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gao_T-AIMD-97-34 | gao_T-AIMD-97-34_0 | Our efforts to audit IRS accounting records have resulted in disclaimers of opinion each year. IRS’ inability to account for tax collections in total and by type of tax collected reduces the Congress’ and others’ ability to (1) fully assess the effectiveness of tax policies to achieve their intended goals, (2) know the amount the general revenue fund is subsidizing the Social Security Trust Fund, (3) determine whether excise taxes are being collected and distributed in accordance with legislation, and (4) assess IRS’ collection efforts on unpaid taxes. While IRS is making interim efforts to increase its capability to account for tax collections, longer term solutions will be needed before IRS will be able to provide this information in an accurate and timely manner. Right now, IRS does not have the capacity to account for its costs and outcomes in a manner consistent with good financial management. Finally, IRS needs to have good financial management to show that it does not have a double standard for financial management—one that taxpayers must adhere to and another that applies to itself. IRS has made progress on addressing some of these problems, and we have worked closely with it to identify interim solutions to address the problems that can be fixed quicker and partially address the problems that will require longer term solutions. IRS has developed an action plan, with specific timetables and deliverables, to attempt to address the reasons for our audit disclaimer. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed the Internal Revenue Service's (IRS) financial management challenges.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) GAO efforts to audit IRS accounting records have resulted in a disclaimer of opinions each year; (2) IRS' inability to account for tax collections in total and by type of tax collected reduces the Congress' and others' ability to fully assess the effectiveness of tax policies to achieve their intended goals, know the amount the general revenue fund is subsidizing the Social Security Trust Fund, determine whether excise taxes are being collected and distributed in accordance with legislation, and assess IRS' collection efforts on unpaid taxes; (3) while IRS is making interim efforts to increase its capability to account for tax collections, longer term solutions will be needed before IRS will be able to provide this information in an accurate and timely manner; (4) right now, IRS does not have the capacity to account for its costs and outcomes in a manner consistent with good financial management; (5) IRS needs to have good financial management to show that is does not have a double standard for financial management--one that taxpayers must adhere to and another that applies to itself; (6) IRS has made progress on addressing some of these problems, and GAO has worked closely with it to identify interim solutions to address the problems that can be fixed quicker and partially address the problems that will require longer term solutions; and (7) IRS has developed an action plan, with specific timetables and deliverables, to attempt to address the reasons for GAO's audit disclaimer. |
gao_GAO-13-100 | gao_GAO-13-100_0 | States must operate their Medicaid programs within broad federal parameters. states may obtain the authority to enroll Medicaid beneficiaries, including dual-eligible beneficiaries, into managed care through the approval of two types of Medicaid waivers:
Section 1115 of the Social Security Act provides the Secretary of Health and Human Services with the authority to grant states waivers of certain federal Medicaid requirements and allow costs that would not otherwise be eligible for federal funds for the purpose of demonstrating alternative approaches to service delivery. In 2010, about 9.3 percent of dual-eligible beneficiaries were enrolled in Medicaid managed care plans. Selected Consumer Protection Requirements
Medicare and Medicaid have a number of requirements intended to protect the rights of beneficiaries, some of which are of particular importance to dual-eligible beneficiaries. Programs to Integrate Medicare and Medicaid for Dual-Eligible Beneficiaries
Both Medicare and Medicaid have standard appeals processes and expedited appeals processes in cases of urgent need. Medicare and Medicaid Consumer Protection Requirements Vary across Programs, Payment Systems, and States
There are key differences in enrollment choice requirements across the Medicare and Medicaid programs, the FFS and managed care payment systems and the selected states. SNPs, including D-SNPs, have been reauthorized several times since their establishment was first authorized in 2003.
Notable Differences Exist in Requirements for Enrollment Choice across the Programs, Payment Systems, and Selected States
Within Medicare, enrollment in managed care is always voluntary, whereas state Medicaid programs can require enrollment in managed care in certain situations. Under the Geographic Managed Care program, dual-
Minnesota: Dually eligible seniors in Minnesota must enroll in one of two managed care programs, and dual-eligible beneficiaries who became eligible on the basis of their disabilities can choose whether to enroll in a managed care program. North Carolina: According to North Carolina Medicaid officials, all Medicaid beneficiaries, including dual-eligible beneficiaries, are in FFS, and the majority of dual-eligible beneficiaries are in a primary care case management program, where primary care providers are paid on a FFS basis, in addition to receiving a monthly fee to perform certain care coordination activities. Certain Requirements for Continuity and Coordination of Care, Provider Networks, and Marketing Materials Are Unique to Managed Care
Continuity and Coordination of Care
In general, federal law and regulations do not specifically require MA plans or Medicaid managed care plans to cover services provided by a beneficiary’s previous providers if that provider is not in the plan’s network when a beneficiary first enrolls in a plan or switches plans. However, states determine to what extent Medicaid managed care plans must provide beneficiaries with access to a person or entity primarily responsible for coordinating health services on the basis of the services the plan must cover. Medicare and state Medicaid programs require managed care plans to meet certain provider network standards. For example, MA plans operating in rural counties must have at least one full-time equivalent (FTE) primary care provider per 1,000 beneficiaries. Medicare has five levels of appeals for managed care and FFS. 1. States can structure their Medicaid appeals processes within the parameters of federal requirements. Beneficiaries in Medicaid managed care plans must have the ability to appeal a termination, suspension, or reduction of a benefit to the plan as well as have access to a state fair hearing. For example, Arizona requires beneficiaries to first appeal to their managed care plan before requesting a state fair hearing. CMS and States Used a Range of Actions to Help Ensure Organizations Comply with Medicare and Medicaid Consumer Protection Requirements
CMS and states used compliance and enforcement actions that ranged from informal written notices to contract terminations in order to help ensure MA organizations and Medicaid managed care plans complied with consumer protection requirements. CMS Took Compliance and Enforcement Actions against Medicare Advantage Organizations
CMS used both compliance and enforcement actions to bring noncompliant MA organizations into compliance with federal requirements. Between January 1, 2010, and June 30, 2012, CMS took 546 compliance actions generally related to consumer protection requirements of importance to dual-eligible beneficiaries. Between January 1, 2010, and June 30, 2012, the three states reported they took a total of 157 compliance actions against their Medicaid managed care plans. California and Minnesota identified noncompliance with the appeals and grievance process that required corrective actions.take corrective actions to ensure beneficiaries were able to access appropriate translation services. The department noted that the report was an accurate assessment of the programs we reviewed, and added that the Medicare- Medicaid Coordination Office has already made some progress aligning the requirements between the two programs in the area of appeals. Appendix II: Description of Selected Federal and State Requirements
Table 3 describes selected consumer protection requirements for Medicare and Medicaid fee-for-service (FFS), and table 4 describes selected consumer protection requirements for Medicare Advantage (MA) and Medicaid managed care. | Why GAO Did This Study
Dual-eligible beneficiaries are low-income seniors and individuals with disabilities enrolled in Medicare and Medicaid. In 2010, there were about 9.9 million dual-eligible beneficiaries. Both programs have requirements to protect the rights of beneficiaries. These requirements are particularly important to dual-eligible beneficiaries, who must navigate the rules of both programs and generally have poorer health status.
To help inform efforts to better integrate the financing and care for dual-eligible beneficiaries, GAO (1) compared selected consumer protection requirements within Medicare FFS and Medicare Advantage, and Medicaid FFS and managed care, and (2) described related compliance and enforcement actions taken by CMS and selected states against managed care plans.
GAO identified consumer protections of particular importance to dual-eligible beneficiaries on the basis of expert interviews and literature, including protections related to enrollment, provider networks, and appeals. GAO reviewed relevant federal and state statutes, regulations, and policy statements, and interviewed officials from CMS and four states selected on the basis of their share of dual-eligible beneficiaries and use of managed care (Arizona, California, Minnesota, and North Carolina). GAO analyzed data on compliance and enforcement actions in Medicare Advantage and Medicaid managed care from January 1, 2010, through June 30, 2012.
What GAO Found
Medicare and Medicaid consumer protection requirements vary across programs, payment systems--either fee-for-service (FFS) or managed care--and states. Within Medicare, enrollment in managed care through the Medicare Advantage (MA) program must always be voluntary, whereas state Medicaid programs can require enrollment in managed care in certain situations. For example, Arizona requires nearly all beneficiaries, including dual-eligible beneficiaries, to enroll in managed care, but in North Carolina all beneficiaries are in FFS. In addition, Medicare and state Medicaid programs require managed care plans to meet certain provider network requirements to ensure beneficiaries have adequate access to covered services. For example, MA plans in rural counties must have at least one primary care provider per 1,000 beneficiaries. Subject to federal parameters, states establish network requirements for their Medicaid programs. For example, in California every plan must have at least one primary care provider per 2,000 beneficiaries. Finally, Medicare and Medicaid also have different appeals processes that do not align with each other. The Medicare appeals process has up to five levels of review for decisions to deny, reduce, or terminate services, with certain differences between FFS and MA. In Medicaid, states can structure appeals processes within federal parameters. States must establish a Medicaid appeals process that provides access to a state fair hearing and Medicaid managed care plans must provide beneficiaries with the right to appeal to the plan, though states can determine the sequence of these appeals. For example, Arizona requires beneficiaries to appeal to the managed care plan first, while a beneficiary in Minnesota may go directly to a state fair hearing without an initial appeal to the managed care plan.
Both the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), the agency that administers the Medicare program and oversees states' operation of Medicaid programs, and states took a range of compliance and enforcement actions to help ensure that MA and Medicaid managed care organizations complied with their consumer protection requirements. Between January 1, 2010, and June 30, 2012, CMS took 546 compliance actions against MA organizations on the issues GAO identified as generally related to consumer protections of particular importance to dual-eligible beneficiaries. Compliance actions included notices, warning letters, and requests for corrective action plans (CAP). During the same period, CMS took 22 enforcement actions against MA organizations, including the imposition of 17 civil money penalties--nearly all for late or inaccurate marketing materials. For five serious violations, CMS suspended enrollment into the MA plan and suspended the MA plan's ability to market to beneficiaries. Similarly, states used notices, letters, fines, and CAPs to improve Medicaid managed care plan compliance with Medicaid consumer protection requirements. During the same period, Arizona, California, and Minnesota required managed care plans to undertake 91 corrective action plans, 52 percent of which related to problems with plans' appeals and grievances processes.
In commenting on a draft of the report, the Department of Health and Human Services noted that the report was an accurate assessment of the programs we reviewed. |
gao_GAO-15-572T | gao_GAO-15-572T_0 | Our December 2012 report found that while the TANF block grant still serves as the nation’s major cash assistance program for low-income families with children, states have also increasingly used it as a flexible funding stream for supporting a broad range of allowable services. We reported that nationwide, in fiscal year 1997, states spent about 23 percent of TANF funds on non-cash services. In contrast, states spent more than 66 percent of TANF funds for these purposes in fiscal year 2013, according to the most recent available data from HHS. 1). TANF’s Accountability Framework Has Limitations
States Have Generally Met Work Participation Rates by Using Credits Allowed by Law
Because job preparation and employment are key goals of TANF, one of the federal measures of state TANF programs’ performance is the proportion of TANF cash assistance recipients engaged in allowable work activities. Our work has shown that over the years, states have engaged about one third of families receiving TANF cash assistance in federally-defined work activities nationwide.For example, according to HHS data, in fiscal year 2011—the most recent year for which data are available—states engaged 29.5 percent of work- eligible cash assistance families nationwide in work activities. In addition to the caseload reduction credits and excess MOE discussed above, we also reported in May 2010 that some states have made changes to their TANF programs that may affect which families are counted in their work participation rates, such as providing assistance to non-working families outside of the TANF program, as providing TANF assistance to such families would lower states’ work participation rates. While funding for non-cash services represents the majority of TANF spending, there were no reporting requirements mandating performance information specifically on families receiving non-cash services or their outcomes. Thus, in our December 2012 report, we recommended that HHS develop a detailed plan with specific timelines to assist it in monitoring its progress on revising its financial reporting categories for expenditures of federal TANF and state maintenance of effort funds. In response to our recommendation, HHS has taken some steps to improve expenditure reports from states. Specifically, HHS revised its reporting form and accounting methodology to collect more detailed and accurate expenditure data for the TANF program. Despite these efforts by HHS, without more information that encompasses the breadth of states’ uses of TANF funds, Congress will not be able to fully assess how funds are being used, including who is receiving services or what is being achieved. We suggested that Congress should consider ways to improve reporting and performance information in our December 2012 report. HHS cited a statutory provision as prohibiting it from requiring states to estimate improper payments for TANF and stated that when legislation is considered to reauthorize TANF, the agency plans to encourage Congress to consider statutory modifications that would allow for a reliable error rate measurement. Several Factors Limit Incentives for Innovation and Evaluation in the TANF Program
In a November 2014 report, we concluded that while selected state and local programs are making use of some promising approaches for moving TANF recipients into employment and increasing their earnings, incentives are lacking for large numbers of state and local TANF agencies to adopt and test such approaches under the structure of the TANF program. TANF allows states to spend funds on a wide range of programs and services that are not necessarily related to welfare-to-work activities as long as these services support one of TANF’s four statutory purposes. Our December 2012 report found that states spent significant amounts of TANF funds on services such as child welfare or child care, and we noted that state use of federal TANF funds for these and other services can create tensions and trade-offs in state funding decisions.additional resources needed for implementing more costly promising approaches for TANF cash assistance clients may compete with other allowable uses of TANF funds. In addition, our November 2014 report included factors discussed above, such as the caseload reduction credit, that have allowed states to reduce the percentage of families they needed to engage in work to meet their work participation rate requirements. We found that states may have less incentive to use promising approaches to engage hard-to-employ individuals in work activities as they can meet their work participation rate requirements without them. impact evaluations of their TANF programs, although these evaluations can provide useful information on program effectiveness. GAO-15-31. Consequently, to encourage broader adoption and evaluation of promising approaches, we recommended that HHS, in consultation with Congress, identify potential changes that would address the lack of incentives for states and localities to adopt promising approaches and then develop and submit a legislative proposal outlining those changes. We maintain that HHS should develop more concrete proposals to address the lack of incentives within the TANF program itself, and noted that the agency need not wait for Congress to take up reauthorization to do so. | Why GAO Did This Study
The TANF block grant provides $16.5 billion annually in federal funding to states for cash assistance as well as a variety of other benefits and services to meet the needs of low-income families. TANF requires states to maintain a specified level of their own past welfare spending to receive all of their TANF funds. In fiscal year 2013, states spent a total of $31.6 billion in federal TANF and related state funds on cash assistance and other services for low-income families. GAO was asked to provide information from its recent reports to inform a hearing on next steps for welfare reform.
This statement addresses (1) states' use of TANF funds, (2) TANF's accountability framework, and (3) innovation and evaluation in the TANF program, drawing primarily from GAO reports issued from 2010 to 2014. For these reports, GAO reviewed and analyzed state TANF data reported to HHS from fiscal year 1997 through 2013; reviewed relevant federal laws, regulations, and guidance; interviewed HHS and state TANF administrators; and conducted visits in selected states.
What GAO Found
While the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) block grant serves as the nation's major cash assistance program for low-income families with children, states increasingly use it as a flexible funding stream for supporting a broad range of allowable services. For example, in December 2012 GAO found that nationwide, in fiscal year 1997, states spent about 23 percent of TANF funds on services other than cash assistance, such as child welfare or child care. In contrast, states spent more than 66 percent of TANF funds for these purposes in fiscal year 2013, according to the most recent available data from the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS).
TANF's accountability framework has limitations in both the approach used for measuring work participation and the information that is available on trends in services other than cash assistance. One program performance measure, the work participation rate, measures the extent to which states engage work-eligible TANF cash assistance recipients in work activities as defined by federal law. In May 2010, GAO found that states often relied on several options allowed in law, including credits for caseload reductions, to reduce the percentage of families they needed to engage in work to meet their work participation rate requirements. Thus, GAO concluded that the rate's usefulness as an indicator of TANF performance is limited. There are also no reporting requirements mandating performance information specifically on families receiving services other than cash assistance. To fully assess how funds are being used, GAO suggested Congress should consider ways to improve performance information when TANF is being reauthorized. In response to GAO's 2012 recommendation that HHS develop a detailed plan to revise reporting categories for TANF expenditures to provide a more complete picture on the use of TANF funds, HHS has taken steps such as revising its reporting form and accounting methodology for expenditure data. HHS has also cited a statutory provision as preventing it from reporting an improper payment estimate for the TANF program, but says it will seek statutory modifications to allow for such an estimate when the program is reauthorized.
Incentives are often lacking for state and local TANF agencies to adopt and test promising approaches for moving cash assistance recipients from welfare to work, according to a November 2014 GAO report. State use of federal TANF funds for services that are not necessarily related to welfare-to-work activities may compete with funding for developing promising approaches for TANF cash assistance clients. Also, the federal work participation rate requirements may discourage states from pursuing approaches that incorporate longer-term education and training or treatment services, or from engaging hard-to-employ individuals in work activities as states can meet their work participation rate requirements by using the law's other options. In addition, little incentive exists for states to evaluate their TANF programs, and states are not required to do so, although these evaluations can provide useful information on program effectiveness. GAO recommended that HHS, in consultation with Congress, identify potential changes to address the lack of incentives to adopt and test promising approaches and submit a legislative proposal outlining those changes. HHS agreed with the recommendation but has not yet suggested program changes.
What GAO Recommends
In its prior work, GAO recommended that HHS take steps to improve TANF expenditure reporting and identify potential changes to address the lack of incentives in the TANF program. HHS has taken some action. GAO has also suggested Congress consider ways to improve performance information when TANF is reauthorized. Consequently, GAO is not making any new recommendations at this time. |
gao_GAO-16-231 | gao_GAO-16-231_0 | The fiscal year 2015 ADP in these facilities totaled approximately 28,000 detainees. DHS Has Established Processes for Providing Detainee Medical Care, but Does Not Have Complete Data on Costs for Care
All Detention Facilities Provide On-site Medical Care
DHS has established processes for the provision of routine medical care on-site at both IHSC and non-IHSC staffed facilities. For example, at the 19 over-72-hour facilities where IHSC provided direct medical care to detainees in fiscal year 2015, ICE maintained medical expenditure data in its accounting system of record, the Federal Financial Management System. However, ICE’s system for managing the provision of off-site medical care does not provide ICE with the information needed to identify and assess trends across the types of off- site care requested or approved over time or across facility types, and ICE could better link data on approvals and amounts paid to improve ICE oversight of the costs of providing off-site medical care to detainees. However, the number of claims paid for fiscal years 2012 through 2014 did not correspond to the number of IHSC MedPAR authorizations, or approvals for requested services, for the same time period. For example, an emergency room visit may require one MedPAR approval, but claims may be paid to multiple providers associated with the visit. In addition, establishing stronger internal controls to ensure that payments for off-site care are supported by the appropriate authorizations could help ICE monitor medical care costs and better validate payments. ICE Uses Various Oversight Mechanisms and Collects Medical Care Compliance Data at Individual Facilities, but Conducts Limited Analyses of Data across Facilities
ICE Uses Various Mechanisms to Oversee Facilities’ Compliance with Medical Care Standards
ICE has various mechanisms to oversee medical care at facilities, and it uses a combination of these mechanisms to monitor conditions within a facility, including the quality of medical care. In these ways, facilities can resolve issues and improve the conditions of confinement for detainees in a timely manner. Similarly, CMD officials stated that their priority has been to address issues at individual facilities rather than to conduct analyses of data across facilities. Expanding analysis of oversight data across facilities would strengthen ICE’s ability to manage and oversee the provision of medical care across facility types. As shown in figure 6, various DHS entities obtain complaints, and IHSC ultimately receives and is responsible for addressing medical complaints obtained by those entities. Similarly, there are multiple avenues for detainees or others to file medical complaints, such as toll-free telephone hotlines or formal written complaints, and all medical complaints eventually are received by IHSC for resolution. Recommendations for Executive Action
To enhance Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s (ICE) ability to make more effective business decisions across immigration detention facilities with respect to the provision of medical care, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct ICE to take the following actions: develop and implement a mechanism to identify and assess trends in off-site medical care procedures across types of procedures and develop and implement a mechanism to ensure that payments for off- site care are supported by the appropriate authorizations; and track inspection results and conduct analyses of oversight data over time, by standards, and by facility type. Additionally, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security ensure that IHSC’s planned new tasking system includes all medical- care-related complaints received by DHS entities, and that this system facilitates the tracking and analysis of complaints over time and across facilities. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report addresses to what extent does the Department of Homeland Security (DHS): 1. have processes for administering medical care to immigration detainees and maintaining information on costs associated with care, 2. assess and monitor compliance with medical care standards at 3. oversee processes to obtain and address complaints about medical care in immigration detention facilities? To determine the extent to which DHS oversees immigration detention medical care complaint mechanisms, we analyzed and compared Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties (CRCL), Detention and Reporting Information Line (DRIL), IHSC, Joint Intake Center (JIC), and Office of the Inspector General (OIG) processes for obtaining and addressing complaints; analyzed fiscal year 2014 complaint data maintained by these DHS entities’ data systems; and reviewed ICE detention and family residential standards that govern facility grievance systems. Appendix IV: Description of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) Medical Care Oversight Mechanisms
Based on our review of ICE policy, ICE uses the following seven oversight mechanisms to assess facility compliance with medical care detention standards and to inspect the quality of medical care at facilities:
Custody Management Division (CMD) Inspections
Operational Review Self-Assessments (ORSA)
Field Medical Coordinator (FMC) Site Visits ICE Health Service Corps (IHSC) Quality Improvement Audits
Office of Detention Oversight (ODO) Inspections
Detention Service Managers (DSM)
During fiscal year 2015, more than 99 percent of ICE’s average daily population (ADP) was covered by two or more of these oversight mechanisms. Inspections are conducted annually or biennially at facilities that are authorized to house detainees for more than 72 hours, and that have an ADP of 10 or more detainees. | Why GAO Did This Study
DHS is responsible for providing safe, secure, and humane confinement for detained aliens who may be subject to removal or have been ordered removed from the United States. GAO was asked to examine the provision and oversight of medical care in immigration detention facilities. This report examines the extent to which DHS (1) has processes for administering detainee medical care and maintaining cost information for care, (2) monitors and assesses compliance with medical care standards, and (3) oversees processes to obtain and address complaints about detainee medical care.
GAO reviewed ICE data and information on costs, detention population, standards, and oversight for 165 facilities that held detainees for more than 72 hours in fiscal year 2015. GAO also reviewed complaint processes, interviewed DHS and ICE officials, and visited 12 facilities selected based on detainee population and facility type, among other factors. The visit results are not generalizable, but provided insight to the provision of medical care.
What GAO Found
The Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) oversees basic on-site medical care at all facilities, as required by ICE detention standards, but does not maintain complete information about medical care costs. The ICE Health Service Corps (IHSC) provided direct care to detainees at 19 over-72-hour facilities and oversaw care at the remaining 146 non-IHSC-staffed facilities in fiscal year 2015. At all facilities, IHSC uses an electronic system, the Medical Payment Authorization (MedPAR) system, to approve or deny off-site care requests for detainees; such requests could include dental visits or surgical needs. IHSC uses a system different from MedPAR to track costs or amounts paid for off-site care. The use of separate systems limits ICE's ability to link approvals and payments. For example, the number of claims paid for fiscal years 2012 through 2014 did not correspond to the number of IHSC MedPAR approvals for requested services for the same time period. While there are valid reasons for these differences, such as that approvals and claims could be made in different fiscal years, establishing a mechanism to more fully ensure that payments for off-site care are supported by the appropriate authorizations could help ICE monitor medical care costs and better validate payments.
ICE conducts medical care compliance inspections at individual facilities, but conducts limited analyses of inspection data across facilities and over time. ICE uses seven oversight mechanisms to monitor facilities' compliance with medical care detention standards, such as facility inspections and on-site detention monitors. The combined use of these oversight mechanisms resulted in more than 99 percent of ICE's average daily population (ADP) of approximately 28,000 detainees being covered by two or more mechanisms in fiscal year 2015. ICE's priority has been to focus on local, facility-specific issues rather than perform overarching analyses. For example, ICE does not utilize the data gathered through these mechanisms in a way that examines overall trends in medical care deficiencies. Conducting analysis of oversight data over time, by detention standards, and across facilities, consistent with internal control standards, could strengthen ICE's ability to manage and oversee the provision of medical care across facility types.
DHS has various processes to obtain and address the hundreds of medical care complaints it receives annually. Specifically, detainees can submit complaints regarding medical care directly to facilities or to one of various DHS entities, including the Office of Inspector General and Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties. These entities generally determine whether to take their own action on the complaints or forward them to ICE for resolution. These entities maintain complaint data in various ways, and IHSC, which is ultimately responsible for addressing medical complaints received, is developing and piloting a new system for managing tasks, including addressing complaints. However, internal control standards call for evaluation of performance over time, and it is unclear whether IHSC's new system will capture all medical complaints received by DHS or facilitate analyses of complaints over time and across facilities. Ensuring that a new tasking system would capture all complaints and facilitate analysis could improve DHS's decision-making for detainee medical care.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DHS, among other things, ensure payments for medical care are supported by authorizations, conduct trend analyses of oversight data, and track all medical complaints received by DHS entities. DHS concurred with the recommendations and identified planned actions to address the recommendations. |
gao_GAO-08-56 | gao_GAO-08-56_0 | The growth in the demand for CRNAs is expected to continue. Overall, 54 percent of the chief anesthesiologists responding to our survey reported temporarily closing some operating rooms and 72 percent reported delaying some elective surgeries because of VA CRNA vacancies in fiscal year 2006. On the basis of our survey results, in addition to their current recruiting challenges, VA medical facilities will likely face a challenge retaining VA CRNAs in the next 5 years due to the number of VA CRNAs projected to either retire from or leave VA. VA medical facility officials reported in our survey that the recruitment and retention challenges are caused primarily by the low level of VA CRNA salaries when compared with CRNA salaries in local market areas. Of all VA medical facility chief anesthesiologists that responded to our survey, 74 percent reported that they had difficulty recruiting CRNAs in fiscal years 2005 and 2006. According to VA Officials and VA CRNAs, Difficulty Recruiting and Retaining VA CRNAs is Due to Noncompetitive VA CRNA Salaries
Our surveys of VA medical facility chief anesthesiologists and HR officers indicate that medical facilities have trouble recruiting and will have trouble retaining VA CRNAs because salaries for VA CRNAs are low compared to CRNA salaries in local market areas. Although the majority—about 79 percent—of VA medical facility chief anesthesiologists reported that VA CRNA salaries are not competitive with local market CRNA salaries, less than half of VA medical facility HR officers who responded to our survey concurred. VA Can Offer Bonuses, Pay Education Costs, and Adjust Salaries to Recruit and Retain VA CRNAs
VA has three key mechanisms its medical facilities can use to recruit and retain VA CRNAs. One program provides funding to registered nurses for training to become a CRNA, and the other provides funding to offset educational debt incurred by VA CRNAs. Finally, medical facilities can use VA’s LPS to determine whether to adjust VA CRNA salaries to help the facilities remain competitive with CRNA salaries in local market areas. Some Medical Facilities Use the Key Recruitment and Retention Mechanisms, Though in Some Cases LPS Was Used Incorrectly
Each of the three key recruitment and retention mechanisms—bonuses, education payment programs, and VA’s LPS—are used by some VA medical facilities. We found in fiscal years 2005 or 2006, of those VA medical facilities that hired VA CRNAs, just over one-third gave recruitment bonuses. In addition, less than one-third of all VA medical facilities that employ VA CRNAs gave retention bonuses, and a few gave relocation bonuses. However, five of the eight VA medical facilities we visited did not fully follow VA’s LPS policy in either 2005 or 2006, and officials at these facilities did not appear to understand certain aspects of the policy. These problems indicate VA has not provided adequate training on the LPS process since the policy was changed in 2001. A Majority of Medical Facilities Use VA’s LPS to Determine Whether to Adjust VA CRNA Salaries, but Instances of Incorrect Use Indicate Inadequate Training on LPS Policy
According to VA’s 2005 data, 86 VA medical facilities that employ VA CRNAs used VA’s LPS to determine whether to adjust salaries of VA CRNAs at their facilities. As a result, VA medical facility officials have not received LPS training that reflects VA’s current LPS policy, and accordingly, cannot ensure that VA CRNA salaries have been adjusted as needed to be competitive. VA is in the process of developing a Web-based training course for the LPS that VA medical facility officials can complete on-line. Because VA has not made the training a priority, it has not established a time frame for finalizing the development and implementation of this training course. VA expressed concern about our projected VA CRNA attrition rate. Specifically, we (1) identified workforce challenges that VA medical facilities may experience related to VA CRNAs, (2) identified the key mechanisms that VA medical facility officials can use to recruit and retain VA CRNAs, and (3) determined the extent to which VA medical facilities use the key mechanisms to recruit and retain VA CRNAs. | Why GAO Did This Study
Certified registered nurse anesthetists (CRNA), registered nurses who have completed a master's degree program in nurse anesthesia, provide the majority of anesthesia care veterans receive in VA medical facilities. While the demand for CRNAs is anticipated to increase, many CRNAs employed by VA--VA CRNAs--are nearing retirement eligibility age. Concerns have been raised about the challenges VA may face in maintaining its VA CRNA workforce. GAO (1) identified VA CRNA workforce challenges that VA medical facilities may experience related to VA CRNAs, (2) identified the key mechanisms that VA medical facilities can use to recruit and retain VA CRNAs, and (3) determined the extent to which facilities use the key mechanisms. To identify VA CRNA workforce challenges, GAO analyzed Web-based surveys it sent to VA chief anesthesiologists, VA human resources officers, and VA CRNAs, with survey response rates of 92, 85, and 76 percent, respectively. GAO also identified the key mechanisms VA medical facilities can use to recruit and retain VA CRNAs and the extent that these mechanisms are used.
What GAO Found
Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) medical facilities have challenges in recruiting and retaining VA CRNAs for their workforce. About three-fourths of all VA medical facility chief anesthesiologists responding to GAO's survey reported that they had difficulty recruiting VA CRNAs. The challenge recruiting VA CRNAs has made it difficult to fill existing VA CRNA vacancies at VA medical facilities. Overall, 54 percent of VA medical facility chief anesthesiologists reported temporarily closing some operating rooms and 72 percent reported delaying some elective surgeries. VA's retention challenge comes from a projected substantial attrition rate. Based on the results of its survey, GAO projects that 26 percent of VA's CRNAs will either retire from or leave VA in the next 5 years. VA medical facility officials reported in GAO's survey that the recruitment and retention challenges are caused primarily by the low level of VA CRNA salaries when compared with CRNA salaries in local market areas. VA has three key mechanisms its medical facilities can use to recruit and retain VA CRNAs. VA medical facilities can give bonuses to VA CRNAs--recruitment, relocation, and retention bonuses. In addition, VA has education payment programs that provide funding to cover CRNA education costs. Finally, medical facilities can also use VA's locality pay system (LPS) to determine whether to adjust VA CRNA salaries to help the facilities remain competitive with CRNA salaries in local market areas. Each of the three key recruitment and retention mechanisms--bonuses, education payment programs, and VA's LPS--are used by some VA medical facilities. GAO found that in fiscal years 2005 or 2006, just over one-third of VA medical facilities that hired VA CRNAs gave recruitment bonuses. For VA medical facilities that have VA CRNAs, less than one-third gave retention bonuses in fiscal years 2005 or 2006. In addition, all VA CRNAs that applied for funds to attend a CRNA school or to offset their educational debt and were eligible received these funds in fiscal years 2005 and 2006. GAO also found that more than half of VA medical facilities used VA's LPS to determine whether to adjust VA CRNA salaries in 2005 and in 2006. However, in the eight VA medical facilities visited, GAO found that although the facilities used VA's LPS, the majority of them did not fully follow VA's LPS policy correctly in either 2005 or 2006. Officials at these facilities did not always know or were not aware of certain aspects of the LPS policy, and VA has not provided training on the LPS to VA medical facility officials since the policy was changed in 2001. As a result, VA medical facility officials have not received LPS training that reflects VA's current LPS policy, and accordingly, cannot ensure that VA CRNA salaries have been adjusted as needed to be competitive. Although VA is in the process of developing a Web-based training course for the LPS, the department has not established a time frame for finalizing the development and implementation of this training course. |
gao_GAO-14-832 | gao_GAO-14-832_0 | ILAB Could Improve Its Processes for Financial Oversight
The child labor office and trade and labor office both have guidance for the financial monitoring of projects, but could improve their financial oversight. For example, we found that project managers completed their acceptance or rejection of about 20 percent of quarterly financial reports more than 90 days after receipt from the grantee, after the next quarter’s report was due. ILAB does not have guidance that provides time frames and criteria for accepting or rejecting quarterly financial reports. In addition, although the child labor office supplements federal financial of selected projects to, requirements with attestation engagementsamong other things, assess the accuracy and reliability of grantee financial and performance data, the trade and labor office has not yet implemented its plan to conduct such attestation engagements of its grants, although officials said they plan to do so by November 2014. Without addressing these gaps in financial oversight, it could be difficult for ILAB to ensure federal resources are used efficiently and effectively to achieve desired objectives. The Trade and Labor Office’s Performance Monitoring Efforts Need Improvement
While ILAB uses a number of tools to monitor its grants, the child labor office requirements have generally been more comprehensive than those of the trade and labor office. For example, in contrast to the child labor office, the trade and labor office does not have common indicators that are used across projects to assess overall progress in key areas. Without common indicators and attestation engagements, it is difficult for the trade and labor office to assess progress across projects and overall progress toward the office’s goals, and whether its grantees are in compliance with relevant regulations. While the Child Labor Office Has More Comprehensive Performance Monitoring Requirements than the Trade and Labor Office, Both Offices Complied with Monitoring Requirements
The Child Labor Office Has More Comprehensive Monitoring Requirements than the Trade and Labor Office, Which Lacks Common Indicators and Attestation Engagements
The child labor office has monitoring requirements that the trade and labor office does not, including common indicators and attestation engagements. Project evaluations, such as the midterm and final evaluations, are assessments of performance against goals and objectives. Child labor office officials said they have drawn some lessons learned from the evaluations that they have incorporated into subsequent projects, including addressing monitoring and evaluation issues earlier in a project. Their purpose is to determine whether a program has an impact and to quantify how large the impact is. So far, two impact evaluations have been completed. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve ILAB’s financial and performance monitoring, we recommend that the Secretary of Labor, in concert with ILAB management, take four actions: 1. to facilitate the effective financial oversight of its grants, establish guidance specifying time frames in which project managers must accept or reject quarterly financial reports and the criteria for accepting or rejecting the reports; 2. to better ensure accurate accounting of federal funds, revise ILAB policies to specify that subgrantee inventories of equipment and real property purchased with federal funds are included in inventory lists submitted by the grantee; 3. to improve financial and performance monitoring of trade and labor grants, implement the trade and labor office’s plan to conduct attestation engagements and develop guidance on the management of these engagements; and 4. to improve performance monitoring of trade and labor grants, ensure that the trade and labor office implement its plan to develop common indicators to track progress across projects. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report reviews issues related to the Department of Labor’s (DOL) Bureau of International Labor Affairs (ILAB) international technical assistance. The objectives of this report examined how ILAB: (1) ensures the financial accountability of its technical assistance funds, (2) monitors the performance of its projects, and (3) evaluates its projects and uses the results of the evaluations. We selected a nongeneralizable sample of 26 projects out of a total of 98 projects that were active in calendar years 2011, 2012, and 2013. We selected the sample based on several factors, such as dollar value and geographic location. | Why GAO Did This Study
According to the International Labour Organization, millions of children worldwide are engaged in labor that hinders their development. Recent incidents, including a factory collapse in Bangladesh, have highlighted poor working conditions overseas. ILAB's child labor office and trade and labor office provide funding to improve working conditions by supporting worker rights and combating child labor, mainly through international and nongovernmental organizations. The child labor office obligated about $56 million and the trade and labor office obligated about $13.5 million in fiscal year 2013. You asked us to review issues related to ILAB's international technical assistance. This report examines how ILAB (1) ensures the financial accountability of its technical assistance funds, (2) monitors the performance of its projects, and (3) evaluates its projects and uses the results of the evaluations. To address these objectives, GAO reviewed ILAB documents on financial requirements, performance monitoring, and evaluation. GAO analyzed a nongeneralizable sample of 26 grants that were active in calendar years 2011-2013. GAO selected this sample based on several factors, including dollar value and geographic location.
What GAO Found
The Department of Labor's (DOL) Bureau of International Labor Affairs' (ILAB) child labor office and trade and labor office both have guidance for the financial monitoring of grants, but could improve their financial oversight. For example, we found that project managers completed their acceptance or rejection of about 20 percent of quarterly financial reports more than 90 days after receipt from the grantee, after the next quarter's report was due. ILAB does not have guidance that provides time frames and criteria for accepting or rejecting quarterly financial reports. In addition, although the child labor office supplements federal financial requirements with attestation engagements of selected projects to, among other things, assess the accuracy and reliability of grantee financial and performance data, the trade and labor office has not yet implemented its plan to conduct such attestation engagements of its grants, although officials said they plan to do so by November 2014. Without addressing these gaps in financial oversight, it could be difficult for ILAB to ensure federal resources are used efficiently and effectively to achieve desired objectives. The figure below outlines selected financial and performance monitoring tools and requirements from each office.
ILAB uses a number of tools to monitor the performance of its projects, but the trade and labor office's monitoring could be strengthened. Twenty-two of 26 grant files we reviewed included key monitoring documents, such as periodic performance progress reports. The child labor office requirements have generally been more comprehensive than those of the trade and labor office. For example, in contrast to the child labor office, the trade and labor office does not have common indicators that are used across projects and, as stated above, has not conducted attestation engagements of its grants. Without common indicators and attestation engagements, it is difficult for the trade and labor office to assess overall progress across projects and toward the office's goals, and whether its grantees are in compliance with relevant regulations.
ILAB conducts final evaluations for all projects to assess the performance of the project, including an assessment of performance against goals and objectives. Officials said they have drawn lessons learned from these evaluations that they have incorporated into subsequent projects, including addressing monitoring and evaluation issues earlier in a project. ILAB has also commissioned impact evaluations to determine whether a project has an effect and to quantify how large the effect is, and two have been completed to date.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the Secretary of Labor take actions such as establishing guidance on time frames and criteria for accepting or rejecting financial reports, and implementing the trade and labor office's plans to conduct attestation engagements and develop common indicators. DOL agreed with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-16-403 | gao_GAO-16-403_0 | VA reported spending approximately $3.9 billion to improve and maintain its IT resources in fiscal year 2015. For fiscal year 2016, the department received appropriations of approximately $4.1 billion for IT. VA Has Faced Long- Standing Challenges in IT Management
Even as the department has engaged in various attempts to improve its IT management capabilities, we have issued numerous reports that highlighted challenges facing its efforts. VA concurred with our recommendation, but had not completed actions to address it. VA Manages and Performs Key IT- Related Functions through a Largely Centralized Organization, Which Is Taking Steps to Address Challenges
Since 2007, VA has been operating a centralized IT organization in which most key functions intended for effective management of IT are performed by the department’s Office of Information & Technology (OI&T) and led by the department-level CIO. IT activities have occurred outside the control of OI&T. The CIO’s transformation strategy calls for OI&T to focus on stabilizing and streamlining core processes and platforms, mitigating weaknesses highlighted in information security and GAO assessments, and improving outcomes by institutionalizing a new set of IT management capabilities. VA Generally Implemented IT Human Capital Management Best Practices but Has Not Projected Leadership Retirements or Fully Identified Skill Gaps
Key to an agency’s success in effectively managing its IT systems is sustaining a workforce with the necessary knowledge, skills, and abilities to execute a range of management functions that support the agency’s mission and goals. OI&T took steps toward implementing effective IT human capital practices by documenting an IT human capital strategic plan and initiating an update based on changed priorities, regularly analyzing workforce data, identifying skill gaps for the current fiscal year, and implementing an IT training program. Without tracking and forecasting leadership retirements, OI&T faces a risk of being unprepared to identify and effectively respond to vacancies in key leadership positions, which in turn can contribute to ineffective IT management. It has also been challenged in effectively collaborating with the department’s various business units and in efficiently and cost-effectively delivering new IT capabilities. VA’s documented processes for managing IT system development and acquisition generally reflected best practices in the key areas we reviewed. However, there were gaps in most of these areas. Ensuring that these processes address all key practices will assist the department in effectively managing its IT system development and acquisitions. Recommendations for Executive Action
To assist VA in sustaining an IT workforce with the necessary knowledge, skills, and abilities to execute its mission and goals, we recommend that the Secretary of Veterans Affairs direct the Chief Information Officer to track and review OI&T historical workforce data and projections related to leadership retirements, and identify IT skills needed beyond the current fiscal year to assist in identifying future skills gaps. To assist VA in establishing comprehensive and documented processes that reflect system development and acquisition best practices, we recommend that the Secretary of Veterans Affairs direct the Chief Information Officer to revise OI&T’s documented processes related to project planning, to include (1) estimating the level of effort that will need to be expended for work products and tasks, and (2) making adjustments to the project plan to reconcile differences between estimated and available resources; requirements management, to include identifying changes to be made to plans and work products as a result of requirements baseline changes; risk management, to include (1) determining costs and benefits of implementing the risk mitigation plan for each risk and (2) collecting performance measures on risk handling activities; project monitoring and control, to include the 10 best practices that were missing from the guidance; process and product quality assurance, to include (1) documenting a description of the quality assurance reporting chain and defining how objectivity will be ensured, and (2) periodically reviewing open noncompliance issues and trends with management that is designated to receive and act on them; and project scheduling, to include the 9 best practices that were missing from the guidance and revise the documented processes where the guidance was contrary to best practices. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of this study were to determine (1) how the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) is organized to manage and perform key information technology (IT)-related functions and the extent to which it has centralized the management of IT resources, (2) the extent to which VA has implemented effective IT human capital management, and (3) the extent to which VA has established key processes to effectively manage major system development and acquisition efforts. | Why GAO Did This Study
VA relies extensively on IT to deliver services to millions of our nation's veterans. VA reported spending approximately $3.9 billion in 2015 and received appropriations of approximately $4.1 billion in 2016 to improve and maintain its IT resources. Even as the department has engaged in various attempts to improve its IT management capabilities, GAO has issued numerous reports that highlighted challenges in its efforts.
This study was to determine (1) how VA is organized to manage and perform key IT-related functions and the extent to which it has centralized the management of IT resources, (2) the extent to which VA has implemented effective IT human capital management, and (3) the extent to which VA has established key processes to effectively manage major system development and acquisition efforts. To conduct its study, GAO reviewed VA policies, procedures, and other documentation and compared the department's processes to best practices for human capital management and IT systems development and acquisition. GAO also interviewed VA officials.
What GAO Found
The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) performs key information technology (IT)-related functions, such as leadership, strategic planning, systems development and acquisition, and systems operations and maintenance, largely through its centralized Office of Information & Technology (OI&T), led by the Chief Information Officer (CIO). VA's two IT governance boards are intended to play a role in other key functions, such as investment management. Nevertheless, the department faced challenges in effectively managing IT, including (1) preventing IT activities from occurring outside the control of OI&T, (2) maintaining collaboration between OI&T and business units, and (3) delivering efficient and cost-effective IT capabilities. In response to these and other challenges, the CIO initiated an effort in January 2016 to transform OI&T into a more veteran-focused organization that emphasized transparency, accountability, innovation, and teamwork. The transformation strategy calls for OI&T to stabilize and streamline core processes and platforms, mitigate weaknesses from information security and GAO assessments, and improve outcomes by institutionalizing a new set of IT management capabilities. The CIO intends to complete the transformation by the first quarter of 2017.
Key to an agency's success in effectively managing its IT systems is sustaining a workforce with the necessary knowledge, skills, and abilities to execute a range of management functions that support its mission and goals. VA took steps to implement effective IT human capital practices by documenting an IT human capital strategic plan and initiating an update based on changed priorities, analyzing workforce data, identifying skill gaps for the current year, and implementing an IT training program. However, OI&T had not consistently implemented all of these practices. Specifically, the office had not (1) tracked and reviewed historical and projected leadership retirements and (2) identified skills and competencies needed beyond the current year. Without annually tracking and reviewing data related to leadership retirements or identifying skills needed in future years, OI&T faces a risk of being unprepared to effectively respond to vacancies in key positions and not having the capabilities to deliver IT support that can contribute to improved services for veterans.
Key to successful development and acquisition of IT services is establishing documented processes that reflect best practices. Although there were gaps in some areas, VA's processes generally included best practices for project validation, project planning, requirements management, risk management, project monitoring and control, and process and product quality assurance. In addition, processes for developing and maintaining a project schedule had not fully addressed the majority of the associated best practices. Ensuring that these processes address all key practices will assist the department in effectively managing its IT system development and acquisitions.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is recommending that VA take two actions to assist the department in sustaining a workforce with the necessary knowledge, skills, and abilities to execute its mission and goals, as well as six actions to assist the department in developing comprehensive processes that reflect systems development best practices. VA generally agreed with GAO's conclusions and concurred with GAO's eight recommendations. |
gao_GAO-10-201 | gao_GAO-10-201_0 | Overview of Brand-name Drugs
Brand-name drugs are drug products that have received FDA approval and typically have patent protection. From 2000 to 2008, 416 Extraordinary Price Increases Occurred for 321 Different Drug Brands
From 2000 to 2008, 416 brand-name drug products representing 321 drug brands had an extraordinary price increase. The number of brand-name drug products that had these extraordinary price increases each year trended upwards, more than doubling from 2000 to 2008; however, they represent about half of 1 percent of all brand-name drug products. For example, following the extraordinary price increase, about 87 percent of the brand-name drug products remained at the increased price, or had another increase in price, and only 13 percent had a decrease in price. Depending on the condition treated and length of treatment, the full cost of treatment for a drug could total several thousand dollars. Three Therapeutic Classes Accounted for More Than Half of the Extraordinary Price Increases
While extraordinary price increases for brand-name drug products occurred in 20 therapeutic classes, the majority of the drugs— 52 percent—that had extraordinary price increases fell into 3 therapeutic classes—central nervous system, anti-infective, and cardiovascular drugs. Cardiov used to treat the heart. Brand-name Drug Products Priced Less Than $25 Per Unit Accounted for Most of the Extraordinary Price Increases
Ninety-six percent of brand-name drug products that had extraordinary price increases cost less than $25 per unit prior to the price increase. Repackaged Drugs Accounted for More Than Half of the Extraordinary Price Increases for Brand- name Drug Products
More than half of the brand-name drug products that had extraordinary price increases were repackaged—that is, purchased from drug manufacturers or wholesalers and resold in smaller packages to health care providers such as hospitals or physicians. However, some drug repackagers serve a niche in the drug market and therefore may have a small share of the market in a therapeutic class. Lack of Therapeutically Equivalent Drugs and Limited Competition May Contribute to Extraordinary Price Increases for Brand- name Drugs
Based on interviews with experts and industry representatives, we found that a lack of therapeutically equivalent drugs—generics and other brand- name drugs used to treat the same condition—and limited competition may contribute to extraordinary price increases. According to these experts and industry representatives, the availability of few therapeutically equivalent drugs may result from patent protection and market exclusivity, and the limited size of the market for a given drug. Experts noted that the transfer of drug rights and corporate consolidations may limit competition among drug companies, resulting in few drug options. The experts and industry representatives also noted that unusual events—such as disruptions in production due to shortages of raw materials—and other factors may also contribute to some extraordinary price increases. Two of our six case study drugs had patent protection at the time of the extraordinary price increase. Both of these drug companies market specialized drugs that treat rare diseases. The rights to four of our case study drugs were obtained by a new drug company, and two of these drugs had an extraordinary price increase shortly after the rights to the drugs were purchased. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
In this report we address the following objectives: (1) the frequency of extraordinary price increases for brand-name prescription drugs from 2000 to 2008, (2) the characteristics of the brand-name drugs that had extraordinary price increases, and (3) the factors that contributed to the extraordinary price increases experienced by these brand-name drugs. To determine the frequency of extraordinary price increases, we reviewed the average wholesale price (AWP) for all brand-name drugs in Thomson Reuters’ Red Book, and identified all extraordinary price increases—a unit price increase equal to 100 percent or more at a single point in time from 2000 to 2008. Appendix III: Characteristics of Case Study Drugs
To gain an understanding of the market dynamics leading to extraordinary price increases for brand-name drugs, we developed case studies of six brand-name drugs identified from our analysis of Red Book data. | Why GAO Did This Study
The growing cost of brand-name prescription drugs--FDA-approved drug products that typically have patent protection--is a concern for patients, payers, and providers of health care--particularly when price increases are large and occur suddenly. A 2008 congressional hearing by the Joint Economic Committee drew attention to some small market prescription drugs that had an extraordinary price increase--a price increase of 100 percent or more at a single point in time. GAO was asked to examine extraordinary price increases for brand-name prescription drugs. Specifically, GAO examined the: (1) frequency of extraordinary price increases for brand-name prescription drugs from 2000 to 2008, (2) characteristics of the brand-name prescription drugs that had extraordinary price increases, and (3) factors that contributed to the extraordinary price increases experienced by these brand-name prescription drugs. To determine the frequency and characteristics of the brand-name prescription drugs that experienced an extraordinary price increase, GAO reviewed drug pricing and other data from a pharmaceutical industry compendium. To illustrate the factors that may contribute to extraordinary price increases, GAO developed case studies of six brand-name prescription drugs identified from the analysis of drug pricing data. These brand-name prescription drugs were selected based on factors including price, and the percentage and number of price increases.
What GAO Found
From 2000 to 2008, 416 brand-name drug products--different drug strengths and dosage forms of the same drug brands--had extraordinary price increases. These 416 brand-name drug products represented 321 different drug brands. The number of brand-name drug products that had these extraordinary price increases represents half of 1 percent of all brand-name drug products. The number of extraordinary price increases each year more than doubled from 2000 to 2008 and most of the extraordinary price increases ranged between 100 percent and 499 percent. Almost 90 percent of all brand-name drug products that had an extraordinary price increase sustained the new higher price--by either having another increase in price or remaining at the increased price. More than half of the brand-name drug products that had extraordinary price increases were in just three therapeutic classes--central nervous system, anti-infective, and cardiovascular. These therapeutic classes include drugs used to treat conditions such as fungal or viral infections, and heart disease. About half of the extraordinary price increases were for brand-name drug products that were purchased from drug manufacturers or wholesalers, repackaged, and resold in smaller packages to health care providers such as hospitals or physicians. However, some drug repackagers serve a niche in the drug market, and therefore may have a small share of the market in a therapeutic class. The majority of all extraordinary price increases were for drugs priced less than $25 per unit; however, a full course of treatment for some of these drugs could total several thousand dollars. Based on interviews with experts and industry representatives, a lack of therapeutically equivalent drugs--both generics and other brand-name drugs used to treat the same condition--and limited competition may contribute to extraordinary price increases. The limited availability of therapeutically equivalent drugs may result from patent protection and market exclusivity, and the size of the market for a given drug. Patent protection and market exclusivity temporarily limit competition and thereby allow a drug company to recoup research and development costs and earn a return on its financial investment. Two of six case study drugs that had extraordinary price increases were patented at the time of the extraordinary price increase. The transfer of the rights to a drug and corporate consolidations among drug companies may result in fewer drug options and contribute to extraordinary price increases, according to experts. For example, the rights to four of the case-study drugs were obtained by a new drug company, and two of these drugs had an extraordinary price increase shortly after the rights to the drugs were purchased. Finally, experts and industry representatives noted that unusual events--such as disruptions in production due to shortages of raw materials--and other factors, including manufacturing issues, may also contribute to some extraordinary price increases. |
gao_GAO-06-1134T | gao_GAO-06-1134T_0 | Differences in FVAP’s Efforts Between the 2000 and 2004 Presidential Elections
For the 2004 presidential election, FVAP expanded its efforts beyond those taken for the 2000 election to provide military personnel tools needed to vote by absentee ballot. FVAP distributed more absentee voting materials and improved the accessibility of its Web site, which includes voting information. Also, FVAP conducted 102 more voting training workshops for its VAOs than it did for the 2000 election. FVAP also provided an online training course for them. FVAP also designed an electronic version of the Federal Write-in Absentee Ballot—an emergency ballot accepted by all states and territories—although its availability was not announced until a few weeks before the election. In assessing its efforts for the 2004 election, using data from its postelection surveys, FVAP attributed increased voter participation rates to an effective voter information and education program. However, in light of low survey response rates, FVAP’s estimates and conclusions should be interpreted with caution. Actions Taken in Response to Prior Recommendations
DOD has taken actions in response to our prior recommendations regarding voting assistance to servicemembers. In 2001, we recommended that DOD revise its voting guidance, improve program oversight, and increase command emphasis to reduce the variance in voting assistance to military servicemembers. Prior to the 2004 presidential election, DOD implemented corrective actions, such as revising voting guidance and increasing emphasis on voting education at top command levels to address our recommendations. However, the level of assistance continued to vary at the installations we visited. Because the VAO role is a collateral duty and VAOs’ understanding and interest in the voting process differ, some variance in voting assistance may always exist. DOD plans to continue its efforts to improve absentee voting assistance. The Services Revised Their Voting Guidance and Enhanced Program Oversight
In response to our recommendations in 2001, the services revised their voting guidance and enhanced oversight of the military’s voting assistance program. Top-level Command Emphasis Increased
For the 2004 election, emphasis on voting education and awareness increased throughout the top levels of command within DOD. Remaining Challenges Related to Absentee Military Voting
Despite the efforts of DOD and the states, our April 2006 report identified two major challenges that remain in providing voting assistance to military personnel, which are: simplifying and standardizing the time-consuming and multistep absentee voting process, which includes different requirements and time frames for each state; and developing and implementing a secure electronic registration and voting system. Simplifying and Standardizing the Absentee Voting Process
FVAP attempted to make the absentee voting process easier by encouraging states through its Legislative Initiatives program, to simplify the multi-step process and standardize their absentee voting requirements. However, the majority of states have not agreed to any new initiatives since FVAP’s 2001 report to Congress and the President on the effectiveness of its efforts during the 2000 election. FVAP is limited in its ability to affect state voting procedures because it lacks the authority to require states to take action on absentee voting initiatives. 1.) For the 2004 election, FVAP developed a secure registration and voting experiment. However, it was not used by any voters. Also, because DOD did not want to call into question the integrity of votes that would have been cast via SERVE, they decided to shut it down prior to its use by any absentee voters. Communications technologies, such as faxing, e-mail, and the Internet, can improve communication between local jurisdictions and voters during some portions of the election process. Elections: Voting Assistance to Military and Overseas Citizens Should Be Improved. | Why GAO Did This Study
The narrow margin of victory in the 2000 presidential election raised concerns about the extent to which members of the military and their dependents living abroad were able to vote via absentee ballot. In September 2001, GAO made recommendations to address variances in the Department of Defense's (DOD) Federal Voting Assistance Program (FVAP). Along with the military services, FVAP is responsible for educating and assisting military personnel in the absentee voting process. Leading up to the 2004 presidential election, Members of Congress raised concerns about efforts under FVAP to facilitate absentee voting. This testimony, which draws on prior GAO work, addresses three questions: (1) How did FVAP's assistance efforts differ between the 2000 and 2004 presidential elections? (2) What actions did DOD take in response to prior GAO recommendations on absentee voting? and (3) What challenges remain in providing voting assistance to military personnel?
