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gao_GAO-05-844T | gao_GAO-05-844T_0 | Background
The role of the armed forces in the global war on terrorism and in military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq has heightened concerns about the assistance that these and other service members receive when they transition back into civilian life. About 309,000 servicemen and women separated from the military in fiscal year 2004 with sufficient time on active duty to meet the TAP eligibility criteria. TAP’s Delivery and Participation Vary
The delivery of TAP varies in the amount of personal attention participants receive, the length of the components, and the instructional methods used. Participation in TAP also varies. No data, however, are available regarding participation in the VA components of TAP. Very few members of the Reserve and National Guard are able to attend the 2 to 2 ½ days of employment workshops, although they receive preseparation counseling. Several Actions Directed at Improving Program Content
To improve program content, the three agencies administering TAP have plans to take, or have taken, actions to update their TAP manuals, forms, and other briefing materials, including Internet sites. In addition, DOL and VA are expanding the availability of their employment workshops and veterans’ benefit briefings by offering them at some overseas bases where service members that are likely to separate may access them. Challenges Remain in Meeting the Needs of Reserve and National Guard Service Members
Despite the actions under way or planned to improve TAP, challenges remain, particularly in designing transition services that better accommodate the schedules of demobilizing Reserve and National Guard service members. To deal with the logistical challenges, the TAP managers for DOD and the military services told us that they are considering the option of providing some TAP components to Reserves and National Guard members after they have been demobilized. Meanwhile, DOL officials told us that the agency was involved in three state pilot programs that will offer a version of the employment workshops to the Reserve and National Guard after they have been released from active duty and have returned home. For this reason, it is important that the government do all it can to help servicemen and women successfully transition to civilian life after service ends. To ensure that members of the Reserves and National Guard have the opportunity to benefit from transition assistance, we recommended that DOD, in conjunction with DOL and VA, determine what demobilizing Reserve and National Guard members need to make a smooth transition and explore the logistical options for providing that assistance, such as opportunities for employment workshops before or after their demobilization and providing timely information about the need to apply for certain benefits while still on active duty. Related GAO Products
Military and Veterans’ Benefits: Enhanced Services Could Improve Transition Assistance for Reserves and National Guard. GAO-05-544. Military and Veterans’ Benefits: Observations on the Transition Assistance Program. | Why GAO Did This Study
The increased role of the armed forces in military operations around the world, and the greater reliance on the Reserves and National Guard, has focused national attention on what is done to help service members transition to civilian life. GAO was asked to testify on its May 2005 report Military and Veterans' Benefits: Enhanced Services Could Improve Transition Assistance for Reserves and National Guard (GAO-05-544) and to highlight its concerns about TAP for the Reserves and National Guard. That report (1) assessed TAP administration, including program participation, and (2) identified actions agencies are taking and challenges they face in improving TAP.
What GAO Found
Jointly administered by the Departments of Defense (DOD), Labor (DOL), and Veterans Affairs (VA), the transition assistance program (TAP) is intended to help service men and women successfully adjust to civilian life after serving in the military. Originally created in 1990, TAP is composed of four components that are coordinated through meetings of TAP managers and interagency agreements. In fiscal year 2004, about 309,000 service members were released from active duty after serving at least 180 days and were eligible for TAP, including about 38 percent who were members of the Reserves and National Guard. Both the method of delivery and level of participation in the program components vary. Notably, few members of the Reserves and National Guard have time to attend most of TAP. Because they demobilize within days after returning from overseas, members of the Reserves and National Guard participate in an abbreviated version of some components and generally do not have time for any employment preparation. Participation of service members in the Disabled TAP component is unknown because VA does not track this information. DOD, DOL, and VA have taken actions to improve TAP's content and increase participation among full-time active duty service members. However, they continue to face challenges serving Reserve and National Guard members because of their rapid demobilization. To improve program content, the agencies have updated, or plan to update, their manuals, forms, and briefing materials. To increase participation, DOL and VA provide some employment workshops and veterans' benefits briefings overseas, and DOD is considering a policy change that would mandate participation in all components. While the agencies have not assessed when and where to offer TAP for members of the Reserves and National Guard, DOL has pilot programs in three states that will offer employment workshops after members return home. |
gao_GAO-05-927 | gao_GAO-05-927_0 | Performance planning and measurement have slowly yet increasingly become a part of agencies’ cultures. While our surveys found that managers reported having more performance measures in 2003 than in 1997, the data showed that the use of performance information for program management activities did not increase significantly from 1997 levels. Similarly, wide variation among agencies was seen in managers’ reported use of performance information for other types of management decisions. Agencies Can Use Performance Information to Manage for Results
Federal agencies can use performance information to make various types of management decisions to improve programs and results. Managers can use performance information to identify problems in existing programs, to try to identify the causes of problems, and/or to develop corrective actions. Management Practices Can Enhance the Use of Performance Information
Agencies can adopt or apply a number of practices that can enhance the use of performance information for policy and program decisions aimed at improving results. The five federal agencies that we examined for this report provide examples of how agencies can use performance information for key management decisions and practices that can facilitate such use. The specific ways in which the case agencies used performance information or implemented the practices may not be appropriate for wholesale adoption throughout the federal government because agencies face different management conditions and challenges, and operate under different authorities. Nevertheless, the general uses and practices highlighted in this report are universal and could be adapted by each agency. Helpful next steps would be for the relevant experiences of agencies in using performance information and adopting practices that facilitate use of performance information to be more widely shared, and for agencies to be encouraged to adapt practices to their unique situations. Executive Guide: Effectively Implementing the Government Performance and Results Act. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) of 1993 has laid a foundation of results-oriented agency planning, measurement, and reporting in the federal government. Performance planning and measurement have slowly, yet increasingly, become a part of agencies' cultures. For planning and performance measurement to be effective, federal managers need to use performance information to identify performance problems and look for solutions, develop approaches that improve results, and make other important management decisions. According to GAO's periodic surveys, federal managers reported having more performance measures in 2003 than in 1997. However, the data also showed that managers' reported use of performance information for program management activities has remained essentially unchanged from 1997 levels. GAO was asked to identify (1) how federal agencies can use performance information to make management decisions and (2) practices that can enhance or facilitate the use of performance information to make management decisions.
What GAO Found
Agencies can use performance information to make various types of management decisions to improve programs and results. Agencies can also implement a number of practices that can enhance or facilitate the use of performance information. GAO identified four broad types of management decisions for which federal managers can use performance information and five different types of practices that can contribute to greater use of performance information. The five federal agencies that GAO examined for this report provide examples of how agencies can use performance information for key management decisions and practices that can enhance or facilitate such use. While agencies face different management conditions and challenges and operate under different authorities, the general uses and practices highlighted in this report could be adapted by other agencies. Helpful next steps would be for agency experiences in using performance information to be more widely shared; and, for agencies to be encouraged to adapt the practices to their unique situations. |
gao_GAO-08-187 | gao_GAO-08-187_0 | However, the Department of Energy (DOE) has led U.S. efforts to detect radiation in cargo containers originating at foreign seaports. CSI places staff at participating foreign seaports to work with host country customs officials to target and examine high-risk cargo to be shipped in containers for weapons of mass destruction before they are shipped to the United States. CBP Collaborated on the DHS Strategy to Enhance International Supply Chain Security, and Met Goals for CSI Expansion and Increased Container Examination
CBP has undertaken strategic planning to guide efforts to secure the international supply chain and, more specifically, to manage the CSI program. As CBP expanded the number of CSI seaports and increased the proportion of total U.S.-bound container cargo passing through CSI seaports, the agency also achieved increases in security activities that occur at CSI seaports—targeting (CBP screens container cargo with ATS to produce risk scores and conducts additional review or research to ascertain risk levels) and examining high-risk container cargo (host government officials examine high-risk containers by scanning with nonintrusive inspection equipment or by physically searching the container). To Strengthen CSI Operations, CBP Has Taken Steps to Address Human Capital Challenges and Enhance Host Government Relations, but Operational Challenges Remain
CBP has made various operational improvements to CSI, though challenges remain. In addition, CBP has taken action to enhance its human capital planning process for CSI, but has not yet included important factors in its staffing allocation model. CBP’s Lack of Information on Host Government Examination Systems Potentially Limits Assurance That Examinations of High- Risk Container Cargo are Effective
CBP’s lack of a systematic way to collect information on host governments’ examination systems—including their equipment, people, and processes—potentially limits CBP’s ability to ensure that examinations of high-risk container cargo at CSI seaports can detect and identify WMD. For example, the target of one of CBP’s performance measures—the “number of operational CSI seaports”—was to have 58 CSI seaports operating in fiscal year 2007, which the agency achieved as described previously in this report. Also, we identified a weakness in how some CSI performance measures are calculated. However, limitations that remain in CBP’s evaluation process affect the accuracy and completeness of the program information available for making sound management decisions about the CSI program as a whole. Though CBP identified performance measures it considers proxies for program outcomes (given the difficulty in assessing the deterrent effect of CSI), these measures do not cover a key core program function, for example a performance measure for the number of high-risk U.S.-bound containers examined at CSI seaports. Recommendations for Executive Action
To help ensure that CBP has the information needed to assess its achievement of CSI program goals to help enhance supply chain security—while at the same time balancing security concerns with the need to facilitate the free flow of commerce—we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the Commissioner of U. S. Customs and Border Protection to take the following actions in three areas: Strengthen CBP’s process for evaluating CSI teams at overseas ports by (a) systematically capturing and maintaining all relevant evaluation data and documentation so that it can be used by CBP management to guide operating decisions, monitor program performance, and inform resource allocation decisions; (b) ensuring that CSI evaluation teams follow established evaluation procedures; and (c) monitoring the completion, within established time frames, of recommendations made in previous evaluations. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Objectives
We addressed the following issues regarding the U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s (CBP) Container Security Initiative (CSI): How has CBP contributed to strategic planning for supply chain security efforts and the CSI program in particular, and what progress has been made in achieving CSI performance goals? This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. | Why GAO Did This Study
Customs and Border Protection's (CBP) Container Security Initiative (CSI) aims to identify and examine high-risk U.S.-bound cargo at foreign seaports. GAO reported in 2003 and 2005 that CSI helped to enhance homeland security, and recommended actions to strengthen the program. This report updates information and assesses how CBP has (1) contributed to strategic planning for supply chain security, (2) strengthened CSI operations, and (3) evaluated CSI operations. To address these issues, GAO interviewed CBP officials and reviewed CSI evaluations and performance measures. GAO also visited selected U.S. and CSI seaports, and met with U.S. and foreign government officials.
What GAO Found
By collaborating on the development of the Department of Homeland Security's Strategy to Enhance International Supply Chain Security, and by revising the CSI strategic plan as GAO recommended, CBP has contributed to the overall U.S. strategic planning efforts related to enhancing the security for the overseas supply chain. Also, CBP reached its targets of operating CSI in 58 foreign seaports, and thereby having 86 percent of all U.S.-bound cargo containers pass through CSI seaports in fiscal year 2007--representing a steady increase in these measures of CSI performance. To strengthen CSI operations, CBP has sought to address human capital challenges and previous GAO recommendations by increasing CSI staffing levels closer to those called for in its staffing model and revising its human capital plan. However, challenges remain because CBP continues to rely, in part, on a temporary workforce; has not determined how to optimize its staffing resources; and reports difficulties in identifying sufficient numbers of qualified staff. In addition, CBP has enhanced relationships with host governments participating in CSI. However, hurdles to cooperation remain at some seaports, such as restrictions on CSI teams witnessing examinations. CBP improved its evaluation of CSI team performance at seaports, but limitations remain in the evaluation process that affect the accuracy and completeness of data collected. CBP has not set minimum technical criteria for equipment or systematically collected information on the equipment, people, and processes involved in CSI host government examinations of high-risk, U.S-bound container cargo. Also, CBP has not developed general guidelines to use in assessing the reliability of these examinations. Thus, CBP potentially lacks information to ensure that host government examinations can detect and identify weapons of mass destruction, which is important because containers are typically not reexamined in the United States if already examined at a CSI seaport. CBP refined overall CSI performance measures, but has not fully developed performance measures and annual targets for core CSI functions, such as the examination of high-risk containers before they are placed on vessels bound for the United States. These weaknesses in CBP's data collection and performance measures potentially limit the information available on overall CSI effectiveness. |
gao_GAO-05-360T | gao_GAO-05-360T_0 | More than 34 million workers and retirees in about 30,000 single-employer defined benefit plans rely on PBGC to protect their pension benefits. 1.) In July 2003, we designated the single-employer insurance program as “high risk,” given its deteriorating financial condition and the long-term vulnerabilities of the program. In fiscal year 2004, PBGC’s single-employer pension insurance program incurred a net loss of $12.1 billion and its accumulated deficit increased to $23.3 billion, up from $11.2 billion a year earlier. Furthermore, PBGC estimated that total underfunding in single-employer plans exceeded $450 billion, as of the end of fiscal year 2004. Structural Problems Limit PBGC’s Ability to Protect Itself from Risk
Existing laws governing pension funding and premiums have not protected PBGC from accumulating a significant long-term deficit and have not limited PBGC’s exposure to moral hazard from the companies whose pension plans it insures. The pension funding rules, under ERISA and the IRC, were not designed to ensure that plans have the means to meet their benefit obligations in the event that plan sponsors run into financial distress. Meanwhile, in the aggregate, premiums paid by plan sponsors under the pension insurance system have not adequately reflected the financial risk to which PBGC is exposed. Accordingly, defined benefit plan sponsors, acting rationally and within the rules, have been able to turn significantly underfunded plans over to PBGC, thus creating PBGC’s current deficit. PBGC Has Attempted to Improve Its Ability to Forecast and Manage Risk but Ultimately Lacks Adequate Authority to Properly Do So
PBGC has proactively attempted to forecast and mitigate the risks that it faces. The Pension Insurance Modeling System (PIMS), created by PBGC to forecast claim risk, has projected a high probability of future deficits for the agency. However, the accuracy of the projections produced by the model is unclear. Also, through its Early Warning Program, PBGC negotiates with companies that have underfunded pension plans and that engage in business transactions that could adversely affect their pensions. Over the years, these negotiations have directly led to billions of dollars of pension plan contributions and other protections by the plan sponsors. PBGC has also changed its investment strategy and decreased its equity exposure to better shield itself from market risks. However, despite these efforts, the agency, unlike other federal insurance programs, ultimately lacks the authority to effectively protect itself, such as by adjusting premiums according to the risks it faces. | Why GAO Did This Study
More than 34 million workers and retirees in about 30,000 singleemployer defined benefit plans rely on a federal insurance program managed by the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) to protect their pension benefits. However, the insurance program's long-term viability is in doubt and in July 2003 we placed the single-employer insurance program on our high-risk list of agencies with significant vulnerabilities for the federal government. In fiscal year 2004, PBGC's single-employer pension insurance program incurred a net loss of $12.1 billion for fiscal year 2004, and the program's accumulated deficit increased to $23.3 billion from $11.2 billion a year earlier. Further, PBGC estimated that underfunding in single-employer plans exceeded $450 billion as of the end of fiscal year 2004. This testimony provides GAO's observations on (1) some of the structural problems that limit PBGC's ability to protect itself from risk and (2) steps PBGC has taken to forecast and manage the risks that it faces.
What GAO Found
Existing laws governing pension funding and premiums have not protected PBGC from accumulating a significant long-term deficit and have exposed PBGC to "moral hazard" from the companies whose pension plans it insures. The pension funding rules, under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) and the Internal Revenue Code (IRC), were not designed to ensure that plans have the means to meet their benefit obligations in the event that plan sponsors run into financial distress. Meanwhile, in the aggregate, premiums paid by plan sponsors under the pension insurance system have not adequately reflected the financial risk to which PBGC is exposed. Accordingly, PBGC faces moral hazard, and defined benefit plan sponsors, acting rationally and within the rules, have been able to turn significantly underfunded plans over to PBGC, thus creating PBGC's current deficit. Despite the challenges it faces, PBGC has proactively attempted to forecast and mitigate its risks. The Pension Insurance Modeling System, created by the PBGC to forecast claim risk, has projected a high probability of future deficits for the agency. However, the accuracy of the projections produced by the model is unclear. Through its Early Warning Program, PBGC negotiates with companies that have underfunded pension plans and that engage in business transactions that could adversely affect their pensions. Over the years, these negotiations have directly led to billions of dollars of pension plan contributions and other protections by the plan sponsors. Moreover, PBGC has changed its investment strategy and decreased its equity exposure to better shield itself from market risks. However, despite these efforts, the agency ultimately lacks the authority, unlike other federal insurance programs, to effectively protect itself. |
gao_GAO-12-500 | gao_GAO-12-500_0 | FDA grants priority review for applications that it expects, if approved, would provide significant therapeutic benefits, compared to available drugs, in the treatment, diagnosis, or prevention of a disease. FDA Met Most Performance Goals for Original NDAs and BLAs for FYs 2000 through 2010
FDA met most of its performance goals for priority and standard original NDA and BLA submissions during our analysis period by issuing the proportion of action letters specified in the performance goals within the goal time frames. For Class 2 NDA and BLA resubmissions, FDA met the performance goals for 10 of the 11 completed cohorts we examined. Average FDA Review Time Increased Slightly for Original NDAs and BLAs from FY 2000 through FY 2010
Overall, average FDA review time—the time elapsed from when FDA received a submission until it issued an action letter—increased slightly from FY 2000 through FY 2010 for both priority and standard NDAs and BLAs. Percentage of FDA First-Cycle Approvals Generally Increased from FY 2000 through FY 2010 but Decreased for Priority NDAs and BLAs Since FY 2007
The percentage of priority NDAs and BLAs receiving an approval letter at the end of the first review cycle exhibited a sharp 1-year decline from FY 2000 to FY 2001, then increased substantially from FY 2001 through FY 2007, before decreasing again from FY 2007 through FY 2010 (see fig. 3). Trends for FYs 2000 through 2010 in the percentage of first-cycle approvals were similar for the subset of NDAs and BLAs that were for innovative drugs when compared to trends for all priority or standard NDAs and BLAs. However, the average FDA review time generally increased during this period for both priority and standard efficacy supplements. Specifically, FDA met the performance goals for both priority and standard efficacy supplements for 10 of the 11 completed cohorts we examined (see fig. Although the FY 2011 cohort was still incomplete at the time we received FDA’s data, based on efficacy supplements on which it had taken action, FDA was meeting the goal for both priority and standard efficacy supplements. Percentage of FDA First-Cycle Approvals Fluctuated for Priority Efficacy Supplements but Generally Increased for Standard Efficacy Supplements from FYs 2000 through 2010
The percentage of priority efficacy supplements receiving an approval decision at the end of the first review cycle fluctuated for FYs 2000 through 2010, ranging between 47 percent and 80 percent during this time (see fig. The results for standard efficacy supplements showed a steadier increase than for priority submissions. Stakeholders Noted Issues with the Prescription Drug Review Process and FDA Is Taking Steps That May Address Many of Those Issues
The industry groups and consumer advocacy groups we interviewed noted a number of issues related to FDA’s review of prescription drug applications. The most commonly mentioned issues raised by industry and consumer advocacy stakeholder groups were actions or requirements that stakeholders believe can increase review times and insufficient communication between FDA and stakeholders throughout the review process. Industry stakeholders also noted a lack of predictability and consistency in reviews. Industry Stakeholders Report a Lack of Predictability and Consistency in Reviews
The two industry stakeholders that we interviewed also told us that there is a lack of predictability and consistency in FDA’s reviews of drug applications. Consumer Advocacy Group Stakeholders Suggest That FDA May Provide Inadequate Assurance of the Safety and Efficacy of Approved Drugs
Three of the five consumer advocacy group stakeholders that we spoke with raised issues about whether FDA is adequately ensuring the safety and efficacy of the drugs it approves for marketing. While FDA has met most of the performance goals we examined, stakeholders we spoke with point to a number of issues that the agency could consider to improve the drug review process; FDA is taking or has agreed to take steps that may address these issues, such as issuing new guidance, establishing new communication-related performance goals, training staff, and enhancing scientific decision making. HHS generally agreed with our findings and noted that they reflect what the agency reported for the same time period. HHS also called attention to activities FDA has undertaken to improve the prescription drug review process. It highlighted FDA’s performance in approving innovative drugs in FY 2011. Finally, HHS discussed enhancements to the drug review program that were included in the proposed recommendations for the 2012 reauthorization of the prescription drug user fee program, such as establishing a new review program for innovative drugs, enhancing benefit-risk assessment, and requiring electronic submissions and standardization of electronic application data to improve efficiency. At that time, we will send copies of this report to the Secretary of Health and Human Services, the Commissioner of the Food and Drug Administration, and other interested parties. FYs 2008 through 2011 calculations exclude submissions for which FDA had not yet issued an action letter. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) is responsible for overseeing the safety and efficacy of drugs and biologics sold in the United States. New drugs and biologics must be reviewed by FDA before they can be marketed, and the Prescription Drug User Fee Act (PDUFA) authorizes FDA to collect user fees from the pharmaceutical industry to support its review of prescription drug applications, including new drug applications (NDA), biologic license applications (BLA), and efficacy supplements that propose changes to the way approved drugs and biologics are marketed or used. Under each authorization of PDUFA since 1992, FDA committed to performance goals for its drug and biologic reviews.
In preparation for the next PDUFA reauthorization, GAO was asked to examine FDAs drug and biologic review processes. In this report, we (1) examine trends in FDAs NDA and BLA review performance for fiscal years (FY) 2000 through 2010, (2) examine trends in FDAs efficacy supplement review performance for FYs 2000 through 2010, and (3) describe issues stakeholders have raised about the drug and biologic review processes and steps FDA is taking that may address these issues. To do this work, GAO examined FDA drug and biologic review data, reviewed FDA user fee data, interviewed FDA officials, and interviewed two industry groups and five consumer advocacy groups. All of the stakeholder groups participated in at least half of the meetings held by FDA to discuss the reauthorization of the prescription drug user fee program.
What GAO Found
FDA met most performance goals for priority and standard NDAs and BLAs received from FY 2000 through FY 2010. FDA meets its performance goals by completing its review and issuing an action lettersuch as an approval or a response detailing deficiencies that are preventing the application from being approvedfor a specified percentage of applications within a designated period of time. FDA designates NDAs and BLAs as either priorityif the product would provide significant therapeutic benefits when compared to available drugsor standard. FDA met the performance goals for both priority and standard NDAs and BLAs for 10 of the 11 fiscal years GAO examined; FDA did not meet either of the goals for FY 2008. Although FDA had not yet issued an action letter for all of the applications it received in FY 2011 and results are therefore preliminary, FDA was meeting the goals for both priority and standard NDAs and BLAs on which it had taken action. Meanwhile, FDA review time for NDAs and BLAsthe time elapsed between FDAs receipt of an application and issuance of an action letterincreased slightly from FY 2000 through FY 2010. In addition, the percentage of NDAs and BLAs receiving an approval letter at the end of the first review cycle generally increased, although that percentage has decreased for priority NDAs and BLAs since FY 2007.
FDA met most of its performance goals for efficacy supplements from FY 2000 through FY 2010. Specifically, FDA met the performance goals for both priority and standard efficacy supplements for 10 of the 11 fiscal years GAO examined. FDA review time generally increased during the analysis period for both priority and standard efficacy supplements. The percentage of priority efficacy supplements receiving an approval letter at the end of the first review cycle fluctuated from FY 2000 through FY 2010, ranging between 47 percent and 80 percent during this time. The results for standard efficacy supplements showed a steadier increase with the percentage of first-cycle approval letters rising from 43 percent for FY 2000 applications to 69 percent for FY 2010 applications.
The industry groups and consumer advocacy groups we interviewed noted a number of perceived issues related to FDAs review of drug and biologic applications. The most commonly mentioned issues raised by industry and consumer advocacy stakeholder groups were actions or requirements that can increase review times (such as taking more than one cycle to approve applications) and insufficient communication between FDA and stakeholders throughout the review process. Industry stakeholders also noted a perceived lack of predictability and consistency in reviews. Consumer advocacy group stakeholders noted issues related to inadequate assurance of the safety and effectiveness of approved drugs. FDA is taking steps that may address many of these issues, including issuing new guidance, establishing new communication-related performance goals, training staff, and enhancing scientific decision making.
In commenting on a draft of this report, HHS generally agreed with GAOs findings and noted that they reflect what the agency reported for the same time period. HHS also called attention to activities FDA has undertaken to improve the prescription drug review process. |
gao_GAO-09-796 | gao_GAO-09-796_0 | Finally, many households faced challenges in finding full-time employment to support a return to permanent housing. FEMA Reports Basic Activities in Closing Group Sites, but Efforts to Measure Results Are Limited
FEMA’s overall effectiveness in measuring its performance in closing group sites and transitioning households into permanent housing was limited. Previously, we have reported that for performance measures to be useful, they should be linked or aligned with program goals, cover the activities that an entity is expected to perform to support the program’s purpose, and have a measurable target. These measures describe program outputs—that is, information on the number of sites established, current number of sites, number of households that lived in group sites, and current number of households— but do not provide information on results, such as successfully moving households to permanent housing, or on qualitative factors, such as the timeliness or efficiency of the assistance FEMA provided at group sites. Having such information can help identify potential problems in meeting program goals and could be used to make management decisions about resources needed and steps to be taken. In earlier work, we identified certain key characteristics of effective national strategies and plans. Furthermore, the annex does not reflect some of the experience that FEMA gained in responding to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita regarding coordinating with other agencies. Nonetheless, the National Disaster Housing Strategy does not specify HUD’s role in transitioning households out of group sites and into permanent housing. The absence of detailed information in the housing strategy and its Disaster Housing Community Site Operations Annex on the partnerships that FEMA needs to form, the resources it needs, and the mechanisms that FEMA is to use to address the challenges specific to a catastrophic disaster when closing group sites and transitioning households to permanent housing can lead to delays in helping disaster victims return to more stable and conventional living arrangements. FEMA’s Disaster Housing Strategy Neither Assesses Alternatives to Trailers Nor Provides Clear Guidance on What Options States Can Use Instead of Trailers
FEMA’s National Disaster Housing Strategy does not assess alternatives to trailers because evaluations are ongoing, nor does it provide clear guidance on what other temporary housing options states should use instead of trailers while FEMA completes these assessments. In describing these programs in the strategy, FEMA identified currently available options for providing temporary housing after a major disaster under the housing assistance provision of FEMA’s section 408 program, such as rental assistance to disaster victims in existing privately owned rental properties and temporary housing units, such as mobile homes; described a number of factors that were relevant in selecting and deploying temporary housing options, including relative costs, implementation time, and program funding levels; and provided a broad framework of how states were to consider these factors in selecting specific temporary housing options—for example, FEMA characterized the section 408 rental assistance provision as more efficient as long as rental housing was available and the direct assistance provision as less efficient due to the time needed to activate units, such as mobile homes. For example, because the strategy and the annex do not address the roles and responsibilities of other federal and state agencies in closing group sites and transitioning households into permanent housing, stakeholders and the public may not have a full understanding of their role and responsibilities. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
The objectives of this report were to examine (1) challenges that households living in group sites faced in transitioning to permanent housing; (2) the extent to which the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) effectively measured its performance in closing group sites and assisting households with transitioning into permanent housing; (3) the National Disaster Housing Strategy’s effectiveness in defining FEMA’s roles and responsibilities for closing group sites and assisting households with transitioning to permanent housing; and (4) the alternatives to travel trailers in group sites when providing temporary housing after major disasters, how they compare with respect to identified policy factors, and how well FEMA’s National Disaster Housing Strategy assessed these alternatives. In addition, we interviewed officials from FEMA, state housing agencies in the Gulf Coast region, and selected nonprofit and housing research groups. | Why GAO Did This Study
Concerns over the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA) provision of temporary housing assistance, including travel trailers at group sites, after the 2005 hurricanes led to the development of the National Disaster Housing Strategy. GAO was asked to assess (1) the challenges households faced in transitioning to permanent housing, (2) the extent to which FEMA measured its performance in closing and transitioning households in group sites, (3) the strategy's effectiveness in defining FEMA's roles and responsibilities for closing and transitioning households in group sites, and (4) the alternatives to travel trailers in group sites and how well the strategy assessed them. GAO reviewed the strategy and interviewed officials from FEMA, state agencies, and selected nonprofit and housing research groups.
What GAO Found
Households living in FEMA group sites encountered various challenges in transitioning to permanent housing. A significant challenge cited by several reports and officials GAO contacted was the availability of affordable rental housing. Other challenges that were cited included insufficient financing to fund repairs of homes, significantly higher insurance premiums, and the availability of full-time employment to support disaster victims' return to permanent housing. FEMA's overall effectiveness in measuring its performance in closing and transitioning households in group sites was limited because the agency's measures do not provide information on program results that would be helpful in gauging whether the program is achieving its goal. Previously, GAO reported that performance measures should be aligned with program goals and cover the activities that an entity is expected to perform to support the purpose of the program. However, FEMA's performance measures for Katrina and Rita group sites primarily describe program outputs and do not provide information on results, such as the timeliness or efficiency of closing group sites and transitioning households into permanent housing. Having such information could help identify potential problems in meeting goals and could be used to make decisions about resources needed and steps to be taken. The National Disaster Housing Strategy broadly defines FEMA's roles and responsibilities for closing group sites and assisting households with the transition into permanent housing. Although the strategy states that FEMA is responsible for closing group sites and assisting households find permanent housing, the strategy does not reflect the key characteristics of effective national strategies and plans that GAO identified in prior work. For example, the strategy does not explain how FEMA will work with other agencies in closing these sites and transitioning households into permanent housing. A lack of a detailed plan that includes information on the steps FEMA needs to take to assist households with transitioning into permanent housing could lead to delays in the future in helping disaster victims return to more stable and conventional living arrangements. Officials contacted and reports reviewed by GAO identified a number of housing options that could serve as alternatives to travel trailers in group sites--for example, providing rental assistance for existing housing and repairing damaged rental housing. However, FEMA's strategy does not assess alternatives, in part, because evaluations are ongoing. Also, it does not provide clear guidance on the specific temporary housing options that states can use instead of travel trailers while FEMA completes these evaluations. Without more specific information on what these temporary housing options are, including alternatives to travel trailers, state officials will not have the information needed to expedite the selection of temporary housing options. As a result, FEMA and the states may not be fully prepared to quickly respond to the temporary housing needs of those displaced by major disasters. |
gao_GAO-09-860T | gao_GAO-09-860T_0 | Mercury can harm fetuses and cause neurological disorders in children, resulting in, among other things, impaired cognitive abilities. As a result, DOE now has comprehensive information on the effectiveness of sorbent injection systems using all coal types at a wide variety of boiler configurations. Substantial Mercury Reductions Have Been Achieved Using Sorbent Injection Technology at 14 Plants and in Many DOE Tests, but Some Plants May Require Alternative Strategies to Achieve Comparable Results
The managers of 14 coal-fired power plants reported to us they currently operate sorbent injection systems on 25 boilers to meet the mercury emission reduction requirements of 4 states and several consent decrees and construction permits. Preliminary data show that these boilers have achieved, on average, reductions in mercury emissions of about 90 percent. Further, when the results of 50 tests of sorbent injection systems at power plants conducted primarily as part of DOE’s or EPRI’s mercury control research and development programs are factored in, mercury reductions of at least 90 percent have been achieved at boiler configurations used at nearly three-fourths of coal-fired power boilers nationally. The successful deployments of sorbent injection technologies at power plants occurred around the time DOE concluded, on the basis of its tests, that these technologies were ready for commercial deployment. Other plants may also be able to achieve high mercury reduction with their existing pollution control devices. While sorbent injection technology has been shown to be effective with all coal types and on boiler configurations at more than three-fourths of U.S. coal-fired power plants, DOE tests show that some plants may not be able to achieve mercury reductions of 90 percent or more with sorbent injection systems alone. Finally, mercury controls have been tested on about 90 percent of the boiler configurations at coal-fired power plants. Mercury Control Technologies Are Often Relatively Inexpensive, but Costs Depend Largely on How Plants Comply with Requirements for Reducing Other Pollutants
The cost to meet current regulatory requirements for mercury reductions has varied depending in large part on decisions regarding compliance with other pollution reduction requirements. For example, while sorbent injection systems alone have been installed on most boilers that must meet mercury reduction requirements—at a fraction of the cost of other pollution control devices—fabric filters have also been installed on some boilers to assist in mercury capture or to comply with particulate matter requirements, according to plant officials we interviewed. The costs of purchasing and installing sorbent injection systems and monitoring equipment have averaged about $3.6 million for the 14 coal- fired boilers that use sorbent injection systems alone to reduce mercury emissions (see table 1). Regarding operating costs, plant managers said that annual operating costs associated with sorbent injection systems consist almost entirely of the cost of the sorbent itself. For the 18 boilers with sorbent injection systems for which power plants provided sorbent cost data, the average annualized cost of sorbent was $674,000. Most sorbents increase the carbon content of fly ash, which may render it unsuitable for some commercial uses. Advances in sorbent technologies that have reduced costs at some plants also offer the potential to preserve the market value of fly ash. Decisions EPA Faces on Key Regulatory Issues Will Have Implications for the Effectiveness of its Mercury Emission Standard for Coal- Fired Power Plants and the Availability of Monitoring Data
EPA’s decisions on key regulatory issues will impact the overall stringency of its mercury emissions limit. Specifically, the data EPA decides to use will affect (1) the mercury emission reductions calculated for “best performers,” from which a proposed emission limit is derived, (2) whether EPA will establish varying standards for the three coal types, and (3) how EPA’s standard will take into account varying operating conditions. In addition, the format of the standard—whether it limits the mercury content of coal being burned (an input standard) or of emissions from the stack (an output standard)—may affect the stringency of the MACT standard the agency proposes. Current Data from Commercial Deployments and DOE Tests Could Be Used to Support a More Stringent Standard for Mercury Emissions from Power Plants Than Was Last Proposed by EPA
Obtaining data on mercury emissions and identifying the “best performers”—defined as the 12 percent of coal-fired power plant boilers with the lowest mercury emissions—is a critical initial step in the development of a MACT standard for mercury. The 1999 data do not reflect the significant and widespread mercury reductions achieved by sorbent injection systems. Other strategies, including blending coal and using other technologies, exist for the small number of plants with configuration types that were not able to achieve significant mercury emissions reductions with sorbent injection alone. | Why GAO Did This Study
The 491 U.S. coal-fired power plants are the largest unregulated industrial source of mercury emissions nationwide, annually emitting about 48 tons of mercury--a toxic element that poses health threats, including neurological disorders in children. In 2000, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) determined that mercury emissions from these sources should be regulated, but the agency has not set a maximum achievable control technology (MACT) standard, as the Clean Air Act requires. Some power plants, however, must reduce mercury emissions to comply with state laws or consent decrees. After managing a long-term mercury control research and development program, the Department of Energy (DOE) reported in 2008 that systems that inject sorbents--powdery substances to which mercury binds--into the exhaust from boilers of coal-fired power plants were ready for commercial deployment. Tests of sorbent injection systems, the most mature mercury control technology, were conducted on a variety of coal types and boiler configurations--that is, on boilers using different air pollution control devices. This testimony provides preliminary data from GAO's ongoing work on (1) reductions achieved by mercury control technologies and the extent of their use at coal-fired power plants, (2) the cost of mercury control technologies in use at these plants, and (3) key issues EPA faces in regulating mercury emissions from power plants. GAO obtained data from power plants operating sorbent injection systems.
What GAO Found
Commercial deployments and 50 DOE and industry tests of sorbent injection systems have achieved, on average, 90 percent reductions in mercury emissions. These systems are being used on 25 boilers at 14 coal-fired plants, enabling them to meet state or other mercury emission requirements--generally 80 to 90 percent reductions. The effectiveness of sorbent injection is largely affected by coal type and boiler configuration. Importantly, the substantial mercury reductions using these systems commercially and in tests were achieved with all three main types of coal and on boiler configurations that exist at nearly three-fourths of U.S. coal-fired power plants. While sorbent injection has been shown to be widely effective, DOE tests suggest that other strategies, such as blending coals or using other technologies, may be needed to achieve substantial reductions at some plants. Finally, sorbent injection has not been tested on a small number of boiler configurations, some of which achieve high mercury removal with other pollution control devices. The cost of the mercury control technologies in use at power plants has varied, depending in large part on decisions regarding compliance with other pollution reduction requirements. The costs of purchasing and installing sorbent injection systems and monitoring equipment have averaged about $3.6 million for the 14 coal-fired boilers operating sorbent systems alone to meet state requirements. This cost is a fraction of the cost of other pollution control devices. When plants also installed a fabric filter device primarily to assist the sorbent injection system in mercury reduction, the average cost of $16 million is still relatively low compared with that of other air pollution control devices. Annual operating costs of sorbent injection systems, which often consist almost entirely of the cost of the sorbent itself, have been, on average, about $640,000. In addition, some plants have incurred other costs, primarily due to lost sales of a coal combustion byproduct--fly ash--that plants have sold for commercial use. The carbon in sorbents can render fly ash unusable for certain purposes. Advances in sorbent technologies that have reduced sorbent costs at some plants offer the potential to preserve the market value of fly ash. EPA's decisions on key regulatory issues will have implications for the effectiveness of its mercury emissions standard. For example, the data EPA decides to use will impact (1) the emissions reductions it starts with in developing its regulation, (2) whether it will establish varying standards for the three main coal types, and (3) how the standard will take into account a full range of operating conditions at the plants. These issues can affect the stringency of the MACT standard EPA proposes. Data from EPA's 1999 power plant survey do not reflect commercial deployments or DOE tests of sorbent injection systems and could support a standard well below what has recently been broadly achieved. Moreover, the time frame for proposing the standard may be compressed because of a pending lawsuit. On July 2, 2009, EPA announced that it planned to conduct an information collection request to update existing emission data, among other things, from power plants. |
gao_GGD-98-1 | gao_GGD-98-1_0 | We found that such problems were long-standing and had multiple causes that were related to adversarial employee, management, and union attitudes; autocratic management styles; and inappropriate and inadequate performance management systems. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of our review were to (1) determine the status and results of the Postal Service’s progress in improving various labor-management relations problems identified in our 1994 report, including how the Service implemented 10 specific improvement initiatives; and (2) identify any approaches that could help the Service and its unions and management associations achieve consensus on how to deal with the problems we discussed in our 1994 report. Using this information, we developed a list of 32 initiatives that the Service, the 4 labor unions, and 3 management associations had piloted or implemented to try to improve the postal workplace environment. Specifically, this information included (1) the results of the most recent contract negotiations between the Service and each of the four major labor unions; (2) data related to postal employee grievances; and (3) efforts by the Service and the unions and management associations to address the recommendations in our 1994 report, such as the Postmaster General’s (PMG) invitation to the other seven organizations to attend a labor-management relations summit meeting and the implementation of various improvement initiatives, including their status and results. Little Progress Has Been Made in Improving Labor-Management Relations Problems
Since our 1994 report was issued, the Postal Service and its unions and management associations have made little progress in improving long-standing labor-management relations problems. These problems have generally contributed to a sometimes contentious work environment and lower productivity. Such problems may make it more difficult for these organizations to work together to improve the Service’s performance so that it can remain competitive in a dynamic communications market. Figure 2 shows that the number of backlogged grievances had increased from 36,669 in fiscal year 1994 to 69,555 in fiscal year 1996, an increase of about 90 percent. Although many postal, union, and management association officials we spoke with believed that some of these initiatives held promise for making a positive difference in the labor-management relations climate, little information was available to measure the results of various initiatives. to the four unions and the three management associations. Actions Have Been Taken to Implement Five Initiatives, Although Disagreements Exist Over Approaches
For five initiatives, the Service and some of the organizations, especially APWU and NALC, fundamentally disagreed on how specific improvement initiatives should be implemented. However, in large part, fundamental disagreements among the Service and some of the organizations on strategies for implementing specific initiatives continued to hamper their efforts to achieve these goals and improve the overall working climate for postal employees. With the significant future challenges it faces to compete in a fast-moving communications marketplace, the Service can ill afford to be burdened with long-standing labor-management relations problems. 5. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Postal Service's (USPS) efforts to improve employee working conditions and the overall performance of the Service, focusing on: (1) the status and results of the Postal Service's efforts in improving various labor-management relations problems identified in GAO's 1994 report, including how USPS implemented specific improvement initiatives; and (2) approaches that could help USPS and its four labor unions and three management associations achieve consensus on how to deal with the problems GAO discussed in its 1994 report.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) little progress has been made in improving the persistent labor-management relations problems that had, in many instances, resulted from autocratic management styles, the sometimes adversarial attitudes of employees, unions, and management, and an inappropriate and inadequate performance management system; (2) these problems have generally contributed to a sometimes contentious work environment and lower productivity for USPS; (3) also, the number of employee grievances not settled at the first 2 steps of the grievance process has increased from around 65,000 in fiscal year (FY) 1994 to almost 90,000 in FY 1996; (4) these problems continue to plague USPS in part because the parties involved, including USPS, the four major labor unions, and the three management associations, cannot agree on common approaches for addressing the problems; (5) this inability to reach agreement has prevented USPS and the other seven organizations from implementing GAO's recommendation to develop a framework agreement that would outline common objectives and strategies for addressing labor-management relations problems and improving the postal workroom climate; (6) since 1994, USPS and its unions and management associations have tried to improve the climate of the postal workplace by implementing specific improvement initiatives; (7) many postal, union, and management association officials told GAO that they believed some of these initiatives held promise for making a positive difference in the labor-management climate; (8) however, GAO's review of specific improvement initiative showed that although some actions had been taken to implement certain initiatives, little information was available to measure their results; (9) in some instances, the initiatives were only recently piloted or implemented, and some had been discontinued; (10) in other instances, although postal and union officials agreed that improvements were needed, they disagreed on approaches for implementing specific initiatives; (11) generally, these disagreements have made it difficult for USPS and its unions and management associations to move forward and work together to ensure that the initiatives' intended improvements could be achieved; and (12) with the significant future challenges it faces to compete in a fast-moving communications marketplace, USPS can ill afford to be burdened with long-standing labor-management relations problems. |
gao_GAO-04-361 | gao_GAO-04-361_0 | Member States Are Experiencing Delays in Complying with Key CWC Requirements
Although the CWC has helped to reduce the risks from chemical weapons, member states are experiencing delays in destroying their chemical weapons and implementing key requirements of the treaty. For example, Russia and the United States are unlikely to destroy their declared chemical weapons by the extended deadline of 2012, and many member states have not adopted national laws that fully implement the CWC. Complete Destruction of Largest Possessor States’ Chemical Weapons Stockpiles Will Extend beyond Deadline
We estimate that the United States and Russia are unlikely to meet the 2012 extended CWC deadline for destroying their chemical weapons. However, a large quantity of Russia’s chemical weapons will remain vulnerable to theft or diversion until they are destroyed. Many Member States Have Yet to Adopt National Laws Implementing the CWC
According to the OPCW, less than 40 percent of CWC member states have adopted national laws to criminalize CWC-prohibited activities. State views Russia’s declaration of its chemical weapons production, development facilities, and chemical agent and weapons stockpiles as incomplete. Since April 1997, more than half of OPCW inspections have taken place at military facilities even though some commercial facilities may pose a greater proliferation threat. Since April 1997, most OPCW commercial inspections have taken place at facilities that produce chemicals listed on the CWC’s three schedules. The OPCW projects that the number of chemical weapons destruction facilities that will require monitoring will increase from seven to nine by 2007. As of September 2003, Russia had destroyed 1.1 percent of its 40,000 metric tons of chemical weapons at its only operational destruction facility. Russian destruction efforts have also relied almost entirely on international assistance. As of December 2003, international donors have shipped about $585 million and committed more than $1.7 billion to Russian destruction efforts. Nearly 7 years after entry into force, the CWC’s nonproliferation goals have proven more difficult to achieve than originally anticipated. CWC member states and the OPCW face difficult choices in addressing the delays in Russia’s destruction program, the limited number of inspections at dual-use commercial sites, and the slow progress in passing laws criminalizing CWC-prohibited activities. Thirdly, the report clearly articulates that the OPCW has established a credible inspection regime and has conducted nearly 1,600 inspections in 58 member states. Scope and Methodology
To determine what efforts member states have made in meeting key Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) requirements, we compared these requirements with documents obtained from the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and the Department of State (State), including annual reports that assess member states’ compliance with the treaty, surveys assessing the status of member states’ compliance with key requirements, and member states’ official statements to the 2003 CWC Review Conference. We also toured the U.S. chemical weapons destruction facility in Aberdeen, Maryland. Russia has spent about $95 million. 2. 3. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) bans chemical weapons and requires their destruction by 2007, with possible extensions to 2012. The CWC also seeks to reduce the proliferation of these weapons by requiring member states to adopt comprehensive national laws to criminalize CWC-prohibited activities. The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) monitors the destruction of chemical weapons and inspects declared commercial facilities in member states. GAO was asked to review (1) member states' efforts to meet key convention requirements, (2) OPCW's efforts in conducting inspections to ensure compliance with the convention, and (3) Russia's efforts to destroy its chemical weapons stockpile.
What GAO Found
The CWC has helped reduce the risks from chemical weapons, but CWC member states are experiencing delays in meeting key convention requirements as the CWC's goals have proven more difficult to achieve than anticipated. For example, we estimate that Russia and the United States will not complete destruction of their chemical weapons stockpiles until after the convention's deadline of 2012, if extended. Less than 40 percent of member states have adopted national laws to prosecute individuals that pursue CWC-prohibited activities. The Department of State also believes that China, Iran, Russia, and Sudan have not fully declared the extent of their chemical weapons programs. The OPCW faces resource challenges in addressing the proliferation threat posed by commercial facilities and inspecting an increased number of military facilities that destroy possessor states' chemical weapons. Although the OPCW has conducted nearly 1,600 inspections in 58 member states since April 1997, more than half have been conducted at military facilities. About 36 percent of OPCW commercial inspections have taken place at facilities producing the most dangerous chemicals identified by the CWC. The OPCW recognizes that it must increase the number of inspections conducted at facilities that produce dual-use chemicals. Some of these facilities may pose a proliferation threat. The lack of a credible Russian chemical weapons destruction plan has hindered and may further delay destruction efforts, leaving Russia's vast chemical weapons arsenal vulnerable to theft or diversion. As of September 2003, Russia had one operational destruction facility and had destroyed 1.1 percent of its 40,000 metric tons of chemical weapons. Russia's destruction efforts rely heavily on international assistance. Since 1993 international donors, including the United States, have obligated about $585 million for Russian destruction efforts while Russia has spent about $95 million. |
gao_GAO-01-694 | gao_GAO-01-694_0 | Background
Since 1992, DOD has obligated more than $2.5 billion of the over $3 billion the Congress has appropriated to help CTR recipient countries destroy weapons of mass destruction, transport and store weapons to be destroyed, and prevent weapons proliferation. Through program management, audit and examination procedures, and intelligence analysis, our analysis indicated that DOD can reasonably account for at least 95 percent of the total program dollars provided to recipient countries. Our analysis showed that a limited amount of equipment—less than 5 percent of the total value of CTR assistance provided—is in locations where U.S. personnel have no access rights or do not visit. DOD Can Improve Its Audit and Examination Procedure to Better Oversee CTR Assistance
DOD could improve the quality of its program oversight function by better targeting and expanding the scope of its audit and examination procedure. Scope and Methodology
On the basis of the legislative mandate, our objectives were to assess (1) whether DOD’s oversight procedures produce the necessary information to determine if the threat reduction assistance, including equipment provided and services furnished, is being used as intended and (2) whether improvements can be made in the way DOD carries out its oversight responsibilities. Appendix II: Comments From the Department of Defense | Why GAO Did This Study
Since 1992, Congress has authorized more than $3 billion for the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program to help Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Moldova, and Georgia secure and eliminate weapons of mass destruction. Concerned about proper oversight of equipment and services provided by the program, Congress required the Department of Defense (DOD) to report annually on whether the assistance was being used as intended. This report reviews (1) whether DOD's oversight procedures produce the necessary information to determine if the threat reduction assistance, including equipment provided and services furnished, is being used as intended and (2) whether DOD can improve its oversight.
What GAO Found
GAO found that DOD has procedures in place that reasonably ensure that at least 95 percent of the assistance is being used as intended and is adequately accounted for. Because of access restrictions imposed by the Russian government, a limited amount of equipment--less than five percent of the total value of assistance provided--is in locations where access by U.S. personnel is not permitted. DOD can enhance the quality of its program oversight by better targeting and expanding the scope of its formal audit and examination procedures. |
gao_T-AIMD-99-188 | gao_T-AIMD-99-188_0 | General Criteria for a Budget Process
In the past we have suggested four broad goals or criteria for a budget process. The process should provide information about the long-term impact of decisions while recognizing the differences between short-term forecasts, medium-term projections, and longer-term simulations; provide information and be structured to focus on important macro provide information necessary to make informed trade-offs between missions and between the different tools of government; and be enforceable, provide for control and accountability, and be transparent. 853, your staff asked me to focus especially on the importance of the long-term perspective, on increasing the understanding and recognition of long-term commitments and insurance commitments in the budget, and on how this relates to the need for control, accountability, and transparency. In this spirit, the approach taken in H.R. 853 has much to recommend it. Requiring reports on 75-year budgetary trends for the budget as a whole can help provide the necessary long-term context. The inclusion in the budget of OMB’s reports and comparisons between the President’s policy proposals and current law will focus more attention on the long term and on how the President would seek to address looming problems. Having a CBO report as well will permit the Congress and other observers to make comparisons with the OMB current law report, providing an independent view. Although for many programs BEA’s multiyear time frame has represented great progress, there are programs and activities where a longer time horizon is necessary to understand the spending implications of the government’s commitment-- and this commitment affects future budgetary flexibility. H.R. Programs with an apparently shorter time horizon than pension and health commitments could also benefit from a longer-term perspective. Federal insurance provided to individuals and businesses against a wide variety of risks is a prime example of the type of program that may carry long-term cost implications. H.R. 853 requires that estimates of the risk assumed by the government in these programs be disclosed in the budget. It also sets fiscal year 2006 as a date certain for moving to the comprehensive approach. H.R. 853 also calls for OMB, CBO, and GAO to report on the advisability and appropriate implementation of budgeting for the risk-assumed costs. 853, if a joint resolution is enacted into law, it would specify subtotals of new budget authority and outlays for nondefense and defense discretionary spending, direct spending, emergencies, and other subsets of spending if deemed necessary. 853 contains “fall-back” procedures for expediting a concurrent resolution if the President vetoes the joint resolution. H.R. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed the implications of H.R. 853 on the congressional budget process, focusing on: (1) the importance of the long-term perspective; (2) the long-term and insurance commitments in the budget; and (3) how this relates to the need for control, accountability, and transparency.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) in the past GAO suggested four broad goals for a budget process; (2) the process should: (a) provide information about the long-term impact of decisions while recognizing the differences between short-term forecasts, medium-term projections, and longer-term simulations; (b) provide information and be structured to focus on important macro trade-offs; (c) provide information necessary to make informed trade-offs between missions and between the different tools of government; and (d) be enforceable, provide for control and accountability, and be transparent; (3) the approach taken in H.R. 853 has much to recommend it; (4) requiring reports on 75-year budgetary trends for the budget as a whole can help provide the necessary long-term context; (5) the inclusion in the budget of the Office of Management and Budget's (OMB) reports and comparisons between the President's policy proposals and current law will focus more attention on the long term and on how the President would seek to address looming problems; (6) having a Congressional Budget Office (CBO) report as well will permit Congress and other observers to make comparisons with the OMB law report, providing an independent view; (7) although for many programs the Budget Enforcement Act's multiyear timeframe has represented great progress, there are programs and activities where a longer time horizon is necessary to understand the spending implications of the government's commitment and how this commitment affects future budgetary flexibility; (8) programs with an apparently shorter time horizon than pension and health commitments could also benefit from a longer term perspective; (9) federal insurance provided to individuals and businesses against a wide variety of risks is a prime example of the type of program that may carry long-term cost implications; (10) H.R. 853 requires estimates of the risk assumed by the government in these programs be disclosed in the budget; (11) it sets fiscal year 2006 as a date certain for moving to the comprehensive approach; (12) H.R. 853 also calls for OMB, CBO, and GAO to report on the advisability and appropriate implementation of budgeting for the risk-assumed costs; (13) if a joint resolution is enacted into law, it would specify subtotals of new budget authority and outlays for nondefense and defense discretionary spending, direct spending, emergencies, and other subsets of spending deemed necessary; and (14) H.R. 853 contains fall-back procedures for expediting a concurrent resolution if the President vetoes the joint resolution. |
gao_GAO-17-39 | gao_GAO-17-39_0 | DOD officials attributed the decrease to a combination of reduced overseas contingency operations, a reduced annual average strength of the force, and a favorable recruiting climate. Obligations for Special and Incentive Pays for Active Duty Personnel Decreased from Fiscal Years 2005 through 2015
Our analysis of DOD budget data shows that from fiscal year 2005 through fiscal year 2015 the department’s active duty S&I pay obligations decreased by 42 percent, from $5.8 billion to $3.4 billion (see figure 1). DOD officials told us that the services would likely need to make programming changes to various financial and personnel systems in order to separately track and report Reserve Component S&I pay obligations in their budget materials. The Military Services Varied in Their Application of Key Principles of Effective Human Capital Management in S&I Pay Programs for Selected Occupations and Have Not Taken Steps to Fully Ensure Effectiveness in Program Design
The military services have largely applied key principles of effective human capital management in using S&I pay programs to retain servicemembers within our selected case study occupations (nuclear propulsion, aviation, and cybersecurity). The extent to which the principles were applied varied in consistency by service and by occupation. Nuclear Propulsion Occupation
The Navy’s nuclear propulsion program demonstrated consistent application of all seven principles throughout the use of S&I pays for both officers and enlisted personnel. In the absence of measures for ensuring efficiency in S&I pay programs, DOD and the services generally assess their S&I pay programs’ effectiveness by the extent to which they achieve desired staffing targets. However, this approach does not ensure that S&I pay programs are using resources in the most efficient manner, as DOD guidance requires. Until DOD reviews whether its S&I pay programs have incorporated the key principles of human capital management that we identified, reviews whether the programs have used resources efficiently, and prioritizes and completes the establishment of measures for efficient use of resources, DOD and the services may lack assurance that S&I pay programs are effective and that resources are optimized for the greatest return on investment. Recommendations for Executive Action
To facilitate DOD’s oversight of the military services’ S&I pay programs, and to fully ensure the effectiveness of these programs, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following five actions:
Direct the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), in coordination with the military services, to explore cost-effective approaches to collect and report S&I pay program data for the Reserve Components;
Direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, in coordination with the military services, to review whether S&I pay programs have incorporated key principles of effective human capital management and used resources efficiently, and prioritize and complete the establishment of measures for the efficient use of resources; routinely assess the impact of non-monetary incentive approaches on retention behavior and on the necessary levels of S&I pays; clarify existing guidance for S&I pay programs regarding the extent to which personnel performance should be incorporated into retention decisions; and
Direct the Secretaries of the Military Departments to develop approaches to directly target SRBs to cybersecurity skill sets. In its written comments, reproduced in appendix VI, DOD concurred with three of our recommendations and partially concurred with two. However, this has not been completed. This report assesses (1) trends in DOD obligations for S&I pay programs for fiscal years 2005 through 2015 and the extent to which DOD reports such obligations department-wide and (2) the extent to which the military services applied key principles of effective human capital management in the design of S&I pay programs for recruitment and retention of servicemembers in selected high-skill occupations for fiscal years 2010 through 2015. | Why GAO Did This Study
DOD uses S&I pay programs to compensate and incentivize servicemembers for occupations that are dangerous, less desirable, or require special skills. Senate Report 114-49 included a provision for GAO to review the effectiveness of DOD's S&I pay programs. This report assesses (1) trends in DOD obligations for S&I pay programs for fiscal years 2005 through 2015 and the extent to which DOD reports such obligations department-wide; and (2) the extent to which the military services applied key principles of effective human capital management in the design of S&I pay programs for selected high-skill occupations for fiscal years 2010 through 2015.
GAO analyzed DOD S&I pay obligations for fiscal years 2005 through 2015; reviewed a nongeneralizable sample of S&I pay programs for nuclear propulsion, aviation, and cybersecurity occupations, chosen based on their pay programs' attributes; compared DOD and service policies and documents with key principles of effective human capital management; and interviewed DOD officials.
What GAO Found
The Department of Defense's (DOD) special and incentive (S&I) pay obligations for active duty servicemembers decreased from fiscal years 2005 through 2015 from $5.8 billion to $3.4 billion (about 42 percent) in constant 2015 dollars (see fig.). DOD officials attributed the decrease to a combination of reduced overseas contingency operations, a reduced annual average strength of the force, and a favorable recruiting climate. DOD does not collect and report complete S&I obligation data for the reserve components because, according to officials, there is no requirement to do so and the services would likely need to make changes to their financial and personnel systems to separately track the obligations. However, according to officials, DOD has not explored cost-effective approaches to collect and report this information, which would better position the department to know the full cost of its S&I pay programs.
The military services largely applied key principles of effective human capital management in the design of their S&I pay programs for nuclear propulsion, aviation, and cybersecurity occupations. However, the application of these key principles varied by service and occupation. Only the Navy's S&I pay programs for nuclear propulsion and aviation fully addressed all seven principles; programs for other occupations and services generally exhibited a mixture of full and partial application. GAO found that, according to officials, DOD and the services had not taken steps to fully ensure consistent application of the principles. For example, DOD has not reviewed the extent to which its S&I pay programs have incorporated principles of effective human capital management and used resources efficiently. DOD also has not established related measures to ensure efficient use of resources. Without such measures, DOD and the services generally assess the effectiveness of S&I pay programs by the extent to which they achieve desired staffing targets. However, this approach does not ensure that S&I pay programs are using resources in the most efficient manner, as DOD guidance requires. Until DOD reviews the extent to which S&I pay programs have incorporated human capital management principles and used resources efficiently—and develops related measures for efficient use of resources—DOD and the services may lack assurance that S&I pay programs are effective and that resources are optimized for the greatest return on investment.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is making five recommendations, including that DOD explore reporting reserve S&I pay program data, review the incorporation of human capital management principles and use of resources, and develop related measures. DOD concurred with three recommendations and partially concurred with two. GAO continues to believe that actions to fully address these two recommendations are needed, as discussed in the report. |
gao_GAO-04-256 | gao_GAO-04-256_0 | States Provide a Wide Range of Supports to Low-Income Families although Extent of Receipt Varies
States draw on a mixture of federal and state funds to provide low-income families with a wide range of supports, although the specific types of supports offered and the extent to which eligible families are able to receive the supports they seek vary by state and sometimes within states. For example, most states subsidized several types of child care, subsidized individuals’ public transportation costs, and offered employment services in at least one location in the state, but somewhat fewer states subsidized child care for sick children, assisted with the purchase of used cars, or offered employment retention bonuses to parents who found and kept jobs. However, as the emphasis of support programs has shifted toward promoting employment and economic self-sufficiency for a broader population, states have targeted some supports to low-income families who are not receiving cash assistance. Officials reported that they structured the eligibility criteria and benefits of many supports in ways that allow them to serve families with different levels of income and employment. In the five states we visited, the average benefit amount provided to support recipients varied by state and support, as shown in figure 3. Many States Have Expanded Supports in Recent Years, but Express Uncertainty about the Future
Over the last several years, states have made substantial changes in their supports for low-income families, with most of these changes expanding the provision and receipt of supports, but state officials expressed uncertainty about their continued ability to provide the current level of support. States made significant changes to the structure of their welfare programs in order to focus their new TANF cash assistance programs on the goals of employment and economic independence. Further, as states plan for the future of supports in the current fiscal environment, officials reported that they are considering changes that would likely limit the availability and provision of supports for low-income families. States can expand or limit the availability of supports by increasing or decreasing the number of benefits and services available or the types of services provided. Concluding Observations
Overall, supports for low-income families have undergone many changes over the past several years, and they will likely continue to evolve as federal and state governments further develop policies and respond to cyclical fiscal conditions and changes in the demand for services. HHS agreed with the findings and conclusions of the report. Survey of State Social Services Directors
To obtain information on the extent to which states provide supports for low-income families and how this has changed in the last few years, we conducted a survey of support programs in each state and the District of Columbia. State Site Visits
To obtain information about each assignment objective and, in particular, to gain a deeper understanding of how selected states have structured programs to support low-income families, we interviewed state officials in New York, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Washington, and Wisconsin. Review of Federal Reports
To obtain information about policies, participation rates, and other characteristics of the support programs that are administered largely at the federal level, such as food stamps, rental housing assistance, and the federal EITC, we reviewed reports and information readily available from prior GAO work and relevant federal agencies. | Why GAO Did This Study
Over the last decade, the Congress has made significant changes in numerous federal programs that support low-income families, including changes that have shifted program emphases from providing cash assistance to providing services that promote employment and economic independence. As a result of some of the federal policy changes, the support system is more decentralized than before. This heightens the importance of understanding policy choices and practices at the state and local levels as well as those at the federal level. To provide the Congress with information on this system, GAO agreed to address the following questions: (1) To what extent do states provide supports for lowincome families? (2) How have states structured programs to support low-income families? (3) What changes have states made to supports for low-income families in recent years? Our review focused primarily on supports for which states make many of the key decisions about eligibility, benefit amounts, and service provision. To obtain this information, GAO conducted a mail survey of the social service directors in the 50 states and the District of Columbia; conducted site visits in New York, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Washington, and Wisconsin; and reviewed federal reports and other relevant literature.
What GAO Found
States use an array of federal and state funds to provide a wide range of benefits and services that can support the work efforts of low-income families, although the types of supports and coverage of the eligible population vary among the states and sometimes within states. For instance, most states subsidize several types of child care, subsidize use of public transportation, and offer employment services in at least one location in the state, but somewhat fewer states subsidize child care for sick children, assist with the purchase of used cars, or offer employment retention bonuses to parents who find and maintain jobs. The five states we visited structured the eligibility criteria and benefits of many supports in ways that allow them to serve a broad range of low-income families, including families on and off welfare and families who are working and those who are not currently working. The specific support structures vary, however, by state and type of support. These differences create a complex national picture of supports that provide an assortment of benefits and services to a range of populations. Over the last several years, many states have expanded the availability of supports that promote employment and economic independence for lowincome families. State officials reported that both the number of support services available and the number of recipients have increased. However, state officials express uncertainty about their continued ability to provide this level of support. As states plan for the future of supports in the current state fiscal environment, officials reported that they are considering changes that could limit the availability and provision of supports for low-income families. Overall, it its probable that the support system will continue to change as the federal and state governments further amend policies and respond to changes in the demand for services and cyclical fiscal conditions. |
gao_GAO-14-584 | gao_GAO-14-584_0 | When using the LPTA process, DOD specifies its requirements in the solicitation. Tradeoffs among price and non-cost factors allow DOD to accept other than the lowest priced proposal. DOD Predominately Used Best Value Processes in Fiscal Year 2013, but Increased Its Use of LPTA for Higher Dollar Contracts since Fiscal Year 2009
DOD predominately used best value processes—tradeoff and LPTA—to evaluate offers from potential vendors in fiscal year 2013. For contracts with obligations of $25 million or more, DOD used the tradeoff process for approximately 58 percent of the contracts and the LPTA process for approximately 36 percent of the contracts. As seen in the above figure, DOD used the tradeoff process most often in our sample to acquire services, including those related to construction projects, aircraft maintenance, and other support services, regardless of obligation amount. For contracts with obligations of $25 million or more, DOD used the LPTA process primarily to acquire commercial products such as fuel. Several contracting and program officials said that their commands gave more attention to whether LPTA is an alternative option in light of declining budgets and Better Buying Power Initiatives. Knowledge of Requirements and Potential Vendors Underpin Decisions about Source Selection Process
Our review of contract documents and interviews with program and contracting officials from our 16 case studies found that for these specific acquisitions, DOD’s ability to clearly define its requirements and its knowledge of potential vendors were the key factors that underpinned the decisions about whether to use tradeoff or LPTA. For example, in the eight case studies in which DOD used LPTA, DOD contracting and program officials generally stated they had sufficient knowledge of the requirements or vendors to feel confident that the lowest priced vendor, after meeting technical acceptability requirements, could deliver the product or service. In contrast, in our eight tradeoff case studies, contracting and program officials were less certain about requirements, were looking for innovative solutions, or wanted to use non-cost factors, such as past performance, as a differentiator when selecting the vendor. We found that for these 16 case studies DOD’s reasons for choosing LPTA or tradeoff were generally consistent with guidance in the FAR and DOD’s source selection procedures. DOD Provides Online and Classroom Training on Source Selection Processes, but On-the-Job Training Considered Essential for Making Sound Source Selection Decisions
DOD, through courses offered by DAU and the military departments, provides both classroom and online training related to source selection processes to its acquisition personnel. Both DAU and military department officials stressed, however, the importance of on-the-job training in preparing personnel to make informed source selection determinations. Naval Facilities Engineering Command officials and contracting officials from one of our case studies stated that the task of identifying when requirements would better suit a particular source selection process is learned through gaining experience from on-the-job training. Concluding Observations
Best value processes continued to underlie the vast majority of DOD’s new, competitively awarded contracts. DOD did not provide written comments on this report but did provide technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. We determined 1) the extent to which DOD used best value processes in fiscal year 2013; (2) the factors DOD considers when choosing a source selection process; and (3) training DOD provides to its acquisition personnel on source selection processes. To determine the extent DOD used the best value processes in fiscal year 2013, we used data from the Federal Procurement Data System-Next Generation (FPDS-NG) as of October 2013 to identify a population of contracts based on the following criteria: (1) newly awarded by DOD in fiscal year 2013, (2) competitively awarded, and (3) had obligations of over $1 million in fiscal year 2013. more, we compared the percentage of contracts solicited using best value processes to fiscal year 2009 data we reported in October 2010.prior report did not include contracts with lower obligations of less than $25 million. Unless otherwise noted, percentage estimates of contracts with obligations of $25 million or more have 95 percent confidence intervals within +/- 8 percentage points of the estimate itself. | Why GAO Did This Study
DOD obligated about $310 billion in fiscal year 2013 for products and services needed to support its mission. To competitively acquire what is needed, DOD may use best value processes—including tradeoff and LPTA—to evaluate vendors' proposals. When using the tradeoff process, DOD weighs the relative importance of price against non-cost factors. By contrast, DOD may use the LPTA process and award the contract based on lowest price once technical requirements are met.
