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gao_GAO-05-24 | gao_GAO-05-24_0 | At the federal level, NHTSA provides guidelines, recommendations, and technical assistance to help states improve their crash data systems and is responsible for overseeing state highway safety programs. Quality of Data Systems Varied Greatly, with All States Examined Showing a Need for Improvement
The 9 states we examined in detail varied considerably in the extent to which their traffic safety data systems met NHTSA’s recommended criteria for the quality of crash information. However, relatively little is known about the extent to which they made progress in improving their traffic safety data systems for the years of the grant. However, the required documents filed with NHTSA yielded little or no information on what states had achieved. Case-study States Conducted a Variety of Activities Ranging from One Specific Project to a Variety of Activities
Our visits to 8 of the states that participated in the 411 grant program yielded additional information and documentation about their grant activities, the nature of their efforts, and the extent of progress made. According to officials at the state department of transportation, however, improvements in the crash information did not effectively serve to facilitate the state’s use of crash data to identify unsafe roadways because the state department of transportation was not fully engaged in the coordinating committee’s process. In addition, the agency did not have an effective process for monitoring progress and ensuring that grant monies were being spent as intended. For example:
Some states provided brief descriptions of the activities completed or under way, while others did not. As the previous proposed bills were drafted, however, they omitted one requirement that will be important in tracking state progress—the requirement for a state to have an assessment of its traffic safety data system no more than 5 years prior to participating in the 411 grant program. If the program is reauthorized, NHTSA should develop an oversight process that does a better job of (1) tracking state activities to their strategic plans and assessments, (2) providing information about progress made in improving safety data, and (3) ensuring that NHTSA can adequately manage the documentation it is requiring. Finally, one requirement present in the earlier program—up-to-date assessments of state traffic safety data systems—was not included in recent proposals to reauthorize the 411 grant program. Second, department officials noted that their oversight of the 411 grant program was in accordance with the statutory requirements. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives in this report were to identify (1) the quality of state crash information; (2) the activities states undertook using 411 grant funds to improve their traffic safety data systems, and progress made using the data improvement grants; and (3) the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration’s (NHTSA) oversight of the grant program, including what changes in oversight, if any, might help encourage states to improve traffic safety data systems and ensure accountability under a reauthorized program. We found these thresholds differed from state to state. Even for states that collected information about uninjured passengers, the information may be incomplete. One element relates to whether the officer suspects alcohol or drug use, and the other to an actual test for alcohol or drugs. | Why GAO Did This Study
Auto crashes kill or injure millions of people each year. Information about where and why such crashes occur is important in reducing this toll, both for identifying particular hazards and for planning safety efforts at the state and federal levels. Differences in the quality of state traffic data from state to state, however, affect the usability of data for these purposes. The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) administers a grant program to help states improve the safety data systems that collect and analyze crash data from police and sheriff's offices and other agencies, and the Congress is considering whether to reauthorize and expand the program. The Senate Appropriations Committee directed GAO to study state systems and the grant program. Accordingly, GAO examined (1) the quality of state crash information, (2) the activities states undertook to improve their traffic records systems and any progress made, and (3) NHTSA's oversight of the grant program.
What GAO Found
States vary considerably in the extent to which their traffic safety data systems meet recommended criteria used by NHTSA to assess the quality of crash information. These criteria relate to whether the information is timely, consistent, complete, and accurate, as well as to whether it is available to users and integrated with other relevant information, such as that in the driver history files. GAO reviewed systems in 9 states and found, for example, that some states entered crash information into their systems in a matter of weeks, while others took a year or more. While some systems were better than others, all had opportunities for improvement. States reported carrying out a range of activities to improve their traffic safety data systems with the grants they received from NHTSA. Relatively little is known about the extent to which these activities improved the systems, largely because the documents submitted to NHTSA contained little or no information about what the activities accomplished. The states GAO reviewed used their grant funds for a variety of projects and showed varying degrees of progress. These efforts included completing strategic plans, hiring consultants, and buying equipment to facilitate data collection. NHTSA officials said their oversight of the grant program complied with the statutory requirements, but for two main reasons, it does not provide a useful picture of what states were accomplishing. First, the agency did not provide adequate guidance to ensure that states provided accurate and complete data on what they were accomplishing with their grants. Second, it did not have an effective process for monitoring progress. The agency has begun to take some actions to strengthen oversight of all its grant programs. If the Congress decides to reauthorize the program, however, additional steps are needed to provide effective oversight of this particular program. GAO also noted that in proposing legislation to reauthorize the program, one requirement was omitted that may be helpful in assessing progress--the requirement for states to have an up to date assessment of their traffic data systems. |
gao_GAO-14-781T | gao_GAO-14-781T_0 | In addition, three operational offices are responsible for providing NTIS’s products (which include the reports it collects and disseminates) and services. As of October 2012, NTIS was supported NTIS’s basic statutory function is to collect research reports, maintain a bibliographic record and permanent repository of these reports, and disseminate them to the public. NTIS Offers a Variety of Products and Services in Carrying Out Its Operations, but Its Dissemination of Technical Reports Continues to Need Attention
Our most recent reporting on NTIS, in November 2012, continued to highlight the need for attention to NTIS’s basic statutory role of disseminating technical reports and the fee-based model upon which it In particular, while the agency was carrying out a variety of operates.mission-related functions, it was being financially sustained primarily by information-related services it offered to other federal agencies. NTIS Offers a Variety of Fee-Based Products and Services, but Is Primarily Sustained by Its Service Offerings
In our 2012 report, we identified the types of products offered by NTIS as part of its basic statutory function to collect and disseminate technical information:
Technical reports: NTIS maintains a searchable repository containing bibliographic records on over 2.5 million scientific, technical, engineering, and business research reports. However, for 10 of these years, NTIS’s expenditures for its product lines exceeded revenues. Reports Added to NTIS’s Repository between 1990 and 2011 Were Mostly Older, but Demand for More Recent Reports Was Greater
Our study also found that, during the period from fiscal year 1990 through 2011, the majority of reports added to NTIS’s repository were older; however, the demand for more recent reports was greater:
From fiscal year 1990 through fiscal year 2011, most of the additions to NTIS’s repository were reports published in the year 2000 or before. Specifically, about 62 percent of the documents added during this period—524,256 of the 841,502 documents added—had publication dates of 2000 or earlier, while about 38 percent were published from 2001 to 2011. And of these, 95 percent were available for free. Accordingly, we suggested that Congress consider examining the appropriateness and viability of the fee-based model to determine whether it should continue. We have also continued to highlight this issue in our report and related updates on actions needed to reduce fragmentation, overlap, and duplication in the federal government. Specifically, in our 2013 report we noted that many of the reports in NTIS’s collection overlap with similar information available from the issuing organizations or other sources for free, and that action was still needed to reevaluate the appropriateness and viability of the agency’s fee-based model. In a subsequent update, we noted that Congress had not taken final action to reexamine the fee- based model for disseminating technical information, and that Commerce did not plan to propose any changes to the NTIS fee-based business model in the near term. | Why GAO Did This Study
NTIS was established by statute in 1950 to collect scientific and technical research reports, maintain a bibliographic record and repository of these reports, and disseminate them to the public. In addition, it provides various information-based services to other federal agencies. NTIS charges fees for its products and services and is required by law to be financially self-sustaining to the greatest extent possible.
GAO was asked to provide a statement summarizing its November 2012 report in which it examined (1) NTIS's operations; (2) the age of and demand for reports added to its repository; and (3) the extent to which these reports are readily available from other public sources. In preparing this statement, GAO relied primarily on its previously published work as well as related updates on actions needed to reduce fragmentation, overlap, and duplication in the federal government.
What GAO Found
The Department of Commerce's National Technical Information Service (NTIS) offers a variety of products and information-related services. Its products include a repository of scientific, technical, engineering, and business research reports, which it makes available individually as well as through subscriptions to its reports library. However, from fiscal year 2001 through 2011, costs for NTIS's products exceeded revenue for 10 of the 11 fiscal years, and the agency was financially sustained during this period by services it offered to other federal agencies, such as distribution and order fulfillment and various web-based services. (See figure.)
In addition, about 62 percent of the reports added to NTIS's repository between 1990 and 2011 were older—with publications dates in the year 2000 or earlier, while about 38 percent were published from 2001 to 2011. However, demand was greater for more recent reports—those published in 2001 or later.
Further, GAO estimated that 74 percent of the reports added to NTIS's collection from fiscal year 1990 through 2011 were available elsewhere, and 95 percent of these were available for free. This calls into question the viability and appropriateness of NTIS's fee-based model for disseminating the reports it collects.
What GAO Recommends
In its 2012 report, GAO suggested that Congress reassess the appropriateness and viability of the fee-based model under which NTIS operates to determine whether this model should be continued. While the Department of Commerce stated that it did not plan to propose any changes to NTIS's fee-based model, legislation recently introduced in Congress may provide a vehicle for reassessing this model. |
gao_GAO-03-471 | gao_GAO-03-471_0 | In 2000, however, the Congress created a separately organized agency within DOE—the NNSA. NNSA’s Lack of Safeguards and Security Direction in Key Areas Results in Inconsistent Management of Contractors
NNSA has not been fully effective in managing its safeguards and security program in four key areas, and therefore, it cannot be assured that its contractors are working to maximum advantage to protect its sites. First, NNSA has not fully defined safeguards and security roles and responsibilities. Third, even when assessments are done, NNSA contractors do not consistently conduct required DOE analyses in preparing corrective action plans. Finally, NNSA’s shortfalls at its site offices in the total number of staff and expertise could make it more difficult for the site offices to oversee safeguards and security effectively. However, NNSA needs a stable structure to establish clear roles and responsibilities for its headquarters and site offices, including safeguards and security oversight. NNSA’s Security Assessment Processes Differ among Sites and Are Inconsistent with DOE Requirements
NNSA site offices are not consistent in how they assess contractor safeguards and security activities, and they may not be conducting these assessments in accordance with DOE policy. Consistency problems are likely to continue without effective NNSA guidance for corrective actions. As a result, NNSA cannot be assured that all contractors are considering the costs of corrective actions in conjunction with the risk posed or the potential benefits to be gained. Recommendations for Executive Action
In order to strengthen the safeguards and security program of the nuclear weapons complex, we recommend that the NNSA Administrator and Secretary of Energy formalize the roles and responsibilities of site offices and headquarters for conducting oversight; ensure that sites are performing oversight using a survey approach that provides an integrated comprehensive view of security conditions and is consistent with DOE orders; ensure that contractors’ corrective action plans are prepared and documented consistently and are based on qualitative root-cause, risk- assessment, and cost-benefit analyses, and that appropriate incentives are used to help motivate contractors toward effectively addressing findings; and develop and implement a plan to ensure that NNSA allocates safeguards and security staff so that it provides effective safeguards and security oversight over the long term. | Why GAO Did This Study
The attacks of September 11, 2001, intensified long-standing concerns about the adequacy of safeguards and security at four nuclear weapons production sites and three national laboratories that design nuclear weapons--most of these facilities store plutonium and uranium in a variety of forms. These facilities can become targets for such actions as sabotage or theft. The Department of Energy (DOE) and the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)--a separately organized agency within DOE--are responsible for these facilities. NNSA plays a crucial role in managing the contractors operating many of these facilities to ensure that security activities are effective and in line with departmental policy. GAO reviewed how effectively NNSA manages its safeguards and security program, including how it oversees contractor security operations.
What GAO Found
NNSA has not been fully effective in managing its safeguards and security program in four key areas. As a result, NNSA cannot be assured that its contractors are working to maximum advantage to protect critical facilities and material from individuals seeking to inflict damage. Defining clear roles and responsibilities: NNSA still has not fully defined clear roles and responsibilities for its headquarters and site operations. Assessing sites' security activities: Without a stable and effective management structure and with ongoing confusion about roles and responsibilities, inconsistencies have emerged among NNSA sites on how they assess contractors' security activities. Consequently, NNSA cannot be assured that all facilities are subject to the comprehensive annual assessments that DOE policy requires. Overseeing contractors' corrective actions: To compound the problems in conducting security assessments, NNSA contractors do not consistently conduct required analyses in preparing corrective action plans. As a result, potential opportunities to improve physical security at the sites are not maximized because corrective actions are developed without fully considering the problems' root causes, risks posed, or cost versus the benefit of taking corrective action. Allocating staff: NNSA has shortfalls at its site offices in the total number of staff and in expertise, which could make it more difficult for site offices to effectively oversee security activities. |
gao_RCED-98-26 | gao_RCED-98-26_0 | Laboratory officials attributed the leak to the reactor’s spent-fuel pool. Although the tritium posed little threat to the public, a firestorm of public concern erupted because
BNL had delayed until 1996 installing monitoring wells near the reactor despite a 1994 agreement by laboratory staff with Suffolk County officials to do so, and
BNL officials reported that the tritium had probably been leaking for at least 12 years without the laboratory’s or DOE’s knowledge. Fuel pool passes leak test. Although BNL officials later told us that the leak test was not accurate and that the two monitoring wells they installed earlier were in the wrong location to detect the tritium contamination, BNL officials relied on these data as the basis for their confidence that the spent-fuel pool did not leak. DOE’s Brookhaven Group, which had line accountability over BNL activities, failed to hold the laboratory accountable for meeting its agreements with local authorities. However, the laboratory’s own investigation of the tritium leak concluded that the laboratory’s safety and environmental protection division should have placed more emphasis on assessing potential risk and should have questioned the reactor division on the accuracy of the test results. They were part of a group of 51 wells installed throughout the laboratory site in response to a need to improve BNL’s groundwater monitoring program. BNL used the results from the two monitoring wells near the reactor as further evidence that the spent-fuel pool was not leaking because water samples from these wells did not identify the tritium leak. DOE’s Assistant Secretary for Environment, Safety and Health; the Director of the Office of Nuclear Energy, Science and Technology; and the Director of the Office of Energy Research all told us of their dissatisfaction with BNL’s and the Brookhaven Group’s inability to develop effective ways to maintain the public’s trust. The Decision to Terminate AUI Was Based on Performance and Loss of the Community’s Trust
The Secretary of Energy took full responsibility for his decision to terminate DOE’s contract with AUI as BNL’s contractor. Lab publicly announces elevated levels of tritium in groundwater on site. DOE’s resident oversight office, the Brookhaven Group, had direct responsibility for the laboratory’s ES&H performance but failed to hold BNL officials accountable for meeting all regulatory commitments. Senior DOE leadership also failed by not creating an effective management and accountability system that would ensure that all offices of DOE and its contractors met their ES&H responsibilities. One hope for clarifying DOE’s roles and responsibilities may be found in the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 (Results Act), which offers DOE the opportunity to raise these issues to a strategic level. Associated Universities generally agreed with our summary of the events surrounding the tritium leak. 2. 3. 4. Comments From Associated Universities, Inc. GAO Comments
1. However, as our report discusses, BNL and DOE staff agreed with Suffolk County to install monitoring wells but delayed their installation in favor of higher priority projects. 5. 6. 7. For example, within DOE we interviewed Office of Environment, Safety and Health officials who had evaluated the tritium recovery effort and safety management processes at the laboratory; the Chicago Operations Office manager and staff who were responsible for overseeing activities of DOE’s local Brookhaven office (the Brookhaven Group) during the early 1990s; and officials of DOE’s Brookhaven Group who administered DOE’s contract with AUI and who reviewed the laboratory’s reactor, ES&H, and groundwater monitoring programs. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the events surrounding the leak of the radioactive element tritium from a research reactor at the Brookhaven National Laboratory and the resulting termination of Associated Universities, Inc., as the laboratory's contractor.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) because Brookhaven employees did not aggressively monitor its reactor's spent-fuel pool for leaks, years passed before tritium contamination was discovered in the aquifer near the spent-fuel pool; (2) reliance on incomplete tests of the water level in the spent-fuel pool and on sample data from monitoring wells scattered about the site led Brookhaven and Department of Energy (DOE) officials to give low priority to a potential tritium leak; (3) even after laboratory and DOE staff agreed with Suffolk County regulatory officials to install monitoring wells near the reactor in 1994, Brookhaven officials postponed their installation in favor of environmental, safety, and health activities they considered more important; (4) once the wells were installed and the high levels of tritium were discovered, the laboratory reported that the spent-fuel pool could have been leaking for as long as 12 years; (5) although the tritium poses little threat to the public, the delay in installing the monitoring wells raised serious concerns in the Long Island community about: (a) the laboratory's ability to take seriously its responsibilities for environment and for human health and safety; and (b) DOE's competence as an overseer of the laboratory's activities; (6) the responsibility for failing to discover Brookhaven's tritium leak has been acknowledged by laboratory managers, and DOE admits it failed to properly oversee the laboratory's operations; (7) DOE's on-site oversight office, the Brookhaven Group, was directly responsible for Brookhaven's performance, but it failed to hold the laboratory accountable for meeting all of its regulatory commitments, especially its agreement to install monitoring wells; (8) senior DOE leadership also shares responsibility because they failed to put in place an effective system that encourages all parts of DOE to work together to ensure that contractors meet their responsibilities for environmental, safety and health issues; (9) DOE's latest strategic plan, submitted in support of the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993, offers an opportunity to focus attention on the need to address DOE's management structure and accountability problems from a strategic perspective; and (10) the Secretary of Energy's decision to terminate Associated Universities' 50 years as the laboratory's contractor was based, according to DOE's official statements, on the laboratory's loss of the public's trust and DOE's own investigation, which concluded that the laboratory had not kept pace with contemporary expectations for the protection of the environment and human health and safety. |
gao_GAO-06-324 | gao_GAO-06-324_0 | Almost Half of All Agencies Have Used Buyout and Early-out Programs to Reshape Their Workforces and the Number of Programs Has Increased
Since fiscal year 2003, the number of agencies using buyouts and early outs to reshape their workforces has increased, and to date, about half of the executive branch agencies have requested and used these authorities. According to OPM data, at least 22,600 employees have separated from federal service under a buyout, early out, or both. OPM is taking steps to reduce the amount of time it takes to review agency submissions and is further planning to streamline its review process. The number of and maximum amounts of Voluntary Incentive Payments to be offered. Reasons why the agency needs voluntary early retirement authority. OPM and Agency Officials Responsible for Use of These Authorities Believe Plans Can at Times Be Approved More Quickly and the Process Can Be Streamlined
OPM program officials and nearly all of the agency officials responsible for use of these authorities in our review believe the approval process can at times be accomplished more quickly and have fewer steps. On average, we found that OPM took 36 days to review the programs in our sample. 3. However, agencies have not expanded on these monitoring efforts to provide an evaluation of the longer-term effectiveness of these tools. OPM officials said that they believe that the CHCO Act does not provide OPM the authority to allow agencies to make changes to approved plans. Officials in four agencies said some consideration should be given to ways to make buyouts more attractive to employees. In addition, some agency officials suggested that more coordination across the agencies using the programs would be helpful as would the sharing of examples of how some agencies used effective practices in ways that were particularly successful or instructive in reshaping their workforces, and that OPM may be in the best position to do this coordination. 1. 2. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of our review were to identify how many agencies have sought and been granted authority to offer buyouts and early outs and the extent to which agencies have used these authorities; how selected agency officials view the Office of Personnel Management’s (OPM) role in facilitating the use of the buyout and early- out authorities; what practices are associated with agencies’ effective use of buyouts and early outs, how selected agencies used these practices, and whether they have helped agencies to achieve their workforce reshaping goals; and what challenges the selected agencies identified, if any, to continued effective use of these authorities. We selected the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Energy, Health and Human Services, Interior, and the Treasury for further review since they accounted for over half of all requests for authorities at the time we started our review. We interviewed agency officials, such as human capital officers and buyout and early-out program managers from the six selected agencies to ascertain (1) their views of OPM’s role in their use of the buyout and early-out authorities, (2) the particular buyout and early-out practices they were using, (3) their views on how the practices helped them to achieve their goals, (4) the lessons learned from their experiences, and (5) the challenges to continued successful use of these authorities. | Why GAO Did This Study
Under the Chief Human Capital Officers (CHCO) Act of 2002, an agency may request authority from the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) to offer employees voluntary separation incentive payments (buyouts) and voluntary early retirement (early outs) to help reshape its workforce. GAO was asked to identify (1) how many agencies have been granted authority to offer buyouts and early outs and how often agencies used them, (2) how agencies view OPM's role in facilitating the use of these tools, (3) how agencies have used practices associated with effective use of the tools, and (4) what challenges agencies identified, if any, to continued effective use. To respond, GAO reviewed the practices of the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Energy, Health and Human Services, Interior, and the Treasury because they were among the most frequent users of these authorities.
What GAO Found
The total number of agencies using buyouts and early outs to reshape their workforces has significantly increased from 28 to 51 during fiscal years 2003 through 2005, and the number of programs agencies have offered over the past 3 years has also significantly increased. During this timeframe, at least 22,600 employees have separated from federal service under these authorities. Officials at all six agencies GAO reviewed believe that OPM's mandatory review of and feedback on their plans for using buyouts and early outs has improved implementation. However, nearly all of the agencies said they believe the review at times can be achieved more quickly and should be streamlined. OPM on average took 36 days to review the 28 randomly selected programs GAO assessed at the six agencies. OPM is taking steps to reduce its overall average review time including establishing more stringent timeframes for review and reducing the number of reviewers. The six agencies also reported using almost all of the practices GAO identified as associated with the effective use of buyouts and early outs, and that these practices resulted in better-planned programs. Agencies were not, however, using one practice that involves evaluating the longer-term effectiveness of the buyout and early-out authorities for reshaping their future workforces. Officials at the six agencies suggested that information on how some agencies used effective practices in ways that were particularly successful or instructive in reshaping their workforces could help them improve program results. Agency officials responsible for use of these authorities from the six agencies agreed that certain reforms would help them address some of the challenges they face in implementing their programs. These include (1) increasing the current dollar amount agencies can pay under buyouts to make the programs more attractive to employees and increase the acceptance rate and (2) allowing agencies to make minor changes to buyout and early-out plans after OPM approval. OPM is in the best position to assess these and other possible reforms and ways to achieve them. |
gao_NSIAD-95-78 | gao_NSIAD-95-78_0 | Plans for Continuing STARS Program
In March 1993, the Secretary of Defense initiated a comprehensive “Bottom-Up Review” of the nation’s defense strategy. Additionally, he decided to limit the NMD effort to a technology program, which drastically reduced the number of STARS launches to support NMD. The SSDC STARS project office developed a draft long-range plan that included management options for (1) continuing the STARS program; (2) placing it in a dormant status, retaining the capability to reactivate it; and (3) terminating it. BMDO is currently evaluating STARS as a potential long-range system for launching targets for development tests of future TMD systems. The final decision, which may not be made for 6 to 9 months, will be based on factors such as the cost to maintain STARS and ABM Treaty issues associated with testing TMD systems. All of these launches were to support NMD objectives. BMDO now has only one firm launch scheduled. Additionally, BMDO has 11 potential launches identified through fiscal year 2000. Ten would support TMD and 1 would support NMD. Of this amount, $15.1 million is the cost to maintain the capability to conduct launches, and the remaining cost of about $7.6 million primarily represents costs to be incurred for the scheduled launch in fiscal year 1995. For future years, it is estimated that the annual STARS operating budget would also be about $15 million (excluding inflation) to maintain the capability to launch. Sandia is to perform work (1) related to the third stage of the STARS launch vehicle that houses the Orbus motor and (2) support of launch-field operations. Charges to Users for a Launch
In September 1993, we reported that STARS users would pay an estimated $5.9 million for each STARS I launch and an estimated $10.9 million for each STARS II launch. Specifically, for the next three STARS launches, the cost to STARS I customers is estimated to be about $2.8 million, and the cost to STARS II customers is estimated to range from $6.7 million to $9.1 million. Acquisition Hardware and Refurbishment Status
The STARS program acquired surplus Navy Polaris first- and second-stage boosters starting in the mid-1980s through 1991. Table 3 shows the status of STARS hardware acquisition and refurbishment as of December 1994. When the STARS program was begun, four launches a year were anticipated. According to a STARS official, there were two reasons the STARS office acquired such a large number of surplus Polaris first- and second-stage boosters. BMDO and STARS officials and the SSDC treaty advisor provided information about how U.S. treaties may affect the future of the STARS program. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization's (BMDO) Strategic Target System (STARS), focusing on the status of STARS, planned launches, costs, and the status of major hardware acquisition and refurbishment.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) the Secretary of Defense's 1993 comprehensive review of the nation's defense strategy drastically reduced the number of STARS launches required to support National Missile Defense (NMD) and BMDO funding; (2) due to the launch and budget reductions, the STARS office developed a draft long-range plan for the STARS program; (3) the study examined three options: (a) place the program in a dormant status, but retain the capability to reactivate it; (b) terminate the program; and (c) continue the program; (4) BMDO is currently evaluating STARS as a potential long-range system for launching targets for development tests of future Theater Missile Defense (TMD) systems; (5) the final decision, which may not be made for 6 to 9 months, will be based on factors such as the cost to maintain STARS and Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty issues associated with testing TMD systems; (6) since July 1993, the planned level of test launches has decreased; (7) one firm STARS launch is scheduled to support NMD in fiscal year (FY) 1995; (8) BMDO has identified another 11 potential launches through FY 2000; (9) ten of these 11 launches would support TMD and are dependent on the successful resolution of ABM Treaty issues; the remaining launch would support NMD; (10) the estimated annual cost of operating STARS varies depending on how many launches are conducted; (11) in FY 1995, BMDO plans to spend approximately $22.7 million on STARS and will conduct one launch; (12) of this amount, $15.1 million is the cost to maintain the capability to launch STARS; this cost would be incurred whether or not any launches occur in a fiscal year; (13) for future years, it is estimated that the annual cost to maintain the capability to launch STARS would remain at about $15 million; (14) beginning in FY 1996, project offices that use STARS to launch experiments or targets will be charged from $2.8 million to $4.1 million for each STARS I launch and from $6.7 million to $9.1 million for each STARS II launch; (15) the STARS program has a substantial inventory of STARS hardware; (16) when the STARS program was started in 1985, four launches were anticipated each year; (17) because of the large number of anticipated launches and an unknown defect rate for surplus Polaris motors, the STARS office acquired 117 first-stage and 102 second-stage surplus motors; (18) as of December 1994, seven first-stage and five second-stage refurbished motors were available for future launches; and (19) thirteen third-stage new motors were on-hand and 1 post-boost vehicle built for the STARS launch scheduled in FY 1995. |
gao_GGD-95-32 | gao_GGD-95-32_0 | FTC Complied With the Requirements for Accepting and Reporting Reimbursed Travel
We did not identify any deficiencies in FTC’s acceptance of reimbursed expenses for the 59 trips we reviewed. Specifically, Commerce could better ensure that (1) employees have approved travel requests containing all of the necessary information before trips are taken; (2) travel reports to OGE accurately disclose the circumstances of each travel incident, including the nature, dates, and itemized costs of the trips; and (3) trips are adequately documented with receipts and vouchers. FTC’s procedures for accepting and reporting reimbursed travel were basically sound. The overall effect of Commerce’s temporary denial of access was minimal in that OGE eventually received access to Commerce records, and OGE has not been denied access to such records at any other agency. Recommendations
We recommend that the Secretary of Commerce take actions to ensure that all Commerce employees’ travel requests containing all of the necessary information, such as the name of the payer and the amount and type of expenses to be paid, are reviewed and approved before a trip; the Office of General Counsel, as part of its responsibilities for submitting semiannual reports to OGE, ensure that these reports include the required information, including the dates and nature of events attended and expenses paid; and
Commerce offices require (1) travel vouchers and (2) receipts for reimbursed expenses, except for meals since they are not required by Federal Travel Regulations to be supported in this manner. Comments From the Department of Commerce
The following are GAO’s comments on Commerce’s letter dated October 12, 1994. The focus of our review was to determine how well these controls over reimbursed travel were being implemented. 4. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Department of Commerce's and the Federal Trade Commission's (FTC) controls over the acceptance and reporting of nonfederally reimbursed travel by their employees, focusing on: (1) whether Commerce and FTC met their review and reporting requirements; and (2) the implications of Commerce denying the Office of Government Ethics (OGE) access to its records of reimbursed travel in 1992.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) although Commerce generally met applicable requirements for accepting and reporting travel reimbursements, certain procedural improvements could be implemented in the receipt and reporting of these funds; (2) Commerce did not ensure that travel requests contained all of the required information, were prepared and reviewed before trips were approved, accurately disclosed the circumstances of each trip, or adequately documented the actual expenses reimbursed; (3) although FTC consistently met the requirements for controlling the acceptance and reporting of travel reimbursements by its employees, it could improve its reporting by better detailing the nature of events attended by FTC employees; (4) Commerce's decision to deny OGE access to its travel records was based on its view that OGE was not responsible for the applicable travel regulations; and (5) although Commerce changed its position and acknowledged that OGE did have the authority to review such records, the overall effect of Commerce's temporary denial of access was minimal. |
gao_GAO-05-863T | gao_GAO-05-863T_0 | As part of its mission, the department has a role in the planning needed to prepare for and respond to an influenza pandemic. CDC’s activities include efforts to prevent and control diseases and to respond to public health emergencies. FDA, another HHS agency, also plays a role in preparing for the annual influenza season and for a potential pandemic. For the 2004–05 influenza season, CDC estimated as late as September 2004 that about 100 million doses of vaccine would be available for the U.S. market. HHS has not finalized planning for an influenza pandemic, leaving unanswered questions about the nation’s ability to prepare for and respond to such an outbreak. Key questions about the federal role in purchasing and distributing vaccines during a pandemic remain, and clear guidance on potential groups that would likely have priority for vaccination is lacking in the current draft plan. One challenge is that the draft pandemic plan does not establish the actions the federal government would take to purchase or distribute vaccine during an influenza pandemic. Communicating Information about the Situation and Response Plan Clearly and Effectively
Another challenge in responding to a pandemic will be to clearly communicate information about the situation and the nation’s response plans to public health officials, providers, and the public. State officials emphasized that these mixed messages created confusion. In the 2004–05 influenza season, individuals seeking vaccine could have found themselves in a communication loop that provided no answers. During the 2004–05 influenza season, public health officials reported the importance of different methods of communication. Ensuring Supply of Influenza Vaccine and Antiviral Drugs
Challenges in ensuring an adequate and timely supply of influenza vaccine and antiviral drugs—which can help prevent or mitigate the number of influenza-related deaths until an pandemic influenza vaccine becomes available—may be exacerbated during an influenza pandemic. Particularly given the time needed to produce vaccines, influenza vaccine may be unavailable or in short supply and may not be widely available during the initial stages of a pandemic. The shortages of influenza vaccine in 2004–05 and previous seasons have highlighted the fragility of the influenza vaccine market and the need for its expansion and stabilization. Hospital and Workforce Capacity to Respond to Large- Scale Infectious Disease Outbreaks
The lack of sufficient hospital and workforce capacity is another challenge that may affect response efforts during an influenza pandemic. Public health officials we spoke with said that a large-scale outbreak, such as an influenza pandemic, could strain the available capacity of hospitals by requiring entire hospital sections, along with their staff, to be used as isolation facilities. Concluding Observations
Important challenges remain in the nation’s preparedness and response should an influenza pandemic occur in the United States. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. | Why GAO Did This Study
Shortages of influenza vaccine in the 2004-05 and previous influenza seasons and mounting concern about recent avian influenza activity in Asia have raised concern about the nation's preparedness to deal with a worldwide influenza epidemic, or influenza pandemic. Although the extent of such a pandemic cannot be predicted, according to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), an agency within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), it has been estimated that in the absence of any control measures such as vaccination or antiviral drugs, a "medium-level" influenza pandemic could kill up to 207,000 people in the United States, affect from 15 to 35 percent of the U.S. population, and generate associated costs ranging from $71 billion to $167 billion in the United States. GAO was asked to discuss the challenges the nation faces in responding to the threat of an influenza pandemic, including the lessons learned from previous annual influenza seasons that can be applied to its preparedness and overall ability to respond to a pandemic. This testimony is based on GAO reports and testimony issued since 2000 on influenza vaccine supply, pandemic planning, emergency preparedness, and emerging infectious diseases and on current work examining the influenza vaccine shortage in the United States for the 2004-05 influenza season.
What GAO Found
The nation faces multiple challenges to prepare for and respond to an influenza pandemic. First, key questions about the federal role in purchasing and distributing vaccines during a pandemic remain, and clear guidance on potential priority groups is lacking in HHS's current draft of its pandemic preparedness plan. For example, the draft plan does not establish the actions the federal government would take to purchase or distribute vaccine during an influenza pandemic. In addition, as was highlighted in the nation's recent experience responding to the unexpected influenza vaccine shortage for the 2004-05 influenza season, clear communication of the nation's response plan will be a major challenge. During the 2004-05 influenza season, state health officials reported that mixed messages created confusion. For example, CDC advised vaccination for persons aged 65 and older, and at the same time a state advised vaccination for persons aged 50 and older. Further challenges include ensuring an adequate and timely supply of influenza vaccine and antiviral drugs, which can help prevent or mitigate the number of influenza-related deaths. Particularly given the length of time needed to produce vaccines, influenza vaccine may be unavailable or in short supply and might not be widely available during the initial states of a pandemic. Finally, the lack of sufficient hospital and health care workforce capacity to respond to an infectious disease outbreak may also affect response efforts during an influenza pandemic. Public health officials we spoke with said that a large-scale outbreak, such as an influenza pandemic, could strain the available capacity of hospitals by requiring entire hospital sections, along with their staff, to be used as isolation facilities. |
gao_GAO-07-1074T | gao_GAO-07-1074T_0 | 1.) FMCSA’s primary mission is to reduce the number and severity of crashes involving large trucks and buses. FMCSA uses a data-driven analysis model called SafeStat to assess carriers’ risks relative to all other carriers based on safety indicators, such as their crash rates and safety violations identified during roadside inspections and prior compliance reviews. 2.) SafeStat Identifies Many High-risk Carriers, but Enhancements Could Identify Carriers with Even Higher Risks
SafeStat identifies many carriers that pose a high risk for crashes and is about twice as effective (83 percent) as randomly selecting carriers for compliance reviews. Using Either a Statistical Approach or Modifying Existing SafeStat Categorization Rules Could Improve Identification of High-risk Carriers
In June 2007, we reported that FMCSA could improve SafeStat’s ability to identify carriers that pose high crash risks if it applied a statistical approach, called the negative binomial regression model, to the four SafeStat safety evaluation areas instead of its current approach. By its very nature the regression approach looks for the “best fit” in identifying the degree to which prior accidents and driver, vehicle, and safety management violations identify the likelihood of carriers having crashes in the future, compared to the current SafeStat approach, in which the relationship among the four evaluation areas is based on expert judgment. First, FMCSA is concerned that this would require placing correspondingly less emphasis on the types of problems the compliance review is designed to address so that crashes can be reduced (i.e., the lack of compliance with safety regulations related to drivers, vehicles, and safety management that is captured in the other evaluation areas). We found that while driver, vehicle, and safety management evaluation area scores are correlated with the future crash risk of a carrier, high crash rates are a stronger predictor of future crashes than poor compliance with safety regulations. FMCSA’s mission—as well as the ultimate purpose of compliance reviews—is to reduce the number and severity of truck and bus crashes. FMCSA’s Management of Its Compliance Reviews Promotes Thoroughness and Consistency
Our preliminary assessment is that FMCSA manages its compliance reviews in a way that meets our standards for internal control, thereby promoting thoroughness and consistency in the reviews. It does so by establishing compliance review policies and procedures through an electronic manual and training, using an information system to document the results of its compliance reviews, and monitoring performance. FMCSA records and communicates its policies and procedures electronically through its Field Operations Training Manual, which it provides to all federal and state investigators and their managers. According to FMCSA and state managers and investigators, the managers review all compliance reviews in each division office and state to ensure thoroughness and consistency across investigators and across compliance reviews. For the most part, 95 percent or more of the compliance reviews covered each major applicable area in the agency’s safety regulations. FMCSA Follows Up with Many Carriers with Serious Safety Violations but Does Not Assess Maximum Fines for All of the Violations Required by Law
Our preliminary assessment is that FMCSA placed many carriers rated unsatisfactory in fiscal year 2005 out of service and followed up with nearly all of the rest to determine whether they had improved. Furthermore, FMCSA does not assess maximum fines against all carriers, as we believe the law requires, partly because FMCSA does not distinguish between carriers with a pattern of serious safety violations and those that repeat a serious violation. FMCSA Followed Up with Almost All Carriers That Received a Proposed Safety Rating of Unsatisfactory
FMCSA followed up with at least 1,189 of 1,196 carriers (99 percent) that received a proposed safety rating of unsatisfactory following compliance reviews completed in fiscal year 2005. FMCSA issued out-of-service orders to 306 of these carriers. The language of the statute does not allow FMCSA’s interpretation; rather, it requires FMCSA to assess the maximum allowable fine for each serious violation against a carrier that has previously committed the same serious violation. GAO-07-585. GAO-07-771R. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) has the primary federal responsibility for reducing crashes involving large trucks and buses. FMCSA uses its "SafeStat" tool to select carriers for reviews for compliance with its safety regulations based on the carriers' crash rates and prior safety violations. FMCSA then conducts these compliance reviews and can place carriers out of service if they are found to be operating unsafely. This statement is based on a recent report (GAO-07-585) and other nearly completed work. GAO assessed (1) the extent to which FMCSA identifies carriers that subsequently have high crash rates, (2) how FMCSA ensures that its compliance reviews are conducted thoroughly and consistently, and (3) the extent to which FMCSA follows up with carriers with serious safety violations. GAO's work was based on a review of laws, program guidance, and analyses of data from 2004 through early 2006.
What GAO Found
FMCSA generally does a good job in identifying carriers that pose high crash risks for subsequent compliance reviews, ensuring the thoroughness and consistency of those reviews, and following up with high-risk carriers. SafeStat is nearly twice as effective (83 percent) as random selection in identifying carriers that pose high crash risks. However, its effectiveness could be improved by using a statistical approach (negative binomial regression), which provides for a systematic assessment to apply weights to the four SafeStat safety evaluation areas (accidents and driver, vehicle, and safety management violations) rather than FMCSA's approach, which relies on expert judgment. The regression approach identified carriers that had twice as many crashes in the subsequent 18 months as did the carriers identified by the current SafeStat approach. FMCSA is concerned that adopting this approach would result in it placing more emphasis on crashes and less emphasis on compliance with its safety management, vehicle, and driver regulations. GAO believes that because (1) the ultimate purpose of compliance reviews is to reduce the number and severity of truck and bus crashes and (2) GAO's and others' research has shown that crash rates are stronger predictors of future crashes than is poor compliance with FMCSA's safety regulations, the regression approach would improve safety. GAO's preliminary assessment is that FMCSA promotes thoroughness and consistency in its compliance reviews through its management processes, which meet GAO's standards for internal controls. For example, FMCSA uses an electronic manual to record and communicate its compliance review policies and procedures and teaches proper compliance review procedures through both classroom and on-the-job training. Furthermore, investigators use an information system to document their compliance reviews, and managers review these data, helping to ensure thoroughness and consistency between investigators. For the most part, FMCSA and state investigators cover the nine major applicable areas of the safety regulations (e.g., driver qualifications and vehicle condition) in 95 percent or more of compliance reviews, demonstrating thoroughness and consistency. GAO's preliminary assessment is that FMCSA follows up with almost all carriers with serious safety violations, but it does not assess the maximum fines against all serious violators that GAO believes the law requires. FMCSA followed up with at least 1,189 of 1,196 carriers (99 percent) that received proposed unsatisfactory safety ratings from compliance reviews completed in fiscal year 2005. For example, FMCSA found that 873 of these carriers made safety improvements and it placed 306 other carriers out of service. GAO also found that FMCSA (1) assesses maximum fines against carriers for the third instance of a violation, whereas GAO reads the statute as requiring FMCSA to do so for the second violation and (2) does not always assess maximum fines against carriers with a pattern of varied serious violations, as GAO believes the law requires. |
gao_NSIAD-97-225 | gao_NSIAD-97-225_0 | To carry out its operations, SSS is authorized a staff of 197 civilians (166 on board as of June 1, 1997); 15 active military personnel (2 additional positions are funded by the Air Force); 745 part-time authorized reservists (518 are funded); 56 part-time state directors (one in each state, territory, the District of Columbia, and New York City); and 10,635 uncompensated civilian volunteer members of local, review, and various appeal boards. We did not validate the current DOD requirements for inductees. Effects of the Options on Organization and Costs
The portions of the $22.9 million 1997 budget that could be most affected by the alternatives total approximately $15.2 million: $7.4 million for the registration program and $7.8 million for operational readiness. According to SSS officials, under the suspended registration alternative, 74 civilian, 4 active duty military, and 241 part-time reserve positions may be eliminated. SSS officials estimated first-year cost savings of $4.1 million and subsequent annual cost savings of $5.7 million under this alternative. Also, 10,395 local and appeal board members and 240 civilian review board members (all unpaid volunteers) would be dismissed. SSS officials estimated first-year cost savings of $8.5 million and subsequent annual cost savings of $11.3 million under this alternative. Time and Costs Required to Reinstitute Full Operations
Under either the suspended registration or the deep standby alternative, reactivation of a draft registration process would be initiated upon receipt of authorization. SSS officials estimate that recovering from suspended registration or a deep standby and delivering the first draftees to the induction centers would take more time than DOD’s current 193-day requirement. They estimate it would take about 24 more days to deliver the first draftees after recovering from the suspended registration alternative. The officials expect that the recovery costs would total about $17.2 million. SSS officials also estimate that revitalizing the agency from a deep standby posture and delivering the first draftees would take about 181 more days than DOD’s current requirement and would cost about $22.8 million. SSS officials informed us that if the agency reinstated registration after having operated under either the suspended registration or deep standby option, it would need to conduct a time-limited registration of the 19- and 20-year-old groups and then conduct a continuous registration of all males in the remaining age groups (those between the ages of 21 and 26). At that time, SSS conducted two time-limited registrations, after recovering from a deep standby posture. SSS officials stated that the agency’s main problem in gearing up in 1980 was in reinstating and activating the local, district appeal, and national boards in preparation for a possible draft. We made preliminary inquiries regarding four alternatives to SSS’ present operations, that is, two passive registration alternatives, a suspended active registration alternative, and a deep standby alternative. For the two remaining alternatives, we obtained from SSS estimates of costs that could be saved upon implementation of either alternative. SSS also gave us time estimates for the revitalization of both the registration process and the board structure and its assessment of the alternatives’ effects on meeting DOD’s manpower and mobilization time frame requirements. Registrants should receive a registration acknowledgement and a Selective Service number within 90 days. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the organization and costs of the Selective Service System (SSS) draft registration program and estimates of the comparative costs and organizational structure changes of two selected alternatives: (1) a suspended registration alternative, under which most of SSS' infrastructure would remain intact, including a significant portion of its staff and all of its local, district appeal, civilian review, and national boards; and (2) a deep standby alternative, which would suspend registration, reduce a substantial portion of the workforce, and disband the local, district appeal, civilian review, and national boards.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) most of SSS' potential cost reductions, under either a suspended registration or a deep standby alternative, would result from reductions in personnel; (2) SSS estimates that the suspended registration alternative would reduce authorized and assigned civilian, active military, and part-time military reserve personnel by about 33 percent; (3) these reductions would produce first-year cost savings of $4.1 million and subsequent annual cost savings of $5.7 million; (4) SSS estimates that the deep standby alternative would reduce authorized civilian, active military, and part-time reserve personnel by about 60 percent; (5) the latter alternative reflects a dismissal of thousands of trained, unpaid local, review, and appeal board volunteers; (6) under the deep standby alternative, the part-time state directors, who according to SSS officials are paid for an average of 14 days of work per year, would not be paid; (7) altogether, these reductions would produce first-year cost savings of $8.5 million and subsequent annual cost savings of $11.3 million; (8) under both alternatives, mass registrations would be needed if a mobilization were authorized; (9) SSS' plans show that the agency could currently meet the Department of Defense's (DOD) requirement to provide the first draftees at 193 days; (10) in contrast, SSS officials believe that the agency would be unable to meet DOD's current requirements for unpaid manpower under either alternative; (11) the reason cited is the time needed to reinstate an active registration system (for either alternative), to reconstitute and train the boards, and to rebuild their supporting infrastructure (for the deep standby alternative); (12) SSS officials estimate that in reinstating registration after suspension, they could meet DOD's requirement for the first draftees in about 217 days; (13) they also estimate that in reinstating a registration system, reconstituting and training the boards, and rebuilding the supporting infrastructure after a deep standby posture, they could meet DOD's requirement for the first draftees in about 374 days; (14) officials told GAO that these estimates represent their best assessment of the time required to return to full operations; and (15) SSS officials also estimated that the cost to reinstate a suspended registration could total about $17.2 million and the cost to revitalize the agency from a deep standby posture could total about $22.8 million. |
gao_GAO-03-917T | gao_GAO-03-917T_0 | To facilitate assurance of compliance with federal regulations for the protection of human subjects, VA awarded a contract to the National Committee for Quality Assurance (NCQA) to provide external accreditation of its medical centers’ human research protection programs in August 2000. The specific actions we recommended involved guidance, training, monitoring and oversight, handling of information about adverse events, and funding of human subject protection activities. VA concurred with our recommendations. Insufficient Action Taken to Strengthen Protections for Human Subjects, Although VA Has Made Some Progress
VA has not taken sufficient action to strengthen protections for human subjects since we made our recommendations nearly 3 years ago although it has taken some important steps. Moreover, VA has not established a mechanism for handling adverse event reports to ensure that IRBs have the information they need to safeguard the rights and welfare of human research participants and it has not ensured that sufficient resources are allocated to support human subject protection activities. On the other hand, VA has strengthened aspects of its human subject protection systems. VA also instituted an external accreditation program that has the potential to further strengthen VA’s oversight of human subject protections. Policy for Human Subject Protections Has Not Been Revised, but Other Important Guidance Was Issued
In 2000, we reported that we had found problems with VA’s policy for implementing federal regulations for the protection of human subjects. The Institute of Medicine recommended that the NCQA standards be strengthened, for example, by specifying how research subjects will be involved in human subject protection systems. Since then, VA has not developed a mechanism for handling adverse event reports to ensure that IRBs have information that can help them interpret reports of actual adverse events that research subjects experience while participating in studies. Recent Reorganization Appears to Maintain Independent Compliance Function, but Other Roles and Responsibilities Unclear
In 2003, VA began a reorganization of its research offices without adequate planning and notice. We found that VA did not initially ensure the independence of compliance activities, although more recent actions appear to have restored the integrity of the compliance function. In addition, VA has not clarified responsibilities for education, training, and policy development. It is not clear to what extent VA’s efforts to strengthen its human subject protections will bring to bear the collective expertise of the staff in its compliance and operational research offices. GAO/HEHS-00-155. VA Research: System for Protecting Human Subjects Needs Improvements. | Why GAO Did This Study
Every year thousands of veterans volunteer to participate in research projects under the auspices of the VA. Research offers the possibility of benefits to individual participants and to society, but it is not without risk to research subjects. VA studies, like other federally funded research programs, are governed by regulations designed to minimize risks and protect the rights and welfare of research participants. VA must ensure that veterans have accurate and understandable information so that they can make informed decisions about volunteering for research. In September 2000, GAO reported on weaknesses it found in VA's systems for protecting human subjects. VA concurred with GAO's recommendations that its human subject protections could be strengthened by taking actions in five domains--guidance, training, monitoring and oversight, handling of adverse event reports, and funding of human subject protection activities. (VA Research: Protections for Human Subjects Need to Be Strengthened, (GAO/HEHS-00-155, Sept. 28, 2000)). GAO was asked to assess whether VA has made sufficient progress in implementing the recommendations and to examine the recent changes in VA's organizational structure for monitoring and overseeing human subject protections.
What GAO Found
VA has not taken sufficient actions to strengthen its human subject protection systems since GAO made recommendations nearly 3 years ago. Continuing weaknesses VA has not sufficiently addressed include ensuring that its policy for implementing federal regulations for the protection of human subjects is up to date; training occurs periodically for all personnel involved in human subject protections; those charged with reviewing risks have information that can help them interpret reports of adverse events; and sufficient funding is allocated to support human subject protection activities. VA has taken some important steps to strengthen aspects of its human subject protections by providing some necessary guidance and offering training to research personnel. Moreover, it strengthened its internal oversight and instituted an external accreditation program, with reviews of all its medical centers' human subject protection programs scheduled through summer 2005. VA is now in the midst of a reorganization of its headquarters research offices that was begun without adequate planning and notice. VA did not initially ensure the independence of compliance activities although more recent actions appear to have restored the integrity of the compliance function. VA has not clarified responsibilities for education, training, and policy development. Until it does so, it is unclear how the reorganization will affect VA's efforts to further strengthen its human subject protections. |
gao_GGD-97-49 | gao_GGD-97-49_0 | Because a state was the largest area within which a bank could expand, information collected at the bank level has been used by such parties to approximate bank loan and deposit activity within a state. To determine whether there would likely be a material loss of information important to regulatory and congressional oversight of banks, we reviewed call, Y-9, Summary of Deposit, Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) loan application register, and required reserve reports collected by the regulators pursuant to laws and regulations. Call Report Data May Become Less Useful for Approximating Bank Activities by State
Regulators collect a variety of information about bank loan and deposit activities through reports filed by banks and BHCs. These reporting requirements were not affected by Riegle-Neal. Additionally, these data are only collected yearly. Data From Call and Y-9 Reports Have Historically Had Limited Usefulness in Determining State Banking Activity
Although regulators and other interested parties have used call report data to produce state, regional, and national summaries of the types and overall dollar amounts of loans and deposits held by banks, the data reported have always had limitations in their ability to provide information about the geographical location of banking activity. Interstate Branching Could Increase the Number of Banks Reporting Data From Activities in More Than One State
To the extent that interstate branching becomes prevalent, the usefulness of information reported to bank regulators, which is currently used to compile banking data on a state-by-state basis, would become even more problematic. If BHCs consolidate their operations by merging multistate banking operations or if banks expand across state lines by opening or acquiring branches, call report information would increasingly encompass the loans and deposits of more than one state. Implementation of Riegle-Neal Is Unlikely to Lead to Material Loss of Information
While the usefulness of data collected at the bank level to provide information for state-by-state measures of banking activity—including monitoring the industry’s geographic concentrations—may be affected by Riegle-Neal, it is unlikely to have a material effect on federal regulation or oversight for three reasons. Second, deposit data should continue to be provided at the branch level and, with the limitations noted, should provide some measure of state-by-state banking activity. Third, the most useful and detailed information about bank activities is attained through examinations. Regulators with primary supervisory responsibility still have this tool available, although those who rely solely on off-site information will not. However, they stated that to ensure there is no material loss of information necessary to oversee bank activities in an interstate branching environment, banks should be required to submit information on the origin of their loans and deposits. Therefore, the implementation of Riegle-Neal did not give rise to their concern, but does heighten it. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO reviewed how the interstate branching provisions of the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994 are likely to affect the usefulness of the deposit and loan data collected and reported to federal regulators by the banking industry under statutory and regulatory requirements, focusing on whether modifications to such data requirements would help to ensure that the implementation of the act's interstate branching provisions does not result in material loss of information important to regulatory and congressional oversight of banks.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) to the extent that interstate branching becomes prevalent, call report data, as currently collected and reported, will become less useful for approximating bank loan and deposit activity within a state; (2) as bank holding companies (BHC) consolidate by merging multistate banking operations and as banks expand across state lines by opening or acquiring branches, call report information reported at the bank level will increasingly encompass the loans and deposits from more than one state; (3) however, accurately measuring loan and deposit activity by state was subject to limitations even before Riegle-Neal; (4) BHCs had already begun establishing interstate operations and creating regional booking centers for some of their activities and national markets have developed for certain bank products; (5) compared with the information that existed before it was enacted, the implementation of Riegle-Neal is unlikely to result in a material loss of information necessary to perform regulatory and congressional oversight for three reasons; (6) first, as previously mentioned, the usefulness of call report data to approximate bank loan or deposit activities within a state was already somewhat limited and has become increasingly so, but only in part due to Riegle-Neal; (7) second, sources of information collected at the branch level or by geographic location should not be affected by interstate branching; (8) for example, summary of deposits data should still be available to measure deposit activities that are booked in a particular state, although these data will not provide information on the geographic source of those deposits; (9) also, home mortgage loan data should be available as an indicator of mortgage loan activity in a geographic area; (10) finally, the most useful and detailed information about bank activities is attained through examinations; (11) regulators with primary supervisory responsibility still have this tool available, although those who rely solely on off-site information will not; and (12) for these reasons, at this time, there does not appear to be sufficient need to modify regulatory or statutory reporting requirements. |
gao_GAO-09-372 | gao_GAO-09-372_0 | Following passage of the act, NAIC and state regulators worked to develop the PLMA and various NAIC and state licensing standards. Though some state insurance regulators have sought authority to conduct full background checks using fingerprinting, NAIC officials noted that only 17 states as of March 2009 were performing full nationwide criminal history checks using fingerprinting as part of their licensing programs. Officials from some of the states in our sample also noted that many states are unwilling to reciprocate with other states that do not conduct such checks and expressed concern that doing so would diminish their consumer protections. A Lack of Full Reciprocity and Uniformity in Producer Licensing Could Lead to Uneven Consumer Protection and Some Inefficiency
According to some industry participants in our sample, while reciprocity and uniformity of producer licensing across states have grown, the differences in background checks, licensing requirements, and insurance line definitions across states prevent them from achieving full reciprocity and uniformity, and may impact regulators and consumers. These inefficiencies could result in higher costs for insurers, which in turn could be passed on to consumers. Product Approval Has Become More Efficient, but Barriers Exist to Greater Reciprocity and Uniformity
According to NAIC officials, NAIC and state regulators have taken steps to make product approval more efficient, but barriers to greater reciprocity and uniformity exist in the areas of product review and states’ approval processes. As of March 2009, SERFF was used by 52 states and jurisdictions. In addition, some industry participants noted that states that have not joined the Compact may feel their current product approval and consumer protection processes are superior to the Compact’s processes. As a result, consumer groups suggested that they and others do not have an opportunity to review filings and help ensure that harmful products do not get approved for market. Full Reciprocity Is Unlikely for Approvals in Property/Casualty Insurance Lines
According to some industry participants, while the Compact has increased reciprocity of approvals for some life, annuity, and long-term care insurance products, similar reciprocity is unlikely for property/casualty insurance products. In addition, some industry participants noted that lack of uniformity and reciprocity in product approval processes may lead to higher costs for insurers and, in turn, consumers. NAIC Has Initiated a Number of Efforts to Improve Market Conduct Regulation, but Implementation among States Has Varied
NAIC has taken several steps to improve market conduct regulation that include updating examination guidance and developing new data collection and analysis tools to promote uniformity. NAIC has also sought to improve coordination of enforcement actions across states. Specifically, the program outlines six market conduct accreditation categories, based on the 99 core competency standards: data collection and reporting, including use by states of key NAIC databases such as the Regulatory Information Retrieval System (RIRS), Complaints Database, Market Analysis Review System (MARS), Market Conduct Examination Tracking System, Special Activities Database (SAD), and Market Initiative Tracking System (MITS); market analysis, which includes having appropriate regulatory staff with specific responsibility for data analysis and developing a baseline understanding of insurance markets and issues; market conduct examinations, including having procedural guidelines and standards in place to determine when examinations should be called, and which adhere to the Scheduling, Coordinating, and Communicating chapter of the Market Regulation Handbook; interstate collaboration, including contacts designated by commissioners of insurance for the purpose of interstate communication and collaborative actions; oversight of contractors hired by insurance departments that have the expertise and professional qualifications to perform market conduct and analysis and examinations; and treatment of confidential information, meaning that insurance departments should have the authority to analyze, examine, or investigate entities involved with the business of insurance, as well as protect consumers, enforce a continuum of regulatory responses when needed, and keep records and insurance information confidential. In addition, some industry participants in our sample noted that it was difficult to achieve greater market conduct uniformity when not all states participate in standardized improvement efforts like the MCAS. Limited Reciprocity and Uniformity Can Create Inefficiencies and Uneven Consumer Protection across States
Limited uniformity in the use of NAIC’s market conduct tools and in state laws and resources—and the resulting limits on reciprocity among states—may create inefficiencies for insurers and regulators and lead to uneven levels of consumer protection across states. To address these questions, in each of the regulatory areas of producer licensing, product approval, and market conduct regulation, we have been asked to assess (1) the progress NAIC and state regulators have made to increase reciprocity and uniformity, (2) the factors that have challenged efforts to achieve greater reciprocity and uniformity, and (3) the potential effects on the insurance industry and consumers if greater progress is not made. | Why GAO Did This Study
Because the insurance market is a vital part of the U.S. economy, Congress and others are concerned about limitations to reciprocity and uniformity, regulatory inefficiency, higher insurance costs, and uneven consumer protection. GAO was asked to review the areas of (1) producer licensing, (2) product approval, and (3) market conduct regulation in terms of progress by NAIC and state regulators to increase reciprocity and uniformity, the factors affecting this progress, and the potential impacts if greater progress is not made. GAO analyzed federal laws and regulatory documents, assessed NAIC efforts, and interviewed industry officials.