What GAO Found
For the 2004 presidential election, FVAP expanded its efforts beyond those taken for the 2000 election to facilitate absentee voting by military personnel. FVAP distributed more absentee voting materials and improved the accessibility of its Web site, which includes voting information. Also, FVAP conducted 102 more voting training workshops than it did for the 2000 election, and it provided an online training course for Voting Assistance Officers (VAO). FVAP also designed an electronic version of the Federal Write-in Absentee Ballot--an emergency ballot accepted by all states and territories--although its availability was not announced until a few weeks before the election. In assessing its efforts for the 2004 election, using data from its postelection surveys, FVAP attributed increased voter participation rates to an effective voter information and education program. However, in light of low survey response rates, FVAP's estimates and conclusions should be interpreted with caution. DOD has taken actions in response to GAO's prior recommendations regarding voting assistance to servicemembers. In 2001, GAO recommended that DOD revise its voting guidance, improve program oversight, and increase command emphasis to reduce the variance in voting assistance to military servicemembers. Prior to the 2004 presidential election, DOD implemented corrective actions that addressed GAO's recommendations. Specifically, the services revised their voting guidance and enhanced oversight of the military's voting assistance program, and emphasis on voting education and awareness increased throughout the top levels of command within DOD. However, the level of assistance continued to vary at the installations GAO visited. Because the VAO role is a collateral duty and VAOs' understanding and interest in the voting process differ, some variance in voting assistance may always exist. DOD plans to continue its efforts to improve absentee voting assistance. Despite efforts of DOD and the states, GAO's April 2006 report identified two major challenges that remain in providing voting assistance to military personnel: (1) simplifying and standardizing the time-consuming and multi-step absentee voting process, which includes different requirements and time frames for each state; and (2) developing and implementing a secure electronic registration and voting system. FVAP attempted to make the absentee voting process easier by using its Legislative Initiatives program to encourage states to simplify the multi-step process and standardize their absentee voting requirements. However, the majority of states have not agreed to any new initiatives since FVAP's 2001 report on the 2000 election. FVAP is limited in its ability to affect state voting procedures because it lacks the authority to require states to take action on absentee voting initiatives. For the 2004 election, FVAP developed an electronic registration and voting experiment. However, it was not used by any voters due to concerns about the security of the system. Because DOD did not want to call into question the integrity of votes that would have been cast via the system, they decided to shut the experiment down prior to its use by any absentee voters. Some technologies--such as faxing, e-mail and the Internet--have been used to improve communication between local jurisdictions and voters. |
gao_GAO-14-102 | gao_GAO-14-102_0 | China is currently the second largest U.S. trading partner, the third largest U.S. export market, and the largest source of U.S. imports. In setting S&ED priorities, the Department of the Treasury (Treasury) and the National Security Staff lead an interagency process, working closely with the Department of Commerce (Commerce), the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR), and other agencies, on trade and investment issues. The prominence of issue areas across the commitments differs between the dialogues, reflecting differences in the dialogues’ structure and focus. Prominent Issue Areas Include Intellectual Property Rights for JCCT Commitments and Investment for S&ED Trade and Investment Commitments
We identified 184 commitments in the JCCT since 2004 and 114 trade and investment commitments in the S&ED since 2007 that involve China or China and the United States. We identified 11 issue areas to characterize the content of each commitment, including sector-specific issues. Differences in the number of commitments associated with specific issue areas across the two dialogues may reflect differences in the dialogues’ structure and focus. According to Treasury officials, this reflects the broad economic focus and cross-cutting discussions of the S&ED’s economic track. In addition, U.S. agencies have sought to identify commercial metrics such as increased sales to use as indicators of implementation progress where possible, but cited challenges in identifying appropriate data. U.S. officials serving in China obtain feedback from industry representatives based in that country. Lack of Comprehensive Information on Implementation of Commitments across Reports Limits Understanding of Progress
USTR includes information in nine reports on trade barriers generally and efforts to address them, but does not provide comprehensive information to Congress and the public on the status of implementation of JCCT and S&ED trade and investment commitments. For example,
We identified 9 commitments from the 2008-2011 JCCT, and 1 from the 2011 S&ED related to software legalization. Recommendation for Executive Action
To improve policymakers’ and the public’s understanding of progress through bilateral dialogues in increasing access to China’s markets, we recommend that the U.S. Trade Representative, in conjunction with the Secretary of Commerce and the Secretary of the Treasury, work to provide clearer and more comprehensive reporting on the status of China’s implementation of its JCCT and S&ED trade and investment commitments. Neither Commerce nor USTR directly agreed or disagreed with our recommendation. With respect to U.S. agency reporting on commitment implementation, USTR stated that in its view the Administration’s written reporting currently provides congressional policymakers and other stakeholders comprehensive information on China’s implementation of JCCT and S&ED commitments, and stated that it also meets with those parties on these issues. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
In this report, we (1) describe the commitments China made at the Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade (JCCT) and the trade and investment commitments China made at the Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED), (2) describe U.S. agency tracking of China’s implementation of these commitments, and (3) evaluate U.S. agency reporting on the status of commitment implementation. According to senior USTR officials, the commitments as presented in the fact sheets are high-level political commitments and are the outcomes of the structured dialogues established to address and resolve a range of issues. (An inventory of the commitments we identified and their categorization by issue area, described below, is provided in an online e-supplement, GAO-14-224SP.) | Why GAO Did This Study
China is the largest destination for U.S. exports outside North America and also the source of the largest U.S. bilateral trade deficit. The countries engage in two high-level dialogues to address trade barriers and cross-cutting economic issues. These are the JCCT, co-led for the United States by Commerce and USTR, and the economic track of the S&ED, led by Treasury. GAO was asked to review China's bilateral trade commitments made in these dialogues. This report (1) describes trade and investment commitments China has made at the JCCT and S&ED; (2) describes U.S. agency tracking of China's implementation of these commitments; and (3) evaluates U.S. agency reporting on implementation. GAO analyzed documents, including public fact sheets stating commitments; interviewed officials, industry representatives, and other experts; used a structured process to categorize commitments; and reviewed reports officials identified as reporting implementation status of commitments.
What GAO Found
GAO identified 298 trade and investment commitments made by China in the U.S.-China Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade (JCCT)—184 since 2004—and the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED) and its predecessor—114 since 2007. The commitments range from affirmations of open trade principles to sector-specific actions. GAO identified 11 issue areas to characterize the content of each commitment. The prominence of issue areas, measured in number of commitments associated with an issue area, differs between the dialogues, reflecting differences in the dialogues' structure and focus. Intellectual property rights commitments are among those most common in the JCCT and investment commitments are among those most common in the S&ED. (For a detailed inventory of commitments and their categorization, see GAO-14-224SP .)
U.S. agencies track commitment implementation through several means, including outreach to domestic stakeholders, issue-based working groups with China in the JCCT, and consultations in advance of S&ED annual meetings. No single document is used to track implementation, according to U.S. officials. In addition, although there have been calls to use metrics such as exports and sales in developing commitments, agencies identified only one such commitment in the dialogues and cited challenges in identifying appropriate data.
Although several reports on trade barriers present information on JCCT and S&ED commitments, information on commitment implementation in these reports does not provide a clear and comprehensive picture of progress across the dialogues. The Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) produces these reports with assistance from other agencies, including the Departments of Commerce (Commerce) and Treasury (Treasury). GAO's analysis of 10 software commitments from 2008-2011 shows, for example, that the implementation status of most could not be clearly identified. More comprehensive reporting would give Congress and other policy makers a clearer understanding of progress and the role of the dialogues as they continue to assess challenges in the U.S.-China relationship.
What GAO Recommends
To improve understanding of progress through the bilateral dialogues in increasing access to China's markets, USTR, in conjunction with Commerce and Treasury, should work to improve reporting on China's implementation of JCCT and S&ED trade and investment commitments. In written comments, USTR and Commerce did not directly agree or disagree with the recommendation, but raised several concerns. USTR maintained current reporting is comprehensive and Commerce noted resource constraints. GAO continues to believe improved reporting would benefit policymakers. |
gao_GAO-08-1148T | gao_GAO-08-1148T_0 | Within SBI, SBInet is the program for acquiring, developing, integrating, and deploying an appropriate mix of surveillance technologies and command, control, communications, and intelligence (C3I) technologies. Limited Definition of SBInet Deployments, Capabilities, Schedule, and Life Cycle Management Process Increases Program’s Exposure to Risk
Important aspects of SBInet—the scope, schedule, and development and deployment approach—remain ambiguous and in a continued state of flux, making it unclear and uncertain what technology capabilities will be delivered and when, where, and how they will be delivered. Further, the approach that is being used to define, develop, acquire, test, and deploy SBInet is similarly unclear and has continued to change. Scope and Timing of Planned Deployments and Capabilities Are Not Clear and Stable
The scope and timing of planned SBInet deployments and capabilities have not been clearly established, but rather have continued to change since the program began. Specifically, the program office does not yet have an approved integrated master schedule to guide the execution of SBInet. While the program office recently issued guidance that is consistent with recognized leading practices, this guidance was not finalized until February 2008, and thus was not used in performing a number of key requirements-related activities. In the absence of well-defined guidance, the program’s efforts to effectively define and manage requirements have been mixed. For example, the program has taken credible steps to include users in the definition of requirements. However, several requirements definition and management limitations exist. Program Office Has Taken Steps to Involve Users in Developing High-Level Requirements
One of the leading practices associated with effective requirements development and management is engaging system users early and continuously. According to the System Program Office, the operational requirements, system requirements, and various system component requirements have been baselined. This test management plan should define the schedule of high- level test activities in sufficient detail to allow for more detailed test planning and execution to occur, define metrics to track test progress and report and address results, and define the roles and responsibilities of the various groups responsible for different levels of testing. Specifically, the SBInet Test and Evaluation Master Plan, which documents the program’s test strategy and is being used to manage system testing, has yet to be approved by the SBInet Acting Program Manager, even though testing activities began in June 2008. As of July 2008, agency officials reported that component-level tests had not been completed and were not scheduled to occur. In light of these circumstances and risks surrounding SBInet, our soon to be issued report contains eight recommendations to the department aimed at reassessing its approach to and plans for the program—including its associated exposure to cost, schedule, and performance risks—and disclosing these risks and alternative courses of action for addressing them to DHS and congressional decision makers. The recommendations also provide for correcting the weaknesses surrounding the program’s unclear and constantly changing commitments and its life cycle management approach and processes, as well as implementing key requirements development and management and testing practices. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Secure Border Initiative (SBI) is a multiyear, multibillion-dollar program to secure the nation's borders through, among other things, new technology, increased staffing, and new fencing and barriers. The technology component of SBI, which is known as SBInet, involves the acquisition, development, integration, and deployment of surveillance systems and command, control, communications, and intelligence technologies. GAO was asked to testify on its draft report, which assesses DHS's efforts to (1) define the scope, timing, and life cycle management approach for planned SBInet capabilities and (2) manage SBInet requirements and testing activities. In preparing the draft report, GAO reviewed key program documentation, including guidance, plans, and requirements and testing documentation; interviewed program officials; analyzed a random probability sample of system requirements; and observed operations of the initial SBInet project.
What GAO Found
Important aspects of SBInet remain ambiguous and in a continued state of flux, making it unclear and uncertain what technology capabilities will be delivered and when, where, and how they will be delivered. For example, the scope and timing of planned SBInet deployments and capabilities have continued to be delayed without becoming more specific. Further, the program office does not have an approved integrated master schedule to guide the execution of the program, and the nature and timing of planned activities has continued to change. This schedule-related risk is exacerbated by the continuous change in, and the absence of a clear definition of, the approach that is being used to define, develop, acquire, test, and deploy SBInet. SBInet requirements have not been effectively defined and managed. While the program office recently issued guidance that is consistent with recognized leading practices, this guidance was not finalized until February 2008, and thus was not used in performing a number of important requirements-related activities. In the absence of this guidance, the program's efforts have been mixed. For example, while the program has taken steps to include users in developing high-level requirements, several requirements definition and management limitations exist. These include a lack of proper alignment (i.e., traceability) among the different levels of requirements, as evidenced by GAO's analysis of a random probability sample of requirements, which revealed large percentages that were not traceable backward to higher level requirements, or forward to more detailed system design specifications and verification methods. SBInet testing has also not been effectively managed. While a test management strategy was drafted in May 2008, it has not been finalized and approved, and it does not contain, among other things, a high-level master schedule of SBInet test activities, metrics for measuring testing progress, and a clear definition of testing roles and responsibilities. Further, the program office has not tested the individual system components to be deployed to the initial deployment locations, even though the contractor initiated testing of these components with other system components and subsystems in June 2008. In light of these circumstances, our soon to be issued report contains eight recommendations to the department aimed at reassessing its approach to and plans for the program, including its associated exposure to cost, schedule and performance risks, and disclosing these risks and alternative courses of action to DHS and congressional decision makers. The recommendations also provide for correcting the weaknesses surrounding the program's unclear and constantly changing commitments and its life cycle management approach and processes, as well as implementing key requirements development and management and testing practices. |
gao_GAO-09-682 | gao_GAO-09-682_0 | Coast Guard Has Assumed the Role of Systems Integrator but Lags in Applying Disciplined Asset- Level Processes as It Continues with Procurements
The Coast Guard has assumed the role of systems integrator for Deepwater, concurrently downsizing the scope of systems engineering and integration work under contract with ICGS. In conjunction with its role as systems integrator, the Coast Guard has undertaken a fundamental reassessment of the capabilities and mix of assets it needs to meet its Deepwater missions. Recognizing the importance of ensuring that each acquisition project is managed through a sustainable and repeatable process and wanting to adhere to proven acquisition procedures, in July 2008 the Coast Guard set a goal of completing the MSAM acquisition management activities for all Deepwater assets by the end of March 2009. Coast Guard Developing Better- Informed Cost and Schedule Estimates for Deepwater Assets, but Reporting May Not Keep Congress Fully Informed
Due in part to the Coast Guard’s increased insight into what it is buying, the anticipated cost, schedules, and capabilities of many of the Deepwater assets have changed since the establishment of the $24.2 billion baseline in 2007. Coast Guard officials have stated that this baseline reflected not a traditional cost estimate, but rather the anticipated contract costs as determined by ICGS. As the Coast Guard has developed its own cost baselines, it has become apparent that some of the assets will likely cost more than anticipated. Information to date shows that the total cost of the program will likely grow by at least $2.7 billion. While the Coast Guard plans to update its annual budget requests with this new information, the current structure of its budget submission to Congress does not include details at the asset level, such as estimates of total costs and total numbers to be procured. For the assets with revised cost estimates, this represents cost growth of approximately 39 percent. As baselines for the additional assets are approved, further cost growth will likely become apparent. Other federal agencies that acquire systems similar to those of the Coast Guard, such as the Department of Defense, capture these elements in justifications of their budget requests. Coast Guard Having Difficulty Staffing Government Acquisition Positions but Working to Improve Processes
The Coast Guard sought a systems integrator at the outset of the Deepwater Program in part because its workforce lacked the experience and depth to manage the acquisition internally. The Coast Guard acknowledges that it still faces challenges in hiring and retaining qualified acquisition personnel and that this situation poses a risk to the successful execution of its acquisition programs. According to human capital officials in the acquisition directorate, as of April 2009 the acquisition branch had funding for 855 military and civilian personnel and had filled 717 of these positions—leaving 16 percent unfilled. Even as it attempts to fill its current vacancies, the Coast Guard plans to increase the size of its acquisition workforce significantly by the end of fiscal year 2011. For example, the Coast Guard’s fiscal year 2010 budget request includes funding for 100 new acquisition workforce positions, and the Coast Guard anticipates requesting funding for additional positions in future budget requests. In addition to third-party experts, the Coast Guard has been increasing its use of support contractors. Conclusions
In assuming the role of systems integrator, the Coast Guard has made a major change in its management of the Deepwater Program, one that has increased its insight into the capabilities needed to fulfill Coast Guard missions, the costs and capabilities of what it is currently procuring, and what resources are needed to complete the acquisition. Further, as operational testing proceeds for Deepwater assets, the MSAM appears to be inconsistent with DHS policy and the recent directive on test and evaluation, which require operational test authorities to be independent of the system’s user. We supplemented this analysis with interviews of acquisition directorate officials, including contracting and Office of Acquisition Workforce Management officials and program and project managers to discuss current vacancy rates—especially for key acquisition positions such as contracting officials and systems engineers—and the Coast Guard’s plans to increase the size of the acquisition workforce. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Deepwater Program includes efforts to build or modernize ships and aircraft and to procure other capabilities. In 2002, the Coast Guard contracted with Integrated Coast Guard Systems (ICGS) to manage the acquisition as systems integrator. After a series of project failures, the Coast Guard announced in April 2007 that it would take over the lead role, with future work on individual assets bid competitively, and a program baseline of $24.2 billion was set. In June 2008, GAO reported on the Coast Guard's progress and made several recommendations, which the Coast Guard and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) have addressed. In response to a Senate report accompanying the DHS Appropriations Bill, 2009, GAO addressed (1) efforts to manage Deepwater, (2) changes in cost and schedule of the assets, and (3) efforts to build an acquisition workforce. GAO reviewed Coast Guard and DHS documents and interviewed officials.
What GAO Found
The Coast Guard has assumed the role of systems integrator for the overall Deepwater Program by reducing the scope of the work on contract with ICGS and assigning these functions to Coast Guard stakeholders. As part of its systems integration responsibilities, the Coast Guard has undertaken a fundamental reassessment of the capabilities, number, and mix of assets it needs and expects to complete this analysis by the summer of 2009. At the individual Deepwater asset level, the Coast Guard has improved and begun to apply the disciplined management process contained in its Major Systems Acquisition Manual (MSAM), but did not meet its goal of complete adherence to this process for all Deepwater assets by the end of March 2009. For example, key acquisition management activities--such as operational requirements documents and test plans--are not in place for assets with contracts or orders recently awarded (such as the Fast Response Cutter and C4ISR) or in production, placing the Coast Guard at risk of cost growth or schedule slips. In addition, the MSAM does not appear to be consistent with recent DHS policy that requires entities responsible for operational testing to be independent of the system's users. Due in part to the Coast Guard's increased insight into what it is buying, the anticipated cost, schedules, and capabilities of many Deepwater assets have changed since the $24.2 billion baseline was established in 2007. Coast Guard officials have stated that this baseline reflected not a traditional cost estimate, but rather the anticipated contract costs as determined by ICGS. As the Coast Guard has developed its own cost baselines for some assets, it has become apparent that some of these assets it is procuring will likely cost more than anticipated--up to $2.7 billion more based on information to date. This represents approximately 39 percent cost growth for the assets with revised cost estimates. As more cost baselines are developed and approved, further cost growth is likely. Updated baselines also indicate that schedules have slipped for several of the assets. In addition, the current structure of the Coast Guard's budget submission to Congress does not include details at the asset level, such as estimates of total costs and total numbers to be procured, as do those of the Department of Defense, which acquires similar systems. One reason the Coast Guard hired a contractor as a systems integrator was because it recognized that it lacked the experience and depth in workforce to manage the acquisition internally. The Coast Guard acknowledges that it still faces challenges in hiring and retaining qualified acquisition personnel and that this situation poses a risk to the successful execution of its acquisition programs. According to human capital officials in the acquisition directorate, as of April 2009, the acquisition branch had 16 percent of positions unfilled, including key jobs such as contracting officers and systems engineers. Even as it attempts to fill its current vacancies, the Coast Guard plans to increase the size of its acquisition workforce significantly; the fiscal year 2010 budget request includes funding for 100 new acquisition workforce positions. In the meantime, the Coast Guard has been increasing its use of support contractors. |
gao_GAO-04-391 | gao_GAO-04-391_0 | Background
The F/A-22 is planned to be an air superiority and ground attack aircraft with advanced features to make it less detectable to adversaries (stealth characteristics) and capable of high speeds for long ranges. It has integrated avionics that greatly improve pilots’ awareness of the situation surrounding them. Following a history of increasing cost estimates to complete the development phase of the F/A-22 program, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998 established a cost limitation for both the development and the production. Significant Changes Have Occurred in the F/A-22 Program during Nearly Two Decades of Development
The F/A-22 program has experienced several significant changes since it began development in 1986. First, the Air Force cannot afford to purchase the quantities of aircraft that were originally planned 18 years ago. Lastly, the Air Force has determined that new computer processors and architecture are needed to support some planned enhancements, which will further increase program costs and risk. These schedule extensions, delays, and cost increases were major contributors to changes in the Air Force’s initial plan to purchase 750 aircraft. To enhance the utility of the F/A-22, the Air Force plans to develop a robust air-to-ground attack capability to be able to engage a greater variety of ground targets, such as surface-to-air missile systems, that have posed a significant threat to U.S. aircraft in recent years. In March 2003, the Office of Secretary of Defense’s Cost Analysis Improvement Group (CAIG) estimated that the Air Force would need $11.7 billion for the planned modernization program. In addition, the F/A-22 program is not performing as expected in some other key performance areas, including reliability and maintenance support. This has led to the development test aircraft spending more time than planned on the ground undergoing maintenance. At the present time, the Air Force expects to complete IOT&E in October 2004, before the full rate production decision, now expected in December 2004. The Director of Operational Test and Evaluation, Office of Secretary of Defense, believes the start of testing will slip, although the Air Force maintains it will meet its schedule. DOD Did Not Provide Congress Sufficient Business Case Information to Justify Current Aircraft Quantities or Modernization Investment Plans
DOD has not provided Congress with sufficient information to support the business case for buying and modernizing the F/A-22 program. In its response, DOD did not sufficiently address key business case questions such as how many F/A-22s are needed, how many are affordable, and if alternatives to planned investments increasing the F/A-22 air-to-ground capabilities exist. Therefore, DOD must still make investment decisions affecting another $40 billion to support this program through full rate production and implementation of the spiraled modernization effort. In light of the uncertainty concerning how many aircraft are needed in today’s environment, the large investments that remain, and the unknown outcomes of planned initial operational testing, we continue to be concerned with DOD’s readiness to address a December 2004 decision to enter full rate production. Specifically, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following two actions: Complete a new business case analysis that determines the continued need for the F/A-22 and that specifically (a) addresses the need for an expanded air-to-ground capability and an assessment of alternatives, to include the feasibility of using other assets like the F-35 and unmanned aerial vehicles planned for the future; (b) justifies the quantity of F/A-22 aircraft needed to satisfy requirements for air-to-air and air-to-ground missions; and (c) provides evidence that the planned quantity is affordable within current budgets and the congressional funding limitation. F-22 Aircraft: Development Cost Goal Achievable If Major Problems Are Avoided. | Why GAO Did This Study
Following a history of increasing cost estimates to complete F/A-22 development, Congress asked GAO to assess the Air Force's F/A-22 development program annually and determine whether the Air Force is meeting key performance, schedule, and cost goals. On April 23, 2003, a congressional subcommittee requested that the Department of Defense (DOD) provide more detailed information on the business case that supports the estimated quantities and costs for an affordable F/A-22 program. Specifically, GAO (1) identified changes in the F/A-22 program since its inception, (2) reviewed the status of the development activities, and (3) examined the sufficiency of business case information provided for congressional oversight.
What GAO Found
The Air Force is developing the F/A-22 aircraft to be less detectable to adversaries, capable of high speeds for long ranges, and able to provide a pilot with improved awareness of the surrounding situation through integrated avionics. In addition, the Air Force plans to expand the F/A-22's ability to engage targets on the ground to provide a robust capability not originally planned at the start of the program. The Air Force plans to begin initial operational test and evaluation in March 2004 and to seek full rate production approval in December 2004. The F/A-22 program has experienced several significant changes since it began development in 1986. First, the Air Force cannot afford to purchase the quantities of aircraft that were planned 18 years ago. The Air Force had originally planned to buy 750 aircraft, but it now estimates it can only afford 218 aircraft. Second, in order to develop the expanded air-to-ground attack capability, the Office of Secretary of Defense estimates that the Air Force will need $11.7 billion in modernization funding. Lastly, the Air Force has determined that new avionics computer processors and architecture are needed to support most planned enhancements, which will further increase program costs and risk. Further, the development test program continues to experience problems and risks further delays. The F/A-22's avionics continue to experience shutdowns and failures. Moreover, the F/A-22 has not met its reliability requirements and has experienced failures in its computerized maintenance support system. This has led to aircraft spending more time on the ground undergoing maintenance. Due to the risks of future cost increases and schedule delays, a congressional subcommittee requested that DOD provide business case information on the F/A-22. However, the information DOD provided did not address why this aircraft is needed given current and projected threats. The business case also did not address how many aircraft the Air Force needs to accomplish its missions, how many the Air Force can afford considering the full life-cycle costs, whether investments in new air-to-ground capabilities are needed, and what are the opportunity costs associated with purchasing any proposed quantities of this aircraft. While the response stated that the Air Force still plans to buy 277 F/A-22 aircraft, the Air Force estimates that only 218 aircraft are affordable within congressionally imposed funding limitations. In addition, significant investment decisions remain and could affect another $40 billion to support this program through full rate production and implementation of the spiraled improvement efforts. In light of the uncertainty concerning how many aircraft are needed in today's environment, the large investments that remain, and unknown outcomes of planned operational testing, GAO continues to have concerns regarding the DOD's readiness to make a full rate production decision. |
gao_GAO-02-941 | gao_GAO-02-941_0 | Insurance and Reinsurance Markets Provide Catastrophe Risk Coverage and Capital Markets Add to Industry Capacity
Natural catastrophes are infrequent events that can cause severe financial losses. Hurricane Andrew and the Northridge earthquake provided an impetus for insurance companies and others to find different ways of raising capital to help cover catastrophic risk and helped spur the development of risk-linked securities and other alternatives to traditional reinsurance. Recent catastrophe bonds have been nonindemnity-based to limit moral hazard; therefore, they expose the sponsor to basis risk. Most catastrophe bonds issued to date have been noninvestment-grade bonds. 2. Currently, the industry representatives are considering using a structure that would receive tax treatment similar to the treatment received by an issuer of asset- or mortgage-backed securities. Expanded use of catastrophe bonds might occur with favorable implementing requirements, but such legislative actions may also create pressure from other industry sectors for similar tax treatment. Risk-Linked Securities Do Not Have Broad Investor Participation
Catastrophe bonds have not attracted a wide range of investors beyond institutional investors. Investor participation in risk-linked securities is limited in part because the risks of these securities are difficult to assess. Scope and Methodology
You asked us to report on the potential for risk-linked securities to cover catastrophic risks arising from natural events. To analyze how key regulatory, accounting, tax, and investor issues might affect the use of risk-linked securities, we examined a variety of documents, including books on insurance accounting and taxation, the Financial Accounting Standards Board’s (FASB) proposed consolidation principles for special-purpose entities, accounting firm publications, the National Association of Insurance Commissioners’ (NAIC) Statutory Accounting Principles, and the proceedings of NAIC’s Working Group on Securitization. However, low trading volumes on options also raised questions about liquidity risk. The NAIC formed a working group on Insurance Securitization in 1998 to “investigate whether there needs to be a regulatory response to continuing developments in insurance securitization, including the use of non-U.S. special purpose vehicles and to prepare educational material for regulators.” As a result of its deliberations, the NAIC has taken the position that U.S. insurance regulators should encourage the development of alternative sources of capacity such as insurance securitizations and risk linked securities as long as such developments are commensurate with the overriding goal of the NAIC membership of consumer protection. GAO Comments
1. | What GAO Found
Because of population growth, resulting real estate development, and using real estate values in hazard-prone areas, the nation is increasingly exposed to much higher property-casualty losses--both insured and uninsured--from natural catastrophes than in the past. In the 1990s, a series of natural disasters, (1) raised questions about the adequacy of the insurance industry's financial capacity to cover large catastrophes without limiting coverage or substantially raising premiums and (2) called attention to ways of raising additional sources of capital to help cover catastrophic risk. Catastrophe risk includes exposure to losses from natural disasters, such as hurricanes, earthquakes and tornadoes, which are infrequent events that can cause substantial financial loss but are difficult to reliably predict. The characteristics of natural disasters prompt most insurers to limit the amount and type of catastrophic risk they hold. Risk-linked securities that can be used to cover risk from natural catastrophes employ many structures and include catastrophic bonds and catastrophic options. GAO identified and analyzed several issues that might affect the use of risk-linked securities. First, the National Association of Insurance Commissioners and insurance industry representatives are considering revisions in the regulatory accounting treatment of risk transfer obtained from nonindemnity-based coverage that would allow credit to the insurer similar to that now afforded additional reinsurance. Such a revision has the potential to facilitate the use of risk-linked securities. Second, the Financial Accounting Standards Board is proposing a new U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles interpretation, which would increase independent capital investment requirements that allow the sponsor to treat special purpose reinsurance vehicles (SPRV) and similar entities as independent entities and report SPRV assets and liabilities separately. Third, "pass-through" tax treatment--which eliminates taxation at the SPRV level--with favorable implementing requirements could facilitate expanded use of catastrophe bonds. Finally, catastrophe bonds, most of which are noninvestment-grade instruments, have not been sold to a wide range of investors beyond institutional investors. |
gao_GAO-04-866 | gao_GAO-04-866_0 | These material deficiencies contributed to our disclaimer of opinion on the CFS and also constitute material weaknesses in internal control, which contributed to our adverse opinion on internal control. This report provides the details of the additional weaknesses we identified in our audit of the fiscal year 2003 and 2002 CFS and recommendations to correct those weaknesses. Allocation Methodology for Certain Costs in the Statement of Net Cost
Statement of Federal Financial Accounting Standard (SFFAS) No. Statement of Changes in Cash Balance from Unified Budget and Other Activities
As part of our fiscal year 2003 audit of the Statement of Changes in Cash Balance from Unified Budget and Other Activities (Statement of Changes in Cash Balance), we found (1) material differences between the net outlay records used by Treasury to prepare the Statement of Changes in Cash Balance and the total net outlays reported in selected federal agencies’ audited Statements of Budgetary Resources (SBR); (2) that the Statement of Changes in Cash Balance reported only the changes in the “operating” cash of the U.S. government rather than all cash, as it is reported on the U.S. government’s Balance Sheet; and (3) that the major program activities of the U.S. government relating to direct and guaranteed loans extended to the public were reported as a net amount on the Statement of Changes in Cash Balance rather than disclosed as gross amounts for receipts and disbursements of cash related to direct loans and loan guarantees. In addition, SFFAS No. Directly Linking Audited Federal Agency Financial Statements to the CFS
As we have reported in the past, Treasury’s current process for compiling the CFS did not directly link information from federal agencies’ audited financial statements to amounts reported in the CFS, and therefore Treasury could not fully ensure that the information in the CFS was consistent with the underlying information in federal agencies’ audited financial statements and other financial data. Prior Period Adjustments
According to SFFAS No. Changes in accounting principles are not errors and have different reporting requirements. Conformity with U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles
As we reported as part of our fiscal year 2002 audit, and found again during our fiscal year 2003 audit, Treasury lacks an adequate process to ensure that the financial statements, related notes, stewardship, and supplemental information in the CFS are presented in conformity with GAAP. During our fiscal year 2003 audit, we found 4 disclosure areas involving an additional 11 specific disclosures that may not have been in conformity with applicable standards. As a result of this and certain other weaknesses we identified, we were unable to determine if the missing information was material to the CFS. Recommendations for Executive Action. Treasury stated that our report identified issues regarding certain federal financial reporting procedures and internal controls and provided valuable advice and recommendations for improvements. This report contains recommendations to you. Status of Treasury’s and OMB’s Progress in Addressing GAO Recommendations for Preparing the CFS
The Secretary of the Treasury should direct the Fiscal Assistant Secretary, in connection with Treasury's current compilation process and the development of Treasury's new compilation system and process, to segregate the duties of individuals who have the capability to enter, change, and delete data within the Federal Agencies' Centralized Trial Balance System and the Hyperion database and post adjustments to the consolidated financial statements (CFS). Open. Open. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. | Why GAO Did This Study
For the past 7 years, since the first audit of the consolidated financial statements of the U.S. government (CFS), certain material weaknesses in internal control and financial reporting have resulted in conditions that have prevented GAO from expressing an opinion on the CFS. Specifically, GAO has reported that the federal government did not have adequate systems, controls, and procedures to properly prepare the CFS. In October 2003, GAO reported on weaknesses identified during the fiscal year 2002 audit regarding financial reporting procedures and internal control over the process for preparing the CFS. The purpose of this report is to (1) discuss additional weaknesses identified during the fiscal year 2003 audit, (2) recommend improvements to address those weaknesses, and (3) provide the status of corrective actions to address the 129 open recommendations contained in the October 2003 report.
What GAO Found
Many of the weaknesses in internal control that have contributed to GAO's continuing disclaimers of opinion on the CFS were identified by agency financial statement auditors during their audits of federal agencies' financial statements and have been reported in detail with recommendations to agencies in separate reports. However, some of the weaknesses GAO reported were identified during GAO's tests of the Department of the Treasury's process for preparing the CFS. Such weaknesses impair the federal government's ability to ensure that the CFS is consistent with the underlying audited agency financial statements, properly balanced, and in conformity with U.S. generally accepted accounting principles. In addition to the compilation and reporting weaknesses that GAO reported in October 2003, GAO found additional weaknesses in the compilation and reporting process in the following seven areas during the fiscal year 2003 CFS audit: (1) allocation methodology for certain costs in the statement of net cost, (2) statement of changes in cash balance from unified budget and other activities, (3) reporting of criminal debt, (4) recording and disclosing contingencies, (5) directly linking audited federal agency financial statements to the CFS, (6) prior period adjustments, and (7) conformity with U.S. generally accepted accounting principles. GAO found that with respect to four required disclosure areas, information was either not included in the CFS or was not presented in conformity with U.S. generally accepted accounting principles. As a result of this and certain other weaknesses GAO identified, GAO was unable to determine if the missing information was material to the CFS. The four disclosure areas were (1) federal employee and veteran benefits payable, (2) environmental and disposal liabilities, (3) research and development, and (4) deferred maintenance. GAO's October 2003 report contained 129 recommendations. Of those recommendations, 118 remained open as of February 20, 2004, the end of GAO's fieldwork for the fiscal year 2003 CFS audit. |
gao_GAO-16-596 | gao_GAO-16-596_0 | Women represent a large share of the population eligible for MHS services. For example, as of the end of fiscal year 2014, 49 percent of all eligible MHS health care beneficiaries aged 18 or older were female, and among active-duty servicemembers and their dependents served by the MHS, females represented 43 percent. Health care services for women represent a significant percentage of the care provided by domestic military hospitals. Each health system and hospital may select from a variety of measures for women’s health care services to assess the quality of care they provide, and to initiate efforts to improve the delivery of care. Almost All Domestic Military Hospitals Offered General Women’s Health Care Services, with Fewer Offering Specialty Care Services
As of July 2015, almost all of the 41 domestic military hospitals offered a basic or higher level of maternity and neonatal care services, although fewer offered more specialized levels of these services, according to military-service and NCR officials. All 41 hospitals offered general gynecological care, including contraceptive services and cervical cancer screenings, while fewer hospitals offered more specialized gynecological care, such as treatment for gynecological cancers. The MHS Draws on Expertise of Internal Advisory Groups and National Clinical Organizations to Select Quality Measures
According to MHS officials, the MHS selects quality measures for women’s health care services based on assessments and input from advisory groups at multiple levels of the MHS, including at the department, military-service, and hospital levels. Specifically, members of these advisory groups participate in the activities of national clinical organizations and educate their colleagues within the MHS about new developments in health-care quality assessment, including new quality measures. According to MHS and military service and NCR officials, coordination of the selection of quality measures for women’s health care services across the military services has increased in the past several years. For example, the PAG, which coordinates the MHS’s efforts to improve the quality of maternity and neonatal care, annually reviews quality measures. The dashboard is intended to provide more timely quality information to providers during a patient’s hospital stay. The MHS Selected 90 Quality Measures for Women’s Health Care Services in 2015 and Used Them in a Variety of Quality Improvement Activities
In 2015, the MHS selected 90 quality measures for women’s health care services, which were collected across all three services and NCR. In 2015, the MHS Collected Data on 90 Quality Measures for Women’s Health Care Services in Military Hospitals
In 2015, the MHS collected data for 90 quality measures related to maternity, neonatal, and gynecological care. Seventy-three of the 90 women’s health care services quality measures that the MHS collected data on in 2015 were related to maternity or neonatal care, and included measures related to areas that had been identified nationally as being problematic, such as high rates of maternal morbidity and elective cesarean sections and low rates of breastfeeding. Seventeen of the 90 women’s health care services quality measures that the MHS collected data on in 2015 were related to gynecological care, including surgery and preventive screening. Gynecological surgery measures included 14 measures from the National Surgical Quality Improvement Program (NSQIP), which identified the rate of different types of adverse outcomes within 30 days following surgery. The MHS, the Military Services and NCR, and Individual Military Hospitals Used Quality Measures to Identify and Implement Quality Improvement Activities
In 2015, the MHS, the military services and NCR, and individual military hospitals used information from the data they collected through quality measurement efforts to identify and implement quality improvement activities. For example, according to MHS officials, the MHS 2015 Perinatal Quality Initiative was implemented across all military hospitals in response to a finding that postpartum hemorrhage rates were higher in military hospitals compared to certain civilian hospitals. This initiative addressed various processes of care, including training for military hospital staff, conducting postpartum hemorrhage simulation drills, and implementing quality tools. Agency Comments
We are not making recommendations in this report. We provided DOD with a draft copy of this report for review and comment. DOD provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. Appendix II: Location and Number of Beds of Domestic Military Hospitals by Military Service
In 2015, the Military Health System’s direct care system included 41 domestic military hospitals across the three military services (Army, Navy, and Air Force), and the National Capital Region (NCR). | Why GAO Did This Study
DOD provides health care services to active-duty servicemembers, their dependents, and others, in part through direct care provided at military hospitals and clinics located on military bases. Women represent a significant percentage of the population eligible for MHS services, comprising nearly half of the 7 million adults eligible for coverage at the end of fiscal year 2014.
In recent years, DOD’s study of the quality of care in the MHS raised questions about the quality of health care at military hospitals, including the quality of women’s health care services. The Carl Levin and Howard P. “Buck” McKeon National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015 included a provision for GAO to describe the availability of women’s health care services at military hospitals, particularly maternity care, and the measurement and monitoring of the quality of these services.
This report describes: (1) the extent to which women’s health care services are available to servicemembers and other beneficiaries at domestic military hospitals; (2) how the MHS selects quality measures for women’s health care services provided at military hospitals; and (3) the quality measures that the MHS has selected for women’s health care services and how they are used to improve the quality of care. GAO reviewed documentation, information, and data provided by DOD and the military services, on women’s health care services available as of July 2015, and interviewed officials from DOD, the military services and NCR, and six hospitals (selected based on military service, geographic diversity, and volume of deliveries).
What GAO Found
Almost all of the domestic military hospitals in the Department of Defense’s (DOD) Military Health System (MHS) offered general women’s health care services, including general maternity, neonatal, and gynecological care, with fewer offering specialty care services. Specifically, according to officials from the three military services and the National Capital Region (NCR) (which includes two military hospitals in the Washington, D.C. area), 37 of the 41 domestic military hospitals offered a basic or specialized level of maternity and neonatal care services, although fewer offered more specialized levels of these services. All of the 41 hospitals offered general gynecological care, including contraceptive services and cervical cancer screenings, while fewer offered more specialized care, such as treatment for gynecological cancers, according to officials.
According to MHS officials, the MHS selects quality measures for women’s health care services based on assessments and input from advisory groups at multiple levels of the MHS, including at the department, military service, and hospital levels. Members of these advisory groups participate in the activities of national clinical organizations and educate their colleagues within the MHS about new developments in health-care quality assessment, including new quality measures. According to officials from the MHS and all three services and NCR, coordination of the selection of quality measures for women’s health care services across the military services and NCR has increased in the past several years, including for the selection of measures to include in a perinatal quality measures “dashboard,” which is being developed to provide more timely quality information to providers during the patient’s stay in the hospital.
In 2015, the MHS collected data for 90 quality measures related to maternity, neonatal, and gynecological care, a number of which related to areas that had been identified nationally as being problematic and associated with high rates of maternal morbidity. In maternity and neonatal care, for example, data was collected on elective deliveries (where the birth is facilitated, such as with medication or surgical cesarean section, without a medical indication). For gynecological care, the MHS collected data for quality measures related to prevention, such as screenings for breast and cervical cancer, and gynecological surgery, such as morbidity rates within 30 days following surgery. The MHS, the military services and NCR, and individual military hospitals used the data collected to identify areas for quality improvement and implement related improvement activities. For example, MHS officials told GAO that the MHS’s 2015 Perinatal Quality Initiative was implemented across all military hospitals in response to a finding that postpartum hemorrhage rates were higher in military hospitals compared to certain civilian hospitals. This initiative included training for hospital staff, clinical simulation drills, and using quality tools to help providers prepare for and carry out steps to minimize the risk and negative outcomes of the condition. Officials reported that after implementation of the initiative, postpartum hemorrhage rates decreased, on average, across the MHS.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is not making recommendations in this report. DOD reviewed a draft of this report and provided technical comments, which GAO incorporated as appropriate. |
gao_GAO-14-726 | gao_GAO-14-726_0 | As table 3 illustrates, the majority of the OIG’s audit and inspection reports issued in fiscal years 2012 and 2013 addressed issues at the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). Of these 200 reports, 166 reports involved audits of FEMA grants, including 118 reports on Disaster Assistance Grants. OIG Reports Covered All Reported DHS Management Challenges and High-Risk Areas
Of the 361 audit and inspection reports issued during fiscal years 2012 and 2013, we found that 355 OIG reports pertained to the department’s management challenges reported by the OIG. However, we identified three areas—coordinating with the FBI, protecting employees’ identities, and obtaining legal advice—in which the OIG’s policies and procedures could be improved to better meet its responsibilities. For example, the DHS OIG has its own Office of Counsel, which is currently headed by a Deputy Counsel to the IG. DHS OIG’s Roles and Responsibilities Are Generally in Accordance with the IG Act
The DHS OIG’s policies and procedures contained in its manuals and directives indicate that the OIG’s roles and responsibilities are generally consistent with selected requirements of the IG Act. The IG Act requires OIGs to recommend policies for, and to conduct, supervise, or coordinate relationships between, the OIG and other federal agencies with respect to the identification and prosecution of participants in fraud or abuse. OIG Lacks Adequate Controls to Protect Identities of Employees Filing Complaints
The OIG receives and reviews complaints filed by DHS employees and the public regarding allegations of misconduct, including criminal misconduct, by DHS employees. The IG Act requires that IGs shall not, after receipt of a complaint or information from an employee, disclose the identity of the employee without his or her consent unless the IG determines that such disclosure is unavoidable during the course of an investigation. In its recent report on an investigation into allegations of misconduct by the former Acting IG, the Subcommittee on Financial and Contracting Oversight, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, reported that the former Acting IG inappropriately sought advice from the department’s counsel, according to former OIG officials.interviewed former and current OIG officials and reviewed various e-mails provided that indicated the former Acting IG sought legal advice from a counsel at the department on several occasions. The OIG’s Deputy Counsel stated that he was considering whether to develop a policy and that he has asked a working group to draft guidelines on consultations between the OIG and the department’s counsel. The OIG Audit Manual describes how OIG audit staff should document their independence. For example, as a result of an impairment to the former Acting IG’s independence that was not identified in a timely manner, several audits and inspections were affected in fiscal year 2012. The OIG has made some meaningful changes to its structure to try to address concerns about the integrity and independence of the OIG. Although the former Acting IG was required to sign an annual certificate of independence reminding him of independence requirements, the OIG did not have a policy that these certificates be collected and maintained centrally, which would improve management’s ability to monitor compliance with independence requirements. To help avoid any impairment to independence when seeking legal advice, we recommend that the OIG develop a policy for obtaining legal advice from counsel reporting either directly to the IG or another IG and work with the IG’s counsel to establish guidelines for when it would be appropriate for the OIG to consult with the department’s counsel. GAO staff members who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The joint explanatory statement accompanying the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Appropriations Act, 2013, directed GAO to review the Office of Inspector General’s (OIG) organizational structure and whether its audit, investigation, and inspection functions are organizationally structured to ensure that independence standards are met. This report provides the results of our review to determine (1) the coverage that the OIG’s audits and inspections provided of DHS’s key component agencies, management challenges, and high-risk areas; (2) the extent to which the OIG’s organizational structure and roles and responsibilities were consistent with the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended (IG Act); and (3) the extent to which the design of OIG’s policies and procedures for planning, reviewing, and reporting on audit, inspection, and investigation results was consistent with applicable independence standards. | Why GAO Did This Study
The DHS OIG plays a critical role in strengthening accountability throughout DHS. The OIG received about $141 million in fiscal year 2013 appropriations to carry out this oversight.
The joint explanatory statement to the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2013, directed GAO to review the OIG and its organizational structure for meeting independence standards. This report examines (1) the coverage the OIG's audits and inspections provided of DHS's component agencies, management challenges, and high-risk areas; (2) the extent to which the OIG's organizational structure, roles, and responsibilities were consistent with the IG Act; and (3) the extent to which the design of the OIG's policies and procedures was consistent with applicable independence standards.
To address these objectives, GAO obtained relevant documentation, such as selected reports and OIG policies and procedures, and compared this information to the IG Act and independence standards. GAO also interviewed officials from the OIG, DHS components, and the FBI.
What GAO Found
During fiscal years 2012 and 2013, the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Office of Inspector General (OIG) issued 361 audit and inspection reports that collectively cover key components, management challenges identified by the OIG, and relevant high-risk areas identified by GAO. Of the 361 reports, 200 pertained solely to the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)—the DHS component with the largest budget. Of those FEMA reports, 118 reports involved audits of disaster assistance grants.
The OIG's organizational structure, roles, and responsibilities are generally consistent with the Inspector General (IG) Act of 1978, as amended (IG Act). In 2013, the OIG made changes to its structure to enhance independence and oversight, including establishing an Office of Integrity and Quality Oversight. However, areas for improvement exist for the OIG to better meet its responsibilities.
The OIG has not reached agreement with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) on coordinating and sharing border corruption information. The IG Act requires OIGs to recommend policies for and to conduct, supervise, or coordinate relationships with other federal agencies regarding cases of fraud or abuse. The Senate Appropriations Committee directed DHS to report jointly with the OIG and other DHS components on plans for working with the FBI.
The OIG lacks adequate controls to protect identities of employees filing complaints because its process for recording complaints involves significant manual procedures, without review, that can be subject to human error. The IG Act requires that OIGs not disclose the identity of an employee filing a complaint without the employee's consent unless such disclosure is unavoidable during the course of an investigation. The OIG is aware of these issues and is developing standard operating procedures.
The OIG does not have a policy for obtaining legal advice from its own counsel or guidelines specifying when it is appropriate to consult with the department's counsel. The former Acting IG requested legal help from a counsel at the department for 4 months, and it was not clear if this request was for appropriate matters. The IG Act requires the IG to obtain legal advice from a counsel reporting directly to the IG or another IG. The OIG Deputy Counsel has asked a working group to draft guidelines on consultations with the department's counsel.
The OIG's policies and procedures are consistent with independence standards. However, OIG senior executives did not always comply with the policy to annually complete certificates of independence. Because the OIG does not centrally maintain the certifications, management's ability to monitor compliance is hindered. For example, no certificate of independence could be found for the former Acting IG. As a result of an impairment to the former Acting IG's independence that was not identified in a timely manner, the OIG had to reissue six reports for fiscal year 2012 to add an explanatory statement about the impairment. External peer reviews of the OIG's audit function, completed in 2009 and 2012, also found that OIG staff, including senior executives, had not documented their independence as required.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is making three recommendations for improving controls over processing complaints, obtaining legal advice, and monitoring compliance with independence standards. The IG concurred with GAO's recommendations and described actions being taken to address them. |
gao_RCED-97-3 | gao_RCED-97-3_0 | All of these sources of capital are affected by federal policies. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Because of continuing widespread interest in airport privatization, the Chairman and Ranking Minority Member of the Subcommittee on Aviation, House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, requested that we undertake a study to examine the current extent of private sector participation at commercial airports in the United States and foreign countries; the current incentives and barriers to the sale or lease of airports; and the potential implications for major stakeholders, such as the passengers, airlines, and local, state, and federal governments, should airports be sold or leased. At the Largest Airports, Most Services Are Provided by the Private Sector
Most of the people working at the nation’s largest airports are employed by the private sector. To Attract Private Capital, Airports Must Demonstrate That Revenue Will Be Sufficient to Cover Debt Payments
The use of private investment funds, such as bonds, is subject to the scrutiny of credit rating agencies. 1.2). However, considerable legal barriers currently block the sale or lease of U.S. airports. First, they note that private entities would provide additional private capital to help finance airport development. Few Public Sponsors Have Sustained Efforts to Sell or Lease Commercial Airports in the United States
As of October 1996, only one of the ten attempts by public owners to sell or lease U.S. commercial airports to a private entity has been successfully implemented (see table 3.1). However, the proposal also states that FAA does not intend to discourage privatization and will consider privatization proposals on a case-by-case basis. The proposal further states that the FAA will remain open and flexible in specifying conditions on the use of airport revenue that will protect the public interest and fulfill revenue diversion restrictions without interfering with privatization. However, FAA has not specified these conditions. Implications of the Sale or Lease of Airports for Various Stakeholders Depend on Several Factors
How the sale or lease of airports would affect local and state governments, airlines, passengers, and the federal government depends on several factors, including how privatization is implemented, how privatized airports might be regulated, and the unique characteristics of each airport, such as its size and future revenue potential. The Congress recently established a pilot program for airport privatization. Up to five airports can participate in the pilot program. Also, the Secretary must determine that the sale or lease agreement would meet several conditions, including the following: the airport would remain available to public use; airport operations would not be interrupted if the operator went bankrupt; the private owner or lessee would maintain and improve the facilities; airline fees would not increase faster than the rate of inflation, unless a higher amount is approved by 65 percent of the airlines that service the airport; general aviation fees would not increase faster than airline fees; safety and security would be maintained at the highest levels; and noise and environmental effects would be mitigated to the same extent as at a publicly owned airport. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed issues relating to airport privatization in the United States, focusing on: (1) the extent of private sector participation at commercial airports in the United States and foreign countries; (2) incentives and barriers to the sale or lease of airports; and (3) the potential implications for major stakeholders, such as the passengers, airlines, and local, state, and federal governments, should airports be sold or leased.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) none of the nation's commercial airports has ever been sold to the private sector, and only one has ever been leased, nevertheless, employees of private companies including airlines, concessionaires, and contractors account for 90 percent of all employees at the nation's largest airports; (2) the largest source of capital for airport development is long-term bond debt secured by future airport revenue and subject to the scrutiny of credit rating agencies; (3) in other countries, a majority of airports are owned and operated by their national governments, but 50 countries have sought greater private sector involvement in their airports; (4) several factors, such as providing additional private capital for development, are motivating greater interest in privatization, but legal and economic constraints impede the sale or lease of U.S. airports; (5) although FAA has permitted and even encouraged some limited forms of privatization, it has generally discouraged the sale or lease of an entire airport to a private entity; (6) FAA proposed policy on the use of airport revenue states that FAA will consider privatization proposals on a case-by-case basis and will be flexible in specifying conditions on the use of airport revenue that will protect the public interest and fulfill restrictions on diverting revenue without interfering with privatization, but FAA has not specified these conditions; (7) predicting how various stakeholders might be affected by the sale or lease of airports largely depends on how such privatization might ultimately be implemented; (8) recognizing the barriers to and the opportunity to test the potential benefits of privatization, Congress established an airport privatization pilot program and, as of October 9, 1996, the Secretary of Transportation can exempt up to 5 airports from some legal requirements that impede their sale or lease to private entities; and (9) the pilot program also requires that a sale or lease agreement meet certain conditions, such as requiring that the private owner or lessee maintain airport safety and security at the highest levels. |
gao_GAO-02-856 | gao_GAO-02-856_0 | Participation in Joint Experimentation Continues to Evolve
Since it first began joint experimentation, the Joint Forces Command has broadened and deepened the inclusion of other DOD organizations, federal agencies and departments, the private sector, and allies and coalition partners in its process for capturing and identifying new joint ideas and innovations. Stakeholders Generally Satisfied but Point to Some Possible Improvements
Officials at the military services, the combatant commands, and other DOD organizations we talked with said they were generally satisfied with the opportunities for input provided by the Joint Forces Command. No Recommendations for Change Have Been Approved or Implemented
Nearly 4 years after the program was established, only three recommendations have flowed from the joint experimentation program, and none of them have been approved. Confusion about proposed changes in guidance regarding the information required for submitting these recommendations has partly delayed their approval. Some Key Management Elements Are Missing
DOD has been providing more specific and clearer guidance on its goals, expectations, and priorities for the joint experimentation program. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve the management of DOD’s joint experimentation program, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to approve and issue guidance that clearly defines the information required to accompany joint experimentation recommendations for the Joint Requirements Oversight Council’s review and approval and require the Commander in Chief of the U.S. Joint Forces Command to develop strategic planning tools to use in managing and periodically assessing the progress of its joint experimentation program. Joint concept development and experimentation program initiated. Joint Forces Command assumed responsibility as the executive agent for joint experimentation. | What GAO Found
The Department of Defense (DOD) considers the transformation of the U.S. military a strategic imperative to meet the security challenges of the new century. In October 1998, DOD established a joint concept development and experimentation program to provide the engine of change for this transformation. In the nearly 4 years since becoming the executive agent for joint concept development and experimentation, the Joint Forces Command has increased in participation of key DOD stakeholders--the military services, the combatant commands, and other organizations and agencies--in its experimentation activities. The Command has also expanded the participation of federal agencies and departments, academia, the private sector, and some foreign allies. No recommendations flowing from joint experimentation have been approved or implemented. Although the Joint Forces Command issued three recommendations nearly a year ago, they were not approved by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council because of confusion among the Joint Staff and the Joint Forces Command about a proposed change in guidance that required additional data be included when submitting these recommendations. Although DOD has been providing more specific and clearer guidance for joint experimentation, DOD and the Joint Forces Command are missing some key management elements that are generally considered necessary for successful program management. |
gao_GAO-15-566 | gao_GAO-15-566_0 | DOD Expects to Play a Supporting Role to Other Federal Agencies Involved in the Arctic Based on a Low Level of Military Threat and Is Monitoring the Security Environment for Changes
Recent strategic guidance on the Arctic establishes a supporting role for DOD relative to other federal agencies, based on a low level of military threat expected in the region. However, DOD continues to monitor the security environment in the region and is tracking indicators that, depending on the outcomes, could change its threat assessment and affect the department’s future role. Between the release of the National Strategy in May 2013 and the Implementation Plan in January 2014, DOD issued its Arctic Strategy in November 2013. The strategy establishes the department’s strategic approach to the Arctic and identifies the timeframes to be used for planning: near-term (present–2020), mid-term (2020–2030), and far-term (beyond 2030).The Arctic Strategy emphasizes that as sea ice diminishes and the Arctic opens to more activity, DOD may have an increased role supporting other federal agencies in the region. This senior-level event is aimed at building confidence and encouraging discussion of the Arctic among the security forces of Arctic and non-Arctic nations. DOD also leads and is involved in a number of training exercises focused on the Arctic to build partner capacity in the region. For example, DOD leads the annual Arctic Zephyr exercise—a multilateral scenario-based exercise that focuses on search and rescue operations in the Arctic. In addition, DOD is identified as a supporting agency for a number of other activities identified in the implementation plan, including efforts focused on communications in the Arctic. DOD Is Updating Its Regional Plans for the Arctic and Conducting Analysis to Determine Future Capability Needs, but the Uncertain Pace of Climate Change and Commercial Activity May Affect Its Timelines
U.S. Northern Command—the DOD advocate for Arctic capabilities—is in the process of updating its regional plans based on recent DOD guidance and is conducting analysis to determine future capability needs. Northern Command is updating the Commander’s Estimate for the Arctic, which establishes the commander’s intent and missions in the Arctic and identifies near-, mid-, and long-term goals. Northern Command is reviewing other Arctic mission areas including maritime mine countermeasures, undersea surveillance, and maritime domain awareness. DOD’s Arctic Strategy further states that the uncertainty around the pace of change creates a challenge for the department to balance the risk of having inadequate capabilities or insufficient capacity when required to perform these operations with the cost of making premature or unnecessary investments. According to the strategy, DOD will mitigate this risk by monitoring the changing Arctic conditions to determine the appropriate timing for future capability investments. This variable rate of change can affect DOD’s ability to plan for future conditions in the region. Agency Comments
We are not making any recommendations in this report. DOD provided written technical comments, which we incorporated into the report as appropriate. Appendix II: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of this report are to determine (1) the role the Department of Defense (DOD) expects to play in the Arctic based on recent strategic guidance and its assessment of the security environment in the region, (2) the actions, if any, DOD has taken to address near-term capability needs, and (3) the efforts DOD has under way to update plans for the Arctic and identify future capability needs. To identify the role DOD expects to play in the Arctic based on recent strategic guidance and its assessment of the security environment in the region, we reviewed national, DOD, military service, and combatant command strategies and guidance that have been developed on the Arctic including the 2013 National Strategy for the Arctic Region, DOD’s November 2013 Arctic Strategy, and the U.S. Navy’s February 2014 Arctic Roadmap for 2014-2030, among others. In June 2015, we issued a classified version of this report that includes detailed information on the security environment in the Arctic and indicators that my change DOD’s threat assessment. | Why GAO Did This Study
Decreasing seasonal sea ice in the Arctic has made some Arctic waters navigable for longer periods and, as a result, may contribute to new economic opportunities in commercial shipping, oil exploration, and tourism. This could eventually increase the need for a U.S. military and homeland security presence in the Arctic, particularly in the maritime environment.
House Report 113-446, which accompanied a bill for the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015, included a provision that GAO review DOD's Arctic capabilities.
This report discusses (1) the role of DOD in the Arctic based on recent strategic guidance and its assessment of the security environment in the region, (2) the actions taken by DOD to address near-term capability needs, and (3) the efforts DOD has under way to update plans for the Arctic and identify future capability needs.
GAO reviewed national, DOD, military service, and combatant command strategies; reviewed studies on near-term capabilities needed and examined efforts initiated to address those needs based on supporting documentation; reviewed Northern Command's regional plans that cover the Arctic and identified ongoing planning activities; and interviewed agency officials. GAO also issued a classified version of this report in June 2015 that includes details on the Arctic's security environment.