Congress mandated GAO to review DOD's use of best value processes. GAO identified, among other things, (1) the extent to which DOD used best value processes in fiscal year 2013, (2) the factors DOD considers when choosing a source selection process, and (3) training DOD provides to its acquisition personnel on source selection processes.
GAO identified and reviewed solicitations for a projectable sample of 183 contracts out of 2,851 new, competitively awarded contracts that DOD awarded in fiscal year 2013 with obligations over $1 million. GAO also reviewed DOD and military departments' guidance regarding their use of the best value process. GAO selected 16 contracts for case studies based on military department, best value process used, and other factors. GAO reviewed contract documents and interviewed program and contracting officials for these case studies. GAO also reviewed DAU and military departments' training on source selection procedures.
DOD provided technical comments that GAO incorporated as appropriate.
What GAO Found
The Department of Defense (DOD) used two best value processes—tradeoff and lowest price technically acceptable (LPTA)—for approximately 93 percent of the 2,851 new, competitively awarded contracts awarded in fiscal year 2013 with obligations greater than $1 million. DOD used the tradeoff process most often in GAO's sample of contracts to acquire services, regardless of obligation value. For contracts with higher obligations, DOD used the LPTA process primarily to acquire commercial products, such as fuel. In contrast, for contracts in GAO's sample with lower obligations, DOD used the LPTA process to acquire both products and services. Several contracting and program officials said that their commands gave more attention to whether LPTA is an alternative option in light of declining budgets and efficiency initiatives. For contracts with obligations of $25 million or more, GAO found that DOD increased its use of LPTA since GAO last reported on this issue in October 2010 using fiscal year 2009 data. GAO's prior report did not include contracts with lower obligations.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD contract and solicitation documents. | GAO-14-584
a The 95 percent confidence intervals for estimates in this table are within +/- 8 percentage points of the estimates themselves.
DOD's ability to clearly define its requirements and its knowledge of potential vendors were key factors that underpinned decisions about whether to use tradeoff or LPTA in GAO's 16 case studies. In the eight case studies in which DOD used LPTA, contracting and program officials generally stated that they had sufficient knowledge of the requirements or vendors to feel confident that the lowest priced vendor, meeting DOD's technical requirements, could deliver the product or service. In contrast, in the eight tradeoff case studies, contracting and program officials were less certain about requirements, were looking for innovative solutions, or wanted to use non-cost factors to differentiate vendors. For example, the United States Army Corps of Engineers used technical non-cost factors to evaluate vendors' abilities to use robotics for explosives disposal. These factors are generally consistent with guidance in the Federal Acquisition Regulation and DOD's March 2011 source selection procedures.
DOD, through courses offered by the Defense Acquisition University (DAU) and the military departments, provides both classroom and online training related to source selection processes to its acquisition personnel. Both DAU and military department officials stressed, however, the importance of on-the-job training in preparing personnel to make informed source selection determinations. For example, Naval Facilities Engineering Command officials told GAO that determining when requirements are better suited for tradeoff or LPTA is learned through gaining experience from on-the-job training. |
gao_RCED-98-60 | gao_RCED-98-60_0 | 1). Costs Associated With a Liquidation Are Difficult to Predict
In September 1997, Amtrak estimated the net cost to creditors and others of a possible liquidation to be between about $10 billion and $14 billion over a 6-year period. However, the financial impacts associated with a possible liquidation are difficult to estimate because of the uncertainties connected with the financial condition of the Corporation at the time of liquidation. Amtrak’s obligations, if any, to employees who lose their jobs as a result of a liquidation would depend on the results of these negotiations. For example, existing commuter rail agencies might assume some of these costs. The extent to which this liability could be met would depend in large part on the market value of Amtrak’s available assets and liquidation proceeds. With the exception of its interests in the Northeast Corridor and certain other real property, the federal government’s financial interests in the event of a liquidation would generally be subordinate to those of other creditors. In either case, proceeds from the sale would be available to satisfy creditors’ claims. Liquidation Could Place Financial Burden on Participants in the Railroad Retirement and Unemployment Systems
In contrast to the losses that creditors might suffer, participants in the railroad retirement and unemployment systems would have increased financial obligations in the event of Amtrak’s liquidation. The primary source of income for the railroad retirement system is payroll taxes levied on employers and employees. A loss of this contribution could have a significant impact. A February 1997 analysis by the Railroad Retirement Board found that, if Amtrak had been liquidated in 1997 and no actions had been taken to increase payroll taxes or reduce benefit levels, the balance in the railroad retirement account would have begun to decline in 2000 and that the account would have been depleted by 2026. In contrast to the impacts on the retirement account, the financial effects would be more immediate and shorter-term. An Amtrak Liquidation Could Affect Intercity, Commuter, and Other Rail Service
Liquidating Amtrak could disrupt intercity and other passenger rail service—service that affects over 20 million intercity passengers and over 100 million commuter and other passengers on the Northeast Corridor annually. In particular, for both intercity and commuter rail, issues associated with accessing tracks and stations—and the cost of such access—would largely determine the extent of service, if any, including service on the Northeast Corridor. Commuter railroads that contract for service from Amtrak and freight railroads using the Corridor might also face hardships. Although the use of compacts may not guarantee either access to tracks or a specified cost, it could be a means to maintaining intercity passenger rail service. The ability of states and commuter authorities to absorb this level of cost is uncertain. Freight railroads that operate on the Northeast Corridor could also face severe problems if Amtrak were liquidated. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO reviewed the financial and other issues associated with a possible Amtrak bankruptcy and liquidation, focusing on: (1) uncertainties in estimating the potential costs associated with a liquidation; (2) possible financial impacts on creditors, including the federal government; (3) possible financial impacts on participants in the railroad retirement and unemployment systems; and (4) possible impacts on intercity, commuter, and other rail service.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) Amtrak has estimated that the net cost to creditors and others of a possible liquidation could be as much as $10 billion to $14 billion over a 6-year period; (2) however, the costs associated with a possible liquidation are difficult to predict because they will depend on a few uncertainties; (3) Amtrak's financial obligations, if any, to employees who lose their jobs as a result of a liquidation would depend on the results of negotiations between Amtrak and its unions; (4) in addition, most of the costs identified by Amtrak are not liquidation costs; (5) existing commuter rail agencies and others that operate on Amtrak tracks might assume some of these costs; (6) Amtrak's creditors might face losses in the event of a liquidation; (7) the extent to which these creditors' claims could be paid would depend in large part on the market value of assets available to satisfy such claims; (8) with the exception of its interest in the Northeast Corridor and certain other real property, the federal government's financial interests in the event of liquidation would generally be subordinate to other creditors'; (9) for participants in the railroad retirement and unemployment systems, an Amtrak liquidation would result in higher payroll taxes on employers and employees of other railroads or a reduction in benefits to compensate for the loss of Amtrak's annual contributions; (10) according to the Railroad Retirement Board, which administers these systems, if no actions were taken to increase payroll taxes or reduce benefit levels, the balance of the railroad retirement account would start to decline by 2000 and would be depleted by 2026.; (11) the railroad unemployment account, on the other hand, would experience more immediate financial problems requiring the imposition of surcharges on participants as well as borrowing from the retirement account; (12) according to the Railroad Retirement Board, these measures would be required for 2 to 3 years to maintain financial solvency in the unemployment account; (13) the liquidation of Amtrak could also disrupt intercity and other passenger rail service; (14) a number of factors could affect the continuation of rail service, including access to the tracks and stations that are owned by Amtrak and others, and the ability of states and commuter railroads to absorb the cost of continuing service; and (15) some freight railroads use the Northeast Corridor and may also face the potential loss of millions of dollars of business to the extent that they are unable to retain access to the Corridor. |
gao_GAO-06-700 | gao_GAO-06-700_0 | The Children’s Health Act of 2000 required HHS and certain HHS agencies to conduct various activities and programs related to autism. However, CDC officials believe a 2003 change in Education’s interpretation of the federal law governing the privacy of education records has hindered CDC’s ability to continue to use this methodology. HHS and Education were required to submit a report to congressional committees in June 2005 identifying how to overcome the challenges CDC faces in using education records to conduct surveillance; as of June 2006, the agencies had not agreed on options for overcoming these challenges and had not completed the report. CDC Supports Autism Surveillance, but Faces Challenges in Its Ability to Report Accurate Prevalence Data
CDC supports surveillance activities in certain locations that track the prevalence of autism and other developmental disabilities in children. NIH and CDC Reported That Their Funding of Activities Related to Autism Increased from Fiscal Year 2000 to Fiscal Year 2005
NIH’s funding of autism research increased from about $51.5 million in fiscal year 2000 to about $101.6 million in fiscal year 2005, based on estimated funding data provided by NIH. CDC’s funding of autism activities increased from about $2.1 million in fiscal year 2000 to about $16.7 million in fiscal year 2005. The National Center on Birth Defects and Developmental Disabilities has provided the most support for CDC’s autism activities, and agency officials told us that the center’s funding of these activities increased from about $1.1 million to about $14.9 million during this period. Federal Agencies Support Services for People with Autism Primarily Through Broader Disability Programs, and Some Services May Not Always Be Available
Federal agencies support services for people with autism primarily through broader programs that focus on disabilities, and some services may not always be available to meet the needs of this population. ACF and Education support education services for children with autism through broader programs for people with disabilities. Other federal agencies, including HRSA and CMS, support programs that provide services or enhance the delivery of health care for people with developmental disabilities. For example, CMS supports community-based services to meet the needs of people with autism through Medicaid programs; however, many people with autism may not be able to obtain services through these programs. Although Medicaid autism and developmental disability waiver programs support the provision of treatment services for people with autism, many people with autism may be unable to obtain services through these programs because they do not meet the programs’ eligibility rules or because states limit enrollment. Interagency Autism Coordinating Committee Enhances Communication among Federal Agencies, but Coordination Is Limited
The primary vehicle for coordinating federal agencies’ autism activities is the IACC. Moreover, no federal agency perceives itself as having lead responsibility for addressing the service needs of adults with autism or services for children beyond education. However, coordination among agencies in carrying out their autism activities remains limited. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To determine the autism-related activities and programs that the Department of Health and Human Services’ (HHS) National Institutes of Health (NIH) and Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) have under way, we collected documents from and interviewed agency officials about their fiscal year 2005 research and surveillance activities. Appendix II: Selected NIH Autism-Related Activities
Appendix III: Interagency Autism Coordinating Committee Research Goals
Appendix III: Interagency Autism Coordinating Committee Research Goals Define and plan Autism Phenome Project and study existing data to begin to characterize the autism phenome Establish resources for genotype and phenotype studies (e.g., genetic repository)
Develop nonbrain biomarkers (e.g., blood levels of specific molecules) to provide the biological characteristics of autism Implement multisite longitudinal study of subsequent pregnancies and infant siblings of children with autism to identify risk factors, broader phenotype, and early characteristics of autism Identify genes that increase susceptibility for autism and animal models of autism for further study of phenotypic characteristics of autism Expand, disseminate, and implement effective interventions, including transition services, to improve outcomes in school and community settings throughout a person with autism’s life span Develop, evaluate, implement, and disseminate innovative intervention strategies, including transition services, to improve outcomes in school and community settings throughout a person with autism’s life span Continue formulating, evaluating, and implementing appropriate and effective intervention strategies incorporating research-based findings to improve outcomes in school and community settings throughout the life span of a person with autism Ensure appropriate and effective interventions are widely recognized and broadly implemented in school and community settings throughout the life span of a person with autism Implement first-generation, intensive community-based prevalence studies with clinical evaluations; the studies will produce initial data for detecting changes in prevalence of autism Plan and implement second-generation intensive community-based prevalence studies with clinical evaluations Develop a randomized clinical trial for evaluating the effectiveness of early behavioral interventions and factors predicting response to interventions Implement a multisite, randomized clinical trial to identify moderators and effective components of early intervention treatments (e.g., dose, intensity, mode of delivery, age of onset)
Appendix IV: Interagency Autism Coordinating Committee Services Roadmap Goals and Recommendations
All people with autism and their families will have a well-established, trusting, and mutually respectful relationship with a health care professional (medical home) who listens and responds to concerns and who acts as an equal partner in providing a clearly defined plan of coordinated services. | Why GAO Did This Study
Autism is a developmental disorder involving communication and social impairment. It has no known cause or cure, and its prevalence is unknown. The Children's Health Act of 2000 required the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and HHS agencies to conduct activities related to autism research, surveillance, and coordination. This report provides information on (1) the National Institutes of Health's (NIH) and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention's (CDC) autism activities and these agencies' funding of autism activities, (2) programs that federal agencies have under way to support services for people with autism and concerns related to providing services, and (3) coordination of federal autism activities.
What GAO Found
NIH and CDC have undertaken a range of autism activities, and the agencies reported that their funding of autism activities has increased. Many of NIH's activities were developed in response to requirements in the Children's Health Act for NIH to expand, intensify, and coordinate its autism activities. According to estimates from NIH, the agency increased funding for autism from about $51.5 million in fiscal year 2000 to about $101.6 million in fiscal year 2005. CDC supports surveillance activities in certain locations that track the prevalence of autism and other developmental disabilities, and its total funding of autism activities increased from about $2.1 million in fiscal year 2000 to about $16.7 million in fiscal year 2005. CDC's surveillance methodology has relied, in part, on information in student education records, but CDC officials believe that a 2003 change in the Department of Education's (Education) interpretation of relevant federal privacy law has hindered CDC's ability to use this methodology to determine the prevalence of autism. Education stated that the law does not allow CDC to access these records without written parental consent. A 2003 law required HHS and Education to submit a report to the Congress by June 2005 describing ways to overcome the challenges CDC faces in obtaining education records. As of June 2006, CDC and Education had not agreed on options for overcoming these challenges and could not estimate when the report would be completed. Federal agencies support services for people with autism primarily through broader disability programs, and some services may not always be available to meet the needs of this population. Education and HHS's Administration for Children and Families support services for children with autism through education programs for children with disabilities. Other federal agencies support services for people with autism, generally as part of broader programs to provide services or enhance the delivery of health care to people with developmental disabilities. For example, HHS's Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services supports services to meet the needs of people with autism through Medicaid programs targeted to people with developmental disabilities. However, many people with autism may not be able to obtain services under these Medicaid programs because they do not meet eligibility rules or because states limit enrollment. The primary vehicle for coordinating federal agencies' autism activities is the Interagency Autism Coordinating Committee (IACC), and although it has enhanced communication and coordination among agencies, coordination remains limited. The IACC developed recommendations on how to better serve people with autism and established autism research goals. Agency officials told us that federal coordination is limited, in part because, except for education services, no agency perceives itself as having lead responsibility for supporting services for people with autism. |
gao_GAO-03-829 | gao_GAO-03-829_0 | Following this discovery, the drug was developed primarily through research funded by NIH, and then transferred to the private sector and successfully commercialized by BMS. Public-Private Technology Transfer
The 1991 NIH-BMS CRADA was one of the first CRADAs to result in a breakthrough drug. Specifically, the royalty payments can be used to (1) reward employees of the laboratory, (2) further scientific exchange among the laboratories of the agency, (3) educate and train employees of the agency or laboratory, (4) support other activities that increase the potential for transfer of the technology of the laboratories of the agency, (5) pay expenses incidental to the administration and licensing of intellectual property by the agency or laboratory, and (6) support scientific research and development consistent with the research and development missions and objectives of the laboratory. FDA’s approval of BMS’s NDA to market Taxol for the treatment of ovarian cancer triggered a provision in federal law granting BMS 5 years of marketing exclusivity for Taxol as a new chemical entity under the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984. NIH-BMS Partnership Provided Research Results Critical to Developing Taxol’s Commercial Uses
The NIH-BMS collaboration provided BMS access to NIH research results that were critical for BMS’s quick commercialization of Taxol. Prior to the signing of the 1991 CRADA, and during the first 2 years of the CRADA, NCI conducted most of the clinical trials associated with paclitaxel. NIH Invested Heavily in Taxol-Related Research, but Federal Financial Benefits Have Been Limited
Although NIH estimates that it has invested heavily in research related to paclitaxel, its financial benefits from the collaboration with BMS have not been great in comparison to BMS’s revenue from the drug. For one portion of its investment in Taxol, NIH estimates that its net cost for conducting clinical trials that supported the development of Taxol through the 1991 CRADA was $80 million—NIH estimates that it spent $96 million on the studies, and this expense was offset by $16 million in financial support from BMS. We estimate that the paclitaxel BMS supplied NIH through the CRADA had a value of $92 million. In addition, NIH spent an additional $301 million on paclitaxel-related research from 1998 through 2002, some of which supported cancer research, bringing NIH’s total investment in paclitaxel- related research from 1977 to 2002 to $484 million. The federal government has been a major payer for Taxol, primarily through Medicare. For example, Medicare payments for Taxol totaled $687 million from 1994 through 1999. In 1996, when BMS licensed from NIH three patents on methods for using Taxol in cancer treatment, it negotiated its first and only license agreement with NIH for Taxol, requiring BMS to pay royalties to NIH at a rate of 0.5 percent of its worldwide sales of Taxol. Worldwide Taxol sales totaled over $9 billion from 1993 through 2002. For example, BMS officials told us that the company’s clinical trials had enrolled over 21,000 patients by 1997. The CRADA noted NIH’s concern that “there be a reasonable relationship between the pricing of Taxol, the public investment in Taxol research and development, and the health and safety needs of the public.” BMS agreed in the 1991 CRADA that these factors would be taken into account in establishing a fair market price. Several Factors Affected NIH’s Exercise of Its Broad Authority in Technology Transfer Activities Related to the Development of Taxol
Although NIH has broad authority under applicable statutes to negotiate CRADAs and license agreements with outside partners, several factors affected its exercise of that authority in the technology transfer activities related to the development of Taxol. In the case of Taxol, NIH’s ability to exercise its authority was limited because it did not have a patent on paclitaxel and because its evaluation found that there was a shortage of available, qualified alternative CRADA partners. With regard to the license negotiations on the inventions resulting from the CRADA, the setting of royalties was affected by the criteria that both NIH and BMS used to help guide royalty negotiations. NIH’s goals in the technology transfer process emphasize public health benefits over financial considerations. NIH made a substantial investment in the development of Taxol. Agency and Bristol- Myers Squibb Company Comments and Our Evaluation
We provided a draft of this report to NIH and BMS for their review. In its comments, NIH provided us with additional information about its expenditures related to the 1991 NIH-BMS CRADA and BMS’s contributions to NIH research under the CRADA, and also presented the reasons that it did not patent paclitaxel. NIH begins to receive royalty payments from BMS. | Why GAO Did This Study
The transfer of technology from government-funded medical research laboratories to the private sector aims to have new pharmaceuticals brought to market more efficiently than would be possible for a federal agency acting alone. Much of the pharmaceutical-related technology transfer originates with research funded by the National Institutes of Health (NIH). GAO was asked to examine the legal and financial issues involved in technology transfers as illustrated by the research, development, and commercialization of Taxol. Taxol was developed through a cooperative research and development agreement (CRADA) between NIH and the Bristol-Meyers Squibb Company (BMS) and by 2001 had become the best-selling cancer drug in history. Specifically, GAO examined (1) how the technology transfer partnership affected the research and development of Taxol, (2) what NIH's financial investment was in Taxol-related research, and what the financial outcomes were of the technology transfer process related to Taxol, and (3) what factors influenced how NIH exercised its authority in Taxol-related technology transfer activities. GAO reviewed relevant materials and statutes governing technology transfer, reviewed the patent history of Taxol, interviewed NIH and BMS officials, and reviewed data on NIH's financial investment and drug pricing policies.
What GAO Found
The 1991 HIH-BMS CRADA was one of the first CRADAs to result in a major breakthrough drug. NIH's partnership with BMS provided the company with the research results that enabled Taxol to be commercialized quickly and made available as a treatment for cancer patients. Prior to the CRADA and during the first 2 years of the agreement, NIH conducted most of the clinical trials associated with the drug. The results of these trials were critical for BMS to secure FDA's approval in 1992 to market Taxol for the treatment of advanced ovarian cancer. As agreed in the CRADA, BMS supplied the drug to NIH researchers to overcome previous shortages. The additional supplies from BMS allowed NIH to increase the number of patients enrolled in NIH clinical trials for this drug from 500 patients by 1989 to nearly 29,000 patients over the course of the CRADA. NIH made substantial investments in the research related to Taxol, but its financial benefits from the collaboration with BMS have not been great in comparison to BMS's revenue from the drug. NIH estimates that it spent $183 million on all Taxol-related research from 1977 through the end of the CRADA's term in 1997. For one portion of its spending, NIH estimates that it spent $96 million to conduct clinical trials supporting the CRADA; this was offset by a $16 million payment from BMS. In addition, BMS supplied Taxol to NIH, the value of which GAO estimates to be $92 million. NIH spent an additional $301 million on Taxol-related research from 1998 through 2002, some of which was for cancer research, making NIH's total Taxol-related spending $484 million through 2002. BMS's sales of Taxol totaled over $9 billion from 1993 through 2002. BMS agreed to pay NIH royalties at a rate equal to 0.5 percent of worldwide sales of Taxol as part of a 1996 agreement to license three NIH Taxol-related inventions developed during the CRADA. Royalty payments to NIH have totaled $35 million. The federal government has been a major payer for Taxol, primarily through Medicare. For example, Medicare payments for Taxol totaled $687 million from 1994 through 1999. Several factors affected NIH's exercise of its broad authority in negotiating its Taxol-related technology transfer activities. First, NIH did not have a patent on Taxol and thus could not grant an exclusive patent license to a CRADA partner. Second, in NIH's evaluation, it was limited by a shortage of available, qualified alternative partners. Finally, the negotiation of royalties for NIH's Taxol-related inventions was affected by multiple considerations, including the priorities that both NIH and BMS assigned to different factors in the setting of royalties. These factors include the stage of development, the potential market value of the license, and the contribution to public health of making the product available. In commenting on a draft of this report, NIH provided additional information about its expenditures and the contributions of BMS, which GAO incorporated, and also discussed its evaluation of whether BMS's pricing of Taxol was reasonable. |
gao_GAO-06-184 | gao_GAO-06-184_0 | Developing an enterprise architecture, establishing IT investment management policies, and addressing information security weaknesses are critical to ensuring successful system implementation. The predictable result of not effectively addressing these three areas has been numerous agency systems throughout the federal government that did not meet their cost, schedule, and performance objectives. Disciplined Processes Have Not Been Fully Used
From our review of over 40 prior reports, we identified a number of key problem areas in disciplined processes related to requirements management, testing, data conversion and system interfaces, risk management, and project management activities. Human Capital Management Problems Impede Financial Systems Development and Deployment
Effective human capital management is critical to the success of systems implementations. Federal Initiatives Under Way to Improve System Implementations
As the federal organization with key responsibility for federal financial management systems, OMB has undertaken a number of initiatives related to acquiring and implementing financial management system capabilities. Some of these initiatives are in collaboration with the CIO and CFO Councils and are broad-based attempts to reform financial management operations across the federal government. Notably, OMB has developed and continues to evolve governmentwide Federal Enterprise Architecture products and has required a mapping of agency architectures to this federal architecture as part of the budget review process. Another key OMB initiative is referred to as the lines of business and promotes streamlining common systems to enhance the government’s performance and services, such as establishing centers of excellence to consolidate financial management activities for major agencies through cross-servicing arrangements. Furthermore, certain activities and responsibilities performed by JFMIP prior to its termination have been reassigned to OMB’s OFFM, the Financial Systems Integration Office, and a CFO Council Committee providing guidance and oversight. The financial management line of business raises a number of issues that have far- reaching implications for the government and private sector application service providers. Broad-Based Actions Needed to Implement Financial Management Systems Governmentwide
The key for federal agencies to avoid the long-standing problems that have plagued financial management system improvement efforts is to address the foremost causes of those problems and adopt solutions that reduce the risks associated with these efforts to acceptable levels. Although OMB has articulated an approach for reforming financial management systems governmentwide under its financial management line of business and JFMIP realignment initiatives, implementing these initiatives will be complex and challenging. OMB has correctly recognized that enhancing the government’s ability to implement financial management systems that are capable of providing accurate, reliable, and timely information on the results of operations needs to be addressed as a governmentwide solution, rather than as individual agency stove-piped efforts designed to meet a given entity’s needs. Based on industry best practices, the following four concepts would help ensure a sound foundation for developing and implementing a governmentwide solution for long-standing financial management system implementation failures: (1) developing a concept of operations that ties in other systems, (2) defining standard business processes, (3) developing a strategy for ensuring that agencies are migrated to a limited number of application service providers, and (4) defining and effectively implementing applicable disciplined processes. We also interviewed key Office of Management and Budget (OMB) officials and had discussions with other interested parties such as Chief Financial Officers (CFO) Council representatives. To provide our views on actions that can be taken to help improve the management and control of agency financial management system modernization efforts, we analyzed the GAO and IG reports we had identified as relevant to the topic to highlight the actions called for in those reports. Implementing a New Financial Management System. 2. Human Capital: Key Principles for Effective Strategic Workforce Planning. | Why GAO Did This Study
Billions of dollars have been spent governmentwide to modernize financial management systems that have often exceeded budgeted cost, resulted in delays in delivery dates and did not provide the anticipated system functionality when implemented. GAO was asked to identify (1) the key causes for financial management system implementation failures, and (2) the significant governmentwide initiatives currently under way that are intended to address the key causes of financial management system implementation failures. GAO was also asked to provide its views on actions that can be taken to help improve the management and control of agency financial management system modernization efforts.
What GAO Found
GAO's work has linked financial management system implementation failures to three recurring themes: (1) disciplined processes, (2) human capital management, and (3) other information technology (IT) management practices. The predictable result of not effectively addressing these three areas has been numerous agency systems throughout the federal government that did not meet their cost, schedule, and performance objectives. Problems related to disciplined processes included requirements management, testing, data conversion and system interfaces, and risk and project management. Human capital management issues included strategic workforce planning, human resources, and change management. Other areas of IT management identified as problems included enterprise architecture, investment management, and information security. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has undertaken a number of initiatives to reduce the risks associated with acquiring and implementing financial management systems and addressing long-standing financial management problems. Some of these initiatives are in collaboration with others and are broad-based attempts to reform financial management operations governmentwide. First, OMB has developed and continues to evolve Federal Enterprise Architecture products and has required a mapping of agency architectures to this federal architecture. Another key OMB initiative is referred to as the financial management line of business which established centers of excellence to consolidate financial management activities for major agencies through cross-servicing arrangements. Finally, certain financial management activities and responsibilities have been reassigned to OMB, the Financial Systems Integration Office, and a Chief Financial Officers Council Committee. OMB's initiatives for reforming financial management systems governmentwide could help address the key causes of system implementation failures, but further actions are needed to fully define and implement the processes necessary to successfully complete these initiatives. OMB has correctly recognized the need to implement financial management systems as a governmentwide solution, rather than individual agency stove-piped efforts designed to meet a given entity's needs. Based on industry best practices, GAO believes that four concepts are integral to OMB's approach and key to successfully implementing financial management systems: a concept of operations provides the foundation, standard business processes promote consistency, a strategy for implementing the financial management line of business, and disciplined processes to help ensure successful implementations. GAO recognizes that implementing these concepts is a complex undertaking and raises a number of issues that have far-reaching implications for the government and private sector application service providers. |
gao_GAO-13-352 | gao_GAO-13-352_0 | As shown in table 1, these components and offices have a variety of roles in supporting border security efforts on Indian reservations. DHS Is Coordinating with Tribes on Border Security, but Could Strengthen Efforts by Establishing Agreements and Oversight
DHS and Tribes Use a Variety of Methods to Coordinate on Border Security and Report Positive Aspects of This Coordination
The Border Patrol is coordinating and sharing information with tribes in a number of ways to address border security issues. The Border Patrol and six tribes reported using one or more of the following coordination methods: Operation Stonegarden—a DHS grant program intended to enhance coordination among local, tribal, territorial, state, and federal law enforcement agencies in securing United States borders—task forces such as BESTs and IBETs, fusion centers, tribal and public land liaisons, and joint operations and shared facilities to coordinate on border security. Specifically, officials from five of the eight tribes we reviewed reported coordination challenges related to not receiving notification and information from federal agencies, including the Border Patrol, regarding federal law enforcement activity on their respective reservations. Both Border Patrol and tribal officials reported that a written government- to-government agreement could benefit their border security coordination. The Tribal Desk, which is responsible for coordinating tribal consultation and outreach with the component liaisons, holds monthly teleconferences with these liaisons to discuss tribal issues and programs, according to IGA and Tribal Desk officials. Such monitoring should be performed continually; ingrained in the agency’s operations; and clearly documented in directives, policies, or manuals to help ensure operations are carried out as intended. Additionally, DHS officials reported that they did not establish an advisory council because of personnel limitations, among other issues. Further, such a mechanism could help DHS enhance its awareness of and accountability for components’ border security coordination efforts with the tribes and better look across the department to determine the progress being made and the improvements needed to more effectively coordinate border security with the tribes. Government-to-government agreements with tribes to address specific challenges, such as federal agency notification to tribes of law enforcement actions occurring on the reservation, that have emerged between the Border Patrol and individual tribes could help better position the Border Patrol and the tribes to resolve their coordination challenges and better work together to secure the border. Recommendations for Executive Action
To enhance DHS-tribal coordination on border security on Indian reservations, including DHS’s monitoring and oversight of these coordination efforts, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security take the following two actions: examine, or direct CBP to examine, as appropriate, the potential benefits of government-to-government written agreements with tribes facing border security threats, and develop and implement a mechanism to monitor DHS’s department- wide border security coordination efforts with tribes. DOJ and DOI did not provide written comments to include in this report. Regarding the second recommendation, that DHS develop and implement a mechanism to monitor DHS’s department-wide border security coordination with tribes, DHS concurred. | Why GAO Did This Study
Individuals seeking to enter the United States illegally may attempt to avoid screening procedures at ports of entry by crossing the border in areas between these ports, including Indian reservations, many of which have been vulnerable to illicit cross-border threat activity, such as drug smuggling, according to DHS. GAO was asked to review DHS's efforts to coordinate border security activities on Indian reservations. This report examines DHS's efforts to coordinate with tribal governments to address border security threats and vulnerabilities on Indian reservations. GAO interviewed DHS officials at headquarters and conducted interviews with eight tribes, selected based on factors such as proximity to the border, and the corresponding DHS field offices that have a role in border security for these Indian reservations. While GAO cannot generalize its results from these interviews to all Indian reservations and field offices along the border, they provide examples of border security coordination issues. This is a public version of a sensitive report that GAO issued in December 2012. Information that DHS, the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Department of the Interior (DOI) deemed sensitive has been redacted.
What GAO Found
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is coordinating in a variety of ways with tribes, such as through joint operations and shared facilities and Operation Stonegarden--a DHS grant program intended to enhance coordination among local, tribal, territorial, state, and federal law enforcement agencies in securing United States borders. However, the Border Patrol and tribes face coordination challenges. Officials from five tribes reported information-sharing challenges with the Border Patrol, such as not receiving notification of federal activity on their lands. Border Patrol officials reported challenges navigating tribal rules and decisions. Border Patrol and DHS have existing agreements with some, but not all, tribes to address specific border security issues, such as for the establishment of a law enforcement center on tribal lands. These agreements could serve as models for developing additional agreements between the Border Patrol and other tribes on their specific border security coordination challenges. Written government-to-government agreements could assist Border Patrol and tribal officials with enhancing their coordination, consistent with practices for sustaining effective coordination. DHS established an office to coordinate the components' tribal outreach efforts, which has taken actions such as monthly teleconferences with DHS tribal liaisons to discuss tribal issues and programs, but does not have a mechanism for monitoring and overseeing outreach efforts, consistent with internal control standards. Such monitoring should be performed continually; ingrained in the agency's operations; and clearly documented in directives, policies, or manuals to help ensure operations are carried out as intended. Implementing an oversight mechanism could help enhance DHS's department-wide awareness of and accountability for border security coordination efforts with the tribes while identifying those areas that work well and any needing improvement.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DHS examine the benefits of government-to-government agreements with tribes and develop and implement a mechanism to monitor border security coordination efforts with tribes. DHS concurred with our recommendations. |
gao_GAO-03-583 | gao_GAO-03-583_0 | NNSA provided the Congress with supplementary information in its fiscal year 2003 budget request that attempted to capture the budget for the Stockpile Life Extension Program; however, this information was not comprehensive because it did not include the budget for activities necessary to successfully complete the life extension efforts. NNSA Does Not Have a System for Tracking Refurbishment Costs by Weapon System
Once a budget is established, having reliable information on the cost of federal programs is crucial to the effective management of government operations. As a result, even if NNSA required contractors to report the full cost of individual refurbishments, some differences in the data, which reflects the contractor’s different organizations and operations, would still exist. As a result, NNSA has repeatedly attempted to improve program and project management. However, NNSA has not taken a consistent position on prioritizing the life extensions. Specifically, NNSA has not (1) defined the life extensions as projects and managed them accordingly, (2) clearly defined the roles and responsibilities of those officials associated with the Stockpile Life Extension Program, (3) provided program managers with sufficient authority to carry out the refurbishments, or (4) given program and deputy program managers proper project/program management training. For instance, one program manager said he has neither the control nor the authority associated with his refurbishment. With respect to the Stockpile Life Extension Program, NNSA does not have an adequate process for reporting life extension changes and progress, despite the fact that cost growth and schedule slippage are occurring. In addition, the refurbishment was within cost and within scope, but behind schedule. These officials recognized that certain cost growth and schedule changes had occurred for each of the refurbishments. As a result, NNSA was rebaselining the W-80 refurbishment. Unfortunately, NNSA has not developed performance measures with sufficient specificity to determine the progress of the three refurbishments that we reviewed. It will demand a budget of hundreds of millions of dollars annually for the next decade. Likewise, all parties involved in the oversight of the Stockpile Life Extension Program must be able to determine the true cost to complete the life extensions throughout the refurbishment process, identify cost overruns as they develop, and decide when intervention in those cost overruns is necessary. This cannot occur without sound cost accounting. To improve the management of the Stockpile Life Extension Program, we recommend that the Secretary of Energy direct the NNSA Administrator to: finalize the Office of Defense Programs’ integrated program plan and, within that plan, rank the Stockpile Life Extension Program against all other defense program priorities, establish the relative priority among the individual life extension refurbishments, and disseminate the ranking across the nuclear weapons complex so that those within that complex know the priority of the refurbishment work; develop a formalized process for identifying resource and schedule conflicts between the individual life extension efforts and resolve those conflicts in a timely and systematic manner; and finalize individual refurbishment project plans. | Why GAO Did This Study
As a separately organized agency within the Department of Energy (DOE), the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) administers the Stockpile Life Extension Program, whose purpose is to extend, through refurbishment, the operational lives of the weapons in the nuclear stockpile. NNSA encountered significant management problems with its first refurbishment. NNSA has begun three additional life extensions. This study was undertaken to determine the extent to which budgetary, cost accounting, and other management issues that contributed to problems with the first refurbishment have been adequately addressed.
What GAO Found
GAO found that NNSA's budget for the Stockpile Life Extension Program has not been comprehensive or reliable. For instance, the fiscal year 2003 budget for this program was not comprehensive because it did not include all activities necessary to successfully complete each of the refurbishments. As a result, neither NNSA nor the Congress was in a position to properly evaluate the budgetary tradeoffs among the refurbishments in the program. NNSA does not have a system for tracking the full costs associated with the individual refurbishments. Instead, NNSA has several mechanisms that track a portion of the refurbishment costs, but these mechanisms are used for different purposes, include different types of costs, and cannot be reconciled with one another. As a result, NNSA lacks information regarding the full cost of the refurbishment work that can help identify cost problems as they develop or when management intervention in those cost problems may be necessary. Finally, NNSA does not have an adequate planning, organization, and cost and schedule oversight process. With respect to planning, NNSA has not, for instance, consistently developed a formalized list of resource and schedule conflicts between the individual refurbishments in order to systematically resolve those conflicts. Regarding organization, NNSA has not, for example, clearly defined the roles and responsibilities of those officials associated with the refurbishments or given the refurbishments' managers proper project/program management training required by DOE standards. Finally, NNSA has not developed an adequate process for reporting cost and schedule changes or developed performance measures with sufficient specificity to determine the progress of the three refurbishments that GAO reviewed. As a result, NNSA lacks the means to help ensure that the refurbishments will not experience cost overruns potentially amounting to hundreds of millions of dollars or encounter significant schedule delays. |
gao_PEMD-95-202 | gao_PEMD-95-202_0 | 1). Successful Programs Had Attendance Monitoring and Follow-Up in Common
All five program evaluations provided outcome data on secondary education completion. Additional Approaches to Helping Teenage Mothers
In addition to the approaches taken in the programs included in our evaluation synthesis, the programs we visited provided examples of innovative approaches to helping teenage mothers complete their high school education that are quite different from those evaluated. Alternative Schools Bridge Student and Parent Roles
Alternative schools provide an opportunity for teenage mothers to continue their education in a setting that also actively supports their role as a parent. A Few Programs Monitored Education of All Teenage AFDC Recipients
Only three of the city welfare offices we interviewed routinely monitored the school attendance of teenage mothers who were still attending high school when they applied for AFDC. Conclusions
A variety of local programs aim to help teenage mothers avoid welfare dependence through completing their secondary education. Finally, assistance in meeting their child care and transportation needs may be particularly helpful but did not appear to be sufficient, without attendance monitoring, to enable these young mothers to complete their secondary education. 12-21. Families on Welfare: Teenage Mothers Least Likely to Become Self-Sufficient (GAO/HEHS-94-115, May 31, 1994). A recorded menu will provide information on how to obtain these lists. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on local programs that help teenage mothers complete their secondary education as a step toward self-sufficiency.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) communities have responded to the growth of unwed teenage mothers by creating programs to help them achieve economic self-sufficiency by completing their secondary education; (2) three of the five programs studied increased secondary education completion by actively monitoring school attendance and providing access to child care and transportation; (3) innovative approaches to help teenage mothers complete high school included alternative public schools for pregnant and parenting students, residential facilities for homeless teenage mothers on welfare, and home visiting; (4) all of the 15 cities surveyed required teenage mothers on welfare to continue their secondary education, but 12 of the cities did not monitor the teenage mothers' attendance; and (5) states use of these successful approaches will depend on Congress' decision on whether welfare benefits should be provided to teenage mothers. |
gao_GAO-16-602 | gao_GAO-16-602_0 | According to OMB, USDS’s mission is to transform the most important public-facing digital services. 18F and USDS Provided a Variety of Development and Consulting Services Supporting Agency Technology Efforts and Agencies Were Generally Satisfied with the Programs
18F and USDS have provided a variety of development and consulting services to agencies to support their technology efforts. Of the 32 18F projects, 6 are associated with major IT investments. Quality assurance. Problem identification and recommendations. Website consultation. Software engineering. In addition to providing services to agencies, USDS has developed products to help agencies improve federal IT services. A Majority of Surveyed Agency Project Managers Were Satisfied with Services Provided by 18F and USDS
In response to a satisfaction survey we administered to agency managers of selected 18F and USDS projects, a majority of managers were satisfied with the services they received from the groups. However, not all of its goals are outcome-oriented and it has not yet measured program performance. 18F has largely implemented its procedures. Further, USDS has only measured actual results for one of its goals. Until USDS ensures that all of its goals are outcome- oriented and establishes performance measures and targets for each goal, it will be difficult to hold the program accountable for results. Agencies Have Begun to Establish Digital Service Teams, but OMB Has Not Taken Steps to Ensure CIO Coordination
To help agencies effectively deliver digital services, the President’s Budget for fiscal year 2016 proposed funding for digital service teams at 25 agencies—the 24 Chief Financial Officers Act agencies, as well as the National Archives and Records Administration. Of the 25 agencies included in the President’s budget proposal to establish teams, OMB has established charters with 6 agencies for their digital service teams—the Departments of Defense, Health and Human Services, Homeland Security, the Treasury, State, and Veterans Affairs. In addition, according to the Deputy USDS Administrator, USDS expects to establish charters with an additional 2 agencies by the end of the fiscal year—the Department of Education and the Small Business Administration. For the remaining 16 agencies, as of April 2016, 8 agencies reported that they plan to establish digital service teams but have yet to establish charters with USDS—the Department of Housing and Urban Development, Environmental Protection Agency, General Services Administration, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, National Archives and Records Administration, National Science Foundation, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and Office of Personnel Management. Of the other 9 agencies, 8 reported that they do not plan to establish digital service teams by September 2016 because they did not receive requested funding—the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Energy, the Interior, Justice, Labor, and Transportation; and the U.S. Agency for International Development. Table 7 summarizes agency and OMB efforts to establish digital service teams. The lack of defined relationships is due, in large part, to the fact that USDS policy on digital service teams does not describe the expected relationship between agency CIOs and these teams. To their credit, both 18F and USDS have developed several outcome- orientated goals and procedures for prioritizing projects. To effectively measure performance, prioritize USDS’s resources, and ensure that CIOs play an integral role in agency digital service teams, we recommend that the Director of the Office of Management and Budget direct the Federal Chief Information Officer to take the following three actions: ensure that all goals and associated performance measures are outcome-oriented and that performance measures have targets; assess actual results for each performance measure; and update USDS policy to clearly define the responsibilities and authorities governing the relationships between CIOs and the digital service teams and require existing agency digital service teams to address this policy. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to (1) describe 18F and U.S. Digital Service (USDS) efforts to identify and address problems with information technology (IT) projects and agencies’ views of services provided, (2) assess these programs’ efforts against practices for performance measurement and project prioritization, and (3) assess agency plans to establish their own digital service teams. We also reviewed information obtained from 18F and USDS regarding key projects that did not have agency customers. Appendix II: Projects for which 18F and U.S. Digital Service Provided Assistance
Between March 2014 and August 2015, the General Services Administration’s (GSA) 18F staff helped 18 agencies with 32 projects, and generally provided services relating to its five business units: Custom Partner Solutions, Products and Platforms, Transformation Services, Acquisition Services, and Learn. In addition, 18F also provided Agency Digital Service Team Candidate Qualification Reviews. Between August 2014 and August 2015, USDS provided assistance on 13 projects across 11 agencies. | Why GAO Did This Study
In an effort to improve IT across the federal government, in March 2014 GSA established 18F, which provides IT services (e.g., develop websites) to agencies. In addition, in August 2014 the Administration established USDS, which aims to improve public-facing federal IT services. The President's Budget for fiscal year 2016 also proposed funding for agencies to establish their own digital service teams.
GAO was asked to review 18F and USDS. GAO's objectives were to (1) describe 18F and USDS efforts to address problems with IT projects and agencies' views of services provided, (2) assess these programs' efforts against practices for performance measurement and project prioritization, and (3) assess agency plans to establish their own digital service teams. To do so, GAO reviewed 32 18F projects and 13 USDS projects that were underway or completed as of August 2015 and surveyed agencies about these projects; reviewed 18F and USDS in key performance measurement and project prioritization practices; reviewed 25 agencies' efforts to establish digital service teams; and reviewed documentation from four agencies, which were chosen based on their progress made in establishing digital service teams.
What GAO Found
The General Service Administration's (GSA) 18F and Office of Management and Budget's (OMB) U.S. Digital Service (USDS) have provided a variety of services to agencies supporting their information technology (IT) efforts. Specifically, 18F staff helped 18 agencies with 32 projects and generally provided development and consulting services, including software development solutions and acquisition consulting. In addition, USDS provided assistance on 13 projects across 11 agencies and generally provided consulting services, including quality assurance, problem identification and recommendations, and software engineering. Further, according to GAO's survey, managers were generally satisfied with the services they received from 18F and USDS on these projects (see table).
Source: GAO survey of agency project managers that engaged with 18F and U.S. Digital Service. | GAO-16-602
Both 18F and USDS have partially implemented practices to identify and help agencies address problems with IT projects. Specifically, 18F has developed several outcome-oriented goals and related performance measures, as well as procedures for prioritizing projects; however, not all of its goals are outcome-oriented and it has not yet fully measured program performance. Similarly, USDS has developed goals, but they are not all outcome-oriented and it has established performance measures for only one of its goals. USDS has also measured progress for just one goal. Until 18F and USDS fully implement these practices, it will be difficult to hold the programs accountable for results.
Agencies are beginning to establish digital service teams. Of the 25 agencies included in the President's proposed funding for agency digital service teams, OMB has established charters with 6 agencies for their digital service teams. In addition, according to the Deputy USDS Administrator, USDS expects to establish charters with an additional 2 agencies by the end of the fiscal year—the Department of Education and the Small Business Administration. For the remaining 16 agencies, as of April 2016, 8 agencies reported that they plan to establish digital service teams but have yet to establish charters with USDS. The other 9 agencies reported that they do not plan to establish digital service teams by September 2016 and most noted that it was because they did not receive requested funding to do so. Further, of the 4 agencies GAO selected to review, only 1 has defined the relationship between its digital service team and the agency Chief Information Officer (CIO). This is due, in part, to the fact that USDS policy does not describe the expected relationship between CIOs and these teams. Until OMB updates its policy and ensures that the responsibilities between the CIOs and digital services teams are clearly defined, it is unclear whether CIOs will be able to fulfill their statutory responsibilities with respect to IT management of the projects undertaken by the digital service teams.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is making two recommendations to GSA and two recommendations to OMB to improve goals and performance measurement. GAO is also recommending that OMB update policy regarding CIOs and digital services teams. GSA and OMB concurred with the recommendations. |
gao_GAO-14-523 | gao_GAO-14-523_0 | CMS Financial Alignment Demonstration
In 2011, CMS announced a financial alignment demonstration that is intended to align Medicare and Medicaid services and funding to reduce costs and improve the quality of care for dual-eligible beneficiaries. Under the capitated model, CMS and states provide a single capitated payment to health plans to provide all Medicare and Medicaid benefits to enrolled dual-eligible beneficiaries. Overall Spending for High-Expenditure Disabled Dual-Eligible Beneficiaries Driven Largely by Medicaid Spending
Medicaid Spending— Particularly for Users of Community-based LTSS— Accounted for Nearly Two- Thirds of Overall Spending for High-Expenditure Beneficiaries
High Medicaid spending for disabled dual-eligible beneficiaries drove high combined (Medicare and Medicaid) program spending for these beneficiaries. 1.) Only 26 percent of high-expenditure beneficiaries were in both the top Medicare and the top Medicaid spending quintiles in their states. 2.) Service Use and Characteristics Differed Widely between High- Medicare-Expenditure and High-Medicaid- Expenditure Disabled Dual-Eligible Beneficiaries
Beneficiaries with High Medicare Expenditures Were More Likely to Use Inpatient Services; Beneficiaries with High Medicaid Expenditures Were More Likely to Use LTSS
The services most commonly used by disabled dual-eligible beneficiaries in the top Medicare-spending quintile and those in the top Medicaid- spending quintile often differed widely. Beneficiaries with High Medicare Expenditures Were Far More Likely than Those with High Medicaid Expenditures to Have Multiple Health Conditions
Disabled dual-eligible beneficiaries with high Medicare expenditures were considerably more likely than beneficiaries with high Medicaid expenditures to have multiple chronic or mental health conditions. The presence of multiple health conditions may drive the use of costly Medicare services among beneficiaries with high Medicare expenditures. Fully Integrated D-SNPs Often Provided High Quality Care, but Had Limited Experience Serving Disabled Dual-Eligible Beneficiaries or Demonstrating Medicare Savings
Fully Integrated D-SNPs Often Met Criteria for High Quality, but Relatively Few of Those Plans Served Disabled Dual-Eligible Beneficiaries
FIDE-SNPs in 2013 were far more likely than other D-SNPs to meet criteria for high quality. The 14 high quality FIDE-SNPs operated across four states under programs through which all D-SNPs fully integrated Medicare and Medicaid benefits. Relatively Few High Quality FIDE-SNPs Showed Potential for Medicare Savings, Regardless of Whether They Served Disabled Dual-Eligible Beneficiaries
Only 8 of the 35 FIDE-SNPs—and 3 of the 14 with high quality—bid below Medicare FFS spending in 2013, an indication that these plans can provide standard Medicare Part A and B benefits at a lower cost than what Medicare would have likely spent for these beneficiaries in FFS. Moderately Better Health Outcomes for Disabled Dual-Eligible Beneficiaries in D-SNPs Relative to Those in Traditional MA Plans Did Not Translate into Lower Levels of Costly Medicare Services
D-SNPs’ performance for disabled dual-eligible beneficiaries relative to traditional MA plans’ was similar on average for process measures, but was moderately better on health outcome measures. Concluding Observations
These results suggest that CMS’s expectations regarding the extent to which integration of benefits will produce savings through lower use of costly Medicare services may be optimistic. In addition, many fully integrated D-SNPs that demonstrated the potential for Medicare savings operated in service areas where D-SNPs with less integration of benefits demonstrated more potential for Medicare savings. Despite moderately better performance on health outcome measures for both disabled and aged dual-eligible beneficiaries, the fact that D-SNPs had similar levels of costly Medicare-covered services (i.e., inpatient admissions, readmissions, and emergency room visits) as traditional MA plans for this population has significant implications for program costs. The agency provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 2009, the Medicare and Medicaid programs spent an estimated $103 billion on disabled dual-eligible beneficiaries—those individuals who are disabled, under age 65, and qualify for both Medicare and Medicaid benefits. Recently, Congress and CMS have emphasized benefit integration for all dual-eligible beneficiaries—both disabled and aged—including beginning a financial alignment demonstration, which CMS expects will improve care and reduce program spending.
GAO was asked to provide insights for potentially improving the care provided to disabled dual-eligible beneficiaries while reducing spending. GAO examined (1) spending, utilization, and health status patterns for the portion of this population with the highest spending, (2) the extent to which integrated D-SNPs provided high quality of care for this population while controlling Medicare spending, and (3) D-SNPs' and traditional MA plans' performance in serving this population based on quality and resource use measures.
To do this work, GAO analyzed Medicare and Medicaid 2009 claims and summary data—the most recent data available. GAO identified D-SNPs that met standards of quality and integration and compared their 2013 costs to expected Medicare FFS spending. GAO used 2011 data—the most recent data available when GAO began its analysis—from the Health Care Effectiveness Data and Information Set to evaluate D-SNPs' and traditional MA plans' performance.
What GAO Found
Overall spending for high-expenditure disabled dual-eligible beneficiaries—those in the top 20 percent of spending in their respective states—was driven largely by Medicaid spending, and the service use and health status often differed widely between those with high Medicare expenditures and high Medicaid expenditures. For these beneficiaries, Medicaid expenditures accounted for nearly two-thirds of overall spending. Also, states with high Medicaid spending often had lower Medicare spending but nearly always had greater overall spending for these beneficiaries. Furthermore, service use and health status often differed widely between high-Medicare-expenditure and high-Medicaid-expenditure disabled dual-eligible beneficiaries. Those with high Medicare expenditures were considerably more likely than those with high Medicaid expenditures to have multiple health conditions and use inpatient services but far less likely to use long-term services and supports.
Dual-eligible special needs plans (D-SNP)—Medicare Advantage (MA) private plans designed to target the needs of dual-eligible beneficiaries—that fully integrated Medicare and Medicaid benefits often met criteria for high quality but had limited experience serving disabled dual-eligible beneficiaries or demonstrating Medicare savings. D-SNPs that the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS)—the agency that administers Medicare and oversees Medicaid—designated as Fully Integrated Dual-Eligible (FIDE) SNPs were far more likely to meet high quality criteria compared with other D-SNPs. However, relatively few FIDE-SNPs with high quality served disabled dual-eligible beneficiaries or reported lower costs for Medicare services than expected Medicare fee-for-service (FFS) spending in the same areas. Additionally, FIDE-SNPs that demonstrated the potential for Medicare savings often operated in service areas where D-SNPs with less integration of Medicaid benefits demonstrated more potential for Medicare savings (i.e., lower relative costs for Medicare services).
Moderately better health outcomes for disabled dual-eligible beneficiaries in D-SNPs relative to those in traditional MA plans did not translate into lower levels of costly Medicare services (that is, inpatient stays, readmissions, and emergency room visits). These results were also similar whether dual-eligible beneficiaries were at risk for high Medicare spending (those with six or more chronic health conditions), aged (those age 65 and over), or aged and enrolled in FIDE-SNPs.
These results suggest that CMS's expectations regarding the extent to which integration of benefits will produce savings through lower use of costly Medicare services may be optimistic. While operating specialized plans and integrating benefits could lead to improved care, GAO's results suggest that these conditions may not reduce dual-eligible beneficiaries' Medicare spending compared with Medicare spending in settings without integrated benefits.
CMS reviewed a draft of the report and provided technical comments, which GAO incorporated as appropriate. |
gao_GAO-07-1099T | gao_GAO-07-1099T_0 | NOAA’s National Environmental Satellite Data and Information Service (NESDIS) is responsible for managing the existing civilian geostationary and polar-orbiting satellite systems as two separate programs, called the Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellites and the Polar Operational Environmental Satellites (POES), respectively. Polar-orbiting environmental satellites obtain environmental data that are processed to provide graphical weather images and specialized weather products. NPOESS is a major system acquisition that was originally estimated to cost about $6.5 billion over the 24-year life of the program from its inception in 1995 through 2018. The program was to provide satellite development, satellite launch and operation, and ground- based satellite data processing. NPOESS Experienced Cost Increases, Schedule Delays, and Technical Problems over Several Years Over the last few years, NPOESS experienced continued cost increases and schedule delays, requiring difficult decisions to be made about the program’s direction and capabilities. NPOESS Acquisition Restructuring Is Well Under Way, but Key Steps Remain To Be Completed
Since the June 2006 decision to revise the scope, cost, and schedule of the NPOESS program, the program office has made progress in restructuring the satellite acquisition; however, important tasks remain to be done. Although the NPOESS program has made progress in establishing an effective management structure, this progress is currently at risk. Four sensors are of critical importance—VIIRS, CrIS, OMPS, and ATMS— because they are to be launched on the NPP satellite in September 2009. The GOES-R Series Procurement Activities Are Under Way, but System Requirements and Cost Estimates May Change
NOAA is nearing the end of the preliminary design phase of its GOES-R system, which was initially estimated to cost $6.2 billion and scheduled to have the first satellite ready for launch in 2012. At the time of our most recent review in September 2006, NOAA had issued contracts for the preliminary design of the overall GOES-R system to three vendors and expected to award a contract to one of these vendors in August 2007 to develop the satellites. However, analyses of the GOES-R program cost—which in May 2006 the program office estimated could reach $11.4 billion—led the agency to consider reducing the scope of requirements for the satellite series. In September 2006, NOAA officials reported that the agency had made a decision to reduce the scope and complexity of the GOES-R program by reducing the number of satellites from 4 to 2 and canceling a technically complex instrument—called the Hyperspectral Environmental Suite. We have work under way to evaluate these changes. Steps Taken to Reduce GOES-R Risk, More Work Remains
NOAA has taken steps to implement lessons learned from past satellite programs, but more remains to be done. In summary, both the NPOESS and GOES-R programs are critical to developing weather forecasts, issuing severe weather warnings for events such as hurricanes, and maintaining continuity in environmental and climate monitoring. | Why GAO Did This Study
Environmental satellites provide data and imagery that are used by weather forecasters, climatologists, and the military to map and monitor changes in weather (including severe weather such as hurricanes), climate, the oceans, and the environment. Two current acquisitions are the $12.5 billion National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS) program--which is to replace two existing polar-orbiting environmental satellite systems--and the planned $7 billion Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellites-R (GOES-R) program, which is to replace the current series of satellites due to reach end of their useful lives in approximately 2012. GAO was asked to summarize its past work on the progress and challenges facing these key environmental satellite acquisitions.
What GAO Found
Both the NPOESS and GOES-R satellite acquisitions are costly, technically complex, and critically important to weather forecasting and climate monitoring. NPOESS was originally estimated to cost about $6.5 billion over the 24-year life of the program, with its first satellite launch planned for April 2009. Over the last few years, NPOESS experienced escalating costs, schedule delays, and technical difficulties. These factors led to a June 2006 decision to restructure the program thereby decreasing the program's complexity by reducing the number of sensors and satellites, increasing its estimated cost to $12.5 billion, and delaying the launches of the first two satellites to 2013 and 2016. Since that time, the program office has made progress in restructuring the satellite acquisition and establishing an effective management structure; however, important tasks remain to be done and significant risks remain. The GOES-R acquisition, originally estimated to cost $6.2 billion and scheduled to have the first satellite ready for launch in 2012, is at a much earlier stage in its life cycle than NPOESS. In September 2006, GAO reported that the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) had issued contracts for the preliminary design of the overall GOES-R system to three vendors and expected to award a contract to one of these vendors in August 2007 to develop the satellites. However, analyses of GOES-R cost--which in May 2006 was estimated to reach $11.4 billion--led the agency, in September 2006, to reduce the program's scope from four to two satellites and to discontinue one of the critical sensors. Program officials now report that they are reevaluating that decision and may further revise the scope and requirements of the program in coming months. GAO also reported that NOAA had taken steps to implement lessons learned from past satellite programs, but more remained to be done to ensure sound cost estimates and adequate system engineering capabilities. GAO currently has work under way to evaluate GOES-R risks and challenges. |
gao_GAO-04-550T | gao_GAO-04-550T_0 | The goal of PART is to evaluate programs systematically, consistently, and transparently. OMB went to great lengths to encourage consistent application of PART in the evaluation of government programs, including pilot testing the instrument, issuing detailed guidance, and conducting consistency reviews. Although there is undoubtedly room for continued improvement, any tool is inherently limited in providing a single performance answer or judgment on complex federal programs with multiple goals. Performance measurement challenges in evaluating complex federal programs make it difficult to meaningfully interpret a bottom-line rating. OMB published both a single, bottom-line rating for PART results and individual section scores. In a case like this, the individual section ratings provided a better understanding of areas needing improvement than the overall rating alone. Any tool that is sophisticated enough to take into account the complexity of the U.S. government will always require some interpretation and judgment. Therefore it is not surprising that OMB staff were not fully consistent in interpreting complex questions about agency goals and results. The lack of program performance information also creates challenges in effectively assessing program performance. As a result, the goals and measures used in PART must meet OMB’s needs. Federal programs cannot be assessed in isolation. Targeting PART assessments based on such factors as the relative priorities, costs, and risks associated with related clusters of programs and activities addressing common strategic and performance goals not only could help ration scarce analytic resources but also could focus decision makers’ attention on the most pressing policy and program issues. The relationship between PART and its process and the broader GPRA strategic planning process is still evolving. As part of the executive branch budget formulation process, PART must clearly serve the President’s interests. PART offers the potential to build on the infrastructure of performance plans and information ushered in by GPRA and the law’s intent to promote the use of these plans in resource allocation decision making. Continue to improve the PART guidance by (1) expanding the discussion of how the unit of analysis is to be determined to include trade-offs made when defining a unit of analysis, implications of how the unit of analysis is defined, or both; (2) clarifying when output versus outcome measures are acceptable; and (3) better defining an “independent, quality evaluation.”
Clarify OMB’s expectations to agencies regarding the allocation of scarce evaluation resources among programs, the timing of such evaluations, as well as the evaluation strategies it wants for PART, and consider using internal agency evaluations as evidence on a case-by-case basis—whether conducted by agencies, contractors, or other parties. Attempt to generate, early in the PART process, an ongoing, meaningful dialogue with congressional appropriations, authorization, and oversight committees about what they consider to be the most important performance issues and program areas that warrant review. GPRA’s strategic planning goals could be used to anchor the selection and review of programs by providing a foundation to assess the relative contribution of related programs and tools to broader performance goals and outcomes. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Office of Management and Budget's (OMB) Performance Assessment Rating Tool (PART) is meant to provide a consistent approach to evaluating federal programs during budget formulation. The subcommittee asked GAO to discuss its overall findings and recommendations concerning PART, based on a recent report, Performance Budgeting: Observations on the Use of OMB's Program Assessment Rating Tool for the Fiscal Year 2004 Budget (GAO-04-174).
What GAO Found
PART helped structure OMB's use of performance information for internal program and budget analysis and stimulated agency interest in budget and performance integration. Moreover, it illustrated the potential to build on GPRA's foundation to more actively promote the use of performance information in budget decisions. OMB deserves credit for inviting scrutiny of its federal program performance reviews and sharing them on its Web site. The goal of PART is to evaluate programs systematically, consistently, and transparently. OMB went to great lengths to encourage consistent application of PART in the evaluation of government programs, including pilot testing the instrument, issuing detailed guidance, and conducting consistency reviews. Although there is undoubtedly room for continued improvement, any tool is inherently limited in providing a single performance answer or judgment on complex federal programs with multiple goals. Performance measurement challenges in evaluating complex federal programs make it difficult to meaningfully interpret a single bottom-line rating. The individual section ratings for each PART review provided a better understanding of areas needing improvement than the overall rating alone. Moreover, any tool that is sophisticated enough to take into account the complexity of the U.S. government will always require some interpretation and judgment. Therefore it is not surprising that OMB staff were not fully consistent in interpreting complex questions about agency goals and results. The lack of program performance information at the agency level also creates challenges in effectively measuring program performance. PART provides an opportunity to consider strategically targeting the assessments on groups of related programs contributing to common outcomes to more efficiently use scarce analytic resources and focus decision makers' attention on the most pressing performance issues cutting across individual programs and agencies. The relationship between PART and the broader GPRA strategic planning process is still evolving and highlights the critical importance of defining the unit of analysis for program evaluation. Although PART can stimulate discussion on program-specific performance measurement issues, it is not a substitute for GPRA's strategic, longer-term focus on thematic goals, and department- and governmentwide crosscutting comparisons. PART clearly serves OMB's needs, but questions remain about whether it serves the various needs of other key stakeholders. If PART results are to be considered in the congressional debate, it will be important for OMB to (1) involve congressional stakeholders early in providing input on the focus of the assessments; (2) clarify any significant limitations in the assessments and underlying performance information; and (3) initiate discussions with key congressional committees about how they can best leverage PART information in congressional authorization, appropriations, and oversight processes. |
gao_RCED-95-125 | gao_RCED-95-125_0 | The Corps estimated that about 1,100 of the 1,358 nonfederal levees in the area covered by the five Corps districts involved in the 1993 flood failed to keep the flood out of the areas they were designed to protect or were otherwise damaged. Objectives, Scope and Methodology
The Ranking Minority Member of the Subcommittee on Water Resources and Environment, House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, and Representative William L. Clay of Missouri asked GAO to review the extent to which (1) the Corps’ flood control levees prevented flooding and reduced damage during the event; (2) these federal levees increased the height of the flooding and added to the damage; and (3) federal, state, and local governments exercise control over the design, construction, placement, and maintenance of nonfederal levees. Most Corps Levees Performed as Designed and Prevented Significant Damage
According to the Corps, 157 (81 percent) of the 193 Corps levees located in the area affected by the 1993 flood prevented rivers from severely flooding about 1 million acres. Another 32 Corps levees withstood flood flows until the water exceeded their design capacity and overtopped the levees. The Corps estimated that flooding at the 36 levees caused about $450 million in damage. Only four levees allowed floodwater to enter the protected floodplain before the levees were overtopped. This study found that the 1973 flow rate of about 851,100 cfs produced a flood elevation about 7.9 feet higher than it did during the base period. Local governments usually exercise control over nonfederal levees in response to requirements of the National Flood Insurance Program and state regulatory programs. Conclusions
While no comprehensive federal program regulates the design, placement, construction, or maintenance of nonfederal levees, control over nonfederal levees is exercised through various federal programs for regulating navigable waters and wetlands and for providing flood insurance and disaster and emergency assistance. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO examined the operations of levees involved in the 1993 Midwest flood, focusing on: (1) whether the Army Corps of Engineers' flood control levees prevented flooding and reduced damage or increased the flooding and added to the damage; and (2) the governments exercise control over the design, construction, placement, and maintenance of nonfederal levees.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) 157 of the 193 Army Corps of Engineers levees found in the areas affected by the 1993 flood prevented rivers from flooding and $7.4 billion in damages; (2) 32 of the Corps levees withstood floodwaters until the water rose above the levees and overtopped them; (3) 4 of the Corps levees allowed water into protected areas before their design capacity was exceeded; (4) the Corps estimated that the breaching of these levees caused about $450 million in damages; (5) although levees allow floodwater to rise higher than it normally would because they confine a flood to a portion of a floodplain, the Corps believe that its levees have the net effect of reducing flooding; (6) no federal programs specifically regulate the design, placement, construction, or maintenance of nonfederal levees, however, flood insurance and disaster assistance programs may exercise control over certain levees; and (7) 17 states and various local governments have programs to regulate levees, many of which are in response to the requirements of the National Flood Insurance Program. |
gao_GAO-16-453 | gao_GAO-16-453_0 | 1). A 2009 national security presidential directive reflects current U.S. Arctic policy and is key among U.S. policies. Additional White House national strategies and plans supplementing existing Arctic policy have been issued since the 2009 presidential directive on the Arctic region. The Coast Guard Is the Primary Federal Maritime Agency in the Arctic, but Multiple Stakeholders Have Arctic Responsibilities
Given the Arctic region’s extensive maritime domain, the Coast Guard plays a significant role in Arctic policy implementation and enforcement. State and local governments, Alaska Native tribal governments, Alaska Native corporations, and other Alaska Native entities, private industry, and nonprofit groups are also important Arctic stakeholders. The Coast Guard Reported Progress Implementing its Arctic Strategy
The Coast Guard has reported making progress implementing its Arctic strategy and addressing tasks in its implementation plan. The Coast Guard Has Assessed Its Arctic Capabilities and Taken Actions to Mitigate Gaps but Has Not Systematically Assessed its Progress
The Coast Guard Assessed Its Capabilities in the Arctic and Identified Capability Gaps
In addition to taking actions to implement its Arctic strategy, the Coast Guard assessed its capability to perform its missions in the Arctic and identified various capability gaps, primarily through two key studies. For example, Coast Guard officials stated that until national priorities are better articulated by the AESC, the Coast Guard will not be able to identify all of its Arctic requirements. The Coast Guard Has Taken Actions to Help Mitigate Capability Gaps but Has Not Systematically Assessed Its Progress in this Effort
The Coast Guard has worked with its Arctic partners—such as other federal agencies—to carry out actions to help mitigate Arctic capability gaps; however, it has not systematically assessed how its actions, across the agency, have helped to mitigate these gaps. However, while taking actions to help mitigate these capability gaps requires joint efforts among Arctic partners, the Coast Guard has taken actions in the Arctic that are specific to its missions and therefore has responsibility for assessing the extent to which its actions have helped to mitigate its part of these capability gaps. Coast Guard Has Been Unable to Fulfill All Polar Icebreaking Operations and Is Taking Steps to Begin Icebreaker Acquisition
The Coast Guard Has Been Unable to Reliably Fulfill Polar Icebreaking Responsibilities with Current Fleet
Various requirements drive the Coast Guard’s icebreaking mission responsibilities, and since 2010 the Coast Guard has been unable to fulfill some of these responsibilities. Specifically, the Coast Guard was unable to complete 5 out of 26 requests for polar icebreaking, including 4 out of 11 requests in 2011 and 2012 when both heavy icebreakers were unavailable. The Coast Guard Has Initiated an Icebreaker Acquisition Program and Is Considering Various Strategies
To maintain polar icebreaking capability after the Polar Star’s projected service life ends between 2020 and 2023, the Coast Guard initiated a program in 2013 to acquire a new heavy icebreaker and is currently working to determine the optimal acquisition strategy. Availability. The Coast Guard Is Developing a Bridging Strategy to Address Expected Heavy Icebreaker Service Gap
Anticipating a likely gap in heavy icebreaker capability between the end of the Polar Star’s service life and the deployment of a new icebreaker, the Coast Guard is developing a bridging strategy, as required by law, to determine how to address this expected gap. By systematically assessing and measuring how its actions have helped to mitigate capability gaps, the Coast Guard will better understand the status of these gaps and be better positioned to effectively plan its Arctic operations, including its allocation of resources and prioritization of activities to target the gaps. Recommendations for Executive Action
To better position the Coast Guard to effectively plan its Arctic operations, we recommend that the Commandant of the Coast Guard take the following two actions: develop measures, as appropriate, for gauging how the agency’s actions have helped to mitigate the Arctic capability gaps; and design and implement a process to systematically assess the extent to which actions taken agency-wide have helped mitigate the Arctic capability gaps for which it has responsibility. Other federal departments and agencies also have a role in U.S. Government efforts in the Arctic, but were not discussed in this report. | Why GAO Did This Study
The retreat of polar sea ice in the Arctic, as reported by the U.S. National Snow and Ice Data Center, combined with an expected increase in human activity, has heightened U.S. interests in the Arctic region. To supplement U.S. Arctic policy, the White House and federal agencies have issued Arctic strategies and plans. Since the Arctic region has a substantial maritime domain, the Coast Guard plays a significant role in Arctic policy implementation and enforcement. GAO was asked to examine the Coast Guard's responsibilities, capabilities, and plans for the Arctic. This report discusses, among other things, the extent to which the Coast Guard has (1) reported progress in implementing its Arctic strategy, (2) assessed its Arctic capabilities and taken actions to mitigate any identified gaps, and (3) reported being able to carry out polar icebreaking operations. GAO reviewed relevant laws and policies and Coast Guard documents that detail its Arctic plans. GAO conducted a site visit to Alaska and interviewed officials from the Coast Guard, state and local government entities, native village corporations, and private or nonprofit organizations. These observations are not generalizable, but provided insights on Coast Guard activities.