What GAO Found
Reciprocity of producer licensing among states has improved, but consumer protection and other issues present challenges to uniformity and full reciprocity. Congress' passage of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) in 1999, NAIC's Producer Licensing Model Act (PLMA) of 2000, and uniform licensing standards (2002) have helped improve reciprocity and uniformity. However, NAIC officials noted that as of March 2009, only 17 states were performing full criminal history checks using fingerprinting, and some states that do such checks have been unwilling to reciprocate with states that do not. In addition, some insurance regulators in our sample noted that regulators do not have a systematic way to access disciplinary records of other financial regulators. Without full checks on applicants, states may less effectively protect consumers. Licensing standards, including how state regulators define lines of insurance, also vary across states, further hindering efforts to create reciprocity in agent licensing. These differences may result in inefficiencies that raise costs for insurers and consumers. State regulators' processes to approve insurance products have become more efficient, but barriers exist to greater reciprocity and uniformity. NAIC and state regulators have improved product approval filings by creating the System for Electronic Rate and Form Filing (SERFF) in 1998, which, according to some industry participants, has simplified filings and reduced filing errors. However, SERFF does not address differences in regulators' review and approval processes. In addition, an Interstate Compact was created in 2006 to facilitate approval of certain life, annuity, disability income, and long-term care products, which are accepted across participating states. As of March 2009, 34 states participated in the Compact. However, the Compact leaves some decisions on approval up to the individual states, and several key states have not joined because they feel their processes and protections are superior to the Compact's. Moreover, differences in state laws are likely to limit reciprocity in the approval of property/casualty insurance products. To the extent these areas lack reciprocity and uniformity, some industry participants noted that there may be inefficiencies that slow the introduction of new products and raise costs for insurers and consumers. NAIC and the states have taken steps to improve reciprocity and uniformity of market conduct regulation, but variation across states has limited progress. For example, NAIC noted that in 2006 it developed uniform guidance, and in 2008 created core competency standards, which are intended to be part of an accreditation process for market conduct regulation. NAIC noted that the accreditation plan has not been finalized, and the standards do not include adherence to all NAIC market conduct guidance. In addition, NAIC in 2002 developed the Market Conduct Annual Statement (MCAS) to promote uniform data collection and better target exams. However, industry participants have several concerns about the MCAS and NAIC noted that fewer than half of insurance regulators use it for data collection. NAIC has also created a working group to coordinate enforcement actions. While better communication and coordination appears to have resulted, according to some states in our sample, the effect on uniformity of market conduct regulation is uncertain. Lack of uniformity and reciprocity may lead to inefficiencies, higher insurance costs, and uneven consumer protection across states. |
gao_GAO-11-406 | gao_GAO-11-406_0 | Federal Agencies Do Not Routinely Quantify Amount of Antibiotics Produced for Human Use, but Sales Data Show Over 7 Million Pounds of Antibiotics Were Sold in 2009
Federal agencies do not routinely quantify the amount of antibiotics that are produced in the United States for human use, but sales data, which can be used to estimate the quantity of antibiotic production, show that over 7 million pounds of antibiotics were sold in 2009 for human use in the United States. These data indicate that most of the antibiotics sold have common characteristics, such as belonging to five antibiotic classes. The class of penicillins was the largest group of antibiotics sold in 2009. Penicillins, such as amoxicillin, are used to treat bacterial infections that include pneumonia and urinary tract infections. Data Gaps Remain Despite CDC’s Efforts to Expand Its Limited Monitoring of Antibiotic Use; CDC, NIH, and FDA Have Implemented Efforts to Promote Appropriate Use
Although CDC annually collects certain national data on antibiotic prescriptions to monitor the use of antibiotics, these data have limitations and do not allow for important analyses. Information about overall antibiotic use in humans is also needed to routinely assess the contribution that human antibiotic use makes to the overall problem of antibiotic resistance in humans, relative to other contributing factors. For example, monitoring what portion of antibiotic use is attributed to humans versus animals is important to understanding antibiotic resistance. CDC Has Observed Declines in Inappropriate Antibiotic Prescribing, but It Is Unclear to What Extent Its Program to Promote Appropriate Antibiotic Use Contributed to Recent Trends
CDC has observed declines in inappropriate antibiotic prescribing in outpatient settings since its Get Smart program began in 1995, but it is unclear to what extent this program contributed to these trends. Without an accurate national estimate of antibiotic-resistant HAIs, CDC cannot assess the magnitude and types of such infections that occur in all patient populations (i.e., facilitywide) within healthcare settings. CDC Is Taking Steps to Improve Its Monitoring of Antibiotic-Resistant Infections in Healthcare Facilities, but These Steps Will Not Improve CDC’s Ability to Assess the Overall Problem of Antibiotic Resistance
CDC is taking steps to improve its monitoring of antibiotic-resistant infections in healthcare facilities, but CDC’s ability to assess the overall problem of antibiotic resistance will not be improved. Federal Agencies Do Not Monitor Antibiotic Disposal, but Have Examined the Presence of Antibiotics in the Environment, and Studies Find that Such Antibiotics Can Increase the Population of Resistant Bacteria
Federal agencies do not collect data regarding the disposal of most antibiotics intended for human use, but EPA and USGS have measured the presence of certain antibiotics in the environment due, in part, to their disposal. Studies conducted by scientists have found that antibiotics that are present in the environment at certain concentration levels can increase the population of resistant bacteria due to selective pressure. EPA and USGS have conducted several studies to measure the presence of antibiotics in the environment, which results partly from their disposal. Such information could help policymakers set priorities for actions to control the spread of antibiotic resistance. Without more comprehensive information about the occurrence of cases of antibiotic-resistant infections and the use of antibiotics, the agency’s ability to understand the overall scope of the public health problem, detect emerging trends, and plan and implement prevention activities is impeded. Recommendations
To better prevent and control the spread of antibiotic resistance, we recommend that the Director of CDC take the following two actions: Develop and implement a strategy to improve CDC’s monitoring of antibiotic use in humans, for example, by identifying available sources of antibiotic use information; and develop and implement a strategy to improve CDC’s monitoring of antibiotic-resistant infections in inpatient healthcare facilities to more accurately estimate the national occurrence of such infections. HHS provided written comments, which are reproduced in appendix V. HHS, EPA, and DOI provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. In its written comments, HHS generally agreed with the actions we recommend it take to improve its monitoring of antibiotic use and resistance. At that time, we will send copies to the Secretaries of the Department of Health and Human Services and the Department of the Interior, the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, and other interested parties. | Why GAO Did This Study
Infections that were once treatable have become more difficult to treat because of antibiotic resistance. Resistance occurs naturally but is accelerated by inappropriate antibiotic use in people, among other things. Questions have been raised about whether agencies such as the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) have adequately assessed the effects of antibiotic use and disposal on resistance in humans. GAO was asked to (1) describe federal efforts to quantify the amount of antibiotics produced, (2) evaluate HHS's monitoring of antibiotic use and efforts to promote appropriate use, (3) examine HHS's monitoring of antibiotic-resistant infections, and (4) describe federal efforts to monitor antibiotic disposal and antibiotics in the environment, and describe research on antibiotics in the development of resistance in the environment. GAO reviewed documents and interviewed officials, conducted a literature review, and analyzed antibiotic sales data.
What GAO Found
Federal agencies do not routinely quantify the amount of antibiotics that are produced in the United States for human use. However, sales data can be used as an estimate of production, and these show that over 7 million pounds of antibiotics were sold for human use in 2009. Most of the antibiotics that were sold have common characteristics, such as belonging to the same five antibiotic classes. The class of penicillins was the largest group of antibiotics sold for human use in 2009, representing about 45 percent of antibiotics sold. HHS performs limited monitoring of antibiotic use in humans and has implemented efforts to promote their appropriate use, but gaps in data on use will remain despite efforts to improve monitoring. Although HHS's Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) monitors use in outpatient healthcare settings, there are gaps in data on inpatient antibiotic use and geographic patterns of use. CDC is taking steps to improve its monitoring, but gaps such as information about overall antibiotic use will remain. Because use contributes to resistance, more complete information could help policymakers determine what portion of antibiotic resistance is attributed to human antibiotic use, and set priorities for action to control the spread of resistance. CDC's Get Smart program promotes appropriate antibiotic use; CDC has observed declines in inappropriate prescribing, but it is unclear to what extent the declines were due to the program or to other factors. CDC's program has been complemented by efforts by the National Institutes of Health and the Food and Drug Administration, such as supporting studies to develop tests to quickly diagnose bacterial infections. Gaps in CDC's monitoring of antibiotic-resistant infections limit the agency's ability to assess the overall problem of antibiotic resistance. There are data gaps in monitoring of such infections that occur in healthcare facilities; CDC does not collect data on all types of resistant infections to make facilitywide estimates and the agency's information is not nationally representative. CDC can provide accurate national estimates for certain resistant infections that develop in the community, including tuberculosis. Although CDC is taking steps to improve its monitoring, these efforts will not allow CDC to accurately assess the overall problem of antibiotic resistance because they do not fill gaps in information. Without more comprehensive data, CDC's ability to assess the overall scope of the public health problem and plan and implement preventive activities will be impeded. Federal agencies do not monitor the disposal of most antibiotics intended for human use, but they have detected them, as well as antibiotics for animal use, in the environment, which results partly from their disposal. EPA and DOI's United States Geological Survey have examined the presence of certain antibiotics in environmental settings such as streams. Studies conducted by scientists have found that antibiotics present in the environment at certain concentrations can increase the population of resistant bacteria.
What GAO Recommends
To better control the spread of resistance, GAO recommends that CDC develop and implement strategies to improve its monitoring of (1) antibiotic use and (2) antibiotic-resistant infections. HHS generally agreed with our recommendations. HHS, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Department of the Interior (DOI) provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. |
gao_GAO-05-84T | gao_GAO-05-84T_0 | As of June 2004, 15 federal agencies reported 34 ongoing smart card projects. Initially, many of the smart card initiatives that were undertaken were small-scale demonstration projects that involved as few as 100 cardholders and intended to show the value of using smart cards for identification or to store cash value or other personal information. However, federal efforts toward the adoption of smart cards have continued to evolve as agencies have gained an increased understanding of the technology and its potential uses and benefits. Our most recent study of federal agencies’ investments in smart card technology, which we reported on last month, noted that agencies are increasingly moving away from many of their earlier efforts— which frequently involved small-scale, limited-duration pilot projects—toward much larger, integrated, agencywide initiatives aimed at providing smart cards as identity credentials that agency employees can use to gain both physical access to facilities, such as buildings, and logical access to computer systems and networks. Results from this project have indicated that smart cards can offer many useful benefits, such as significantly reducing the processing time required for deploying military personnel, tracking immunization records of dependent children, and verifying the identity of individuals accessing buildings and computer systems. Our prior work noted a number of management and technical challenges that agency managers have faced. In considering these challenges, it is important to note that, while they served to slow the adoption of smart card technology in past years, they may be less difficult in the future because of increased management concerns about securing federal facilities and information systems and because technical advances have improved the capabilities and reduced the cost of smart card systems. Specifically, we recommended that ● the Director, OMB, issue governmentwide policy guidance regarding adoption of smart cards for secure access to physical and logical assets; ● the Director, NIST, continue to improve and update the government smart card interoperability specification by addressing governmentwide standards for additional technologies—such as contactless cards, biometrics, and optical stripe media—as well as integration with PKI; and ● the Administrator, GSA, improve the effectiveness of GSA’s promotion of smart card technologies within the federal government by (1) developing an internal implementation strategy with specific goals and milestones to ensure that GSA’s internal organizations support and implement smart card systems consistently; (2) updating its governmentwide implementation strategy and administrative guidance on implementing smart card systems to address current security priorities; (3) establishing guidelines for federal building security that address the role of smart card technology; and (4) developing a process for conducting ongoing evaluations of the implementation of smart card-based systems by federal agencies to ensure that lessons learned and best practices are shared across government. VA Is Pursuing Agencywide Use of Smart Cards
Mr. Chairman, beyond the governmentwide assessment presented, you requested that we specifically address actions of the Department of Veterans Affairs in adopting smart card technology. VA currently estimates that, between fiscal years 2004 and 2009, this initiative will cost about $162 million. According to project documentation, the One-VA ID card is intended to replace the several hundred methods for issuing identification cards that are currently in place across the department, and improve physical and information security by strengthening the ability to authenticate users and grant access to information systems that employees and contractors rely on to perform VA’s business functions. The adoption of such technology is continuing to evolve, with a number of large-scale, agencywide projects having been undertaken by federal agencies over the past several years. | Why GAO Did This Study
The federal government is interested in the use of smart cards--credit card-like devices that use integrated circuit chips to store and process data--for improving the security of its many physical and information assets. Besides providing better authentication of the identities of people accessing buildings and computer systems, smart cards offer a number of other potential benefits and uses, such as creating electronic passenger lists for deploying military personnel and tracking immunization and other medical records. Over the past 2 years, GAO has studied and reported on the uses of smart cards across the federal government. Congress requested that GAO testify on federal agencies' efforts in adopting smart card technology--based on the results of this prior work--and on the specific actions that the Department of Veterans Affairs is taking to implement smart card technology.
What GAO Found
As the unique properties and capabilities of smart cards have become more apparent, federal agencies, including the Office of Management and Budget, the National Institute of Standards and Technology, and the General Services Administration, have acted to advance the governmentwide adoption of smart card technology. In turn, numerous smart card projects that offer a variety of uses and benefits have been launched. As of June 2004, 15 federal agencies reported 34 ongoing smart card projects. Further, agencies' actions toward the adoption of smart cards continue to evolve as understanding of the technology grows. Agencies are moving away from the small-scale, limited-duration demonstration projects of past years (involving as few as 100 cardholders and aiming mostly to show the value of using smart cards for identification) to larger, more integrated, agencywide initiatives involving many thousands (or even millions) of users and that are focused on physical access to facilities and logical (information systems) access to computer systems and networks. In pursuing smart card projects, federal agencies have had to contend with numerous management and technical challenges. However, these challenges may be less imposing in the future because of increased management concerns about securing federal facilities and because technical advances have improved the capabilities and cost effectiveness of smart card systems. The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) is one of 9 federal agencies currently pursuing large-scale, agencywide smart card initiatives. VA's project, currently in limited deployment, involves using, among other technologies, the One-VA Identification smart card to provide an agencywide capability to authenticate users with certainty and grant them access to information systems essential to accomplishing the agency's business functions. VA estimates that this project will cost about $162 million between 2004 and 2009, and enable it to issue 500,000 smart cards to its employees and contractors. |
gao_GAO-06-362 | gao_GAO-06-362_0 | DOD has explicitly given the services the responsibility to set up their own processes for some aspects of the disability system and has given the services much room for interpretation. Each service has implemented its system somewhat differently. DOD and the Services Have Established Policies That Result in Different Experiences with the Disability System for Reservists
The laws that govern the military disability system and the policies and guidance that DOD and the services have developed to implement the laws can result in different experiences with the disability system for reservists. Twenty Years of Service Requirement for Disability Retirement
Because they are not on duty at all times, reservists take longer to accrue the 20 years of service that may be needed to earn the monthly disability retirement benefit when the disability rating is less than 30 percent. DOD Has Guidance in Place to Promote Consistent and Timely Decisions, but Does Not Adequately Oversee Key Aspects of the Disability System
DOD has policies and guidance to promote consistent and timely disability decisions, but is not monitoring whether the services are compliant. Neither DOD nor the services systematically determine the consistency of decision making, which would be a key component of quality assurance. Finally, DOD is not exercising any oversight over training for staff in the disability system, despite being required to do so. DOD Requires All Services to Use a Common Ratings System and Multiple Reviewers and Convenes a Disability Council
To encourage consistent decision making, DOD policies require that service members’ case files undergo multiple reviews and federal law requires that disability ratings be based on a common schedule. Data on years of service and preexisting conditions were not available for this analysis, however, factors that influence disability benefit decisions. Finally, we were unable to compare processing times for reserve and active duty disability cases because we found that Army data on processing times were not reliable. Army Reservists Received Disability Ratings Similar to Their Active Duty Counterparts, but Reservists May Be Less Likely to Receive Benefits
Before controlling for factors that could account for differences in the outcomes of the Army disability evaluation system for reserve and active duty soldiers, our analysis of Army data indicates that, from 2001 through 2005, reservists were assigned slightly higher disability ratings, but received benefits less often than active duty soldiers. Nonetheless, the statistics the Army provided indicate that disability cases reviewed between fiscal years 2001 and 2005 took consistently longer than those of active duty soldiers. In addition, it may take longer for reservist cases to go through the system. Recommendations for Executive Action
To ensure that all service members—both active duty and reserves— receive consistent and timely treatment within the disability evaluation process, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following five actions require the Army, Navy, and Air Force to take action to ensure that data needed to assess consistency and timeliness of military disability rating and benefit decisions are reliable; require these services to track and regularly report these data— including comparisons of processing times, ratings and benefit decisions for reservists and active duty members—to the Under Secretary of Personnel and Readiness and the Surgeons General; determine, based on these reports, if ratings and benefit decisions are consistent and timely across the services and between reservists and active duty members and institute improvements to address any deficiencies that might be found; evaluate the appropriateness of current timeliness goals for the disability process and make any necessary changes; and assess the adequacy of training for MEB and PEB disability evaluation staff. Appendix I: Objective, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of our report were to determine: (1) how current DOD policies and guidance for disability determinations compare for the Army, Navy, and Air Force, and what policies are specific to reserve component members of the military; (2) what oversight and quality control mechanisms are in place at DOD and these three services of the military to ensure consistent and timely disability rating and benefit decisions for active and reserve component members, and (3) how disability rating and benefit decisions, and processing times compare for active and reserve component members of the Army, the largest branch of the service, and what factors might explain any differences. | Why GAO Did This Study
The House Committee on Armed Services report that accompanies the National Defense Authorization Act of fiscal year 2006 directs GAO to review results of the military disability evaluation system. In response to this mandate, GAO determined: (1) how current DOD policies and guidance for disability determinations compare for the Army, Navy, and Air Force, and what policies are specific to reserve component members of the military; (2) what oversight and quality control mechanisms are in place at DOD and these three services of the military to ensure consistent and timely disability decisions for active and reserve component members; and (3) how disability decisions, ratings, and processing times compare for active and reserve component members of the Army, the largest branch of the service, and what factors might explain any differences.
What GAO Found
Policies and guidance for military disability determinations differ somewhat among the Army, Navy, and Air Force. DOD has explicitly given the services the responsibility to set up their own processes for certain aspects of the disability evaluation system and has given them latitude in how they go about this. As a result, each service implements its system somewhat differently. Further, the laws that govern military disability and the policies that DOD and the services have developed to implement these laws have led reservists to have different experiences in the disability system compared to active duty members. For example, because reservists are not on active duty at all times, it takes longer for them to accrue the 20 years of service that may be needed to earn monthly disability retirement benefits. While DOD has issued policies and guidance to promote consistent and timely disability decisions for active duty and reserve disability cases, DOD is not monitoring compliance. To encourage consistent decision making, DOD requires all services to use multiple reviewers to evaluate disability cases. Furthermore, federal law requires that reviewers use a standardized disability rating system to classify the severity of the medical impairment. In addition, DOD periodically convenes the Disability Advisory Council, comprised of DOD and service officials, to review and update disability policy and to discuss current issues. However, neither DOD nor the services systematically determine the consistency of disability decision making. DOD has issued timeliness goals for processing disability cases, but is not collecting information to determine compliance. Finally, the consistency and timeliness of decisions depend, in part, on the training that disability staff receive. However, DOD is not exercising oversight over training for staff in the disability system. While GAO's review of the military disability evaluation system's policies and oversight covered the three services, GAO examined Army data on disability ratings and benefit decisions from calendar year 2001 through 2005. After controlling for many of the differences between reserve and active duty soldiers, GAO found that, among soldiers who received disability ratings, the ratings of reservists were comparable to those of active duty soldiers with similar conditions. GAO's analyses of the military disability benefit decisions for the soldiers who were determined to be unfit for duty were less definitive, but suggest that Army reservists were less likely to receive permanent disability retirement or lump sum disability severance pay than their active duty counterparts. However, data on possible reasons for this difference, such as whether the condition existed prior to service, were not available for our analysis. GAO did not compare processing times for Army reserve and active duty cases because GAO found that Army's data needed to calculate processing times were unreliable. However, Army statistics based on this data indicate that from fiscal 2001 through 2005, reservists' cases took longer to process than active duty cases. |
gao_T-AIMD-96-168 | gao_T-AIMD-96-168_0 | GAO Observations on Users, Data Source, and Operating Processes and Performance
In developing the data base, the White House acquired well-established, commercially available products and created a system that users we interviewed were generally satisfied with. Data Base Use and User Satisfaction
As noted earlier, data base users primarily use the data base as a tool for maintaining contact with individuals and organizations important to the Presidency. Less than 100 White House staff actually use the system, and only about 25 make moderate to heavy use (relative to other users) of the system—with the heaviest users representing the White House Social Office, Personal Correspondence Office, and Outreach Office, as well as system administrators. Social Office personnel use the system to assist in developing invitation lists and planning state dinners and other events. Personal Correspondence personnel use the data base to help compose letters for the President. The Outreach user we interviewed entered data into the data base for use in generating lists of holiday card recipients. However, if demand increased, system performance could unnecessarily degrade. In order to minimize performance impact, system administrators have made compromises which affect the data base’s internal controls. Operating Processes and Procedures
Good business systems operate in a controlled environment to ensure that data within these systems is accurate, that data output is reliable, and that data integrity is assured so that only authorized users have access to the data and that such access is appropriate to their needs. We found that the White House has taken several positive steps to create a controlled environment. For example, the system does not require frequent changes in passwords. Additional copies are $2 each. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the White House database, focusing on its users and operational components.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) users are generally satisfied with the database as a tool for maintaining information important to the Presidency; (2) fewer than 100 White House staff use the database, and the 25 heaviest users represent three White House offices and systems administrators; (3) the Social Office uses the database to develop invitation lists and plan state dinners and other events, the Personal Correspondence Office uses the database to help compose Presidential letters, and the Outreach Office uses the database for generating lists of holiday card recipients; (4) these users believe that the database is critical in performing their tasks, but the database's design is limited because it does not employ certain relational database capabilities; (5) because of additional processing steps, system performance will degrade if demand increases; (6) systems administrators have made compromises to minimize performance impacts that affect data integrity and audit trails; (7) the White House has taken actions to ensure a controlled environment by providing personalized user training, requiring signed ethics documents and passwords, providing anti-hacker defense systems, and limiting user access; and (8) to ensure data integrity and operational effectiveness, the White House needs to document systems security policies and procedures, limit report printing, and establish an audit trail for systems administrators to monitor database operations. |
gao_GGD-98-170 | gao_GGD-98-170_0 | Implications of Differences Between Assessed and Actual Inspectional Personnel Levels Could Not Be Determined
We were not able to perform the requested analyses to identify the implications of differences between assessed and actual inspectional personnel levels because Customs had not assessed the appropriate inspectional personnel levels for its ports. While Customs uses a quantitative model to determine the need for additional inspectional personnel to process air passengers, the model is not intended to establish the level at which airports should be staffed. Customs is in the early stages of responding to a recommendation in our April 1998 report that it establish an inspectional personnel needs assessment and allocation process. Inspectional personnel levels at the selected ports at the end of fiscal year 1997 were at or near the levels for which funds had been provided to the ports. According to Customs officials we interviewed at air and sea ports, these personnel levels, coupled with the use of overtime, enabled the ports to process commercial cargo and passengers within prescribed performance parameters. Customs Has Not Determined Appropriate Inspectional Personnel Levels for Its Ports
In our April 1998 report, we reported that Customs does not have a systematic, agencywide process for determining its need for inspectional personnel for processing commercial cargo and allocating such personnel to ports of entry nationwide. Customs also does not have a systematic inspectional personnel assessment and allocation process for processing land passengers. Customs has not assessed the need for inspectional personnel to process sea passengers. Specifically, we identified significant discrepancies in the workload data as reported from Customs headquarters and a CMC and ports for two ports. According to Customs officials, the drug-smuggling threat—such as the use of rail cars to smuggle drugs—was the primary factor considered in these assessments and allocations. In addition, Customs considered factors other than workload—such as budget constraints and legislative limitations—in determining its need for inspectional personnel and allocating such personnel to ports. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives in this review were to analyze (1) the cargo and passenger inspectional personnel levels at selected airports and seaports around the United States and the implications of any differences between these levels and those determined by Customs to be appropriate for these ports (assessed levels) and (2) the cargo and passenger processing workloads and related workload-to-inspector ratios at the selected ports and the rationales for any significant differences in these ratios. To identify the cargo and passenger processing workloads and any related workload-to-inspector ratios at the selected ports and the rationales for any significant differences in these ratios, we obtained and reviewed workload data from Customs headquarters, CMCs, and ports. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed certain aspects of the Customs Service's inspectional personnel and its commercial cargo and passenger workloads, focusing on: (1) the implications of any differences between the cargo and passenger inspectional personnel levels at selected airports and seaports around the United States and those determined by Customs to be appropriate for these ports (assessed levels); and (2) any differences among the cargo and passenger processing workload-to-inspector ratios at the selected ports and the rationales for any significant differences in these ratios.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) it was not able to perform the requested analyses to identify the implications of differences between assessed and actual inspectional personnel levels because, as GAO reported in April 1998, Customs had not assessed the appropriate inspectional personnel levels for its ports; (2) in that report, GAO determined that Customs does not have a systematic agencywide process for assessing the need for inspectional personnel and allocating such personnel to commercial cargo ports; (3) Customs also does not have such a process for assessing the need for inspectional personnel to process land and sea passengers at ports; (4) while Customs uses a quantitative model to determine the need for additional inspectional personnel to process air passengers, the model is not intended to establish the level at which airports should be staffed, according to Customs officials; (5) Customs is in the early stages of responding to a recommendation in GAO's April 1998 report that it establish an inspectional personnel needs assessment and allocation process; (6) Customs officials GAO interviewed at air and sea ports told GAO that the current personnel levels, coupled with the use of overtime, enabled the ports to process commercial cargo and passengers within prescribed performance parameters; (7) the inspectional personnel data that GAO obtained for the selected ports showed that at the end of fiscal year 1997, the personnel levels at these ports were at or near the levels for which funds were provided to the ports; (8) GAO was also not able to perform the analyses to identify workload-to-inspector ratios and rationales for any differences in these ratios because it did not have a sufficient level of confidence in the quality of the workload data; (9) GAO identified significant discrepancies in the workload data it obtained from Customs headquarters, a Customs Management Center (CMC) and two ports; (10) data from the New York CMC indicated that these airports processed about 1.5 million formal entries alone, almost 100,000 entries more than the number headquarters had for all entries at these ports; (11) workload was only one of several factors considered by Customs in the few assessments--which focused on its drug smuggling initiatives--completed since 1995 to determine its needs for additional inspectional personnel and allocate such personnel to ports; and (12) Customs also considered factors such as the threat of drug smuggling, budgetary constraints, and legislative limitations. |
gao_GAO-05-891T | gao_GAO-05-891T_0 | As a result, DOD has been unable to deliver capabilities as promised. Causes of Space System Acquisition Problems
We have analyzed the range of space-based acquisitions over the last several years to identify the common and causal factors for these poor acquisition outcomes. Overall, we have found that DOD has been unable to match resources (technology, time, and money) to requirements before beginning individual programs, setting the stage for technical and other problems, which lead to cost and schedule increases. Requirements for what the satellite needed to do and how well it must perform are not adequately defined at the beginning of a program or are changed significantly once the program has begun. Technologies are not mature enough to be included in product development. Cost estimates are unreliable—largely because requirements have not been fully defined and because programs start with many unknowns about technologies. We also have reported on cross-cutting factors that make it more difficult for DOD to achieve a match between resources and requirements for space acquisitions. Second, space acquisition programs have historically attempted to satisfy all requirements in a single step, regardless of the design challenge or the maturity of technologies to achieve the full capability. Third, there is a tendency among space system acquisition programs to take on technology development that should occur within the science and technology (S&T) environment. DOD Starts More Programs than It Can Afford in the Long Run
There is a widespread belief among DOD and other officials involved with space programs that DOD starts more programs than it can afford in the long run, forcing programs to underestimate costs and over-promise capability and creating a host of negative incentives and pressures. Another key to success is employing the technique of systems engineering to close the gaps between available technologies and customer needs before committing to new product development. This puts programs in a better position to succeed because they can focus on design, system integration, and manufacturing. For example, it has recently revised its space acquisition policy, in part to encourage programs to attain more knowledge about technologies before starting. However, we remain concerned that these measures will not be sufficient. The space acquisition policy, for example, still allows programs to begin before demonstrating technologies in an operational or simulated environment. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO was asked to testify on problems relating to the Department of Defense's (DOD) space system acquisitions. In doing so, we drew on our previous reports related to the causes of acquisition problems, underlying incentives and pressures, and potential solutions.
What GAO Found
Our work on the acquisition of space-based capabilities over the last several years has been conducted on two levels. First, we have reviewed most of the major space system acquisitions to determine their status at different points in time. The results are discouraging--systems cost more and take much longer to acquire than promised when initially approved. In some cases, the justification or business case for the system when initially approved is far different from the current status, so DOD has had to re-assess the need to acquire that particular system and the soundness of its acquisition strategy. Second, we have analyzed the common and causal factors for these poor acquisition outcomes. Overall, we have found that DOD has been unable to match resources (technology, time, money) to requirements before beginning individual programs, setting the stage for technical and other problems, which lead to cost and schedule increases. Specifically, (1) requirements for what the satellite needed to do and how well it must perform are not adequately defined at the beginning of a program or are changed significantly once the program has begun; (2) technologies are not mature enough to be included in product development; and (3) cost estimates are unreliable--largely because requirements have not been fully defined and because programs start with many unknowns about technologies. We also have reported on cross-cutting factors that make it more difficult for DOD to achieve a match between resources and requirements for space acquisitions. These include: a diverse array of organizations with competing interests; a desire to satisfy all requirements in a single step, regardless of the design or technology challenge; and a tendency for acquisition programs to take on technology development that should occur within the S&T environment. On a broader scale, DOD starts more programs than it can afford in the long run, forcing programs to underestimate costs and over promise capability. As a result, there is pressure to suppress bad news about programs, which could endanger funding and support, as well as to skip testing because of its high cost. One key to success is closing the gaps between available technologies and customer needs before beginning an acquisition program. This puts programs in a better position to succeed because they can focus on design, system integration, and manufacturing. DOD has recently revised its space acquisition policy, in part to attain more knowledge about technologies before starting an acquisition program. However, we remain concerned that the policy still allows programs to begin before demonstrating technologies in an operational or simulated environment. |
gao_GAO-04-6 | gao_GAO-04-6_0 | One of the key provisions of the management agenda is the expansion of electronic government. However, while the projects are continuing to make progress, some of the tasks they face are increasingly challenging, such as e-Payroll’s objective of establishing governmentwide payroll processing standards or Geospatial One-Stop’s goal of compiling a comprehensive inventory of geospatial data holdings. Initiatives Have Achieved Varying Degrees of Collaboration
The four initiatives we reviewed have all taken steps to promote collaboration with their partner agencies. However, none of the initiatives has been fully effective in collaborating with important stakeholders. The four initiatives have all faced short time frames to accomplish their tasks, and they generally have not fully adopted key collaboration practices because of other competing priorities. However, without involving important stakeholders, the initiatives increase the risk that they will not fully achieve their objectives or the broader goals of the President’s management agenda. Interior has taken steps to include nonfederal stakeholders on the project. A number of early goals have been achieved, including establishing Web portals such as www.geodata.gov for the Geospatial One-Stop initiative and www.BusinessLaw.gov for the Business Gateway project. For example, while OPM has taken steps to promote close collaboration with its four designated e-Payroll providers, it has not fully addressed the concerns of a key stakeholder that may be required to make costly changes to its payroll processes and policies in response to OPM’s decisions. Until these issues are addressed, the initiatives may be at risk of not fully achieving their goals. Recommendations for Executive Action
To enhance the effectiveness of collaboration as a tool for the four e-government initiatives to use in achieving their goals, we recommend that the Director of OPM (1) institute a review and feedback process with VA to ensure that its concerns are reviewed and addressed before decisions are made that could have a policy or resource impact on agency payroll operations, and (2) ensure that a collaborative process is in place for development of governmentwide payroll standards; the Secretary of the Interior establish formal agreements with federal agency partners to clarify collaborative relationships and develop an outreach plan for the Geospatial One-Stop initiative that includes specific tasks for contacting and interacting with a wider range of state and local government GIS officials to facilitate and explain the benefits of broad participation in the initiative and promote the use of federal geospatial data standards; the Administrator, GSA, modify the structure of its working groups and other communication mechanisms for the Integrated Acquisition Environment initiative to fully include the CFOs of partner agencies and better ensure that agreed-upon partner resource contributions are made; and the Administrator, SBA, establish a more collaborative management structure for the Business Gateway initiative by defining roles and responsibilities, establishing formal collaboration agreements with federal agency partners, developing a shared funding strategy, and implementing projectwide communication and outreach mechanisms to ensure that key decision makers at partner agencies are kept informed and involved in the management of the project. General Services Administration. | Why GAO Did This Study
In accordance with the President's management agenda, the Office of Management and Budget has sponsored initiatives to promote expansion of electronic government--the use of information technology, particularly Web-based Internet applications, to enhance government services. Each initiative demands a high degree of collaboration among organizations. For four of these initiatives, GAO was asked to determine, among other things, their implementation progress and the extent of collaboration among agencies and other parties involved.
What GAO Found
All four of the e-government initiatives that GAO reviewed have made progress in meeting the objectives and milestones of their early phases. Two of the initiatives have established Web portals--www.geodata.gov for the Geospatial One-Stop initiative and www.BusinessLaw.gov for the Business Gateway. The projects face additional challenging tasks, such as e-Payroll's objective of establishing governmentwide payroll processing standards and Geospatial One-Stop's goal of compiling a comprehensive inventory of geospatial data holdings. All four initiatives have taken steps to promote collaboration with their partner agencies, but none has been fully effective in involving all important stakeholders. For example, for the e-Payroll initiative, the Office of Personnel Management has taken steps to promote close collaboration with its four designated e-Payroll providers, but has not addressed the concerns of a key stakeholder that will be required to make changes to its payroll processes and policies. For Geospatial One-Stop, Interior has established a board of directors with broad representation, but has not taken steps to ensure that key stakeholders at the state and local levels are involved in the initiative. For the Integrated Acquisition Environment initiative, the General Services Administration is using a variety of tools to promote collaboration, but has not involved partner agencies' chief financial officers (CFOs). Finally, for the Business Gateway, the Small Business Administration has not taken key steps to facilitate effective collaboration with its partners and stakeholders, such as establishing a collaborative decision-making process and reaching formal agreements on partner roles and responsibilities. All four initiatives have faced short time frames to accomplish their major tasks, so that competing priorities have sometimes hindered full collaboration. However, without effective collaboration on the tasks that remain to be completed, these initiatives may be at risk of not fully achieving their objectives or the broader goals of the President's management agenda. |
gao_GGD-96-150 | gao_GGD-96-150_0 | Federal Assistance to Local Law Enforcement in the Los Angeles Area Was Provided Mainly Through the LA Task Force
According to the various federal and local law enforcement personnel in the Los Angeles area whom we interviewed, federal law enforcement assistance targeted directly at gangs in the area consisted primarily of the use of federal laws and authority not otherwise available to local law enforcement agencies, funds, equipment, and personnel. Assistance provided through the LA Task Force included the use of federal laws and authority (including prosecutive, wiretap, and witness security assistance); overtime pay; office space; various types of equipment; personnel; and money for undercover drug/firearms purchases and informants. As previously noted, 5 of the 47 local law enforcement agencies in the Los Angeles metropolitan area that we identified participated in the LA Task Force. In regard to personnel assistance, 10 of the 23 line officers who received such assistance believed that the number of FBI agents assigned to their squads was insufficient, and 5 believed that turnover in FBI agents assigned to their squads hindered task force operations. Several line officers indicated that long-term investigations permitted local law enforcement to deal more effectively with violent criminal gangs. Attorneys, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO reviewed how the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and other federal agencies worked with local law enforcement agencies to target gangs in the Los Angeles metropolitan area.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) FBI provided assistance to local law enforcement in the Los Angeles area through the Los Angeles Metropolitan Task Force on Violent Crime; (2) federal assistance provided through the task force included the use of federal laws and authority not otherwise available to local law enforcement, personnel, overtime pay, office space, various types of equipment, and funding for law enforcement activities; (3) local law enforcement officials believed that the task force enhanced their ability to conduct long-term, proactive investigations into entire gangs rather than short-term, reactive investigations; (4) local law enforcement officers believed that, overall, federal assistance helped to reduce gang violence; and (5) local law enforcement officers believed that the number of FBI agents assigned to the task force was insufficient, agent turnover hindered operations, and a lack of cellular telephones hindered operations. |
gao_GAO-09-840 | gao_GAO-09-840_0 | DOD Has Taken Some Steps to Implement Internal Safeguards, but Additional Monitoring Is Needed to Ensure the Fairness of NSPS
DOD has taken some steps to implement internal safeguards to help ensure that the NSPS performance management system is fair, effective, and credible; however, we believe continued monitoring of safeguards is needed to help ensure that DOD’s actions are effective as implementation proceeds. Specifically, we reported in September 2008 that DOD had taken some steps to (1) involve employees in the system’s design and implementation; (2) link employee objectives and the agency’s strategic goals and mission; (3) train and retrain employees in the system’s operation; (4) provide ongoing performance feedback between supervisors and employees; (5) better link individual pay to performance in an equitable manner; (6) allocate agency resources for the system’s design, implementation, and administration; (7) provide reasonable transparency of the system and its operation; (8) impart meaningful distinctions in individual employee performance; and (9) include predecisional internal safeguards to determine whether rating results are fair, consistent, and equitable. For example, all 12 sites we visited trained employees on NSPS, and the DOD-wide tool used to compose self- assessments links employees’ objectives to the commands’ or agencies’ strategic goals and mission. However, we determined that DOD could immediately improve its implementation of three safeguards. We are currently assessing DOD’s postdecisional analysis approach as part of our ongoing review of the implementation of NSPS. Although DOD Civilian Employees under NSPS View Some Aspects of the System Positively, DOD Does Not Have a Plan to Address the Generally Negative Employee Perceptions of the System
Although DOD civilian employees under NSPS responded positively regarding some aspects of the NSPS performance management system, DOD does not have an action plan to address the generally negative employee perceptions of NSPS identified in both the department’s Status of Forces Survey of civilian employees and discussion groups we held at 12 select installations. According to our analysis of DOD’s survey from May 2007, NSPS employees expressed slightly more positive attitudes than their DOD colleagues who remain under the General Schedule system about some goals of performance management, such as connecting pay to performance and receiving feedback regularly. For example, an estimated 43 percent of NSPS employees compared to an estimated 25 percent of all other DOD employees said that pay raises depend on how well employees perform their jobs. We therefore recommended, in our September 2008 report, that DOD develop and implement a specific action plan to address employee perceptions of NSPS ascertained from DOD’s surveys and employee focus groups. The degree of ultimate success of NSPS largely depends on the extent to which DOD incorporates internal safeguards and addresses employee perceptions. Moving forward, we hope that the Defense Business Board considers our previous work on NSPS as it assesses how NSPS operates and its underlying policies. 1. Human Capital: DOD’s Civilian Personnel Strategic Management and the Proposed National Security Personnel System. | Why GAO Did This Study
DOD is in the process of implementing this human capital system, and according to DOD, about 212,000 civilian employees are currently under the system. On February 11, 2009, however, the House Armed Services Committee and its Subcommittee on Readiness asked DOD to halt conversions of any additional employees to NSPS until the administration and Congress could properly address the future of DOD's personnel management system. On March 16, 2009, DOD and the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) announced an upcoming review of NSPS policies, regulations, and practices. According to DOD, the department has delayed any further transitions of employees into NSPS until at least October 2009--pending the outcome of its review. Furthermore, on May 14, 2009, the Deputy Secretary of Defense asked the Defense Business Board to form what has become this task group to review NSPS to help the department determine, among others things, whether NSPS is operating in a fair, transparent, and effective manner. This statement focuses on the performance management aspect of NSPS specifically (1) the extent to which DOD has implemented internal safeguards to ensure the fairness, effectiveness, and credibility of NSPS and (2) how DOD civilian personnel perceive NSPS and what actions DOD has taken to address these perceptions. It is based on the work we reported on in our September 2008 report, which was conducted in response to a mandate in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008. This mandate also directed us to continue examining DOD efforts in these areas for the next 2 years. We currently have ongoing work reviewing the implementation of NSPS for the second year, and we also will perform another review next year.
What GAO Found
DOD has taken some steps to implement internal safeguards to help ensure that the NSPS performance management system is fair, effective, and credible; however, we believe continued monitoring of safeguards is needed to help ensure that DOD's actions are effective as implementation proceeds. Specifically, we reported in September 2008 that DOD had taken some steps to (1) involve employees in the system's design and implementation; (2) link employee objectives and the agency's strategic goals and mission; (3) train and retrain employees in the system's operation; (4) provide ongoing performance feedback between supervisors and employees; (5) better link individual pay to performance in an equitable manner; (6) allocate agency resources for the system's design, implementation, and administration; (7) provide reasonable transparency of the system and its operation; (8) impart meaningful distinctions in individual employee performance; and (9) include predecisional internal safeguards to determine whether rating results are fair, consistent, and equitable. For example, all 12 sites we visited trained employees on NSPS, and the DOD-wide tool used to compose self-assessments links employees' objectives to the commands' or agencies' strategic goals and mission. However, we determined that DOD could immediately improve its implementation of three safeguards. Although DOD civilian employees under NSPS responded positively regarding some aspects of the NSPS performance management system, DOD does not have an action plan to address the generally negative employee perceptions of NSPS identified in both the department's Status of Forces Survey of civilian employees and discussion groups we held at 12 select installations. According to our analysis of DOD's survey from May 2007, NSPS employees expressed slightly more positive attitudes than their DOD colleagues who remain under the General Schedule system about some goals of performance management, such as connecting pay to performance and receiving feedback regularly. For example, an estimated 43 percent of NSPS employees compared to an estimated 25 percent of all other DOD employees said that pay raises depend on how well employees perform their jobs. |
gao_GAO-06-1133T | gao_GAO-06-1133T_0 | Background
Consumer-directed health plans generally include three components: a health plan with a high deductible, a savings account—such as an HSA—to pay for health care expenses, and enrollee decision-support tools. There are several types of savings accounts that may be associated with consumer-directed health plans, with HSAs being among the most prominent. Financial Features of HSA-Eligible Plans Differed From Those of Traditional Plans, but Covered Services Were Similar
HSA-eligible plans had lower premiums, higher deductibles, and higher out-of-pocket spending limits than traditional plans in 2005. Our illustration of enrollees’ potential health care costs—including premiums, deductibles, and other out-of-pocket costs for covered services—for the three employers’ 2005 health plans we reviewed showed that HSA-eligible plan enrollees would incur higher annual costs than PPO enrollees for extensive use of health care, but would incur lower annual costs than PPO enrollees for low to moderate use of health care. HSA-Eligible Plan Enrollees Had Higher Incomes than Comparison Groups, but Data on Age Differences Were Inconclusive
HSA-eligible plan enrollees generally had higher incomes than comparison groups. Moreover, 51 percent of tax filers reporting HSA contributions had an adjusted gross income of $75,000 or more, compared with 18 percent of all tax filers under age 65. Additionally, two of the three employers we reviewed and eHealthInsurance reported that HSA-eligible plan enrollees had higher incomes than did traditional plan enrollees in 2005. Just Over Half of Enrollees and Most Employers Contributed to HSAs, and These Funds Were Used to Pay for Medical Care and to Accumulate Savings
Just over half of HSA-eligible plan enrollees and most employers contributed to HSAs. About 55 percent of HSA-eligible plan enrollees reported HSA contributions in 2004, according to our analysis of data obtained from IRS and a publicly available survey. About two-thirds of employers offering HSA-eligible plans contributed to their employees’ HSAs in 2005, according to two national employer health benefits surveys. Account holders used HSA funds to pay for medical care and to accumulate savings. About 45 percent of tax filers reporting an HSA contribution in 2004—made by themselves, their employers, or others on their behalf—also reported withdrawing funds in 2004. About 55 percent of tax filers reporting HSA contributions in 2004 withdrew no money from their account in 2004. Focus Group Participants Were Generally Satisfied with HSA-Eligible Plans, but Would Not Recommend Them to All Consumers
HSA-eligible plan enrollees who participated in our focus groups at the three employers we reviewed generally reported positive experiences with their plans. Few participants researched the cost of hospital or physician services before obtaining care, although many participants researched the cost of prescription drugs. Most participants reported that they would not recommend HSA-eligible plans to all consumers. Most participants would recommend the plans to healthy consumers, but not to those who use maintenance medication, have a chronic condition, have children, or may not have the funds to meet the high deductible. Few of the HSA-eligible plan enrollees who participated in our focus groups researched cost before obtaining health care services. | Why GAO Did This Study
Health savings accounts (HSA) and the high-deductible health insurance plans that are eligible to be coupled with them are a new type of consumer-directed health plan attracting interest among employers and consumers. HSA-eligible plans constitute a small but growing share of the private insurance market, and the novel structure of the plans has raised questions about how they could affect enrollees' health care purchasing decisions and costs. This statement is based on GAO's August 2006 report entitled "Consumer-Directed Health Plans: Early Enrollee Experiences with Health Savings Accounts and Eligible Health Plans" (GAO-06-798). In this report, GAO reviewed (1) the financial features of HSA-eligible plans in comparison with those of traditional plans, such as preferred provider organizations (PPO); (2) the characteristics of HSA-eligible plan enrollees in comparison with those of traditional plan enrollees or others; (3) HSA funding and use; and (4) enrollees' experiences with HSA-eligible plans.
What GAO Found
HSA-eligible plans had lower premiums, higher deductibles, and higher out-of-pocket spending limits than did traditional plans in 2005, but both plan types covered similar services, including preventive services. For the three employers' health plans GAO reviewed to illustrate enrollees' potential health care costs, GAO estimated that HSA-eligible plan enrollees would incur higher annual costs than PPO enrollees for extensive use of health care, but would incur lower annual costs than PPO enrollees for low to moderate use of health care. HSA-eligible plan enrollees generally had higher incomes than comparison groups, but data on age differences were inconclusive. In 2004, 51 percent of tax filers reporting an HSA contribution had an adjusted gross income of $75,000 or more, compared with 18 percent of all tax filers under 65 years old. Two of the three employers GAO reviewed, the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program, and a national broker of health insurance also reported that HSA-eligible plan enrollees had higher incomes than traditional plan enrollees in 2005. Just over half of all HSA-eligible plan enrollees and most employers contributed to HSAs, and account holders used their HSA funds to pay for medical care and accumulate savings. About 55 percent of HSA-eligible plan enrollees reported HSA contributions to the Internal Revenue Service in 2004, and about two-thirds of employers offering HSA-eligible plans contributed to their employees' HSAs. About 45 percent of tax filers reporting 2004 HSA contributions also reported that they withdrew funds in that year, and 90 percent of these funds were withdrawn for qualified medical expenses. The other 55 percent of those reporting HSA contributions did not withdraw any funds from their HSA in 2004. HSA-eligible plan enrollees who participated in GAO's focus groups generally reported positive experiences, but most would not recommend the plans to all consumers. Few participants reported researching cost before obtaining health care services, although many researched the cost of prescription drugs. Most participants were satisfied with their HSA-eligible plans and would recommend them to healthy consumers, but not to those who use maintenance medication, have a chronic condition, have children, or may not have the funds to meet the high deductible. |
gao_GAO-05-527T | gao_GAO-05-527T_0 | The estimate is an aggregate of estimates for the three primary types of noncompliance: (1) underreporting of tax liabilities on tax returns; (2) underpayment of taxes due from filed returns; and (3) nonfiling, which refers to the failure to file a required tax return altogether or timely. For tax year 2001, IRS estimated that it would eventually recover about $55 billion for a net tax gap from $257 billion to $298 billion. Our capacity to address these and other emerging needs and challenges will be predicated on when and how we deal with our fiscal challenges—the long-term fiscal pressures we face are daunting and unprecedented in the nation’s history. A Fundamental Review, Reexamination, and Reprioritization Is Needed
Confronting the nation’s fiscal challenge will require nothing less than a fundamental review, reexamination, and reprioritization of all major spending and tax policies and programs that may take a generation or more to resolve. Tax law enforcement is a high-risk area in part because past declines in IRS’s enforcement activities threatened to erode taxpayer compliance. However, IRS’s preliminary compliance estimate based on NRP indicates that compliance has not improved and may be worse than IRS originally estimated. As such, sustained progress toward improving compliance is needed. Reducing the tax gap will not likely be achieved through a single solution, but will likely involve multiple strategies that include reducing tax code complexity, providing quality services to taxpayers, and enhancing enforcement of the tax laws through the use of tools such as tax withholding and information reporting that increase the transparency of income and deductions to both IRS and taxpayers. Also, as IRS moves forward in continuing to address the tax gap, building and maintaining a base of information on the extent of, and reasons for, noncompliance as well as defining desired changes in the tax gap and measuring results of efforts to address it will be critical. Rather, the tax gap must be attacked on multiple fronts and with multiple strategies on a sustained basis. However, for any given set of tax policies, IRS’s efforts to reduce the tax gap and ensure appropriate levels of compliance will need to be based on a balanced approach of providing service to taxpayers and enforcing the tax laws. Regular Compliance Measurement Can Support Informed Decisions to Reduce the Tax Gap, but IRS Lacks Firm Plans for Such Measurement
Regularly measuring compliance can offer many benefits, including helping IRS identify new or major types of noncompliance, identify changes in tax laws and regulations that may improve compliance, more effectively target examinations of tax returns or other enforcement programs, understand the effectiveness of its programs to promote and enforce compliance, and determine its resource needs and allocations. A significant portion of IRS’s new tax gap estimate is based on recent compliance data. IRS used data from NRP to update individual income tax underreporting and the portion of individual employment tax underreporting from self-employed individuals. IRS has concerns with the certainty of the overall tax gap estimate in part because some areas of the estimate rely on old data and IRS has no estimates for other areas of the tax gap. The officials have not indicated how many goals will be related to improving taxpayer compliance or whether they will be quantitative and results- oriented. Chairman Grassley, Senator Baucus, and Members of the Committee, this concludes my testimony. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Internal Revenue Service's (IRS) recent estimate of the difference between what taxpayers timely and accurately paid in taxes and what they owed ranged from $312 billion to $353 billion for tax year 2001. IRS estimates it will eventually recover some of this tax gap, resulting in a net tax gap from $257 billion to $298 billion. The tax gap arises when taxpayers fail to comply with the tax laws by underreporting tax liabilities on tax returns; underpaying taxes due from filed returns; or "nonfiling," which refers to the failure to file a required tax return altogether or in a timely manner. The Chairman and Ranking Minority Member of the Senate Committee on Finance asked GAO to review a number of issues related to the tax gap. This testimony will address GAO's longstanding concerns regarding tax compliance; IRS's efforts to ensure compliance; and the significance of reducing the tax gap, including some steps that may assist with this challenging task. For context, this testimony will also address GAO's most recent simulations of the long-term fiscal outlook and the need for a fundamental reexamination of major spending and tax policies and priorities.
What GAO Found
Our nation's fiscal policy is on an unsustainable course. As long-term budget simulations by GAO, the Congressional Budget Office, and others show, over the long term we face a large and growing structural deficit due primarily to known demographic trends and rising health care costs. All simulations indicate that the long-term fiscal challenge is too big to be solved by economic growth alone or by making modest changes to existing spending and tax policies. Rather, a fundamental reexamination of major policies and priorities will be important to recapture our fiscal flexibility. Especially relevant to this committee will be deciding whether and how to change current tax policies and how to ensure that tax compliance is as high as practically possible. Tax law enforcement is one factor affecting compliance that has caused concern in the past, due in part to declines in IRS enforcement occupations, examinations, and other enforcement results. The recent turnaround in staffing and some enforcement results is good news, but IRS's recent compliance estimate indicates that compliance levels have not improved and may be worse than it originally estimated. Thus, sustained progress in improving compliance is needed. Reducing the tax gap would help improve fiscal sustainability, but will be challenging given persistent noncompliance. This task will not likely be achieved through a single solution. Rather, the tax gap must be attacked on multiple fronts and with multiple strategies over a sustained period of time, including reducing tax code complexity, providing quality services to taxpayers, enhancing enforcement of tax laws, and evaluating the success of IRS's efforts to promote compliance. Also important is obtaining current information on the extent of, and reasons for, noncompliance. IRS's 2001 tax gap estimate is based in part on recently collected compliance data for individual income tax underreporting. However, IRS does not have firm plans to obtain compliance data for other areas of the tax gap or again collect data on individual income tax underreporting. Finally, IRS lacks quantitative, long-term goals for improving taxpayer compliance, which would be consistent with results-oriented management. |
gao_GAO-02-462 | gao_GAO-02-462_0 | Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objective of our review was to determine the advantages and disadvantages of existing major information sources, namely, credit bureau reports, CAIVRS, and the TOP database, to promptly identify delinquent federal debtors for the purpose of denying them federal financial assistance. As such, credit bureau reports are a relatively good information source for identifying certain delinquent federal nontax debtors. Second, CAIVRS contains limited information on delinquent debts. FMS’s TOP Database
TOP is a mandatory governmentwide delinquent debt matching and payment offset system. However, the information from the TOP database also has some limitations. On the other hand, enhancing the information from the TOP database for the Barring Delinquent Debtors Program may or may not be appropriate for certain types of debt (e.g., debt from 91 to 180 days delinquent) because federal credit agencies are already required by DCIA to report such debt to credit bureaus, and credit-granting agencies are required to use credit reports as a way to determine whether an applicant for federal financial assistance owes a delinquent debt to the government. Conclusions
The federal government does not presently have an effective mechanism for ensuring compliance with DCIA’s debtor bar provision. By enhancing or supplementing information currently maintained in the TOP database and allowing federal agencies access to certain current and historical data on delinquent debtors, Treasury can improve the information available to federal agencies to enhance the effectiveness of agencies’ implementation of the DCIA debtor bar provision. | What GAO Found
The Debt Collection Improvement Act of 1996 seeks to maximize collections of delinquent nontax debt owed to the federal government. However, the act also seeks to reduce losses by requiring proper screening of potential borrowers and information sharing within and among federal agencies. The major information sources of data on delinquent federal debtors are credit bureau reports, the Department of Housing and Urban Development's Credit Alert Interactive Voice Response System (CAIVRS), and the Financial Management Service's (FMS) Treasury Offset Program's (TOP) database. There is no effective mechanism for federal implementation of the act's debtor bar provision. Although credit bureau reports, CAIVRS, and FMS's TOP database each contain some information on delinquent federal nontax debtors, none provides all-inclusive, timely data or maintains them long enough to serve as an adequate data source for successfully barring future financial assistance to currently delinquent debtors or those who did not meet their past obligations. The TOP database, with modifications, now provides an adequate reference point for identifying delinquent debtors to deny them additional financial assistance. Maximizing the TOP database as a delinquency reporting tool would require several changes, such as improving agencies' delinquent debt referral practices and enhancing or supplementing information in the TOP database. |
gao_GAO-12-742 | gao_GAO-12-742_0 | 2. GAO Has Previously Reported on Federal Data Center Consolidation Efforts
We have previously reported on OMB’s efforts to consolidate federal data centers. However, we also found that only one of the 24 agencies submitted a complete inventory and no agency submitted complete plans. Agencies Updated Inventories and Plans, but Key Elements Are Still Missing
As discussed earlier, OMB required agencies to submit an updated data center inventory that included information on each center and its assets by the end of June 2011, and an updated consolidation plan that included key information on the agencies’ consolidation approach by the end of September 2011. Additionally, in their consolidation plans, 13 agencies do not provide a full master program schedule, 17 agencies do not provide full cost-benefit analysis results, and 21 agencies do not include all required cost savings information. In the absence of important information such as schedules and cost estimates, agencies are at risk of not realizing key FDCCI goals such as anticipated cost savings and improved infrastructure utilization. Our most recent analysis of 24 agencies’ documentation indicates that as of September 2011, agencies identified almost 2,900 total centers, and established plans to close over 1,185 of them by 2015. Asset Inventories Are Still Not Complete
In our July 2011 report, we recommended that agencies complete the missing elements from their inventories. IT facilities and energy. Only 1 agency fully reports on consolidation cost savings, while 13 agencies do so partially, and 8 do not. Without completing this information, agencies may not realize anticipated cost savings, improved infrastructure utilization, or energy efficiency. Selected Agencies Have Incomplete Schedules and Cost Estimates
OMB requires both a master program schedule and a cost-benefit analysis as key elements of agencies’ consolidation plans, but none of the agencies we evaluated had complete schedules or cost estimates. Our research has identified four select attributes of properly sequenced schedule activities that are essential for a reliable schedule network. However, none of these agencies’ schedules is fully compliant with the four attributes, although each agency was at least partially consistent with these practices. Identified dependencies. Comprehensive. Well-documented. In the absence of reliable cost estimates, these five agencies are exposed to the types of risks that we have reported to be recurring problems in our program reviews—namely cost overruns, missed deadlines, and performance shortfalls. Officials from several agencies told us that they plan to use the TCO model in future cost estimating efforts. Agencies Have Experienced Consolidation Successes and Continue to Report Challenges
Agencies reported experiencing multiple areas of success in their consolidation efforts. Specifically, 20 agencies identified 34 areas of success, with the number of agencies reporting a particular success ranging from 9 to 1. Additionally, 25 challenges reported in 2011 were not reported in 2012. Specifically, 15 agencies reported that obtaining power usage information was a challenge, which is less than the 19 agencies that reported this challenge last year. The two most reported consolidation successes are both key tenets of OMB’s FDCCI: the use of virtualization and cloud services, and working with other agencies to find consolidation opportunities. In light of how closely the successes and challenges reported by agencies relate to FDCCI, it will be important for OMB to continue to provide leadership and guidance to the initiative. However, agencies’ use of the model is still voluntary. Specifically, we recommend that the Director of OMB direct the Federal CIO to ensure that all future revisions to the guidance on data center consolidation inventories and plans are defined in OMB memorandum and posted to the FDCCI public website in a manner consistent with the guidance published in 2010, and ensure agencies utilize OMB’s Total Cost of Ownership model as a standardized planning tool across the consolidation initiative. In addition, we recommend that the Secretaries of Agriculture, Homeland Security, Interior, Transportation, and Veterans Affairs direct their component agencies and their data center consolidation program managers to implement recognized best practices when completing required program schedules and cost-benefit analyses. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to (1) evaluate the extent to which agencies have updated and verified their data center inventories and data center consolidation plans, (2) evaluate the extent to which selected agencies have adequately completed key elements of their consolidation plans, and (3) identify agencies’ notable consolidation successes and challenges. For this governmentwide review, we assessed the 24 departments and agencies (agencies) that were identified by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the Federal Chief Information Officer (CIO) to be included in the Federal Data Center Consolidation Initiative (FDCCI). To assess the reliability of the data agencies provided in their data center inventories and plans, we reviewed the letters agencies were required to submit attesting to the completeness and reliability of their inventories and plans, we interviewed agency officials about the actions taken to verify their data, and reviewed those results against our past reviews of agency inventories and plans. To assess the reliability of the data the five agencies provided in their master program schedules and cost estimates, we reviewed the schedules and estimates, compared them to our guidance on scheduling and estimating, and interviewed officials about how the schedules and estimates were constructed. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 2010, as focal point for information technology management across the government, OMBs Federal Chief Information Officer launched the Federal Data Center Consolidation Initiativean effort to consolidate the growing number of federal data centers. In July 2011, GAO evaluated 24 agencies progress on this effort and reported that most agencies had not yet completed data center inventories or consolidation plans and recommended that they do so.
In this subsequent review, GAO was asked to (1) evaluate the extent to which the 24 agencies updated and verified their data center inventories and plans, (2) evaluate the extent to which selected agencies have adequately completed key elements of their consolidation plans, and (3) identify agencies notable consolidation successes and challenges. To address these objectives, GAO assessed the completeness of agency inventories and plans, analyzed the schedule and cost estimates of 5 agencies previously reported to have completed one or both estimates, and interviewed officials from all 24 agencies about their consolidation successes and challenges.
What GAO Found
As of the most recent agency data submitted in September 2011, 24 agencies identified almost 2,900 total centers, established plans to close 1,186 of them by 2015, and estimated they would realize over $2.4 billion in cost savings in doing so. However, while the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) required agencies to complete missing elements in their data center inventories and plans by the end of September 2011, only 3 agencies submitted complete inventories and only 1 agency submitted a complete plan. For example, in their inventories, 17 agencies do not provide full information on their information technology facilities and energy usage, and 8 provide only partial information on their servers. Further, in their consolidation plans, 13 agencies do not provide a full master program schedule and 21 agencies do not fully report their expected cost savings. Officials from several agencies reported that some of this information was unavailable at certain facilities or that the information was still being developed. In a prior report, GAO recommended that agencies complete the missing elements from their inventories and plans. Until these inventories and plans are complete, agencies will continue to be at risk of not realizing anticipated savings, improved infrastructure utilization, or energy efficiency.
OMB requires a master program schedule and a cost-benefit analysis (a type of cost estimate) as key requirements of agencies consolidation plans, but none of the five agencies GAO reviewed had a schedule or cost estimate that was fully consistent with the four selected attributes of a properly sequenced schedule (such as having identified dependencies), or the four characteristics that form the basis of a reliable cost estimate (such as being comprehensive and well-documented). For example, the Departments of Interior and Transportation did not have schedules and the Department of Agricultures schedule was consistent with three of four attributes. Additionally, cost estimates for the Departments of Homeland Security and Veterans Affairs were partially consistent with the four cost characteristics. In the absence of reliable schedules and estimates, these agencies are at risk of experiencing cost overruns, missed deadlines, and performance shortfalls. OMB has established a standardized cost model to aid agencies in their consolidation planning efforts, but use of the model is voluntary.
Many federal agencies reported consolidation successes. Notably, 20 agencies identified 34 areas of success, although only 3 of those areas were reported by more than 1 agency. The two most-reported successes were focusing on the benefits of key technologies and the benefits of working with other agencies and components to identify consolidation opportunities. However, agencies have continued to report a number of the same challenges that GAO first described in 2011, while other challenges are evolving. For example, 15 agencies reported continued issues with obtaining power usage information and 9 agencies reported that their organization continued to struggle with acquiring the funding required for consolidation. However, other challenges appear to be less prevalent, including challenges in identifying consolidation cost savings and meeting OMBs deadlines. Overall, 25 challenges that were reported in 2011 were no longer reported in 2012. In light of these successes and challenges, it is important for OMB to continue to provide leadership and guidance, such asas GAO previously recommendedusing the consolidation task force to monitor agencies consolidation efforts.