GAO is not making any recommendations in this report. DOD provided written technical comments, which we incorporated into the report as appropriate.
What GAO Found
Recent strategic guidance on the Arctic issued by the administration and the Department of Defense (DOD) establish a supporting role for the department relative to other federal agencies, based on a low level of military threat expected in the region. In January 2014 the administration issued the Implementation Plan to the National Strategy for the Arctic Region that designated DOD as having a largely supporting role for the activities outlined in the plan. Additionally, DOD's Arctic Strategy issued in November 2013 and the Navy's Arctic Roadmap 2014-2030 issued in February 2014 emphasize that, as sea ice diminishes and the Arctic Ocean opens to more activity, the department may be called upon more frequently to support other federal agencies and work with partners to ensure a secure and stable region. To further its role, DOD participates in a number of forums focused on military security cooperation in the Arctic, including the Arctic Security Forces Roundtable, a senior-level event aimed at encouraging discussion among the security forces of Arctic and non-Arctic nations. In addition, DOD leads training exercises focused on building partner capacity in the region, including Arctic Zephyr, a multilateral scenario-based exercise. DOD continues to monitor the security environment in the region and is tracking indicators that could change its threat assessment and affect DOD's future role.
U.S. Northern Command—the DOD advocate for Arctic capabilities—stated that it is in the process of updating its regional plans for the Arctic and is conducting analysis to determine future capability needs. For example, Northern Command is updating the Commander's Estimate for the Arctic, which establishes the commander's intent and missions in the Arctic and identifies near-, mid-, and long-term goals. Additionally, the command is conducting studies of various Arctic mission areas, such as maritime homeland defense and undersea surveillance, to identify future capability needs. However, according to DOD's Arctic Strategy , uncertainty remains around the pace of change and commercial activity in the region that may affect its planning timelines. Difficulty in developing accurate sea ice models, variability in the Arctic's climate, and the uncertain rate of activity in the region create challenges for DOD to balance the risk of having inadequate capabilities or insufficient capacity when required to operate in the region with the cost of making premature or unnecessary investments. According to its Arctic Strategy , DOD plans to mitigate this risk by monitoring the changing Arctic conditions to determine the appropriate timing for capability investments. |
gao_GAO-01-545 | gao_GAO-01-545_0 | The International Agency for Research on Cancer, a part of the World Health Organization, is coordinating a series of large epidemiological studies looking at whether there is an association between mobile phone use and brain cancer. Given this situation, the federal government’s role in providing the public with clear information on this issue is particularly important. FDA’s consumer information on mobile phone health issues, however, has not been revised since 1999 and does not reflect more recent studies and research developments. Although informative, the update has not been revised since 1999, and consequently does not discuss the significance of major, recently published research studies that have been reported and debated in the media. One of the requirements for CTIA certification is that manufacturers include the text of FDA’s “Consumer Update on Mobile Phones” in the packaging of the phones. Conclusions
Scientific research to date does not demonstrate that the radiofrequency energy emitted from mobile phones has adverse health effects, but the findings of some studies have raised questions indicating the need for further investigation. Although the initiative is being funded solely by the industry, FDA’s active role in setting the research agenda and providing scientific oversight should help alleviate concerns about the objectivity of industry- funded research. | What GAO Found
The consensus of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), the World Health Organization, and other major health agencies is that the research to date does not show radiofrequency energy emitted from mobile phones has harmful health effects, but there is not yet enough information to conclude that they pose no risk. Although most of the epidemiological and laboratory studies done on this issue have found no adverse health effects, the findings of some studies have raised questions about cancer and other health problems that require further study. The Cellular Telecommunication & Internet Association (CTIA) and FDA will jointly conduct research on mobile phone health affects. Although the initiative is funded solely by CTIA, FDA's active role in setting the research agenda and providing scientific oversight should help alleviate concerns about the objectivity of the report. The media has widely reported on the debate over whether mobile phones can cause health problems. Thus, the federal government's role in providing the public with clear information on this issue is particularly important. FDA has a consumer information update on mobile phone health issues but has not revised that data since October 1999. Consequently FDA does not discuss the significance of major, recently published research studies that have been reported in the press. FDA said that it has not revised the update because the scientific picture has not changed significantly. |
gao_GAO-03-450 | gao_GAO-03-450_0 | Numerous studies over the past decade by OPM, MSPB, NAPA, the Partnership for Public Service, the National Commission on the Public Service, and GAO have noted problems with the federal hiring process. Although, as noted above, nearly all HR directors and others note that the time to hire is too long for most federal hires. In July 2002, NAPA reported that federal “hiring remains a slow and tedious process.” The report noted that “Many managers are attempting to rebuild a pipeline of entry level employees in this very competitive labor market, yet current hiring methods do not keep pace with the private sector.”
In September 2002, MSPB said that the federal hiring process has a number of key problems including “overly complex and ineffective hiring authorities” and “inadequate, time-consuming assessment procedures.”
In November 2002, OPM in its strategic plan for 2002 through 2007 stated, “ There is a general perception that our hiring process takes too long and may not provide well-qualified candidates.”
In January 2003, the National Commission on the Public Service said, “Recruitment to federal jobs is heavily burdened by ancient and illogical procedures that vastly complicate the application process and limit the hiring flexibility of individual managers.”
Not only does the current hiring process not serve agencies and managers well as they seek to obtain the right people with the right skills, but applicants can be dissuaded from public service by the complex and lengthy process. OPM and the agencies we studied have taken steps to address some of these hiring obstacles. OPM points out that the classification standards and process need to be reformed. OPM recognizes that it must do more to improve assessment tools. The Rule of Three Limits Managers’ Choice of Quality Candidates
One of the largest obstacles to the federal hiring process mentioned in our interviews with HR directors was the rule of three. Conclusions
Improving the federal hiring process is critical as the number of new hires is expected to increase substantially to address the security needs arising from the terrorists attacks of September 11, 2001, and to replace the large number of employees expected to retire over the next few years. Recommendations for Executive Action
OPM’s hiring initiatives are moving in the direction that will help agencies improve their hiring processes. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
As agreed with the requesters and in accordance with discussions with their offices, the objectives of this study were to identify major factors that hamper or delay the federal hiring process; provide examples of innovative practices or approaches used by selected agencies to improve their hiring processes and have the potential to be adapted by other agencies; and identify opportunities for the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), agencies, and others to improve the federal hiring process. Next we gathered information on our three objectives by conducting semistructured interviews with the HR directors of the 24 largest federal departments and agencies. In order to provide examples of innovative practices or approaches used by selected agencies to improve their hiring processes and that have the potential to be adapted by other agencies, we conducted a second phase of interviews at five selected agencies from February through November 2002: Department of Agriculture’s Agricultural Research Service (ARS) and Forest Service (FS), U. S. Geological Survey (USGS), U.S. Census Bureau (Census), and Department of the Army (Army). 3. We recommend that OPM help agencies improve all applicant assessment tools. 6. | Why GAO Did This Study
Improving the federal hiring process is critical, as the number of new hires is expected to increase substantially. Federal agencies are responsible for their hiring processes, but must generally comply with applicable Office of Personnel Management (OPM) rules and regulations. Congressional requesters asked GAO to identify federal hiring obstacles, provide examples of innovative hiring practices, and identify opportunities for improvement. To address these issues, GAO interviewed the human resources directors in 24 largest departments and agencies, analyzed the hiring practices of five federal executive branch agencies, and reviewed OPM's role in the hiring process.
What GAO Found
There is widespread recognition that the current federal hiring process all too often does not meet the needs of agencies in achieving their missions, managers in filling positions with the right talent, and applicants for a timely, efficient, transparent, and merit-based process. Numerous studies over the past decade have noted problems with the federal hiring process. Nearly all of the federal human resource directors from the 24 largest federal agencies told us that it takes too long to hire quality employees. According to data compiled by OPM, the estimated time to fill a competitive service position was typically more than 3 months, with some human resources directors citing examples of hiring delays exceeding 6 months. The competitive hiring process is hampered by inefficient or ineffective practices, including defining a vacant job and pay that is bound by narrow federal classification standards, unclear job announcements, the quality of certain applicant assessment tools, time-consuming panels to evaluate applicants, and the "rule of three" that limits selecting managers choice of candidates. Equally important, agencies need to develop their hiring systems using a strategic and results-oriented approach. GAO studied five agencies that human capital experts identified as having taken steps to improve parts of the hiring process--the U.S. Geological Survey, the Department of the Army, the U.S. Census Bureau, and the Department of Agriculture's Agricultural Research Service and Forest Service. Some of these practices might help agencies across government improve their hiring processes. OPM recognizes that the federal hiring process needs reform and has a major initiative to study the federal hiring process. OPM's efforts will be most effective to the extent to which they help transform agency hiring practices from process focused to mission-focused hiring tools that are more closely integrated into agencies strategic plans. |
gao_GAO-01-662 | gao_GAO-01-662_0 | Funding for these agencies to pursue fraud and abuse in federal health care programs is available from the Health Care Fraud and Abuse Control Program (HCFAC). The magnitude of improper payments throughout Medicaid is unknown, although a few states have attempted to determine the level by measuring the accuracy of their program’s payments. As we recently reported, the Medicare program devotes little more than one-fourth of 1 percent of its program expenditures to safeguarding payments. States’ Postpayment Detection Activities and Capabilities Differ
Just as states are uneven in their efforts to prevent improper payments, they also vary in their ability to detect improperly paid claims. Current Federal Role Focuses on Technical Assistance
HCFA and the OIG—the agencies that are responsible for the Medicaid program at the federal level—are taking steps to promote effective Medicaid program integrity by providing technical help to the states to facilitate states’ efforts. The federal government has provided technical assistance and a forum for information exchange for the states, as well as some guidance. Scope and Methodology
As we developed our work on this report, we focused on the risk of improper Medicaid fee-for-service payments, states’ efforts to address improper payments—including efforts to investigate and prosecute fraud— and the guidance and oversight the states are receiving from federal oversight agencies. | What GAO Found
State Medicaid programs make a wide variety of payments to individuals, institutions, and managed health care plans for services provided to beneficiaries whose eligibility status may fluctuate because of changes in income. Because of the size and the nature of the program, Medicaid is potentially at risk for billions of dollars in improper payments. The exact amount is unknown because few states measure the overall accuracy of their payments. Some improper Medicaid payments by states are the result of fraud by billers or program participants, but such improper payments are hard to measure because of the covert nature of fraud. Efforts by state Medicaid programs to address improper payments are modestly and unevenly funded. Half of the states spend no more than 1/10th of one percent of program expenditures to safeguard program payments. States also differ in how they help prevent improper payments as well as the degree to which they coordinate their investigations and prosecutions of fraud. Federal guidance to the states relies largely on technical assistance. The Health Care Financing Administration has recently taken a more active role to facilitate states' efforts and provide a national forum to share information. |
gao_GAO-01-68 | gao_GAO-01-68_0 | FDLP has two types of loans and offers multiple repayment options. FDLP and FFELP Loan Programs Have Similar Default Rates
The most recent available default rate data—Education’s data for the 1998 cohort—showed little difference between the overall default rates for FDLP and FFELP student loan borrowers. The overall default rate was 6.6 percent for FDLP and 6.7 percent for FFELP. Most had nonconsolidated loans, and most were using the standard repayment plan. On average, borrowers who had consolidation loans had larger loan balances than borrowers with nonconsolidated loans ($19,167 versus $9,395). Default Rates for Standard and Income Contingent Repayment Borrowers Varied Substantially
Among borrowers using the standard repayment plan, those with consolidation loans had a much lower default rate than those with nonconsolidated loans: 5.1 percent versus 9.6 percent. Education Uses Several Means to Ensure Proper FDLP Loan Servicing and Collection
The Department’s procedures for ensuring that FDLP loans are properly serviced and collected involve several outside contractors. Scope and Methodology
To compare the default rate experience under the Federal Direct Loan Program (FDLP) and the Federal Family Education Loan Program (FFELP) for our first objective, we obtained school cohort default rate data from the Department of Education's National Student Loan Data System through the Default Management Division. | Why GAO Did This Study
This report focuses on the default rate for student loans.
What GAO Found
Two major federal student loan programs, the Federal Direct Loan Program (FDLP) and the Federal Family Education Loan Program (FFELP), together provided student borrowers with about 9 million loans totaling about $42.9 billion in fiscal year 1999. The most recent student loan default rate statistics for schools showed that, overall, the direct and guaranteed student loan programs had similar default rates: at 6.6 percent for FDLP and 6.7 percent for FFELP. The two programs had similar default rates when the comparisons focused on the type of school. FDLP has two types of loans, consolidated and nonconsolidated. Generally, borrowers with consolidated loans who used the standard payment plan had a lower default rate than did borrowers with nonconsolidated loans. However, when income contingent repayment plans were used, borrowers with consolidated loans had a higher default rate than did those with nonconsolidated loans. The Department of Education uses various procedures to ensure that loans are properly serviced and collected, including independent monitoring and external assessments of monitoring results. |
gao_GAO-11-857 | gao_GAO-11-857_0 | Attorneys, Assistant U.S. The Interagency Security Committee (ISC) ranks U.S. circuit, district, and bankruptcy courthouses as “very high”—the highest security level—because they are prominent symbols of U.S. power or authority. Stakeholders Have Taken Steps to Improve Courthouse Security, but Face Challenges Implementing Their Roles and Responsibilities
Interagency Agreements and Mechanisms for Identifying and Coordinating Roles and Responsibilities
Various interagency agreements designate courthouse security roles and responsibilities for federal stakeholders, including FPS, the Marshals Service, GSA, and the judiciary. In recent years, federal stakeholders have taken various actions to strengthen their collaborative efforts to secure courthouses. First, according to AOUSC and other stakeholders, the federal government’s approach to courthouse security in which the Marshals Service and FPS both provide security services has resulted in a bifurcated security environment with two lines of authority for implementation and oversight of security services. In 2008 Congress authorized the Marshals Service, in consultation with the AOUSC, to implement a Perimeter Pilot Security Program for the Marshals Service to assume FPS’s responsibilities to provide perimeter security at selected courthouses participating in the program. Although AOUSC has recommended expansion of the pilot program on the basis of its evaluation, additional analysis of the benefits and costs of this approach could better position the federal stakeholders and Congress to consider and determine whether to expand the pilot. We have previously reported that allocating resources using risk management is a facility protection key practice. The Marshals Service and FPS have not always conducted risk assessments of courthouses, as required by their respective guidance and directives. With regard to the Marshals Service, in 9 of the 11 courthouses we visited, the Marshals Service had not conducted risk assessments—what the Marshals refer to as court security facility surveys—for their judicial facilities. Marshals Service officials at 6 courthouses told us they assess security needs as part of the budget process. FPS has also faced difficulties in preparing FSAs. Marshals Service, GSA, and court officials told us that they did not consistently receive full FSAs from FPS at the courthouses we visited. Among other things, we recommended that FPS develop interim solutions for completing FSAs. However, updating the MOA that identifies these roles and responsibilities to better incorporate accountability for federal agencies’ collaborative efforts could strengthen the multiagency courthouse security framework. As such, updating the MOA to help ensure that these assessments, referred to by the Marshals Service as court security facility surveys and by FPS as FSAs, are completed in a timely manner and the results shared with the other federal agencies responsible for courthouse security, could better equip federal stakeholders to assess courthouses’ security needs and gaps and make informed decisions. Specifically, in this update to the MOA stakeholders should: (1) clarify federal stakeholders’ roles and responsibilities including, but not limited to, the conditions under which stakeholders may assume each other’s responsibilities and whether such agreements should be documented; and define GSA’s responsibilities and determine whether GSA should be included as a signatory to the updated MOA; (2) outline how they will ensure greater participation of relevant stakeholders in court or facility security committees; and (3) specify how they will complete required risk assessments for courthouses, referred to by the Marshals Service as court security facility surveys and by FPS as FSAs, and ensure that the results of those assessments are shared with relevant stakeholders, as appropriate. Second, to the extent that steps are taken to expand the perimeter pilot program, we recommend that the Secretary and Attorney General instruct the Director of FPS, and the Director of the Marshals Service, respectively, to work collaboratively, in consultation and agreement with the judiciary and GSA, to further assess costs and benefits, in terms of enhanced security, of expanding the pilot program to other primary courthouses, and assess all stakeholders’ views about the pilot program. DHS concurred with our recommendations. To assess the extent to which federal stakeholders have collaborated and used risk management practices to protect federal courthouses, we examined relevant statutes; and documentation from the Marshals Service, FPS, GSA, and the judiciary, including plans, reports, guidance, security assessments, and surveys. The information we obtained from our site visits cannot be generalized across all U.S. federal courthouses, but because we selected the courthouses based on a mix of criteria, they provided us with examples of federal stakeholders’ implementation of courthouse security activities. | Why GAO Did This Study
Safe and accessible federal courthouses are critical to the U.S. judicial process. The Federal Protective Service (FPS), within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the U.S. Marshals Service (Marshals Service), within the Department of Justice (DOJ), the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts (AOUSC), and the General Services Administration (GSA) are the federal stakeholders with roles related to courthouse security. As requested, this report addresses (1) attributes that influence courthouse security considerations and (2) the extent to which stakeholders have collaborated in implementing their responsibilities and using risk management. GAO analyzed laws and documents, such as security assessments; reviewed GAO's work on key practices for collaboration and facility protection; visited 11 courthouse facilities, selected based on geographic dispersion, age, size, and other criteria; and interviewed agency and judiciary officials. While the results from site visits cannot be generalized, they provided examples of courthouse security activities.
What GAO Found
Various attributes influence security considerations for the nation's 424 federal courthouses, which range from small court spaces to large buildings in major urban areas. According to DOJ data, threats against the courts have increased between fiscal years 2004 and 2010--from approximately 600 to more than 1,400. The Interagency Security Committee--an interagency group that develops standards for federal facility security--has assigned courthouses the highest security level because they are prominent symbols of U.S. power. Federal stakeholders have taken steps to strengthen their collaboration, such as establishing agency liaisons, but have faced challenges in implementing assigned responsibilities and using risk assessment tools. (1) A 1997 memorandum of agreement (MOA) outlines each stakeholder's roles and responsibilities and identifies areas requiring stakeholder coordination. However, at 5 of the 11 courthouses GAO visited, FPS and the Marshals Service were either performing duplicative efforts (e.g., both monitoring the courthouse lobby) or performing security roles that were inconsistent with their responsibilities. The judiciary and other stakeholders stated that having the Marshals Service and FPS both provide security services has resulted in two lines of authority for implementing and overseeing security services. Updating the MOA that identifies roles and responsibilities could strengthen the multiagency courthouse security framework by better incorporating accountability for federal agencies' collaborative efforts. (2) In 2008, Congress authorized a pilot program, whereby the Marshals Service would assume FPS's responsibilities to provide perimeter security at 7 courthouses. In October 2010, the judiciary recommended that the pilot be expanded. AOUSC noted general consensus among various stakeholders in support of the pilot and estimated the costs of expanding it, but AOUSC did not obtain FPS's views on assessing the pilot results or on how the expansion may affect FPS's mission. Additional analysis on the costs and benefits of this approach and the inclusion of all stakeholder perspectives could better position Congress and federal stakeholders to evaluate expansion options. (3) The Marshals Service has not always completed court security facility surveys (a type of risk assessment), as required by Marshals Service guidance. At 9 of the courthouses GAO visited, the Marshals Service had not conducted these surveys, but Marshals Service officials at some courthouses told us that they assessed security needs as part of their budget development process. However, these assessments are less comprehensive than the court security facility surveys required by Marshals Service guidance. FPS has faced difficulties completing its risk assessments, known as facility security assessments, and recently halted an effort to implement a new system for completing them. Furthermore, GAO found that the Marshals Service and FPS did not consistently share the full results of their risk assessments with each other and key stakeholders. Sharing risk assessment information could better equip federal stakeholders to assess courthouses' security needs and make informed decisions.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends DHS and DOJ update the MOA to, among other things, clarify stakeholders' roles and responsibilities and ensure the completion and sharing of risk assessments; and further assess costs and benefits of the perimeter pilot program, in terms of enhanced security, and include all stakeholders' views, should steps be taken to expand the program. DHS and DOJ concurred with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-17-674 | gao_GAO-17-674_0 | Federal agencies must use appropriate authorities and follow proper procedures in converting political appointees to career positions. OPM Approved 78 of 99 Political to Career Conversion Requests Agencies Intended to Complete from January 1, 2010, through March 17, 2016
As shown in figure 2 below, OPM reviewed 99 agency requests to convert individuals from political to career positions. The agencies proposed to complete these conversions during the period of our review. OPM denied 21 and approved 78 of the 99 political conversion requests. Of the 78 approved conversion requests, agencies followed through and converted 69 political appointees to career positions. During the period, agencies also completed 7 conversions without obtaining OPM approval. OPM conducted post- appointment reviews for 4 of these 7 conversions, denying all 4. For each of the 4 denied cases, agencies undertook various remedies, such as readvertising positions, in response to OPM’s concerns. OPM did not complete a review for the 3 other conversions because the appointees were no longer in the career positions to which they were converted. While Agencies Appeared to Have Acted Appropriately, OPM Case Files Lacked Supporting Documents for Most Approved Conversion Requests
For the 78 OPM-approved agency requests, agencies appeared to have used appropriate authorities and followed proper procedures in converting political appointees to career positions. As part of this effort, OPM’s Agency Records Office is drafting a records schedule for maintaining political conversion files, which OPM expects to be completed by the end of calendar year 2017. Additionally, OPM’s procedures do not require its staff to verify they have reviewed documentation required by OPM checklists. We were, however, able to support OPM’s decisions with additional documentation obtained directly from involved agencies. Additionally, to provide greater assurance that its staff reviewed all documentation required by OPM checklists to support a conversion request, OPM can incorporate a process requiring its staff to verify they have reviewed such documentation before recommending approval or denial of agencies’ conversion requests. Recommendations for Executive Action
We are making the following two recommendations to OPM: The Associate Director of Merit System Accountability and Compliance should ensure that OPM’s finalized records schedule on retaining conversion case files specifically lists all documentation that must be saved in its case files. Specifically, for each of the 78 cases, our review of OPM’s case files and additional documentation from individual agencies supported OPM’s conclusion that each of these conversions appeared to be free of political influence. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Political Conversions Reviewed and Completed from January 1, 2010, through March 17, 2016
Number of conversion requests reviewed by OPM 1
Appendix II: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of this engagement were to provide information on conversions of political appointees to career positions, and examine the implementation and effectiveness of the Office of Personnel Management’s (OPM) 2010 policy for reviewing these conversions. Specifically, this report examines (1) conversion requests submitted by agencies and reviewed by OPM, (2) whether agencies used appropriate authorities and proper procedures in conversions approved by OPM, (3) conversion requests denied by OPM and referred to the Office of Special Counsel (OSC), and (4) the extent to which OPM has complied with governmentwide reporting requirements stipulated by the Edward “Ted” Kaufman and Michael Leavitt Presidential Transitions Improvements Act of 2015 (Transitions Act). | Why GAO Did This Study
Federal agencies must use appropriate authorities and follow proper procedures in converting political appointees to career positions, including obtaining prior approval from OPM.
GAO was asked to provide information on political conversions and examine the implementation and effectiveness of OPM's policy for reviewing them. GAO, as part of its review, examined (1) conversion requests submitted by agencies and reviewed by OPM, (2) whether agencies used appropriate authorities and proper procedures in conversions approved by OPM, and (3) conversion requests denied by OPM and referred to OSC.
GAO obtained and corroborated OPM data on the number of political conversions OPM reviewed and agencies intended to complete from January 1, 2010, through March 17, 2016. GAO also assessed OPM's reviews of all approved political conversion requests during the same period.
What GAO Found
The Office of Personnel Management (OPM) approved 78 of 99 requests to convert political appointees to career positions agencies proposed to complete from January 1, 2010, through March 17, 2016. OPM denied 21 requests for varying reasons, such as bypassing qualified veterans, and referred 9 denied cases to the Office of Special Counsel (OSC). Of the 78 approved requests, agencies followed through and converted 69 political appointees to career positions. During the period, agencies completed 7 conversions without obtaining OPM approval; OPM completed post-appointment reviews for 4 of these 7 conversions, denying all 4. For each of the 4 denied cases, the agencies undertook various remedies, such as readvertising positions, in response to OPM's concerns. OPM did not complete a review for the 3 other conversions because the appointees were no longer in the career positions to which they were converted.
Agencies appeared to have used appropriate authorities and followed proper procedures for each of the 78 OPM approved requests. GAO's review of OPM's case files and additional documentation from agencies supported OPM's conclusion that each of these conversions appeared to be free of political influence and complied with merit system principles. However, for 55 of the 78 requests, OPM's case files did not provide enough information for GAO to initially support OPM's approvals of the requests. GAO could only decide after obtaining and reviewing supporting documentation directly from involved agencies.
OPM's procedures for reviewing political conversion requests do not specify which agency documents it should save into case files. Further, OPM's procedures do not require its staff to verify they have reviewed agency documentation required by OPM checklists. OPM officials told GAO that it is drafting a records schedule to be completed by the end of calendar year 2017 for maintaining political conversion files. Without this schedule, OPM risks not maintaining complete documentation to justify conversion request decisions.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that OPM (1) ensure its finalized records schedule lists all documentation that must be saved in OPM's case files, and (2) establish a policy requiring its staff to verify they reviewed all documentation required by OPM checklists before recommending approval or denial of a conversion request. OPM partially concurred with both recommendations, but believes it has a process to thoroughly review conversion requests. GAO continues to believe the recommendations are valid, as discussed in the report. |
gao_GAO-15-678T | gao_GAO-15-678T_0 | To mitigate those concerns, TSA began installing automated target recognition (ATR) software on deployed AIT systems in July 2011.with ATR (AIT-ATR) automatically interpret the image and display anomalies on a generic outline of a passenger instead of displaying images of actual passenger bodies. TSA Has Taken Steps to Improve Oversight of Secure Flight, but Could Take Further Action to Measure Program Performance and Address Screening Errors
In September 2014, we reported on three issues affecting the effectiveness of TSA’s Secure Flight program—(1) the need for additional performance measures to capture progress toward Secure Flight program goals, (2) Secure Flight system matching errors, and (3) mistakes screening personnel have made in implementing Secure Flight at the screening checkpoint. Secure Flight system matching errors: In September 2014, we found that TSA lacked timely and reliable information on all known cases of Secure Flight system matching errors, meaning instances where Secure Flight did not identify passengers who were actual matches to these lists. DHS concurred with our recommendation, and as of April 2015, TSA had developed such a mechanism. However, TSA has not yet demonstrated how it will use the information to improve the performance of the Secure Flight system. TSA information from May 2012 through February 2014 that we assessed indicates that screening personnel made errors at the checkpoint in screening passengers consistent with their Secure Flight determinations. However, we found that TSA did not have a systematic process for evaluating the root causes of these screening errors across airports, which could allow TSA to identify trends across airports and target nationwide efforts to address these issues. Therefore, we recommended in September 2014 that TSA develop a process for evaluating the root causes of screening errors at the checkpoint and then implement corrective measures to address those causes. DHS concurred with our recommendations and has developed a process for collecting and evaluating data on the root causes of screening errors. However, as of April 2015, TSA had not yet shown that the agency has implemented corrective measures to address the root causes. TSA Performance Assessments of AIT- ATR Did Not Account for All Factors Affecting the System
In March 2014, we reported that, according to TSA officials, checkpoint security is a function of technology, people, and the processes that govern them, however we found that TSA did not include each of those factors in determining overall AIT-ATR system performance. Specifically, we found that TSA evaluated the technology’s performance in the laboratory to determine system effectiveness. However, laboratory test results provide important insights but do not accurately reflect how well the technology will perform in the field with actual human operators. AIT-ATR system effectiveness relies on both the technology’s capability to identify threat items and its operators to resolve those threat items. Given that TSA was seeking to procure the second generation of AIT systems, known as AIT-2, we reported that DHS and TSA would be hampered in their ability to ensure that future AIT systems meet mission needs and perform as intended at airports unless TSA evaluated system effectiveness based on both the performance of the AIT-2 technology and screening officers who operate the technology. TSA concurred and reported taking steps to address this recommendation. However, TSA has not yet provided sufficient documentation showing that this recommendation has been fully addressed. TSA Has Not Tested the Overall Effectiveness of Its Managed Inclusion Process, But Plans to Conduct Such Testing
In December 2014, we reported that, according to TSA officials, TSA tested the security effectiveness of the individual components of the Managed Inclusion process—such as BDOs and ETD devices—before implementing Managed Inclusion, and TSA determined that each layer alone provides an effective level of security. As a result, we recommended that to ensure TSA’s planned testing yields reliable results, the TSA Administrator take steps to ensure that TSA’s planned effectiveness testing of the Managed Inclusion process adheres to established evaluation design practices. Specifically, DHS stated that TSA plans to use a test and evaluation process—which calls for the preparation of test and evaluation framework documents including plans, analyses, and a final report describing the test results— for its planned effectiveness testing of Managed Inclusion. Key contributors for the previous work that this testimony is based on are listed in each product. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since the attacks of September 11, 2001 exposed vulnerabilities in the nation's aviation system, billions of dollars have been spent on a wide range of programs designed to enhance aviation security. Securing commercial aviation remains a daunting task, and continuing fiscal pressure highlights the need for TSA to determine how to allocate its finite resources for the greatest impact. GAO previously reported on TSA's oversight of its aviation security programs, including the extent to which TSA has the information needed to assess the programs.
This testimony focuses on TSA's oversight of aviation security measures including, among other things (1) Secure Flight, (2) Advanced Imaging Technology, and (3) Managed Inclusion. This statement is based on reports and testimonies issued from December 2011 through May 2015. For prior work, GAO analyzed TSA documents and interviewed TSA officials, among other things.
What GAO Found
The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has taken steps to improve oversight of Secure Flight—a passenger prescreening program that matches passenger information against watch lists and assigns each passenger a risk category—but could take further action to address screening errors. In September 2014, GAO reported that TSA lacked timely and reliable information on system matching errors—instances where Secure Flight did not identify passengers who were actual matches to watch lists. GAO recommended that TSA systematically document such errors to help TSA determine if actions can be taken to prevent similar errors from occurring. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) concurred and has developed a mechanism to do so, but has not yet shown how it will use this information to improve system performance. In September 2014, GAO also found that screening personnel made errors in screening passengers at the checkpoint at a level consistent with their Secure Flight risk determinations and that TSA did not have a systematic process for evaluating the root causes of these errors across airports. GAO recommended that TSA develop a process for evaluating the root causes and implement corrective measures to address them. DHS concurred and has developed such a process but has not yet demonstrated implementation of corrective measures.
In March 2014, GAO found that TSA performance assessments of certain full-body scanners used to screen passengers at airports did not account for all factors affecting the systems. GAO reported that the effectiveness of Advanced Imaging Technology (AIT) systems equipped with automated target recognition software (AIT-ATR)—which displays anomalies on a generic passenger outline instead of actual passenger bodies—relied on both the technology's capability to identify potential threat items and its operators' ability to resolve them. However, GAO found that TSA did not include these factors in determining overall AIT-ATR system performance. GAO also found that TSA evaluated the technology's performance in the laboratory—a practice that does not reflect how well the technology will perform with actual human operators. In considering procurement of the next generation of AIT systems (AIT-2), GAO recommended that TSA measure system effectiveness based on the performance of both the technology and the screening personnel. DHS concurred and in January 2015 reported that it has evaluated the AIT-2 technology and screening personnel as a system but has not yet provided sufficient documentation of this effort.
In December 2014, GAO found that TSA had not tested the effectiveness of its overall Managed Inclusion process—a process to assess passenger risk in real time at the airport and provide expedited screening to certain passengers—but had plans to do so. Specifically, GAO found that TSA had tested the effectiveness of individual components of the Managed Inclusion process, such as canine teams, but had not yet tested the effectiveness of the overall process. TSA officials stated that they had plans to conduct such testing. Given that GAO has previously reported on TSA challenges testing the effectiveness of its security programs, GAO recommended that TSA ensure its planned testing of the Managed Inclusion process adhere to established evaluation design practices. DHS concurred and has plans to use a test and evaluation process for its planned testing of Managed Inclusion.
What GAO Recommends
GAO has previously made recommendations to DHS to strengthen TSA's oversight of aviation security programs. DHS generally agreed and has actions underway to address them. Consequently, GAO is not making any new recommendations in this testimony. |
gao_GAO-10-436 | gao_GAO-10-436_0 | Because the Army believed that the changes it made to its facility acquisition and building practices under its transformation strategy would result in lower construction costs and shorter building timelines, the Army established goals to reduce its military construction costs by 15 percent and facility construction timelines by 30 percent beginning in fiscal year 2007. The Army Did Not Measure the Achievement of Goals to Reduce Military Construction Costs and Timelines
Because the Army did not measure the achievement of its goals to reduce military construction costs and timelines, the Army did not know to what extent the goals were met nor whether its military construction transformation strategy resulted in actual reductions in facility costs. Our review of selected project information showed that the Army did reduce the estimated cost of some facility construction projects and shortened building timelines during fiscal years 2007 through 2009, but it did not meet its overall stated goals. Although the Army discontinued these numerical goals in 2010, Army officials believed its efforts to transform its military construction acquisition and building practices were successful in dampening the escalation of Army facilities’ costs and would continue to help ensure cost-effective and timely facilities in future years. As shown in table 2, we found that the Army’s average lapsed time for this timeline measure was reduced by about 11 percent during fiscal years 2007 through 2009—an improvement, but less than the Army’s 30 percent goal. Army officials stated that they were pleased that average building timelines had been reduced even if the 30 percent goal was not achieved. However, the Army did not have substantial quantitative information or analyses to support its view on lower life-cycle costs. The Navy and the Air Force generally disagreed with the Army’s views on the benefits from expanded use of wood materials and modular building methods. 3). Conflicts Exist between Antiterrorism Building Standards and Sustainable Goals, but the Services Consider the Conflicts to Be Manageable
Although there are areas of conflict when designing facilities that meet both antiterrorism construction standards and sustainable design goals, military service officials stated that the conflicts are considered to be manageable and not a significant obstacle to the design and construction of new facilities. Service officials noted, however, that achieving higher levels of sustainability in future construction projects while still meeting the antiterrorism standards would further increase initial facility costs and create additional design challenges. According to the planners, 80 of the 90 projects (89 percent) required no special steps or workarounds to meet both antiterrorism standards and sustainable design goals. Conclusions
Although the Army appears to have achieved some savings in initial construction costs by expanding the use of wood materials for some permanent facilities, the military services had little quantitative information on whether the use of wood materials and modular building methods will also result in lower long-term costs compared to the traditional use of steel, concrete, and masonry materials and on-site building methods. Unless the services perform additional study and analysis to determine the relative merits and long-term economic impacts from the use of alternative construction materials and methods, DOD will not know whether the use of wood materials and modular building methods will result in the most economical long-term building solution or whether DOD’s unified facilities criteria, or other military construction program guidance, needs to be changed so that new facilities are constructed with materials and methods that meet requirements at the lowest cost over the long term. To evaluate the merits and economic impacts from the Army’s expanded use of wood materials and modular building methods for permanent facilities, we interviewed Office of the Secretary of Defense, Army, Navy, and Air Force officials and reviewed related documentation, policies, and construction guidance on the use of construction materials and building methods for military facilities. To review potential conflicts between antiterrorism construction standards and sustainable design goals and the costs to incorporate the standards and goals in new facilities, we reviewed applicable Department of Defense (DOD) policies, guidance, goals, and costs related to incorporating antiterrorism construction standards and sustainable design goals in new military facilities. We selected projects for review from a list of all Army, Navy, and Air Force military construction projects approved during fiscal years 2007 through 2009. | Why GAO Did This Study
To meet the challenges associated with a threefold increase in the Army's military construction program between fiscal years 2005 and 2009, the Army adopted numerous changes, including the expanded use of wood materials and modular building methods, designed to reduce building costs and timelines for new facilities. With the changes, the Army set goals to reduce building costs by 15 percent and timelines by 30 percent. The Army, Navy, and Air Force have also faced challenges associated with incorporating both antiterrorism construction standards and sustainable design ("green") goals into new facilities. GAO was asked to (1) assess the Army's progress in meeting its goals, (2) evaluate the merits from the Army's expanded use of wood materials and modular building methods, and (3) examine potential conflicts between antiterrorism construction standards and sustainable design goals. GAO reviewed relevant documentation, interviewed cognizant service officials, analyzed selected construction project data, and visited five Army installations to review facilities built with alternative materials and methods.
What GAO Found
The Army set goals to reduce its estimated construction costs by 15 percent and building timelines by 30 percent, but it did not monitor goal achievement and thus did not know to what extent the goals had been met or whether changes made to its military construction program resulted in actual reductions in facility costs. GAO's review of selected project information showed that the Army did reduce the estimated cost of some facility construction projects and shortened building timelines during fiscal years 2007 through 2009, but it did not meet its overall stated goals. For example, GAO found that the average building timeline for one key measurement (design start to ready for occupancy) was reduced by about 11 percent--an improvement, but less than the 30 percent goal. The Army discontinued the numerical goals in fiscal year 2010, and Army officials stated that, although the specific goals might not have been achieved, they believed that the Army's efforts were successful in dampening the escalation of Army facilities' costs and would continue to help ensure cost-effective and timely facilities in future years. The Army appears to have achieved some savings in selected construction projects by expanding the use of wood materials and modular construction methods for some of its facilities, but GAO found little quantitative data on whether the use of these materials and methods will result in savings over the long term compared to the traditional use of steel, concrete, and masonry materials and on-site building methods. Without long-term or life-cycle analyses that consider not only initial construction costs but also possible differences in facility service lives and annual operating and maintenance costs between the construction alternatives, it is not clear that the Army's expanded use of wood materials and modular building methods will achieve the Army's intended purpose of reduced facility costs over the long term. The Navy and the Air Force generally disagreed with the Army's view and believed that the use of wood materials and modular construction will result in facilities with shorter service lives and higher life-cycle costs. However, none of the services had the analyses to support its views. Without additional study and analysis, DOD will not know whether military construction program guidance needs to be changed to ensure that facilities are constructed with materials and methods that meet needs at the lowest cost over the long term. Conflicts between antiterrorism building standards and sustainable design goals exist, but military service officials stated that the conflicts are considered to be manageable. GAO's review of 90 Army, Navy, and Air Force military construction projects, approved during fiscal years 2007 through 2009, showed that although incorporating the standards and the goals in new facilities added to construction costs, 80 of the projects required no special steps or workarounds to meet both the standards and the goals. However, service officials noted that achieving higher levels of sustainability in future construction projects while still meeting the antiterrorism standards would further increase initial facility costs and create additional design challenges. |
gao_OSI-95-17 | gao_OSI-95-17_0 | Background
The Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA)—an agency of the Department of Health and Human Services—administers the Medicare home health care program. ABC Modified Medical Records to Continue to Provide Services to Patients Who May Be Ineligible
Current and former ABC employees told us that medical records were altered and forged to ensure continued or prolonged home health care visits. We found instances in which ABC’s records appeared to justify home visits, but the patient seemed no longer eligible. This practice was intended to create the appearance that continued home health visits were needed. Another office manager directed a nurse to record visits that were never made. ABC Reportedly Charged Medicare for Costs of Purchasing Home Health Agencies and for Gifts Given to Physicians
ABC reportedly charged Medicare for questionable costs when ABC included expenses associated with the purchase of other HHAs in its cost reports. Former owners who had sold their HHAs to ABC maintain that ABC masked the total price of purchasing their HHAs by paying HHA owners a small sum up front and the balance in the form of salary under employment agreements over a number of years. ABC Reportedly Charged Nonallowable Marketing Expenses to Medicare
According to former employees, ABC directed them to market its services to physicians and the community with the intent of charging Medicare for these nonallowable expenditures. It addressed issues involving ABC’s participation in the Medicare home health care program. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO investigated specific allegations regarding a home health care firm's participation in the Medicare home health care program, focusing on whether its employees: (1) altered or forged medical records to ensure continued home visits; (2) made more visits to patients than necessary; and (3) charged Medicare for costs unrelated to patient care.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) some local office managers directed current and former employees to alter patient records so that it appeared that the patients continued to need home health visits, and to continue visiting patients that no longer qualified for Medicare home health care; (2) the firm charged Medicare for the cost of acquiring other home health agencies by paying home health owners a small sum up front, and paying the balance as a salary under employment agreements; and (3) some managers directed their employees to market the home health care firm and its services with the intent of charging Medicare for these unallowable costs. |
gao_GAO-04-596 | gao_GAO-04-596_0 | According to the FBI, the launch of this initiative also increased the number of state and local security clearance applications. The security clearance process for state and local officials involves six broad steps that consist of the (1) FBI field office officials’ determining the applicant’s need to know classified national security information and level of clearance required, (2) applicant’s submission of application materials to an FBI field office, (3) applicant fingerprinting and interview conducted by FBI field office officials, (4) FBI field officials’ routing of application materials to FBI headquarters and the FBI investigators’ completion of a background investigation, (5) FBI headquarters’ adjudication of clearance applications based on federal government adjudication standards, and (6) notification of an adjudication. General FBI Criteria for Granting Security Clearances Apply Equally to FBI Employees and State and Local Officials
The FBI’s policies for granting access to classified information requires state and local officials to undergo the same background investigation and adjudication procedures as do individuals who have an employment relationship with the FBI or other federal government agencies and require access to classified national security information. The FBI Processed the Majority of Top Secret Security Clearances within its Time Frame Goals; Secret Security Clearances Generally Missed the Time Frame Goals, but Improvements Have Been Made
The FBI’s goal for processing top secret security clearance applications is 6 to 9 months, and its goal for processing secret security clearance applications is 45 to 60 days, though actual completion times can vary from case to case. The FBI often assigns greater priority to processing applications for state and local JTTF members, who are required to have top secret clearances. Consequently, as figure 5 shows, about 92 percent of the 835 applications for top secret security clearances granted were processed within the FBI’s time frame goal of 6 to 9 months since September 11. The average number of days for processing a secret security clearance application was about 90 in the last quarter of 2001. FBI guidance to state and local officials states that the processing time for each application will vary depending on its complexity. The FBI and State and Local Officials Have Identified Process Impediments and the FBI Has Taken Steps to Enhance the Security Clearance Process and Information Sharing
The FBI has undertaken various steps to enhance its process for granting security clearances to state and local officials and to facilitate information sharing with state and local law enforcement agencies. State and Local Officials and the FBI Have Consulted to Identify Ways to Improve the Security Clearance and Information Sharing Processes
In response to an increased interest in information sharing between the FBI and state and local law enforcement agencies following the terrorist attacks of September 11, high-level FBI officials met with state and local law enforcement leaders to discuss ways to prevent or respond to terrorist attacks. In addition to the FBI’s direct consultation with state and local officials, after September 11, some state and local law enforcement organizations expressed their members’ concerns regarding information sharing with the FBI and the FBI’s security clearance application process. FBI Outreach to State and Local Officials Helped Clarify Security Clearance Requirements and Time Frames
With the assistance of the newly created OLEC, in November 2002, the FBI distributed an informational brochure to state and local law enforcement agencies to help improve these officials’ understanding of the FBI’s security clearance requirements and process. The FBI Utilizes Bulletins and Information Networks to Share Information with State and Local Officials
In addition to the JTTFs and the LEO initiative, which was created to provide classified information to state and local officials, the FBI utilizes several means of disseminating terrorism-related information to agencies and individuals outside the FBI, including state and local officials. We are providing copies of this report to the Ranking Minority Member of the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Administrative Oversight and the Courts. We gathered additional information from interviews with officials from the FBI’s Security Division Personnel Security Section, which oversees the unit responsible for granting security clearances to state and local officials. To determine the extent to which the FBI is meeting its timeliness goals for processing security clearances for state and local officials, we analyzed data from the FBI Security Division’s state and local law enforcement security clearance databases collected between September 2001 and December 2003. To describe the efforts undertaken by the FBI to enhance its state and local law enforcement security clearance and information-sharing processes, we reviewed a variety of reports and studies, including literature published by state and local law enforcement organizations. | Why GAO Did This Study
The free flow of information among federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies could prove vital to fighting the war on terrorism. State and local law enforcement officials are key stakeholders in the United States' efforts to combat terrorism, and as such, they may require access to classified national security information to help prevent or respond to terrorist attacks. In order to gain access to such information, state and local law enforcement officials generally need federal security clearances. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) grants security clearances and shares classified information with state and local law enforcement officials. Immediately following September 11, 2001, some state and local law enforcement officials expressed frustration with the complexity of the process for obtaining security clearances. Others expressed frustration with the length of time it took to obtain a security clearance. These frustrations exacerbated the general concern among law enforcement stakeholders that the lack of security clearances could impede the flow of critical information from the FBI to the state and local level, from the state and local level to the FBI, and laterally from one state or local agency to another. In turn, this potential lack of access to critical terrorism-related information might place local law enforcement officials at a disadvantage in their efforts to respond to or combat a terrorist threat. The Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee on Administrative Oversight and the Courts, Senate Committee on the Judiciary asked us to examine several issues regarding the FBI's process for granting security clearances to state and local law enforcement officials. This report provides information on: (1) the FBI's process for granting security clearances to state and local law enforcement officials, (2) the extent to which the FBI has met its time frame goals for processing security clearance applications for state and local law enforcement officials and factors that could affect the timely processing of security clearance applications, and (3) efforts undertaken by the FBI to enhance its security clearance and information-sharing processes with state and local law enforcement officials.
What GAO Found
The FBI's process for granting access to classified information requires state and local law enforcement officials to undergo the same background investigation and adjudication procedures as do individuals who have an employment relationship with the federal government and require access to classified national security information. The FBI's goal is to complete the processing for secret security clearances within 45 to 60 days and top secret security clearances within 6 to 9 months, beginning with the FBI headquarters' receipt of the application from the FBI field office. Since September 11, about 92 percent of applications for top secret security clearances were processed within the FBI's time frame goals. During this same period, about 26 percent of secret security clearance applications were processed within the FBI's time frame goals, although substantial improvements have been made in the most recent quarters for which we have data. The FBI was more successful with processing top secret security clearances within its stated time frame goals than secret security clearances, in part because the FBI often assigns greater priority to processing applications for state and local Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) members, who are required to have top secret clearances. For either secret or top secret security clearance applications, processing timeframes can vary depending on the complexity of individual cases. The FBI has taken a number of steps to enhance its process for granting security clearances to, and sharing information with, state and local law enforcement officials. One of the impediments highlighted was the state and local officials' and the FBI field office staff's lack of a clear understanding of the FBI's security clearance granting process. In response to this impediment, the FBI headquarters widely distributed step-by- step guidance to state and local law enforcement officials and reeducated the FBI field staff on the FBI security clearance process and goals. In addition, the FBI added staff to its headquarters unit responsible for adjudicating state and local security clearance applications and created databases to track state and local security clearance applications. Efforts undertaken by the FBI to enhance information sharing with state and local officials include increasing the number of JTTFs from 35 to 84 and increasing state and local law enforcement officials' participation on these forces. Serving on JTTFs provides state and local law enforcement officials the opportunity to interact with the FBI on a daily basis. The FBI also circulates declassified intelligence through a weekly bulletin and provides threat information to state and local law enforcement officials via various database networks. |
gao_GAO-09-742 | gao_GAO-09-742_0 | In addition, the act provides the government march-in authority. Under this authority, the federal agency that funded the development of an invention has the right to require the contractor or exclusive licensee to grant a license in any field of use to a responsible applicant upon terms that are reasonable under the circumstances, if the agency determines that: the contractor has not made, and is not expected to make, efforts to commercialize the invention within an agreed upon time frame; public health or safety needs are not reasonably satisfied by the contractor the use of the invention is required by the federal government and the contractor or licensee cannot meet the government’s requirements; or the owner of an exclusive license is not ensuring that the invention is “manufactured substantially” in the United States and has not obtained the necessary waivers to do so. Federal Agencies Use Department of Commerce Regulations to Implement the March- in Authority under the Bayh-Dole Act
Officials at DOD, DOE, NASA, and NIH rely on Commerce regulations for the Bayh-Dole Act and on their agencies’ interpretations of the act to determine whether to exercise their march-in authority. These officials told us that the administrative processes developed by Commerce for agencies to use when considering whether marching-in may be warranted are detailed and time-consuming, and may make it difficult to initiate a march-in proceeding. However, some officials also acknowledged that because the regulations are detailed, they ensure that appropriate and fair processes are followed during march-in proceedings. However, according to agency officials we spoke with, the agencies have chosen not to develop agency-specific guidance for a variety of reasons. First, none of the agency officials we spoke with believe that the regulations developed by Commerce are onerous enough to warrant the development of agency-specific guidance. Second, both agency and technology transfer officials told us that agency-specific guidance would, in essence, pre-define how the federal government would exercise its march-in authority and reduce the flexibility agencies have to examine the specific circumstances of each individual case. Third, federal officials—as well as officials from organizations that represent technology transfer offices in colleges and universities—told us that creating an array of agency-specific regulations could hinder the transfer of research results to the market by increasing the regulatory burden on contractors. DOD, DOE, and NASA have neither discovered nor received information that would lead them to initiate a march-in proceeding or exercise their march-in authority during the last 20 years. In contrast, NIH has been petitioned formally to exercise its march- in authority three times, but in each case determined that the statutory requirements for march-in proceedings had not been met. Nevertheless, officials at three of the four agencies told us they value the authority because, together with other tools, it provides them leverage to promote commercialization of federally funded inventions. In contrast, DOE officials do not believe march-in authority has significant value as leverage, in part, because no agency has ever exercised the authority. According to the agency officials we spoke with, relying on the public for information is a more efficient and effective mechanism for tracking federally funded inventions, which would otherwise require federal agencies to expend significant additional resources to monitor a large volume of federally funded inventions for possible situations that might lead to march-in proceedings. Although none of the agencies we reviewed has actually used its authority to march in, officials in three of the four agencies we contacted said they value the authority and they do not want it eliminated because it helps to ensure that federally sponsored research results are commercialized. The government can also use patented technology without a license subject to reasonable compensation being paid to the patent owner or licensee, regardless of whether the invention had been developed with federal funding. This section further describes these four disincentives. Some agency, university, and industry officials we contacted said the march-in authority could have a “chilling effect” on the willingness of venture capital firms and other investors to provide funding for the further commercial development of federally funded inventions. In the four fact-finding instances we reviewed, the time to reach a decision not to initiate march- in proceedings ranged from 5 to 30 months. DOD, DOE, and NIH did not provide overall comments, but NIH provided technical comments that we incorporated, as appropriate. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of this report were to determine (1) what policies and procedures federal agencies with significant research budgets have established to determine whether march-in authority under the Bayh-Dole Act should be exercised; (2) the extent to which these selected federal research agencies have used Bayh-Dole march-in authority and what they believe are its benefits; and (3) what barriers and disincentives, if any, these agencies have encountered to the exercise of their march-in authority under the Bayh-Dole Act. The top four agencies receiving research and development funding were the Department of Defense (DOD), the Department of Energy (DOE), the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), and the National Institutes of Health (NIH) within the Department of Health and Human Services. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Bayh-Dole Act, passed in 1980, allows recipients of federal research funds the option to retain patents on any inventions they create using those funds. At the same time, the act provides the government with rights intended to ensure that the public benefits from these federal research investments. One of these rights is known as the "march-in" authority, which allows federal agencies to take control of a patent when they have credible information that certain conditions described in the act have been met. Until March 2009, the Bayh-Dole Act required GAO to report periodically on its implementation. To meet that requirement, for select federal agencies, GAO reviewed (1) the policies and procedures used to determine whether march-in authority should be exercised; (2) how the march-in authority has been used; and (3) what barriers and disincentives have been encountered in exercising the march-in authority. GAO selected four agencies for this review that accounted for 89 percent of the federal research funding for fiscal year 2006. These were the Departments of Defense and Energy (DOD and DOE), the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), and the National Institutes of Health (NIH). GAO is not making any recommendations in this report. DOE, NASA, and NIH provided technical comments on this report that GAO incorporated, as appropriate.
What GAO Found
Officials at DOD, DOE, NASA, and NIH rely on Commerce regulations for the Bayh-Dole Act and on their agencies' interpretations of the act to determine whether to exercise their march-in authority. Agency officials said that the administrative processes developed by Commerce are detailed and time-consuming, and may make it difficult to initiate and exercise a march-in proceeding. However, some officials said the detailed regulations ensure that appropriate and fair processes are followed during march-in proceedings. The agencies have chosen not to develop agency-specific guidance for a variety of reasons. For example, none of the officials believe that the regulations are onerous enough to warrant the development of agency-specific guidance and agency-specific guidance would reduce the flexibility agencies have to examine the specific circumstances of each case. In addition, an array of agency-specific regulations could hinder the transfer of research results to the market by increasing the regulatory burden on recipients of federal research funds. None of the four agencies has chosen to exercise march-in authority. DOD, DOE, and NASA have neither discovered nor received information that would lead them to initiate a march-in proceeding or exercise their march-in authority during the last 20 years. In contrast, NIH has been petitioned formally three times, but in each case determined that the statutory requirements for march-in proceedings had not been met. Nevertheless, officials at DOD, NASA, and NIH said they value the authority because it provides leverage to promote commercialization of federally funded inventions. DOE officials disagree, in part, because no agency has ever exercised the authority. Agency officials said they do not have ongoing efforts to identify potential candidates for a march-in proceeding and primarily rely on the public, including potential competitors, to provide information that could lead to a march-in proceeding. According to these officials, their agencies would have to expend significant additional resources to track federally funded inventions because of the large number of inventions and because commercialization can take many years. Officials at DOD, NASA, and NIH said they value the march-in authority because it helps ensure that federally sponsored research results are commercialized. Also march-in authority is not the only tool to achieve the goals of the Bayh-Dole Act. For example, the government can take a patent without a license subject to reasonable compensation being paid to the patent owner or licensee that may allow for more timely interventions than would occur under the Bayh-Dole march-in process. Federal and technology transfer officials identified four disincentives to the use of march-in authority. One of these is that the use of the march-in authority could have a "chilling effect" on federal research. These officials said that if a march-in occurred, investors would be less likely to provide the funds to commercialize federal inventions for fear of losing their investments. Also, because the march-in process can be long, these officials believe that it would have limited utility in an emergency situation. For example, the time to complete the fact-finding process in the three cases NIH reviewed ranged from 5 to 8 months. |
gao_GAO-12-914 | gao_GAO-12-914_0 | CMS Oversees Coverage Gap Discounts Provided by Plan Sponsors and Paid for by Manufacturers
CMS oversees the provision of discounts by plan sponsors to eligible beneficiaries who reach the coverage gap, and ensures that the discounts are paid for by drug manufacturers. CMS also tracks the payment of discounts by drug manufacturers to plan sponsors and has implemented a dispute resolution process to resolve manufacturer disputes about discounts. In addition, CMS performs other activities, such as monitoring beneficiary complaints, and has reported on certain Discount Program outcomes. CMS Checks Prescription Drug Data to Verify That Plan Sponsors Provide Accurate Discounts to Eligible Beneficiaries
CMS performs 15 automated checks of PDE data specific to the Discount Program that verify whether plan sponsors have provided and accurately calculated discounts at the point-of-sale to eligible beneficiaries who reach the coverage gap. In addition, CMS has stated that the agency conducts other monitoring activities of the Discount Program, which include reporting on certain outcomes of the program and monitoring Medicare Part D drug prices. Plan Sponsors, PBMs, and Manufacturers Had Different Perspectives on Aspects of the Drug Pricing and Plan Design Effects of the Discount Program
Plan sponsors, PBMs, and drug manufacturers we spoke with had different perspectives on aspects of the drug pricing and plan design effects of the Discount Program, which include drug prices, rebates, formularies, plan benefit design, and utilization management practices. The three PBMs we interviewed also told us they observed that some manufacturers decreased the amount of rebates for the brand-name drugs they offered, which they believe occurred as a result of the Discount Program. In comparison, most of the plan sponsors did not observe manufacturers decrease rebate amounts and most manufacturers reported no effects on their rebate negotiations as a result of the Discount Program. Most plan sponsors and PBMs also reported that the Discount Program did not affect their Part D plan formularies, plan benefit design, or utilization management practices. Most Plan Sponsors and PBMs Believe the Discount Program May Have Been a Factor in Rising Drug Prices, While Most Manufacturers Said It Has Not
Six of the seven plan sponsors and two of the three PBMs we interviewed told us they believe the Discount Program may have been a contributing factor in the rising prices of brand-name drugs by some manufacturers.Some sponsors and one PBM told us they believe that some manufacturers raised prices for their brand-name drugs to recoup the costs of the discounts that they anticipated paying. Prices Increased at a Similar Rate for Brand-Name Drugs Used by Beneficiaries in the Coverage Gap and by Those Who Did Not Reach the Gap
We found that prices for brand-name drugs used by beneficiaries in the coverage gap increased similarly to those used by beneficiaries who did not reach the gap, before and after the Discount Program was implemented in January 2011. From January 2007 to December 2010, prior to the implementation of the Discount Program, the median price (weighted by the utilization of each drug) for the basket of 77 brand-name drugs used by beneficiaries in the coverage gap increased 36.2 percent (see fig. 2). During the first year with the Discount Program (from December 2010 through December 2011), the median prices for the two baskets increased equally at a rate of about 13 percent. 3). The greatest annual percent increase for the two baskets of brand-name drugs occurred from December 2010 through December 2011, during which time the median price increased 13.1 percent for the basket of brand- name drugs used by beneficiaries in the coverage gap and 13.2 percent for the basket of brand-name drugs used by beneficiaries who did not reach the coverage gap. Agency Comments
HHS reviewed a draft of this report and in its written comments noted that our finding on the perspectives of stakeholders (Medicare Part D plan sponsors, drug manufacturers, and PBMs) on the effects of the Discount Program is consistent with HHS’s expectations and experience. HHS commented that CMS will continue to monitor the Discount Program to ensure that discounts on brand-name drugs are applied accurately and in a timely manner for Medicare Part D beneficiaries. GAO staff members who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Methodology for Examining Brand-Name Drug Price Trends
To describe how prices changed before and after implementation of the Medicare Coverage Gap Discount Program (Discount Program) for brand-name drugs, we compared the trend of Medicare Part D prices from January 2007 to December 2011 for a basket of brand-name drugs used by beneficiaries in the coverage gap with a basket of brand-name drugs used by beneficiaries who did not reach the gap in 2011. We compared price trends for these two baskets because brand-name drugs used by beneficiaries in the coverage gap in 2011—the year the Discount Program began—may be more susceptible to price increases, since manufacturers must provide a 50 percent discount for these drugs compared with drugs used by beneficiaries that do not reach the gap and thus are not subject to the discount. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 established the Discount Program to help Medicare Part D beneficiaries with their prescription drug costs while in the coverage gap, which occurs between the initial and catastrophic coverage periods where Medicare helps pay for drug costs. Until the Discount Program began in 2011, beneficiaries in the coverage gap paid 100 percent of drug costs. The Discount Program required manufacturers to provide a 50 percent discount on the price of brand-name drugs for beneficiaries in the gap.
