Are Dissatisfied with Acquisition Outcomes, Citing Requirements Growth as a Key Problem
Most current and former military service chiefs that we interviewed collectively expressed dissatisfaction with the current acquisition process and the outcomes it produces. They were concerned that after validated requirements are handed over to the acquisition process, requirements are frequently added or changed to increase the scope and capabilities of a weapon system. According to a number of both current and former service chiefs, they are not always involved in the acquisition process and are frequently caught by surprise when these problems emerge. Current service chiefs and other acquisition leadership generally indicated the service chiefs have the ability to be more involved in the current process, such as by attending service and DOD level program reviews. Several current and former service chiefs agreed that they have been involved in the oversight of some programs, but their level of involvement is dependent on the importance of the program and established working relationships with the service acquisition executive. Defining Lower-Level Requirements Is Often the More Significant Contributing Factor to Program Cost Increases
Acting on the chiefs’ concerns, we analyzed all 78 major defense acquisition programs and found that growth in high-level requirements— and consequent cost growth—was rare. We presented our assessment of the requirements problem to current and former service chiefs and they generally agreed with it. This allows trade-offs between requirements and resources to take place, and the establishment of more realistic cost, schedule, and performance commitments before programs get underway. Recommendations for Executive Action
To help ensure that requirements are well defined and well understood before a program is approved to start system development, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the military service chiefs and service acquisition executives to work together to take the following two actions:
Assess whether sufficient systems engineering expertise is available during the requirements development process; and
Develop a better way to make sure sufficient systems engineering is conducted and opportunities exist to better define requirements and assess resource trade-offs before a program starts. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
GAO issued a report in 2014 on the military service chiefs’ role in the acquisition chain of command. This report reviews further related issues and concerns the military service chiefs have with the Department of Defense’s (DOD) acquisition process and outcomes it produces. To obtain the views of current and former military service chiefs on the current acquisition process, we conducted interviews with 12 current and former military service chiefs and vice chiefs between August and December 2014. To assess key problems or factors the service chiefs identified with the acquisition process and our assessment of these issues, we drew upon our extensive body of work in defense acquisitions and best practices, and reviewed program execution information from ongoing major defense acquisition programs. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO has reported extensively on problems in cost, schedule, and performance for major defense acquisition programs. According to some acquisition reform advocates, expanding the role of the military service chiefs in the process to acquire weapon systems may improve acquisition outcomes.
Following a 2014 GAO report on the service chiefs' role in the acquisition chain of command, GAO was asked to review further related issues and concerns the service chiefs have with the acquisition process and its outcomes. This report examines: (1) the views of current and former military service chiefs on the acquisition process, and (2) key problems or factors the service chiefs identified with the acquisition process and GAO's assessment of these issues.
GAO conducted interviews with 12 current and former military service chiefs and vice chiefs, and with other current and former DOD leadership to discuss the acquisition process. GAO also drew upon its extensive body of work on defense acquisitions and best practices. To assess key problems with the current process, GAO reviewed program execution information on all 78 current major defense programs.
What GAO Found
Most current and former military service chiefs and vice chiefs GAO interviewed from the Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps collectively expressed dissatisfaction with acquisition program outcomes and believed that the Department of Defense's (DOD) requirements development and acquisition processes need to be better integrated. The service chiefs are largely responsible for developing the services' requirements for weapon systems, while the service acquisition executives are responsible for overseeing programs to plan and develop systems. Most service chiefs told GAO they were concerned that after weapon system requirements are handed to the acquisition process, requirements are changed or added by the acquisition community (sometimes referred to as “creep”), increasing the capabilities and cost of the system. Some service chiefs stated that they are not always involved in the acquisition process and are frequently caught by surprise when cost, schedule, and performance problems emerge in programs. Current and former chiefs agreed that the chiefs should be more involved in programs, but their views varied on how best to achieve this.
GAO analyzed requirements for all 78 major defense acquisition programs and found that creep—or growth—in the high-level requirements is rare. Instead, it is after a program has formally started development that the myriad lower-level, technical requirements needed to complete a weapon system's design are defined (see figure). It is the definition of these requirements—most of which occurs after the service chiefs' primary involvement—that leads to the realization that much more time and resources are needed to build the weapon system.