What GAO Recommends
OMBs Federal Chief Information Officer should ensure that agencies use a standardized cost model to improve consolidation planning, and the 5 selected agencies should implement recognized best practices when establishing schedules and cost estimates for their consolidation efforts. OMB and 3 agencies agreed with, and 2 did not agree or disagree with, GAOs recommendations. |
gao_GAO-10-546T | gao_GAO-10-546T_0 | Substantial Uncertainties Remain Regarding Geoengineering Approaches and Their Potential Effects
Substantial questions remain on the efficacy and potential environmental impacts of proposed geoengineering approaches, in part, because geoengineering research and field experiments to date have been limited. According to recent studies, much of the research into SRM approaches to date has been limited to modeling studies to assess the effects of either injecting sulfur aerosols into the stratosphere or brightening clouds to reduce incoming solar radiation at the earth’s surface and produce a cooling effect. One expert familiar with these experiments noted that, while they improved scientific understanding of the role of iron in regulating ocean ecosystems and carbon dynamics, they were not specifically designed to determine the implications of ocean fertilization with iron as a geoengineering approach for large-scale removal of carbon dioxide from the atmosphere. Due to the limited amount of geoengineering research conducted to date, the experts we interviewed stated that a sustained program of additional research would be needed to address the significant uncertainties regarding the effectiveness and potential impacts of geoengineering approaches. Due to the potential for disparities in environmental outcomes from using these technologies—similar to the expected regional variation in climate change impacts—experts that we spoke with said that the political, ethical, legal, and economic issues surrounding the potential impacts of geoengineering technologies warranted close examination. Federal Agencies Have Sponsored Some Research Activities, but These Activities Are Not Part of a Coordinated Federal Geoengineering Research Strategy
Our observations to date indicate that federal agencies such as DOE, National Science Foundation (NSF), U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), and others have funded some research and small-scale technology testing relevant to proposed geoengineering approaches on an ad-hoc basis. For CDR approaches, DOE has sponsored research in both land-based and ocean-based carbon storage, including small-scale demonstration projects of geological sequestration as part of its Regional Carbon Sequestration Partnerships. In addition to these efforts, federal officials noted that a large fraction of the existing federal research and observations on basic climate change and earth science could be relevant to improving understanding about proposed geoengineering approaches and their potential impacts. Staff from federal offices coordinating the U.S. response to climate change—CEQ, OSTP, and USGCRP—stated that they do not currently have a geoengineering strategy or position. In the event that the federal government decides to fund a coordinated geoengineering research strategy, our review of relevant studies and interviews with experts to date identified some key factors for policymakers to consider when designing a federal strategy for geoengineering research. Recent GAO work offers insights on key considerations for assessing risk and managing technology-based research programs. Existing Federal Laws and International Agreements Could Apply to Certain Geoengineering Activities, but Regulatory Gaps Remain
Existing federal laws and international agreements were not enacted or negotiated with the purpose or intent to cover geoengineering activities, but according to legal experts and federal officials, several existing federal laws and international agreements could apply to geoengineering research and deployment, depending upon the type, location, and sponsor of the activity. Domestically, however, interviews with agency officials to date and our past work indicate that federal agencies have not yet assessed their statutory authority to regulate geoengineering activities, and those that have done so have identified regulatory gaps. Although some geoengineering approaches, such as geological sequestration of carbon dioxide in underground formations, would not involve international agreements because the activities and their effects would be confined to U.S. territory, other SRM and CDR approaches would. Our initial work indicates that parties to two international agreements have taken action to address geoengineering activities, but it is still uncertain whether and how other existing international agreements that legal experts have identified as potentially relevant could apply to geoengineering. The scientific and policy experts we spoke with largely echoed the same themes and issues that the legal experts raised. Interviews with scientific experts to date suggest that governance issues related to geoengineering research with the potential for transboundary impacts should be addressed in a transparent, international manner in consultation with the scientific community. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. | Why GAO Did This Study
Key scientific assessments have underscored the urgency of reducing emissions of carbon dioxide to help mitigate potentially negative effects of climate change; however, many countries with significant greenhouse gas emissions, including the United States, China, and India, have not committed to binding limits on emissions to date, and carbon dioxide levels continue to rise. Recently, some policymakers have raised questions about geoengineering--large-scale deliberate interventions in the earth's climate system to diminish climate change or its potential impacts--and its role in a broader strategy of mitigating and adapting to climate change. Most geoengineering proposals fall into two approaches: solar radiation management (SRM), which offset temperature increases by reflecting a small percentage of the sun's light back into space, and carbon dioxide removal (CDR), which address the root cause of climate change by removing carbon dioxide from the atmosphere. Today's testimony focuses on GAO's preliminary observations on (1) the state of the science regarding geoengineering approaches and their effects, (2) federal involvement in geoengineering activities, and (3) the views of experts and federal officials about the extent to which federal laws and international agreements apply to geoengineering. To address these issues, GAO reviewed scientific literature and interviewed federal officials and scientific and legal experts.
What GAO Found
Substantial uncertainties remain on the efficacy and potential environmental impacts of proposed geoengineering approaches, because geoengineering research and field experiments to date have been limited. GAO's review of relevant studies and interviews with experts to date found that relatively few modeling studies for SRM approaches have been published, and only limited small-scale testing--primarily of carbon storage activities relevant to CDR approaches--have been performed. Consequently, the experts GAO spoke with stated that a sustained effort of coordinated and cooperative research would be needed to determine whether proposed geoengineering approaches would be effective at a scale necessary to reduce temperatures and to attempt to anticipate and respond to potential unintended consequences--including the political, ethical, and economic issues surrounding the use of certain approaches. Specifically, just as the effects of climate change in general are expected to vary by region, so would the effects of certain large-scale geoengineering efforts, therefore, potentially creating relative winners and losers and thus sowing the seeds of future conflict. Federal agencies have funded some research and small demonstration projects of certain technologies related to proposed geoengineering approaches; but these efforts have been limited, fragmented, and not coordinated as part of a federal geoengineering strategy. Officials from interagency bodies coordinating the federal response to climate change stated that their offices (1) have not developed a coordinated research strategy, (2) do not have a position on geoengineering, and (3) do not believe is it necessary to coordinate efforts due to the limited federal investment to date. In the event that the federal government decides to expand geoengineering research, GAO's interviews with experts suggest that transparency and international cooperation are key factors for any geoengineering research that poses a risk of environmental impacts beyond our borders. Further, GAO's past work indicates that a comprehensive assessment of costs and benefits that includes all relevant risks and uncertainties is a key component in strategic planning for technology-based research. According to legal experts and federal agency officials, some existing federal laws and international agreements could apply to geoengineering research and deployment. However, some federal agencies have not yet assessed their authority to regulate geoengineering, and those that have done so have identified regulatory gaps. Although legal experts have identified some relevant international agreements and parties to two agreements have taken actions to address geoengineering, it is not certain whether and how other agreements would apply. Most scientific and legal experts GAO spoke with distinguished the governance of research from governance of deployment and noted that governance of geoengineering research with transboundary impacts, such as SRM approaches, should be addressed at the international level in a transparent manner and in consultation with the scientific community. However, the experts' views on the details of governance varied. |
gao_NSIAD-96-93 | gao_NSIAD-96-93_0 | This cost differential, when multiplied by the fiscal year 1995 training workload, shows that since fiscal year 1987, training costs have increased about $745 million more than normal inflation even though the training workload has decreased. Officials attributed the smaller reduction in military personnel funding mainly to increases in military pay and allowances for students and military personnel supporting formal training and education activities. Actions to Decrease the Training Infrastructure
Actions already implemented or planned for implementation by the services, DOD, and the BRAC over the next several years are expected to further reduce and streamline the training infrastructure for military personnel by reducing the number of locations at which a service teaches a particular course; increasing interservice training for similar curricula; increasing the number of private sector instructors, courses, and training facilities; and closing or realigning bases at which formal training is now provided. DOD estimated that ITRO’s recommended consolidations and collocations of training courses have resulted in approximately $300 million in savings. DOD estimates that full implementation of the recommendations for the functional areas would result in a one-time savings of about $2.4 million and annual recurring savings of about $680,000. BRAC Impacts on DOD Training Infrastructure
Since 1987, BRAC has recommended base closures and mission realignments that, when fully implemented, will reduce the number of locations where the services provide formal training for military personnel. We also recommend that the Secretary of Defense develop a long-range plan to guide and measure the services’ efforts to reduce the training infrastructure. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO reviewed the Department of Defense's (DOD) efforts to reduce its formal training infrastructure, focusing on: (1) the size of the active forces' formal training infrastructure; and (2) planned, completed, or ongoing plans to reduce this infrastructure.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) the formal military training and education cost per student increased about $4,200 between fiscal years (FY) 1987 and 1995; (2) despite a decrease in the training workload, training costs have increased about $745 million more than normal inflation between FY 1987 and 1995; (3) DOD officials reported that the main reason for the increase is the use of private-sector and civilian instructors; (4) planned or ongoing actions to reduce training infrastructure include reducing the number of locations at which a service teaches a particular course, increasing interservice training for similar curricula, increasing the number of private-sector instructors, courses, and training facilities, and closing or realigning bases that provide formal training; (5) DOD lacks an overall plan to guide and measure training infrastructure reduction (6) the number of locations that provide training decreased from 265 to 172 between FY 1987 and 1995; (7) DOD estimated that increases in interservice training have resulted in about $300 million in savings and that future course consolidations and collocations would result in one-time savings of about $4.4 million and annual recurring savings of about $7.28 million; and (8) despite expected base closures and mission realignments, DOD expects that excess training infrastructure will continue to exist. |
gao_GAO-12-993 | gao_GAO-12-993_0 | The CTAA program was designed to supplement other TAA programs by providing assistance specifically to trade-impacted communities. 1). EDA Awarded CTAA Grants Using Its Standard Grant Process but Reported Some Program- Specific Challenges
We found that EDA announced and reviewed CTAA grant applications using the standard process it uses for awarding other grants, with modifications related to CTAA program eligibility. Our file review and interviews with EDA regional offices show that EDA awarded the grants using the process outlined in the CTAA federal funding opportunity—the grant application announcement. First, officials highlighted the upfront effort required to set up the new program. 3). Outreach and technical assistance. EDA officials said that they awarded the CTAA grants in accordance with the review panel and selection process outlined in the federal funding opportunity. In our review of a sample of EDA grant files, we found no gaps in the regional offices’ collection of required progress and financial reports. Grantees with construction projects are required to report on certain EDA performance measures—such as the number of jobs created and retained—3, 6, and 9 years after the award. In 2013, those grantees will be required to report measures relating to jobs created, jobs retained, and level of new private investment. Consequently, EDA will not be able to determine the effectiveness of the program until then or later. CTAA Targeted Trade- Impacted Communities; Some May Not Have Qualified for Other EDA Programs, and Some May Have
Our review of how the CTAA program compared with other EDA grant programs shows that while the CTAA grants targeted trade-impacted communities, some grantees might have been eligible for other EDA grant programs. EDA officials identified two other programs that target economically distressed communities—EDA’s Economic Adjustment Assistance (EAA) and Public Works—which may have been able to provide assistance to CTAA communities. We found that EDA, through CTAA grants, assisted some trade-impacted communities that may not have qualified for EDA’s other community grant programs due to differences in eligibility and cost-share requirements. However, EDA officials also provided some specific examples of CTAA grantees that may have qualified for the EAA or Public Works programs. Although EDA officials credited the CTAA program with providing a funding stream to assist more communities, some officials suggested that funding for trade- impacted communities could have been designated within, and similar services could have been delivered through, EDA’s existing programs, for the following reasons:
CTAA communities met the primary eligibility requirements. As noted above, the administration proposed to discontinue the CTAA program in 2012, contending that EDA could provide similar assistance to communities at a lower cost through its EAA program (see table 4 for more on the funding of these programs). Congress responded by repealing the CTAA program in 2012. Agency Comments
We provided a draft of this report to the Department of Commerce for comment. In its comments, Commerce concurred with this report and provided additional information clarifying that the outcomes of the CTAA grants may not be known until 2019, when the final nine-year reports on impact will be provided by the grantees. Commerce also provided further information on planned improvements to EDA’s performance measures. We selected a nonprobability sample of 12 grant recipients for a file review. To identify the mechanisms that EDA established to monitor the grants and evaluate their effectiveness, we reviewed program information, agency documentation, and data on the status of the grants. To determine how the CTAA program compared with other EDA community grant programs, we obtained agency information on the goals, eligibility, activities, and targeted recipients of the CTAA program and other EDA community grant programs. EDA provides funding to 11 Trade Adjustment Assistance Centers. The Economic Development Administration awards grants to communities. | Why GAO Did This Study
Congress established the CTAA program in February 2009 through the Trade and Globalization Adjustment Assistance Act (TGAAA), passed as part of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act. The CTAA program was designed to supplement other Trade Adjustment Assistance programs by providing assistance through grants to trade-impacted communities to help them become more competitive in the global economy. In 2010, EDA awarded $36.8 million in CTAA grants to 36 communities. The administration proposed to discontinue the program, contending that EDA could provide similar assistance to communities at a lower cost through its EAA program. Congress responded by repealing the CTAA program in 2012.
TGAAA mandated that GAO review the operation and effectiveness of Trade Adjustment Assistance programs. This is one of several reports responding to that mandate. For this report, GAO determined (1) how EDA made grant award decisions, (2) what mechanisms EDA established to monitor the grants and evaluate their effectiveness, and (3) how the CTAA program compared with other EDA community grant programs. GAO reviewed agency documents, conducted a file review, and interviewed EDA officials.
What GAO Found
The Department of Commerce's Economic Development Administration (EDA) used its standard grant award process to announce, receive, and review applications for the Community Trade Adjustment Assistance (CTAA) program, with modifications related to program eligibility. To comply with legislative requirements, EDA reached out to eligible communities by identifying those with workers or firms already certified as trade impacted by other trade adjustment assistance programs. EDA awarded the grants in accordance with the review and selection process outlined in the CTAA federal funding opportunity--the program's grant application announcement. More than half of the grants were for construction projects, such as building roads and installing broadband fiber for industrial parks. Although EDA was able to adapt standard procedures already in place for its other grant programs, EDA officials cited some CTAA-specific challenges: first, the effort required to set up the new program for CTAA grants; second, a relatively limited time for the outreach and application process; and third, the development of a list of eligible communities for outreach, which proved to be a complex undertaking.
EDA regional staff said that they monitor the grants using tools such as periodic progress and financial reports. GAO's review of a nonprobability sample of 12 of the 36 CTAA grant files found no gaps in the regional offices' collection of required reports. Many of the projects will not be completed until after 2013, but grantees with construction projects are required to report on certain EDA performance measures 3, 6, and 9 years after the award. Thus, in 2013, those grantees will be required to report measures relating to jobs created, jobs retained, and level of new private investment. The grantees will submit final nineyear project reports in 2019 that will help the agency determine whether the projects met their goals.
GAO's review of how the CTAA program compared with other EDA grant programs shows that although the CTAA grants targeted trade-impacted communities, some grantees might have been eligible for other EDA grant programs. EDA officials identified two other programs that target economically distressed communities--EDA's Economic Adjustment Assistance (EAA) and Public Works programs--that may have been able to provide assistance to CTAA communities. GAO found that, through CTAA grants, EDA assisted some trade-impacted communities that may not have qualified for EDA's other community grant programs due to differences in eligibility and cost-share requirements. However, EDA officials provided some specific examples of CTAA grantees that may have qualified for the EAA or Public Works programs. Although officials credited the CTAA program with providing additional funding to assist more communities, some officials suggested that funding for tradeimpacted communities could have been designated within, and similar services could have been delivered through, EDA's existing programs.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is not making recommendations in this report. Commerce concurred with GAO's findings and provided additional information on grantee performance reports and planned improvements to performance measures. |
gao_GAO-15-705 | gao_GAO-15-705_0 | NHTSA’s guideline on state motor vehicle inspection programs, included in its Uniform Guidelines for State Highway Safety Programs, recommends that states should have a program for periodic inspection of all registered vehicles to reduce the number of vehicles with existing or potential conditions that may contribute to crashes or increase the severity of crashes that do occur, and should require the owner to correct such conditions. Impact of Safety Inspections on Vehicle Safety Is Unclear as Benefits and Costs Are Difficult to Quantify
Officials in States with Vehicle Safety Inspection Programs Said Their Programs Enhance Vehicle Safety
According to officials in 15 states with existing vehicle safety inspection programs whom we interviewed, these programs help improve the condition of vehicles; these officials point to data on the number of failed inspections as evidence of the safety benefit of these programs. For example, Pennsylvania officials provided 2014 data showing that more than 529,000 vehicles (about 20 percent of the state’s 2.7-million registered vehicles) underwent repairs in order to pass inspection after initially failing. However, this analysis does not provide sufficient In both cases, crashes involving evidence to conclude that inspection programs did not have an effect on crash rates because additional factors—such as implementation or increased enforcement of traffic safety laws—could influence crash rates. State Challenges Include Oversight and Paper-Based Data Systems
Officials in the 15 states we spoke with primarily cited oversight and paper-based data systems as challenges they have faced when operating their vehicle safety inspection programs. Eleven of 15 states cited oversight efforts as a challenge. Literature that we reviewed and other stakeholders whom we interviewed, including representatives from safety groups, vehicle manufacturer industry groups, and DOT officials, also cited challenges that states face in operating their programs. Some states have taken action to address their challenges, including implementing more stringent program rules, preparing manpower studies, and developing electronic database systems. NHTSA Could Improve Communications with States
Officials in all 15 states with inspection programs that we spoke with told us that additional guidance and information from NHTSA would help in operating their programs. The example most frequently cited by state officials was light-emitting diode (LED) brake lights. State officials in eight states with safety programs we interviewed also said that additional information from NHTSA on new safety technologies required by the agency’s safety standards for vehicle manufacturers would help them in operating their inspection programs. These state officials told us they generally track new vehicle safety standards implemented by NHTSA, but it is not always clear to program officials whether or how new standards might be incorporated into their inspection programs. According to NHTSA officials, there are no NHTSA staff designated to answer questions related to state inspection programs or disseminate relevant information to program officials because agency resources are currently focused on areas that have a greater impact on crash rates, such as driver behavior. With no recent federal guidance, state officials have implemented different criteria or chosen not to include new technologies in their inspection programs, potentially reducing the safety benefits of their inspection program. NHTSA’s decision to not devote significant resources to state vehicle inspection programs is consistent with research showing that vehicle component failures are a relatively minor contributor to traffic crashes. Recommendation
To improve assistance to states in regard to the periodic motor vehicle inspection guideline, the Secretary of Transportation should direct the Administrator of NHTSA to establish and maintain a communication channel with states to convey relevant information related to vehicle inspections and respond to questions from state safety inspection program officials. This report assesses: 1) what is known about the safety benefits and costs of operating state vehicle safety inspection programs, 2) any challenges states have faced in operating these programs, and 3) any actions NHTSA could take to assist states with these programs. To identify what is known about the costs and safety benefits of state vehicle inspection programs, we conducted a literature search for studies that analyzed relationships between safety inspections and outcomes, such as crash rates, vehicle component failures, and vehicle fleet age. We analyzed this data to determine the estimated number of total crashes with vehicle factors nationwide as well as the specific vehicle component failures that were reported, such as issues with brakes, tires, and steering. To determine challenges states faced in operating their inspection programs and what actions, if any, NHTSA could take to assist states with their vehicle safety inspection programs, we reviewed federal and state policy and program documents related to inspection programs. We also interviewed state officials in five of six jurisdictions (four states and the District of Columbia) that eliminated their programs since 1990. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 2013, an estimated 5.7-million vehicle crashes resulted in approximately 32,700 fatalities and over 2.3-million injuries. One of NHTSA's guidelines to help states optimize the effectiveness of highway safety programs recommends that each state have a program to periodically inspect all registered vehicles to reduce the number of vehicles with conditions that may contribute to crashes or increase the severity of crashes.
GAO was asked to review these state programs and NHTSA's assistance to states. This report assesses: 1) what is known about the safety benefits and costs of operating state vehicle safety inspection programs, 2) challenges that states have faced in operating these programs, and 3) actions NHTSA could take to assist states with these programs. GAO analyzed NHTSA 2009—2013 data and state data for crash trends related to vehicle component failure; reviewed studies that analyzed relationships between safety inspections and outcomes; and interviewed officials in 15 states that have inspection programs. GAO also interviewed officials in 5 states that eliminated their programs since 1990, NHTSA officials, and representatives from safety groups and automotive industry groups.
What GAO Found
According to officials GAO interviewed from 15 state vehicle safety inspection programs, these programs enhance vehicle safety; however, the benefits and costs of such programs are difficult to quantify. State officials told GAO that inspections help identify vehicles with safety problems and result in repair or removal of unsafe vehicles from the roads. For example, Pennsylvania state data show that in 2014, more than 529,000 vehicles (about 20 percent of vehicles in the state) failed inspection and then underwent repairs to pass. Nationwide, however, estimates derived from data collected by the Department of Transportation's (DOT) National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) show that vehicle component failure is a factor in about 2 to 7 percent of crashes. Given this relatively small percentage as well as other factors—such as implementation or increased enforcement of state traffic safety laws—that could influence crash rates, it is difficult to determine the effect of inspection programs based on crash data. Studies GAO reviewed and GAO's analysis of state data examined the effect of inspection programs on crash rates related to vehicle component failure, but showed no clear influence. Finally, many states do not directly track the costs of operating safety inspection programs because costs may be comingled with other inspection programs, such as emissions.
State safety inspection program officials GAO interviewed primarily cited the oversight of inspection activities and paper-based data systems as challenges they have faced in operating vehicle safety inspection programs. For example, officials in 11 of the 15 states with programs GAO interviewed cited oversight efforts as a challenge, including ensuring that private inspection stations were conducting inspections consistent with program requirements, and officials in 4 of the 15 states also said that paper-based data systems can hinder oversight efforts. To address challenges, some states have taken actions such as implementing more stringent program rules and exploring the development of electronic data systems. Other states have eliminated their inspection programs altogether.
Program officials in all 15 states said that additional information from NHTSA—for example, information related to new vehicle safety technologies—would help in operating their programs. However, there is no designated channel for communication between NHTSA and program officials. Several state officials noted that they would like more information on new technologies such as light-emitting diode (LED) brake lights. State officials also said that it is not clear whether or how to inspect new safety technologies, such as tire pressure monitoring systems, required by NHTSA for new vehicles. Without information, states have implemented different inspection pass-fail criteria or chosen not to include new technologies in their inspections, potentially reducing the safety benefit of their programs. NHTSA officials told GAO they have adopted a hands-off approach to state vehicle inspection programs because the agency devotes its resources primarily to areas that contribute more heavily to crashes, such as driver behavior. However, consistent with NHTSA's mission to assist states in implementing traffic safety programs, improving communication with state officials on vehicle safety issues could help these officials in operating their inspection programs.
What GAO Recommends
DOT should establish a communication channel with states to convey relevant information to state safety inspection officials and respond to their questions. DOT officials reviewed this report and agreed with GAO's recommendation. |
gao_GAO-13-776 | gao_GAO-13-776_0 | FISMA requires each agency to develop, document, and implement an information security program that includes the following components: periodic assessments of the risk and magnitude of harm that could result from the unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification, or destruction of information or information systems; policies and procedures that (1) are based on risk assessments, (2) cost-effectively reduce information security risks to an acceptable level, (3) ensure that information security is addressed throughout the life cycle of each system, and (4) ensure compliance with applicable requirements; subordinate plans for providing adequate information security for networks, facilities, and systems or group of information systems, as appropriate; security awareness training to inform personnel of information security risks and of their responsibilities in complying with agency policies and procedures, as well as training personnel with significant security responsibilities for information security; periodic testing and evaluation of the effectiveness of information security policies, procedures, and practices, to be performed with a frequency depending on risk, but no less than annually, and that includes testing of management, operational, and technical controls for every system identified in the agency’s required inventory of major information systems; a process for planning, implementing, evaluating, and documenting remedial action to address any deficiencies in the information security policies, procedures, and practices of the agency; procedures for detecting, reporting, and responding to security plans and procedures to ensure continuity of operations for information systems that support the operations and assets of the agency. The act also requires each agency inspector general, or other independent auditor, to annually evaluate and report on the information security program and practices of the agency. OMB’s responsibilities include developing and overseeing the implementation of policies, principles, standards, and guidelines on information security in federal agencies (except with regard to national security systems). Mixed Progress Has Been Made in Implementing Many FISMA Requirements, but Weaknesses Continue in Agencies’ Security Programs
In fiscal year 2012, agencies and their inspectors general reported mixed progress from fiscal year 2011 in implementing many of the requirements for establishing an entity-wide information security program. In addition, OMB and DHS continued to develop reporting metrics and assist agencies in improving their information security programs; however, the metrics do not evaluate all FISMA requirements, focused mainly on compliance rather than effectiveness of controls, and in many cases did not identify specific performance targets for determining levels of implementation. For example, in fiscal year 2012, 20 of 24 agencies had weaknesses in periodically assessing and validating risks. To illustrate, most major federal agencies had weaknesses in the following information system controls:
Access controls: In fiscal year 2012, almost all (23 of 24) of the major federal agencies had weaknesses in the controls that are intended to limit or detect access to computer resources (data, programs, equipment, and facilities), thereby protecting them against unauthorized modification, loss, and disclosure. Although the number of agencies implementing specialized training programs increased, 16 of 24 inspectors general identified weaknesses with such programs in fiscal year 2012. According to OMB instructions for FISMA reporting, the DHS metrics for inspectors general were also designed to measure the effectiveness of agencies’ information security programs, and OMB relied on responses by inspectors general to these metrics to gauge the effectiveness of information security programs. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix III. We reviewed and analyzed the provisions of the act to identify agency, Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) responsibilities for implementing, overseeing, and providing guidance for agency information security to evaluate federal agencies’ implementation of FISMA requirements. | Why GAO Did This Study
FISMA requires the Comptroller General to periodically report to Congress on agency implementation of the act's provisions. To this end, this report summarizes GAO's evaluation of the extent to which agencies have implemented the requirements of FISMA, including the adequacy and effectiveness of agency information security policies and practices. To do this, GAO analyzed its previous information security reports, annual FISMA reports and other reports from the 24 major federal agencies, reports from inspectors general, and OMB's annual reports to Congress on FISMA implementation. GAO also interviewed agency officials at OMB, DHS, NIST, and 6 agencies selected using the total number of systems the agencies reported in fiscal year 2011.
What GAO Found
In fiscal year 2012, 24 major federal agencies had established many of the components of an information security program required by The Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002 (FISMA); however, they had partially established others. FISMA requires each federal agency to establish an information security program that incorporates eight key components, and each agency inspector general to annually evaluate and report on the information security program and practices of the agency. The act also requires the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to develop and oversee the implementation of policies, principles, standards, and guidelines on information security in federal agencies and the National Institute of Standards and Technology to develop security standards and guidelines.
The extent to which agencies implemented security program components showed mixed progress from fiscal year 2011 to fiscal year 2012. For example, according to inspectors general reports, the number of agencies that had analyzed, validated, and documented security incidents increased from 16 to 19, while the number able to track identified weaknesses declined from 20 to 15. GAO and inspectors general continue to identify weaknesses in elements of agencies' programs, such as the implementation of specific security controls. For instance, in fiscal year 2012, almost all (23 of 24) of the major federal agencies had weaknesses in the controls that are intended to limit or detect access to computer resources.
OMB and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) continued to develop reporting metrics and assist agencies in improving their information security programs; however, the metrics do not evaluate all FISMA requirements, such as conducting risk assessments and developing security plans; are focused mainly on compliance rather than effectiveness of controls; and in many cases did not identify specific performance targets for determining levels of implementation. Enhancements to these metrics would provide additional insight into agency information security programs. |
gao_GAO-02-765T | gao_GAO-02-765T_0 | Amendments to the act in 1987 directed DOE to investigate only the Yucca Mountain site. The contractor develops and maintains the baseline, but senior DOE managers must approve significant changes to cost or schedule estimates. DOE Will Not Be Ready to Submit a License Application within the Statutory Time Frame
DOE is not prepared to submit an acceptable license application to NRC within the statutory limits that would take effect if the site were approved. Essentially the Same Information Is Needed for a Site Recommendation and a License Application
Under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, DOE’s site characterization activities are to provide information necessary to evaluate the Yucca Mountain site’s suitability for submitting a license application to NRC for placing a repository at the site. In implementing the act, DOE’s guidelines provide that the site will be suitable as a waste repository if the site is likely to meet the radiation protection standards that NRC would use to reach a licensing decision on the proposed repository. Bechtel anticipates a 5-year period of construction between the receipt of a construction authorization from NRC and the opening of the repository. | What GAO Found
The Department of Energy (DOE) has been investigating Yucca Mountain, Nevada, as a possible repository for highly radioactive nuclear waste. In February, the Secretary of Energy endorsed the Yucca Mountain site, and the President recommended that Congress approve the site. If the site is approved, DOE must apply to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) for authorization to build a repository. If the site is not approved for a license application, or if NRC denies a construction license, the administration and Congress will have to consider other options. GAO concludes that DOE is unprepared to submit an acceptable license application to NRC within the statutory deadlines if the site is approved. On the basis of a reassessment done by DOE's managing contractor in September 2001, GAO believes that DOE would not have enough time to obtain a license from NRC and build and open the repository by 2010. DOE lacks a reliable estimate of when, and at what cost, a license application can be submitted or a repository can be opened. |
gao_GAO-10-816 | gao_GAO-10-816_0 | In the case of sludge, the material is immobilized through vitrification—a process that stabilizes waste by mixing it with molten glass and then pouring it into large metal canisters where it hardens—at the Savannah River Site’s Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF), which has operated since March 1996. Based on Current Cost Estimates and Schedule, Closing the Savannah River Site’s Tanks Is Likely to Cost More and Take Longer Than Originally Estimated
Emptying, cleaning, and permanently closing the 22 underground liquid radioactive waste tanks at the Savannah River Site that lack secondary containment is likely to cost significantly more and take longer than estimated in the December 2008 contract between DOE and SRR. Specifically, SRR notified DOE in June 2009 that the total cost to close the 22 tanks had increased by slightly more than $1.4 billion from $3.2 billion as estimated in the December 2008 contract to about $4.6 billion. In addition, closing the tanks may take longer than originally estimated because of persistent delays constructing SWPF—a facility vital to successful tank closure because it will treat a large portion of the waste removed from the tanks. Although DOE is exploring ways to mitigate the effects of SWPF construction delays by deploying new technologies to treat additional quantities of waste, DOE officials told us that additional research and development on these technologies is still required and that it would be several years before these new technologies could be deployed. Our review indicates that much of this increase is because the cost estimate in DOE’s 2007 request for proposals that formed the basis of the December 2008 contract was not accurate or comprehensive. In addition, DOE did not account for the more than $600 million in pension costs that were needed to make up for significant losses suffered by the Savannah River Site workers’ defined-benefit pension plans as a result of the economic crisis that began in 2007. In addition, on-time completion of the SWPF may be in question because the facility’s construction schedule does not fully meet GAO-identified best scheduling practices. Although these officials also identified steps the department is taking to ensure these challenges are met, several factors raise concerns about whether DOE will be able to resolve them. Moreover, although most experts we spoke with were generally confident of DOE’s ability to successfully overcome these challenges, some of them identified additional concerns about DOE’s ability to successfully close the underground tanks. DOE Is Taking Steps to Overcome the Primary Challenges That Could Impede Savannah River Site Tank Closure, but Concerns Remain About Its Ability to Resolve Them
According to DOE officials, there are three primary challenges to successfully closing the liquid radioactive waste tanks at the Savannah River Site: (1) on-time construction and successful operation of SWPF; (2) increasing the amount and speed at which high-level radioactive waste is vitrified at DWPF; and (3) successfully implementing an enhanced chemical cleaning process for the underground tanks. SRR is relying on a new chemical cleaning process to accelerate tank cleaning with minimal creation of additional waste that must be treated. Conclusions
The potential for significant cost increases and the possibility of accomplishing one-third fewer tank closures by 2017 than agreed to under the December 2008 contract between DOE and SRR raises concerns about the department’s ability to successfully close the 22 underground liquid radioactive waste tanks that lack secondary containment at the Savannah River Site within DOE’s cost and schedule goals. However, we share the experts’ concerns that DOE has not engaged in sufficient planning in the event that the department’s chosen waste removal, treatment, and tank closure strategies are unsuccessful. Furthermore, it is important to note that construction delays have already occurred and SRR already estimates that between 2 and 7 fewer tanks than originally planned will be closed by 2017. However, DOE disagreed with our recommendation to revise DOE contract management guidance to ensure it includes provisions that detail how contract cost increases should be requested by a contractor. In particular, both of our assessments found that the schedule had problems with excess float time, which indicates that the schedule’s activities are not sequenced logically. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To determine the current costs and schedule for closing the tanks at the Savannah River Site and the extent to which the Department of Energy (DOE) established these using best practices, we analyzed cost and schedule documents such as DOE’s June 2007 tank closure cost estimate, the December 2008 tank closure contract between DOE and Savannah River Remediation, LLC (SRR), SRR’s contract performance baseline, and tank closure cost increase proposals. To determine the extent to which DOE established the tank closure schedule using best practices, we reviewed the construction schedule for the Salt Waste Processing Facility (SWPF), a facility that will be used to treat a majority of the tank waste. | Why GAO Did This Study
Decades of nuclear materials production at the Department of Energy's (DOE) Savannah River Site in South Carolina have left 37 million gallons of radioactive liquid waste in 49 underground storage tanks. In December 2008, DOE entered into a contract with Savannah River Remediation, LLC (SRR) to close, by 2017, 22 of the highest-risk tanks at a cost of $3.2 billion. GAO was asked to assess: (1) DOE's cost estimates and schedule for closing the tanks at the Savannah River Site, and (2) the primary challenges, if any, to closing the tanks and the steps DOE has taken to address them. GAO visited the Savannah River Site and reviewed tank closure documents, as well as conducted an analysis of the construction schedule of the Salt Waste Processing Facility (SWPF), which is a facility vital to successful tank closure because it will treat a large portion of the waste removed from the tanks.
What GAO Found
Emptying, cleaning, and permanently closing the 22 underground liquid radioactive waste tanks at the Savannah River Site is likely to cost significantly more and take longer than estimated in the December 2008 contract between DOE and SRR. Originally estimated to cost $3.2 billion, SRR notified DOE in June 2010 that the total cost to close the 22 tanks had increased by more than $1.4 billion or 44 percent. Much of this increase is because DOE's cost estimate in the September 2007 request for proposals that formed the basis of the December 2008 contract between DOE and SRR was not accurate or comprehensive. For example, DOE underestimated the costs of labor and fringe benefits. DOE also omitted certain other costs related to equipment and services needed to support tank closure activities. Moreover, more than $600 million of this increase is due to increased funding needed to make up for significant losses suffered by Savannah River Site workers' pension plans as a result of the recent economic crisis. Closing the tanks may also take longer than originally estimated because of persistent delays and shortcomings in the construction schedule for SWPF. According to SRR, construction delays that have already occurred will result in between 2 and 7 fewer tanks being closed by 2017 than agreed to in the contract. Furthermore, the SWPF construction schedule does not fully meet GAO-identified best scheduling practices. For example, the schedule had problems with excess float time between activities, indicating that the schedule's activities may not be sequenced logically. DOE is exploring ways to mitigate the effects of construction delays by deploying new technologies to treat radioactive waste. However, additional research and development on these new technologies is still required and, therefore, it will be several years before they are deployed. DOE officials identified three primary challenges to closing the liquid radioactive waste tanks at the Savannah River Site: (1) on-time construction and successful operation of SWPF; (2) increasing the amount and speed at which radioactive waste is processed at the Savannah River Site's Defense Waste Processing Facility, which prepares the waste for permanent disposal by mixing it with molten glass and then pouring it into large metal canisters where it hardens; and (3)successful implementation of an enhanced chemical cleaning process that will remove residual waste from the tanks with minimal creation of additional waste that must be treated. DOE officials identified steps the department is taking to ensure these challenges are met. However, several factors raise concerns about whether DOE will be able to resolve them. For example, the enhanced chemical cleaning process that is a cornerstone of SRR's ability to close tanks on time has never been used in liquid radioactive waste tanks and, according to SRR officials, DOE has not consistently funded additional research and development on the technology. Most experts GAO spoke with were generally confident of DOE's ability to successfully overcome these challenges, although some of them identified additional concerns. For example, some experts suggested that DOE has not engaged in sufficient contingency planning in the event that the department's chosen waste removal, treatment, and tank closure strategies are unsuccessful.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is making five recommendations to DOE to, among other things, clarify how cost increases should be requested by a contractor, as well as reviewed and approved by DOE and to ensure the SWPF construction schedule conforms to best practices. Although DOE generally agreed with two of our recommendations, they disagreed on the necessity of additional clarity on how cost increases should be requested by a contractor and that the SWPF construction schedule did not conform to best practices. We continue to believe our recommendations are valid. |
gao_GAO-03-503 | gao_GAO-03-503_0 | BLM is responsible for administering more public lands than any other federal agency, with a budget of approximately $1.7 billion and 10,900 employees. Forest Service Has Made Little Progress in Resolving Known Performance Accountability Problems, unlike Other Federal Land Management Agencies
The Forest Service has made little progress in resolving previously identified performance accountability problems and remains years away from implementing a credible performance accountability system. The agency is developing or has implemented two systems that should be important components of a performance accountability system—a budget formulation and execution system and a work-planning system—but neither was originally designed to be part of a performance accountability system, nor has the Forest Service developed the clear linkages needed between these new systems and its strategic goal-setting and results-reporting functions. The Forest Service Continues to Study Performance Accountability
To understand how other agencies have established clear linkages among key components of a performance accountability system, the Forest Service initiated a benchmarking study of other agencies’ performance accountability systems in March 2002, including USDA’s NRCS and Interior’s BLM and National Park Service. Forest Service Has Developed Two Systems That Should Be Part of a Performance Accountability System, but It Has Not Established Clear Linkages between These Systems and Its Strategic Goals and Performance Results
The Forest Service began considering new budget and work-planning systems in April 2000 and August 2001, respectively, long before the Chief emphasized his intention to “get started” on performance accountability in July 2002. Without these linkages, the agency will not be able to report in an integrated, results- oriented way on what activities it completed, how much they cost, and what they accomplished—key elements of any effective performance accountability system. Both NRCS and BLM believe that their accountability systems have produced multiple benefits. Forest Service’s Inability to Address Organizational, Cultural, and Leadership Challenges Continues to Impede Its Progress on Performance Accountability
Three key challenges continue to keep the Forest Service from resolving its performance accountability problems: (1) establishing clear authority and responsibility within the current organizational structure, (2) making and implementing decisions in an agency culture that relies on consensus, and (3) establishing sufficient leadership emphasis and making performance accountability a higher priority. Organizationally, several senior executives have been assigned responsibilities for components of performance accountability, but none of them has overall responsibility and authority for ensuring that these components are properly linked or that the agency achieves performance accountability. At times, this approach slows the agency’s ability to make progress on important issues. The Forest Service has been unable to develop and implement a performance accountability system, largely because it cannot agree on an integrated approach. The executive steering team’s current effort to study available options for a performance accountability system is an indication that the draft plan for implementing such a system does not have broad support throughout the agency. Unlike other land management agencies that have developed and implemented performance accountability systems within the last 3 years, the Forest Service has yet to come to this commitment on its own. We also reviewed reports, planning documents, USDA OIG audits, and other documents on past performance accountability problems in the Forest Service and on the status of the development and implementation of the agency’s efforts to improve its planning, budgeting, performance measurement, and accomplishment reporting processes. Forest Service: Actions Needed for the Agency to Become More Accountable for Its Performance. | Why GAO Did This Study
Historically, the Forest Service has not been able to provide Congress or the public with a clear understanding of what the Forest Service's 30,000 employees accomplish with the approximately $5 billion the agency receives every year. Since 1990, GAO has reported 7 times on performance accountability weaknesses at the Forest Service, including its inability to systematically link planning, budgeting, and results reporting. This report reviews the recent progress the Forest Service has made in resolving previously identified performance accountability problems and identifies key challenges the Forest Service must overcome to resolve these problems.
What GAO Found
The Forest Service has made little real progress in resolving its long-standing performance accountability problems and, based on the status of its current efforts, remains years away from implementing a credible performance accountability system. Since June 2000, when we last reported on performance accountability at the Forest Service, the agency has continued to study the issue but has made little real progress. For example, in March 2002, the agency initiated a study of how several other federal agencies implemented their performance accountability systems and, by September 2002, had devised a draft plan for implementing a system of its own. However, broad support within the agency for implementing this plan could not be achieved, and an executive steering team was recently established to restudy the issue. While the agency continues to study and restudy the issue, opportunities to establish key linkages among components of a performance accountability system have been missed. For example, in April 2000, the agency began considering a new budget system and, in August 2001, a new work-plan system--two critical components that should be part of a performance accountability system. However, the Forest Service has yet to develop clear linkages between these new systems and its strategic goals and performance results. Without these linkages, the agency will be unable to report in an integrated, results-oriented way on what activities it completed, how much they cost, and what they accomplished--key elements of an effective performance accountability system. While we recognize that developing a performance accountability system is a complex, time-consuming process, other federal agencies with land management responsibilities have developed and implemented performance accountability systems and believe that their systems have produced multiple benefits. The Forest Service faces three key challenges that it must meet if it is to make more progress. First, the agency needs to establish clear lines of authority and responsibility for developing and implementing a performance accountability system. Currently, various senior executives have responsibilities for components of performance accountability; however, no one has overall responsibility and authority for ensuring these components are developed and properly linked. Second, the Forest Service needs to address its culture of consensus decision-making, which has made it difficult for the Forest Service to agree on how to develop and implement an integrated performance accountability system. Third, top agency leadership needs to give sufficient emphasis and priority to establishing a performance accountability system. The agency is currently giving greater emphasis to other priorities, like financial accountability. GAO recognizes the importance of, and need for, addressing the Forest Service's long-standing financial accountability problems, but believes more can and should be done to address the agency's performance accountability problems so that both performance and financial accountability can work in concert to assess and, ultimately, to improve the agency's overall performance. |
gao_GAO-06-594 | gao_GAO-06-594_0 | In recent years, NOAA has experienced problems in acquiring goods and services. NOAA Lacks Oversight of Some Field Acquisition Activities
Although NOAA has taken some actions, the agency has yet to structure all of its field acquisition activities under the appropriate oversight of its acquisition organization, increasing the risk that taxpayers are not getting best value for their dollars. Our work has shown that a well-functioning acquisition organization has direct lines of oversight between the head of acquisition and various components of the organization to help enforce acquisition policies that enable the agency to get the best value on goods and services. NOAA is missing key elements that promote successful outcomes because it must adhere to Commerce’s acquisition policies that do not promote a knowledge-based approach to acquiring complex developmental systems. NOAA Has Taken Limited Actions to Address Contracting Workforce Retirement Challenges
NOAA is facing a human capital challenge because of its aging contracting workforce, and senior acquisition managers are concerned about the loss of a high percentage of their contracting staff to retirement and other attrition. However, NOAA has yet to focus on succession planning and management for its contracting workforce, even though the agency has approval to use flexible direct hire authority in anticipation of an impending wave of retirements. Moreover, NOAA reported in January 2006 that about 43 percent of its contracting employees are already eligible to retire or will become eligible to retire between now and fiscal year 2009. However, it is too early to determine if this Commerce-wide plan will determine the gaps in numbers and skills in the contracting workforce to achieve mission-critical work and develop strategies to address these gaps. Unless the future retirement and workforce capacity challenges are strategically addressed, NOAA could soon lose a significant portion of its contracting knowledge base. NOAA can improve oversight of its field acquisition operations by requiring direct reporting of all of its acquisition offices and developing an oversight process for collateral duty contracting officers; adopting a knowledge-based acquisition process to help ensure that complex developmental systems meet cost, schedule, and performance targets; and addressing the imminent retirements of its contracting workforce to ensure it has a solid knowledge base to carry out its acquisition function. To provide appropriate oversight of NOAA’s field acquisition operations, we recommend that the Under Secretary of Commerce for Oceans and Atmosphere take the following two actions: take steps to ensure that NOAA’s Director of Acquisition and Grants has direct authority over all acquisition entities within the agency by realigning the National Data Buoy Center’s Acquisition Office to report directly to NOAA’s acquisition director and provide for regular monitoring of collateral duty contracting officers in field offices to help ensure they are accountable to senior acquisition officials for their contracting work. To determine if NOAA has established clear and consistent acquisition policies and processes that promote, among other things, a knowledge- based acquisition approach for development and production of complex systems, we reviewed acquisition policies, processes, and guidelines. Finally, to determine the extent to which NOAA has planned and managed its contracting workforce to address future retirement challenges, we interviewed NOAA and Commerce officials responsible for contracting workforce and strategic human capital planning. | Why GAO Did This Study
The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) accounts for about half of the Department of Commerce's (Commerce) acquisition spending, over $851 million in fiscal year 2005 alone. In recent years however, NOAA has experienced instances of poor contract management. GAO was asked to determine if NOAA is positioned to effectively carry out its acquisition function. Specifically, GAO assessed the extent to which NOAA has structured an acquisition organization that provides appropriate oversight; established policies and processes that promote, among other things, a knowledge-based acquisition process for development and production of complex systems; and planned and managed its contracting workforce to address future retirement challenges.
What GAO Found
NOAA has yet to structure all of its field acquisition activities under the direct oversight of its acquisition organization, increasing the risk that taxpayers are not getting the best value for their dollars. To improve oversight of its acquisition function, NOAA reorganized in 2005 by having all acquisition divisions report to the NOAA Director of Acquisition and Grants. However, NOAA's acquisition director still lacks direct line authority to oversee a National Weather Service field office that is responsible for one of the agency's contracts worth up to half a billion dollars. Also, without appropriate oversight from the acquisition organization, collateral duty field staff who are not career contracting officers have bought millions of dollars in goods and services. Our work has shown that a well-functioning acquisition organization has direct lines of oversight between the head of acquisition and various components to help enforce policies that enable efficient and effective contract spending. Although NOAA has established clear and consistent policies for some key areas, such as advance acquisition planning, the agency lacks a knowledge-based process for developing and producing complex systems--a situation that can increase the risk of cost increases and schedule delays. NOAA is missing key elements that promote successful outcomes for complex developmental systems because it must adhere to Commerce's acquisition policies that do not support a knowledge-based approach. Without such an approach, the multibillion-dollar satellite investment that NOAA is in the early stages of acquiring is at a higher risk of not meeting program requirements. NOAA has yet to focus on succession planning and management for its contracting workforce, although the agency is pursuing hiring flexibilities to recruit new contracting employees in anticipation of an impending wave of retirements. NOAA is facing a human capital challenge because of its aging contracting workforce and has reported that about 43 percent of contracting employees are now eligible to retire or will be eligible to retire by 2009. While senior acquisition managers are concerned with the loss of a high percentage of their contracting staff to retirement and other attrition, NOAA has not specifically addressed such contracting workforce challenges in its strategic human capital plan. Also, it is unclear whether human capital planning under way by Commerce will determine the gaps in numbers and skills in the contracting workforce. Unless the future retirement and workforce capacity challenges are strategically addressed, NOAA could soon lose a significant portion of its contracting knowledge base. |
gao_NSIAD-99-31 | gao_NSIAD-99-31_0 | The number of these facilities has been reduced and the size of their workloads and staffs have declined significantly. It also looks for ways to consolidate and create more effective use of indirect and overhead personnel assigned to Army industrial activities. Accordingly, this report focuses on (1) whether the Army had a sound basis for personnel reductions planned at its depots during a 2-year period ending in fiscal year 1999; (2) progress the Army has made in developing an automated system for making depot staffing decisions based on workload estimates; (3) other factors that may adversely impact the Army’s ability to improve the cost-effectiveness of its depot maintenance programs and operations; and (4) workload trends, staffing, and productivity issues at the Army’s manufacturing arsenals. Of the 281 personnel separating with incentives from the Corpus Christi depot, 147 were classified as direct labor and 134 as overhead personnel. Automated System for Identifying Requirements Could Soon Be Certified Operational, but Some Development Work Remains
Army efforts to develop AWPS have proceeded to the point that required certification to the Congress of its operational capability is expected soon. Movement Toward Greater Reliance on the Private Sector
The Arsenal Act (10 U.S.C. In this context, recent experiences at the Army’s maintenance depots and arsenals indicate that the Army is facing multiple, difficult challenges and uncertainties in determining staffing requirements, and in improving the efficiency and effectiveness of its industrial activities. The Army has inadequate long-range plans to deal with issues such as those currently affecting the Army’s industrial facilities. Among the key actions that DOD identified are: a study to assess the Army’s overall maintenance support infrastructure to determine what functions need to be retained in-house to include its five depot-level repair activities and the recently expanded regional repair facilities; establishment of a board of directors to oversee and manage the Army’s total maintenance requirements process, including the allocation of work to in-house and contractor repair facilities; and development of a 5-year strategic plan for maximizing the efficient use of remaining maintenance depots and manufacturing arsenals. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed: (1) the Army's basis for personnel reductions planned at its depots during fiscal years 1998-1999; (2) the Army's progress in developing an automated system for making maintenance depot staffing decisions based on workload estimates; (3) factors that may impact the Army's ability to improve the cost-effectiveness of its maintenance depot's programs and operations; and (4) workload trends, staffing, and productivity issues at the Army's manufacturing arsenals.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the Army did not have a sound basis for identifying the number of positions to be eliminated from the Corpus Christi Depot; (2) this was particularly the case in determining the number of direct labor personnel needed to support depot workload requirements; (3) Army efforts to develop an automated workload and performance system for use in its depots have proceeded to the point that required certification to Congress of the system's operational capability is expected soon; (4) however, system improvements that are under way would enhance the system's capabilities for determining indirect and overhead personnel requirements in Army depots; (5) other issues and factors affecting the Army's basis for workload forecasting or the cost-effectiveness of its depot maintenance programs and activities are: (a) an increased reliance on the use of regional repair activities and contractors for work that otherwise might be done in maintenance depots; (b) declining productivity; (c) difficulties in effectively using depot personnel; and (d) nonavailability of repair parts; (6) use of the arsenals has declined significantly over the years as the private sector has assumed an increasingly larger share of their work; (7) according to Army officials, as of mid-1998, the Army's two weapons manufacturing arsenals used less than 24 percent of their industrial capacity, compared to more than 80 percent 10 years ago; and (8) the Army's depots and arsenals face multiple challenges and uncertainties, and the Army has inadequate long-range plans to guide its actions regarding its industrial infrastructure. |
gao_GAO-13-227 | gao_GAO-13-227_0 | Fiscal year 2011 marked the eighth year of the implementation of IPIA as well as the first year of implementation of IPERA. IPIA required executive agencies to (1) identify programs and activities susceptible to improper payments (typically referred to as risk assessments), (2) estimate the amount of improper payments in susceptible programs and activities, and (3) report these improper payment estimates and actions taken to reduce them. Legislative Requirements Related to Identifying, Estimating, Reducing, Recovering, and Reporting Improper Payments
The following sections describe key provisions of IPIA, the RAA, and IPERA. IPERA amended IPIA’s requirements for reporting on corrective actions. IPIA required, with respect to any program or activity of an agency with estimated improper payments that exceeded $10 million, the head of the agency to provide along with the estimate a report on what actions the agency was taking to reduce the improper payments, including a discussion of the causes of the improper payments identified, actions taken to correct those causes, and results of the actions taken to address those causes; statement of whether the agency had the information systems and other infrastructure it needed in order to reduce improper payments to minimal cost-effective levels; description of the resources the agency had requested in its budget submission to obtain the necessary information systems and infrastructure if the agency did not have such systems and infrastructure; and description of the steps the agency had taken to ensure that agency managers (including the agency head) were held accountable for reducing improper payments. Significant Deficiencies Existed in DOD’s Implementation of Key Provisions of IPIA, IPERA, and OMB Guidance
DOD did not adequately implement key provisions of IPIA, IPERA, and OMB guidance related to estimating improper payments, identifying programs susceptible to significant improper payments, reducing improper payments through corrective actions, recovering improper payments, and reporting improper payment estimates and recovery efforts. DOD’s Improper Payment Estimates Were Neither Reliable Nor Statistically Valid
DOD’s improper payment estimates reported in its fiscal year 2011 AFR were neither reliable nor statistically valid because of several deficiencies in the department’s procedures as documented in its sampling methodologies. However, the department’s long-standing and pervasive financial management weaknesses precluded it from validating the completeness of its payment transaction populations. For example, the sampling unit for travel pay for fiscal year 2011 was the travel voucher. DOD neither conducted recovery audits in fiscal year 2011 nor determined that such audits would not be cost effective, as required by IPERA. DOD Did Not Have Documented Procedures for Improper Payment and Recovery Audits Reporting
DOD did not have documented procedures to ensure that improper payment reporting in the AFR was complete, accurate, and in compliance with statutory and regulatory guidance. Conclusions
Although DOD reported estimated and known improper payments of over $1.1 billion for fiscal year 2011, this amount cannot be relied upon because of the deficiencies we found related to DOD’s procedures for identifying, estimating, reducing, recovering, and reporting improper payments. Until the department takes definitive action to address these deficiencies and thereby fulfills the requirements of IPERA and its implementing guidance, it remains at risk of continuing to make improper payments and wasting taxpayer funds. In response, DOD provided written comments, in which it concurred with nine recommendations and partially concurred with one recommendation. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objective of this engagement was to review the extent to which the Department of Defense (DOD) has implemented key provisions of the Improper Payments Information Act of 2002 (IPIA), the Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery Act of 2010 (IPERA), and related Office of Management and Budget (OMB) guidance. As part of this objective, we assessed DOD’s plans and actions to estimate improper payments for commercial payments made by the Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) for fiscal year 2012, because DOD limited its improper payment reporting for this program to known improper payments for fiscal year 2011, rather than reporting a statistical estimate. | Why GAO Did This Study
DOD reported $1.1 billion in improper payments for fiscal year 2011, which marked the eighth year of implementation of IPIA, as well as the first year of implementation of IPERA. IPIA required executive branch agencies to annually identify programs and activities susceptible to significant improper payments, estimate the amount of improper payments for such programs and activities, and report these estimates along with actions taken to reduce them. IPERA amended IPIA and expanded requirements for recovering overpayments across a broad range of federal programs.
GAO was asked to review the progress DOD has made to identify, estimate, and reduce improper payments. GAO's objective was to review the extent to which DOD has implemented key provisions of IPIA, IPERA, and OMB guidance. GAO reviewed improper payment requirements; analyzed agency financial reports, internal guidance and plans, and sampling methodologies; and interviewed cognizant officials. The scope for this engagement was DOD's reported improper payment information for fiscal year 2011 and DOD's plans and actions to estimate commercial pay improper payments for fiscal year 2012.
What GAO Found
The Department of Defense (DOD) did not adequately implement key provisions of the Improper Payments Information Act of 2002 (IPIA) and the Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery Act of 2010 (IPERA) and Office of Management and Budget (OMB) requirements for fiscal year 2011. Most important, GAO found that DOD's improper payment estimates reported in its fiscal year 2011 Agency Financial Report were neither reliable nor statistically valid because of long-standing and pervasive financial management weaknesses and significant deficiencies in the department's procedures to estimate improper payments. For example, DOD did not
have key quality assurance procedures in place, such as reconciliations, to validate the completeness and accuracy of the populations used to estimate improper payments;
develop appropriate sampling methodologies for estimating improper payments;
maintain key documentation supporting its reported improper payment estimates.
Also, GAO found significant deficiencies in DOD's policies and procedures to address other key improper payment requirements for fiscal year 2011. Specifically, DOD did not
have procedures to identify root causes of improper payments and develop related corrective actions,
conduct recovery audits for any of its programs or determine that these audits would not be cost effective, and
have procedures to ensure that its annual improper payment and recovery audit reporting is complete, accurate, and in compliance with IPERA and OMB reporting requirements.
DOD has taken some actions since fiscal year 2011, such as reporting a statistical estimate for Defense Finance and Accounting Service commercial pay and issuing revised Financial Management Regulation chapters on improper payments and recovery audits. However, until the department takes action to correct the deficiencies GAO found related to identifying, estimating, reducing, recovering, and reporting improper payments and thereby fulfills legislative requirements and implements related guidance, it remains at risk of continuing to make improper payments and wasting taxpayer funds.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is making 10 recommendations to improve DOD's processes to identify, estimate, reduce, recover, and report on improper payments. DOD concurred with 9 and partially concurred with 1 of the recommendations and described its plans to address them. |
gao_GAO-08-139T | gao_GAO-08-139T_0 | Background
The Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA), enacted in November 2001, created TSA and gave it responsibility for securing all modes of transportation.5 TSA’s aviation security mission includes strengthening the security of airport perimeters and restricted airport areas; hiring and training a screening workforce; prescreening passengers against terrorist watch lists; and screening passengers, baggage, and cargo at the over 400 commercial airports nation-wide, among other responsibilities. DHS Has Made Progress in Securing the Nation’s Commercial Aviation System, but More Work Remains
DHS, primarily through the efforts of TSA, has undertaken numerous initiatives since its inception to strengthen the security of the nation’s commercial aviation system. Although TSA has taken important actions to strengthen aviation security, the agency has faced difficulties in implementing an advanced, government-run passenger prescreening program for domestic flights, and in developing and implementing technology to screen passengers at security checkpoints and cargo placed on aircraft, among other areas. As shown in table 1, we identified 24 performance expectations for DHS in the area of aviation security, and found that overall, DHS has made moderate progress in meeting these expectations. Specifically, we found that DHS has generally achieved 17 performance expectations and has generally not achieved 7 performance expectations. In our past work, we reported that TSA identified and implemented a wide range of initiatives to strengthen the security of key components of the commercial aviation system. Regarding procedures for implementing biometric identification systems, we reported that TSA had not developed a plan for implementing new technologies to meet the security needs of individual airports and the commercial airport system as a whole. We are currently reviewing DHS and TSA’s efforts to develop, test and deploy airport checkpoint technologies. Checked Baggage Screening. Although TSA has taken action to develop plans for securing air cargo and establishing and implementing procedures to screen air cargo, DHS has not yet developed and implemented screening technologies. Cross-cutting Issues Have Hindered DHS’s Efforts in Implementing Its Mission and Management Functions
Our work has identified homeland security challenges that cut across DHS’s mission and core management functions. These issues have impeded the department’s progress since its inception and will continue as DHS moves forward. While it is important that DHS continue to work to strengthen each of its mission and core management functions, to include aviation security, it is equally important that these key issues be addressed from a comprehensive, department-wide perspective to help ensure that the department has the structure and processes in place to effectively address the threats and vulnerabilities that face the nation. In addition, DHS has not always implemented effective strategic planning efforts and has not yet fully developed performance measures or put into place structures to help ensure that the agency is managing for results. For example, with regards to TSA’s efforts to secure air cargo, we reported that TSA completed an Air Cargo Strategic Plan in November 2003 that outlined a threat-based risk management approach to securing the nation’s domestic air cargo system, and that this plan identified strategic objectives and priority actions for enhancing air cargo security based on risk, cost, and deadlines. DHS has also not fully adopted and applied a risk management approach in implementing its mission and core management functions. | Why GAO Did This Study
Within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Transportation Security Administration's (TSA) mission is to protect the nation's transportation network. Since its inception in 2001, TSA has developed and implemented a variety of programs and procedures to secure commercial aviation. GAO examined (1) the progress DHS and TSA have made in securing the nation's commercial aviation system, and (2) challenges that have impeded the Department's efforts to implement its mission and management functions. This testimony is based on issued GAO reports and testimonies addressing the security of the nation's commercial aviation system, including a recently issued report (GAO-07-454) that highlights the progress DHS has made in implementing its mission and management functions.
What GAO Found
In August 2007, GAO reported that DHS had made moderate progress in securing the commercial aviation system, but that more work remains. Specifically, DHS generally achieved 17 of the 24 performance expectations that GAO identified in the area of aviation security but had generally not achieved 7 of them. DHS and TSA have made progress in many areas related to securing commercial aviation. For example, to meet congressional mandates to screen airline passengers and 100 percent of checked baggage, TSA initially hired and deployed a federal workforce of over 50,000 passenger and checked baggage screeners and installed equipment at the nation's more than 400 commercial airports to provide the capability to screen all checked baggage using explosive detection systems. TSA has since turned its attention to, among other things, strengthening passenger prescreening; more efficiently allocating, deploying, and managing the transportation security officer (TSO)------formerly known as screener------workforce; strengthening screening procedures; developing and deploying more effective and efficient screening technologies; and improving domestic air cargo security. While these efforts have helped strengthen the security of the commercial aviation system, DHS and TSA still face a number of key challenges in further securing this system. For example, TSA has faced difficulties in developing and implementing its advanced passenger prescreening system, known as Secure Flight, and has not yet completed development efforts. In addition, DHS's efforts to enhance perimeter security at airports may not be sufficient to provide for effective security. TSA has also initiated efforts to evaluate the effectiveness of security-related technologies, such as biometric identification systems, but has not developed a plan for implementing new technologies to meet the security needs of individual airports. TSA has also not yet effectively deployed checkpoint technologies to address key existing vulnerabilities, and has not yet developed and implemented technologies needed to screen air cargo. GAO also reported that a number of issues have impeded DHS's efforts in implementing its mission and management functions, including not always implementing effective strategic planning or fully adopting and applying a risk management approach with respect to commercial aviation security. |
gao_GAO-05-352T | gao_GAO-05-352T_0 | GAO has long had a statutory responsibility for monitoring the nation’s finances. In the report, we describe the forces at work, the challenges they present, and the 21st century questions they prompt, in each of 12 broad areas based in large measure on functional areas in the federal budget, but also including governmentwide issues and the revenue side of the budget as listed in table 3. Long-term Fiscal Challenge Provides Reexamination Impetus
Chairman Collins, the nation is facing a range of important new forces that are already working to reshape American society, our place in the world and the role of the federal government. The size and trend of our projected longer term deficits means that the nation cannot ignore the resulting fiscal pressures—it is not a matter of whether the nation deals with the fiscal gap, but when and how. I’ll start with demographics, including the aging of our population, and then discuss increasing global interdependence, economic change, evolving security threats and changing governance systems. 4.) As the foregoing suggests, globalization will have profound implications for our policies and programs. Governance Challenges
The government’s capacity to address these trends and challenges is, itself, a 21st century challenge. Given prior experience and political tendencies, there is little real “low-hanging fruit.”