GAO was asked to describe (1) CMS's oversight of the Discount Program; (2) perspectives of plan sponsors, manufacturers, and PBMs on effects of the Discount Program; and (3) how prices for brand-name drugs used by beneficiaries in the coverage gap and by those who did not reach the gap changed before and after the start of the Discount Program. To describe CMS's oversight, GAO reviewed CMS documents and interviewed CMS officials. To describe perspectives on the effects of the Discount Program, GAO interviewed the 7 largest Part D plan sponsors based on enrollment data, 8 of 10 manufacturers of brand-name drugs with the highest expenditures in the gap, and 3 PBMs who contracted with sponsors GAO interviewed. To describe price changes, GAO used CMS Part D data from 2007 to 2011 to track prices for high-expenditure brand-name drugs used by those in and those who did not reach the gap. GAO compared prices for the two baskets because drugs used by those in the gap may be more susceptible to price increases since manufacturers must provide the discount for these drugs.
What GAO Found
As part of Medicare's Part D Coverage Gap Discount Program (Discount Program), the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), located within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), oversees the provision of discounts by plan sponsors to eligible beneficiaries when they purchase brand-name drugs and monitors that discounts are paid for by drug manufacturers. CMS checks prescription drug data to verify that sponsors provide accurate discounts at the point-of-sale to eligible beneficiaries in the coverage gap. These checks include verifying whether a beneficiary has reached the coverage gap and that the plan sponsor has calculated the discount amount correctly. CMS also tracks that manufacturers pay plan sponsors for the discounts sponsors have provided to beneficiaries and has implemented a dispute resolution process for manufacturers disputing discount payment amounts. CMS also performs other activities such as monitoring beneficiary complaints related to the program.
The plan sponsors, pharmacy benefit managers (PBM) that negotiate on behalf of plan sponsors, and drug manufacturers GAO interviewed had different perspectives on aspects of the drug pricing and plan design effects of the Discount Program. Most sponsors and PBMs believed the Discount Program may have been a contributing factor in the rising prices of some brand-name drugs by some manufacturers. However, most manufacturers did not believe the Discount Program affected drug prices they negotiated with sponsors and PBMs. The PBMs we interviewed also told us they observed that some manufacturers decreased the amount of rebates for the brand-name drugs they offered, which they believe occurred as a result of the Discount Program. In comparison, most of the plan sponsors did not observe manufacturers decreasing rebate amounts and most manufacturers reported no effects on their rebate negotiations as a result of the Discount Program. Most sponsors and PBMs told GAO that the Discount Program did not affect Part D plan formularies, plan benefit designs, or utilization management practices.
GAO found that the prices for high-expenditure brand-name drugs used by beneficiaries in the coverage gap and by those who did not reach the gap in 2011 increased at a similar rate before and after the Discount Program was implemented in January 2011. Specifically, from January 2007 to December 2010, before the Discount Program began, the median price for the basket of 77 brand-name drugs (weighted by the utilization of each drug) used by beneficiaries in the coverage gap increased 36.2 percent. During the same period, the median price for the basket of 78 brand-name drugs used by beneficiaries who did not reach the coverage gap increased 35.2 percent. From December 2010 through December 2011, the first year with the Discount Program, the median price for the two baskets increased equally by about 13 percent, the greatest increase in median price for both baskets compared to earlier individual years.
HHS reviewed a draft of this report and in its written comments noted that GAO's findings on stakeholder perspectives and changes in brand-name drug prices were consistent with its experience and CMS's drug price analysis. HHS stated that CMS will continue to monitor the Discount Program and Part D drug prices. |
gao_GAO-17-121 | gao_GAO-17-121_0 | Specifically, the division’s areas of kidney research include chronic kidney disease, ESRD, cystic kidney disease, acute kidney injury, and kidney donation. NIDDK and the other ICs accomplish their missions primarily through extramural research conducted by scientists and research personnel working at universities, medical schools, and other research institutions. For example, a study on how diabetes leads to kidney disease would be listed in the “diabetes” and “kidney disease” categories. NIH Funding for Kidney Disease Research Totaled $564 Million in Fiscal Year 2015; Funding Levels Varied across Leading Diseases and Conditions
NIH funding for biomedical research related to kidney disease totaled approximately $564 million for 1,493 projects in fiscal year 2015—an increase of 2.7 percent from fiscal year 2014. NIDDK provided the majority (60 percent) of this funding; other ICs provided the remaining 40 percent of funding. Although NIH is the primary federal agency involved in biomedical research on kidney disease, there are other federal agencies that conduct and fund research in this area. To provide context for the level of NIH research funding for kidney disease, we also analyzed NIH funding levels for other leading diseases and conditions in the United States—those that had high mortality, were among the most prevalent chronic conditions, or both. In fiscal year 2015, NIH research funding varied across the categories corresponding to the diseases and conditions in our analysis, from $8 million for fibromyalgia to nearly $5.4 billion for cancer. The variation in research funding across the RCDC categories in table 1 reflects a range of factors, including differences in each IC’s mission, congressional appropriations, and research priorities. NIDDK Obtains Input from the Broader Kidney Care Community to Develop its Research Priorities
NIDDK works with the broader kidney care community to develop its kidney disease research priorities by using a web-based forum, hosting a variety of meetings for kidney disease stakeholders, and by assessing its research portfolio. NIDDK considers the community’s input in the context of the institute’s ongoing work and its knowledge of the current state of kidney disease research to develop funding announcements that target high-priority research areas that are not being adequately addressed. According to NIDDK officials, NIDDK’s process for obtaining input from the kidney care and scientific communities, and developing research priorities is iterative by design to help ensure that the institute’s priorities evolve to reflect the latest research developments and needs of the communities. 2.) Representatives from six private kidney care groups we interviewed generally agreed with NIDDK’s kidney disease research priorities as published in the KRND; however, all of the organizations’ representatives identified kidney disease topic areas that they said warranted increased emphasis by NIDDK. NIDDK officials agreed that improving kidney disease awareness and reducing kidney disease disparities were important issues, and pointed out a variety of ongoing NIDDK programs related to these topics. The department provided us with technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. Appendix I: Leading Diseases and Conditions and their Corresponding National Institutes of Health Research Categories
To determine the leading diseases and conditions for our analysis of National Institutes of Health (NIH) research funding, we identified diseases and conditions that had high mortality, were chronic conditions with high prevalence, or both. Appendix II: Federal Funding for Kidney Disease Biomedical Research by Agencies Other than the National Institutes of Health
The following is a summary of biomedical research on kidney disease conducted by federal agencies outside the National Institutes of Health (NIH): specifically, agencies that are part of the Kidney Interagency Coordinating Committee (KICC), as well as the Patient-Centered Outcomes Research Institute (PCORI). Two of the topic areas in fiscal year 2015 were directly related to kidney disease: focal segmental glomerulosclerosis—a disease in which scar tissue develops on the parts of the kidneys that filter waste out of the blood; and polycystic kidney disease—an inherited disorder in which clusters of cysts develop primarily within the kidneys. Department of Health and Human Services. | Why GAO Did This Study
An estimated 17 percent of U.S. adults have chronic kidney disease—the most common form of kidney disease—a condition in which the kidneys are damaged and cannot filter blood sufficiently, causing waste from the blood to remain in the body. Kidney disease patients may progress to ESRD, a condition of kidney failure, which can cause death without dialysis or kidney transplant. In 2013, the Medicare program—which pays for ESRD treatment—spent $30.9 billion to treat approximately 530,000 patients. Given the high cost of kidney disease in terms of health consequences and federal spending, GAO was asked to examine how the federal government funds and prioritizes kidney disease research. This report describes (1) the level of NIH funding for biomedical research on kidney disease, and for other leading diseases and conditions; and (2) how NIDDK sets priorities for kidney disease research.
To describe NIH funding for research on kidney disease and other diseases and conditions, GAO selected leading diseases and conditions (based on mortality and prevalence) and analyzed their levels of research funding based on NIH data for fiscal year 2015. To describe how NIDDK sets priorities for kidney disease research, GAO reviewed documents—including those on research portfolios and strategic planning—from NIDDK, NIH, and other relevant federal agencies. Also, GAO interviewed agency officials and private kidney care groups representing a broad range of perspectives.
What GAO Found
The National Institutes of Health (NIH), within the Department of Health and Human Services, is the primary federal agency that conducts biomedical research on kidney disease, as well as various other diseases and conditions. NIH's budget—$30 billion in fiscal year 2015—mostly funds extramural research that supports research personnel working at universities, medical schools, and other institutions. The National Institute of Diabetes and Digestive and Kidney Diseases (NIDDK)—one of NIH's 27 institutes and centers (IC)—has primary responsibility for kidney disease research. NIH funding for biomedical research on kidney disease in fiscal year 2015 was approximately $564 million—an increase of 2.7 percent from fiscal year 2014. NIDDK provided the majority (60 percent) of this funding, supporting a broad range of projects, such as chronic kidney disease, end-stage renal disease (ESRD) treatment, and kidney donation. GAO also reviewed NIH research funding levels for other diseases and conditions in the United States—those that are associated with high mortality or are among the most prevalent chronic conditions. GAO found that funding for fiscal year 2015 varied widely among these diseases and conditions—for example, from $28 million for emphysema to nearly $5.4 billion for cancer. This variation in funding reflects a range of factors, including each IC's mission, budget, and research priorities.
NIDDK obtains input from the broader kidney care community to develop its research priorities. To develop funding announcements that target high-priority research areas, NIDDK considers the kidney care community's input in the context of its ongoing work and its knowledge of the current state of kidney disease research. NIDDK's process for obtaining input from the kidney care community is iterative by design to help ensure that the institute's research priorities evolve to reflect the latest research developments and needs of the kidney care community.
Representatives from six private kidney care groups GAO interviewed generally agreed with NIDDK's kidney disease research priorities; however, some of the groups' members identified kidney disease topic areas they believe warrant more attention from NIDDK, such as a lack of kidney disease awareness in the general public. NIDDK agreed with this and other topics raised by the groups, and pointed out a variety of ongoing NIDDK programs that address these topics.
The Department of Health and Human Services provided technical comments, which GAO incorporated as appropriate. |
gao_GAO-06-977T | gao_GAO-06-977T_0 | Results Contain Health-related Predictions That Are Both Medically Unproven and Meaningless
Although there are numerous disclaimers indicating that the tests we purchased do not diagnose disease, the 14 results we received predicted that our fictitious consumers were at risk of developing a myriad of medical conditions. With regard to the tests we purchased from Web site 1, the 3 results we received stated that the DNA sample from the female displayed an “increased risk of reduced calcium and Vitamin D absorption,” meaning that she “may be at increased risk of developing osteoporosis.” Results from the same tests contained similar predictions with regard to risks for developing high blood pressure, type 2 diabetes, and heart disease. Furthermore, the genetic experts we spoke with informed us that even though it is possible to make a definitive diagnosis of disease by looking at certain genes, none of the predictions contained in any of the results we received can be medically proven at this time. Medical Predictions Are Also Meaningless
Even if the predictions could be medically proven, the way the results are presented—using ambiguous language—renders them meaningless. In fact, these types of predictions could apply to any human that submitted DNA. Results Encourage the Purchase of Supplements That Are Overpriced, Make Unproven Medical Claims, and May Even Be Harmful
Results from the tests that we purchased from Web sites 1 and 4 further mislead the consumer by recommending expensive supplements. Supplements Recommended by the Tests Purchased from Web Site 1
The results from the tests we purchased from Web site 1 recommended a 90-day supply of a “personalized, custom” nutritional formula for $295, or approximately $1,200 per year. According to the product information, this formula is based on “what your genetic profile reveals as areas in your body that may need special support.” Despite this claim, when we examined the listed ingredients, we found that we were recommended the same product for all 3 of the fictitious consumers we created for this test—2 of these consumers actually had the DNA from the female, 1 had the DNA from the male, and all 3 had different lifestyle descriptions, as previously shown in figure 1. Moreover, the experts we spoke with confirmed that the supplements themselves are not unique; they contain vitamins that can be found in any pharmacy or grocery store. According to the results, these supplements are personalized based on the DNA submitted and lifestyle descriptions provided on the questionnaires, and they are supposed to help “compensate” for “genetic deficiencies.” Specifically, the product information accompanying the test results claims that the regimen will repair damaged DNA through the consumption of 7 pills per day, including 4 tablets per day of a supplement containing over “70 vitamins, minerals, and enzymes combined with “CAEs”, a proprietary extract from the Tropical Rainforest botanical Uncaria tomentosa, known as Cat’s Claw, which has been clinically shown to promote DNA repair in the body.” A 60-day supply costs $160. Results Do Not Provide Recommendations Based on a Unique Genetic Profile
Results from the tests that we purchased from Web sites 1, 2, and 3 promise recommendations based on the consumer’s unique genetic profile. If the recommendations were truly based on the consumer’s unique genetic profile, then these 9 consumers should have received the same recommendations because their DNA came from the same source. Instead, they received a variety of different recommendations, depending on the fictitious lifestyles we provided for them. For example, when we said that a fictitious consumer with the female DNA smoked and ate a lot of fatty foods, we received recommendations to stop smoking and eat fewer fatty foods. Although these recommendations may be beneficial to consumers in that they constitute common sense health and dietary guidance, DNA analysis is not needed to generate this advice. Nutrigentic Testing in the United Kingdom: The company that manufactures the tests used by Web sites 1, 2, and 3 used to sell the same type of test in the United Kingdom—consumers provided DNA samples and filled out a lifestyle questionnaire, and the company provided advice on what consumers should do to improve their health with diet and lifestyle changes. However, as demand for these new tests continues to rise, it will become increasingly important for consumers to have reliable information in order to determine which tests are accurate and useful. | Why GAO Did This Study
Scientists increasingly believe that most, if not all, diseases have a genetic component. Consequently, genetic testing is becoming an integral part of health care with great potential for future test development and use. Some genetic tests are sold directly to the consumer via the Internet or retail stores, and purport to use genetic information to deliver personalized nutrition and lifestyle guidance. These tests require consumers to self-collect a sample of genetic material, usually from a cheek swab, and then forward the sample to a laboratory for analysis. Companies that market this type of test claim to provide consumers with the information needed to tailor their diet and exercise programs to address their genetically determined health risks. GAO was asked to investigate the "legitimacy" of these claims. This testimony reflects the findings of GAO's investigation of a nonrepresentative selection of genetic tests. Specifically, GAO purchased tests from four Web sites and created "fictitious consumers" by submitting for analysis 12 DNA samples from a female and 2 samples from an unrelated male, and describing this DNA as coming from adults of various ages, weights, and lifestyle descriptions. GAO also consulted with experts in genetics and nutrition.
What GAO Found
The results from all the tests GAO purchased mislead consumers by making predictions that are medically unproven and so ambiguous that they do not provide meaningful information to consumers. Although there are numerous disclaimers indicating that the tests are not intended to diagnose disease, all 14 results predict that the fictitious consumers are at risk for developing a range of conditions, as shown in the figure below. However, although some types of diseases, such as cystic fibrosis, can be definitively diagnosed by looking at certain genes, the experts GAO spoke with said that the medical predictions in the tests results can not be medically proven at this time. Even if the predictions could be medically proven, the way the results are presented renders them meaningless. For example, many people "may" be "at increased risk" for developing heart disease, so such an ambiguous statement could relate to any human that submitted DNA. Results from the tests that GAO purchased from Web sites 1 and 4 further mislead the consumer by recommending costly dietary supplements. The results from the tests from Web site 1 suggested "personalized" supplements costing approximately $1,200 per year. However, after examining the list of ingredients, GAO found that they were substantially the same as typical vitamins and antioxidants that can be found in any grocery store for about $35 per year. Results from the tests from Web site 4 suggested expensive products that claimed to repair damaged DNA. However, the experts GAO spoke with stated that there is no "pill" currently available that has been proven to do so. The experts also told us that, in some circumstances, taking supplements such as those recommended may be harmful. In addition, results from the tests that GAO purchased from Web sites 1, 2, and 3 do not provide recommendations based on a unique genetic profile as promised, but instead provide a number of common sense health recommendations. If the recommendations were truly based on genetic analysis, then the 9 fictitious consumers that GAO created for these sites using the female DNA should have received the same recommendations because their DNA came from the same source. Instead, they received a variety of different recommendations, depending on their fictitious lifestyles. For example, when GAO created lifestyle descriptions stating that the consumers smoked, they received recommendations to stop smoking. In contrast, if GAO said the consumers never smoked, they received recommendations to continue to avoid smoking. |
gao_GAO-02-239 | gao_GAO-02-239_0 | A second provision of PRWORA requires that states enact laws requiring procedures to suspend licenses of noncustodial parents who owe past-due child support. CSE programs use SSNs to help locate noncustodial parents and enforce support orders. Most MVAs Are Collecting SSNs from Driver’s License Applicants but OCSE Actions to Track and Promote Compliance Have Been Limited
Most MVAs (47 out of 53) collect SSNs from all applicants for driver’s licenses, but OCSE has taken limited or no steps to promote such collection in states not currently doing so. Few Privacy Concerns Expressed about MVAs Collecting SSNs, Yet Potential Weaknesses in Safeguarding SSNs May Compromise Privacy
State officials and privacy experts we spoke with generally did not express privacy concerns regarding the policy that MVAs collect SSNs for child support enforcement. Children’s advocacy groups echoed this belief, and noted that SSNs are particularly important for facilitating the collection of payments when noncustodial parents or their income and assets are not in the same state as the child. Furthermore, although the Social Security Act requires MVAs to collect SSNs for child support enforcement purposes and restricts their use to those purposes, the law did not address computer security at MVAs. When used, the driver’s license suspension process can result in collecting child support payments in some cases. SSNs from MVAs are particularly valuable because they include the SSNs of noncustodial parents that CSE programs may have had difficulty obtaining from other sources. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Objectives
The objectives of our review were to (1) determine the extent to which states have implemented the federal requirement that MVAs collect SSNs from all licensed drivers and what OCSE has done to promote compliance in states not adhering to this requirement, (2) identify privacy concerns associated with MVA efforts to collect and safeguard SSNs that are used for child support enforcement purposes, and (3) determine the extent to which state CSE programs use driver’s license suspension to collect past- due child support and whether this tool has resulted in collections. | What GAO Found
Congress established a national child support enforcement (CSE) program in 1965 to ensure that noncustodial parents financially support their children. In fiscal year 2000, the Office of Child Support Enforcement (OCSE) estimated that $84 billion in past-due child support was owed, but never collected. The Social Security Act contains provisions to help child support agencies collect support when noncustodial parents or their income and assets are hard to find. The Act mandates that states enact laws requiring social security numbers (SSNs) on applications for a driver's license. State CSE programs rely on SSNs to locate the addresses, income, and assets of noncustodial parents. Motor vehicle agencies can be a valuable source of SSNs that CSE programs have difficulty obtaining elsewhere. The Act also requires that states suspend, withhold, or restrict the driver's licenses of noncustodial parents delinquent in child support payments. Most motor vehicle agencies that GAO surveyed collect SSNs from all applicants for driver's licenses, but OCSE has taken few steps to promote such collection in states not currently doing so. Although state officials and privacy experts expressed few concerns about motor vehicle agencies collecting SSNs for child support enforcement, possible weaknesses in the policies and procedures in use to safeguard SSNs indicate the potential for compromising privacy. Child support enforcement officials in 35 states told GAO that their agencies use driver's license suspension extensively, which has led to the collection of some payments. |
gao_GAO-16-336 | gao_GAO-16-336_0 | All Programs with a Critical Change Reported Required Elements, but Most Missed Deadlines and Obligations Were Not Monitored
According to statute, for programs that declare a critical change, the report that is submitted to Congress must include a written certification stating that: the automated information system or IT investment to be acquired is essential to the national security or to the efficient management of the DOD; there is no alternative to the system or IT investment which will provide equal or greater capability at less cost; the new estimates of the costs, schedule, and performance parameters have been determined, with the concurrence of the Director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation, to be reasonable; and the management structure for the program is adequate to manage and control program costs. All 18 MAIS critical change reports in our review contained the required elements. Specifically, 16 exceeded the 60-day reporting requirement and 10 of those programs took over 100 days to report. CAC2S program was late because of the need to conduct an independent assessment that was directed by DOD. According to a DOD AT&L official, 60 days is too short to perform a program evaluation and achieve all the coordination necessary for an important communication with Congress. Further, DOD does not have a mechanism to monitor and ensure that MAIS programs with late reports were restricted as required by law from obligating funds on major contracts prior to Congress receiving the report. Selected MAIS Programs Had Varying Cost and Schedule Estimate Changes, One Did Not Meet Its Technical Performance Targets
The extent to which the three selected MAIS programs in our study experienced changes in their cost and schedule estimates and met performance targets varied. All three selected programs implemented IT acquisition best practices for risk management, but requirements management best practices were not consistently implemented by the programs. The Army had implemented three requirements management best practices for the program, but did not fully implement two: the practice of managing requirements changes and ensuring that work products are in alignment with requirements. The Air Force Program Implemented Risk Management Practices, but Did Not Apply One Requirements Management Practice
The Air Force implemented all seven risk management best practices for the DEAMS program. However, the organization responsible for supervising MAIS acquisition programs—AT&L—is not represented on the Dashboard. Nonetheless, since only the DOD CIO is represented on the Dashboard, the public and other users may be unaware that AT&L has overall oversight for the acquisition performance of MAIS programs, minimizing the intended accountability the Dashboard is to provide. Managing requirements effectively is especially necessary since MAIS programs are intended to help the department sustain its key operations. Recommendations for Executive Action
To help improve the management of MAIS programs, we are making six recommendations that:
The Secretary of Defense examine the MAIS critical change reporting process to identify root causes for delays and implement corrective actions for the timely delivery of critical change reports. The IT Dashboard publicly shows DOD’s CIO as the responsible party, pursuant to OMB’s direction. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 includes a provision that we select, assess, and report on selected Department of Defense (DOD) major automated information system (MAIS) programs annually through March 2018. Our objectives for this report were to (1) evaluate DOD’s implementation of statutory reporting requirements for MAIS programs experiencing a critical change; (2) describe the extent to which selected MAIS programs have changed their planned cost and schedule estimates, and met performance targets; (3) assess the extent to which selected MAIS programs have used key IT acquisition best practices, including risk management; and (4) determine the extent to which MAIS programs are accurately represented on the Federal IT Dashboard. For those programs that were found to not be reported on the Dashboard, we met with agency officials from the Office of the Chief Information Officer (OCIO) and the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics) (AT&L) to determine the reasons for not reporting. Did Not Fully Meet System Performance Targets As of October 2015, DEAMS program officials reported that it did not meet all of its nine key performance parameters. | Why GAO Did This Study
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 includes a provision for GAO to select, assess, and report on DOD MAIS programs annually through March 2018. MAIS programs are intended to help the department sustain its key operations. This report: (1) evaluates DOD's implementation of statutory reporting requirements for MAIS programs experiencing a critical change; (2) describes the extent to which selected MAIS programs have changed their planned cost and schedule estimates, and met performance targets; (3) assesses the extent to which selected MAIS programs have used key IT acquisition best practices, including requirements and risk management; and (4) determines the extent to which MAIS programs are represented on the Dashboard. GAO compared information on programs with a critical change to the reporting requirements. GAO selected three programs based on factors, such as representation from each military service (Air Force, Army, and Navy), identified changes to cost, schedule, and performance, and assessed them against selected best practices. GAO traced the programs to the Dashboard and reviewed relevant processes.
What GAO Found
All 18 major automated information system (MAIS) programs that experienced a critical change to program cost, schedule, or system performance targets submitted complete reports to Congress that contained all four statutory elements, but 16 programs did not meet the requirement to report to Congress within 60 days of the program manager's submission to the senior Department of Defense (DOD) official that led to the critical change determination. Of the 16 critical change reports that exceeded the 60-days to report, 10 of the programs took over 100 days. Officials said that 60 days is too short to perform a program evaluation. Since the reports were not always timely, Congress may not have the necessary information when it is needed to make decisions. Finally, the DOD did not demonstrate that it had an internal control to ensure that MAIS programs not in compliance with reporting requirements were restricted from obligating funds on major contracts as required by law.
All three MAIS programs GAO selected to review experienced changes in their cost and schedule estimates, and one program did not fully meet its technical performance targets (see table).
Source: GAO analysis of data provided by DOD officials. | GAO-16-336
a Delay was attributed to a major change in project scope and restructuring of the program.
The three selected programs implemented all seven IT acquisition best practices for risk management, and most of the best practices were implemented for requirements management: the Army and Navy implemented three of five best practices and the Air Force implemented four of five best practices. For example, the Army program did not adequately manage requirements changes and ensure that deliverables were in alignment with requirements. Until the programs fully implement best practices for requirements management, management of development efforts will likely be impaired.
As of October 2015, all appropriate programs were represented on the Federal IT Dashboard (Dashboard) as required by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB); however, the organization responsible for performance of MAIS programs was not provided. Specifically, DOD's Chief Information Officer is shown as the responsible party because OMB requires this, but the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (AT&L) has overall responsibility for the MAIS programs. Therefore, users of the Dashboard are unaware that AT&L is the responsible organization and, thus, public accountability of the MAIS programs is decreased.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends, among others, that DOD examine the critical change reporting process and implement corrections for the reports' timeliness, and address weaknesses with requirements management, and add AT&L as a responsible organization for MAIS programs to the Dashboard. DOD concurred with all recommendations. OMB did not concur but GAO continues to believe that improved transparency is needed. |
gao_RCED-97-23 | gao_RCED-97-23_0 | Ticket Tax May Not Fairly Allocate the System’s Costs Among Its Users
FAA is responsible for a wide range of functions, which range from certifying new aircraft; to inspecting the existing fleet; to providing air traffic services, such as controlling takeoffs and landings and managing the flow of aircraft between airports. Similarly, we have reported our view that the various commercial users of the nation’s airspace and airports should pay their fair share of the costs that they impose on the system. However, because the ticket tax is based on the fares paid, the airline that charges the lower fares in this example will pay less for the system’s use, even though both airlines had the same number of takeoffs and landings and flew the same number of passengers, the same type of aircraft, and the same distance. Proposal by Larger Airlines Would Increase the Share Paid by Other Airlines and Have Substantial Competitive Impacts
Motivated by their belief that the current system unfairly subsidizes their low-fare competitors, the nation’s seven largest airlines have proposed that the ticket tax be replaced by user fees on domestic operations. As a result, by charging commuter carriers less per seat, the proposal would provide the coalition airlines with an additional benefit. Implementing a proposal that would shift nearly $600 million in costs from one segment of the industry to another could have substantial competitive impacts and needs to be studied first. A more precise fee system, however, would account for those costs incurred by FAA in managing the airport and airway system, which vary greatly by the amount, type, and timing of various airline operations. Further Study With Broader Input Needed to Determine How Best to Finance FAA
Determining how best to finance FAA involves complex issues, requiring careful examination. Specifically, the Federal Aviation Reauthorization Act (P.L. This assessment, which the contractor is required to complete by February 1997, will be a critical piece in designing a new fee system if the Congress ultimately decides to replace the ticket tax. Status of the Airport and Airway Trust Fund and the Potential Effect on FAA’s Budget of the Trust Fund’s Taxes Lapsing
During fiscal years 1990 through 1996, the Airport and Airway Trust Fund financed 100 percent of three FAA accounts—Grants-in-Aid for Airports (the Airport Improvement Program); Facilities and Equipment; and Research, Engineering, and Development. FAA officials estimate that in order for the Trust Fund to finance $5.31 billion of FAA’s fiscal year 1997 budget, the taxes would need to be reinstated by July 1997. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO examined the proposal by a coalition of the seven largest U.S. airlines to replace the ticket tax with user fees, focusing on: (1) whether the ticket tax should be replaced by a different fee system; (2) what the potential competitive impacts of the fees proposed by the coalition airlines would be; (3) what factors need to be considered if a new fee system were to be developed; and (4) the implications on the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) budget of reinstating or not reinstating the taxes that finance the Airport and Airway Trust Fund.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) because the ticket tax is based on the fares paid by travelers and not an allocation of actual FAA costs, it may not fairly allocate the system's costs among the users; (2) the coalition airlines' proposal to replace the ticket tax with user fees only incorporates factors that would substantially increase the fees paid by low-fare and small airlines and decrease the fees paid by the seven coalition airlines; (3) the proposal would dramatically redistribute the cost burden among airlines and could have substantial implications for domestic competition; (4) any replacement system for the ticket tax would need to account for the wide range of costs incurred by FAA in managing the airport and airway system; (5) the views of all affected parties, not just any particular group of airlines, would need to be included in assessing the mechanisms for financing the airport and airway system; and (6) Congress established a commission to study how best to meet FAA financing needs which will help ensure that, in the long term, FAA has a secure funding source, commercial users of the system pay their fair share, and a strong, competitive airline industry continues to exist. |
gao_GAO-16-22 | gao_GAO-16-22_0 | ACV 1.1, 1.2 and 2.0: In 2014, the USMC revised its ACV acquisition approach, adopting a plan to develop the ACV in three increments:
The first increment of ACV development—ACV 1.1—is planned to be a wheeled vehicle that would provide improved protected land mobility and limited amphibious capability. These technology exploration efforts are seeking design options that may enable high water speed capability without accruing unacceptable trade-offs in other capabilities, cost or schedule. According to officials, ACV 2.0 is a conceptual placeholder for a future decision point when the Marine Corps plans to determine how to replace the AAV fleet, which is expected to occur in the mid- 2020s. This means that the technologies needed to meet essential product requirements have been demonstrated to work in their intended environment. Early ACV Acquisition Activities Demonstrate Best Practices
Our review of the available documents that have been prepared to inform the November 2015 decision to begin system development of ACV 1.1— including the acquisition strategy and an updated 2014 AOA—found that most of the ACV program’s acquisition activities to date reflect the use of best practices. While some aspects of this acquisition do suggest lower levels of risk, these deviations could potentially increase program risk. GAO will continue to monitor this risk as the program moves forward. Technology maturity. According to our prior work, competition is a critical tool for achieving the best return on the government’s investment. 2014 ACV Analysis of Alternatives Met Best Practices
Our assessment of the 2014 AOA found that overall it met best practices for AOAs and is, therefore, considered reliable. The program is scheduled to hold its PDR after development starts, a deviation from best practices. Some factors may mitigate the risk posed by this acceleration, for example, program officials have stated that all required testing will take place prior to the start of production. However, our past work has also shown that beginning production before demonstrating that a design is mature and that a system will work as intended increases the risk of discovering deficiencies during production that could require substantial design changes and costly modifications to systems already built. ACV 1.1 Expects to Rely on Surface Connector Craft for All Ship to Shore Transportation
While ACV 1.1 is expected to have shore to shore amphibious capability, which would enable the vehicle to cross rivers and inland waterways, the vehicle is also expected to rely on Navy surface connector craft for ship to shore transportation. Future Amphibious Capability to be Determined
The exact nature of the ACV’s future amphibious capability is not yet known. Based on tests and demonstrations to date, program officials also expressed confidence that ACV 1.2 will build on the ACV 1.1 capabilities and have the ability to self-deploy from ships. According to DOD officials, with the ACV 2.0 decision, the ACV program expects to achieve high water speed, a long-standing goal and a significant increase from the current amphibious goals identified for ACV 1.1. This USMC strategy, and the analysis that supports it, is based on the assumption that ACV 1.2 will reach a desired level of amphibious capability and that ACV 1.1 vehicles can be upgraded to that level. We will continue to monitor these issues along with the program’s performance against best practices as it progresses toward the Milestone C production decision currently planned for the second quarter of fiscal year 2018. Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
We are not making any recommendations in this report. The comments are reprinted in appendix V.
In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD stated that it believes its efforts on this program are aligned with our best practices and that our report appears to underestimate ACV 1.1’s planned technical maturity and associated risks. As we stated in this report, the program’s plan to hold a PDR after beginning development does not align with best practices and combining the PDR and CDR may limit the time available to the program to address any issues identified and ensure that sufficient knowledge is attained prior to the program moving forward. Further, as we stated earlier, while some aspects of this acquisition do suggest lower levels of risk, these deviations could potentially increase program risk—risks that we will continue to monitor as the program moves forward. 2. To determine how the increments of ACV are to achieve amphibious capability, we reviewed program documentation from the ACV acquisition, including the acquisition strategy and the Concept of Employment, as well as program documentation for Navy surface connector programs, including the Ship to Shore Connector Capabilities Development Document and the Surface Connector Council charter. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Marine Corps' ACV is intended to transport Marines from ship to shore and provide armored protection on land. It is to potentially replace all or a portion of the decades old AAV fleet, and is expected to eventually offer increased amphibious capability and high water speed.
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014 included a provision that GAO annually review and report on the ACV program until 2018. This report provides an updated discussion of (1) how the ACV program's efforts compare to acquisition best practices and examines (2) how the increments of ACV will achieve amphibious capability.
To conduct this work, GAO reviewed program documentation and other materials for the ACV acquisition and Navy surface connector programs. GAO identified acquisition and analysis of alternatives best practices based on its prior body of work and DOD guidance. GAO also interviewed program and agency officials.
What GAO Found
Most of the current activities of the U.S. Marine Corps' Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV) program have demonstrated the use of best practices, but plans for an accelerated acquisition schedule pose potential risks. As the program approaches the start of engineering and manufacturing development, it is seeking to rely on mature technologies that have been demonstrated to work in their intended environment as well as fostering competition—a critical tool for achieving the best return on the government's investment. Further, GAO analyzed the ACV analysis of alternatives that the Marine Corps produced for the initial portion of the ACV development, finding that overall it met best practices by, for example, ensuring that the analysis of alternatives process was impartial. However, the Marine Corps is pursuing an accelerated program schedule that presents some risks, including plans to hold the preliminary design review after the start of development—a deviation from best practices which could postpone the attainment of information about whether the design performs as expected. Moreover, GAO believes that the level of planned concurrency—conducting development testing and production at the same time—could leave the program at greater risk of discovering deficiencies after some systems have already been built, potentially requiring costly modifications. Agency officials stated that mature technologies reduce risk and that, while some concurrency is planned, all required testing will be completed prior to the production decision. While some aspects of this acquisition do suggest lower levels of risk, these deviations could potentially increase program risk. GAO will continue to monitor this risk as the program moves forward.
The ACV program relies heavily on future plans to increase ACV amphibious capability gradually, in three planned increments known as ACV 1.1, 1.2, and 2.0, but exactly how this capability will be attained has not yet been determined.
ACV 1.1 – Although this increment is expected to have some amphibious capability, according to program documents, it is expected to rely on surface connector craft—vessels that enable the transportation of military assets from ship to shore. Marine Corps and U.S. Navy officials regularly coordinate ACV 1.1 plans to operate with the surface connector fleet through coordination mechanisms such as the Surface Connector Council.
ACV 1.2 – This increment is expected to have greater amphibious capability, including the ability to self-deploy from ships. Based on demonstrations from related programs to date, program officials believe it will reach that capability, but indicated that plans for 1.2 are expected to depend on the success of ACV 1.1 development.
ACV 2.0 – This increment represents a future decision point when the Marine Corps plans to determine how to replace the Assault Amphibious Vehicle (AAV) fleet. The Marine Corps is currently exploring technologies that may enable high water speed—a significant increase from the amphibious goals identified for ACV 1.1. Therefore, how it will achieve the amphibious capability envisioned for ACV 2.0 is undetermined.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is not making recommendations in this report. In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD stated that it believes its efforts are aligned with best practices and that GAO's report appears to underestimate ACV 1.1's planned technical maturity. GAO found that some program plans do not align with best practices and that while some aspects of the acquisition do suggest lower levels of risk, these deviations could potentially increase program risk. GAO will continue to monitor these risks as the program moves forward. |
gao_GAO-02-149T | gao_GAO-02-149T_0 | Preparedness Efforts Include Multiple Actions
Federal departments’ and agencies’ preparedness efforts have included efforts to increase federal, state, and local response capabilities, develop response teams of medical professionals, increase availability of medical treatments, participate in and sponsor terrorism response exercises, plan to aid victims, and provide support during special events such as presidential inaugurations, major political party conventions, and the Superbowl. However, we found evidence that coordination remains fragmented. Departments and agencies use several approaches to coordinate their activities on terrorism, including interagency response plans, work groups, and formal agreements. Table 1 shows some of the federal programs providing assistance to state and local governments for emergency planning that would be relevant to responding to a bioterrorist attack. These concerns include insufficient state and local planning for response to terrorist events, a lack of hospital participation in training on terrorism and emergency response planning, questions regarding the timely availability of medical teams and resources in an emergency, and inadequacies in the public health infrastructure. Interagency Group for Equipment Standards. Bioterrorism: Federal Research and Preparedness Activities (GAO-01-915, Sept. 28, 2001). | Why GAO Did This Study
Federal research and preparedness activities related to bioterrorism center on detecting of such agents; developing new or improved vaccines, antibiotics, and antivirals; and developing performance standards for emergency response equipment. Preparedness activities include: (1) increasing federal, state, and local response capabilities; (2) developing response teams; (3) increasing the availability of medical treatments; (4) participating in and sponsoring exercises; (5) aiding victims; and (6) providing support at special events, such as presidential inaugurations and Olympic games. To coordinate their activities, federal agencies are developing interagency response plans, participating in various interagency work groups, and entering into formal agreements with each other to share resources and capabilities.
What GAO Found
However, GAO found that coordination of federal terrorism research, preparedness, and response programs is fragmented, raising concerns about the ability of states and localities to respond to a bioterrorist attack. These concerns include poor state and local planning and the lack of hospital participation in training on terrorism and emergency response planning. This report summarized a September 2001 report (GAO-01-915). |
gao_GGD-99-68 | gao_GGD-99-68_0 | Did SBA follow applicable policies and procedures when appointing--and setting the starting salaries of--individuals hired during the period January 1, 1993, through December 31, 1998, from outside of SBA for the position of District Director, and what procedures did SBA’s Office of Advocacy use in hiring Regional Advocates and Assistant Advocates during calendar year 1998? There were allegations that the individual appointed to the Denver position obtained the appointment through her political connections. Setting the Starting Salaries for the Six Directors
Federal regulations govern the salary-setting process for new appointees. However, in one of the six cases, SBA did not consider the use of a recruitment bonus when it set the District Director’s salary at a level higher than the minimum rate for the pay grade. In that instance, SBA officials--during our review--determined that the salary had been set incorrectly. SBA said that it is revising its procedures to ensure program managers know extensions and terminations of interagency details are to be documented on a Notification of Personnel Action (SF-50) and that the new procedure will ensure that SBA’s personnel/payroll system provides automated “ticklers” to help eliminate the possibility of any funds from reimbursable details not being collected. For example, like political appointees, Regional Advocates can be hired noncompetitively. However, the documentation necessary to support certain pay settings could not always be found. We recommend that the SBA Administrator identify and establish appropriate procedures for better controlling the interagency detailing of its employees. However, we also report a number of cases in which SBA could not provide documentation allowing a determination as to whether SBA followed appropriate procedures when setting advanced salaries at the time the employees were hired. Consequently, SBA had not developed a recruitment bonus plan, as required by regulations. Date of Reimburse- ment 7/26/94 ?? ? 6. 2. 3. 4. 5. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed events related to personnel reassignments, appointments, and activities at the Small Business Administration (SBA).
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) SBA made hundreds of appointments during the 1990s using competitive procedures for career appointments, special noncompetitive hiring authority for the Office of Advocacy, and political appointment procedures for other appointments; (2) for the appointments that GAO reviewed, GAO found that SBA adhered to the different procedural requirements; (3) for example, although 6 of the 42 District Director appointees were hired from outside SBA to the career positions, and 2 of them had political backgrounds, GAO found nothing procedurally amiss in the hiring process; (4) GAO determined, however, that in several cases SBA did not follow applicable federal regulations when setting the starting salary at a rate higher than the minimum rate for the grade; (5) SBA could not provide the documentation required by federal regulations to support the advanced salary settings; (6) SBA has developed draft procedures that, if properly implemented, should help prevent such situations from recurring; (7) GAO also determined that SBA poorly controlled its interagency detailing of employees, with the result that cost reimbursements were not always being collected; and (8) SBA officials advised GAO that they are developing new procedures to better control interagency details and collections of reimbursements. |
gao_GAO-05-49 | gao_GAO-05-49_0 | ISC Faces Challenges to Fulfilling Its Responsibilities
ISC’s Executive Director identified several challenges that relate to ISC’s many roles and responsibilities in coordinating the government’s facility protection efforts. Although ISC has taken steps to address challenges, such as seeking additional resources for fiscal year 2006, it lacks an action plan that could be used to (1) provide DHS and other stakeholders with detailed information on, and a rationale for, its resource needs; (2) garner and maintain the support of ISC member agencies, DHS management, OMB, and Congress; (3) identify implementation goals and measures for gauging progress in fulfilling all of its responsibilities; and (4) propose strategies for addressing the challenges ISC faces. Key Practices in Federal Facility Protection
As ISC and agencies have paid greater attention to facility protection in recent years, several key practices have emerged that collectively could provide a framework for guiding agencies’ efforts. Key facility protection practices that we identified include allocating security resources using risk management, leveraging the use of security technology, coordinating protection efforts and sharing information with other stakeholders, and measuring program performance and testing security initiatives. These include realigning real property assets to agencies’ missions, thereby reducing vulnerabilities, and strategic human capital management, to ensure that agencies are well equipped to recruit and retain high- performing security professionals. Without an overall action plan for meeting this and other responsibilities, ISC’s strategy and time line for these efforts remain unclear. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to (1) assess the Interagency Security Committee’s (ISC) progress in fulfilling its responsibilities and (2) identify key practices in protecting federal facilities and any related implementation obstacles. Develop and evaluate security standards for federal facilities. Responsibilities Related to Ensuring Compliance and Overseeing Implementation of Policies and Standards Develop a strategy for ensuring compliance with standards. July 2004, ISC became responsible for reviewing federal agencies physical security plans 4. | Why GAO Did This Study
The war on terrorism has made physical security for federal facilities a governmentwide concern. The Interagency Security Committee (ISC), which is chaired by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), is tasked with coordinating federal agencies' facility protection efforts, developing protection standards, and overseeing implementation. GAO's objectives were to (1) assess ISC's progress in fulfilling its responsibilities and (2) identify key practices in protecting federal facilities and any related implementation obstacles.
What GAO Found
ISC has made progress in coordinating the government's facility protection efforts. In recent years, ISC has taken several actions to develop policies and guidance for facility protection and to share related information. Although its actions to ensure compliance with security standards and oversee implementation have been limited, in July 2004, ISC became responsible for reviewing federal agencies' physical security plans for the administration. ISC, however, lacks an action plan that could be used to provide DHS and other stakeholders with information on, and a rationale for, its resource needs; garner and maintain the support of ISC member agencies, DHS management, Office of Management and Budget, and Congress; identify implementation goals and measures for gauging progress; and propose strategies for addressing various challenges it faces, such as resource constraints. Without an action plan, ISC's strategy and time line for implementing its responsibilities remain unclear. s ISC and agencies have paid greater attention to facility protection in recent years, several key practices have emerged that, collectively, could provide a framework for guiding agencies' efforts. These include allocating resources using risk management; leveraging security technology; coordinating protection efforts and sharing information; measuring program performance and testing security initiatives; realigning real property assets to mission, thereby reducing vulnerabilities; and, implementing strategic human capital management, to ensure that agencies are well equipped to recruit and retain high-performing security professionals. GAO also noted several obstacles to implementation, such as developing quality data for risk management and performance measurement, and ensuring that technology will perform as expected. |
gao_GGD-96-62 | gao_GGD-96-62_0 | What have the buyouts achieved? In response, we reviewed whether the downsizing goals of the Federal Workforce Restructuring Act whether agencies’ use of buyouts reflected the administration’s workforce restructuring goals as articulated by NPR; what the demographic results of the buyouts were; how agencies viewed buyouts as a downsizing tool; and what operational impacts were attributed by agencies to workforce downsizing. Buyouts Helped Agencies Downsize With Minimal Use of RIFs
Federal employment levels have declined steadily since the administration’s downsizing efforts began in early 1993. According to OPM data, as of March 1996, non-Postal executive branch civilian employment was 1.96 million, a reduction of almost 230,500 employees (10.5 percent) since January 1993. Had agencies more successfully directed their buyouts to NPR management control positions, the percentage of buyouts in these occupations would probably have been higher than their representation in the workforce. Finally, some agencies may not have restricted buyout eligibility to employees in specific positions because they may have feared morale would be adversely affected if buyouts were offered to one set of employees but not to others. Agencies Often Set Restructuring Goals That Were Less Ambitious Than Those Recommended by the Administration
Another likely reason for the minimal change in levels of management control positions is that agencies said they could not meet NPR’s workforce restructuring goals without adversely affecting their ability to carry out their missions. Indeed, several individual agencies have already met or exceeded their reduction goals. 3). RIFs, an alternative method of downsizing, could have resulted in higher separation rates of such individuals. Of these, the largest number of respondents said that downsizing resulted in the loss of corporate memory and expertise and created work backlogs because key personnel were separated. Backlogs have been created and some “nice to do” actions are no longer being performed or are significantly delayed. These included various reengineering and automation initiatives as well as contracting out work formerly done by federal employees. Matters for Congressional Consideration
To ensure the most cost-effective use of any future buyouts and to help mitigate the adverse effects that can result from poorly planned downsizing, we recommend that Congress, in reviewing HR 2751 or other legislation that would grant buyout authority to agencies, consider:
Requiring agencies to do strategic and workforce planning as a prerequisite for receiving buyout authority and to implement downsizing consistent with the results of their planning efforts. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed several issues related to the federal employee buyout program, focusing on: (1) whether the Federal Workforce Restructuring Act's downsizing goals are being achieved; (2) whether agencies' use of buyouts reflects National Performance Review (NPR) downsizing goals; (3) the demographic results of the buyouts; and (4) how agencies view buyouts as a downsizing tool.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) between January 1993 and March 1996, non-postal executive civilian employment decreased by 230,500 employees; (2) employee buyouts have minimized the use of reductions in force (RIF); (3) agencies have not met NPR restructuring goals, since the percentage of management positions has not significantly changed; (4) agencies often set lower downsizing goals for management positions, since they do not specifically target buyouts to these positions; (5) agencies that plan their buyouts have more successful outcomes; (6) buyouts have allowed agencies to increase the representation of minorities and women in the workforce, who likely would have been adversely affected by RIF; (7) 72 percent of buyouts have gone to employees taking regular or early retirement, and some employees may have delayed their separation so they could receive buyouts; (8) most agencies believe buyouts have been an effective downsizing tool, but downsizing has caused operational problems such as the loss of corporate memory and expertise, increased workloads and backlogs, skill imbalances, and more overtime; (9) some agencies believe that downsizing has hindered their ability to carry out their missions; (10) agencies have used reengineered work processes and automation to offset personnel reductions, but a few agencies are using contract employees, some of whom are buyout recipients; (11) outsourcing work may offset some downsizing benefits and be inconsistent with the act's purpose; and (12) agencies could have mitigated some of the adverse impacts of downsizing through better strategic and workforce planning. |
gao_GAO-12-932 | gao_GAO-12-932_0 | None of these causes provide for automatic suspension or debarment. DOD Components Have Active Processes to Refer Identified Cases of Contractor Misconduct for Appropriate Action
All four DOD components we examined—the Air Force, Army, DLA, and DON—use multiple sources to identify numerous cases of actual or alleged contractor misconduct and follow their procedures to refer them for appropriate action, including possible suspension and debarment. Our analysis of selected cases confirmed that DOD follows its procedures for identifying and referring cases involving contractor misconduct or poor performance. Analysis of Contractor Misconduct Cases Shows That DOD Follows Its Identification and Referral Processes
DOD follows its procedures for identifying and referring cases involving contractor misconduct or poor performance, based on our analysis of
A random sample of 75 contractors suspended, proposed for debarment, or debarred during fiscal years 2009 through 2011;
The 48 contractors identified in the 2011 DOD contracting fraud report as having received contract funding after criminal convictions, settlement agreements, or civil judgments; and
A random sample of 62 contractors that had three or more contracts terminated for default. We found that DOD generally had reviewed these contractors for possible suspension and debarment or other action. DOD Follows the FAR in Taking Suspension and Debarment Actions, but Is Not Notifying GSA about Compelling Reason Determinations
Once a case of contractor misconduct is referred to the SDO, DOD components follow the FAR in taking action. SDOs make decisions on a case-by-case basis, in accordance with the discretion provided by the FAR. As such, suspension and debarment periods vary based on the circumstances of the case, as do the reasons for removing contractors from the EPLS. We found that required notices were in all 75 case files. This demonstrated that DOD components had provided the contractors with information on the suspension and debarment process and the appropriate FAR citation to the cause for which they were being suspended or debarred. The FAR also provides that a debarment period should be commensurate with the seriousness of the cause and generally should not exceed 3 years, but provides the SDO with discretion to extend that period if it is necessary to protect the government’s interest. Of these, 211 (almost 50 percent) were for a period of more than 3 years. Such agreements were used in a total of 30 cases during fiscal years 2009 through 2011. DOD Has Not Complied with Requirement to Submit Compelling Reason Determinations to GSA
Contractors that are suspended, proposed for debarment, or debarred are excluded from receiving new contracts, and agencies may not solicit offers from, award contracts to, or consent to subcontracts with these contractors, unless the agency designee determines on a contract-by- contract basis that there is a compelling reason for such action. DOD components made 14 compelling reason determinations during fiscal years 2009 through 2011. DOD officials stated that they were uncertain why these determinations had not been forwarded to GSA. Recommendation for Executive Action
We recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics to ensure that each DOD component is aware of and complies with the requirement to notify the GSA of determinations that a compelling reason exists to do business with a suspended or debarred contractor. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To determine the extent the Department of Defense (DOD) has processes for identifying and referring cases of possible suspension and debarment and how DOD components make suspension and debarment decisions, we reviewed the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), as well as regulations, procedures, processes, and policies as they pertain to suspension and debarment for the Department of the Navy (DON) (including the U.S. Marine Corps), Departments of the Air Force, and Army, and the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA). We identified the total universe of suspension, proposed debarment, and debarment actions for fiscal years 2009 through 2011 by the four DOD components by downloading the EPLS data from EPLS public website. 2. 3. | Why GAO Did This Study
DOD spends more than any other federal agency on contracts for goods and services and must be able to protect itself from irresponsible contractors. Once a case of misconductsuch as fraudis identified, DOD can use suspensions and debarments to prevent irresponsible contractors from receiving new contracts. As requested, GAO determined (1) the extent to which DOD has processes for identifying and referring cases of contractor misconduct for possible suspension or debarment, and (2) how DOD makes suspension and debarment decisions once cases have been referred for potential action. GAOs review focused on four DOD componentsthe Departments of the Air Force, Army, Navy (including the U.S. Marine Corps), and Defense Logistics Agencywhich together took a total of 3,443 suspension and debarment actions during fiscal years 2009 through 2011, accounting for nearly 100 percent of all such actions in DOD. GAO reviewed DOD and component regulations, procedures, and policies; reviewed case files; analyzed information from federal databases; and interviewed DOD and component officials.
What GAO Found
The four Department of Defense (DOD) components GAO examined have active processes for referring identified cases of contractor misconduct for appropriate action, including suspension or debarment. The components identify numerous cases of actual or alleged contractor misconduct each year from various internal and external sources. The figure below shows the process for identifying and referring cases to the suspension and debarment official for consideration.
DOD received hundreds of leads on contractor misconduct from sources such as lawsuits against contractors or contractor disclosures in fiscal years 2009 through 2011, although it is not possible to know the full extent of potential leads. Some cases are referred to suspension and debarment officials for their consideration or to other agencies for further action. GAOs analysis of selected cases shows that DOD follows its procedures for identifying and referring cases involving contractor misconduct or poor performance for possible suspension and debarment.
Once a case is referred, DOD generally makes suspension and debarment decisions in accordance with the discretion provided by the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR). GAO found in reviewing 75 case files that DOD generally maintained adequate records, informed the contractor of the cause and rationale for its decisions, and provided notice of the action to the contractor as required by the FAR. Given the discretion provided by the FAR, suspension and debarment periods vary based on the circumstances of the case, as do the reasons for removing contractors from the suspension and debarment list. For example, the FAR provides that the period of debarment generally should not exceed 3 years, but notes that the debarment period must be for a period commensurate with the seriousness of the cause. GAO found that nearly half the contractors DOD debarred during fiscal years 2009 through 2011 had debarment periods that exceeded 3 years.
The FAR prohibits all agencies from doing business with suspended or debarred contractors unless there is a compelling reason for doing so. The four DOD components made 14 compelling reason determinations during fiscal years 2009 through 2011. In none of these cases, however, did the components provide notice of their compelling reason determinations to the General Services Administration (GSA), as required by statute and regulation, until GAO raised this as an issue. Component officials said they were uncertain why these determinations which can promote transparency to the public were not forwarded to GSA.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOD ensure that DOD components are aware of and comply with the requirement to notify GSA when awarding contracts to suspended or debarred contractors based on compelling reason determinations. DOD concurred with this recommendation. |
gao_GAO-17-561 | gao_GAO-17-561_0 | The Public Workforce Development System
As the centerpiece of the federal government’s workforce system, the purposes of WIOA include the following: (1) provide individuals, particularly those with barriers to employment, increased access to and opportunities for employment, education, training, and support services to succeed in the labor market; (2) provide America’s workers with the skills and credentials necessary to secure and advance in employment with family-sustaining wages; and (3) provide activities through the state and local workforce development systems to increase the employment, retention, earnings, and economic self-sufficiency of participants; among other purposes. Studies of Gig Workers Suggest They Differ on Multiple Characteristics, and Stakeholders Describe Key Benefits and Downsides to Gig Work
Studies of Gig Workers and the Types of Work They Perform Suggest They Differ on Multiple Characteristics
Because there is no universally accepted definition of gig work, characteristics of individuals engaging in this work and the types of work they perform depend on how this population is studied. Each of the three quantitative studies we reviewed defined their population of workers, type of work performed, and time frames of work performed differently. According to the studies we reviewed, up to about 40 percent of workers engaging in online gig or informal work were 34 years old or younger. Online gig work included completing tasks that were identified or mediated through online platforms. Officials from 10 of the 11 local workforce boards we interviewed said that a lack of financial security was a downside to gig work. Federal Programs and Other Sources Offer Training in Self- Employment Skills That Stakeholders State Gig Workers Need
Gig Workers Need Self- Employment Skills Such as Customer Service, Marketing, Digital and Financial Literacy, and Legal Skills, According to Stakeholders
Stakeholders we interviewed said that gig workers need various self- employment skills. In addition to soft skills, stakeholders said that gig workers need business skills. In Chicago, the workforce board recruited job seekers for a ridesharing company, and some of them then used this work as an income source while they received WIOA services, scheduling it around their WIOA training activities, according to board officials. Officials from other boards, some of which were not included in our analysis of board services for gig workers, expressed interest in studying the gig economy. Despite these efforts to better understand gig work at the national level, selected state and local workforce board officials said that they lacked local labor market data on gig workers and that it would be helpful if DOL shared information about other boards’ efforts to serve these workers. DOL disseminates information on promising practices, but boards may not be readily able to find information related to gig workers. Linking “gig” and related terms to self-employment may be particularly important because DOL officials indicated that recent and soon-to-be issued evaluations from self- employment initiatives funded through the Workforce Innovation Fund grants may yield information relevant to gig workers. Helping workforce boards easily find and share promising practices relevant to gig workers would allow them to fully and efficiently be able to help individuals who want to engage in this type of work. Workforce Boards Said They Face Challenges in Reporting and Documenting Performance Outcomes for Gig Workers
Documenting employment and earnings outcomes for gig workers may be challenging for workforce boards. verify outcomes. Recommendation for Executive Action
The Assistant Secretary, Employment and Training Administration, should take steps to help workforce boards readily find and share information on promising practices related to serving gig workers by, for example, cross referencing promising practices on self-employment and other relevant practices in WorkforceGPS with terms commonly used to describe the gig economy, by creating a community of practice on this topic, or other mechanisms, as appropriate. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
We examined (1) what is known about the characteristics of gig workers and the work they perform, including its benefits and downsides; (2) the non-occupational skills and training stakeholders indicate are needed by gig workers and how they are provided; and (3) the challenges, if any, that select federal agencies and workforce development boards cite in providing supports for gig workers. To address our research questions, we: 1. reviewed relevant federal laws, regulations and guidance; 2. conducted a review of relevant literature; 3. reviewed DOL’s technical assistance website and federal internal control standards that address communication with external parties; and 4. conducted interviews with federal agencies, state agencies, local workforce boards, gig workers, gig companies, and researchers and other stakeholders. Overall, in selecting the boards that we visited in person, we considered factors such as the potential volume of gig workers in the local area; the range of board services provided to gig workers; the opportunity to learn about different forms of gig work (i.e., both online and offline gig work); the role that DOL grants may have played in supporting boards’ efforts to serve gig workers; and opportunities to interview gig workers and gig companies. GAO-14-19. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 2015, GAO reported that millions of workers do not have standard work arrangements. Some barriers to self-employed gig work have been reduced by online platforms, and while the public workforce system is accessible to all job seekers, it is unclear how the system is helping gig workers obtain the necessary skills and training to be successful. GAO was asked to review the skill and training supports needed by gig workers.