The process of systems engineering translates high-level requirements, such as range, into specifics, like fuel tank size. GAO has previously reported on the importance of conducting systems engineering early so that the consequences of high-level requirements can be confronted before a program starts. When GAO presented its analysis of the problem to the service chiefs, they generally agreed with it. Several noted that trade-offs informed by systems engineering must take place before programs start so that requirements are better defined and more realistic cost, schedule, and performance commitments can be made.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOD ensure sufficient systems engineering is conducted to better define requirements and assess resource trade-offs before a program starts. DOD concurred with the recommendations, citing recent policy changes. GAO believes more focus is needed on implementing actions. |
gao_GAO-11-649T | gao_GAO-11-649T_0 | Banking regulators oversee most entities that conduct mortgage servicing, but their oversight of foreclosure activities generally has been limited. However, the extent to which regulators have reviewed the foreclosure activities of banks or banking subsidiaries that perform mortgage servicing has been limited because these practices generally were not considered as posing a high risk to safety and soundness. Generally, these examinations revealed severe deficiencies in the preparation of foreclosure documentation and with the oversight of internal foreclosure processes and the activities of external third-party vendors. Examiners generally found in the files they reviewed that borrowers were seriously delinquent on the payments on their loans and that the servicers had the documents necessary to demonstrate their authority to foreclose. As a result of these reviews, the regulators issued enforcement actions requiring servicers to improve foreclosure practices. As we stated in our report, fragmentation among the various entities responsible for overseeing mortgage servicers heightens the importance of coordinating plans for future oversight. In our report, we recommend that the regulators and CFPB develop and coordinate plans for ongoing oversight and establish clear goals, roles, and timelines for overseeing mortgage servicers under their respective jurisdiction. In written comments on the report, the agencies generally agreed with our recommendation and said that they would continue to oversee servicers’ foreclosure processes. As part of addressing the problems associated with mortgage servicing, including those relating to customer service, loan modifications, and other issues, various market participants and federal agencies have begun calling for the creation of national servicing standards, but the extent to which any final standards would address foreclosure documentation and processing is unclear. While Documentation Problems Likely Will Result in Delays in the Foreclosure Process, the Impact on Financial Institutions and Others Is Less Clear
To date, a key impact of the problems relating to affidavits and notarization of mortgage foreclosure documents appears to be delays in the rate at which foreclosures proceed. Impacts on servicers, trusts, and investors because of loan transfer documentation problems were unclear. To reduce the likelihood that problems with transfer documentation could pose a risk to the financial system, we recommended that the banking regulators assess the risks of potential litigation or repurchases due to improper mortgage loan transfer documentation on institutions under their jurisdiction and require that the institutions act to mitigate the risks, if warranted. In written comments on a draft of our report, the regulators generally agreed with or did not comment on this recommendation. | Why GAO Did This Study
This testimony discusses our work on mortgage servicing issues. With record numbers of borrowers in default and delinquent on their loans, mortgage servicers--entities that manage home mortgage loans--are initiating large numbers of foreclosures throughout the country. As of December 2010, an estimated 4.6 percent of the about 50 million first-lien mortgages outstanding were in foreclosure--an increase of more than 370 percent since the first quarter of 2006, when 1 percent were in foreclosure. Beginning in September 2010, several servicers announced that they were halting or reviewing their foreclosure proceedings throughout the country after allegations that the documents accompanying judicial foreclosures may have been inappropriately signed or notarized. The servicers subsequently resumed some foreclosure actions after reviewing their processes and procedures. However, following these allegations, some homeowners challenged the validity of foreclosure proceedings against them. Questions about whether documents for loans that were sold and packaged into mortgage-backed securities were properly handled prompted additional challenges. This statement focuses on (1) the extent to which federal laws address mortgage servicers' foreclosure procedures and federal agencies' authority to oversee servicers' activities and the extent of past oversight; (2) federal agencies' current oversight activities and future oversight plans; and (3) the potential impact of foreclosure documentation issues on homeowners, servicers, regulators, and investors in mortgage-backed securities. It is based on the report we issued on May 2, 2011, on foreclosure documentation problems that Congress requested.
What GAO Found
In summary, until the problems with foreclosure documentation came to light, federal regulatory oversight of mortgage servicers had been limited, because regulators regarded servicers' activities as low risk for banking safety and soundness. However, regulators' recent examinations revealed that servicers generally failed to prepare required documentation properly and lacked effective supervision and controls over foreclosure processes. Moreover, the resulting delays in completing foreclosures and increased exposure to litigation highlight how the failure to oversee whether institutions follow sound practices can heighten the risks these entities present to the financial system and create problems for the communities in which foreclosures occur. As a result, we recommended in our report that the financial regulators take various actions, including (1) developing and coordinating plans for ongoing oversight of servicers, (2) including foreclosure practices as part of any national servicing standards that are created, and (3) assessing the risks of improper documentation for mortgage loan transfers. The regulators generally agreed with or did not comment on our recommendations, and some are taking actions to address them. |
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