The size of the fiscal challenge and the significance of the societal and economic changes worldwide means this kind of examination and the hard choices necessary to restore a sustainable fiscal path and modernize government may take a generation to address. | Why GAO Did This Study
This report stems from the recognition that the Congress faces a daunting challenge: the need to bring government and its programs in line with 21st century realities. This challenge has many related pieces: addressing the nation's large and growing long-term fiscal gap; deciding on the appropriate role and size of the federal government--and how to finance that government--and bringing the panoply of federal activities into line with today's world. The reexamination questions discussed in this report are drawn primarily from the work GAO has done for the Congress over the years. Many of these questions do not represent immediate crises, however many pose important longer-term threats to the country's fiscal and economic, and national security as well as the quality of life for our children and grandchildren.
What GAO Found
GAO describes the forces at work, the challenges they present, and the 21st century questions they prompt, in each of 12 broad areas based in large measure on functional areas in the federal budget, but also including governmentwide issues and the revenue side of the budget. These areas include (1) long-term fiscal challenges; (2) policy frameworks, such as the aging population and increasing global interdependence; (3) changing security threats; and (4) governance challenges. The size of the fiscal challenge and the significance of the societal and economic changes worldwide means this kind of examination and the hard choices necessary to restore a sustainable fiscal path and modernize government may take a generation to address. |
gao_GAO-07-484T | gao_GAO-07-484T_0 | SBA also provides low-interest, long-term loans to individuals and businesses to assist them with disaster recovery through its Disaster Loan Program—the only form of SBA assistance not limited to small businesses. DCMS’s Limited Capacity and Difficulties in Other Logistical Areas Impeded SBA’s Response to the Gulf Coast Hurricanes
Our July 2006 report identified several significant limitations in DCMS’s capacity and other system and procurement deficiencies that likely contributed to the challenges that SBA faced in providing timely assistance to Gulf Coast hurricane victims as follows: First, due to limited capacity, the number of SBA staff who could access DCMS at any one time to process disaster loans was restricted. Second, SBA experienced instability with DCMS during the initial months following Hurricane Katrina, as users encountered multiple outages and slow response times in completing loan processing tasks. Moreover, SBA faced challenges in obtaining suitable office space to house its expanded workforce. By late May 2006, SBA took about 74 days on average to process disaster loan applications, compared with the agency’s goal of within 21 days. Unprecedented Loan Application Volume and SBA’s Limited Disaster Planning Contributed to Challenges in Providing Timely Assistance to Hurricane Victims
As we stated in our July 2006 report, the sheer volume of disaster loan applications that SBA received was clearly a major factor contributing to the agency’s challenges in providing timely assistance to Gulf Coast hurricane. As of late May 2006, SBA had issued 2.1 million loan applications to hurricane victims, which was four times the number of applications issued to victims of the 1994 Northridge, California, earthquake, the previous single largest disaster that the agency had faced. However, our two reports on SBA’s response to the Gulf Coast hurricanes also found that the absence of a comprehensive and sophisticated planning process contributed to the challenges that the agency faced. SBA did not consider the likelihood of more severe disaster scenarios and, in contrast to insurance companies and some government agencies, use the information available from catastrophe models or disaster simulations to enhance its planning process. Additionally, SBA did not adequately monitor the performance of a DCMS contractor or stress test the system prior to its implementation. In the report we are releasing today, we found that SBA did not engage in comprehensive disaster planning for other logistical areas—such as workforce or space acquisition planning—prior to the Gulf Coast hurricanes at either the headquarters or field office levels. For example, SBA had not taken steps to help ensure the availability of additional trained and experienced staff such as (1) cross-training agency staff not normally involved in disaster assistance to provide backup support or (2) maintaining the status of the disaster reserve corps as I previously discussed. SBA Has Taken Steps to Better Prepare for Future Disasters, but Their Effectiveness Remains to Be Seen
In our July 2006 report, we recommended that SBA take several steps to enhance DCMS, such as reassessing the system’s capacity in light of the Gulf Coast hurricane experience and reviewing information from disaster simulations and catastrophe models. SBA agreed with these recommendations. SBA officials said that DCMS can now support a minimum of 8,000 concurrent agency users as compared with only 1,500 concurrent users for the Gulf Coast hurricanes. These steps include appointing a single individual to coordinate the agency’s disaster preparedness planning and coordination efforts, enhancing systems to forecast the resource requirements to respond to disasters of varying scenarios, and redesigning the process for reviewing applications and disbursing loan proceeds. Additionally, SBA has planned or initiated steps to help ensure the availability of additional trained and experienced staff in the event of a future disaster. For example, SBA has not established a time line for completing the key elements of its disaster management plan, such as cross-training nondisaster staff to provide back up support. To strengthen SBA capacity to respond to a future disaster, the report recommends that SBA develop time frames for completing key elements of the disaster management plan (and a long-term strategy for acquiring adequate office space); and direct staff involved in developing the disaster plan to continue assessing whether the use of disaster simulations or catastrophe models would enhance the agency’s overall disaster planning process. However, it remains to be seen how comprehensive SBA’s final disaster management plan will be and how effectively the agency will respond to a future disaster. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Small Business Administration (SBA) helps individuals and businesses recover from disasters such as hurricanes through its Disaster Loan Program. SBA faced an unprecedented demand for disaster loan assistance following the 2005 Gulf Coast hurricanes (Katrina, Rita, and Wilma), which resulted in extensive property damage and loss of life. In the aftermath of these disasters, concerns were expressed regarding the timeliness of SBA's disaster assistance. GAO initiated work and completed two reports under the Comptroller General's authority to conduct evaluations and determine how well SBA provided victims of the Gulf Coast hurricanes with timely assistance. This testimony, which is based on these two reports, discusses (1) challenges SBA experienced in providing victims of the Gulf Coast hurricanes with timely assistance, (2) factors that contributed to these challenges, and (3) steps SBA has taken since the Gulf Coast hurricanes to enhance its disaster preparedness. GAO visited the Gulf Coast region, reviewed SBA planning documents, and interviewed SBA officials.
What GAO Found
GAO identified several significant system and logistical challenges that SBA experienced in responding to the Gulf Coast hurricanes that undermined the agency's ability to provide timely disaster assistance to victims. For example, the limited capacity of SBA's automated loan processing system--the Disaster Credit Management System (DCMS)--restricted the number of staff who could access the system at any one time to process disaster loan applications. In addition, SBA staff who could access DCMS initially encountered multiple system outages and slow response times in completing loan processing tasks. SBA also faced challenges training and supervising the thousands of mostly temporary employees the agency hired to process loan applications and obtaining suitable office space for its expanded workforce. As of late May 2006, SBA processed disaster loan applications, on average, in about 74 days compared with its goal of within 21 days. While the large volume of disaster loan applications that SBA received clearly affected its capacity to provide timely disaster assistance to Gulf Coast hurricane victims, GAO's two reports found that the absence of a comprehensive and sophisticated planning process beforehand likely limited the efficiency of the agency's initial response. For example, in designing the capacity of DCMS, SBA primarily relied on historical data such as the number of loan applications that the agency received after the 1994 Northridge, California, earthquake--the most severe disaster that the agency had previously encountered. SBA did not consider disaster scenarios that were more severe or use the information available from disaster simulations (developed by federal agencies) or catastrophe models (used by insurance companies to estimate disaster losses). SBA also did not adequately monitor the performance of a DCMS contractor or completely stress test the system prior to its implementation. Moreover, SBA did not engage in comprehensive disaster planning prior to the Gulf Coast hurricanes for other logistical areas, such as workforce planning or space acquisition, at either the headquarters or field office levels. In the aftermath of the Gulf Coast hurricanes, SBA has planned or initiated several measures that officials said would enhance the agency's capacity to respond to future disasters. For example, SBA has completed an expansion of DCMS's user capacity to support a minimum of 8,000 concurrent users as compared with just 1,500 for the Gulf Coast hurricanes. Additionally, SBA initiated steps to increase the availability of trained and experienced disaster staff and redesigned its process for reviewing loan applications and disbursing funds. However, SBA has not established a time line for completing key elements of its disaster management plan, such as cross-training agency staff not typically involved in disaster assistance to provide back up support in an emergency. SBA also has not (1) assessed whether its disaster planning process could benefit from the supplemental use of disaster simulations or catastrophe models and (2) developed a long-term strategy to obtain suitable office space for its disaster staff. While SBA agreed with GAO's report recommendations to address these concerns, it remains to be seen how comprehensive the agency's final disaster plan will be and how the agency will respond to a future disaster. |
gao_GAO-04-715 | gao_GAO-04-715_0 | DOD Directive 5000.1, the Defense Acquisition System, highlights the department’s preference for using performance-based logistics at the platform level, stating, “Program Managers shall develop and implement performance-based logistics strategies that optimize total system availability while minimizing cost and logistics footprint.” As part of its implementation of this strategy, in 2003 DOD proposed that the Congress adopt legislative changes that would allow the services to increase the appropriations allocation flexibility within a weapon system program, allowing the program manager to use funds from different accounts (such as operation and maintenance; research, development, test, and evaluation; and procurement) to pay for system support costs. In the private sector, performance-based contracting is a tool used according to the applicability of subsystem or component and circumstance, when it is cost-effective and reduces risk in a noncompetitive environment. DOD officials have stated that this is an industry best practice and should be adopted more aggressively, but in 7 of 14 companies we interviewed that used some type of performance-based contracting, this agreement was used at the subsystem or component level—that is, for engines, auxiliary power units, wheels, or brakes— and it was generally used for older systems. The life-cycle management issues are comparable to those of DOD in managing its weapon system sustainment programs. In contrast, traditional transaction-based time and material contracts are used to purchase logistics inputs—such as quantities of spare parts, specific repair tasks, and engineering studies. For example, officials from one company said they used a performance-based contract for the older of the two types of engines in the company’s inventory. But in the absence of reliable and complete performance data as a baseline, the adoption of this approach as the preferred support strategy for new weapon systems could undermine DOD’s ability to negotiate cost-effective terms—particularly since the performance-based contracts at the weapon system level have cost-reimbursement elements, while the private-sector companies generally used fixed-price agreements. First, they prefer to take advantage of competition whenever it is available and to manage support contracts through the use of competitive procedures. Second, company officials emphasized the importance of gaining purchasing power from volume discounts on subsystems or components across their entire fleet of systems as a reason for not implementing performance contracting at the platform level. Finally, by having contracts at the subsystem or component level, companies can avoid the administrative costs that would be charged by a prime integrator. However, logistics officials agree that the product support strategy should clearly provide for the future delivery of the technical data when required to support competition or alternative source development. Using performance-based logistics at the platform level also creates risk by contracting out the program integration function—a core function that private contractors consider essential for the cost-effective management of costly and complex systems over their life cycle. Regarding our recommendation to incorporate in its performance-based logistics guidance to the services the private sector’s practice of using performance-based logistics as a tool to achieve economies at the subsystem or component level, DOD’s response stated that the department recognizes the need to re-emphasize the use of performance-based logistics for subsystems and components in its policy memorandum and guide books. To identify commercial industries that use complex and costly equipment with life-cycle management issues similar to military weapon systems, we interviewed DOD depot maintenance and logistics policy officials. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Defense (DOD) is pursuing a policy that promotes performance-based logistics at the platform level as the preferred product support strategy for its weapon systems, based in part on DOD's perception that this is an industry best practice. GAO was asked to compare industry practices for activities using complex and costly equipment with life-cycle management issues similar to those of military systems to identify lessons learned that can be useful to DOD. This is the first of two reports addressing DOD's implementation of performance-based logistics and is intended to facilitate DOD's development of new guidance on the use of this approach.
What GAO Found
DOD's current policy for implementing performance-based logistics as a preferred support approach at the weapon system platform level does not reflect the practices of private-sector companies that support expensive and complex equipment with life-cycle management issues. The companies GAO interviewed use performance-based contracting as a tool rather than as a preferred support concept at the weapon system platform level. While 7 of the 14 companies GAO interviewed use some type of performance-based contracting, they use it at the subsystem or component level--for commodities such as engines, wheels, and brakes--when it is cost-effective and reduces risk in a noncompetitive environment. DOD's proposed policy of pursuing performance-based logistics as the preferred support approach at the platform level results in contracting out the program-integration function--a core process the private-sector firms consider integral to successful business operations. Further, this proposed policy could limit opportunities to take advantage of competition when it is available for subsystems or components as well as limit opportunities to gain purchasing power from volume discounts on components across an entire fleet and avoid the administrative costs charged by a prime integrator. While DOD is proposing the aggressive use of performance-based logistics on both older and new weapon system platforms, the companies GAO interviewed use performance-based contracting at the subsystem or component level when it is cost-effective--often in a noncompetitive environment when the manufacturer controls expensive repair parts, such as engines. In general company officials said they rely more widely on other contracting vehicles, such as time and material contracts, particularly for new systems. Company officials noted that in the absence of accurate and reliable information on system performance to establish a baseline for evaluating the cost-effectiveness of a performance-based contract for new systems, the risk of the negotiated price's being excessive is increased. The companies GAO interviewed also emphasized the importance of having rights to the technical data--such as maintenance drawings, specifications, and tolerances--needed to support the management of all logistics contracts and, should the service provider arrangements fail, to support competition among alternate providers. In contrast, DOD program managers often opt to spend limited acquisition dollars on increased weapon system capability rather than on rights to the technical data--thus limiting their flexibility to perform work in-house or to support alternate source development should contractual arrangements fail. |
gao_GAO-03-146 | gao_GAO-03-146_0 | This assessment determines if the property was ever owned or controlled by DOD and if hazards caused by DOD’s use may be present. If, however, the Corps determines that a DOD-caused hazard that could require further study may exist on a former DOD-controlled property, the Corps begins a project to further study and/or clean up the hazard. Similarly, the two primary DOD and Corps guidance documents for implementing the FUDS program emphasize the need for Corps coordination with regulators but do not provide clear direction or specific steps for involving regulators in the FUDS program. More specific language regarding consultation as it relates to the cleanup of hazardous substances is provided in 10 U.S.C. In addition, CERCLA has specific consultation requirements for properties on the National Priorities List, including the 21 FUDS on the list for which EPA is the primary regulator. Guidance Does Not Cover the Preliminary Assessment of Eligibility and Very Little Coordination Took Place During This Phase
The DOD Management Guidance and FUDS Program Manual are silent on regulators’ roles in preliminary assessments of eligibility, during which decisions on property eligibility and the need for cleanup are made, in part because the law requiring consultation with regulators is broad and does not mention consultation with the states, only with EPA. Individual Corps districts also took steps to improve coordination. For example, the memorandum required the Corps to inform states of FUDS that are likely to go through a preliminary assessment of eligibility, provide states with updated lists of all ongoing and future activities at involve states in setting priorities for FUDS work, provide states a final list of FUDS that will undergo some type of work in the coming year, inform states of any Corps deviation from planned work and provide them with the rationale for any such changes, and involve states in developing the final report of the preliminary assessment of eligibility. To better promote greater and more consistent coordination with regulators, DOD and the Corps will need to assess the success of individual district efforts to determine which lessons learned from these activities should be included in program guidance. Some State Regulators Believe Poor Coordination by the Corps Makes It Difficult for Them to Ensure That Environmental Standards Are Met
Some state regulators we contacted believe that when the Corps does not inform them of its FUDS cleanup activities or involve them in the various stages of the FUDS program, they do not have the information necessary to ensure that applicable cleanup standards have been met and that the cleanup actions will protect human health and the environment. Further, officials in 9 of the states we contacted said that when they are not involved in project and property closeouts—the points at which the Corps concludes that all its cleanup work has been completed—state regulatory agencies have no assurance that Corps actions have met state cleanup requirements. On the other hand, eight of these officials told us that they agree with recent NDAI decisions that were made during the last 3 years. Specifically, 10 U.S.C. Overall, EPA believes that a better-coordinated effort among all parties, as discussed in its policy, would improve the effectiveness of cleanup at FUDS and increase public confidence in the actions taken at these sites. Without an agreement on roles and responsibilities, DOD and EPA have been unable to establish an effective working relationship on FUDS or have had to undertake extra efforts to come to an agreement on how a cleanup should be conducted. Because the site was a formerly used defense site, DOD has responsibility for cleaning up the site under the Defense Environmental Restoration Program. Finally, at the federal level, EPA and the Corps disagree about EPA’s role in the cleanup of more than 9,000 FUDS that are not on the National Priorities List. As a starting point, we recommend that the Secretary of the Department of Defense direct the Secretary of the Department of Army to assess the impact of the Corps’ recent efforts to improve coordination through actions such as directives and the Management Action Plan pilot program and incorporate the successful components as requirements into its FUDS Program Manual, and assess practices individual Corps districts have used to coordinate with regulators and develop a list of best practices for dissemination throughout the Corps that districts might use to improve their coordination. Overall, the steps being taken or planned by DOD to improve coordination with regulators could, when completed, constitute a significant improvement over current processes and should go a long way toward addressing the problems identified in this report that were the subject of our recommendations. Appendix I: Additional Details on Our Scope and Methodology
The objectives of our review were to (1) identify federal requirements for DOD and the Corps to coordinate with state and federal regulators during the FUDS cleanup program, (2) determine the extent to which the Corps has coordinated with state regulators since the start of the FUDS program and assess the recent steps it has taken to better coordinate, and (3) identify any concerns regulators may have about coordination with the Corps. | Why GAO Did This Study
The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) is in charge of addressing cleanup at the more than 9,000 U.S. properties that were formerly owned or controlled by the Department of Defense (DOD) and have been identified as potentially eligible for environmental cleanup. The Corps has determined that more than 4,000 of these properties have no hazards that require further Corps study or cleanup action. However, in recent years, hazards have surfaced at some of these properties, leading state and federal regulators to question whether the Corps has properly assessed and cleaned up these properties. In this context, Congress asked us to (1) analyze federal coordination requirements that apply to the cleanup of these properties, (2) assess recent DOD and Corps efforts to improve coordination, and (3) identify any issues regulators may have about coordination with the Corps.
What GAO Found
Federal law requires DOD and the Corps of Engineers to consult with state regulatory agencies and EPA during the process of cleaning up formerly used defense sites (FUDS). However, the law only provides specifics for the cleanup phase for hazardous substances. DOD's Management Guidance and the FUDS Program Manual do not provide clear direction or specific steps for involving regulators in the FUDS program. In addition, both the law and the guidance are silent on the subject of consultation or coordination with regulators during the preliminary assessment phase, when the Corps makes decisions on whether a former defense site is eligible for DOD cleanup and whether further investigation and/or cleanup are needed. DOD and Corps officials told GAO that they would revise their guidance to include specific, but as yet undetermined, instructions for coordination with regulators during such decisions. DOD and the Corps have recently taken several steps to improve coordination. For example, they are working with the regulatory community to develop specific steps that Corps districts can take, such as providing states with updated lists of current and future FUDS program activities in their states and initiating a new pilot program in nine states that has the Corps working side by side with regulators in the cleanup of former defense sites. In addition, several Corps districts have independently taken steps to improve coordination with state regulators. DOD and the Corps will need to assess the effectiveness of these various initiatives to determine which are successful and should be included in program guidance to all districts. Despite the improvements in coordination, regulators still raised two major issues about Corps coordination on the FUDS program. First, some states believe that they lack the information necessary to properly oversee cleanup work at former defense sites and to judge the validity of Corps decisions. For example, 15 of the 27 states GAO contacted believe they need to be involved in knowing what the Corps is doing during the preliminary assessment phase. Also, 9 of the 27 states believe they need to be involved in project closeouts, so that they can ensure that the Corps has met state cleanup standards. Second, EPA believes it should have a larger role in the cleanup of former defense sites. Although states are the primary regulator at the majority of former defense sites and EPA is the primary regulator for only the 21 former defense sites that are on the list of the nation's worst hazardous sites, EPA believes that its role even on the unlisted sites should be greater. The agency believes that this would improve the effectiveness of the cleanups and increase public confidence overall. The Corps disagrees, and the two agencies have been unable to establish an effective working relationship on the cleanup for former defense sites. Commenting on a draft of this report, DOD stated that it generally agreed with the recommendations and was taking or planned to take steps that should, when completed, substantially correct the problems GAO cited. |
gao_GAO-11-145 | gao_GAO-11-145_0 | In addition to increasing CAFE standards, EISA also authorized, but did not provide funding for, the ATVM loan program to provide up to $25 billion in loans to support projects to produce more fuel-efficient passenger vehicles and components. DOE Established Three Goals for the ATVM Program
Although DOE documents do not specifically identify the goals of the ATVM loan program, DOE officials told us that they established three broad goals for the program: increase the fuel economy of U.S. passenger vehicles as a whole, advance automotive technology in the United States, and protect taxpayers’ financial interests. According to DOE officials, the program’s first goal is to increase the fuel economy of U.S. passenger vehicles as a whole. DOE Also Set Criteria for Determining Eligible Projects’ Technical and Financial Merits
To help choose among applicants and projects deemed eligible, DOE also considers their technical and financial merits. Finally, the program’s procedures call for the Credit Review Board to weigh an applicant’s technical and financial merit scores, the credit subsidy cost approved by OMB, the six policy factors, and other information, such as a summary of the financial analysis, to decide whether to recommend that the Secretary of Energy award a loan. The remaining funds—$3.1 billion, or about 38 percent of the $8.4 billion— support projects for vehicles and components with newer technologies. The ATVM Program Has Used about Half of the Funds Available to Pay Credit Subsidy Costs, Which May Limit the Program’s Ability to Loan the Entire $25 Billion Allowed by Statute
In order to make loans, federal agencies are required by the Federal Credit Reform Act of 1990 to set aside the estimated net long-term costs of the loans to the government over the life of the loans in present value terms— that is, the loans’ credit subsidy costs. At this rate, the $4.2 billion remaining to be used to pay credit subsidy costs will not be sufficient to enable DOE to loan the full $25 billion in loan authority. The ATVM Program Has Begun Overseeing Loans to Ensure Borrowers Comply with Financial and Technical Requirements but Has Not Engaged Engineering Expertise That Would Help Ensure That Projects Are Delivered as Agreed
ATVM program staff have set procedures and have begun using those procedures to oversee borrowers’ compliance with the financial and technical requirements of the loans. DOE Lacks Performance Measures That Would Enable It to Fully Assess the Extent to Which the ATVM Program Has Achieved Its Goals
DOE lacks sufficient performance measures that would enable it to fully assess whether the ATVM program has achieved its three goals. While these two performance measures will enable DOE to assess the fuel economy improvements of ATVM-funded vehicles specifically, the measures stop short of enabling DOE to fully determine the extent to which it has accomplished its overall goal of improving the fuel economy of all passenger vehicles in use in the United States. However, the program’s current approach of using ATVM staff to monitor the technical progress of the projects may not be sufficient to ensure that the vehicles are delivered as agreed because their expertise is largely financial and not technical—that is, ATVM staff lack the engineering expertise called for in the program’s procedures, which cite the need for independent engineering expertise to validate project progress. Although the ATVM program has performance measures tied to DOE’s first goal of increasing the fuel economy of passenger vehicles in use in the United States, because these measures do not isolate the net effect of the program—that is, the improvements in fuel economy achieved by ATVM-funded vehicles that are the direct result of the program and that would not have occurred for other reasons, such as complying with new CAFE standards—gains in fuel economy and reductions in petroleum use that the program reports could be inaccurate. We maintain that DOE should accelerate its efforts to engage sufficient engineering expertise for monitoring technical aspects of the projects as soon as possible. DOE also disagreed with our recommendation to develop sufficient and quantifiable performance measures for its three ATVM program goals. By not setting sufficient performance measures for its three program goals, DOE is unable to assess its progress in accomplishing them. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
To identify the steps the Department of Energy (DOE) has taken to implement the Advanced Technology Vehicles Manufacturing (ATVM) Loan Program, we analyzed relevant provisions of the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 (EISA) and the Consolidated Security, Disaster Assistance, and Continuing Appropriations Act, 2009; the ATVM program’s 2008 interim final rule; the ATVM program’s credit policies and procedures manual; and other documentation provided by DOE. To evaluate the extent to which DOE can assess its progress toward meeting program goals, we analyzed relevant provisions of EISA, DOE’s budget request documents, and other documentation provided by the ATVM program. | Why GAO Did This Study
In the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, Congress mandated higher vehicle fuel economy by model year 2020 and established the Advanced Technology Vehicles Manufacturing (ATVM) loan program in the Department of Energy (DOE). ATVM is to provide up to $25 billion in loans for more fuel-efficient vehicles and components. Congress also provided $7.5 billion to pay the required credit subsidy costs--the government's estimated net long-term cost, in present value terms, of the loans. GAO was asked to review the ATVM program and agreed to (1) identify the steps DOE has taken to implement the program, (2) examine the program's progress in awarding loans, (3) assess how the program is overseeing the loans, and (4) evaluate the extent to which DOE can assess progress toward meeting its goals. GAO analyzed loan documents and relevant laws and regulations and interviewed DOE and ATVM officials.
What GAO Found
DOE has taken several steps to implement the ATVM program. First, it set three goals: increase the fuel economy of U.S. passenger vehicles as a whole, advance U.S. automotive technology, and protect taxpayers' financial interests. DOE also set technical, financial, and environmental eligibility requirements. In addition, DOE established criteria for judging the technical and financial merits of applicants and projects deemed eligible, and policy factors to consider, such as a project's potential for supporting jobs. DOE established procedures for ATVM staff, aided by experts from within and outside DOE, to score applicants and projects. Finally, the Credit Review Board, composed of senior DOE officials, uses the scores and other information to recommend loan decisions to the Secretary of Energy. The ATVM program has made $8.4 billion in loans that DOE expects to yield fuel economy improvements in the near term along with greater advances, through newer technologies, in years to come. Although the loans represent about a third of the $25 billion authorized by law, the program has used 44 percent of the $7.5 billion allocated to pay credit subsidy costs, which is more than was initially anticipated. These higher credit subsidy costs were, in part, a reflection of the risky financial situation of the automotive industry at the time the loans were made. As a result of the higher credit subsidy costs, the program may be unable to loan the full $25 billion allowed by statute. Although the ATVM program has set procedures for overseeing the financial and technical performance of borrowers and has begun oversight, it has not yet engaged engineering expertise needed for technical oversight. To oversee financial performance, staff review data submitted by borrowers on their financial health to identify challenges to repaying the loans. Staff also rely on outside auditors to confirm whether funds have been used for allowable expenses. To oversee technical performance, ATVM staff analyze information borrowers report on their technical progress and are to use outside engineering expertise to supplement their analysis. According to our review, projects needing additional technical oversight are under way and the ATVM staff lack the engineering expertise called for by the program's procedures for adequately overseeing technical aspects of the projects. However, the program has not yet engaged such expertise. As a result, DOE cannot be adequately assured that the projects will be delivered as agreed. DOE has not developed sufficient performance measures that would enable it to fully assess the extent to which it has achieved its three program goals. For example, while DOE has a measure for assessing specifically the fuel economy gains for the vehicles produced under the program, the measure falls short of enabling assessment of progress in achieving DOE's broad goal of improving the fuel economy of U.S. passenger vehicles as a whole because it does not account for, among other things, the fuel economy improvements manufacturers would have made, in the absence of the loans, to remain in compliance with increasingly strict federal fuel economy requirements. Principles of good governance call for performance measures tied to goals as a means of assessing the extent to which goals have been achieved.
What GAO Recommends
To help ensure the effectiveness and accountability of the ATVM program, GAO recommends that DOE accelerate its efforts to engage the engineering expertise needed for effective technical oversight and develop sufficient, quantifiable performance measures for its program goals. DOE disagreed with GAO's recommendations. GAO continues to believe DOE should engage expertise and reaffirms its recommendation that DOE develop sufficient performance measures. |
gao_GAO-05-105 | gao_GAO-05-105_0 | Work-study is awarded based on the difference between a student’s need less other aid awarded. While Education has been required to revise the allowance tables annually since 1993, prior to 2004 it had attempted to update the allowance twice—once in 1993 and once in 2003—but the latter update was suspended. As a result, the 1988 tax data used for the 1993 update are still in effect. The lack of updates is primarily because Education did not annually seek data needed to update the allowance and did not establish effective internal control to guide the updating process. In addition, Education did not consider alternatives when data were not readily available. Education’s Proposed Update Would Have Increased Expected Family Contributions, Thereby Affecting the Allocation of Federal Aid and Potentially State and Institutional Aid as Well
Under the proposed update, the state and other tax allowance would have decreased for most states; the change in the allowance, in turn, would have increased the amount that families are expected to contribute by about $500 on average for a majority of student aid applicants. Of those aid applicants with an increase in their EFC, some would have received lower Pell Grant awards or would have become ineligible for Pell Grants. As a result, the proposed update would have decreased overall federal Pell Grant expenditures by $290 million. The effect of the update on state and institutional need- based aid would also have varied based on differences in state and institutional aid awarding policies and on how much the tax allowance would have changed for each state. The Current Allowance May Not Capture the Taxes Paid Due to the Type of Data and Methodology in Use
As a result of certain limitations of the SOI dataset for the purpose of calculating the allowance and problems with how Education uses this dataset, the current state and other tax allowance may not reflect the amount of taxes paid by students and families. The dataset is limited for this purpose because the taxpayers included in it are generally not representative of financial aid applicants, the tax data it provides do not include all state and other taxes paid by students and families, and the tax data are several years older than the income information reported by students and families on the FAFSA. In addition to the limitations of the SOI dataset, Education does not make full use of the dataset to account for the varying tax rates paid by taxpayers in different income groups. Four Strategies Might Address Some of the Limitations Associated with the Tax Allowance and Would Yield a Variety of Effects on Federal Spending and Aid Recipients
We have identified four strategies for addressing the limitations of the tax allowance that range from modest to more substantial changes to the process: (1) continue to use SOI data but with a revised method for calculating the allowance, (2) substitute SOI data with one of several alternative data sources, (3) use the same allowance for all aid applicants without regard to state of residence, or (4) collect information directly from the aid applicants themselves. Also, these four strategies differ in their impacts on federal costs and on aid applicants. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
Overview
The objectives of this study were to determine (1) what tax data form the basis of the current tax allowance and what factors have affected regular updates, (2) the effect the Department of Education’s (Education) proposed update would have had in award year 2004–2005 on financial assistance for students and families, (3) the extent to which current methods for determining the allowance accurately measure how much students and families have paid in state and other taxes, and (4) the strategies available to address any problems in deriving the allowance. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 2003, the Department of Education (Education) proposed an update to the state and other tax allowance, a part of the federal need analysis for student financial aid. Most federal aid as well as some state and institutional aid is awarded based on the student's cost of attendance less the student's and/or family's ability to pay these costs--known as the expected family contribution (EFC). The allowance, which accounts for the amount of state and other taxes paid by students and families, effectively reduces the EFC. Given the potential impact of the allowance on the awarding of aid, we determined what factors have affected the updating of the tax data on which it is based, the effects the proposed 2003 update would have had on financial assistance for aid applicants, any limitations in the method for deriving the allowance, and strategies available to address them.
What GAO Found
While Education has been required to revise the allowance annually since 1993, prior to 2004 it attempted to update the allowance only twice--in 1993 and again in 2003--but the latter update was suspended. As a result, the 1988 IRS tax data used for the 1993 update remained in effect. The lack of updates is primarily because Education did not annually seek data needed to update the allowance or establish effective internal control to guide the updating process. Also, Education did not consider alternatives when data were not readily available. Had the update been implemented in 2004-2005, the allowance would have decreased for most states; as a result, the EFC would have increased by about $500, on average, for a majority of aid applicants. Of those with an EFC increase, 38 percent would either have received less in Pell Grants ($144 less on average) or would have become ineligible for them; the percentage of recipients affected would have varied by income. Overall Pell Grant expenditures would have decreased by $290 million. Increases in EFCs could also have affected other forms of aid, including state aid; these effects in turn could have affected Stafford loans and Parent Loans for Undergraduate Students. The impact of the proposed update on Campus-Based, state, and institutional need-based aid would likely have varied based on state and institutional aid awarding policies and changes in state allowances. Due to certain limitations of the IRS dataset with respect to calculating the allowance, and problems with how Education uses this dataset, the current allowance may not reflect the amount of taxes paid by students and families. The dataset is limited because the taxpayers included in it are generally not representative of aid applicants, it does not include all state and other taxes paid by students and families, and the tax data are several years older than the income information reported by applicants on aid applications. In addition to these limitations, Education does not make full use of the dataset to better reflect the varying tax rates paid by taxpayers in different income groups. Strategies we identified for addressing the limitations of the tax allowance include (1) using IRS data with revisions to the method for calculating the allowance, (2) substituting IRS data with one of several alternative data sources, (3) using a standard allowance for all aid applicants irrespective of state of residence, or (4) collecting tax information directly from aid applicants. These could require modest to substantial changes, would differ in their impact on applicants and federal costs, and could require legislative changes |
gao_NSIAD-96-104 | gao_NSIAD-96-104_0 | 1.2.) The MHC ship program, which is in the production phase, will cost about $1.5 billion. 1.3.) Specifically, we evaluated the (1) status of the Navy’s research and development programs, (2) readiness of the Navy’s on-hand mine countermeasures assets, and (3) match between the Navy’s mine countermeasures assets and its mine countermeasures requirements. A long-range plan addressing the gaps and limitations in the Navy’s mine warfare capabilities, especially its shallow water capabilities, could help the Navy maximize its limited financial resources and ensure sustained funding of its priority systems. The mine warfare program is experiencing budget constraints, and the Navy has not fully funded its shallow water mine countermeasures projects, even though it identified this area as a priority. Reliability and Supportability Problems Affect Mission Capability of Mine Warfare Ships
Reliability problems and parts shortages continue to affect the readiness and performance capabilities of the Navy’s MCM ships. The Command has had some success with its efforts. In addition, the Navy has plans to acquire a new MCS ship early in the next century. In the interim, the Navy is spending more than $118 million to modify an existing amphibious warfare ship to provide mine warfare assets with command, control, and support. Further, Navy officials estimate that it will cost the Navy $4.5 million annually to operate and maintain the MCS ship. Many of the shallow water mine countermeasures projects are underfunded. The Navy estimates that it will cost $3.6 million per year to operate and maintain each of these ships. Recommendations
To improve the Navy’s readiness to conduct mine countermeasures, we recommend that the Secretary of the Navy develop a long-range plan to identify the gaps and limitations in the Navy’s mine countermeasures capabilities; establish priorities among the competing projects and programs, including those in research and development; and sustain the development and procurement of the most critical systems. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Navy's efforts to improve its ability to conduct effective sea mine countermeasures (MCM) in two simultaneous major regional conflicts, focusing on the: (1) status of the Navy's research and development projects; (2) readiness of the Navy's present MCM equipment; and (3) match between the Navy's planned and on-hand MCM equipment and its MCM requirements.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) the Navy must develop different systems to cover deep- and shallow-water mine clearing operations, and its shallow-water MCM capability is limited; (2) the Navy has about 18 different projects to address its MCM weaknesses, but has not set clear priorities among its mine warfare programs; (3) a long-range plan could help the Navy maximize its limited financial resources and ensure ongoing funding of its priority systems; (4) the Navy has experienced delays in new systems' deployment and has identified shortfalls of at least $99.5 million in its shallow-water projects' development; (5) the Navy's 14 oceangoing MCM ships have long-standing equipment reliability problems and parts shortages, which hinders mission performance; (6) the Navy is resolving the ships' problems, but that will take several more years; (7) the Navy is spending about $1.5 billion for 12 coastal, non-oceangoing mine hunting ships that are no longer needed, and will spend an average of $3.6 million annually to operate and maintain each of them; (8) the Navy plans to acquire a new MCM command, control, and support ship early in the next century and, in the interim, convert an older helicopter carrier at a cost of $118 million, but other existing ships and onshore locations could fulfill mission requirements at a lower cost; and (9) the Navy could save millions of dollars by deactivating some of the coastal ships and the command support ship. |
gao_GAO-12-582 | gao_GAO-12-582_0 | CPSC has jurisdiction over thousands of types of consumer products and hazardous substances, many of which are subject to mandatory regulations or voluntary standards, or both. Its activities include enforcing mandatory standards and reporting requirements, investigating product hazards, and determining corrective actions (such as recalls) for manufacturers not in compliance with safety standards. Standards Development Process, Industry Certification, and Legal Factors Help Ensure Compliance with Voluntary Standards
Industry representatives and consumer groups we spoke to said that compliance with voluntary standards developed through the consensus process is generally considered to be high, although they do not track compliance. While CPSC Cannot Legally Require Compliance with Voluntary Standards, Industry Monitoring and Participation in Standards Development Help Encourage Compliance
CPSC cannot compel compliance with voluntary standards. Noncompliance with a voluntary standard, however, can inform a determination of a substantial product hazard by the CPSC. Staff may attend standards development meetings, take an active part in the discussions, and provide data and explanatory material, but CPSC’s regulation prohibits staff from voting on the standards or from holding leadership positions in standards development committees. CPSC’s rationale for limiting involvement in standards development activity, as described in its regulation, is to maintain its independence—such as not appearing to endorse a specific standard. Specifically, it states that the federal government may need to be actively engaged or play a convening role to accelerate standards development in standard setting and implementation, including supporting leadership positions for federal agency staff in SDO committees. Consumer Product Safety Experts Value CPSC’s Input, but Also Called For Earlier and More Active CPSC Participation
CPSC, consumer groups, and industry officials with whom we spoke generally viewed CPSC’s participation in voluntary standards development activities favorably. Although voluntary standards do not have the force of law, manufacturers are legally required to report substantial product hazards to CPSC. Although failure to meet a voluntary standard alone is not sufficient for CPSC to take action against a company—because voluntary standards are not enforceable by law—CPSC’s analysis of the evidence of noncompliance and determination that the product could pose a substantial product hazard can lead to corrective action. In our review of CPSC documents, the agency focused much of its surveillance and compliance work on imported products. Compliance investigators examine the sample to determine whether it (1) complies with the relevant mandatory standard or standards; (2) is accompanied by a certification of compliance with relevant product safety standard that is supported by testing, in some cases by a third party, (3) is or has been determined to be an imminently hazardous product; (4) has a product defect that presents a substantial product hazard; or (5) is produced by a manufacturer who failed to comply with CPSC inspection and According to a CPSC notice, from October recordkeeping requirements.1, 2011, to December 1, 2011, officials identified about 240 noncompliant products at ports of entry, including defective hair dryers, lamps, and holiday lights. CPSC is required by law to rely on these standards, developed through consensus by industry, consumer, and government participants, when the standards are adequate to address the risk of harm and substantial compliance with them is likely. For fiscal years 2008 through 2011, 80 percent of recalls have been of imported products that may be subject to voluntary standards, highlighting challenges CPSC faces in helping to ensure the safety of consumer products. While OMB guidance gives agencies discretion to determine their level of participation in standard setting activities, CPSC has chosen to limit participation to maintain impartiality and avoid appearance of endorsing a specific voluntary standard. Recommendation for Executive Action
To strengthen the adequacy of voluntary standards, we recommend that the Chairman of CPSC direct agency staff to review the policy for participating in voluntary standards development activities and determine the feasibility of assuming a more active, engaged role in developing voluntary standards. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To evaluate the extent to which manufacturers comply with voluntary standards for consumer products, we interviewed officials from the Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) and national consumer, industry, standard-setting, and legal organizations that have expertise in working on voluntary standards development for consumer products. To evaluate CPSC’s authority and ability to encourage compliance with voluntary standards, we reviewed CPSC’s statutory and regulatory authority related to voluntary standards. To evaluate the consequences for manufacturers that fail to comply with voluntary standards, we reviewed documents from CPSC officials and obtained and reviewed publicly available data on recalls and other corrective actions. | Why GAO Did This Study
Growing numbers of recalls in 2007 and 2008, particularly of childrens products, focused increased attention on CPSC. Consumer products can be subject to mandatory or voluntary standards, or both. Questions have been raised about the level of compliance with voluntary standards and CPSCs ability to encourage compliance. The Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2012 directed GAO to analyze manufacturers compliance with voluntary industry standards. This report evaluates (1) what is known about the extent to which manufacturers comply with voluntary standards for consumer products, (2) CPSCs authority and ability to require compliance with voluntary standards, and (3) the consequences for manufacturers that fail to comply with voluntary standards.
To do this, GAO reviewed CPSCs statutory and regulatory authorities to encourage compliance with voluntary standards; reviewed agency documents and literature on consumer product safety; analyzed data on CPSC corrective actions; and met with representatives from national consumer, industry, legal, and standard-setting organizations who have expertise in developing consumer product safety standards.
What GAO Found
Although the Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) enforces compliance with mandatory federal safety standards, it is also required by law to rely on voluntary safety standards when it determines that the standard adequately addresses the product hazard and is likely to have substantial compliance. Voluntary standardsdeveloped by industry, consumer, and government participants through a consensus processcover many of the thousands of types of products in CPSCs jurisdiction. Compliance with voluntary standards is not routinely tracked, but it is generally considered to be high by industry participants. Compliance with these standards also depends on industry and legal factors, such as retailer requirements to demonstrate proof of compliance with voluntary safety standards and risk of liability in product liability lawsuits.
Because voluntary standards do not have the force of law, CPSC cannot compel compliance with them. However, noncompliance with a voluntary standard can inform a determination of a substantial product hazard by the CPSC that in turn can lead to CPSC enforcement actions. CPSC has exercised its expanded authority to place a product on the substantial product hazards list. Specifically, it designated drawstrings from childrens upper outerwear and hair dryers without a ground fault circuit interrupter as hazardous products, and Customs has seized violative items at ports. CPSC also participates in standard development activities with industry and consumer representatives and monitors select voluntary standards. CPSC attends standard development meetings, supplies hazard and injury data and analysis, and provides input on draft standards. However, CPSCs regulation prohibits staff from voting on the final standards or from participating in any meeting that excludes other groups, such as media or consumers. CPSCs rationale for limiting involvement in standards development activity is to maintain its independencesuch as not appearing to endorse a specific standard. Office of Management and Budget guidance gives agencies discretion to determine their level of participation in standard setting activities, including full involvement in discussions, serving in leadership positions, and voting on standards. A January 2012 White House memorandum states that the federal government may need to be actively engaged in standards development and implementation, including playing an active role in standard setting and assuming leadership positions in Standard Development Organization committees. Committee participants GAO spoke to value CPSCs input but generally agreed that CPSC should participate earlier and take a more active role in standards development. These actions could enhance CPSCs oversight, and may strengthen voluntary standards.
Manufacturers that fail to comply with voluntary standards can face consequences when CPSC has determined that noncompliance poses a significant risk of injury or death to consumers. CPSC can take corrective action against the manufacturer, including recalls, or take longer term action to ban the hazardous product. CPSC has focused much of its surveillance and compliance work on imported products. For fiscal years 2008 through 2011, 80 percent of CPSC recalls have been of imported products that may be subject to voluntary standards, highlighting challenges CPSC faces in helping to ensure the safety of consumer products.
What GAO Recommends
To strengthen the adequacy of voluntary standards, CPSC should review the policy for participating in voluntary standards development activities and determine the feasibility of assuming a more active, engaged role in developing voluntary standards. CPSC supported the recommendation. |
gao_GAO-02-546 | gao_GAO-02-546_0 | DOJ’s use of the False Claims Act currently includes three national initiatives involving hospitals. Similarly, DOJ’s requirement that all U.S. Attorneys’ Offices involved in civil health care fraud matters annually certify their compliance with the guidance, a process also instituted 2 years ago in response to our recommendations, appears to have continued to promote compliance. The working groups have continued to be involved in the development and implementation of the national initiatives. It also enables offices to devote individualized attention to each hospital’s unique circumstances, such as its efforts to comply with billing rules and its financial condition, as the guidance requires. Hospital Associations Express Few Concerns Regarding DOJ’s Compliance with the Guidance
Representatives from the AHA and the eight state hospital associations we spoke to were generally satisfied that U.S. Attorneys’ Offices were adhering to DOJ’s False Claims Act guidance in the national initiatives. DOJ has instituted sufficient monitoring of U.S. Attorneys’ Offices participating in the national initiatives and other civil health care fraud matters to help ensure that offices use the act in a fair and even-handed manner. | What GAO Found
The Department of Justice (DOJ) recovered more than $1.2 billion in health care fraud cases in fiscal year 2001. The False Claims Act bolstered DOJ's recoveries and enabled the government to seek damages and penalties against providers who knowingly submitted fraudulent bills to Medicare, Medicaid, or other government programs. In the late 1990s, industry representatives voiced concerns that DOJ had over zealously pursued hospitals, conducted unwarranted investigations, and demanded large penalties for unintentional errors. In response, DOJ issued guidance that emphasized the importance of using the act in a fair and even-handed manner and introduced new procedures for national initiatives. DOJ requires all U.S. Attorneys' Offices that pursue civil health care fraud to annually certify their compliance with the guidance. DOJ appears to be conducting its three national initiatives consistent with the guidance. U.S. Attorneys' Offices that GAO visited had coordinated their activities with the national initiative working groups and, as the guidance requires, took each hospital's unique circumstances into consideration in resolving these matters. Representatives from the American Hospital Association and the state hospital associations GAO spoke to were generally satisfied that U.S. Attorneys' Offices were adhering to DOJ's False Claims Act guidance. |
gao_GAO-08-360 | gao_GAO-08-360_0 | In August 2007, 42 percent of CCE’s contract specialists were contractors. Activities and Responsibilities of Contractor Contract Specialists Mirror Those of Government Personnel
Contractor contract specialists at CCE perform the same tasks as government contract specialists. We reviewed contract files for 42 randomly selected contract actions on which contractor contract specialists worked during fiscal years 2006 and 2007 and found that the contractors had prepared a range of contracting documents, such as contract modifications, requests for legal review, small business coordination records, cover sheets to route contract actions for approval, award decision memorandums, and memorandums to the file. In fact, CCE officials said that they cannot compete with the private sector when it comes to offering some employment incentives. Finally, although policies and procedures are in place to help mitigate organizational and personal conflicts of interest, in practice, CCE relies on contractor employees to self-identify potential conflicts. Although the distinction between a personal services contract and a non-personal services contract is somewhat murky and requires a case-by-case analysis based on the facts of each circumstance, we found no additional DOD guidance that elaborated on the factors contracting officers or program officials should consider in determining whether a personal services contract exists and how to mitigate against this risk when contractors are working side by side with their government counterparts, perhaps even receiving their daily task assignments from a government supervisor. Although CCE and the contractor have taken steps to mitigate OCI risks, in practice, identifying and mitigating the risks necessarily relies, to a large extent, on individual contractor personnel. CCE Is Paying More for Contractor Contract Specialists Than Its Government Employees
CCE is paying more on average for contractor-provided contract specialists than for its government specialists. Therefore, we compared the costs and experience of the government and contractor employees within these two categories. Key elements of our analysis were as follows: The loaded hourly cost of a government employee includes salary, costs of the government’s contributions to the employee’s benefits, the costs to train the employee, the employee’s travel expenses, and the costs of operations overhead—which are the costs of government employees who provide support services, such as budget analysts or human capital staff. Contract Vehicles Inappropriately Issued and Used to Order Contract Specialists
CCE’s issuance of the BPAs with four contractors for contract specialists under GSA’s MOBIS schedule was inappropriate as some of the services required in CCE’s performance work statements were outside the scope of the underlying contracts. Because of federal agencies’ demand for contract support services, GSA recently implemented a revised MOBIS category for acquisition management support, which includes contract specialist services. Because CCE has not considered the appropriate balance of contractor and government personnel performing specific functions, or adequately trained its government workforce, the agency runs the risk of over reliance on contractors to meet its mission and of paying more in the long run. To help ensure that CCE has sufficient qualified government personnel to meet its mission, and uses contractors appropriately, we recommend that the Secretary of the Army direct ACA to work with CCE in taking the following three actions: identify the appropriate mix of contractor and government contract specialists over the long term and develop a plan to help fill positions to achieve the desired balance; implement a training program designed to ensure that CCE’s permanent employees develop and maintain needed skills; and implement formal oversight procedures to ensure that contractors identify themselves as such in all interactions external to CCE, including telephone communications, e-mail signature lines, and documents, as required by the FAR. This report will also be available at no charge on GAO’s Web site at http://www.gao.gov. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To learn more about the use and roles of contractors providing contract specialist services, we conducted a case study under the authority of the Comptroller General to conduct evaluations on his own initiative. We selected the Army’s Contracting Center of Excellence (CCE), in the Washington, D.C., area, as one Department of Defense (DOD) agency using contractors in this role based on a bid protest that had been submitted to our office. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 2007, the Department of Defense (DOD) paid contractors $158.3 billion for a range of services, including contract specialists. To better understand the use of contractors in this role, GAO initiated a case study, under the authority of the Comptroller General, at the Army Contracting Agency's (ACA) Contracting Center of Excellence (CCE). GAO determined (1) the extent to which and why CCE relies on contractor contract specialists, (2) how risks of contractor use are mitigated, (3) how the cost of the contractors compares to that for CCE's government employees, and (4) whether the contract vehicles were appropriate. GAO reviewed a random sample of contract files to understand the contractors' duties and responsibilities, compared compensation costs, and reviewed documents from the General Services Administration (GSA), under whose contracts CCE ordered the contract specialists.
What GAO Found
CCE has relied on contractor contract specialists since it began hiring them in 2003. In August 2007, contractors--who work side by side and perform the same functions as their government counterparts--comprised 42 percent of CCE's contract specialists. CCE officials cited difficulties hiring and retaining government personnel in light of the competition from government and the private sector for this competency. While CCE officials said that they prefer to use government employees, they have not considered the appropriate balance of contractor versus government contract specialists. Furthermore, CCE has not addressed the need for more training of its government employees to strengthen their skills in conducting CCE's increasingly more complex procurements. Methods to mitigate the risks of using contractors have been mixed in effect. First, the line separating contractor from government employee is blurry, and contractors did not always clearly identify themselves as such when dealing with the public. Second, the potential for the work being done under a personal services contract, which the Federal Acquisition Regulation generally prohibits because of the government-contractor relationship it creates, was clearly present. While contractor managers retained control over matters such as approving leave requests, CCE took steps to further strengthen the management distinction between government and contractor employees based on GAO's findings. Finally, risks of organizational and personal conflicts of interest were mitigated to some extent, but in practice the government relies on individual contractor employees to identify potential conflicts. These types of risks must be mitigated to ensure that the government does not lose accountability over policy and program decisions. CCE is paying up to almost 27 percent more for its contractor-provided contract specialists than for similarly graded government employees. This comparison took into account government salary, benefits, and overhead and the loaded hourly labor rates paid to contractors. Our review of available r?sum?s showed that six contractor employees supporting CCE in fiscal year 2007 had on average more contracting experience than CCE's five recent government hires. Despite CCE's legal counsel's concerns, CCE has been inappropriately ordering contract specialists under a GSA contract because the services were out of scope of those contracts. GAO found additional problems, such as a contractor advertising contract specialist services on GSA's Web site that it was not authorized to provide. Due to what it characterizes as the growing demand by federal agencies for contractor contract specialists, GSA recently posted a revised contract category, under which government agencies can procure contract specialists to provide acquisition management services, such as cost estimating and proposal evaluation support. In response to GAO's findings, GSA contacted each of the contractors involved in our review about their out-of-scope services and plans further follow-ups with them. |
gao_GAO-16-866T | gao_GAO-16-866T_0 | SBA Improved Communications to Firms about Changes to HUBZone Designations but Had Not Fully Implemented GAO’s Recommendation
As of August 2016, SBA had taken some actions to address but had not yet fully implemented our recommendation on better informing firms about programmatic changes that could affect their eligibility. In our February 2015 report, we described how HUBZone designations can change with some frequency. Areas that lose their designation begin a 3-year “redesignation” period during which firms in those areas can continue to apply to and participate in the program and receive contracting preferences. After the 3 years, firms in these areas lose their HUBZone certified firm status and the associated federal contracting award preferences. However, we found that SBA’s communications to firms about programmatic changes (including redesignation) generally had not been targeted or specific to firms that would be affected by the changes. Consequently, we recommended that SBA establish a mechanism to better ensure that firms are notified of changes to HUBZone designations that may affect their participation in the program. In response to the recommendation, SBA has improved notifications to newly certified firms. As we reported in March 2016, SBA revised its certification letters to firms. However, we found in March 2016 that SBA had not yet implemented changes to ensure that all currently certified firms are notified of changes that could affect their program eligibility. As of August 2016, SBA had plans to improve its notifications to all firms. Additionally, SBA officials told us that the agency intends to develop a technology solution similar to SBA One—a database now used to process loan applications—to include the HUBZone program to help collect information and documents from existing firms and address this recommendation. SBA expects to implement this solution by spring 2017. SBA Has Taken Some Steps to Address GAO’s Recommendation to Strengthen the Recertification Process
We found in February 2015 that SBA had addressed weaknesses in its certification process that we previously identified. However, as of August 2016, SBA had not yet taken steps to fully address our recommendation related to the HUBZone firm recertification process. In February 2015, we reported that SBA had changed its certification process to require all applicant firms to provide documentation supporting their eligibility and to require agency staff to perform a full document review to determine firms’ eligibility for the program. Additionally, SBA had conducted site visits on 10 percent of its portfolio of certified firms every year in response to a prior GAO June 2008 recommendation. Second, in 2015 we found that SBA relied on firms’ attestations of continued eligibility and generally did not request supporting documentation. Consequently, we recommended that SBA reassess the recertification process and implement additional controls, such as developing criteria and guidance on using a risk-based approach to requesting and verifying firm information, allowing firms to initiate the recertification process, and ensuring that sufficient staff would be dedicated to the effort so that significant backlogs would not recur. For example, instead of manually identifying firms for recertification twice a year, SBA automated the notification process, enabling notices to be sent daily for firms to respond to and attest that they continued to meet the eligibility requirements for the program. According to SBA officials, this change should ultimately help eliminate the backlog by September 30, 2016. However, as we discussed in our March 2016 report, SBA had not implemented additional controls (such as guidance for when to request supporting documents) for the recertification process because SBA officials believe that any potential risk of fraud would be mitigated by site visits to firms. Based on data that SBA provided, the agency visited about 10 percent of certified firms each year during fiscal years 2013–2015. SBA’s reliance on site visits alone would not mitigate the recertification weaknesses that were the basis for our recommendation. And as we stated in 2015 and reiterated in 2016, the characteristics of firms and the status of HUBZone areas—the bases for program eligibility—often can change, and need to be monitored. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. | Why GAO Did This Study
The purpose of the HUBZone program is to stimulate economic development in economically distressed areas. SBA certified HUBZone firms are eligible for federal contracting benefits, including limited competition awards such as sole-source and set-aside contracts. Small firms in SBA's HUBZone program had almost $6.6 billion in obligations on active federal contracts for calendar year 2015.
This testimony includes a discussion of (1) how SBA communicates changes in HUBZone designations to firms, including how SBA addressed GAO's 2015 recommendation to improve this process, and (2) SBA's certification and recertification processes for firms, including how SBA addressed GAO's 2015 recommendation to improve recertification.
GAO relied on the work supporting its February 2015 report on SBA's oversight of the program ( GAO-15-234 ) and its March 2016 report on actions taken in response to GAO recommendations ( GAO-16-4232R ), as well as July and August 2016 interviews with SBA officials on efforts the agency had undertaken to implement GAO's recommendations.
What GAO Found
As of August 2016, the Small Business Administration (SBA) had taken steps to better inform firms about changes in the designations of Historically Underutilized Business Zones (HUBZones) but had not yet fully implemented GAO's February 2015 recommendation to improve this process.
SBA primarily designates economically distressed areas as HUBZones, based on demographic data such as unemployment and poverty rates. The designations include certain census tracts and counties and are subject to periodic changes as economic conditions change. HUBZones that lose qualifying status due to changes in economic conditions become “redesignated” and undergo a 3-year transition period. After the 3-year period, HUBZone certified firms in these areas can no longer apply to and participate in the program and receive contracting preferences.
GAO found in February 2015 that SBA's communications to firms about programmatic changes (including redesignation) generally were not specific to affected firms and thus some firms might not have been informed they would lose eligibility. GAO recommended SBA better ensure firms were notified of changes that might affect program participation.
In response, SBA revised its approval letters to newly certified firms to include information about the consequences of redesignation (if applicable). But as of August 2016, SBA had not yet implemented changes to help ensure all currently certified firms would be notified of changes that could affect their program eligibility. SBA officials recently told GAO the agency intended to develop a technology solution by spring 2017 to help address GAO's recommendations.
While SBA made changes to its certification and recertification processes, SBA had not fully addressed GAO's recommendation on recertification of firms. To receive initial certification, SBA requires all firms to provide documentation to show they meet the eligibility requirements. SBA also conducts site visits at selected firms (for example, based on the amount of federal contracts received). According to HUBZone regulations, firms wishing to remain in the program without any interruption must recertify their continued eligibility to SBA within 30 days after the third anniversary of their certification date and each subsequent 3-year period. But in 2015, GAO found SBA did not require firms seeking recertification to submit any information to verify continued eligibility and instead relied on firms' attestations of continued eligibility. GAO also found SBA had a backlog for recertifying firms. GAO recommended in February 2015 that SBA implement additional controls for recertification, including criteria for requesting and verifying firm information, and ensuring sufficient staffing for the process so that significant backlogs would not recur. As of August 2016, SBA had plans to eliminate the backlog, but had not issued guidance on requesting supporting documents. SBA officials stated that any potential risk of fraud during recertification would be mitigated by SBA's site visits of firms. But as GAO stated in 2015 and reiterated in 2016, SBA only conducts site visits to about 10 percent of certified firms on an annual basis and characteristics of firms often can change, therefore relying on site visits is not adequate to mitigate this risk. |
gao_GAO-06-644 | gao_GAO-06-644_0 | Background
Agricultural inspections at U.S. ports of entry had been the responsibility of USDA since 1913. After the transfer, CBP formalized this process to ensure all agriculture specialists were receiving the necessary on-the-job training. CBP and APHIS Have Taken Steps to Improve Targeting of Agricultural Inspections
CBP and APHIS have also taken steps to better identify and target shipments and passengers that present potentially high risk to U.S. agriculture. CBP has not developed sufficient performance measures to manage and evaluate the AQI program. Since then, CBP has hired more than 630 specialists, but the agency has not yet developed or used a risk-based staffing model for determining where to assign its agriculture specialists. However, CBP has not used this data to evaluate the effectiveness of the AQI program. Agriculture Canine Program Has Deteriorated
Agriculture canines are a key tool for targeting passengers and cargo for inspection, but we found that the program has deteriorated since the transfer. Furthermore, APHIS did not always make regular transfers of funds to CBP as it had agreed to, causing CBP to use other funding sources or to reduce spending. Despite the drop in revenue, APHIS had to increase AQI inspection activities because of post- September 11 concerns about the threat of bioterrorism. Consequently, in fiscal years 2004 and 2005, APHIS used AQI user-fee collections from previous years, and CBP used another available appropriation to cover AQI costs. APHIS uses this information to set user-fee rates and to audit user-fee collections. Although CBP provided detailed cost information by activity and user-fee type to APHIS for fiscal year 2004, CBP provided only estimated cost information for fiscal year 2005 because of a weakness in the design of the agency’s new financial management system. Specifically, in light of the AQI program’s expanded mission, DHS needs to develop and adopt meaningful performance measures to assess the AQI program’s effectiveness at intercepting prohibited agricultural materials; implement a national risk-based staffing model to ensure that adequate numbers of agriculture specialists are staffed to areas of greatest vulnerability; and review its financial management systems to ensure financial accountability for funds allocated to the AQI program. Recommendations for Executive Action
To ensure the effectiveness of CBP and APHIS agricultural quarantine inspection programs designed to protect U.S. agriculture from accidental or deliberate introduction of foreign pests and disease, we are making the following seven recommendations: We recommend that the Secretaries of Homeland Security and Agriculture work together to adopt meaningful performance measures for assessing the AQI program’s effectiveness at intercepting foreign pests and disease on agricultural materials entering the country by all pathways—including commercial aircraft, vessels, and truck cargo—and posing a risk to U.S. agriculture; establish a process to identify and assess the major risks posed by foreign pests and disease and develop and implement a national staffing model to ensure that agriculture staffing levels at each port are sufficient to meet those risks; ensure that urgent agriculture alerts and other information essential to safeguarding U.S. agriculture are more effectively shared between the departments and transmitted to DHS agriculture specialists in the ports; improve the effectiveness of the agriculture canine program by reviewing policies and procedures regarding training and staffing of agriculture canines and ensure that these policies and procedures are followed in the ports; and revise the user fees to ensure that they cover the AQI program’s costs. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Scope and Methodology
To assess the extent to which the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) have changed the Agricultural Quarantine Inspection (AQI) program since the transfer of responsibilities from USDA to DHS, we reviewed the 2003 Memorandum of Agreement between the United States Department of Homeland Security and the United States Department of Agriculture, dated February 28, 2003, and the associated appendixes governing how USDA and DHS are to coordinate inspection responsibilities. We also reviewed agency documentation, including training materials for newly hired Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officers, information on databases used by CBP agricultural specialists to target agriculture inspections, joint-agency reports on port compliance with agricultural inspection policy, and information related to CBP’s establishment and utilization of new agriculture liaison positions. To assess how the departments have managed and coordinated their agriculture inspection responsibilities, we reviewed the interagency memorandum of agreement between DHS and USDA and its associated appendixes. 3. | Why GAO Did This Study
U.S. agriculture generates over $1 trillion in annual economic activity, but concerns exist about the sector's vulnerability to a natural or deliberate introduction of foreign livestock, poultry, and crop pests and disease. Under the Agricultural Quarantine Inspection (AQI) program, international passengers and cargo are inspected at U.S. ports of entry to seize prohibited material and intercept foreign agricultural pests. The Homeland Security Act of 2002 transferred AQI inspections from the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and left certain other AQI responsibilities at USDA. GAO examined (1) the extent to which USDA and DHS have changed the inspection program since the transfer, (2) how the agencies have managed and coordinated their responsibilities, and (3) how funding for agricultural inspections has been managed since the transfer.