What GAO Found
The U.S. Coast Guard, within the Department of Homeland Security, reported making progress implementing its Arctic strategy . For example, the Coast Guard reported conducting exercises related to Arctic oil spill response and search and rescue, and facilitating the formation of a safety committee in the Arctic, among other tasks in its strategy. To track the status of these efforts, the Coast Guard is developing a web-based tool and anticipates finalizing the tool in mid-2016.
The Coast Guard assessed its capability to perform its Arctic missions and identified various capability gaps—including communications, infrastructure, and icebreaking, and has worked to mitigate these gaps with its Arctic partners, such as other federal agencies. Specifically, Coast Guard officials stated that the agency's actions to implement the various Arctic strategies and carry out annual Arctic operations have helped to mitigate Arctic capability gaps. However, the Coast Guard has not systematically assessed the extent to which its actions agency-wide have helped to mitigate these gaps. Coast Guard officials attributed this, in part, to not being able to unilaterally close the gaps. While mitigating these gaps requires joint efforts among Arctic partners, the Coast Guard has taken actions in the Arctic that are specific to its missions and therefore has responsibility for assessing the extent to which these actions have helped to mitigate capability gaps. By systematically assessing and measuring its progress, the Coast Guard will better understand the status of these gaps and be better positioned to effectively plan its Arctic operations.
The Coast Guard has been unable to fulfill some of its polar icebreaking responsibilities with its aging icebreaker fleet, which currently includes two active polar icebreakers. In 2011 and 2012, the Coast Guard was unable to maintain assured, year-round access to the Arctic and did not meet 4 of 11 requests for polar icebreaking services. With its one active heavy icebreaker—which has greater icebreaking capability—nearing the end of its service life, the Coast Guard initiated a program in 2013 to acquire a new one and is working to determine the optimal acquisition strategy. However, the Coast Guard's efforts to acquire an icebreaker, whether by lease or purchase, will be limited by legal and operational requirements. In addition, current projections show that the Coast Guard is likely to have a 3- to 6-year gap in its heavy icebreaking capability before a new icebreaker becomes operational, as shown below. The Coast Guard is developing a strategy to determine how to best address this expected gap.
Coast Guard's Heavy Icebreaker Availability and Expected Capability Gaps, Present until 2030
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the Coast Guard develop measures for assessing how its actions have helped to mitigate Arctic capability gaps, and design and implement a process to systematically assess its progress on this. DHS concurred with our recommendations. |
gao_GAO-16-547T | gao_GAO-16-547T_0 | The biodefense enterprise is the whole combination of systems at every level of government and the private sector that can contribute to protecting the nation and its citizens from potentially catastrophic effects of a biological event. It is composed of a complex collection of federal, state, local, tribal, territorial, and private resources, programs, and initiatives, designed for different purposes and dedicated to mitigating various risks, both natural and intentional. In an era of rapid transit and global trade, the public health and agricultural industries, as well as natural ecosystems including native plants and wildlife, face increased threats of naturally occurring outbreaks of infectious disease and accidental exposure to biological threats. Diseases among wildlife can also provide early warnings of environmental damage, bioterrorism, and other risks to human health. In 2014, a Blue Ribbon Study Panel on Biodefense (Study Panel) was established to assess gaps and provide recommendations to improve U.S. biodefense. The Biodefense Enterprise Is Fragmented and Does Not Have Strategic Oversight to Promote Efficiency and Accountability
The Biodefense Enterprise Does Not Have Enterprise-Wide Institutionalized Leadership to Provide Strategic Oversight and Coordination
In 2011, we reported that reducing fragmentation in the biodefense enterprise could enhance assurance that the nation is prepared to prevent, detect, and respond to biological attacks with potentially devastating consequences in terms of loss of life, economic damage, and decreased national security. We reported that there are more than two dozen presidentially appointed individuals with some responsibility for biodefense. However, there is no individual or entity with responsibility, authority, and accountability for overseeing the entire biodefense enterprise. Because none of the federal departments has authority over the entire biodefense enterprise, in 2011 we reported that the Homeland Security Council (HSC) should consider establishing a focal point to coordinate federal biodefense activities. In December 2014 officials from National Security Council (NSC) staff, which supports the HSC told us that two of its directorates work together as the focal point for federal biodefense efforts. We recognize the policy work of the directorates as an important step in promoting a comprehensive and coordinated approach to biodefense, but strategic leadership issues persist. The report called for a focal point to provide strategic leadership by elevating authority above what any single agency has to help overcome the challenges faced by the biodefense enterprise. However, the Study Panel found that White House councils and offices generally only become involved when a specific biodefense issue affects a prominent ongoing responsibility—a method which is not consistent with our call for a strategic approach. The Enterprise Does Not Have an Integrated National Strategy to Guide Priorities and Investments
In 2011, we reported that while some high-level biodefense strategies have been developed, there is no broad, integrated national strategy that encompasses all stakeholders with biodefense responsibilities that can be used to guide the systematic identification of risk; assess resources needed to address those risks; and prioritize and allocate investment across the entire biodefense enterprise. We reported that the overarching biodefense enterprise would benefit from strategic oversight mechanisms, including a national strategy, to ensure efficient, effective, and accountable results, and suggested the HSC take action. As of February 2016, NSC staff had not developed such a strategy. Biosurveillance Faces Similar Challenges
Much like biodefense, biosurveillance faces key challenges that transcend what any one agency can address on its own. Our findings have identified challenges at all levels of government, and our more recent and ongoing work continues to highlight these challenges. We recommended the HSC establish a focal point to lead the development of a national biosurveillance strategy that clarifies roles and responsibilities, provides goals and performance measures, and identifies resource and investment needs, among other elements. However, the recommendations have not been fully implemented. Challenges for Biosurveillance Capabilities
Our recent work has also identified challenges with specific biosurveillance capabilities. Specifically, we have identified biosurveillance capability challenges with, among other topics, (1) state and local public heath capabilities, (2) animal health surveillance capabilities, and (3) two DHS specific biosurveillance efforts—the National Biosurveillance Integration Center (NBIC) and the BioWatch Program. However, while the agency agreed, this recommendation has not been implemented. DHS Biosurveillance Efforts. | Why GAO Did This Study
The nation's biodefense enterprise is the whole combination of systems at every level of government and the private sector that can contribute to protecting the nation and its citizens from potentially catastrophic effects of a biological event. It is composed of a complex collection of resources, programs, and initiatives, designed for different purposes and dedicated to mitigating various risks, both natural and intentional.
In an era of rapid transit and global trade, the public health and agricultural industries, as well as natural ecosystems including native plants and wildlife, face increased threats of naturally occurring outbreaks of infectious disease and accidental exposure to biological threats. Also, threats of bioterrorism, such as anthrax attacks, highlight the continued need for biosurveillance systems that provide early detection and warning about biological threats to humans.
This statement summarizes GAO's work on challenges to building and maintaining the nation's biodefense and biosurveillance. This statement is based on GAO work issued from December 2009 through March 2016 on various biodefense and biosurveillance efforts. GAO also reviewed the 2015 report of the Blue Ribbon Study Panel on Biodefense for updates, but has not independently assessed the entirety of the conclusions, recommendations or methods. To conduct the prior work, GAO reviewed relevant laws, presidential directives, policies, strategic plans, and other reports; surveyed states; and interviewed federal, state, and industry officials, among others.
What GAO Found
The biodefense enterprise is fragmented and does not have strategic oversight to promote efficiency and accountability. Specifically, the biodefense enterprise lacks institutionalized leadership enterprise-wide to provide strategic oversight and coordination. In 2011, GAO reported, there are more than two dozen presidentially appointed individuals with biodefense responsibilities and numerous federal agencies with mission responsibilities for supporting biodefense activities, but no individual or entity with responsibility for overseeing the entire biodefense enterprise. In 2011, GAO reported that the Homeland Security Council (HSC) should consider establishing a focal point for federal biodefense coordination. In December 2014, National Security Council (NSC) staff, which supports the HSC, told GAO that two of its directorates work together as the focal point for federal biodefense efforts. This is an important step in promoting a comprehensive and coordinated approach to biodefense, but strategic leadership issues persist. In October 2015, a report by the Blue Ribbon Study Panel on Biodefense stated strategic leadership issues persist and called for a focal point to provide strategic leadership, noting that elevating authority above the agency-level can help overcome the challenges faced by the biodefense enterprise. The Study Panel found that White House councils and offices generally only become involved when a specific biodefense issue affects a prominent ongoing responsibility—a method which is not consistent with our call for a strategic approach.
In 2011, GAO also reported that while some high-level biodefense strategies have been developed, there is no broad, integrated national strategy that encompasses all stakeholders with biodefense responsibilities that can be used to guide the systematic identification of risk; assess resources needed to address those risks; and prioritize and allocate investment across the entire biodefense enterprise. GAO reported that the overarching biodefense enterprise would benefit from strategic oversight mechanisms, including a national strategy, to help ensure efficient, effective, and accountable results, and suggested the HSC take action. However, as of February 2016, such a strategy had not been developed.
Biosurveillance, an aspect of biodefense, also faces key challenges at all levels of government that transcend what any one agency can address on its own, and our more recent and ongoing work continues to highlight these challenges. In 2010, GAO recommended the HSC establish a focal point to lead the development of a national biosurveillance strategy that clarifies roles and responsibilities, provides goals and performance measures, and identifies resource and investment needs, among other elements. However, the recommendations have not been fully implemented. Since 2009 GAO's has also identified challenges with specific biosurveillance capabilities. Specifically, GAO has identified biosurveillance capability challenges with, among other topics, (1) state and local public heath capabilities, (2) animal health surveillance capabilities, and (3) two Department of Homeland Security biosurveillance efforts—the National Biosurveillance Integration Center (NBIC) and the BioWatch Program (which aims to provide early indication of an aerosolized biological weapon attack). However, not all recommendations have been implemented. |
gao_GAO-11-149 | gao_GAO-11-149_0 | Although iPost Does Not Provide a Complete View of Information Security Risks, It Helps to Prioritize Vulnerability Mitigation Efforts
The iPost risk scoring program identifies and prioritizes several but not all areas affecting information security risk to State’s IT infrastructure. Specifically, the scope of the iPost risk scoring program: addresses Windows hosts but not other IT assets on the OpenNet network, such as routers and switches; covers a set of 10 scoring components that includes several but not all information system controls that are intended to reduce risk; and assigns a score for each identified security weakness, but the extent to which the score reflects risk factors such as the impact and likelihood of threat occurrence that are specific to State’s computing environment could not be demonstrated. As a result, the iPost risk scoring program helps to identify, monitor, and prioritize mitigation of vulnerabilities and weaknesses for the areas it covers, but it does not provide a complete view of the information security risks to the department. 3. State Uses iPost to Identify, Prioritize, and Implement Improvements on Windows Hosts
State officials surveyed responded that they used iPost to (1) identify, prioritize, and fix security weaknesses and vulnerabilities on Windows devices and (2) implement other security improvements at their sites. 1). 2). For example, more than half of the 40 respondents said that assigning a numeric score to each vulnerability identified and each component was very or moderately helpful in their efforts to prioritize vulnerability mitigation. 4). 5). State has developed and implemented several controls that are intended to ensure the timeliness, accuracy, and completeness of iPost data. For example, State has employed the use of automated tools to collect monitoring data that are integrated into iPost. State also has used data collection schedules that support the frequent collection of monitoring data. Notwithstanding these controls, the timeliness, accuracy, and completeness of iPost data were not always assured. For example, several instances where iPost data were not updated as frequently as scheduled, inconsistent, or incomplete are illustrated below. Consequently, iPost users may make risk management decisions based on inaccurate or incomplete data. iPost Provides Many Benefits, but Also Poses Challenges
State’s implementation of iPost has resulted in improvements to the department’s information security by providing extensive and timely information on vulnerabilities and weaknesses on Windows servers and workstations, while also creating an environment where officials are motivated to fix vulnerabilities based on department priorities. However, State has faced, and will continue to face, challenges in implementing iPost. These challenges include overcoming limitations and technical issues with data collection tools, identifying and notifying individuals with responsibility for site-level security, implementing configuration management, and adopting a continuous monitoring strategy for moving forward in incorporating additional functionality into iPost. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve implementation of iPost at State, we recommend that the Secretary of State direct the Chief Information Officer to take the following seven actions: Incorporate the results of iPost’s monitoring of controls into key security documents such as the OpenNet security plan, security assessment report, and plan of action and milestones. The department also concurred with two of our recommendations, partially concurred with two, and did not concur with three. As we noted in the report, the department relies on users to report when inaccurate and incomplete iPost data and scoring is identified, so that it may be investigated and corrected as appropriate—even though there is no list in iPost showing who is responsible for a particular operational unit. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of our review were to determine (1) the extent to which the Department of State (State) has identified and prioritized risk to the department in its risk scoring program; (2) how agency officials use iPost information to implement security improvements; (3) the controls for ensuring the timeliness, accuracy, and completeness of iPost information; and (4) the benefits and challenges associated with implementing iPost. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of State (State) has implemented a custom application called iPost and a risk scoring program that is intended to provide continuous monitoring capabilities of information security risk to elements of its information technology (IT) infrastructure. Continuous monitoring can facilitate nearer real-time risk management and represents a significant change in the way information security activities have been conducted in the past. GAO was asked to determine (1) the extent to which State has identified and prioritized risk to the department in its risk scoring program; (2) how agency officials use iPost information to implement security improvements; (3) the controls for ensuring the timeliness, accuracy, and completeness of iPost information; and (4) the benefits and challenges associated with implementing iPost. To do this, GAO analyzed program documentation and compared it to relevant standards, interviewed and surveyed department officials, and performed analyses on iPost data.
What GAO Found
State has developed and implemented a risk scoring program that identifies and prioritizes several but not all areas affecting information security risk. Specifically, the scope of iPost's risk scoring program (1) addresses Windows hosts but not other IT assets on its major unclassified network; (2) covers a set of 10 scoring components that includes many, but not all, information system controls that are intended to reduce risk; and (3) assigns a score for each identified security weakness, although State could not demonstrate the extent to which scores are based on risk factors such as threat, impact, or likelihood of occurrence that are specific to its computing environment. As a result, the iPost risk scoring program helps to identify, monitor, and prioritize the mitigation of vulnerabilities and weaknesses for the areas it covers, but it does not provide a complete view of the information security risks to the department. State officials reported they used iPost to (1) identify, prioritize, and fix Windows vulnerabilities that were reported in iPost and (2) to implement other security improvements at their sites. For example, more than half of the 40 survey respondents said that assigning a numeric score to each vulnerability identified and each component was very or moderately helpful in their efforts to prioritize vulnerability mitigation. State has implemented several controls aimed at ensuring the timeliness, accuracy, and completeness of iPost information. For example, State employed the use of automated tools and collection schedules that support the frequent collection of monitoring data, which helps to ensure the timeliness of iPost data. State also relies on users to report when inaccurate and incomplete iPost data and scoring are identified, so they may be investigated and corrected as appropriate. Notwithstanding these controls, the timeliness, accuracy, and completeness of iPost data were not always assured. For example, several instances existed where iPost data were not updated as frequently as scheduled, inconsistent, or incomplete. As a result, State may not have reasonable assurance that data within iPost are accurate and complete with which to make risk management decisions. iPost provides many benefits but also poses challenges for the department. iPost has resulted in improvements to the department's information security by providing more extensive and timely information on vulnerabilities, while also creating an environment where officials are motivated to fix vulnerabilities based on department priorities. However, State has faced, and will continue to face, challenges with the implementation of iPost. These include (1) overcoming limitations and technical issues with data collection tools, (2) identifying and notifying individuals with responsibility for site-level security, (3) implementing configuration management for iPost, (4) adopting a strategy for continuous monitoring of controls, and (5) managing stakeholder expectations for continuous monitoring activities.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends the Secretary of State direct the Chief Information Officer to take a number of actions aimed at improving implementation of iPost. State agreed with two of GAO's recommendations, partially agreed with two, and disagreed with three. GAO continues to believe that its recommendations are valid and appropriate. |
gao_GAO-16-193 | gao_GAO-16-193_0 | Estimated Costs of Guarantee Program Have Risen, and Rural Development Has Enhanced Its Cost Estimation Process
In part due to the recent housing crisis, the estimated credit subsidy costs of RHS’s guarantee program rose in recent years. The reestimated costs of the RHS guarantee portfolio as a whole substantially increased in recent years. The upward reestimates for fiscal years 2012 through 2014 were significantly larger than those of prior years. For example, the reestimates for 2012, 2013, and 2014 were $364 million, $804 million, and $615 million, respectively, compared with $42 million for 2010. Furthermore, the auditor said that using an econometric modeling methodology would allow RD to improve the quality of its estimates. RHS Has Not Fully Aligned Its Policies and Procedures with OMB Guidance
RHS’s policies and procedures for the guarantee program were consistent with 19 of 26 OMB A-129 standards for managing federal credit programs, but were not fully consistent with the other 7. RHS’s compliance review guide contains risk factors for prioritizing the reviews. RHS Has Not Established Risk-Related Metrics and Responsibilities Fully Consistent with All OMB Standards for Credit Program Management
As shown in table 4, RHS’s policies and procedures were consistent with two of the six standards in Circular A-129 concerning credit program management and partially consistent with the remaining four. While RD has position descriptions for individuals involved in risk-management functions that specify duties and responsibilities, RHS does not have written procedures for a key part of its risk-management structure and documented lines of communication, as required by OMB’s Circular A-129. RHS’s risk-management structure is decentralized and complex. For example, RHS has not developed thresholds for the magnitude of expected losses that are acceptable at the portfolio or loan level. However, these reports do not include a qualitative discussion of areas meriting increased management focus, as specified in Circular A-129. However, RHS could further strengthen its policies and procedures for managing the guarantee program by addressing inconsistencies with Circular A-129 standards related to applicant screening, lender oversight, management frameworks, and risk assessment and reporting. To strengthen oversight of lenders and servicers, develop and publish in the Federal Register qualification requirements for the principal officers of lenders and servicers seeking initial or continued approval to participate in the guarantee program, develop and publish in the Federal Register capital and financial requirements for guarantee program lenders that are not regulated by a federal financial institution regulatory agency, and establish standing policies and procedures to help ensure that the agency reviews the eligibility of lenders and servicers participating in the guarantee program at least every 2 years. To strengthen risk assessment and reporting, improve performance measures comparing RHS and FHA loan performance, potentially by making comparisons on a cohort basis and limiting comparisons to loans made in similar geographic areas, develop risk thresholds for the guarantee program, potentially in the form of maximum portfolio- or loan-level loss tolerances, and identify issues for increased management focus in high-level dashboard reports. For four of the six recommendations with which RD neither agreed nor disagreed, RD said it recognized the underlying risk implications and was continuing to consider the recommendations. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to examine: (1) recent trends in the credit subsidy costs of the Rural Housing Service’s (RHS) single-family guarantee program (guarantee program) and the process for estimating those costs and (2) the extent to which RHS’s policies and procedures for the guarantee program are consistent with Office of Management and Budget (OMB) standards for managing credit programs. We did not verify RHS’s compliance with its own policies and procedures or assess their effectiveness. | Why GAO Did This Study
In recent years, RHS's single-family mortgage guarantee program has grown significantly, and RHS currently manages a guaranteed portfolio of more than $100 billion. RHS helps low- and moderate-income rural residents purchase homes by guaranteeing mortgages made by private lenders.
GAO was asked to examine the program's cost estimation methodology and risk-management structure. This report discusses (1) recent trends in the credit subsidy costs of RHS's guarantee program and the process for estimating those costs and (2) the extent to which RHS's policies and procedures for the program are consistent with federal standards for managing credit programs. GAO analyzed RHS budget data for fiscal years 2004 through 2014, examined RHS policies and procedures, reviewed OMB standards, and interviewed RHS officials.
What GAO Found
The estimated credit subsidy costs (expected net lifetime costs) of single-family mortgages guaranteed by the Department of Agriculture's (USDA) Rural Housing Service (RHS) substantially increased in recent years, partly due to high losses from the 2007 through 2011 housing crisis. For example, the fiscal year 2013 and 2014 reestimates (which federal agencies must do annually) indicated higher expected costs of $804 million and $615 million, respectively, compared with the prior reestimates (see fig.). To improve the current estimation method (which relies on average historical losses), RHS hired a contractor to develop statistical models that will predict losses based on loan, borrower, and economic variables.
RHS's policies and procedures are not fully consistent with all Office of Management and Budget (OMB) standards for managing credit programs (OMB Circular A-129). RHS's policies and procedures are consistent with the OMB standards in most areas, including loan documentation, collateral requirements, and aspects of applicant screening and lender oversight. However, RHS
has not established and published all required lender eligibility standards such as principal officer qualifications (e.g., experience level) and financial standards (e.g., minimum net worth);
lacks written policies and procedures for a committee responsible for analyzing and addressing the credit quality (default risk) of guaranteed loans;
has not established a position independent of program management to help manage the risks of its guaranteed portfolio;
has not established risk thresholds (for example, maximum portfolio- or loan-level loss tolerances) and uses certain loan performance benchmarks that have limited value for risk management; and
has not incorporated a discussion of areas needing increased management focus into its “dashboard” reports.
These and other inconsistencies occurred in part because RHS has not completed an ongoing assessment of its policies and procedures against Circular A-129. Furthermore, the Office of Rural Development (which oversees RHS) has not established procedures for prioritizing Circular A-129 reviews of its credit programs based on risk. More fully adhering to Circular A-129 standards would enhance RHS's effectiveness in managing the risks of its guarantee program.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is making 11 recommendations to USDA to help ensure that RHS's policies and procedures are consistent with OMB standards and to strengthen management of the guarantee program and other credit programs. Areas on which the recommendations focus include overseeing lenders, formalizing or establishing key risk management functions, and assessing and reporting on portfolio risk and performance. RHS agreed with or said it was acting on five of the recommendations. RHS neither agreed nor disagreed with the rest but said it generally recognized the underlying risk implications. GAO maintains that the recommendations are valid, as discussed in the report. |
gao_T-AIMD-98-109 | gao_T-AIMD-98-109_0 | It made significant early progress in assessing and renovating mission-critical mainframe systems—those necessary to prevent the disruption of benefits —and has been a leader among federal agencies. Yet as our report of last October indicated, three key risks remained, mainly stemming from the large degree to which SSA interfaces with other entities in the sharing of information. One major risk concerned Year 2000 compliance of the 54 state Disability Determination Services (DDS) that provide vital support to the agency in administering SSA’s disability programs. The second major risk concerned data exchanges, ensuring that information obtained from outside sources—such as other federal agencies, state agencies, and private businesses—was not “corrupted” by data being passed from systems that were not Year 2000 compliant. SSA exchanges data with thousands of such sources. Third, such risks were compounded by the lack of contingency plans to ensure business continuity in the event of systems failure. Ongoing Issues Concerning IWS/LAN Implementation
The resources that SSA plans to invest in acquiring IWS/LAN are enormous: Over 7 years the agency plans to spend about $1 billion during phase I to replace its present computer terminals with “intelligent” workstations and local area networks. As of March 1, SSA had completed installation of about 30,000 IWSs and 800 LANs, generally meeting or exceeding its phase I schedule. We have not identified any significant problems in SSA’s installation of IWS/LAN equipment at its field offices to date, and the agency has taken steps to minimize adverse impact on service to the public while installation takes place. At the conclusion of our review, however, SSA had not established targeted goals or a process for using performance measures to assess IWS/LAN’s impact on agency productivity improvements. SSA has recognized weaknesses in its own capability to develop software, and is improving its processes and methods. SSA plans many initiatives using the Internet to provide electronic service delivery to its clients. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed the information technology challenges facing the Social Security Administration and its recently appointed commissioner.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) SSA made significant early progress in assessing and renovating mission-critical mainframe systems--those necessary to prevent the disruption of benefits--and has been a leader among federal agencies; (2) yet as GAO's report of last October indicated, three key risks remained, mainly stemming from the large degree to which SSA interfaces with other entities in the sharing of information; (3) one major risk concerned year 2000 compliance of the 54 state Disability Determination Services (DDS) that provide vital support to the agency in administering SSA's disability programs; (4) the second major risk concerned data exchanges, ensuring that information obtained from outside sources--such as other federal agencies, state agencies, and private businesses--was not corrupted by data being passed from systems that were not year 2000 compliant; (5) SSA exchanges data with thousands of such sources; (6) third, such risks were compounded by the lack of contingency plans to ensure business continuity in the event of systems failure; (7) the resources that SSA plans to invest in acquiring Intelligent Workstation/Local Area Network (IWS/LAN) are enormous; (8) over 7 years the agency plans to spend about $1 billion during phase I to replace its present computer terminals with intelligent workstations and local area networks; (9) as of March 1, SSA had completed installation of about 30,000 IWSs and 800 LANs, generally meeting or exceeding its phase I schedule; (10) GAO has not identified any significant problems in SSA's installation of IWS/LAN equipment at its field offices to date, and the agency has taken steps to minimize adverse impact on service to the public while installation takes place; (11) at the conclusion of GAO's review, however, SSA had not established targeted goals or a process or using performance measures to asses IWS/LAN's impact in agency productivity improvements; (12) SSA has recognized weaknesses in its own capability to develop software, and is improving its processes and methods; and (13) SSA plans many initiatives using the Internet to provide electronic service delivery to its clients. |
gao_RCED-95-23 | gao_RCED-95-23_0 | . . is no longer justified and logically should be revoked.” EPA added that “the agencies are concerned that having formal tolerances remaining in effect for canceled pesticides may serve to condone use of these pesticides in this country and/or in or on commodities imported from foreign countries.”
EPA May Recommend Action Levels for Monitoring Unavoidable Residues
Although most pesticides break down fairly quickly in the environment, some pesticides degrade very slowly and persist in the environment long after their use has ended. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Concerned that residues of canceled pesticides in food continue to pose a health risk to U.S. consumers, the Chairman, Environment, Energy, and Natural Resources Subcommittee, House Committee on Government Operations, asked GAO to (1) determine whether marketed foods contain unsafe levels of residues from canceled pesticides and (2) evaluate EPA’s procedures for revoking tolerances for canceled food-use pesticides. To determine whether marketed foods contain unsafe levels of residues from canceled pesticides, we focused on health risks from fish contaminated with residues of five canceled pesticides—DDT, chlordane, dieldrin, heptachlor, and mirex. In addition, EPA evaluated the economic effects of lower action levels. However, EPA has not formally recommended the lower action levels to FDA. The region is concerned that if the action levels for pesticides’ residues in fish are not lowered, then the states will not issue more protective fish consumption advisories. They have not been adjusted to reflect health risk assessments or subsequent declines in residue levels. This official believes that the food-use registrations for most of these pesticides have been canceled for over 2 years. EPA Assigns Revocation a Low Priority and Has No Procedures Linking Revocation to Cancellation
Since 1982, when it issued its policy on revoking tolerances, EPA has taken over 6 years, on average, to revoke a pesticide’s tolerances after canceling the pesticide’s registrations. EPA officials acknowledge that the agency’s current process for revoking tolerances takes too long and is inefficient. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed: (1) whether marketed foods contain unsafe levels of residues from cancelled pesticides; and (2) the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) procedures for revoking tolerances for cancelled food-use pesticides.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) EPA believes that most marketed foods do not contain unsafe levels of residues from cancelled pesticides, since most pesticides do not persist in the environment for very long; (2) residues from a particular class of cancelled pesticides do persist, particularly in fish, and pose a health risk to some consumers over their lifetimes; (3) in 1991, EPA proposed lower action levels for five cancelled pesticides in fish to reflect the decline in actual residue levels; (4) the reduced action levels have not been implemented because the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) believes that EPA has not fully demonstrated the need for lower action levels; (5) many state monitoring programs would be affected by lower action levels, since they use federal standards in issuing fish consumption advisories; (6) EPA has taken over 6 years to revoke tolerances for cancelled pesticides; (7) the process for revoking tolerances takes too long and makes inefficient use of scare resources; (8) linking residue revocations to pesticide cancellations would be more efficient and would reduce consumers' exposure to pesticide residues in imported food; and (9) although EPA has made progress in revoking tolerances for cancelled pesticides, its revocation backlog is expected to increase because of additional pesticide registration cancellations. |
gao_GAO-13-95 | gao_GAO-13-95_0 | VA Has Made Changes to Improve Its Verification Program, but Continues to Face Challenges in Its Strategic Planning Efforts and Information Technology Infrastructure
VA has made significant changes to its verification processes in an effort to improve its operations and address program weaknesses, but continues to face challenges in establishing a stable and efficient program to verify firms on a timely and consistent basis. Since December 2011, VA has instituted a number of significant operational changes, including revising standard operating procedures and enhancing quality assurance protocols. However, it has not had a comprehensive, long-term strategic plan for the verification program and has consistently prioritized addressing immediate operational challenges, contributing to programmatic inefficiencies. In response to our observations, VA’s OSDBU initiated action in late October 2012 to compile a strategic planning document that encompasses the verification program. OSDBU appears to have at least partially applied key leading strategic planning practices in its initial planning effort. But the plan lacked performance measures to assess whether the desired outcomes are being achieved and had a shorter-term focus than typically associated with a strategic plan. In addition, the verification program’s information technology (IT) system has shortcomings that have hindered VA’s ability to operate, oversee, and monitor the program. VA is planning to modify or replace the system, but has not directly tied this effort into its long-term strategic planning efforts to ensure that the new system meets the verification program’s long-term information needs. Expanding Its Verification Program Government-wide Would Require VA to Improve the Program and Address Policy Issues
Expanding VA’s verification program to support the government-wide SDVOSB contracting program would require VA to increase the scale of its program to verify potentially thousands of additional firms. VA has faced ongoing challenges implementing its verification program, and it would need to continue to stabilize and improve its verification operations by addressing remaining vulnerabilities to fraud and abuse, demonstrating whether recent operational changes have resulted in improved performance and whether new methods for educating applicants are effective, and addressing data system limitations. Our prior and current work indicates that several aspects of VA’s current verification program, specified below, would have to be addressed before the program could be effectively implemented government-wide. VA officials said that they were planning to revise the regulations partly in response to applicants’ and veterans’ organizations concerns about VA’s eligibility standards. Any changes to VA’s verification requirements could create or widen differences between the various government-wide small business contracting programs’ requirements and VA’s, a consideration that would likely be of even greater importance if VA’s verification program were expanded. Additionally, VA has not shared the plan with key stakeholders. The system does not collect data for monitoring program trends and staff performance, has limited reporting and workflow management capabilities, and has been unable to accept applications for extended periods, hindering VA’s ability to operate and monitor the verification program. Addressing these policy issues for its own program—or ultimately for a government- wide verification program—will require VA to weigh certain tradeoffs. Direct OSDBU and OI&T, as they modify or replace the verification program’s data system, to integrate their efforts with OSDBU’s broader strategic planning effort for the verification program to ensure that the new system not only addresses the short-term needs of the program but also can be readily adapted to meet longer-term needs. VA also provided additional information about its efforts to replace the verification program’s data system. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
Our objectives were to (1) describe and assess the progress that the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) has made in establishing a program to verify the eligibility of service-disabled veteran-owned small businesses (SDVOSB) and veteran-owned small businesses (VOSB) on a timely and consistent basis, and (2) describe the key operational and policy issues that VA would need to address should its verification program be implemented government-wide. For both objectives we interviewed officials in VA’s Office of Small and Disadvantaged Business Utilization (OSDBU), CVE, Office of the General Counsel, and the Office of Information and Technology to understand their historical, current, and expected roles in the verification program. | Why GAO Did This Study
VA is required to give contracting preference to service-disabled and other veteran-owned small businesses. It must also verify the ownership and control of these firms to confirm eligibility. Prior reports by GAO and VA's Office of Inspector General identified weaknesses in VA's processes and controls that allowed ineligible firms to be verified. GAO was asked to review the verification program. For this report, GAO assessed (1) VA's progress in establishing a program for verifying firms' eligibility on a timely and consistent basis and (2) key operational and policy issues that VA would have to address should its verification program be implemented government-wide. GAO reviewed VA's policies and procedures; compared its initial strategic planning effort with previously identified leading strategic planning practices; interviewed VA officials and veterans' organizations; and analyzed government-wide contracting databases.
What GAO Found
The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) has made significant changes to its verification processes for service-disabled and other veteran-owned small businesses to improve operations and address program weaknesses, but continues to face challenges in establishing a stable and efficient program to verify firms on a timely and consistent basis. Since December 2011, VA has instituted a number of significant operational changes, including revising standard operating procedures and enhancing quality assurance protocols for its verification program. However, GAO found that VA did not have a comprehensive, long-term strategic plan for the program and had prioritized addressing immediate operational challenges, contributing to programmatic inefficiencies. In response to this observation, VA's Office of Small and Disadvantaged Business Utilization (OSDBU) initiated action in late October 2012 to compile a strategic planning document that encompassed the verification program. VA's OSDBU appears to have partially applied key leading strategic planning practices in its initial planning effort. But the plan lacks performance measures to assess whether the desired outcomes are being achieved and has a short-term focus that is not typically associated with a strategic plan. VA also has not shared the plan with key stakeholders, including congressional staff. Further, the verification program's data system has shortcomings that have hindered VA's ability to operate, oversee, and monitor the program. Among other things, the system does not collect important data and has limited reporting and workflow management capabilities. VA plans to modify or replace the system, but has not directly tied this effort into its long-term strategic planning efforts to ensure that the new system meets the verification program's long-term information needs.
Expanding VA's verification program to support the government-wide contracting program for service-disabled, veteran-owned small businesses would require VA to improve its verification process and address a number of operational and policy issues. GAO estimated that between about 3,600 and 16,400 currently self-certified firms could seek verification under an expanded program, but VA has experienced ongoing challenges verifying the volume of firms currently participating in the program. GAO's prior and current work indicates that VA would need to further reduce its program's vulnerability to fraud and abuse, demonstrate whether recent operational changes have improved performance, have in place effective methods for educating applicants, and address the limitations of the program's data system in order to expand successfully. Also, VA has begun a process to revise the verification program's regulations, partly in response to concerns about VA's eligibility standards being too stringent. However, any changes to VA's verification requirements could create or widen differences between the various government-wide small business contracting programs' requirements and VA's, a consideration that would likely be of even greater importance if VA's verification program were expanded. Addressing these issues for its own program--or ultimately for a government-wide program-- requires weighing tradeoffs between reducing the burden of verification on eligible firms and providing reasonable assurance that contracting preferences reach their intended beneficiaries.
What GAO Recommends
To improve the long-term effectiveness of the program, VA should (1) refine and implement a strategic plan with outcome-oriented long-term goals and performance measures, and (2) integrate its efforts to modify or replace the program's data system with a broader strategic planning effort to ensure that the system addresses the program's short- and long-term needs. VA concurred with both recommendations. |
gao_GAO-08-491T | gao_GAO-08-491T_0 | Neither NWS nor FAA Currently Ensures the Quality of Aviation Weather Services at En Route Centers
While interagency agreements between NWS and FAA state that both agencies have responsibilities for assuring and controlling the quality of aviation weather observations, neither NWS nor FAA consistently does so for weather products produced at the en route centers. However, neither NWS nor FAA has developed and implemented performance measures and metrics, regularly evaluated weather service unit performance, or provided feedback to improve these aviation weather products and services. Because of this lack of performance tracking and oversight, NWS cannot demonstrate the quality or value of its services, and FAA cannot ensure the value of the services it funds. In our accompanying report released today, we made two recommendations to the Secretary of Commerce and three recommendations to the Secretary of Transportation to improve the quality of aviation weather products and services at en route centers. We recommended that the Secretary of Commerce direct the Assistant Administrator for the National Weather Service to assist FAA in developing performance measures and metrics for the products and services to be provided by center weather service units, and perform annual evaluations of aviation weather services provided at en route centers and provide feedback to the center weather service units. The department stated that after FAA provides its revised requirements, it would work with FAA to develop methods for performance monitoring and evaluation. In those comments, the department did not agree or disagree with our recommendations. The department stated that FAA’s revised requirements are consistent with our recommendations in that they establish performance measures and evaluation procedures, and that FAA would begin to negotiate with NWS to implement them. FAA Identified New Aviation Weather Requirements and Performance Measures
FAA has already begun to address our recommendations; specifically, in late December 2007, FAA finalized its new requirements for the aviation weather services to be provided by center weather service units, which include proposed performance measures and methods for evaluation. In its requirements, FAA provides NWS with its overall vision for aviation weather services, revises existing requirements, and defines a requirement for a new product for terminal radar approach control facilities. In addition, FAA identifies performance measures and processes for evaluating performance and providing feedback to NWS. In its new requirements, FAA also reiterates its need for existing products and services and provides revisions to some of these requirements. In addition, FAA directed NWS to include plans for three operational concepts (including technical and cost information) for fulfilling the requirements—in its existing configuration located at the 21 en route centers, through remote services provided by a reduced number of regional facilities, and through remote services provided by a single centralized facility. According to the requirements, NWS’s response should assume a transition time of 90 days for the existing configuration, 180 days for regionalized remote services, and 1 year for a single facility. NWS Plans to Respond to FAA’s Requirements, but Proposed Transition Time Frames May Be Overly Ambitious
NWS plans to respond to FAA by the May 2008 deadline, but FAA’s estimated time frames for providing the revised services may be overly ambitious. Given the importance of accurate and timely weather information in air traffic control, it will be important for NWS to conduct a thorough evaluation before it transitions to a new operational concept in order to ensure that there are no impacts on the continuity of air traffic operations and no degradation of weather service. This collaboration will help both agencies ensure the quality and consistency of these services, and ensure that FAA has the information it needs to effectively manage air traffic. In addition, we were asked to provide an update on FAA’s recent efforts to develop aviation weather requirements and performance measures, and NWS’s plans for responding to these requirements. | Why GAO Did This Study
The National Weather Service (NWS), an agency under the Department of Commerce's National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), provides staff on-site at each of the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) en route centers--the facilities that control high-altitude flight outside the airport tower and terminal areas. This group of NWS meteorologists provides air traffic managers with forecasts and briefings on regional conditions such as turbulence and icing. Over the last few years, FAA has been exploring options for enhancing the efficiency of the aviation weather services provided by these NWS meteorologists. In late December 2007, FAA delivered revised requirements and associated performance measures to NWS to improve these services. GAO was asked to summarize key segments of its report being released today, including its assessment of NWS and FAA efforts to ensure the quality of aviation weather services at en route centers, and its recommendations to improve these efforts. In addition, GAO was asked to provide an update on FAA's recent efforts to establish aviation weather requirements and performance measures, and NWS's plans for responding to these requirements. To do so, GAO summarized segments of its report, reviewed FAA's recently released requirements, and interviewed the official responsible for NWS's response.
What GAO Found
Although interagency agreements between NWS and FAA state that both agencies have responsibilities for assuring and controlling the quality of aviation weather observations, neither agency consistently does so for weather products and services produced at the en route centers. Specifically, neither agency has developed and implemented performance measures and metrics, regularly evaluated weather service unit performance, or provided feedback to improve these aviation weather products and services. Because of this lack of performance tracking and oversight, NWS cannot demonstrate the quality or value of its services, and FAA cannot ensure the quality of the services it funds. Until both agencies are able to measure and ensure the quality of the aviation weather products at the en route centers, FAA may not be getting the information it needs to effectively manage air traffic. In its report being issued today, GAO is making recommendations to the Secretaries of Commerce and Transportation to ensure that NWS and FAA develop performance measures, evaluate the services against those measures, and provide feedback to NWS. Commerce agreed with the recommendations and stated that NOAA would work with FAA to develop methods for performance monitoring and evaluation. Transportation did not agree or disagree with the recommendations, but stated that FAA's revised requirements would establish performance measures and evaluation procedures, and that FAA would negotiate with NWS to implement them. FAA has begun to address GAO's recommendations. In late December 2007, FAA finalized its new requirements, including performance measures and methods for evaluating performance and providing feedback to NWS. In doing so, FAA provides its overall vision for aviation weather services, reiterates its need for existing products and services, provides revisions to existing requirements, and defines a new product. FAA directed NWS to respond by May 2008 and include plans in its response for three operational concepts--in its existing configuration located at the 21 en route centers, through remote services provided by a reduced number of regional facilities, and through remote services provided by a single centralized facility. FAA stated that NWS should assume a transition time of 90 days for the existing configuration, 180 days for regionalized services, and 1 year for a single facility. NWS plans to respond to FAA by the May 2008 deadline, but FAA's estimated time frames for transitioning to a new operational concept may be overly ambitious. Given the importance of accurate and timely weather information in air traffic control, it will be important for NWS to conduct a thorough evaluation before it transitions to a new operational concept in order to ensure that there are no impacts on the continuity of air traffic operations and no degradation of weather service. |
gao_GAO-09-484T | gao_GAO-09-484T_0 | Treasury also has begun to receive dividend payments relating to capital purchases under CPP and other programs. Initially, Treasury approved $125 billion in capital purchases for nine of the largest public financial institutions that federal banking regulators and Treasury considered to be systemically significant to the operation of the financial system. These efforts are important steps toward ensuring that all participating institutions are held accountable for their use of the funds and are consistent with our past recommendation that Treasury seek similar information from existing CPP participants.. We will continue to monitor Treasury’s oversight efforts as well as the consistency of the approval process in future work. We will also continue to monitor the system that Treasury develops to ensure compliance with the agreements and the implementation of additional oversight and accountability efforts under its new plan. In our December 2008 report, we first raised questions about the effectiveness of Treasury’s communication strategy for TARP with Congress, the financial markets, and the public. In response to our recommendation about its communication strategy, Treasury noted numerous publicly available reports, testimonies, and speeches. At least two institutions (Citigroup and Bank of America) currently participate in more than one program, adding to the confusion about Treasury’s strategy and vision for implementing TARP. On March 4, 2009, Treasury unveiled its Making Home Affordable program, which is based in part on the use of TARP funds. As part of our oversight responsibilities for TARP, we are monitoring Treasury’s implementation of AIFP, including the auto manufacturers’ use of federal funds and development of the required restructuring plans. However, hiring for OFS is still ongoing, Treasury is working to improve its oversight of contractors, and its development of a system of internal control is still evolving. Specifically, we recommended that Treasury continue to expeditiously hire personnel needed to carry out and oversee TARP. Finally, as noted in December, these indicators may be suggestive of TARP’s ongoing impact, but no single indicator or set of indicators can provide a definitive determination of its effects because of the range of actions that have been and are being taken to address the current crisis. These include coordinated efforts by U.S. regulators—namely, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, and the Federal Housing Finance Agency—as well as actions by financial institutions to mitigate foreclosures. Additionally, we plan to use the Treasury survey data in our efforts to evaluate changes in lending activity resulting from CPP. Federal Debt Management Challenges
You also asked that I discuss the impact of TARP and related activities on the national debt and borrowing. Because the Treasury must borrow the funds disbursed, TARP and other actions taken to stabilize the financial markets increase the need to borrow so adding to the federal debt. To support Congress’ oversight of the use of TARP funds we have work underway looking at how Treasury has financed borrowing associated with the recent financial crisis and at additional ideas for debt management that might make sense going forward. Total borrowing will increase by trillions of dollars this year, not solely due to TARP and other activities aimed at stabilizing the financial system. The debt limit was increased by the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 and the Recovery Act, but with only $1.2 trillion remaining under the limit, it will have to be raised again. Today Congress, the executive branch and the American people are understandably focused on restoring financial stability and economic growth. Contact
For further information on this testimony, please contact Thomas J. McCool on (202) 512-2642 or [email protected]. | Why GAO Did This Study
This testimony discusses our work on the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), under which the Department of the Treasury (Treasury) has the authority to purchase and insure up to $700 billion in troubled assets held by financial institutions through its Office of Financial Stability (OFS). As Congress may know, Treasury was granted this authority in response to the financial crisis that has threatened the stability of the U.S. banking system and the solvency of numerous financial institutions. The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act (the act) that authorized TARP on October 3, 2008, requires GAO to report at least every 60 days on findings resulting from our oversight of the actions taken under the program. We are also responsible for auditing OFS's annual financial statements and for producing special reports on any issues that emerge from our oversight. To carry out these oversight responsibilities, we have assembled interdisciplinary teams with a wide range of technical skills, including financial market and public policy analysts, accountants, lawyers, and economists who represent combined resources from across GAO. In addition, we are building on our in-house technical expertise with targeted new hires and experts. The act also created additional oversight entities--the Congressional Oversight Panel (COP) and the Special Inspector General for TARP (SIGTARP)--that also have reporting responsibilities. We are coordinating our work with COP and SIGTARP and are meeting with officials from both entities to share information and coordinate our oversight efforts. These meetings help to ensure that we are collaborating as appropriate and not duplicating efforts.
What GAO Found
This testimony is based primarily on our January 30, 2009 report, the second under the act's mandate, which covers the actions taken as part of TARP through January 23, 2009, and follows up on the nine recommendations we made in our December 2, 2008 report.3 This statement also provides additional information on some recent program developments, including Treasury's new financial stability plan and, as you requested, provides some insights on our ongoing work on the implications of actions related to the financial crisis on federal debt management. Our oversight work under the act is ongoing, and our next report is due to be issued by March 31, 2009, as required. Specifically, this statement focuses on (1) the nature and purpose of activities that have been initiated under TARP; (2) the status of OFS's hiring efforts, use of contractors, and development of a system of internal control; (3) implications of TARP and other events on federal debt management, and (4) preliminary indicators of TARP's performance. To do this work, we reviewed documents related to TARP, including contracts, agreements, guidance, and rules. We also met with OFS, contractors, federal agencies, and officials from all eight of the first large institutions to receive disbursements. We plan to continue to monitor the issues highlighted in our prior reports, as well as future and ongoing capital purchases, other more recent transactions undertaken as part of TARP (for example, guarantees on assets of Citigroup and Bank of America), and the status of other aspects of TARP. |
gao_GAO-04-283 | gao_GAO-04-283_0 | The Fed pays BEP the costs of developing and printing the currency. The Fed buys coins from the Mint for face value. Because the Mint, a part of Treasury, is included in the budget, the recognition of the earnings from coins—the difference between production costs and face value, called seigniorage—is shown in the federal budget as a reduction in needed borrowing for the government, after the deficit or surplus for the year is calculated. Production costs of both coins and Federal Reserve notes are accounted for as increases in the net cost of operations in Treasury’s consolidated financial statements. Federal accounting standards provide that seigniorage be accounted for as a source of financing in Treasury’s statement of changes in net position, whereas interest earned by the Fed for its open market operations is accounted for as revenue received on Treasury’s statement of custodial activity. Treasury has not been reporting seigniorage correctly in its consolidated financial statements but corrected its misclassification beginning in fiscal year 2003. Budgeting for Coin and Currency Earnings
The profit earned from making coins, or seigniorage, is shown in the budget as a means of financing the government’s borrowings and is not counted as revenue in calculating the deficit or surplus for the annual budget. However, the interest avoided from the borrowing displaced by seigniorage is neither quantified nor shown in the budget. In recent years, both the Mint and BEP have had some problems in contracting for and acquiring property and equipment. In addition, the Mint has had problems with forecasting demand, monitoring costs, and reporting plans and results to Congress. The amount of interest paid to the Fed, and subsequently returned by the Fed to Treasury, is quantified and visible in the budget. The Mint and BEP have generally taken action to address the operational problems identified in the past few years by Treasury’s Inspector General and others. Recommendation for Executive Action
To comply with the purpose of the reporting requirement of the Public Enterprise Fund, we recommend that the Secretary of the Treasury ensure that the Director of the Mint identifies whether amounts are being retained in excess of the estimated operating costs of the following year and, if so, explains how they will be used in reports to Congress each year. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
To better understand how the nation’s coins and currency are produced and issued, we reviewed (1) how the production costs of and earnings from coin and currency are budgeted and accounted for and (2) whether there are any operational problems at the Mint and BEP needing further action. To determine how production costs and earnings from coin and currency are budgeted and accounted for, we reviewed the history of coins and currency in the United States and the agencies involved in producing and distributing coins and currency; legislation and accompanying hearings and reports concerning coins and currency; the U.S. budget for the last 5 years; financial reports of the Fed; the consolidated financial statements of the Department of the Treasury for the last 5 years; annual reports for the last 5 years issued by the Federal Reserve System (Fed), the Mint and the Bureau of Engraving and Printing (BEP); accounting guidance issued by the Financial Accounting Standards Board and the Federal Accounting Standards Advisory Board; and budgeting guidance issued by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). The reserve banks back up the notes primarily with Treasury securities. | Why GAO Did This Study
The government produces billions of coins and currency notes each year. Coins are made by the U.S. Mint and issued by the Treasury Department. Currency notes are made by the Bureau of Engraving and Printing and issued by the Federal Reserve System (Fed). The Fed buys coins from the Mint at face value but pays the Bureau only the costs of printing currency. Coins on the books of the Fed are assets that are issued by the Mint, and notes are liabilities of the Federal Reserve Banks. In recent years congressional hearings have highlighted the confusion over differences in the budgetary and accounting treatment of coins and currency. In addition, the Treasury Inspector General and others have reported problems with Mint and Bureau operations. GAO was asked to review (1) how the costs and earnings from coins and currency are budgeted and accounted for and (2) whether any operational problems at the Mint and Bureau need further action.
What GAO Found
The earnings from issuing both coins and currency reduce government borrowing costs; however, how these earnings are budgeted and accounted for differs. Production costs of coins and currency are generally treated the same in the budget and accounting statements. The difference between the face value of coins and the costs of minting them results in earnings, called seigniorage, which is shown in the budget as a reduction in needed borrowing for the government, after the deficit or surplus for the year is calculated. The budgetary impact of seigniorage is interest avoided from the borrowing it displaces and is not visible because it is neither quantified nor shown in the budget. The government also generates earnings by issuing currency, but it is handled differently. The difference between the face value of currency issued and its production cost goes to the Fed. The Fed buys collateral, usually Treasury securities, to back up the currency issued. The interest collected on those Treasury securities is used to pay for Fed costs, and the remainder is returned to Treasury. The budgetary impact of issuing currency comes from the interest returned by the Fed, which is shown as a budgetary receipt and counted in the calculation of the deficit or surplus. Production costs of both coins and currency are shown as costs of operations in Treasury's financial statements. According to the Federal Accounting Standards Advisory Board, seigniorage should be shown as a source of financing in Treasury's statement of changes in net position, whereas interest returned by the Fed for currency is shown as revenue in Treasury's statement of custodial activity. Treasury has not been reporting seigniorage this way but made the correction beginning with its fiscal year 2003 financial statements. Both the Mint and the Bureau have had operational problems in recent years in contracting and acquiring property and equipment. The Mint has also had problems with forecasting demand, monitoring costs, and reporting to Congress. The Mint and Bureau have generally taken or started to take actions to address the problems. The Mint has clarified its first quarterly report for 2004 to include more information on how retained funds will be used. However, the Mint is still not explicitly stating whether the retained amounts are in excess of the estimated operating costs for the following year and, if so, it is not explaining how the retained earnings will be used, as required by law. |
gao_GAO-16-105 | gao_GAO-16-105_0 | Since its establishment AFRICOM has increased its footprint on the continent to support the command’s missions of building African partner defense capabilities, responding to crises, and deterring transnational threats in order to promote regional security. In tandem with AFRICOM’s growing footprint there has been a continued reliance on contractors to provide, among other things, logistical, transportation, and intelligence support to the command’s missions. AFRICOM Has Established an Organizational Structure to Manage, Plan for, and Assess OCS, but Some Subordinate Commands Have Not Done So
AFRICOM established a formal OCS structure with dedicated personnel—including an OCS Integration Cell—at the headquarters level to serve as the central coordination point to integrate OCS in all directorates, and to manage, plan for, and assess OCS. AFRICOM’s OCS Integration Cell has also taken steps to manage OCS at its subordinate commands by conducting staff assistance visits to enhance OCS capabilities. Most AFRICOM Subordinate Commands Have Not Established an OCS Organizational Structure
With the exception of U.S. Army Africa, AFRICOM’s subordinate commands, including service component and joint force commands, generally lack formal organizational structures with personnel dedicated to OCS. While U.S. According to Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa contracting officials, applying OCS concepts such as establishing an OCS Integration Cell at Camp Lemonnier would be helpful to avoid duplication of work and increased costs. However, AFRICOM officials stated that no subordinate command had processes in place to ensure that contractor personnel were being included in SPOT—a contractor accountability database—at the time of the assessment, and that AFRICOM contractor personnel accountability guidance was unclear about when the commands were required to account for contractor personnel, and what types of contractor personnel to include. Without clearly defined assessment standards for the scorecard, AFRICOM cannot accurately assess the OCS actions taken by subordinate commands. However, AFRICOM does not have a complete picture of the number of contractor personnel supporting its operations in the region. AFRICOM uses two primary sources—daily personnel status reports and SPOT, a DOD contractor personnel accountability database—to collect contractor personnel accountability information, but neither source provides comprehensive accountability or visibility of DOD contractor personnel on the continent because the total number of local national contractor personnel are not being included in either, and because the numbers of U.S. citizen and third country national contractor personnel vary between the two. AFRICOM Conducts Limited Vetting of Contractors and Contractor Employees and Does Not Have Guidance to Apply Additional Risk-Based Measures
AFRICOM conducts some limited vetting of potential contractors, also referred to as vendors, but it has not established a foreign vendor vetting process or cell that would preemptively identify vendors who support criminal, terrorist, or other sanctioned organizations. However, these AFRICOM forward operating sites were not incorporating additional screening measures, such as biometric screening or counterintelligence interviews, according to the specific risks at each site. As a result, AFRICOM is at risk of not exercising the appropriate level of vendor vetting or contractor employee screening on the African continent. However, the guidance does not require the establishment of a vendor vetting cell or specify under what conditions it would be appropriate. Without having a foreign vendor vetting process in place, it will be difficult for AFRICOM to recognize and thereby avoid instances of contracting with the enemy. AFRICOM officials stated that all DOD sites in the AFRICOM area of responsibility conduct background investigations for non-U.S. contractors who require base access. To ensure that AFRICOM applies a risk-based approach to contractor employee screening in Africa, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following action:
Direct AFRICOM to complete and issue guidance that specifies the standard of contractor employee screening for forward operating sites, based on factors such as the number of DOD personnel on base, type of operations, and local security threat. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of our review were to determine the extent to which AFRICOM: (1) has an organizational structure in place to manage, plan for, and assess operational contract support; (2) accounts for contractor personnel in its area of responsibility; and (3) vets non-U.S. contractors and contractor employees. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since its establishment in 2008, AFRICOM has increased its footprint in Africa to support its mission—building African partner capabilities and deterring threats to regional security. In tandem with AFRICOM's growing footprint will be a continued reliance on contractors to support the command's operations. Accordingly, AFRICOM and subordinate commands must be able to plan for and integrate OCS during operations. House Report 113-446 included a provision for GAO to review OCS in Africa.
This report examines the extent to which AFRICOM (1) has an organizational structure in place to manage, plan for, and assess OCS; (2) accounts for contractor personnel; and (3) vets non-U.S. contractors and contractor employees. To conduct this work, GAO evaluated AFRICOM's OCS organizational structures and conducted site visits to Djibouti, Niger, and Uganda to collect information on accountability and vetting processes. GAO selected these locations based on the types of contractor employees represented, among other factors.
What GAO Found
U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) has established a formal operational contract support (OCS) organizational structure at its headquarters to serve as the central coordination point to manage, plan for, and assess OCS. However, except for U.S. Army Africa, AFRICOM's subordinate commands do not have OCS organizational structures with dedicated personnel to manage OCS. Officials from AFRICOM's subordinate commands stated that applying OCS concepts would be helpful to avoid duplication of work and increased costs. One structure that the Department of Defense (DOD) has introduced is an OCS Integration Cell, an entity with dedicated personnel to provide staff integration and promote coordination on OCS issues; such a cell could help identify and address gaps at AFRICOM's commands, especially in a joint environment like Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa, where contracting officials stated that some military tenants have arrived without informing responsible officials about the number of contractors accompanying them. AFRICOM has also developed a scorecard to assess OCS management capabilities at the subordinate commands against certain standards, but these assessments have not always been accurate because the standards have not been clearly defined or consistently applied. Without clearly defined assessment standards, AFRICOM cannot accurately assess the OCS actions taken by subordinate commands.
AFRICOM does not have a complete picture of the number of contractor personnel supporting its operations in the region. AFRICOM uses two primary sources—daily personnel status reports and the Synchronized Predeployment and Operational Tracker, a DOD contractor personnel accountability database—to collect contractor personnel accountability information, but neither source provides comprehensive accountability or visibility of DOD contractor personnel on the continent because the total number of local national contractor personnel are not being included in either, and the numbers of U.S. citizen and third country national contractor personnel vary between the two. Without clear guidance on how to comprehensively account for contractor personnel, it will be difficult for AFRICOM to ensure that it has full visibility over who is supporting its operations.
AFRICOM conducts some limited vetting of potential non-U.S. contractors, also referred to as vendors, but it has not established a foreign vendor vetting process or cell that would preemptively identify vendors who support terrorist or other prohibited organizations. AFRICOM has not yet established a foreign vendor vetting cell because while DOD guidance discusses the benefit of a cell, it does not require it or specify under what conditions it would be appropriate. Additionally, DOD sites in Africa use background investigations to determine the trustworthiness of contractor employees with access to DOD facilities. However, not all AFRICOM sites are incorporating additional screening measures, such as biometric screening or counterintelligence interviews, based on the specific risks at each site. As a result, AFRICOM is at risk of not exercising the appropriate level of vendor vetting or contractor employee screening on the African continent to protect DOD personnel from insider threats.
What GAO Recommends
GAO made recommendations to DOD regarding types of contractor personnel to account for, foreign vendor vetting process development, and guidance for contractor accountability and employee screening, among others. DOD generally concurred, but did not concur that AFRICOM should develop contractor accountability guidance because it was in the process of doing so. GAO continues to believe the recommendations are valid, as discussed in this report. |
gao_GAO-14-671T | gao_GAO-14-671T_0 | However, as we have described in numerous reports, although a variety of best practices exist to guide their successful acquisition, federal IT projects too frequently incur cost overruns and schedule slippages while contributing little to mission-related outcomes. Consequently, we recommended, among other things, that OMB improve its guidance to agencies on identifying and categorizing IT investments. In September 2011, we reported that the results of OMB initiatives to identify potentially duplicative investments were mixed and that several federal agencies did not routinely assess their entire IT portfolios to identify and remove or consolidate duplicative systems. Given the importance of transparency, oversight, and management of the government’s IT investments, in June 2009, OMB established a public website, referred to as the IT Dashboard, that provides detailed information on 759 major IT investments at 27 federal agencies, including ratings of their performance against cost and schedule targets. As of June 2014, according to the IT Dashboard, 183 of the federal government’s 759 major IT investments—totaling $10 billion—were in need of management attention (rated “yellow” to indicate the need for attention or “red” to indicate significant concerns). IT Reform Plan. This document established an ambitious plan for achieving operational efficiencies and effectively managing large- scale IT programs. Opportunities Exist to Improve Acquisition and Management of IT Investments
Given the magnitude of the federal government’s annual IT budget, which is expected to be more than $82 billion in fiscal year 2014, it is important that agencies leverage all available opportunities to ensure that their IT investments are acquired in the most effective manner possible. However, we have issued a series of reports highlighting deficiencies with the accuracy and reliability of the data reported on the Dashboard. Further, while we reported in 2011 that the accuracy of Dashboard cost and schedule data had improved over time, more recently, in December 2013, we found that agencies had removed investments from the Dashboard by reclassifying their investments—representing a troubling trend toward decreased transparency and accountability. Additionally, as of December 2013, the public version of the Dashboard was not updated for 15 of the previous 24 months because OMB does not revise it as the President’s budget request is being prepared. Six agencies generally agreed with the report or had no comments and two others did not agree, believing their categorizations were appropriate. In particular, in 2010 OMB called for IT investments to deliver functionality every 12 months, and since 2012 has required investments to deliver functionality every 6 months. Additionally, the weaknesses in agency policies enabled inconsistent implementation of incremental development approaches. Specifically, almost three-quarters of the selected investments we reviewed did not plan to deliver functionality every 6 months and less than half planned to deliver functionality in 12-month cycles. We recommended that OMB develop and issue realistic and clear guidance on incremental development, and that Defense, HHS, DHS, and Transportation update and implement their incremental development policies, once OMB’s guidance is made available. Accordingly, we continued to believe that our recommendations were warranted and can be implemented. In 2013, we reported that OMB and selected agencies had held multiple TechStats, but that additional OMB oversight was needed to ensure that these meetings were having the appropriate impact on underperforming projects and that resulting cost savings were valid. OMB agreed with these two recommendations, and most agencies agreed with our recommendations to them. Agencies’ PortfolioStat Efforts Have the Potential to Save Billions of Dollars OMB launched the PortfolioStat initiative in March 2012, which required 26 executive agencies to, among other things, reduce commodity IT spending and demonstrate how their IT investments align with the agencies’ mission and business functions. In November 2013, we reported on agencies’ efforts to complete key required PortfolioStat actions and make portfolio improvements. Our analysis, which included these estimates, showed that collectively the 26 agencies reported about 200 opportunities and at least $5.8 billion in potential savings through fiscal year 2015—at least $3.3 billion more than the number initially reported by OMB. We made more than 50 recommendations to improve agencies’ implementation of PortfolioStat requirements. OMB partially agreed with our recommendations, and responses from 20 of the agencies commenting on the report varied. Last month, we also reported on OMB’s and agencies’ policies and management of software licenses—one PortfolioStat focus area. We recommended that OMB issue a directive to help guide agencies in managing licenses and made more than 130 recommendations to the 24 agencies to improve their policies and practices for managing licenses. OMB disagreed with the need for a directive. Most agencies generally agreed with the recommendations or had no comments. | Why GAO Did This Study
The federal government reportedly plans to spend at least $82 billion on IT in fiscal year 2014. Given the scale of such planned outlays and the criticality of many of these systems to the health, economy, and security of the nation, it is important that OMB and federal agencies provide appropriate oversight and transparency into these programs and avoid duplicative investments, whenever possible, to ensure the most efficient use of resources.