GAO examined (1) what is known about the characteristics of gig workers and the work they perform, including its benefits and downsides, (2) the non-occupational skills and training that stakeholders indicate are needed by gig workers and how they are provided, and (3) the challenges that selected federal agencies and workforce development boards cite in providing supports for gig workers. GAO conducted a literature review and interviewed officials at federal agencies and a nongeneralizable sample of 8 state and 11 local workforce boards—locations selected based on the likelihood of a large number of gig workers, among other factors—and gig company officials, gig workers, researchers, and other stakeholders. GAO also reviewed relevant federal laws, regulations, and guidance.
What GAO Found
Studies GAO reviewed suggest that workers who engage in on-demand, or “gig” work, differ in their characteristics and types of work performed, but each of these defined these workers differently. There is no universally accepted or official definition of gig workers; but, for its report, GAO has identified their characteristics as follows: self-employed individuals providing labor services and completing single projects or tasks on demand for pay. Gig work can be obtained or performed either offline or online. According to the three quantitative studies GAO reviewed, up to about 40 percent of workers earning money through online gig work (i.e., applications or websites that connect workers with customers) were 34 years old or younger. They worked in a variety of occupations ranging from providing legal services to moving furniture. According to stakeholders GAO interviewed, benefits of gig work included flexibility in scheduling and autonomy, while downsides included a lack of financial security and benefits, such as health and unemployment insurance.
According to stakeholders, gig workers need soft skills and business skills, many of which can be provided by the Department of Labor's (DOL) existing programs. Soft skills include customer service, time management, and self-motivation, and business skills include marketing and financial literacy and management. In addition, gig workers need an understanding of legal matters (e.g., contracts) associated with gig work. The nation's public workforce system, including workforce boards, which DOL oversees, and other partners can provide some of these self-employment skills based on local area needs. Officials at the local workforce boards GAO interviewed said they served gig workers either directly, for example, through recruitment events and by providing career services, or indirectly, such as through general self-employment services. For instance, the Chicago board recruited drivers for a ridesharing company and the San Francisco board helped gig workers in the media and visual arts develop their portfolios and build their networks.
Officials from selected state and local workforce boards cited two broad challenges in providing supports for gig workers: a lack of information on promising practices related to gig workers and difficulties in reporting their employment-related outcomes. Officials from all 19 state and local boards GAO interviewed expressed interest in other boards' efforts to serve gig workers. DOL shares promising practices through its searchable online portal, but has not fully linked “gig” and related terms to relevant information on self-employment. Helping boards easily find and share promising practices relevant to gig workers would allow boards that want to help gig workers to do so more fully and efficiently. State and local board officials also explained that it is challenging to verify employment and earnings outcomes for the self-employed as they are required to do under the Workforce Innovation and Opportunity Act (WIOA). Because these outcomes for gig workers may be difficult to verify, a board's performance under WIOA may be negatively affected and result in penalties. Consequently, DOL officials said workforce boards had asked for guidance on collecting outcome information. In June 2017, DOL issued clarifying guidance to boards on how to collect information that can be used to report outcomes required under WIOA.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOL take steps to help workforce boards find and share information on promising practices related to serving gig workers. DOL agreed with GAO's recommendation. |
gao_NSIAD-97-7 | gao_NSIAD-97-7_0 | High-Risk Markets Absorb a Relatively Large Share of the Eximbank’s Program Subsidy
From fiscal years 1992 to 1996, the Eximbank supported an average of $13.3 billion in export financing commitments (loans, loan guarantees, and export credit insurance) per year at an average subsidy cost of $750 million. On the other hand, financing commitments to the NIS represented a relatively small share of overall financing commitments yet absorbed a relatively large share (23 percent) of the Eximbank’s total subsidy costs (see fig. 4). Raising Fees for Services Is a Policy Option
One option we identified for reducing subsidy costs at the Eximbank would be to increase the fees charged for the Eximbank’s financing programs while still satisfying the congressional mandate for setting program fees at levels that are fully competitive with other ECAs. Any proposed Eximbank fee increases need to be considered within the context of the ongoing OECD negotiations to reduce government export credit subsidies. In order to remain competitive, any potential Eximbank fee increase should be considered within the broader context of progress made in these international negotiations. According to an Eximbank official, it is hoped that these negotiations will eventually lead to an agreement for fee convergence that would allow for reductions in the costs of OECD members’ officially supported export financing programs. Implications of Reducing Eximbank Program Availability in High-risk Markets
This option would result in a reduction of Eximbank subsidy costs but there could be implications for trade promotion and foreign policy objectives. Various export financing techniques exist that would allow the Eximbank to reduce the risks of some of the transactions in these markets. In that year, the average budgetary cost for project finance deals was about 3 percent, whereas the average cost for all Eximbank-supported transactions was 7.5 percent. The Eximbank’s project finance program has expanded over the past few years and has accounted for an increasing proportion of Eximbank transactions. In 1993, project finance accounted for less than 1 percent of the Eximbank’s total financing commitments. Scope and Methodology
To develop information on how the Eximbank spends its program funds, we reviewed budget data provided to us by the Eximbank and reviewed various Eximbank reports, including annual reports, budget reports from the Office of the Chief Financial Officer, and the Eximbank’s 1992-96 Report to the U.S. Congress on Export Credit Competition and the Export-Import Bank of the United States. Our report focused on the Eximbank’s use of its program subsidy appropriation—the largest component of its annual appropriation. GAO’s Comments
1. 2. The report noted that it is difficult to estimate the full impact of fee changes on exporter behavior and states that U.S. exporters’ sensitivity to a fee increase would depend on several factors, including the size of the fee increase, the volume of U.S. exports to a particular market, and the credit risk of the importing market. 3. 4. 5. 6. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed: (1) how the Export-Import Bank of the United States (Eximbank) spends its program appropriation; (2) program options that the Eximbank may want to consider to reduce the cost of its export financing programs; (3) potential implications of these options; and (4) the nature and extent of Eximbank's involvement in a type of financing known as project financing.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) in each of the last 5 fiscal years (FY) 1992 through 1996, the Eximbank has used an average of $750 million of its credit subsidy appropriation to support an average of $13.3 billion in export financing commitments; (2) these appropriations have facilitated exports to areas with important U.S. commercial and strategic interests; (3) high risk markets constituted a relatively small share of the Eximbank's total financing commitments yet absorbed a relatively large share of its subsidy costs in FY 1995; (4) GAO identified two broad options that would allow the Eximbank to reduce subsidies while remaining competitive with foreign export credit agencies (ECA): (a) raising fees for services; and (b) reducing the risks of its programs; (5) both of these options could result in significant reductions in subsidy costs and would allow the Eximbank to continue to operate with reduced federal funding; (6) the specific level of subsidy savings resulting from these program options would be dependent on several factors, including the willingness of exporters and participating banks to absorb increased costs and risks and the reaction of competitor ECAs; (7) the options GAO identified have several trade and foreign policy implications that decisionmakers would need to address before making any changes in the Eximbank's programs; (8) Eximbank officials noted that: (a) any proposed fee increases need to be considered within the broader context of current international efforts to gradually reduce government export finance subsidies; (b) these options could make Eximbank programs less competitive relative to other ECAs; and (c) these options would undermine U.S. government efforts to provide support in some higher-risk markets; (9) the project finance program was created to help U.S. exporters and project lenders compete for contracts for large capital projects in various developing countries; (10) the program has expanded over the past few years and has accounted for an increasing proportion of Eximbank transactions; (11) for FY 1996, project finance deals constituted about 3 percent of the Eximbank's total subsidy costs; (12) although project financing techniques appear to highly leverage available Eximbank resources, Eximbank officials said that this technique is suited only to long-term capital projects that the Eximbank expects to be self-sustaining; and (13) the Eximbank aims to structure its project finance program so as to limit its risks and minimize its budgetary costs. |
gao_NSIAD-98-128 | gao_NSIAD-98-128_0 | The support costs associated with this type of program can be very significant at certain posts. We found that the prevalent private sector process for providing housing and furniture includes contracting with a relocation company or other service provider to identify available housing from which the employees can make a choice, giving an allowance to the employee to pay for rent, and using a contractor to ship employees’ household effects to furnish the residence. Another option the British government uses is acquiring furniture overseas. Our analysis at two posts indicates that using a relocation company could result in potential savings of several hundred thousand dollars annually. Furthermore, most property preparation and related maintenance expenses were typically handled by landlords for leases signed either by individuals or by the corporation. Housing Allowances
Greater use of housing allowances is another private sector practice that could substantially reduce State’s overseas in-house support requirements and maintenance costs, and give employees a choice in selecting their residences. We believe that the private sector practices we identified could help mitigate some of the problems that employees of State and other government agencies have with the LQA program and encourage State to expand it as a cost-effective option to government leasing at certain posts. They acknowledged that State and the Department of Defense have not (1) examined all costs involved in overseas housing or attempted to determine if an increase in the coverage of LQA rates would be advantageous or disadvantageous to the government as a whole or (2) determined if State should ensure its government lease ceilings are consistent with LQA rates to control costs and ensure equity among all civilian government employees at overseas posts. If these factors are considered, the expanded use of employees’ household effects may be an efficient and cost-effective alternative to State’s practice of buying, storing, and managing large inventories of residential furniture supplemented by making additional shipments of employee-owned furniture. It also has not conducted valid, systematic analysis of its furniture program and its costs. We believe that State could save money and provide quality services to its employees and those of other agencies by adopting the practices we identified in the private sector. The data provided by the U.S. mission in Brussels and the U.S. embassy in London showed that the posts’ internal compensation-related housing support costs for short-term leases were higher than the estimated costs of services available from relocation companies. For example, it is premature to assume that outsourcing would not reduce costs associated with State’s market analysis programs, management of housing profiles, and housing board operations. Our analysis of the furniture program and State’s own data demonstrate that local procurement could save substantial amounts of money and reduce delivery time at a number of posts. Therefore, the additional shipping costs incurred in shipping employees’ household effects would likely be minimal, resulting in little or no need for a government-furniture program at some locations. As noted in the report, one indicator is the large numbers of American and foreign national personnel directly involved in managing and supporting posts’ residential housing and furniture programs. 3. 4. 5. As stated in our report, we reviewed whether any private sector practices offer the potential to reduce costs and provide quality services overseas to State. 6. 7. Analyses must first be based on State’s actual shipping data, which we found to show that employees often ship the same weight of household effects whether a post is furnished or unfurnished. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO reviewed the practices of the private sector and other foreign governments to determine whether those practices offer the potential to reduce overseas housing costs and provide quality services for Department of State and other agencies.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) its examination of practices in the private sector suggests that several options may exist to reduce State's overseas residential housing and furniture costs, including: (a) using relocation companies and similar service providers to search for housing and negotiate leases to reduce in-house support costs, and shift some property preparation and related maintenance expenses to landlords; (b) providing employees with housing allowances to select their own homes rather than managing and maintaining a housing pool of government leases and preassigning residences; and (c) shipping employees' household effects and/or acquiring furniture overseas as an option to operating an extensive government-buying and inventory program; (2) GAO's analysis of State's processes shows that State has not based its current approach to providing overseas residential housing and furniture on a comparative cost analysis; (3) based on GAO's analysis of selected posts, State could potentially reduce its costs by adopting some or all of these practices; (4) GAO's analysis of practices in Brussels and London showed that State's internal housing support costs are several hundred thousand dollars greater than the costs that would be incurred if homefinding services were outsourced to a relocation company; (5) such practices are potentially applicable for a large number of annual relocations that State and other agencies conduct; (6) expanding housing allowance programs consistent with practices of the private sector could also result in recurring savings, primarily by minimizing in-house support requirements; (7) private-sector practices indicate that two options should be considered for reducing costs associated with residential furniture; (8) State could ship employees' household effects as its primary means of furnishing residences; (9) actual shipping data show that State often ships nearly the same amount of employees' household effects to posts offering government furniture as it does to its unfurnished posts; (10) thus, an expansion in the number of unfurnished posts could occur with relatively minor increases in shipping costs for household effects and avoid the often significant procurement, storage, and handling costs associated with the government furniture program; (11) the second option is to give overseas posts the alternative of acquiring furniture on the local market; and (12) cost savings would potentially result from lower furniture prices and reduced shipping, inland transportation, and inventory costs. |
gao_GAO-12-402 | gao_GAO-12-402_0 | Background
The FECA program covers over 2.7 million civilian federal and postal employees in more than 70 agencies, providing wage-loss compensation and payments for medical treatment to employees injured while performing their federal duties. Every year, employing agencies reimburse OWCP for the amounts paid to their employees in FECA compensation during the previous year. Certain government corporations and USPS also make payments to Labor for program administrative fees. Claims examiners at OWCP’s 12 FECA district offices determine applicants’ eligibility for FECA benefits and process claims for wage-loss payments. The elements include evidence that the claim was filed within FECA’s statutory time requirements, that the employee was, at the time of injury, disease, or death, an employee of the United States, and that the employee was injured while on duty, and that the condition resulted from the work-related injury. Observations from Preliminary Work Identify Promising Practices and Potential Vulnerabilities
Promising Practices
We have identified several promising practices that employing agencies and Labor have implemented that may help to reduce fraudulent FECA claims. GAO’s Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Governmentcompetent personnel are a key element to an effective control also specifically mentions that appropriate, environment. According to agency staff:
Labor requires long-term claimants to submit updated claim documentation about wages earned and dependent status for annual reviews. Similar to the periodic reviews previously discussed, these controls fall within the monitoring component of GAO’s fraud-prevention framework and could help to validate claimants’ self-reported income and medical-condition information. The investigation and effective prosecution of claimants fraudulently receiving benefits is a key element in GAO’s fraud-prevention framework. Examples of the effective integration of investigative resources provided by these employing agencies include the following:
The Air Force discussed its plan to hire staff in early fiscal year 2012 to conduct background investigations and surveillance of claimants to determine whether they are entitled to receive FECA benefits. The USPS IG reported that since October 2008 it identified and facilitated terminating benefits for 476 claimants who were committing workers’ compensation fraud, and recovered over $83 million in medical and disability judgments. Potential Vulnerabilities
Our preliminary observations also identified potential vulnerabilities in the FECA program fraud-prevention controls that could increase the risk of claimants receiving benefits they are not entitled to. We found that management of the FECA program could be affected by limited access to necessary data. For example, Labor does not have authority to compare private or public wage data with FECA wage-loss compensation information to identify potential fraud. Prior reports by us and Labor’s IG have shown that relying on claimant-reported data could lead to overpayments. Labor agreed with the findings of this report. We found this could result in essential processes within the FECA program operating without reviews by physicians selected by the government. Officials at multiple employing agencies covered in our work to date stated that they faced difficulties successfully investigating and prosecuting fraud. GAO’s Plans to Further Assess Controls and Perform Data Analysis as Part of Ongoing Work
We plan to follow up on these promising practices and potential weaknesses as part of our ongoing review of FECA fraud-prevention controls. However, HHS has denied access to the NDNH database because they assert that we do not have authority to obtain NDNH data, despite the fact that we have a broad right of access to all federal agency records.slowed the progress of this engagement reviewing federal beneficiary fraud and abuse and has limited our ability to assess the potential vulnerability of the FECA program to fraud and abuse at a national level. HHS’ denial of access has In addition to our fraud-prevention work in the FECA program, we are conducting two other program-related engagements. Those engagements focus largely on issues related to retirement-age FECA beneficiaries. Labor and the employing agencies generally agreed with the preliminary findings and provided technical comments, which were incorporated into the statement. Those findings and associated technical comments are included in this report. | Why GAO Did This Study
According to the Department of Labor (Labor), in fiscal year 2010 about 251,000 federal and postal employees and their survivors received wage-loss compensation, medical and vocational rehabilitation services, and death benefits through the Federal Employees Compensation Act (FECA) program. Administered by Labor, the FECA program provides benefits to federal employees who sustained injuries or illnesses while performing their federal duties. Employees must submit claims to their employing agency, which are then reviewed by Labor. For those claims that are approved, employing agencies reimburse Labor for payments made to their employees, while Labor bears most of the programs administrative costs. Wage-loss benefits for eligible workersincluding those who are at, or older than, retirement agewith total disabilities are generally 66.67 percent of the workers salary (with no spouse or dependent) or 75 percent for a worker with a spouse or dependent. FECA wage-loss compensation benefits are tax free and not subject to time or age limits.
Labors Office of Workers Compensation Programs (OWCP) estimated that future actuarial liabilities for governmentwide FECA compensation payments to those receiving benefits as of fiscal year 2011 would total nearly $30 billion (this amount does not include any costs for workers added to the FECA rolls in future years). In 2010, the United States Postal Service (USPS) Inspector General (IG) reported that USPS alone had more than $12 billion of the $30 billion in estimated actuarial FECA liabilities. In April 2011, the USPS IG testified that USPS had removed 476 claimants from the program based on disability fraud since October 2008 and recovered more than $83 million in judgments. Given the significant projected outlays of the governmentwide FECA program and prior USPS IG findings of fraud, Congress asked us to provide preliminary observations on our ongoing work examining FECA fraud-prevention controls and discuss related prior work conducted by us and other federal agencies.
What GAO Found
Our work to this point has identified several promising practices that could help to reduce the risk of fraud within the FECA program. The promising practices link back to fraud-prevention concepts contained in GAOs Fraud Prevention Framework and Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, and include agencies use of full-time staff dedicated to the FECA program, periodic reviews of claimants continued eligibility, data analysis for potential fraud indicators, and effective use of investigative resources. These promising practices have already resulted in successful investigations and prosecutions of FECA-related fraud at some agencies, and could help to further enhance the programs fraud-prevention controls. However, our preliminary work has also identified several potential vulnerabilities in the programs design and controls that could increase the risk for fraud. Specifically, we found that limited access to necessary data is potentially reducing agencies ability to effectively monitor claims and wage-loss information. In addition, agencies reliance on self-reported data related to wages and dependent status, lack of a physician selected by the government throughout the process, and difficulties associated with successful investigations and prosecutions all potentially reduce the programs ability to prevent and detect fraudulent activity. Labor and employing agencies generally agreed with the preliminary findings presented in this report and provided technical comments, which were incorporated into this report. We plan to follow up on the promising practices and potential vulnerabilities as part of our ongoing work, although our progress has been slowed by difficulties in accessing certain databases. |
gao_RCED-96-23 | gao_RCED-96-23_0 | Cases of significant noncompliance are the more severe and chronic violations of the discharge limits or monitoring requirements established in a facility’s discharge permit. Significant noncompliance is defined (1) for toxic pollutants as exceeding an average monthly limit by 20 percent or more in any 2 months of a 6-month period and (2) for conventional pollutants as exceeding an average monthly limit by 40 percent in any 2 months of a 6-month period. Appendix II contains additional data from EPA’s Permit Compliance System on the frequency with which major facilities violated their discharge permits. These analyses were based on the same information sources that the agency regularly uses to identify cases of significant noncompliance. EPA’s Criterion for Screening Excludes Many Cases of Significant Noncompliance
EPA’s Permit Compliance System understates significant noncompliance because its criterion for screening cases has not remained consistent with the types of discharge limits used in permits. Enforcement Is Limited, and Penalties Can Vary
EPA assigns priorities for enforcement action to facilities whose violations have met its criterion for significant noncompliance, and it bases its penalties, in part, on the types of limits that the facilities have violated. Enforcement
EPA’s regions and the states concentrate their enforcement resources on facilities that the Permit Compliance System has identified as being in significant noncompliance. During fiscal year 1994, EPA assessed penalties of about $25 million in 323 cases of Clean Water Act violations. EPA’s 1992 and 1994 studies indicate that very few penalties were assessed for significant violations of daily maximum limits. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) progress in ensuring that facilities comply with federal pollutant discharge requirements, focusing on: (1) the frequency of facilities' violations; (2) the limitations of EPA systems and the effects of these limitations; and (3) EPA plans to correct these facilities.
What GAO Found
GAO found that EPA: (1) compliance data for FY 1994 show that 1 in 6 of the nation's 7,053 major regulated facilities have significantly violated the discharge limits in their permits; (2) considers facilities to be in significant noncompliance of their discharge levels when discharged pollutants exceed permit limits by 20 percent or more in a 2- to 6-month period; (3) is unable to identify all of the facilities that violate their discharge limits because the criteria it uses to screen facilities have not remained consistent with the types of discharge limits used in permits; (4) has expanded its criteria for identifying cases of significant noncompliance and assigning priorities of enforcement action in order to identify major facilities that have violated discharge levels in the past; and (5) assessed penalties of about $25 million in 323 cases of Clean Water Act violations in 1994, and its studies indicate that very few penalties are assessed for significant violations of daily maximum discharge limits. |
gao_GGD-97-42 | gao_GGD-97-42_0 | We recommended in our 1993 report that ONDCP, as the coordinator of the federal drug control effort, (1) develop additional measures to assess progress in reducing drug use, (2) develop performance measures to evaluate the contributions made by major components of current antidrug efforts and significant new initiatives, and (3) incorporate these measures into annual drug control strategies. It provides a useful framework for assessing the effectiveness of federal drug control efforts. To obtain information on the U.S. Coast Guard’s performance measures for its antidrug activities, we interviewed officials responsible for managing the Coast Guard’s drug interdiction program and reviewed key agency documents such as the Coast Guard’s preliminary performance plans (for implementing the GPRA). The first approach emphasizes individual drug resistance skills, generic problem-solving/decisionmaking training, and modification of attitudes and norms that encourage drug use (the psychosocial approach). These approaches have been used in several notable programs. Obstacles to U.S. International Drug Control Efforts
Over the past 10 years, U.S. agencies involved in counternarcotics efforts have attempted to reduce the supply and availability of illegal drugs in the United States by implementing the U.S. international drug control strategy. During this period, we reported on other significant long-standing obstacles faced by the United States in its international drug control efforts, including the inconsistency in the amount of funds applied to international drug control programs, difficulty in obtaining bilateral and multilateral donor support for U.S. drug control efforts, and organizational and operational limitations. Inadequate resources and institutional capabilities of these and other foreign countries have limited arrests and convictions of drug traffickers. In reauthorizing ONDCP in 1993, Congress specified that ONDCP’s performance measurement system should assess changes in drug use, drug availability, the consequences of drug use, drug treatment capacity, and the adequacy of drug treatment systems. The Coast Guard has taken steps toward conforming with certain GPRA principles. The Coast Guard has developed preliminary performance plans that reflect a need for additional work in three areas: (1) developing goals and ways of achieving them, (2) developing data to measure the results of its actions, and (3) identifying wide variety of constraints that could influence the effectiveness of its antidrug activities. Conclusions
ONDCP and several other agencies are developing measures of the results of their antidrug activities. Monitoring the Future, National Institute on Drug Abuse, 1996. the nature and objectives of drug prevention and treatment, the types of prevention approaches currently being used and promising prevention practices for school-age youths, the types of cocaine treatment approaches currently being used and promising treatment practices for those abusing or addicted to cocaine, and future research initiatives needed to enhance our knowledge base of prevention and treatment effectiveness. 4. According to the study, “given that annual U.S. cocaine consumption is less than 300 tons, the impact of the additional resources in the transit zone does not seem significant enough to affect U.S. drug use.”
On the basis of this analysis, the study concluded that “t does not appear that the potential benefit of decreased trafficker smuggling success rate in the transit zone is significant enough to warrant additional resources.” The study noted that the federal policy challenge is not only to determine the benefits from direct investment in the transit zone but also to consider whether the investment of a similar level of resources elsewhere in the drug strategy might produce even more benefits. Drug Control: Reauthorization of the Office of National Drug Control Policy (GAO/GGD-93-144, Sept. 29, 1993). | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on the federal drug control strategy, focusing on: (1) findings of current research on promising drug approaches in drug abuse prevention targeted at school-age youth; (2) promising drug treatment strategies for cocaine addiction; (3) GAO's recent work assessing the effectiveness of international efforts to reduce illegal drug availability, including interdiction; (4) whether the U.S. Coast Guard's performance measures for its antidrug activities conform to the principles of the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA); and (5) summaries of several of GAO's recent products on federal drug-prevention and treatment-related efforts.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) recent research points to two types of promising drug prevention approaches for school-age youth; (2) the first approach emphasizes drug resistance skills, generic problem-solving, decisionmaking training, and modification of attitudes and norms that encourage drug use; (3) three approaches have been found to be potentially promising in the treatment of cocaine use; (4) these approaches include avoidance or better management of drug-triggering situations, exposure to community support programs, drug sanctions, and necessary employment counseling, and use of a coordinated behavioral, emotional, and cognitive treatment approach; (5) despite some successes, United States and host countries' efforts have not materially reduced the availability of drugs in the United States for several reasons; (6) international drug trafficking organizations have become sophisticated, multibillion dollar industries that quickly adapt to new U.S. drug control efforts; (7) the United States faces other significant and long-standing obstacles, such as inconsistent funding for U.S. international drug control efforts, competing foreign policy objectives, organizational and operational limitations, and a lack of ways to tell whether or how well counternarcotics efforts are contributing to the goals and objectives of the national drug control strategy, which results in an inablity to prioritize the use of limited resources; (8) in drug-producing and transit countries, counternarcotics efforts are constrained by competing economic and political policies, inadequate laws, limited resources and institutional capabilities, and internal problems such as terrorism, corruption, and civil unrest; (9) measuring the effectiveness of U.S. antidrug activities has been a continuing problem in assessing the results of the national drug control strategy; (10) in reauthorizing the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) in 1993, Congress specified that ONDCP's performance measurement system should assess changes in drug use, drug availability, the consequences of drug use, and the adequacy of drug treatment systems; (11) to implement the statutory requirements, which are consistent with recommendations in GAO's 1993 report, ONDCP is developing national-level measures of drug control performance; (12) similarly, the Coast Guard is developing performance measures to assess the results of its antidrug activities; and (13) it appears from GAO's review of the Coast Guard's strategic and performance plans that it has taken steps toward conforming with certain GPRA principles. |
gao_RCED-96-71 | gao_RCED-96-71_0 | The Department of the Interior (Interior) and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) are the two principal federal trustees for natural resources. The agencies estimate that 60 sites may eventually have claims for damages to natural resources that will equal or exceed $5 million and that up to 20 of these sites may have claims exceeding $50 million. Through July 1995, about 40 percent of the moneys for the five settlements had been collected from the responsible parties. Of these collections, about 11 percent had been disbursed either to reimburse trustees for completed damage assessments or to pay for planning natural resource restorations. Table 2 summarizes the amounts collected and disbursed for the five largest settlements as of July 1995. Procedures in Regulations to Assess Natural Resource Damages Seldom Fully Implemented
CERCLA does not require the trustees to use a particular standard or method for assessing natural resource damages. Because one procedure is limited in scope and the other procedure can be costly and time-consuming to implement, the trustees seldom fully implement either one. Instead, according to Interior and NOAA officials, the trustees most often use an abbreviated procedure that employs readily available site-specific information and scientific literature to quantify damages. The third issue involves the procedures used by the trustees to develop natural resource damage claims. For the case that has been settled for $12 million, $8.1 million has been collected, $1.4 million of which has been disbursed. New Bedford Harbor, Massachusetts
The New Bedford Harbor case was one of the first natural resource damage cases filed under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA). | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed natural resource damage provisions of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), focusing on: (1) the prospect for future claims by the federal government against polluters for natural resources damage; (2) the amount and use of settlements that federal agencies have already collected from polluters; and (3) the guidelines used by federal agencies to determine an appropriate amount of compensation for natural resources damage.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) the Department of the Interior and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration estimate that 60 sites may eventually have claims for damages to natural resources that will equal or exceed $5 million and that up to 20 of these sites may have claims exceeding $50 million; (2) of the $83.8 million owed to the federal government for the five largest natural resource damage settlements, only about 40 percent has been collected, and 11 percent of these funds has been spent; (3) the collected money has been used to reimburse trustees for completed damage assessments and to pay for natural resource restoration plans; (4) while CERCLA did not require standards or methods to determine damages, it directed Interior to develop consistent procedures that trustees should consider when assessing damages to natural resources; (5) trustees rarely use either of the procedures, since one is limited in scope and the other is costly and time-consuming; and (6) the 95 settlements reached as of April 1995 used abbreviated procedures that use readily available site-specific information and scientific literature to quantify damages. |
gao_GAO-16-180 | gao_GAO-16-180_0 | The Homeland Security Act of 2002 gives ORR responsibility for coordinating and implementing the care and placement of unaccompanied children— individuals younger than 18 years old with no lawful immigration status and no parent or legal guardian in the United States available to provide care and physical custody. ORR Responded to the Increase in Unaccompanied Children by Expanding Its Capacity, but Has Not Yet Updated Its Plans to Meet Future Needs
ORR Expanded Capacity to Care for the Highest Number of Children on Record in 2014 and Updated Policies to Help Expedite Release of Children to Sponsors
In response to an increased number of referrals of unaccompanied children from DHS in recent years, particularly in fiscal year 2014, ORR increased its shelter capacity (the number of beds it has available) and updated its policies and procedures to reduce the number of days children spend in ORR custody. The actual number of children placed in ORR’s care in fiscal year 2015 was over 33,700 with almost 6,000 children in ORR’s custody in September 2015 (see fig. Not having a documented and continually updated process for capacity planning may hinder ORR’s ability to be prepared for an increase in unaccompanied children while at the same time minimizing excess capacity to conserve federal resources. Grantees Provided Education, Medical, and Therapeutic Services to Unaccompanied Children in ORR Custody, but ORR’s Monitoring of Grantees Is Inconsistent
Grantees Provided Services to Children
ORR policy requires certain care and services be provided to unaccompanied children while in ORR facilities (see table 4). Grantees Did Not Always Document the Services They Provided
ORR requires grantees to document in case files many of the services they provide to children and review of case files figures prominently in ORR’s monitoring of grantees. Without all of the documents included in the case files, it is difficult for ORR to verify that required services were actually provided in accordance with ORR policy and grant agreements during its monitoring visits. Also, according to ORR, on-site monitoring typically includes a review of a random sample of case files for children cared for at a facility. Nevertheless, ORR did not meet its goal to visit all of its facilities by the end of fiscal year 2015. ORR Grantees Have Identified and Screened Sponsors before Placing Children with Them
ORR has delegated the responsibility for identifying and screening sponsors to its grantees. Prior to children’s release to sponsors, sponsors sign a Sponsor Care Agreement, which stipulates, among other things, that they will: provide for the physical and mental well-being of the child; ensure that the child appears for all removal proceedings in ensure that the child reports to ICE in the event that they are ordered removed from the United States by an immigration judge; notify DHS of address changes; and if not the parent or legal guardian of the child, attempt to establish legal guardianship through the local court system. Of these children, nearly 60 percent were released to a parent. Limited Information Is Available on Services Provided and Status of Children Once Released from ORR Care
ORR Continues to Serve a Small Percentage of Children After They Have Been Released, but Has Limited Contact with Most
The Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act requires ORR to provide post-release services in cases in which a home study was conducted prior to a child’s release to a sponsor, and authorizes ORR to provide post-release services to other children, such as those with mental health needs, who may benefit from them. In addition, on May 15, 2015, ORR began operating a National Call Center help-line. Lastly, in August 2015, ORR instituted a new policy requiring facility staff to place follow-up calls to all children and their sponsors after the children are released. However, ORR does not have processes to ensure that all of these data are reliable, systematically collected, and compiled in summary form to provide useful information about this population for its use and for other government agencies. Recommendations for Executive Action
We recommend that the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services direct the Office of Refugee Resettlement to take the following three actions:
Develop a process to update its bed capacity framework on an annual basis to include the most recent data related to numbers of unaccompanied children who may be referred to its care and adjust its planning scenarios that guide its bed capacity as appropriate. HHS also agreed to improve its data collection process to provide more systematic and standardized information on post-release services. Locations were selected to ensure variation in the types of care provided by ORR grantees, shelter size, and location. Lastly, to learn what is known about these children once they leave ORR’s custody, we conducted phone interviews with school districts and other local government officials and nonprofit groups in 6 counties where 50 or more children were released to sponsors in fiscal year 2014. | Why GAO Did This Study
ORR is responsible for coordinating and implementing the care and placement of unaccompanied children. The number of children placed in ORR's care rose from nearly 6,600 in fiscal year 2011 to nearly 57,500 in fiscal year 2014. GAO was asked to review how ORR managed their care.
This report examines (1) ORR's response to the increase in unaccompanied children, (2) how ORR cares for children in its custody and monitors their care, (3) how ORR identifies and screens sponsors for children, and (4) what is known about services children receive after they leave ORR custody. GAO reviewed relevant federal laws and regulations, ORR policies, and ORR and Executive Office for Immigration Review data. GAO also visited nine ORR grantee facilities in three states selected to vary in the type of care provided, shelter size, and location, and conducted a random, non-generalizable case file review of 27 case files of children released from these facilities. GAO interviewed agency officials and community stakeholders in six counties that received unaccompanied children, representing diversity in geographic location, size, and demographics.
What GAO Found
In fiscal year 2014, nearly 57,500 children traveling without their parents or guardians (referred to as unaccompanied children) were apprehended by federal immigration officers and transferred to the care of the Department of Health and Human Services' Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR). Most of these children were from Central America. GAO found that ORR was initially unprepared to care for that many children; however, the agency increased its bed capacity to accommodate up to 10,000 children at a time. Given the unprecedented demand for capacity in 2014, ORR developed a plan to help prepare it to meet fiscal year 2015 needs. The number of children needing ORR's care declined significantly through most of fiscal year 2015, but began increasing again toward the end of the summer. Given the inherent uncertainties associated with planning for capacity needs, ORR's lack of a process for annually updating and documenting its plan inhibits its ability to balance preparations for anticipated needs while minimizing excess capacity.
ORR relies on grantees to provide care for unaccompanied children, including housing and educational, medical, and therapeutic services. GAO's review of a sample of children's case files found that they often did not contain required documents, making it difficult to verify that all required services were provided. ORR revised its on-site monitoring program in 2014 to ensure better coverage of grantees. However, ORR was not able to complete all the visits it planned for fiscal years 2014 and 2015, citing lack of resources. By not monitoring its grantees consistently, ORR may not be able to identify areas where children's care is not provided in accordance with ORR policies and the agreements with grantees.
ORR grantees conduct various background checks on potential sponsors prior to releasing children to them. These potential sponsors are identified and screened by the grantees as part of their responsibilities for the unaccompanied children in their care. The extent of the checks conducted depends on the relationship of the sponsor to the child. Between January 2014 and April 2015, ORR released about 50,000 children from Central America to sponsors to await their immigration hearings. In nearly 90 percent of these cases, the sponsors were a parent or other close relative already residing in the United States. Sponsors do not need to have legal U.S. residency status.
There is limited information available on post-release services provided to children after they leave ORR care. In part, this is because ORR is only required to provide services to a small percentage of children, such as those who were victims of trafficking. In May 2015, ORR established a National Call Center to assist children who may be facing placement disruptions, making post-release services available to some of them. Also, in August 2015, ORR began requiring well-being follow-up calls to all children 30 days after their release. ORR is collecting information through these new initiatives, but does not currently have a process to ensure that the data are reliable, systematically collected, or compiled in summary form. Service providers GAO spoke with also noted that some of these children may have difficultly accessing services due to the lack of bilingual services in the community, lack of health insurance, or other barriers.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that HHS (1) develop a process to regularly update its capacity plan, (2) improve its monitoring of grantees, and (3) develop processes to ensure its post-release activities provide reliable and useful summary data. HHS agreed with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_NSIAD-98-92 | gao_NSIAD-98-92_0 | Background
DOD’s Office of Small and Disadvantaged Business Utilization (OSADBU) is responsible for the mentor-protege program. Also, OSADBU requested that the Defense Contract Management Command (DCMC) conduct performance reviews of all mentor-protege agreements approved since the program’s inception, and thereafter, to review all active agreements annually. Manner of Obligating Funds Has Changed
The funding appropriated from fiscal year 1992 to 1998 was generally obligated through either cooperative agreements, separate contracts, or in a line item in DOD prime contracts. While OSADBU has managed cooperative agreements in the past, it has decided that the services and the defense agencies should be responsible for managing reimbursable mentor-protege agreements. Conclusion
After spending over $200 million on the pilot mentor-protege program, OSADBU does not know the overall extent to which the program is achieving the purposes Congress has established because sufficient and reliable information on program performance is unavailable. While OSADBU has initiated an assessment of the program by conducting a survey and establishing a performance review process, shortcomings in the assessment will limit its usefulness. For example, a low survey response rate will limit the usefulness of its findings in assessing the program’s overall effectiveness. DOD acknowledges that the services have been inconsistent in their policies on paying fees to mentors for providing assistance to proteges and reimbursing proteges for various expenses. We focused our review on the management of the program. We attempted to assess the extent to which the funds benefited the proteges by reviewing OSADBU’s files and contacting service and defense agency officials to identify the number of mentors and proteges that have participated in the program. GAO Comments
1. 2. 3. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO reviewed the Department of Defense's (DOD) Pilot Mentor-Protege Program, focusing on: (1) DOD's management of the program, including its efforts to evaluate the program's effectiveness; and (2) the manner in which program funds have been obligated.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) data limitations preclude GAO's assessing the extent to which the program is achieving the purpose established by Congress; (2) the Office of Small and Disadvantaged Business Utilization (OSADBU) has recently undertaken actions to review the program that were intended to provide the basis for such an assessment; (3) it has initiated a survey of mentors and proteges and enlisted the Defense Contract Management Command to conduct performance evaluations of each agreement; (4) however, GAO believes shortcomings in the survey methodology and incomplete coverage in the performance evaluations will limit the usefulness of their results in assessing the program's overall effectiveness; (5) Congress has appropriated about $233 million for the program since fiscal year 1992; (6) the funding was generally obligated through either cooperative agreements, separate contracts, or line items in DOD prime contracts; (7) while OSADBU has managed cooperative agreements in the past, it has decided that the services and the defense agencies should be responsible for managing reimbursable mentor-protege agreements; (8) the services have been inconsistent in their policies on paying fees to mentors for providing assistance to proteges and reimbursing proteges for various expenses; and (9) because sufficient and reliable information on program performance was unavailable, the overall extent to which the pilot program benefited the proteges could not be assessed. |
gao_GAO-12-247 | gao_GAO-12-247_0 | NCUA is required to maintain NCUSIF’s equity ratio at a percentage of no less than 1.2 percent and not more than 1.5 percent of insured shares. Corporate and Credit Union Failures Were Largely the Result of Poor Investment Strategies and Weak Management
From January 1, 2008, to June 30, 2011, 5 corporates and 85 credit unions failed. Specifically, these five failed corporates accounted for 75 percent of all corporate assets as of December 31, 2007 (see fig. Specifically, U.S. Central and the failed corporates overconcentrated their investments in private-label, mortgage-backed securities (MBS), investing substantially more in private-label MBS than corporate credit unions that did not fail (see fig. Eventually, the deterioration of the underlying credit quality of the private-label MBS led to the corporates’ insolvencies. Poor Management Was the Primary Reason That 85 Credit Unions Failed
According to our analysis of NCUA’s and its OIG’s data, the 85 credit union failures were primarily the result of poor management.Management of failed credit unions exposed their institutions to increased operational, credit, liquidity, and concentration risks, which it then failed to properly monitor or mitigate. OIG Identified Weaknesses in NCUA’s Examination Processes for Corporates and Credit Unions
In addition to the management weaknesses in corporates and credit unions, NCUA’s examination and enforcement processes did not result in strong and timely actions to avert the failure of these institutions. NCUA Has Taken Various Actions to Stabilize and Reform the Corporate System
NCUA took actions to stabilize, resolve, and reform the corporate system and to minimize the costs of its intervention. To resolve the failed corporates, NCUA placed five corporates—U.S. NCUA used NCUSIF to provide liquidity to the corporate system. Second, NCUA ultimately placed the five failing corporates into conservatorship. Third, NCUA established a securitization program to provide long-term funding for the legacy assets formerly held in the securities portfolios of certain corporate credit unions by issuing NCUA-guaranteed notes. Introduce new corporate governance requirements. Use of PCA and Other Enforcement Actions Highlight the Need to Address Deteriorating Credit Unions Earlier
The number of credit unions in PCA significantly increased as the financial crisis unfolded (see fig. Prior to the release of these statements, NCUA had estimated losses for the Stabilization Fund, but NCUA did not provide adequate documentation to allow us to verify the reasonableness and completeness of these estimates. As previously reported, capital- based indicators have weaknesses, notably that they can lag behind other indicators of financial distress. To improve the effectiveness of the PCA framework, we recommend that the Chairman of NCUA consider additional triggers that would require early and forceful regulatory actions, including the indicators identified in this report. In considering these actions, the Chairman should make recommendations to Congress on how to modify PCA for credit unions, and if appropriate, for corporates. Although NCUA has said that its analysis shows that the credit union system has the capacity to pay for the loss estimates, we continue to believe that without well-documented cost information, NCUA faces questions about its ability to effectively estimate the total costs of the failures and determine whether the credit unions will be able to pay for these losses. NCUA agreed with the recommendation to consider other triggers for PCA but noted that some of the potential financial indicators that we identified could have drawbacks. Appendix II: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Legislation enacted in January 2011 requires us to examine NCUA’s supervision of the credit union system and the use of PCA. This report examines (1) what is known about the causes of failures among corporates and credit unions since 2008; (2) the steps that NCUA has taken to resolve these failures and the extent to which its actions were designed to protect taxpayers, avoid moral hazard, and minimize the cost of corporate resolutions; and (3) NCUA’s use of PCA and other enforcement actions. To determine loss data from the corporates’ and credit union failures, we reviewed NCUA’s 2008, 2009, and 2010 annual reports; MLRs; BAMs; and NCUA data on losses to National Credit Union Share Insurance Fund (NCUSIF) and the Temporary Corporate Credit Union Stabilization Fund (Stabilization Fund). In considering other indicators for detecting early distress in credit unions, we reviewed data from regulatory filings from the fourth quarter of 2005 through the first quarter of 2011 for three groups: (1) the 85 credit unions that failed from January 2008 to June 2011; (2) a group of 340 peer credit unions—the four closest credit unions in terms of total assets within the state as each failed credit union; and (3) all credit unions that reported their financial condition in a regulatory filing for each quarter within the period. | Why GAO Did This Study
Corporate credit unions (corporates)financial institutions that provide liquidity and other services to the more than 7,400 federally insured credit unionsexperienced billions in financial losses since the financial crisis began in 2007, contributing to failures throughout the credit union system and losses to the National Credit Union Share Insurance Fund (NCUSIF). Since 1998, Congress has required the National Credit Union Administration (NCUA), the federal regulator of the credit union system, to take prompt corrective action (PCA) to identify and address the financial deterioration of federally insured natural person credit unions (credit unions) and minimize potential losses to the NCUSIF. Legislation enacted in 2011 requires GAO to examine NCUAs supervision of the credit union system and use of PCA. This report examines (1) the failures of corporate and credit unions since 2008, (2) NCUAs response to the failures, and (3) the effectiveness of NCUAs use of PCA. To do this work, GAO analyzed agency and industry financial data and material loss reviews, reviewed regulations, and interviewed agency officials and trade organizations.
What GAO Found
From January 1, 2008, through June 30, 2011, 5 corporates and 85 credit unions failed. As of January 1, 2008, the 5 failed corporates were some of the largestaccounting for 75 percent of all corporate assetsbut the 85 failed credit unions were relatively smallaccounting for less than 1 percent of total credit union assets. GAO found poor investment and business strategies contributed to the corporate failures. Specifically, the failed corporates over concentrated their investments in private-label, mortgage-backed securities (MBS) and invested substantially more in private-label MBS than corporates that did not fail. GAO also found that poor management was the primary reason the 85 credit unions failed. In addition, NCUAs Office of Inspector General has reported that NCUAs examination and enforcement processes did not result in strong and timely actions to avert the failure of these institutions NCUA took multiple actions to stabilize, resolve, and reform the corporate system. NCUA used existing funding sources, such as the NCUSIF, and new funding sources, including the Temporary Corporate Credit Union Stabilization Fund (Stabilization Fund), to stabilize and provide liquidity to the corporates. NCUA placed the failing corporates into conservatorship and liquidated certain poor performing assets. In order to decrease losses from the corporates failures, NCUA established a securitization program to provide long-term funding for assets formerly held in the portfolios of failed corporates by issuing NCUA guaranteed notes. To address weaknesses highlighted by the crisis, in 2010, NCUA issued regulations to prohibit investment in private-label MBS, established a PCA framework for corporates, and introduced new governance provisions. NCUA considered credit unions ability to repay borrowings from Treasury and included measures to reduce moral hazard, minimize the cost of resolving the corporates, and protect taxpayers. While NCUA has estimated the losses to the Stabilization Fund, it could not provide adequate documentation to allow NCUAs Office of Inspector General or GAO to verify their completeness and reasonableness. Without well-documented cost information, NCUA faces questions about its ability to effectively estimate the total costs of the failures and determine whether the credit unions will be able to pay for these losses. GAOs analysis of PCA and other NCUA enforcement actions highlights opportunities for improvement. For credit unions subject to PCA, GAO found those credit unions that did not fail were more likely subject to earlier PCA actionthat is, before their capital levels deteriorated to the significantly or critically undercapitalized levelsthan failed credit unions. GAO also found that for many of the failed credit unions, other enforcement actions were initiated either too late or not at all. GAO has previously noted that the effectiveness of PCA for banks is limited because of its reliance on capital, which can lag behind other indicators of financial health. GAO examined other potential financial indicators for credit unions, including measures of asset quality and liquidity, and found a number of indicators that could provide early warning of credit union distress. Incorporating such indicators into the PCA framework could improve its effectiveness.
What GAO Recommends
NCUA should (1) provide its Office Inspector General the necessary documentation to verify loss estimates and (2) consider additional triggers for PCA that would require early and forceful regulatory action and make recommendations to Congress on how to modify PCA, as appropriate. NCUA agreed with both recommendations. |
gao_GAO-11-45 | gao_GAO-11-45_0 | The Bureau’s Outreach and Promotion Efforts Were Generally More Robust Compared to Those in 2000 and Were Implemented as Planned, but They Could Be Further Improved
Paid Media Plans Built in Better Targeting
The Bureau refined its paid media efforts for 2010, in part to address challenges from the 2000 Census. Additionally, the Bureau strengthened its outreach efforts in 2010 by improving its monitoring and evaluation activities. For example, in 2000, the Bureau hired about 600 partnership staff in the field who were responsible for mobilizing local support for the census by working with local organizations to promote census participation. Thus, the Bureau increased the ratio of partnership staff per county and staff were not spread as thin. We reported that the database was not user- friendly, which led to inefficiencies and duplication of effort. Moreover, most of the partnership staff we interviewed reported working closely or having mutually supportive relationships with local census office staff. The Bureau Enhanced Enumeration Programs Aimed at HTC Groups; Additional Refinements Could Improve Them for 2020
Aspects of 2010 SBE Were Refined to Address Implementation Issues from 2000 and Better Enumerate HTC Groups
To improve its ability to count individuals without conventional housing, the Bureau made a number of improvements to SBE, many of which were designed to address challenges experienced in 2000. In response to service providers’ requests for more flexibility on scheduling enumeration during the 3-day operation, the Bureau trained census workers to enumerate all types of SBE facilities. Advanced Visits Helped Enhance Service Providers’ Readiness for Enumeration
Our observers reported that facilities were prepared for SBE enumeration in 35 of 56 visits to SBE facilities. Overstaffing can lead to unnecessarily higher labor costs and poor productivity, while understaffing can affect the Bureau’s ability to obtain a complete count at a particular site. Also, while most LCOMs we surveyed were satisfied with SBE staffing levels, pockets of dissatisfaction existed at some locations. Be Counted/QAC Programs Were Implemented as Planned, but Visibility Issues Remain a Concern
For 2010, the Bureau developed plans that according to Bureau officials, were designed to address challenges that the Be Counted/QAC programs faced during the 2000 Census, such as (1) visibility of sites, (2) ability of the public to find where the Be Counted/QAC sites were located, and (3) monitoring of site activity. The Bureau opened around 38,000 sites, conducted the Be Counted/QAC program as scheduled from March 19 through April 19, and completed the Be Counted/QAC program under budget. Site Selection Guidance Does Not Consider Potential Activity Levels
Along with visibility, the procedures used to select Be Counted/QAC sites are also key to the effectiveness of the program because they affect the extent to which sites are easily accessible to targeted populations. Moving forward, it will also be important for the Bureau to explore ways to maximize the Be Counted/QAC program’s ability to increase the number of forms returned and checked in from the target population for the 2020 Census and, ultimately, determine whether fewer but more strategically placed sites could produce more cost-effective results. Conclusions
In 2010, the Bureau was better positioned to reach out to and enumerate HTC populations compared to 2000 in large part because its plans addressed a number of the challenges experienced in the previous decennial. Key focus areas for outreach efforts include (1) ensuring the Bureau is using paid media efficiently to improve response rates, (2) improving the coordination between partnership and local census office staff to leverage opportunities to achieve a more accurate and complete count, (3) improving the partnership database to enhance its use as a management tool, and (4) making promotional materials available to partnership staff when they begin their work to improve their ability to develop relationships with partner organizations. Recommendations for Executive Action
To help improve the effectiveness of the Bureau’s outreach and enumeration efforts, especially for HTC populations, should they be used again in the 2020 Census, we recommend that the Secretary of Commerce require the Under Secretary for Economic Affairs as well as the Director of the U.S. Census Bureau to take the following seven actions: To improve the Bureau’s marketing/outreach efforts: Use evaluation results, response rate, and other data to develop a predictive model that would inform decisions on how much and how best to allocate paid media funds for 2020. The Department of Commerce generally agreed with the overall findings and recommendations of the report. | Why GAO Did This Study
To overcome the long-standing challenge of enumerating hard-to-count (HTC) groups such as minorities and renters, the U.S. Census Bureau (Bureau), used outreach programs, such as paid advertising, and partnered with thousands of organizations to enlist their support for the census. The Bureau also conducted Service-Based Enumeration (SBE), which was designed to count people who frequent soup kitchens or other service providers, and the Be Counted/Questionnaire Assistance Center (QAC) program, designed to count individuals who believed the census had missed them. As requested, GAO assessed how the design of these efforts compared to 2000 and the extent to which they were implemented as planned. GAO reviewed Bureau budget, planning, operational, and evaluation documents; observed enumeration efforts in 12 HTC areas; surveyed local census office managers; and interviewed Bureau officials.