What GAO Found
After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, federal agencies' roles and responsibilities were modified to help protect agriculture. In March 2003, more than 1,800 agriculture specialists within USDA's Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) became DHS Customs and Border Protection (CBP) employees, while USDA retained responsibility for AQI activities such as setting inspection policy, providing training, and collecting user fees. Since the transfer, the agencies have expanded training on agriculture issues for CBP officers and agriculture specialists. CBP and APHIS also have taken steps to enable agriculture specialists to better target shipments and passengers for inspections and established a process to assess how CBP agriculture specialists are implementing AQI policy. Finally, CBP created a new agriculture liaison position in each of its district field offices to advise regional directors on agricultural issues. While these are positive steps, the agencies face management and coordination problems that increase the vulnerability of U.S. agriculture to foreign pests and disease. CBP has not developed sufficient performance measures that take into account the agency's expanded mission or consider all pathways by which prohibited agricultural items or foreign pests may enter the country. Specifically, although CBP's measures focus on two pathways that pose a risk to U.S. agriculture, they do not consider other key pathways such as commercial aircraft, vessels, and truck cargo. Also, although CBP has hired more than 630 specialists since the transfer, it has not yet developed or used a risk-based staffing model to ensure that adequate numbers of agriculture specialists are staffed to areas of greatest vulnerability. CBP also has not used available inspection and interception data to evaluate the performance of the AQI program. CBP and APHIS also continue to experience difficulty in sharing information such as key policy changes and urgent inspection alerts, and CBP has allowed the number and proficiency of agriculture canine units to decline. Although APHIS is legally authorized (though not required) to charge AQI user fees to cover program costs, we found that the agencies have not taken the necessary steps to ensure that user fees cover AQI costs. Consequently, the agencies had to use other authorized funding sources to pay for the program. Also, because of weaknesses in the design of CBP's new financial management system, CBP was unable to provide APHIS with information on the actual costs of the AQI program by user-fee type--for example, fees paid by international air passengers. APHIS uses this information to set future user-fee rates. Finally, in fiscal years 2004 and 2005, APHIS did not transfer AQI funds to CBP as agreed to by both agencies, causing some ports of entry to reduce spending on inspection activities in fiscal year 2005. |
gao_HEHS-98-1 | gao_HEHS-98-1_0 | Job Corps Eligibility Guidance Is Inadequate
We found that Job Corps’ policy guidance on two of its eligibility criteria was ambiguous and incomplete. As a result, the program’s eligibility process was not following all the requirements of the law or program regulations. Our statistical analysis provides some information about characteristics significantly related to the likelihood of remaining in the program for at least 60 days that Labor could use to design outreach efforts, establish priorities among applicants, or improve the retention rate for those who might otherwise leave the program early. Contractors With Higher Retention Rates Have Better Assessment Procedures
Of the 11 outreach and admissions contractors that we visited, those with higher retention rates (10 percent or fewer of their enrollees dropping out within the first 30 days) tended to have better procedures for identifying applicants with the commitment and motivation to remain in and benefit from the program. However, Labor does not have the information it needs to accurately assess the performance of its placement contractors. One of the measures held contractors accountable for placing participants who were realistically unemployable. Job Corps requires placement contractors to assist all terminees with placement regardless of how long they were in the program or the reason they left, and it has established the following standards to measure contractor performance:
70 percent of all terminees assigned to a contractor are to be placed,
70 percent of all placements are to be in full-time jobs, the average wage paid to participants placed in jobs is to be equal to or greater than a specified level, and
42 percent of all job placements are to be in occupations related to the training received. Training-Related Placement Measure Is Flawed
The job-training match measure is used to evaluate the effectiveness of vocational training programs and placement contractors by determining the percentage of jobs terminees obtain that matches the training they received while in Job Corps. Labor’s guidance gives placement contractors wide latitude in deciding whether a job placement was a job-training match. Placement contractors are responsible for recording this information. A common characteristic among these contractors was having staff who had only one responsibility—placing Job Corps participants. Between program years 1994 and 1996, Labor regional offices did not renew two-thirds (12 of 18) of the placement contracts they had with state employment service agencies (see table 3). Although Job Corps is a performance-driven program, the measures used to assess placement performance may not be meaningful and thus may not provide Labor with the information it needs to accurately assess placement contractor performance. We reviewed Job Corps legislation as well as Labor’s program regulations and policy guidance on program eligibility, outreach and assessment of individuals for participation in the program, and placement of participants after termination. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on the Job Corps program's recruitment and placement contractors, focusing on: (1) whether Job Corps' policy guidance regarding eligibility criteria is consistent with the legislation and regulations; (2) how the use of recruiting contractors could be improved to increase participant retention in the program; and (3) how the use of placement contractors could be improved to enhance positive outcomes.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) Job Corps' policy guidance for 2 of the 11 eligibility criteria was ambiguous and incomplete, which has led to an eligibility determination process that fails to follow the requirements of the law and program regulations; (2) in GAO's visits to several outreach and admissions contractors, GAO found that those with higher retention rates follow procedures aimed at identifying applicants with the commitment and motivation to remain in and benefit from the program; (3) in GAO's analysis of participant characteristics, GAO identified certain characteristics significantly related to the likelihood of remaining in the program for at least 60 days; (4) the Department of Labor (DOL) could use some of these characteristics to design outreach efforts or to establish priorities among eligible applicants; (5) although Job Corps is a performance-driven program and DOL uses performance measures to make decisions on placement contractor renewal, two of the measures DOL used were not meaningful and, thus, DOL did not have the information it needed to accurately assess the performance of placement contractors; (6) placement measures held contractors responsible for placing individuals who may have received little or no benefit from the program or who demonstrated behavior that normally would be unacceptable to most employers; (7) the job-training match measure did not accurately portray the extent to which participants obtained jobs related to their vocational training because of the wide latitude placement contractors have in deciding whether a job is related to the training received and the creativity contractors used in recording the occupational titles of the jobs obtained; (8) one aspect of placement contractors' operations associated with better performance was having staff solely responsible for placing Job Corps participants; (9) seven contractors visited by GAO with high placement rates had staff solely responsible for placing Job Corps participants; (10) in contrast, four of the five contractors having lower placement rates had the same staff responsible for performing outreach and assessment as well as placement; and (11) as a result of its concern about performance, DOL has not renewed 12 of the 18 contracts with state agencies. |
gao_GAO-05-696 | gao_GAO-05-696_0 | DOD Does Not Know the Extent of Solicitation Violations and Does Not Disseminate Information on All Confirmed Violations
DOD does not know the extent to which life insurance agents are violating regulations pertaining to on-installation personal commercial solicitation, and it does not actively disseminate information about all confirmed violations to other portions of DOD and state insurance regulators. The absence of evaluative and reporting requirements in the solicitation directive, as well as ambiguity in the directive about the dissemination of information, are some of the reasons for these situations that limit DOD’s ability to provide oversight of supplemental life insurance solicitation on installations and prevent violators from having access to servicemembers on installations. DOD Does Not Know the Extent to Which Life Insurance Agents Have Violated Solicitation Policies on Domestic Installations
Because of the absence of evaluation and reporting requirements, DOD has not collected the data that it needs to monitor the number, types, and severity of life insurance agents’ violations of DOD’s regulations regarding on-installation solicitation. A survey of personal financial management program managers on installations in the United States indicated that six types of prohibited solicitation practices were perceived to have occurred with varying frequency on their installations during the prior 12 months. More than one-third of the managers indicated that misleading sales presentations regarding supplemental life insurance had occurred occasionally or routinely on their installations, and more than one-quarter said that four of the other five prohibited practices had occurred at least occasionally (see fig. Without knowing the extent of the problem, DOD cannot develop an effective and efficient strategy for curbing the violations. DOD Does Not Disseminate Information about All Confirmed Violations and Enforcement Actions to Other Parts of DOD or to State Life Insurance Regulators
The DOD policy office responsible for oversight of supplemental life insurance solicitation on installations does not routinely disseminate information on all confirmed violations to installations, to the services, or to state life insurance regulators. Data on Payroll Allotments for Supplemental Life Insurance Unreliable and Procedures for Submitting Such Allotments Are Not Always Being Followed
We could not determine the extent to which servicemembers follow DOD’s and the services’ allotment processing policies when purchasing supplemental life insurance because of limitations in the allotment databases and the different ways that finance offices were accepting forms to start the allotments. We could not substantiate insurance officials’ and agents’ assertion that servicemembers were being prevented from using allotments to purchase life insurance. For example: A life insurance agent is alleged to have submitted allotment forms at Fort Bragg for servicemembers who later said they had not wanted the policies for which they were paying. DOD’s Revised Directive Adds New Requirements, but Does Not Fully Address Oversight Deficiencies
DOD’s revised directive on personal commercial solicitation practices on DOD installations incorporates new requirements, but does not address all oversight problems. Some interim policy and practices that are currently in place have been incorporated into the draft revision. Two sets of proposed changes add requirements for gathering and disseminating information about violations on banned agents. As we noted earlier, continued gathering and disseminating information on only those violations severe enough to result in banning an agent will result in DOD’s continuing to be unable to (1) identify the number, types, and severity of all violations and (2) recognize patterns of violations. 3. To assess the extent to which the draft revision of DOD’s directive will address ongoing problems with supplemental life insurance policies on DOD installations, we reviewed the Department of Defense Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2005 to determine the restrictions on when the draft directive could be issued. Additional information, such as direct deposit forms, was also obtained. | Why GAO Did This Study
Servicemembers are engaged overseas in hostile actions that threaten their lives and possibly the future financial security of their families, should they die. To address their financial security needs, some servicemembers have purchased additional life insurance to supplement that offered by the government. Concerns have been raised, though, about solicitation violations, as well as problems in the system for setting up payroll allotments for such insurance. The Department of Defense (DOD) recently published a revised draft directive on solicitation but will not implement the directive until at least 90 days following this GAO report. GAO addressed three primary issues: (1) the extent to which DOD solicitation regulations are being violated; (2) the extent to which DOD personnel are adhering to allotment regulations for the purchase of supplemental life insurance; and (3) the extent to which the new directive addresses ongoing problems in supplemental life insurance solicitation policies.
What GAO Found
DOD does not know the extent to which life insurance agents violate on-installation commercial solicitation regulations and does not actively disseminate information on all confirmed violations to other parts of DOD or to state insurance regulators. GAO found that violations are occurring. For example, in responses to GAO's 2004 survey of personal financial management program managers, one-quarter said prohibited practices such as misleading sales presentations had occurred occasionally or routinely on their installations in the prior 12 months. Also, between October 2001 and October 2004, DOD revoked agents' on-installation solicitation approval at least 26 times. The reason DOD does not have complete data on violations is that it does not have adequate mechanisms for ensuring the systematic tracking of violations. The dissemination problem is attributable to a lack of oversight by the DOD policy office and an ambiguity in its guidance. DOD cannot develop an effective and efficient process for curbing violations without maintaining accurate data on the number, types, and severity of violations and disseminating confirmed violation data to relevant parties. DOD cannot determine the extent to which DOD personnel adhere to allotment regulations because of problems with DOD's payroll databases and the different ways in which regulations are implemented. DOD's Financial Management Regulations, among other things, restrict who can submit an allotment form for supplemental life insurance. GAO could not determine the number of servicemembers with supplemental life insurance allotments due to database limitations, such as all insurance allotments (for example, for life and automobile) sharing the same code. Contrary to regulations, GAO found finance personnel accepting allotment forms without confirming they came from authorized sources. Some said they did this to ensure that policies started promptly. Database problems limit DOD's visibility over prohibited practices, such as those for group solicitation and the acceptance of allotment forms without proper authorization. In addition, GAO could not substantiate the assertion that servicemembers are prevented from using allotments to purchase supplemental life insurance and has identified reasons why this is probably not a widespread problem. DOD's revised directive on commercial insurance solicitation practices on DOD installations adds new requirements, but does not fully address oversight deficiencies. The revised directive will incorporate the interim policy and practices now in place and, to partially address the problems cited above, will add requirements for gathering and disseminating information on confirmed violations. Those requirements, however, will focus on banned agents only, rather than all confirmed violations. The result will be DOD's continuing inability to identify the number, types, and severity of all violations, or to recognize patterns of violations. The directive will also add requirements that installation commanders inquire into alleged violations of the solicitation regulation. |
gao_HEHS-97-3 | gao_HEHS-97-3_0 | We did no verification at SSA’s six other regions. The overall time spent on union activities has grown steadily, from 254,000 hours in 1990 to over 413,000 in 1995. SSA Plans to Improve Its Time-Tracking System
SSA is currently developing a new system to better track and account for time spent on union activities in its field offices and teleservice centers. SSA has also reported to the Congress that the number of full-time representatives—those spending 75 percent or more of their time on union activities—grew from 80 to 145 between fiscal years 1993 and 1995. IRS records showed that their union representatives reported spending 527,000 hours on union activities in fiscal year 1995. Postal Service records show that during fiscal year 1995, union representatives at the Postal Service reported spending 1.7 million hours of official time on the early stages of grievance processing and handling. In discussions with National Labor Relations Board officials, we were told that some private-sector firms do not pay their employees’ salaries for the time they spend performing union activities, and other firms pay for at least some of the time. Workers in the private sector are more likely to financially support unions representing them. To resolve ongoing disputes about official time in SSA field offices, SSA and AFGE signed a new contract in January 1990 that specified a fixed amount of official time to be used by the field office representatives for certain union activities; this time was called “bank time.” The contract also specified additional allowable time for other union activities; this was called “nonbank time.” No fixed amount of official time was specified for nonbank time, however, and the union and SSA disagreed over which activities qualified as bank time activities and which qualified as nonbank time activities. Amount and Cost of Time Spent on Union Activities
During fiscal year 1995, Postal Service employees charged about 1,744,000 hours to union activities related to the early stages of grievance resolution at a cost of over $29 million for salaries. GAO Comments
1. It also states that, today, unions operating in federal government agencies have significant involvement in operational and management decisions. 2. 3. 4. A recorded menu will provide information on how to obtain these lists. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on the time and expenses devoted to union activities at the Social Security Administration (SSA) and other large federal agencies, focusing on: (1) how SSA accounts for employee salaries and expenses for union activities; and (2) union activities in the private sector.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) federal agencies have the discretion to grant employees official time for certain union activities; (2) government employee unions are significantly involved in operational and management decisions but generally cannot bargain over employees' pay and other economic benefits; (3) over the last 6 years, the time spent on union activities at SSA has grown from 254,000 hours to at least 413,000 hours annually, at a cost of $12.6 million in 1995; (4) the number of full-time union representatives at SSA grew from 80 to 145 between 1993 and 1995; (5) although SSA is developing a new system to more accurately track the time spent on union activities, it plans to replace only the automated reporting system for union representatives in SSA field offices and teleservice centers; and (6) SSA field managers stated that their having no involvement in decisions about how much time individuals spend on union activities causes problems in managing day-to-day operations. GAO also found that: (1) the Postal Service reported that 1.7 million hours were spent on union activities related to grievances in fiscal year (FY) 1995; (2) the Internal Revenue Service reported spending 527,000 hours on union activities in FY 1995; and (3) some private-sector employers pay at least some of the salaries and expenses of union representatives, while others do not. |
gao_GAO-15-409 | gao_GAO-15-409_0 | There are currently 10 TRS providers that are compensated from the federal TRS Fund. Total TRS Minutes and Costs Have Grown Significantly since 2002 due to Internet-Based TRS and Increased Usage
According to officials from FCC, most of the TRS providers, and all of the consumer groups that we interviewed, the development of Internet-based TRS technologies and increased usage of these technologies have led to growth in overall program minutes and costs. TRS program data show that total TRS minutes have grown from about 53 million in rate year 2002–2003 to about 249 million in rate year 2013–2014, an almost five- fold increase. Total TRS costs have grown from about $104 million in 2002 to about $818 million in rate year 2013–2014, an almost eight-fold increase (see fig. Figure 5 shows changes in minutes of use from rate years 2002–2003 through 2013–2014 for each form of TRS. According to FCC, one provider and one consumer group, reducing fraud also has played a role in reducing costs for some forms of TRS. With regard to the TRS program, the ADA directs FCC to ensure that telecommunications services are available, to the extent possible and in the most efficient manner, to persons with a hearing or speech disability, and that such services are “functionally equivalent” to the telecommunications services available to individuals without a hearing or speech disability.that the high-level purpose of the TRS program is this provision of functionally equivalent telecommunications to people with hearing or speech disabilities, but FCC has not established specific performance goals to guide its efforts toward achieving that purpose. TRS calls (except VRS) must be answered by CAs within 10 seconds 85 percent of the time. Although FCC has established some TRS performance measures, these measures are not linked to any TRS or universal-service performance goals. By establishing performance measures before establishing performance goals, FCC may be spending its time and resources, and those of the service providers or program administrator, on efforts not well linked to key dimensions of the program. Because of the lack of specific TRS performance goals—and specific performance measures that are crafted around those goals—it is difficult to determine in an objective, quantifiable way if TRS is fulfilling its purpose of making available functionally equivalent telecommunications services to persons with hearing and speech disabilities, and it is difficult for FCC to manage the program in a proactive, results-oriented manner. FCC Lacks a Comprehensive Internal Control System to Manage TRS Program Risks
FCC has designed some internal controls for the TRS program, particularly with respect to program compliance; however, as previously discussed, FCC does not have clear program performance goals. Risk Assessment: Internal control standards call for a risk assessment that will identify risks, both internal and external, and analyze the risks for possible effects. FCC’s risk assessment of the TRS program was a one-page document that did not comprehensively identify risks or considerations of all interactions between FCC and external parties. Information and communication: Internal control standards call for effective external communications to those groups that can have an impact on programs; such groups in the case of TRS, would include TRS users and service providers. TRS rules are contained in federal regulations, and FCC program policies are explained across numerous reports and orders. Following the establishment of TRS’s performance goals, conduct a robust risk assessment that can help FCC design a comprehensive internal-control system. Improve FCC’s communication of TRS rules and procedures to the community of individuals who are deaf, hard of hearing, or have speech disabilities and the companies providing TRS services through the creation and dissemination of a handbook, program manual, or other consolidation of TRS rules and procedures. FCC agreed with our recommendations and discussed actions it plans to take to implement the recommendations. Major contributors to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of this report were to examine (1) how the services and costs of the Telecommunications Relay Service (TRS) program have changed since 2002; (2) the Federal Communication Commission’s (FCC) performance goals and measures for the TRS program and how they compare with key characteristics of successful performance goals and measures; (3) the extent to which the design of the TRS program’s internal control system identifies and considers program risks; and (4) the challenges, if any, that exist in ensuring quality services for users and a competitive environment for providers. To assess program goals and measures, we compared FCC’s performance goals and measures to key characteristics of successful performance goals and measures that GAO developed in prior work, as well as to requirements contained in the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993, as amended by the GPRA Modernization Act of 2010. We identified what controls were in place and then compared the design of the internal control system with the requirements contained in the GAO Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government (the Green Book). 10. | Why GAO Did This Study
TRS allows persons with hearing or speech disabilities to place and receive telephone calls, often with the help of a communications assistant who acts as a translator or facilitator between the two parties having the conversation. FCC is the steward of the TRS program and the federal TRS Fund, which reimburses TRS providers.
GAO was asked to examine FCC's management of the TRS program. This report examines, among other things, (1) changes in TRS services and costs since 2002, (2) FCC's TRS performance goals and measures and how they compare with key characteristics of successful performance goals and measures, and (3) the extent to which the design of the program's internal control system identifies and considers program risks. GAO analyzed 2002 through 2014 service and cost data, compared TRS performance goals and measures to key characteristics of successful performance goals and measures, compared the design of the TRS's internal control system with GAO's standards for internal control, and interviewed officials from FCC, the 10 companies providing interstate TRS, and associations representing the deaf and hard of hearing.
What GAO Found
Since 2002, the overall minutes of use and costs for the Telecommunications Relay Service (TRS) program have grown significantly due to the advent of Internet-based forms of TRS and increased usage by the deaf and hard-of-hearing communities. Program data show that total TRS minutes have grown from about 53 million in “rate year” (July-to-June) 2002–2003 to about 249 million in rate year 2013–2014, an almost five-fold increase. Total TRS costs have grown from about $104 million in the 2002–2003 rate year to about $818 million in the 2013–2014 rate year, an almost eight-fold increase. These increases stem from the popularity of new forms of TRS that use the Internet—such as Video Relay Service (VRS) and Internet Protocol Captioned Telephone Service—and the growth in consumers' use of them, according to FCC, some providers, and one consumer group that GAO interviewed.
The purpose of the TRS program under federal law is to provide persons who are deaf or hard of hearing or have a speech disability with telecommunications services that are “functionally equivalent” to those provided to persons without a hearing or speech disability, but FCC has not established specific performance goals to guide its efforts. FCC has established some performance measures for TRS in the form of minimum performance standards for TRS providers, such as regulations requiring that TRS communications assistants must answer 85 percent of TRS calls (except VRS) within 10 seconds; however, these standards are not linked to higher-level performance goals. By establishing performance measures before establishing performance goals, FCC may be spending time and resources on efforts not well linked to key dimensions of the program. Because of the lack of specific TRS performance goals—and specific performance measures crafted around those goals—it is difficult to determine in an objective, quantifiable way if TRS is making available functionally equivalent telecommunications services, and it is difficult for FCC to manage the program in a proactive, results-oriented manner.
FCC has designed some internal controls for the TRS program, but lacks a comprehensive internal-control system to manage program risks. To address fraud, FCC has designed numerous controls to address compliance risks. For example, FCC eliminated the ability of TRS providers to use subcontractors in 2011 and strengthened TRS's provider-certification rules and user registration rules in 2013. Internal control standards call for the completion of a risk assessment to identify and analyze program risks. FCC's last risk assessment, in 2013, was a one-page document that did not comprehensively identify programmatic risks. A robust risk assessment would help FCC identify risks to providing functionally equivalent services and inform the development of the overall internal-control system. Internal control standards also call for effective external communications to groups that can impact the program, such as TRS's users and providers. FCC's program policies are spread across numerous reports and orders. Six of 10 TRS providers told us they experienced difficulties understanding TRS rules. FCC has sought comment on how best to reorganize its rules to improve clarity, but has not yet adopted any such changes. Doing so could improve FCC's communication of TRS rules and procedures to the deaf community and the companies providing services.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that FCC develop specific TRS performance goals and measures, conduct a robust program risk assessment, and improve the communication of TRS's rules and procedures. In commenting on a draft of this report, FCC agreed with the recommendations and discussed actions it plans to take to implement them. |
gao_GAO-11-363T | gao_GAO-11-363T_0 | Results of Our Audit of the U.S. Government’s Consolidated Financial Statements for Fiscal Years 2010 and 2009
Since the enactment of key financial management reforms in the 1990s, the federal government has made significant progress in improving financial management activities and practices. For fiscal year 2010, 20 of 24 Chief Financial Officers (CFO) Act agencies were able to attain unqualified audit opinions on their accrual-based financial statements within an accelerated reporting timeframe, up from 6 CFO Act agencies for fiscal year 1996. Also, accounting and financial reporting standards have continued to evolve to provide greater transparency and accountability over the federal government’s operations, financial condition, and fiscal outlook. Further, the preparation and audit of financial statements has identified numerous deficiencies, leading to actions to strengthen controls and systems. It is important for the individual federal departments and agencies to remain committed to maintain the progress that has been achieved in obtaining positive audit results and to build upon that progress to make needed improvements. We were, however, able to render unqualified opinions on the 2009, 2008, and 2007 Statements of Social Insurance. Those material weaknesses relate to the federal government’s inability to satisfactorily determine that property, plant, and equipment and inventories and related property, primarily held by the Department of Defense (DOD), were properly reported in the accrual-based consolidated financial statements; reasonably estimate or adequately support amounts reported for certain liabilities, such as environmental and disposal liabilities, or determine whether commitments and contingencies were complete and properly reported; support significant portions of the reported total net cost of operations, most notably related to DOD, and adequately reconcile disbursement activity at certain federal entities; adequately account for and reconcile intragovernmental activity and balances between federal entities; ensure that the federal government’s accrual-based consolidated financial statements were (1) consistent with the underlying audited entities’ financial statements, (2) properly balanced, and (3) in conformity with U.S. generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP); and identify and either resolve or explain material differences between (1) certain components of the budget deficit reported in Treasury’s records that are used to prepare the Reconciliation of Net Operating Cost and Unified Budget Deficit, the Statement of Changes in Cash Balance from Unified Budget and Other Activities, and the Fiscal Projections for the U.S. Government (included in the Supplemental Information section of the Financial Report) and (2) related amounts reported in federal entities’ financial statements and underlying financial information and records. These material weaknesses continued to (1) hamper the federal government’s ability to reliably report a significant portion of its assets, liabilities, costs, and other related information; (2) affect the federal government’s ability to reliably measure the full cost as well as the financial and nonfinancial performance of certain programs and activities; (3) impair the federal government’s ability to adequately safeguard significant assets and properly record various transactions; and (4) hinder the federal government from having reliable financial information to operate in an efficient and effective manner. Addressing Impediments to an Opinion on the Accrual-Based Consolidated Financial Statements
Three major impediments continued to prevent us from rendering an opinion on the U.S. government’s accrual-based consolidated financial statements: (1) serious financial management problems at DOD that have prevented DOD’s financial statements from being auditable, (2) the federal government’s inability to adequately account for and reconcile intragovernmental activity and balances between federal entities, and (3) the federal government’s ineffective process for preparing the consolidated financial statements. Treasury and OMB have generally taken or plan to take actions to address these recommendations. Significant Uncertainties Result in Disclaimer of Opinion on 2010 Statement of Social Insurance
Because of significant uncertainties (as discussed in Note 26 to the consolidated financial statements), primarily related to the achievement of projected reductions in Medicare cost growth reflected in the 2010 Statement of Social Insurance, we were unable to, and we did not, express an opinion on the 2010 Statement of Social Insurance. Long-Term Fiscal Challenges
The 2010 Financial Report includes the first sustainability statement required under new financial reporting standards. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) has also published long-term simulations for many years. Further, sound decisions on the current and future direction of all vital federal government programs and policies are more difficult without reliable, useful, and timely financial and performance information. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO annually audits the consolidated financial statements of the U.S. government. Congress and the President need reliable, useful, and timely financial and performance information to make sound decisions and conduct effective oversight of federal government programs and policies. Over the years, certain material weaknesses in internal control over financial reporting have prevented GAO from expressing an opinion on the accrual-based consolidated financial statements. Unless these weaknesses are adequately addressed, they will, among other things, continue to (1) hamper the federal government's ability to reliably report a significant portion of its assets, liabilities, costs, and other related information; and (2) affect the federal government's ability to reliably measure the full cost as well as the financial and nonfinancial performance of certain programs and activities. This testimony presents the results of GAO's audit for fiscal year 2010 and discusses certain of the federal government's significant long-term fiscal challenges.
What GAO Found
Three major impediments continued to prevent GAO from rendering an opinion on the federal government's accrual-based consolidated financial statements: (1) serious financial management problems at the Department of Defense, (2) federal entities' inability to adequately account for and reconcile intragovernmental activity and balances, and (3) the federal government's ineffective process for preparing the consolidated financial statements. In addition to the material weaknesses underlying these major impediments, GAO noted material weaknesses involving billions of dollars in improper payments, information security, and tax collection activities. With regard to the Statement of Social Insurance (SOSI), GAO was unable to, and did not, express an opinion on the 2010 SOSI because of significant uncertainties discussed by management in the consolidated financial statements, primarily related to the achievement of projected reductions in Medicare cost growth reflected in the 2010 SOSI. GAO was, however, able to render unqualified opinions on the 2009, 2008, and 2007 SOSIs. Since the enactment of key financial management reforms in the 1990s, the federal government has made significant progress in improving financial management activities and practices. For fiscal year 2010, 20 of 24 Chief Financial Officers (CFO) Act agencies were able to attain unqualified audit opinions on their accrual-based financial statements within an accelerated reporting timeframe, up from 6 CFO Act agencies for fiscal year 1996. Also, accounting and financial reporting standards have continued to evolve to provide greater transparency and accountability over the federal government's operations, financial condition, and fiscal outlook. Further, the preparation and audit of financial statements has identified numerous deficiencies, leading to actions to strengthen controls and systems. Much work remains, however, to improve federal financial management. For example, it is essential that the Department of Defense, the Department of the Treasury, and the Office of Management and Budget, along with other federal entities, address the major impediments discussed above. Also, it is important for the individual federal departments and agencies to remain committed to maintain the progress that has been achieved in obtaining positive audit results and to build upon that progress to make needed improvements. The 2010 Financial Report of the United States Government (Financial Report) introduces the first sustainability statement required under a new financial reporting standard, which presents comprehensive long-term fiscal projections for the U.S. government. Such reporting provides a much needed perspective on the federal government's long-term fiscal position and outlook. The Financial Report, like the latest Congressional Budget Office long-term budget outlook and GAO simulations, shows that the federal government is on an unsustainable long-term fiscal path.
What GAO Recommends
Over the years, GAO has made numerous recommendations directed at improving federal financial management. The federal government has generally taken or plans to take actions to address our recommendations. |
gao_NSIAD-96-166 | gao_NSIAD-96-166_0 | 2466—the 60/40 rule, its effects on readiness and national security, and a description of specific difficulties experienced by DOD as a result of that requirement; (2) an analysis of the public-private distribution of depot maintenance and repair workloads for fiscal years 1991 through 1995; and (3) a projection of the public-private workload distribution for fiscal years 1997 through 2001. Current Depot Maintenance Market Is Not Highly Competitive
Although DOD’s workload distribution report stated that privatization would lower depot maintenance costs, DOD offered no documentation to show that its plans to rapidly increase the private sector’s share of depot maintenance workload will be cost-effective. Reported Historical Workloads Could Be More Comprehensive
Section 311 did not provide specific guidance on data to be included in the workload reports. This data collection included the value of parts and services the depots purchase from the private sector as public sector costs. Reporting workload in direct labor hours would provide a more accurate picture of workload mix in that it would address the repair parts problem. However, DOD’s report did not include such data. Data Reported in Historical Workloads Excluded From Future Projections
Like the historical data provided for fiscal years 1991 through 1995, the future workload projections for fiscal years 1997 through 2001 also overstate the public sector’s share by the treatment of funding for repair parts and subcontracts to the private sector and understate the private sector’s share by including the funding of government-furnished material in the public sector’s share and by not including in the private sector share the costs of contract depot maintenance for some classified systems and the cost of contracts awarded by DOD depots for maintenance and repair services. However, when we adjusted the data to make it comparable, the historical and future data are relatively consistent. Matters for Congressional Consideration
More comprehensive and consistent workload data would improve congressional oversight of the allocation of workload between the public and private sectors. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO reviewed the Department of Defense's (DOD) "Depot Maintenance and Repair Workload" report, focusing on: (1) the effect of the legislative requirement concerning the allocation of depot maintenance workloads between the public and private sectors; (2) historical public and private sector depot maintenance workload allocations; and (3) projected public and private depot maintenance workload allocations for fiscal years 1997 through 2001.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) DOD generally complied with the section 311 requirements regarding workload data, except that it did not provide direct labor hour data as required by Congress; (2) DOD stated that it does not collect labor hour statistics from private contractors, but GAO's analysis of DOD's workload report shows that the use of more comprehensive and consistent data would provide Congress and DOD decisionmakers a more accurate picture of historical and future projections of depot maintenance workload allocations between the public and private sectors; (3) without such data, the reports are of limited use to Congress and defense decisionmakers when considering public and private sector workload allocation policy; (4) the 60/40 rule has not adversely affected military readiness; (5) the historical public-private depot workload data for fiscal years 1991 to 1995 presented in the workload distribution report includes in the public sector workload share, the value of repair parts and services they purchase from the private sector, but some of these parts are furnished to the private sector as government-furnished material; and (6) the report's projections of public-private depot workloads for fiscal years 1997 to 2001 are not consistent and comparable to historical data. |
gao_GAO-14-237 | gao_GAO-14-237_0 | 1). Representatives of the aviation industry are concerned there will not be a sufficient number of certain aviation professionals to support this growth—that is, the industry is concerned that the demand will exceed the available supply and that a labor shortage will result. Data and Forecasts Provide Mixed Evidence for a Current or Future Workforce Shortage
Our analyses of labor market data indicate that a shortage of aerospace engineers may exist, but our analysis found less support for a shortage of aircraft mechanics. For example, while both have low unemployment rates, neither employment nor earnings have increased for aircraft mechanics suggesting that employers’ demand for this occupation has not outstripped supply. Further, while some of these individuals will pursue other careers, the number of people completing degrees in these or related fields has increased in recent years, and BLS employment projections indicate slower than average or no growth through 2022. Median earnings for aerospace engineers, however, have stayed about the same over that time period, a statistic that does not appear consistent with a labor shortage. 5). DOD was unable to provide data for engineers. Employment for aircraft mechanics and services technicians and avionics technicians is expected to increase by about 2.5 percent (or 3,000 jobs) and 2.9 percent (or 500 jobs) over the same 10-year period, respectively. Industry and Government Are Taking Some Actions to Facilitate Entry into the Aviation Workforce, but Employers Remain Concerned about Future Needs
Most of the employers we interviewed reported some challenges hiring individuals in the selected professions; often this was not an issue of an insufficient number of candidates seeking employment, but rather an insufficient number of candidates with the experience and skills employers sought available to work at the wage being offered. Almost all employers we spoke with reported taking some actions that economists associate with responding to a labor shortage, but few were raising wages to attract workers. Employers Are Taking a Variety of Actions to Attract and Retain Individuals in the Selected Aviation Professions
According to economic literature we reviewed, employers—who first identify a shortage when they encounter difficulty filling vacancies at the current wage rate—may take a variety of actions in response to a Their actions vary in desirability for the perceived labor shortage.employer based on resources required and their permanency. In response to difficulties filling employment vacancies, employers may: Increase recruiting efforts. These tasks included non-destructive testing and parts plating. The Federal Government Maintains Several Programs and Initiatives That Can Help Attract People to Aviation-Related Fields
As mentioned previously, while no single agency is tasked with developing the aviation professional workforce, several maintain programs that help promote and train people for aviation-related careers. Despite the availability of these programs, most employers and stakeholders we interviewed told us that maintaining a qualified aviation professional workforce will be more difficult in the future due to changes in K-12 education, a perceived emphasis on earning a 4-year degree, and the perceived decreased desirability for working in aviation, particularly aviation maintenance. Agency Comments
We provided a draft of this report to the departments of Defense (DOD), Education (Education), Labor (DOL), and Transportation (DOT) for review and comment. We received technical comments on this report from Education, DOL, and DOT which were incorporated as appropriate. DOD did have any comments on the report. In this report, we examined: (1) what available data and forecasts reveal about the need for and potential availability of aerospace engineers, aircrafts mechanics, and avionics technicians and (2) what actions industry and the federal government are taking, if any, to help attract and retain these professionals. For both employment and earnings we analyzed any change from 2000 through 2012. We did not verify the data that the companies collected and used in making their projections. DOD was unable to provide data on aerospace engineers. Information collected from these interviews is not generalizable. The identified agencies were: FAA, DOD, Veterans Affairs, and DOL. | Why GAO Did This Study
Maintaining a safe and robust aviation system requires qualified aviation professionals—including aerospace engineers, aircraft mechanics, and avionics technicians—to design, manufacture, and repair more than 225,000 aircraft. Aviation stakeholders have expressed concerns that an insufficient supply of personnel could develop because of imminent retirements and a perception that fewer people enter these professions.
GAO was asked to review the supply and demand of aviation professionals. This report discusses (1) what available data and forecasts reveal about the need for and potential availability of aerospace engineers, aircraft mechanics, and avionics technicians, and (2) what actions industry and the federal government are taking to help attract and retain these professionals. GAO (1) collected and analyzed data from 2000 through 2012, employment projections from 2012 through 2022, and literature relevant to the aviation professionals' labor markets; (2) reviewed agency documents; and (3) interviewed agency officials about programs that support training. GAO also interviewed 10 aviation industry associations (5 representing employees and 5 representing employers) and selected a non-generalizable sample of 23 private sector employers, based on size and location, to understand any actions used to attract their workforce.
GAO is not making recommendations. GAO received technical comments on this report from Education, DOL, and DOT, which were incorporated as appropriate. DOD did not have any comments on this report.
What GAO Found
GAO analysis found mixed evidence about a current or possible future shortage of aviation professionals. Aerospace engineers have experienced a low unemployment rate—the most direct measure of a labor shortage—and increases in employment suggesting a shortage may exist; however, earnings for the occupation have stayed about the same. Data provide less support for a shortage of aircraft mechanics; while the occupation has had a low unemployment rate, both employment and earnings have stayed about the same, suggesting that demand for this occupation has not outstripped supply. GAO was unable to analyze information on avionics technicians because of insufficient data. In addition, the Bureau of Labor Statistics' employment projections indicate slower than average or no growth for these three occupations over the next 10 years. Data also suggest the number of people who have received training related to these aviation professions is increasing; however, several other industries compete for these individuals and not all will pursue aviation careers.
Industry and government are taking some actions to attract and retain qualified individuals in these occupations, but employers GAO interviewed remain concerned about future needs. GAO found that most of these employers had some challenges hiring personnel with the skills employers were seeking at the wage they offered. According to economic literature, employers may take several actions in response to a perceived labor shortage—including increasing recruiting efforts and raising wages. Employers reported taking a variety of actions, but few were raising wages. Several agencies—the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and the Departments of Defense (DOD), Education, Labor (DOL), and Veterans Affairs—maintain programs that assist individuals interested in aviation careers. For example, in academic year 2011–2012, Education disbursed approximately $1.6 billion in federal grants to students majoring in related fields. Still, most employers and stakeholders stated that maintaining a qualified workforce will be difficult, in part because of a perception that fewer people are interested in aviation careers. GAO was unable to verify these concerns with available data. It could be expected that employers would continue to take actions at their disposal—such as adjusting wages or changing recruiting and training practices—if a labor shortage were to develop. While such actions would be considered typical market responses to a potential shortage, it does not mean such actions are costless or might not affect the industry. |
gao_GAO-05-444T | gao_GAO-05-444T_0 | VA Has Taken Steps to Provide Services to Seriously Injured Servicemembers as a High Priority
In our January 2005 report on VA’s efforts to expedite VR&E services for seriously injured servicemembers returning from Afghanistan and Iraq, we noted that VA instructed its VBA regional offices, in a September 2003 letter, to provide priority consideration and assistance for all VA services, including health care, to these servicemembers. To identify and monitor those whose injuries may result in a need for VA disability and health services, VA has asked DOD to share data about seriously injured servicemembers. VA has been working with DOD to develop a formal agreement on what specific information to share. In the absence of a formal arrangement for DOD data on seriously injured servicemembers, VA has relied on its regional offices to obtain information about them. In its September 2003 letter, VA asked the regional offices to coordinate with staff at MTFs and VA medical centers in their areas to ascertain the identities, medical conditions, and military status of the seriously injured. VA and DOD jointly developed a clinical practice guideline for identifying and treating individuals with PTSD. The guideline includes a four-question screening tool to identify servicemembers and veterans who may be at risk for PTSD. VA Faces Significant Challenges in Providing Services to the Seriously Injured
VA faces significant challenges in providing services to servicemembers who have sustained serious physical and psychological injuries. For example, in providing VR&E services, individual differences and uncertainties in the recovery process make it inherently difficult to determine when a seriously injured servicemember will be most receptive to assistance. In our January 2005 report, we stated that DOD expressed concern about the timing of VA’s outreach to servicemembers whose discharge from military service is not yet certain. Further, VA is challenged by the lack of access to systematic data regarding seriously injured servicemembers. VA and DOD generally concurred with our recommendations. Inaccurate data limit VA’s ability to estimate its capacity for treating additional veterans and to plan for an increased demand for these services. Related GAO Products
VA Health Care: VA Should Expedite the Implementation of Recommendations Needed to Improve Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder Services. VA Vocational Rehabilitation and Employment Program: GAO Comments on Key Task Force Findings and Recommendations. Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of Veterans Affairs. | Why GAO Did This Study
More than 10,000 U.S. military servicemembers, including members of the National Guard and Reserve, have been injured in the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq. Those with serious physical and psychological injuries are initially treated at the Department of Defense's (DOD) major military treatment facilities (MTF). The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) has made provision of services to these servicemembers a high priority. This testimony focuses on the steps VA has taken and the challenges it faces in providing services to the seriously injured and highlights findings from three recent GAO reports that addressed VA's efforts to provide services to the seriously injured. These services include vocational rehabilitation and employment (VR&E) and health care for those with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD).
What GAO Found
VA has taken steps to provide services as a high priority to seriously injured servicemembers returning from Afghanistan and Iraq. To identify and monitor those who may require VA's services, VA and DOD are working on a formal agreement to share data about servicemembers with serious injuries. Meanwhile, VA has relied on its regional offices to coordinate with staff at MTFs and VA medical centers to learn the identities, medical conditions, and military status of seriously injured servicemembers. For servicemembers with PTSD, VA has taken steps to improve care including developing with DOD a clinical practice guideline for identifying and treating individuals with PTSD. The guideline contains a four-question screening tool, which both VA and DOD use to identify those who may be at risk for PTSD. VA faces significant challenges in providing services to seriously injured servicemembers. For example, the individualized nature of recovery makes it difficult to determine when a seriously injured servicemember will be ready for vocational rehabilitation, and DOD has expressed concern that VA's outreach to servicemembers could affect retention for those whose discharge from military service is uncertain. VA is also challenged by the lack of access to DOD data; although VA staff have developed ad hoc arrangements, such informal agreements can break down. Regarding PTSD, inaccurate data limit VA's ability to estimate its capacity for treating additional veterans and to plan for an increased demand for these services. |
gao_GAO-15-62 | gao_GAO-15-62_0 | SSA’s Disability Determination Process
SSA’s disability determination process is complex and involves offices at the federal and state level (see fig.1). 2.) State General Assistance: These programs provide cash assistance to poor individuals who do not qualify for other assistance programs (e.g., they do not have children and are not elderly). Little Is Known About the Extent of Advocacy Contracts, but Evidence Suggests Such Contracts Account for a Small Proportion of Claims Nationwide
Limited Information Exists, but We Identified 16 States with Some Type of SSI/DI Advocacy Contract in 2014
Little is known about the extent to which states or counties contract for SSI/DI advocacy services. For example, Tennessee officials stated they provided a grant to a legal aid organization to work with about 100 TANF recipients per year who may be eligible for federal disability benefits. Westchester County also had a contract with a for-profit organization for SSI/DI advocacy. Claims from these government SSI/DI advocacy contracts represent about 1 percent of all initial SSI and DI claims in 2010. Selected Sites Represented Different Approaches to SSI/DI Advocacy but Were Similar in Many Respects
We selected three sites—Hawaii; Minnesota; and Westchester County, New York—to illustrate different approaches to SSI/DI advocacy, in terms of the number and types of organizations they contracted with and geographic coverage. For example, all three sites articulated a similar goal for their SSI/DI advocacy contracts, targeted similar populations, and generally paid SSI/DI advocacy contractors only for approved claims, among other similarities (see table 1). At the same time, officials from all three sites told us that moving individuals off state benefit programs and onto federal disability programs has financial benefits for the state or county. SSA’s Controls over Representatives Providing SSI/DI Advocacy Services to States and Other Third Parties Are Limited
SSA Does Not Have Specific Controls and Readily Available Data on Representatives, Particularly Those Paid by States and Other Third Parties
SSA has a number of controls in place—including rules and regulations—related to appointed representatives in the disability determination process, but it does not have controls specific to organizations providing SSI/DI advocacy services to states and other third parties. SSA Does Not Coordinate with Third Parties Contracting for SSI/DI Advocacy, Which May Result in Overpayments
SSA does not coordinate its direct payments to representatives with states and other third parties that might also pay representatives. In 2007, we reported on this risk of overpayments to representatives and recommended that SSA take steps to address it. 5.) SSA anticipates being able to combine data across its systems in order to evaluate data variations on representatives but those plans are under development. Recommendations for Executive Action
As part of initiatives currently under way to improve agency information on claims with appointed representatives and detect potential fraud associated with representatives, the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration should consider actions to provide more timely access to data on representatives and enhance mechanisms for identifying and monitoring trends and patterns related to representation, particularly trends that may present risks to program integrity. We did note that other types of SSI/DI advocacy contracts—such as those held by insurance companies or hospitals—represented an estimated 30 percent of initial disability claims with nonattorney representatives in 2010. SSA partially agreed with our second recommendation to take steps to enhance coordination with states, counties, and other third parties with the goal of improving oversight and preventing and identifying potential overpayments. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
In conducting our review of state Supplemental Security Income (SSI)/Disability Insurance (DI) advocacy practices, our objectives were to examine (1) what is known about the extent to which states are contracting with private organizations to identify and move eligible individuals from state- or county- administered benefit programs to Social Security disability programs, (2) how SSI/DI advocacy practices compare across selected sites, and (3) the key controls the Social Security Administration (SSA) has in place to ensure these organizations follow SSI/DI program rules and regulations. Data Analysis
Analysis of a Random Sample of Social Security Disability Claims
We used data from a 2014 report issued by SSA’s OIG to estimate the percentage of initial claims in 2010 with nonattorney representatives working under a government SSI/DI advocacy contract, as well as the percentage that were potentially working under contract with another third party, such as a hospital or long-term disability insurance company. | Why GAO Did This Study
For years, states and counties have helped individuals who receive state or county assistance apply for federal disability programs. Federal benefits can be more generous, and moving individuals to these programs can allow states and counties to reduce their benefit costs or reinvest savings into other services. Some states have hired private organizations to help individuals apply for federal benefits, but the extent and nature of this practice is not well-known. GAO was asked to study this practice.
This report examines (1) what is known about the extent to which states have SSI/DI advocacy contracts with private organizations, (2) how SSI/DI advocacy practices compare across selected sites, and (3) the key controls SSA has to ensure these organizations follow SSI/DI program rules and regulations. GAO reviewed relevant federal laws, regulations, and program rules; selected three sites to illustrate different contracting approaches; reviewed prior studies, including one by SSA's Office of the Inspector General with a generalizable sample of disability claim files; and interviewed SSA, state, and county officials and contractors.
What GAO Found
Little is known about the extent to which states are contracting with private organizations to help individuals who receive state or county assistance apply for federal disability programs. Representatives from these private organizations help individuals apply for Supplemental Security Income (SSI) and Disability Insurance (DI) from the Social Security Administration (SSA). Available evidence suggests that this practice—known as SSI/DI advocacy—accounts for a small proportion of federal disability claims. Using a variety of methods, including interviewing stakeholders, GAO identified 16 states with some type of SSI/DI advocacy contract in 2014. In addition, GAO analyzed a sample of 2010 claims nationwide and estimated that such contracts accounted for about 5 percent of initial disability claims with nonattorney representatives, or about 1 percent of all initial disability claims. Representatives working under contract to other third parties, such as private insurers and hospitals, accounted for an estimated 30 percent of initial disability claims with nonattorney representatives.
Three selected sites represented different approaches to SSI/DI advocacy, but were similar in many respects. For example, Minnesota contracted with 55 nonprofit and for-profit organizations, while Hawaii and Westchester County, New York, each had a single contractor: a legal aid organization, and a for-profit company, respectively. At the same time, all three sites targeted recipients of similar state and county programs, such as General Assistance, and generally paid contractors only for approved disability claims, among other similarities.
SSA has controls to ensure representatives follow program rules and regulations, but these controls are not specific to those working under contract to states or other third parties and may not be sufficient to assess risks and prevent overpayments—known by SSA as fee violations. Specifically:
Despite the growing involvement of different types of representatives in the initial disability determination process, SSA does not have readily available data on representatives, particularly those it does not pay directly. This hinders SSA's ability to identify trends and assess risks, a key internal control. SSA's existing data are limited and are not used to provide staff with routine information, such as the number of claims associated with a given representative. SSA has plans to combine data on representatives across systems, but these plans are still in development.
SSA does not coordinate its direct payments to representatives with states or other third parties that might also pay representatives, a risk GAO identified in 2007. In cases involving SSI/DI advocacy contracts, a representative may be able to collect payments from both the state and from SSA, potentially resulting in an overpayment—a violation of SSA's regulations.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that SSA (1) consider ways to improve data and identify and monitor trends related to representatives, and (2) enhance coordination with states, counties, and other third parties with the goal of improving oversight and preventing potential overpayments. SSA partially agreed with our recommendations and noted that it may consider additional actions related to representatives. |
gao_GGD-00-46 | gao_GGD-00-46_0 | Since that time, its principals and a Steering Committee, consisting of senior staff of the participating agencies, have met regularly. In a letter dated September 23, 1993, they requested the views of the Secretary of the Treasury on the status of the Working Group; its activities; and the adequacy of coordination among and contingency planning by, the federal financial regulatory agencies. We also reviewed 1998 and 1999 Steering Committee meeting agendas to determine the nature of the group’s biweekly meetings. The Working Group Addressed the Issues Specified in the Executive Order
In May 1988, the Working Group issued its market crash report, which generally responded to the issues that the President required the Working Group to consider in the executive order. The Working Group Has Responded to Various Market Events
The Working Group was established in response to a market event, and its subsequent activities focused on responding to market events. The Working Group Was Asked to Report on Y2K Preparedness
In May 1999, the Ranking Minority Member of the House Committee on Commerce asked the group to report on progress made on issues raised in our April 1999 report on Y2K preparedness within the financial markets.In September 1999, the Working Group issued a response to this request.Specifically, the group outlined work completed on (1) coordination of actions and information among regulators and other organizations during the date change period; (2) promotion of additional Y2K readiness disclosure by foreign organizations; (3) development of strategies to communicate the readiness of the financial sector to alleviate the public’s concerns; and (4) identification of significant changes, if any, in the conditions reported in our April 1999 report. The Working Group Provides a Mechanism for Coordination and Cooperation
Agency officials involved with the Working Group generally described it as an informal mechanism that allows the free exchange of views and information on market events, proposed rulemaking or other regulatory action, and legislative developments. The Working Group Views Itself as an Informal Coordinating Mechanism
Although the Working Group is not based in statute and thus has no authority, agency officials involved with the Working Group view it as a useful mechanism that facilitates informal information sharing and coordination for various intermarket issues. Proposals to Provide Statutory Basis for the Working Group Raise Issues of Resources and Structure
Since 1994, various Members of Congress have raised questions about the Working Group’s ability to coordinate and function effectively. The issues were divided among (1) investor confidence, (2) the credit system, (3) market mechanisms, and (4) the regulatory structure. Most of the recommendations were to be carried out by the relevant agencies, primarily the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and/or the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) and the securities and futures exchanges they regulate. Although all of the issues have been considered, the action taken varies. 5. 6. Issue for consideration Credit system issues 7. 8. 9. 10. 12. 14. 15. 29. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on the role and functioning of the President's Working Group on Financial Markets, focusing on: (1) whether the issues listed for consideration by the Working Group in Executive Order 12631 have been considered; (2) what additional issues have been considered by the Working Group and how they were identified; and (3) the nature of coordination and cooperation within the Working Group and the views of members of Congress and Working Group participants about whether it needs to be formalized in statute.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the Working Group and the relevant agencies have considered the issues articulated in the executive order concerning the 1987 market crash; (2) the 29 issues were divided among four categories: (a) investor confidence; (b) the credit system; (c) market mechanisms; and (d) the financial regulatory structure; (3) all of the issues were discussed in the Working Group's 1988 report on the market crash, or subsequently were addressed by the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, or the exchanges they regulate; (4) the Working Group and the agencies have revised a few of its May 1988 recommendations, such as the 1998 revision of coordinated trading halts and expansion of their work on bankruptcy reform; (5) since 1994, the Working Group also has considered a variety of other financial issues; (6) most of its activities have resulted from self-initiated or congressionally requested work following some market event or issue; (7) the Working Group has drafted legislation aimed at reforming provisions of the Bankruptcy Code that apply to certain types of financial instruments; (8) the Working Group serves as an informal mechanism for coordination and cooperation among its members and their staffs; (9) according to the officials familiar with the Working Group, the frequency of its meetings usually is driven by market events; (10) the senior staffs of the agencies, who are responsible for carrying out the work of the Working Group (the Steering Committee), generally meet biweekly; (11) agency officials said that meetings of the Steering Committee are informal and generally have focused on agency perspectives, market events, agency actions, and financial legislation; (12) various members of Congress have raised questions about the Working Group's ability to coordinate and function effectively; (13) since 1994, various proposals have been made to provide a statutory basis for the Working Group; (14) although such proposals could enhance continuity, they also raise resource and structural issues; and (15) agency officials involved with the Working Group were generally averse to any formalization of the group and said that it functions as an informal coordinating body. |
gao_GAO-14-539 | gao_GAO-14-539_0 | OMB Circular No. As part of this assessment, OMB Circular No. Agencies’ Assessments of Internal Controls over Grants Programs Were Consistent with OMB Requirements
The processes used by all five agencies to conduct their internal control assessments for fiscal year 2012 were consistent with the requirements in OMB Circular No. The agencies identified areas of risk in which to implement key controls and then monitored and tested those controls. The agencies identified deficiencies through the control tests, prepared and implemented corrective action plans to address the deficiencies identified, and reported on their internal control through management assurance statements. A-123 requires that agencies identify significant areas within their operations in which to implement key controls and then continuously monitor and test those controls. A-123 requires agencies to report annually on management’s judgment regarding the adequacy and effectiveness of internal control in assurance statements signed by management. Three of the five agencies (HHS, DOT, and USDA) qualified their assurance statements because of weaknesses in grants processes or grants programs. A-123 process, other audits and reviews have reported internal control issues related to the grants management process and grant programs. Because of many of these internal control issues and ones identified at other federal agencies, we reported a significant deficiency in internal controls related to grants management in our audit reports on the U.S. government’s consolidated financial statements for fiscal years 2012 and 2013.adversely affect the federal government’s ability to ensure that grant funds are being properly reported and used in accordance with applicable program laws and regulations. In July 2013, HUD’s OIG reported that HUD’s guidance for ensuring grantee compliance with the Community Development Block Grant program’s timeliness spending requirement was not always implemented effectively, and documentation of HUD’s rationale for not sanctioning noncompliant grantees was inadequate. HUD generally concurred with these recommendations and stated that it would enhance current procedures to address the recommendations. Agencies Reported Improper Payments in Grant Programs
In both fiscal years 2012 and 2013, four of the largest grant-making agencies reported almost $5 billion in estimated improper payments in grants programs. HHS did publish a corrective action plan for this program for fiscal year 2013. Concluding Observations
In fiscal year 2013, the federal government obligated over $555 billion in grants for a wide array of activities. Effective oversight of internal controls is important for providing reasonable assurance to federal managers and taxpayers that grants are awarded properly, recipients are eligible, and federal grant funds are used as intended and in accordance with applicable laws and regulations. A-123 notes that agency managers and staff should be encouraged to identify control deficiencies, as this reflects positively on the agency’s commitment to recognizing and addressing management problems. Financial statement auditors, OIGs, and we continue to focus on grants internal controls through audits and reviews, and the agencies continue to use the results of these reviews and their own assessments to develop corrective actions and oversee internal controls of federal grants to ensure controls are in place and operating effectively. In general, all five agencies concurred with the information in the report. Education, DOT, USDA, and HUD also provided technical comments that were incorporated as appropriate. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to (1) examine whether the five largest grant-making agencies’ internal control oversight processes for their grant programs were consistent with Office of Management and Budget (OMB) requirements and (2) describe internal control issues that have been reported related to the grants management process and key grant programs. The Departments of Health and Human Services (HHS), Education (Education), Transportation (DOT), Agriculture (USDA), and Housing and Urban Development (HUD) were the top five federal grant-making agencies based on grants obligations for fiscal year 2012. Examination of Agencies’ Internal Control Oversight
To examine whether the five largest grant-making agencies’ internal control oversight processes for their grants programs were consistent with OMB requirements, we focused on the agencies’ fiscal year 2012 internal control evaluations performed to meet the internal control assessment and reporting requirements of OMB Circular No. Identification of Reported Internal Control Issues
To identify internal control issues that have been reported related to the grants management process and key grant programs, we reviewed the agencies’ financial statement audit reports for fiscal years 2012 and 2013 and relevant GAO and OIG reports issued in fiscal years 2012 and 2013 to identify grants-related internal control findings and recommendations. We reviewed the OIGs’ reports on their agencies’ compliance with the criteria listed in the Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery Act of 2010 for fiscal years 2012 and 2013. | Why GAO Did This Study
In fiscal year 2013, the federal government obligated over $555 billion for grants. Effective oversight of internal controls is important for providing reasonable assurance that grants are awarded properly, recipients are eligible, and federal grant funds are used as intended.
GAO was asked to review internal control issues over grants. This report (1) examines whether the five largest grant-making agencies' internal control oversight processes for their grant programs were consistent with OMB requirements and (2) describes internal control issues that have been reported related to the grants management process and key grant programs.
To achieve these objectives, GAO reviewed the fiscal year 2012 internal control assessment processes for the five largest grant-making agencies' grants programs, as conducted under OMB Circular No. A-123. GAO reviewed the agencies' assessment documentation and reviewed grants internal control findings reported in other reviews of these agencies for fiscal years 2012 and 2013. GAO did not include Medicaid—the largest federal grant program—which has been well covered in other GAO and HHS OIG reviews.
GAO is not making any recommendations but continues to monitor grants management as part of its work on key issues.
In general, the five agencies concurred with the information in the report. Some agencies also provided technical comments that were incorporated, as appropriate.
What GAO Found
For fiscal year 2012, the processes used by the five largest grant-making agencies to conduct their internal control assessments were consistent with the requirements of Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular No. A-123, which requires that agencies identify significant areas within their operations in which to implement key controls, continuously monitor and test those controls, and report annually on management's judgment regarding the adequacy and effectiveness of internal control. The five largest grant-making agencies by amount of grant obligations are the Departments of Health and Human Services (HHS), Education, Transportation (DOT), Agriculture (USDA), and Housing and Urban Development (HUD). The agencies identified areas of risk, including grants programs and grants management processes, in which to implement key controls and then monitored and tested those controls. The agencies identified deficiencies through control tests, prepared and implemented corrective action plans to address the deficiencies identified, and reported on their internal control through annual management assurance statements. HHS, DOT, and USDA qualified their internal control management assurance statements for fiscal year 2012, in part because of material weaknesses affecting their grant programs. For fiscal year 2013, HHS, USDA, and HUD gave qualified statements of assurance in part because of material weaknesses in their grant programs.
In addition to issues identified through the OMB Circular No. A-123 process, other audits and reviews have reported internal control issues related to the grants management process and grant programs. For example:
For fiscal years 2012 and 2013, DOT's financial statement auditors reported that DOT did not timely identify and deobligate unused grant obligations. DOT took actions to address the recommendations, resulting in the auditors reducing the issue from a material weakness in fiscal year 2012 to a significant deficiency in fiscal year 2013.