GAO has previously reported and testified that federal IT projects too frequently fail and incur cost overruns and schedule slippages while contributing little to mission-related outcomes. Numerous best practices and administration initiatives are available for agencies that can help them improve the oversight and management of IT investments.
GAO is testifying today on the results and recommendations from selected reports that focused on how federal IT reform efforts could be improved by more effective IT acquisition and more efficient management of existing IT systems.
What GAO Found
GAO has issued a number of reports on the federal government's efforts to efficiently acquire and manage information technology (IT). While the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and agencies have taken steps to improve federal IT through a number of initiatives, additional actions are needed. For example, OMB's IT Dashboard provides information, including ratings of risk, on 759 major investments at 27 federal agencies. As of June 2014, according to the Dashboard, 576 investments were low or moderately low risk, 147 were medium risk, and 36 were moderately high or high risk. GAO has issued a series of reports on Dashboard accuracy and identified issues with the accuracy and reliability of cost and schedule data. Furthermore, a recent GAO report found that agencies had removed major investments from the Dashboard, representing a troubling trend toward decreased transparency. GAO also reported that, as of December 2013, the public version of the Dashboard was not updated for 15 of the previous 24 months. GAO made recommendations to ensure that the Dashboard includes all major IT investments and to increase its availability. Agencies generally agreed with the report or had no comments.
An additional key reform initiated by OMB emphasizes incremental development in order to reduce investment risk. In 2010 it called for agency investments to deliver functionality every 12 months and since 2012 has required investments to deliver functionality every 6 months. However, GAO recently reported that almost three-quarters of investments reviewed did not plan to deliver capabilities every 6 months and less than half planned to deliver capabilities in 12-month cycles. GAO recommended that OMB develop and issue clearer guidance on incremental development and that selected agencies update and implement their associated policies. Most agencies agreed with GAO recommendations or had no comment. GAO continued to believe that its recommendations were valid.
To better manage existing IT systems, OMB launched the PortfolioStat initiative, which, among other things, requires agencies to conduct annual reviews of their IT portfolio and make decisions on eliminating duplication. GAO reported that agencies continued to identify duplicative spending as part of PortfolioStat and that this initiative had the potential to save at least $5.8 billion through fiscal year 2015, but that weaknesses existed in agencies' implementation of the initiative, such as limitations in the Chief Information Officer's authority. Among other things, GAO made several recommendations to improve agencies' implementation of PortfolioStat requirements. OMB partially agreed with GAO's recommendations and responses from 20 of the agencies varied.
GAO also recently reported on software license management—one PortfolioStat focus area—and determined that better management was needed to achieve significant savings government-wide. In particular, 22 of the 24 major federal agencies did not have comprehensive license policies. GAO recommended that OMB issue needed guidance to agencies and made more than 130 recommendations to the agencies to improve their policies and practices for managing licenses.OMB disagreed with the need for guidance. However, without it the management of agencies' licenses may be weakened. Most agencies generally agreed with the recommendations or had no comments.
What GAO Recommends
GAO has previously made numerous recommendations to OMB and federal agencies on key aspects of IT management, including the IT Dashboard, incremental development approaches, and PortfolioStat implementation, including software license management. |
gao_GAO-05-177T | gao_GAO-05-177T_0 | Background
Influenza is associated with an average of more than 200,000 hospitalizations and 36,000 deaths each year in the United States. People who are aged 65 and older, people of any age with chronic medical conditions, children younger than 2 years, and pregnant women are more likely to get severe complications from influenza than other people. Not everyone in these high-risk and target groups, however, receives a vaccination each year. This nasal spray vaccine is not recommended for individuals at high risk for flu- related complications. Challenges Exist in Ensuring an Adequate and Timely Flu Vaccine Supply
Ensuring an adequate and timely supply of vaccine is a difficult task. If production problems delay or disrupt the availability of vaccine in a given year, the timing for an individual provider to obtain flu vaccine may depend on which manufacturer’s vaccine it ordered. This happened in the 2000-2001 season, and there are reports of similar problems this season after one manufacturer that had previously stated it expected to supply 46 million to 48 million doses announced that it would not deliver any flu vaccine to the U.S. market. When vaccine supply is limited relative to public demand for flu vaccinations, distributors and others who have supplies of the vaccine have the ability—and the economic incentive—to sell their supplies to the highest bidders rather than filling the lower priced orders they had already received. Following the 2000-2001 flu season, HHS undertook several initiatives to address supply and demand of flu vaccine and to protect high-risk individuals from flu-related complications when vaccine is in short supply. For the 2004-2005 flu season, despite early indications that one manufacturer was having production difficulties, CDC published guidance in September 2004 stating that it did not envision any need for tiered vaccination recommendations or prioritization of vaccine for those at higher risk of flu-related complications. Following the suspension of one manufacturer’s license and the announcement it would not supply any vaccine to the U.S. market this season, CDC revised its recommendations and took steps to mitigate the vaccine shortage. Although HHS has limited authority to control flu vaccine distribution, upon learning that nearly half of the nation’s expected flu vaccine supply was in jeopardy, it took steps to help direct the available vaccine to help providers get some vaccine for their high-risk patients. There are other media reports of anxious seniors unable to get vaccinated in a timely fashion. We are beginning new work to analyze this year’s vaccine shortage and the federal response. Under this system, some providers can be left with little immediate recourse for meeting the needs of those most at risk. | Why GAO Did This Study
Influenza is associated with an average of 36,000 deaths and more than 200,000 hospitalizations each year in the United States. Persons who are aged 65 and older, people with chronic medical conditions, children younger than 2 years, and pregnant women are more likely to get severe complications from influenza than other people. The best way to prevent influenza is to be vaccinated each fall. In early October 2004, one major manufacturer of flu vaccine for the United States announced that its facility's license had been temporarily suspended and it would not be releasing any vaccine for the 2004-2005 flu season. Because this manufacturer was expected to produce roughly one-half of the U.S. flu vaccine supply, the shortage resulting from its announcement has led to concern about the availability of flu vaccine, especially to those at high risk for flu-related complications. GAO was asked to discuss issues related to the supply, demand, and distribution of vaccine for this flu season in the context of the current shortage. GAO based this testimony on products we have issued since May 2001, as well as work we conducted to update key information.
What GAO Found
The current vaccine shortage demonstrates the challenges to ensuring an adequate and timely flu vaccine supply. Only three manufacturers produce flu vaccine for the U.S. market, and the potential for future manufacturing problems such as those experienced both this year and to a lesser degree in previous years is still present. When shortages occur, their effect can be exacerbated by the existing distribution system. Under this system, health providers and vaccine distributors generally order a particular manufacturer's vaccine and have limited recourse, even for meeting the needs of high-risk persons, if that manufacturer's production is adversely affected. By contrast, providers who purchased vaccine from a different manufacturer might receive more of their order and be able to vaccinate their high-risk patients. The current situation also reflects another concern: the nation lacks a systematic approach for ensuring that seniors and others at high risk for flu-related complications receive flu vaccine when it is in short supply. Once this year's shortage became apparent, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) took a number of steps to influence distribution patterns to help providers get some vaccine for their high-risk patients. These steps are still playing themselves out, and it will take more time to assess how well they will work. Problems have not been totally averted, however, as there have been media reports of long lines to obtain limited doses of vaccine and of high-risk individuals unable to find a flu vaccination in a timely fashion. |
gao_GAO-01-835 | gao_GAO-01-835_0 | GSA maintains information on the investment needs for public buildings and the Army Corps maintains information on the investment needs for water resources (inland and deep draft navigation, flood control, and shore protection), hydropower, water supply and wastewater treatment. Some estimates—for water resources, hydropower, and public buildings—are developed for federal spending; the other estimates are developed for spending from federal, state, and local sources. Agencies Have Identified Vast Amounts of Investment Estimates
The seven agencies identified investment amounts that vary from GSA’s estimate of $4.58 billion over 1 to 5 years to repair public buildings to FHWA’s estimate of $83.4 billion each year over 20 years to preserve and improve the nation’s highways. The investment estimates cannot be easily compared or simply “added up” to produce a national estimate of all infrastructure investment needs because of differences in the methods used, time periods covered, and funding sources. Estimates Used Data From Local, State, or Regional Sources
Each of the seven agencies used data from various localities, states, or agency regional offices and aggregated those data to produce a national estimate for infrastructure investment. None of the agencies we reviewed had procedures for all eight of the leading practices. Key contacts and major contributors to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our report focuses on infrastructure investment estimates compiled by six federal agencies—the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Federal Highway Administration (FHWA), Federal Transit Administration (FTA), and General Services Administration (GSA)—and the Appalachian Regional Commission (ARC). (2) To what extent do the agencies’ procedures for developing the estimates embody practices of leading government and private-sector organizations? FTA estimated that the average cost for these four scenarios ranged from $10.8 billion to $16.0 billion per year (in constant 1997 dollars). | Why GAO Did This Study
A sound public infrastructure plays a vital role in encouraging a more productive and competitive national economy and meeting public demands for safety, health, and improved quality of life. The federal government has spent an average of $149 billion (in constant 1998 dollars) annually since the late 1980s on the nation's infrastructure. Little is known, however, about the comparability and reasonableness of individual agencies' estimates for infrastructure needs. This report discusses infrastructure investment or "needs" estimates compiled by seven agencies--the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA), the Federal Transit Administration (FTA), the General Services Administration (GSA), and the Appalachian Regional Commission (ARC). GAO focuses on the following infrastructure areas: water resources (inland and deep draft navigation, flood control, and shore protection), hydropower, water supply, wastewater treatment, airports, highways, mass transit, and public buildings.
What GAO Found
GAO found that the agencies' estimates for infrastructure investments ranged from GSA's calculation of $4.58 billion (in current dollars) over one to five years to repair public buildings to FHWA's estimate of $83.4 billion (in constant 1997 dollars) per year over 20 years to improve highways. The estimates prepared by the Army Corps (for water resources and hydropower) and GSA are for federal spending; the other estimates are for spending from federal, state, and local sources. Each of the seven agencies developed their investment estimate using data from localities, states, or agency regional offices. The estimates, however, were developed using different analytical procedures. The investment estimates cannot be easily compared or simply "added up" to produce a national estimate of infrastructure investment needs because of differences in the methods used, time periods covered, and spending sources. Each of the seven agencies has procedures for developing infrastructure investment estimates that reflect eight practices used by leading government and private sector organizations. No agency has procedures for all eight leading practices. |
gao_GAO-08-593 | gao_GAO-08-593_0 | NNSA Met Its Cost and Schedule Goals but Did Not Establish Clear, Consistent Goals for the Number and Type of W88 Pits It Planned to Produce
NNSA achieved its major goals for reestablishing its pit manufacturing capability at LANL as defined by the agency in 2002. In addition, NNSA estimated that pit manufacturing and certification expenditures for fiscal years 2001 through 2007 would be about $1.55 billion. Finally, NNSA’s cost estimate did not include a portion of over $1 billion in costs for other activities that were needed to support the production of pits, as well as a wide variety of other defense- related activities, at LANL for fiscal years 2001 through 2007. NNSA Met Its 2002 Schedule and Cost Goals
According to NNSA officials, LANL first identified the activities necessary to manufacture and certify a W88 pit in a 1998 project plan entitled, “Integrated Pit Manufacturing and Certification Program Plan.” According to the plan, the pit manufacturing mission would require a total of about $1.25 billion for fiscal years 1996 through 2007 to fund three types of activities: (1) establishing the capability to manufacture W88 pits, (2) construction projects to support the pit manufacturing mission, and (3) engineering and physics tests to certify the LANL-produced W88 pits. NNSA Did Not Establish Clear, Consistent Requirements for W88 Pit Production
While LANL’s 2001 plan contained goals related to a capability to manufacture 10 W88 pits per year and the delivery of a single war reserve pit to the stockpile, the 2001 plan did not define NNSA’s requirements for the total number of war reserve W88 pits that LANL needed to manufacture. According to NNSA officials, other types of pits, such as pits that are destructively tested as part of production quality control, may not meet the same standards and may be of lower production quality. Several Factors Constrain NNSA’s Ability to Increase Its Pit Manufacturing Capacity
Because of three major constraints on pit manufacturing operations at LANL, NNSA will not be able to substantively increase its pit manufacturing capacity for the foreseeable future. First, LANL’s existing facility for performing analytical chemistry has major operational and structural limitations. Second, LANL’s ability to store pits and associated waste is constrained by limited vault space. In particular, this program is responsible for facility operations and maintenance and addressing environment, safety, and health issues. NNSA Has Not Established a Cost and Schedule Baseline for Its Future Pit Manufacturing Mission
NNSA’s plans for future pit manufacturing are still being developed and, as a result, no reliable cost estimates exist. Over the past few years, NNSA and DOD had planned to develop the capability to produce RRW pits beginning about 2014. While NNSA and DOD continue to support the RRW program, in the short run, NNSA plans to maintain the existing pit manufacturing capability at LANL. Over the long term, NNSA is planning, with DOD’s concurrence, to upgrade the PF-4 facility to achieve a production capacity of up to 80 pits per year. However, NNSA has not established a cost and schedule baseline to support its projected efforts. Specifically, in its fiscal year 2009 budget request to Congress, NNSA stated that three of its key objectives for the pit manufacturing mission were to (1) establish the capability to manufacture replacement pits for warheads other than the W88, (2) improve manufacturing processes used to manufacture all pit types, and (3) develop the processes and equipment necessary to manufacture pits for future requirements. In October 2006, NNSA offered a new proposal to address the need for a large-scale pit manufacturing facility. NNSA’s plans also call for spending hundreds of millions of dollars to install a second manufacturing line for producing pits. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) is responsible for manufacturing pits, a key component in a nuclear warhead. The department lost its ability to manufacture pits in 1989 with the closing of the Rocky Flats Plant. In 1996, the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) was directed to reestablish a pit manufacturing capability, starting with a limited number of pits for the W88 warhead. In recent years, NNSA has considered ways to increase its pit manufacturing capacity, including building a new, large-scale pit manufacturing facility. It has also proposed producing pits for the Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW). GAO was asked to determine the (1) extent to which NNSA achieved its major goals for reestablishing its pit manufacturing capability, (2) factors that currently constrain its ability to increase its pit manufacturing capacity, and (3) status of its plans for future pit manufacturing. For this review, GAO met with NNSA and LANL officials, reviewed agency documents, and visited the nuclear facility used to manufacture pits.
What GAO Found
NNSA achieved its major goals for reestablishing its pit manufacturing capability at LANL as defined by the agency in 2002. Specifically, NNSA's goals were to create a capability to manufacture 10 pits per year starting in 2007 and to deliver a single W88 war reserve pit to the stockpile in 2007. War reserve pits must meet stringent specifications, while other types of pits, such as pits destructively tested for production quality control, may not meet the same standards. NNSA estimated that this effort would cost about $1.55 billion for fiscal years 2001 through 2007. According to NNSA, LANL produced 11 pits in 2007, eight of which were W88 war reserve pits, and spent about $1.29 billion for fiscal years 2001 through 2007. However, GAO found that NNSA did not establish clear, consistent goals for the number of W88 war reserve pits it planned to produce. Specifically, some NNSA documents, including budget requests to Congress, called for delivering 10 W88 war reserve pits per year starting in 2007. In addition, NNSA's cost estimate did not include estimates for a variety of activities that directly and indirectly supported the pit manufacturing mission at LANL between 2001 and 2007. These support activities, which included scientific experiments and facility operations and maintenance, totaled over $1 billion. Because of three major constraints on pit manufacturing operations at LANL, NNSA will not be able to substantively increase its current pit manufacturing capacity for the foreseeable future. Specifically, GAO found that LANL's building for performing analytical chemistry, which deals with the separation and identification of the components in a pit sample, has major operational and structural limitations. LANL's ability to store pits and associated waste is also constrained by limited vault storage space. Finally, a lack of available floor space in LANL's main nuclear facility limits its ability to install a large-scale, efficient production line for manufacturing pits. NNSA's plans for future pit manufacturing are still being developed and, as a result, no reliable cost estimates exist. Originally, NNSA and the Department of Defense (DOD) had planned to develop the capability to produce RRW pits beginning about 2014, pending the outcome of a RRW design definition and cost study in 2008. However, in fiscal year 2008 all of NNSA's RRW funding was eliminated. While NNSA and DOD continue to support the RRW program, in the short run, NNSA plans to maintain the existing pit manufacturing capability at LANL. Over the long term, NNSA is planning, with DOD's concurrence, to upgrade the existing LANL facility to achieve a production capacity of up to 80 pits per year. However, NNSA has not established a cost and schedule baseline to support its projected effort. |
gao_GAO-10-304 | gao_GAO-10-304_0 | Iraq’s Estimated Actual and Available Cumulative Budget Surplus through the End of 2009
Iraq generated an estimated cumulative budget surplus of $52.1 billion through 2009, according to GAO’s analysis of data provided by the Iraqi government. Adjusting for $40.3 billion in advances that were outstanding as of September 2009 reduces the amount of available surplus to $11.8 billion. Iraq’s Board of Supreme Audit has highlighted weaknesses in Iraq’s accounting for a large and growing amount of advances. The composition of advances is unclear. A senior Ministry of Finance official stated that advances include funds set aside for FMS purchases and letters of credit as well as advance payments to contractors. However, 40 percent of total outstanding advances through 2008 was categorized as “other temporary advances,” which are not fully defined (see app. Under the terms of the IMF arrangement, Iraq has committed to completing this report by September 30, 2010. Iraq’s Financial Deposit Balances
Iraqi government data and an independent audit report show that, through the end of 2009, Iraq had accumulated between $15.3 billion and $32.2 billion in financial deposit balances held at the Central Bank of Iraq, the Development Fund for Iraq in New York, and state-owned banks in Iraq. Ministry of Finance Reclassified $16.9 Billion of $32.2 Billion in Deposits as Encumbered and Not Available to the Iraqi Government
Data from the Central Bank of Iraq and the International Advisory and Monitoring Board show that Iraq began 2010 with $32.2 billion in financial deposits held at state-owned banks in Iraq, the Central Bank of Iraq, and the U.S. Federal Reserve Bank’s Development Fund for Iraq account (see table 2). The IMF is seeking greater clarity on the amount of Iraq’s financial deposits that is unencumbered and available for government spending. Under the terms of Iraq’s February 2010 arrangement with the IMF, the Ministry of Finance is required to complete a review of all central government accounts in the banking system, reconcile them with Iraqi Treasury records, and return any idle balances received from the budget to the central Iraqi Treasury. Iraq Has Increased Its Spending on Security but Did Not Use All of Its Available Funds
Iraqi government data show that the Iraqi security ministries have increased their spending from 2005 through 2009 and set aside about $5.5 billion to purchase equipment, training, and services under the FMS program. Iraq’s Security Ministries Have Not Fully Used Available Resources, and Funding for I-CERP Has Fallen Short of Expectations
Our analysis of data from the Iraqi Ministries of Finance, Defense, and Interior; DSCA; and the Trade Bank of Iraq indicated that—despite increases in spending by the security ministries since 2005—the Ministries of Defense and Interior did not spend or set aside between $2.5 billion and $5.2 billion that could have been applied to Iraq’s security needs (see table 8). The Administration Is Requesting $2 Billion in Additional Funds for the Iraqi Military and Police Forces
In February 2010, the administration submitted a budget request for $3 billion in additional U.S. funding to provide training, equipment, and other services to the Iraqi military and police forces. Matter for Congressional Consideration
To ensure that Iraq continues to spend its own resources on security costs, Congress should consider Iraq’s available financial resources when reviewing (1) a fiscal year 2011 budget request and (2) potential future funding requests to support the Iraqi security forces. Recommendation for Executive Action
We recommend that the Departments of State and the Treasury work with the Iraqi government to further identify Iraqi resources available for future spending. We a Agency (DSCA) on funds set aside by the Iraqi government for U.S. Foreign Military Sales (FMS) purchases. 5). First, Iraq has agreed to prepare a report on its outstanding advances, identify those that are recoverable, and set a schedule for their recovery. This review was due to be completed by March 31, 2010, but, according to the IMF, it was still under way as of August 2010. The Board of Supreme Audit raised concerns about all advances, despite our attempt to independently corroborate a portion of these advances. Rather, as we point out in comment 3, we report a range for Iraq’s available financial deposits on the basis of a discrepancy between the amount of government-sector deposits reported by the Central Bank of Iraq to the IMF and the amount that the Ministry of Finance asserted is available for government spending. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since 2003, the United States has reported obligating $642 billion for U.S. military operations in Iraq and provided about $24 billion for training, equipment, and other services for Iraqi security forces. To assist Congress in overseeing efforts to encourage the Iraqi government to contribute more toward the cost of securing and stabilizing Iraq, this report provides information on (1) the amount and availability of Iraq's budget surplus or deficit, (2) the amount of Iraq's financial deposit balances, and (3) the extent to which Iraq has spent its financial resources on security costs. To conduct this audit, GAO analyzed Iraqi financial data, reviewed U.S. and Iraqi documents, and interviewed U.S. and Iraqi officials.
What GAO Found
GAO analysis of Iraqi government data showed that Iraq generated an estimated cumulative budget surplus of $52.1 billion through the end of 2009. This estimate is consistent with the method that Iraq uses to calculate its fiscal position. Adjusting for $40.3 billion in estimated outstanding advances as of September 2009 reduces the amount of available surplus funds to $11.8 billion. In April 2010, a senior Ministry of Finance official stated that advances should be deducted from the budget surplus because they are committed for future expenditures or have been paid out. According to this official and Board of Supreme Audit reports on Iraq's financial statements, advances include funds for letters of credit, advance payments on domestic contracts, and other advances. However, Iraq's Board of Supreme Audit has raised concerns that weaknesses in accounting for advances could result in the misappropriation of government funds and inaccurate reporting of expenditures. Furthermore, the composition of some of these advances is unclear; about 40 percent of the outstanding advances through 2008 are defined as "other temporary advances." Under the terms of a February 2010 International Monetary Fund (IMF) arrangement, Iraq agreed to prepare a report on its outstanding advances, which will identify those advances that are recoverable and could be used for future spending, and set a time schedule for their recovery. This Iraqi report is to be completed by September 30, 2010. Another means of assessing Iraq's fiscal position is to examine its financial deposit balances. Iraqi government data and an independent audit report show that, through the end of 2009, Iraq had accumulated between $15.3 billion and $32.2 billion in financial deposit balances held at the Central Bank of Iraq, the Development Fund for Iraq in New York, and state-owned banks in Iraq. This range reflects a discrepancy between the amount of government-sector deposits reported by the Central Bank of Iraq to the IMF and the amount that the Ministry of Finance asserts is available for government spending. In November 2009, the Ministry of Finance reclassified $16.9 billion in state-owned banks as belonging to state-owned enterprises and trusts, leaving $15.3 billion of $32.2 billion available to the Iraqi government for other spending. The IMF is seeking clarification on the amount of financial deposits that is available for government spending. Under the terms of Iraq's 2010 arrangement with the IMF, the Ministry of Finance is required to complete a review of all central government accounts and return any idle balances received from the budget to the central Iraqi Treasury by March 31, 2010. As of August 2010, according to the IMF, this review was still under way. Iraqi government data show that Iraq's security ministries--the Ministries of Defense and Interior--increased their spending from 2005 through 2009 and set aside about $5.5 billion for purchases through the U.S. Foreign Military Sales program. However, over this 5-year period, these ministries did not use between $2.5 billion and $5.2 billion of their budgeted funds that could have been used to address security needs. The administration is requesting $2 billion in additional U.S. funding in its fiscal year 2011 budget request to support the training and equipping of Iraq's military and police. GAO believes that Congress should consider Iraq's available financial resources when reviewing the administration's fiscal year 2011 budget request and any future funding requests for securing and stabilizing Iraq. Also, GAO recommends that the Departments of State and the Treasury work with the Iraqi government to further identify available resources. |
gao_GAO-11-428T | gao_GAO-11-428T_0 | USPS’s Financial Condition Continues to Deteriorate, and USPS May Face a Cash Shortfall This Fiscal Year
USPS’s financial condition has deteriorated significantly since fiscal year 2006, and its financial outlook is grim in both the short- and long-term. USPS experienced a net loss of $329 million in the first quarter of fiscal year 2011 and is projecting a $6.4 billion total net loss for fiscal year 2011. In February 2011, we retained USPS on our updated high-risk list and reported that USPS finds itself without sufficient revenues to cover its expenses and financial obligations (see table 1). Mail volumes have generally been decreasing as customers have increasingly shifted to electronic communications and payment alternatives (see fig. For fiscal year 2011, USPS has not updated its financial projections based on its first quarter results and it still plans to borrow an additional $3 billion—an increase that would place USPS at its $15 billion statutory limit and prevent it from further borrowing in fiscal year 2012 absent congressional action. The President’s Fiscal Year 2012 Budget Request also proposes changes that, if enacted, would provide USPS with over $4.5 billion in short-term financial relief for fiscal year 2011. The remaining relief would come from reducing USPS’s obligation for future funding of retirement payments to the Federal Employees Retirement System (FERS). Actions Are Urgently Needed to Modernize and Restructure USPS to Achieve Financial Viability
Considering USPS’s important role, action is urgently needed to facilitate its financial viability as USPS cannot support its current level of service and operations. Congress, USPS, the administration, and stakeholders need to reach agreement on a package of actions to restore USPS’s financial viability and take steps to modernize and restructure it. Realign operations, networks, and workforce: USPS’s operations, networks, and workforce need to be realigned with the changes in mail usage and customer behavior, as USPS now has costly excess capacity. USPS also consulted with its three management associations. What impact would changes to these premiums have on USPS and its employees? As we reported in 2010, Congress should consider modifying USPS’s retiree health benefit payments in a fiscally responsible manner. Less attention has been given to more positive aspects of USPS’s plans to modernize its retail services, which it believes will improve customer access and convenience while reducing costs and improving efficiency. In a recently issued report on strategies and initiatives foreign posts have used to modernize their delivery and retail networks, we discussed some lessons learned that could inform USPS’s modernization efforts. Although the foreign posts we reviewed reported that changing how postal services were provided was challenging, they also found that outreach and communication strategies helped to inform public officials and customers of increased access to products and services and to gain acceptance for retail network changes. A few foreign posts developed labor transition plans or strategies under which they provided training, relocation and job search services, and financial incentives to support employees who were negatively affected by the modernizations. While USPS has taken steps in the past year to generate ideas for modernizing its retail and delivery networks, the experiences of foreign posts suggest that it will be critically important for USPS to fully develop and implement similar outreach, communication, and labor transition strategies. U.S. Postal Service: Strategies and Options to Facilitate Progress toward Financial Viability. U.S. U.S. | Why GAO Did This Study
The U.S. Postal Service's (USPS) financial condition and outlook are deteriorating because revenues are not sufficient to cover its expenses and financial obligations. These challenges continue to threaten USPS's financial viability and GAO has therefore retained USPS on its high risk list issued in February 2011. USPS also faces cost pressures from maintaining a national network of processing, retail, and delivery operations. This testimony discusses (1) updated information on USPS's financial condition and outlook and (2) actions needed to modernize and restructure USPS. It is based primarily on GAO's past and ongoing work, as well as GAO's review of USPS's recent financial results and the President's proposed budget for fiscal year 2012.
What GAO Found
USPS experienced a net loss of $329 million in the first quarter of fiscal year 2011 and is projecting a $6.4 billion total net loss for fiscal year 2011. Mail volumes, USPS's main revenue source, have generally been decreasing as customers have shifted to electronic alternatives. This trend exposes weaknesses in USPS's business model, which has relied on mail volume growth to help cover costs. While USPS continues to reduce employees' work hours, its cost reduction efforts have not been sufficient to offset lost revenue. Since fiscal year 2006, USPS has relied on debt to help cover its obligations. If it borrows $3 billion in fiscal year 2011 as its plans indicate, USPS will reach its $15 billion statutory debt limit. The President's Fiscal Year 2012 Budget Request proposes providing USPS with over $4.5 billion in short-term financial relief in fiscal year 2011 by reducing its retiree health benefit payment by $4 billion and reimbursing it for approximately $550 million in Federal Employee Retirement System payments. While useful, these actions would not sufficiently address USPS's structural problems. USPS's financial condition has reached a tipping point. Given USPS's role in facilitating key aspects of the U.S. economy, Congress, the administration, USPS, and stakeholders need to reach agreement on a package of actions to restore USPS's financial viability, facilitate progress toward modernizing its services to meet changing customer needs, and remove barriers restricting USPS actions. This would allow USPS to optimize its networks and workforce so that it can become more efficient and reduce costs. GAO recently reported on lessons learned from foreign posts' modernization efforts, including using outreach and communication strategies to inform public officials and customers of increased access to products and services to help gain acceptance for retail network changes. Some posts also developed labor transition strategies that included training, relocation, job search services, and financial incentives to support employees who were negatively affected. While USPS has taken steps to generate ideas for modernizing its retail and delivery networks, the experiences of foreign posts suggest that it will be critically important for USPS to fully develop and implement similar outreach, communication, and labor transition strategies. While this testimony contains no new recommendations, GAO has reported that Congress, the administration, and USPS urgently need to reach agreement on a package of actions to restore USPS's financial viability by modernizing its operations, networks, and workforce. GAO has also recommended that Congress consider providing USPS with financial relief, and in doing so, consider all options available to reduce costs. In commenting on this statement, USPS generally agreed with its accuracy and provided technical comments that were incorporated as appropriate. |
gao_GAO-11-523 | gao_GAO-11-523_0 | The Marine Corps Has a Reset Strategy for Aviation Equipment Used in Afghanistan and Plans to Develop a Reset Strategy for Ground Equipment
Aviation Equipment Reset Strategy Incorporates Elements Needed for a Comprehensive, Results- Oriented Framework
The Marine Corps has developed an annual aviation plan and an aviation reset program policy that together constitute its reset strategy for aviation equipment used in Afghanistan. The Marine Corps is taking steps to develop a strategy addressing the reset of ground equipment used in Afghanistan; however, the timeline for completing and issuing this strategy is uncertain. Although Marine Corps officials agreed that a reset strategy for ground equipment will be needed, they stated that they do not plan to issue a strategy until there is a better understanding of the dates for initial and final drawdown of forces from Afghanistan. While more specific and certain drawdown information is desirable and will be needed to firm-up reset plans, the President stated that troops would begin to withdraw in July 2011, working towards a complete transfer of all security operations to Afghan National Security Forces by 2014. Until the reset strategy is issued, establishing firm plans for reset may be difficult for the Marine Corps Logistics Command to effectively manage the rotation of equipment to units to sustain combat operations or meet the equipment needs of a newly defined post- Afghanistan Marine Corps force structure. It is also uncertain to what extent the Marine Corps plans to align its ground equipment reset strategy with its ground equipment modernization plan. In contrast, we found that the Iraq reset strategy for ground equipment contained no direct reference to the service’s equipment modernization plans. However, this indirect linkage does not provide a clear relationship between reset and modernization. A clear alignment of the ground equipment reset strategy for Afghanistan and modernization plan would help to ensure that the identification, development, and integration of warfighting capabilities also factor in equipment reset strategies so that equipment planned for modernization is not unnecessarily repaired. Differing Definitions for Reset May Result in Inaccurate or Inconsistent Estimates of Total Reset Costs
The total costs of reset estimated by the Marine Corps may not be accurate or consistent because of differing definitions of reset that have been used for aviation and ground equipment. These differing definitions exist because DOD has not established a single standard definition for use in DOD’s budget process. According to Marine Corps officials, procurement costs are excluded because such costs are not consistent with its definition of aviation equipment reset. In contrast, the Marine Corps’ definition of reset for ground equipment includes procurement costs to replace theater losses. Although the Marine Corps excludes procurement costs when estimating aviation equipment reset costs, we found that the Director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation had obtained a procurement cost estimate for Marine Corps aviation equipment as part of its efforts to track reset costs for the department. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve the Marine Corps’ ability to plan, budget for, and execute the reset of ground equipment used in Afghanistan, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Commandant of the Marine Corps to take the following two actions: Establish a timeline for completing and issuing formal reset planning guidance and a ground equipment reset strategy for equipment used in Afghanistan that allows operating force units and the Marine Corps Logistics Command to effectively manage equipment reset. To improve oversight and ensure consistency in the reporting of total reset costs, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), in coordination with the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisitions, Technology and Logistics, the services, and the Joint Staff to act on the tasking in the Resource Management Decision 700 to develop and publish a DOD definition of reset for use in the DOD overseas contingency operations budgeting process. | Why GAO Did This Study
The U.S. Marine Corps received approximately $16 billion in appropriated funds between fiscal years 2006 and 2010 for reset of aviation and ground equipment that has been degraded, damaged, and destroyed during oversees contingency operations. Reset encompasses activities for repairing, upgrading, or replacing equipment used in contingency operations. The Marine Corps continues to request funding to reset equipment used in Afghanistan. GAO initiated this review under its authority to address significant issues of broad interest to the Congress. GAO's objectives were to evaluate the extent to which the Marine Corps has made progress toward (1) developing effective reset strategies for both aviation and ground equipment used in Afghanistan and (2) providing accurate estimates of total reset costs.
What GAO Found
The Marine Corps has developed a strategic plan that addresses the reset of aviation equipment used in operations in Afghanistan and includes the elements of a comprehensive, results-oriented strategic planning framework. However, a reset strategy for ground equipment has not yet been developed. The Marine Corps is taking steps to develop such a strategy; however, the timeline for completing and issuing this strategy is uncertain. Although Marine Corps officials agreed that a reset strategy for ground equipment will be needed, they stated that they do not plan to issue a strategy until there is a better understanding of the dates for drawdown of forces from Afghanistan. While more specific drawdown information is desirable and will be needed to firm up reset plans, the President stated that troops would begin to withdraw in July 2011, working towards a transfer of all security operations to Afghan National Security Forces by 2014. Until the ground equipment reset strategy is issued, establishing firm plans for reset may be difficult for the Marine Corps Logistics Command to effectively manage the rotation of equipment to units to sustain combat operations. It is also uncertain to what extent the Marine Corps plans to align its ground equipment reset strategy with its ground equipment modernization plan. GAO found that the Iraq reset strategy for ground equipment contained no direct reference to the service's equipment modernization plans, leaving unclear the relationship between reset and modernization. A clear alignment of the ground equipment reset strategy for Afghanistan and modernization plans would help to ensure that the identification, development, and integration of warfighting capabilities also factor in equipment reset strategies so that equipment planned for modernization is not unnecessarily repaired. The total costs of reset estimated by the Marine Corps may not be accurate or consistent because of differing definitions of reset that have been used for aviation and ground equipment. These differing definitions exist because Department of Defense (DOD) has not established a single standard definition for use in DOD's budget process. Specifically, the Marine Corps does not include aviation equipment procurement costs when estimating total reset costs. According to Marine Corps officials, procurement costs are excluded because such costs are not consistent with its definition of aviation equipment reset. In contrast, the Marine Corps' definition of reset for ground equipment includes procurement costs to replace theater losses. However, GAO found that the Office of the Secretary of Defense Director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation had obtained a procurement cost estimate for Marine Corps aviation equipment as part of its efforts to track reset costs for the department. DOD's Resource Management Decision 700 tasks the Office of the Secretary of Defense Director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation to provide annual departmentwide reset updates.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense (1) establish a timeline for issuing formal reset planning guidance and a ground equipment reset strategy for equipment used in operations in Afghanistan, (2) provide linkages between the ground equipment reset strategy and the modernization plan, and (3) develop and publish a DOD definition of reset for use in the DOD overseas contingency operations budgeting process. DOD concurred with one and partially concurred with two of the recommendations. |
gao_GAO-07-1131 | gao_GAO-07-1131_0 | Background
Millions of individuals arrive in the United States every year and undergo an inspection to ensure they are entering the country lawfully and not transporting any illegal goods or harmful pests and prohibited agricultural products. Prior to the creation of DHS in 2003, passengers were required to undergo separate customs, immigration, and agriculture quarantine inspections (AQI), which were performed by the United States Customs Service, the United States Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), and APHIS. The fees are still governed by separate, dissimilar authorizing legislation and are administered by multiple executive branch agencies and overseen by multiple congressional committees. Finally, airports and airlines play an important role in both facilitating inspections and in fee collection and remittance, but they have limited substantive interaction with the three agencies. This contributes to misunderstandings, skepticism, and confusion about how the fees work and what activities they may fund. A Complicated Network of Decision Makers Administer and Oversee These Fees
Although the passenger inspections themselves have largely been consolidated, administrative authority remains divided. However, stakeholders report that these disjointed mechanisms for two-way communication are insufficient. As a result, they feel they lack data necessary to know whether the passenger inspection fees are set fairly or accurately, or are being spent on the appropriate activities. First of all, by statute, the customs fees are available for limited purposes. Even if all the costs were reimburseable, according to CBP, the fees collected still would not cover the full inspection costs. Therefore, under current law not all activities that may be funded from the customs fee (see table 4) are necessarily associated with conducting air passenger inspections (see table 5), and not all inspection activities are reimbursable, that is, can be covered by funds from the user fee account. Therefore, CBP cannot match the fees paid to individual passengers. According to CBP officials many foreign-owned airlines already remit the fees based on passengers transported, though these payments are in violation of the statute, and the International Air Transport Association (IATA) reports that the manifest-based remittance system is common in other countries that collect similar fees. In addition, airlines that do not remit the customs fee timely—or not at all—are charged liquidated damages for breach of bond conditions that are equal to twice the fee amount owed for each violation, whether it is the first violation or a repeat violation. CBP is also authorized to deny landing rights if the airline does not remit customs and immigration fees. These issues should be considered regardless of whether the fees are consolidated. Recommendations for Executive Action
We recommend that the Secretaries of Agriculture and Homeland Security take the following seven actions: direct CBP, ICE, and APHIS to make information on the estimated cost of inspections as well as the basis for these cost estimates readily available to affected parties to improve the transparency and credibility—and hence the acceptance by stakeholders and payers—of the processes for setting, collecting, and distributing the fees; direct CBP, ICE, and APHIS to collaborate on agendas, presentations, and discussions with stakeholders for the CBP Airport and Seaport Inspections User Fee Advisory Committee (Advisory Committee) meetings in order to improve the usefulness of these meetings for both agencies and fee stakeholders; consolidate reporting of the passenger inspection fees, to include the activities and proportion of fees for which CBP, ICE, and APHIS are each responsible to provide a comprehensive picture of the user fees supporting the passenger inspection process; develop a legislative proposal in consultation with Congress on a consolidated, graduated penalty system that reflects airline payment history and includes specific administrative procedures regarding when penalties should be invoked in order to improve the effectiveness of the tools for enforcing payment of passenger inspection fees; develop a legislative proposal in consultation with Congress on a single, common set of airline record-keeping requirements for all three passenger inspection fees that reflects the consolidated audit function for these fees and reduces the administrative burden on airlines; develop a legislative proposal in consultation with Congress to eliminate key differences among the fourth quarter remittance requirement for the immigration fee; and develop and implement common assumptions used to forecast the collections of agriculture quarantine inspection activities in order to more closely tie the fee rate to CBP’s and APHIS’s agriculture fee distribution to actual collections. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of this report were to identify how the three separate passenger inspection user fees are set, collected, and distributed and the benefits and challenges of this process for agencies and stakeholders, and implications of consolidating these fees under the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). | Why GAO Did This Study
International air passengers arriving in the United States are subject to an inspection to ensure they possess legal entry and immigration documents and do not bring in contraband, such as illegal drugs, counterfeit goods, or harmful pests and prohibited agriculture products. With the creation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in 2003, the customs, immigration, and agriculture inspections activities were integrated into one program led by DHS's office of Customs and Border Protection (CBP). However, the three fees--whose collections totaled about $1 billion in fiscal year 2006--linked to these inspections remain statutorily distinct and are coadministered by CBP, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), both within DHS, and the Department of Agriculture's Animal Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS). GAO was asked to examine how the fees are set, collected, and distributed, and the benefits and challenges of this process to agencies and stakeholders, including implications of consolidating these fees under the authority of DHS.
What GAO Found
The process of setting, collecting, and distributing separate, dissimilar fees creates challenges for agencies and stakeholders. Although air passenger inspections were integrated within CBP, the fees supporting these inspections were created and are still governed by separate, dissimilar authorizing legislation. Two fee amounts are set in statute and one is set by regulation; all are collected by the airlines, deposited into three separate accounts and distributed among the agencies. As a result, the fees are administered and overseen by a complicated network of executive branch agencies and congressional committees, creating a series of challenges. For example, neither CBP nor ICE know whether the fees collected are recovering the full cost of the immigration inspection activities or whether the fees are properly divided between them, because ICE does not have finalized cost calculations for its inspection-related activities. In addition, certain passengers are exempt from some fees but not others, making it difficult for agencies to administer the fees. Further, although airports and airlines play an important role in facilitating inspections and the process of collecting and remitting the fees, opportunities for two-way communication are fragmented and limited, reducing stakeholder buy-in and acceptance of the fees and contributing to confusion about how the three fees work and what activities they may fund. Other challenges are due to the statutory structure of the individual passenger inspection fees. For example, the customs inspection fees are available for limited purposes: not all reimbursable activities may be associated with inspections, and not all inspection activities are reimbursable. However, CBP officials said even if the customs fees were spent on inspection-related activities, they still would only recover about 72 percent of costs in fiscal year 2006. Therefore, customs inspection-related activities are mainly funded by appropriations from general revenues. Further, without auditing each airline, CBP cannot independently verify the amount owed by airlines, partly because airlines are required to remit the fees based on ticket sales rather than passengers transported. CBP said it is developing a legislative proposal that would address these and other challenges by requiring airlines to remit based on passengers transported, but airline industry stakeholders said this change would complicate their collection process and create substantial transition costs. Although a number of options for addressing these fees have been raised, regardless of whether these fees are consolidated in whole, in part, or not at all, certain problems specific to the individual fees can and should be resolved first, and in a manner consistent with principles of effective user fee design, on which GAO has previously reported. Moreover, although partly or fully consolidating the fees under DHS's authority could provide opportunities to address some of the many challenges identified in this report, consolidation in-and-of-itself will not solve all of the problems we have identified. |
gao_NSIAD-96-26 | gao_NSIAD-96-26_0 | DCAA has also raised questions about MITRE’s use of fees. DOD Could Reduce Need to Fund Nonreimbursable Interest Costs
Because the Army and the Air Force delay providing contract funding at the start of a fiscal year, MITRE needs discretionary funding—provided through fees—to cover estimates of nonreimbursable interest costs. Oversight and Negotiation of Fees Could Be Improved
DOD’s oversight of MITRE’s fee expenditures does not ensure that negotiated fee awards are equitable and consistent. Payment cycles on MITRE’s non-DOD contracts are typically longer than those on DOD contracts. Recommendations to the Secretary of Defense
We recommend that the Secretary of Defense issue guidance that, to the extent practicable, specifically identifies the nature and extent of nonreimbursable costs that may be covered by fee and the costs for which fees should not be provided; consider the feasibility of issuing guidance specifying the circumstances in which each of the various funding and payment methods devised by the services should be used; and assign responsibility to the Director of Defense Research and Engineering for routinely surveying the services’ fee-granting processes for FFRDCs, identifying and promoting the use of effective or innovative analytical practices, and recommending needed changes to eliminate inconsistencies in awarding fees. It stated that the report would be helpful to ongoing DOD efforts to strengthen its procedures for the oversight and use of management fees by DOD-sponsored FFRDCs. At that time, we will send copies to other interested congressional committees, the Secretary of Defense, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, and the President of the MITRE Corporation. GAO Comment
1. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO examined the use of Department of Defense (DOD) management fees provided to the Mitre Corporation, focusing on: (1) the adequacy of federal guidance on how fees may be used; (2) ways to reduce contractor management fees and strengthen DOD management fee oversight; and (3) DOD efforts to improve the fee management process for its federally funded research and development centers (FFRDC).
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) neither the Office of Management and Budget nor DOD has prepared sufficient guidance on negotiating FFRDC contract fees; (2) consequently, recurring questions are raised about Mitre's use of fees, as well as the use of fees by other DOD FFRDC; (3) the services have delayed providing contract funding at the start of a fiscal year; (4) consequently, Mitre has needed large amounts of fee to cover interest expenses; and (5) DOD oversight of contract fees has not ensured that fee awards to Mitre are reasonable and consistent. |
gao_GAO-12-756 | gao_GAO-12-756_0 | As part of a comprehensive effort to increase the operational efficiency of federal technology assets and deliver greater value to the American taxpayer, federal agencies are shifting to the deployment of cloud services. In comments on a draft of this report, each of the agencies generally agreed with our recommendations. Agencies Have Made Progress Implementing OMB’s Cloud First Policy, but Better Planning Is Needed for Future Efforts
OMB requires federal agencies to immediately shift to a “Cloud First” policy by implementing cloud-based solutions whenever a secure, reliable, and cost-effective cloud option exists. To accelerate the shift, OMB required agencies, by February 2011, to identify three IT services to be migrated to a cloud solution and develop a plan for each of the three services, migrate one of the services to a cloud-based solution by December 2011, and migrate the remaining services by June 2012. Each agency has incorporated cloud computing requirements into its policies and processes. For example, the Department of State (State) incorporated into its plan a review of its IT investment portfolio to identify candidates for cloud solutions. Each agency identified at least three services by February 2011 to implement in a cloud environment and reported that the agency had implemented at least one cloud service by December 2011. While each agency submitted plans to OMB for its selected services, all but 1 of the 20 plans submitted to OMB were missing one or more key required elements. According to agency officials, information was missing because it was not available at the time the plans were submitted to OMB or it was deemed not to be relevant. Additionally, each of the agencies identified opportunities for future cloud implementations. Procuring services on a consumption (on-demand) basis: Because of the on-demand, scalable nature of cloud services, it can be difficult to define specific quantities and costs. Recently issued federal guidance and initiatives recognize many of these challenges. Two agencies do not plan to meet OMB’s requirement to fully implement three services to a cloud environment by June 2012, but plan to do so by year end. Further, agencies’ plans for implementing these services were often missing key information, such as performance goals or legacy system retirement plans. Until agencies’ cloud implementations are sufficiently planned and relevant systems are retired, the benefits of federal efforts to implement cloud solutions—improved operational efficiencies and reduced costs associated with retiring legacy systems— may be delayed or not fully realized. Recommendations for Executive Action
To help ensure the success of agencies’ implementation of cloud-based solutions, we are recommending that the Secretaries of Agriculture, Health and Human Services, Homeland Security, State, and the Treasury; and the Administrators of the General Services Administration and Small Business Administration direct their respective CIOs to take the following two actions: establish estimated costs, performance goals, and plans to retire associated legacy systems for each cloud-based service discussed in this report, as applicable; and develop, at a minimum, estimated costs, milestones, performance goals, and plans for retiring legacy systems, as applicable, for planned additional cloud-based services. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to (1) assess the progress selected agencies have made in implementing the federal “Cloud First” policy and (2) identify challenges selected agencies are facing as they implement the policy. Finally, we interviewed officials from the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and OMB to understand cloud computing standards, requirements, and guidance for federal agencies. | Why GAO Did This Study
As part of a comprehensive effort to increase the operational efficiency of federal technology assets, federal agencies are shifting how they deploy IT services. OMB issued a Cloud First policy in December 2010 that requires federal agencies to implement cloud-based solutions whenever a secure, reliable, and cost-effective cloud option exists; and to migrate three technology services to a cloud solution by June 2012. Cloud computing provides on-demand access to a shared pool of computing resources; can be provisioned on a scalable basis; and reportedly has the potential to deliver services faster, more efficiently, and at a lower cost than custom-developed systems.
GAO was asked to (1) assess the progress selected agencies have made in implementing this policy and (2) identify challenges they are facing in implementing the policy. To do so, GAO (1) selected seven agencies, analyzed agency documentation, and interviewed agency and OMB officials; and (2) identified, assessed, and categorized common challenges.
What GAO Found
The selected federal agencies have made progress implementing the Office of Management and Budgets (OMB) Cloud First policy. Consistent with this policy, each of the seven agencies incorporated cloud computing requirements into their policies and processes. For example, one agency had incorporated a review of its information technology (IT) investment portfolio to identify candidates for a cloud solution into its IT plan. Further, each of the seven agencies met the OMB deadlines to identify three cloud implementations by February 2011 and to implement at least one service by December 2011. However, two agencies do not plan to meet OMBs deadline to implement three services by June 2012, but plan to do so by calendar year end, ranging from August to December. Each of the seven agencies has also identified opportunities for future cloud implementations, such as moving storage and help desk services to a cloud environment. While each of the seven agencies submitted plans to OMB for implementing the cloud solutions, all but one plan were missing key required elements. For example, 7 of the 20 plans did not include estimated costs and none of the plans for services that were to migrate existing functionality to a cloud-based service included plans for retiring or repurposing the associated legacy systems. According to agency officials, this was largely because the information was not available at the time the plans were developed. Until agencies cloud implementations are sufficiently planned and relevant systems are retired, the benefits of federal efforts to implement cloud solutionsimproved operational efficiencies and reduced costsmay be delayed or not fully realized.
GAO identified seven common challenges associated with the implementation of OMBs Cloud First policy.
Common Challenges to Cloud Computing
1. Meeting Federal Security Requirements
2. Obtaining guidance
3. Acquiring knowledge and expertise
4. Certifying and accrediting vendors
5. Ensuring data portability and interoperability
6. Overcoming cultural barriers
7. Procuring services on a consumption (on-demand) basis
Recently issued federal guidance and initiatives recognize many of these challenges, such as the National Institute of Standards and Technology standards and guidance, and the General Services Administrations program to assist federal agencies certify and accredit potential cloud service providers.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is making recommendations to seven agencies to develop key planning information, such as estimated costs and legacy IT systems retirement plans for existing and planned services. The agencies generally agreed with GAOs recommendations. State disagreed with one recommendation, noting that legacy retirement plans were not applicable to its existing cloud services. GAO maintains that the recommendation is applicable for reasons discussed in this report. |
gao_GAO-05-650 | gao_GAO-05-650_0 | Local Boards Used an Estimated 40 Percent of Available WIA Funds to Train Program Participants
Local boards used an estimated 40 percent of the WIA funds they had available in program year 2003 to obtain training services for WIA participants. Nationally, local boards had approximately $2.4 billion in WIA funds that were available to serve adult participants during program year 2003 and used about $929 million for training activities, primarily occupational classroom training. We estimate that 416,000 WIA participants received training during the year. However, because some individuals may have received more than one type of training, this count may include some individuals more than once. The remaining funds pay for other program costs, including job search assistance, case management, and supportive services, as well as administrative costs. Local Boards Manage ITAs but Have Faced Challenges in Implementing Them
Most local workforce boards have developed policies to manage the use of ITAs, but many boards have encountered challenges in trying to implement their use. Local boards often require participants to complete various skill assessments prior to entering training and gather additional information on the occupation for which they desire training. In addition, they generally limit the amount of money participants can spend on training using ITAs and how long participants can spend in training. The challenge most frequently identified was lack of good performance data on training providers. Local boards in rural areas face a different challenge—lack of nearby training providers. Little Is Known about Outcomes of Those Being Trained because of Weaknesses in Data Collected
Little is known on a national level about the outcomes of those being trained. Certain aspects of WIASRD have been found to be incomplete and unverified. Additionally, data generally cannot be compared across states or local areas because of differences in data definitions. Our findings reaffirm the need for a continued focus on resolving reported data quality issues and determining what services are the most successful. In its comments, Labor acknowledged that the WIA reporting system currently has limited information on training expenditures and training outcomes, but noted that some of our information conflicts with their estimates of these activities. Our estimate of 416,000 comes directly from the local workforce areas that provided the training and includes the total number of adults who received training in program year 2003, including those who had not exited from the program. We believe our estimates of the amount of WIA funds used for training and the number of adults trained represent a more complete and accurate picture than Labor’s estimates because we included all funds used for training in program year 2003, whether they were spent or obligated, and counted all adults who received training in program year 2003, not just those who exited the program. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
We were asked to determine (1) to what extent Workforce Investment Act (WIA) funds have been used for training, (2) how local workforce investment boards have managed the use of Individual Training Accounts (ITA) and what challenges they have encountered, and (3) what is known at the national level about the outcomes of those receiving training. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Congress passed the Workforce Investment Act (WIA) in 1998 seeking to create a system connecting employment, education, and training services to better match job seekers to labor market needs. However, questions have been raised about how WIA funds are being used and, in particular, how much is being spent on training. Contributing to the concern about the use of WIA funds is the lack of accurate information about the extent to which WIA participants are enrolled in training activities. GAO was asked to determine (1) the extent to which WIA funds are used for training, (2) how local workforce boards manage the use of Individual Training Accounts (ITA) and what challenges they have encountered, and (3) what is known at the national level about outcomes of those being trained. In its comments, the Department of Labor (Labor) noted that some of our estimates on training conflicts with their estimates. Labor's estimate of the number of adults trained comes from their database and includes only those who had exited from the program. GAO's estimates represent a more complete and accurate picture than Labor's because they are based on information obtained directly from the local workforce areas, include all funds spent or obligated for training, and count all adults who received training in program year 2003, not just those who exited the program.
What GAO Found
Local workforce boards used an estimated 40 percent of the WIA funds they had available in program year 2003 to obtain training services for WIA participants. Nationally, local boards had approximately $2.4 billion in WIA funds that were available to serve adults and dislocated workers during program year 2003 and used about $929 million for training activities. The remaining funds paid for other program costs as well as administrative costs. We estimate that 416,000 WIA participants received training during the year. However, because some individuals may have received more than one type of training, this count may include some individuals more than once. Most of the participants received occupational classroom training purchased with ITAs, which are established on behalf of an eligible participant to finance training services. Most local workforce boards have developed policies to manage the use of ITAs, but many boards have encountered challenges in trying to implement their use. Local boards often require participants to complete specified tasks prior to entering training, such as gathering additional information on their desired occupation. In addition, they generally limit the amount of money participants can spend on training using ITAs and how long the training can last. Among the challenges encountered by local boards was the lack of good performance data on training providers making it difficult to determine which providers were most effective. Local boards in rural areas faced a different challenge--lack of nearby training providers. Little is known on a national level about the outcomes of those being trained. Certain aspects of Labor's national participant database have been found to be incomplete and unverified. Additionally, data generally cannot be compared across states or local areas because of variations in data definitions. Labor is taking some steps to address these concerns, but the findings from this study reaffirm the need for a continued focus on resolving reported data quality issues. |
gao_GAO-17-117 | gao_GAO-17-117_0 | Implementing Reserve Requirements Primarily Involves Depository Institutions and the Federal Reserve and Can Affect Customers
Implementing and enforcing transaction account reserve requirements (and therefore the distinction between reservable transaction accounts and nonreservable savings deposits through the “savings deposit” definition in Regulation D) imposes administrative responsibilities for depository institutions, the Board of Governors, and Reserve Banks and can affect the customers of depository institutions. Banks and credit unions differed in how they monitored accounts to enforce the transaction limit. Because they shifted funds from transaction accounts to savings deposits to reduce balances in transaction accounts subject to reserve requirements, these institutions had to enforce the transfer and withdrawal limit for savings deposits (ensuring that the automatic transfers from savings deposits did not exceed six times per month). The reasons depository institutions cited for maintaining reserves on savings deposits (i.e., classifying both transaction accounts and savings deposits as transaction accounts) to eliminate the need to enforce the transaction limit included: (1) net transaction account balances were low enough that holding additional reserves did not increase the institution’s required reserve ratio, (2) customer feedback (questions or concerns about the transaction limit), and (3) the Federal Reserve’s payment of interest on reserves. Few (1 percent) depository institutions indicated that more than 10 percent of their customers’ savings deposits exceeded the transaction limit in a month or during a statement cycle. In one instance, representatives from a depository institution we interviewed also told us that a change in policy (from classifying savings deposits as transaction accounts and maintaining reserves against them to avoid enforcing the transaction limit to classifying those accounts as savings deposits and enforcing the transaction limit) caused confusion among their customers and prompted complaints. Options to Reduce or Eliminate Reserve Requirements Have Monetary Policy Implications
Internationally, many central banks have taken steps to reduce their reliance on reserve requirements, including eliminating them completely in some cases. While the ability to extend these experiences to the United States context is unclear, they provide examples of monetary policy implementation frameworks that do not involve mandatory reserve requirements. A Number of Central Banks Have Reduced Their Reliance on Reserve Requirements
Due, in part, to concerns about the cost, burdens and market distortions associated with their use, there has been a decline in the level and use of reserve requirements globally. Other developed and emerging countries have operated with a reserve requirement imposed on all deposits, which eliminates the need for measures like transaction limits on certain kinds of transfers and withdrawals from certain deposit liabilities to distinguish between reservable and nonreservable deposits. This approach allowed the Federal Reserve to expand its balance sheet to promote financial stability while maintaining control over the federal funds rate. Because of the unique features of the U.S. financial system, it is unclear that the practices used by other countries would translate to the United States. A key objective in an interest rate targeting procedure—which includes corridor operating approaches—is to limit the volatility of the interest rate around the targeted level because of the cost associated with the signals it sends to market participants about the ability of the central bank to achieve its target. Regulation D’s definitions that define reserveable liabilities for reserve requirements purposes in the United States would not be needed and all costs and administrative burdens associated with reserve requirements would be eliminated. CFPB did not provide comments on a draft of this report. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of this report were to examine: (1) the purpose of reserve requirements and Regulation D; (2) how depository institutions implement Regulation D’s requirements and the effect of the regulation on operations; (3) the effect on customers of the Regulation D transaction limit on certain transfers and withdrawals from savings deposits; and (4) foreign central banks’ varying dependence on reserve requirements and the monetary policy implications. Finally, to examine foreign central banks’ varying dependence on reserve requirements and the monetary policy implications, we reviewed academic literature and Federal Reserve publications on the role of reserve requirements and other tools in conducting monetary policy, recent innovations in the conduct of monetary policy that may change that role, and other developed countries’ approaches to implementing monetary policy. We obtained an unweighted survey response rate of 71 percent. However, this objective was complicated in practice because reserve requirement ratios were established in the Federal Reserve Act and not by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Board of Governors) and by the reliance on the discount rate as the primary tool for influencing the availability and cost of money and credit at the time. By 1931, the Federal Reserve moved from using reserve requirements as a source of liquidity for deposits held at depository institutions to using reserve requirements to proactively affect the cost and availability of money and credit. While there are consequences for reducing or eliminating reserve requirements on the implementation of monetary policy, including potential short-term interest rate volatility and the cost associated with other frameworks, the corridor operating frameworks in these and other counties also provide examples of dealing with those consequences without reliance on the required maintenance of reserves. | Why GAO Did This Study
Section 19 of the Federal Reserve Act requires depository institutions to maintain reserves against a portion of their transaction accounts solely for the implementation of monetary policy. Regulation D implements section 19, and it also requires institutions to limit certain kinds of transfers and withdrawals from savings deposits to not more than six per month or statement cycle if they wish to avoid having to maintain reserves against these accounts. The transaction limit allows the Federal Reserve to distinguish between transaction accounts and savings deposits for reserves purposes.
GAO was asked to review certain effects of Regulation D. This report's objectives include examining depository institutions' implementation of Regulation D's requirements, the effect of the transaction limit on their customers, and central banks' varying dependence on reserve requirements and the monetary policy implications.
To examine these issues, GAO conducted a generalizable survey of 892 depository institutions (with a response rate of 71 percent); analyzed consumer complaint data from federal financial regulators; reviewed federal statutes and regulations, Federal Reserve System publications, and academic literature; and interviewed regulatory agency officials, representatives from banking and credit union associations, and depository institutions selected based on institution type and size.
The Federal Reserve and other federal banking regulators provided technical comments on a draft of this report, which we incorporated as appropriate.
What GAO Found
The methods by which depository institutions can implement Regulation D (Reserve Requirements of Depository Institutions) include maintaining reserves against transaction accounts and enforcing a numeric transfer and withdrawal (transaction) limit for savings deposits if they wish to avoid classifying those accounts as reservable transaction accounts. GAO estimates that 70–78 percent of depository institutions limit savings deposit transactions. Other methods include automatically transferring balances from transaction (e.g., checking) accounts to savings deposits in order to reduce reserve requirements. Institutions may choose to maintain transaction account reserves against savings deposits to eliminate the need to enforce the transaction limit. But some institutions GAO surveyed indicated that they had operational burdens associated with monitoring and enforcing the transaction limit (for example, 63–73 percent cited challenges, such as creating forms and converting and closing accounts). Available data indicate that few customers exceeded or expressed concerns about the limit.
Monetary policy—actions taken to influence the availability and cost of money and credit (i.e., interest rates)—can be conducted with varying dependence on reserve requirements. While many central banks around the world use reserve requirements, some have reduced their reliance on them due, in part, to the associated cost and administrative burdens. GAO reviewed how different central banks rely on reserve requirements and found a wide range of frameworks, including those with: (1) different mandatory reserve requirements (as compared to the United States), (2) voluntary reserve requirements, and (3) no reserve requirements at all. For example, countries with different mandatory reserves frameworks require maintaining reserves against all deposits, which eliminate the need to impose limits on transfers and withdrawals from specific accounts. While the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Federal Reserve) has used reserve requirements to help achieve the interest rate targets it sets in the market for reserves (federal funds market), central banks of other developed countries such as Canada, Australia, Sweden, and Denmark, among others, do not rely on reserve requirements. Instead, they use interest rates under their direct control to restrict interest rates from moving outside of a targeted range (corridor operating approach).
The authority for the Federal Reserve to pay interest on reserves has reduced some of the costs associated with reserve requirements in the United States. One of the alternatives to the current reserve requirement framework that GAO examined would require legislative change to further reduce some of these costs and burdens. Other approaches, while proven feasible for some foreign central banks, have implications for the conduct of monetary policy (e.g., require the pursuit of a corridor operating approach). Given the differences in financial systems across the globe, it is unclear whether the practices used by other nations would translate to the United States. Moreover, lowering or eliminating reserve requirements would raise a number of operational and technical issues for monetary policy implementation. For example, lowering or eliminating reserve requirements could introduce the need to manage potential volatility in short-term interest rates. Therefore, minimizing the burdens associated with reserve requirements would have to be weighed against the costs and monetary policy implications of any alternative framework when considering changes. |
gao_GAO-01-339 | gao_GAO-01-339_0 | This report focuses on three specific services— nutrition education, breastfeeding promotion and support, and health referrals. FNS Has an Outcome- Based Measure for One of Its Three Nutrition Services
FNS established the breastfeeding initiation rate as an outcome-based measure for the WIC program’s breastfeeding promotion and support activities, but has no outcome measures for its nutrition education or health referral services. For health referrals, FNS has been unable to identify a measure that, among other things, would permit it to appropriately link the service’s activities with a desired outcome. FNS lacked the resources needed to develop another sample with a large enough number of WIC participants to establish national estimates. Generally, these measures are used to examine the types and quantities of services the state agencies provide and whether the agencies are in compliance with grant expenditure and other program requirements. However, they cautioned that the report addressed performance measures as they pertained to three nutrition service components of the WIC program and not the program in its entirety, which includes supplemental foods and other aspects of nutrition services. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO examined the performance measures that the Food and Nutrition Service (FNS) uses to assess the nutrition education, breastfeeding promotion and support, and health referral services provided to participants in the Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children (WIC) program.
What GAO Found
GAO found that FNS has an outcome-based measure for one of the three nutrition services--breastfeeding promotion and support. However, the measure, breastfeeding initiation rate, examines only one of several important aspects of the service's possible impact on WIC participants. In addition, several obstacles have hindered FNS' efforts to develop and implement outcome-based measures for nutrition education and health referral services for the WIC program. These include difficulties in identifying measures that would allow the agency to appropriately link a particular service's activity to a desired outcome and resource constraints affecting FNS' ability to collect data needed to implement a proposed measure. |
gao_GAO-13-529T | gao_GAO-13-529T_0 | Background
Since 2005, there have been several efforts to inventory federal STEM education programs and reports that call for the need to better coordinate and evaluate STEM education programs. In addition, the National Science and Technology Council (NSTC) was established in 1993 and is the principal means for the administration to coordinate science and technology with the federal government’s larger research and development effort. In our January 2012 report on STEM education, we defined a federally funded STEM education program as a program funded in fiscal year 2010 by congressional appropriation or allocation that included one or more of the following as a primary objective: attract or prepare students to pursue classes or coursework in STEM areas through formal or informal education activities, attract students to pursue degrees (2-year, 4-year, graduate, or doctoral degrees) in STEM fields through formal or informal education activities, provide training opportunities for undergraduate or graduate students attract graduates to pursue careers in STEM fields, improve teacher (preservice or in-service) education in STEM areas, improve or expand the capacity of K-12 schools or postsecondary institutions to promote or foster education in STEM fields, or conduct research to enhance the quality of STEM education programs provided to students. Agencies reported that they developed the majority (130) of these programs through their general statutory authority and that Congress specifically directed agencies to create 59 of these programs. The number of programs each agency administered ranged from 3 to 46 with three agencies—the Department of Health and Human Services, the Department of Energy, and the National Science Foundation (NSF)—administering more than half of all programs—112 of 209. Almost a third of the programs had obligations of $1 million or less, with five programs having obligations of more than $100 million each. Beyond the 209 programs identified in our review, federal agencies carried out other activities that contribute to the overall federal STEM education effort. Most STEM Programs Overlapped to Some Degree
As we reported in 2012, and as figure 2 illustrates, in fiscal year 2010, 83 percent of STEM education programs overlapped to some degree with another program in that they offered at least one similar service to at least one similar target group in at least one similar STEM field to achieve at least one similar objective. In addition, many programs served multiple target groups. Biological sciences and technology were the most selected STEM fields that programs focused on. However, even when programs overlapped, we found that the services they provided and the populations they served may differ in meaningful ways and would therefore not necessarily be duplicative. Limited Use of Performance Measures and Evaluations Hamper Ability to Assess Effectiveness
In 2012, we reported that in addition to the fragmented and overlapping nature of federal STEM education programs, agencies’ limited use of performance measures and evaluations may hamper their ability to assess the effectiveness of their individual programs as well as the overall STEM education effort. Program officials varied in their ability to provide reliable output measures—for example, the number of students, teachers, or institutions directly served by their program. In addition, most agencies did not use outcome measures in a way that is clearly reflected in their performance plans and reports—publicly available documents they use for performance planning. Work with agencies, through its strategic-planning process, to identify programs that might be candidates for consolidation or elimination, which could be identified through an analysis that includes information on program overlap and program effectiveness. In February 2012, NSTC published Coordinating Federal Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics (STEM) Education Investments: Progress Report, which identified a number of programs that could be eliminated in fiscal year 2013. Agency and program officials would benefit from guidance and information sharing within and across agencies about what is working and how to best evaluate programs. In addition, STEM education was named as an interim crosscutting priority goal in the President’s 2013 budget submission; however, it will be important for NSTC to finalize its strategic plan, which should include guidance for how agencies can better align their performance plans and reports to new governmentwide goals. | Why GAO Did This Study
STEM education programs help to enhance the nation's global competitiveness. Many federal agencies have been involved in administering these programs. Concerns have been raised about the overall effectiveness and efficiency of STEM education programs.