What GAO Found
The Bureau better positioned itself to reach out to and enumerate HTC populations in 2010 in part by addressing a number of key challenges from 2000. The Bureau's outreach efforts were generally more robust compared to 2000. For example, compared to 2000, the Bureau used more reliable data to target advertising; focused a larger share of its advertising dollars on HTC groups, such as non-English-speaking audiences; and strengthened its monitoring abilities so that the Bureau was able to run additional advertising in locations where mail response rates were lagging. The Bureau also significantly expanded the partnership program by hiring about 2,800 partnership staff in 2010 compared to around 600 in 2000. As a result, staff were not spread as thin. The number of languages they spoke increased from 35 in 2000 to 145 for the 2010 Census. Despite these enhancements, the outreach efforts still faced challenges. For example, while most of the partnership staff GAO interviewed reported having mutually supportive relationships with local census offices, about half of the local census office managers surveyed were dissatisfied with the level of coordination, noting duplication of effort in some cases. Additionally, a tracking database that partnership staff were to use to help manage their efforts was not user-friendly nor was it kept current. The Bureau also improved the key enumeration programs aimed at HTC groups and the efforts were generally implemented as planned, but additional refinements could improve them for 2020. For example, the Bureau expanded SBE training by teaching staff how to enumerate all types of SBE facilities, which gave the Bureau more flexibility in scheduling enumerations, and advance visits helped enhance service providers' readiness for the enumeration. Nevertheless, while most local census office managers were satisfied with SBE staffing levels, pockets of dissatisfaction existed and observers noted what appeared to be a surplus of enumerators with little work to do in some locations. While overstaffing can lead to unnecessarily higher labor costs, understaffing can also be problematic because it can affect the accuracy of the overall count, and it will be important for the Bureau to review the results of SBE to staff SBE efficiently in 2020. For the Be Counted/QAC program, the Bureau addressed visibility and site selection challenges from 2000 by developing banners to prominently display site locations and hours of operation and updating site selection guidance. For 2010, the Bureau opened around 38,000 sites and completed the monthlong operation under budget. However, the Bureau experienced recurring challenges with ensuring that the sites were visible from street level and were in areas with potential for high levels of activity, and the overall effort was resource intensive relative to the average of 20 forms that were returned and checked in from each site. Moving forward, it will be important for the Bureau to explore ways to maximize the program's ability to increase the number of forms checked in for 2020.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the Bureau take steps to improve the effectiveness of its outreach and enumeration activities aimed at HTC groups, including developing a predictive model to better allocate paid advertising funds, improving coordination between partnership and local census staff, revisiting SBE staffing guidance, and ensuring Be Counted/QAC sites are more visible and optimally located. Commerce generally agreed with the overall findings and recommendations. |
gao_HEHS-00-155 | gao_HEHS-00-155_0 | 1). 2, which presents noncompliance with VA regulations.) The extent of this problem varied by site. 4). Specific Weaknesses Compromise VA’s Protection of Human Subjects
We identified three specific weaknesses in VA’s system for protecting human subjects: not ensuring that research staff have appropriate guidance, insufficient monitoring and oversight activity, and not ensuring that the necessary funds for human subject protections are provided. Headquarters Has Not Provided Adequate Guidance
VA headquarters has not provided the guidance necessary to ensure that its medical center staff are adequately informed about requirements for the protection of human research subjects. In addition to finding that VA did not have a systemwide educational program, we found problems with VA guidance for documenting consent to participate in research. Although VA has not determined the funding amounts needed for human subject protection activities at the medical centers, research officials at five of the eight medical centers we visited told us that they had insufficient funds to ensure adequate operation of their human subject protection systems. Local Actions Address Problems Identified by Regulators But Systemwide Focus Slow to Develop
Substantial corrective actions have been implemented at three medical centers in response to sanctions by regulatory agencies against their human research programs. VA has, however, been slow to identify systemwide deficiencies and to obtain information needed to step up oversight of human subject protection systems at its medical centers. However, VA’s progress on systemwide improvements to its human subject protection system has been slow. Some facilities we visited and projects we reviewed appeared to have reasonably strong protections for the rights and welfare of participants. Recommendations
To strengthen VA’s protections for human subjects, we recommend that the Acting Secretary of Veterans Affairs direct the Under Secretary for Health to take immediate steps to ensure that VA medical centers, their IRBs— whether operated by VA or not—and VA investigators comply with all applicable regulations for the protection of human subjects by providing research staff with current, comprehensive, and clear guidance regarding protections for the rights and welfare of human research subjects; providing periodic training to investigators, IRB members, and IRB staff about research ethics and standards for protecting human subjects; developing a mechanism for handling adverse event reports to ensure that IRBs have the information they need to safeguard the rights and welfare of human research participants; expediting development of information needed to monitor local protection systems, investigators, and studies and to ensure that oversight activities are implemented; and determining the funding levels needed to support human subject protection activities at medical centers and ensuring an appropriate allocation of funds to support these activities. Scope and Methodology
Our objectives were to (1) assess the Department of Veterans Affairs’ (VA) implementation of human subject protections, (2) identify whether weaknesses exist in VA’s system for protecting human subjects, and (3) assess VA’s actions to improve human subject protections at those sites affected by sanctions imposed by regulatory agencies and throughout VA’s health care system. Our results from these eight medical centers cannot be generalized to other sites. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed rights and welfare of veterans who volunteer to participate in research at Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) and the effectiveness of its human subject protection system, focusing on: (1) VA's implementation of human subject protections; (2) whether weaknesses exist in VA's system for protecting human subjects; and (3) VA's actions to improve human subject protections at those sites affected by sanctions applied by regulatory agencies and throughout VA's health care system.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) VA has adopted a system of protections for human research subjects, but GAO found substantial problems with its implementation of these protections; (2) medical centers GAO visited did not comply with all regulations to protect the rights and welfare of research participants; (3) among problems GAO observed were failures to provide adequate information to subjects before they participated in research, inadequate reviews of proposed and ongoing research, insufficient staff and space for review boards, and incomplete documentation of review board activities; (4) GAO found relatively few problems at some sites that had stronger systems to protect human subjects, but GAO observed multiple problems at other sites; (5) although the results of GAO's visits to medical centers cannot be projected to VA as a whole, the extent of the problems GAO found strongly indicates that human subject protections at VA need to be strengthened; (6) three specific weaknesses have compromised VA's ability to protect human subjects in research; (7) VA headquarters has not provided medical center research staff with adequate guidance about human subject protections and thus has not ensured that research staff have all the information they need to protect the rights and welfare of human subjects; (8) insufficient monitoring and oversight of local human subject protections have permitted noncompliance with regulations to go undetected and uncorrected; (9) VA has not ensured that funds needed for human subject protections are allocated for that purpose at the medical centers, with officials at some medical centers reporting that they did not have sufficient resources to accomplish their mandated responsibilities; (10) to VA's credit, substantial corrective actions have been implemented at three medical centers in response to sanctions by regulatory agencies taken against their human research programs, but VA's systemwide efforts at improving protections have been slow to develop; (11) medical centers affected by sanctions have taken numerous steps to improve human subject protections; and (12) VA has, however, been slow to take action to identify any systemwide deficiencies and obtain necessary information about the human subject protection systems at its medical centers. |
gao_GAO-08-698 | gao_GAO-08-698_0 | Studies Suggest That Discrimination May Play a Role in Certain Types of Nonmortgage Lending, but Data Limitations Complicate Efforts to Better Understand the Issue
The limited number of studies on nonmortgage lending that met our criteria for selection focused primarily on the small business sector, largely because there is data available on this type of lending from FRB’s SSBF. In addition, studies have also found that Hispanic-owned businesses were denied credit or charged higher interest rates more often when compared with white-owned businesses with similar risk characteristics. While studies using SSBF data have provided important insights into possible discrimination in small business lending, researchers and FRB officials also said the data had the following certain limitations as a research tool: SSBF data are collected from individual small business borrowers rather than lenders, which limit their analytical value. In the absence of similar race, gender, and other data on personal characteristics for nonmortgage loan applicants, regulators may rely on time-consuming and possibly unreliable techniques to assess lenders’ compliance with fair lending laws. For example, some researchers said that data collection by itself would not necessarily mean the information would be used to discriminate because in many cases— such as small business lending—lenders may already be aware of an applicant’s personal characteristics because such lending is often done on a face-to-face basis. Even so, a range of researchers, regulatory staff, and representatives from both consumer and banking groups we contacted generally concurred with FRB that voluntarily collected data might not be useful or reliable and that very few banks would choose to collect it. Researchers and Others Had Mixed Views on FRB’s Conclusion That Voluntary Data Collection Could Create Some Risk for Discrimination in Nonmortgage Lending
Some researchers, staff from a bank regulatory agency, and representatives from banking and business trade groups we contacted generally agreed with FRB that permitting voluntary data collection on personal characteristics, such as race and gender, could create a risk that the information would be used for discriminatory purposes relative to prohibiting data collection. A Data Collection and Reporting Requirement Could Further Efforts to Better Understand Possible Discrimination in Nonmortgage Lending but Would also Involve Complexities and Costs That Would Require Consideration
In concept, a requirement that lenders collect and publicly report data on the personal characteristics of nonmortgage loan applicants, similar to HMDA requirements, could help address some of the existing data limitations that complicate efforts by researchers, federal bank regulators, and others to identify possible discrimination. Such data would also be more timely than SSBF data, and the implementation of data collection standards could help ensure its reliability. Further, examiners could use such data to compare practices across lenders to identify possibly discriminatory practices. Consequently, the officials said that lenders would have to collect and report significant additional information on a range of underwriting standards and data for small business lending in order to make the data on personal characteristics useful so that examiners, researchers, Congress, and others are in a better position to determine whether a particular lender’s practices may involve discrimination or not. One option to potentially enhance federal oversight of the fair lending laws, while mitigating lender cost concerns, would be to require lenders to collect data on personal characteristics for small business loan applicants, and perhaps other types of nonmortgage lending like automobile lending, and make the data available to regulators but not require public reporting of such data or any other information. In its written comments, FRB did not take a position on our analyses but restated one of its 2003 rationales for retaining Regulation B’s general prohibition on collecting data on personal characteristics for nonmortgage loan applicants. Moreover, FRB also summarized the draft report’s analysis that, while there was not full agreement among those that we contacted with all aspects of the FRB’s rationale for retaining the prohibition, there was widespread agreement that such voluntary data would have limited benefits. However, such a requirement would impose additional costs on lenders that could be partially passed along to borrowers. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of our report were to discuss (1) available research on possible discrimination in nonmortgage lending and review the strengths and limitations of the data that researchers and regulators use to detect possible discrimination; (2) analyze the Federal Reserve Board’s (FRB) basis for largely retaining Regulation B’s prohibition against the voluntary collection of racial and gender data in 2003; and (3) assess the potential benefits and costs of requiring lenders to both collect and publicly report racial and gender data for nonmortgage loan applicants, as well as options to mitigate such costs. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Federal Reserve Board's (FRB) Regulation B, which implements the Equal Credit Opportunity Act of 1974 (ECOA), generally prohibits lenders from collecting certain data from loan applicants, such as their race or gender, for nonmortgage loans (e.g., small business loans). FRB has stated that this provision of Regulation B minimizes the chances that lenders would use such data in an unlawful and discriminatory manner. However, others argue that the prohibition limits the capacity of researchers and regulators to identify possible discrimination in nonmortgage lending. This report analyzes (1) studies on possible discrimination in nonmortgage lending and the data used in them, (2) FRB's 2003 decision to retain the prohibition of voluntary data collection, and (3) the benefits and costs of a data collection and reporting requirement. GAO conducted a literature review; reviewed FRB documents; analyzed issues involving the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA), which requires lenders to collect and publicly report data on personal characteristics for mortgage loan applicants; and interviewed FRB and other regulatory officials, researchers, banks, and consumer groups. FRB did not take a position on this report's analysis. In addition to restating its rationale for retaining the prohibition of voluntary data collection, FRB summarized GAO's findings, including the potential benefits and costs of additional data for fair lending enforcement.
What GAO Found
Most studies suggest that discrimination may play a role in certain types of nonmortgage lending, but data limitations complicate efforts by researchers and regulators to better understand this issue. For example, available studies indicate that African-American-owned small businesses are denied loans more often or pay higher interest rates than white-owned businesses with similar risk characteristics. While the primary data source for these studies, a periodic FRB small business survey, provides important insights into possible discrimination, it also has limits compared with HMDA data. For example, the FRB survey data are collected from borrowers rather than lenders, which limit their usefulness as a means to assess lending practices. In addition, federal bank regulators that enforce ECOA said that HMDA data facilitates the identification of lenders that may be engaging in discriminatory mortgage lending. In the absence of such data for nonmortgage loans, regulators may rely on time-consuming and less reliable approaches to identify possible discrimination, such as assuming a loan applicant is Hispanic based on his or her last name. While testimony from researchers and other information GAO collected did not fully agree with all aspects of FRB's 2003 rationale for retaining the prohibition of voluntary data collection, there was general agreement that such voluntary data would have limited benefits. FRB did not adopt a proposal that would have allowed lenders to collect data, without any standards, because it said the proposal would have (1) created an opportunity for lenders to use the data for discriminatory purposes and (2) such data would not be useful because lenders may use different collection approaches. While some researchers and others agreed with FRB's first rationale, others said that data collection alone would not necessarily create the risk for discrimination because, in some cases (e.g., small business lending), lenders may already be aware of applicants' personal characteristics as such lending is often done on a face-to-face basis. Even so, a range of researchers, staff from regulatory agencies, and others agreed that voluntarily collected data would not likely materially benefit efforts by researchers, regulators, and others to better understand possible discrimination in nonmortgage lending because it would be collected on an inconsistent basis or few lenders would participate out of concern for additional regulatory scrutiny of their nonmortgage lending practices and the potential for litigation. Requiring lenders to collect and publicly report data on personal characteristics for nonmortgage loan applicants could help address current data limitations that complicate efforts to better assess possible discrimination (e.g., the data may enhance regulators' ability to detect discriminatory practices). However, such a requirement would impose additional costs on lenders that could be partially passed on to borrowers. These potential costs include those associated with information system integration, software development, data storage and verification, and employee training. Limiting a requirement to certain types of loans could help mitigate such costs but may also involve complexities that would need to be considered. For example, to the extent that small business lending is more complicated than other types of lending, lenders may need to collect and report additional information on a range of underwriting standards in addition to data on personal characteristics so that informed judgments can be made about their lending practices. |
gao_GAO-17-532 | gao_GAO-17-532_0 | As of December 2016, the LESO program office finalized a memorandum of understanding (MOU) that it plans to sign with participating federal agencies. According to the MOU, it will establish DLA’s authority as the owner of the program and, among other things, establish general terms and conditions. DLA Has Taken Actions and Is Planning Additional Actions to Address Identified Weaknesses in Its Transfer Process
Revisions to Policy and Procedures, Compliance Reviews, and LESO Program Application
DLA has taken some steps to address identified weaknesses in its processes for transferring and monitoring its excess controlled property through revisions to its policy and procedures on the management, oversight, and accountability of the LESO program. DLA Has Deficiencies in Its Processes for Verifying and Approving Applications and Transferring Property and Has Not Conducted a Risk Assessment
DLA Has Deficiencies in Its Processes for Verifying and Approving Federal Agency Applications
Our independent testing of the LESO program’s internal controls identified deficiencies in the processes for verification and approval of federal law enforcement agency applications. DLA Did Not Routinely Request and Verify Identification of Individuals Picking Up Controlled Property or Verify the Quantity of Approved Items Transferred
Our independent testing of DLA’s internal controls also identified deficiencies in the transfer of controlled property, such as DLA personnel not routinely requesting and verifying identification of individuals picking up controlled property or verifying the quantity of approved items prior to transfer. We subsequently submitted requests to obtain controlled property, including non-lethal items and potentially-lethal items if modified with commercially available items. The estimated value of each item ranged from $277 to over $600,000, including items such as night-vision goggles, reflex (also known as reflector) sights, infrared illuminators, simulated pipe bombs, and simulated rifles. If DLA conducted a fraud risk assessment on the LESO program, to include the application process, and designed and implemented a strategy with specific internal control activities to mitigate assessed fraud risks, DLA would be more effective in preventing, detecting, and responding to potential fraud and security risks. DLA Maintains a Public Internet Site with Data on Property Transfers, Including Information on Excess Controlled Property
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 included a provision for DOD to create and maintain a publicly available Internet site that provides information on the controlled property transferred and the recipients of such property. However, after we briefed DLA officials in April 2017 on the results of our audit, DLA officials took immediate action and added a definition of controlled property to their Internet site to distinguish for the general public what items are considered controlled. However, our investigators tested the LESO program’s internal controls by creating a fictitious agency allowing us to gain access to the program and to obtain over 100 controlled property items valued at about $1.2 million. Finally, we found that DLA lacks a comprehensive framework for instituting fraud prevention and mitigation measures that would allow it to examine potential risks for all stages of the process from application to transfer of excess controlled property to legitimate law enforcement agencies. Recommendations for Executive Action
We are making four recommendations to enhance the department’s transfer of its excess controlled property. DOD concurred with all four recommendations and highlighted the actions it was taking to address each recommendation. Appendix I: Law Enforcement Agencies Reported Various Uses and Benefits from the Transfer of the Department of Defense’s (DOD) Excess Controlled Property
Federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies reported various uses and benefits from the receipt of DOD’s excess controlled property through the Law Enforcement Support Office (LESO) program. Appendix II: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report addresses the extent to which the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) has: (1) taken actions to enhance processes, including internal controls, relating to its transfers of excess controlled property; and (2) addressed the statutory requirement to maintain a public Internet site that provides transparency about controlled property transfers and about the recipients of such property. In our survey of select federal law enforcement agencies, training had not been regularly provided to participating federal law enforcement agencies. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since 1991, DOD has reported transferring more than $6 billion worth of its excess controlled and non-controlled personal property to more than 8,600 federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies through the LESO program, which is managed by DLA. According to DOD, about 4 to 7 percent of the total excess property transferred is controlled property, which typically involves sensitive equipment and items that cannot be released to the public.
The National Defense Authorization Act of 2016 included a provision that GAO conduct an assessment of DOD's excess property program. This report addresses the extent to which (1) DLA has taken actions to enhance processes, including internal controls, related to its transfers of excess controlled property; and (2) DLA has addressed the statutory requirement to maintain a public Internet site that provides transparency about controlled property transfers and about the recipients of such property. GAO reviewed DOD policies and procedures, interviewed cognizant officials, and conducted independent testing of LESO's application and DLA's transfer process.
What GAO Found
The Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) has taken some actions and is planning additional actions to address identified weaknesses in its excess controlled property program. However, internal control deficiencies exist for, among other things, ensuring that only eligible applicants are approved to participate in the Law Enforcement Support Office (LESO) program and receive transfers of excess controlled property. DLA is establishing memorandums of understanding with participating federal agencies intended to, among other things, establish general terms and conditions for participation, revise its program application to require additional prospective participant information, and plans to provide additional online training for participating agencies that is expected to begin in late 2017. However, GAO created a fictitious federal agency to conduct independent testing of the LESO program's internal controls and DLA's transfer of controlled property to law enforcement agencies.
Through the testing, GAO gained access to the LESO program and obtained over 100 controlled items with an estimated value of $1.2 million, including night-vision goggles, simulated rifles, and simulated pipe bombs, which could be potentially lethal items if modified with commercially available items (see photos). GAO's testing identified that DLA has deficiencies in the processes for verification and approval of federal law enforcement agency applications and in the transfer of controlled property, such as DLA personnel not routinely requesting and verifying identification of individuals picking up controlled property or verifying the quantity of approved items prior to transfer. Further, GAO found that DLA has not conducted a fraud risk assessment on the LESO program, including the application process. Without strengthening DLA and LESO program internal controls over the approval and transfer of controlled property to law enforcement agencies, such as reviewing and revising policy or procedures for verifying and approving federal agency applications and enrollment, DLA lacks reasonable assurance that it has the ability to prevent, detect, and respond to potential fraud and minimize associated security risks.
Examples of Controlled Property Items Obtained
DLA maintains a public Internet site to address statutory requirements to provide information on all property transfers to law enforcement agencies. DLA's public Internet site shows all transferred property, and, as of April 2017, in response to GAO's findings, has included a definition of controlled property to distinguish for the general public what items are considered controlled.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is making four recommendations to DLA, including strengthening internal controls over the approval and transfer of DOD excess controlled property to law enforcement agencies, and conducting a fraud risk assessment to institute comprehensive fraud prevention and mitigation measures. DOD concurred with all four recommendations and highlighted actions to address each one. |
gao_GAO-17-183 | gao_GAO-17-183_0 | Additionally, in February 2015, we reported on progress DOD had made in addressing weaknesses in its asset visibility, including developing its 2014 Strategy. Components Have Identified Performance Measures for the Eight Initiatives We Reviewed, but Limitations in the Measures and Related Status Reports Affect DOD’s Ability to Assess the Success of the Initiatives
DOD components have identified performance measures for the 8 initiatives we reviewed, but the measures do not generally include the key attributes of successful performance measures (i.e., the measures were not generally clear, quantifiable, objective, and reliable). We also found that after-action reports for some initiatives did not always include information on the performance measures and therefore prevent DOD from effectively evaluating the success of the initiatives in achieving the goals and objectives described in the Strategies. DOD Has Met the Criteria for Leadership Commitment, Capacity, and an Action Plan, but Additional Actions Are Needed to Address Monitoring and Demonstrated Progress
DOD has fully met three of our criteria for removal from the High Risk List by improving leadership commitment, capacity, and its corrective action plan, and it has partially met the criteria to monitor the implementation of the initiatives and demonstrate progress in improving asset visibility. To address this issue, in December 2016, a DOD official provided an abstract from the draft update to the 2015 Strategy that provides additional direction on how to explain and document cases where the funding for the initiatives is embedded within overall program funding. DOD Has Partially Met the Monitoring and Demonstrated Progress Criteria for Removal from the High Risk List
DOD Has Taken Steps to Monitor the Status of Initiatives, but Its Performance Measures Could Not Always Be Used to Track Progress Our high-risk criterion on monitoring calls for agencies to institute a program to monitor and independently validate the effectiveness and sustainability of corrective measures, for example, through performance measures. Without improved performance measures and information to support that progress has been made, DOD may not be able to monitor asset visibility initiatives. Also, DOD will be limited in its ability to demonstrate sustained progress in implementing corrective actions and resolving the high-risk area. We recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Logistics and Materiel Readiness, in collaboration with the Director, Defense Logistics Agency; the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force; the Commandant of the Marine Corps; the Commander of the United States Transportation Command; and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to: use the key attributes of successful performance measures—including clarity, measurable target, objectivity, reliability, baseline and trend data, and linkage—in refining the performance measures in subsequent updates to the Strategy to improve DOD’s efforts to monitor asset visibility initiatives; and incorporate into after-action reports information relating to performance measures for the asset visibility initiatives when evaluating and closing these initiatives to ensure that implemented initiatives will achieve the goals and objectives in the Strategies. GAO staff who made contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To determine the extent to which DOD identified performance measures that allow it to monitor the progress of selected asset visibility initiatives identified in DOD’s 2014 and 2015 Strategy for Improving DOD Asset Visibility (Strategies), we reviewed documents such as the 2014 Strategy and its subsequent update in October 2015 (2015 Strategy); minutes from the Asset Visibility Working Group meetings; and documents showing the status of the implementation, including charts that track the development and closure of the asset visibility initiatives. We also selected sites to observe demonstrations of initiatives that were intended to show how they have achieved progress in improving asset visibility. Defense Logistics: DOD Needs to Take Additional Actions to Address Challenges in Supply Chain Management. DOD’s High-Risk Areas: Observations on DOD’s Progress and Challenges in Strategic Planning for Supply Chain Management. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO designated DOD's supply chain management as a high-risk area in 1990 and in February 2011 reported that limitations in asset visibility make it difficult to obtain timely and accurate information on assets that are present in a theater of operations. DOD defines asset visibility as the ability to provide timely and accurate information on the location, quantity, condition, movement, and status of items in its inventory. In 2015, GAO found that DOD had demonstrated leadership commitment and made considerable progress in addressing weaknesses in its supply chain management.
This report addresses the extent to which DOD has (1) identified performance measures that allow it to monitor the progress of selected asset visibility initiatives identified in its Strategies ; and (2) addressed the five criteria—leadership commitment, capacity, corrective action plan, monitoring, and demonstrated progress—for removing asset visibility from the High Risk List. GAO reviewed documents associated with selected initiatives, surveyed DOD officials, and observed demonstrations.
What GAO Found
The Department of Defense (DOD) has identified performance measures for the eight selected asset visibility initiatives GAO reviewed, but these performance measures generally cannot be used to monitor progress. Specifically, GAO found that the measures for the eight initiatives reviewed did not generally include key attributes of successful performance measures. For example, for six initiatives there were no baseline and trend data associated with the measures. While DOD's 2014 and 2015 Strategy for Improving DOD Asset Visibility ( Strategies ) called for performance measures to be identified for the initiatives, the Strategies lacked complete direction on how to develop performance measures that would allow DOD to assess the progress of the initiatives toward their intended outcomes. GAO also found that after-action reports for the initiatives did not always include key information needed to determine the success of the initiatives in achieving the goals described in the Strategies . Without improved performance measures and information to support that progress has been made, DOD may not be able to monitor and show progress in improving asset visibility.
DOD has made progress and meets the criteria related to capacity and its corrective action plan but needs to take additional actions to monitor implementation and demonstrate progress to meet GAO's two remaining criteria for removal from the High Risk List, as shown in the figure. For the capacity criterion, in its draft update to the 2015 Strategy , DOD provides guidance on how to document cases where the funding for the initiatives is embedded within the overall program funding. Also, for the action plan criterion, DOD included matrixes in its 2015 Strategy to link ongoing initiatives to the Strategy 's goals and objectives. DOD has also taken steps to monitor the status of initiatives. However, the performance measures for the selected initiatives that GAO reviewed generally cannot be used to track progress and are not consistently incorporated into reports to demonstrate results. Until these criteria are met, DOD will have limited ability to demonstrate sustained progress in improving asset visibility.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOD use key attributes of successful performance measures in refining measures in updates to the Strategy and incorporate information related to performance measures into after-action reports for the asset visibility initiatives. DOD partially concurred with both recommendations. The actions DOD proposed are positive steps, but GAO believes the recommendations should be fully implemented, as discussed in the report. |
gao_GAO-15-486T | gao_GAO-15-486T_0 | UAS operations in the national airspace system are considered on a case-by-case basis. FAA’s Six Test Sites Are Operational and Beginning to Conduct UAS Flights
Since being named in December 2013, the six designated test sites have become operational, applying for and receiving authorization from FAA to conduct test flights. These flights provide operations and safety data to FAA in support of UAS integration. Test site officials meet every two weeks with FAA officials to discuss current issues, challenges, and progress. In addition, test sites have developed operational and safety processes that have been reviewed by FAA. Thus, while FAA has no funding directed to the test sites to specifically support research and development activities, FAA dedicates time and resources to supporting the test sites, and FAA staff we spoke to believe test sites are a benefit to the integration process and worth this investment. The Other Transaction Agreement between FAA and the test sites defines the purpose of the test sites as research and testing in support of safe UAS integration into the national airspace. Other Countries Have Progressed with UAS Integration to Allow some Level of Commercial UAS Use
As part of our ongoing work, we identified a number of countries that allow commercial UAS operations and have done so for years. For example, as of December 2014, Australia had issued over 180 UAS operating certificates to businesses engaged in aerial surveying, photography, and other lines of business. While UAS commercial operations can occur in some countries, there are restrictions controlling their use. We studied the UAS regulations of Australia, Canada, France, and the United Kingdom and found these countries impose similar types of requirements and restrictions on commercial UAS operations. In November 2014, Canada issued new rules creating exemptions for commercial use of small UASs weighing 4.4 pounds or less and from 4.4 pounds to 55 pounds. If UASs were to begin flying today in the national airspace system under the provisions of FAA’s proposed rules, their operating restrictions would be similar to regulations in these other four countries. This category goes beyond FAA’s proposed rules by proposing regulations for large UAS operations and operations beyond the pilot’s visual line-of-sight. For example, three UAS industry stakeholders and FAA teamed up to launch an informational website for UAS operators. | Why GAO Did This Study
UAS—often called drones—are aircraft that do not carry a pilot but instead operate on pre-programmed routes or are manually controlled. Currently, UAS only operate in the United States with FAA approval on a case-by-case basis. However, in the absence of regulations, unauthorized UAS operations have, in some instances, compromised safety.
The FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012 emphasized the need to integrate UAS into the national airspace by requiring that FAA establish requirements governing them. In response, FAA has taken a number of steps, most notably,
issuing an NPRM for small UAS operations, and
designating six UAS test sites which became operational in 2014 and have begun to conduct test flights.
Other countries have started to integrate UAS as well, and many currently allow commercial operations.
This testimony provides preliminary observations on 1) status of FAA's test sites, 2) how other countries have progressed integrating UAS for commercial purposes, and 3) critical steps for FAA going forward.
This testimony is based on GAO's ongoing study examining issues related to UAS integration into the national airspace system for UAS operations. To conduct this work, GAO reviewed documents and met with officials from test sites, FAA, and industry stakeholders.
What GAO Found
Since becoming operational in 2014, the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) unmanned aerial systems (UAS) test sites have conducted over 195 flights across five of the six test sites. These flights provide operations and safety data that FAA can use in support of integrating UAS into the national airspace. FAA has not provided funding to the test sites in support of research and development activities but has provided staff time through, for example bi-weekly meetings to discuss ongoing issues with test site officials. FAA staff said that the sites are a benefit to the integration process and worth this investment.
GAO's preliminary observations found that other countries have progressed toward UAS integration and allow commercial use. GAO studied the UAS regulations in Australia, Canada, France, and the United Kingdom and found these countries have similar rules and restrictions on commercial UAS operations, such as allowing line of sight operations only. In November 2014, Canada issued new rules creating exemptions for UAS operations based on size and relative risk. In addition, as of December 2014, Australia had issued over 180 UAS operating certificates to businesses engaged in aerial surveying, photography, and other lines of business. Under the provisions of FAA's proposed rules, operating restrictions would be similar to regulations in these other four countries. For example, all countries have UAS altitude restrictions of 500 feet or below. |
gao_GAO-07-433T | gao_GAO-07-433T_0 | We, along with others, have highlighted the need to engage and retain older workers to address some of these challenges associated with an aging workforce. Workers also cited what they perceived as their own limited skills and employers’ age discrimination as barriers to continued employment. Obstacles to Engaging and Retaining Older Workers
According to participants at our forum, some of the key obstacles that hinder continued work at older ages include: first, employer perceptions about the cost of employing older workers; second, employee perceptions about the costs and benefits of continued work; and third, changes in industry and job skill requirements, which may hinder older workers from remaining employed or finding suitable new employment. In addition to these financial incentives, jobs that are physically demanding or have inflexible schedules that compete with family caregiving needs also provide strong disincentives to continued work. For some, the incentive to retire lies in the lack of suitable job opportunities. In addition, layoffs due to changes in the economy, along with the lack of skills needed to compete in the global economy, are also challenges facing older workers. Best Practices and Lessons Learned on Engaging and Retaining Older Workers
We, along with others, have previously reported on the importance of flexibility in recruiting and retaining older workers. In order to effectively engage older workers, forum participants suggested implementing new recruiting approaches, workplace flexibility, the right mix of benefits and incentives, financial literary education, and consistent performance management systems. For example, some employers have established partnerships with national organizations, such as AARP, to help advertise themselves as employers of older workers. Other employers have adapted job designs to accommodate the physical constraints of older workers. Modifying pension plans can also entice workers to work longer. Improving Employee Financial Literacy and Helping Employees Better Prepare for Retirement
With older Americans living longer and spending more time in retirement, workers will have to ensure they have a realistic plan to provide for retirement security that may include working longer. To limit exposure to age discrimination litigation, one participant said a consistent performance management system is essential for dealing with all workers. Suggested Strategies for Policymakers and Employers
Given the scope and importance of this issue, participants offered a number of strategies to encourage older workers to remain in the labor force and to encourage employers to engage and retain older workers. One strategy discussed was the establishment of a national clearinghouse of best practices, such as the different kinds of work structures, recruiting techniques, and workplace flexibilities used by some employers to attract and retain older workers. Second, it can help to foster the kinds of public/private partnerships that would promote the national campaign, begin a national discussion, or contribute to the national clearinghouse discussed above. And third, through specific legislation or regulations that would increase flexibility for employers and employees, the federal government can help create new models of employment for older Americans. Given existing trends in the aging of baby boomers, pressures on federal entitlement programs, and threats to individuals’ retirement security, it is in the nation’s interest for people to work longer. Harnessing the benefits of this growing group of potential older workers requires that barriers to continued work be removed sooner rather than later. Clearly, there is also a role for government to play, whether it be through becoming a model employer of older federal employees or helping to foster flexible work arrangements in the private sector to meet the needs of older workers, or by considering legislative and regulatory changes, including those that Labor’s interagency task force may propose. | Why GAO Did This Study
More Americans remaining in the workforce at older ages could lead to benefits at several levels. First, working longer will allow older workers to bolster their retirement savings. Second, hiring and retaining older workers will help employers deal with projected labor shortages. Third, older workers will contribute to economic growth and increase federal revenues, helping to defray some of the anticipated costs associated with increased claims on Social Security and Medicare. Despite all of these gains to be had, there are barriers to continued employment for older workers. In addition, some employers remain reluctant to engage and retain this group. It is in the nation's interest for people to work longer, which requires that barriers to continued work be removed sooner rather than later. This testimony highlights issues discussed at a recent forum GAO convened on engaging and retaining older workers, as well as prior GAO work. Forum participants included experts representing employers, business and union groups, advocates, researchers, actuaries, and federal agencies. These highlights do not necessarily represent the views of any one participant or the organizations that these participants represent, including GAO.
What GAO Found
Obstacles continue to exist for older workers seeking continued or new employment and for employers who want to attract or retain older workers. The following obstacles, best practices, lessons learned, and strategies to address some of these obstacles and promote work at older ages were discussed at a recent GAO forum on older workers. Key Obstacles: (1) Some employers' perceptions about the cost of hiring and retaining older workers are a key obstacle in older workers' continued employment. (2) Workplace age discrimination, the lack of suitable job opportunities, layoffs due to changes in the economy, as well as the need to keep skills up to date, are all challenges facing older workers. (3) Strong financial incentives for workers to retire as soon as possible and some jobs that are physically demanding or have inflexible schedules provide strong disincentives to continued work. Best Practices and Lessons Learned: (1) Use nontraditional recruiting techniques such as partnerships with national organizations that focus on older Americans. (2) Employ flexible work situations and adapt job designs to meet the preferences and physical constraints of older workers. (3) Offer the right mix of benefits and incentives to attract older workers such as tuition assistance, time off for elder care, employee discounts, and pension plans that allow retirees to return to work. (4) Provide employees with financial literacy skills to ensure they have a realistic plan to provide for retirement security. (5) Treat all employees in a fair and consistent manner and employ a consistent performance management system to prevent age discrimination complaints. Strategies: (1) Conduct a national campaign to help change the national mindset about work at older ages. (2) Hold a national discussion about what "old" is to help change the culture of retirement. (3) Create a clearinghouse of best recruiting, hiring, and retention practices for older workers. (4) Strengthen financial literacy education to help workers prepare to retire.(5) Make the federal government a model employer for the nation in how it recruits and retains older workers. (6) Create a key federal role in partnerships to implement these strategies. (7) Consider specific legislation or regulations to increase flexibility for employers and employees to create new employment models. |
gao_GAO-07-1023T | gao_GAO-07-1023T_0 | Government Agencies Collect and Use SSNs for a Variety of Purposes
A number of federal laws and regulations require agencies at all levels of government to frequently collect and use SSNs for various purposes. Private Sector Entities Collect SSNs from Various Sources for Identity Verification Purposes
Certain private sector entities, such as information resellers, consumer reporting agencies (CRAs), and healthcare organizations collect SSNs from public and private sources, as well as their customers, and primarily use SSNs for identity verification purposes. In addition, banks, securities firms, telecommunication firms, and tax preparers engage in third party contracting and sometimes share SSNs with their contractors for limited purposes, generally when it is necessary and unavoidable. Vulnerabilities Persist in Federal Laws Addressing SSN Collection and Use by Private Sector Entities
In our reviews of private sector entities’ collection and use of SSNs, we found variation in how different industries are covered by federal laws protecting individuals’ personal information. For example, although federal laws place restrictions on reselling some personal information, these laws only apply to certain types of private sector entities, such as financial institutions. Consequently, information resellers are not covered by these laws, and there are few restrictions placed on these entities’ ability to obtain, use, and resell SSNs. Vulnerabilities also exist in federal law and agency oversight for different industries that share SSNs with their contractors. For example, while federal law and oversight of the sharing of personal information in the financial services industry is very extensive, federal law and oversight of the sharing of personal information in the tax preparation and telecommunications industries is somewhat lacking. Specifically, in our Internet resellers report, several resellers provided us with truncated SSNs showing the first five digits, though other entities truncate SSNs by showing the last four digits. Therefore, because of the lack of SSN truncation standards, even truncated SSNs remain vulnerable to potential misuse by identity thieves and others. While we suggested that the Congress consider enacting standards for truncating SSNs or delegating authority to SSA or some other governmental entity to do so, SSN truncation standards have yet to be addressed at the federal level. However, because of this widespread use of SSNs, and the vulnerabilities that remain to protecting this identifier in both sectors, SSNs continue to be accessible to misuse by identity thieves and others. Social Security Numbers: Use Is Widespread and Protections Vary in Private and Public Sectors. Social Security Numbers: Private Sector Entities Routinely Obtain and Use SSNs, and Laws Limit the Disclosure of This Information. Social Security Numbers: Ensuring the Integrity of the SSN. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since its creation, the Social Security number (SSN) has evolved beyond its intended purpose to become the identifier of choice for public and private sector entities, and it is now used for myriad non-Social Security purposes. This is significant because a person's SSN, along with name and date of birth, are the key pieces of personal information used to perpetrate identity theft. Consequently, the potential for misuse of the SSN has raised questions about how private and public sector entities obtain, use, and protect SSNs. Accordingly, this testimony focuses on describing the (1) use of SSNs by government agencies, (2) use of SSNs by the private sector, and (3) vulnerabilities that remain to protecting SSNs. For this testimony, we primarily relied on information from our prior reports and testimonies that address public and private sector use and protection of SSNs. These products were issued between 2002 and 2006 and are listed in the Related GAO Products section at the end of this statement. We conducted our reviews in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
What GAO Found
A number of federal laws and regulations require agencies at all levels of government to frequently collect and use SSNs for various purposes. For example, agencies frequently collect and use SSNs to administer their programs, link data for verifying applicants' eligibility for services and benefits, and conduct program evaluations. In the private sector, certain entities, such as information resellers, collect SSNs from public sources, private sources, and their customers and use this information for identity verification purposes. In addition, banks, securities firms, telecommunication firms, and tax preparers engage in third party contracting, and consequently sometimes share SSNs with their contractors for limited purposes. Vulnerabilities persist in federal laws addressing SSN collection and use by private sector entities. In particular, we found variation in how different industries are covered by federal laws protecting individuals' personal information. For example, although federal laws place restrictions on reselling some personal information, these laws apply only to certain types of private sector entities, such as financial institutions. Consequently, information resellers are not covered by these laws, and there are few restrictions placed on these entities' ability to obtain, use, and resell SSNs for their businesses. Vulnerabilities also exist in federal law and agency oversight for different industries that share SSNs with their contractors. For example, while federal law and oversight of the sharing of personal information in the financial services industry are very extensive, federal law and oversight of the sharing of personal information in the tax preparation and telecommunications industries are somewhat lacking. Moreover, in our Internet resellers report, several resellers provided us with truncated SSNs showing the first five digits, though other information resellers and consumer reporting agencies truncate SSNs to show the last four digits. Therefore, because of the lack of SSN truncation standards, even truncated SSNs remain vulnerable to potential misuse by identity thieves and others. While we suggested that the Congress consider enacting standards for truncating SSNs or delegating authority to the Social Security Administration or some other governmental entity to do so, SSN truncation standards have yet to be addressed at the federal level. |
gao_GAO-06-103 | gao_GAO-06-103_0 | Total funding for these programs in fiscal year 2005 was $36.3 million, with the largest share—$33.1 million—allotted to the New Entrant program. FMCSA’s education and outreach programs target a variety of audiences, including the motor carrier industry, commercial vehicle drivers, and the public; and they involve a variety of approaches, such as direct contact with carriers, media campaigns, distributing printed materials, and establishing Web sites. New Entrant Program
FMCSA intends the New Entrant program to inform newly registered motor carriers (new entrants) about motor carrier safety standards and regulations to help them gain compliance with FMCSA requirements and improve truck safety and thus reduce crash rates. The conference report accompanying the DOT appropriations bill for fiscal year 2005, for example, asked that FMCSA report by April 2005 to the House and Senate Committees on Appropriations on strategies linking outreach and education program initiatives to each goal. The performance budget documents address education and outreach primarily under this strategic objective for safety, by stating that “educating carriers about the benefits of operating safely, and in compliance with safety regulations, is advantageous to both the carrier and enforcement community.” The budget also states that the education programs are designed to change “the knowledge, attitudes, and behaviors of commercial motor carriers, commercial motor vehicle drivers, and passenger vehicle drivers, driving in the vicinity of large trucks.”
However, the performance budget does not provide specific information for each program on how these expected attitude and behavior changes are linked to broader goals. FMCSA’s performance budget relates its Household Goods program to DOT’s mobility and FMCSA’s productivity objectives. Evaluations of Specific Education and Outreach Programs Impacts Are Still in Preliminary Stages, but the Lack of a Plan to Evaluate How New Entrant Safety Audits Improve Knowledge and Attitudes Raises Concern
FMCSA has begun some evaluations of its education and outreach activities, including the New Entrant program, and plans to use contractors to evaluate some programs. Specifically, FMCSA has not evaluated whether the Education and Technical Assistance Package provided to new entrants and the safety audits conducted under the New Entrant program effectively communicated information to new entrants, making it difficult to determine the impact of that program. However, FMCSA’s education and outreach programs and marketing materials appear to follow theories and research on behavior change. Finally, a public-safety group suggests FMCSA followed reasonable approaches in starting its education and outreach efforts, however, it would like to see more quantitative evaluation in the future to help FMCSA refine its programs. FMCSA Is Increasing Enforcement in the New Entrant Program and Acknowledges the Importance of Enforcement to the Non-Entrant and Safety Belt Programs
Three of FMCSA’s programs we examined, the New Entrant, Non-Entrant and Commercial Motor Vehicle Safety Belt programs have regulations, such as a requirement for motor carrier drivers to wear safety belts, affecting the target audiences’ (motor carrier industry) behavior. The following sections describe how FMCSA has indicated it is using or will be using enforcement along with education and outreach in these programs. Recommendations for Executive Action
To better demonstrate how FMCSA education and outreach programs contribute to achieving agency goals, we recommend that the Secretary of Transportation direct the Administrator of FMCSA to take the following two actions: Ensure that the agency describes and documents how education and outreach program activities link to and support broader program and agency goals in a planning, program, or budget document that is available to the public, and Evaluate the effectiveness of the education and outreach of the New Entrant program, assessing the extent to which the Education and Technical Assistance Package and safety audits are helping new carriers learn and understand FMCSA requirements. In addition, although FMCSA officials stated that they have used a logic model in their performance budget to link education and outreach programs to agency goals, the discussion implied a link, but does not describe how FMCSA’s education and outreach activities are intended to change target audience’s attitudes and behaviors that would contribute to meeting agency goals. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) is responsible for improving commercial vehicle safety and uses education and outreach as part of its efforts. The House report accompanying the fiscal year 2005 Department of Transportation (DOT) appropriations bill asked GAO to report on FMCSA's education and outreach programs to the House and Senate Committees on Appropriations. GAO (1) describes FMCSA's education and outreach programs and how they relate to FMCSA's goals (2) identifies the extent to which FMCSA has evaluated its education and outreach programs and (3) describes the extent to which FMCSA's education and outreach programs are effective.
What GAO Found
FMCSA's education and outreach programs--New Entrant, Non-Entrant, Motor Coach, Safety Belt, and Household Goods' target different audiences, including the motor carrier industry, commercial vehicle drivers, and the public.Total funding for these programs in fiscal year 2005 was $36.3 million; the largest share (about $33 million) went to the New Entrant program, which is designed to inform newly registered motor carriers (new entrants) about motor carrier safety standards and regulations to help them gain compliance with FMCSA requirements. FMCSA uses many approaches, such as direct contact with carriers, media campaigns, distributing printed materials, and establishing Web sites to provide information to target audiences. FMCSA has not described how its education and outreach program activities link expected changes in attitudes and behavior to broader goals, such as DOT's strategic objective of reducing transportation-related fatalities. FMCSA officials state that the education and outreach activities and programs link to agency goals at a high level, but this was not evident from our review, with the exception of the Safety Belt program. FMCSA has used a logic model as a tool in other programs to show the relationship between program activities and broader goals. FMCSA has begun some evaluations of its education and outreach programs, and plans other evaluations of these programs. However, although FMCSA's New Entrant program has existed for over 2 years, FMCSA has no plans to evaluate its New Entrant program until 2008. Thus FMCSA has no information on whether information on its safety requirements, provided through the Education and Technical Assistance package or during New Entrant safety audits--targeted toward truckers newly entering the industry--effectively communicate information to new entrants. This lack of evaluation makes it difficult to determine the impact the education portion of the New Entrant program has on commercial motor vehicle safety. Since FMCSA currently has little information on how its programs have affected attitudes and behavior, it is difficult to determine the effectiveness of FMCSA's effort. However, the designs of two programs appear to follow theories and research regarding media campaigns, which are intended to influence decision making about safety. Research and behavior theory suggest that for some types of programs--such as DOT's Click It or Ticket program, which is designed to increase safety-belt use by passenger car drivers--enforcement linked to education can improve results, and FMCSA has indicated it is linking some education and outreach programs to enforcement efforts, where appropriate. Finally, motor carrier association officials whom we spoke with stated that, in their view, FMCSA is doing some positive things in its education and outreach activities. A public safety group stated that FMCSA followed reasonable approaches in starting its education and outreach efforts; however, they would like to see more information on program effectiveness to help FMCSA refine the programs. |
gao_GAO-16-884T | gao_GAO-16-884T_0 | As such, according to VA officials, leasing is often VA’s preferred alternative for major medical facilities because project implementation times are often shorter than the time for constructing a federally-owned facility and leasing can provide flexibility to relocate in the future to meet changes in VA’s needs. This period provides some of the flexibility that VA values in terms of relocating to facilities that align with VA’s changing needs. In our issued report, we recommended that the Secretary of Veterans Affairs annually assess how VA has benefited from flexibilities afforded by leasing its major medical facilities and use information from these assessments in its annual capital plans in order to enhance transparency and allow for more informed decision making related to VA’s major medical facility leases. VA’s Cost Estimating Process for Major Medical Facility Leases Aligns with Most of Our Best Practice Steps and Recent Changes May Improve VA’s Estimates for These Leases
VA’s cost-estimating procedures for major medical facilities’ leases generally align with 9 of the 12 best practice steps for cost-estimating that we have previously identified, and recent changes may improve the quality of VA’s cost-estimating process for these leases. 1.) For a cost-estimating process to support the creation of reliable cost estimates, it should substantially or fully meet each of the four characteristics in GAO’s Cost Guide—comprehensive, well-documented, accurate, and credible—based on the extent to which the procedures incorporate the underlying best practice steps for each characteristic. We found that VA’s use of an escalation rate often did not fully account for variation in lease costs. For example, actual first-year lease costs increased about 26 percent over the adjusted estimate for VA’s San Francisco, California, medical facility’s lease and decreased about 44 percent for the VA’s Montgomery, Alabama, facility. The new design guide and the lessons-learned study are in the early stages, and their success will depend on how quickly and successfully VA implements them. | Why GAO Did This Study
VA operates the largest health care network in the United States, with over 2,700 health care sites, including hospitals and outpatient facilities. However, many facilities are outdated, and VA estimates that its capital needs will require up to $63 billion over the next 10 years. In recent years, VA has increasingly leased its facilities, including major medical facilities.
This testimony discusses (1) the factors that account for VA’s decisions to lease major medical facilities and (2) the extent to which VA’s cost-estimating process for leasing these facilities reflects best practices. This testimony is based on GAO’s June 2016 report (GAO-16-619). For that report, GAO analyzed agency documents, VA data on major medical facilities’ leases, compared VA’s cost-estimating procedures to best practices in GAO’s Cost Guide, and interviewed VA officials.
What GAO Found
VA’s cost-estimating procedures for leasing major medical facilities generally align with GAO’s 12 cost-estimating best practice steps and recent changes in VA’s approach may improve the quality of VA’s estimates. GAO’s review of cost data for these leases since 2006 found that actual costs often varied more than 15 percent above or below the estimates included in VA’s proposals for these leases, often due to project design changes. In 2016, VA introduced a design guide for leased medical facilities that delineates VA and federal requirements, such as security and sustainability standards, that may reduce the risk that a project, and its cost, change from what the VA proposed. VA also initiated a lessons-learned effort to evaluate the factors that contribute to differences between actual lease costs and those included in proposals. The success of these steps will depend on how quickly and effectively VA implements them.
What GAO Recommends
In its June 2016 report, GAO recommended that VA assess the benefits of leasing major medical facilities and use the information in VA’s annual capital plans. VA concurred with GAO’s recommendation. |
gao_GAO-04-639 | gao_GAO-04-639_0 | Background
With certain exceptions, Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 requires all entities receiving any form of federal financial assistance to prohibit sex discrimination in their education programs or activities, which are defined broadly under Title IX to include all the operations of the entity. The Four Federal Science Granting Agencies Made Efforts to Ensure Compliance, but Three Have Not Conducted Required Monitoring
The four federal science agencies have made efforts to ensure that federal grant recipients comply with Title IX in the sciences by performing several compliance activities, such as investigating complaints and providing technical assistance, but most have not monitored grantees as required by the law. However, only Education has monitored its grantees by conducting periodic compliance reviews—an agency-initiated assessment of grantees to determine if they are complying with the law. However, officials at Energy, NASA, and NSF told us that they have received very few Title IX complaints each year. Women’s Participation in the Sciences Has Increased Substantially since the Early 1960s, but Their Representation in Mathematics and Engineering Continues to Be Low
Women’s participation in the sciences has increased substantially in the last three decades, especially in the life sciences, such as biology. The proportion of women science students has grown, but to a lesser extent at the graduate level than the undergraduate level. Meanwhile, the proportion of faculty in the sciences who are women has also increased since the early 1970s. A variety of studies indicate that experience, work patterns, and education levels can largely explain differences in salaries and rank. Studies also suggest that discrimination may still affect women’s choices and professional progress. Some Agencies and Grantees Have Activities That May Foster Greater Participation in the Sciences by Women
We found several examples of grant-making agencies that have instituted policies and practices designed to foster greater participation by women in the sciences. While some of the policies and practices are aimed at encouraging more women to pursue and to persist in education in the sciences, others provide time off and fewer teaching duties so junior faculty can balance work and family life while beginning a university career. Finally, a few policies and practices seek to expand the recruiting pool for jobs in the sciences and make them more attractive to women. This report addresses: 1) how do the Department of Education (Education), the Department of Energy (Energy), the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), and the National Science Foundation (NSF) ensure that federal grant recipient institutions comply with Title IX in mathematics, engineering, and science; 2) what do data show about women’s participation in these fields; and 3) what promising practices exist to promote their participation? 20 U.S.C. | Why GAO Did This Study
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 extended protections against sex discrimination to students and employees at institutions receiving federal assistance for educational programs or activities. In the 32 years since Title IX was enacted, women have made significant gains in many fields, but much attention has focused on women's participation in the sciences. Because of the concern about women's access to opportunities in the sciences, which receive billions of dollars in federal assistance, this report addresses: (1) how do the Department of Education (Education), the Department of Energy (Energy), the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), and the National Science Foundation (NSF) ensure that federal grant recipient institutions comply with Title IX in math, engineering, and science; (2) what do data show about women's participation in these fields; and (3) what promising practices exist to promote their participation?
What GAO Found
Four federal science agencies have made efforts to ensure that grantees comply with Title IX in the sciences by performing several compliance activities, such as investigating complaints and providing technical assistance, but most have not conducted all required monitoring activities. Agency officials at Energy, NASA, and NSF told us that they refer complaints to Education and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, where they are investigated. However, only Education has monitored its grantees by conducting compliance reviews--periodic, agency-initiated assessments of grantees to determine if they are complying with Title IX. Women's participation in the sciences has increased substantially in the last three decades, especially in the life sciences, such as biology. The proportion of women science students has grown, but to a lesser extent at the graduate level than the undergraduate level. Meanwhile, the proportion of faculty in the sciences who are women has also increased, but they still lag behind men faculty in terms of salary and rank. However, studies indicate that experience, work patterns, and education levels can largely explain these differences. Studies also suggest that discrimination may still affect women's choices and professional progress. We found several examples of agencies and grantees that have instituted practices designed to foster greater women's participation in the sciences. While some of the practices are aimed at encouraging more women to pursue the sciences, others provide time off and fewer teaching duties so faculty can balance work and family life. Finally, a few practices seek to expand the recruiting pool for jobs in the sciences and make them more attractive to a greater portion of the U.S. population, including women. |
gao_GGD-95-19 | gao_GGD-95-19_0 | (See table 1.4.) In conducting this study, we were asked to consider the impact of FCB mergers on the following factors: (1) any economy of scale benefits, (2) the level of services provided, (3) the cooperative nature of the System, (4) the issuance of System-wide bonds, (5) the bank-association relationship, and (6) jointly provided services. Most District Costs Are Incurred at the Association Level
Although the initial FCB mergers focused on bank-level operating cost savings, association costs comprise most of the districts’ operating costs. Officials of merged FCBs generally expected their associations to offer the same or a wider variety of services to borrowers. Although we found no evidence that FCB mergers would affect the System’s cooperative nature, mergers could change the way certain cooperative principles are applied. If the merged banks choose to increase the services and loan products offered in each district before the merger, some associations could enjoy greater flexibility in servicing their borrowers’ needs. (See table 3.2.) Related to the System’s cooperative nature is its tradition of local control, which refers to associations making lending, credit, and operational decisions with member-borrowers having an active voice in decision-making through their election of peers to serve as directors on association and bank boards. FCB mergers would enhance local control if the merged banks promoted association autonomy and encouraged borrower involvement. Merged banks may also experience local differences in merged districts. Mergers Have an Impact on Association Voting Strength and Number of Elected Bank Directors
An FCB merger increases the number of associations affiliated with a single bank and dilutes individual association voting strength. FCB Mergers Could Significantly Affect How Banks and Associations Relate
Of all the factors covered by our study, the bank-association relationship is likely to be most affected by FCB mergers. Since support services provided by the banks facilitate association operations, there may be some indirect impact on member-borrowers. Conclusions
FCB and association relationships vary throughout the System; therefore, certain FCB mergers could affect some bank-association relationships. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO examined the potential impact of Farm Credit Bank (FCB) mergers on Farm Credit System borrowers and associations, focusing on the: (1) economies of scale; (2) level of services offered by FCB associations; (3) System's operation as a cooperative; and (4) bank-association relationship.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) cost savings from FCB mergers through economies of scale may be difficult to realize, since the associations incur most of the district operating costs and their increased costs could more than offset any savings at the bank level; (2) associations in merged districts are expected to offer the same or increased services based on their borrowers' demands, but the banks can withdraw approval for existing services after merging; (3) mergers between certain FCB could affect the application of certain cooperative principles; (4) local control of merged FCB will continue, since local borrowers serve as association and bank board directors; (5) an individual association's influence will be diluted by the mergers, since each association will have proportionally fewer bank directors; (6) local control may increase as FCB lessen their supervision of associations which generally enjoy greater autonomy in operations; (7) FCB mergers should have little impact on systemwide bond issues, since all banks remain liable for the bonds; (8) FCB mergers could significantly change some bank-association relationships due to the merging of banks with varying oversight practices and association support services, but these changes may not directly affect member-borrowers; and (9) FCB mergers could spur jointly provided support services by reducing the number of entities involved and encouraging uniformity in borrower services. |
gao_GAO-14-229 | gao_GAO-14-229_0 | For example, in October 2013, State’s Under Secretary for Management approved a series of actions, which included changing the organizational structure by establishing a new staff unit to oversee elements of contracting in overseas contingency operations, a new contract risk mitigation effort, and the creation of specific contingency contracting policy in its Foreign Affairs Manual. In response to long-standing challenges that the agency faces in implementing and monitoring activities in high-threat environments, USAID established a nonpermissive environment working group in October 2013 to develop lessons learned, toolkits, and training, but it is not expected to complete this effort until the end of September 2014. We found that USAID missions and offices with responsibilities for responding to contingencies have established procedures and practices, but USAID did not consider whether these procedures should be institutionalized agency-wide. As a result, USAID may have missed opportunities to leverage its institutional knowledge to better support future contingencies. Federal Internal Control Standards highlight the importance of reviews by management at the functional level to compare actual performance to planned or expected results and Accordingly, without management analyze significant differences.reviews to assess planned and actual performance, State may not be able to determine whether these initiatives better enable it to support future contingency operations. Section 850 required USAID to assess its policies and procedures related to contract support of contingency operations. This working group affords USAID another opportunity to leverage its institutional knowledge, such as that residing at its missions and other offices with contingency contracting related responsibilities. State and USAID Increased Their Acquisition Workforces and Continue to Assess Contingency Acquisition Workforce Needs
Since 2011, State and USAID have increased their overall acquisition workforces and are in various stages of assessing their workforce needs for overseas contingency operations. Per Office of Management and Budget (OMB) guidance, both agencies identified competency and skill gaps for their acquisition workforces in their 2013 acquisition human capital plans. In October 2013, State’s Under Secretary for Management approved the formation of a multibureau working group that plans to further explore workforce needs for current and future contingency operations. State’s 2013 acquisition human capital plan noted that, in response to growth in contracting activity in areas such as Iraq and Afghanistan, additional acquisition personnel were needed. Further, State noted in its Section 850 report that it will increase its focus on conducting risk assessments on the reliance, use, and oversight of contractors through the establishment of risk management staff. USAID established a Professional Development and Training Division in the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2013 to implement acquisition and assistance training. USAID’s Section 850 report did not address reliance on contractors in connection with contingency operations, but in October 2013, USAID drafted a revision of its planning policy to require a risk assessment and mitigation plan associated with contractor performance of critical functions in overseas contingency operations. Conclusions
State and USAID have faced numerous contract management and oversight challenges while operating in contingency environments such as Iraq and Afghanistan. Except for a limited number of cases, State generally has not developed plans to assess the impact of these initiatives. As a result, continued management attention is needed to ensure that these efforts achieve their intended objectives. While USAID has identified some needed improvements, such as completing contractor performance evaluations, it did not assess whether the procedures and practices created by the missions or offices that operate in contingency environments should be reflected in agency-wide policy or guidance. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Section 850(c) of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2013 mandated that we report on the progress that the Department of State (State) and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) have made in identifying and implementing improvements in a range of areas related to contract support for overseas contingency operations. The objectives for this review were to examine the extent to which State and USAID have identified and implemented changes to the agencies’ (1) organizational structures and policies; and (2) workforces, including their use of contractors. For all objectives, we reviewed State and USAID’s Section 850 reports submitted to Congress in June and July, 2013, respectively; interviewed officials at State and USAID in the United States and Afghanistan with related program, acquisition, or workforce planning responsibilities to discuss their role in identifying and implementing changes, as appropriate; and reviewed and analyzed GAO and other oversight reports, including those from State and USAID’s Offices of the Inspector General, the Commission on Wartime Contracting, and the Special Inspectors General for Iraq and Afghanistan to identify key challenges reported by the accountability community. | Why GAO Did This Study
For more than a decade, State and USAID have used contractors extensively to help carry out missions in contingency operations, such as those in Iraq and Afghanistan. While State and USAID transition to more traditional diplomatic and assistance missions in Iraq and Afghanistan, contract management and oversight challenges remain significant because the agencies are likely to be called upon again to operate in future contingencies. Section 850(a) of the Fiscal Year 2013 NDAA directed State and USAID to assess their organizational structures, policies, and workforces related to contract support for overseas contingency operations.
Section 850(c) mandated that GAO report on the progress State and USAID have made in identifying and implementing improvements related to those areas. GAO analyzed the extent to which State and USAID have identified and implemented changes to their (1) organizational structures and policies; and (2) workforces, including their use of contractors.
GAO analyzed State and USAID's Section 850 reports to Congress, contract policies and procedures, and 2013 acquisition human capital plans, and interviewed agency officials.