In July 2013, HUD's Office of Inspector General (OIG) reported that guidance for ensuring whether grantees are carrying out grant activities in a timely manner in compliance with requirements of the Community Development Block Grant program was not always implemented effectively. HUD generally concurred with the recommendations and stated its intent to address them.
In both fiscal years 2012 and 2013, HHS reported over $1 billion in estimated improper payments in grant programs. HHS's OIG determined that HHS did not comply with all requirements of the Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery Act of 2010 for certain grant programs. HHS reported that it has steps planned and under way to help prevent and reduce improper payments.
OMB Circular No. A-123 notes that agency managers and staff should be encouraged to identify control deficiencies, as this reflects positively on the agency's commitment to recognizing and addressing management problems. Financial statement auditors, OIGs, and GAO continue to focus on grants internal controls through their audits and reviews, and the agencies continue to use the results of these reviews and their own assessments to develop corrective actions and oversee internal controls of federal grants to ensure that necessary controls are in place and operating effectively. |
gao_GAO-03-326 | gao_GAO-03-326_0 | Subsequently, VA identified 30 vacant buildings that were no longer needed to meet veterans’ health care needs. VA’s Management of 30 Vacant Buildings in Its Great Lakes Network
VA has negotiated Enhanced-Use Leases for 10 vacant buildings and is negotiating Enhanced-Use Leases for 3 buildings. VA currently has no disposal plans for the other 9 buildings. VA is negotiating an Enhanced-Use Lease with Catholic Charities of Chicago for 3 vacant buildings at the Hines VA hospital in Chicago. Four buildings have been demolished, and 4 others will be demolished. This building will be demolished in order to construct a surface parking lot for a new spinal cord injury/blind rehabilitation center. Obstacles to Alternate Use or Disposal of 9 Vacant Buildings
Despite the efforts of network officials, the lack of interest in 9 of VA’s vacant buildings has been an obstacle to finding alternate uses for these buildings. This is because proceeds that are received from the sale of real property must be deposited into the VA Nursing Home Revolving Fund, which is only to be used for the construction of nursing homes. As a result, VA would prefer to pursue Enhanced-Use Leases, which will allow VA to use revenue to meet the overall health care needs of veterans. As the CARES process is completed in the 20 remaining networks, costs associated with an increasing number of unneeded buildings that will be identified will grow. Recommendation for Executive Action
To ensure that the newly developed CARES model for managing excess buildings will provide an effective decision-making tool that could be used in the other networks, we recommend that the Secretary of Veterans Affairs conduct a pilot test of the model in the Great Lakes network and make modifications, if needed. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To assess the Department of Veterans Affairs’ (VA) efforts to manage unneeded, vacant buildings, we obtained information from the Great Lakes network on the number of such buildings, the cost to maintain the buildings, and its efforts to find alternate uses for the buildings. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) has changed from a hospital-based system to primary reliance on outpatient care. As a result, VA expects that the number of unneeded buildings will increase. Veterans' needs could be better served if VA finds ways to minimize resources devoted to these buildings. VA must have an effective process to find alternate uses or dispose of unneeded property. In August 2002, VA completed a pilot test for realigning its health care system in the Great Lakes network. The pilot identified 30 buildings that are no longer needed to provide health care to veterans. VA is currently studying how to realign assets in its 20 remaining networks. GAO was asked to review VA's management of unneeded buildings in its Great Lakes network.
What GAO Found
The Great Lakes network has developed or implemented alternative use or disposal plans for 21 of the 30 unneeded, vacant buildings. VA has leased 10 of the buildings to the Chicago Medical School and is negotiating a lease for 3 buildings with Catholic Charities of Chicago. Four buildings were demolished, and 4 buildings will be demolished in order to construct new facilities or to expand an existing cemetery. The network identified three obstacles that hinder alternative use or planning for the remaining buildings: (1) VA has been unable to find organizations interested in using the vacant, unneeded buildings due primarily to their location or physical condition; (2) VA may spend more to demolish buildings than it would spend to maintain the buildings as is; and (3) VA is reluctant to transfer disposal responsibility for the buildings to the General Services Administration, primarily because (a) VA would incur costs for environmental and other requirements that could exceed potential savings through avoidance of routine maintenance costs, and (b) any proceeds may only be used for the construction of VA nursing homes. |
gao_GAO-08-412 | gao_GAO-08-412_0 | CMS’s Role and Responsibilities
CMS is responsible for overseeing organ transplant programs that receive Medicare reimbursement for transplant services. Limitations Existed in Federal Oversight at the Time High-Profile Problems Came to Light
CMS’s and, to a lesser extent, the OPTN’s oversight of transplant programs was not comprehensive at the time high-profile problems came to light in 2005 and 2006. CMS monitored renal transplant programs through contracts with state agencies, but the surveys reviewed compliance with requirements that had not been substantially updated in decades and were limited in scope; also, not all programs were actively monitored. At the same time, the OPTN actively monitored transplant programs and took action to resolve identified problems, but its oversight activities fell short in some respects—the OPTN’s monitoring did not include methods capable of promptly detecting problems at transplant programs that prolonged the time that patients waited for transplants, and the OPTN did not always meet its goals for conducting on-site reviews. CMS Did Not Actively Monitor Extra-Renal Transplant Programs
At the time high-profile problems came to light in 2005 and 2006, CMS was not actively monitoring the ongoing compliance of Medicare-approved extra-renal transplant programs with the criteria specified in the NCDs, which included performing a minimum number of transplants per year and achieving a minimum patient survival rate. While helpful in detecting completely inactive programs, this particular method did not identify more subtle problems, such as a transplant program that was understaffed and was turning down organs offered for patients at markedly high rates. CMS, HRSA, and the OPTN Have Acted to Strengthen Oversight, but the Full Effect of These Actions Will Depend on Implementation and Further Information Sharing
Since the high-profile cases came to light, CMS, HRSA, and the OPTN have made some changes and planned others to improve federal oversight of organ transplant programs; however, the full effect of these changes remains to be seen. The OPTN and HRSA are working to develop and implement a set of indicators to help the OPTN better identify problems that prolong the time patients wait for transplants. Implementation of CMS’s new requirements is in its early stages, however, and CMS has not resolved the extent to which on-site surveys will be performed as part of its periodic reviews of programs for Medicare reapproval. In March 2007, CMS made a more fundamental change to its oversight by publishing final regulations establishing a new set of Medicare requirements specifically for organ transplant programs. In addition, the new regulations both update and expand upon previous requirements. As of January 2008, CMS officials said that the agency had not decided how many reapproval surveys it would conduct or how it would choose which programs to survey among those that meet the aforementioned requirements. CMS, HRSA, and the OPTN Are Sharing Basic Data on Transplant Programs, but How They Will Share Additional Information from Their Oversight Activities Has Not Been Resolved
CMS, HRSA, and the OPTN have recognized the importance of sharing data on transplant programs with one another and have taken initial steps to share basic data. It will be important for CMS and HRSA to determine specifically what information they will share from their oversight activities. A more difficult challenge that CMS and HRSA face is agreeing when to share information about potential problems at transplant programs. Not conducting on-site reapproval surveys may limit CMS’s ability to monitor these transplant programs’ compliance with other Medicare CoPs, for example, whether transplant programs are providing required protections for living donors, and to detect problems like those involved in some of the high-profile cases. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve federal oversight of organ transplant programs, we recommend that the Secretary of Health and Human Services: (1) Direct the Administrator of CMS to develop a methodology for conducting on-site surveys of transplant programs seeking Medicare reapproval that ensures that at least some transplant programs meeting data submission, clinical experience, and outcomes requirements receive on-site surveys. | Why GAO Did This Study
Media reports in 2005 and 2006 highlighted serious problems at organ transplant programs, calling attention to possible deficits in federal oversight. Two agencies in the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) oversee organ transplant programs: the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) oversees transplant programs that receive Medicare reimbursement, and the Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA) oversees the Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network (OPTN), which manages the nation's organ allocation system. GAO was asked to examine (1) federal oversight of transplant programs at the time the high-profile cases came to light in 2005 and 2006 and (2) changes that federal agencies have made or planned since then to strengthen oversight. GAO interviewed CMS, HRSA, and OPTN officials and reviewed agency documents and data and a CMS draft proposal for sharing information with HRSA.
What GAO Found
Limitations in federal oversight of organ transplant programs existed when high-profile problems came to light in 2005 and 2006. These high-profile cases included, for example, a transplant program that lacked a full-time surgeon for over a year and had been turning down organs offered for patients at markedly high rates. At that time, CMS did not actively monitor heart, liver, lung, and intestine transplant programs, relying instead primarily on complaints to detect problems. CMS periodically monitored kidney transplant programs through on-site inspections, known as surveys, but the surveys reviewed compliance with requirements that had not been substantially updated in decades and were limited in scope. In addition, some programs were not actively monitored. At the same time, the OPTN actively monitored transplant programs for many types of potential problems and worked with the programs to resolve identified problems. The OPTN's monitoring activities, however, were not sufficient to promptly detect certain problems that prolonged the time that patients waited for transplants, such as inadequate staffing at transplant programs. CMS, HRSA, and the OPTN have made or plan to make changes to strengthen their oversight of organ transplant programs, but the effectiveness of these changes will depend, in part, on implementation and information sharing by CMS, HRSA, and the OPTN. In 2006, after high-profile problems came to light, CMS began actively monitoring heart, liver, lung, and intestine transplant programs. In a more fundamental change, CMS published new regulations in 2007 that establish a single set of updated requirements for all Medicare-approved transplant programs and provide for periodic reviews of programs. The OPTN has been working with HRSA to develop and implement a set of indicators to better detect problems that prolong the time patients wait for transplants. However, neither CMS nor the OPTN has fully implemented these changes, and their full effect remains to be seen. In particular, CMS has not determined the extent to which it will conduct on-site surveys in its periodic reviews of programs for Medicare reapproval. Under the new regulations, CMS may choose not to conduct on-site reapproval surveys of programs meeting certain Medicare requirements. Not conducting these surveys may limit CMS's ability to monitor for compliance with other Medicare requirements and to detect problems like some of those involved in the high-profile cases. As of January 2008, CMS had not determined how it will choose which transplant programs to survey, if any, among those for which it has discretion. Further, while CMS, HRSA, and the OPTN recognize the value of sharing information about potential problems at transplant programs, how they will share additional information from their oversight activities has not been resolved. A definitive agreement between CMS and HRSA on this issue will better ensure that problems at transplant programs are detected and corrected in a timely manner. |
gao_GAO-03-139 | gao_GAO-03-139_0 | HHS has primary responsibility for coordinating the nation’s response to public health emergencies, including bioterrorism. Surveillance—systems that facilitate the performance of ongoing collection, analysis, and interpretation of disease-related data to plan, implement, and evaluate public health actions. Supporting technologies—tools or systems that provide information for the other categories of systems (e.g., detection, surveillance, etc.). For example, CDC is currently implementing the Health Alert Network (HAN), an early warning and response system that is intended to provide federal, state, and local health agencies with better communications during public health emergencies; additional details are provided in appendix III. One example of a DOD system is the Electronic Surveillance System for the Early Notification of Community-based Epidemics (ESSENCE), which supports early identification of infectious disease outbreaks in the military by comparing analyses of data collected daily with historical trends; additional details are provided in appendix III. Such coordination ranged from a lack of contact with other agencies, to awareness, to formal coordination, to joint development of initiatives. Yet, despite these efforts, the identification and implementation of these standards remains incomplete. An underlying challenge for establishing and implementing such standards is that no overall strategy guides IT development and initiatives. The system increases the interaction between CDC and public health laboratories. Consequently agencies may not be able to share successes or lessons learned. The extent of coordination or interaction among the lead agency and other related government agencies ranged from a lack of coordination, to awareness, to formal coordination, to jointly developed initiatives. More specifically, it should identify all federal agencies’ IT initiatives, using the results of our inventory as a starting point; set priorities for information systems, supporting technologies, and define activities for ensuring that the various standards-setting organizations coordinate their efforts and reach further consensus on the definition and use of standards; establish milestones for defining and implementing all standards; create a mechanism—consistent with HIPAA requirements—to monitor the implementation of standards throughout the health care industry; and address existing barriers and establish mechanisms for identifying and prioritizing uses of emerging technologies that are appropriate for ensuring continued improvements to the nation’s ability to prepare for and respond to public health emergencies. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of our review were to compile an inventory of current and planned bioterrorism information technology (IT) initiatives at selected federal agencies and identify the range of coordination efforts, identify and describe the development and use of health care IT standards for bioterrorism-related systems, and review the potential use of emerging information technologies for bioterrorism preparedness and response. Surveillance activities may be either active or passive. Communications
The purpose of communications and reporting systems is to facilitate the secure and timely delivery of information in the midst of a public health emergency to the relevant responders and decision makers, so that appropriate action can be undertaken. It can be easily enhanced to collect biological agents in addition to chemical agents. | Why GAO Did This Study
The October 2001 anthrax attacks, the recent outbreak of the virulent Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS), and increased awareness that terrorist groups may be capable of releasing life-threatening biological agents have prompted efforts to improve our nation's preparedness for, and response to, public health emergencies--including bioterrorism. GAO was asked, among other things, to identify federal agencies information technology (IT) initiatives to support our nation's readiness to deal with bioterrorism. Specifically, we compiled an inventory of such activities, determined the range of these coordination activities with other agencies, and identified the use of health care standards in these efforts.
What GAO Found
The six key federal agencies involved in bioterrorism preparedness and response identified about 70 planned and operational information systems in several IT categories associated with supporting a public health emergency. These encompass detection (systems that collect and identify potential biological agents from environmental samples), surveillance (systems that facilitate ongoing data collection, analysis, and interpretation of disease-related data), communications (systems that facilitate the secure and timely delivery of information to the relevant responders and decision makers), and supporting technologies (tools or systems that provide information for the other categories of systems). For example, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) is currently implementing its Health Alert Network, an early warning and response system intended to provide federal, state, and local agencies with better communications during public health emergencies, and the Department of Defense is using its Electronic Surveillance System for the Early Notification of Community-based Epidemics to support early identification of infectious disease outbreaks in the military by comparing analyses of data collected daily with historical trends. The extent of coordination or interaction of these systems among agencies covered a wide range--from an absence of coordination, to awareness among the agencies with no formal coordination, to formal coordination, to joint development of initiatives. IT can more effectively facilitate emergency response if standards are developed and implemented that allow systems to be interoperable. The need for common, agreed-upon standards is widely acknowledged in the health community, and activities to strengthen and increase the use of applicable standards are ongoing. For example, CDC has defined a public health information architecture, which identifies data, communication, and security standards needed to ensure the interoperability of related systems. Despite these ongoing efforts to address IT standards, many issues remain to be worked out, including coordinating the various standards-setting initiatives and monitoring the implementation of standards for health care delivery and public health. An underlying challenge for establishing and implementing such standards is the lack of an overall strategy guiding IT development and initiatives. Without such a strategy to address the development and implementation of standards, agencies may not be well positioned to take advantage of IT that could facilitate better preparation for and response to public health emergencies--including bioterrorism. |
gao_GAO-03-1056 | gao_GAO-03-1056_0 | If direct laboratory payments are terminated, CAHs would be reimbursed by Medicare for their costs of paying laboratories to perform technical pathology services, and outpatient beneficiaries who currently are responsible for paying 20 percent of the payment for their technical pathology services to the laboratories under the MPFS would instead be responsible for paying 20 percent of the CAHs’ customary charges. Few Hospitals Outsource Large Volumes of Technical Pathology Services
We estimate that in 2001, 4,773 PPS hospitals and CAHs, representing 95 percent of all such facilities, outsourced at least some technical pathology services to laboratories that received direct payment from Medicare for those services (see table 3). In 2001, approximately 1.4 million technical pathology services were outsourced, and the median number of outsourced services per hospital was 81. Medicare Expenditures and Beneficiary Copayments Would Be Reduced, While Hospital Costs Would Increase Slightly, If Direct Payment to Laboratories Is Terminated
If laboratories had not received direct payment for services for hospital patients, we estimate that Medicare spending would have been $42 million less in 2001, with $18 million and $24 million in savings for inpatient and outpatient services, respectively, and overall beneficiary cost sharing would have been reduced by $2 million. Paying laboratories to provide technical pathology services is unlikely to impose a large financial burden on most hospitals. If payment to the laboratory is made at the MPFS rate, a PPS hospital outsourcing the median number of technical pathology services would incur an additional cost of approximately $2,900. In 2001, a PPS hospital outsourcing the median number of services outsourced by PPS hospitals, 94, would have incurred additional costs of approximately $2,900 in paying a laboratory for technical pathology services, representing a small fraction of hospitals’ annual Medicare revenues. There would be no financial impact from terminating direct laboratory payments for rural hospitals that are or become CAHs, as CAHs would recover from Medicare their reasonable costs of outsourcing technical pathology services. Beneficiaries’ Access Medicare beneficiaries’ access to pathology services is unlikely to be Likely Would Be Unaffected disrupted if direct payments to laboratories are terminated because hospitals are unlikely to limit surgical services, including those requiring pathology services. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
In conducting this study, we analyzed Medicare claims and provider data obtained from the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS). To do so, we matched Medicare laboratory claims with claims submitted by prospective payment system (PPS) hospitals and critical access hospitals (CAH). | Why GAO Did This Study
In 1999, the Health Care Financing Administration, now called the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), proposed terminating an exception to a payment rule that had permitted laboratories to receive direct payment from Medicare when providing technical pathology services that had been outsourced by certain hospitals. The Congress enacted provisions in the Medicare, Medicaid, and SCHIP Benefits Improvement and Protection Act of 2000 (BIPA) to delay the termination. The BIPA provisions directed GAO to report on the number of outsourcing hospitals and their service volumes and the effect of the termination of direct laboratory payments on hospitals and laboratories, as well as on access to technical pathology services by Medicare beneficiaries. GAO analyzed Medicare inpatient and outpatient hospital and laboratory claims data from 2001 to develop its estimates.
What GAO Found
In 2001, approximately 95 percent of all Medicare prospective payment system (PPS) hospitals--hospitals that are paid predetermined fixed amounts for services--and critical access hospitals (CAH), which receive reimbursement from Medicare based on their reasonable costs, outsourced some technical pathology services to laboratories that received direct payment for those services. However, the median number of outsourced services per hospital was small--81. If laboratories had not received direct payments for services for hospital patients, GAO estimates that Medicare spending would have been $42 million less in 2001, and beneficiary cost sharing obligations for inpatient and outpatient services would have been reduced by $2 million. Most hospitals are unlikely to experience a financial burden from paying laboratories to provide technical pathology services. If payment to the laboratory is made at the current rate, a PPS hospital outsourcing the median number of technical pathology services outsourced by PPS hospitals, 94, would incur an additional annual cost of approximately $2,900. There would be no financial impact for the 31 percent of rural hospitals that are CAHs, as they would receive Medicare reimbursement for their additional costs. Medicare beneficiaries' access to pathology services would likely be unaffected if direct laboratory payments are terminated. Hospital officials stated they were unlikely to limit surgical services, including those requiring pathology services, because limiting these services would result in a loss of revenue and could restrict access to services for their communities. |
gao_GAO-10-733T | gao_GAO-10-733T_0 | To accomplish Head Start’s goals, the Congress provided $7.2 billion in federal funds for fiscal year 2010, as well as $2.1 billion in Recovery Act funds. If the Head Start program has implemented policies and procedures that ensure the program is meeting the needs of children eligible under the primary criteria and prioritizes their enrollment in the program, then the program may also fill up to 35 percent of their slots with children from families with income between the federal poverty line and 130 percent of the poverty line. Children from families with incomes below 130 percent of the poverty line, and children that qualify under one of the primary eligibility criteria, are referred to as “under-income” for the purposes of this testimony. Allegations of Fraud and Abuse Involving Two Head Start Grantees
We are currently investigating the two allegations of fraud and abuse that we received involving Head Start nonprofit grantees in the Midwest and Texas. The percentage of over-income families in the 28 centers ranged from centers with no over-income enrollments to one center where 44 percent of the families it enrolled were over-income. However, the grantee as a whole did not report having more than 10 percent over-income families enrolled. Our concern, based on the allegation, is that some portion of these families classified as homeless in grantee records were actually over- income families that were not, in fact, homeless, but were encouraged to report that they were in order to qualify. In addition, we spoke with several individuals who described a number of fraudulent activities that they had witnessed. We are in the process of attempting to determine if other allegations are true, including manipulating family income documentation to make over-income families appear to meet Head Start poverty guidelines, enrolling families who do not meet the specific program requirements for the Migrant Head Start program, including earning at least 51 percent of the household income through agricultural work and migrating for work within the past 24 months, and misappropriation of property purchased with Head Start funds. Undercover Tests Show the Head Start Program Is Vulnerable to Fraud and Abuse
Our undercover tests determined that the types of eligibility and enrollment fraud schemes allegedly perpetrated by the two grantees are occurring at other Head Start locations around the country. Employees at seven centers knowingly disregarded part of our families’ income to help make over-income families and their children appear to actually be under- income. To view selected video clips of these undercover enrollments, go to http://www.gao.gov/products/gao-10-733T. We also identified a key vulnerability during our investigation that could allow over-income children to be enrolled in other Head Start centers: income documentation for enrollees is not required to be maintained by grantees. We found only 44 centers stated they had any openings. We interviewed 21 families on wait lists and found that the majority stated their income was at or below the federal poverty level. In some cases, families had experienced some type of domestic violence or were receiving some other type of public assistance, a group targeted specifically for assistance by Head Start program guidelines. We did not attempt to verify this information. Head Start Center Wait Lists Were Substantial
The length of these wait lists varied considerably; however, several of the centers we contacted had lengthy wait lists. Given the fraud committed by several grantees we investigated, and the relative ease with which GAO employees posing as fictitious parents were able to qualify for Head Start services, it is likely that some over-income or otherwise ineligible children are currently enrolled in Head Start programs while low-income children are put on wait lists and do not receive necessary services. We did not attempt to verify the applicants’ statements. Corrective Action Briefing
On April 20 and April 23, 2010, we briefed OHS and HHS officials on the results of our work. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Head Start program, overseen by the Department of Health and Human Services and administered by the Office of Head Start, provides child development services primarily to low-income families and their children. Federal law allows up to 10 percent of enrolled families to have incomes above 130 percent of the poverty line--GAO refers to them as "over-income." Families with incomes below 130 percent of the poverty line, or who meet certain other criteria, are referred to as "under-income". Nearly 1 million children a year participate in Head Start, and the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act provided an additional $2.1 billion in funding. GAO received hotline tips alleging fraud and abuse by grantees. In response, GAO investigated the validity of the allegations, conducted undercover tests to determine if other centers were committing fraud, and documented instances where potentially eligible children were put on Head Start wait lists. The investigation of allegations is ongoing. To perform this work, GAO interviewed grantees and a number of informants and reviewed documentation. GAO used fictitious identities and bogus documents for proactive testing of Head Start centers. GAO also interviewed families on wait lists. Results of undercover tests and family interviews cannot be projected to the entire Head Start program. In a corrective action briefing, agency officials agreed to address identified weaknesses.
What GAO Found
GAO received allegations of fraud and abuse involving two Head Start nonprofit grantees in the Midwest and Texas. Allegations include manipulating recorded income to make over-income applicants appear under-income, encouraging families to report that they were homeless when they were not, enrolling more than 10 percent of over-income children, and counting children as enrolled in more than one center at a time. GAO confirmed that one grantee operated several centers with more than 10 percent over-income students, and the other grantee manipulated enrollment data to over-report the number of children enrolled. GAO is still investigating the other allegations reported. Realizing that these fraud schemes could be perpetrated at other Head Start programs, GAO attempted to register fictitious children as part of 15 undercover test scenarios at centers in six states and the District of Columbia. In 8 instances staff at these centers fraudulently misrepresented information, including disregarding part of the families' income to register over-income children into under-income slots. The undercover tests revealed that 7 Head Start employees lied about applicants' employment status or misrepresented their earnings. This leaves Head Start at risk that over-income children may be enrolled while legitimate under-income children are put on wait lists. At no point during our registrations was information submitted by GAO's fictitious parents verified, leaving the program at risk that dishonest persons could falsify earnings statements and other documents in order to qualify. In 7 instances centers did not manipulate information. To see selected video clips of GAO enrollments, see http://www.gao.gov/products/gao-10-733T . In addition, GAO found that most of the 550 Head Start centers contacted had wait lists. GAO also found that 2 centers where it enrolled fictitious children later became full and developed wait lists after the fictitious children had been withdrawn. Only 44 centers reported that they had openings. GAO interviewed families on wait lists from other centers and found that many stated that their incomes were at or below the federal poverty level. In some cases, families stated they had experienced some type of domestic violence, or were receiving some type of public assistance, a group automatically eligible for Head Start. GAO did not attempt to verify family statements. |
gao_GAO-05-957 | gao_GAO-05-957_0 | For more than 50 years, the Berry Amendment consistently appeared in annual appropriations acts. The Berry Amendment includes a number of exceptions to the requirement to buy certain domestically produced articles. Air Force Waiver Lacked Thorough Analysis
The Air Force did not conduct a thorough analysis of opportunities for compliance with the Berry Amendment on a system-by-system basis in approving a broad, permanent waiver covering 23 commercial derivative aircraft systems. The Air Force initiated the waiver at the headquarters level after it became aware of problems with implementing the Berry Amendment. In supporting the waiver, the Air Force did not conduct market research as called for in its policy, thoroughly review alternatives, or include an explanation as to why it believed that alternatives did not exist for each of the systems in the waiver. We identified several instances that highlight the Air Force’s lack of thoroughness in its analysis to support the waiver. In the summer of 2003, the Air Force official who led the waiver effort told us he visited an aircraft manufacturer, two of its subcontractors (including a titanium producer), and an engine manufacturer to evaluate the difficulty of complying with the Berry Amendment specialty metals requirement. Following these visits, the Air Force official concluded that other contractors involved in the Air Force’s acquisition and support of commercial derivative aircraft systems would also have difficulty complying with the Berry Amendment. However, these legislative changes did not occur, and in April 2004 the Secretary signed a permanent waiver that covered 23 commercial derivative aircraft systems—which included 4 additional systems— exempting all of them from the Berry Amendment requirements. The permanent waiver relied on the same findings as the temporary waiver. A senior Air Force acquisition official told us that it was unnecessary to conduct market research for each system because Air Force officials were knowledgeable about the aerospace industry and did not need to contact the Department of Commerce for assistance. To address DOD and Air Force policy requirements, the Air Force included 13 memos from military user representatives in the waiver’s supporting documentation, representing 22 of the 23 aircraft systems on the waiver. Specifically, memos representing 18 aircraft systems state that they had considered compliant alternatives and rejected them as not feasible, without stating what those alternatives were. Memos for 3 aircraft systems make no reference to whether alternatives had been considered. The Air Force also did not question the contractors’ inability to be compliant on military unique spare parts. The Air Force will also need to purchase spare parts for the life of the aircraft system. Air Force Did Not Recognize Some Systems Were Already Covered under Other Regulatory Exceptions
By not conducting a system-by-system review, the Air Force was unaware that some systems were already covered under other regulatory exceptions to the Berry Amendment. The Air Force’s failure to follow established policies and its decision to combine 23 aircraft systems in one waiver diminished the persuasiveness of the waiver’s support. Specifically, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Air Force to take the following two actions: Conduct an analysis of each commercial derivative aircraft system included in the waiver to consider opportunities to achieve compliance with the Berry Amendment requirements or to document why such compliance is not possible. While the Air Force stated that the waiver is reasonable and necessary, our report shows that the Air Force did not follow established policy when it did not thoroughly analyze the opportunities for compliance on a system- by-system basis. | Why GAO Did This Study
In April 2004, the Secretary of the Air Force approved a permanent waiver of the requirements of the Berry Amendment for 23 commercial derivative aircraft systems, representing more than 1,200 aircraft in the Air Force's inventory. The Berry Amendment generally requires the Department of Defense (DOD) to purchase certain domestically grown or produced items, including specialty metals used in defense systems such as aircraft. Waivers to the Berry Amendment can be granted under certain circumstances. GAO was asked to evaluate the supporting evidence and analysis that the Air Force relied on to waive the Berry Amendment. GAO did not conduct a legal analysis of the waiver.
What GAO Found
The Air Force did not follow established policy when evaluating the need for a waiver of the Berry Amendment for 23 commercial derivative aircraft systems. Specifically, the Air Force did not thoroughly analyze the opportunities for compliance with the Berry Amendment on a system-by-system basis, thereby diminishing the persuasiveness of the waiver's support. The Air Force's review of its compliance with the Berry Amendment regarding these systems began in early 2003 when it became aware that some aircraft manufacturers could not meet the Berry Amendment requirements. Faced with this problem, a senior Air Force acquisition official visited an aircraft manufacturer, two of its subcontractors (including a titanium producer), and an engine manufacturer. The Air Force's conclusion, based on these visits and knowledge of the aerospace industry, was that other contractors involved in the Air Force's acquisition and support of commercial derivative aircraft systems would also have difficulty complying with the Berry Amendment. In September 2003, the Secretary of the Air Force signed a temporary waiver that was initiated at the headquarters level and covered 19 systems. That was followed in April 2004 with a permanent waiver of the Berry Amendment for these 19 systems plus another 4. Air Force policy calls for certain actions before issuing a waiver, including conducting market research and conducting an analysis of what alternatives are available and why they are not acceptable. In this instance, the Air Force did not conduct market research for each system, as it believed no company could produce compliant parts--a position not explained in the waiver's supporting documents. The Air Force documented an analysis of alternatives for only 1 aircraft system in the waiver. Memos representing 18 other aircraft systems state that alternatives to the waiver had been considered and rejected as not feasible but did not identify what the alternatives were, while memos for 3 additional aircraft systems make no reference to whether alternatives had been considered. The Air Force provided no documentation about its analysis of alternatives for the 1 remaining aircraft system in the waiver. After discussions with representatives for all 23 aircraft systems, GAO concluded that the Air Force did not document alternatives or thoroughly review possible options to achieve compliance with the Berry Amendment for many of the aircraft systems. GAO has identified several instances that highlight the Air Force's lack of thoroughness in its waiver process for the 23 aircraft systems. For example, the Air Force did not question contractors' inability to provide compliant spare parts when they were military unique and therefore not the same as the parts used in commercial aircraft. Also, the Air Force included some aircraft systems in the waiver that were already covered under other regulatory exceptions to the Berry Amendment. |
gao_T-RCED-98-33 | gao_T-RCED-98-33_0 | As its preamble states, the purpose of the joint agreement is to “establish a clear pathway and decision-making process for state innovations that have encountered federal barriers or need greater attention to help them succeed.” Toward this end, the draft agreement outlines (1) a set of general principles that will govern regulatory innovation activities that EPA and the states will manage jointly; (2) a process that EPA and the states will use to identify which innovation proposals to pursue, including the establishment of a mechanism for making decisions about how to manage innovation proposals that do not fit into ongoing reinvention programs; and (3) guidelines for EPA and the states to evaluate the success of innovation activities carried out under the agreement. Issues Needing Clarification
As might be expected with any such agreement, a number of practical questions and procedural issues will need to be clarified. Negotiators for EPA and ECOS debated the extent to which riskier projects should be held to higher environmental performance standards than other projects. On the first issue, the agreement provides that while “innovations may be designed primarily to improve the cost-effectiveness of achieving environmental goals, these projects must ensure that there is no adverse impact on environmental protection. Broader Issues to Address If Reinvention Efforts Are to Succeed
As pointed out in our July 1997 report, a number of broader issues still need to be effectively addressed if the agreement is to have its intended effect, and if, in the long run, environmental regulation is to be truly “reinvented.”
Difficulty in Managing a Large Number of Initiatives
Successful reinvention efforts require a clear understanding of an organization’s mission and of the role that individual efforts play in achieving that mission. The problem is further compounded by confusion both within EPA and among other stakeholders over the primary purpose of some of the agency’s most important initiatives. Difficulty in Achieving Agreement Among All Stakeholders
Under EPA’s reinvention strategy, the agency’s goal is to share information and decision-making with all stakeholders, including those “external” to the agency, such as state regulators and representatives of industry and environmental organizations. They cite the need for a more sustainable process that distinguishes between problems that can be resolved at lower levels within the agency and those that require senior management’s attention. EPA has, in fact, made some progress in measuring the effectiveness of its reinvention initiatives. However, the framework does establish standards that lead to many of the existing regulatory and behavioral practices the agency is seeking to change. Consequently, as we and other organizations have noted in the past, EPA will be limited in its ability to achieve major changes in environmental regulation within the legislative framework as presently constructed. In summary, Mr. Chairman, the EPA-ECOS agreement helps to clarify some of the difficult issues that have arisen in defining EPA’s and the states’ roles in promoting reinvention. We believe these barriers, discussed in our July 1997 report, will need to be addressed before environmental regulation can be substantially reinvented. Additional copies are $2 each. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) and the states' roles in promoting and implementing innovative methods of environmental regulation, focusing on: (1) a draft agreement between EPA and the Environmental Council of the States (ECOS) on environmental regulation; and (2) the findings of a GAO report on EPA's and the states' efforts to reinvent environmental regulation.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the draft EPA-ECOS agreement provides a useful framework in two key respects; (2) it attempts to clarify EPA's and the states' roles in promoting and implementing innovative regulatory projects; (3) in particular, the agreement addresses sensitive issues that had been the subject of much debate between EPA and many states, such as the extent to which innovation projects must demonstrate improved environmental performance; (4) the agreement attempts to help EPA manage a growing number of innovation projects by establishing a process that distinguishes between those projects that can be handled at lower levels within the agency and those that require senior management's attention; (5) as with any such agreement, there are a number of practical questions and procedural issues that need to be clarified--some of which may be fully addressed only after EPA and ECOS have had experience implementing the agreement; (6) beyond these practical considerations, however, a number of broader issues need to be addressed effectively to create a climate in which regulatory innovation can succeed and in which environmental regulation can be truly be reinvented; (7) among these barriers are: (a) many key stakeholders in the reinvention process have expressed concern over the large number of complex and demanding initiatives now being undertaken--as well as confusion over the underlying purpose of some of the agency's major initiatives; (b) EPA has had difficulty achieving buy-in among the agency's rank and file, who have grown accustomed to a regulatory structure that has largely been in place throughout the agency's 27-year history; (c) the agency has had difficulty achieving agreement among external stakeholders in a number of its reinvention efforts, particularly when stakeholders perceive that unanimous agreement is required before progress can be made; and (d) EPA has an uneven record in evaluating the success of many of its initiatives; (8) in addition, today's environmental laws impose requirements that have led to, and tend to reinforce, many of the existing regulatory and behavioral practices that EPA is seeking to change; and (9) as a consequence, the agency will be limited in its ability to reinvent environmental regulation within this existing legislative framework. |
gao_GAO-01-964 | gao_GAO-01-964_0 | Basically, when the price farmers will receive for their crops falls below the loan rate, they can repay their loans at a lower alternative repayment rate, also known as the posted county price. Farmers who do not choose to obtain marketing loans may still receive similar help from USDA when prices are low. In lieu of securing loans, eligible farmers may choose to receive payments for the difference between the alternative repayment rate and the loan rate. Farmers use commodity certificates to redeem their marketing assistance loans at a lower repayment rate. Changes to the Marketing Assistance Loan Program Had Only a Modest Impact on Total Payments
The increase in the payment limit and the introduction of commodity certificates had a limited impact on total payments made through the Marketing Assistance Loan Program in crop years 1999 and 2000. Because of the increase in the payment limit, 1999 payments for loan deficiency payments and marketing loan gains were 2.5 percent, or $170.7 million, more than they would have been otherwise. Commodity certificates also composed a small proportion of all program payments—$380 million of the $15 billion in marketing loan assistance payments made over the 2-year period. The cooperatives’ certificate gains were about the same as they would have been if they had chosen to obtain market gains or loan deficiency payments. That is, 47 farmers in 1999 and 100 farmers in 2000 received more than $150,000. While most farmers did not use the majority of the certificates to receive benefits in excess of the payment limit, a handful of farmers did so. Appendix II: Crops and Loan Quantities Redeemed With Certificates, Crop Years 1999 and 2000
Appendix III: Farmers, by State, Receiving More than $75,000 Due to Increase in the Payment Limit, Crop Years 1999 and 2000
In both crop years 1999 and 2000, less than 1 percent of farmers who received marketing loan benefits from USDA’s county offices received over $75,000 in market loan gains and loan deficiency payments combined. | What GAO Found
Under the Department of Agriculture's (USDA) Marketing Assistance Loan Program, the federal government accepts harvested crops as collateral for interest-bearing loans (marketing assistance loans) that are typically due in nine months. When market prices drop below the loan rate (the loan price per pound or bushel), the government allows farmers to repay the loan at a lower rate and retain ownership of their commodity for eventual sale. The difference between the loan rate and the lower repayment rate is called the "marketing loan gain." Conversely, farmers who do not have marketing assistance loans can also receive a benefit when prices are low called a "loan deficiency payment." The loan deficiency payment is equal to the marketing loan gain that the farmer would have received if he or she had a loan. Farmers may choose to obtain either a marketing loan gain or a loan deficiency payment--both of which are known as the marketing loan benefit. The increase in the payment limit and the availability of commodity certificates had only modest effects on the $15 billion in marketing assistance loan payments provided for crop year 1999 and for crop year 2000 through May 2001. Because of the increase in the payment limit, total payments over the two-year period were 1.9 percent more than they would have been under the previous limit, or an additional $261.1 million. Most farmers did not use commodity certificates to receive gains more than the payment limit, but a small number of farmers did benefit from the program. According to the best available data from USDA's county offices, 47 farmers used certificates to receive more than $150,000 in 1999, and 100 farmers did so in 2000. |
gao_GAO-01-1165T | gao_GAO-01-1165T_0 | Yet the task of providing security to the nation’s aviation system is unquestionably daunting, and we must reluctantly acknowledge that any form of travel can never be made totally secure. Safeguarding airplanes and passengers requires, at the least, ensuring that perpetrators are kept from breaching security checkpoints and gaining access to aircraft. Still, in recent years, we and others have often demonstrated that significant weaknesses continue to plague the nation’s aviation security. With the events of the last week, concerns have been raised again as to who should be responsible for security and screening passengers at our nation’s airports. Weaknesses in Airport Access Controls
Control of access to aircraft, airfields, and certain airport facilities is a critical component of aviation security. In May 2000, we reported that our special agents, in an undercover capacity, obtained access to secure areas of two airports by using counterfeit law enforcement credentials and badges. Concerns have long existed about screeners’ ability to detect and prevent dangerous objects from entering secure areas. Furthermore, the recent tests show that as tests become more realistic and more closely approximate how a terrorist might attempt to penetrate a checkpoint, screeners’ ability to detect dangerous objects declines even further. These criteria are to establish accountability for screening performance; ensure cooperation among stakeholders, such as airlines, airports, FAA, efficiently move passengers to flights; and minimize legal and liability issues. Because each country follows its own unique set of screening practices, and because data on screeners’ performance in each country were not available to us, it is difficult to measure the impact of these different practices on improving screeners’ performance. | What GAO Found
A safe and secure civil aviation system is a critical component of the nation's overall security, physical infrastructure, and economic foundation. Billions of dollars and a myriad of programs and policies have been devoted to achieving such a system. Although it is not fully known at this time what actually occurred or what all the weaknesses in the nation's aviation security apparatus are that contributed to the horrendous terrorist acts of Semptember 11, 2001, it is clear that serious weaknesses exist in the nation's aviation security system and that their impact can be far more devastating than previously imagined. There are security concerns with (1) airport access controls, (2) passenger and carry-on baggage screening, and (3) alternatives to current screening practices, including practices in selected other countries. Controls for limiting access to secure areas, including aircraft, have not always worked as intended. In May of 2000, special agents used counterfeit law enforcement badges and credentials to gain access to secure areas at two airports, bypassing security checkpoints and walking unescorted to aircraft departure gates. In June 2000, testing of screeners showed that significant, long-standing weaknesses--measured by the screeners' abilities to detect threat objects located on passengers or contained in their carry-on luggage--continue to exist. More recent results show that as tests more closely approximate how a terrorist might attempt to penetrate a checkpoint--screeners' performance declines significantly. Weaknesses in screening and controlling access to secure are as have left questions concerning alternative approaches. In assessing alternatives, respondents identified five important criteria: improving screening performance, establishing accountability, ensuring cooperation among stakeholders, moving people efficiently, and minimizing legal and liability issues. |
gao_HEHS-96-22 | gao_HEHS-96-22_0 | To What Extent Did SAA Gatekeeping Overlap Other Efforts? More specifically, an estimated 87 percent of SAA staff time, costing about $10.5 million of the $12 million spent by VA in fiscal year 1994, was spent reviewing and approving courses at academic and vocational schools that were also accredited by Education-approved agencies (see fig. The remaining portion of SAA staff time, costing about $1.1 million, was spent on gatekeeping functions that did not overlap the efforts of other entities. While SAA reviews may differ somewhat from those conducted by Education gatekeepers, SAAs and Education use similar standards for approving education and training programs. This portion of SAA activity fell into two categories: approval of unaccredited schools and programs, and approval of OJT programs other than apprenticeships. Department of Education
As the federal representative in the gatekeeping triad, the role of Education is varied. 2. 3. 4. Schools are to be financially sound. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO determined the extent to which state approving agencies (SAA) assessment activities overlap the efforts of other agencies.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) $10.5 million of the $12 million paid to SAA in 1994 was spent to conduct assessments already performed by the Department of Education; (2) these assessments involved reviews of accredited academic and vocational schools; (3) the remaining SAA assessment activities did not overlap the activities of other agencies, since they involved on-the-job training programs and unaccredited schools; and (4) although SAA use evaluation standards that differ from those of other reviewing agencies, SAA activity should be reduced to schools and programs not subject to Department of Education approval. |
gao_GAO-07-860 | gao_GAO-07-860_0 | Army Lacks an Integrated Strategy for Achieving TAV
The Army has estimated that it will invest about $5 billion over the next several years to complete development and implementation of GFEBS, GCSS-Army, and LMP. However, the Army is making this significant investment without a clear integrated strategy for how these systems will be used to achieve TAV over hundreds of billions of dollars of assets. Without these key foundational elements, the Army is at risk of investing billions of dollars in business systems that may not achieve DOD’s and the Army’s goal of achieving TAV. GFEBS, GCSS-Army, and LMP are not being managed and developed in the context of a well-defined Army-wide EA. As a result, the Army does not have a well-informed basis for determining if these systems will fit within the context of future Army business operations and will most efficiently and effectively address the Army’s long-standing weaknesses associated with the lack of asset visibility. Improving asset visibility is critical to addressing the problems associated with supply chain management, which has been on our high-risk list since 1990. An effective concept of operations would describe, at a high level, (1) how the three business systems relate to each other in achieving the Army’s TAV goal, and (2) how information flows from and through these systems. Moreover, we found that the Army’s lack of a concept of operations has contributed to its failure to take full advantage of business process reengineering opportunities that are available when using an ERP solution. Army’s Ability to Effectively Oversee Portfolios of Business Systems Investment Is Not Yet Fully Developed
While the Army has established a governance structure to oversee its business system investments—including its asset accountability system investments—that is consistent with DOD guidance, additional actions are needed to enhance oversight, control, and accountability. Taking an enterprise view enables an organization to consider its investment comprehensively, so that collectively the investments optimally address the organization’s mission, goals, and objectives. In addition, we found that the Army did not have reliable processes and analyses to support its oversight of individual systems modernization program efforts intended to improve asset visibility. LMP Illustrates Continuing Problems in Implementing Business Systems on Time, within Budget, and with the Promised Capability
LMP continues to be plagued by operational problems that have beset the system virtually since its initial implementation in July 2003. These problems can, in part, be attributed to ineffective system testing. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve the department’s efforts to achieve TAV and further enhance its efforts to improve the control and accountability over business system investments, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Army and the Director, BTA, to jointly take the following five actions: Develop a concept of operations that (1) clearly defines the ERP vision for accomplishing total asset visibility within the Army; (2) addresses how its business systems and processes, individually and collectively, will provide the desired functionality to achieve TAV; and (3) determines the desired functionality among the selected systems. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To determine whether the Army has developed a business system strategy for achieving total asset visibility (TAV), we met with program office officials for the General Fund Enterprise Business System (GFEBS), the Global Combat Support System-Army (GCSS-Army), and the Logistics Modernization Program (LMP). More specifically, LMP continues to experience problems with accurately recognizing revenue and billing customers. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Defense (DOD) established a goal to achieve total asset visibility (TAV) over 30 years ago, but to date it has been unsuccessful. GAO was requested to (1) determine whether the Army has a systems strategy for achieving TAV, (2) determine if the Army's business system investment governance structure is consistent with DOD guidance, and (3) evaluate the Army's effort to correct previously reported problems with the Logistics Modernization Program (LMP). GAO obtained an understanding of the Army's efforts to achieve TAV, oversee and manage its business system investments, and address previously reported LMP problems.
What GAO Found
Supply chain management has been on GAO's high-risk list since 1990. One area that has contributed to this long-standing problem has been DOD's inability to maintain control and accountability over hundreds of billions of dollars of assets. DOD plans to improve its asset management through its business system modernization. In this regard, GFEBS, the Global Combat Support System-Army (GCSS-Army), and LMP are aimed at achieving TAV within the Army. The Army estimates that it will invest approximately $5 billion to develop and implement these systems. However, this investment is being made without a clear integrated strategy. GFEBS, GCSS-Army, and LMP are not being developed in the context of a well-defined Army-wide enterprise architecture. As a result, the Army does not have an informed basis for determining if these systems will fit within the context of future Army business operations and will efficiently and effectively address the Army's long-standing weaknesses associated with the lack of asset visibility. The Army lacks a concept of operations that would describe, at a high level, (1) how the three business systems relate to each other in achieving the Army's TAV goal, and (2) how information flows from and through these systems. Moreover, GAO found that the Army's lack of a concept of operations has contributed to its failure to take full advantage of business process reengineering opportunities that are available when using an enterprise resource planning solution. Without these key foundational elements, the Army is at risk of investing about $5 billion in business systems and still not achieving DOD's and the Army's goal of TAV. Furthermore, while the Army has established a governance structure that is consistent with DOD guidance, its processes are still maturing. The Army's governance structure is designed to certify and review individual business systems rather than to evaluate these investments from a portfolio perspective. Such a perspective permits investments to be viewed in a comprehensive manner to help ensure that the organization's missions and objectives are achieved. GAO also found that the Army did not have reliable processes and analyses, such as an independent validation and verification function or economic analyses, to support its oversight of individual business systems. Until the Army's investment processes mature, it runs the risk of investing in business systems that do not provide the desired functionality and efficiency. Additionally, LMP continues to be plagued by problems that have beset the system since its implementation in July 2003. LMP continues to experience problems with accurately recognizing revenue and billing customers, which can, in part, be attributed to ineffective system testing. |
gao_GAO-05-850T | gao_GAO-05-850T_0 | Background
The Medicaid drug rebate program provides savings to state Medicaid programs through rebates for outpatient prescription drugs that are based on two prices per drug that manufacturers report to CMS: best price and AMP. Program Oversight Does Not Ensure That Manufacturer- Reported Prices or Price Determination Methods Are Consistent with Program Criteria
As we reported in February 2005, the minimal oversight by CMS and OIG of manufacturer-reported prices and price determination methods does not ensure that those prices or methods are consistent with program criteria, as specified in the rebate statute, rebate agreement, and CMS program memoranda. CMS conducts limited reviews of prices and only reviews price determination methods when manufacturers request recalculations of prior rebates. Although OIG in some cases identified problems with manufacturers’ price determination methods and reported prices, CMS had not followed up with manufacturers to make sure that those problems were resolved. Manufacturer Price Determination Methods Varied: Some Could Have Led to Lower Rebates
As we reported, we found considerable variation in the methods that the manufacturers we reviewed used to determine best price and AMP. Manufacturers are allowed to make reasonable assumptions when determining best price and AMP, as long as those assumptions are consistent with the law and the rebate agreement. We found that manufacturers made varying assumptions about which sales and prices to include and exclude from their determinations of best price and AMP. We also found that manufacturers also differed in how they accounted for certain price reductions, fees, and other transactions when determining best price and AMP. In other cases, manufacturers’ methods could have raised rebates. Rebate Program Does Not Clearly Address Certain Financial Concessions Negotiated by PBMs
As we reported, the rebates that manufacturers pay to states are based on a range of prices and financial concessions that manufacturers make available to entities that purchase their drugs, but they may not reflect certain financial concessions manufacturers offer to other entities in today’s complex market. The rebate program did not initially address these types of concessions, which are relatively new to the market. CMS’s subsequent guidance to manufacturers has not clearly stated how manufacturers should treat these concessions in their determinations of best price and AMP. Within the current structure of the rebate formula, additional guidance on how to account for manufacturer payments to PBMs could affect the rebates paid to states, although whether rebates would increase or decrease as a result, and by how much, is uncertain. As of January 2005, CMS had not issued such clarifying guidance on how PBM-negotiated manufacturer payments should be reflected in best price and AMP when PBMs have negotiated on behalf of third parties. | Why GAO Did This Study
To help control Medicaid spending on drugs, states receive rebates from pharmaceutical manufacturers through the Medicaid drug rebate program. Rebates are based on two prices--best price and average manufacturer price (AMP)--reported by manufacturers. GAO was asked to discuss issues relating to the rebate program and in February 2005 issued a report, Medicaid Drug Rebate Program: Inadequate Oversight Raises Concerns about Rebates Paid to States (GAO-05-102). For that report, GAO reviewed program guidance and OIG reports and conducted an analysis of rebates for brand name drugs. This testimony is based on the February 2005 report.
What GAO Found
As noted in the February 2005 report, GAO found that rebate program oversight does not ensure that manufacturer-reported prices or price determination methods are consistent with program criteria specified in the rebate statute, rebate agreement, and Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) program memoranda. In administering the program, CMS conducts only limited checks for reporting errors in manufacturer-reported drug prices and only reviews price determination methods when manufacturers request recalculations of prior rebates. In several reports, the Department of Health and Human Services' (HHS) Office of Inspector General (OIG) identified several factors that limited its ability to verify the accuracy of manufacturer-reported prices, including a lack of clear guidance on how AMP should be calculated. GAO noted that although in some cases OIG found problems with manufacturers' price determination methods and prices, CMS had not followed up with manufacturers to make sure that problems had been resolved. GAO also found considerable variation in the methods that manufacturers used to determine best price and AMP. In some cases, manufacturers' assumptions could have lowered rebates; in other cases, their assumptions could have raised rebates. Manufacturers are allowed to make assumptions when determining best price and AMP, as long as they are consistent with the law and the rebate agreement. GAO found that manufacturers made varying assumptions about which sales and prices to include and exclude from their determinations of best price and AMP. Manufacturers also differed in how they accounted for certain price reductions, fees, and other transactions when determining best price and AMP. The rebates that manufacturers pay to states are based on prices and financial concessions manufacturers make available to entities that purchase their drugs but may not reflect certain financial concessions they offer to other entities. In particular, the rebate program does not clearly address certain manufacturer payments negotiated by pharmacy benefit managers (PBM) on behalf of third-party payers. These types of financial arrangements are relatively new to the market. CMS's guidance to manufacturers has not clearly stated how manufacturers should treat these payments when determining best price and AMP. Additional guidance on how to account for these payments could affect rebates, although whether rebates would increase or decrease as a result, and by how much, is uncertain. |
gao_GAO-08-1094 | gao_GAO-08-1094_0 | To address these concerns, we recommended that the Secretary of State and the Permanent Representative of the United States to the UN work with other member states to encourage the Secretary-General to take the following eight actions: Establish clear and effective lines of authority and responsibility between headquarters and the field for UN procurement, Enhance the professionalism of the UN procurement workforce by establishing a comprehensive procurement training program and a formal career path, Provide the Headquarters Committee on Contracts with an adequate structure and manageable workload for contract review needs, Establish an independent bid protest process for UN vendors, Take action to keep the UN procurement manual complete and updated on a timely basis and complete ethics guidance, Develop a consistent process for providing reasonable assurance that the UN is conducting business with only qualified vendors, Develop a strategic risk assessment process that provides reasonable assurance of systematic and comprehensive examination of headquarters and field procurement, and Standardize and strengthen monitoring of procurement activities by procurement managers, including actions to ensure that oversight agencies’ recommendations are implemented and that officials are held accountable for their actions. UN Logistics Base
The UN Logistics Base (UNLB) in Brindisi, Italy, is a permanent logistics base that supports UN peacekeeping operations and has been in operation since 1994. 1). Restructuring of Peacekeeping Management under Way, but Ambiguity Remains on Procurement Lines of Authority
The United Nations is in the process of restructuring and strengthening its organization for peacekeeping management, but the Secretary-General and General Assembly have not decided whether the Department of Management or the Department of Field Support (DFS) will have full authority for field procurement. Peacekeeping Procurement Reforms Are Proceeding, but Have Not Addressed Some Previously Identified Concerns
The United Nations has made some progress in implementing procurement reforms, but has not resolved continuing concerns in areas such as developing career paths for procurement officers in the field. However, these reforms and initiatives have not addressed some previously identified concerns, such as difficulties in attracting and retaining field procurement staff. Initiatives that the Department of Management’s Procurement Division has implemented include the following: Financial disclosure requirement for procurement staff. Several procurement chiefs also discussed a need to expand training for other mission staff involved in the procurement process—particularly requisitioners. UNLB Provides Important Communications and Logistical Support to Peacekeeping Missions, but Its Growth Has Raised Concerns among Member States
UNLB provides several important services to peacekeeping missions, including the management of the UN’s worldwide communications and information network and the rapid deployment of Strategic Deployment Stocks (SDS). In response to peacekeeping mandates, UNLB’s responsibilities have increased to incorporate other services, such as training and aviation support. However, its growth over the past 5 to 6 years has raised concerns among UN member states about its expansion and future roles in peacekeeping support. 4). However, the UN has yet to resolve this issue. State commented that it would draw upon our findings in its continuing discussions with the UN. State and the UN also provided technical comments, which we addressed in the report as appropriate. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our review focused on three objectives related to the management of peacekeeping operations: (1) the status of restructuring and strengthening peacekeeping management, including the authority for field procurement; (2) the status of reforms to address previously identified problems with peacekeeping procurement; and (3) UN Logistics Base’s (UNLB) support of peacekeeping operations and its recent expansion. In addition, we conducted structured telephone interviews with chief procurement officers at 20 current peacekeeping and special political missions. | Why GAO Did This Study
The United States is the largest financial contributor to United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations--providing about $1.4 billion in 2008 (about 26 percent of the total UN peacekeeping assessed budget)--and has a strong interest in the efficient and effective management of these operations. The size and scope of UN peacekeeping has significantly increased over the past several years and the UN has pursued management reforms to strengthen its capacity to support operations. GAO was asked to examine (1) the status of the current restructuring and strengthening of peacekeeping management including procurement for the field, (2) the status of reforms to address previously identified problems with peacekeeping procurement, and (3) the UN Logistics Base's support of peacekeeping operations. GAO reviewed relevant UN documents; conducted structured interviews with chief procurement officers at 20 peacekeeping missions; and interviewed UN and U.S. officials. State agreed with the report and commented that it would draw upon some of the report findings in its discussion with the United Nations. The UN agreed with GAO's assessment of the status of reforms and provided technical comments, which are addressed in the report as appropriate.
What GAO Found
The United Nations (UN) is in the process of restructuring and strengthening its organization for peacekeeping management, but has not resolved the issue of authority for field procurement, which is fundamental to the restructuring. Instead, the authority for field procurement remains divided between two departments, leaving the lines of accountability and responsibility for field procurement unclear. Member states are also concerned that the head of the new Department of Field Support reports to and takes direction from the head of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations on matters related to peacekeeping missions. The UN has not yet appointed several key senior-level staff for both departments, at a critical time in the restructuring. The UN has made some progress in implementing procurement reforms to improve internal controls and processes. For example, the UN Secretariat has established financial disclosure requirements for all staff involved in the procurement process, expanded training for peacekeeping staff and updated its procurement manual. However, these efforts have not addressed some previously identified concerns, including difficulties in attracting and retaining field procurement staff and in applying procurement processes in the field. The UN Logistics Base (UNLB) in Brindisi, Italy, provides important communications and logistical support to peacekeeping operations and has expanded considerably since 2002. UNLB maintains the UN's worldwide information and technology network and provides peacekeeping missions with stocks that are essential during start-up. In response to peacekeeping mandates, UNLB has further expanded to take on tasks such as training and aviation support. However, its growth over the past 5 to 6 years has raised concerns of the General Assembly, which requested that it clarify its role and future development plans. |
gao_GAO-04-38 | gao_GAO-04-38_0 | Now that GPRA has been in effect for 10 years, you asked us to assess the effectiveness of GPRA in creating a focus on results in the federal government. Specifically, this report discusses (1) the effect of GPRA over the last 10 years in creating a governmentwide focus on results and the government’s ability to deliver results to the American public, including an assessment of the changes in the overall quality of agencies’ strategic plans, annual performance plans, and annual performance reports; (2) the challenges agencies face in measuring performance and using performance information in management decisions; and (3) how the federal government can continue to shift toward a more results-oriented focus. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) plays an important role in the management of the federal government’s performance, and specifically GPRA implementation. Ten years after enactment, GPRA’s requirements have laid a foundation of results- oriented agency planning, measurement, and reporting that have begun to address these purposes. Our survey results indicate that since GPRA went into effect governmentwide in 1997, federal managers reported having significantly more of the types of performance measures called for by GPRA—particularly outcome-oriented performance measures. GPRA has also begun to facilitate the linking of resources to results, although much remains to be done in this area. This would provide important guidance to agencies that could then be incorporated in agency strategic and annual performance plans. Challenges to successful implementation of GPRA include inconsistent top leadership commitment to creating a focus on results; an approach to setting goals and developing strategies for achieving critical outcomes that creates individual agency stovepipes rather than an integrated, holistic governmentwide approach; getting federal managers to make greater use of performance information to manage their programs and providing them authority to act that is commensurate with their accountability for results; difficulty in establishing meaningful measures of outcomes and assessing results of federal programs that are carried out by nonfederal entities; and untimely performance data. Through the administration’s PMA and PART initiatives, OMB has clearly placed greater emphasis on management issues over the past several years. OMB leadership is critical to addressing the continuing challenges presented in GPRA implementation and the transformation of the federal government to an increasingly results-oriented culture. | Why GAO Did This Study
Now that the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) has been in effect for 10 years, GAO was asked to address (1) the effect of GPRA in creating a governmentwide focus on results and the government's ability to deliver results to the American public, (2) the challenges agencies face in measuring performance and using performance information in management decisions, and (3) how the federal government can continue to shift toward a more results-oriented focus.