This testimony discusses (1) the number of federal agencies and programs that provided funding for STEM education programs in fiscal year 2010; (2) the extent to which STEM education programs overlap; and (3) the extent to which STEM education programs measured effectiveness and were aligned to a governmentwide strategy. This testimony is based on several previously published GAO reports and includes updates on actions taken in response to these reports.
What GAO Found
In fiscal year 2010, 13 federal agencies invested over $3 billion in 209 programs designed to increase knowledge of science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) fields and attainment of STEM degrees. The number of programs within agencies ranged from 3 to 46, with the Department of Health and Human Services, Department of Energy, and the National Science Foundation administering more than half of the 209 programs. Almost a third of all programs had obligations of $1 million or less, while some had obligations of over $100 million. Beyond programs specifically focused on STEM education, agencies funded other broad efforts that contributed to enhancing STEM education.
Eighty-three percent of the programs GAO identified overlapped to some degree with at least 1 other program in that they offered similar services to similar target groups in similar STEM fields to achieve similar objectives. Many programs have a broad scope--serving multiple target groups with multiple services. However, even when programs overlap, the services they provide and the populations they serve may differ in meaningful ways and would therefore not necessarily be duplicative. Nonetheless, the programs are similar enough that they need to be well coordinated and guided by a robust strategic plan.
Agencies' limited use of performance measures and evaluations may hamper their ability to assess the effectiveness of their individual programs as well as the overall STEM education effort. Specifically, program officials varied in their ability to provide reliable output measures--for example, the number of students, teachers, or institutions directly served by their program. Further, most agencies did not use outcomes measures in a way that is clearly reflected in their performance planning documents. In addition, a majority of programs did not conduct comprehensive evaluations since our prior review in 2005 and the time of our survey in 2011 to assess effectiveness, and the evaluations GAO reviewed did not always align with program objectives. Finally, GAO found that completed STEM education evaluation results had not always been disseminated in a fashion that facilitated knowledge sharing between both practitioners and researchers. In naming STEM education as a crosscutting goal, the administration is taking the first step towards better governmentwide coordinated planning; however, it will be important to finalize a governmentwide strategic plan so agencies can better align their performance plans and reports to new governmentwide goals. GAO previously recommended that the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) should direct the National Science and Technology Council (NSTC) to work with agencies to better align their activities with a governmentwide strategy, develop a plan for sustained monitoring of coordination, identify programs for consolidation or potential elimination, and assist agencies in determining how to better evaluate their programs. Since GAO's report, OSTP released a progress report that identified some programs for elimination, and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) named STEM education one of its interim cross-cutting priority goals.
What GAO Recommends
GAO previously recommended that the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) should direct the National Science and Technology Council (NSTC) to work with agencies to better align their activities with a governmentwide strategy, develop a plan for sustained monitoring of coordination, identify programs for consolidation or potential elimination, and assist agencies in determining how to better evaluate their programs. Since GAOs report, OSTP released a progress report that identified some programs for elimination, and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) named STEM education one of its interim cross-cutting priority goals. |
gao_GAO-10-224T | gao_GAO-10-224T_0 | Nonfederal recipients of Recovery Act-funded grants, contracts, and loans are required to submit reports with information on each project or activity, including the amount and use of funds and an estimate of jobs created or retained. The first of the required recipient reports cover cumulative activity since the Recovery Act’s passage in February 2009 through the quarter ending September 30, 2009. The final recipient reporting data for the first round of reports were first made available on October 30. We assessed the reports from the Inspectors General (IG) on Recovery Act data quality reviews from 15 agencies. Initial Observations on Recipient Reporting Data Identify Areas for Further Review
As detailed in our report, our analysis and fieldwork indicate there are significant issues to be addressed in reporting, data quality, and consistent application of OMB guidance in several areas. Many entries merit further attention due to an unexpected or atypical data value or relationship between data. o Coverage: While OMB estimates that more than 90 percent of recipients reported, questions remain about the other 10 percent. o Review: Over three quarters of the prime reports were marked as having undergone review by a federal agency, while less than 1 percent were marked as having undergone review by the prime recipient Issues in the calculation of full-time equivalents (FTE). As part of our review, we examined the relationship between recipient reports showing the presence or absence of any full-time equivalent (FTE) counts with the presence or absence of funding amounts shown in either or both data fields for “amount of Recovery Act funds received” and “amount of Recovery Act funds expended.” Forty-four percent of the prime recipient reports showed an FTE value. However, as shown in table 1, we identified 3,978 prime recipient reports where FTEs were reported but no dollar amount was reported in the data fields for amount of Recovery Act funds received and amount of Recovery Act funds expended. These records account for 58,386 of the total 640,329 FTEs reported. The small percentage reviewed by the prime recipients themselves during the OMB review time frame warrants further examination. While it may be the case that the recipients’ data quality review efforts prior to initial submission of their reports were seen as not needing further revision during the review timeframe, it may also be indicative of problems with the process of noting and recording when and how the prime recipient reviews occur and the setting of the review flag. In addition, the report record data included a flag as to whether a correction was initiated. Overall, slightly more than a quarter of the reports were marked as having undergone a correction during the period of review. Issues in Calculation of Full-Time Equivalents
In its guidance to recipients for estimating employment effects, OMB instructed recipients to report solely the direct employment effects as “jobs created or retained” as a single number. Problems with the interpretation of this guidance or the calculation of FTEs were one of the most significant problems we found. Jobs created or retained expressed in FTEs raised questions and concerns for some recipients. One source of inconsistency was variation in the period of performance used to calculate FTEs, which occurred in both the highway and education programs we examined. While there were problems of inconsistent interpretation of the guidance, the reporting process went relatively well for highway projects. DOT had an established procedure for reporting prior to enactment of the Recovery Act. As our report shows, in the cases of Education and the Department of Housing and Urban Development, which do not have this prior reporting experience, we found more problems. State and federal officials are examining identified issues and have stated their intention to deal with them. As recipient reporting moves forward, we will continue to review the processes that federal agencies and recipients have in place to ensure the completeness and accuracy of data, including reviewing a sample of recipient reports across various Recovery Act programs to assure the quality of the reported information. Recipient Reports and Economic Methods Together Can Offer Insights into Employment Impact
While the recipient reports provide a real-time window on the use and results of Recovery Act spending, the data will represent only a portion of the employment effect, even after data quality issues are addressed. Therefore, both the data reported by recipients and other macroeconomic data and methods are helpful in gauging the overall employment effects of the stimulus. | Why GAO Did This Study
This testimony discusses the report being issued today on the first set of recipient reports made available in October 2009 in response to the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act's section 1512 requirement. On October 30, Recovery.gov (the federal Web site on Recovery Act spending) reported that more than 100,000 recipients had reported hundreds of thousands of jobs created or retained. GAO is required to comment quarterly on the estimates of jobs created or retained as reported by direct recipients of Recovery Act funding from federal agencies. In the first quarterly GAO report, being released today, we address the following issues: (1) the extent to which recipients were able to fulfill their reporting requirements and the processes in place to help ensure recipient reporting data quality and (2) how macroeconomic data and methods, and the recipient reports, can be used to help gauge the employment effects of the Recovery Act. Because the recipient reporting effort will be an ongoing process of cumulative reporting, our review represents a snapshot in time. At this juncture, given the national scale of the recipient reporting exercise and the limited time frames in which it was implemented, the ability of the reporting mechanism to handle the volume of data from a wide variety of recipients represents a solid first step in moving toward more transparency and accountability for federal funds; however, there is a range of significant reporting and quality issues that need to be addressed. Consequently, our report contains several recommendations to improve data quality that Office of Management and Budget (OMB) staff generally agreed to implement. We will continue to review the processes that federal agencies and recipients have in place to ensure the future completeness and accuracy of data reported. Finally, our report notes that because the recipient reports cover about one-third of Recovery Act funds, both the data in those reports and other macroeconomic data and methods together can offer a more complete view of the overall employment impact of the Recovery Act.
What GAO Found
As detailed in our report, our analysis and fieldwork indicate there are significant issues to be addressed in reporting, data quality, and consistent application of OMB guidance in several areas. Many entries merit further attention due to an unexpected or atypical data value or relationship between data. As part of our review, we examined the relationship between recipient reports showing the presence or absence of any full-time equivalent (FTE) counts with the presence or absence of funding amounts shown in either or both data fields for "amount of Recovery Act funds received" and "amount of Recovery Act funds expended." Forty-four percent of the prime recipient reports showed an FTE value. However,we identified 3,978 prime recipient reports where FTEs were reported but no dollar amount was reported in the data fields for amount of Recovery Act funds received and amount of Recovery Act funds expended. These records account for 58,386 of the total 640,329 FTEs reported. While OMB estimates that more than 90 percent of recipients reported, questions remain about the other 10 percent. Less than 1 percent of the records were marked as having undergone review by the prime recipient. The small percentage reviewed by the prime recipients themselves during the OMB review time frame warrants further examination. While it may be the case that the recipients' data quality review efforts prior to initial submission of their reports were seen as not needing further revision during the review timeframe, it may also be indicative of problems with the process of noting and recording when and how the prime recipient reviews occur and the setting of the review flag. In addition, the report record data included a flag as to whether a correction was initiated. Overall, slightly more than a quarter of the reports were marked as having undergone a correction during the period of review. In its guidance to recipients for estimating employment effects, OMB instructed recipients to report solely the direct employment effects as "jobs created or retained" as a single number. Problems with the interpretation of this guidance or the calculation of FTEs were one of the most significant problems we found. Jobs created or retained expressed in FTEs raised questions and concerns for some recipients. One source of inconsistency was variation in the period of performance used to calculate FTEs, which occurred in both the highway and education programs we examined. While there were problems of inconsistent interpretation of the guidance, the reporting process went relatively well for highway projects. DOT had an established procedure for reporting prior to enactment of the Recovery Act. As our report shows, in the cases of Education and the Department of Housing and Urban Development, which do not have this prior reporting experience, we found more problems. State and federal officials are examining identified issues and have stated their intention to deal with them. |
gao_GAO-03-930T | gao_GAO-03-930T_0 | Background
DOE has a vast complex of sites across the nation dedicated to the nuclear weapons program. DOE expects this process to concentrate at least 90 percent of the radioactivity into a much smaller volume that can be permanently isolated for at least 10,000 years in a geologic repository. Based on current disposal standards used by the NRC, if the radioactivity of this remaining waste is sufficiently low, it can be disposed of on site near the surface of the ground, using less complex and expensive techniques than those required for the highly radioactive portion. DOE plans to dispose of this waste on site in vaults or canisters, or at other designated disposal facilities. DOE’s Initiative for Accelerating Cleanup Is Still Evolving, with the Extent of Savings Uncertain
DOE’s new initiative, implemented in 2002, attempts to address the schedule delays and increasing costs DOE has encountered in its efforts to treat and dispose of high-level waste. Savings Estimate May Not Be Reliable
Our review indicates that DOE’s current estimate of $29 billion may not yet be reliable and that the actual amount to be saved if DOE successfully implements the alternative waste treatment and disposal strategies may be substantially different from what DOE is projecting. Key Legal and Technical Challenges Could Limit Potential Savings from DOE’s Accelerated Cleanup Initiative
DOE faces significant legal and technical challenges in achieving the cost and schedule reductions proposed in its new initiative. On the legal side, DOE’s proposals depend heavily on the agency’s authority to apply a designation other than “high-level waste” to the low-activity portion of the waste stream, so that this low-activity portion does not have to be disposed of more expensively as high-level waste. DOE’s Accelerated Initiative Relies on a Process for Reclassifying Waste That the Court Has Ruled Invalid
DOE has traditionally managed all of the wastes in its tanks as high-level waste because the waste resulted primarily from the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel and contains significant amounts of radioactivity. The challenge to successfully separate the waste is significant at the Hanford Site, where DOE intends to build a facility for separating the waste before fully testing the separation processes that will be used. Opportunities Exist to Explore Additional Cost Savings and to Strengthen Program Management
In addition to the potential cost savings identified in the accelerated site cleanup plans, DOE continues to develop and evaluate other proposals to reduce costs but is still assessing them. DOE also has a number of initiatives under way to improve overall program management. New Technology Is Incorporated before It Is Sufficiently Mature
Our work on Department of Defense acquisitions has documented a set of “best practices” used by industry for integrating new technology into major projects. Furthermore, specific components of this initiative face key legal and technical challenges. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Energy (DOE) oversees the treatment and disposal of 94 million gallons of highly radioactive nuclear waste from the nation's nuclear weapons program, currently at DOE sites in Washington, Idaho, and South Carolina. In 2002, DOE began an initiative to reduce the estimated $105-billion cost and 70-year time frame of this cleanup. GAO was asked to testify on the status of this initiative, the legal and technical challenges DOE faces in implementation, and any further opportunities to reduce costs or improve program management. GAO's testimony is based on a report (GAO-03-593) released at the hearing.
What GAO Found
DOE's initiative for reducing the costs and time required for cleanup of high-level wastes is still evolving. DOE's main strategy for treating high-level waste continues to include separating and concentrating much of the radioactivity into a smaller volume for disposal in a geologic repository. Under the initiative, DOE sites are evaluating other approaches, such as disposing of more waste on site. DOE's current savings estimate for these approaches is $29 billion, but the estimate may not be reliable or complete. For example, the savings estimate does not adequately reflect uncertainties or take into account the timing of when savings will be realized. DOE faces significant legal and technical challenges to realize these savings. A key legal challenge involves DOE's process for deciding that some waste with relatively low concentrations of radioactivity can be treated and disposed of on-site. A recent court ruling invalidated this process, putting the accelerated schedule and potential savings in jeopardy. A key technical challenge is that DOE's approach relies on laboratory testing to confirm separation of the waste into high-level and low-activity portions. At the Hanford Site in Washington State, DOE plans to build a facility before conducting integrated testing of the waste separation technology--an approach that failed on a prior major project. DOE is exploring proposals, such as increasing the amount of high-level waste in each disposal canister, that if successful could save billions of dollars more than the current $29 billion estimate. However, considerable evaluation remains to be done. DOE also has opportunities to improve program management by fully addressing recurring weaknesses GAO has identified in DOE's management of cleanup projects, including the practice of incorporating technology into projects before it is sufficiently tested. |
gao_GAO-16-660T | gao_GAO-16-660T_0 | In this role, the office is responsible for (1) developing a national drug control policy, (2) developing and applying specific goals and performance measurements to evaluate the effectiveness of national drug control policy and National Drug Control Program agencies’ programs, (3) overseeing and coordinating the implementation of the national drug control policy, and (4) assessing and certifying the adequacy of the budget for National Drug Control Programs. ONDCP and Other Federal Agencies Have Not Fully Achieved 2010 Strategy Goals; ONDCP Has Established a Mechanism to Monitor Progress
Although Limited Progress Has Been Made for Some Goals, None of the National Drug Control Strategy Goals Have Been Fully Achieved
In the 2010 National Drug Control Strategy, ONDCP established seven goals related to reducing illicit drug use and its consequences to be achieved by 2015. As of May 2016, our analysis indicates that ONDCP and federal agencies have made moderate progress toward achieving one goal, limited progress on three goals, and no demonstrated progress on the remaining three goals. ONDCP officials stated that they intend to report on updated progress toward meeting the strategic goals in summer 2016. ONDCP Established a System to Monitor Progress toward Strategy Goals
In March 2013, we reported that ONDCP established the Performance Reporting System (PRS) to monitor and assess progress toward meeting Strategy goals and objectives and issued a report describing the system with its 2012 Strategy. These PRS measures were established to help assess progress towards each objective. As part of our review for our March 2013 report, we assessed the PRS measures for the Strategy’s seven objectives and found them to be generally consistent with attributes of effective performance management identified in our prior work as important for ensuring performance measures demonstrate results and are useful for decision making. The groups assessed the validity of the measures and evaluated data sources, among other things. ONDCP released its most recent annual PRS report in November 2015. Total Federal Spending for Drug Control Programs Has Increased since FY 2007
Federal Drug Control Spending on Treatment and Prevention Increased, While Law Enforcement and Interdiction Spending Remain Relatively Constant
According to ONDCP, federal drug control spending increased from $21.7 billion in FY 2007 to approximately $30.6 billion that was allocated for drug control programs in FY 2016 as shown in figure 2. Though, total federal drug control spending increased from FY 2007 through FY 2016, spending on supply reduction programs, such as domestic law enforcement, interdiction, and international programs remained relatively constant at $13.3 billion in FY 2007 and $15.8 billion in FY 2016. However, federal spending for demand programs—treatment and prevention steadily increased from FY 2007 through FY 2016 and spending in these two programs went from $8.4 billion in FY 2007 to $14.7 billion in FY 2016. | Why GAO Did This Study
Policymakers, health care providers, and the public are concerned about the nation's current drug epidemic and its effects, as drug overdose deaths surpassed auto accidents as the leading cause of death or injury in recent years. To help address national drug control policy efforts, ONDCP coordinates and oversees implementation of a National Drug Control Strategy to reduce illicit drug use, among other things.
This statement addresses (1) what progress has been made toward achieving National Drug Control Strategy goals and how ONDCP monitors progress and (2) trends in federal drug control spending.
This statement is based upon findings GAO reported in March 2013 and December 2015, analysis of ONDCP's Budget and Performance Summaries and selected updates in 2016. For the updates, GAO analyzed publically available data sources that ONDCP uses to assess progress on Strategy goals, reviewed ONDCP Performance Reporting System reports, and interviewed ONDCP officials.
What GAO Found
The Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) and federal agencies have made mixed progress toward achieving the goals articulated in the 2010 National Drug Control Strategy (Strategy) and ONDCP has established a mechanism to monitor and assess progress. In the Strategy, ONDCP established seven goals related to reducing illicit drug use and its consequences by 2015. As of May 2016, our analysis indicates that ONDCP and federal agencies have made moderate progress toward achieving one goal, limited progress on three goals, and no progress on the three other three goals. Overall, none of the goals in the Strategy have been fully achieved. In March 2013, GAO reported that ONDCP established the Performance Reporting System to monitor and assess progress toward meeting Strategy goals and objectives. GAO reported that the system's 26 new performance measures were generally consistent with attributes of effective performance management. A 2015 ONDCP report on progress towards these measures similarly identified some progress towards overall achievements—some of the measures had met or exceeded targets, some had significant progress underway, and some had limited or no progress.
Federal drug control spending increased from $21.7 billion in fiscal year (FY) 2007 to approximately $30.6 billion in allocated funding in FY 2016 as shown in figure 1. Although total federal drug control spending increased from FY 2007 through FY 2016, spending on supply reduction programs, such as domestic law enforcement, interdiction, and international programs remained relatively constant at $13.3 billion in FY 2007 and $15.8 billion allocated in FY 2016. However, federal spending for—treatment and prevention has steadily increased from FY 2007 through FY 2016 and spending in these two programs went from $8.4 billion in FY 2007 to $14.7 billion allocated in FY 2016.
What GAO Recommends
GAO made a prior recommendation to ONDCP to assess overlap in drug prevention and treatment programs. ONDCP concurred and has implemented it. GAO is not making new recommendations in this testimony. |
gao_GAO-10-811SP | gao_GAO-10-811SP_0 | Overview
As required by section 11 of the GAO Human Capital Reform Act of 2004 (Pub. L. No. 108-271), GAO is providing its final report not later than 6 years after the date of the Act’s enactment. This report provides, as required by the Act, (1) a summary of the information included in GAO’s annual reports for the fiscal year 2005 through 2009 reporting cycle for sections 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 9, and 10; (2) recommendations for any legislative changes to sections 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 9, and 10; and (3) any assessment furnished by the GAO Personnel Appeals Board or any interested groups or associations representing officers and employees of GAO. | What GAO Found
As required by section 11 of the GAO Human Capital Reform Act of 2004 (Pub. L. No. 108-271), GAO is providing its final report not later than 6 years after the date of the Act's enactment. This report provides, as required by the Act, (1) a summary of the information included in GAO's annual reports for the fiscal year 2005 through 2009 reporting cycle for sections 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 9, and 10; (2) recommendations for any legislative changes to sections 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 9, and 10; and (3) any assessment furnished by the GAO Personnel Appeals Board or any interested groups or associations representing officers and employees of GAO. |
gao_GAO-06-343 | gao_GAO-06-343_0 | Background
The U.S. Commission on Civil Rights was established to serve as an independent, bipartisan, fact-finding agency whose mission is to investigate and report on the status of civil rights in the United States. The Commission has established 51 state advisory committees composed of private citizens appointed by the Commission who volunteer to assist the agency by identifying local civil rights issues, some of which may become important at the national level. The primary written product produced by the Commission’s national office is a statutorily required annual report on federal civil rights enforcement efforts. The Commission has also conducted public hearings with witnesses as part of its investigative and fact-finding mission. The Commission’s professional staff researches and writes its national office reports and organizes Commission briefings and fact-finding hearings. To carry out their mission to gather information and to advise the Commission on state and local civil rights issues, state advisory committees are authorized to hold fact-finding meetings and invite government officials and private persons to provide information and their views on various subjects. However, it does not have policies for ensuring an objective examination of the issues or ensuring accountability for the decisions made on its products. The Commission Lacks Policies for Ensuring the Objectivity of National Office Products
The Commission does not have a policy requiring the representation of varied perspectives in its national office reports, in contrast to its policies for state advisory committee reports, which are required to “represent a variety of different and opposing views.” For example, the initial draft of the Commission’s 2005 report, Federal Procurement after Adarand (the Adarand report)—the most significant report recently issued by the Commission because it was the statutorily required annual report— reflected a range of research and perspectives on a controversial issue involving the application of racial considerations in federal contracting. Commission Policies for State Advisory Committee Products Are More Comprehensive than Those for Its National Office Products
For state advisory committee products, which are researched and written principally by the Commission’s regional office staff, the Commission has quality assurance policies that are generally more comprehensive than its policies for its national office products. State Advisory Committees Have Played a Key Role in the Commission’s Work, but Most of Their Operations Have Been Suspended
The state advisory committees have played a key role in accomplishing the work of the Commission, but most committees cannot currently conduct any work because the Commission has not renewed their charters. Since 1980, the state advisory committee issued 200 of the 254 reports published by the Commission. According to the Commission’s Chair, the new membership criteria were developed in order to, among other things, move away from racially and ethnically based representation toward greater diversity in expertise and ideas. Reports that have satisfied these criteria will be printed with a disclaimer stating: “The views expressed in this report and the findings and recommendations contained herein are those of a majority of the members of the state advisory committee and do not necessarily represent the views of the Commission, its individual members, or the policies of the United States government.” According to two Commissioners in their comments on our draft report, the Commission will be reviewing project procedures for state advisory committee products as it did previously for national office products. According to the Staff Director, the Commission is now working to include goals that incorporate the role of the state advisory committees in its strategic plan, including obtaining the views of the state advisory committees on the Commission’s goals and their role in accomplishing these goals. In addition, only 22 percent of state committee chairs who responded to our survey reported that they were satisfied with the quality of their communication with the national office. The Commission has not provided for independent oversight of its policies and practices for state advisory committees, despite the long-standing nature of many of the issues we identified regarding the Commission’s lack of consultation and communication with the state advisory committees, delays in renewing charter applications, and lack of timeliness and other issues in approving state advisory committee reports. Conclusions
Without having policies in place for ensuring the objectivity of its reports, briefings, and hearings, the Commission cannot provide adequate assurance that it is achieving its mission as an independent, bipartisan fact-finding agency by informing often controversial debates over civil rights issues for the public’s benefit. (3) In order to ensure that the Commission can provide advice to Congress and make the most effective use of the state advisory committees, it should develop and implement a formal process for approving state advisory committee charters with specific timetables to ensure their approval in a timely manner and for appointing and seating advisory committee members promptly after charter approval; renew its practice of separately identifying funds for the regional offices and state advisory committees to better evaluate the adequacy of funding for supporting the committees, given budgetary constraints; establish required time frames for Staff Director reviews in order to ensure that state advisory committee reports are published in a timely manner; and integrate the state advisory committees’ mission and work in its strategic planning and decision-making processes, including articulating how the national office will use the state advisory committees’ findings on state and local civil rights issues to inform the Commission’s national goals and strategies. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives in this study were to assess (1) the adequacy of the Commission’s policies for ensuring the quality of its products and (2) the role of the state advisory committees in contributing to the Commission’s work. For example, we noted that, after the arrival of new leadership, the Commission began to reevaluate its policies on product development and state advisory committee matters and, in discussing the Commission’s quality assurance policies for its products, we reported on the increased involvement of the Commissioners in product development, describing it as a “significant improvement over previous Commission policy.” In addition, we devoted a considerable portion of two appendixes to the Commission’s process for developing and approving national and state advisory committee products, including policy changes. However, the Commissioners are not asked to accept or reject the committee reports. | Why GAO Did This Study
The U.S. Commission on Civil Rights (the Commission) was established by the Civil Rights Act of 1957 to serve as an independent, bipartisan, fact-finding agency whose mission is to investigate and report on the status of civil rights in the United States. Since its inception, the Commission has conducted hearings and issued reports highlighting critical, controversial civil rights issues, including racial segregation, impediments to voting rights, and affirmative action. To carry out its fact-finding and reporting mission, the Commission is required to submit at least one report annually to the President and Congress on federal civil rights enforcement efforts, among other requirements. Because the Commission has no enforcement power, the key means for achieving its mission lies in its credibility as an independent and impartial fact-finding and reporting organization. To complement this national fact-finding and reporting effort, separate state advisory committees were also authorized in 1957 to advise the Commission and serve as its "eyes and ears" on state and local civil rights issues. State advisory committees are composed of volunteers appointed by the Commission in every state who conduct public hearings on state and local civil rights issues and issue reports to the Commission on their findings. The Commission's national office reports are researched and written by national office staff and approved by the Commissioners, and the state advisory committee reports are researched and drafted by the Commission's regional office staff under the direction of the state advisory committees. We were asked to assess the Commission's quality assurance policies for its national and state advisory committee reports and other products and the role of the state advisory committees in fulfilling the Commission's fact-finding and reporting mission. More specifically, our objectives were to assess (1) the adequacy of the Commission's policies for ensuring the quality of its products and (2) the role of the state advisory committees in contributing to the Commission's work.
What GAO Found
The Commission has some policies that provide adequate quality assurance for its products; however, it lacks policies for ensuring the objectivity of its national office reports, briefings, and hearings and providing accountability for decisions made on its national office products. Among its key policies, the Commission requires its national office products to be reviewed for legal sufficiency and provides affected agencies an opportunity to comment on the accuracy of information in its draft reports. In addition, under new Commission policies, Commissioners have an increased role in the development of its products, as we previously recommended. However, the Commission lacks several key policies that could help ensure objectivity in its national office products. The state advisory committees have played a key role in the Commission's work by identifying and reporting on local civil rights issues, but most committees do not have current charters giving them authorization to operate, and the Commission has not fully integrated the committees into the accomplishment of its mission. Traditionally, the committees have gathered data on state and local civil rights issues by holding hearings, forums, and briefings and communicated their findings to the Commission and the public through reports. Since 1980, the state advisory committees have accounted for 200 of the 254 reports published by the Commission. Currently, however, 38 of the 51 state advisory committees cannot conduct any work because they do not have approved charters. In late 2005, the Commission began revising the criteria for state advisory committee membership in order to, among other things, move away from racially and ethnically based representation toward great diversity in expertise and ideas. It also decided that the committees' applications for new charters would not be accepted until they had been redrafted to include only members who meet the new criteria. Several other actions by the Commission have limited the activities of the state advisory committees. First, since the 1990s, because of budgetary constraints, the Commission has significantly reduced the number of regional office staff, who provide extensive support to the state committees in conducting their activities and producing reports. In addition, the Commission has reduced funding for the state advisory committees, including money needed to hold public meetings. Furthermore, draft reports prepared by the state advisory committees are often not reviewed or published by the Commission in a timely manner. For example, most of the state advisory committees we visited told us the national office had not reviewed and accepted their reports in a timely manner, and less than a quarter of the state advisory committee chairs who responded to our survey reported that they were satisfied with the national office's timeliness in processing their reports. The Commission has also not incorporated the work of the state advisory committees into its strategic planning and decision-making processes, including articulating how the national office will use the state advisory committees' findings on state and local civil rights issues to inform the Commission's national goals and strategies. For example, the Commission did not obtain input from the state advisory committees in developing its new draft strategic plan, although the committees play an important role in accomplishing the agency's goals. Finally, although many of these are long-standing issues, the Commission has not provided for independent oversight of its policies and practices for the state advisory committees. |
gao_T-AIMD-98-278 | gao_T-AIMD-98-278_0 | Risk of Year 2000 Disruption to the Public Is High
The public faces a high risk that critical services provided by the government and the private sector could be severely disrupted by the Year 2000 computing crisis. In addition, the year 2000 could cause problems for the many facilities used by the federal government that were built or renovated within the last 20 years and contain embedded computer systems to control, monitor, or assist in operations. Nevertheless, overall, the government’s 24 major departments and agencies are making slow progress in fixing their systems. In May 1997, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) reported that about 21 percent of the mission-critical systems (1,598 of 7,649) for these departments and agencies were Year 2000 compliant. However, unless agency progress improved dramatically, a substantial number of mission-critical systems will not be compliant in time. In addition to slow governmentwide progress in fixing systems, our reviews of federal agency Year 2000 programs have found uneven progress. Some agencies are significantly behind schedule and are at high risk that they will not fix their systems in time. Other agencies have made progress, although risks continue and a great deal of work remains. First, governmentwide priorities in fixing systems have not yet been established. These governmentwide priorities need to be based on such criteria as the potential for adverse health and safety effects, adverse financial effects on American citizens, detrimental effects on national security, and adverse economic consequences. Second, business continuity and contingency planning across the government has been inadequate. In their May 1998 quarterly reports to OMB, only four agencies reported that they had drafted contingency plans for their core business processes. Third, OMB’s assessment of the current status of federal Year 2000 progress is predominantly based on agency reports that have not been consistently reviewed or verified. In fact, we have found cases in which agencies’ systems compliance status as reported to OMB has been inaccurate. Fourth, end-to-end testing responsibilities have not yet been defined. State and Local Governments Face Significant Year 2000 Risks
State and local governments also face a major risk of Year 2000-induced failures to the many vital services—such as benefits payments, transportation, and public safety—that they provide. Recent surveys of state Year 2000 efforts have indicated that much remains to be completed. For example, (1) Illinois’ Office of the Auditor General reported that significant future efforts were needed to ensure that the year 2000 would not adversely affect state government operations, (2) Vermont’s Office of Auditor of Accounts reported that the state faces the risk that critical portions of its Year 2000 compliance efforts could fail, (3) Texas’ Office of the State Auditor reported that many state entities had not finished their embedded systems inventories and, therefore, it is not likely that they will complete their embedded systems repairs before the year 2000, and (4) Florida’s Auditor General has issued several reports detailing the need for additional Year 2000 planning at various district school boards and community colleges. At the time of our review, much work remained to ensure that federal and state data exchanges will be Year 2000 compliant. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed the year 2000 computer system risks facing the nation, focusing on: (1) GAO's major concerns with the federal government's progress in correcting its systems; (2) state and local government year 2000 issues; and (3) critical year 2000 data exchange issues.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the public faces a high risk that critical services provided by the government and the private sector could be severely disrupted by the year 2000 computing crisis; (2) the year 2000 could cause problems for the many facilities used by the federal government that were built or renovated within the last 20 years and contain embedded computer systems to control, monitor, or assist in operations; (3) overall, the government's 24 major departments and agencies are making slow progress in fixing their systems; (4) in May 1997, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) reported that about 21 percent of the mission-critical systems for these departments and agencies were year 2000 compliant; (5) in May 1998, these departments reported that 40 percent of the mission-critical systems were year 2000 compliant; (6) unless progress improves dramatically, a substantial number of mission-critical systems will not be compliant in time; (7) in addition to slow governmentwide progress in fixing systems, GAO's reviews of federal agency year 2000 programs have found uneven progress; (8) some agencies are significantly behind schedule and are at high risk that they will not fix their systems in time; (9) other agencies have made progress, although risks continue and a great deal of work remains; (10) governmentwide priorities in fixing systems have not yet been established; (11) these governmentwide priorities need to be based on such criteria as the potential for adverse health and safety effects, adverse financial effects on American citizens, detrimental effects on national security, and adverse economic consequences; (12) business continuity and contingency planning across the government has been inadequate; (13) in their May 1998 quarterly reports to OMB, only four agencies reported that they had drafted contingency plans for their core business processes; (14) OMB's assessment of the status of federal year 2000 progress is predominantly based on agency reports that have not been consistently reviewed or verified; (15) GAO found cases in which agencies' systems compliance status as reported to OMB had been inaccurate; (16) end-to-end testing responsibilities have not yet been identified; (17) state and local governments also face a major risk of year 2000-induced failures to the many vital services that they provide; (18) recent surveys of state year 2000 efforts have indicated that much remains to be completed; and (19) at the time of GAO's review, much work remained to ensure that federal and state data exchanges will be year 2000 compliant. |
gao_GAO-02-797T | gao_GAO-02-797T_0 | Background
The District of Columbia Family Court Act of 2001 (P.L. The chief judge’s determination of the number of individuals serving as judges of the Superior Court who meet the qualifications for judges of the Family Court and are willing and able to serve on the Family Court. Volume III addresses the physical space the court needs to house and operate the Family Court. The Transition Plan Reveals Progress and Challenges in Planning the Transition to the Family Court
The Family Court transition plan provides information on most, but not all, of the elements required by the Family Court Act; however, some aspects of case management, training, and performance evaluation are unclear. The Family Court has begun several initiatives to integrate its activities with the social services provided by other District agencies. In achieving coordinated services in the longer term, the court faces several challenges. The plan calls for renovations under tight deadlines and all required space may not be available, as currently planned, to support the additional judges the Family Court needs to perform its work in accordance with the act, making it uncertain as to when the court can fully complete its transition. | What GAO Found
The District of Columbia Superior Court has made progress in planning the transition of its Family Division to a Family Court, but some challenges remain. The Superior Court's transition plan addresses most, but not all, of the required elements outlined in the District of Columbia Family Court Act of 2001. Significantly, the completion of the transition hinges on timely completion of a complex series of interdependent plans intended to obtain and renovate physical space to house the court and its functions. All required space may not be available, as currently planned, to support the additional judges the Family Court needs to perform its work in accordance with the act, making it uncertain as to when the court can fully complete its transition. Although not required as part of its transition plan efforts, the Superior Court has begun to coordinate its activities with social services agencies in the District. However, the court and agencies face challenges in achieving coordinated services in the longer term. Finally, the development and application of the District of Columbia Courts' Integrated Justice Information System will be critical for the Family Court to be able to operate effectively, evaluate its performance, and meet its judicial goals in the context of the changes mandated by the Family Court Act. |
gao_GAO-03-945 | gao_GAO-03-945_0 | Inadequate ventilation systems or roof support systems can directly affect the safety and health of mine workers. Although MSHA has extensive inspection procedures, some of them are unclear, while others are difficult to locate because they are contained in so many different sources. Although many of MSHA’s highly trained and experienced underground coal mine inspectors will be eligible to retire within the next 5 years, and the agency’s historic attrition rates indicate that many of them will actually retire, the agency has not developed a plan for replacing these inspectors. However, MSHA is not making full use of available human capital flexibilities to streamline its hiring procedures or retain the services of inspectors. In addition, MSHA cannot track trends in fatal or nonfatal injury rates at mines that use contractor staff to mine coal. Conclusions
MSHA plays an important role in protecting the safety and health of coal miners. MSHA has extensive policies and procedures and has assigned highly qualified staff to its processes for reviewing and approving mine plans, conducting inspections of underground coal mines, and investigating accidents. If MSHA does not develop a plan for addressing the large number of retirements of inspectors over the next 5 years, it may not be able to continue to ensure the safety and health of underground coal miners. Recommendations
In order to provide better oversight over its operations, including collecting all of the data needed to provide this oversight, we recommend that the Secretary of Labor direct the Assistant Secretary for Mine Safety and Health to monitor the timeliness of 6-month technical inspections conducted as part of MSHA’s review of ventilation and roof control plans to ensure that all inspections are completed by the district offices; monitor follow-up actions taken by its district offices to ensure that mine operators are correcting hazards identified during inspections on a timely basis; update and consolidate guidance provided to its district offices on plan approval and inspections to eliminate inconsistencies and outdated instructions, including clarifying guidance on coordinating technical inspections with regular quarterly inspections of mines; develop a plan for addressing anticipated shortages in the number of qualified inspectors due to upcoming retirements, including considering options such as streamlining the agency’s hiring process and offering retention allowances; amend the guidance provided to independent contractors engaged in high- hazard activities requiring them to report information on the number of hours worked by their staff at specific mines so that MSHA can use this information to compute the injury and fatality rates used to measure the effectiveness of its enforcement efforts; and revise the systems it uses to collect information on accidents and investigations to provide better data on accidents and make it easier to link injuries, accidents, and investigations. The plan also does not link the accomplishment of MSHA’s strategic goals using outcome data—such as trends in the incidence rate (fatalities and nonfatal injuries) at underground coal mines—to its future human capital needs. | Why GAO Did This Study
Despite a drop in injury and fatality rates since the formation of the Department of Labor's Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA), mining is still a dangerous industry. Focusing on underground coal mines, GAO assessed how well MSHA oversees its process for reviewing and approving critical types of mine plans and the extent to which MSHA's inspections and accident investigations processes help ensure the safety and health of underground coal miners.
What GAO Found
To help ensure the safety and health of underground coal miners, MSHA staff review and approve mine plans, conduct inspections, and investigate serious accidents. In these three areas, GAO found that MSHA has extensive procedures and qualified staff. However, MSHA can improve its oversight, guidance, and human capital planning efforts. MSHA is not effectively monitoring a few key areas. MSHA headquarters does not ensure that 6-month technical inspections of ventilation and roof support plans are being completed in a timely fashion. This may lead to mines operating without up-to-date plans or mine operators not following all requirements of the plans. Additionally, MSHA officials do not always ensure that hazards found during inspections are corrected promptly. Gaps were found in the information that MSHA uses to monitor fatal and nonfatal injuries, limiting trend analysis and agency oversight. Specifically, the agency does not collect information on hours worked by independent contractor staff needed to compute fatality and nonfatal injury rates for specific mines, and it is difficult to link information on accidents at underground coal mines with MSHA's investigations. Guidance provided by MSHA management to agency employees could be strengthened. Some inspection procedures are unclear and are contained in many sources, leading to differing interpretations by mine inspectors. The guidance on coordinating inspections conducted by specialists and regular inspectors is also unclear, resulting in some duplication of effort. Finally, although about 44 percent of MSHA's underground coal mine inspectors will be eligible to retire in the next 5 years, the agency has no plan for replacing them or using other human capital flexibilities available to the agency to retain its highly qualified and trained inspectors. The potential shortage of inspectors may limit MSHA's ability to ensure the safety and health of underground coal miners. |
gao_GAO-16-633T | gao_GAO-16-633T_0 | The Coast Guard’s Process for Allocating Assets to Meet Mission Responsibilities
Since fiscal year 2008, the Coast Guard has used the Standard Operational Planning Process for annually developing and communicating strategic commitments and allocating resource hours, by asset type (i.e., aircraft, cutters, and boats), throughout its chain of command for meeting mission responsibilities. The Coast Guard’s Acquisition Plans Do Not Reflect Its New Assets and Current Funding Levels
The 2005 Mission Needs Statement Baseline Does Not Reflect the Coast Guard’s Planned Assets and Capacities
Since the Coast Guard developed acquisition plans for its Deepwater recapitalization program, many of the assumptions that initially informed these plans, including the 2005 Mission Needs Statement baseline for those assets, have changed and are no longer accurate, as we reported in June 2014 and May 2015. However, we reported in March 2015 that the unexpected transfer of C-27J aircraft from the Department of Defense in December 2013 represented a significant change to this aircraft fleet mix. However, Congress recently provided the Coast Guard with funding for a ninth National Security Cutter as part of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016, representing an unanticipated addition to its planned major cutter fleet. However, the Coast Guard’s April 2016 report to Congress on its capital investments states that the planned resource hours for each Fast Response Cutter is 2,500 hours per year—a reduction of 500 hours per cutter from the 2005 baseline. For the past 6 years, we have consistently found that there is a significant difference between the funding the Coast Guard estimates it needs to carry out its program of record for its major acquisitions and what it has traditionally requested and received through annual appropriations. To date, the Coast Guard’s attempts to address this difference by establishing its future fleet’s mission needs within reasonable budget constraints have been unsuccessful. As the Coast Guard has faced fiscal constraints in recent years, this has led to asset capability gaps. We recommended in June 2014, that the Coast Guard develop a 20-year fleet modernization plan that identifies all acquisitions needed to maintain the current level of service—aircraft and vessels—and the fiscal resources needed to buy the identified assets. As of June 2016, the Coast Guard has yet to complete this plan. Past GAO Recommendations
In addition to the 20-year fleet modernization plan, we have made several recommendations in recent years for the Coast Guard to improve its recapitalization business case by, among other things, identifying the cost, capabilities, and quantity and mix of assets needed; as well as the trade-offs necessary to meet fiscal constraints. Use of Asset Capacities Limit the Strategic Effectiveness of the Asset Allocation Process, but the Coast Guard Is Taking Steps to Improve the Process
Coast Guard Headquarters’ Strategic Planning Directions Reflect Asset Maximum Capacities Rather Than Achievable Goals
In May 2016, we reported that Coast Guard headquarters does not provide field units with realistic goals for allocating assets, by mission. In response to our findings, we recommended that the Coast Guard more systematically incorporate field unit input to inform more realistic asset allocation decisions—in addition to asset maximum capacities currently used—in the annual Strategic Planning Directions to more effectively communicate strategic intent to field units. The Coast Guard concurred with our recommendation and stated that it was taking actions to better incorporate field unit input for fiscal year 2017. The Coast Guard Does Not Document the Extent to Which Risk Assessments Affect Asset Allocation Decisions
In May 2016, we also reported that the Coast Guard does not maintain documentation on the extent to which risk factors have affected the allocation of asset resource hours to missions through its Strategic Planning Directions. Furthermore, to ensure that assets are deployed consistent with Coast Guard mission priorities, the Coast Guard should follow through with implementing our prior recommendations to improve its annual resource allocation process. Key contributors for the previous work that this testimony is based on are listed in each product. | Why GAO Did This Study
Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the Coast Guard has been charged with expanded security-related missions. Constrained budgets in recent years have underscored the importance of ensuring that the Coast Guard has the proper mix of assets and that it can effectively allocate these assets to achieve its missions. In recent years, the Coast Guard has begun to deploy new assets, and has taken actions to assess what assets it needs to carry out its missions and how to best allocate its current assets. However, the Coast Guard continues to face decisions about what assets it needs and how to best allocate these assets to meet its mission responsibilities.
This statement addresses the Coast Guard's (1) mission needs, and (2) process for allocating asset resource hours across missions and units. This testimony is based on GAO's May 2016 report on the Coast Guard's allocation of assets, and GAO's body of work over the past 6 years on Coast Guard major acquisitions, as well as selected updates obtained in May 2016. For the selected updates, GAO reviewed Coast Guard documentation and analyzed fiscal year 2015 data on Coast Guard asset resource hour utilization, which GAO found to be sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this testimony statement.
What GAO Found
Since the U.S. Coast Guard developed acquisition plans for its asset recapitalization program, many of the assumptions that initially informed these documents, including its 2005 Mission Needs Statement baseline, are no longer accurate. For example, in March 2015, GAO reported that the Coast Guard received an unexpected transfer of 14 C-27J aircraft from the Air Force, representing a significant change to its aircraft fleet mix. In addition, Congress recently provided the Coast Guard with funding for a ninth National Security Cutter—one more than it had planned for in 2005. Further, the Coast Guard has reduced the operational capacities of several assets to reflect more realistic and achievable operational targets. For example, the Coast Guard reduced the operational capacity of the Fast Response Cutter from 3,000 hours per vessel per year to 2,500 hours. GAO has also consistently found that there is a significant difference between the funding the Coast Guard estimates it needs for its major acquisitions and what it has traditionally requested and received. The Coast Guard's attempts to address this difference by establishing its future fleet's mission needs within reasonable budget constraints have been unsuccessful. GAO has made several recommendations for the Coast Guard to improve its recapitalization business case, including that the Coast Guard develop a 20-year fleet modernization plan that identifies all acquisitions needed to maintain the current level of service and the fiscal resources needed to acquire them. The Coast Guard concurred with the recommendation and has actions underway, but has not completed this plan. Given that key changes have taken place since 2005, the Coast Guard should continue to take steps to address GAO's recommendations.
GAO reported in May 2016 that the Coast Guard uses the Standard Operational Planning Process to annually allocate asset resource hours to field units for meeting missions, but the headquarters' Strategic Planning Directions used in this process do not provide field units with strategic, realistic goals. Rather, headquarters' Strategic Planning Directions allocate maximum resource hour capacities for each asset. These allocations have consistently exceeded actual asset resource hours used by field units. GAO recommended, among other things, that the Coast Guard more systematically incorporate field unit input to inform more realistic asset allocation decisions—in addition to asset maximum capacities currently used—in the annual Strategic Planning Directions to more effectively communicate strategic intent to field units. The Coast Guard concurred with GAO's recommendation and stated that it was taking actions to better incorporate field unit input for fiscal year 2017.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is not making any new recommendations in this statement. |
gao_GAO-14-152 | gao_GAO-14-152_0 | As stated earlier, in October 2010, we reported that although the Air Force met best practices in developing a cost estimate, it did not meet best practices in developing the schedule estimate for implementing DEAMS. In particular, the Air Force had not developed a fully integrated master schedule that reflected all government and contractor activities. DOD concurred with our recommendation, and we discuss later in this report the status of DOD’s efforts to address this recommendation. DEAMS Program Schedule Did Not Meet Best Practices, but the Cost Estimate Did Meet Best Practices
We found that the schedule for the DEAMS program did not meet best practices. The cost estimate did meet best practices, but the issues associated with the schedule could negatively affect the cost estimate. Specifically, the DEAMS schedule supporting the February 2012 Milestone B decision partially or minimally met the four characteristics for developing a high-quality and reliable schedule—it was not comprehensive, well-constructed, credible, or controlled. In addition, our assessment of the October 2012 updated schedule found that it was not comprehensive, well-constructed, and credible and thus was also not reliable. In contrast, the DEAMS cost estimate fully or substantially met the four characteristics of a high-quality and reliable cost estimate—it was comprehensive, well-documented, accurate, and credible. Resources were identified in the schedule; however, the resources were not assigned to specific activities in the schedule. Without a valid critical path, management cannot focus on activities that will have detrimental effects on the key project milestones and deliveries if they slip. A schedule risk analysis should also be performed using statistical techniques to predict the level of confidence in meeting a program’s completion date. Similar to the previous schedule, the updated schedule presented unreasonable float throughout and did not include a schedule risk analysis. In May 2013, program management officials provided another updated DEAMS schedule that they stated included some improvements, but they acknowledged that it contained issues that prevented the schedule from meeting best practices. However, because the cost estimate relies on dates derived from the schedule and we are questioning the reliability of the forecasted program dates, the credibility of the cost estimate can be affected. The cost estimate included both government and contractor costs of the program over its life cycle—from the inception of the program through design, development, deployment, and operation and maintenance—as outlined in the roadmap prepared by program officials. We found that the cost estimate for DEAMS was accurate. We found that the cost estimate was credible. Recommendation for Executive Action
To help provide for the successful implementation of DEAMS, we recommend that the Secretary of the Air Force direct the Under Secretary of the Air Force, in his capacity as the Chief Management Officer, to consider and make any necessary adjustments to the DEAMS cost estimate after addressing our prior recommendation to adopt scheduling best practices. Appendix II: Assessment of the Defense Enterprise Accounting and Management System Program’s Cost Estimate
This appendix provides the results of our analysis of the extent to which the Defense Enterprise Accounting and Management System (DEAMS) cost estimate supporting the February 2012 Milestone B decision met the characteristics of a high-quality cost estimate. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Defense (DOD) has stated that the development and implementation of DEAMS is critical to the department's goal of producing auditable financial statements by September 2017. In October 2010, GAO reported that although the Air Force had developed a cost estimate that met best practices, it had not developed a schedule that met best practices for implementing DEAMS. GAO has published guides that identify the characteristics and associated best practices for developing reliable schedule and cost estimates. GAO was asked to review the schedule and cost estimates for selected DOD systems. This report addresses the extent to which the current schedule and cost estimates for DEAMS were prepared in accordance with GAO's Schedule and Cost Guides.
Specifically, GAO's review focused on the schedule and cost estimates that supported DOD's February 2012 Milestone B decision, which determined that investment in DEAMS was justified. GAO assessed the schedule and cost estimates and supporting documentation. GAO also assessed an updated schedule dated October 2012. GAO interviewed DEAMS program officials, lead schedulers, and cost estimators.
What GAO Found
The Air Force's schedule that supported the February 2012 Milestone B decision for the Defense Enterprise Accounting and Management System (DEAMS) did not meet best practices. The cost estimate did meet best practices, but the issues associated with the schedule could negatively affect the cost estimate. GAO found that the schedule supporting the Air Force's decision to invest in DEAMS partially or minimally met the four characteristics for developing a high-quality and reliable schedule. For example, the schedule did not reflect all government and contractor activities, and resources were not assigned to specific activities. The schedule also lacked a valid critical path, preventing management from focusing on the activities most likely to cause critical program delays if they are not completed as planned. In addition, a schedule risk analysis was not conducted to predict a level of confidence in meeting the program's completion date.
GAO found that the October 2012 updated schedule estimate was not comprehensive, well-constructed, and credible, and contained weaknesses similar to those found in the previous schedule. In May 2013, program officials provided a third schedule that they said contained some improvements but acknowledged that issues remained that prevented the schedule from meeting best practices.
GAO found that the DEAMS cost estimate fully or substantially met the four characteristics of a high-quality and reliable cost estimate. For example, the cost estimate included both government and contractor costs for the program over its life cycle and provided for an independent assessment and reconciliation. Because the cost estimate relies on dates derived from the schedule and GAO is questioning the reliability of the schedule, the credibility of the cost estimate could be affected.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the Secretary of the Air Force update the cost estimate as necessary after implementing GAO's prior recommendation to adopt scheduling best practices. DOD concurred with the recommendation. |
gao_GAO-11-117 | gao_GAO-11-117_0 | In addition to the NIST efforts to develop a framework for identifying interoperability and cybersecurity standards, the agency also identified the need to institute an initiative to develop cybersecurity guidelines for organizations such as electric companies, IT system vendors, and others involved in developing and implementing smart grid systems. NIST Has Developed and Issued Smart Grid Cybersecurity Guidelines, but They Do Not Address Some Key Cybersecurity Elements
NIST developed, and issued in August 2010, a first version of its smart grid cybersecurity guidelines. To develop the guidelines, NIST planned to have the working group perform an assessment of the cybersecurity risks associated with existing and planned smart grid systems and then use the risk information, and an assessment of the privacy implications of these systems, to identify security requirements (i.e., controls) essential to securing such systems. While NIST largely addressed the key elements in developing its guidelines, it did not address an important element essential to securing smart grid systems and networks that NIST had planned to include. NIST also identified other key elements that surfaced during its development of the guidelines that need to be addressed in future guideline updates. NIST officials also said that the working group intends to update the guidelines to, among other things, address these missing elements. To do so, NIST drafted a plan and schedule for updating the cybersecurity guidelines periodically. While a positive step, the plan and schedule, as of October 2010, were still in draft form. Without it, there is increased risk that important cybersecurity elements will not be addressed by entities implementing smart grid systems, thus making these systems vulnerable to attack. However, FERC has not developed a coordinated approach with other regulators to monitor the extent to which industry follows these voluntary standards, because, according to officials, it has not yet determined whether or how to perform such a task. While EISA gives FERC authority to adopt smart grid standards, it does not provide FERC with specific enforcement authority. FERC Has Not Developed a Coordinated Approach to Monitor Whether Industry Follows Voluntary Standards
Despite the importance of ensuring manufacturers and utilities follow smart grid standards, FERC has not developed an approach coordinated with other regulators to monitor at a high level the extent to which industry will follow the voluntary smart grid standards it adopts. Adherence to standards is an important step toward achieving an interoperable and secure electricity system. Aspects of the current regulatory environment make it difficult to ensure the cybersecurity of smart grid systems. Specifically, there is concern that consumers are not aware of the benefits, costs, and risks associated with smart grid systems. As a result, until consumers are more informed about the benefits, costs, and risks of smart grid systems, utilities may not invest in, or get approval for, comprehensive security for smart grid systems, which may increase the risk of attacks succeeding. Utilities are focusing on regulatory compliance instead of comprehensive security. There is a lack of security features being built into smart grid systems. The electricity industry does not have an effective mechanism for sharing information on cybersecurity and other issues. The electricity industry does not have metrics for evaluating cybersecurity. To improve coordination among regulators and help Congress better assess the effectiveness of the voluntary smart grid standards process, we recommend that the Chairman of FERC, making use of existing smart grid information, develop an approach to coordinate with state regulators to (1) periodically evaluate the extent to which utilities and manufacturers are following voluntary interoperability and cybersecurity standards and (2) develop strategies for addressing any gaps in compliance with standards that are identified as a result of this evaluation. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to (1) assess the extent to which the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has developed smart grid cybersecurity guidelines, (2) evaluate the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission’s (FERC) efforts to adopt smart grid cybersecurity and other standards and monitor their use by industry, and (3) identify challenges associated with ensuring the cybersecurity of the smart grid. Electricity Restructuring: Key Challenges Remain. | Why GAO Did This Study
The electric industry is increasingly incorporating information technology (IT) systems into its operations as part of nationwide efforts--commonly referred to as smart grid--to improve reliability and efficiency. There is concern that if these efforts are not implemented securely, the electric grid could become more vulnerable to attacks and loss of services. To address this concern, the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 (EISA) provided the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) with responsibilities related to coordinating the development and adoption of smart grid guidelines and standards. GAO was asked to (1) assess the extent to which NIST has developed smart grid cybersecurity guidelines; (2) evaluate FERC's approach for adopting and monitoring smart grid cybersecurity and other standards; and (3) identify challenges associated with smart grid cybersecurity. To do so, GAO analyzed agency documentation, interviewed responsible officials, and hosted an expert panel.
What GAO Found
NIST has developed, and issued in August 2010, a first version of its smart grid cybersecurity guidelines. The agency developed the guidelines--for entities such as electric companies involved in implementing smart grid systems--to provide guidance on how to securely implement such systems. In doing this, NIST largely addressed key cybersecurity elements that it had planned to include in the guidelines, such as an assessment of the cybersecurity risks associated with smart grid systems and the identification of security requirements (i.e., controls) essential to securing such systems. This notwithstanding, NIST did not address an important element essential to securing smart grid systems that it had planned to include--addressing the risk of attacks that use both cyber and physical means. NIST also identified other key elements that surfaced during its development of the guidelines that need to be addressed in future guideline updates. NIST officials said that they intend to update the guidelines to address the missing elements, and have drafted a plan to do so. While a positive step, the plan and schedule are still in draft form. Until the missing elements are addressed, there is an increased risk that smart grid implementations will not be secure as otherwise possible. In 2010, FERC began a process to consider an initial set of smart grid interoperability and cybersecurity standards for adoption, but has not developed a coordinated approach to monitor the extent to which industry is following these standards. While EISA gives FERC authority to adopt smart grid standards, it does not provide FERC with specific enforcement authority. This means that standards will remain voluntary unless regulators are able to use other authorities--such as the ability to oversee the rates electricity providers charge customers--to enforce them. Additionally, although regulatory fragmentation--the divided regulation over aspects of the industry between federal, state, and local entities--complicates oversight of smart grid interoperability and cybersecurity, FERC has not developed an approach coordinated with other regulators to monitor whether industry is following the voluntary smart grid standards it adopts. FERC officials said they have not yet determined whether or how to do so. Nonetheless, adherence to standards is an important step toward achieving an interoperable and secure electricity system and establishing an approach for coordinating on standards adoption could help address gaps, if they arise. With respect to challenges to securing smart grid systems, GAO identified the following six key challenges: (1) Aspects of the regulatory environment may make it difficult to ensure smart grid systems' cybersecurity. (2) Utilities are focusing on regulatory compliance instead of comprehensive security. (3) The electric industry does not have an effective mechanism for sharing information on cybersecurity. (4) Consumers are not adequately informed about the benefits, costs, and risks associated with smart grid systems. (5) There is a lack of security features being built into certain smart grid systems. (6) The electricity industry does not have metrics for evaluating cybersecurity.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that NIST finalize its plan and schedule for updating its cybersecurity guidelines to incorporate missing elements, and that FERC develop a coordinated approach to monitor voluntary standards and address any gaps in compliance. Both agencies agreed with these recommendations. |
gao_GAO-06-378 | gao_GAO-06-378_0 | GPRA required federal agencies to develop strategic plans with long-term, outcome-oriented goals and objectives, annual goals linked to achieving the long-term goals, and annual reports on the results achieved. In the case of FAA, the agency has made available much of the information and analytic resources that Congress needs to conduct its oversight role. Analytical Agencies and Organizations Can Provide Information and Analysis to Enhance Oversight Efforts
Through its legislative support agencies—GAO, Congressional Research Service and the Congressional Budget Office—and the Department of Transportation’s Inspector General, congressional committees also have access to considerable resources for oversight. These included two involving FAA—FAA Financial Management and FAA Air Traffic Control modernization. In addition, the OIG annually reports on the top management challenges facing DOT. Regular Communication and Timely Access to Useful Information Can Enhance Oversight
Effective communication among agency officials, Members of Congress and congressional staff is needed to ensure that information agencies provide meets committee needs. While considerable information resources are available, they may not be available in a manner that is useful to committees. We have previously reported, in a review of interactions between the Congress and other executive branch agencies, that although agencies collect and produce a great deal of useful information, much of it did not reach the interested congressional committees, and the information that did reach the committees was difficult to digest, too highly aggregated, or was received too late to be useful. While FAA provides a great deal of information on its Web site, enhancing access to agency information using technology can improve the timeliness and usefulness of agency information to the Congress. Further, regular meetings between committees, staff and agency officials could identify the committee’s principal oversight objectives, provide a forum to discuss the issues, and develop the best approaches to meet them. House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee staff indicated that FAA has a large quantity of information available and effective communication between the staff and the agency, but it is also interested in using technology to gain additional, timely access to agency data when conducting oversight. For example, as a result of our discussions with committee and agency staff, FAA has initiated a For Congress page on its Web site. The page provides a single point of access for information committee staff identified in our discussions as relevant for oversight, as shown in figure 5. Importantly, these findings constitute lessons learned that may be transferable to other agencies. Recommendations for Executive Action
We recommend the Secretary of the Department of Transportation, direct the Administrator of FAA, to take the following actions to further enhance committee access to FAA information: Continue to work with committee staff to further refine the For Congress Web site by improving the flow of information and taking advantage of emerging technologies; Include a Frequently Asked Questions page on the For Congress site, allowing oversight committees to quickly find answers to commonly requested items relevant to Congress; Add moderated access on the For Congress Web site to allow access to information that should be made available to congressional committees, yet may not be appropriate for the general public; Consider offering regular meetings between the Members of the committee and key staff with senior FAA executives to address matters of mutual concern. They noted that a considerable amount of information is available to Members of Congress and their staff in a section of FAA’s Web site dedicated to serving the information needs of Congress—as our report notes, an improvement developed as a result of discussions between agency and congressional staff during our review. Objectives, Scope and Methodology
The objectives of this report were to identify (1) information FAA produces that could enhance congressional oversight; (2) other available information resources that could enhance congressional oversight; and, (3) how committee access to FAA’s information could be improved to enhance timeliness and usefulness. Financial Statements Provide Insights into Agency Financial Management and Resources
FAA’s annual financial statements can be used to analyze the agency’s operating results and its financial position. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to various statutes, federal agencies develop an abundance of performance, budget, and financial information that could be useful for Congress' review and monitoring of agencies. However, agencies' understanding of Congress' information needs is often limited and agencies may not be providing timely information in a format that aids congressional understanding of trends and issues. Thus, Members and their staff may not be aware of or avail themselves to certain information. To describe the information available and how it might be used to support congressional oversight, the Federal Aviation Administration was selected as a case study in part due to the large quantity of information already available. GAO was asked to identify: (1) information FAA produces that could enhance congressional oversight, (2) other technology and information resources that could enhance congressional oversight, and (3) how committee access to FAA's information could be improved to enhance its timeliness and usefulness.
What GAO Found
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has made available much of the information and analytic resources that Congress needs to carry out its oversight function. For example, FAA has a strategic plan with long-term, outcome-oriented goals and objectives. Its annual Performance and Accountability Report includes the agency's progress in achieving its goals, and allows Congress to monitor performance trends. This report also provides financial information useful for analyzing its operating results and financial position. FAA's budget documents combined with performance data could provide Congress information to use in determining whether resources are achieving the planned performance improvements. Used together, this information could assist Members of Congress and congressional staff in their oversight responsibilities. Through its legislative support agencies--GAO, Congressional Research Service and the Congressional Budget Office--and the Department of Transportation's (DOT) Inspector General (IG), congressional committee staff also have access to considerable resources for oversight. For example, GAO's 2005 High Risk Series Update includes FAA's Air Traffic Control Modernization program and discusses progress the agency has made in addressing its problems. DOT's IG annually reports on the top management challenges facing FAA, such as safety and capacity challenges. Effective communication is needed to ensure that information agencies provide meets congressional needs. While considerable information resources are available, they may not be available in a manner that is useful to committees. We have reported that although agencies collect and produce a great deal of information, much of it did not reach the interested committees, and the information that did reach them was difficult to digest, highly aggregated, or was received too late to be useful. In the case of FAA, House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee staff said FAA has a large quantity of information available and effective communication between the staff and agency, but is interested in using technology to gain additional agency data. While FAA provides a great deal of information on its Web site, it could take additional advantage of technology to improve the timeliness and usefulness of information to the Congress. For example, a Frequently Asked Questions section could provide quick access to information often requested by committees. As a result of our discussions with committee and agency staff, FAA has initiated two suggested technology enhancements, a For Congress page on its Web site, providing a single point of access for information relevant for oversight, and a Web site subscription service notifying committee staff when relevant information has been updated on its Web site. Further, regular meetings between congressional committees and agency officials could identify the committee's oversight objectives, provide a forum to discuss the issues, and develop approaches to meet them. Importantly, these findings constitute lessons learned that may be transferable to other agencies. |
gao_GAO-04-480 | gao_GAO-04-480_0 | For example, states may choose to expand coverage to seniors whose incomes are above statutory limits, and all states have opted to provide prescription drug coverage. HHS denied two demonstration proposals, from Delaware and Hawaii, because they were not consistent with Pharmacy Plus guidelines. For Florida, Illinois, South Carolina, and Wisconsin, total combined federal and state Medicaid spending on the new drug benefit alone is expected to be more than $3.6 billion over 5 years, of which the federal share would be approximately $2.1 billion. HHS Has Not Ensured That Approved Demonstrations’ Spending Limits Will Be Budget Neutral
HHS has not adequately ensured that the spending limits it has approved for Pharmacy Plus demonstrations will be budget neutral—in other words, that the federal government will spend no more under the demonstrations than without them. For all four demonstrations, HHS approved 5-year spending limits based on projections of cost and beneficiary enrollment growth that exceeded benchmarks that department officials told us they considered in assessing the reasonableness of states’ demonstration proposals. Neither HHS’s negotiations with the states nor the department’s rationale for approving higher-than-benchmark growth rates is well documented. To determine budget neutral spending limits for the pharmacy demonstrations, HHS officials told us they consider the following for estimating growth in costs and enrollment through the course of the demonstrations: For cost growth per beneficiary, similar to guidelines for other types of section 1115 demonstrations, HHS seeks to approve a growth rate equal to the lower of either the state’s historical average annual growth in per- beneficiary cost (that is, the average annual rate for the 5 years before the demonstration proposal) or the nationwide projected growth rate, developed by CMS’s Office of the Actuary, for Medicaid cost per beneficiary age 65 or older. Pharmacy Plus Savings Assumptions Not Well Supported
Neither data from state experience nor other research supports the savings assumptions necessary for budget neutrality in the Pharmacy Plus demonstrations. In developing their demonstration proposals, states assumed that keeping low-income seniors healthy—thus preventing them from spending down their financial resources on health services and “diverting” them from Medicaid eligibility—would generate savings to help offset the increased costs of providing a new drug benefit. Without state- specific evidence, HHS approved savings assumptions negotiated with the states, including significant projected reductions in Medicaid senior enrollment. Had more conservative savings assumptions been used to estimate the demonstrations’ costs, the proposals likely could not have been approved as budget neutral. The dollar amounts of combined federal and state savings projected under these assumptions in the demonstrations’ budget neutrality calculations range from $480 million in Florida to $2 billion in Illinois (see table 4). States Have Taken Few Steps to Evaluate Demonstrations, and HHS Has Not Ensured Sufficient or Timely Progress Reporting
As of February 2004, efforts by the states and HHS to evaluate and monitor the four approved demonstrations, and to address some of the research questions the Pharmacy Plus initiative raises, were in their early stages. The four states with approved demonstrations had taken few steps toward implementing the evaluation plans required as a condition of approval, and an independent evaluation of two of the demonstrations, contracted by HHS and started in October 2002, was not scheduled to report until September 2005. The information that HHS requires states to report has been insufficient for determining whether the demonstrations are operating as intended. Recommendations for Executive Action
In light of our findings that the four HHS-approved Pharmacy Plus demonstrations are likely to substantially increase federal Medicaid spending, as previously approved Medicaid section 1115 demonstrations have done; that HHS’s review process and basis for these approvals have not been clearly set forth; and that approved demonstrations are not all meeting evaluation and monitoring requirements, we are making seven recommendations to the Secretary of HHS related to the section 1115 demonstration process. 1. 2. 3. 5. | Why GAO Did This Study
Under section 1115 of the Social Security Act, the Secretary of Health and Human Services may waive certain Medicaid requirements for states seeking to deliver services through demonstration projects. By policy, these demonstrations must not increase federal spending. GAO has previously reported concerns with HHS's approval process. GAO was asked to provide information on a new Medicaid section 1115 demonstration initiative called Pharmacy Plus, intended to allow states to cover prescription drugs for seniors not otherwise eligible for Medicaid. GAO reviewed the (1) approval status of state proposals, (2) extent to which HHS ensured that demonstrations are budget neutral, (3) basis for savings assumptions, and (4) federal and state steps to evaluate and monitor the demonstrations.