What GAO Found
The Department of State (State) and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) identified a number of changes needed to improve contract support in overseas contingency operations, but have not completed implementation efforts. As required by the Fiscal Year 2013 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), both agencies determined that their organizational structures were effective, though State created a new regional Contract Management Office to better support contracting efforts in Iraq. In October 2013, State approved a number of actions to improve policies and procedures, including specific initiatives in acquisition planning and risk management, among others, and intends to institutionalize these changes in its Foreign Affairs Manual in 2014. State generally has not, however, developed plans to assess the impact of these initiatives. Federal internal control standards highlight the importance of managers comparing actual performance to expected results. Accordingly, continued management attention is needed to ensure that these efforts achieve their intended objectives. USAID focused its efforts on areas such as improving contractor performance evaluations and risk management. GAO found that some USAID missions and offices that operate in contingency environments have developed procedures and practices, but USAID did not consider whether these should be institutionalized agency-wide because USAID officials interpreted the legislative requirement to include only a review of agency-wide policies. As a result, USAID may have missed opportunities to leverage its institutional knowledge to better support future contingencies. USAID established a new working group in October 2013 to develop lessons learned, toolkits, and training and is expected to complete its efforts in late 2014. This working group could further assess the policies and procedures developed by the missions and offices, thus potentially affording USAID an opportunity to better leverage its institutional knowledge. State and USAID have increased their acquisition workforce by 53 and 15 percent, respectively, from their 2011 levels and are in various stages of assessing their workforce needs for overseas contingency operations. Per Office of Management and Budget guidance, both agencies identified competency and skill gaps for their acquisition workforce in their 2013 acquisition human capital plans. State's 2013 plan noted that in response to growth in contracting activity in areas such as Iraq and Afghanistan, additional acquisition personnel are needed. In October 2013, State's Under Secretary for Management approved the formation of a multibureau working group that plans to further explore workforce needs for current and future contingency operations. USAID's 2013 plan cited its greatest challenge as providing training for its acquisition workforce, as many personnel have 5 years or less of contracting experience. USAID established a training division in 2013 for its acquisition workforce. State noted in its Section 850 report that it will increase its focus on conducting risk assessments on the reliance, use, and oversight of contractors through the establishment of risk management staff. USAID's Section 850 report did not address reliance on contractors, but in October 2013, USAID drafted a revision to its planning policy that will require a risk assessment and mitigation plan associated with contractor performance of critical functions in overseas contingency operations.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that State assess whether identified changes achieve intended objectives, and that USAID further assess contingency contracting related procedures and practices. State and USAID concurred with the recommendations. |
gao_GAO-14-513 | gao_GAO-14-513_0 | In 2011, we made recommendations to improve agency and government- wide suspension and debarment efforts. We reviewed 10 agencies and found that the four agencies with the most procurement-related suspension and debarment cases shared common characteristics: a suspension and debarment program with dedicated staff, detailed policies and procedures, and practices that encourage an active referral process. Agencies Took Action to Incorporate Characteristics Associated with Active Suspension and Debarment Programs
We found that the Departments of Commerce, HHS, Justice, State, the Treasury, and DHS’s FEMA all took action since we made recommendations in 2011 to incorporate characteristics associated with active suspension and debarment programs.agencies have addressed staffing issues through actions such as defining roles and responsibilities, adding positions, and consolidating the suspension and debarment function into one office. The six agencies also have taken actions such as issuing formal policy and promulgating detailed guidance. Finally, the six agencies have engaged in practices that encourage an active referral process, including establishing positions to ensure cases are referred, developing case management tools that Since 2011, all six allow for referral tracking and case reporting, and establishing training programs. Table 1 summarizes the actions that agencies have taken since 2011. The agencies generally experienced a notable increase starting in fiscal year 2011 when they began to take action to incorporate the characteristics associated with active suspension and debarment programs. Suspension and Debarment Programs Have Received Attention Government-wide
The number of suspension and debarment actions government-wide has increased in recent years, more than doubling from 1,836 in fiscal year 2009 to 4,812 in fiscal year 2013, as shown in figure 1. ISDC officials do not consider the overall number of suspensions and debarments as the only measure of success, and emphasized that increased suspension and debarment activity has been coupled with agencies’ increased capability to use suspension and debarment appropriately and adhere to the principles of fairness and due process as laid out in the governing regulations. OMB and ISDC have taken a number of actions to strengthen government-wide suspension and debarment efforts. In response to GAO’s recommendations, on November 15, 2011, OMB directed agencies to take a number of actions to address program weaknesses and reinforce best practices in their suspension and debarment programs, including the following:
Appoint a senior accountable official, if one has not already been designated, to be responsible for assessing the agency’s suspension and debarment program and the adequacy of available resources, ensuring that the agency maintains effective internal controls and tracking capabilities, and ensuring that the agency participates regularly on the ISDC. ISDC reported in September 2012 that each of the 24 agencies said it had an accountable official in place responsible for suspension and debarment activities, including assessing the adequacy of available training and resources; taken steps to address resources, policies, or both—in some cases by dedicating greater staff resources to handle referrals and manage cases and in others by entering into agreements to be mentored by the managers of successful programs; and procedures to forward possible actions to the suspending and debarring official. The ISDC also has increased its efforts to coordinate government-wide suspension and debarment efforts by promoting best practices and coordinating mentoring and training activities. Officials from several agencies noted that the ISDC is instrumental in managing an informal process to help agencies coordinate lead agency responsibility when multiple agencies have a potential interest in pursuing suspension and debarment of the same entity. Agency Comments
We provided a draft of this report to OMB and the Departments of Commerce, Health and Human Services, Justice, Homeland Security, State, the Treasury, and Veterans Affairs for review and comment. Further, OMB credits the work of the Interagency Suspension and Debarment Committee in helping to make many of the achievements possible. | Why GAO Did This Study
To protect the government's interests, agencies can use suspension and debarment to exclude individuals, contractors, and grantees from receiving future contracts, grants, and other federal assistance due to various types of misconduct. In 2011, GAO reviewed ten agencies and found that agencies issuing the most procurement related suspensions and debarments shared common characteristics: dedicated staff, detailed policies and procedures, and an active referral process. GAO recommended that six agencies—the Departments of Commerce, Health and Human Services, Justice, State, the Treasury, and the Federal Emergency Management Agency—incorporate those characteristics, and that OMB issue guidance to improve oversight and government-wide suspension and debarment efforts.
GAO was asked to review actions taken to implement the 2011 recommendations. This report examines (1) actions taken by the six agencies to incorporate characteristics of active suspension and debarment programs; (2) changes in the level of suspension and debarment activity; and (3) actions taken to improve oversight and government-wide efforts. To do so, GAO reviewed suspension and debarment programs, interviewed agency officials, verified the accuracy of agency data, and reviewed government-wide efforts.
GAO is not making any new recommendations in this report. OMB commented that it is pleased with the progress that agencies have made and with the work of the ISDC.The other agencies did not provide substantive comments.
What GAO Found
The six agencies GAO reviewed all took action to incorporate characteristics associated with active suspension and debarment programs. Since GAO made recommendations to do so in 2011, the agencies have addressed staffing issues through actions such as defining roles and responsibilities, adding positions, and consolidating suspension and debarment functions. The agencies also have issued formal policies and promulgated detailed guidance. Finally, the agencies have engaged in practices that encourage an active referral process, such as establishing positions to ensure cases are referred for possible action, and developing case management tools.
The number of suspension and debarment actions government-wide has more than doubled from 1,836 in fiscal year 2009 to 4,812 in fiscal year 2013. The number of suspension and debarment actions for the six agencies increased from 19 in fiscal year 2009 to 271 in fiscal year 2013 (see table below). The six agencies generally experienced a notable increase starting in fiscal year 2011 when the agencies began to take action to incorporate the characteristics associated with active suspension and debarment programs.
The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the Interagency Suspension and Debarment Committee (ISDC) have taken action to strengthen government-wide suspension and debarment efforts. In November 2011, OMB directed agencies to address weaknesses and reinforce best practices in their suspension and debarment programs. The ISDC reported to Congress in September 2012 that, per OMB direction, the 24 standing member agencies of the ISDC had
an accountable official in place responsible for suspension and debarment;
taken steps to address resources, policies, or both; and
procedures to forward matters to the suspension and debarment official for possible action.
The ISDC has promoted best practices, coordinated mentoring and training, and helped coordinate lead agency responsibility when multiple agencies have an interest in pursuing suspension and debarment of the same entity. Reported increases in the number of suspension or debarment actions suggest that its efforts have been effective. ISDC officials emphasized that increased activity has been coupled with an increased capability to use suspension and debarment appropriately while adhering to the principles of fairness and due process. |
gao_GAO-04-796T | gao_GAO-04-796T_0 | OPM and Agencies Are Taking Steps to Improve the Hiring Process
OPM and agencies are continuing to address the problems with the key parts of the hiring process we identified in our May 2003 report. Significant issues and actions being taken include the following. Reforming the classification system. Improving job announcements and Web postings. To give support to this effort, OPM has continued to move forward on its interagency project to modernize federal job vacancy announcements, including providing guidance to agencies to improve the announcements. As we show in the report we are issuing today, all 22 of the CHCO Council members responding to our recent survey indicated that their agencies had made efforts to improve their job announcements and Web postings. Automating hiring processes. These automated steps would include efforts to recruit candidates, use of automated tools to assess candidates, automatic referral of high-quality candidates to selecting officials, and electronic notification of applicants on their status in the hiring process. We concluded in our May 2003 report that key candidate assessment tools used in the federal hiring process can be ineffective. Agencies Appear to Be Making Limited Use of New Hiring Flexibilities
Despite agency officials’ past calls for hiring reform, agencies appear to be making limited use of category rating and direct-hire authority, two new hiring flexibilities created by Congress in November 2002 and implemented by OPM in June of last year. 1). The limited use of category rating is somewhat unexpected given the views of human resources directors we interviewed 2 years ago. The report we are issuing today also includes information about barriers that the CHCO Council members believed have prevented or hindered their agencies from using or making greater use of category rating and direct hire. Frequently cited barriers included the lack of OPM guidance for using the flexibilities, the lack of agency policies and procedures for using the flexibilities, the lack of flexibility in OPM rules and regulations, and concern about possible inconsistencies in the implementation of the flexibilities within the department or agency. In conclusion, the federal government is now facing one of the most transformational changes to the civil service in half a century, which is reflected in the new personnel systems for DHS and the Department of Defense and in new hiring flexibilities provided to all agencies. Today’s challenge is to define the appropriate roles and day-to-day working relationships for OPM and individual agencies as they collaborate on developing innovative and more effective hiring systems. Moreover, for this transformation to be successful and enduring, human capital expertise within the agencies must be up to the challenge. | Why GAO Did This Study
The executive branch hired nearly 95,000 new employees during fiscal year 2003. Improving the federal hiring process is critical given the increasing number of new hires expected in the next few years. In May 2003, GAO issued a report highlighting several key problems in the federal hiring process. That report concluded that the process needed improvement and included several recommendations to address the problems. Today, GAO is releasing a followup report requested by the subcommittee that discusses (1) the status of recent efforts to help improve the federal hiring process and (2) the extent to which federal agencies are using two new hiring flexibilities--category rating and direct-hire authority. Category rating permits an agency manager to select any job candidate placed in a best-qualified category. Direct-hire authority allows an agency to appoint individuals to positions without adherence to certain competitive examination requirements when there is a severe shortage of qualified candidates or a critical hiring need.
What GAO Found
Congress, the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), and agencies have all taken steps to improve the federal hiring process. In particular, Congress has provided agencies with additional hiring flexibilities, OPM has taken significant steps to modernize job vacancy announcements and develop the government's recruiting Web site, and most agencies are continuing to automate parts of their hiring processes. Nonetheless, problems remain with a job classification process and standards that many view as antiquated, and there is a need for improved tools to assess the qualifications of job candidates. Specifically, the report being released today discusses significant issues and actions being taken to (1) reform the classification system, (2) improve job announcements and Web postings, (3) automate hiring processes, and (4) improve candidate assessment tools. In addition, agencies appear to be making limited use of the two new hiring flexibilities contained in the Homeland Security Act of 2002--category rating and direct-hire authority--that could help agencies in expediting and controlling their hiring processes. GAO surveyed members of the interagency Chief Human Capital Officers Council who reported several barriers to greater use of these new flexibilities. Frequently cited barriers included (1) the lack of OPM guidance for using the flexibilities, (2) the lack of agency policies and procedures for using the flexibilities, (3) the lack of flexibility in OPM rules and regulations, and (4) concern about possible inconsistencies in the implementation of the flexibilities within the department or agency. The federal government is now facing one of the most transformational changes to the civil service in half a century, which is reflected in the new personnel systems for Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Defense and in new hiring flexibilities provided to all agencies. Today's challenge is to define the appropriate roles and day-to-day working relationships for OPM and individual agencies as they collaborate on developing innovative and more effective hiring systems. Moreover, human capital expertise within the agencies must be up to the challenge for this transformation to be successful and enduring. |
gao_GAO-08-1001 | gao_GAO-08-1001_0 | LANL Has Information Security Controls in Place to Protect Its Unclassified Network, but Weaknesses Remain
LANL has implemented measures to enhance its information security, but weaknesses remain. In particular, LANL has implemented a network security system that can detect potential intrusions on the network. However, LANL has vulnerabilities in several critical areas, including (1) identifying and authenticating users, (2) encrypting sensitive information, (3) monitoring and auditing compliance with security policies, (4) controlling and documenting changes to a computer system’s hardware and software, and (5) restricting physical access to computing resources. However, strong authentication was not always used. Once a user successfully accessed the network, the user could create a separate login password that would allow alternative access to sensitive information on the unclassified network. Furthermore, LANL neither uses encryption to protect certain network management connections, nor requires encryption for authentication to certain internal services. However, it did not fully characterize risks to the network. Policies and procedures. DOE’s Office of Independent Oversight and LASO Have Also Raised Concerns about Foreign Nationals’ Access to LANL’s Unclassified Network
DOE’s Office of Independent Oversight and LASO also reported that LANL had not fully implemented DOE policies and procedures for protecting sensitive but unclassified information from foreign nationals who have access to information technology resources. Of the 688 foreign nationals, 301 (or 44 percent) were from countries classified as sensitive by DOE. In addition, a significant number of foreign nationals from sensitive countries have been authorized remote access to LANL’s unclassified network. In response, NNSA’s Chief Information Officer told us that LANL has not adequately justified its request for additional funds to address the laboratory’s stated shortfalls. NNSA is now implementing a more systematic approach for developing information security budgets at LANL. LANL Officials Assert That Resources Are Inadequate to Protect the Unclassified Network
LANL spent approximately $51.4 million from fiscal years 2001 through 2007 to protect and maintain the unclassified network. Moreover, there was risk that LANL could not ensure that media (e.g., disks) containing sensitive unclassified information would be properly sanitized or destroyed. While the laboratory has taken steps to protect sensitive information, a number of weaknesses in security controls raise concerns. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve LANL’s information security program for its unclassified network, we recommend that the Secretary of Energy and the Administrator of NNSA require the Director of Los Alamos National Laboratory to take the following eight actions: Ensure that the risk assessment for the unclassified network evaluates all known vulnerabilities and is revised periodically; Strengthen policies with a view toward further reducing, as appropriate, foreign nationals’—particularly those from countries identified by DOE as sensitive—access to the unclassified network; Ensure that the new set of cyber security policies and procedures applicable to the unclassified network are comprehensive, including centralized configuration management for all types of systems, and contain specific instructions on how to implement federal requirements and guidance; Ensure that the network security plan for the unclassified network is revised to document security controls using federal guidance and that this plan also includes or references key security activities, such as risk assessment development and the evaluation of security test results; Strengthen the security test and evaluation process for the unclassified network by expanding technical testing to cover new areas that might be vulnerable, such as those disclosed in our report, and ensure that testing adequately considers federal guidance for evaluating security controls and determining their effectiveness; Ensure that milestones in corrective action plans are met or that new milestones are established to remediate security weaknesses for the unclassified network in a timely manner. NNSA did not specifically comment on our recommendations. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of our review were to (1) assess the effectiveness of the security controls the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) has implemented to protect information transmitted over its unclassified computer network; (2) assess whether LANL had fully implemented an information security program to ensure that controls were established and maintained for its unclassified computer network; and (3) examine the expenditure of funds used to protect LANL’s unclassified network from fiscal years 2001 through 2007. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), which is operated by the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), has experienced security lapses protecting information on its unclassified computer network. The unclassified network contains sensitive information. GAO (1) assessed the effectiveness of the security controls LANL has in place to protect information transmitted over its unclassified computer network, (2) assessed whether LANL had implemented an information security program for its unclassified network, and (3) examined expenditures to protect LANL's unclassified network from fiscal years 2001 through 2007. To carry out its work, GAO examined security policies and procedures and reviewed the laboratory's access controls for protecting information on the unclassified network.
What GAO Found
LANL has implemented measures to enhance its information security, but weaknesses remain in protecting the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of information on its unclassified network. LANL has implemented a network security system that is capable of detecting potential intrusions. However, GAO found vulnerabilities in several critical areas, including (1) identifying and authenticating users, (2) encrypting sensitive information, and (3) monitoring and auditing compliance with security policies. For example, LANL had implemented strong authentication measures for accessing the network. However, once gaining this access, a user could create a simple password that would allow alternative access to certain sensitive information. Furthermore, LANL did not use encryption for authentication to certain internal services, which increased the risk that sensitive information transmitted over the unclassified network could be compromised. A key reason for the information security weaknesses is that the laboratory has not implemented an information security program to ensure that controls are effectively established and maintained. For example, LANL did not adequately assess information security risks or develop effective policies and procedures to govern the security of its computing environment. LANL's most recent risk assessment for the unclassified network generally identified and analyzed vulnerabilities, but did not account for risks identified by internal vulnerability testing. Deficiencies in LANL's policies and procedures have been the subject of reports by the Department of Energy's (DOE) Office of Independent Oversight and the Los Alamos Site Office, including foreign nationals' access to the unclassified network. GAO found that, as of May 2008, 301 (or 44 percent) of 688 foreign nationals, who had access to the unclassified network, were from countries classified as sensitive by DOE, such as China, India, and Russia. In addition, a significant number of foreign nationals from sensitive countries were authorized remote access to LANL's unclassified network. The number of foreign nationals with access has raised concerns among laboratory and NNSA officials because of the sensitive information contained on the unclassified network. In response, the laboratory has taken some measures to limit foreign nationals' access. From fiscal years 2001 through 2007, LANL spent approximately $51.4 million to protect its unclassified network. LANL cyber security officials told us that funding has been inadequate to address some of their security concerns. Specifically, there was a risk that unclassified network users would no longer receive cyber security training and that the laboratory would not be able to ensure that data containing sensitive unclassified information would be properly sanitized or destroyed. However, NNSA officials asserted that LANL has not adequately justified its requests for additional funds. NNSA is in the process of implementing a more systematic approach for developing budgets for cyber security activities across the nuclear weapons complex, including LANL. |
gao_GAO-14-646 | gao_GAO-14-646_0 | VA Dialysis Pilot Evaluation
VA is performing an internal evaluation of the performance of the four pilot locations by assessing the quality of care—including clinical quality, patient satisfaction, and access to care—and treatment costs at each pilot location. Dialysis Pilot Evaluation Contractor Review
In September 2012, VA awarded a 3-year contract to an evaluation contractor to provide an independent evaluation of its Dialysis Pilot— including a comparison of the clinical quality provided by the four pilot locations with non-VA dialysis providers and a dialysis per treatment cost comparison between the pilot locations and the Non-VA Medical Care Program. VA Has Not Documented Criteria or Plans for Concluding the Dialysis Pilot
Even though it is 5 years into the Dialysis Pilot, VA Central Office has not yet set a timetable for completing the pilot or documented how it will determine the success of the four pilot locations. We have previously outlined best practices for project scheduling that specify project timelines are critical for managing and measuring an agency’s performance on projects and that it is necessary for the agency to have a document that details the rationale used in developing a project timeline. In addition, we have outlined best practices for designing evaluations that state that choosing and documenting well-regarded criteria that are used to make comparisons can lead to strong, defensible conclusions. According to VA’s business analysis of the Dialysis Pilot conducted prior to opening the pilot locations, VA planned to conclude the Dialysis Pilot 5 years after the pilot locations opened and assumed all four pilot locations would begin operations at generally the same time. However, in March 2014, VA officials told us they are no longer operating under the 5-year timeline outlined in this plan, although they have not updated the timeline included in the Dialysis Pilot business analysis. According to VA officials, the first achievement that indicates success is the creation of a model for a VA-operated, free-standing dialysis clinic that can be replicated by other VAMCs. VA officials stated that the second achievement that indicates success is the confirmation of the time necessary for a pilot location to reach its breakeven point—which VA has defined as the point when a pilot location achieves cost savings in the Non-VA Medical Care Program for dialysis services for its sponsoring VAMC and repays its start-up funding to VA Central Office. By not clearly communicating these milestones as criteria for concluding the Dialysis Pilot, the transparency of VA’s management decisions on pilot location outcomes is compromised and the Department lacks accountability for ensuring the success of the Dialysis Pilot. Current Data on Quality of Care and Treatment Costs Are Limited Due to Ongoing Evaluations
VA and the evaluation contractor have been evaluating the Dialysis Pilot for 2 years; however, neither has concluded its evaluation of the Dialysis Pilot and data on two of the pilot locations—Philadelphia and Cleveland— is limited due to their delayed opening. As a result, VA recommended that another full 12 months of data from the Philadelphia and Cleveland pilot locations be analyzed before making conclusive comparisons of the treatment costs of these pilot locations with non-VA dialysis providers. In addition, the transparency of the Dialysis Pilot is jeopardized by VA not clearly documenting the achievements stated by VA officials— the creation of a replicable model for additional VA-operated free- standing dialysis clinics and demonstrating a breakeven point—as criteria for concluding the Dialysis Pilot. | Why GAO Did This Study
Veterans with end-stage renal disease—a condition of permanent kidney failure—are one of the most resource-intensive patient populations served by the VA and are generally prescribed a life-saving medical procedure called dialysis. In 2009, VA began developing a pilot program at four VAMCs to provide dialysis to veterans in VA-operated, free-standing dialysis clinics largely in an effort to stem rising costs for providing such care in the private sector through the Non-VA Medical Care Program. In May 2012, GAO issued a report identifying several weaknesses in VA's execution of the planning and early implementation phases of the Dialysis Pilot.
GAO was asked to continue its evaluation of the Dialysis Pilot. GAO examined the extent to which VA documented plans for concluding the Dialysis Pilot and the status of data on the quality of care and treatment costs for the four pilot locations.
GAO reviewed relevant documents from VA and the evaluation contractor selected by VA to perform an independent analysis of the pilot locations. GAO also spoke with VA officials responsible for managing the Dialysis Pilot, representatives from all four pilot locations, and evaluation contractor officials responsible for reviewing the performance of the four pilot locations.
What GAO Found
Five years into the Dialysis Pilot, the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Central Office still has not set a timetable for completing the pilot or documented how it will determine the success of the pilot locations. GAO previously identified best practices that state that a project timeline is critical for managing and measuring an entity's performance on projects and that choosing and documenting well-regarded criteria that are used to make comparisons can lead to strong, defensible conclusions. Initially, VA planned to conclude the Dialysis Pilot after the pilot locations were all open for 5 years. However, in March 2014, VA officials told GAO they are no longer operating under this timeline but instead plan to conclude the pilot once the pilot locations achieve (1) the creation of a model for a VA-operated, free-standing dialysis clinic that can be replicated by other VA medical centers (VAMC) and (2) the confirmation of the time necessary for a pilot location to reach a “breakeven point.” VA considers that a pilot location has achieved a breakeven point when it repays its start-up funding and the VAMC realizes a cost savings because its treatment cost for dialysis at the pilot location is lower than purchasing care from non-VA dialysis providers. However, VA has not formally documented these pilot location achievements as criteria for concluding the Dialysis Pilot. By not doing so, the transparency of VA's management decisions on pilot location outcomes is compromised and the Department lacks accountability for ensuring the success of the Dialysis Pilot.
The Dialysis Pilot has been under evaluation for 2 years by VA and the contractor it selected to conduct an independent analysis of pilot location quality of care and treatment costs. However, neither has concluded its evaluation. Specifically, VA noted that the delayed openings and initial operational issues of two pilot locations—Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and Cleveland, Ohio—led to limited data availability, and it recommended another 12 months of data be collected on these two pilot locations before drawing conclusions.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that VA document its plans for concluding the Dialysis Pilot. VA concurred with GAO's recommendation but did not clearly delineate its plans for pilot conclusion. |
gao_GAO-03-267 | gao_GAO-03-267_0 | Established Remittance Control Procedures Are Not Consistently Followed
The Service’s policies and procedures include a number of remittance control activities that, if properly implemented, would help prevent remittance losses. However, Service employees are not always following established policies and procedures, and Postal Service management does not appear to have taken effective actions to address this problem. The Service’s control activities or procedures include, among others, the requirement that there is to be continuous individual accountability of remittances, including hand-to-hand exchanges at all transfers. We reviewed a number of Postal Inspection Service reports on the results of these reviews, which were completed in fiscal years 1999, 2000, 2001, and 2002. In August 2001, after the theft in Phoenix, the Chief Postal Inspector, who is the head of the Postal Inspection Service, wrote to the Postal Service’s Chief Operating Officer about the Postal Inspection Service’s concern over continuing problems with remittances. Background Checks Not Updated Before Employees Process Remittances
The Service performs background checks for all prospective employees as part of a suitability test to identify applicants who possess the necessary skills, abilities, and qualifications to perform specific jobs in the Postal Service. Training May Not Be Adequate
The Service provides training to its employees who process remittances. The training includes on-the-job training as well as a requirement that the employees complete self-paced training manuals pertaining to their specific responsibilities. Service training manuals have not been updated to address the processing of remittances. Conclusions
The Service has policies and procedures that, if properly implemented, would help to control and physically secure its remittances. Recommendations for Executive Action
We recommend that the Postmaster General more rigorously reinforce to managers and employees at facilities throughout the Postal Service the importance of following Service policies and procedures for controlling and securing remittances; hold Service managers and employees accountable for following Service policies and procedures for controlling and securing remittances and correcting the control problems identified by the Postal Inspection Service; include adherence to policies and procedures for securing remittances and minimizing remittance losses in its organizational goals and performance management and pay systems and define and enforce supervisory responsibilities to achieve these reinforcement and accountability objectives; reassess current Service policy of not updating background checks of career employees prior to their being selected to process remittances; and update applicable training manuals that predate the Service’s adoption of its consolidated banking policy and determine whether additional training for managers and employees on the Service’s policies and procedures for physically controlling and securing remittances is needed and, if so, see that such training is developed and provided. | Why GAO Did This Study
In fiscal year 2001, the United States Postal Service reported that it lost about $6.3 million in remittances (cash and checks) to robberies, internal theft, and mishandling. One particular loss--a June 2001 theft of over $3.2 million from a Phoenix, Arizona, postal facility by a Career Service employee--received considerable media attention. Pursuant to the request of the Chairman, House Committee on Government Reform, we agreed to review Service policies and procedures for the security of remittances by addressing the following questions: (1) Does the Service have reasonable physical controls and security to safeguard its remittances? (2) Does the Service have policies for conducting background checks of employees who process remittances? (3) Does the Service provide training to its employees who process remittances?
What GAO Found
The Service has policies and procedures for physically controlling and securing remittances. These include a number of control activities that, if properly implemented, would be effective in helping to safeguard vulnerable assets, such as cash. The control activities include, among others, requirements for continuous individual accountability of remittances. However, Service management does not always provide appropriate oversight of these activities and Service employees do not always follow the Service's policies, procedures, and activities for controlling and physically securing remittances. The Service requires a background check as part of a suitability test for all prospective new employees. The background check includes a review of any criminal or military records, a fingerprint check by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and a drug screening. The Service's training for postal employees who process remittances includes both on-the-job training and the use of self-paced training and development manuals related to the control and security of remittances. However, the Service's training manuals have not been appropriately updated, and in August 2001, the Service's Chief Postal Inspector cited the lack of training as a possible condition leading to the Postal Service's remittance losses. |
gao_GAO-03-720T | gao_GAO-03-720T_0 | Background
The 7(a) loan program, which is authorized by Section 7(a) of the Small Business Act, is SBA’s largest business loan program. Under 7(a), SBA provides guarantees of up to 85 percent on loans made by participating lenders. Of the three categories, preferred lenders have the most autonomy in that they can make loans without prior SBA review or approval. Most preferred lenders are banks that have their own safety and soundness regulators, such as the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency. The other preferred lenders, which are SBLCs, have no regulator other than SBA—making SBA oversight more critical. To give you an idea of this program’s scope, in fiscal year 2002, 7(a) loan approvals totaled approximately $12.2 billion, of which preferred lenders approved $6.7 billion. Two offices within SBA have primary responsibility for 7(a) lender oversight—the Office of Lender Oversight (OLO) and the Office of Financial Assistance (OFA). As participants in the 7(a) program, SBLCs are subject to the same review requirements as other 7(a) lenders, and they are also subject to safety and soundness oversight by SBA. Lender Oversight Is Not Achieving All of Its Goals
SBA has identified goals for its lender oversight program that are consistent with appropriate standards for an oversight program; however, SBA had not yet established a program that is likely to achieve them. Since our last review, SBA had made progress in developing its lender oversight program, but there are still areas in need of improvement if SBA is to develop a successful program. SBA has highlighted risk management in its strategy to modernize the agency; however, PLP reviews are not designed to evaluate financial risk, and the agency has been slow to respond to recommendations made for improving its monitoring and management of financial risk—posing a potential risk to SBA’s portfolio. Although SBA has identified problems with preferred lender and SBLC lending practices, it has not developed clear policies that would describe enforcement responses to specific conditions. SBA’s Lender Oversight Does Not Adequately Focus on Financial Risk
While elements of SBA’s oversight program touch on the financial risk posed by preferred lenders, including SBLCs, weaknesses in the program limit SBA’s ability to focus on, and respond to, current and future financial risk to their portfolio. Upon the completion of its examinations, FCA provides a draft report to SBA for comment, incorporates any changes, and then provides a final report to SBA, which, in turn, issues a final report to the SBLC. Our work confirmed these findings. SBA has been slow to implement recommendations from FCA for improving the SBLC examination program. In addition to examining SBLCs, FCA was asked by SBA to provide recommendations for changes in the SBLC program. PLP Reviews Do Not Provide Adequate Assurance That Lenders Are Sufficiently Assessing Eligibility and Creditworthiness
Assessing whether a borrower is eligible for 7(a) assistance is difficult because the requirements are broad and variable, making a qualitative assessment of a lender’s decision by a trained reviewer all the more important. Factors that lenders should consider include the following: The business requires a loan with a longer maturity than the lender’s The requested loan exceeds either the lender’s legal limit or policy limit, regarding amounts loaned to one customer; The lender’s liquidity depends upon selling the guaranteed portion of the loan on the secondary market; The collateral does not meet the lender’s policy requirements because of its uniqueness or low value; The lender’s policy normally does not allow loans to new ventures or businesses in the applicant’s industry; and Any other factors relating to the credit that in the lender’s opinion cannot be overcome except by receiving a guaranty. Moreover, because it is a cursory review of documents in the file, the PLP review also does not qualitatively assess a lender’s credit decision. We had noted both of these measures in our December 9, 2002 report. And, where a lender persists in noncompliance, SBA will generally allow the status to expire, rather than terminating it. We will continue to followup with SBA and monitor its response on this matter. SBA’s Organizational Alignment Does Not Adequately Support SBA’s Lender Oversight Functions
In our past work analyzing organizational alignment and workload issues at SBA and other agencies’ efforts to improve management and performance, we have described the importance of tying organizational alignment to a clear and comprehensive mission statement and strategic plan. By organizational alignment, we mean the integration of organizational components, activities, core processes, and resources to support efficient and effective achievement of outcomes. And second, in evaluating program compliance, SBA needs to weigh the financial risks to the federal government along with the 7(a) program’s mission to provide credit to those who cannot get it elsewhere. OFA, also part of OCA, is responsible for providing overall direction for the administration of SBA’s lending programs, including working with lenders to deliver lending programs, including 7(a), and developing loan policies and standard operating procedures. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Small Business Administration (SBA) is responsible for oversight of its 7(a) loan program lenders, including those who participate in the Preferred Lenders Program or PLP. SBA delegates full authority to preferred lenders to make loans without prior SBA approval. In fiscal year 2002, preferred lenders approved 55 percent of the dollar value of all 7(a) loans--about $7 billion. Small businesses are certainly a vital part of the nation's economy. According to SBA, they generate more than half of the nation's gross domestic product and are the principal source of new jobs in the U.S. economy. In turn, SBA's mission is to maintain and strengthen the nation's economy by aiding, counseling, assisting, and protecting the interests of small businesses. Providing small businesses with access to credit is a major avenue through which SBA strives to fulfill its mission. Strong oversight of lenders by SBA is needed to protect SBA from financial risk and to ensure that qualified borrowers get 7(a) loans. SBA has a total portfolio of about $46 billion, including $42 billion in direct and guaranteed small business loans and other guarantees. Because SBA guarantees up to 85 percent of the 7(a) loans made by its lending partners, there is risk to SBA if the loans are not repaid. SBA must ensure that lenders provide loans to borrowers who are eligible and creditworthy to protect the integrity of the 7(a) program. Our statement today is based on the report we issued December 9, 2002, Small Business Administration: Progress Made but Improvements Needed in Lender Oversight (GAO-03-90). The report and our remarks will focus on our evaluation of (1) SBA's 7(a) lender oversight program and (2) SBA's organizational alignment for conducting oversight of preferred lenders and Small Business Lending Companies (SBLC). In addition, we will comment on SBA's latest response to our findings and recommendations. Our overall objective is to provide the Senate Committee on Small Business and Entrepreneurship with information and perspectives to consider as it moves forward on SBA reauthorization.
What GAO Found
SBA has made progress in developing its lender oversight program, but there are still areas in need of improvement. While SBA has identified appropriate elements for an effective lender oversight program, it has been slow to change programs and procedures to fully incorporate all of these elements. In addition, financial risk management issues have become more critical for SBA, as its current loan programs focus on partnering with lenders, primarily banks, that make loans guaranteed up to 85 percent by SBA. However, our work showed that SBA had not yet consistently incorporated adequate measures of financial risk into the PLP review process or the SBLC examination program. The current PLP review process, which SBA uses to ensure compliance with the program mission, rules, and regulations, involves a cursory review of documentation maintained in lenders' loan files rather than a qualitative assessment of borrower creditworthiness or eligibility. SBA's standards for borrower eligibility (the "credit elsewhere" requirement) are broad and therefore subject to interpretation. SBA had not developed clear enforcement policies for preferred lenders or SBLSs that would specifically describe its response in the event that reviews discover noncompliance or safety and soundness problems. SBA had been slow to finalize and issue SBLC examination reports. In addition, SBA had been slow to respond to recommendations for improving the SBLC examination program. Without continued improvement to better enable SBA to assess the financial risk posed by 7(a) loans and to ensure that its lending partners are making loans to eligible small businesses, SBA will not have a successful lender oversight program. Although SBA has listed the oversight of its lending partners as an agency priority, the function does not have the necessary organizational independence or resources to accomplish its goals. In our past work analyzing organizational alignment and workload issues, we have described the importance of (1) tying organizational alignment to a clear and comprehensive mission statement and strategic plan and (2) providing adequate resources to accomplish the mission. However, two different offices--Lender Oversight and Financial Assistance, both of which are in the Office of Capital Access (OCA)--carry out SBA's lender oversight functions. OCA also promotes and implements SBA's lending programs. This alignment presents a possible conflict because PLP promotion and operations are housed in the same office that assesses lender compliance with SBA safety and soundness and mission requirements. Additionally, split responsibilities within OCA and limited resources have impeded SBA's ability to complete certain oversight responsibilities, which could result in heightened risk to its portfolio or lack of comprehensive awareness of portfolio risk. |
gao_NSIAD-98-168 | gao_NSIAD-98-168_0 | Most funds for central training are derived from DOD’s military personnel and operation and maintenance appropriation categories. Funding and Personnel Levels Declined Through 1997 but Were Projected to Remain Stable Thereafter
Funds for central training declined $4.5 billion, or 17.3 percent, between 1992 and 1997. From 1997 through 2003, funds were projected to average about $21.5 billion. Three Training Categories Received Majority of Funds
Three training categories—professional and skill training, command managed training, and installation support—received and were projected to receive over 60 percent of DOD’s annual central training funds over the 1992-2003 period. This concentration continued despite a projected 19.6-percent decline in funds for these categories over the period. Army Had Largest Share of Training Funds and Air Force Projected to Overtake Navy for Second Largest Share
The Army had the largest portion of central training funds over the 1992-2003 period—about one-third of the total. Defense-wide programs accounted for about 6 percent of annual central training funds after 1993. In 1998, almost 90 percent of the Air Force’s central training funds were programmed for four categories: command managed training, professional and skill training, aviation and flight training, and installation support, as shown in figure 12. Marine Corps Funding Projected to Be Only Slightly Higher in 2003 Than in 1992
The Marine Corps’ level of annual central training funding was projected to increase 1.1 percent over the 12 years we reviewed. Initiatives to Reduce Training Costs or Enhance Training Efficiency and/or Effectiveness
The Secretary of Defense’s April 1997 Annual Report to the President and the Congress stated that “The key to ensuring a trained, ready force in the future is to develop ways to train the force in more efficient and less costly ways.” The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the services have used and plan to use techniques, such as (1) course consolidations and more extensive use of technology, in programs and initiatives to bring about intra- and inter-service course consolidations; (2) computer-based training and distance learning to improve the efficiency of instruction; (3) the acquisition of new equipment and technology to support joint training, interservice training, and reduce the total cost of training; and (4) private sector cooperation to accelerate the applications of new learning technologies. Overall central training funding was not projected to continue to decline because growth in pilot training requirements for the Air Force, the Navy, and the Army offset decreases in other training categories. We did not validate costs and savings associated with the initiatives. The funding decline was projected to be 32.2 percent. During this period, workload was projected to increase by 40.2 percent. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Department of Defense's (DOD) central training activities, focusing on: (1) trends in central training funding and causes for those trends; (2) DOD's initiatives to reduce central training funding requirements or improve the effectiveness and efficiency of central training programs; and (3) DOD's management of those initiatives. GAO did not validate the services' explanations for those trends, nor did GAO compare trends across the services.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) funding for central training activities declined between fiscal years 1992 and 1997 by almost $4.5 billion; (2) during this period, the services reduced accessions to meet lowered personnel levels, closed and consolidated training installations, and outsourced base maintenance; (3) decreases in Navy and Army central training programs accounted for about 90 percent of the decline; (4) no additional funding decline was programmed through 2003 in the 1998 Future Years Defense Program; (5) from 1997 through 2003, funds were projected to remain stable at about $21.5 billion; (6) projected stability in overall funding after 1997 was a result of several projections; (7) installation support for all of the services was projected to be lower in 2003 than in 1997 because they planned to continue to outsource and replace military personnel with civilians to perform base maintenance; (8) funding for central training was highly concentrated in three training categories--professional and skill training, command managed training, and installation support; (9) these three categories received and were projected to receive almost two-thirds of DOD's central training funds over the 1992 through 2003 period; (10) although funding was projected to continue to decline for professional and skill training and installation support, funding for command managed training was projected to increase because of growth in Air Force and Navy programs; (11) the Army had the largest share of training funds, about one-third of the total; (12) the Air Force was projected to overtake the Navy in 1998 for the second largest share of training funds; (13) the Marine Corps' share of training funds has been and was projected to be less than 10 percent; (14) DOD and the services have programs and initiatives to improve the quality of training and bring about greater efficiency in training programs; (15) these efforts are designed to consolidate intra- and inter-service courses; improve the effectiveness of instruction through computer-based training and distance learning; and foster cooperation with the private sector to accelerate the applications of new learning technologies; and (16) DOD and the services have not projected the total investment required for these initiatives or the total savings that might accrue from them. |
gao_HEHS-95-144 | gao_HEHS-95-144_0 | Participation in Vocational Education Was Virtually Unchanged
We found no significant changes in the rate at which special population students participated in vocational education. 1.) 2). Many of the attributes associated with quality programs still affect only a small percentage of vocational education students. However, many more students will need to be exposed to these approaches before they become a standard part of vocational education. Similarly, despite sizable increases in the number of schools and students participating in tech-prep programs, only 16 percent of vocational students in 1993-94 were participating in tech-prep. Districts Report Using More Quality Indicators for Self-Assessment
School districts reported an increase in the use of various measures in their self-assessment process. Specifically, we measured the extent to which changes have occurred for students, in participation in vocational education, including participation in innovative programs; availability of special services; and college attendance and employment following graduation; for vocational education programs, in schools’ and districts’ use of formal coordination of high school and college courses; integration of academic and vocational learning; and development of competency standards for students. Vocational students and all students. The proportion of students who were not part of special population groups remained constant at about 65 percent, while some of the special population groups grew. Access to School-To-Work Activities
As shown in figure 4 (see p.11), the percentage of schools reporting that they have tech-prep programs increased dramatically (from 27 to 45 percent) between 1990-91 and 1993-94, while the percentage of schools reporting the use of work-study and apprenticeship programs remained about the same (at roughly 75 and 7 percent, respectively). Table II.10: Views of the Districts We Surveyed on the Perkins Amendments’ Effect on Their Ability to Produce Quality Programs “Greatly Increased” or “Increased” “Neither Increased nor Decreased” “Decreased” or “Greatly Decreased” “Don’t Know”
Your district’s ability to purchase state-of-the-art equipment Your district’s ability to spend Perkins funds where needed most Your district’s ability to plan vocational programs and use Perkins funds Equity with which Perkins funding is allocated among districts Amount of record keeping required by state to meet Perkins requirements Extent of services your district offered to vocational-technical students in special populations Extent of services your district offered to vocational-technical students in general Access special population students have to vocational-technical programs Tutoring and remediation for vocational-technical students in general Your district’s program improvement efforts Technical education standards that students must achieve Academic education standards that students must achieve Use of applied curricula in vocational-technical courses Use of integration of academic and vocational-technical courses (continued) “Greatly Increased” or “Increased” “Neither Increased nor Decreased” “Decreased” or “Greatly Decreased” “Don’t Know”
Aggregated Responses to Survey of Public Secondary Schools
Aggregated Responses to Survey of School Districts
Comments From the Department of Education
GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments
GAO Contacts
Staff Acknowledgments
Elsie Picyk, Senior Computer Science Analyst, was responsible for computer programming and data analysis. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO compared student participation and program features in high school vocational education programs between the 1991 and 1994 school years, focusing on the: (1) availability of support services; (2) the extent to which program students attended college or found employment following graduation; and (3) extent to which schools have enhanced the quality of vocational education programs.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) between 40 and 50 percent of students in special population groups participated in vocational education programs in 1990 through 1994, despite the removal of the set-aside requirement; (2) schools continued to offer all students access to support services at the same or greater levels in 1994 than in 1991; (3) there was no significant changes in the proportion of program students who attended college, went directly to work, or were unemployed; (4) the percentage of schools offering tech-prep programs increased from 27 percent in 1991 to 45 percent in 1994 and the percentage of students participating in the programs rose from 9 to 16 percent, respectively; (5) traditional school-to-work transition programs showed no major change in participation; (6) teacher training in integrating vocational and academic instruction also increased, but most of the schools surveyed did not use integrated learning concepts in the classroom; (7) some school districts reported increased use of quality indicators in their self-assessment processes, however, the number of vocational education programs that require graduates to meet competency standards has remained stable; and (8) many of the program features associated with high-quality vocational education still affect a relatively small percentage of students and many more students will need to be exposed to these features before they become a standard part of vocational education. |
gao_GAO-08-349 | gao_GAO-08-349_0 | Districts and Divisions Did Not Maintain Effective Internal Controls over REMIS Data
Real estate officials in districts and divisions did not maintain effective internal controls over REMIS disposal data. Officials in two districts, including one district that made about 300 disposals accounting for over 34,000 acres of land during fiscal years 1996 through 2006, told us that the same person who recorded land disposal data in REMIS was also the one who checked that the data matched the real estate documentation, such as deeds, titles, and transfer forms. Although the Corps’ policy requires division officials to provide the oversight necessary to ensure that their constituent districts recorded reliable real property data, officials we contacted in all three divisions did not perform activities that would ensure the reliability of REMIS disposal data. REMIS Disposal Module Did Not Follow a Best Practice That Protects Against Duplication and Redundancy
The REMIS disposal module—a software application that captures disposal dates and other disposal information—did not follow a software engineering best practice, commonly referred to as data normalization. For example, RESNC officials queried REMIS for a compilation of specific real property information, including data on disposals, for all districts. However, the results RESNC officials obtained differed from the results obtained separately by district officials, who later called on RESNC officials to clarify the query RESNC used for retrieving real property data in REMIS on their district. Land Disposal Dates Were Missing or Sometimes Did Not Represent When the Disposal Took Place
Land disposal dates in REMIS were unreliable, since the vast majority of them were missing, and when disposal dates were present, they sometimes represented the date when district real estate officials entered the land disposal into REMIS rather than the date when the disposal took place. The Corps’ real estate managers at headquarters could not explain the reason for the large numbers of disposals in fiscal years 2005 and 2006, which account for about 54,000 acres of land. Under the President’s Real Property Asset Management Initiative, landholding agencies are accountable for meeting key milestones and performance outcomes. The 2004 guidance emphasized that users should enter data into the RD-82 screen if the disposal generated revenue, but it was unclear whether users should also enter the data in this screen for other types of disposals, such as transfers to other federal agencies. However, the guidance did not clearly indicate which data entry screen—RD-70 or RD-82—completed the process of recording a land disposal. When RESNC issued the 2007 guidance, it did not update the REMIS data entry screens to match the guidance—that is, it did not identify the required data fields using the standard indicators. In addition, RESNC officials provided introductory training to 3 of 32 districts that use REMIS in 2006 and 2007. With limited instructors and funding, RESNC plans to train the New England District and at least one other district in 2008. At these conferences, presenters discussed technical changes to REMIS and the business processes that some attendees considered too advanced—- particularly those who had not received introductory training, including real estate officials in two districts we contacted. Unreliable land disposal data impair the usefulness of REMIS as a record of current inventory, as a valid tool for measuring progress toward the administration’s disposal goal, and as a source of data that would be useful to Corps decision makers for budgeting and strategic land management purposes. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve the reliability of REMIS land disposal data for determining how much land the Corps currently owns and for budgeting and strategic land management purposes, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Commanding General and Chief of Engineers of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to take the following five actions: implement effective internal controls, including segregation of duties and review, over the REMIS land disposal process by incorporating such control into the Corps’ real estate policies at those districts and divisions identified in this report and others, where appropriate; implement the data normalization best practice in the REMIS database with respect to disposal dates; correct the disposal records that were created in REMIS as part of the efforts to adjust the inventory; issue clear guidance for entering land disposal dates in the REMIS land disposal process; and provide and require introductory and periodic refresher training that covers how to correctly enter land disposal dates in REMIS. Appendix I: Objective, Scope, and Methodology
Our objective was to determine whether the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers’ (Corps) real property database—Real Estate Management Information System (REMIS)—could provide reliable information on the civil works land that the Corps disposed of from fiscal year 1996 through fiscal year 2006, or on the civil works land the Corps owned as of September 30, 2006. | Why GAO Did This Study
Unreliable real property data has been a long-standing problem for federal landholding agencies. Under the President's real property initiative, agencies are being held accountable for, among other things, improving accuracy of their real property inventory and disposing of unneeded property. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps), the fourth largest landholding agency, uses the Real Estate Management Information System (REMIS) for recording its civil works inventory. GAO was asked to determine whether REMIS could provide reliable information on the Corps' civil works land disposals from fiscal years 1996 through 2006. GAO's work involved comparison analyses of REMIS disposal data and other Corps reported disposal data, reviews of Corps' real property policies and guidance, and interviews with Corps officials at headquarters, three divisions, four districts, and the Real Estate Systems National Center (RESNC), which manages REMIS.
What GAO Found
REMIS did not provide reliable information on the Corps' civil works land disposals from fiscal years 1996 through 2006, or on the land that the Corps owned as of September 30, 2006. Unreliable land disposal data impair the usefulness of REMIS as a record of current inventory and as a source of data that would be useful for budgeting purposes and the strategic management of landholdings. The following contributed to problems with data reliability: The Corps did not maintain internal controls over REMIS disposal data. Corps policy held district real estate officials accountable for the reliability of REMIS data, but in two of four districts GAO contacted the individual recording land disposal data was also checking the data against documentation such as titles and transfer forms. Dividing data entry and data checking responsibilities is an essential internal control activity. Corps policy also required division real estate staff to ensure the reliability of REMIS data recorded by their constituent districts, but the three divisions GAO contacted did not review REMIS disposal data. The design of the REMIS disposal module, a software application that captures disposal data that users enter, did not follow a best practice, commonly referred to as data normalization. Data normalization organizes data according to rules designed to minimize duplication and redundancies. By not following this best practice, users querying REMIS faced the problem of retrieving inconsistent data. For example, when RESNC officials queried REMIS for specific real property information by district, RESNC officials obtained results that differed from those obtained by district officials. Land disposal dates in REMIS were missing or sometimes represented the date when district real estate officials entered the land disposal rather than when the disposal occurred. The vast majority, or about 89 percent, of all disposal records within REMIS did not have disposal dates. When the records contained dates, large numbers of disposals (accounting for about 54,000 acres) in fiscal years 2005 and 2006 had occurred as early as 1955. Guidance for processing land disposals in REMIS was unclear. For example, guidance issued in 2004 did not indicate whether some types of disposals, such as transfers to other federal agencies, required a disposal date. New disposal guidance issued in 2007 was also unclear because RESNC, which revised the guidance, did not revise the data entry screens in REMIS. As a result, the guidance and the data entry screens were inconsistent. While the guidance called for entering a disposal date, the REMIS data entry screens did not clearly indicate whether or where users should enter the date. RESNC provided limited REMIS training; 3 of 32 districts that use REMIS received introductory training in 2006 and 2007. RESNC plans to train the New England District and at least one other district in 2008. RESNC also sponsored conferences to update systems administrators and other users on key changes to REMIS, but conference presenters discussed aspects of REMIS that some attendees, including real estate officials from 2 of the districts GAO contacted, considered too advanced--especially for those who had never received introductory training. |
gao_NSIAD-95-26 | gao_NSIAD-95-26_0 | DOD plans to have a fleet of 120 C-17s delivered by 2004. In December 1993, as a result of the review, the Secretary of Defense announced that the program would be stopped at 40 aircraft unless McDonnell Douglas could demonstrate that program cost, schedule, and performance warranted completing the 120 aircraft program. C-17’s Planned Role Has Changed
The Air Force justified the C-17 in the early 1980s on the aircraft’s planned capabilities to operate routinely in an intratheater shuttle role; perform direct delivery missions to forward airfields, potentially in hostile areas; and airlift substantial amounts of outsize cargo such as tanks and helicopters. The C-17 was also intended to provide the capability to conduct low-level parachute extractions of the Army’s heavy equipment and to airdrop troops and equipment. Thus, the C-17 will not be used for this mission. However, the C-17 has not been able to meet initial requirements because of airflow problems caused by its design. Alternatives to the C-17 Can Help Meet Airlift Requirements at Significantly Lower Cost
DOD’s COEA showed that the C-17 is the preferred military airlifter because, when considering delivery of outsize cargo, the C-17 retains its throughput ability better than the C-5 if (1) airfield constraints are encountered and (2) the C-17’s planned utilization rate (higher than the C-5’s experienced rate) is achieved. Therefore, the savings associated with a mixed fleet of C-17s and commercial freighters could be significantly greater than the COEA reported. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO reviewed the Department of Defense's (DOD) C-17 program, focusing on: (1) the aircraft's ability to achieve its original program requirements; and (2) whether further procurement of C-17 aircraft is justified.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) although the C-17 was intended to operate routinely in an intratheater shuttle role, perform direct delivery missions to forward airfields, airlift substantial amounts of outsize cargo, provide low-level parachute extractions, and perform strategic airdrops, it has not been able to meet its original operational requirements and will not be used as intended; (2) DOD concluded that the C-17 fleet was its preferred choice for meeting its military airlift requirements because of significant utilization and delivery advantages; (3) recent DOD cost and operational effectiveness analyses showed that a mixed fleet comprised of 40 C-17 aircraft and 64 commercial freighters could be more effective and procured at cost savings of at least $10.7 billion when compared to a fleet of 120 C-17 aircraft; and (4) the 120 C-17 fleet is not the most cost-effective way to meet intratheater military airlift requirements. |
gao_GAO-12-507T | gao_GAO-12-507T_0 | As we have previously reported, the effective functioning of the electricity industry is highly dependent on these control systems. This vision—the smart grid—would increase the use of IT systems and networks and two-way communication to automate actions that system operators formerly had to make manually. Other initiatives include adding “smart” components to provide the system operator with more detailed data on the conditions of the transmission and distribution systems and better tools to observe the overall condition of the grid (referred to as “wide-area situational awareness”). The use of smart grid systems may have a number of benefits, including improved reliability from fewer and shorter outages, downward pressure on electricity rates resulting from the ability to shift peak demand, an improved ability to shift to alternative sources of energy, and an improved ability to detect and respond to potential attacks on the grid. Smart Grid Is Potentially Vulnerable to a Variety of Cyber Threats
Threats to systems supporting critical infrastructure—which includes the electricity industry and its transmission and distribution systems—are evolving and growing. In February 2011, the Director of National Intelligence testified that, in the past year, there had been a dramatic increase in malicious cyber activity targeting U.S. computers and networks, including a more than tripling of the volume of malicious software since 2009.sources may adversely affect computers, software, networks, organizations, entire industries, or the Internet. Intentional threats include both targeted and untargeted attacks from a variety of sources, including criminal groups, hackers, disgruntled employees, foreign nations engaged in espionage and information warfare, and terrorists. Table 1 provides descriptions of common types of cyber exploits. The potential impact of these threats is amplified by the connectivity between information systems, the Internet, and other infrastructures, creating opportunities for attackers to disrupt critical services, including electrical power. Smart Grid Faces Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities
While presenting significant potential benefits, the smart grid vision and its increased reliance on IT systems and networks also expose the electric grid to potential and known cybersecurity vulnerabilities, which could be exploited by a wide array of cyber threats. Securing Smart Grid Systems and Networks Presents Challenges
In our January 2011 report, we identified a number of key challenges that industry and government stakeholders faced in ensuring the cybersecurity of the systems and networks that support our nation’s electricity grid. As mentioned above, under EISA, FERC is responsible for adopting cybersecurity and other standards that it deems necessary to ensure smart grid functionality and interoperability. However, FERC had not developed an approach coordinated with other regulators to monitor, at a high level, the extent to which industry will follow the voluntary smart grid standards it adopts. We noted that without a good understanding of whether utilities and manufacturers are following smart grid standards, it would be difficult for FERC and other regulators to know whether a voluntary approach to standards setting is effective or if changes are needed. Lack of security features being built into certain smart grid systems. For example, according to experts from a panel convened by GAO, currently available smart meters had not been designed with a strong security architecture and lacked important security features, such as event logging and forensics capabilities, which are needed to detect and analyze attacks. Lack of an effective mechanism for sharing cybersecurity information within the electricity industry. For example, experts stated that while the industry has an information-sharing center, it had not fully addressed these information needs. Without quality processes for information sharing, utilities may not have the information needed to adequately protect their assets against attackers. Lack of industry metrics for evaluating cybersecurity. The electricity industry was also challenged by a lack of cybersecurity metrics, making it difficult to measure the extent to which investments in cybersecurity improve the security of smart grid systems. Until such metrics are developed, increased risk exists that utilities will not invest in security in a cost-effective manner or be able to have the information needed to make informed decisions about their cybersecurity investments. Accordingly, in our January 2011 report, we made multiple recommendations to FERC, including that it develop an approach to coordinating with state regulators to evaluate the extent to which utilities and manufacturers are following voluntary smart grid standards and develop strategies for addressing any gaps in compliance with standards that are identified as a result. FERC agreed with our recommendations and described steps the commission intended to take to address them. | Why GAO Did This Study
The electric power industry is increasingly incorporating information technology (IT) systems and networks into its existing infrastructure as part of nationwide effortscommonly referred to as the smart gridaimed at improving reliability and efficiency and facilitating the use of alternative energy sources such as wind and solar. Smart grid technologies include metering infrastructure (smart meters) that enable two-way communication between customers and electricity utilities, smart components that provide system operators with detailed data on the conditions of transmission and distribution systems, and advanced methods for controlling equipment. The use of these systems can bring a number of benefits, such as fewer and shorter outages, lower electricity rates, and an improved ability to respond to attacks on the electric grid. However, this increased reliance on IT systems and networks also exposes the grid to cybersecurity vulnerabilities, which can be exploited by attackers. Moreover, for nearly a decade, GAO has identified the protection of systems supporting our nations critical infrastructurewhich include the electric gridas a governmentwide high-risk area.
GAO is providing a statement describing (1) cyber threats facing cyber-reliant critical infrastructures and (2) key challenges to securing smart grid systems and networks. In preparing this statement, GAO relied on its previously published work in this area.