What GAO Found
GPRA's requirements have established a solid foundation of results-oriented performance planning, measurement, and reporting in the federal government. Federal managers surveyed by GAO reported having significantly more of the types of performance measures called for by GPRA. GPRA has also begun to facilitate the linking of resources to results, although much remains to be done in this area to increase the use of performance information to make decisions about resources. We also found agency strategic and annual performance plans and reports we reviewed have improved over initial efforts. Although a foundation has been established, numerous significant challenges to GPRA implementation still exist. Inconsistent top leadership commitment to achieving results within agencies and Office of Management and Budget (OMB) can hinder the development of results-oriented cultures in agencies. Furthermore, in certain areas, federal managers continue to have difficulty setting outcome-oriented goals, collecting useful data on results, and linking institutional, program, unit, and individual performance measurement and reward systems. Finally, there is an inadequate focus on addressing issues that cut across federal agencies. OMB, as the focal point for management in the federal government, is responsible for overall leadership and direction in addressing these challenges. OMB has clearly placed greater emphasis on management issues during the past several years. However, it has showed less commitment to GPRA implementation in its guidance to agencies and in using the governmentwide performance plan requirement of GPRA to develop an integrated approach to crosscutting issues. In our view, governmentwide strategic planning could better facilitate the integration of federal activities to achieve national goals. |
gao_GAO-06-335T | gao_GAO-06-335T_0 | The program is not actuarially sound because of the number of policies in force that are subsidized—about 29 percent at the time of our 2003 report. As a result of these subsidies, some policyholders with dwellings that were built before flood plain management regulations were established in their communities pay premiums that represent about 35 to 40 percent of the true risk premium. From 1978 until March 2004, these repetitive loss properties represented about $4.6 billion in claims payments. The extent of noncompliance with current mandatory purchase requirements by affected property owners is unknown. Some interest has been expressed in Congress in assessing the feasibility of expanding mandatory purchase requirements beyond current special high-risk flood hazard areas. FEMA and its private insurance partners also have efforts underway to increase participation in the NFIP by marketing flood insurance policies in areas where purchase is not mandatory. As a result, the program does not collect sufficient premium income to build reserves to meet the long-term future expected flood losses. FEMA has statutory authority to borrow funds from the Treasury to keep the NFIP solvent. FEMA’s current debt with the Treasury is almost entirely for payment of claims from Hurricanes Katrina and Rita and other flood events that occurred in 2005. In January 2006, FEMA estimated an annual shortfall in premium income of $750 million because of policy subsidies. Because of the financial drain that repetitive loss properties have posed for the program, it will be important in future studies of the NFIP to continue to analyze data on progress being made to reduce the inventory of subsidized NFIP properties, particularly those with repetitive losses; how the reduction of this inventory contributes to the financial stability of the program; and whether additional FEMA regulatory steps or congressional actions could contribute to the financial solvency of the NFIP, while meeting commitments made by the authorizing legislation. For example, areas subject to damage by waves and storm surge are in the zone with the highest expectation for flood loss. To expand the NFIP policyholder base, there has been some congressional interest in the feasibility of extending the current mandatory purchase requirement to properties in a 500-year flood plain, which statistically have a 1 in 500 chance of flooding in any given year. It would be difficult to effectively assess the impacts, effectiveness, and feasibility of such a change in the structure of the NFIP. We share FEMA’s concerns related to enforcing and assessing compliance. FEMA Has Not Fully Implemented NFIP Program Changes Mandated by the Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2004
As of January 2006, FEMA had not yet fully implemented provisions of the Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2004. The 6-month statutory deadline for implementing these changes was December 30, 2004. We recommended that FEMA develop documented plans with milestones for implementing requirements of the Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2004 to provide policyholders a flood insurance claims handbook that meets statutory requirements, to establish a regulatory appeals process, and to ensure that flood insurance agents meet minimum NFIP education and training requirements. In the longer term, Congress and the NFIP face a complex challenge in assessing potential changes to the program that would improve its financial stability, increase participation in the program by property owners in areas at risk of flooding, reduce the number of repetitive loss properties in the program, and maintain current and accurate flood plain maps. | Why GAO Did This Study
The National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP), established in 1968, provides property owners with some insurance coverage for flood damage. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) within the Department of Homeland Security is responsible for managing the NFIP. The unprecedented magnitude and severity of the flood losses from hurricanes in 2005 challenged the NFIP to process a record number of claims. These storms also illustrated the extent to which the federal government has exposure for claims coverage in catastrophic loss years. FEMA estimates that Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma will generate claims and payments of about $23 billion--far surpassing the total claims paid in the entire history of the NFIP. This testimony provides information from past and ongoing GAO work on issues including: (1) NFIP's financial structure; (2) the impact of properties with repetitive flood losses on NFIP's resources; (3) proposals to increase the number of policies in force; and (4) the status of past GAO recommendations.
What GAO Found
The NFIP, by design, is not actuarially sound. The program does not collect sufficient premium income to build reserves to meet long-term future expected flood losses. In November 2005, FEMA's authority to borrow from the Treasury was increased from $1.5 billion to $18.5 billion through fiscal year 2008 to help pay claims from the 2005 hurricane season. It is highly unlikely that the NFIP as presently funded could generate sufficient revenues to repay a debt of this size. One reason the NFIP is not actuarially sound is because a number of its policies on dwellings that were built before flood plain management regulations were established in their communities are subsidized and pay premiums of 35-40 percent of the true risk premium. In January 2006, FEMA estimated an annual shortfall in premium income of $750 million because of such policy subsidies. Some subsidized properties, called repetitive loss properties, also suffer repetitive flood losses, which accounted for about $4.6 billion in claims payments from 1978 to March 2004. We need to analyze the progress made to reduce the inventory of subsidized repetitive-loss properties and determine whether additional regulatory or congressional action is needed. A challenge for FEMA is to expand the NFIP policyholder base by enforcing mandatory purchase requirements and encouraging voluntary purchase by homeowners who live in areas at lower risk of flooding. The extent of noncompliance with current mandatory purchase requirements for property owners in special flood hazard areas is unknown. There has been some congressional interest in the feasibility of expanding mandatory purchase requirements beyond the current special high-risk areas, however, there are a number of difficulties to assessing the impacts, effectiveness, and feasibility of such a change in the structure of the NFIP, as well as concerns related to enforcing and assessing compliance. For example, more precise flood mapping of areas outside the current high-risk areas would be required to accurately identify affected property owners. FEMA and its private insurance partners also have efforts underway to increase NFIP participation by marketing policies in areas where purchase is not mandatory. FEMA has not yet fully implemented provisions of the Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2004 requiring the agency to develop new materials to explain coverage and the claims process to policyholders, establish an appeals process for claimants, and provide insurance agent education and training requirements. The statutory deadline for implementing these changes was December 30, 2004, and, as of January 2006, FEMA had not developed documented plans with milestones for meeting the provisions of the act, as recommended by GAO. |
gao_GAO-09-42 | gao_GAO-09-42_0 | ASD(HD&ASA) has issued guidance to help assure the availability of critical infrastructure. Aspects of Critical Infrastructure Assurance Are Incorporated into TRANSCOM and Installation Exercises
TRANSCOM and the installations we visited that have critical transportation assets have incorporated DCIP-like elements into their existing exercises. Although installation personnel we met with often were unaware of DCIP, we found that many conducted routine antiterrorism, emergency management, information assurance, and continuity of operations planning exercises that often include critical transportation assets located on the installation. DOD guidance requires the testing of antiterrorism and continuity of operations plans annually through various exercises. DOD Has Not Developed DCIP Training Standards Departmentwide, and Installation Personnel Remain Unaware of Existing DCIP Expertise
Although several of the combatant commands and military services we visited have variously developed headquarters-level DCIP training programs, DOD has not developed DCIP training standards departmentwide. DCIP Training Standards Have Not Yet Been Developed Departmentwide
DOD’s DCIP instruction requires ASD(HD&ASA) to provide policy and guidance for DCIP and oversee the implementation of DCIP education, training, and awareness of goals and objectives. ASD(HD&ASA) recognized the need for DCIP training in its March 2008 Strategy for Defense Critical Infrastructure. Given that this strategy is relatively new, DCIP training standards have not yet been established departmentwide nor has DOD established a time frame for implementing the training standards. However, in the absence of DCIP training standards departmentwide, we determined through our work examining the five defense sectors that several combatant commands and military services have independently developed their own training programs or modules. With Few Exceptions, Installation Personnel We Met with Responsible for Critical Transportation Assets Were Unaware of Existing DCIP Expertise
With few exceptions, installation personnel we met with who are responsible for assuring the availability of critical transportation infrastructure were not familiar with DCIP and were not aware that the combatant commands or military services possessed DCIP expertise that they could leverage for two reasons. Furthermore, DOD has not developed an effective way to communicate that DCIP expertise is available to installation personnel at the combatant command and military service levels. Conclusions
Because the network of DOD- and non-DOD-owned critical infrastructure represents an attractive target to adversaries and also is potentially vulnerable to a variety of natural disasters or accidents, it is crucial for DOD to conduct DCIP exercises and develop and implement DCIP training. However, they conducted complementary exercises that while in some cases not emphasizing the full spectrum of threats and hazards, often involved some aspects of critical infrastructure assurance and provided a measure of protection for critical assets located on the installation. Coordinate with the combatant commands and military services to develop an effective means to communicate to installation personnel the existence and availability of DCIP expertise at the combatant command and military service levels. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To determine the extent to which the Department of Defense (DOD) has (1) incorporated aspects of the Defense Critical Infrastructure Program (DCIP) into its exercises in the Transportation Defense Sector and (2) developed DCIP training standards departmentwide and made installation personnel aware of existing DCIP expertise, we obtained relevant documentation and interviewed officials from the following DOD organizations: Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Joint Staff, Directorate for Operations, Antiterrorism and Homeland Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Combat Support Assessments Division Military services Department of the Army, Asymmetric Warfare Office, Critical Office of the Chief Information Officer Mission Assurance Division, Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren Division, Dahlgren, Virginia Department of the Air Force, Air, Space and Information Operations, Plans, and Requirements, Homeland Defense Division Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, Security Division, Critical Headquarters, U.S. Central Command, Critical Infrastructure Program Office, MacDill Air Force Base (AFB), Florida Headquarters, U.S. European Command, Critical Infrastructure Protection Program Office, Patch Barracks, Vaihingen, Germany Headquarters, U.S. Pacific Command, Antiterrorism and Critical Infrastructure Division, Camp H.M. Smith, Hawaii U.S. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Defense (DOD) relies on a global network of DOD and non-DOD infrastructure so critical that its unavailability could have a debilitating effect on DOD's ability to project, support, and sustain its forces and operations worldwide. DOD established the Defense Critical Infrastructure Program (DCIP) to assure the availability of mission-critical infrastructure. GAO was asked to evaluate the extent to which DOD has (1) incorporated aspects of DCIP into its exercises in the Transportation Defense Sector and (2) developed DCIP training standards departmentwide and made installation personnel aware of existing DCIP expertise. GAO examined a nonprojectable sample of 46 critical assets representing the four military services, five combatant commands, and selected installations within five defense sectors. GAO reviewed relevant DOD DCIP guidance and documents and interviewed cognizant officials regarding DCIP exercises, training, and awareness.
What GAO Found
U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) and the installations GAO visited that have critical transportation assets have incorporated aspects of critical infrastructure assurance into their exercises. DOD's DCIP guidance requires the combatant commands and the military services to conduct annual DCIP exercises, either separately or in conjunction with existing exercises. DCIP guidance also requires commanders to ensure submission of lessons learned from these exercises. For example, TRANSCOM has included aspects of critical infrastructure assurance in its two major biennial exercises. Although military personnel at 13 of the 19 installations GAO visited that have critical transportation assets generally were not aware of DCIP, GAO found that all 19 of these installations conduct routine exercises that often involve aspects of critical infrastructure assurance, and they incorporate lessons learned from past exercises into future exercises. For example, personnel at these installations conduct antiterrorism, emergency management, and continuity of operations planning exercises that often include critical assets located on the installation. While several of the combatant commands and military services included in GAO's review of the five defense sectors have independently developed DCIP training at the headquarters level, DOD has not yet developed DCIP training standards departmentwide, and installation personnel remained largely unaware of existing DCIP expertise. DOD's DCIP instruction requires the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas' Security Affairs (ASD[HD&ASA]) to provide policy and guidance for DCIP and oversee the implementation of DCIP education, training, and awareness of goals and objectives. ASD(HD&ASA) recognizes the need for DCIP training and program awareness, as noted in its March 2008 critical infrastructure strategy. However, given the newness of the strategy, ASD(HD&ASA) has not yet established departmentwide DCIP training standards for assuring the availability of critical infrastructure or a time frame for implementing the training standards. In the absence of established DCIP training standards, the combatant commands and military services are variously developing and implementing their own DCIP training programs. For example, the Navy has established an information assurance training program that includes a DCIP module. Furthermore, installation personnel GAO spoke with, with few exceptions, were not familiar with DCIP or aware of DCIP expertise at the combatant command and military service headquarters levels. In addition, DOD has not developed an effective way to communicate to installation personnel the existence of DCIP expertise. Consequently, they rely on other, more established programs that in some cases do not emphasize the consideration of the full spectrum of threats and hazards. Without DCIP training standards departmentwide and a means of communicating them to installation personnel, the combatant commands and military services potentially may develop mutually redundant or inconsistent training programs, and installation personnel will continue to be unaware of existing DCIP expertise. |
gao_GGD-99-66 | gao_GGD-99-66_0 | OPM Developed a Strong Planning Strategy for Its Year 2000 Continuity Efforts
The first phase of business continuity planning—referred to herein as initiation—involves developing a planning strategy for ensuring the continuity of agency operations in the event of Year 2000-induced failures. In developing this planning strategy, OPM established a project structure and milestones for carrying out the planning effort, identified the agency’s core business processes, established key reporting requirements, and obtained the concerted support and involvement of senior managers in the agency. To determine whether the plans would be effective if implemented, OPM established milestones to develop and test the contingency plans by May 1999. OPM Developed Information to Assess the Risk of System Failures
After developing a business continuity strategy for the Year 2000 problem, agencies need to determine the risk and impact of internal and external system failures on the viability and operations of the agency’s core business processes. After reviewing a draft of this report, OPM provided us with documentation that showed that the agency had taken additional action to develop a Year 2000 risk assessment for each of its 109 mission-critical systems. When it provided written comments on our draft report, OPM gave us supplemental documentation that demonstrated that the agency had taken additional actions to address our concerns. Conclusions
OPM has made progress in its business continuity and contingency planning efforts for the Year 2000 computing problem. In response to concerns we raised during our review, OPM undertook actions to improve the implementation of its Year 2000 business continuity planning strategy. Specifically, we evaluated OPM’s efforts to (1) develop an overall planning strategy for ensuring the continuity of agency operations, (2) assess the risk and impact of system failures on the agency’s core business processes, (3) prepare contingency plans that include procedures and timetables for continuing agency operations in the event that critical systems fail, and (4) test the contingency plans to determine their effectiveness. To assess OPM’s efforts in preparing Year 2000 contingency plans, we reviewed the 27 plans that were prepared and submitted by the 17 OPM units represented on the agency’s business continuity work group (listed in app. Comments from the Office of Personnel Management
The following is GAO’s comment on OPM’s letter dated April 2, 1999. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Office of Personnel Management's (OPM) year 2000 business continuity and contingency planning activities, focusing on OPM's efforts to: (1) develop an overall planning strategy for ensuring the continuity of agency operations; (2) assess the risk and impact of system failures on the agency's core business processes; (3) prepare contingency plans that include procedures and timetables for continuing agency operations in the event that critical systems fail; and (4) test the contingency plans to determine their effectiveness.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) OPM has made progress in its business continuity planning efforts in preparation for the year 2000 computing problem; (2) using GAO's guidance on year 2000 business continuity planning for federal agencies, OPM developed a strong planning strategy for ensuring the continuity of critical agency operations in the event of year 2000-induced system failures; (3) to develop its planning strategy, OPM created a project structure involving representatives from the agency's major business units; (4) through the coordination of this project work group, OPM developed a master schedule and milestones for continuity planning activities, identified business processes that are critical to agency operations, established key reporting requirements, and obtained the concerted support and involvement of the agency's senior management; (5) GAO's review raised concerns, however, about OPM's implementation of the business continuity planning strategy; (6) GAO identified these concerns after reviewing key planning documents that OPM had developed according to critical milestones established by the agency in its year 2000 business continuity planning process; (7) specifically, GAO's concerns involved the approach that OPM used for: (a) assessing the risk and impact of system failures on the agency's core business processes; (b) preparing contingency plans to be used in the event of critical system failures; and (c) developing plans to test the contingency plans to determine whether they would be effective if implemented; (8) when OPM presented GAO with its written comments on a draft of this report, it provided GAO with supplemental documentation that demonstrated that the agency had taken additional actions to address GAO's concerns; (9) by taking these additional actions, OPM has improved the implementation of its business continuity planning strategy and increased the likelihood that critical agency functions can be carried out even if year 2000-induced failures occur in key computer systems; and (10) thus, GAO is not making recommendations to address the concerns originally observed. |
gao_GGD-98-37 | gao_GGD-98-37_0 | Major Design Differences Among Alternative Tax Systems
Table 1 lists four basic design features of the tax systems we studied: (1) the basis for taxation (income or consumption); (2) whether individuals, businesses, or both would be subject to tax; (3) whether tax preferences could exist for certain individuals, businesses, or goods and services; and (4) the rate structure for individuals (single or multiple rates). Preferential Treatment
Each of the various alternatives could include tax preferences, although the types of preferences provided would differ among alternatives. Implications of the Alternative Tax Systems for Taxpayer Compliance Burden and Tax Administration
Because of differences in the four basic design features, the tax systems we studied would have different impacts on taxpayers’ and tax administrators’ responsibilities, and thus on taxpayers’ compliance burden and the costs of tax administration. Business-level tax systems generally have fewer filers than individual-level tax systems or systems that combine a business and individual tax. In addition, businesses would not be required to file information returns related to individuals. The alternatives that include a business tax and a relatively simple individual tax would likely require return filing by businesses and by some individuals. Determining Correct Tax Amounts and Assessing Compliance
Because of differences in the four design features we discussed earlier, the tax systems we studied would differ in the burden experienced by taxpayers in determining their tax liability and in the costs to tax administrators of assessing compliance. The fact that some tax systems—the current income tax, versions of a reformed income tax, and the personal consumption tax—have or could have multiple rates on individuals imposes little additional burden on taxpayers or tax administrators except to the extent that multiple rates encourage tax planning. Transition to a New Tax System
A wide range of options exist for moving from the current income tax system to an alternative tax system, and the way that any transition is formulated could have significant effects for economic efficiency, equity, taxpayer compliance burden, and tax administration. Special rules designed to exempt existing saving from tax could burden individuals with additional recordkeeping, filing, and tax determination requirements and create additional tax compliance issues for tax administrators. Our second objective was to describe how the alternatives, by incorporating these differences, may affect taxpayers’ burden of complying with the tax laws and the government’s responsibilities for tax administration. Then, it discusses the potential impact of these options on taxpayers’ compliance burden and on tax administration. An income VAT could reduce the number of tax returns still further. Processing of Returns
With a flat tax, a tax agency might process almost the same number of tax returns as the 122 million in the current system (in 1995), since both individuals and businesses would continue to file returns and remit taxes; however, the level of personal allowances and deductions available could affect that number considerably. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO reviewed alternative tax systems, focusing on: (1) the major differences in design among the tax alternatives; and (2) how the alternatives, by incorporating different design features, may affect the taxpayers' burden of complying with the tax laws and the government's responsibilities for administering those laws.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the alternative tax systems that GAO studied differ in their potential impacts on taxpayer compliance burden and tax administration; (2) the different potential impacts of the tax systems can largely be explained by four basic design features: (a) the basis for taxation; (b) the type of taxpayer; (c) preferential tax treatment for certain individuals, businesses, or goods and services; and (d) the rate structure for individuals; (3) the differences in the four basic design features of the tax systems GAO studied explain in large part the differing potential impacts of the tax systems on taxpayer compliance burden and tax administration; (4) simplifying the determination of tax liability for taxpayers could simplify assessing compliance and providing taxpayer assistance for tax administrators; (5) tax systems that would tax only businesses, rather than individuals and businesses, could reduce taxpayer compliance burden and the costs of tax administration by greatly reducing the number of taxpayers required to file returns; (6) tax systems that combine a business tax with a relatively simple individual tax, such as flat tax or some version of a reformed income tax, could add limited burden relative to a business-only tax; (7) tax systems requiring individuals to report more information about their personal finances could add more burden than a business tax combined with a simple individual tax because more individuals could have to file tax returns and the returns would be more complicated; (8) an alternative tax system incorporating tax preferences--exemptions, special deductions, credits, or multiple rates on goods and services aimed at various economic and social goals--would generally add complexity; (9) tax preferences generally increase taxpayer compliance burden by complicating the determination of tax liability, adding recordkeeping requirements, and creating incentives to engage in tax planning; (10) tax preferences generally increase taxpayer compliance burden by complicating the determination of tax liability, adding recordkeeping requirements, and creating incentives to engage in tax planning; (11) tax systems with multiple tax rates for individuals, which could include income taxes and a personal consumption tax, do not need to add burden to taxpayers' calculation of tax liability compared to single-rate systems; and (12) in addition to impacts due to the four basic design features, the transition to an alternative tax system could affect taxpayer compliance burden and tax administration. |
gao_GAO-12-784T | gao_GAO-12-784T_0 | These benefits are available to low-income wartime veterans who are 65 and older, or who are under age 65 but are permanently and totally disabled due to conditions unrelated to their military service. Surviving spouses and dependent children may also qualify for these benefits. These income limits are also the maximum annual pension payment that a beneficiary may receive and may vary based on whether claimants are veterans or survivors, their family composition, as well as whether they need enhanced benefits, such as aid and attendance or housebound benefits.example, to qualify for pension benefits in 2012 a veteran with no dependents and who is in need of aid and attendance benefits cannot have income that exceeds $20,447. Organizations Help Veterans Transfer Assets to Qualify for Pension Benefits
We identified over 200 organizations located throughout the country that market their services to help veterans and their surviving spouses qualify for VA pension benefits by transferring or preserving excess assets. These organizations consist primarily of financial planners and attorneys offering products and services such as annuities and the establishment of trusts, to enable potential VA pension claimants with excess assets to meet financial eligibility criteria for VA pension benefits. In contrast, for Medicaid—another means tested program—federal law explicitly restricts eligibility for coverage for long term care for certain individuals who transfer assets for less than fair market value prior to applying., As a result, when an individual applies for Medicaid coverage for long-term care, states conduct a look-back—a review to determine if the applicant transferred assets for less than fair market value prior to applying. During our investigative calls, all 19 organizations correctly noted that pension claimants can legally transfer assets prior to applying. Some Products and Services May Adversely Affect Claimants
Some products may not be suitable for elderly veterans because they may lose access to funds they may need for future expenses, such as medical care. To help elderly clients become financially eligible for VA pension benefits, some organizations may sell deferred annuities which would make the client unable to access the funds in the annuity during their expected lifetime without facing high withdrawal fees, according to some attorneys we spoke with. Claimants may not understand that this accreditation only means that the individual is proficient in VA’s policies and procedures to assist in preparing and submitting VA benefits claims and does not ensure the products and services these individuals are selling are in claimants’ best interests. Among the 19 organizations our investigative staff contacted for this review, about one-third said they did not charge for their services to help qualify claimants for VA pension benefits. Among organizations that did charge for services, fees ranged from a few hundred dollars for benefits counseling up to $10,000 for the establishment of a trust. In addition, concerns have been raised that fees charged may be excessive for the services provided. Accordingly, we asked Congress to consider establishing a look-back and penalty period for pension claimants who transfer assets at less than fair market value prior to applying for pension benefits, similar to other federally supported means- tested programs. | Why GAO Did This Study
This testinony discusses the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) pension program, which provides economic benefits to wartime veterans age 65 and older or who have disabilities that are unrelated to their military service, as well as to their surviving spouses and dependent children. To qualify for VA pension benefits, a claimant must have limited income and assets. Recently, concerns have been raised that some organizations are marketing financial products and other services to help individuals whose assets exceed the programs financial eligibility thresholds qualify for these benefits. These organizations may charge substantial fees for products and services that may not always be in claimants best long-term interests.
In our report released today on VAs pension program, we identified vulnerabilities in VAs procedures for assessing financial eligibility. We also found that there is no prohibition on claimants transferring assets prior to applying for benefits, and some claimants do so. Other means-tested programs, such as Medicaid, conduct a look-back review to determine if an individual has transferred assets for less than fair market value, and if so, may deny eligibility for benefits for a period of time. This control helps ensure that only those in financial need receive benefits.
This testimony is based on our report and focuses on what is known about organizations that are marketing financial products and services to veterans and survivors to enable them to qualify for VA pension benefits.
What GAO Found
In summary, we identified over 200 organizations that market financial and estate planning services to help pension claimants with excess assets qualify for pension benefits. These organizations consist primarily of financial planners and attorneys who offer products such as annuities and trusts. All 19 organizations our investigative staff contacted said a claimant can qualify for pension benefits by transferring assets before applying, which is permitted under the program. Two organization representatives said they helped pension claimants with substantial assets, including millionaires, obtain VAs approval for benefits. Some products and services provided, such as deferred annuities, may not be suitable for the elderly because they may not have access to their funds within their expected lifetime without facing high withdrawal fees. Also, such asset transfers may result in ineligibility for Medicaid coverage for long-term care for a period of time. The majority of the 19 organizations contacted charged fees, ranging from a few hundred dollars for benefits counseling to $10,000 for establishment of a trust. In our report we asked Congress to consider establishing a look-back and penalty period for pension claimants who transfer assets prior to applying for pension benefits, similar to other federally supported means-tested programs, such as Medicaid. We also recommended that VA obtain timely information on asset transfers, strengthen income and asset verification processes, and provide clearer guidance to claims processors. VA concurred with our recommendations and agreed that a look back and penalty period for asset transfers was needed. |
gao_GAO-05-271 | gao_GAO-05-271_0 | As a result, the initial operational capability date was delayed. With reduced quantities and increased program costs, the JSF program is now buying fewer aircraft at a higher cost, thereby reducing the program’s buying power. Over the past year, DOD has been working to restructure the JSF program to accommodate changes in the aircraft’s design; until this restructuring is completed, it will be difficult to accurately estimate program costs. The program plans to have a more comprehensive cost estimate in the spring of 2005. JSF’s Current Acquisition Strategy May Not Provide for Successful Program Execution
The JSF program does not have an evolutionary, knowledge-based acquisition strategy that fully follows the intent of DOD’s acquisition policy. This type of strategy is necessary for having an executable business case in the future. Table 4 compares the product knowledge available at the JSF system development start and the knowledge expected to be available to support future decision points based on the current acquisition plan. Recommendations for Executive Actions
Given that DOD has invested only about 10 percent of the estimated cost to develop and produce the JSF aircraft, and that significant investments are planned in the next few years that can lock the program into a higher- risk acquisition, we recommend the Secretary of Defense take the following two actions to increase the likelihood of having a successful program outcome by delivering capabilities to the warfighter when needed and within available resources: (1) Establish an executable program consistent with best practices and DOD policy regarding evolutionary acquisitions. Appendix I: Comments from the Department of Defense
Appendix II: Scope and Methodology
To determine the status of the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) business case for delivering new capabilities to the warfighter, we compared the original program estimates with current estimates. To evaluate whether the current acquisition plan follows an evolutionary, knowledge-based approach to meeting business case goals in the future, we applied GAO’s methodology for assessing risks in major weapon systems. We also reviewed DOD’s acquisition policy to determine whether JSF’s approach met its intent. | Why GAO Did This Study
Under the Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act of 2005, GAO is required to to review the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program annually for the next 5 years. This is the first GAO report, and it (1) analyzes the JSF program's business case for delivering new capabilities to the warfighter and (2) determines whether the JSF program's acquisition strategy follows an evolutionary, knowledge-based approach. Also, the act requires GAO to certify whether we had access to sufficient information to make informed judgments on the matters contained in our report.
What GAO Found
GAO found that the original business case for the JSF program has proven to be unexecutable. DOD now plans to buy 535 fewer aircraft than originally planned. Due to increases in total program costs and program acquisition unit costs, the DOD has reduced buying power and is now buying fewer JSF's at a higher investment than originally planned. The first delivery of initial operational capabilities to the warfighter have been delayed 2 years so far. The program's current acquisition strategy does not fully follow the intent of DOD's evolutionary, knowledge-based acquisition policy that is based on best practices. An evolutionary, knowledge-based strategy will be necessary to successfully execute a new business case in the future. Instead, the program plans to concurrently develop the JSF technologies, integrate and demonstrate the expected product design, and produce deliverable fighters, which is a risky approach. Finally, as a result of a lengthy program replanning effort that had been in process during most of 2004, GAO did not have access to the cost estimate expected to be contained in the JSF's Selected Acquisition Report, to be delivered by Congress in the spring of 2005. At the time of GAO's review, JSF program officials were still collecting the necessary information to develop and complete the estimate. Therefore, GAO's review was limited to the estimated program costs contained in the December 31, 2003, Selected Acquisition Report. |
gao_GAO-03-564T | gao_GAO-03-564T_0 | Experts also agree that there has been a steady advance in the sophistication and effectiveness of attack technology. The weaknesses identified place a broad array of federal operations and assets at risk. GISRA supplemented information security requirements established in the Computer Security Act of 1987, the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, and the Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996 and was consistent with existing information security guidance issued by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), as well as audit and best practice guidance issued by GAO. Specifically, this program was to include periodic risk assessments that consider internal and external threats to the integrity, confidentiality, and availability of systems, and to data supporting critical operations and assets; the development and implementation of risk-based, cost-effective policies and procedures to provide security protections for information collected or maintained by or for the agency; training on security responsibilities for information security personnel and on security awareness for agency personnel; periodic management testing and evaluation of the effectiveness of policies, procedures, controls, and techniques; a process for identifying and remediating any significant deficiencies; procedures for detecting, reporting, and responding to security incidents; an annual program review by agency program officials. Agencies Show Progress in Implementing Security Requirements, but Further Improvement Needed
In our March 2002 testimony, we reported that the initial implementation of GISRA was a significant step in improving federal agencies’ information security programs and addressing their serious, pervasive information security weaknesses. As shown in figure 6, our analyses showed that 14 agencies reported that they had tested the controls of less than 60 percent of their systems for fiscal year 2002. Further information security improvement efforts are also needed at the governmentwide level, and it is important that these efforts are guided by a comprehensive strategy and, as development of this strategy continues, that certain key issues be addressed. Sixth, agencies can allocate resources sufficient to support their information security and infrastructure protection activities. Federal awareness of the importance of securing our nation’s critical infrastructures has continued to evolve since the mid-1990s. Regarding CIP, the new department is responsible for, among other things, (1) developing a comprehensive national plan for securing the key resources and critical infrastructure of the United States; (2) recommending measures to protect the key resources and critical infrastructure of the United States in coordination with other federal agencies and in cooperation with state and local government agencies and authorities, the private sector, and other entities; and (3) disseminating, as appropriate, information analyzed by the department both within the department and to other federal agencies, state and local government agencies, and private-sector entities to assist in the deterrence, prevention, preemption of, or response to terrorist attacks. The Nation Faces Ongoing CIP Challenges
Although the actions taken to date are major steps to more effectively protect our nation’s critical infrastructures, we have made numerous recommendations over the last several years concerning CIP challenges that still need to be addressed. For each of these challenges, improvements have been made and continuing efforts are in progress. However, even greater efforts are needed to address them. These challenges include developing a comprehensive and coordinated national CIP plan, improving information sharing on threats and vulnerabilities, improving analysis and warning capabilities, and ensuring appropriate incentives to encourage entities outside of the federal government to increase their CIP efforts. Both define strategic objectives for protecting our nation’s critical assets. Such capabilities need to address both cyber and physical threats. Some of these tools are already being used. | Why GAO Did This Study
Protecting the computer systems that support federal agencies' operations and our nation's critical infrastructures--such as power distribution, telecommunications, water supply, and national defense--is a continuing concern. These concerns are well-founded for a number of reasons, including the dramatic increases in reported computer security incidents, the ease of obtaining and using hacking tools, the steady advance in the sophistication and effectiveness of attack technology, and the dire warnings of new and more destructive attacks. GAO first designated computer security as high risk in 1997, and in 2003 expanded this high-risk area to include protecting the systems that support our nation's critical infrastructures, referred to as cyber critical infrastructure protection or cyber CIP. GAO has made previous recommendations and periodically testified on federal information security weaknesses--including agencies' progress in implementing key legislative provisions on information security--and the challenges that the nation faces in protecting our nation's critical infrastructures. GAO was asked to provide an update on the status of federal information security and CIP.
What GAO Found
With the enactment of the Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002, the Congress continued its efforts to improve federal information security by permanently authorizing and strengthening key information security requirements. The administration has also made progress through a number of efforts, among them the Office of Management and Budget's emphasis of information security in the budget process. However, significant information security weaknesses at 24 major agencies continue to place a broad array of federal operations and assets at risk of fraud, misuse, and disruption. Although recent reporting by these agencies showed some improvements, GAO found that agencies still have not established information security programs consistent with the legal requirements. For example, periodic testing of security controls is essential to security program management, but for fiscal year 2002, 14 agencies reported they had tested the controls of less than 60 percent of their systems. Further information security improvement efforts are also needed at the governmentwide level, and these efforts need to be guided by a comprehensive strategy in which roles and responsibilities are clearly delineated, appropriate guidance is given, adequate technical expertise is obtained, and sufficient agency information security resources are allocated. Although improvements have been made in protecting our nation's critical infrastructures and continuing efforts are in progress, further efforts are needed to address critical challenges that GAO has identified over the last several years. These challenges include: (1) developing a comprehensive and coordinated national CIP plan; (2) improving information sharing on threats and vulnerabilities between the private sector and the federal government, as well as within the government itself; (3) improving analysis and warning capabilities for both cyber and physical threats; and (4) encouraging entities outside the federal government to increase their CIP efforts. |
gao_GAO-01-779 | gao_GAO-01-779_0 | This section also discusses how the agency’s fiscal year 2000 report and fiscal year 2002 plan address concerns raised by GAO and OIG. Conclusions
In general, Labor appears to be making progress in achieving the key outcomes. Labor has increased its target levels for some goals for fiscal year 2002 and generally provided sound strategies for achieving these new targets. We continue to have concerns about some of the measures Labor uses. We are most concerned about the way in which Labor addresses two of its management challenges—information technology and strategic human capital management. Given the breadth of these goals, goal achievement cannot be fully assessed with the performance indicators Labor proposes. Without better indicators that more accurately and comprehensively measure performance toward the goal, Labor will be unable to fully assess its progress in these areas. Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Labor | Why GAO Did This Study
This report reviews the Department of Labor's fiscal year 2000 performance report and fiscal year 2002 performance plan required by the Government Performance and Results Act.
What GAO Found
GAO found that Labor appears to be making progress in achieving the key outcomes in its strategic plan. Labor has increased its target levels for some goals for fiscal year 2002 and generally provided sound strategies for achieving these new targets. GAO continues to have concerns about some of the measures Labor uses. GAO is most concerned about the way in which Labor addresses two of its management challenges--information technology and strategic human capital management. Given the breadth of these goals, goal achievement cannot be fully assessed with the performance indicators Labor proposes. Without better indicators that more accurately and comprehensively measure performance toward the goal, Labor will be unable to fully assess its progress in these areas. |
gao_NSIAD-96-162 | gao_NSIAD-96-162_0 | Changing DOD’s Quality Assurance Practices Is Challenging Given Long-standing Problems
DOD faces a formidable challenge in changing its quality assurance culture. This estimate does not include what DOD has spent to correct the manufacturing and quality problems that have contributed to historical cost and schedule overruns on weapon system production programs. A major difference between DOD and commercial manufacturers is that DOD has, until recently, maintained its practice of inspecting rather than designing quality into a product while world-class companies have broadened their definition of quality to include design. An Industry Review Panel on Specifications and Standards found that the C-17 production process had many quality problems that were adding cost to the program. Quality assurance changed from being a postmanufacturing step, done at the end of each process, to being part of the process itself. They began by reducing their number of suppliers. DOD Moves to Improve Quality Assurance Practices
Beginning in the early 1990s, DCMC implemented Process Oriented Contract Administration Services (PROCAS) as a method of moving away from inspection-oriented quality assurance practices and toward process control. According to the plan created by the Government and Industry Quality Liaison Panel in April 1995, DOD would allow a contractor to use the same quality management system—based on process controls—for its military contracts that it uses on its commercial contracts. Therefore, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense (1) establish measurable steps to implement and monitor the progress of the Government and Industry Quality Liaison Panel plan closely; (2) periodically assess its success in implementing basic standards such as ISO-9000; (3) develop ways to encourage the adoption of advanced quality concepts of design for manufacturing, process controls, and supplier quality programs throughout the defense industry, using commercial practices as a guide; and (4) as suggested in the plan, establish incentives for defense contractors to participate, such as providing credit during source selection for successful implementation of these advanced quality practices. 7. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO reviewed the Department of Defense's (DOD) quality assurance practices, focusing on: (1) the problems that DOD has had in improving such practices; (2) private-sector practices that could be beneficial to DOD; and (3) DOD efforts to improve its quality assurance activities.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) DOD spends more than $1.5 billion annually to support its quality assurance activities; (2) manufacturing and quality problems have contributed to cost and schedule overruns on DOD weapons systems programs; (3) DOD acquisition programs have experienced quality problems during the production phase due to incomplete weapon designs; (4) DOD is relying on unstable designs and inspections to rework the defects in its B-2 bomber and C-17 Airlifter programs; (5) a number of successful commercial manufacturers are improving the quality of their products, while reducing their oversight and inspection costs; (6) commercial manufacturers have broadened their definition of quality assurance, by changing it from a postmanufacturing step done at the end of each process to being part of the process itself; (7) DOD began in the early 1990s to implement a method of moving away from inspection-oriented quality assurance practices and toward process control; (8) DOD is developing a plan to reduce the costs of redundant quality assurance processes; (9) the plan will allow DOD contractors to use a single quality management system based on process controls for all DOD contracts; and (10) DOD could enhance its quality management system by encouraging defense contractors to use more advanced commercial techniques and quality assurance practices. |
gao_GAO-01-900 | gao_GAO-01-900_0 | Two SROs--NASD for the securities industry and NFA for the futures industry--are associations that regulate registered securities and futures firms as well as oversee individuals employed in the securities and futures industries. Changes in NASD and NFA Fine Imposition Practices Resulted in Improved Collection Rates
Fine collection rates improved at both NASD and NFA primarily because of changes they made to their fine imposition practices. Compared with its rates for the 1992 through 1996 period, NASD has recently been more successful in collecting the fines it levied. SEC and CFTC Continue to Review Individual SRO Fines but Have Also Taken Steps to Improve Their Industrywide Oversight
In conducting their oversight of securities and futures SROs disciplinary programs, SEC and CFTC review individual fines imposed by SROs to assess the reasonableness of the sanctions applied. SEC and CFTC Process Weaknesses Hamper FMS Efforts to Collect Their Fines
As required by the DCIA, SEC and CFTC refer delinquent fines to Treasury’s FMS, which conducts collections on behalf of federal agencies (see app. SEC officials acknowledged that there had been delays in responding to FMS. FMS and SEC officials told us they have been working together to reduce the delays in approving compromise offers. Conclusions
On the basis of the data we obtained, collection rates at SEC, CFTC, and the nine securities and futures SROs were generally comparable to, or higher than, their rates from our previous review. Also, SEC has not yet adopted the regulations it needs to again submit its fines to TOP to benefit from the associated collection opportunities. Finally, although CFTC has only recently begun submitting fines to FMS for collection, already concerns about the timeliness of these submissions exist. The agency’s Inspector General staff have recommended steps to ensure that CFTC fines are submitted more timely to FMS, but these steps have yet to be implemented. Weaknesses in procedures for ensuring that CFTC submits all needed information to FMS to collect its unpaid fines also appear to have further delayed FMS’ collection efforts. We also recommend that the Acting Chairman, CFTC, periodically assess the pattern of readmission applications to ensure that the changes in NFA’s fine imposition practices do not result in any unintended consequences, such as inappropriate readmissions; and take steps to ensure that delinquent fines are promptly referred to FMS, including creating formal procedures that address both sending debts to FMS within the required time frames and requiring all of the necessary information from the Division of Enforcement on these debts. We have included this information in this report. In most cases, including both the Security and Exchange Commission and Commodity Futures Trading Commission, fees are added to the original debt amount so that the debtor pays. | Why GAO Did This Study
Fines are one way for regulators to sanction those who violate securities and futures industry rules. However, for fines to be effective, regulators must collect them. This report reviews fine collection by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), and nine exchanges and industry associations that act as self-regulatory organizations (SRO) in the securities and futures industries. GAO (1) compares how the securities and futures regulators' current collection rates have changed since GAO's November 1998 report 1998 and assesses the changes they made in their fine imposition practices; (2) discusses the steps taken by SEC and CFTC to oversee the SROs' fine imposition activities, including the actions they have recently taken to improve this oversight; and (3) assesses the effectiveness of actions taken by SEC and CFTC to refer unpaid fines to the Financial Management Services (FMS).
What GAO Found
GAO found that collection rates at SEC, CFTC, and the SROs were generally comparable to, or higher than, their rates at the time of GAO's earlier report. Among the SROs, the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) and the National Futures Association (NFA) had the lowest collection rates between 1992 and 1996. However, fine collection rates for both organizations improved after they changed their fine imposition practices. SEC has begun to collect data that would allow it to analyze securities sanctions throughout the industry. Similarly, CFTC has begun to document the results of its review of industrywide futures sanctions. Both SEC and CFTC have reviewed the extent to which their respective SROs maintain automated fine collection records. FMS' efforts to collect SEC's fines have been hampered by SEC's delays in approving compromise offers, delays by SEC's Commissioners in responding to FMS' requests for more timely action, and by SEC's failure thus far to adopt the regulations it needs to again submit its fines to the Treasury Offset Program to benefit from the associated collection opportunities. Although CFTC has only recently begun submitting fines to FMS for collection, concerns about the timeliness of these submissions already exist. The agency's Inspector General staff has recommended steps to ensure that CFTC fines are submitted more timely to FMS, but these steps have yet to be implemented. Weaknesses in procedures for ensuring that CFTC submits all needed information to FMS to collect its unpaid fines also appear to have caused further delays in FMS' collection efforts. |
gao_T-RCED-96-145 | gao_T-RCED-96-145_0 | The agency estimates that the average cost of cleaning up an NPL site, to the federal government or responsible parties, is $26 million. We have reported that basing these decisions on environmental standards and generic assumptions about such things as the projected future use of a site, rather than actual data from the site, can lead to extensive and costly cleanups. The Senate bill would require compliance only with “applicable” standards, that is, with those that directly pertain to hazardous waste cleanups, and it would eliminate the reference to the specific acts. The bill would also provide opportunities for the states to define their own applicable standards. The proposed legislation would allow EPA to waive the standards if reaching them, among other things, is technically infeasible or unreasonably costly. We recently reported that EPA could potentially use these removals at portions of the 1,000 sites currently awaiting cleanup on the NPL, as well as at portions of the estimated 2,000 additional sites that could be listed.Typically, for these portions, EPA is more certain of the types of contamination present and the appropriate methods to address it, and the agency does not need to conduct extensive studies and designs before taking action. The Bill Supports State Cleanup Innovations
To promote faster and less costly cleanups, the bill would provide financial and technical assistance to states to set up programs through which private parties would voluntarily clean up sites under a state’s supervision. The Senate bill would change the current liability rules and establish a nonbinding process to allocate costs at some sites. The bill would limit natural resource damage claims under CERCLA. More Cost-Effective Technologies Are Needed
The Senate bill would authorize the use of new, potentially cost-reducing technologies at certain federally owned hazardous waste sites. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed how the proposed Accelerated Cleanup and Environmental Restoration Act would affect the Superfund Program's reauthorization.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that the legislation would: (1) require that cleanups comply only with standards that pertain to hazardous waste cleanups, rather than with water quality standards; (2) allow states to define their own standards and permit the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to waive those standards; (3) require that EPA use site-specific data and less conservative assumptions when assessing cleanup sites; (4) require that cleanup sites be ranked by risk; (5) allow the expanded use of low-cost hazardous waste containment measures at cleanup sites; (6) relax the restrictions on non-time-critical removals, which can speed the cleanup process; (7) provide assistance to states to establish programs through which private parties would voluntarily clean up sites; (8) restrict the number of additional sites that could be added to the National Priorities List (NPL); (9) shift the financial burden of the Superfund program from the federal government to state governments; (10) limit the liability of responsible parties at Superfund sites, establish a nonbinding process to distribute the cost of cleanups, and decrease liability for natural resource damage; and (11) mandate the testing and use of new, potentially cost-reducing technologies such as bioremediation at cleanup sites. |
gao_GAO-12-118 | gao_GAO-12-118_0 | In the United States, responsibility for spectrum management is divided between two agencies: FCC and the Department of Commerce’s National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA). Since 1994, FCC has primarily used auctions to assign spectrum for mutually exclusive applications. In March 2010, an FCC task force issued the National Broadband Plan. Since 1994, FCC Has Made Over 520 Megahertz of Spectrum Available for New Uses through a Process That Can Be Lengthy
To accommodate new commercial uses of spectrum, such as wireless broadband, FCC must often change its rules to move certain bands of spectrum from an existing use to the new use, a process known as repurposing spectrum. However, this process can be lengthy—from 7 to 15 years for the six repurposings that we examined. We identified the following factors that contribute to the time it takes FCC to repurpose spectrum: the regulatory nature of repurposing, opposition of incumbent users, FCC and NTIA coordination on the repurposing of federal spectrum, and concerns about interference. FCC identified voluntary approaches that it thinks could speed the process by, for example, avoiding some opposition; however, these approaches generally require congressional approval and face some stakeholder opposition. Responding Experts and Stakeholders Had Mixed Views on FCC’s Plans and Recent Actions to Meet Future Spectrum Needs
The National Broadband Plan includes recommendations in several areas aimed at meeting future spectrum needs. To implement the plan’s recommendations to make more spectrum available for broadband in specific bands, FCC, among other things: performed technical analysis and worked with broadcast industry engineers and experts in related fields on how reallocating a portion of television spectrum to broadband could work; issued a proposed rule to establish a regulatory framework to facilitate wireless broadband uses of television bands, in anticipation of the Commission’s intended future reallocation of this spectrum to broadband; granted a waiver to a Mobile Satellite Services provider, LightSquared, allowing it to expand its terrestrial use of its satellite spectrum for broadband, conditional on addressing concerns about interference with Global Positioning System devices; added co-primary fixed and mobile terrestrial wireless allocations to the 2 GHz satellite band and gave Mobile Satellite Services licensees the flexibility to lease their spectrum to terrestrial operators via spectrum manager leasing arrangements, both of which FCC sees as steps toward providing flexibility to allow greater use of the band for mobile broadband; revised its interference rules in Wireless Communications Services spectrum to facilitate its use for broadband, along the lines recommended by the plan; and issued analyses supporting its recommendation to auction the Upper 700 MHz D block; while the plan recommends the auction of this band, several proposals in the 112th Congress, such as the SPECTRUM Act, S.911, and the Public Safety Spectrum and Wireless Innovation Act, H.R. Respondents expressed a variety of views on FCC’s progress. Experts and stakeholders generally supported the recommendation on R&D. Responding Experts and Stakeholders Strongly Supported Extending FCC’s Auction Authority but Varied in Their Opinions on Potential Changes to Auctions
In the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Congress provided FCC authority to use auctions to assign certain spectrum licenses. In particular, auctions were quicker, less costly, and more transparent; were more effective in assigning licenses to entities that valued them the most; and were an effective mechanism for the public to realize a portion of the value of a national resource used for commercial purposes. Experts and stakeholders responding to our survey, by large margins, supported extending FCC’s authority to assign mutually exclusive licenses by auction beyond the September 30, 2012, expiration date. Most experts and stakeholders agreed that FCC should reduce uncertainty by providing a clear road map for future auctions, including their timing and size, so that potential bidders can develop effective strategies. Requiring winners of auctions to pay royalties based on the amount of revenues the winners earn by using the spectrum rather than requiring them to pay the full amounts of the winning bids up front garnered the least support. In some instances, these conflicting opinions arise from participants’ divergent positions in the communications industry; for example, incumbent licensees, such as broadcasters, are likely to oppose recommendations that they believe could impose burdens or costs on their businesses. Matter for Congressional Consideration
Given the continued success of FCC’s use of auctions, and the overwhelming support among experts and stakeholders for extending FCC’s auction authority, Congress should consider extending FCC’s auction authority beyond the current expiration date of September 30, 2012. FCC provided technical comments that we incorporated as appropriate. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
This report addresses the Federal Communications Commission’s (FCC) management of commercial spectrum, including (1) the extent to which FCC has made spectrum available for new commercial uses since it implemented auction authority in 1994, and the time taken to do so; (2) experts’ and stakeholders’ views on FCC’s plans and recent actions to meet future spectrum needs; and (3) experts’ and stakeholders’ views on the continued use of auctions to assign spectrum. To examine the extent to which FCC has made spectrum available for new commercial uses, we reviewed six instances where FCC repurposed spectrum from an existing use to a new use. This could be done securely. | Why GAO Did This Study
The radio-frequency spectrum enables an array of wireless communications services that are critical to the U.S. economy and national security, such as wireless broadband. In 2010, a Federal Communications Commission (FCC) task force issued the National Broadband Plan that included recommendations to reform spectrum policy. Since 1994, FCC has used competitive bidding, or auctions, to assign licenses to commercial entities for their use of spectrum; however, its authority to use auctions expires on September 30, 2012.
Among other things, GAO examined (1) the extent to which FCC has made spectrum available for new commercial uses and the time taken to do so, (2) experts and stakeholders views on FCCs plans and recent actions to meet future spectrum needs, and (3) experts and stakeholders views on the continued use of auctions to assign spectrum. To address these objectives, GAO reviewed FCCs plans, notices, and orders; reviewed six instances in which FCC made spectrum available for new commercial uses; and surveyed 30 experts and 79 industry stakeholders about their views on FCCs efforts to make spectrum available for new uses, its plans and actions to meet future needs, and its continued use of auctions (the survey had a 68 percent response rate).
What GAO Found
Since 1994, FCC has made over 520 megahertz (a measure of quantity) of spectrum available for new uses, such as wireless broadband, through a process that can be lengthy. Because most of the usable spectrum in the United States has been allocated to existing uses, FCC must change its rules to move spectrum from an existing use to a new use, a process known as repurposing spectrum. Yet, this process can be lengthyfrom 7 to 15 years for the six repurposings that GAO reviewed. Four factors contribute to the time it takes FCC to repurpose spectrum: the regulatory nature of the process, which to some extent is guided by statute; opposition of incumbent users, who could be required to vacate spectrum; coordination challenges between FCC and the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA), which oversees federal agencies use of spectrum, on the repurposing of federal spectrum for commercial use; and concerns about interference from users of spectrum in adjacent bands of spectrum. FCC has identified voluntary approaches that it thinks could speed the process, but these approaches generally require congressional approval and face some stakeholder opposition.
Experts and stakeholders had mixed views on FCCs plans and recent actions to meet future spectrum needs. The National Broadband Plan included a set of recommendations to FCC, FCC and NTIA jointly, and Congress, aimed at meeting future spectrum needs. Some recommendations garnered broad support, including recommendations to auction certain bands of spectrum and enhance research and development. However, experts and stakeholders opinions diverged on other recommendations, such as reallocating a portion of spectrum from television to wireless broadband. Opinions also varied on FCCs progress in implementing the recommendations. In some instances, these conflicting opinions arose from participants divergent positions in the industry, with, for example, incumbent licensees such as broadcasters opposing recommendations that they believe could impose burdens or costs on their businesses.
Experts and stakeholders GAO contacted strongly supported extending FCCs auction authority, but varied in their opinions on potential changes to auctions. Since 1994, FCC has used auctions to assign mutually exclusive licenses to commercial entities providing certain wireless services. GAO previously reported that auctions were effective in assigning licenses to entities that valued them the most; were quicker, less costly, and more transparent than mechanisms FCC previously used to assign licenses; and were an effective mechanism for the public to realize a portion of the value of a national resource used for commercial purposes. Experts and stakeholders responding to GAOs survey strongly supported extending FCCs auction authority53 of 65 respondents supported extending FCCs authority. However, experts and stakeholders held varied opinions on potential changes to auctions. For example, respondents generally supported actions that would provide a clear road map detailing future auctions, which could reduce uncertainty. In contrast, a proposal to require winners of auctions to pay royalties based on their revenues rather than the full amount of their winning bids up front garnered the least support.
What GAO Recommends
Given the continued support of FCC's use of auctions, Congress should consider extending FCC's auction authority beyond the current expiration date of September 30, 2012. FCC provided technical comments that were incorporated as appropriate. |
gao_HEHS-98-80 | gao_HEHS-98-80_0 | and generally conforms with accepted actuarial practice. As of March 1997, the most recent available CMAC rate update, approximately 80 percent of the national CMAC rates were at the same level as Medicare and about 20 percent were higher than Medicare because the transition for these rates is not yet complete. Only the rates for 61 of about 7,000 procedures—less than 1 percent—were below the Medicare level of payment. We found that the selected high-volume CMAC rates at each of the four locations were generally consistent with Medicare rates. During the initial CMAC transition process to the Medicare level of payment, some physicians expressed concern about the low level of payment for certain obstetric and pediatric procedures, but payment levels for these procedures have since been addressed by DOD and HHS’ Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA). DOD did not, however, adjust pediatric rates. Physician Complaints Now Focused on Discounted CMAC Rates
Because most CMAC rates are equivalent to Medicare rates, the discounted CMAC rates that TRICARE network physicians agree to accept are typically below the Medicare level of payment. Because of this, some physicians told us that they would not join the TRICARE network but would continue to see military beneficiaries under the Standard option. In the four locations, we found that the differences in the discounted CMAC rates physicians are willing to accept depend largely upon local health care market conditions such as the degree of HMO penetration as well as the dependence of the local physicians on the military beneficiary population. And while these concerns resulted in some physicians dropping out of the network or not joining, these physicians told us that they continue to treat military beneficiaries as nonnetwork physicians under the Standard option. DOD and MCSC officials acknowledged these complaints and told us they are in the process of addressing them. DOD and MCSC officials told us they were aware of only a very small number of balance billing infractions—all of which were easily resolved. Conclusions
By lowering CMAC rates to levels comparable to rates paid under the Medicare program, DOD will save nearly three-quarters of a billion dollars in fiscal year 1998 in health care expenditures. And throughout the nearly complete transition process, DOD has appropriately set and adjusted CMAC rates in compliance with statutory requirements using a methodology that also generally complies with accepted actuarial practice. While most of the physicians we spoke with continue to treat military beneficiaries, addressing physicians’ concerns is crucial to the development and maintenance of TRICARE networks. Although the MCSCs attempt to educate beneficiaries on balance billing limits, this information could be easily communicated by following Medicare’s practice of including balance billing information on explanation of benefits statements sent to both the beneficiaries and physicians. Recommendations
To improve the administration of the TRICARE program, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs to require MCSCs to provide to physicians written or published locality-specific fee schedules after each yearly CMAC update to help eliminate confusion about CMAC reimbursement rate amounts and require MCSCs to notify beneficiaries and physicians of balance billing limits on the explanation of benefits statements for all TRICARE Standard claims submitted by nonparticipating physicians. We also met with officials at HCFA to determine how they enforce Medicare’s balance billing limits. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO examined: (1) whether the Department of Defense's (DOD) methodology for setting the Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services (CHAMPUS) maximum allowable charge (CMAC) rates complies with statutory requirements and how current CMAC rates compare with Medicare rates for similar services; (2) the basis for physicians' concerns about CMAC rates and how these concerns affect physicians' willingness to treat military beneficiaries; (3) the basis for other concerns physicians have about TRICARE that could also affect their willingness to treat military beneficiaries; and (4) how balance billing limits are being enforced.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the methodology used by DOD to transition CMAC rates to the Medicare level of payment complies with statutory requirements and generally conforms with accepted actuarial practice; (2) these adjustments will result in DOD saving about three-quarters of a billion dollars in fiscal year 1998 in health care expenditures; (3) as of the most recent available CMAC rate adjustment in March 1997, 80 percent of CMAC rates nationwide were at the same level as Medicare, with about 20 percent higher and less than 1 percent below the Medicare level of payment; (4) the CMAC rates at the four locations GAO selected were generally consistent with Medicare rates; (5) while physicians' initial concerns about low obstetric and pediatric rates have been addressed by DOD, current physician complaints about reimbursement levels are focused on the discounted CMAC rates paid to network physicians under DOD's TRICARE program; (6) because most CMAC rates are now equivalent to Medicare rates, the discounted CMAC rates that TRICARE network physicians agree to accept are typically below the Medicare level of payment; (7) some physicians told GAO that they considered the discounts unacceptable, and they would not join the TRICARE network but would continue to treat military beneficiaries as nonnetwork physicians; (8) the discount rates physicians were willing to accept in the four locations were largely dependent on local health care market factors such as the degree of health maintenance organization penetration and the dependence of local physicians on the military beneficiary population; (9) physicians GAO met with also expressed concerns about administrative hassles, which contributed to their frustration with the TRICARE program; (10) in many cases, physicians said that while they would be willing to accept discounted CMAC rates, the administrative impediments provided significant disincentives to joining the TRICARE network; (11) DOD and managed care support contractors (MCSC) officials acknowledged these complaints and are making efforts to address them and alleviate physicians' concerns; (12) DOD and MCSC officials told GAO that they were aware of only a very small number of balance billing infractions--all of which had been easily resolved; (13) while the MCSCs attempt to educate beneficiaries about balance billing limits, the explanation of benefits statement does not include information on the balance billing limits; and (14) Medicare, which has the same balance billing limit, sends notice of balance billing limitations on the statements it provides to beneficiaries and physicians. |
gao_GAO-16-514 | gao_GAO-16-514_0 | During fiscal years 2014 and 2015, Border Patrol apprehended 823,768 aliens and held them temporarily in holding facilities. Agencies have also established processes for monitoring holding facilities for compliance with standards. Within CBP, the Management Inspections Division and designated officials from Border Patrol and OFO headquarters manage the annual Self-Inspection Program (SIP), which is designed to assess internal controls in all CBP operations, including holding facilities. CBP and ICE Could Improve Oversight by Better Assessing Time in Custody Data
CBP and ICE do not have a process or processes in place to fully assess their time in custody data, including the quality of the data, and the extent to which holding facilities are adhering to agency standards for time in custody and the factors affecting the length. Our discussions with Border Patrol officials and analysis of Border Patrol’s time in custody data for fiscal years 2014 to 2015 raised questions about the quality of the data. While Border Patrol and ICE maintain specific guidelines regarding time in custody for individuals in short-term holding facilities, these agencies could better understand the level of compliance with the guidelines and factors impacting time in custody. For example, although Border Patrol officials from 10 holding facilities we visited stated that time in custody rarely exceeds 72 hours, we noted that approximately 16 percent of cases with complete data in fiscal years 2014 and 2015 exceeded this threshold. DHS Has Complaint Mechanisms for Individuals in Holding Facilities, but Could Better Communicate the Mechanisms and Classify and Analyze Complaint Data
DHS Has Multiple Mechanisms for Obtaining and Addressing Complaints Related to Holding Facilities
DHS and its components have multiple mechanisms at the holding facility and headquarters levels to obtain and address individuals’ complaints regarding CBP and ICE holding facilities or personnel. During our visits to Border Patrol, OFO, and ICE holding facilities we observed that the posters used to communicate DHS complaint mechanisms varied in their coverage. DHS Does Not Maintain Classification Codes for Holding Facility Complaints in All Tracking Systems or Conduct Trend Analysis
Most of the complaint tracking systems that DHS and its components employ do not have classification codes for holding facilities that would allow agencies to readily identify which complaints are related to holding facilities and to analyze these complaints for potential trends. In reviewing the JICMS data, we found that it does not include a facility, facility type, or issue code related to holding facilities that would allow users to readily identify the universe of complaints involving holding facilities. Rather, we found that information identifying whether a complaint involved a holding facility may be located within narrative fields. However, providing guidance to holding facilities on which of DHS’s various complaint mechanisms they should communicate to individuals in custody would help CBP and ICE have better assurance that individuals in custody within holding facilities have received information on how to submit a complaint. In addition, developing a process for analyzing trends related to holding facility complaints would provide CBP and ICE with more information to oversee such facilities and aid in management decision-making. Recommendations for Executive Action
To enhance the monitoring of holding facilities, the Secretary of Homeland Security should direct Border Patrol and ICE to develop and implement a process to assess their time in custody data for all individuals in holding facilities, including: identifying and addressing potential data quality issues; and identifying cases where time in custody exceeded guidelines and assessing the factors impacting time in custody. With regard to the third recommendation that DHS include a classification code in all complaint tracking systems related to DHS holding facilities, DHS concurred and stated that the agency will take measures to add a code to tracking systems. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to determine the extent to which the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has (1) standards in place for the short-term custody of aliens and monitors compliance with established standards and (2) processes in place for obtaining and addressing complaints from aliens in holding facilities. For this report, our scope covered holding facilities operated by U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). While not generalizable, this sample of organizations provided us with insights into the perspectives of advocacy organizations regarding DHS’s short-term custody of aliens. | Why GAO Did This Study
DHS is responsible for providing safe, secure, and humane confinement for detained aliens who may be subject to removal or have been ordered removed from the United States. For example, during fiscal years 2014 and 2015, Border Patrol apprehended 823,768 aliens and held them temporarily in holding facilities. GAO was asked to examine DHS's management and oversight of holding facilities. This report examines the extent to which DHS has (1) standards in place for the short-term custody of aliens and monitors compliance with established standards and (2) processes in place for obtaining and addressing complaints from aliens in holding facilities.
GAO reviewed CBP and ICE data on time in custody and complaints. GAO also interviewed agency officials and visited 32 holding facilities selected based on geographical location and facility type, among other factors. The visit results are not generalizable, but provided insight to the oversight of holding facilities and management of complaints.