What GAO Found
From January 2002 through May 2004, HHS reviewed Pharmacy Plus proposals from 15 states and approved four: Florida, Illinois, South Carolina, and Wisconsin. These demonstrations offer prescription drug coverage to low-income seniors not otherwise eligible for Medicaid. HHS denied proposals from Delaware and Hawaii as inconsistent with demonstration guidelines; most of the rest were not under active review because HHS had not determined how new Medicare prescription drug legislation will affect proposed or operating Pharmacy Plus demonstrations. Over 5 years, the four approved demonstrations will provide prescription drug coverage to half a million low-income people age 65 or older, at a projected cost of about $3.6 billion, of which the federal share would be about $2.1 billion. HHS has not adequately ensured that the four approved demonstrations will be budget neutral, that is, that the federal government will not spend more with the demonstrations than without them. HHS approved the demonstrations' 5-year spending limits using projections of cost and beneficiary enrollment growth that exceeded benchmarks that HHS said it considered in assessing budget neutrality, specifically, states' recent average growth rates and projections for Medicaid program growth nationwide. Neither HHS's negotiations with the states nor its rationale for approving higher growth rates is documented. Using the benchmark growth rates, GAO estimates that none of the four demonstrations will be budget neutral and federal spending may increase significantly, for example, by more than $1 billion in Illinois and $416 million in Wisconsin over 5 years. Unrealistic savings assumptions also contribute to demonstration spending limits that are not likely to be budget neutral. States assumed that keeping low-income seniors healthy--thus preventing them from spending down their financial resources on health services and "diverting" them from Medicaid eligibility--would generate sufficient savings to offset the increased costs of providing a new drug benefit. GAO found neither state experience nor other research to support such savings. Without state-specific evidence, HHS approved savings assumptions for the four states ranging from $480 million to $2 billion per state over 5 years. Had more conservative assumptions been used to estimate demonstration savings, the proposals likely could not have been approved as budget neutral. Efforts by the states and HHS to evaluate and monitor the Pharmacy Plus demonstrations are in their early stages. The four states have taken few steps to put their own required evaluation plans into practice, and an independent evaluation contracted by HHS and started in October 2002 is scheduled to report in September 2005. In the interim, HHS has not ensured that all states meet requirements for progress reporting on the demonstrations. The information that states have submitted is often insufficient for determining whether the demonstrations are operating as intended, and this shortcoming will limit HHS's oversight capability. |
gao_GAO-07-1109T | gao_GAO-07-1109T_0 | Provisions in the proposal relating to its single-family insurance program would among other things authorize FHA to change the way it sets insurance premiums, reduce down-payment requirements, and insure larger loans. In addition, Congress has proposed changes to FHA’s Title I Manufactured Home Loan program that would increase loan limits and index them annually; insure each loan made instead of capping insurance at 10 percent of the value of a lender’s portfolio; incorporate stricter underwriting requirements; and establish up- front and annual premiums. Based on our analysis of HMDA data, FHA’s share of the market for home purchase mortgages (in terms of numbers of loans) declined 13 percentage points from 1996 through 2005, while the prime share increased slightly, and the subprime share grew 13 percentage points. FHA’s lack of process improvements and product restrictions relative to the conventional market provided conditions that favored conventional over FHA-insured mortgages. FHA and mortgage industry officials with whom we spoke also cited FHA loan limits as a factor that contributed to the decline in FHA market share. Our analysis of HMDA data indicated that the agency could have insured from 9 to 10 percent more loans in 2005 had the higher mortgage limits been in place. Approximately 20 percent of FHA’s 2005 borrowers would not have qualified for FHA mortgage insurance under the parameters of the risk-based pricing proposal we evaluated. FHA determined that the expected claim rates of these borrowers were higher than it found tolerable for either the borrower or the Mutual Mortgage Insurance Fund. Absent any program changes, FHA estimates that the fund would require an appropriation of approximately $143 million. If the major legislative proposals were passed, FHA estimates that the fund would generate $342 million in negative subsidies. FHA Has Enhanced Tools and Resources Important to Implementing Single- Family Proposals but Does Not Intend to Mitigate Risks by Piloting New Products
FHA has planned or taken steps to enhance the tools and resources that would be important to implementing the legislative proposals for its single-family insurance program. FHA is in the process of addressing a number of limitations in its mortgage scorecard that could reduce its effectiveness for risk-based pricing. While FHA plans to take some steps, such as instituting stricter underwriting standards, to mitigate the risks associated with lowering down-payment requirements, it does not plan to pilot any zero-down- payment product the agency is authorized to offer. The proposal to lower down-payment requirements is of particular concern given the greater default risk of low-down-payment loans, housing market conditions that could put borrowers with such loans in a negative equity position, and the difficulty of setting prices for new products whose risks may not be well understood. As we reported in February 2005, other mortgage institutions limit the availability of or pilot new products to manage risks associated with changing or expanding product lines. Our objectives are to (1) describe selected characteristics of manufactured housing and the demographics of the owners, (2) compare federal and state consumer and tenant protections for owners of manufactured homes, and (3) describe the proposed changes to the Manufactured Home Loan program and assess potential benefits and costs to borrowers and the federal government. While our scenario analysis offers a very general illustration of how the proposed changes could affect the General Insurance Fund, the effects of the proposed changes are unclear because FHA has not articulated which borrowers would be targeted if the program were expanded, specified changes in its underwriting requirements, developed a risk-based pricing structure for the proposed legislation, or estimated costs to the General Insurance Fund. | Why GAO Did This Study
Fewer borrowers are using the Federal Housing Administration's (FHA) single-family and manufactured housing insurance programs. To help counter this trend, proposed changes to the single-family program would raise loan limits, allow risk-based pricing of premiums, and reduce down payments. Changes such as higher loan limits also were proposed for the manufactured housing program. To assist Congress in considering the impact of these changes, this testimony provides information from recently issued GAO reports and preliminary views from ongoing work. Specifically, GAO discusses (1) trends in FHA's share of the mortgage market, (2) likely impacts of proposed changes to the single-family program, (3) practices important to implementing the changes to the single-family program, if passed, and (4) preliminary observations from our work on the manufactured housing program. To conduct this work, GAO analyzed agency, Home Mortgage Disclosure Act, and Census data and interviewed agency and lending industry officials and other stakeholders.
What GAO Found
FHA's share of the single-family mortgage market declined 13 percentage points from 1996 through 2005, with conventional lenders gaining notably increased percentages of lower-income and minority borrowers. This decline in market share was associated with a number of factors, including FHA's product restrictions and product innovations in the conventional market. The proposed changes to the single-family program could affect borrowers as well as program costs. For example, GAO estimated that in 2005 FHA could have insured 9 to 10 percent more loans if proposed mortgage limits were in effect. But, if the risk-based pricing proposal had been in effect in 2005, 20 percent of borrowers would not have qualified for FHA insurance. FHA determined that the expected claim rates of these borrowers were higher than it found tolerable for either the borrower or the Mutual Mortgage Insurance Fund. Absent any program changes, FHA estimates that the fund would require an appropriation of approximately $143 million in fiscal year 2008. If proposed changes were passed, FHA estimates that the fund would generate $342 million in negative subsidies (i.e., net cash inflows). Although FHA is taking steps to enhance tools important to implementing the proposed changes to its single-family program, it does not plan to use a common industry practice, piloting, to mitigate the risks of any zero-downpayment product. In response to prior GAO recommendations, FHA improved its loan performance models and is refining its mortgage scorecard (which evaluates the default risk of borrowers). However, the proposals would introduce new risks and challenges. The proposal to lower down payments is of particular concern given the greater default risk of these loans and the difficulty of setting prices for new products whose risks may not be well understood. One of the ways FHA plans to mitigate new or increased risks is through stricter underwriting standards, but it does not plan to pilot any zero-down-payment product. Other mortgage institutions use pilots to manage risks associated with changing or expanding product lines. Proposals for the manufactured home loan program would increase loan limits, insure each loan made, incorporate stricter underwriting requirements, and set premium rates. While the changes could benefit borrowers, according to FHA and the Congressional Budget Office, the potential costs could expand the government's liability. However, FHA has not articulated which borrowers would be targeted if the program were expanded, specified changes in its underwriting requirements, developed a risk-based pricing structure for the proposed legislation, or estimated costs to the General Insurance Fund. As a result, the potential effects of the changes on the program and the insurance fund are unclear. |
gao_AIMD-97-72 | gao_AIMD-97-72_0 | The Department of Health and Human Services’ (HHS) regional office staff and the Office of Child Support Enforcement (OCSE) oversee the state-administered programs. As shown in figure 1.1, reported collections in fiscal year 1995 were 80 percent higher than they were in 1990. In August 1992, we issued a report citing major problems with oversight and monitoring of these development efforts. We, therefore, made recommendations to HHS for improvement. Our specific objectives were to determine (1) the status of automated state systems, including costs, (2) whether HHS had implemented our 1992 recommendations, and (3) whether HHS was providing effective federal oversight of state systems development. Progress in developing systems varies—some states have automated many features, while others are in the earlier phases of development and may not be certified or operational by the October 1, 1997, deadline. Systems Costs Continue to Increase; Vary Widely From State to State
According to OCSE records, states have spent over $2.6 billion since the early 1980s to develop, operate, maintain, and modify county and statewide automated child support systems. States generally underestimated the costs of developing and operating child support enforcement systems. In 1992, we recommended that OCSE (1) work with the audit division to identify and resolve systems-related problems, (2) use its authority to suspend federal funding when major problems existed, and (3) require states to implement needed corrective actions when first identified. Further, OCSE has not completed nationwide analyses or post-implementation reviews to effectively assess lessons learned, hindering its ability to provide more thorough, helpful leadership. According to OCSE’s director of state child support information systems, the agency has not monitored the projects using a structured approach because it lacks the technical expertise and resources needed to be involved at critical points in the development process. SSAIS tracks the historical data on automated systems projects—including the child support program—on a state-by-state basis. Welfare Reform Places New Demands on Child Support Systems
Recently enacted welfare reform legislation substantially increases the importance of collecting child support payments from noncustodial parents, since for welfare recipients who lose eligibility, child support may be their only remaining source of income. But this progress has been expensive. Certifications were narrowly focused and conducted only at a state’s request, when the state was ready. The agency’s reviews are narrowly focused and, as a result, not effective or timely in assessing the states’ systems approaches and progress. In HHS’ response to our report, it noted elsewhere that the agency “has the authority, which it frequently exercises, to require states to send an as-needed APD at critical milestones in its life cycle methodology.” And in response to comments from states concerning the extent of OCSE’s reviews, HHS said that it intends to continue monitoring state systems projects, noting that it has “responsibilities for assuring that the expenditure of federal funds on state systems is necessary for the effective and efficient operation of the programs.” This is consistent with recent legislation that requires more effective oversight of systems development activities. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO updated its 1992 report on child support enforcement, focusing on: (1) the status of state development efforts, including costs incurred; (2) whether the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) had implemented GAO's 1992 recommendations; and (3) whether the Department was providing effective federal oversight of state systems development activities.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) it is too early to judge the potential of fully developed automated systems, yet bringing the benefits of automation to bear on child support enforcement appears to have played a major role in locating more noncustodial parents and increasing collections; (2) according to HHS, in fiscal year (FY) 1995, almost $11 billion was collected, 80 percent higher than the amount collected in 1990; (3) while automated state child support systems are being developed, many may not be certified by the October 1, 1997, deadline; (4) furthermore, states have underestimated the magnitude, complexity, and costs of their systems projects; (5) systems development costs for FY 1995 alone were just under $600 million, and over $2.6 billion has been spent since 1980 for county and statewide systems development; (6) GAO's 1992 report discussed significant problems in federal oversight and monitoring of state activity, and made three recommendations; (7) however, only one has been completely implemented; (8) the Office of Child Support Enforcement (OCSE) now works with its audit division to identify and resolve systems problems; (9) GAO's recommendations to suspend federal funding when major problems exist and to require states to initiate corrective actions when problems are first identified were only partially addressed; (10) OCSE's oversight of state child support systems has been narrowly focused and, as a result, not effective or timely in assessing the states' systems approaches and progress; (11) OCSE believes it lacks the technical expertise and resources to be involved at critical points in the systems development process; (12) OCSE's role has been primarily limited to document review and after-the-fact certification when the states request an inspection of completed systems; (13) therefore, OCSE has allowed some funds to be spent without ensuring that states were progressing toward effective or efficient systems; (14) while OCSE has shared some lessons learned, its oversight has operated on a state-by-state basis; (15) lacking this nationwide perspective has hindered the agency's ability to provide proactive leadership to the states; (16) as added systems functional requirements of the newly enacted welfare reform legislation come into play, it will be increasingly important that child support enforcement systems work as envisioned and that OCSE monitor progress on a broader scale; and (17) many recipients may find that they no longer qualify for welfare benefits, with child support being their only remaining income. |
gao_GAO-10-922T | gao_GAO-10-922T_0 | In March 2009, we reported that our covert testing of State’s passport issuance process demonstrated how malicious individuals might use identity theft to obtain genuine U.S. passports. We reported in March 2009 that State issued four genuine U.S. passports to GAO investigators, even though the applications that we submitted contained bogus information and were supported by counterfeit drivers’ licenses and birth certificates. Covert Testing of State’s Passport Issuance Process Shows That Vulnerabilities Remain
State’s passport issuance process continues to be vulnerable to fraud, as the agency issued five of the seven passports GAO attempted to fraudulently obtain. Despite multiple indicators of fraud and identity theft in each application, State identified only two as fraudulent during its adjudication process and mailed five genuine U.S. passports to undercover GAO mailboxes. GAO successfully obtained three of these passports, but State had two others recovered from the mail before they were delivered. According to State officials, the agency discovered—after its adjudication process—that the two passports were part of GAO testing when they were linked to one of the passport applications it initially denied. State officials told us that they used facial recognition technology —which it could have also used during the adjudication process—to identify our two remaining applications. Our most recent tests show that State does not consistently use data verification and counterfeit detection techniques in its passport issuance process. Of the five passports issued, State failed to crosscheck the bogus citizenship and identity documents in the applications against the same databases that it later used to detect our other fraudulent applications. In addition, despite using facial recognition technology to identify the photos of our undercover investigators and to stop the subsequent delivery of two passports, State did not use the technology to detect fraud in the three applications for passports that we received, which all contained a passport photo of the same investigator. The following day, our investigator returned to the same location and was issued a genuine U.S. passport. State also did not identify about a 10 year age difference between the applicant’s passport photo and the photo in his driver’s license. Finally, the application included suspicious addresses and contact information—a California mailing address, a permanent and driver’s license address from West Virginia and telephone number from the District of Columbia. In addition, the agency identified this application as a GAO undercover test. According to State, these were fraud indicators that should have been questioned prior to the issuance of the passport. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. | Why GAO Did This Study
A U.S. passport is one of the most sought after travel documents in the world, allowing its holder entrance into the United States and many other countries. People attempting to obtain a U.S. passport illegally often seek to use the guise of a U.S. citizen to conceal their involvement with more serious crimes, such as terrorism, drug trafficking, money laundering, or murder. In March 2009, GAO reported on weaknesses in State's passport issuance process that could allow a terrorist or criminal to fraudulently acquire a genuine U.S. passport. Specifically, GAO easily obtained four genuine passports from State using counterfeit documents. In April 2009, GAO suggested that State take 5 corrective actions based on these undercover tests and State acknowledged those corrective actions. GAO was asked to perform additional proactive testing of State's passport issuance process to determine if it continues to be vulnerable to fraud. To do this work, GAO applied for seven U.S. passports using counterfeit or fraudulently obtained documents, such as driver's licenses and birth certificates, to simulate scenarios based on identity theft. GAO created documents for seven fictitious or deceased individuals using off-the-shelf, commercially available hardware, software, and materials. Undercover investigators applied for passports at six U.S. Postal Service locations and one State-run passport office.
What GAO Found
State's passport issuance process continues to be vulnerable to fraud, as the agency issued five of the seven passports GAO attempted to fraudulently obtain. While there were multiple indicators of fraud and identity theft in each application, State identified only two as fraudulent during its adjudication process and mailed five genuine U.S. passports to undercover GAO mailboxes. GAO successfully obtained three of these passports, but State had the remaining two recovered from the mail before they were delivered. According to State officials, the agency discovered--after its adjudication process--that the two passports were part of GAO testing when they were linked to one of the passport applications it initially denied. State officials told GAO that they used facial recognition technology--which they could have also used during the adjudication process--to identify the two remaining applications. GAO's tests show that State does not consistently use data verification and counterfeit detection techniques in its passport issuance process. Of the five passports it issued, State did not recognize discrepancies and suspicious indicators within each application. Some examples include: passport photos of the same investigator on multiple applications; a 62 year-old applicant using a Social Security number issued in 2009; passport and driver's license photos showing about a 10 year age difference; and the use of a California mailing address, a West Virginia permanent address and driver's license address, and a Washington, D.C. phone number in the same application. These were fraud indicators that should have been identified and questioned by State. State also failed to crosscheck the bogus citizenship and identity documents in the applications against the same databases that it later used to detect GAO's other fraudulent applications. State used facial recognition technology to identify the photos of GAO undercover investigators and to stop the subsequent delivery of two passports but not to detect fraud in the three applications that GAO received, which all contained a passport photo of the same investigator. |
gao_GAO-10-700T | gao_GAO-10-700T_0 | The federal government has been extensively involved in the production, storage, and use of helium since the early part of the 20th Century. As directed by the Congress, the National Academies’ National Research Council reviewed the helium program and released a report in 2000 that evaluated changes made in the program, effects of these changes on the program, and several scenarios for managing the federal helium reserve in the future. GAO Reported on Helium Debt, Pricing, Purity, and Alternatives for Meeting Federal Helium Needs in the Early 1990s
Our November 1991 and October 1992 reports included findings and recommendations on the helium program’s debt, the pricing of crude helium, the purity of helium in storage, and three alternatives for meeting federal needs for helium. In 1992, GAO Recommended that Congress Cancel the Debt in the Helium Fund
In October 1992, we reported that the Helium Fund debt had grown to about $1.3 billion, as of September 30, 1991. Section 6(c) of the Helium Act Amendments of 1960 stipulated that (1) the price of federal helium should cover all of the helium program’s costs, including interest on the program’s debt; and (2) the debt should be repaid within 25 years, unless the Secretary of the Interior determines that the deadline should be extended by not more than 10 years. In 1991, GAO Made a Recommendation on the Purity of the Helium in Storage
In our November 1991 report on helium purity, we found that the Bureau of Mines was not restricting the rate at which helium was being extracted from the helium reserve, causing the purity of the crude helium to degrade faster than would otherwise occur. In 1992, GAO Recommended That Congress Reassess the Objectives of the Helium Program
In our October 1992 report, we evaluated three alternatives for meeting federal needs for helium: (1) continue the Bureau of Mines’ existing program, (2) require that all federal needs be supplied by private industry, and (3) allow all federal agencies to choose to purchase helium from the Bureau of Mines or private industry. Two Key Developments Have Affected the Issues That GAO Reported on in the Early 1990s
Since our reports in the early 1990s, two key developments—the Helium Privatization Act of 1996 and the construction of the Cliffside Helium Enrichment Unit in 2003—have caused considerable changes to the federal helium program. The Helium Privatization Act of 1996 Affected the Helium Debt, Pricing, and the Program’s Objectives
After our reports in the early 1990s, the Congress passed the Helium Privatization Act of 1996, which significantly changed the objectives and functions of Interior’s helium program. § 167b(a)); and established a modified “in-kind” program to meet federal needs for helium. These changes affected the federal helium program in various ways. For example, because the 1996 act effectively froze the debt at $1.37 billion and interest no longer accrued, BLM has been able to pay off a large portion of its debt. 1). In addition, since the 1996 act required a specific method for pricing crude helium, the initial minimum BLM selling price for crude helium after the act was passed was almost double the price for private crude helium at that time. As part of the resetting of the helium program’s objectives, the 1996 act established a revised approach for meeting federal needs for helium. 3). The Helium Program’s Direction after 2015 Is Uncertain
Changes in helium prices, production, and demand have generated concerns about the future availability of helium for the federal government and other critical purposes. As a result of these factors, there is uncertainty about the program’s direction after 2015. According to the recent report by the National Academies’ National Research Council, the United States could become a net importer of helium within the next 10 to 15 years, and the principal new sources of helium will be in the Middle East and Russia. How will the helium program be funded after 2015? However, if the helium debt is paid off in 2015 as currently projected and the revolving helium fund is terminated, it is not clear how the operations of the helium program will be paid for. The revenues generated by the program go into the Helium Fund and the program has access to those funds to pay for its day-to-day operations. At what price should BLM sell its crude helium? If the debt is paid off in 2015 as projected, the debt will no longer be a factor in setting helium prices. As the end point for the actions that were required to be taken under the act come upon us in the next 5 years, the Congress may need to address some unresolved issues such as how to use the remaining helium in storage, how the helium program will operate once the Helium Fund expires in 2015, and how to set the price for the helium owned by the federal government. | Why GAO Did This Study
The federal government has been extensively involved in the production, storage, and use of helium since the early part of the 20th Century. The federal helium program is currently managed by the Department of the Interior's Bureau of Land Management (BLM). During the 1960s and early 1970s, Interior purchased about 34 billion cubic feet of crude helium for conservation purposes and to meet federal helium needs, such as for the space program and scientific research. Crude helium is a gas of 50 to 85 percent helium. While some of the helium was used to meet federal needs, most of it was retained in storage. The funds used to purchase the helium became a debt owed by the program. GAO reported on the management of the helium program in the 1990s (GAO/RCED-92-44 and GAO/RCED-93-1). Since GAO's reviews of the program in the 1990s, key changes have affected the federal helium program and a recent report by the National Academy of Sciences concluded that it is time to reassess the program. This testimony discusses (1) GAO's findings and recommendations in the early 1990s, (2) key changes that have occurred since the early 1990s, and (3) some of the issues facing the helium program in the near future. To address these issues, GAO reviewed prior reports, applicable laws and regulations, National Academy of Sciences' reports, and BLM data. GAO is not making any new recommendations.
What GAO Found
In 1991 and 1992, GAO reported on various aspects of the federal helium program including the helium debt, pricing, purity, and alternatives for meeting federal helium needs, and made recommendations to the Congress. For example, in 1992 GAO recommended that the Congress cancel the helium program's debt. As of September 1991, the debt had grown to about $1.3 billion, over $1 billion of which was interest that had accrued on the original debt principle of about $290 million. The debt was also a factor in setting the price of federal helium because the Helium Act Amendments of 1960 stipulated that the price of federal helium cover all program costs, including interest on the debt. In addition, in 1991, GAO recommended that Interior take action to preserve the purity of the helium in storage. GAO found that the unrestricted extraction of helium from the reserve was causing the purity of the crude helium to degrade faster than would otherwise occur, which in turn had increased the program's operating costs. In 1992, GAO also recommended that the Congress reassess the conservation objectives of the helium program and consider other alternatives to meet federal helium needs. Since GAO's reports in the early 1990s, two key developments--the Helium Privatization Act of 1996 and the construction of the Cliffside Helium Enrichment Unit in 2003--have caused considerable changes to the helium program and addressed or altered GAO's prior concerns. Specifically, the 1996 act froze the program's debt and as a result over half the debt has been paid off and the remainder should be paid off by 2015. The 1996 act also required a specific method for pricing helium. This along with other changes in the supply and demand for helium, has resulted in BLM's price to be at or below the market price. Lastly, in resetting the program's objectives, the act directed Interior to stop refining helium and it established a modified in-kind approach for meeting federal helium needs. Agencies must purchase helium from refiners who then purchase an equivalent amount of crude helium from BLM. The Cliffside Helium Enrichment Unit has addressed concerns about helium purity by enriching the crude helium through extracting excess natural gas. Changes in the helium market have generated concerns about the future availability of helium for federal and other needs. The 1996 act did not provide a specific direction for the federal helium program past 2015. Some of the uncertainties facing the program include: (1) How should the helium owned by the federal government be used? BLM's effort to sell off the helium in storage is going slowly and will not be completed by 2015; and some believe that the United States could become a net importer of helium within the next 10 to 15 years. (2) How will the helium program be funded after 2015? If the helium program's debt is paid off by 2015, the revolving Helium Fund that is used to pay for the program's day-to-day operations will be terminated. (3) At what price should BLM sell its helium? In the past, the debt has been a factor in the price and the price has been above the market price. After 2015 the debt will be paid off and the current price is at or below market. |
gao_GAO-11-424T | gao_GAO-11-424T_0 | Strengthening Resource Protection
In fulfilling its resource protection functions, Interior has faced a number of management challenges in the past and will continue to face challenges in the future. In particular, based on our recent work, we would like to highlight three challenges in this area (1) protecting lives, property and resources from wildland fires; (2) adapting to climate change; and (3) protecting and securing federal lands from illegal activities. However, our nation’s wildland fire problem worsened dramatically over the past decade. Strengthening the Accountability of Indian and Insular Area Programs
We have reported on management weaknesses in Indian and insular area programs for a number of years. BIA continues to face challenges in processing land in trust applications, and Interior’s Office of Insular Affairs (OIA) continues to face challenges in providing assistance to seven of the insular areas—four U.S. territories and three sovereign island nations—with long-standing financial, program management, and economic challenges. Improving Federal Land Acquisition and Exchanges
As the steward of more than 500 million acres, federal land sales, acquisitions, and exchanges are important land management tools for Interior. We recommended that Interior take several steps to better manage the land exchange program and protect federal funds. In November 2010, the department estimated that the deferred maintenance backlog for fiscal year 2010 was between $13.5 billion and $19.9 billion (see table 1). Interior has made progress addressing our prior recommendations to improve information on the maintenance needs of NPS facilities and BIA schools and irrigation projects. Management of Federal Oil and Gas Resources
Interior’s management of oil and gas resources has been a focus of a large body of our work and an area where we have found numerous weaknesses and challenges that need to be addressed. We designated Interior’s management of federal oil and gas resources as a governmentwide high risk issue in February 2011. Interior faces ongoing challenges executing its responsibilities to manage oil and gas production from federal lands and waters in four broad areas: (1) oil and gas revenue collection, (2) management of human capital, (3) the recently undertaken reorganization of the bureaus dealing with oil and gas issues, and (4) balancing timely and efficient oil and gas development with environmental stewardship responsibilities. The results of the study may reveal the potential for greater revenues to the federal government. We made a number of recommendations to address these issues. As we stated in our March 2009 testimony, additional revenues could be generated by amending the General Mining Act of 1872 so that the federal government could collect federal royalties on minerals extracted from U.S. mineral rights. In addition, financial assurances and bonds from hardrock mining and oil and gas operations could be enhanced to help ensure the reclamation of federal land disturbed by these operations. Interior has been challenged to effectively protect its computer systems and networks. Our recent work, as well as our analysis of agency and Office of Inspector General reports, show that the department has not consistently implemented effective controls to prevent, limit, and detect unauthorized access to its systems or manage the configuration of network devices to prevent unauthorized access and ensure system integrity. The department agreed with our recommendations and indicated that it has initiated actions to implement them. Interior Management Challenges
Department of the Interior: Major Management Challenges. Federal Land Management: Challenges to Implementing the Federal Land Transaction Facilitation Act. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of the Interior (Interior) is responsible for managing much of the nation's vast natural resources. Its agencies implement an array of programs intended to protect these resources for future generations while also allowing certain uses of them, such as recreation and oil and gas development. In some cases, Interior is authorized to collect royalties and fees for these uses. Over the years, GAO has reported on management challenges at Interior, which are largely characterized by the struggle to balance the demand for greater use of its resources with the need to conserve and protect them. Furthermore, given the government's long-term fiscal challenges, Interior faces difficult choices in balancing its responsibilities. This testimony highlights some of the major management challenges facing Interior today. It is based on prior GAO reports.
What GAO Found
As GAO's previous work has shown, Interior faces major management challenges in the following seven areas: (1) Strengthening resource protection: Interior has not yet developed a cohesive strategy to address wildland fire issues as GAO has recommended in the past. In addition, Interior faces challenges in adapting to climate change and protecting and securing federal lands from illegal activities. (2) Strengthening the accountability of Indian and insular area programs: Having a land base is important to Indian tribal governments. Concerns remain about the effect of a February 2009 Supreme Court decision on the process for taking land in trust for tribes and their members. In addition, seven insular areas--four U.S. territories and three sovereign island nations--continue to face financial, program management, and economic challenges. (3) Improving federal land acquisition and exchanges: As the steward of more than 500 million acres of federal land, land sales, acquisitions, and exchanges are important land management functions for the department. The Federal Land Transaction Facilitation Act of 2000 has had limited success and Interior needs to better manage land exchanges and protect federal funds. (4) Reducing Interior's deferred maintenance backlog: While Interior has made progress improving information on maintenance needs, the dollar estimate of the deferred maintenance backlog for fiscal year 2010 was between $13.5 billion and $19.9 billion. (5) Management of federal oil and gas resources: GAO designated Interior's management of federal oil and gas resources as a governmentwide high-risk area in February 2011. Interior faces ongoing challenges in four broad areas: (1) oil and gas revenue collection, (2) management of human capital, (3) reorganization of the bureaus dealing with oil and gas issues, and (4) balancing timely and efficient oil and gas development with environmental stewardship responsibilities. (6) Generating revenue and enhancing financial assurances and bonds: Additional revenues could be generated by amending the General Mining Act of 1872 so that the federal government could collect federal royalties on minerals extracted from U.S. mineral rights. In addition, financial assurances and bonds from hardrock mining and oil and gas operations could be enhanced to help ensure the reclamation of federal land disturbed by these operations. (7) Improving information security: Interior has been challenged to effectively protect its computer systems and networks. The department has not consistently implemented effective controls to prevent, limit, and detect unauthorized access to its systems or manage the configuration of network devices to prevent unauthorized access and ensure system integrity.
What GAO Recommends
GAO has made a number of recommendations intended to improve Interior's programs by enhancing the information it uses to manage its programs and strengthening internal controls. Interior has agreed with most of the recommendations and taken some steps to implement them. However, Interior has been slow to implement other recommendations, such as developing a cohesive wildland fire strategy and improving oversight of oil and gas activities. |
gao_T-GGD-98-84 | gao_T-GGD-98-84_0 | Decennial Census: Preparations for Dress Rehearsal Underscore the Challenges for 2000
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: I am pleased to be here today to discuss the U.S. Census Bureau’s preparations and operational plans for its dress rehearsal for the 2000 Census, which is currently under way at three sites: Sacramento, CA; 11 counties in the Columbia, SC, area; and Menominee County in Wisconsin, including the Menominee American Indian Reservation. These unresolved issues led us in 1997 to raise concerns about the high risk of a failed census in 2000. At your request, my statement focuses on the progress, if any, that the Bureau has made since July 1997, when we reported that the risk of a failed census in 2000 had increased since we originally designated the 2000 Census as a high-risk area in February 1997. However, Congress has not endorsed the Bureau’s overall design because of its concerns over the validity, legality, and operational feasibility of the Bureau’s statistical sampling and estimation procedures. Thus, according to the Bureau, the dress rehearsal for the 2000 Census should test nearly all of the various operations, procedures, and questions that are planned for the decennial under as census-like conditions as feasible. The Accuracy of the Bureau’s Address Lists and Maps Is Uncertain, and Local Reviews May Be Too Sporadic to Greatly Improve Them
Complete and accurate address lists, along with precise maps, are the foundation of a successful census. Consequently, it will not be known until the 2000 Census whether the Bureau’s redesigned procedures will allow it to meet its goal. The Bureau’s Outreach and Promotion Efforts Face Obstacles That Could Impede Its Ability to Achieve Its Mail Response Rate Objective
To help increase the mail response rate and thus reduce its costly nonresponse follow-up workload, the Bureau plans to partner with local governments and other organizations to raise public awareness of the census. Nevertheless, the Bureau’s experience thus far during the dress rehearsal suggests that, in 2000, this goal might be difficult to achieve. The Bureau Could Encounter Difficulties Staffing the 2000 Census
For the 2000 Census, the Bureau estimates that it will need to recruit over 2.6 million applicants to fill about 295,000 positions. However, if current employment trends continue, the Bureau could find itself recruiting workers in a tighter labor market than prevailed in 1990. A Rigorous Dress Rehearsal Evaluation Program Is Critical to the Ultimate Success of the Census
A properly designed evaluation program that provides information on the cost, performance, required resources, timing of various census operations, and the quality and completeness of census data, is essential for the Bureau to assess the feasibility of its operational plans. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed the Census Bureau's preparations and operational plans for its dress rehearsal for the 2000 Census, focusing on the progress that the Bureau has made since July 1997.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the dress rehearsal for the 2000 Census is currently under way at three sites: (a) Sacramento, California; (b) 11 counties in the Columbia, South Carolina, area; and (c) Menominee County in Wisconsin, including the Menominee American Indian Reservation; (2) although it was originally intended to demonstrate the Census Bureau's plans for the 2000 Census, the dress rehearsal will instead leave a number of design and operational issues unresolved; (3) these unresolved issues led GAO in 1997 to raise concerns about the high risk of a failed census in 2000; (4) accurate address lists and associated maps are the building blocks for successful census; (5) however, the Bureau has concluded that its original procedures for building the 2000 Census address list might not meet its goals of being 99-percent complete; (6) although the Bureau has since revised its address list development procedures, they will not be tested during the dress rehearsal, thus it will not be known until the 2000 Census whether they will meet the Bureau's goal; (7) the Bureau's outreach and promotion initiatives are designed to boost mail response rates and thus avoid costly followups to nonresponding households; (8) while the Bureau is to rely on partnerships with the local governments and organizations to raise public awareness of the census, the level of participation in these efforts has been inconsistent during the dress rehearsal, suggesting their impact on response in 2000 may be limited; (9) uncertainties surround the Bureau's ability to staff the 295,000 mostly temporary office and field positions necessary to conduct the census; (10) census jobs may not be as attractive as other positions, and, if current trends continue, the Bureau could find itself competing for workers in a tight labor market; (11) the Bureau's sampling and statistical estimation procedures, while they could reduce costs and improve accuracy if properly implemented, face methodological, technological, and quality control challenges; (12) in addition to these operational challenges, the Bureau has not finalized its plans for evaluating the dress rehearsal, thus it is not known whether the evaluations will provide needed data to assess the feasibility of the Bureau's plans for the 2000 Census; (13) further, Congress has not endorsed the Bureau's overall design of the 2000 Census because of its concerns over the Bureau's plans to use statistical sampling and estimation procedures; and (14) the longer this impasse continues, the greater likelihood of a failed census. |
gao_GAO-04-671 | gao_GAO-04-671_0 | Moreover, obtaining knowledge of current requirements and usage, as well as developing forecasts of users’ future telecommunication needs, would assist Navy acquisition planning to ensure those future needs can be met in a more cost-effective manner. Navy Sites Lacked Controls Needed to Ensure Appropriate Oversight and Payment of Telecommunication Services
Although DOD established a policy in 1991 requiring that DOD components biennially review and revalidate their local and long-distance telecommunication requirements, none of the four Navy locations we visited or DITCO Scott had established effective review and revalidation programs to ensure that they were not paying for capacity or services they no longer needed or they were not paying too much for the needed services used. In addition, the Navy did not have policies to ensure the cost-effective purchase and use of cell phone services. Finally, we found that the Navy does not have policies addressing the administration and management of calling cards. Consequently, approving officials at these sites failed to detect inappropriate and irregular telecommunication charges, which allowed overpayments and duplicate payments to be made to vendors. However, some of the Navy sites we audited were unaware they owned calling cards. For this one card alone, between April and June of 2003, the Navy paid over $17,000 in long-distance charges. However, because no one was monitoring the activity on this card regularly, the unit was unaware of the excessive charges. Instead, it was not until the vendor’s fraud unit raised questions about more than $11,000 in charges during the first 6 days of July 2003 that the card was suspended. We further recommend that the Secretary of the Navy direct the CNO to establish comprehensive policies and guidance governing the purchase and use of: cell phone services, which should include (1) the use of prenegotiated or centrally negotiated rates and (2) periodic assessment of cell phone usage to determine if plan packages provide the most cost-effective means to satisfy the Navy’s usage requirements; and calling card services, which should include policies about accountability, the proper review of invoices, and the prohibition of sharing of calling cards. Specifically, we were asked to evaluate the effectiveness of DOD’s management oversight and controls of payments to its vendors. Our objectives were to determine (1) whether the Navy has the basic cost and inventory information needed to oversee and manage its purchases from telecommunication vendors and (2) whether selected Navy sites have adequate controls to provide reasonable assurance that telecommunication goods and services are purchased cost effectively and payments are made only for valid telecommunication charges. | Why GAO Did This Study
Problems with management oversight and control of DOD's purchase card program led to concerns that similar issues exist for DOD's vendor payments. As a result, this report focuses on the Navy's telecommunication program and whether (1) the Navy has the basic cost and inventory information needed to oversee and manage these purchases and (2) selected Navy sites have adequate control to provide reasonable assurance that goods and services are purchased cost effectively and payments are made only for valid charges.
What GAO Found
The Navy did not know how much it spent on telecommunications and did not have detailed cost and inventory data needed to evaluate spending patterns and to leverage its buying power. Obtaining knowledge of current requirements and usage, as well as developing forecasts of future telecommunication needs, would assist Navy's acquisition planning to ensure future needs were met in a more cost-effective manner. At the four case study sites we audited, management oversight of telecommunication purchases did not provide reasonable assurance that requirements were met in the most cost-effective manner. For local and long-distance services, these sites did not follow policies to biennially review and revalidate these requirements. As a result, they paid for services no longer required. Also, the Navy lacks policies to provide assurance that cell phone requirements are met in the most cost-effective manner. Cell phone usage at three sites was not monitored to determine whether plan minutes met users' needs. Consequently, these sites overpaid for cell phone services. Also, none of the sites had adequate controls over review of invoices to provide assurance of payments for only valid charges. These sites failed to detect erroneous charges and potentially improper use of these services. In addition, the Navy lacks specific policies and processes addressing the administration and management of calling cards. Consequently, some sites did not know they owned and were being billed for calling cards. Other sites allowed calling cards to be shared and were unable to determine the legitimacy of the calls, and thus paid for potentially fraudulent or abusive long-distance charges. On one card alone, in a 3-month period, the Navy paid over $17,000. However, because no one was regularly monitoring the activity on this card, the unit was unaware of potentially fraudulent charges. Not until the vendor's fraud unit raised questions about more than $11,000 in charges incurred during the first 6 days of July 2003 was the card suspended. |
gao_GAO-12-588 | gao_GAO-12-588_0 | Federal Agencies Spent about $68 Million on Financial Literacy Activities in Fiscal Year 2010
In fiscal year 2010, the federal government spent about $68 million on 15 of its 16 significant financial literacy programs and about $137 million on 4 programs providing housing counseling, which can include elements of financial education. We did not identify any new federal financial literacy programs created since fiscal year 2010 other than CFPB, which was being formed as an agency that year. Some agencies also have deep knowledge and ties to particular populations and may be the most efficient and natural conduit to providing them with information and services, as with the Department of Defense’s (DOD) role in providing financial information and counseling to servicemembers and their families. Our review did identify cases of overlap—that is, multiple agencies or programs with similar goals and activities. These activities potentially overlap with those of FTC, which also plays a role in helping seniors avoid unfair and deceptive practices. Ensuring clear delineation of the respective roles and responsibilities between CFPB and agencies with overlapping financial literacy responsibilities is essential to help ensure efficient use of resources. However, its national strategy does not include a discussion of the appropriate allocation of federal resources. The Financial Literacy and Education Commission Has Improved Coordination but Has Not Addressed Resource Allocation
In general, we found that coordination and collaboration among federal agencies with regard to financial literacy has improved in recent years, in large part due to the efforts of the Financial Literacy and Education Commission. Several federal agencies have efforts under way seeking to determine the most effective approaches and programs. Agencies Assess Their Financial Literacy Efforts in Various Ways
The wide range of federal financial literacy programs and activities and their evaluation metrics and methods, makes it difficult to systematically assess overall effectiveness or compare results across programs. HUD housing counseling. Moreover, the creation of CFPB may signal an opportunity for reconsidering how the federal government’s financial literacy efforts are organized. The commission’s 2011 national strategy includes some elements that may be useful in guiding federal financial literacy efforts, but it could do more to identify the resources needed to implement the strategy and how federal resources might best be allocated among programs and agencies, characteristics we have found to be desirable for any national strategy. Without a clear discussion of resource needs and where resources should be targeted, policymakers lack information to help direct the strategy’s implementation and help ensure efficient use of funds. While some measured the effect on participant behavior, often they assessed changes in participant knowledge or tracked output measures, such as the number of consumers reached. To help ensure effective and efficient use of federal financial literacy resources, we also recommend that the Secretary of the Treasury and the Director of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, in their capacity as Chair and Vice Chair of the Financial Literacy and Education Commission, and in concert with other agency representatives of the commission: identify for federal agencies and Congress options for consolidating federal financial literacy efforts into the activities and agencies that are best suited or most effective, and revise the commission’s national strategy to incorporate clear recommendations on the allocation of federal financial literacy resources across programs and agencies. In its response, CFPB neither agreed nor disagreed with the recommendations addressed to it, but it highlighted steps that its Offices of Financial Education, Servicemember Affairs, and Financial Protection for Older Americans are taking to delineate roles and responsibilities, improve coordination, and avoid duplication with other federal agencies. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to address (1) what is known about the cost of federal financial literacy activities; (2) the extent and consequences of overlap and fragmentation among financial literacy activities; (3) what the federal government is doing to coordinate its financial literacy activities; and (4) what is known about the effectiveness of federal financial literacy activities. In addition, we reviewed information on program effect that appeared in agencies’ strategic plans and performance and accountability reports. | Why GAO Did This Study
Financial literacy—the ability to use knowledge and skills to manage financial resources effectively—plays an important role in helping to ensure the financial health and stability of individuals and families. Federal agencies promote financial literacy through activities including print and online materials, broadcast media, individual counseling, and classroom instruction. In response to a mandate requiring GAO to identify duplicative government programs and activities, this report addresses (1) the cost of federal financial literacy activities; (2) the extent of their overlap and fragmentation; (3) the federal government’s coordination of these activities; and (4) what is known about their effectiveness. GAO reviewed agency budget documents, strategic plans, performance reports, websites, and other materials, and interviewed representatives of federal agencies and other organizations.
What GAO Found
The federal government spent about $68 million on 15 of the 16 financial literacy programs that were comprehensive in scope or scale in fiscal year 2010; cost data were not available for the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), which was created that year. In addition, about $137 million in federal funding in four other major programs was directed to housing counseling, which can include elements of financial education. Since fiscal year 2010, at least four of these programs have been defunded and CFPB has received resources to fund its financial literacy activities.
Federal financial literacy and housing counseling activities are spread across multiple agencies and programs. GAO has not identified duplication—programs providing the same activities and services to the same beneficiaries—but has found overlap—multiple programs with similar goals and activities—in areas such as housing counseling and the financial education of youth. Further, CFPB was charged with some financial education duties that overlap with those of other federal agencies, making it essential that their respective roles and responsibilities be clearly delineated to ensure efficient use of resources. Moreover, CFPB’s creation may signal an opportunity for consolidating some federal financial literacy efforts, which would be consistent with federal goals of reorganizing and consolidating federal agencies to reduce the number of overlapping government programs.
Federal agencies have made progress in recent years in coordinating their financial literacy activities and collaborating with nonfederal entities, in large part due to the efforts of the federal multiagency Financial Literacy and Education Commission. The commission’s 2011 national strategy includes some useful elements—such as plans to coordinate interagency communication, improve strategic partnerships, and promote evaluation. However, it does not recommend or provide guidance on the appropriate allocation of federal resources among programs and agencies, which GAO has found to be desirable in a national strategy. While the commission’s governance structure presents challenges in addressing resource issues, without a clear discussion of resource needs and where resources should be targeted, policymakers lack information to help direct the strategy’s implementation and help ensure efficient use of funds.
The wide range of federal financial literacy activities and evaluation methods makes it difficult to systematically assess overall effectiveness or compare results across programs. Among the federal financial literacy programs that we reviewed, most included some evaluation component. Some measured the effect on participant behavior and others assessed changes in participant knowledge or tracked output measures, such as the number of consumers reached. Rigorous evaluation measuring behavior change is costly and methodologically challenging and may not be practical for all types of activities. However, CFPB and other federal entities have new efforts under way that seek to determine the most effective approaches and programs, which GAO believes to be positive steps toward helping ensure the best and most efficient use of federal financial literacy resources.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that CFPB clearly delineate with other agencies respective roles and responsibilities, and that the Financial Literacy and Education Commission identify options for consolidating federal financial literacy efforts and address the allocation of federal resources in its national strategy. CFPB neither agreed nor disagreed with these recommendations and the Department of the Treasury agreed with the recommendations directed to the commission. |
gao_GAO-16-709 | gao_GAO-16-709_0 | Figure 1 depicts an earthen levee and a floodwall as well as their respective components. The Corps and FEMA Have Made Little Progress on Key Activities under the Act, Citing Resource Constraints, and Do Not Have a Plan for Implementing the Rest
The Corps and FEMA have made little progress in implementing key national levee-safety-related activities under the Water Resources Reform and Development Act of 2014 primarily because of resource constraints, according to officials from both agencies. The Corps has been working on its development of a national levee inventory, but the Corps and FEMA have not begun work on other key national levee- safety-related activities required by the act and do not have a current plan for doing so (see table 1). The agencies have taken no action on the remaining key national levee- safety-related activities for which they were responsible and have missed several statutory deadlines for developing guidelines and reports. Additionally, according to agency officials we interviewed, the agencies have no current plan for implementing the remaining activities. Without a plan, including milestones for accomplishing these activities using existing resources or requesting additional resources as needed, the agencies are unlikely to make further progress on implementing the remaining activities required by the act. We reviewed a 2016 Corps budget document and determined that, except for the national inventory of levees, the Corps did not specifically allocate funds for national levee-safety-related activities required in the act. Corps headquarters officials told us that not implementing the act’s national levee-safety-related activities could result in several potential impacts, including that the disaster relief burden for the federal government may increase, safety risks and loss of life may increase, and risk education in communities with levees may not be carried out. Recommendation for Executive Action
To help ensure that the Corps and FEMA carry out the national levee- safety-related activities required in the Water Resources Reform and Development Act of 2014, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Army to direct the Chief of Engineers and Commanding General of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the FEMA Administrator to develop a plan, with milestones, for implementing these activities, using existing resources or requesting additional resources as needed. In their written comments, reproduced in appendixes I and II, respectively, both agencies generally concurred with our recommendation. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix III. | Why GAO Did This Study
Levees, which are man-made structures such as earthen embankments or concrete floodwalls, play a vital role in reducing the risk of flooding. Their failure can contribute to loss of lives or property, as shown by the devastation of Hurricane Katrina in 2005. It is estimated that there are over 100,000 miles of levees across the United States, many of which are owned or operated by nonfederal entities. The Corps and FEMA are the two principal federal agencies with authorities related to levee safety.
The Water Resources Reform and Development Act of 2014 requires the Corps and FEMA to take the lead on certain national levee-safety-related activities including developing a national levee inventory, which Congress authorized in 2007. The act also includes a provision for GAO to report on related issues. This report examines the Corps' and FEMA's progress in carrying out key national activities related to levee safety required in the act. GAO reviewed pertinent federal laws and executive orders as well as budget, planning, and policy documents from the Corps and FEMA; compared agency activities with federal internal control standards; and interviewed Corps and FEMA headquarters officials.
What GAO Found
The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) have made little progress in implementing key national levee-safety-related activities required in the Water Resources Reform and Development Act of 2014. More specifically, the Corps has been working to develop a national levee inventory, but the agencies have taken no action on the remaining key national levee-safety-related activities for which they are responsible under the act, as shown in the table below. Agency officials identified resource constraints as a primary reason for their lack of progress in implementing such activities, and Corps officials said that not implementing these activities could potentially result in safety risks and federal financial risks for disaster relief, among other impacts. However, the agencies have no plan for implementing the remaining activities required by the act. Without a plan that includes milestones for accomplishing these activities using existing resources or requesting additional resources as needed, the agencies are unlikely to make progress implementing the activities under the act.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the Corps and FEMA develop a plan that includes milestones for implementing the required national levee-safety-related activities using existing resources or requesting additional resources as needed. The agencies generally concurred with GAO's recommendation. |
gao_GAO-16-291 | gao_GAO-16-291_0 | Since 2011, there have been 13 drawdowns of defense articles and services pursuant to the three authorities cited above (see table 1). Interagency Process for Drawdowns Involves State, DOD, National Security Council, and Executive Office of the President
State and DOD are the government agencies primarily charged with planning and executing uses of drawdown authority. State officials said they typically begin the process by developing drawdown proposals under the above authorities when an international crisis arises. 2). Based on the estimated value and availability of the articles and services, the agencies agree on the parameters of the drawdown to recommend to the President, and State prepares a justification package that includes the Presidential Determination for the President’s signature, which is published in the Federal Register. The military services provide the defense articles and services they have available in their existing inventories. Although State policy specifies that the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, Office of Regional Security and Arms Transfers, leads State and interagency processes for presidential drawdowns, the bureau does not manage all of the key documents associated with the use of drawdown authority, nor is there a mechanism to centrally manage such documents. Consequently, it took several months for State to fully respond to our request for key documentation on drawdowns, which includes memorandums to the Secretary of State and Office of the President, and a memorandum of justification containing background information about the crisis a drawdown is intended to address. In addition, State officials initially were not able to readily provide documentation for several drawdowns, such as the 2011 drawdown to Libya, for which State produced documents over 4 months later. Without a mechanism to ensure that key documents relating to the use of drawdown authorities are readily available, State is unable to produce documentation on drawdowns in a timely manner, consistent with federal internal control standards. DOD Has Not Closed Any Presidential Drawdowns and Submitted Few Reports on Defense Articles and Services Provided
DOD has not closed and has not provided certain reports to Congress on the execution of drawdowns since 2011 despite congressional interest in receiving information regarding assistance provided through drawdowns. From 2010 until the end of calendar year 2013, DOD was also responsible for providing an annual report to Congress on drawdowns under Section 1247 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010. DOD provided reports to Congress in response to this requirement. DSCA officials noted that all of the drawdowns since 2011 are still being executed, meaning that there are still articles and services to be delivered. Without periodic reports to indicate the status of the drawdowns under this authority, Congress does not have detailed information on the extent of the President’s use of drawdown authority. DOD agreed with our recommendation, but State did not. In its written comments, State did not concur with our recommendation that the Secretary of State should assign responsibility or develop a mechanism for maintaining State’s justification package documents. State noted that there are officials responsible for maintaining key drawdown documents. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report examines, since 2011, (1) the U.S. government’s process for planning and executing drawdowns; (2) Department of State (State) efforts to manage records related to decisions to use drawdown authorities; and (3) the status of drawdowns and Department of Defense (DOD) efforts to report to Congress on defense articles, defense services, and military education and training delivered through drawdowns to recipient countries or international organizations. | Why GAO Did This Study
The President has special legal authorities that allow him to direct the drawdown of defense articles, such as vehicles, food, or medical equipment, and services, such as airlift support, as well as military education and training, to provide assistance in response to an international crisis. Since 2011, there have been 13 drawdowns. The President may authorize up to $325 million each year in drawdowns.
A House Armed Services Committee report accompanying a bill for the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 included a provision for GAO to conduct a review of drawdown authority. This report examines, since 2011, (1) the U.S. government's process for planning and executing drawdowns, (2) State efforts to manage records on decisions to use drawdown authorities, and (3) the status of drawdowns and DOD efforts to report to Congress on defense articles and services delivered through drawdowns to recipient countries or international organizations. GAO analyzed documents relevant to drawdowns and interviewed State and DOD officials.
What GAO Found
Drawdown proposals to provide U.S. assistance for an international crisis are typically developed through an interagency process led by the Departments of State (State) and Defense (DOD), and involving the National Security Council and the Executive Office of the President. State and DOD work with other agencies to determine whether to use a drawdown authority and identify the assistance to be provided. Based on the estimated value and availability of the articles and services, the agencies agree on the parameters of the drawdown. State prepares a justification package, and the President signs a Presidential Determination to authorize the drawdown. DOD then executes the drawdown by working with the military services to provide the articles and services.
State policy specifies that the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs leads State and interagency processes for presidential drawdowns. Key documents for this process include a memorandum of justification containing background information about the drawdown. However, inconsistent with federal internal control standards, State lacked readily available documents related to drawdowns, and there is no central office or official responsible for maintaining key drawdown documents. As a result, it took several months for State to fully respond to our request for drawdown documents. For example, State officials initially did not provide documentation for the 2011 drawdown to Libya, but provided the documents over 4 months later. Without a mechanism to ensure that key documents relating to the use of drawdown authorities are readily available, State is unable to produce documents in a timely manner.
DOD provided some reports to Congress on the execution of drawdowns in 2011 and 2013. However, DOD has not submitted certain reports to Congress since 2011 despite a legal requirement to keep Congress fully and currently informed regarding assistance provided through drawdowns under one specific authority. DOD officials said that they have not submitted these reports because they have not closed any of the 13 drawdowns since 2011— articles and services are still to be delivered. Nevertheless, without periodic reports to indicate the status of drawdowns, Congress may not have detailed information about the extent of the President's use of drawdown authority.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that (1) State should assign responsibility or establish a mechanism to maintain key drawdowns documents and (2) DOD report more frequently on defense articles and services provided through drawdowns. State did not concur with GAO's recommendation to establish a mechanism to maintain documents, but GAO stands by its recommendation, as discussed in the report. DOD agreed that it should report more frequently on drawdowns. |
gao_GAO-04-492 | gao_GAO-04-492_0 | Specifically, we interviewed officials from 11 state revenue departments that, according to officials from the Federation of Tax Administrators (FTA), represented a mix—in aspects such as amount of resources and PCA roles—of experience in contracting with PCAs for tax debt collection and provided examples of program practices in such areas as case selection and use of performance data; the Department of the Treasury’s Financial Management Service and Department of Education—two federal agencies with large-scale, non- tax debt collection contracting; and the three PCA firms that IRS selected as subject matter experts to assist in drafting the provisions of a contract for PCA collection services. To determine whether IRS has addressed the critical success factors in developing the PCA contracting program and, if not, what is left to be done, we interviewed IRS program officials. Five Factors Are Critical for a Successful PCA Collection Program
Our work identified and validated five broad factors that are critical to the success of a proposed program for contracting with PCAs to collect tax debt. Officials recognize that much work needs to be done to sufficiently address each factor, which they estimate will take 18 to 24 months after any legislation passes. IRS officials said they intend to start developing the evaluation plan after they receive this authority and to finish it before sending cases to PCAs. IRS officials stated that if legislation to authorize the program was not passed during 2004, IRS eventually would suspend work on developing the program. Potential Study Design Would Provide Limited Information to Judge Whether Contracting with PCAs Is the Best Use of Resources
Although IRS officials intend to study the relative performance of PCAs and IRS employees in collecting delinquent taxes, the study approach under initial consideration would provide policymakers limited information to judge whether and when the PCA strategy is the best use of resources. The tentative idea for a design—comparing PCA and IRS performance for similar types of simple cases that would be sent to PCAs—does not recognize that IRS officials believe that using employees on these cases would not be their best use given the need to work on other, higher priority cases. However, because IRS is developing a new case selection model for its own use, after some experience is gained both with using PCAs and with new IRS case selection processes, IRS should have better data to use in determining the best way of achieving its collection goals. In response to our recommendation that, if Congress authorizes IRS’s use of PCAs, IRS do a study that compares the use of PCAs to a collection strategy that officials determine to be the most effective and efficient overall way of achieving collection goals, the Commissioner agreed that IRS would need to analyze the PCA program to determine its effectiveness and impact on the overall collection of delinquent taxes. | Why GAO Did This Study
Congress is considering legislation to authorize IRS to contract with private collection agencies (PCA) and to pay them out of the tax revenue that they collect. Some have expressed concerns that this proposal might be unsuccessful, inefficient, or result in taxpayers being mistreated or having their private tax information compromised. This report discusses (1) the critical success factors for contracting with PCAs for tax debt collection; (2) IRS's actions to address these factors in developing the PCA program and actions left to be done; and (3) whether IRS, if it receives the authority to use PCAs, plans to do a study that will help policy makers judge whether PCAs are the best use of funds to meet IRS's collection objectives.
What GAO Found
Based on our analysis of information from various parties, including officials from selected state revenue departments and federal agencies that use PCAs, five factors are critical to the success of a PCA collection program. Together, these factors increase the chances for success and help the program achieve desired results. Although incomplete, IRS has taken actions to address these factors. For example, IRS has been developing (1) program performance measures and goals, (2) plans for a computer system to transmit data to PCAs, (3) a method to select cases for PCAs, and (4) contract provisions to govern data security and PCAs' interactions with taxpayers. IRS officials recognize that major development work remains and have plans to finish it. Officials said they would suspend work if PCA authorizing legislation is not passed during 2004. If legislation passes, officials estimated that it would take 18 to 24 months to send the first cases to PCAs. Aware of concerns about the efficiency of using PCAs, IRS intends to study the relative performance of PCAs and IRS employees in collecting tax debts after gaining some experience with them. However, the initial idea for a study would provide limited information to judge whether or when the PCA approach is the best use of resources. The tentative idea--comparing PCA and IRS performance for the same type of simpler cases to be sent to PCAs--does not recognize that IRS officials believe that using IRS employees on such cases would not be the best use of staff. Federal guidance emphasizes efficiently and effectively using resources to achieve results and identifying the most realistic and cost-effective program option. Experience gained in using PCAs and a new IRS case selection process would help officials design such a study. |
gao_GGD-99-33 | gao_GGD-99-33_0 | Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
As agreed with your offices, this report addresses the following: (1) the effectiveness of the current employment verification process in preventing employers from hiring unauthorized aliens, (2) INS’ efforts to improve the employment verification process, (3) the level of effort INS and Labor devoted to worksite enforcement activities and the results of these activities, and (4) changes being made to INS’ worksite enforcement program. In about 2,100 (or 60 percent) of the 3,500 investigations in which INS found fraudulent documents, INS determined that the employer had complied with the employment verification process and did not knowingly hire unauthorized aliens, but that unauthorized aliens’ use of fraudulent documents circumvented the process. INS Has Had Difficulty in Meeting Its Pilot Program Enrollment Goal
As mandated in the 1996 Act, INS is testing or expects to test three programs to make it possible for employers to electronically verify an employee’s eligibility to work. Little Progress in Reducing the Number of Acceptable Documents
Various studies of IRCA’s employment verification process have advocated that the number of documents that employees can use to demonstrate employment eligibility should be reduced to make the employment verification process more secure and to reduce employer confusion. However, INS has made changes to the list since the previous regulations were issued. It designated a new document that will eventually replace another document already on the list. These increases notwithstanding, INS consistently devoted about 2 percent of its enforcement workyears to worksite enforcement during this period. In fiscal year 1998, INS’ worksite investigators completed about 6,100 lead-driven investigations and about 400 compliance audits for a total of about 6,500 investigations, which equated to about 3 percent of the estimated number of employers of unauthorized aliens. As a result, Labor had provided little assistance to INS in identifying employers suspected of hiring unauthorized workers. INS Is Changing Its Approach to Worksite Enforcement
INS’ approach to how it will enforce IRCA’s employer sanctions provisions is changing. In January 1999, INS issued an Interior Enforcement Strategy. The strategy calls for INS to prioritize and aggressively pursue criminal investigation of employers who are flagrant or grave violators. Because INS is just beginning this new approach and is still developing implementation plans, it is too soon to tell how or how well INS will implement its strategy. First, Justice indicated that it does not favor a rule requiring aliens to show only INS- issued work authorization documents as proof of employment eligibility, even if the INS documents are more fraud resistant than other documents. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to determine (1) the effectiveness of the current employment verification process in preventing employers from hiring unauthorized aliens, (2) the Immigration and Naturalization Service’s (INS) efforts to improve the employment verification process, (3) the level of effort INS and the Department of Labor devoted to worksite enforcement activities and the results of these activities, and (4) changes being made to INS’ worksite enforcement program. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO reviewed the Attorney General's strategy for enforcing workplace immigration laws, focusing on: (1) the effectiveness of the employment verification process in preventing employers from hiring unauthorized aliens; (2) the Immigration and Naturalization Service's (INS) efforts to improve the employment verification process; (3) the level of effort INS and the Department of Labor (DOL) devoted to worksite enforcement activities and the results of these activities; and (4) changes being made to INS' worksite enforcement program.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the effectiveness of the employment verification process, which relies on identity and employment eligibility documents that employees are to show employers, can be undermined by unauthorized aliens using fraudulent documents; (2) INS has undertaken several initiatives to improve the employment verification process to make it less susceptible to fraud, but significant obstacles remain; (3) INS is testing or expects to test three pilot programs in which employers electronically verify an employee's eligibility to work; (4) INS has made little progress toward its goal of reducing the number of documents that employers can accept to determine employment eligibility; (5) in February 1998, INS issued proposed regulations to reduce the number of documents that can be used from 27 to 14; (6) however, INS received numerous comments on the proposed regulations and INS officials do not know when these regulations will be finalized; (7) INS has begun issuing new documents with increased security features, which INS hopes will make it easier for employers to verify the documents' authenticity; (8) however, aliens are statutorily permitted to show employers various documents other than the INS documents that authorize aliens to work, and other widely used documents do not have the security features of the INS documents; (9) since 1994, INS has devoted about 2 percent of its enforcement workyears to its worksite enforcement program, which is designed to detect noncompliance with the Immigration Reform and Control Act; (10) in 1998, INS completed about 6,500 investigations of employers, which equated to about 3 percent of the country's estimated number of employers of unauthorized aliens; (11) DOL has provided limited assistance to INS in identifying employers suspected of hiring unauthorized workers, and, under a new agreement with INS, DOL's role will be reduced; (12) the results of INS' worksite enforcement program that indicate it has infrequently imposed sanctions on employers; (13) INS is changing its approach to worksite enforcement; (14) INS has developed an interior enforcement strategy with five strategic priorities; (15) two of the priorities involve worksite enforcement, with one calling for INS to pursue the criminal investigation of employers who are flagrant or grave violators; and (16) since INS is just beginning this new approach, it is too soon to know how the proposed changes will be implemented or to assess their impact on the employment of unauthorized workers. |
gao_GAO-12-806 | gao_GAO-12-806_0 | The different phases of PPBE appear sequential, but because of the amount of time required to develop and review resource requirements, the process is continuous and concurrent with at least two phases ongoing at any given time, including phases for different fiscal years. Planning. Evaluation. NNSA Does Not Thoroughly Review Budget Estimates When Developing Its Annual Budget
NNSA does not thoroughly review budget estimates before it incorporates them into its annual budget request. According to senior NNSA officials, NNSA does not comply with DOE Order 130.1 because it believes the order expired in 2003 and therefore no longer applies to NNSA budget activities. NNSA’s Process for Reviewing Budget Estimates Is Not Thorough or Documented
NNSA does not have a thorough, documented process for assessing the validity of its budget estimates prior to their inclusion in the President’s budget submission to Congress, thereby limiting the reliability and credibility of the budget submission. NNSA’s Formal Budget Validation Review Process Occurs Too Late to Affect Budget Decisions and Is Not Sufficiently Thorough
We identified three key problems in NNSA’s annual budget validation review process—its formal process for assessing M&O contractor- and program-developed budget estimates. However, NNSA’s budget validation review process is limited to assessing the processes M&O contractors and programs used to develop budget estimates rather than the accuracy of the resulting budget estimates. NNSA Has Implemented Some Tools to Support Decision Making on Resource Trade-offs but Has Stopped Using or Developing Other Capabilities
During the programming phase of PPBE, NNSA uses a variety of management tools, such as integrated priority lists and requirements and resources assessments, to support its programming phase and assist senior managers in making decisions on resource trade-offs. NNSA’s policy for the programming phase stipulates that each of NNSA’s nine program offices is to annually develop an integrated priority list that ranks program activities according to their importance for meeting mission requirements. These lists provide senior NNSA and DOE managers with an understanding of how various funding scenarios would affect program activities. The DOE Inspector General and GAO, recommended in 2003 and 2007, respectively, that NNSA establish an independent analysis unit to perform such functions as reviewing proposals for program activities and verifying cost estimates. NNSA agreed with these recommendations and, in 2009, instituted the Office of Integration and Assessments to identify, analyze, assess, and present to senior NNSA management options for managing its programs and making decisions on resource trade-offs. However, NNSA disbanded the office in 2010, 18 months after it was formally created. When issued, this document articulated the Administrator’s rationale and methodology for deciding on resource trade-offs during the programming phase of the PPBE process—which one senior official in NNSA’s Office of Management and Budget described as an important component of the PPBE process—to support in his budget proposal to DOE and to better facilitate NNSA’s participation in DOE’s Strategic Resources Review. By disbanding its independent analytical capability, NNSA is losing its ability to improve its cost-estimating capabilities and better ensure that its project cost estimates are credible and reliable. Recommendations for Executive Action
To enhance NNSA’s ability to better ensure the validity of its budget submissions, and to decide on resource trade-offs, we recommend that the Secretary of Energy take the following seven actions:
Direct the DOE Office of Budget to formally evaluate DOE Order 130.1 and revise as necessary, and communicate any revisions to the NNSA Administrator so that the agency will have updated provisions for assessing the quality of its budget estimates. Reinstitute an independent analytical capability to provide senior decision makers with independent program reviews, including an analysis of different options for deciding on resource trade-offs, and facilitate NNSA making the best decisions about what activities to fund and whether they are affordable. Specifically, the reviews conducted by site and headquarters program office officials are informal and undocumented, and NNSA’s budget validation review process—the agency’s formal process for assessing M&O contractor- and program-developed budget estimates—does not assess the accuracy of budget estimates and is conducted for a small portion of the agency’s annual budget. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of our review were to determine (1) the current structure of the National Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA) planning, programming, budgeting, and evaluation (PPBE) process; (2) the extent to which NNSA reviews its budget estimates; and (3) how NNSA decides on resource trade-offs in its PPBE process. | Why GAO Did This Study
NNSA, a semiautonomous agency within DOE, is responsible for the nations nuclear weapons, nonproliferation, and naval reactors programs. Since its inception in 2000, the agency has faced challenges in its ability to accurately identify the costs of major projects. In addition, both the DOE Inspector General, in 2003, and GAO, in 2007, reported concerns with NNSAs PPBE process, specifically in how NNSA validates budget estimates and decides on resource allocations or trade-offs.