What GAO Found
The Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) have standards for short-term holding facilities—which are generally designed to keep individuals in custody for 24 hours or less—and some processes to monitor compliance with the standards. For example, each component has policies governing the operation of holding facilities, and CBP has an annual Self-Inspection Program, which is designed to assess internal controls in all CBP operations, including holding facilities. However, U.S. Border Patrol, within CBP, and ICE do not have a process to fully assess data on the amount of time individuals are held in custody. Such a process could help these agencies in better understanding issues that GAO identified, such as data quality, level of compliance with agency standards, and factors impacting time in custody. For example, GAO identified potential irregularities with Border Patrol's fiscal year 2014 to 2015 time in custody data, due to, among other things, delays in agents recording individuals' “book-out” from holding facilities. In addition, although Border Patrol officials from 10 holding facilities GAO visited stated that time in custody rarely exceeds 72 hours, GAO noted that approximately 16 percent of Border Patrol's cases with complete data in fiscal years 2014 to 2015 exceeded this threshold. Developing and implementing a process to assess time in custody data, consistent with internal control standards, would provide Border Patrol and ICE with more visibility into the quality of their data, facility compliance with time in custody guidelines, and the factors impacting time in custody.
DHS has various mechanisms to obtain and address complaints related to holding facilities. Specifically, individuals can submit complaints directly to holding facilities or to one of various DHS entities, including the DHS Office of Inspector General (OIG) and Joint Intake Center (JIC). However, DHS and its components have not consistently communicated information to individuals in CBP and ICE holding facilities on these mechanisms. For example, during site visits to DHS holding facilities, GAO observed that the posters used to communicate DHS complaint mechanisms varied in their coverage. Providing guidance to holding facilities on which of DHS's various complaint mechanisms they should communicate to individuals in custody, consistent with internal control standards, would help DHS have better assurance that individuals in custody within holding facilities have received information on how to submit a complaint. DHS complaint mechanisms maintain data in various systems; however, most of these systems do not have a classification code for holding facilities to would allow users to readily identify the universe of complaints involving holding facilities and conduct trend analysis. For example, the JIC's complaint tracking system does not include a facility, facility type, or issue code related to holding facilities. GAO found that information identifying whether a complaint involved a holding facility may be located within narrative fields. Creating a classification code and conducting trend analysis on holding facility complaints, consistent with internal control standards, would provide DHS with useful information for management decisions, including targeting areas for compliance monitoring.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DHS establish a process to assess time in custody data for all individuals in holding facilities; issue guidance on how and which complaint mechanisms should be communicated to individuals in short-term custody; include a classification code in all complaint tracking systems related to DHS holding facilities; and develop a process for analyzing trends related to holding facility complaints. DHS concurred with the recommendations and identified planned actions. |
gao_GGD-99-27 | gao_GGD-99-27_0 | The Federal Employees’ Retirement System Act of 1986 (FERSA) granted the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) and federal agencies broad authority to design and implement retirement education programs for employees covered by the two largest federal civilian retirement programs—the Civil Service Retirement System (CSRS) and the Federal Employees’ Retirement System (FERS). OPM's and Experts' Recommendations for Federal Retirement Education Programs
OPM and the experts with whom we consulted held generally consistent views regarding the recommended content, presentation formats, and timing of retirement education programs. The experts identified the following 13 topics as being essential to a retirement education program: plan type, including whether an employee is covered by CSRS or FERS; participation and vesting requirements, or the amount of time that employees must work before they are eligible to (1) contribute to and (2) own, or become “vested” in, accrued benefits of their plan; employer and employee contributions that are allowed and/or required; estimated assets needed to retire that reflect individual employee’s desired retirement date, income level, and lifestyle; investment alternatives and strategies, including information on the association between investment risk and return, the benefits of saving earlier rather than later, and the importance of diversification across different types of investment vehicles; debt management that provides employees with information on how to manage limited resources efficiently and enhance their ability to save; tax considerations, including the benefits of saving with pretax versus retention of agency-provided health and life insurance benefits; minimum voluntary retirement dates; projected benefit amounts and COLA’s; disability and survivor insurance, including how these programs are integrated with their other retirement benefits and any associated costs to employees;
Social Security and Medicare, including whether employees are covered by these programs, how the programs are integrated with their other retirement benefits, and any associated costs to employees; and
Medigap and long-term care insurance, that is, insurance designed to provide coverage for medical costs not covered by Medicare or other federal health insurance. This approach would also provide employees with the opportunity to attend seminars periodically throughout their careers. As part of its governmentwide responsibility for federal retirement systems, OPM supplemented the guidance it provided to agencies on the design and implementation of retirement education programs by developing educational materials, sponsoring training, and providing technical advice to agencies’ benefits personnel. Agencies, which had primary responsibility for developing retirement education programs, generally provided information to employees on topics such as the basic features of CSRS and FERS and financial planning issues for retirement, which were recommended by OPM and the retirement experts with whom we consulted. For example, agencies’ officials told us that they included information on the basic features of CSRS and FERS, financial planning for retirement, and maintaining federal health and life insurance in retirement. Officials said that agencies provided retirement planning information, but not advice, regardless of the topics included. Agencies’ Retirement Education Programs Included a Variety of Presentation Formats
Consistent with OPM and expert recommendations, the officials representing the agencies we surveyed told us that they used a variety of presentation formats in their retirement education programs, including written publications, interactive formats such as seminars and one-on-one counseling, and electronic formats such as Web sites and automated systems. Agencies’ officials told us that they view retirement education as a shared responsibility between the agencies and employees. All of the agencies we surveyed sponsored retirement seminars that were designed for employees who were approximately within 5 years of being eligible to retire. All of the agencies we surveyed told us that one-on-one counseling was available to employees at any point in their careers upon request. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the retirement education that the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) and agencies provide to federal civilian employees covered by the Civil Service Retirement System (CSRS) or the Federal Employees' Retirement System (FERS).
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) OPM and the experts with whom GAO consulted held generally consistent views regarding the recommended content, presentation formats, and timing of retirement education programs; (2) they believed that these programs should provide employees with information on certain topics, or content such as plan features and financial planning, and that other agencies should consider using multiple formats so as to accommodate employees' varying needs; (3) they also believed that such information should be provided early and throughout employees' careers; (4) OPM provided guidance to agencies on the design and implementation of retirement education programs and supplemented the guidance with educational materials, training, and technical advice for agencies' benefits staff; (5) agencies had primary responsibility for designing and implementing their programs according to their agency-specific needs; (6) the retirement education programs of the agencies reviewed generally included those topics recommended by OPM and the experts; (7) in providing retirement education, agencies' officials said that they made information available on a variety of topics, including the specific features of CSRS and FERS, the requirements for maintaining federal health and life insurance benefits in retirement, and financial planning for retirement; (8) agencies' officials told GAO that they used a wide variety of presentation formats to communicate retirement education to their employees; (9) all of the agencies that GAO reviewed provided employees with written educational materials that were supplemented with interactive seminars and one-on-one counseling; (10) agencies provided retirement planning information, but not advice, regardless of the presentation format used; (11) agencies' officials also said that they generally provided retirement education to employees during their initial orientation and throughout their careers; (12) all of the agencies in GAO's review sponsored seminars designed for those employees who were nearing retirement eligibility; (13) some agencies also sponsored additional seminars that were specifically designed for employees who had approximately 15 years of federal service to encourage employees to begin planning for their retirement earlier in their careers; (14) agencies also provided one-on-one counseling at any time upon request; and (15) agencies believed that retirement education is a shared responsibility between agencies and employees, and that employees must ultimately decide for themselves whether or when to seek retirement information. |
gao_GAO-01-671 | gao_GAO-01-671_0 | DOD Successfully Operated Medicare Managed Care Plans, Enrolled Many Retirees
The Senior Prime sites were successful in operating Medicare managed care plans. Sites expended substantial effort to meet Medicare+Choice requirements, and HCFA reviewers said that they generally did as well as other new health plans in meeting these requirements. However, HCFA reviewers found no major problems in the sites’ compliance and said that such deficiencies as they did note were generally typical of new plans. DOD Officials Indicated That, On Balance, Demonstration Had Positive Effects
DOD officials said that providing coordinated care for limited numbers of retirees yielded benefits for both retirees and medical staff. Site Officials Said Demonstration Benefited Seniors, Enhanced Readiness Skills, Had Little Adverse Effect on Other Beneficiaries
Site officials reported that Senior Prime enrollees received coordinated care and a broader range of services in contrast to the episodic space- available care or the mix of military and private care that many had received prior to Senior Prime. Demonstration Challenges Reflected, In Part, Larger DOD Managed Care Issues
Although some difficulties that DOD encountered in implementing Senior Prime reflected Medicare+Choice requirements or factors specific to the subvention demonstration, others highlighted underlying features of DOD managed care. Obtaining staff for the longer term was more problematic. Some lessons from the demonstration apply to military managed care generally. | Why GAO Did This Study
This interim report reviews the implementation of the Department of Defense (DOD) Medicare Subvention Demonstration.
What GAO Found
GAO found that the demonstration sites were successful in operating Medicare managed care plans. Officials put substantial effort into meeting Medicare managed care requirements and, according to Health Care Financing Administration reviewers, were generally as successful as other new Medicare managed care plans in this regard. Most sites reached the enrollment limits they had established for retirees already covered by Medicare. DOD officials indicated that the demonstration's effect was positive. Enrollees received a broader range of services from DOD than in the past, when they got care only when space was available in DOD facilities. Officials also noted that providing more comprehensive care to seniors helped sharpen the skills of military clinical staff, which contributed to their readiness for supporting combat or other military missions. Some challenges encountered in the demonstration reflect larger DOD managed care issues and may have implications for DOD managed care generally. Although access to care was generally good, the demonstration experienced some problems in maintaining adequate clinical staff. |
gao_GAO-11-462 | gao_GAO-11-462_0 | As a result of these initiatives, DOD’s Office of Economic Adjustment has identified 26 domestic installations significantly impacted by the growth in military populations. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 required the Secretary of Defense to conduct a review of two aspects of the housing allowance program and submit a report by July 1, 2010. DOD’s Data-Intensive Process Helps to Ensure the Accuracy of Housing Allowance Rates, and Some Enhancements May Further Strengthen the Process
DOD uses a data-intensive process to set housing allowance rates that officials said generally meets the goals of the program, although enhancements related to providing information to installation officials and service members, defining a key term for data collection, and developing more accurate cost estimates for the allowance to use in budget requests, could further strengthen the process. DOD sets its housing allowance rates for an area based, in part, on current market rental cost data, which DOD collects annually for each housing area. Installation Officials and Service Members Do Not Have Access to All Three Housing Allowance Rate Cost Components
Installation officials and service members do not have access to information on the amount or proportion of the housing allowance rate derived from each of the three costs that comprise the housing allowance. Definition of “Available” May Limit the Number of Properties Submitted in the Rate-Setting Process
Officials at four of the five installations we interviewed said that, in areas with low vacancy rates, it can be difficult to find rental properties for some housing profiles that are adequate and meet the definition of currently available housing used in the data-gathering process. However, because the definition of “available” used in the data collection process limits data submission to only those properties that were available for rent within 4 to 6 weeks prior to data submission, the properties that some installations submit may not be as fully representative of current market costs for adequate housing for comparable civilians in the same area or properties that are representative of such costs may be excluded, increasing the possibility of inaccurate rates for the area. While the services have processes in place to develop housing allowance cost estimates, budget officials in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) and the military services, as well as our analysis, indicated that the services have consistently underestimated the total cost of the housing allowance in part because the services’ processes do not allow them to accurately estimate the number of service members who will receive the housing allowance. The housing allowance is an entitlement for service members. However, shifting funds from another program could disrupt the funding of the other program. Additionally, while an official from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) said that DOD’s budget provides the best estimates available, as a result of consistently underestimating the amount needed to pay the housing allowance, DOD’s budget does not provide decision makers in Congress and DOD with the full picture of housing allowance costs, limiting the ability of both Congress and DOD to make more fully informed funding decisions. Service Members Have Encountered Housing Challenges at Some Growth Installations and DOD Does Not Have a Formal Information- Sharing Process for Tools to Address Such Challenges
Some service members have encountered challenges in obtaining off-base housing near some installations that are increasing in size due to several major defense initiatives, such as BRAC, Grow the Force, Army Modularity, and Global Defense Posture and Realignment. DOD officials have used a number of tools to address challenges in obtaining off-base housing, but DOD does not have a formal process that allows installation officials to share information on these tools. Housing Deficits Exist at Most DOD Growth Installations and Are Expected to Continue or Worsen
According to the military services’ data, demand exceeds the supply of housing at 19 of the 26 growth installations, resulting in housing deficits. DOD partially concurred with our recommendation to provide service members with information on the three elements that comprise the allowance (rent, utilities, and renter’s insurance). DOD concurred with our second recommendation to assess the benefits and drawbacks of revising the definition of “available” rental properties used for data collection purposes. To determine whether service members relocating to installations that DOD projects to experience significant growth have encountered challenges in obtaining off-base housing and the extent to which DOD is using and sharing information on tools to address these challenges, we reviewed and analyzed applicable documentation and interviewed knowledgeable officials. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Defense (DOD) paid active duty military personnel over $18 billion in housing allowances in fiscal year 2010. DOD sets housing allowance rates annually based on market costs of rent, utilities, and renter's insurance. Also, DOD has identified 26 installations significantly impacted by expected growth in personnel due to various rebasing actions. The Senate report accompanying a bill for the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011 (S. 3454) directed GAO to review DOD's rate-setting process, among other issues. GAO determined (1) whether there are enhancements to strengthen DOD's rate-setting process and (2) whether service members have encountered challenges in obtaining off-base housing. GAO reviewed program documents, including a 2010 DOD report to Congress, analyzed data, and interviewed DOD officials and subject matter experts.
What GAO Found
DOD uses a data-intensive process to set housing allowance rates that officials said generally meets program goals. Key quality assurance steps in DOD's process include involving installations in the rental data collection process and verifying data prior to calculating allowance rates. However, some enhancements related to (1) providing additional information to installation officials and service members, (2) defining a key term for data collection, and (3) developing more accurate cost estimates for budget requests could further strengthen the process. First, installation officials and service members do not have access to information on the three costs that comprise the allowance--rent, utilities, and renter's insurance--because DOD issues a single rate for each pay grade. As a result, installation officials cannot help ensure the accuracy of the rates and service members are not fully informed of potential housing costs. Second, in areas with low vacancy rates, officials said it can be difficult to find enough rental properties that meet the definition of available because the definition is limited to rentals on the market within 4 to 6 weeks prior to data collection. As a result, properties that some installations submit may not be fully representative of rental costs in the area or representative properties may be excluded, increasing the possibility of inaccurate rates in an area. Third, the military services have consistently underestimated the amount needed to pay the allowance by $820 million to $1.3 billion each year since 2006 when preparing budget requests, in part because the services' processes do not allow them to accurately estimate the number of service members who will receive the housing allowance. GAO recognizes the difficulties in developing accurate housing allowance cost estimates. However, as a result of consistently underestimating the amount needed to pay the allowance--which is an entitlement for service members and must be paid--DOD has had to shift funds that were budgeted for other programs, which could disrupt the funding of the other programs. Also, DOD's budget does not provide the full picture of housing allowance costs, limiting the ability of Congress and DOD to make fully informed funding decisions. Some service members have encountered challenges in obtaining off-base housing at some growth installations. Military service data show current housing deficits, ranging from about 1 percent of total demand to more than 20 percent, at 19 of 26 installations DOD identified as significantly impacted by growth. Installation officials GAO interviewed expect such housing challenges to continue or worsen. DOD uses a number of tools to address these housing challenges that could be used at other installations, such as expanding housing privatization projects and encouraging collaboration between installations and communities. GAO found that installations share information on these tools on an ad hoc basis, such as through e-mail messages or at conferences, because DOD does not have a formal communications process that would allow them to store and share such information. As a result, DOD cannot ensure that installations that are currently experiencing housing challenges or may experience such challenges in the future will have the needed information on various tools that can be used to address these challenges.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is recommending that DOD (1) provide information on the costs that comprise the housing allowance to installation officials and service members, (2) assess the benefits and drawbacks of revising the definition of "available" properties for data collection, (3) improve its processes to estimate allowance costs for the budget, and (4) develop a formal process for installations to share information on housing tools. DOD generally concurred with all four of GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-11-579 | gao_GAO-11-579_0 | The DOD Inspector General’s Office Is Not Conducting Oversight of Sexual Assault Investigations or Related Training
In addition to its responsibilities for developing policy, DOD Instruction 6495.02 also specifies that the DOD Inspector General’s Office shall oversee sexual assault investigations and related training within the DOD investigative community. However, the DOD Inspector General’s Office is not performing these responsibilities primarily due to its reported focus on other, higher priorities. For example, DOD reported that in fiscal year 2010, the services’ criminal investigative organizations collectively completed 2,594 investigations of alleged sexual assault. The Services Are Not Maximizing Opportunities to Leverage Resources Provided for Investigations and Adjudications of Sexual Assault Incidents
Consistent with the Secretary of Defense’s priorities for sexual assault prevention and response, the military services provide various resources to support their investigations and adjudications of alleged sexual assault incidents. Service Investigative Organizations and Judge Advocate Offices Are Not Maximizing Opportunities to Leverage Expertise and Limited Resources
The services have taken positive steps to enhance investigations and adjudications of alleged sexual assault incidents, but they have not fully capitalized on existing opportunities to leverage each other’s expertise and limited resources. The Base Realignment and Closure Commission subsequently adopted a modified version of the Secretary’s recommendation. However, senior officials from each service’s investigative organization told us that there are currently no plans to use opportunities such as this co-location to develop joint initiatives, including advanced-level training on investigating sexual assaults, that could allow the services to better leverage each other’s expertise and limited resources to achieve the operational synergies noted by the Secretary of Defense. Further, the services reported in their fiscal year 2012 budget justifications to Congress that the co-location efforts have cost over $426 million, and produced a total of about $53 million in savings from fiscal years 2006 to 2011, which were derived, in part, through the reduction in costs to support infrastructure. The Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 directed the Secretary of Defense to review the Uniform Code of Military Justice and the Manual for Courts-Martial in order to determine what changes were required to improve the ability of the military justice system to address issues related to sexual assault, and to conform those authorities more closely to other federal laws and regulations that address such issues. The task force also reported that practitioners consistently advised its members that the new Article 120 is cumbersome and confusing, and stated that prosecutors had expressed concern that the new Article may be causing unwarranted acquittals. For example, service judge advocates told us that there is a lack of clarity with regard to the meaning of certain terms in the amended article, which makes it more difficult to prosecute these cases. Moreover, recent opinions issued by the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces addressed issues that were raised in our discussions with judge advocates, including constitutional issues that may arise related to the burden of proof in certain situations. In concurring with our second recommendation that the DOD Inspector General, in conjunction with the military services, develop and implement clear goals, objectives, and performance data for monitoring and evaluating the services’ sexual assault investigations and related training, the DOD Inspector General’s Office commented that it is currently preparing its fiscal year 2012 oversight plans, which will include initiatives that correspond to its newly developed policy on sexual assault investigations that is currently in coordination with the military services. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To determine the extent to which the Department of Defense (DOD) is conducting oversight of the military services’ investigative organizations, we reviewed and analyzed relevant Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and DOD Inspector General policies, guidance, and procedures to identify department-level policy development and oversight responsibilities for the services’ military criminal investigative organizations. To determine the extent to which the military services provide resources for investigations and adjudications of alleged sexual assault incidents, we reviewed OSD, DOD Inspector General, and the military service investigative and legal policies to identify responsibilities and processes for providing personnel and fiscal resources to initiatives that relate to investigations and adjudications of alleged sexual assault incidents. To supplement our analyses we interviewed senior officials from OSD and spoke with a total of 48 judge advocates and DOD civilian lawyers, between the services’ headquarters and at selected installations, to gain their perspectives on the impact of the revisions made in 2007 to the Uniform Code of Military Justice as well as their recommendations for any suggested modifications. | Why GAO Did This Study
The crime of sexual assault has serious consequences for both the aggrieved and the accused. The severity of these consequences underscores the importance of impartially administering justice in order to promote accountability and confidence that such allegations are taken seriously. GAO was asked to address the extent to which (1) the Department of Defense (DOD) conducts oversight of the military services' investigative organizations and (2) the services provide resources for investigations and adjudications of alleged sexual assault incidents. GAO also identified an issue relating to the military's criminal code during this review. GAO analyzed relevant DOD and service policies and procedures; reviewed applicable laws, including provisions of the Uniform Code of Military Justice; and interviewed senior DOD and service officials, including a total of 48 judge advocates and DOD civilian lawyers, at the headquarters level and at five selected military installations.
What GAO Found
Pursuant to the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) developed a policy on sexual assault prevention and response. In June 2006, OSD published DOD Instruction 6495.02, which specifies that the DOD Inspector General's Office shall develop policy and oversee sexual assault investigations and related training for the DOD criminal investigative organizations. However, the Inspector General's Office has not performed these responsibilities, primarily because it believes it has other, higher priorities. For example, GAO found no evidence of Inspector General oversight at the service level for any of the 2,594 sexual assault investigations that DOD reported the services completed in fiscal year 2010. Without a policy and plan for conducting oversight, the Inspector General's Office will remain limited in its ability to help ensure consistency and accountability, and that training is being conducted in the most effective manner. Consistent with the Secretary of Defense's priorities for sexual assault prevention and response, each service provides various resources to support investigations and adjudications of alleged sexual assault incidents. Specifically, each service has provided personnel who advise and assist on investigations and adjudications of sexual assault incidents. Each service's investigative and legal organizations also received funding, above their operating budgets, for efforts to enhance investigations and adjudications of sexual assault. For example, in fiscal year 2009, Army investigators received $4.4 million to redesign training on sexual assault investigations. However, the services' investigative and legal organizations are not fully capitalizing on opportunities to leverage each other's expertise and limited resources. For example, the Secretary of Defense, as part of the Base Realignment and Closure process, recommended that the services' investigative organizations co-locate to achieve operational synergies. However, the services currently have no plan for using opportunities such as the co-location--a move that has cost over $426 million and reportedly saved about $53 million for infrastructure support from fiscal years 2006 through 2011--to better leverage expertise and limited resources. Judge advocates also collaborate on some initiatives, but do not have a plan for leveraging resources either. Without a plan, the services cannot help ensure that resources are sustained and efficiencies are maximized. GAO met with judge advocates who consistently expressed concerns, similar to those noted in a 2009 Defense Task Force report, that a 2007 amendment to Article 120 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice complicates sexual assault prosecutions and may be causing unwarranted acquittals. Specifically, judge advocates stated that there is a lack of clarity with regard to the meaning of certain terms in the amended article, which makes it more difficult to prosecute these cases. Further, recent opinions issued by the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces addressed constitutional issues that may arise related to the burden of proof in certain situations. For fiscal year 2012, DOD proposed revisions to Congress intended to remedy some of these issues.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is recommending that DOD develop policy and provide oversight for sexual assault investigations and related training, and for the services to develop a plan to better leverage expertise and limited resources. DOD and the Inspector General concurred with the recommendations, although the Inspector General disagreed with the characterization of its performance. GAO believes its findings are accurate, as addressed more fully in the report. |
gao_GAO-08-22 | gao_GAO-08-22_0 | Federal Agencies Have Awarded Grants to States to Support Preparation for Psychological Consequences of Catastrophic Disasters, and SAMHSA Has Assessed States’ Disaster Plans
Federal grants have helped states prepare for the psychological consequences of catastrophic and other disasters, and SAMHSA has conducted an assessment of disaster plans from many state mental health and substance abuse agencies. CDC, HRSA, and DHS have also provided preparedness funding that states may use for mental health or substance abuse preparedness, but the agencies’ data-reporting requirements do not produce information on the extent to which states used funds for this purpose. In 2007, SAMHSA completed an assessment of mental health and substance abuse disaster plans developed by states that received its preparedness grant. SAMHSA found that these plans showed improvements over those that had been submitted by states as part of their application for the preparedness grant. The agency also identified several ways in which the plans could be improved. Federal Grants Have Supported States’ Mental Health and Substance Abuse Preparedness for Catastrophic and Other Disasters
SAMHSA awarded $6.8 million over fiscal years 2003 and 2004 specifically to help state mental health and substance abuse agencies prepare for the psychological consequences of catastrophic and other disasters. Two of the six states in our review, New York and Texas, received a SAMHSA grant. SAMHSA also reported that although states were more likely to incorporate substance abuse services into their disaster planning, about half the plans still did not indicate specific planning and response actions that substance abuse agencies should take. States Experienced Several Difficulties in Applying for and Implementing Their CCPs Following Catastrophic Disasters
State officials told us they experienced difficulties in applying for CCP funding and implementing their programs, particularly in the wake of catastrophic disasters. States also experienced lengthy application reviews, and FEMA and SAMHSA officials said they had taken steps to improve the submission and review process. In addition, state officials told us they experienced problems implementing their CCPs, such as difficulties resulting from FEMA’s policy of not reimbursing state CCPs for indirect program costs. SAMHSA officials said that allowing indirect cost reimbursement would promote participation of a broader array of local service providers. In November 2006, FEMA and SAMHSA allowed Louisiana and Mississippi to plan for providing expanded crisis counseling services, known as “specialized crisis counseling services,” to supplement CCP services offered to people affected by Hurricane Katrina. These officials did not know when the review would be completed. Other FEMA disaster response grant programs allow reimbursement for such costs. Although FEMA had been examining this issue for over a year, an agency official did not know when the agency would reach a decision on whether to revise CCP policy to allow coverage of indirect costs. Recommendations for Executive Action
To address gaps identified by federal and state officials in the federal government’s ability to help states respond to the psychological consequences of catastrophic disasters, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the Administrator of FEMA, in consultation with the Administrator of SAMHSA, to expeditiously take the following two actions: determine what types of expanded crisis counseling services should be formally incorporated into CCP and make any necessary revisions to program policy, and revise CCP policy to allow states and service providers that receive CCP funds to use them for indirect costs. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To do our work, we obtained program documents and interviewed officials from the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), including the Administration for Children and Families, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA), National Institutes of Health, Office of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response, and Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA); the Department of Education; the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), including the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA); the Department of Justice; and the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), including the National Center for Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (NCPTSD). To examine states’ experiences in obtaining and using federal Crisis Counseling Assistance and Training Program (CCP) grants to respond to the psychological consequences of catastrophic disasters, we reviewed program documentation, including the applicable statute, regulations, guidance, and grantee reports. | Why GAO Did This Study
Catastrophic disasters, such as Hurricane Katrina, may result in trauma and other psychological consequences for the people who experience them. The federal government provides states with funding and other support to help them prepare for and respond to disasters. Because of congressional interest in these issues, GAO examined (1) federal agencies' actions to help states prepare for the psychological consequences of catastrophic disasters and (2) states' experiences obtaining and using grants from the Crisis Counseling Assistance and Training Program (CCP) to respond to the psychological consequences of catastrophic disasters. CCP is a program of the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). GAO reviewed documents and interviewed program officials from federal agencies and conducted additional work in six states with experience responding to catastrophic disasters: Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi, New York, Texas, and Washington.
What GAO Found
Federal agencies have awarded grants and conducted other activities to help states prepare for the psychological consequences of catastrophic and other disasters. For example, in fiscal years 2003 and 2004, the Department of Health and Human Services' (HHS) Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA) provided grants to mental health and substance abuse agencies in 35 states for disaster planning. In 2007, SAMHSA completed an assessment of mental health and substance abuse disaster plans developed by states that received a preparedness grant. SAMHSA found that, for the 34 states with plans available for review, these plans generally showed improvement over those that had been submitted by states as part of their application for its preparedness grant. The agency also identified several ways in which the plans could be improved. For example, about half the plans did not indicate specific planning and response actions that substance abuse agencies should take. Similarly, GAO's review of the plans available from six states found varying attention among the plans to covering substance abuse issues. SAMHSA officials said the agency is exploring methods of determining states' individual technical assistance needs. Other federal agencies--the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the Health Resources and Services Administration, and DHS--have provided broader preparedness funding that states may use for mental health or substance abuse preparedness, but these agencies' data-reporting requirements do not produce information on the extent to which states used funds for this purpose. States in GAO's review experienced difficulties in applying for CCP funding and implementing their programs following catastrophic disasters. CCP, a key federal postdisaster response grant program to help states deliver crisis counseling services, is administered by FEMA in collaboration with SAMHSA. State officials said they had difficulty collecting information needed for their CCP applications and experienced lengthy application reviews. FEMA and SAMHSA officials said they have taken steps to improve the application submission and review process. State officials also said they experienced problems implementing their CCPs. For example, they said that FEMA's policy of not reimbursing states and their CCP service providers for indirect costs, such as certain administrative expenses, led to problems recruiting and retaining service providers. Other FEMA postdisaster response grant programs allow reimbursement for indirect costs. A FEMA official said the agency had been considering since 2006 whether to allow indirect cost reimbursement under CCP but did not know when a decision would be made. States also cited difficulties assisting people who needed more intensive crisis counseling services than those traditionally provided through state CCPs. FEMA and SAMHSA officials said they plan to consider options for adding other types of crisis counseling services to CCP, based in part on states' experiences with CCP pilot programs offering expanded crisis counseling services. The officials did not know when they would complete their review and reach a decision. |
gao_GAO-13-103 | gao_GAO-13-103_0 | DOD Has Implemented Most of the Fundamental Reform Act Provisions and Is Strengthening Acquisition Activities
DOD has implemented most of the fundamental Reform Act provisions as required and is taking additional steps to strengthen acquisition reviews, policies, and capabilities. DOD Is Continuing to Implement Reform Act Provisions
The offices established as a result of the Reform Act—SE, DT&E, CAPE, and PARCA—are continuing to make progress in implementing four fundamental Reform Act provisions aimed at strengthening acquisition outcomes and oversight of weapon acquisition programs. The team, which included an SE official, raised concerns about the program’s high number of mandatory requirements and the risks associated with the 7-year schedule. To mitigate program risks, the Army reduced the number of performance requirements by about 25 percent and prioritized the others, giving competing contractors flexibility in addressing some performance requirements. Program Cost and Schedule Estimates Are Becoming More Realistic
By establishing a new cost assessment and program evaluation office and requiring this office to scrutinize program cost and schedule estimates beginning at Milestone A, CAPE officials believe that the Reform Act has helped infuse more realism in cost estimates and promote earlier discussions about affordability. Joint Light Tactical Vehicle: The DT&E office helped this program develop a more realistic reliability growth plan prior to Milestone B. Challenges Exist That Could Limit the Reform Act’s Ability to Influence Systemic Change
While DOD has taken steps to implement most of the fundamental Reform Act provisions, some key efforts to date have been primarily focused on DOD’s largest major defense acquisition programs. We grouped these challenges into five general categories: (1) organizational capability constraints; (2) need for additional guidance on cost estimating and Reform Act implementation; (3) uncertainty about the sufficiency of service level systems engineering and developmental testing resources; (4) limited dissemination of lessons learned; and (5) cultural barriers. However, officials from the Ground Combat Vehicle program were unclear as to when and what type of prototype to use. DOD faces several challenges that must be addressed to get lasting change—organizational capability constraints, the need for additional cost estimating and implementation guidance, the possibility of insufficient systems engineering and developmental testing resources, limited dissemination of lessons learned, and cultural barriers between OSD and the services. However, they may require more resources, which have been difficult to obtain. OSD will need to continue monitoring the services’ efforts. Breaking down cultural resistance to change will take more cooperation between the Under Secretary for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics and other OSD offices, and service acquisition executives to address, as well as continuity of leadership. Recommendations for Executive Action
We recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following four actions to enable systemic change across the entire portfolio of weapon acquisition programs: direct the Director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation to issue guidance for estimating weapon acquisition program costs at Milestone A and operating and support costs throughout the acquisition life cycle by the end of fiscal year 2013 and ensure that the office prioritizes its resources accordingly to accomplish this task; designate responsibility for providing advice and guidance to program offices on competitive prototyping and preliminary design reviews to the appropriate organization within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics and ensure that the guidance is developed. The office(s) designated would be the focal point for addressing program office issues related to the practical implementation of these Reform Act provisions, such as the type of competitive prototyping to use, the timing and benefits of holding preliminary design reviews prior to milestone B, and if a preliminary design review should be held after milestone B; direct the Deputy Assistant Secretaries of Defense for Systems Engineering and Developmental Test and Evaluation to assess and include in their annual report to the Congress beginning with the report on fiscal year 2012 activities: the extent to which the office can perform their required activities with allocated resources; the impact budget cuts are having on the military services total workforce (civilians, military, and contractors) and ability to meet program office needs; and progress the services have made filling leadership positions, such as chief engineers at the service level and technical leads for systems engineering and developmental testing at the program office level; direct the Director of Performance Assessments and Root Cause Analyses to make lessons learned collected during its root cause analysis evaluations available to the acquisition workforce and ensure that the office prioritizes its resources accordingly. DOD partially concurred with our third recommendation. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report examines DOD’s continued implementation of the Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 (Reform Act). Specifically, we examined (1) DOD’s progress in implementing Reform Act provisions; (2) the impact the Reform Act has had on specific acquisition programs; and (3) challenges remaining in improving the weapons acquisition process. To determine the impact the Reform Act has had on specific weapon acquisition programs, we selected 11 weapon system programs to use as case studies. Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense | Why GAO Did This Study
For the past 3 years, DOD has been implementing the Reform Act requirements which are aimed at helping weapon acquisition programs establish a solid foundation from the start. This helps to prevent cost growth, thus helping the Defense dollar go further. This is the third in a series of GAO reports on the Reform Act.
GAO was asked to determine (1) DOD's progress in implementing Reform Act provisions; (2) the impact the Reform Act has had on specific acquisition programs; and (3) challenges remaining. To do this, GAO analyzed documents and interviewed officials from the four OSD offices created as a result of the Reform Act, other DOD offices, the military services, and 11 weapon acquisition programs we chose as case studies. Case study programs were selected based on their development status and interaction with the four OSD offices. Results cannot be generalized to all DOD weapon acquisition programs.
What GAO Found
The Department of Defense (DOD) has taken steps to implement fundamental Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 (Reform Act) provisions, including those for approving acquisition strategies and better monitoring weapon acquisition programs. DOD is also continuing to take additional steps to strengthen policies and capabilities. Some provisions, such as issuing guidance for estimating operating and support costs, are being implemented.
GAO's analysis of 11 weapon acquisition programs showed the Reform Act has reinforced early attention to requirements, cost and schedule estimates, testing, and reliability. For example, prior to starting development, an independent review team raised concerns about the Ground Combat Vehicle program's many requirements and the risks associated with its 7-year schedule. Subsequently, the Army reduced the number of requirements by about 25 percent and prioritized them, giving contractors more flexibility in designing solutions. In addition, the developmental test and evaluation office--resulting from the Reform Act--used test results to help the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle program develop a more realistic reliability goal and a better approach to reach it.
While DOD has taken steps to implement most of the fundamental Reform Act provisions, some key efforts to date have been primarily focused on DOD's largest weapon acquisition programs. DOD faces five challenges--organizational capability constraints, the need for additional guidance on cost estimating and Reform Act implementation, the uncertainty about the sufficiency of systems engineering and developmental testing resources, limited dissemination of lessons learned, and cultural barriers between the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the military services--that limit its ability to broaden the Reform Act's influence to more programs. Service officials believe additional guidance is needed to improve their cost estimates and other implementation efforts. They also believe that lessons learned from programs that experience significant cost and schedule increases should be shared more broadly within the acquisition community. These challenges seem straightforward to address, but they may require more resources, which have been difficult to obtain. Ensuring the services have key leaders and staff dedicated to systems engineering and developmental testing activities, such as chief engineers at the service level and technical leads on programs, as well as breaking down cultural barriers are more difficult to address. They will require continued monitoring and attention by the Under Secretary for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, service acquisition executives, and offices established as a result of the Reform Act to address.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends DOD develop additional cost estimating and Reform Act implementation guidance; make lessons learned available to the acquisition community; and assess the adequacy of the military services' systems engineering and developmental testing workforce. DOD generally concurred with the recommendations. GAO clarified one recommendation to make it clear that DOD needs to designate an office(s) within the Acquisition, Technology and Logistics organization to provide practical Reform Act implementation guidance to program offices. |
gao_GAO-03-449 | gao_GAO-03-449_0 | Almost all state programs provide information for parents and conduct provider education, but fewer than one-fourth of the states provide information for parents on their option to test for additional disorders not included in the state’s program. The number of disorders included in state programs ranges from 4 to 36. The criteria that state newborn screening programs reported they consider in selecting disorders to include in their programs are generally consistent across states. In 2001, HRSA awarded a contract to the American College of Medical Genetics to convene an expert group to assist it in developing a recommended set of disorders for which all states should screen and criteria that states should consider when adding to or revising the disorders in their newborn screening programs. The fees are generally paid by health care providers submitting specimens; they in turn may receive payments from Medicaid and other third-party payers, including private insurers. Nationwide, newborn screening fees funded 64 percent of newborn screening program expenditures in state fiscal year 2001.28, 29 (See table 4.) Newborn Screening Quality Assurance Efforts Focus on Laboratory Testing and Performance Monitoring
CDC and HRSA offer services to assist states in evaluating the quality of their newborn screening programs. However, most state newborn screening statutes or regulations allow exemptions from screening for religious reasons, and several states allow exemptions for any reason. While all states require newborn screening, most newborn screening statutes or regulations provide exemptions in certain situations. Overall, HHS said that the report presents a thorough summary of state newborn screening programs’ current practices. The survey asked for information on the process for selecting disorders to include in newborn screening programs; laboratory and follow-up activities; parent and provider education efforts; expenditures and funding sources; efforts to evaluate the quality of laboratory testing and program administration/follow-up; and states’ retention and sharing of screening results. In addition, the survey instrument was reviewed by staff at the Department of Health and Human Services’ (HHS) Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), National Center for Environmental Health, Newborn Screening Branch, and the National Newborn Screening and Genetics Resource Center, a project funded by HHS’s Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA). The information on states that require consent for newborn screening is based on our analysis of state newborn screening and genetic privacy statutes and the newborn screening regulations in states that do not have newborn screening statutes. Appendix II: Number of Disorders Included in State Newborn Screening Programs, December 2002
Number of disorders for which screening is conducted using tandem mass spectrometry (MS/MS)
Number of disorders for which screening is conducted using tandem mass spectrometry (MS/MS)
Appendix III: Information on Disorders Most Commonly Included in State Newborn Screening Programs
National incidence Description
Appendix IV: Selected Disorders States Screen for Using MS/MS and Number of States That Screen for Each, December 2002
Appendix V: State Newborn Screening Program Fees and Expenditures Per Infant Screened
Expenditure per infant screened not calculated because state did not report number of infants screened. | Why GAO Did This Study
Each year state newborn screening programs test 4 million newborns for disorders that require early detection and treatment to prevent serious illness or death. GAO was asked to provide the Congress with information on the variations among state newborn screening programs, including information on criteria considered in selecting disorders to include in state programs, education for parents and providers about newborn screening programs, and programs' expenditures and funding sources. To collect this information, GAO surveyed newborn screening programs for genetic and metabolic disorders in all 50 states and the District of Columbia. GAO was also asked to provide information on efforts by the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and states to evaluate the quality of newborn screening programs, state laws and regulations that address parental consent for newborn screening, and state laws and regulations that address confidentiality issues.
What GAO Found
While the number of genetic and metabolic disorders included in state newborn screening programs ranges from 4 to 36, most states screen for 8 or fewer disorders. In deciding which disorders to include, states generally consider similar criteria, such as whether the disorder is treatable. States also consider the cost of screening for additional disorders. HHS's Health Resources and Services Administration is funding an expert group to assist it in developing a recommended set of disorders for which all states should screen and criteria for selecting disorders. Most state newborn screening programs have similar practices for administering and funding their programs. Almost all states provide education on their newborn screening program for parents and providers, but fewer than one-fourth inform parents of their option to obtain tests for additional disorders not included in the state's program. State programs are primarily funded through fees collected from health care providers, who may receive payments from Medicaid and other third-party payers. Nationwide, fees funded 64 percent of states' 2001 fiscal year program expenditures of over $120 million. All newborn screening laboratories participate in a quality assurance program offered by HHS's Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, which assists programs in evaluating the quality of their laboratories. All states require newborn screening, and state statutes that govern screening usually do not require parental consent. However, 33 states' newborn screening statutes or regulations allow exemptions from screening for religious reasons, and 13 additional states' newborn screening statutes or regulations allow exemptions for any reason. Newborn screening statutes and regulations in over half the states contain confidentiality provisions, but these provisions are often subject to exceptions. HHS said that the report presents a thorough summary of state newborn screening programs' current practices. |
gao_GAO-03-87 | gao_GAO-03-87_0 | Most 7(a) Lenders with Whom We Spoke Are Satisfied with the Loan Sales
Lenders who participate in SBA’s 7(a) loan guaranty program have an interest in the outcome of the sales, because they still have a stake in the 7(a) loans for sale. Information on Borrowers Is Incomplete Because SBA’s Process for Documenting and Tracking Borrower Inquiries and Complaints Has Weaknesses
We were unable to validate the way in which borrowers have reacted to the loan sales, because SBA could not provide a reliable estimate or information on the number of borrowers who had contacted them about their sold loans. SBA’s Accounting for Loan Sales and the Remaining Portfolio Was Flawed
SBA sold almost 110,000 loans with an unpaid principal balance of about $4.4 billion in five loan sales from August 1999 through January 2002. Specifically, SBA (1) incorrectly calculated loan sales losses reported in the footnotes to its financial statements; (2) did not appropriately consider the effect of loan sales on its estimates of the cost of the remaining portfolio, which could significantly affect its budget and financial statement reporting; and (3) had significant unexplained declines in its subsidy allowance for the disaster loan program. Though we found that loan servicing volume had declined for SBA disaster home loan centers, the effect on regular business loans was less clear. 5), and SBA’s analysis of the servicing centers shows that if more loans are sold, SBA may be able to reduce and consolidate its loan servicing resources for disaster home loans. Since SBA incorrectly calculated the losses on its loan sales and lacks reliable financial data, we were unable to determine the financial impact of SBA’s loan sales on its budget and financial statements. Further, because SBA did not analyze the effect of loan sales on its remaining portfolio, its reestimates of loan program costs for the budget and financial statements may contain significant errors. Until SBA corrects these errors and determines the cause of the precipitous decline in the subsidy allowance account, SBA’s financial statements will likely be misstated, and the audit opinion on past financial statements may be incorrect. Further, the reliability of the current and future subsidy cost estimates will remain unknown. These errors and the lack of key analyses also mean that congressional decisionmakers are not receiving accurate financial data to make informed decisions about SBA’s budget and the level of appropriations the agency should receive. Finally, some of the operational benefits of the loan sales have not yet been realized, or may be overstated. It would be imprudent to continue SBA loan asset sales in the absence of reliable and complete information on the accounting and budgetary effects of the sales. A successful loan sales program is not solely about maximizing proceeds and attracting investors: it is also a means of improving an agency’s ability to achieve its mission and to best serve the American people. Moreover, as OMB continues to encourage loan asset sales, it is important that agencies embarking on new loan asset sales programs have the capability to properly carry out and account for these activities. Finally, to provide Congress and SBA with a better understanding of the impact of loan sales on SBA’s operations, we also recommend that the Administrator conduct a more comprehensive evaluation of the loan sales’ impact on the agency and the cost savings from the sales. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Small Business Administration's (SBA) loan asset sales are being closely watched because similar sales are projected for other government agencies as a means of reducing loan assets and servicing costs. To assess the progress and effects of SBA's loan sales, GAO undertook this study to (1) describe the process for selling loans, (2) identify how lenders and borrowers have reacted to loan sales, (3) determine whether SBA is properly accounting for its loan sales and their subsequent impact on credit subsidy estimates, and (4) assess whether loan sales generated operational benefits for the agency. GAO did not determine whether SBA maximized proceeds from the loan sales.
What GAO Found
From August 1999 through January 2002, SBA held five loan asset sales, disposing of a total of $4.4 billion in disaster assistance home and business loans (85 percent) and regular business loans (15 percent). SBA created a sales process that has attracted investors and responded to their concerns. Lenders who participate in the 7(a) business loan guaranty program were also satisfied with the sales as an option for disposing of their defaulted loans. SBA relies on borrower inquiries and complaints to determine whether purchasers of the loans are using prudent loan servicing practices, as required in the loan sale agreements. However, information on borrowers' reactions to loan sales is incomplete, because SBA does not have a comprehensive process to capture the inquiries and complaints it receives. SBA incorrectly calculated the accounting losses on the loan sales and lacked reliable financial data to determine the overall financial impact of the sales. Further, because SBA did not analyze the effect of loan sales on its remaining portfolio, its reestimates of loan program costs for the budget and financial statements may contain significant errors. In addition, SBA could not explain significant declines in its loss allowance account for disaster loans. Until SBA corrects these errors and determines the cause of the precipitous decline in the loss allowance account, SBA's financial statements will likely be misstated, and the audit opinion on past financial statements may be incorrect. Further, the reliability of current and future subsidy cost estimates will remain unknown. These errors and the lack of key analyses also mean that congressional decisionmakers are not receiving accurate financial data to make informed decisions about SBA's budget and the level of appropriations the agency should receive. Our analysis of the operational benefits from loan sales suggests that some benefits that SBA reported either have not yet materialized or were overstated. SBA conducted a limited analysis of the impact of loan sales on its loan servicing centers, showing that loan servicing volume had been reduced. However, loan sales had a much greater impact on disaster loan servicing than on business loan servicing. Therefore, how the sales will help SBA realign its workforce in the small business programs remains unclear. It would be imprudent to continue SBA loan asset sales in the absence of reliable and complete information on the accounting and budgetary effects. A successful loan sales program is not solely about maximizing proceeds and attracting investors: it is also a means of improving an agency's ability to achieve its mission and to best serve the American people. Moreover, as the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) continues to encourage loan asset sales, it is important that agencies embarking on new loan asset sales programs have the capability to properly carry out and account for these activities. |
gao_RCED-99-5 | gao_RCED-99-5_0 | However, because the Director was not appointed until October 21, 1998, HUD staff began formulating organization and staffing plans for OMHAR in the Director’s absence. In effect, this authority allows the Director to compensate OMHAR employees at a higher level than other HUD employees to obtain the skills and expertise needed to accomplish the program’s purposes. Despite delays in hiring a management studies contractor and a voluminous number of tasks to complete, HUD has made considerable progress toward this end. However, in spite of HUD’s efforts, some of these tasks either have been or will be completed behind their original schedule. HUD’s Procedures to Oversee Mark-To-Market Program’s Implementation Are Under Development
Because HUD is responsible for establishing effective management controls over the program’s implementation, the HUD officials developing the mark-to-market program were establishing or planning several procedures and systems to oversee its implementation. However, as of October 14, 1998, most of these procedures and systems were not yet in place, and many of the related details remained to be developed. Within its general oversight system, HUD has either developed or is planning three key components to help ensure that field offices and PAEs carry out the program in a way that meets its objectives and is in compliance with requirements: (1) performance measures to judge the effectiveness of PAEs’ activities and a system of compensating PAEs, (2) an Internet-based tracking system to monitor and analyze actions taken by HUD field offices and PAEs in carrying out mark-to-market functions, and (3) an oversight and audit guide to test compliance with the program’s requirements and objectives. The act also requires HUD to hold at least three public forums to obtain recommendations on the implementation of certain legislative provisions. In accordance with these requirements, HUD’s program guidance includes steps for involving affected parties in the restructuring process, and, on October 1, 1998, mark-to-market staff held the three required public forums. Organizations representing owners and managers of FHA-insured assisted housing, tenant groups, nonprofit organizations, lenders, coalitions of local and state government agencies, and other advocacy groups were invited to submit ideas and comments on developing the new program. For instance, in May 1998, the mark-to-market official responsible for the HFA component of the 1997 and 1998 demonstration programs met with the Council to obtain HFAs’ views on the compensation structure for their participation in the program. Overview of the Mark-To-Market Process
As the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) plans to implement it, the process to be used under the permanent mark-to-market program has nine phases: (1) screening owners and projects for eligibility, (2) assigning projects for restructuring, (3) preserving affordable housing, (4) collecting data, (5) underwriting, (6) approving the loan, (7) closing, (8) distributing postclosing documents, and (9) servicing and monitoring. 4. 5. Summary of HUD’s Reporting Requirements for the Mark-To-Market Program
The Multifamily Assisted Housing Reform and Affordability Act of 1997 (MAHRAA) requires the OMHAR Director to report certain information to the Secretary of HUD and requires the Secretary of HUD to submit information on OMHAR’s operations to the Congress and the Office of Management and Budget. A recorded menu will provide information on how to obtain these lists. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO reviewed the status of the Office of Multifamily Housing Assistance Restructuring's (OMHAR) development, focusing on: (1) its organization and staffing and how it relates to the Department of Housing and Urban Development's (HUD) overall structure; (2) whether it is on schedule to meet its key operational and reporting requirements; (3) the procedures and systems it will use to oversee the mark-to-market program's implementation; (4) the status of projects included in the three mark-to-market demonstration programs and how HUD is using information gathered from these programs; and (5) the actions it has taken to obtain information and feedback from parties that will be affected by the mark-to-market program.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) because a Director for OMHAR was not appointed until October 21, 1998, HUD had not made final decisions at the time of GAO's review on the Office's staffing and organization or on how the Office would relate to HUD's overall structure; (2) in addition to the 10 staff currently assigned to work on the mark-to-market program, HUD's preliminary plans call for hiring approximately 75 staff for OMHAR; (3) the Departments of Veterans Affairs and Housing and Urban Development, and Independent Agencies Appropriations Act of 1998, provides the Director special compensation authority to pay employees of OMHAR at a higher level than other employees in order to obtain the skills and expertise needed to accomplish the program's purposes; (4) HUD has made considerable progress toward meeting its key operational requirements for implementing the mark-to-market program; (5) because of delays in obtaining contract support and the sheer volume of tasks that HUD needs to complete, some of these tasks either have been or will be completed behind their original schedule; (6) the HUD officials responsible for the mark-to-market program are in the process of establishing or planning several procedures and systems designed to oversee the implementation of the program; (7) these include: (a) a system for measuring the performance of the entities responsible for carrying out restructuring transactions on HUD's behalf; (b) an Internet-based system to track the actions taken by these entities in carrying out mark-to-market functions; and (c) an audit guide to test these entities' compliance with the program's requirements and objectives; (8) as of October 14, 1998, most of these procedures and systems were still being developed; (9) in accordance with legislative requirements, HUD mark-to-market staff have taken actions to obtain information and feedback from affected parties; (10) specifically, they: (a) have developed program guidance that includes steps to involve affected parties including tenants and neighborhood associations, at various points in the restructuring process; and (b) have held three public forums to obtain recommendations from organizations representing affected parties on implementing certain legislative provisions; and (11) in addition to the legislatively required actions, HUD invited organizations representing project owners and managers, tenant groups, nonprofit organizations, lenders, coalitions of local and state government agencies, and other advocacy groups to submit ideas and comments on developing the program and to participate in meetings to discuss these issues. |
gao_GAO-07-520 | gao_GAO-07-520_0 | The Congress formally established the Task Force and expanded its membership in 1996 to include state and local agencies and two American Indian tribes and charged the Task Force with the following responsibilities for restoring the South Florida ecosystem: coordinating the development of consistent policies, strategies, plans, programs, projects, activities, and priorities for addressing the restoration, preservation, and protection of the ecosystem; exchanging information on programs, projects, and activities of the agencies and entities represented on the Task Force to promote ecosystem restoration and maintenance; facilitating the resolution of interagency and intergovernmental conflicts associated with the restoration of the ecosystem among the agencies and entities represented on the Task Force; coordinating scientific and other research associated with the restoration providing assistance and support to agencies and entities represented on the Task Force in their restoration activities. Although Many Restoration Projects Have Been Completed or Are Ongoing, Key Restoration Benefits Are Expected to Come from Projects Not Yet Implemented
Forty-three of the 222 projects that constitute the South Florida ecosystem restoration effort have been completed, while the remaining projects are currently being implemented or are either in design, being planned, or have not yet started. The projects now being implemented also emphasize the restoration of wildlife habitat by acquiring or improving land, as well as the construction of key CERP- related projects that will improve water flow to natural areas. However, both agency and Task Force officials report a number of achievements, such as finalizing key CERP agreements and restoring a more natural water flow to the Kissimmee River. Projects Not Yet Implemented Are Largely Part of CERP and Are Crucial to Achieving Overall Restoration Goals
Of the 72 restoration projects not yet implemented—in other words that are in design, planning, or not yet started—53 are CERP projects that are expected to be completed in the later years of the restoration effort and will provide benefits such as increased habitat for native species, improved water flow, and additional water for restoration as well as other water-related needs. State water quality projects. Funding constraints. While currently scheduled for completion in 2009, agency officials stated that they do not expect this project to be completed until at least 2011. Of this total, federal agencies provided $2.3 billion and Florida provided $4.8 billion. While federal agencies and Florida provided about $2.3 billion during fiscal years 1999 through 2006 for CERP projects, this amount was about $1.2 billion less than they had estimated needing for these projects over this period. As figure 5 shows, however, federal CERP funding fell significantly short in each year during fiscal years 1999 through 2006—by a total of $1.4 billion. Although Estimated Restoration Costs Have Increased Since 2000, Total Cost Estimates Are Incomplete and Likely to Rise
Between July 31, 2000, and June 30, 2006, the total estimated cost for the South Florida ecosystem restoration effort grew by 28 percent, from $15.4 billion to $19.7 billion. However, the cost estimate for the restoration effort is likely to increase even more, in part because the current estimate does not include the costs for the remaining land acquisitions and final design cost estimates for CERP projects, which are not yet known. Additional Interfaces Are Needed to Enhance Models’ Usefulness
We determined that at least 21 of the 27 primary models have interfaces that allow the models to interact with other models and provide a more comprehensive and accurate assessment of the ecosystem. However, the process that participating agencies have used so far to make sequencing decisions for these projects, and in particular for the CERP projects, has been governed largely by funding availability and technical dependencies and constraints among projects, not the full range of criteria that the Corps developed under WRDA 2000. These criteria were not fully applied when sequencing decisions were made for the CERP projects in 2005. Recommendations for Executive Action
Because the correct sequencing of CERP projects is essential to the overall success of the restoration effort, we are recommending that the Secretary of the Army direct the Corps of Engineers to obtain the key data that are needed to ensure that all required sequencing factors are appropriately considered when deciding which projects to implement. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Given the complexity and enormity of the South Florida ecosystem restoration, we were asked to review the current status of the effort, focusing specifically on the (1) status of restoration projects and their expected benefits; (2) factors that influence the sequencing of project implementation; (3) amount of funding provided to the restoration effort since 1999; (4) extent to which cost increases have occurred and the reasons for these increases; and (5) primary mathematical models used to guide the restoration effort and the extent to which these models have interfaces. Also simulates water quality. | Why GAO Did This Study
The South Florida ecosystem covers about 18,000 square miles and is home to the Everglades, a national resource. Over the past 100 years, efforts to manage the flow of water through the ecosystem have jeopardized its health. In 2000, a strategy to restore the ecosystem was set; restoration was expected to take at least 40 years and cost $15.4 billion. The restoration comprises hundreds of projects, including 60 key projects known as the Comprehensive Everglades Restoration Plan (CERP), to be undertaken by a partnership of federal, state, local, and tribal governments. Given the size and complexity of the restoration, GAO was asked to report on the (1) status of project implementation and expected benefits, (2) factors that determine project sequencing, (3) amount of funding provided for the effort and extent that costs have increased, and (4) primary mathematical models that guide the restoration.
What GAO Found
While many of the restoration effort's 222 projects have been completed or are ongoing, a core set of projects that are critical to the success of the restoration are behind schedule or not yet started. Specifically, 43 projects have been completed, 107 are being implemented, and 72 are in design, in planning, or are not yet started. The completed projects will provide improved water quality and additional habitat for wildlife, and the ongoing projects will also help restore wildlife habitat and improve water flow within the ecosystem. However, the projects most critical to the restoration's overall success--the CERP projects--are among those that are currently being designed, planned, or have not yet been started. Some of these projects are behind schedule by up to 6 years. Despite project delays, officials believe that significant progress has been made in acquiring land, constructing water quality projects, and restoring a natural water flow to the Kissimmee River--the headwater of the ecosystem. In addition, many of the policies, strategies, and agreements required to guide the restoration in the future are now in place. To help provide further momentum to the restoration, Florida recently began expediting the design and construction of eight key projects, with the hope that they would immediately benefit the environment, enhance flood control, and increase water supply. There are no overarching sequencing criteria that restoration officials use when making implementation decisions for all 222 projects that make up the restoration effort. Instead, decisions for 162 projects are driven largely by the availability of funds. For the remaining 60 projects--which are among the most critical to the success of the restoration effort--the Corps of Engineers and the Congress established criteria to ensure the goals and purposes of CERP are achieved. However, the sequencing plan developed for these projects in 2005 is not consistent with the criteria established by the Corps. Therefore, there is little assurance that the plan will be effective. From fiscal years 1999 through 2006, the federal government contributed $2.3 billion, and Florida contributed $4.8 billion, for a total of about $7.1 billion for the restoration. However, CERP funding was about $1.2 billion short of the funds originally projected for this period. In addition, the total estimated costs for the restoration have increased by 28 percent--from $15.4 billion in 2000 to at least $19.7 billion in 2006. More importantly, these cost estimates do not represent the true costs for the overall restoration effort because they do not include all cost components for a number of projects. There are 27 primary mathematical models that guide the restoration effort. These include (1) hydrological, (2) water quality, and (3) ecological models. Although 21 of the 27 models are able to interface with other models and provide a more comprehensive pictureof the impact of restoration efforts on the ecosystem, many agency officials stated that additional interfaces are needed. Because coordinating the development of these interfaces is resource intensive, it has been a low priority for the agencies. |
gao_GAO-02-770 | gao_GAO-02-770_0 | States were required in federal fiscal year 2002 to meet a work participation rate of 50 percent for all TANF families with adult members—referred to as the rate for all families. In addition to establishing federal participation rate requirements, PRWORA specified that the required rates are to be reduced if a state’s TANF caseload declines. Separating: A state can use its state MOE to provide cash assistance to needy families in any one or more non-TANF state programs, referred to as “separate state programs.”
Each state may choose one or more of these options to provide cash assistance. In addition, while not required by federal law, states may choose to apply work requirements or time limits on their state-funded assistance. Of 2.1 Million Families Receiving Federal or State MOE- Funded Cash Assistance, One Third Are Child-Only Cases
States reported that in the fall of 2001, 2.1 million families received cash assistance funded with federal TANF or state MOE dollars. However, this caseload is not included in the TANF caseload data. With PRWORA Flexibility, the Percentage of Welfare Recipients Participating in Work Activities Varied Greatly among States
Reduced federal participation rate requirements and states’ use of their MOE funds give states considerable flexibility in implementing work requirements. Almost all the states had more adults participating in work and work-related activities than they were required to, but the percentage of adults participating varied greatly among the states. The percentage of the adult caseload involved in work or work-related activities (as defined by the state) ranged from 6 percent to 93 percent. For example, 13 states exclude families with an adult who is disabled and 13 states exclude families who care for someone with a disability. While States Had Excluded 11 Percent of Families with Adults from Time Limits as of Fall 2001, This Percentage May Increase as More Families Reach Their Time Limits
States have excluded from time limits 11 percent (about 154,000) of the approximately 1.4 million families with adults receiving federal- or state- funded cash assistance. | What GAO Found
Congress created the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) block grant to replace the previous welfare program and help welfare recipients transition into employment. To this end, states are required to enforce work requirements, and face financial penalties if a minimum percentage of adults receiving cash assistance do not participate in work or work-related activities each year. This federal participation rate requirement has increased each year, reaching 50 percent for all families in fiscal year 2002, but it can be adjusted if caseload declines. In addition to work requirements, TANF places a 60 month lifetime limit on the amount of time families with adults can receive cash assistance. To receive TANF block grants, each state must also spend a specified amount of its own funds, referred to as state maintenance-of-effort (MOE) funds. The law allows states considerable flexibility to exclude families from work requirements and time limits. In addition, states may provide cash assistance to families and exempt them from work requirements and time limits by using state MOE in specified ways. States provided cash assistance funded by federal TANF or state MOE dollars to 2.1 million families in 2001. For 736,000 of these families, only the children in the family received assistance. When only children receive the benefits, it is typically because they are cared for by someone who is not their parent or because their parents are noncitizens. The percentage of adults in work or work-related activities varied greatly among the states because of the flexibility allowed. Most states met or exceeded their adjusted required rate in fiscal year 2000. However, the fiscal year 2000 federal participation rates varied, ranging from 6 percent to more than 70 percent. States excluded 154,000 families from federal or state time limits, or 11 percent of the 1.4 million families with an adult receiving cash assistance. |
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