GAO was asked to review how NNSA manages programming and budgeting through its PPBE process. GAO examined (1) the current structure of NNSAs PPBE process, (2) the extent to which NNSA reviews its budget estimates, and (3) how NNSA decides on resource trade-offs in its PPBE process. To carry out its work, GAO reviewed NNSA policies, instructions, guidance, and internal reports documenting the agencys PPBE process and interviewed NNSA, DOE, and M&O contractor officials.
What GAO Found
The National Nuclear Security Administrations (NNSA) planning, programming, budgeting, and evaluation (PPBE) process provides a framework for the agency to plan, prioritize, fund, and evaluate its program activities. Formal policies guide NNSA and management and operating (M&O) contractors through each of four phases of the agencys PPBE cycleplanning, programming, budgeting, and evaluation. These phases appear to be sequential, but the process is continuous and concurrent because of the amount of time required to develop priorities and review resource requirements, with at least two phases ongoing at any time.
NNSA does not thoroughly review budget estimates before it incorporates them into its proposed annual budget. Instead, NNSA relies on informal, undocumented reviews of such estimates and its own budget validation review processthe formal process for assessing budget estimates. Neither of these processes adheres to Department of Energy (DOE) Order 130.1, which defines departmental provisions for the thoroughness, timing, and documentation of budget reviews. NNSA officials said the agency does not follow the order because it expired in 2003. Nevertheless, the order is listed as current on DOEs website, and a senior DOE budget official confirmed that it remains in effect, although it is outdated in terminology and organizational structure. Additionally, according to NNSA officials, the agencys trust in its contractors minimizes the need for formal review of its budget estimates. GAO identified three key problems in NNSAs budget validation review process. First, this process does not inform NNSA, DOE, Office of Management and Budget, or congressional budget development decisions because it occurs too late in the budget cycleafter the submission of the Presidents budget to Congress. Second, this process is not sufficiently thorough to ensure the credibility and reliability of NNSAs budget because it is limited to assessing the processes used to develop budget estimates rather than the accuracy of the resulting estimates and is conducted for a small portion of NNSAs budgetapproximately 1.5 percent of which received such review in 2011. Third, other weaknesses in this process, such as no formal evaluative mechanism to determine if corrective actions were taken in response to previous findings, limit the processs effectiveness in assessing NNSAs budget estimates.
NNSA uses a variety of management tools to decide on resource trade-offs during the programming phase of the PPBE process. One of these tools, integrated priority listswhich rank program activities according to their importance for meeting mission requirementsis to provide senior managers with an understanding of how various funding scenarios would affect program activities. However, NNSA has weakened its ability to gauge the effects of resource trade-offs. For example, in 2010, NNSA disbanded its Office of Integration and Assessments, created in response to DOE Inspector General and GAO recommendations that NNSA establish an independent analysis unit to perform such functions as reviewing proposals for program activities and verifying cost estimates. NNSA agreed with these recommendations and, in 2009, instituted the office to identify, analyze, and assess options for deciding on resource trade-offs. Without an independent analytical capability, NNSA may have difficulty making the best decisions about what activities to fund and whether they are affordable.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that, among other things, DOE update the departmental order for budget reviews, improve the formal process for reviewing budget estimates, and reinstitute an independent analytical capability. The agency agreed in principle with six recommendations but not with one to consolidate various integrated priority lists. GAO continues to believe this recommendation has merit as discussed in the report. |
gao_GAO-13-79 | gao_GAO-13-79_0 | In contrast, DOJ has not identified topics it considers as CVE-related training. According to the DHS Principal Deputy Counterterrorism Coordinator, identifying these topics helped to provide a logical structure for DHS’s CVE-related training–related efforts. DHS Is Undertaking Additional Communication to Help Ensure Grantees Fund CVE-Related Training That Is Consistent with the Goals of the CVE National Strategy
DHS’s communication efforts have helped DHS components and state and local partners to better understand what constitutes CVE-related training, but our review indicates that some state administrative agency representatives are not clear about the principal topics CVE-related training addresses, making it difficult for them to determine what CVE- related training best supports national CVE efforts. However, DOJ has not yet identified topics that should be covered in its CVE-related training. According to senior DOJ officials, even though the department has not identified CVE-related training topics, they understand internally which of the department’s training is CVE-related and contributes either directly or indirectly to the department’s training responsibilities under the CVE national strategy. However, according to DHS officials that participated in the working group, members who led this effort found it challenging to do so because agencies’ views differed as to what CVE-related training includes when providing information on their training. The other DOJ components, however, relied upon a framework that we developed for the purpose of this review to determine which of their existing training was CVE-related. Few Participants Raised Concerns about DHS and DOJ CVE-Related Training, but the FBI and USAOs Could Help Ensure Quality of Training by More Consistently Soliciting Feedback
Less than 1 percent of state and local participants in CVE-related training that DHS and DOJ provided or funded who provided feedback to the departments expressed concerns about information included in the course materials or that instructors presented during training. In addition, while DOJ generally solicits feedback from all participants for programs that provide formal, curriculum-based CVE-related training, the FBI and USAOs do not always solicit feedback for programs that provide less formal CVE-related training (e.g., presentations by guest speakers), even though such training was provided to about 9,900 participants in fiscal years 2010 and 2011. DHS and DOJ collected and retained feedback forms from 8,424 of the more than 28,000 participants—including state, local, and tribal law enforcement officials, prison officials, and community members—of training they provided or funded in fiscal years 2010 and 2011 that was CVE-related according to our framework. The FBI does not require entities providing informal training, such as briefings and presentations during outreach, to solicit feedback. We have previously reported that evaluating training is important and that agencies need to develop systematic evaluation processes in order to We obtain accurate information about the benefits of their training. DOJ Components Have Undertaken Reviews of CVE-Related Training
DOJ components have conducted or are currently conducting internal reviews of their training materials, including those with topics that our framework identified as related to CVE, in an effort to identify and purge potentially objectionable materials. In addition, by proactively soliciting feedback from participants in informal CVE-related training on a more consistent basis, FBI field offices and USAOs could more effectively obtain information on the strengths and weaknesses of their presentations and briefings, and thus better ensure their quality. To obtain valuable information for determining the extent to which CVE- related programs are yielding the desired outcomes and complying with the CVE national strategy, we recommend that the Deputy Attorney General direct USAOs and the Director of the FBI’s Office of Public Affairs direct FBI field offices to consider soliciting feedback more consistently from participants in informal training, such as presentations and briefings, that covers the type of information addressed in the CVE national strategy. For example, DHS stated that it will be hosting a CVE train-the-trainer workshop in September 2012, and identifying trainers on its online CVE training portal who meet the standards included in DHS’s training guidance and best practices. To what extent have the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Department of Justice (DOJ) identified and communicated topics that countering violent extremism-related (CVE-related) training addresses to their components and state and local partners? What, if any, concerns have been raised by state and local partners who have participated in CVE-related training provided or funded by DHS and DOJ? 3. To determine the extent to which DHS and DOJ identified and communicated topics that should be addressed by CVE-related training, we met with officials from both departments to discuss how they define CVE-related training, which departmental training programs were relevant to our review, and how the departments communicated principal CVE- related training topics to relevant components and state and local partners. Identifying DHS and DOJ Efforts to Improve the Quality of CVE-Related Training
To address what actions, if any, DHS and DOJ have taken overall to improve the quality of CVE-related training, we interviewed DHS and DOJ officials responsible for providing or funding CVE-related training to inquire about any current or pending guidance, whether documented or undocumented, they adhere to when vetting training materials and instructors and other actions they have taken to ensure the quality of CVE-related training. | Why GAO Did This Study
DHS and DOJ have responsibility for training state and local law enforcement and community members on how to defend against violent extremism--ideologically motivated violence to further political goals. Community members and advocacy organizations have raised concerns about the quality of some CVE-related training that DOJ and DHS provide or fund. As requested, GAO examined (1)the extent to which DHS and DOJ have identified and communicated topics that CVE-related training should address to their components and state and local partners, (2) any concerns raised by state and local partners who have participated in CVE-related training provided or funded by DHS or DOJ, and (3) actions DHS and DOJ have taken to improve the quality of CVE-related training. GAO reviewed relevant documents, such as training participant feedback forms and DHS and DOJ guidance; and interviewed relevant officials from DHS and DOJ components. This is a public version of a sensitive report that GAO issued in September 2012. Information that the FBI deemed sensitive has been redacted.
What GAO Found
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has identified and is communicating to its components and state and local partners topics that the training on countering violent extremism (CVE) it provides or funds should cover; in contrast, the Department of Justice (DOJ) has not identified what topics should be covered in its CVE-related training. According to a DHS official who leads DHS's CVE efforts, identifying topics has helped to provide a logical structure for DHS's CVE-related training efforts. According to DOJ officials, even though they have not specifically identified what topics should be covered in CVE-related training, they understand internally which of the department's training is CVE-related and contributes either directly or indirectly to the department's training responsibilities under the CVE national strategy. However, over the course of this review, the department generally relied upon the framework GAO developed for potential CVE-related training topics to determine which of its existing training was CVE-related. Further, because DOJ has not identified CVE-related training topics, DOJ components have had challenges in determining the extent to which their training efforts contribute to DOJ's responsibilities under the CVE national strategy. In addition, officials who participated in an interagency working group focusing on ensuring CVE-related training quality stated that the group found it challenging to catalogue federal CVE-related training because agencies' views differed as to what CVE-related training includes.
The majority of state and local participant feedback on training that DHS or DOJ provided or funded and that GAO identified as CVE-related was positive or neutral, but a minority of participants raised concerns about biased, inaccurate, or offensive material. DHS and DOJ collected feedback from 8,424 state and local participants in CVE-related training during fiscal years 2010 and 2011, and 77--less than 1 percent--provided comments that expressed such concerns. According to DHS and DOJ officials, agencies used the feedback to make changes where appropriate. DOJ's Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and other components generally solicit feedback for more formal, curriculum-based training, but the FBI does not require this for activities such as presentations by guest speakers because the FBI does not consider this to be training. Similarly, DOJ's United States Attorneys' Offices (USAO) do not require feedback on presentations and similar efforts. Nevertheless, FBI field offices and USAOs covered about 39 percent (approximately 9,900) of all participants in DOJ CVE-related training during fiscal years 2010 and 2011 through these less formal methods, yet only 4 of 21 FBI field offices and 15 of 39 USAOs chose to solicit feedback on such methods. GAO has previously reported that agencies need to develop systematic evaluation processes in order to obtain accurate information about the benefits of their training. Soliciting feedback for less formal efforts on a more consistent basis could help these agencies ensure their quality.
DOJ and DHS have undertaken reviews and developed guidance to help improve the quality of CVE-related training. For example, in September 2011, the DOJ Deputy Attorney General directed all DOJ components and USAOs to review all of their training materials, including those related to CVE, to ensure they are consistent with DOJ standards. In addition, in October 2011, DHS issued guidance that covers best practices for CVE-related training and informs recipients of DHS grants who use the funding for training involving CVE on how to ensure high-quality training. Since the departments' reviews and efforts to implement the guidance they have developed are relatively new, it is too soon to determine their effectiveness.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOJ identify and communicate principal CVE-related training topics and that FBI field offices and USAOs consider soliciting feedback more consistently. DOJ agreed that it should more consistently solicit feedback, but disagreed that it should identify CVE training topics because DOJ does not have primary responsibility for CVE-related training, among other things. GAO believes this recommendation remains valid as discussed further in this report. |
gao_GAO-16-435 | gao_GAO-16-435_0 | Agencies Committed or Disbursed More Than $6.4 Billion of the Almost $6.5 Billion Allocated for Egypt in Fiscal Years 2011-2015
Of the almost $6.5 billion in security-related assistance funds allocated for Egypt in fiscal years 2011 through 2015, U.S. agencies had committed or disbursed more than $6.4 billion, or almost 100 percent, as of September 30, 2015. Egypt has used FMF funding to purchase and sustain a wide array of military systems, including major systems such as F-16 aircraft, Apache helicopters, and M1A1 tanks (see fig. DOD and State Completed End-Use Monitoring of U.S.- Provided Equipment but Faced Some Challenges Carrying Out These Efforts
DOD and State implemented end-use monitoring for equipment transferred to Egyptian security forces; however, challenges associated with obtaining Egyptian government cooperation sometimes hampered these monitoring efforts, and a lack of agency documentation limited accountability for some of them. DOD officials in Cairo also noted challenges in gaining access to an Egyptian government storage facility for NVDs prior to 2015 to verify the physical security for these items. DOD Completed Required Annual Physical Security Inspections for Sensitive Equipment Subject to Enhanced End-Use Monitoring in Fiscal Year 2015
Under Golden Sentry enhanced end-use monitoring, DOD personnel also are required to conduct annual physical security inspections of storage sites where sensitive equipment subject to enhanced end-use monitoring is housed. Although State has outreach programs to foster cooperation and compliance with Blue Lantern checks, it did not conduct any such outreach in Egypt in fiscal years 2011 through 2015. According to State officials, some of the delays in completing Blue Lantern checks in Egypt were due to the Egyptian government’s slow responses to State’s inquiries. According to State officials in Washington, D.C., and Cairo, Egypt, as of November 2015, no Blue Lantern outreach visit had been conducted in Egypt since 2008, prior to Egypt’s political transitions in 2011 and 2013. U.S. Government Completed Some Human Rights Vetting in Egypt but Has Weaknesses or Gaps in Procedures, Documentation, and Policies
The U.S. government completed human rights vetting for 5,581 Egyptian security forces before providing U.S.-funded training in fiscal year 2011 through March 31, 2015; however, our analysis of a sample of names from training rosters of Egyptian security forces who received U.S.-funded training shows that that the U.S. government did not complete all required vetting prior to providing training, in violation of State’s and DOD’s policies. State deemed our estimate of the percentage of Egyptian security forces that were not vetted and some aspects of the methodology we used to generate this estimate to be sensitive but unclassified information. Various Factors Affected State’s Efforts to Ensure Compliance with the Leahy Laws
Various factors affected State’s implementation of the Leahy laws. State generally concurred with our recommendations. Additionally, State agreed with our recommendation to develop time frames for establishing policies and procedures to provide a more reasonable level of assurance that the department is complying with the Leahy laws for recipients of equipment. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of this review were to examine, for fiscal years 2011 through 2015, the extent to which the U.S. government (1) committed or disbursed funds allocated for security-related assistance for Egypt, (2) implemented end-use monitoring for equipment transferred to Egyptian security forces, and (3) vetted Egyptian recipients of U.S. security-related assistance for human rights concerns. To determine the extent to which the U.S. government implemented end- use monitoring for equipment transferred to Egyptian security forces, we reviewed agency guidance, analyzed end-use monitoring data and documentation, interviewed U.S. and Egyptian officials, and conducted on-site inspections of military equipment during fieldwork to Egypt in June 2015. ensure that for each country the Department of State has a current list of all security force units receiving U.S. training, equipment, or other types of assistance; facilitate receipt by the Department of State and U.S. embassies of information from individuals and organizations outside the U.S. government on gross violations of human rights by security force units; routinely request and obtain such information from the Department of Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency, and other U.S. government sources; ensure that such information is evaluated and preserved; ensure that when an individual is designated to receive United States training, equipment, or other types of assistance the individual’s unit is vetted as well as the individual; seek to identify the unit involved when credible information of a gross violation exists but the identity of the unit is lacking; and make publicly available, to the maximum extent practicable, the identity of those units for which no assistance shall be furnished pursuant to the law. | Why GAO Did This Study
The U.S. government has allocated an average of about $1.3 billion annually in security assistance for Egypt in fiscal years 2011 through 2015. DOD and State have established end-use monitoring programs to ensure that military equipment transferred to foreign countries is safeguarded and used for its intended purposes. In addition, legal requirements, known as the Leahy laws, prohibit DOD- and State-funded assistance to units of foreign security forces if there is credible information that these forces have committed a gross violation of human rights.
This report examines, for fiscal years 2011 through 2015, the extent to which the U.S. government (1) committed or disbursed funds allocated for security-related assistance for Egypt, (2) implemented end-use monitoring for equipment transferred to Egyptian security forces, and (3) vetted Egyptian recipients of security-related assistance for human rights concerns. GAO analyzed U.S. agency data and documentation; conducted fieldwork in Egypt; and interviewed U.S. officials in Washington, D.C., and Cairo, Egypt. This is the public version of a sensitive but unclassified report issued in February 2016.
What GAO Found
U.S. agencies allocated approximately $6.5 billion for security-related assistance to Egypt in fiscal years 2011 through 2015. As of September 30, 2015, over $6.4 billion of the $6.5 billion total had been committed or disbursed. The majority of the funding (99.5 percent) was provided to Egypt through the Department of State's (State) Foreign Military Financing (FMF) account. The funds from this account were used to purchase and sustain a wide variety of military systems, including F-16 aircraft, Apache helicopters, and M1A1 tanks.
The Departments of Defense (DOD) and State implemented end-use monitoring for equipment transferred to Egyptian security forces, but challenges including obtaining Egyptian government cooperation hindered some efforts. DOD completed all required end-use monitoring inventories and physical security inspections of storage sites for missiles and night vision devices (NVD) in fiscal year 2015, but DOD lacked documentation showing that it completed physical security inspections for these sensitive items in prior years. Despite agreeing to give access, the Egyptian government prevented DOD officials from accessing a storage site to verify the physical security of some NVDs prior to 2015, according to DOD officials and documents. State conducted 12 end-use checks of U.S. equipment exported to Egypt in fiscal years 2011 to 2015, but State data indicate that the Egyptian government's incomplete and slow responses to some inquiries limited U.S. efforts to verify the use and security of certain equipment, including NVDs and riot-control items. Despite this lack of cooperation, since 2008, State has not used outreach programs in Egypt that are intended to facilitate host country cooperation and compliance with State's monitoring program. According to State officials, this was due to the small number of end-use checks conducted in Egypt and the lower priority assigned to Egypt than to other countries.
The U.S. government completed some, but not all, human rights vetting required by State policy before providing training or equipment to Egyptian security forces. State deemed GAO's estimate of the percentage of Egyptian security forces that were not vetted to be sensitive but unclassified information, which is excluded from this public report. Moreover, State has not established specific policies and procedures for vetting Egyptian security forces receiving equipment. Although State concurred with a 2011 GAO recommendation to implement equipment vetting, it has not established a time frame for such action. State currently attests in memos that it is in compliance with the Leahy law. However, without vetting policies and procedures, the U.S. government risks providing U.S. equipment to recipients in Egypt in violation of the Leahy laws.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is making six recommendations to strengthen State's implementation of end-use monitoring and human rights vetting, including utilizing its end-use monitoring outreach programs and developing time frames for establishing policies and procedures for equipment vetting. State generally agreed with these recommendations. |
gao_HEHS-98-44 | gao_HEHS-98-44_0 | HHS Reduced FTE Levels for Welfare Programs and Management Positions
While the 1996 welfare reform law requires HHS to reduce its FTE levels by specific amounts, it does not direct HHS on how to implement this requirement. To address this provision, HHS reduced by 245 its authorized FTE levels within OFA. These reductions were achieved primarily through reassigning staff to other programs and eliminating vacant positions. Reductions in OFA Made Primarily Through Reassignments
HHS reduced authorized FTE levels in OFA by 245 between August 1995 and July 1997. States Concerned About Lack of TANF Regulations but Generally Satisfied With HHS Guidance Provided
Although states are concerned that TANF regulations are not yet published, they are generally satisfied with HHS’ TANF guidance, both written and oral.Due to the amount of time the regulatory process takes, HHS does not expect to issue final TANF regulations until spring 1998—more than 18 months after some states began implementing their new welfare programs. Given that the first bonus funds are to be awarded in fiscal year 1999, states are concerned that they will not have enough time to either design their program activities or collect the data necessary to compete for the bonuses. HHS asserts that the delay in issuing regulations is due to the complexities in developing performance measures, the need to consult a number of groups in the process, and HHS’ limited staff resources to work on both TANF and bonus program regulations. Final Bonus Regulations to Be Issued in 1998
While HHS developed a preliminary proposal for performance measures in July 1997, it does not expect to have its notice of proposed rulemaking ready for comment until March 1998 and a final rule published until the end of fiscal year 1998—over a year after the statutory deadline for implementing the high-performance bonus program. APWA officials contend that state administrative data will be used by HHS to sanction states for noncompliance; hence, they could also be used for awarding bonus money. HHS’ key effort in pursuing this mandate is its continued funding of evaluations of waiver programs. In addition to the waiver studies, HHS is funding research efforts on employment-related issues of welfare clients, various technical assistance grants to help states obtain needed expertise or technical assistance to develop their welfare assistance programs, and child well-being studies. Table 6 shows the general areas of research that HHS funded with the $44 million for fiscal year 1997. HHS Evaluations of Innovative Programs Focus on Waiver Studies
HHS is pursuing its research and evaluation mandates, in part, by providing states approximately $9 million in fiscal year 1997 to continue their evaluations of their waiver programs, which is specified as an allowable area of research under the new law. The research questions vary, but several states planned to focus their evaluations on the effects of time limits and mandatory work requirements. However, the Department is having difficulty meeting its responsibility for developing and issuing the TANF and high-performance bonus regulations. In order to define the law’s FTE reduction requirement in a way that it could be measured, we considered such additional criteria as (1) the programs subject to the reductions; (2) the type of FTE, either authorized or actual; (3) the start and end dates for measuring the reductions; and (4) the definition of “managerial position.” In addition, when a statute does not include detailed criteria for implementation, under principles of administrative law, the executive branch department is responsible for interpreting the law’s provisions. In addition to our interviews, we reviewed all policy guidance that HHS distributed to the states, including its January 1997 policy memorandum; April 1997 Compilation of Implementation Materials, which included summaries of the various sections of the law, HHS and other federal agency contacts, and letters from the Acting Assistant Secretary for Children and Families answering frequently asked implementation questions; and other miscellaneous program instructions and memorandums to states. 17, 1995). | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Department of Health and Human Services' (HHS) implementation of the mandates resulting from the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, focusing on the: (1) extent to which HHS reduced its full-time equivalent (FTE) staff levels to the levels prescribed by the law; (2) clarity, timeliness, and usefulness of HHS' guidance and technical assistance to the states in implementing the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program; (3) status of HHS' work in establishing performance measures to use in implementing the high-performance bonus program; and (4) status of HHS' welfare research and evaluation efforts.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) between August 1995 and July 1997, HHS reduced by 245 its authorized FTE level for programs that were connected to block grants, and it reduced its authorized FTE level for managerial positions by more than 60 within the Department; (2) HHS achieved the 245 FTE reductions by reassigning almost three-quarters of them to other programs; (3) through GAO's survey, it found that states are generally satisfied with HHS' guidance but are concerned about the delay in TANF regulations, which HHS plans to issue in spring 1998; (4) HHS concedes that its rulemaking process to issue the regulations is lengthy because it requires the Department to obtain comments from many interested groups; (5) in the absence of regulations, states reported difficulties in designing and implementing their programs; (6) HHS missed the statutory deadline for implementing the high-performance bonus program; (7) while the law requires HHS to have implemented this program by August 1997, HHS is still writing regulations that will define the specific measures against which states are to be assessed; (8) HHS does not expect to issue final rules for the high-performance bonus program until the end of fiscal year (FY) 1998; (9) HHS attributes the delay to the inherent difficulties in developing performance measures; the large number of groups with whom HHS consulted, including advocacy and local government groups; and its limited number of staff with which to develop both TANF and bonus program regulations; (10) however, to be eligible for FY 1999 bonus money--the first year bonuses will be distributed--states are required to submit FY 1998 data; (11) HHS' funding for its welfare research generally follows the mandates outlined in the law; (12) a key effort for HHS in meeting these mandates is continuing the evaluations of state programs that were granted waivers from requirements that applied under the Aid to Families with Dependent Children program; (13) of the $44 million appropriated to Administration for Children and Families in FY 1997 for research, approximately $9 million has been awarded to 17 states for waiver evaluations; (14) several of these states will be evaluating the effect of time limits and mandatory work requirements on their programs, as well as other topics; (15) in addition to the waiver evaluations, HHS has awarded approximately $12 million for studies of employment issues focused on welfare and former welfare clients; and (16) technical assistance to states and child impact studies are other areas of research that were funded. |
gao_GAO-08-171T | gao_GAO-08-171T_0 | Prior Actions Have Improved Port Security, but Issues Remain
Port security overall has improved because of the development of organizations and programs such as AMSCs, Area Maritime Security Plans (AMSPs), maritime security exercises, and the International Port Security Program, but challenges to successful implementation of these efforts remain. Area Maritime Security Committees Share Information and Coast Guard Plans to Expand Interagency Operational Centers
Two main types of forums have developed for agencies to coordinate and share information about port security: area committees and Coast Guard sector command centers. The SAFE Port Act included several new requirements related to security exercises, such as establishing a Port Security Exercise Program to test and evaluate the capabilities of governments and port stakeholders to prevent, prepare for, mitigate against, respond to, and recover from acts of terrorism, natural disasters, and other emergencies at facilities that MTSA regulates. The Coast Guard Is Evaluating the Security of Foreign Ports, but Faces Resource Challenges
The security of domestic ports also depends upon security at foreign ports where cargoes bound for the United States originate. The report, expected to be issued in early 2008, will cover issues related to the program, such as the extent to which the program is using a risk-based approach in carrying out its work, what challenges the program faces as it moves forward, and the extent to which the observations collected during the country visits are used by other programs such as the Coast Guard’s port state control inspections and high interest vessel boarding programs. Port Facility Security Efforts Continue, but Additional Evaluation is Needed
To improve the security at individual facilities at ports, many long-standing programs are underway. The Coast Guard is required to conduct assessments of security plans and facility compliance inspections, but faces challenges in staffing and training to meet the SAFE Port Act’s additional requirements such as the sufficiency of trained personnel and guidance to conduct facility inspections. We currently have ongoing work that reviews the Coast Guard’s oversight strategy under MTSA and SAFE Port Act requirements. In this memo, DHS indicated that (1) programs requiring the collection and use of fingerprints to vet individuals will use the Automated Biometric Identification System (IDENT); (2) these programs are to reuse existing or currently planned and funded infrastructure for the intake of identity information to the greatest extent possible; (3) its CIO is to establish a procurement plan to ensure that the department can handle a large volume of automated vetting from programs currently in the planning phase; and (4) to support the sharing of databases and potential consolidation of duplicative applications, the Enterprise Data Management Office is currently developing an inventory of biographic data assets that DHS maintains to support identity management and screening processes. DOE Continues to Expand Its Megaports Program
The Megaports Initiative, initiated by DOE’s National Nuclear Security Administration in 2003, represents another component in the efforts to prevent terrorists from smuggling WMD in cargo containers from overseas locations. According to CBP, containers from these ports will be scanned for radiation and other risk factors before they are allowed to depart for the United States. These reciprocal agreements also allow foreign governments the opportunity to place customs officials at U.S. seaports and request inspection of cargo containers departing from the United States and bound for their home country. Many ports may lack the space necessary to install additional equipment needed to comply with the requirement to scan 100 percent of U.S. bound containers. Homeland Security: Management and Programmatic Challenges Facing the Department of Homeland Security. Maritime Security: Observations on Selected Aspects of the SAFE Port Act. Customs Revenue: Customs and Border Protection Needs to Improve Workforce Planning and Accountability. Transportation Security: DHS Should Address Key Challenges before Implementing the Transportation Worker Identification Credential Program. | Why GAO Did This Study
Because the safety and economic security of the United States depend in substantial part on the security of its 361 seaports, the United States has a vital national interest in maritime security. The Security and Accountability for Every Port Act (SAFE Port Act), modified existing legislation and created and codified new programs related to maritime security. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and its U.S. Coast Guard, Transportation Security Agency, and U.S. Customs and Border Protection have key maritime security responsibilities. This testimony synthesizes the results of GAO's completed work and preliminary observations from GAO's ongoing work related to the SAFE Port Act pertaining to (1) overall port security, (2) security at individual facilities, and (3) cargo container security. To perform this work GAO visited domestic and overseas ports; reviewed agency program documents, port security plans, and post-exercise reports; and interviewed officials from the federal, state, local, private, and international sectors.
What GAO Found
Federal agencies have improved overall port security efforts by establishing committees to share information with local port stakeholders, taking steps to establish interagency operations centers to monitor port activities, conducting operations such as harbor patrols and vessel escorts, writing port-level plans to prevent and respond to terrorist attacks, testing such plans through exercises, and assessing the security at foreign ports. However, these agencies face resource constraints and other challenges trying to meet the SAFE Port Act's requirements to expand these activities. For example, the Coast Guard faces budget constraints in trying to expand its current command centers and include other agencies at the centers. Similarly, private facilities and federal agencies have taken action to improve security at about 3,000 individual facilities by writing facility-specific security plans, inspecting facilities to ensure they are complying with their plans, and developing special identification cards for workers to prevent terrorists from getting access to secure areas. Federal agencies face challenges trying to meet the act's requirements to expand the scope or speed the implementation of such activities. For example, the Transportation Security Agency missed the act's July 2007 deadline to implement the identification card program at 10 selected ports because of delays in testing equipment and procedures. Federal programs related to the security of cargo containers have also improved as agencies are enhancing systems to identify high-risk cargo, expanding partnerships with other countries to screen containers before they depart for the United States, and working with international organizations to develop a global framework for container security. Federal agencies face challenges implementing container security aspects of the SAFE Port Act and other legislation. For example, Customs and Border Protection must test and implement a new program to screen 100 percent of all incoming containers overseas--a departure from its existing risk-based programs. |
gao_NSIAD-99-82 | gao_NSIAD-99-82_0 | We reviewed the accident categories in terms of “fatal accidents,” defined as any accident event in which at least one occupant of an Army motor vehicle died; “occupant deaths,” defined as the total number of Army motor vehicle occupants killed; “rollovers,” defined as any vehicle that did not remain upright as the result of an accident; and “rollover deaths,” defined as those occurring to occupants of Army motor vehicles that rolled over as a result of an accident. Our comparison of M939 accident statistics with accident statistics for the rest of the Army motor vehicle fleet showed that the M939 accounted for about 34 percent of all Army motor vehicle fatal accident events, and 34 percent of all Army motor vehicle occupant deaths. We also found that, over this same 10-year period, the M939 occupant fatality rate averaged about 30 times higher than those for commercial trucks. Comparison of M939s With 2-1/2 Ton Tactical Army Trucks
The Army Safety Center’s analysis reviewed accident data from October 1990 through June 1998. In this analysis, the accident rate of the M939 was compared with accident rates for another series of trucks—the M34/M35 series 2-1/2 ton truck. The Army Safety Center’s analysis found accident rates for M939s to be higher than the comparison vehicles. The analysis showed M939 Class A mishap frequency rates per million miles driven to be 3 to 21 times higher than those of similar M34/M35 series 2-1/2 ton trucks. Army Plans to Spend $234 Million to Improve M939 Safety Performance
The Army has initiated a program to improve the M939’s safety performance and, according to TACOM estimates, plans to spend around $234 million for various modifications. These studies focused on identifying root causes of M939 accidents based on information contained in accident investigation reports. On the basis of the studies’ findings, the Army concluded that the overall truck design was sound but that some modifications were necessary to improve the truck’s safety performance. Planned modifications include $120 million for upgrading the trucks tires, altering brake proportioning specifications, and adding anti-lock brake kits. Other modifications include $114 million to install cabs equipped with rollover crush protection systems and improve accelerator linkage. The modifications, for the most part, will be completed by 2005 with the M939s remaining in service during the process. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Army's M939 series 5-ton tactical cargo truck, focusing on the: (1) extent to which accidents involving the truck have occurred; and (2) results of Army studies on the truck's design and its plans to address any identified deficiencies.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) GAO's analyses and an Army analysis indicate a higher rate of accidents involving the M939 series 5-ton tactical cargo truck than other comparison vehicles; (2) GAO's analysis of January 1987 through June 1998 accident data showed that, while M939s made up an average of about 9 percent of the Army motor vehicle fleet during that time, about 34 percent of the fleet's accidents resulting in fatalities of vehicle occupants involved these trucks; (3) 44 percent of accidents that involved a rollover and resulted in fatalities of vehicle occupants involved the M939; (4) GAO's comparison of Department of Transportation accident statistics and M939 accident statistics showed that over a 10-year period, the fatality rate for occupants of the M939 averaged about 30 times higher than the fatality rate for occupants of comparably sized commercial trucks; (5) an Army Safety Center analysis found that the chance of a fatality in a M939 was 3 to 21 times higher than in other similar military trucks in the Army motor vehicle fleet--the M34/M35 series 2 1/2 ton trucks; (6) the Army plans to spend an estimated $234 million on various modifications to improve the M939's safety and operational performance; (7) based on the results of studies into the root causes of M939 accidents, the Army concluded that the overall truck design was sound, but some modifications were necessary; (8) the Army plans to use the $234 million to add anti-lock brake kits, alter brake proportioning specifications, upgrade the truck's tires, install cab rollover crush protection, and modify the accelerator linkage; (9) most modifications will be completed by 2005; and (10) the M939s will remain in service as these modifications are made. |
gao_GGD-98-98 | gao_GGD-98-98_0 | Audit workpapers also provide the principal support for the auditor’s report, which is to be provided to the audited taxpayer, on findings and conclusions about the taxpayer’s correct tax liability. According to IRS officials, these files may contain documentation on case reviews by group managers even though such documentation may not be in the workpapers. On the basis of our review of IRS’ audit workpapers, we found that IRS auditors did not always meet the requirements laid out under this workpaper standard. The following are examples of some of the problems we found during our review of IRS audit workpapers:
Tax adjustments shown in the workpapers, summaries, and reports did not agree. They are a tool to use in formulating and documenting the auditor’s findings, conclusions, and recommended adjustments, if any. Documentation of Supervisory Review of Audit Workpapers Was Limited
IRS’ primary quality control mechanism is supervisory review of the audit workpapers to ensure adherence to the audit standards. As a result, the files lacked documentation that IRS group managers reviewed workpapers during the audits to help ensure that the recommended tax adjustments were supported and verified, and that the audits did not unnecessarily burden the audited taxpayers. We found little documentation in the workpapers that group managers reviewed workpapers before sharing the audit results with the taxpayer. On the basis of our analysis of the sampled audits closed during fiscal years 1995 and 1996, we estimated that about 6 percent of the workpapers in the sample population contained documentation of group manager review during the audits. In discussions about our estimate with IRS Examination Division officials, they noted that all unagreed audits (i.e., those audits in which the taxpayers do not agree with the tax adjustments) are to be reviewed by the group managers, and they pointed to the manager’s initials on the notice of deficiency as documentation of this review. We did not count reviews of these notices in our analysis because they occurred after IRS sent the original audit report to the taxpayer. Further, we analyzed all unagreed audits in our sample to see how many had documentation of group manager review during the audit, rather than after the audit results were sent to the taxpayer; this would be the point at which the taxpayer either would agree or disagree with the results. We found documentation of such a review in 12 percent of the unagreed audits. The Examination Division officials also said that a group manager may review the workpapers without documentation of that review being recorded in the workpapers. In these monthly workload reviews, supervisors are to monitor time charges to an audit. These questions cannot be answered conclusively, however, because the amount of supervisory review cannot be determined. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO reviewed the condition of the Internal Revenue Service's (IRS) audit workpapers, including the documentation of supervisory review.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) during its review of IRS' financial status audits, the workpapers did not always meet the requirements under IRS' workpaper standards; (2) standards not met in some audit workpapers included the expectation that: (a) the amount of tax adjustments recorded in the workpapers would be the same as the adjustment amounts shown in the auditor's workpaper summary and on the report sent to the taxpayer; and (b) the workpaper files would contain all required documents to support conclusions about tax liability that an auditor reached and reported to the taxpayer; (3) these shortcomings with the workpapers are not new; (4) GAO found documentation on supervisory review of workpapers prepared during the audits in an estimated 6 percent of the audits in GAO's sample; (5) in the remaining audits, GAO found no documentation that the group managers reviewed either the support for the tax adjustments or the report communicating such adjustments to the taxpayer; (6) IRS officials indicated that all audits in which the taxpayer does not agree with the recommended adjustments are to be reviewed by the group managers; (7) if done, this review would occur after the report on audit results was sent to the taxpayer; (8) even when GAO counts all such unagreed audits, those with documentation of supervisory review would be an estimated 26 percent of the audits in GAO's sample population; (9) GAO believes that supervisory reviews and documentation of such reviews are important because they are IRS' primary quality control process; (10) proper reviews done during the audit can help ensure that audits minimize burden on taxpayers and that any adjustments to taxpayers' liabilities are supported; (11) although Examination Division officials recognized the need for proper reviews, they said IRS group managers cannot review workpapers for all audits because of competing priorities; (12) these officials also said that group managers get involved in the audit process in ways that may not be documented in the workpapers; (13) they stated that these group managers monitor auditors' activities through other processes, such as by reviewing the time that auditors spent on an audit, conducting on-the-job visits, and talking to auditors about their cases and audit inventory; and (14) in these processes, however, the officials said that group managers usually were not reviewing workpapers or validating the calculations used to recommend adjustments before sending the audit results to the taxpayer. |
gao_GAO-16-154 | gao_GAO-16-154_0 | Furthermore, some of the symptoms of mild TBI, which account for the majority of these injuries in the military, are similar to those associated with other conditions, such as PTSD. Published Research on the Use of HBO2 Therapy to Treat TBI and PTSD is Primarily Focused on TBI; Conclusions on Effectiveness for Mild TBI Differ
Most Published HBO2 Therapy Research Is Focused on the Safety and Effectiveness of Treating TBI with Few Studies on PTSD
Most of the 32 peer-reviewed, published articles that we identified examined the use of HBO therapy for treating TBI: 29 focused solely on TBI, 2 focused on both TBI and PTSD, and 1 focused solely on PTSD. The 32 articles we identified included 7 case reports, 10 literature reviews, and 15 articles on interventional studies or clinical trials. Case reports are collections of reports on the treatment of individual patients. The remaining 12 articles evaluated the effectiveness of HBO The 8 articles on mild TBI had differing conclusions on the effectiveness of HBO therapy, while the other 4 articles (two on severe TBI and two that did not specify severity) reported that this therapy was an effective treatment for these conditions. Articles about the Effectiveness of HBO2 Therapy for Treating Mild TBI Report Different Conclusions
The eight articles on interventional studies or clinical trials that were focused on treating mild TBI had different conclusions—six articles concluded that it was not effective and two concluded that it was. The six articles that concluded HBO Each of the three studies was affiliated with a branch of military service—Army, Navy, or Air Force. The remaining two articles were based on two studies conducted by researchers in Israel and the United States. All of the DOD-funded studies were randomized, double- blinded, and included a sham control group in which participants received a procedure that is similar to the HBO For a sham control group in HBO therapy studies, some atmospheric pressure within the hyperbaric chamber is required for participants to perceive they are receiving treatment. However, there is no standard sham control group design for HBO therapy was not effective in treating mild TBI and related symptoms because participants in the sham control and treatment groups had similar outcomes. Although both groups of participants showed improvement, the authors concluded that the improvement was likely attributable to other factors, such as a placebo effect, and not to HBO DOD officials and researchers involved with the studies told us that they believe some improvements were due to factors, such as being away from home and everyday stress. therapy from this study. In a published editorial, the researchers who conducted the DOD-funded study that used a sham control group with hyperbaric treatments at 1.2 ATA responded to these concerns by reporting that they recognize that the sham treatment may have caused physiologic effects from slight increases in oxygen, nitrogen, and direct pressure, as well as a variety of other effects. Nonetheless, DOD officials told us that there have been no studies completed on the long-term effects of the treatment, and such studies would help confirm whether the sham control groups’ improvements should be attributed to placebo effects or other factors. DOD and VA researchers and other subject matter experts told us that these studies were not designed with the same methodological rigor as the DOD-funded studies on mild TBI because they were not blinded, randomized clinical trials, and they did not use sham control groups— qualities that help ensure the validity of a study’s findings. The group of researchers in Israel noted in their article that they did not use a sham control group because it was difficult to design a treatment for the control group that would not be considered therapeutic. The researchers for the other study that was conducted in the United States noted in their article that a sham control group was not used because this was preliminary work, and further work would be needed to confirm the study’s findings. therapy to treat stroke. severities of TBI. Appendix I: Literature Review Methodology and Bibliography
To identify and describe published research on the use of hyperbaric oxygen (HBO) therapy in the treatment of traumatic brain injury (TBI) or post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), we conducted a literature search for relevant articles published during the most recent 10-year period, from January 1, 2005 through April 6, 2015. The assignments are determined by the study protocol. Eight of these articles noted that further research in the area was needed to determine if this treatment was effective. The remaining 3 articles are related to the safety of this treatment (see table 10). Appendix VI: Comments from the Department of Defense
Appendix VII: Comments from the Department of Veterans Affairs
Appendix VIII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments
Debra A. Draper, Director, (202) 512-7114 or [email protected]. | Why GAO Did This Study
TBI and PTSD are signature wounds for servicemembers returning from the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. Within the military, the majority of TBI cases have been classified as mild. Studies have found that one-third or more of servicemembers with mild TBI also have PTSD. As an alternative to traditional treatments, some researchers have studied the use of HBO2 therapy, which delivers higher levels of oxygen to the body inside of pressurized hyperbaric chambers to promote healing. The Joint Explanatory Statement accompanying the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015, included a provision for GAO to review the use of HBO2 therapy to treat TBI and PTSD.
This report identifies and describes published research on the use of HBO2 therapy for these conditions. GAO conducted a literature review for relevant articles published in peer-reviewed journals during the most recent 10-year period, from January 1, 2005 through April 6, 2015. GAO interviewed DOD, VA, and researchers affiliated with published articles, as well as other stakeholders, including officials with the Undersea and Hyperbaric Medical Society. GAO also interviewed officials from the Food and Drug Administration about the process to approve HBO2 therapy for the treatment of TBI and PTSD.
GAO provided a draft of this report to DOD, VA, and the Department of Health and Human Services. Each of the departments provided technical comments, which GAO incorporated, as appropriate.
What GAO Found
GAO identified 32 peer-reviewed, published articles on research about the use of hyperbaric oxygen (HBO2) therapy to treat traumatic brain injury (TBI) and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), most of which were focused solely on TBI (29 articles). The 32 articles consisted of 7 case reports (reports on the treatment of individuals), 10 literature reviews (reviews of studies), and 15 articles on interventional studies or clinical trials, which provide the strongest clinical evidence about a treatment. Three of the 15 articles on interventional studies or clinical trials focused on the safety of HBO2 therapy for treating TBI and concluded that it is safe. The other 12 articles described the effectiveness of HBO2 therapy in treating TBI. Four of these articles (two on severe TBI and two that did not specify severity) reported that HBO2 therapy was effective. The remaining eight articles focused on mild TBI—six concluded that it was not effective and two concluded that it was.
The six articles that concluded HBO2 therapy was not effective in treating mild TBI were based on three studies funded by the Department of Defense (DOD) with collaboration from the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) and others. Each of the DOD-funded studies 1) was randomized—participants were randomly assigned to clinical trial groups, 2) was double-blinded—neither researchers nor participants knew who was assigned to which group, and 3) included a sham control group—participants received a procedure that was similar to HBO2 therapy but lacked certain components of the intervention. However, there is no standard design for sham control groups in HBO2 therapy, and in each of the DOD-funded studies the approach varied. The authors of the six articles based on these studies concluded that HBO2 therapy was not effective in treating mild TBI because participants in the sham control and treatment groups had similar outcomes. Although both groups showed improvement, the researchers concluded that this was likely due to other factors, such as a placebo effect. Researchers not affiliated with the DOD-funded studies have raised concerns about whether the sham control groups received a placebo or a therapeutic treatment. In a published editorial, researchers affiliated with one of the DOD-funded studies acknowledged the challenges associated with designing a sham control group and stated that additional research would be needed to determine whether these participants actually received a therapeutic benefit. DOD officials told us that studying the long-term effects of the treatment also would help confirm whether the sham control groups' improvements should be attributed to a placebo effect.
The two articles that concluded that HBO2 therapy was effective in treating mild TBI were based on studies that were designed differently than the DOD-funded studies. DOD and VA researchers told GAO that the studies related to these articles did not have the same methodological rigor as the DOD-funded studies because they did not have design features such as sham control groups, which help ensure the validity of a study's findings. The researchers for one of these two studies noted in their article that they did not use a sham control group because it was difficult to ensure that participants would receive a non-therapeutic treatment. Researchers for the other study noted in their article that a sham control group was not used because this was preliminary work, and further work would be needed to confirm the findings. |
gao_GAO-07-448T | gao_GAO-07-448T_0 | TSA has named this prospective prescreening program Secure Flight. Additional information on the President’s budget request for fiscal year 2008 as it relates to airline passenger prescreening, airline passenger and checked baggage screening, and air cargo security is provided later in this statement. Accordingly, as TSA moves forward, it will need to employ a range of program management disciplines, which we previously found missing, to control program cost, schedule, performance, and privacy risks. TSA Has Taken Steps to Enhance Security at Passenger Screening Checkpoints and Checked Baggage Screening Stations, but Continues to Face Challenges
TSA has taken steps to strengthen the three key elements of the passenger and checked baggage screening systems—people (TSOs), screening procedures, and technology—but continues to face management, planning, and funding challenges. For example, in May 2006, TSA reported that under current investment levels, the installation of optimal checked baggage screening systems would not be completed until approximately 2024. TSA, in collaboration with key stakeholders, has identified several funding and financing strategies for installing optimal checked baggage screening systems, such as continued appropriations for the procurement and installation of EDS machines. However, as part of our ongoing work, we identified that TSA’s data collection and analyses could be improved to help TSA determine whether proposed procedures that are operationally tested would achieve their intended purpose. Additionally, in September 2006, Congress directed TSA to take a variety of actions—most of which we recommended in our July 2006 report—to monitor and assess the use of alternative screening procedures, including (1) develop performance measures and performance targets for the use of alternative screening procedures; (2) track the use of alternative screening procedures at airports; (3) assess the effectiveness of these measures; (4) conduct covert testing at airports that use alternative screening procedures; (5) develop a plan to stop alternative screening procedures at airports as soon as practicable; and (6) report to the Senate and House Committees on Appropriations, the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, and the House Committee on Homeland Security by January 23, 2007, on implementation of these requirements. However, limited progress has been made in fielding explosives detection technology at passenger screening checkpoints, in part due to challenges DHS S&T and TSA face in coordinating research and development efforts. Despite TSA’s efforts to develop passenger checkpoint screening technologies, preliminary results from our ongoing work suggests that limited progress has been made in fielding explosives detection technology at checkpoints. TSA is collaborating with key stakeholders to identify funding and financing strategies for installing optimal checked baggage screening systems. However, more work remains to ensure that TSA has a comprehensive strategy to secure air cargo that fully incorporates risk management principles. However, TSA has not established a timeframe for completing these assessments. According to TSA officials, the federal government and the air cargo industry face several challenges that must be overcome to effectively implement any of these technologies to inspect or secure air cargo. This report will address (1) the actions TSA and CBP have taken to secure inbound air cargo, and how, if at all these efforts could be strengthened; and (2) the practices the air cargo industry and select foreign governments have adopted that could be used to enhance TSA’s efforts to strengthen inbound air cargo security, and the extent to which TSA and CBP have worked with foreign governments to enhance their air cargo security efforts. Concluding Observations
DHS and TSA have undertaken numerous initiatives to strengthen the security of the nation’s aviation system, and should be commended for these efforts. Meeting the congressional mandates to screen airline passengers and checked baggage alone was a tremendous challenge. Since that time, TSA has turned its attention to strengthening passenger prescreening, more efficiently allocating and deploying TSOs, strengthening screening procedures, developing and deploying more effective and efficient screening technologies, and improving domestic air cargo security, among other efforts. In implementing a risk-based approach, DHS and TSA must also address the challenges we identified in our work related to program planning, risk assessments, and implementation and monitoring of aviation security programs. Aviation Security: TSA Has Strengthened Efforts to Plan for the Optimal Deployment of Checked Baggage Screening Systems but Funding Uncertainties Remain. Aviation Security: Transportation Security Administration Has Made Progress in Managing a Federal Security Workforce and Ensuring Security at U.S. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Transportation Security Administration (TSA), established in November 2001, has developed and implemented a variety of programs to secure the commercial aviation system. To implement these efforts, TSA funding related to aviation security has totaled about $20 billion since fiscal year 2004. Other Department of Homeland Security (DHS) components, such as the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and the Science and Technology Directorate (S&T), also play roles in securing commercial aviation. In this testimony, we address the efforts TSA has taken or planned to strengthen aviation security, and the challenges that remain, in three key areas: airline passenger prescreening, airline passenger and checked baggage screening, and air cargo screening. GAO's comments are based on issued GAO reports and testimonies and our preliminary observations from ongoing work on TSA's passenger checkpoint screening procedures and technologies, and staffing standards for Transportation Security Officers (TSO).
What GAO Found
DHS and TSA have undertaken numerous initiatives to strengthen the security of the nation's aviation system, and should be commended for these efforts. However, more work remains. Meeting the congressional mandates to screen airline passengers and checked baggage alone was a tremendous challenge. Since that time, TSA has turned its attention to, among other things, strengthening passenger prescreening; more efficiently allocating, deploying, and managing the TSO workforce; strengthening screening procedures; developing and deploying more effective and efficient screening technologies; and improving domestic air cargo security. Some of the actions taken by TSA in these areas were in response to GAO recommendations. For example, consistent with GAO's recommendation to strengthen checked baggage screening, TSA has developed a strategic planning framework and identified several funding and financing strategies for installing optimal checked baggage screening systems. While TSA has undertaken numerous efforts to strengthen aviation security, GAO found that DHS and TSA could strengthen their risk-based decision-making efforts and collaboration with stakeholders. For example, as TSA moves forward with Secure Flight--TSA's prospective domestic passenger prescreening program--it will need to employ a range of program management disciplines, which we previously found missing, to control program cost, schedule, performance, and privacy risks. TSA has put in place a new management team, but it is too early to know how this change will affect the program's development. In addition, while TSA has tested some proposed modifications to passenger screening procedures at airports to help determine whether to implement the changes, GAO identified that TSA's data collection and analyses could be improved. GAO also found that limited progress has been made in developing and deploying technologies due to planning and funding challenges. For example, limited progress has been made in fielding explosives detection technology at passenger screening checkpoints, and while TSA has begun to systematically plan for the optimal deployment of checked baggage screening systems and to identify funding and financing strategies for installing these systems, the agency has identified that under current investment levels, installation of optimal checked baggage screening systems will not be completed until approximately 2024. Additionally, the federal government and the air cargo industry face several challenges that must be overcome to effectively implement technologies to inspect air cargo, such as ensuring that air cargo can be inspected in a timely manner to meet the delivery time frames of air carriers. GAO also found that more work is needed to fully implement a risk-based approach to securing air cargo, including finalizing a methodology and schedule for completing assessments of air cargo vulnerabilities and critical assets. TSA stated that the agency intends to perform a vulnerability assessment of U.S. air cargo operations and activities, as recommended by GAO, and plans to complete this assessment in 2007. |
gao_HEHS-98-3 | gao_HEHS-98-3_0 | The Safe and Drug-Free Schools program is one of several substance abuse- and violence- prevention programs funded by the federal government. Act Requires Federal, State, and Local Actions to Ensure Accountability
The Safe and Drug-Free Schools and Communities Act establishes accountability mechanisms at the federal, state, and local levels. The act establishes four types of accountability mechanisms: (1) an application process that requires approval of state and local plans; (2) state monitoring of LEAs’ programs; (3) reports on national, state, and local program effectiveness; and (4) LEAs’ use of advisory councils to develop program plans and assist program implementation. The act also requires, indirectly, that Education collect data from states on the effectiveness and outcomes of state and local programs. Education Conducts Monitoring Activities
Education also monitors states’ activities. Overall, Education’s data collection and evaluation activities comprise a (1) national evaluation of drug- and violence-prevention activities, including those funded under the Safe and Drug-Free Schools program; (2) national data collection on violence in schools; (3) national survey to gather information about local program improvement activities; and (4) compilation of state-level reports on program effectiveness and progress toward state- and locally defined goals for drug and violence prevention. States Review and Approve Local Plans and Monitor Activities
Nearly all states use approved local plans as the primary means for ensuring a local program’s compliance with the act’s requirements as well as a variety of other methods. States’ use of the plans to ensure compliance often begins when LEAs submit their plans for state approval, with states using the approval process to ensure that a LEA’s planned program conforms with the act’s requirements. A few states reported using a combination of these methods to oversee local programs. Ninety-one percent of LEAs provide drug-prevention instruction. Staff training is the next most offered activity, with 77 percent of districts reporting such training. The lack of uniform information on program activities and effectiveness may, however, create a problem for federal oversight. Though the state auditor challenged the Michigan Department of Education’s methodology for determining program content, Education ruled that “the auditors provided no evidence to demonstrate that the methods used by the subcommittee were in violation of any statutory or regulatory requirements.” Education concluded, “Consequently, there is insufficient information to establish that the [Michigan State Department of Education] has violated the requirements contained in the [Drug-Free Schools and Communities Act] and other applicable regulations related to the proportionate use of these funds for the Michigan Model.”
Though Education officials rejected auditors’ findings on the uses of Drug-Free Schools funds for implementation of the Michigan Model, it sustained audit findings on several other points. (2) What activities are used by Education for overseeing state and local programs? (3) How do SEAs ensure local programs’ compliance with the act? and (4) What specific uses are made of Safe and Drug-Free Schools funding at the state and local levels? | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed: (1) the accountability measures the Safe and Drug-Free Schools and Communities Act requires at the federal, state, and local levels; (2) the activities that the Department of Education uses for overseeing state and local programs; (3) how state education agencies (SEA) ensure local programs' compliance with the act; and (4) how Safe and Drug-Free Schools funding is specifically used at the state and local levels.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the Safe and Drug-Free Schools program is one of several substance abuse- and violence-prevention programs funded by the federal government; (2) the act that authorizes the program requires four major types of actions to ensure accountability on the federal, state, and local levels: (a) an application process requiring approval of state and local program plans; (b) monitoring activities by state agencies; (c) periodic reports and evaluations; and (d) the use of local or substate regional advisory councils; (3) Education oversees state programs directly and local programs indirectly through required state actions; (4) working along with states, Education reviews, helps states to revise, and approves state plans; (5) Education has issued no program-specific regulations on the act; (6) Education does require states to conform to general and administrative regulations and advises states on program matters, such as allowable expenditures, through nonbinding guidance; (7) the Department may get involved in resolving allegations of impropriety in the use of funds; (8) no overall evaluations of the Safe and Drug-Free Schools program have been completed; (9) Education conducts evaluation activities designed to provide both descriptive and evaluative information about the programs; (10) Education's evaluative activities focus on broader aspects of program implementation; (11) Education is indirectly gathering information about the effectiveness of specific state and local programs through reports states must submit to Education every 3 years; (12) the lack of uniformity in what states report may create a problem for federal oversight; (13) nearly all states use the approved local plans to ensure local programs' compliance with the act's requirements; (14) states use local compliance with the approved plans as a way of ensuring that funds are spent on activities permitted under the act; (15) most states use both on-site visits and local self-reports to oversee local program activities; (16) local education agencies (LEAs) are also required to evaluate the effectiveness of their programs; (17) SEAs and LEAs use Safe and Drug-Free Schools funds for a variety of activities; (18) states mostly use their 5-percent set-aside for activities such as training and technical assistance; (19) ninety-one percent of LEAs provide drug-prevention instruction; and (20) staff training is the next most offered activity. |
gao_GAO-09-747 | gao_GAO-09-747_0 | The Plum Island Animal Disease Center
The PIADC is a federally owned research facility on Plum Island—an 840- acre island off the northeastern tip of New York’s Long Island. The PIADC’s research and diagnostic activities stem from its mission to protect U.S. animal industries and exports from the accidental or deliberate introduction of foreign animal diseases. Its primary research and diagnostic focus is foreign or exotic diseases that could affect livestock such as FMD, classical swine fever, and vesicular stomatitis. Its BSL-3-Ag includes 40 rooms for livestock and is the only place in the United States used to conduct research on live FMD virus. Another important distinction in a BSL-3-Ag laboratory is the extensive direct contact between human operators and infected animals. DHS’s Reasons for Considering Relocation
DHS has stated that the PIADC is nearing the end of its life cycle and lacks critical capabilities to continue as the primary facility for such work. According to DHS, the nation’s national biodefense and agrodefense capabilities are inadequate to meet future research requirements supporting both agricultural and public health national security. Section 7524 of the Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008 directed the secretary of Agriculture to issue a permit to the secretary of Homeland Security for work on live FMD virus at any facility that is a successor to the PIADC and charged with researching high-consequence biological threats involving zoonotic and foreign animal diseases. Comments on the NBAF draft EIS included the following concerns: the ability of DHS and the federal government in general to safely operate a biosafety facility such as the proposed NBAF; the potential for a pathogenic release through accidents, natural phenomena, and terrorist actions; our May 2008 testimony that concluded that DHS had not conducted or commissioned a study to determine whether FMD research could be conducted safely on the U.S. mainland; natural phenomena such as tornadoes, earthquakes, and hurricanes that could cause catastrophic damage to the NBAF and result in the release of a pathogen; the possibility that an infected mosquito vector could escape, allowing a pathogen such as Rift Valley Fever virus to become permanently established in the United States; the economic effects of a release or a perceived release on the local, state, and national livestock industry. DHS Conducted a Threat and Risk Assessment to Determine Security Risks
DHS developed a threat and risk analysis independent of the EIS that identified and evaluated potential security risks—threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences—that might be encountered in operating the NBAF. They included crimes against people and property and threats from compromised or disgruntled employees. The objectives of this analysis were to present the risks and effective mitigation strategies for ensuring the NBAF’s secure operation and to help DHS select the site with the fewest unique security threats. DHS concluded that the EIS and threat and risk analysis showed very little differentiation across the six sites and considered that the safety and security risks that had been identified at all sites were acceptable, with or without mitigation. Specifically, for all sites the risk was zero to low for all accident scenarios, except for an overpressure fire—an explosion from the buildup of a large amount of gas or flammable chemical in an enclosed area. The risk of an overpressure fire accident was moderate for all sites. For all sites—except Plum Island—the overall risk rank was moderate, based on the potential for infection and opportunity for disease to spread through livestock or wildlife. The Plum Island site’s overall risk rank was low, because the likelihood of any disease spreading beyond the island was small, since animals do not live in the vicinity and the potential for infection is less. The threat and risk assessment concluded that the insider threat would be the biggest threat to the NBAF and would be independent of the site. We also noted that transferring FMD work to an NBAF is to be accompanied by increases in both scope and complexity over those of the current activities at the PIADC. We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Homeland Security and the Secretary of Agriculture. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The Consolidated Security, Disaster Assistance, and Continuing Appropriations Act of 2009 required us to review the U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) risk assessment of whether foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) work can be done safely on the U.S. mainland. To ensure that DHS has properly considered the risks associated with a potential release of FMD virus from a high-containment laboratory (HCL) on a mainland site compared to one on an island, we assessed, as mandated, the evidence DHS used to conclude that work with FMD can be conducted as safely on the U.S. mainland as on Plum Island. | Why GAO Did This Study
Foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) is the most highly infectious animal disease known: nearly 100 percent of exposed animals become infected with it. Although the United States has not had an outbreak of FMD since 1929, a single outbreak of FMD virus as a result of an accidental or intentional release from a laboratory on the U.S. mainland could have significant consequences for U.S. agriculture. The traditional approach to the disease, once infection is confirmed, is to depopulate infected and potentially infected livestock herds to eradicate the disease. The value of U.S. livestock sales was $140 billion in 2007; about 10 percent of this figure, or approximately $13 billion, was accounted for by export markets. The Plum Island Animal Disease Center (PIADC), on a federally owned island off the northern tip of Long Island, New York, is the only facility in the United States that studies the live FMD virus. The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) was responsible for the PIADC from its opening in the 1950s until June 2003, when USDA transferred responsibility for it to the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), as required by the Homeland Security Act of 2002. The act specified that USDA would continue to have access to Plum Island to conduct diagnostic and research work on foreign animal diseases, and it authorized the president to transfer funds from USDA to DHS to operate the PIADC. Also, under Homeland Security Presidential Directive 9 (HSPD-9), the secretary of Agriculture and the secretary of Homeland Security are to develop a plan to provide safe, secure, and state-of-the-art agricultural biocontainment laboratories for researching and developing diagnostic capabilities for foreign animal and zoonotic diseases. On January 19, 2006, DHS announced that to meet its obligations under HSPD-9, it would construct and operate a new facility--the National Bio- and Agro-Defense Facility (NBAF)--containing several biosafety level 3 (BSL-3) laboratories, BSL-3 agricultural (BSL-3-Ag) laboratories, and biosafety level 4 (BSL-4) laboratories. FMD research is to be performed in a BSL-3-Ag laboratory. When fully operational, the NBAF is meant to replace the PIADC. The primary research and diagnostic focus at the PIADC is foreign or exotic diseases, including FMD virus, that could affect livestock, including cattle, pigs, and sheep. DHS stated that the PIADC was "nearing the end of its life cycle" and was lacking critical capabilities to continue as the primary facility for such work. Another reason DHS cited was the need to be close to research facilities. According to DHS, although the PIADC coordinates with many academic institutes throughout the northeast, its isolated island location means that few academic institutes are within a reasonable commuting distance; DHS believes that these are needed to provide research support and collaboration required for the anticipated NBAF program. We are doing this work to respond to the statutory mandate in the fiscal year 2009 appropriations act for DHS (Consolidated Security, Disaster Assistance, and Continuing Appropriations Act, 2009 (Public Law 110-329)). The act restricted DHS's obligation of funds for constructing the NBAF on the mainland until DHS completed a risk assessment on whether FMD work can be done safely on the U.S. mainland and we reviewed DHS's risk assessment. In our review, we specifically assessed the evidence DHS used to conclude that work with FMD can be conducted as safely on the U.S. mainland as on Plum Island, New York.
What GAO Found
DHS developed a threat and risk analysis independent of the environmental impact statement (EIS) that identified and evaluated potential security risks--threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences--that might be encountered in operating the NBAF. They included crimes against people and property and threats from compromised or disgruntled employees. The objectives of this analysis were to present the risks and effective mitigation strategies for ensuring the NBAF's secure operation and to help DHS select the site with the fewest unique security threats. DHS concluded that the EIS and threat and risk analysis showed very little differentiation across the six sites and considered that the safety and security risks that had been identified at all sites were acceptable, with or without mitigation. Specifically, for all sites the risk was zero to low for all accident scenarios, except for an overpressure fire--an explosion from the buildup of a large amount of gas or flammable chemical in an enclosed area. The risk of an overpressure fire accident was moderate for all sites For all sites--except Plum Island--the overall risk rank was moderate, based on the potential for infection and opportunity for disease to spread through livestock or wildlife. The Plum Island site's overall risk rank was low, because the likelihood of any disease spreading beyond the island was small, since animals do not live in the vicinity and the potential for infection is less. The threat and risk assessment concluded that the insider threat would be the biggest threat to the NBAF and would be independent of the site. |
gao_GGD-96-145 | gao_GGD-96-145_0 | Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of this study were to (1) review recent federal efforts to oversee and enforce the fair lending laws and (2) discuss the challenges federal regulators face in their efforts to detect discrimination and ensure compliance. At about the same time, DOJ began its first investigation into alleged discriminatory lending practices, and the federal banking regulators began to revise their fair lending policies and examination procedures. None of these cases has gone to court. Several units within HUD share fair lending oversight and enforcement responsibilities. The federal banking regulatory agencies have also moved to strengthen their ability to detect discrimination through improved examination procedures and techniques. A number of these agencies have also put forward a list of recommended compliance activities and programs for use by lenders who seek to ensure that all loan applicants are treated fairly. Additionally, some key legal issues associated with the interpretation and application of the fair lending laws remain unresolved. On the basis of our review, we found that past and current fair lending examination policies and procedures of the federal banking regulators: (1) lack uniformity across agencies—a situation that could result in inconsistent application and enforcement of the laws; (2) have inadequate methods for detecting discrimination prior to a prospective borrower’s submission of a formal application; and (3) have not resulted in vigorous enforcement of HMDA data reporting requirements by all agencies. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to congressional requests, GAO reviewed federal oversight and enforcement of fair lending laws, focusing on: (1) efforts to strengthen law enforcement procedures; and (2) challenges bank regulators face in their efforts to detect discrimination and ensure compliance.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) since 1992, bank regulators and other enforcement agencies have increased enforcement of fair lending laws and encouraged greater compliance by the lending industry; (2) bank regulators have also overhauled their compliance policies and examination procedures which strengthened their ability to detect discriminatory lending practices; (3) several agencies have recommended a number of compliance programs and activities that could help lenders ensure fair treatment of all loan applicants; (4) referrals to the Department of Justice (DOJ) have increased significantly and DOJ has settled several civil suits that alleged fair lending violations; (5) challenges to fair lending oversight and enforcement include nonuniform examination procedures among regulatory agencies, inadequate provisions to detect discrimination prior to submission of a formal loan application, inadequate disclosure data, examiners' inexperience and lack of training, and insufficient time allowances; (6) unresolved legal issues associated with the interpretation and application of these laws impede formulation of concise guidance and leave lending institutions confused and reluctant to implement voluntary compliance programs; and (7) resolution of these problems may require civil or administrative judicial proceedings or legislative action. |
gao_GAO-15-329 | gao_GAO-15-329_0 | Since 2006, the Navy has nearly doubled the percentage of the fleet assigned to overseas homeports. Overseas-Homeported Ships Incur Additional Costs and Adverse Effects on Readiness and Ship Condition Higher Operations and Support Costs
The operational benefits the Navy describes that result from homeporting ships overseas also result in costs to the Navy and DOD more broadly. For example, casualty report data provide information on individual pieces of equipment or systems that are degraded or out of service, the lack of which will affect a ship’s ability to support required mission areas. The Navy Has Not Identified Costs and Risks Associated with the Increased Operational Tempo for Ships Homeported Overseas
The Navy has not identified or mitigated the risks its increasing reliance on overseas homeporting poses to its force over the long term. We found that, due to the high pace of operations the Navy uses for overseas- homeported ships, some of these ships have had consistently deferred maintenance that has resulted in long-term degraded material condition and increased maintenance costs, and could shorten the ships’ service lives. The Navy is implementing a revised operational schedule for U.S.- based ships that is intended to lengthen time between deployments, citing the need for a sustainable schedule. However, the Navy has not determined how—or whether—it will apply a more sustainable schedule to all ships homeported overseas. Additionally, although the Navy’s decision processes for moving individual ships overseas identifies actions and resources needed, the Navy does not assess risks such moves pose to costs, readiness, or expected service life of ships that it can expect based on its historical experience of increased operational tempo for ships homeported overseas. As discussed earlier, we found that the high pace of operations the Navy uses for overseas- homeported ships limits their dedicated training and maintenance periods, which has resulted in difficulty keeping crews fully trained and ships maintained. In addition, we found that casualty reports for both U.S.- and overseas-homeported ships have doubled over the past 5 years, with the material condition of overseas-homeported ships having decreased slightly faster than U.S.-homeported ships. Recommendations for Executive Action
To balance combatant commanders’ demands for forward presence with the Navy’s needs to sustain a ready force over the long term and identify and mitigate risks consistent with Federal Standards for Internal Control, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Navy to take the following two actions: to fully implement its optimized fleet response plan, develop and implement a sustainable operational schedule for all ships homeported overseas; and develop a comprehensive assessment of the long-term costs and risks to the Navy’s surface and amphibious fleet associated with its increasing reliance on overseas homeporting to meet presence requirements, make any necessary adjustments to its overseas presence based on this assessment, and reassess these risks when making future overseas homeporting decisions and developing future strategic laydown plans. To assess the extent to which the Navy has identified and taken steps to mitigate any risks from homeporting ships overseas, we analyzed (1) key Navy and Department of Defense (DOD) guidance and policies for assigning ships to homeports in the United States and overseas and (2) the Navy’s required actions for evaluating, planning, and implementing changes to overseas force structure. | Why GAO Did This Study
Forward presence supports the Navy's goals of ensuring sea control, projecting U.S. power, and providing maritime security. To meet these goals and combatant commanders' growing demand for forward presence, the Navy has doubled the number of ships assigned to overseas homeports since 2006, to a total of 40 by the end of 2015, and plans to increase this number further in the future.
House Report 113-446 included a provision that GAO analyze the Navy's decision-making process for determining when to homeport ships overseas and identify the relative costs and benefits of various approaches. This report addresses (1) the operational benefits, costs, and readiness effects associated with assigning ships to U.S. or overseas homeports and (2) the extent to which the Navy has identified and mitigated risks from homeporting ships overseas. GAO analyzed Navy policies and 5 to 10 years of historical cost, operational tempo, and readiness data and interviewed fleet officials.
What GAO Found
Homeporting ships overseas considerably increases the forward presence— U.S. naval forces in overseas operating areas—that the Navy's existing fleet provides and has other near-term benefits such as rapid crisis response, but incurs higher operations and support costs when compared to U.S.-homeported ships. GAO found that casualty reports—incidents of degraded or out-of-service equipment—have doubled over the past 5 years and that the material condition of overseas-homeported ships has decreased slightly faster than that of U.S.-homeported ships (see figure below). In addition, the Navy has spent hundreds of millions of dollars on overseas infrastructure and base operating costs since 2009, while moving large numbers of sailors, dependents, and ship repair work overseas. GAO also found that the high pace of operations the Navy uses for overseas-homeported ships limits dedicated training and maintenance periods, which has resulted in difficulty keeping crews fully trained and ships maintained.
The Navy has not identified or mitigated the risks its increasing reliance on overseas homeporting poses to its force over the long term. GAO found that some ships homeported overseas have had consistently deferred maintenance that has resulted in long-term degraded material condition and increased maintenance costs, and could shorten a ship's service life. The Navy began implementing a revised operational schedule in 2014 for U.S.-based ships that lengthens time between deployments, citing the need for a sustainable schedule. However, the Navy has not determined how—or whether—it will apply a more sustainable schedule to all ships homeported overseas. Although the Navy's decision process for moving individual ships overseas identifies actions and resources needed, it does not assess risks that such moves pose to costs, readiness, or expected service lives of ships that the Navy can expect based on its historical experience operating ships from overseas homeports. Without a sustainable operational schedule and a comprehensive risk assessment on overseas homeporting, the Navy lacks information needed to make informed homeporting decisions and it will be difficult for the Navy to identify and mitigate the risks its homeporting decisions pose to its budget, readiness, and ship service lives over the long term.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the Navy develop and implement a sustainable operational schedule for all ships homeported overseas and conduct a comprehensive assessment of the risks associated with overseas homeporting. The Department of Defense concurred with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-05-59 | gao_GAO-05-59_0 | However, this research focused, in general, on how and why governments use SSNs, and did not examine in detail, the extent to which SSNs are exposed to the general public and potentially available for misuse. The number and type of records in which SSNs are displayed varies greatly for both states and counties, but they are most often found in court records and local property records. Agencies in 41 states as well as the District of Columbia reported holding at least one type of public record that shows the SSN. 1.) Under the Law, SSNs Are Generally Not Available to the Public in Federal Executive Records, but They Can Be Viewed in Some Federal Court Records
While the federal government compiles a wide range of information on individuals that often includes SSNs, the Privacy Act of 1974 may prohibit their disclosure, along with other personal information, without the consent of the individual. Social Security numbers are sometimes found in these records. Identity Verification Is the Most Common Use of SSNs in Public Records
State and local government respondents to our survey reported frequently using SSNs in public records to verify identities or to meet state legal requirements, but some agencies said they had no need for them. However, some state and local offices reported that they had no specific use for the SSNs in certain records, although they were often contained in documents submitted to their offices. Courts also reported routinely collecting SSNs for Social Security claims cases. Additionally, quite a few offices maintain public records that contain SSNs for which they have no use. Public Documents with SSNs Are Stored in a Multiplicity of Formats, but Hard Copy Is Still the Most Widely Available Form of Public Access
Storage methods and forms of public access to records with SSNs vary somewhat among the different levels of government, but hard copy is the most common form of access for the public, and some agencies have begun to reduce SSN exposure. Few state agencies make them available on the Internet. In counties, however, we estimate that offices in as many as 15 to 28 percent—several hundred—do so. In its report, the committee that developed the policy noted that there should be “consistent, nationwide policies in federal courts in order to ensure that similar privacy protections and access presumptions apply regardless of which federal court is the custodian of a particular case file.”
Millions of Federal Health Insurance and Identity Cards Display the SSN
Although they are not displayed in public records en masse, we found that millions of SSNs are still subject to exposure on individual identity cards issued under federal auspices. Although some agencies are taking action to address this display of the SSN, we found that, currently, an estimated 42 million Medicare cards display entire nine-digit SSNs, as do some Department of Defense insurance cards and approximately 8 million identification cards, as well as 7 million Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) beneficiary cards. Three of four federal agencies have begun taking action to remove SSNs from such health insurance or identification cards issued under their auspices. Indeed, a variety of government agencies and oversight bodies appear to be taking steps to eliminate the open display of SSNs, but there is no uniform practice or policy at the federal, state, or local level to protect them. While we did not examine the phenomenon of SSN display on identification cards across all federal programs, it is clear that the lack of a broad, uniform policy allows for inconsistent, but persistent exposure. Additional queries dovetailed with questions asked at the state and local levels: public access to the agencies’ public records that contain SSNs, availability of these records on the Internet, privacy and protecting records about individuals and other issues unique to the agency. The questionnaire include such items as accessibility of records displaying SSNs to the public; reasons for collecting or using SSNs in the record; formats for storing records with SSNs; plans for changing those formats; methods by which the public can access or view records with SSNs, including Internet usage and changes the office has made in the past 2 years in the way records with SSNs are displayed to the public. | Why GAO Did This Study
While the use of Social Security numbers (SSN) can be very beneficial to the public sector, SSNs are also a key piece of information used for committing identity crimes. The widespread use of SSNs by both the public and private sectors and their display in public records have raised concern over how SSNs might be misused and how they should be protected. In light of this concern, GAO was asked to examine (1) the extent to which SSNs are visible in records made available to the public, (2) the reasons for which governments collect SSNs in records that display them to the public, and (3) the formats in which these records are stored and ways that the public gains access to them. As well as looking at public records, GAO also examined the practices of several federal agencies regarding the display of entire nine-digit SSNs on health insurance and other identification cards issued under their authority.
What GAO Found
Social Security numbers appear in any number of records exposed to public view almost everywhere in the nation, primarily at the state and local levels of government. State agencies in 41 states and the District of Columbia reported visible SSNs in at least one type of record and a few states have them in as many as 10 or more different records. SSNs are most often to be found in state and local court records and in local property ownership records, but they are also scattered throughout a variety of other government records. In general, federal agency display of SSNs in public records is prohibited under the Privacy Act of 1974. While the act does not apply to the federal courts, they have taken action in recent years to prevent public access. With regard to the SSNs maintained in public records, various state and local officials commonly reported needing them for identity verification. A few, however, said they had no use for the SSN, but that documents submitted to their offices often contained them. States also commonly reported using the SSN to facilitate the matching of information from one record to another. The federal courts largely collect SSNs when required by law to do so; however, due to privacy concerns, SSNs are not in documents that are available electronically to the public. Public records with SSNs are stored in a multiplicity of formats, but public access to them is most often limited to the inspection of individual paper copies on site or via mail by request. Few state agencies make records with SSNs available on the Internet; however, 15 to 28 percent of the nation's 3,141 counties do place them on the Internet and this could affect millions of people. Overall, GAO found that the risk of exposure for SSNs in public records at the state and local levels is highly variable and difficult for any one individual to anticipate or prevent. Another form of SSN exposure results from a government practice that does not involve public records per se. GAO found that SSNs are displayed on cards issued to millions of individuals under the authority of federal agencies for identity purposes and health benefits. This involves approximately 42 million Medicare cards, 8 million Department of Defense identification cards, as well as some insurance cards, and 7 million Veterans Affairs identification cards, which display the full nine-digit SSN. While some of these agencies are taking steps to remove the SSNs, there is no governmentwide federal policy that prohibits their display. Although we did not examine this phenomenon across all federal programs, it is clear that the lack of a broad, uniform policy allows for unnecessary exposure of personal Social Security numbers. |
gao_GAO-16-865T | gao_GAO-16-865T_0 | Lack of Understanding of Key Social Security Information, Along with Financial Need and Other Factors, May Contribute to Individuals Claiming Benefits Early
Our review of surveys and academic studies, and interviews with people with Social Security expertise, suggest that most individuals do not understand key details of Social Security rules that could potentially affect their retirement benefits or the benefits of their spouses and survivors. For example, while some people understand that delaying claiming leads to higher monthly benefits, many are unclear about the actual amount that benefits increase with claiming age. Understanding these rules and other information, such as life expectancy and longevity risk, could be central to people making informed decisions about when to claim benefits. With an understanding of Social Security benefits, people would also be in a better position to balance other factors that influence when they claim benefits, including financial need, poor health, and psychological factors. SSA Provides Key Claiming Information on Its Website and in Publications, but Not Consistently during the Claiming Process
SSA makes comprehensive information on key rules and other considerations related to claiming retirement benefits available through its website, publications, personalized benefits statements, and online calculators. While important information is provided through SSA’s website and publications to help people make informed decisions about when to claim retirement benefits, our observation of 30 claims interviews in SSA field offices and of a demonstration of the online claims process found that some key information may not be consistently provided to potential claimants when they file. The POMS also specifies that when taking an application for Social Security benefits, the claims specialist is responsible for explaining the advantages and disadvantages of filing an application so that the individual can make an informed filing decision. The following summarizes key information that was not consistently covered during the in-person claims process. However, the remaining 8 did not discuss this option. Similarly, the online application process does not inform claimants that benefits are based on the highest 35 years of earnings. Similarly, the online application process does not inform claimants that life expectancy and longevity risk are important considerations in deciding when to claim. Specifically, we recommend that SSA take steps to ensure that: when applicable, claims specialists inform claimants that delaying claiming will result in permanently higher monthly benefit amounts, and at least offer to provide claimants their estimated benefits at their current age, at FRA (unless the claimant is already older than FRA), and age 70; claims specialists understand that they should avoid the use of breakeven analysis to compare benefits at different claiming ages; when applicable, claims specialists inform claimants that monthly benefit amounts are determined by the highest (indexed) 35 years of earnings, and that in some cases, additional work could increase benefits; when appropriate, claims specialists clearly explain the retirement earnings test and inform claimants that any benefits withheld because of earnings above the earnings limit will result in higher monthly benefits starting at FRA; claims specialists explain that lump sum retroactive benefits will result in a permanent reduction of monthly benefits. | Why GAO Did This Study
This testimony summarizes the information contained in GAO's September 2016 report, entitled Social Security: Improvements to Claims Process Could Help People Make Better Informed Decisions about Retirement Benefits ( GAO-16-786 ).
What GAO Found
GAO's review of nine surveys and academic studies, and interviews with retirement experts, suggest that many individuals do not fully understand key details of Social Security rules that can potentially affect their retirement benefits. For example, while some people understand that delaying claiming leads to higher monthly benefits, many are unclear about the actual amount that benefits increase with claiming age. The studies and surveys also found widespread misunderstanding about whether spousal benefits are available, how monthly benefits are determined, and how the retirement earnings test works. Understanding these rules and other information, such as life expectancy and longevity risk, could be central to people making well-informed decisions about when to claim benefits. By having this understanding of retirement benefits, people would also be in a better position to balance other factors that influence when they should claim benefits, including financial need, poor health, and psychological factors.
The Social Security Administration (SSA) makes comprehensive information on key rules and other considerations related to claiming retirement benefits available through its publications, website, personalized benefits statements, and online calculators. However, GAO observed 30 in-person claims at SSA field offices and found that claimants were not consistently provided key information that people may need to make well-informed decisions. For example, in 8 of 26 claims interviews in which the claimant could have received higher monthly benefits by waiting until a later age, the claims specialist did not discuss the advantages and disadvantages of delaying claiming. Further, only 7 of the 18 claimants for whom the retirement earnings test could potentially apply were given complete information about how the test worked. SSA's Program Operations Manual System (POMS) states that claims specialists should explain the advantages and disadvantages of filing an application so that the individual can make an informed filing decision. The problems we observed during the claims interviews occurred in part because the questions included in the claims process did not specifically cover some key information.
Online applicants have more access to key information on the screen or through tabs and pop-up boxes as they complete an application. However, similar to in-person interviews, the online application process does not inform claimants that benefits are based on the highest 35 years of earnings or that life expectancy is an important consideration in deciding when to claim. |
gao_AIMD-96-65 | gao_AIMD-96-65_0 | Some Real Property Was Counted Twice
At September 30, 1994, the Navy’s reported real property account balance was overstated by at least $24.6 billion because DFAS personnel had erroneously double counted $23.9 billion of structures and facilities and $700 million of land. The DFAS, Cleveland Center, personnel compiling these data did not realize that the Center had received some of the same land and building accounting information from two separate sources and had incorrectly included the information from both of them in the consolidated financial reports. The Navy and DFAS, Cleveland Center, did not have effective processes in place to ensure that all financial information on plant property from only general fund activities was included in the Navy’s consolidated financial reports on general fund operations or that plant property from DBOF operations was excluded. The DAOs did not compare the listings of reporting activities with those listed in the Navy Comptroller Manual when accumulating the data. Nor did DFAS, Cleveland Center, consult the listings when consolidating the Navy’s fiscal year 1994 financial reports on its general fund operations. Thus, both the Navy and DFAS are now required to verify the accuracy and completeness of financial reports. Recommendations
We recommend that the Navy Assistant Secretary for Financial Management and Comptroller and the DFAS Director require that by September 30, 1996, the Navy Comptroller Manual provision that lists the Navy’s activities engaged in general fund operations and DBOF operations be updated and accurately maintained; the Navy and DFAS, Cleveland Center, use this listing as one analytical procedure to help ensure that the plant property account balances reported in the Navy’s financial reports are complete and include information from only general fund activities;
Navy activities and DFAS routinely monitor plant property work-in-progress accounts and promptly review and resolve large balances;
Navy activities promptly request, and DFAS expeditiously provide, information to assist in transferring plant property work-in-progress items to on-hand accounts and in correcting errors; and
Navy activities and DFAS personnel be trained to identify and resolve work-in-progress and other plant property problems. GAO Comment
1. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO reviewed the Navy's fiscal year (FY) 1994 consolidated financial reports, focusing on the areas contributing to the inaccurate financial reporting of the Navy's plant property account balance.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) substantial weaknesses in the Navy's financial reporting systems caused the Navy to submit inaccurate FY 1994 financial reports; (2) the Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) erroneously counted $23.9 billion of structures and facilities and $700 million of land twice because it received the information from two separate sources and incorrectly included the information from both sources in the consolidated reports; (3) the Navy failed to ensure that all plant property from general fund activities was included in or that plant property from Defense Business Operations Fund (DBOF) activities was excluded from the reports because the list of general fund activities was outdated; (4) DFAS did not compare the activities included in the reports with the list of general fund activities when it consolidated the Navy's 1994 financial reports; (5) the Navy's reporting of the $291 million plant property work-in-progress balance was highly questionable because not all transactions were properly recorded, and Navy activities found it difficult to resolve in-transit property transactions; (6) the Navy did not reconcile all of its logistics, custodial, and accounting records on a timely basis; and (7) the Navy and DFAS have taken actions to improve their internal controls, verify the accuracy and completeness of financial information, and reconcile plant property accounts. |
gao_GAO-08-684 | gao_GAO-08-684_0 | No Property Conveyances between the District of Columbia and the Federal Government Have Occurred to Date
No property conveyances between the District, GSA, and NPS had occurred as of June 6, 2008. However, all transfers of administrative jurisdiction, which do not involve the transfer of title, became effective the day (Dec. 15, 2006) that the President signed the Federal and District of Columbia Government Real Property Act of 2006. All conveyances between the District and the Secretary of the Interior, except for Poplar Point, are expected to be completed by the end of summer 2008. 2.). The date for the completion of conveyances of title between GSA and the District is uncertain and depends on agreement between the District and the AOC on not more than 12 acres of District property for the AOC. Although the District of Columbia and the Federal Government Have Taken Several Steps toward Completing the Conveyances, Additional Steps Remain
Although the District and the federal government have taken several steps toward completing the conveyances, several factors have affected their efforts, and additional steps must be taken to complete the conveyances. The District and NPS formed working groups as a first step toward completing the conveyances. However, negotiations about cleanup, testing properties for contamination, and disagreement over land to be conveyed as part of the Boathouse Row properties have slowed the completion of District and NPS conveyances. A Change in Mayoral Administrations and Dissolution of the District’s Development Corporations Are Other Factors That Have Affected Conveyance Timelines
Other factors affecting the completion of the conveyances between the District and the Secretary of the Interior, according to stakeholders, was the change in mayoral administrations in the District at the beginning of 2007 and the dissolution of the District’s development corporations later that year. The District and the Federal Government Must Complete Several Steps to Complete the Conveyances
The District Must Complete a Poplar Point Land-Use Plan before Conveyance
For the conveyance of Poplar Point to occur by the fall of 2009 as planned, the District must complete several steps to meet conditions in Public Law 109-396. Limited Development Has Occurred on Properties Exchanged between the District of Columbia and the Federal Government
Limited development has occurred on property transferred or to be conveyed between the District and the federal government. Development of the other exchanged properties, to the extent applicable, is also in its early stages and will take many years to complete as the District and the federal government develop plans for use of each property. Commercial and Residential Development of Poplar Point Will Not Likely Begin until 2011
Poplar Point is the most significant development opportunity involved in the land exchange with the federal government and on the District’s waterfront. 3). 4). Development of Reservation 13 may take as long as a decade. The District of Columbia and th e Federal Governme Face Challenges Going Forward as the District Begins Development
The District and the federal government face challenges as the District moves forward to develop or manage the transferred or to be conveyed properties. For example, cleanup and development uncertainties will likely affect the timeliness of property development at Poplar Point. Other challenges facing the District include (1) transitioning the Deputy Mayor’s Office from policymaking and oversight roles to the lead in coordinating development, a function that has not been the Deputy Mayor’s Office core business, and (2) reaching community agreement about development at Poplar Point. The District and AOC did not comment on our overall findings, but provided technical comments and clarifications via e-mail which we incorporated as appropriate. We are sending copies of this report to the congressional committees identified in the mandate, the Administrator of General Services, the Architect of the Capitol, the Secretary of the Interior, and the Mayor of the District of Columbia. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Federal and District of Columbia Government Real Property Act of 2006 (Public Law 109-396) mandated GAO's review of the property exchange between the District and the federal government. None of the conveyances had occurred by the beginning of GAO's audit phase. After consulting with the congressional committees specified in the law, GAO developed research questions that reflect an assessment of property exchanges and development progress to date. GAO's objectives were to determine (1) the status of the conveyances and transfers of the properties identified in the law; (2) what steps the District and the federal government have taken toward completing the conveyances, what factors have affected their completion, and what additional steps remain; (3)what preliminary development has occurred on the properties exchanged between the District and the federal government, and what are the current plans for use of these properties; and (4)what development challenges the District and federal government face going forward. GAO analyzed planning and property documents; conducted site visits; and interviewed senior officials from the District and the Department of the Interior (DOI) among others. DOI and the General Services Administration agreed with our findings, while the District and the Architect of the Capitol (AOC) did not comment on our overall findings. All provided technical clarifications which we incorporated as appropriate.
What GAO Found
No property conveyances between the District and the federal government have occurred as of June 6, 2008. All transfers of administrative jurisdiction, which do not involve the transfer of title, became effective the day (Dec. 15, 2006) that the President signed the Federal and District of Columbia Government Real Property Act of 2006. Nine conveyances between the Secretary of the Interior and the District, excluding Poplar Point, are planned to be completed by the end of summer 2008. The District intends to complete the conveyance of Poplar Point by the fall of 2009, if it is able to meet several conditions in the law, including developing a Secretary of the Interior approved land-use plan. The date for the completion of the conveyances of title between the General Services Administration and the District is uncertain and depends on an agreement between the District and the AOC on the District conveying not more than 12 acres of District property to the AOC. Although the District and the federal government have taken several steps to complete the conveyances, several factors have affected their efforts, and additional steps must be taken to complete the conveyances. The District and the National Park Service formed working groups as a first step toward completing the conveyances. However, negotiations about cleanup; testing properties for contamination; disagreement over land to be conveyed as part of the Boathouse Row properties, two properties along the western shores of the Anacostia River; and decision changes about environmental impact statement development for Poplar Point have slowed the completion of the conveyances between the District and Secretary of the Interior. Limited development has occurred on property already transferred or to be conveyed between the District and the federal government. Development will take many years to complete because the District must first develop plans for most of these sites. For example, commercial and residential development of Poplar Point is not likely to begin until 2011 because of the steps, such as the development of a land-use plan, which must be completed before the conveyance can occur. Development may take over a decade to complete at Poplar Point. The District and the federal government face several challenges as they move forward to develop or manage the exchanged properties. For example, some cleanup and development uncertainties, such as the extent and location of the cleanup required, will likely affect the timeliness of property development at Poplar Point. Other challenges facing the District include (1) transitioning the Deputy Mayor's Office from policymaking and oversight roles to the lead in coordinating development, a function that has not been the Deputy Mayor's Office core business, and (2) reaching community agreement about development at Poplar Point. |
gao_GAO-13-118 | gao_GAO-13-118_0 | Under the new 8(a) justification requirement, SBA may not accept a sole- source contract over $20 million for negotiation under the 8(a) program unless the procuring agency has completed an 8(a) justification in accordance with the FAR. Section 811 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2010 required that the FAR be amended within 180 days of the statute’s enactment date to require justifications for 8(a) sole- source contracts over $20 million. OFPP officials who were involved in the implementation of this rule explained that the primary reason for the FAR Council’s delay was establishing a process for, and holding, tribal consultations. During this period, according to FPDS-NG data, agencies awarded 42 sole-source 8(a) contracts with anticipated values over $20 million—with a total value of over $2.3 billion—that would have been subject to the new justification requirement if the FAR Council had implemented the change by the statutory deadline. Compared to fiscal years 2008 through 2010, the number and value of these contracts declined significantly in fiscal year 2011, when only 20 were awarded, as shown in figure 4. The agencies awarding the remaining 11 contracts did not comply with the new justification requirement, either because they were not aware of the requirement and did not prepare a justification, or because they were confused and incorrectly used a CICA justification, as summarized in Figure 5. While agencies are required to prepare justifications in accordance with the FAR, SBA is required, in practice, to confirm that these justifications are in place. SBA does not currently have a process in place to do so. Recommendations
To help mitigate future confusion regarding justifications for 8(a) sole- source contracts over $20 million, we recommend that the Administrator of the Office of Federal Procurement Policy, in consultation with the FAR Council, promulgate guidance to:
Clarify whether an 8(a) justification is required for 8(a) contracts that are subject to a pre-existing CICA class justification. To help ensure that federal procurement data provides accurate and complete information, we recommend that the Administrator of the General Services Administration implement controls in FPDS-NG to preclude agency officials from entering a value of zero dollars for the Base and All Options data element when the initial award of a contract is entered into the database. SBA did not fully address our recommendations. In email responses, OFPP and GSA generally agreed with our recommendations, and OFPP also included additional comments. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of this review were to determine (1) the timeliness of actions taken to implement the 8(a) justification requirement in the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR); (2) the number of sole source 8(a) contracts over $20 million that have been awarded since October 2009 and trends over time; and (3) the extent to which agencies have implemented the new justification requirement. We selected those with the highest reported values in the Federal Procurement Data System-Next Generation (FPDS-NG) at agencies already within the scope of our review, and verified the absence of justifications with agency contracting officials. We initially identified 14 sole- source 8(a) contracts with values over $20 million. Appendix II: 8(a) Sole-Source Contracts over $20 Million, by Agency, Awarded between October 28, 2009, and March 31, 2012
Agency Department of Defense
Department of Energy General Services Administration Department of Health and Human Services Department of the Interior Department of Justice Office of Personnel Management Department of State Department of Transportation Total
Air Force Army Navy Other DOD This table summarizes the number of contracts and reported value awarded by agency between October 28, 2009—the date of enactment for the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010—and March 31, 2012, the date of the most current data available at the time of our review. | Why GAO Did This Study
SBA's 8(a) program is the government's primary means of developing small businesses owned by socially and economically disadvantaged individuals, including firms owned by Alaska Native Corporations and Indian tribes. The NDAA for Fiscal Year 2010, enacted on October 28, 2009, called for revisions to the FAR to provide for a written justification for sole-source 8(a) contracts over $20 million, where previously justifications were not required. GAO determined (1) the timeliness with which this new justification requirement was incorporated in the FAR; (2) the number of 8(a) sole-source contracts valued over $20 million that have been awarded since October 2009 and trends over time; and (3) the extent to which agencies have implemented this new justification requirement. GAO analyzed federal procurement data, reviewed the 14 contracts subject to the requirement across five federal agencies, and interviewed officials from OFPP, SBA, the Department of Defense, and other agencies.
What GAO Found
The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2010 required that the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) be amended within 180 days after enactment to require justifications for 8(a) sole-source contracts over $20 million. These justifications bring more attention to large 8(a) sole source contracts. The FAR Council, which updates the FAR, missed this mandatory deadline by almost 325 days. During this delay, based on data in the Federal Procurement Data System-Next Generation (FPDS-NG), 42 sole-source 8(a) contracts with reported values over $20 million, totaling over $2.3 billion, were awarded without being subject to a justification. Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP) representatives involved with the FAR Council's implementation of this rule attributed the delay primarily to the time required to establish a process for consulting with Indian Tribes and Alaska Native Corporations.
From October 28, 2009, through March 31, 2012, agencies reported awarding 72 sole-source 8(a) contracts over $20 million. GAO also analyzed trend information in FPDS-NG from fiscal year 2008 through fiscal year 2011 (the most current available information), which showed that the number and value of these contracts declined significantly in 2011. While GAO determined that FPDS-NG data was sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this review, GAO found errors, such as contracts with an implausible reported value of zero.
GAO found a slow start to implementation of the new justification requirement. Of the 14 sole-source 8(a) contracts awarded since the FAR was revised, only three included an 8(a) justification. The agencies awarding the remaining 11 contracts did not comply, either because contracting officials were not aware of the justification requirement or because they were confused about what the FAR required. For example, contracting officials were confused in one instance where another justification was already in place that covered multiple contracts. Further, the Small Business Administration (SBA) cannot accept a contract over $20 million for negotiation under the 8(a) program unless the procuring agency has completed a justification, but GAO found that SBA did not have a process in place to confirm the presence of a justification.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that OFPP issue guidance to clarify the circumstances in which an 8(a) justification is required. GAO also recommends that the General Services Administration--which operates FPDS-NG--implement controls in FPDS-NG to help ensure that contract values are accurately recorded, and that SBA take steps to ensure that its staff confirm the presence of justifications. OFPP and GSA generally agreed with the recommendations. SBA indicated it would take some actions but did not fully address the recommendations. |
gao_GAO-10-836 | gao_GAO-10-836_0 | PEPFAR’s updated 5-year strategy, released in 2009 as mandated by the 2008 Leadership Act, highlights alignment with national strategies as a key component of promoting sustainability of U.S.- supported HIV/AIDS efforts through partner country ownership. The U.S. Our analysis of PEPFAR documents and national strategies and discussions with PEPFAR country teams in the four countries we visited showed overall alignment between PEPFAR activities and the national strategy goals. Conversely, PEPFAR may support activities not mentioned in the national HIV/AIDS strategy but that are addressed in relevant sector- or program-specific strategies. PEPFAR country teams have engaged in various efforts to help ensure that PEPFAR activities support the achievement of national strategy goals, including assisting in developing national strategies, participating in formal and informal communication and coordination meetings, engaging regularly with partner country governments during the COP development process, and developing new partnership frameworks. PEPFAR and Country Documents and Statements by PEPFAR and HIV/AIDS Stakeholders Indicate Alignment of Program Activities with National HIV/AIDS Goals
Our analysis shows that PEPFAR activities described in the 2010 COPs for Cambodia, Malawi, Uganda, and Vietnam directly or partially address most of the goals and objectives outlined in the countries’ national HIV/AIDS strategies. PEPFAR officials—including officials at OGAC, USAID, CDC, and HHS—and other HIV/AIDS stakeholders and experts operating at a global level, as well as partner government ministry officials, other donors, civil society representatives, and PEPFAR officials in four countries told us that PEPFAR activities are aligned with the goals and objectives outlined in partner countries’ national strategies and support the overall national program. PEPFAR Officials Noted Several Factors Influencing Alignment of PEPFAR Activities with National Strategy Goals
Several factors may influence the degree to which PEPFAR activities align with national HIV/AIDS strategy goals, according to PEPFAR officials. Size of PEPFAR program. Policy restrictions. Meetings with partner governments and other stakeholders. First, PEPFAR indicators sometimes differ from indicators used by partner countries and other international donors. Second, gaps may exist in the sharing of PEPFAR information with partner country governments and other donors. Third, lack of country leadership and capacity to develop strategies and manage programs affects PEPFAR country teams’ ability to ensure that PEPFAR activities align with national strategy goals. Guidance for Measuring Progress of Partnership Frameworks Does Not Include Metrics of Country Ownership
PEPFAR guidance on developing partnership frameworks and implementation plans includes detailed instructions for developing baseline assessments of partner countries’ HIV/AIDS epidemics and of efforts to respond to the epidemics. Recommendation for Executive Action
To enhance PEPFAR country teams’ ability to achieve the goal of promoting partner country ownership of U.S.-supported HIV/AIDS activities, we recommend that the Secretary of State direct OGAC to develop and disseminate a methodology for establishing indicators needed for baseline measurements of country ownership prior to implementation of partnership frameworks. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
In response to a directive in the 2008 Leadership Act, this report (1) examines alignment of the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) programs with partner countries’ HIV/AIDS strategies and (2) describes several challenges related to alignment of PEPFAR programs with the national strategies or promotion of partner country ownership. | Why GAO Did This Study
The President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), reauthorized at $48 billion for fiscal years 2009 through 2013, supports HIV/AIDS prevention, treatment, and care services overseas. The reauthorizing legislation, as well as other key documents and PEPFAR guidance, endorses the alignment of PEPFAR activities with partner country HIV/AIDS strategies and the promotion of partner country ownership of U.S.-supported HIV/AIDS programs. This report, responding to a legislative directive, (1) examines alignment of PEPFAR programs with partner countries' HIV/AIDS strategies and (2) describes several challenges related to alignment or promotion of country ownership. GAO analyzed PEPFAR planning documents and national strategies for four countries--Cambodia, Malawi, Uganda, and Vietnam--selected to represent factors such as diversity of funding levels and geographic location. GAO also reviewed documents and reports by the U.S. government, research institutions, and international organizations and interviewed PEPFAR officials and other stakeholders in headquarters and the four countries.
What GAO Found
PEPFAR activities are generally aligned with partner countries' national HIV/AIDS strategies. GAO's analysis of PEPFAR planning documents and national HIV/AIDS strategies, as well as discussions with PEPFAR officials in the four countries GAO visited, showed overall alignment between PEPFAR activities and the national strategy goals. In addition, statements by global and country-level PEPFAR stakeholders indicate that PEPFAR activities support the achievement of partner countries' national strategy goals. PEPFAR officials noted that a number of factors may influence the degree to which PEPFAR activities align with national strategy goals, including the activities of other donors, the size of the PEPFAR program, and policy restrictions. PEPFAR may also support activities not mentioned in the national HIV/AIDS strategies but that are addressed in relevant sector- or program-specific strategies. PEPFAR officials reported various efforts to help ensure that PEPFAR activities support the achievement of national strategy goals, including assisting in developing national strategies, participating in formal and informal communication and coordination meetings, engaging regularly with partner country governments during the annual planning process, and developing a new HIV/AIDS agreement, known as a partnership framework, between PEPFAR and partner country governments. PEPFAR stakeholders highlighted several challenges related to aligning PEPFAR programs with national HIV/AIDS strategies or promoting country ownership of U.S.-supported HIV/AIDS programs. First, PEPFAR indicators, including indicator definitions and timeframes, sometimes differ from those used by partner countries and other international donors. Second, gaps may exist in the sharing of PEPFAR information with partner country governments and other donors. Third, limitations in country leadership and capacity, such as lack of technical expertise to develop strategies and manage programs, affect country teams' ability to ensure that PEPFAR activities support achievement of national strategy goals. Fourth, Office of the U.S. Global AIDS Coordinator (OGAC) guidance to country teams regarding development of partnership frameworks does not include indicators for establishing baseline measures of country ownership prior to implementation of partnership frameworks. Without baseline measures, country teams may have limited ability to measure the frameworks' impact and make needed adjustments.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the Secretary of State direct OGAC to develop and disseminate a methodology for establishing baseline measures of country ownership prior to implementing partnership frameworks. OGAC concurred with this recommendation. |
gao_GAO-05-489T | gao_GAO-05-489T_0 | The FHLBank System Was Established to Facilitate Housing Finance and Has Undergone Significant Changes in Recent Decades
Congress passed the Federal Home Loan Bank Act (FHLBank Act) in 1932 and established the FHLBank System to facilitate the extension of mortgage credit and the housing finance market, which had been severely affected by the Great Depression. The business of the FHLBank System and its members essentially remained unchanged from the 1930s until the 1980s. However, due to regional downturns, sharply rising interest rates, and poor management, hundreds of FHLBank member thrifts failed during the 1980s, causing a contraction in FHLBank System business. Although FIRREA is credited with helping to restore the financial condition and supervision of the thrift industry during the 1990s, the capital structure of the FHLBank System and the financial obligations that the act imposed on the System and its members subsequently raised concerns. This change minimized the financial obligation on the System during periods of relatively low profitability but increased the total payment when profits increased; and Expanded the amounts and types of collateral that FHLBanks could accept for advances from small members known as community financial institutions (CFI). In addition to providing advances to its members, the FHLBank System provides member institutions other benefits and services. For example, FHLBanks generally pay dividends to their member financial institutions. The FHLBanks hold the mortgages on their books and bear the interest-rate risks associated with them. FHFB Regulates FHLBank System Safety and Soundness and Mission Achievement
FHFB is responsible for regulating the FHLBank System’s safety and soundness as well as its mission achievement. Although FHFB does not have PCA authority, FHFB officials believe they have all the necessary authorities to carry out their responsibilities; and FHFB has the statutory authority to liquidate or reorganize a critically undercapitalized FHLBank “whenever finds that the efficient and economical accomplishment of the purposes of the will be aided by such action.”
FHLBank System Membership, Asset Composition, and Capital Structure Have Undergone Significant Changes in the Past 15 Years
Until 1989, the FHLBank System consisted of the 12 FHLBanks, OF, and thrifts, which were required to join. As shown in figure 3, commercial banks now account for almost half of the System’s capital and advances. In 1990, advances represented about 70 percent of all the System’s assets, but declined to about 50 percent between 1991 and 1996. By 2003, such mortgage assets grew to almost 14 percent of all the System’s assets (about $113 billion in total System mortgage assets at year- end 2003). FHLBank System Has Implemented a New Capital Structure
As I discussed earlier, prior to 1999 voluntary FHLBank members, such as commercial banks, could withdraw their capital on 6-months notice, which raised questions about the stability of the FHLBanks’ capital structure. FHLBank System Faces Important Challenges and Questions
Finally, I would like to discuss some important challenges and questions affecting the FHLBank System. They include risk-management practices, the securitization of mortgage assets, the extent to which the FHLBank System is meeting its mission requirements, and the alleged impacts that large financial institutions are having on the System’s traditional cooperative structure and AHP program. FHFB Has Questioned FHLBanks’ Risk- Management Practices
Over the past year, FHFB identified risk-management deficiencies at two FHLBanks—Chicago and Seattle—primarily related to their management of the interest-rate risks associated with mortgage purchases. Proposals to Use Securitization to Expand FHLBanks’ Mortgage Purchase Programs Are Controversial
In recent years, proposals have been made to permit the FHLBanks to securitize mortgage assets to provide for the continued growth of the mortgage purchase programs. | Why GAO Did This Study
The FHLBank System (FHLBank System or System) is a government-sponsored enterprise (GSE) that consists of 12 Federal Home Loan Banks (FHLBanks) and is cooperatively owned by member financial institutions, typically commercial banks and thrifts. The primary mission of the FHLBank System is to promote housing and community development generally by making loans, also known as advances, to member financial institutions. To minimize the potential for significant financial problems, the Federal Housing Finance Board (FHFB) regulates the FHLBank System's safety and soundness. Over time, a number of developments have affected the System's safety and soundness and have created pressures on its traditional cooperative structure. To assist the committee in understanding the important issues surrounding the FHLBank System and its regulation, this testimony provides information on the development of the System; two legislative changes and FHFB rulemaking that led to changes in membership, asset composition, and capital structure; and important challenges and questions the FHLBank System currently faces.
What GAO Found
Established in 1932 to facilitate the extension of mortgage credit, the FHLBank System has undergone significant statutory changes in the last 15 years. Between the 1930s and the 1980s, the System consisted primarily of thrift members that accepted advances from the FHLBanks. However, during the 1980s, hundreds of FHLBank member thrifts failed forcing Congress to fundamentally reform the System through the Financial Institutions Recovery, Reform, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA). For example, FIRREA permitted commercial banks to join the System. Although FIRREA is credited with strengthening the thrift industry and the System, concerns were raised during the 1990s about the System's capital structure. In particular, commercial bank members could remove stock from their FHLBank on 6-months notice, which raised concerns about the System's financial stability. Among other provisions, the Gramm-Leach-Bilely Act (GLBA) of 1999 created a more permanent and risk-based capital structure for the System. Due to these statutes and FHFB rulemaking, the FHLBank System has evolved substantially since 1990. For example, commercial banks now account for more than 70 percent of all System members. The composition of FHLBank System assets has also fluctuated considerably over the years. For example, FHFB authorized the FHLBanks to purchase mortgages directly from their members in the 1990s. The System's mortgage assets grew to about $113 billion at yearend 2003 representing about 14 percent of total assets. However, the rapid growth in System mortgage assets leveled off in 2004 as two FHLBanks experienced problems managing the interest-rate risks associated with holding mortgages on their books. As provided by GLBA, System capital is now more permanent as members generally must invest capital for a period of 5 years and the FHLBanks are subject to new leverage and risk-based capital requirements. The FHLBank System faces important challenges and questions going forward. For example, FHFB has called the FHLBanks' risk-management practices into question, particularly those related to mortgage purchase programs. Further, proposals to permit the FHLBanks to issue mortgage-backed securities (securitization) could help ensure the growth of the mortgage purchase business and improve risk management, however these proposals raise questions regarding the FHLBanks' capacity to manage the related risks. Additionally, there is limited empirical information available regarding the extent to which the System is fulfilling its housing and community mission. Finally, questions have been raised regarding the potential negative affects that large financial institutions may have on the traditional cooperative structure of the FHLBank System and its programs designed to benefit targeted groups. |
gao_GAO-05-242 | gao_GAO-05-242_0 | The Prometheus 1 spacecraft is being designed to use nuclear power and electric propulsion technologies to explore the outer reaches of the solar system. The Prometheus 1 project will have to compete for funding with other NASA programs. Initial Justification for Prometheus 1 Project Could Form the Basis of a Sound Business Case
NASA is still in the process of preparing initial justification for the Prometheus 1 project to enter the preliminary design phase. According to project officials, however, funding levels would need to be increased to support the planned launch of Prometheus 1 to Jupiter’s Icy Moons. Decision makers will not get their first comprehensive picture of the project’s requirements and the resources needed to meet those requirements—the first basis for funding decisions—until PMSR scheduled for summer 2005. Defining the project’s requirements and developing life-cycle cost estimates by then could be challenging, given the short time frames and NASA’s past difficulties developing requirements and estimates. Adding to these complexities, NASA has historically had difficulty establishing life-cycle cost estimates. Business Case Allows Match of Needs to Resources and Facilitates Informed Decision Making
By PDR—which occurs at end of the preliminary design phase and is scheduled for 2008—the fidelity of the information is expected to improve and could allow NASA to develop a business case that would match requirements with resources and provide decision makers with the information needed to determine whether continued investment in the project is warranted. NASA’s Prometheus 1 technologies are currently immature. While development of Prometheus 1 critical technologies is under way, the technologies will require extensive advancement before they are mature enough to provide the revolutionary capabilities of the Prometheus 1 spacecraft. NASA’s current policy does not require projects to develop knowledge-based business cases that match requirements to available resources and include controls to ensure that sufficient knowledge has been attained and therefore the agency had not planned to develop such a business case for Prometheus 1. We have found, however, that establishing a formal business case based on a knowledge-based approach that includes matching requirements and available resources— which include technical and engineering knowledge, time and funding— and controls to ensure that sufficient knowledge has been attained at critical junctures within the product development process is an essential part of any product development justification. Recommendations for Executive Action
We recommend that the NASA Administrator take the following two actions: identify at PMSR the level of resources the agency is committing to the project and direct project officials to develop project requirements based on this resource constraint and ensure that prior to proceeding beyond PDR (currently planned for 2008) a sound business case is established which includes confirmation that (1) critical technologies have been successfully demonstrated as mature, (2) systems engineering has been conducted to support requirements/cost trade-off decisions, (3) requirements and resource estimates have been updated based on the results of the preliminary design phase, (4) knowledge based criteria are established at each critical juncture to ensure that relevant product development knowledge is captured, and (5) decision reviews are held to determine that appropriate knowledge was captured to allow a move to the next phase. Subsequent to our draft report being provided to NASA for comment, significant changes were made to the Prometheus 1 project. NASA’s fiscal year 2006 budget request includes changes to the Prometheus 1 project that directly address the recommendations in this report. If properly implemented, they could be positive steps toward implementing a knowledge-based approach to project management. 1.) The lifetime required by Prometheus 1, however, has not been demonstrated. Defense Acquisitions: DOD Faces Challenges in Implementing Best Practices. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 2003, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) initiated the Prometheus 1 project to explore the outer reaches of the Solar System. The Prometheus 1 spacecraft is being designed to harness nuclear energy that will increase available electrical power from about 1,000 watts to over 100,000 watts and enable the use of electric propulsion thrusters. Historically, NASA has had difficulty implementing some initiatives. NASA's failure to adequately define requirements and quantify the resources needed to meet those requirements has resulted in some projects costing more, taking longer, and achieving less than originally planned. Prometheus 1 will need to compete for NASA resources with other space missions--including efforts to return the shuttle safely to flight and complete the International Space Station. GAO was asked to determine (1) whether NASA is establishing initial justification for its investment in the Prometheus 1 project and (2) how the agency plans to ensure that critical technologies will be sufficiently mature at key milestones.
What GAO Found
NASA is in the process of establishing initial justification for its investment in the Prometheus 1 project but faces challenges establishing preliminary requirements and developing accurate cost estimates. Decision makers will not get their first comprehensive picture of the project's requirements and the resources needed to meet those requirements until the preliminary mission and systems review, scheduled for summer 2005. Defining the project's requirements and developing life-cycle cost estimates by then could be challenging, given the short time frames. The fidelity of this information should improve by the preliminary design review scheduled for 2008. At that time, NASA has the opportunity to use these more refined requirements and cost estimates to establish a sound business case for its investment in the Prometheus 1 project. According to Prometheus 1 project management, a flat funding profile is inadequate to ramp up for the planned 2015 launch of Prometheus 1, the project's first spacecraft to its original destination of Jupiter's Icy Moons. By matching requirements to resources a sound business case would allow NASA to determine whether trade-offs in the design of the spacecraft or the agency's expectations are needed to avoid outstripping available resources. Significant program cost and schedule increases in past programs can be traced to not matching requirements with resources at preliminary design review. While development of the Prometheus 1 technologies is under way, each will require extensive advancement before they are mature enough to support reliable cost estimates. NASA is preparing technology development plans that include measurable criteria to ensure the Prometheus 1 technologies are on track for meeting NASA's maturity requirements through the end of the preliminary design phase. GAO's best practices work has shown, however, that establishing a formal business case based on a knowledge-based approach that includes matching requirements and available resources--which include technical and engineering knowledge, time, and funding--and controls to ensure that sufficient knowledge has been attained at critical junctures within the product development process is an essential part of any product development justification. NASA's current policy does not require projects to develop knowledge-based business cases that match requirements to available resources and include controls to ensure that sufficient knowledge has been attained. Therefore, the agency had not planned to develop such a business case for Prometheus 1. Since GAO provided our draft report to NASA for comment, the agency released its fiscal year 2006 budget request that includes changes to Prometheus 1. If properly implemented, these changes could be positive steps in addressing the findings and recommendations in this report. |
gao_GAO-11-918 | gao_GAO-11-918_0 | Background
Federal funding for highways is provided to the states mostly through a series of grant programs collectively known as the Federal-Aid Highway Program. This occurred because overall, more funding was authorized and apportioned than was collected from highway users, as the account was supplemented by general funds from Treasury. Each state’s share of contributions into the Highway Account of the Highway Trust Fund is then used to calculate a relative rate of return—how the proportion of each state’s contribution compares to the proportion of funds the state received. States Received More Funding from the Highway Trust Fund Than Was Contributed from Fiscal Years 2005 through 2009, but Rate of Return Varies Depending on the Calculation Used
States Received More Funding Than Was Contributed from Fiscal Years 2005 through 2009
Our analysis of the entire 5-year period of SAFETEA-LU shows that every state was a donee state, receiving more funding for highway programs than their users contributed to the Highway Account (see fig. A state can appear to be a donor using one type of calculation and a donee using a different type. FHWA conducts Equity Bonus calculations annually. However, with the extension of SAFETEA-LU authorization for 2 years, the Equity Bonus Program has not been recalculated. As a result, half of all states received at least a 25 percent increase in their overall Federal-Aid Highway Program funding over their core funding. Adding General Revenues into the Trust Fund and Other Challenges Raise Questions about Relying on States’ Rate of Return to Distribute Federal Highway Funds
Additional factors further complicate the relationship between states’ contributions to the Highway Trust Fund and the funding states receive. Using rate of return as a major factor in determining federal highway funding levels is at odds with re-examining and restructuring federal surface transportation programs so that performance and accountability for results is factored into transportation investment decisions. The Federal-Aid Highway Program, in particular, distributes funding through a complicated process in which the underlying data and factors are ultimately not meaningful because they are overridden by other provisions designed to yield a largely predetermined outcome—that of returning revenues to their attributed state of origin. Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
We provided a draft of this report to DOT for review and comment. DOT provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope and Methodology
This report addresses the following objectives: (1) the amount of revenue contributed to the Highway Trust Fund Highway Account compared with the funding states received during the Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users (SAFETEA-LU) period; (2) the provisions in place during the SAFETEA-LU period to address rate-of-return issues across states, and how they affected the highway funding states received; and (3) additional factors that affected the relationship between contributions to the Highway Trust Fund and the funding states receive. We met with FHWA and other Department of Transportation (DOT) officials to discuss availability of data and appropriate methodologies. FHWA provides feedback to the states on these adjustments and estimates through FHWA Division Offices. | Why GAO Did This Study
Federal funding for highways is provided to the states mostly through a series of grant programs known as the Federal-Aid Highway Program, administered by the Department of Transportation's (DOT) Federal Highway Administration (FHWA). In 2005, the Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users (SAFETEA-LU) authorized $197.5 billion for the Federal-Aid Highway Program for fiscal years 2005 through 2009. The program operates on a "user pay" system, wherein users contribute to the Highway Trust Fund through fuel taxes and other fees. The distribution of funding among the states has been a contentious issue. States that receive less than highway users contribute are known as "donor" states and states that receive more than users contribute are known as "donee" states. GAO was asked to examine for the SAFETEA-LU period (1) how contributions to the Highway Trust Fund compared with the funding states received, (2) what provisions were used to address rate-of-return issues across states, and (3) what additional factors affect the relationship between contributions to the Highway Trust Fund and the funding states receive. To conduct this review, GAO obtained and analyzed data from FHWA, reviewed FHWA and other reports, and interviewed FHWA and DOT officials.
What GAO Found
From 2005 to 2009, every state received more funding for highway programs than they contributed to the Highway Account of the Highway Trust Fund. This was possible because more funding was authorized and apportioned than was collected from the states, and the fund was augmented with about $30 billion in general revenues since fiscal year 2008. If the percentage of funds states contributed to the total is compared with the percentage of funds states received (i.e., relative share), then 28 states received a relatively lower share and 22 states received a relatively higher share than they contributed. Thus, depending on the method of calculation, the same state can appear to be either a donor or donee state. The Equity Bonus Program was used to address rate-of-return issues. It guaranteed a minimum return to states, providing them with about $44 billion. Nearly all states received Equity Bonus funding, and about half received a significant increase--at least 25 percent--over their core funding. The infusion of general revenues into the Highway Trust Fund affects the relationship between funding and contributions, as a significant amount of highway funding is no longer provided by highway users. Additionally, using rate of return as a major factor in determining highway funding poses challenges related to performance and accountability in the highway program; in effect, rateof- return calculations override other considerations to yield a largely predetermined outcome--that of returning revenues to their state of origin. Because of these and other challenges, funding surface transportation programs remains on GAO's High-Risk list.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is not making any recommendations. DOT reviewed a draft of this report and provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. |
gao_T-HEHS-98-199 | gao_T-HEHS-98-199_0 | Changes in Employment, Health, Income, and Insurance Status Typify the Near Elderly
About 14 percent of the near elderly are uninsured—a rate comparable to that of 45- to 54-year-olds and lower than that among the entire nonelderly population. through the individual market and Medicare. It is not surprising that the near elderly are among the most likely age groups to have insurance and the least likely to be uninsured. Future Decline Expected in Employer-Based Health Insurance for 55- to 64-Year-Olds
While an estimated 60 to 70 percent of large employers offered retiree health coverage during the 1980s, fewer than 40 percent do so today, and that number is continuing to decline despite the recent period of strong economic growth. 2). The decision by some large employers not to offer retiree health benefits will primarily affect future retirees. On the one hand, the data suggest that relatively few near elderly use COBRA; on the other hand, compared with younger age groups, 55- to 64-year-olds are more likely to elect continuation coverage. Age and Health Status May Limit Access of Near Elderly to Individual Coverage
In the majority of states, some individuals aged 55 to 64 may be denied coverage in the individual insurance market, may have certain conditions or body parts excluded from coverage, or may pay premiums that are significantly higher than the standard rate. However, depending on their state’s mechanism, the premiums faced by unhealthy individuals who are eligible for a HIPAA product, like those faced by unhealthy individuals who have always relied on the individual market for coverage, may be very expensive. In addition to events that could affect the erosion in employer-based retiree coverage, use of the HIPAA guaranteed-access provision by eligible individuals may improve entry into the individual market for those with preexisting health conditions who lack an alternative way to obtain a comprehensive benefits package. Since group-to-individual portability is only available to qualified individuals who exhaust available COBRA or other conversion coverage, HIPAA may lead to an increased use of employer-based continuation coverage. Comparison of the Health Status and Expenditures of 55- to 64-Year-Olds With the Experience of Younger Americans
Rate per 1,000 people per year Rate per 1,000 people per year Average length of stay (days)
Affordability of Health Insurance for the Near Elderly
Using data from the March 1997 CPS and 1995 and 1996 information on insurance premiums, we estimated the percentage of median income that a 55-to 64-year-old would have to commit to health insurance under a number of possible scenarios, including purchasing coverage through the individual market in a community-rated state (Vermont) as well as one that had no restrictions on the premiums that could be charged (Colorado), using 1996 rates for a commonly purchased health insurance product; and cost sharing under employer-based coverage using 1995 Peat Marwick estimates of the lowest, highest, and average retiree contribution. While no official affordability standard exists, research suggests that older Americans commit a much higher percentage of their income to health insurance than do younger age groups. Table II.1 compares the cost of health insurance purchased in the individual market and employer-imposed cost sharing for early retirees with the median income for the near elderly in 1996. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed access to health insurance by near-elderly Americans aged 55 to 64, focusing on the near elderly's: (1) health, employment, income, and health insurance status; (2) ability to obtain employer-based health insurance if they retire before they are eligible for Medicare; and (3) access to individually purchased coverage or employer-based continuation insurance and the associated costs.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the overall insurance picture of the near elderly is no worse than that of other segments of the under-65 population and is better than that of some younger age groups; (2) the current insurance status of the near elderly is largely due to: (a) the fact that many current retirees still have access to employer-based health benefits; (b) the willingness of near-elderly Americans to devote a significant portion of their income to health insurance purchased through the individual market; and (c) the availability of public programs to disabled 55- to 64-year-olds; (3) the individual market and Medicare and Medicaid for the disabled often mitigate declining access to employer-based coverage for near-elderly Americans and may prevent a larger portion of this age group from becoming uninsured; (4) the steady decline in the proportion of large employers who offer health benefits to early retirees, however, clouds the outlook for future retirees; (5) in the absence of countervailing trends, it is less likely that future 55- to 64-year-olds will be offered health insurance as a retirement benefit, and those who are will bear an increased share of the cost; (6) access and affordability problems may prevent future early retirees who lose employer-based health benefits from obtaining comprehensive private insurance; (7) the two principal private insurance alternatives are continuation coverage under the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 (COBRA) and the individual market; (8) although 55- to 64-year-olds who become eligible for COBRA are more likely than younger age groups to enroll, the use of continuation coverage by early retirees is relatively low; (9) with respect to individual insurance, the cost may put it out of reach of some 55- to 64-year-olds; (10) some states have taken steps to make individual insurance products more accessible; (11) for eligible individuals leaving group coverage who exhaust any available COBRA or other conversion coverage, the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) guarantees access to the individual market, regardless of health status and without coverage exclusions; (12) since the new federal protections under HIPAA hinge on exhausting COBRA, the incentives for enrolling and the length of time enrolled could change; and (13) the premiums faced by some individuals eligible for a HIPAA guaranteed-access product, however, may be substantially higher than the prices charged to those in the individual market who are healthy. |
gao_GAO-08-375 | gao_GAO-08-375_0 | Background
The Grow the Force initiative will increase the end strength of the Army and Marine Corps collectively by more than 100,000 by 2013, as shown in table 1. DOD projects that facility requirements associated with Grow the Force will cost more than $17 billion, as shown in table 2. Army and Marine Corps Used a Compressed Version of the Typical Process to Determine Construction Projects for Grow the Force
The Army and Marine Corps followed all of the steps typically used to determine construction projects when they developed the Grow the Force construction projects submitted in DOD’s budget requests for fiscal years 2007 and 2008, but the process was compressed. As with the Army, the Marine Corps’ process for developing construction projects generally takes about 2 years; however, the Marine Corps completed the process in 6 months for Grow the Force projects included in DOD’s supplemental budget requests for fiscal years 2007 and 2008. In general, the Marine Corps’ typical process for developing construction projects includes 6 steps: (1) Marine Corps headquarters sends guidance on facility projects to the installations, (2) installations develop project proposals and submit them to Marine Corps headquarters, (3) a military construction review board prioritizes the projects and sets funding limits, (4) the Naval Facilities Engineering Command reviews projects and validates the cost and scope of the projects, (5) Marine Corps headquarters reviews projects, and (6) construction projects are included in the Department of the Navy budget for submission to Congress. Most Projects Support Grow the Force, but Some Lack a Clear Link to the Initiative
We found that nearly all of the Grow the Force construction projects submitted by the Army and Army National Guard, and most by the Marine Corps, in DOD’s fiscal year 2007 and fiscal year 2008 budget requests supported the initiative. We found that 7 of the Marine Corps projects totaling $137 million do not support Grow the Force because they address existing deficiencies on the installations that needed to be addressed regardless of whether Grow the Force occurred and we could not clearly identify that existing capacity issues these projects were designed to address would be exacerbated by additional personnel from Grow the Force. For example, the Marine Corps included a $7 million wastewater system modification project at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, which budget justification documentation indicates is needed to limit environmental impacts and does not make reference to capacity issues from additional personnel through Grow the Force. Additionally, installation officials said this project would be needed regardless of whether Grow the Force occurred and was already planned to be included in a future budget request. While most of the Army, Army National Guard, and Marine Corps projects were clearly linked to Grow the Force, it may be more difficult to identify some Marine Corps and Army Reserve projects as supporting the initiative in future budget requests. Army’s and Marine Corps’ Plans to Use Temporary Facilities
Our analysis shows that some units will arrive at installations before facilities are constructed; however, the Army does not plan to purchase or lease temporary facilities, while the Marine Corps plans to do so to bridge the gap between when units are established and permanent facilities are constructed. To bridge the gap, the Army plans to utilize existing space, including space vacated by units deploying overseas, to accommodate the additional personnel. The majority of new Marine Corps units established between fiscal year 2007 and fiscal year 2011 will arrive at installations before permanent facilities are available. A Marine Corps headquarters official expects that the Marine Corps will need additional funding for temporary facilities in the future, but has not yet determined the extent of the funding requirements. Concluding Observations
While most projects submitted in DOD’s budget requests for fiscal years 2007 and 2008 that were identified as Grow the Force projects showed a clear link to the Grow the Force initiative, some future Marine Corps and Army Reserve projects may not be clearly and appropriately identified as supporting Grow the Force. Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD stated that it disagreed with our assessment that 1 Army project and 12 Marine Corps projects did not support Grow the Force. To determine the extent to which Grow the Force projects submitted by the Army, Marine Corps, and Army National Guard supported the initiative, we analyzed budget justification documentation for projects submitted for the fiscal year 2007 supplemental budget request, the fiscal year 2008 Global War on Terrorism supplemental budget request, and the President’s fiscal year 2008 budget request. | Why GAO Did This Study
In January 2007 the President announced an initiative, referred to as Grow the Force, to increase the end strength in the Army by more than 74,000 by 2013 and the Marine Corps by 27,000 personnel by 2011 to enhance U.S. forces, reduce stress on deployable personnel, and provide necessary forces for success in the Global War on Terrorism. The Department of Defense (DOD) estimates that it will need more than $17 billion for facilities to accommodate the planned personnel increases. GAO was asked to review (1) the process the Army and Marine Corps used to develop construction projects associated with Grow the Force, (2) the extent to which the projects submitted in DOD's budget requests for fiscal years 2007 and 2008 support the initiative, and (3) whether the Army and Marine Corps plan to use temporary facilities while construction projects are completed. GAO reviewed the construction projects associated with Grow the Force in DOD's budget requests for fiscal years 2007 and 2008, reviewed stationing documents, and interviewed officials at Army and Marine Corps headquarters and six installations on the process used to develop projects. In comments on a draft of this report, DOD disagreed with GAO's assessment that 1 Army project and 12 Marine Corps projects do not support Grow the Force but did not provide sufficient documentation that existing capacity issues would be exacerbated by additional personnel.
What GAO Found
The Army and Marine Corps followed their typical process to develop construction projects when they developed the Grow the Force projects submitted in DOD's budget requests for fiscal years 2007 and 2008; however, the process was compressed due to the short period of time between the announcement of the initiative and submission of budget requests. For example, the active duty Army took about 2 months and the Marine Corps took 6 months to develop projects submitted in DOD's budget requests for fiscal years 2007 and 2008; the typical process takes about 2 years. Nearly all of the military construction projects submitted as Grow the Force projects in fiscal years 2007 and 2008 supported the Grow the Force initiative. GAO found that 68 of the 69 projects submitted by the Army and Army National Guard, totaling more than $2.3 billion, and 37 of the 49 projects submitted by the Marine Corps, totaling more than $665 million, supported Grow the Force. However, GAO found that 1 Army project and 12 Marine Corps projects did not support Grow the Force because they addressed existing deficiencies and were needed regardless of whether Grow the Force occurred or they supported another initiative. For example, the Marine Corps included a $7 million wastewater system modification project at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, in its fiscal year 2008 budget request to address environmental issues. Officials said the project was already planned for a future budget request and would be needed regardless of whether Grow the Force had occurred. Additionally, GAO determined that 3 Marine Corps projects, totaling $58 million, were to construct facilities for wounded Marines that supported another initiative, not Grow the Force. While most of the fiscal years 2007 and 2008 projects were linked to Grow the Force, it may be more difficult to identify some Marine Corps and Army Reserve projects as supporting the initiative in future budget requests because the Marine Corps may not link installationwide projects to Grow the Force and the Army Reserve plans to identify projects for a related force structure effort as Grow the Force projects. GAO's analysis shows that some units will arrive at installations before facilities are constructed; however, the Army does not plan to purchase or lease temporary facilities, while the Marine Corps plans to do so to bridge the gap between when units are established and permanent facilities are constructed. The Army plans to use existing facilities, including facilities vacated by deployed units, to bridge the gap between the time when personnel arrive and the completion date of construction projects. The majority of new units will be established at Marine Corps installations before permanent facilities are complete and will require temporary facilities. The Marine Corps requested $147 million in fiscal year 2008 for temporary facilities, including armories and trailers, to bridge the gap between the time units arrive and the completion date of construction projects. A Marine Corps official expects that additional funding for temporary facilities will be required but the extent of the funding requirements have not yet been determined. |
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