What GAO Found
The threats to systems supporting critical infrastructures are evolving and growing. In a February 2011 testimony, the Director of National Intelligence noted that there had been a dramatic increase in cyber activity targeting U.S. computers and systems in the previous year, including a more than tripling of the volume of malicious software since 2009. Varying types of threats from numerous sources can adversely affect computers, software, networks, organizations, entire industries, and the Internet itself. These include both unintentional and intentional threats, and may come in the form of targeted or untargeted attacks from criminal groups, hackers, disgruntled employees, hostile nations, or terrorists. The interconnectivity between information systems, the Internet, and other infrastructures can amplify the impact of these threats, potentially affecting the operations of critical infrastructures, the security of sensitive information, and the flow of commerce. Moreover, the smart grids reliance on IT systems and networks exposes the electric grid to potential and known cybersecurity vulnerabilities, which could be exploited by attackers.
As GAO reported in January 2011, securing smart grid systems and networks presented a number of key challenges that required attention by government and industry. These included:
A lack of a coordinated approach to monitor industry compliance with voluntary standards. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) is responsible for regulating aspects of the electric power industry, which includes adopting cybersecurity and other standards it deems necessary to ensure smart grid functionality and interoperability. However, FERC had not, in coordination with other regulators, developed an approach to monitor the extent to which industry will follow the voluntary smart grid standards it adopts. As a result, it would be difficult for FERC and other regulators to know whether a voluntary approach to standards setting is effective.
A lack of security features built into smart grid devices. According to a panel of experts convened by GAO, smart meters had not been designed with a strong security architecture and lacked important security features. Without securely designed systems, utilities would be at risk of attacks occurring undetected.
A lack of an effective information-sharing mechanism within the electricity industry. While the industry has an information-sharing center, it had not fully addressed the need for sharing cybersecurity information in a safe and secure way. Without quality processes for sharing information, utilities may lack information needed to protect their assets against attackers.
A lack of metrics for evaluating cybersecurity. The industry lacked metrics for measuring the effectiveness of cybersecurity controls, making it difficult to measure the extent to which investments in cybersecurity improve the security of smart grid systems. Until such metrics are developed, utilities may not invest in security in a cost-effective manner or be able to make informed decisions about cybersecurity investments.
GAO made several recommendations to FERC aimed at addressing these challenges. The commission agreed with these recommendations and described steps it is taking to implement them. |
gao_GAO-05-644 | gao_GAO-05-644_0 | For example, Statistical Policy Directive No. They required agencies subject to the IQA to take such steps as issue information quality guidelines designed to ensure the quality, objectivity, utility, and integrity of information disseminated to the public; establish administrative mechanisms for affected persons to seek correction of information they believe is not in compliance with the guidelines; report annually to the Director of OMB on the number and nature of complaints received regarding compliance with the guidelines and how the agencies handled those complaints; and designate an official responsible for ensuring compliance with OMB’s guidelines. NASS Met the Procedural and Reporting Requirements of OMB’s IQA Guidelines
NASS fulfilled the various procedural responsibilities and reporting requirements under OMB’s guidelines. Better Documentation Could Improve the Transparency of Data Products and Correction Procedures
NASS’s IQA guidelines define transparency as, “a clear description of the methods, data sources, assumptions, outcomes, and related information that allows a data user to understand how an information product was designed and produced.” NASS’s guidelines also note that “NASS will make the methods used to produce information as transparent as possible” and that its “internal guidelines call for clear documentation of data and methods used in producing estimates and forecasts. . . .”
To assess the extent to which NASS processes help ensure the transparency of the information it publishes, we examined key publications from the 2002 Census of Agriculture. Limitations of the data. Impact of imputations, by item. However, because NASS does not document its informal procedures for handling inquiries and data correction requests, and lacks a recordkeeping system to log and track them, NASS could not provide us with firm information on the number of inquiries it has handled, the nature of those inquiries, and whether and how they were addressed. NASS Has Taken Steps to Better Document Its Criteria for Assessing Input on Census Content
The 2002 Census of Agriculture was the first in which NASS developed the questionnaire (the 1997 Census of Agriculture was moved from the Census Bureau to NASS after the content had been determined). However, as a result of our review, NASS has developed documented criteria similar to that used during the previous census. Document and post on NASS’s Web site its procedures for handling data correction requests not filed under IQA, and track the disposition of those requests. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Information Quality Act (IQA) required the Office of Management and Budget to issue guidelines for ensuring the quality, objectivity, utility, and integrity of information disseminated by federal agencies. As part of our long-term examination of the quality of federal information, under the Comptroller General's authority, we reviewed how the act was implemented by the National Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS), and assessed the transparency of the documentation supporting its Census of Agriculture. NASS is part of the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA).
What GAO Found
NASS fulfilled its various procedural responsibilities and reporting requirements under the Office of Management and Budget's (OMB) guidelines for implementing the act. For example, NASS drafted its own implementation guidance, and developed a mechanism allowing affected parties to request the correction of information they believe is of poor quality. As a result of our review, NASS has also taken steps to better document the criteria it uses to evaluate data users' input on the content of the Census of Agriculture. Building on these efforts, better documentation could improve the transparency of census data products. For example, the nine key products from the 2002 Census we examined lacked, among other things, discussions of any data limitations. This is contrary to NASS's own guidelines for ensuring transparency, which stress the importance of describing the methods, data sources, and other items to help users understand how the information was designed and produced. Although NASS complied with OMB's requirement to establish a mechanism under IQA to address requests to correct information, NASS has not documented its approach for handling correction requests not filed under IQA (NASS handles these correction requests using an existing, informal method). Agency officials told us that data users have been satisfied with the way NASS had responded to these requests. However, because NASS does not document its informal procedures for handling correction requests and lacks a recordkeeping system to log and track them, NASS could not provide us with specific data on the number of such requests it has handled, the nature of those requests, and whether and how they were addressed. |
gao_GAO-06-395 | gao_GAO-06-395_0 | For example, the act recommends that 20 percent of funds appropriated pursuant to the act be spent on prevention and 15 percent on palliative care for those living with the disease. Proportion of Focus Countries’ PEPFAR Funding Dedicated to Prevention Has Declined
The proportion of PEPFAR funding in the 15 focus countries dedicated to prevention declined from 33 percent in fiscal year 2004 to 20 percent in fiscal year 2006, consistent with the Leadership Act’s recommendation that one-fifth of funds appropriated pursuant to the act be spent on prevention. PEPFAR Sexual Transmission Prevention Strategy Is Driven by ABC Approach, Abstinence- Until-Marriage Spending Requirement, and Local Prevention Needs
The PEPFAR strategy for preventing sexual transmission of HIV has three primary components: (1) the ABC model and OGAC guidance for implementing it, (2) the abstinence-until-marriage spending requirement and OGAC’s interpretation of it, and (3) country teams’ strategies for responding to local prevention needs. To guide the teams’ application of the requirement that at least 33 percent of prevention funding appropriated pursuant to the Leadership Act fund abstinence-until-marriage programs, OGAC directed the teams to spend at least 50 percent of their prevention funds on sexual transmission prevention and 66 percent of those funds on AB activities. The model should be applied in accordance with local prevention needs. OGAC adopted this policy although it determined that, as a matter of law, the requirement applies only to funds appropriated to the GHAI account (about $322 million for prevention in fiscal year 2006). OGAC officials told us that they are aware of these issues and plan to clarify the guidance. Country teams consistently told us that they value the ABC model, and several noted the importance of AB messages. In addition, most of the 20 PEPFAR teams required to meet the spending requirement or receive exemptions reported that fulfilling the requirement, including OGAC’s 50 percent and 66 percent policies implementing it, presents challenges to their ability to respond to local epidemiology and cultural and social norms. These constraints included the following: Difficulty reaching certain populations with comprehensive ABC messages. OGAC’s Policies Allow It to Meet the Overall 33 Percent Target
Our analysis shows that OGAC’s policies implementing the 33 percent spending requirement should allow it to just fulfill the Leadership Act’s spending requirement for fiscal year 2006, with the 20 country teams dedicating, in total, slightly more than 33 percent of reported planned prevention funds to AB activities. As a result, all but one of these teams dedicated less than 33 percent of planned fiscal year 2006 prevention funds for AB activities—about 23 percent on average. OGAC’s Application of Spending Requirement to All U.S. Prevention Funding May Further Challenge Country Teams
OGAC’s decision to apply the abstinence-until-marriage spending requirement to all PEPFAR prevention funding—although it determined that, as a matter of law, the requirement applies only to funds in the GHAI account—may further challenge some country teams’ ability to address HIV prevention needs at the local level. According to OGAC officials, they have chosen to apply the spending requirement to all PEPFAR prevention funding in response to a PEPFAR principle that HIV/AIDS programs should be integrated within and across agencies. Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria Act of 2003, significantly increased the United States’ commitment to fight the epidemic. Matters for Congressional Consideration
Given the challenges that meeting the abstinence-until-marriage spending requirement presents to country teams attempting to implement locally responsive and integrated HIV/AIDS prevention programs, Congress, in its ongoing oversight of PEPFAR, should review and consider the information provided by OGAC regarding the spending requirement’s effect on country teams’ efforts to prevent the sexual transmission of HIV and use this information to assess the extent to which the spending requirement supports the Leadership Act’s endorsement of both the ABC model and strong abstinence-until-marriage programs. PEPFAR Planning and Reporting Process
The operational plans that the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) country teams submit to the Office of the U.S. | Why GAO Did This Study
The U.S. Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act of 2003 authorizes the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) and promotes the ABC model (Abstain, Be faithful, or use Condoms). It recommends that 20 percent of funds appropriated pursuant to the act be spent on prevention and requires that, starting in fiscal year 2006, 33 percent of prevention funds appropriated pursuant to the act be spent on abstinence-until-marriage. The Office of the U.S. Global AIDS Coordinator (OGAC) is responsible for administering PEPFAR. GAO reviewed PEPFAR prevention funds, described PEPFAR's strategy to prevent sexual HIV transmission, and examined related challenges.
What GAO Found
In fiscal years 2004-2006, the PEPFAR prevention budget increased by almost 55 percent, from $207 million to $322 million. During this time, the prevention share of the total PEPFAR budget fell from 33 to 20 percent, consistent with the Leadership Act's recommendation that 20 percent of funds appropriated pursuant to the act should support prevention. The PEPFAR strategy for preventing sexual transmission of HIV is largely shaped by the ABC model and the abstinence-until-marriage spending requirement. In addition to adopting the ABC model, OGAC developed guidance for applying it--stating, for instance, that prevention interventions should be integrated and respond to local epidemiology and cultural norms. OGAC also established policies for applying the spending requirement for fiscal year 2006. To meet the 33 percent spending requirement, it mandated that country teams--PEPFAR officials in the field--spend half of prevention funds on sexual transmission prevention and two-thirds of those funds on abstinence/faithfulness (AB) activities. At the same time, OGAC permitted certain teams, especially those with relatively small budgets, to seek waivers from this policy to help them respond to local prevention needs. OGAC also applied the spending requirement to all PEPFAR prevention funding as a matter of policy, although it determined that, as a matter of law, it applies only to funds appropriated to the Global HIV/AIDS Initiative account. OGAC's ABC guidance and the abstinence-until-marriage spending requirement, including OGAC's policies for implementing it, have presented challenges for country teams. First, although most teams found the ABC guidance generally clear, two-thirds reported that ambiguities in some parts of the guidance led to uncertainty about implementing the model. OGAC officials told GAO that they plan to clarify the guidance. Second, although several teams told GAO that they value the ABC model and emphasize AB messages for certain populations, teams also reported that the spending requirement can limit their efforts to design prevention programs that are integrated and responsive to local prevention needs. Seventeen of 20 country teams reported that fulfilling the spending requirement, including OGAC's policies implementing it, presents challenges to their ability to respond to local prevention needs. Ten of these teams (primarily those with smaller PEPFAR budgets) received exemptions from the requirement, allowing them to dedicate less than 33 percent of prevention funds to AB activities. In general, the nonexempted teams were effectively required to spend more than 33 percent of prevention funds on AB activities; as a result, OGAC should just meet the overall 33 percent spending requirement for fiscal year 2006. However, to meet the requirement, nonexempted country teams have, in some cases, reduced or cut funding for certain prevention programs, such as programs to deliver comprehensive ABC messages to populations at risk of contracting HIV. Finally, OGAC's decision to apply the spending requirement to all PEPFAR prevention funds may further challenge teams' ability to address local prevention needs. |
gao_RCED-98-23 | gao_RCED-98-23_0 | Within this vast network, DOD, the Department of Energy (DOE), and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) receive about three-quarters of the R&D funding and own most of the research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) infrastructure. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
At the request of the former and current Chairmen of the Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, Restructuring and the District of Columbia, Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, and the Chairman of the House Committee on the Budget, we reviewed a number of issues related to the federal RDT&E infrastructure. To do so, we have (1) examined the condition of existing infrastructure, (2) analyzed the approaches used by organizations outside the federal government to realign RDT&E infrastructure, (3) and compared those approaches to federal agency efforts. Although budgetary constraints forced NASA to look for savings, NASA has not consolidated or closed any of its 10 major centers. While this action is laudable, once complete, DOD still will have about 35-percent excess capacity in its laboratory infrastructure and about 52-percent excess capacity in the air vehicles, electronic combat, and armaments/weapons arenas of its T&E infrastructure, according to DOD’s own estimates. Although individual agencies have taken limited actions to reduce their own RDT&E infrastructures, they have had little success in consolidating infrastructure across agency boundaries. As a result, their efforts achieved minimal infrastructure reduction to date. In recent years, several organizations that faced declining resources and a globally competitive business environment have restructured successfully their RDT&E operations, reducing both the size and cost of their RDT&E infrastructures. The full scope of supporting infrastructure clearly delineated. What research areas are the organizations involved in? Federal Agencies’ Approaches to Reducing RDT&E Infrastructure Lacked Critical Elements
When the Boeing Company Defense & Space Group and the Defence Research Agency applied elements critical to their restructuring efforts, they achieved cost savings and operational efficiencies. When the last round has been implemented fully by 2001, DOD will have closed 62 RDT&E sites and activities at host sites, but significant excess capacity will remain in DOD’s RDT&E infrastructure. A Catalyst to Spark Action. Many government officials responsible for directing federal RDT&E activities, as well as academic and industry representatives, have said that significant barriers impede successful infrastructure reduction efforts. First, we encourage the federal departments and independent agencies to continue their individual efforts to achieve management efficiencies in their respective RDT&E infrastructure restructuring efforts, but with an increased focus on interagency approaches. DOE also commented that (1) the end of the Cold War has had a major direct effect on its mission and the mission of its laboratories, (2) DOE’s Offices of Defense Programs, Nuclear Energy, and Energy Research will declare excess an estimated 1,000 facilities over the 5-year period from 1996 to 2000, (3) DOE laboratories have unique facilities and capabilities that also serve other federal agencies, and (4) the agency’s Laboratory Operations Board has developed a “Strategic Laboratories Mission Plan.” We have reported that much of DOE’s “evolved mission” is not unique, but is shared, at a minimum, with the NSF and the Department of Commerce. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed a number of issues related to the federal government's research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) infrastructure, focusing on: (1) the condition of the existing infrastructure; (2) the approaches used by organizations outside of the federal government to realign RDT&E infrastructure; and (3) a comparison of those approaches to federal agency efforts.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the Department of Energy (DOE), the Department of Defense (DOD), and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) have attempted to reduce their excess laboratory capacity and associated costs, but could achieve even further reductions in their RDT&E infrastructure; (2) even though DOD will have closed 62 RDT&E sites and activities at host sites after implementing fully all four base realignment and closure rounds, a 1995 DOD estimate indicates the department still will have an estimated 35 percent excess capacity in its laboratories and an estimated 52 percent excess capacity in its test and evaluation centers in the air vehicles, electronic combat, and armaments/weapons areas; (3) while NASA closed a number of individual sites and facilities in recent years, it has yet to consolidate or close any of its major laboratory facilities; (4) all of the individual agency actions were taken independent of one another and have resulted in limited infrastructure reductions and cost savings; (5) little success has been achieved in attempts to consolidate federal RDT&E infrastructure across agency boundaries; (6) in recent years, corporate and foreign government organizations have restructured successfully their laboratory operations to achieve cost-saving efficiencies; (7) GAO examined restructuring efforts by two organizations, both of which reduced substantially their laboratories' infrastructure and costs; (8) officials responsible for those successful efforts identified five critical elements that were key to their success; (9) many of the elements that made the Boeing Company Defense & Space Group's and the British Defence Research Agency's laboratory consolidations a success generally are lacking in U.S. federal agencies' efforts; (10) in general, budgetary concerns have not, to date, created a catalyst to focus and redefine missions and then reduce the supporting RDT&E infrastructure within DOE, DOD, and NASA; (11) agencies are not collecting the information they need to assess the full scope and cost of their RDT&E infrastructure; (12) according to U.S. officials that direct federal RDT&E activities, in some cases resistance to inter- and intra-agency restructuring of RDT&E activities has stymied the thrust of recent streamlining efforts; and (13) balancing the federal RDT&E infrastructure with current and future missions is a complex problem that has proven intractable largely because of the limited scope of past efforts. |
gao_GAO-08-538 | gao_GAO-08-538_0 | CBP and Foreign Customs Administrations Have Jointly Developed Global Customs Security Standards and Initiatives and Work Cooperatively to Implement These Standards Worldwide
Working through the WCO and in cooperation with the international customs community, CBP has taken a lead role in the development of international standards in customs security practices and in customs-to- business partnership programs. To that end, CBP has taken a lead role in working with foreign customs administrations, through the WCO, to establish the framework of international standards designed to enhance the security of the global supply chain while facilitating international trade. In June 2005, the 173 member customs administrations of the WCO adopted the SAFE Framework. Further, as of June 2008, 154 WCO member countries, including the United States, had signed letters of intent for implementing the SAFE Framework (see fig. Finally, CBP engages in activities to assist in the development of a system of mutual recognition, such as pilot programs, and in June 2007, CBP signed a mutual recognition arrangement with New Zealand—the first ever such arrangement in the world—to recognize each other’s customs-to-business partnership programs. CBP and International Organizations Have Defined Different Types of Mutual Recognition
CBP has worked with the international customs community to develop and implement the SAFE Framework, a set of international customs standards that calls for a system of mutual recognition, which the CBP and the WCO define as the arrangement whereby the actions or decisions taken by the customs administration of one country are recognized and accepted by the administration of another. According to officials from the European Commission and other European customs officials, with the establishment of these common security practices, a state of mutual recognition of customs controls between the European Union and the United States would exist, and there would no longer be a need to have CBP personnel stationed at European seaports as part of the CSI program. CBP later signed mutual recognition arrangements with Jordan and Canada in June 2008. While Working to Internationalize Customs Security Standards, CBP and International Partners Report Challenges in Balancing These Efforts with Other Legal Requirements
CBP has been actively engaged in the development and implementation of international customs security standards; however, recent laws requiring 100 percent scanning of U.S.-bound container cargo at foreign seaports may affect worldwide adoption of these standards. The act requires by 2012 100 percent scanning of all U.S.-bound container cargo using nonintrusive inspection equipment, including imaging equipment, which may use X-rays or gamma rays to create images of the containers’ contents and radiation detection equipment at foreign seaports. Given this situation, officials from the European Commission and CBP stated that unless additional resources are made available, 100 percent scanning could not be accomplished. According to a senior WCO official, under the current risk-management system, customs officers review the scanned images of high-risk containers in a very thorough and detailed manner. Further, a European customs administration official reported that 100 percent scanning could have a negative impact on the flow of international commerce, which under the 9/11 Act may be grounds for granting a 2-year, renewable extension to the 100 percent scanning requirement at individual seaports. The Department of Homeland Security provided technical comments, which we incorporated in this report where appropriate. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Objectives
In response to a request from the Chairman and Vice Chairman, Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation; the Chairman and Ranking Member, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs; the Chairman and Ranking Member, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs; and the Chairman, House Committee on Energy and Commerce, we reviewed U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s (CBP) programs—the Container Security Initiative (CSI) program and the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) program—and CBP’s efforts to promote international supply chain security standards. What actions has CBP taken with international partners to achieve mutual recognition of customs security practices? What issues do CBP and foreign customs administrations working to internationalize customs security standards anticipate in implementing 100 percent scanning of U.S.-bound container cargo? Related GAO Products
Supply Chain Security: Challenges to Scanning 100 Percent of U.S.- Bound Cargo Containers. GAO-08-533T. GAO-08-187. GAO-08-171T. GAO-08-86T. | Why GAO Did This Study
Oceangoing cargo containers play a vital role in global trade but can also pose a risk of terrorist exploitation. U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), part of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), oversees security of the supply chain--the flow of goods from manufacturer to retailer. CBP anticipates that adoption of uniform, international customs security standards could eventually lead to a system of mutual recognition whereby the customs security-related practices and programs taken by one customs administration are recognized and accepted by another administration. In response to congressional requesters, GAO determined (1) actions CBP has taken to develop and implement international supply chain security standards, (2) actions CBP has taken with international partners to achieve mutual recognition of customs security practices, and (3) issues CBP and foreign customs administrations anticipate in implementing 100 percent scanning of U.S.-bound container cargo. To conduct its work, GAO analyzed CBP documents on supply chain security programs and international cooperation initiatives and met with CBP officials and foreign customs officials from various trading partner nations. Also, GAO drew upon its related reports and testimony on supply chain security issued earlier this year-- GAO-08-187 (Jan. 25), GAO-08-240 (Apr. 25), and GAO-08-533T (June 12). DHS provided technical comments on a draft of this report, which GAO incorporated where appropriate.
What GAO Found
To develop and implement international supply chain security standards, CBP has taken a lead role in working with foreign customs administrations and the World Customs Organization (WCO). Through the Container Security Initiative (CSI), CBP places staff at foreign seaports to work with host nation customs officials to identify high-risk container cargo bound for the United States, and through the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT), CBP forms voluntary partnerships to enhance security measures with international businesses involved in oceangoing trade with the United States. In collaboration with 11 other members of the WCO, CBP developed the Framework of Standards to Secure and Facilitate Global Trade (SAFE Framework), which is based in part on the core concepts of the CSI and C-TPAT programs and provides standards for collaboration among customs administrations and entities participating in the supply chain. The SAFE Framework was adopted by the 173 WCO member customs administrations in June 2005; and as of July 2008 154 had signed letters of intent to implement the standards. CBP has actively engaged with international partners to define and achieve mutual recognition of customs security practices. Broadly, for example, CBP contributed to development of the SAFE Framework, which calls for a system of mutual recognition. More specifically, in June 2007, CBP signed a mutual recognition arrangement with New Zealand--the first such arrangement in the world--to recognize each other's customs-to-business partnership programs. Furthermore, in June of this year, CBP signed mutual recognition agreements with Jordan and Canada. By early 2009, CBP anticipates obtaining a mutual recognition agreement with the European Commission, which represents the 27 member nations of the European Union. CBP actively engages in the implementation of international customs security standards, however recent law, such as The Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (9/11 Act) requiring that 100 percent of U.S.-bound container cargo be scanned at foreign seaports--using a nonintrusive inspection process involving equipment such as X-rays and radiation detection equipment--may affect worldwide adoption of international supply chain security standards. CBP and some foreign partners have stated that unless additional resources are made available, 100 percent scanning could not be met. Given limited resources, CBP and European custom administration officials said that 100 percent scanning may provide a lower level of security if customs officers are diverted from focusing on high-risk container cargo. Under the current risk-management system, for example, the scanned images of high-risk containers are to be reviewed in a very detailed manner. However, according to WCO and industry officials, if all containers are to be scanned, the reviews may not be as thorough. Further, a European customs administration reported that 100 percent scanning could have a negative impact on the flow of commerce and also would affect trade with developing countries disproportionately. |
gao_GAO-03-1073 | gao_GAO-03-1073_0 | DOD is now implementing a new acquisition management policy tailored to its space systems. It expects to finalize the policy this fiscal year. Gap between Resources and Requirements Has Undermined Space Acquisitions
The majority of satellite programs we have reviewed over the past 2 decades experienced problems during acquisition that drove up costs and schedules and increased technical risks. This initial decision sets the stage for the eventual outcome—desirable or problematic. At times, even more requirements were added after the program began. In particular, tools being adopted, such as technology readiness assessments, alternatives analyses, and independent cost estimates, may help provide more consistent and robust information on technologies, requirements, and costs. Without knowing that technologies can work as intended, for example, programs cannot reliably estimate costs and schedules. IPA teams are to be drawn from experts who are not directly affiliated with the program. New Space Policy Does Not Call for a Match between Resources and Requirements at Program Start
DOD’s new acquisition management policy for space systems does not alter DOD’s practice of committing major investments before knowing what resources will be required to deliver promised capability. Instead, the policy allows programs to continue to mature technologies while they are designing the system and undertaking other product development activities. By contrast, allowing technology development to carry over into product development increases the risk that significant problems will be discovered late in development. Further, the consequences of problems experienced during development will be much greater for space programs since the design review occurs at the same time as the commitment to build and deliver the first product to a customer. Launching demonstrators is costly and time consuming. However, DOD has found ways to test sensors and other critical technologies on experimental satellites and it has built and launched technology demonstrator satellites. We compared the new space policy to DOD’s new acquisition policy for other weapon systems as well as our past reviews of the best practices of commercial and military acquisitions. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Defense is spending nearly $18 billion annually to develop, acquire, and operate satellites and other space-related systems. The majority of satellite programs that GAO has reviewed over the past 2 decades experienced increased costs and delayed schedules. DOD has recently implemented a new acquisition management policy, which sets the stage for decision making on individual space programs. GAO was asked to assess the new policy.
What GAO Found
DOD's new space acquisition policy may help provide more consistent and robust information on technologies, requirements, and costs. For example, the policy employs a new independent cost estimating process, independent program reviews performed by space experts not connected with the program, and more rigorous analyses of alternatives, requirements, and system interdependencies. This information may help decision-makers assess whether gaps exist between expectations and what the program can deliver. However, the benefits that can be derived from these tools will be limited since the new policy does not alter DOD's practice of committing major investments before knowing what resources will be required to deliver promised capability. Instead, the policy encourages development of leading edge technology within product development, that is, at the same time the program manager is designing the system and undertaking other product development activities. As our work has repeatedly shown, such concurrency increases the risk that significant problems will be discovered as the system is integrated and built, when it is more costly and time-consuming to fix them. Moreover, when even one technology does not mature as expected, the entire program can be thrown off course since time and cost for invention cannot be reliably estimated. DOD's new acquisition policy for its other weapon systems recognizes these risks and consequently requires technology and product development to be done separately. |
gao_GAO-04-632 | gao_GAO-04-632_0 | 1.) DOD’s Backlog for Industry Personnel Was Roughly 188,000 Cases, and the Time Needed for the Clearance Process Has Increased
DOD’s security clearance backlog for industry personnel was roughly 188,000 cases, and the time needed to conduct an investigation and determine eligibility for a clearance had increased by 56 days during the last 3 fiscal years. As of March 31, 2004, DSS identified more than 61,000 overdue but not submitted reinvestigations and about 127,000 investigations or adjudications that had been started but not completed within set time frames. DOD’s delays in conducting an investigation and determining clearance eligibility can, among other things, increase national security risks and the costs to the federal government of contractor performance on defense contracts. DOD identified more than 61,000 reinvestigations that were overdue but had not been submitted, over 101,000 backlogged investigations, and over 25,000 backlogged adjudications. 2.) 2.) As of September 30, 2003, the estimated size of the adjudicative backlog for industry personnel totaled roughly 17,300 cases. Average Time for Clearance Process Increased to More Than 1 Year for Industry Personnel
In the 3-year period from fiscal year 2001 through fiscal year 2003, the average time that DOD took to determine clearance eligibility for industry personnel rose from 319 days to 375 days, an increase of 18 percent. According to industry contractors, these delays increased the amount of time needed to complete national-security-related contracts. Impediments Hinder Elimination of the Backlog and Reduction of Time Needed to Conduct an Investigation and Determine Eligibility for a Clearance
A number of impediments hinder DOD’s efforts to eliminate the clearance backlog for industry personnel and reduce the time needed to conduct an investigation and determine eligibility for a clearance. Impediments— similar to those we identified DOD-wide in our February 2004 report—also affect industry personnel and include large investigative and adjudicative workloads resulting from a large number of clearance requests in recent years and an increase in the proportion of requests requiring top secret clearances, inaccurate workload projections, and insufficient investigative and adjudicative workforces to handle the large workloads. The underutilization of reciprocity is an impediment that industrial contractors cited as an obstacle to timely eligibility determinations. The effects of past conditions, such as the backlog itself, problems with DSS’s Case Control Management System, and additional national investigative requirements, also have been identified by DOD officials as impediments to timely eligibility determinations. DOD Is Considering Several Initiatives to Decrease the Backlog and Time Needed to Obtain a Security Clearance
DOD and industry association officials have suggested a number of initiatives to reduce the backlog and delays in conducting an investigation and issuing eligibility for a security clearance. A single adjudicative facility would serve as the clearinghouse for all industrial contractor-related issues. Like a phased periodic reinvestigation, this initiative would require changes in the Common Investigative Standards. This initiative would use an automated verification process to identify and validate security clearance requirements for industry personnel. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve the security clearance process for industry personnel as well as for military members and federal employees, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence to take the following four actions: improve the projections of clearance requirements for industrial personnel—both the number and type of clearances—by working with DOD components, industrial contractors, and the acquisition community to identify obstacles and implement steps to overcome them; work with DOD components and other agencies to eliminate unnecessary reciprocity limitations for industry personnel whose eligibility for a clearance is granted by DOD; develop and implement an integrated, comprehensive management plan to eliminate the backlog, reduce the delays in conducting investigations and determining eligibility for security clearances, and overcome the impediments that could allow such problems to recur; and analyze the feasibility of implementing initiatives designed to reduce the backlog and delays, prioritize the initiatives, and make resources available for testing and implementing the initiatives, which could include, but are not limited to, those evaluated in this report. 1. 2. 3. 4. | Why GAO Did This Study
As more and more federal jobs are privatized, individuals working for private industry are taking on a greater role in national security work for the Department of Defense (DOD) and other federal agencies. Because many of these jobs require access to classified information, industry personnel must hold a security clearance. As of September 30, 2003, industry workers held more than one-third of all clearances issued by DOD. Long-standing security clearance backlogs and delays in determining clearance eligibility affect industry personnel, military members, and federal employees. As requested, we reviewed the clearance eligibility process for industry personnel and (1) describe the size of the backlog and changes in the time needed to issue eligibility determinations, (2) identify reasons for the backlog and delays, and (3) evaluate initiatives that DOD could take to eliminate the backlog and decrease the delays.
What GAO Found
As of March 31, 2004, DOD's security clearance backlog for industry personnel was roughly 188,000 cases, and the time needed to conduct an investigation and determine eligibility for a clearance during the last 3 fiscal years had increased by 56 days to a total of 375 days. DOD identified three separate backlog estimates; (1) more than 61,000 reinvestigations (required for renewing clearances) that were overdue but had not been submitted, (2) over 101,000 new investigations or reinvestigations that had not been completed within DOD's established time frames, and (3) over 25,000 adjudications (a determination of clearance eligibility) that had not been completed within DOD's established time frames. From fiscal year 2001 through fiscal year 2003, the average time that it took DOD to conduct an investigation and determine clearance eligibility for industry personnel increased from 319 days to 375 days. Delays in conducting investigations and determining clearance eligibility can increase national security risks, prevent industry personnel from beginning or continuing work on classified programs and activities, hinder industrial contractors from hiring the most experienced and best qualified personnel, increase the time needed to complete national-security-related contracts, and increase costs to the federal government. Several impediments hinder DOD's ability to eliminate the backlogs and reduce the amount of time needed to conduct an investigation and determine security clearance eligibility for industry personnel. Impediments include a large number of new clearance requests; an increase in the proportion of requests for top secret clearances, which require more time to process; inaccurate workload projections for both the number and type of clearances needed for industry personnel; and insufficient investigative and adjudicative workforces to handle the large workloads. Industrial contractors cited the lack of full reciprocity (the acceptance of a clearance and access granted by another department, agency, or military service) as an obstacle that can cause industry delays in filling positions and starting work on government contracts. Also, the effects of past conditions, such as the backlog itself, have been identified as impediments to timely eligibility determinations. Furthermore, DOD does not have an integrated, comprehensive management plan for addressing the backlog and delays. DOD is considering several initiatives that might reduce security clearance backlogs and processing times for determining clearance eligibility for industry personnel. Among those initiatives that DOD is exploring are (1) conducting a phased, periodic reinvestigation; (2) establishing a single adjudicative facility for industry; (3) reevaluating investigative standards and adjudicative guidelines; and (4) implementing an automated verification process for identifying and validating industrial security clearance requirements. These initiates could, however, face implementation obstacles, such as the need to change governmentwide regulations. |
gao_GAO-11-60 | gao_GAO-11-60_0 | Background
The Military Construction Authorization Act, 1984, established the Military Family Housing Leasing Program, commonly referred to as the Section 801 housing program. In 1996, Congress created a new military family housing program, called the Military Housing Privatization Initiative, which provides DOD with authorities to attract investments from private developers for the construction and improvement of military housing. The Status of On-Base Section 801 Housing Contracts Varies Widely among Military Installations
Four Contracts Are Still in Their In-Lease Phase
The status of contracts for on-base Section 801 military housing varies widely, ranging from continuing the in-lease phase of the contracts to demolishing unneeded units. There are eight on-base Section 801 housing contracts: four remain in the in-lease phase during which DOD rents all of the units from the developer for up to 20 years whether the units are occupied or not, two are in the out-lease phase during which developers may be permitted to lease units to the general public and pay DOD rent for the use of the land for another 20 to 30 years, and two are involved in contract disputes or litigation. Of the two contracts in the out-lease phase, one (Fort Wainwright) has completed its housing transition to the general public’s use, while the other (Fort Hood) has renegotiated its contract to retain priority use of the housing units for military personnel or DOD civilians. Finally, the two contracts in dispute or litigation are Eielson Air Force Base and Naval Weapons Station Earle. Additionally, while some Section 801 contracts provide that DOD may terminate early in the event of a national emergency or other specific circumstances, such as when the developer fails to perform or violates certain contractual requirements, none of the original contracts specifically address potential liability in instances where DOD might terminate for reasons such as reduced demand for housing due to base realignment and closure, or security concerns with permitting the general public to occupy on-base housing. Some DOD Installations or Communities Would Face Transition Costs If Housing Units Are Converted to the General Public’s Use
We found there would be transition costs for DOD and communities at three of the four installations remaining in the in-lease phase of their contracts—the period in which DOD rents all of the units from the developer for a period of up to 20 years whether the units are occupied or not—if the on-base Section 801 housing units were to transition to the out- lease (the general public’s use). The three affected sites are: Naval Base Ventura County Port Hueneme, Ellsworth Air Force Base, and Hurlburt Field. No cost estimate was available at the time of our review. We found, for example, that Fort Hood renegotiated its on- base Section 801 contract to contractually agree to the terms of any potential early termination of its lease and retain priority use of the housing units for future military or DOD civilians. However, in our interviews with housing officials at five installations, Air Force and Navy officials stated they were unfamiliar with Fort Hood’s Section 801 housing contract modifications or any contract changes at other installation with Section 801 contracts. According to federal best practices for sharing information to ensure efficient use of resources, program managers should communicate information within a time frame to management and others within the entity to meet goals for effective and efficient use of resources. Without a communications process to share installations’ experiences with any major housing contract changes and community interaction, DOD and the services cannot ensure that the four installations facing potential contract changes in their out-lease will have all timely information to position them to negotiate the most cost-effective contract terms for the U.S. government. Also, while at least one installation has interacted with the community—including communicating which entity pays for security, education, transportation, and environmental considerations when the general public occupy on-base housing—DOD lacks a communications process to share any community interaction experiences among all Section 801 housing installations. Recommendation for Executive Action
To ensure that DOD and the military services have all information and possible options they need to revise relevant housing contracts in the future in the best interests of the federal government, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics) to develop a communications process so that all Section 801 housing installations may share information and best practices for negotiating any revisions to military housing contracts and for interacting with communities before allowing the general public’s use of on-base housing. The Department of Defense (DOD) and the local community will not incur any transition costs. | Why GAO Did This Study
In the Military Construction Authorization Act, 1984, Congress authorized the Section 801 housing program, which provided a means for improving and expanding military family housing through private developers' investment. Under this authority, the Department of Defense (DOD) awarded eight contracts for the construction of on-base housing that typically consisted of two phases: the in-lease (DOD leases all of the units from developers for up to 20 years whether housing is occupied or not) and the out-lease (under some contracts, developers may rent housing to the general public while leasing the land from DOD for up to 30 more years). Based on a mandate in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 conference report, GAO's objectives were to assess (1) the status of contracts for on-base Section 801 military housing, (2) the estimated costs to DOD and local communities that would result from the general public occupying this housing, and (3) the extent to which DOD and the services share information on modifications to the contracts and community interaction experiences. GAO visited five installations with on-base Section 801 housing, analyzed housing contracts, and interviewed relevant officials.
What GAO Found
The status of contracts for on-base Section 801 military housing varies widely, ranging from continuing the in-lease phase of the contracts to demolishing unneeded units. Of the eight on-base Section 801 housing contracts, four remain in the in-lease phase (when housing is reserved for service members and their families), two are in the out-lease phase (when, depending on the terms of the contract, the installation may allow the developer to rent housing to the general public or reserve housing for service members), and two are in contract dispute or litigation--Eielson Air Force Base and Naval Weapons Station Earle. For the two contracts in the out-lease, Fort Wainwright converted its housing units to the general public's use, while Fort Hood renegotiated its contract to retain housing for military or DOD civilians' use. The housing contracts generally require the developer to pay certain costs (potentially including roads construction, utilities, and demolition costs) to permit the Section 801 housing units' transition to the general public's use; however, no cost estimates existed during GAO's review. Also, GAO found potential transition costs for DOD and the communities linked to three installations: Naval Base Ventura County Port Hueneme, Ellsworth Air Force Base, and Hurlburt Field. The potential costs relate to security, education, transportation, and environmental considerations. GAO did not identify any potential benefits that might accrue from converting the leases to the out-lease phase because it was outside of the scope of our work. GAO found that the services share information regarding their Section 801 housing contracts with other installations within the service; but DOD and the services do not share this information across the services. For example, Fort Hood renegotiated its contract to specify additional reasons for potential early termination of its lease, and retained priority use of the housing units for military personnel or DOD civilians; however, Air Force and Navy officials stated they were unfamiliar with these contract modifications. Additionally, GAO reported that most Section 801 contracts provide that DOD may terminate early in the event of national emergency or other limited circumstances, but none of the contracts specifically address potential liability in instances where DOD might terminate for other reasons such as reduced demand for housing or security concerns. GAO found that the services and DOD lack a communications process to share information from contract negotiations and community interaction--both of which can affect the efficient use of military housing resources. According to best practices for internal control in the federal government, program managers should communicate information within a time frame to management and others within the entity to meet goals for effective and efficient use of resources. Without a communications process to share installations' experiences with any major housing-contract changes and community interaction, DOD and the services cannot ensure that the four installations facing potential contract changes will have the timely information to better position the installations to negotiate the most cost-effective contract terms for the federal government.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOD develop a communications process among installations with Section 801 housing to share information regarding any contract changes. DOD concurred with GAO's recommendation. |
gao_GAO-13-102 | gao_GAO-13-102_0 | In fiscal year 2011, MACs and other claims administration contractors processed about 1.2 billion claims. Medicare claims administration contractors have had a role in determining coverage since 1965, when the Medicare program was enacted. Limits on quantities of services that will be covered in a MAC’s jurisdiction. Shared systems. To calculate error rates, CMS’s CERT Program contractor randomly samples Medicare fee-for-service claims and reviews them after payment. Prepayment Edits Saved Medicare at Least $1.76 Billion in 2010 but Were Not Used to Full Extent Possible
CMS reported that the use of prepayment edits saved Medicare $1.76 billion in fiscal year 2010, but the reported total is likely to be an underestimate because CMS does not collect information on savings from all of its current edits. Moreover, the savings could have been greater had prepayment edits been more widely used. Our analysis of Medicare data using only a limited number of national policies identified payments that appeared to be improper and that might have been prevented through wider use of automated edits. Specifically, we found $14.7 million in payments from fiscal year 2010 that appeared to be inconsistent with four of the selected policies and therefore improper. At least some of these payments that were improper could have been prevented by prepayment edits. We found that Medicare paid $8.6 million for claims that exceeded the MUE quantity limits for a single beneficiary under most circumstances on a single date of service. We also found $6.1 million in payments that appeared to be inconsistent with three selected NCDs and therefore improper. As a result, CMS can leave vulnerabilities unaddressed, some of which could be addressed with prepayment edits. As we reported earlier, we found about $6.1 million in payments in fiscal year 2010 that appeared to be inconsistent with three NCDs we selected for analysis. CMS Informs MACs about Some Vulnerabilities That Could Be Addressed through Local Edits but Provides Relatively Small Financial Incentives to Promote Their Use
CMS informs MACs about program vulnerabilities that could be addressed through local prepayment edits and about the varying coverage policies MACs have implemented in their jurisdictions, but the agency does not systematically compile and disseminate information about effective local edits. In fiscal year 2011, CMS increased the funding allocated to MACs for medical review However, the agency provided relatively small activities by 12 percent.financial incentives in the form of award fees to motivate MACs to make more effective use of prepayment edits. CMS’s Oversight of Edit Use Relies Partly on MACs’ Reports on Their Efforts to Address Specific Vulnerabilities
CMS provides oversight of MACs’ use of prepayment edits primarily through its review of certain MAC reports, through annual QASP reviews, and, most recently, through directives requiring the MACs to explain whether and how they have addressed certain vulnerabilities specified by CMS. To promote implementation of effective edits based on national policies, we recommend that the CMS Administrator: centralize within CMS the development and implementation of automated edits based on NCDs to ensure greater consistency; implement MUEs that assess all quantities provided to the same beneficiary by the same provider on the same day, so providers cannot avoid claim denials by billing for services on multiple claim lines or multiple claims without including modifiers that reflect a declaration that quantities above the normal limit are reasonable and necessary; revise the method for compiling information about RAC-identified vulnerabilities to identify their full extent and prioritize them accordingly; and develop written procedures to provide guidance to agency staff on all steps in the processes for developing and implementing edits based on national policies, including (1) time frames for taking corrective actions, (2) methods for assessing the effects of corrective actions, and (3) procedures for ensuring consideration of automated edits whenever possible, including for all existing NCDs and other national policies. To encourage more widespread use of effective local edits by MACs, we recommend that the CMS Administrator: improve the data collected about local prepayment edits to enable CMS to identify the most effective edits and the local coverage policies on which they are based and disseminate this information to MACs for their consideration; until CMS has a new database in place to collect information about edits, require MACs to share information about the underlying policies and savings related to their most effective edits; and assess the feasibility of providing increased incentives to MACs to implement effective prepayment edits. In its written comments, HHS generally concurred with our seven recommendations and cited actions that CMS plans to take to address them. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
We used several methods to assess the extent to which (1) the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) and its contractors employed prepayment edits, (2) CMS has designed adequate processes to determine the need for prepayment edits and to implement edits based on national policies, and (3) CMS provides information, oversight, and incentives to Medicare administrative contractors (MAC) to promote use of effective prepayment edits. | Why GAO Did This Study
CMS reported an improper payment rate of 8.6 percent ($28.8 billion) in the Medicare fee-for-service program for fiscal year 2011. To help ensure that payments are made properly, CMS uses controls called edits that are programmed into claims processing systems to compare claims data to Medicare requirements in order to approve or deny claims or flag them for further review.
GAO was asked to assess the use of prepayment edits in the Medicare program and CMS's oversight of MACs, which process claims and implement some edits. This report examines the extent to which (1) CMS and its contractors employed prepayment edits, (2) CMS has designed adequate processes to determine the need for and to implement edits based on national policies, and (3) CMS provides information, oversight, and incentives to MACs to promote use of effective edits. GAO analyzed Medicare claims for consistency with selected coverage policies, reviewed CMS and contractor documents, and interviewed officials from CMS and selected contractors.
What GAO Found
Use of prepayment edits saved Medicare at least $1.76 billion in fiscal year 2010, but GAO found that savings could have been greater had prepayment edits been more widely used. GAO illustrated this point using analysis of a limited number of national policies and local coverage determinations (LCD), which are established by each Medicare administrative contractor (MAC) to specify coverage rules in its jurisdiction. GAO identified $14.7 million in payments in fiscal year 2010 that appeared to be inconsistent with four national policies and therefore improper. These payments could have been prevented through automated prepayment edits. GAO also found more than $100 million in payments that were inconsistent with three selected LCDs and that could have been identified using automated edits.
The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) has three processes with some appropriately designed steps to identify the need for, and to implement, edits based on national policies, but each of these processes has at least one weakness. The weaknesses include incomplete analysis of vulnerabilities to improper payment that could be addressed by edits; lack of specific time frames for implementing edits and other corrective actions; flaws in the structure of some edits; lack of centralization in the implementation of some edits, which leads to inconsistencies; incomplete assessment of whether edits are working as intended; and lack of full documentation of the processes. For example, GAO found that Medicare paid $8.6 million in fiscal year 2010 for claims that exceeded CMS's limits on the quantity of certain services that can be provided to a beneficiary by the same provider on a single date of service. Although edits had been implemented to limit service quantities, a weakness in their structure caused them to miss instances in which quantity limits were exceeded.
CMS informs MACs about vulnerabilities that could be addressed through prepayment edits, but the agency does not systematically compile and disseminate information about effective local edits to address such vulnerabilities. CMS oversees MACs' use of edits partly through its review of certain MAC reports, but these reports are not intended to provide a comprehensive overview of their edits. In January 2011, CMS expanded its oversight activities and began requiring MACs to report on how they had addressed certain vulnerabilities to improper payment, some of which could be addressed through edits. While CMS increased the funding in fiscal year 2011 for contractors' medical review activities, including edit development, the agency provided relatively small incentives--3 percent or less of all contract award fees--to promote use of effective prepayment edits by MACs.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that CMS take seven actions to strengthen its use of prepayment edits, such as restructuring some edits, centralizing implementation of others, fully documenting processes, encouraging more information sharing about effective edits, and assessing the feasibility of increasing incentives for edit use. The Department of Health and Human Services generally agreed with GAO's recommendations and noted CMS's plans to address them. |
gao_GAO-03-658 | gao_GAO-03-658_0 | Federal uniformed police forces operate under various compensation systems. Using this information, we created a survey and distributed it to the 13 police forces to obtain information on (1) entry-level officer pay and benefits, types of officer duties, and minimum entry-level officer qualifications; (2) officer turnover rates and the availability and use of human capital flexibilities to retain officers; and (3) difficulties in recruiting officers, and the availability and use of human capital flexibilities to improve recruiting. Annual pay for entry-level police officers ranged from $28,801 to $39,427, as of September 30, 2002. Officers at 4 of the 13 police forces received federal law enforcement retirement benefits, while officers at the remaining 9 police forces received standard federal employee retirement benefits. These pay raises received by entry-level officers from October 1, 2002, through April 1, 2003, narrowed the entry-level pay gap for some of the 13 forces. Although there are similarities in the general duties, there were differences among the police forces with respect to the extent to which they performed specialized functions. Sizable Differences in Turnover Rates among the 13 Police Forces
Total turnover at the 13 police forces nearly doubled from fiscal years 2001 to 2002. The total number of separations at all 13 police forces nearly doubled (from 375 to 729) between fiscal years 2001 and 2002. The number (316) of police officers who voluntarily separated from the 13 police forces to take positions at TSA nearly equaled the increase in the total number of separations (354) that occurred between fiscal years 2001 and 2002. Despite recruitment difficulties faced by many of the police forces, none of the police forces used important human capital recruitment flexibilities, such as recruitment bonuses and student loan repayments, in fiscal year 2002. Some police force officials reported that the human capital recruitment flexibilities were not used for various reasons, such as limited funding or that the flexibilities themselves were not available to the forces during the fiscal year 2002 recruiting cycle. Given that TSA’s Federal Air Marshal Program has now been established, and the buildup in staffing has been substantially completed, the increase in turnover experienced in fiscal year 2002 at 12 of the 13 police forces may have been a one-time occurrence. However, our objective was to provide information on pay, retirement benefits, types of duties, turnover, and the use of human capital flexibilities at 13 federal uniformed police forces in the Washington, D.C. area. Appendix II: Selected Turnover Data for the 13 Police Forces
Table 7 shows, among other things, that during fiscal year 2002, 12 of the 13 police forces experienced increased turnover from the prior fiscal year, while 8 of the 13 police forces experienced their highest turnover rates over the 6-year period, from fiscal years 1997 through 2002. Additionally, officials from several police forces reported that they were considering providing increases in retention allowances and student loan repayments to address their retention difficulties. | Why GAO Did This Study
Officials at several federal uniformed police forces in the Washington, D.C., metropolitan area have raised concerns that disparities in pay and retirement benefits have caused their police forces to experience difficulties in recruiting and retaining officers. These concerns have increased during the past year with the significant expansion of the Federal Air Marshal Program, which has created numerous relatively high-paying job opportunities for existing federal uniformed police officers and reportedly has lured many experienced officers from their uniformed police forces. GAO's objectives were to (1) determine the differences that exist among selected federal uniformed police forces regarding entry-level pay, retirement benefits, and types of duties; (2) provide information on the differences in turnover rates among these federal uniformed police forces, including where officers who separated from the police forces went and the extent to which human capital flexibilities were available and used to address turnover; and (3) provide information on possible difficulties police forces may have faced recruiting officers and the extent to which human capital flexibilities were available to help these forces recruit officers.
What GAO Found
During fiscal year 2002, entry-level police officer salaries varied by more than $10,000 across the 13 police forces, from a high of $39,427 per year to a low of $28,801 per year. Four of the 13 police forces received federal law enforcement retirement benefits. Between October 1, 2002, and April 1, 2003, 12 of the 13 police forces received pay increases, which narrowed the pay gap for entry-level officers at some of the 13 forces. Officials at the 13 police forces reported that while officers performed many of the same types of duties, the extent to which they performed specialized functions varied. Total turnover at the 13 police forces nearly doubled (from 375 to 729) between fiscal years 2001 and 2002. Additionally, during fiscal year 2002, 8 of the 13 police forces experienced their highest annual turnover rates over the 6-year period, from fiscal years 1997 through 2002. Sizable differences existed in the turnover rates among the 13 federal uniformed police forces during fiscal year 2002. The availability and use of human capital flexibilities to retain employees, such as retention allowances, varied. GAO found that the increase in the number of separations (354) across the 13 police forces between fiscal years 2001 and 2002 almost equaled the number of officers (316) who left their forces to join the Transportation Security Administration (TSA). Given that the buildup in staffing for TSA's Federal Air Marshal Program has been substantially completed, the increase in turnover experienced in fiscal year 2002 at 12 of the 13 police forces may have been a one-time occurrence. Officials at 9 of 13 police forces reported at least some difficulty recruiting officers. However, none of the police forces used important human capital flexibilities, such as recruitment bonuses and student loan repayments, during fiscal year 2002. |
gao_GAO-11-611 | gao_GAO-11-611_0 | DCOE consists of a central office and six directorates. In fiscal year 2008, Congress specifically appropriated $75 million for PH and TBI activities. While DCOE’s Role in the Budget Formulation Process Is Limited, More Complete Information Would Be Helpful
DCOE Does Not Make PH and TBI Budget Formulation Decisions, and Its Input to the Process Is Limited
DCOE had a limited role in budget decision making for the fiscal year 2012 POM process. Guidance contained in OMB Circular A-11 specifies that the basic requirements for a justification include a description of the means and strategies used to achieve performance goals. The absence of readily available, comprehensive historical funding and obligations data indicates that TMA and DCOE did not have benefit of these data to inform budget formulation. Prior to our review, DCOE did not collect information on the sources and amounts of funds component centers received in addition to allotments from DCOE, and therefore did not have benefit of these data to help inform budget decision making. Limited Information Is Available on DCOE’s Mission, Funding, and Activities
DCOE’s mission has not been clearly defined to Congress. For example, in one hearing of the House Committee on Armed Services, Members expressed differing visions of DCOE’s mission. In four congressional subcommittee testimonies, DCOE’s first director and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs characterized DCOE as DOD’s “open front door for all concerns related to PH and TBI.” These statements suggest a divergent understanding of DCOE’s role and bolster the importance of clear communication on DCOE’s mission, funding, and activities. DCOE is a relatively small entity and it does not typically appear in DOD DHP budget presentation materials and falls below the most detailed level that is presented—the Budget Activity Group level. Specifically, the request stated “$0.8B to fund operations of the Defense Center of Excellence (DCoE) for Psychological Health and Traumatic Brain Injury, and to ensure that critical wartime medical and health professionals are available to provide needed mental health services by improving hiring and retention bonuses and offering targeted special pay.”
DOD provides supplemental reporting on PH and TBI expenditures through reports mandated in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, as well as ad hoc reports at Congress’s request. While these reports present activities and accomplishments by strategic initiative, DOD is not required to separately report on DCOE in its annual reports. Recommendations for Executive Action
To enhance visibility and improve accountability, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Director of TMA to work with the Director of DCOE on the following three actions: 1. develop and use additional narrative, such as that available in component center fact sheets, in budget justifications to explain the means and strategies that support the request. 2. establish a process to regularly collect and review data on component centers’ funding and obligations, including funding external to DCOE. 3. expand its review and analysis process to include component centers. Specifically, DOD concurred with our recommendation that the Director of TRICARE Management Activity (TMA) work with the Director of the Defense Centers of Excellence for Psychological Health and Traumatic Brain Injury (DCOE) to develop and use additional narrative, such as that available in component centers’ fact sheets and budget justifications. DOD also concurred with our recommendation to establish a process to regularly collect and review data on component centers’ funding and obligations, including funding external to DCOE. To understand DCOE’s budget formulation process and the data used to inform budget requests, we reviewed documentation relevant to its budget formulation process and interviewed knowledgeable Department of Defense (DOD) officials. | Why GAO Did This Study
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 established the Defense Centers of Excellence for Psychological Health and Traumatic Brain Injury (DCOE) in January 2008 to develop excellence in prevention, outreach, and care for service members with psychological health (PH) conditions and traumatic brain injury (TBI). DCOE consists of six directorates and five component centers that carry out a range of PH- and TBI-related functions. GAO was asked to report on (1) DCOE's budget formulation process; and (2) availability of information to Congress on DCOE. GAO reviewed budget guidance, budget requests and performance data. GAO reviewed Department of Defense (DOD) reports submitted to Congress on PH and TBI and interviewed DOD officials.
What GAO Found
DCOE's role in the DOD budget formulation process is limited. For fiscal year 2012, DCOE's role in budget formulation was limited to consolidating component center budget requests and providing budget requests to the TRICARE Management Activity (TMA). Further, the budget requests DCOE provided to TMA did not have complete narrative justifications. Office of Management and Budget Circular A-11 specifies that the basic requirements for a justification include a description of the means and strategies used to achieve performance goals. At the time of GAO's review, prior-year funding and obligations data and funding received by component centers from sources external to DCOE were not readily available. The absence of these data indicates that TMA and DCOE did not have benefit of this data to inform budget formulation decisions. Also, quarterly reviews conducted by DCOE that collect data on performance and resources do not include component centers. Expansion of reviews and greater access to performance information could provide DCOE an opportunity to collect information that links component center performance with resources and better informs budget decision making. DCOE's mission and funding have not been clearly defined to Congress. At a congressional hearing, Members expressed differing visions of DCOE's mission and voiced concern about the amount of time needed to establish DCOE and achieve results. Moreover, in four congressional subcommittee testimonies, DCOE's first director and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs characterized DCOE as DOD's "open front door for all concerns related to PH and TBI." These statements suggest a divergent understanding of DCOE's role and bolster the importance of clear communication on DCOE's mission, funding, and activities. Because DCOE is a relatively small entity primarily funded through the larger Defense Health Program appropriation, it falls below the most detailed level that is presented in congressional budget presentation materials. In addition, at Congress's request DOD provides mandated and ad hoc reports on PH and TBI expenditures. While these reports present information on activities and accomplishments for PH and TBI, DOD does not--and is not required to--report separately on DCOE.
What GAO Recommends
To enhance visibility and improve accountability, GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense direct the Director of TMA work with the Director of DCOE to develop and use additional narrative in budget justifications, to regularly collect and review data on funding and obligations, and expand its review and analysis process. DOD concurred with GAO's recommendations. GAO understands that the expanded review and analysis process would not include realigned component centers. GAO agrees that ensuring entities external to TMA comply with regular collections of funding and obligations data could be a limitation. |
gao_GGD-97-71 | gao_GGD-97-71_0 | Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Focusing on tax disputes between IRS and taxpayers, our objectives were to (1) analyze IRS’ design of its initiatives and taxpayers’ use of them since 1990 in resolving disputes over tax liability, and (2) analyze IRS’ plans for evaluating the impacts of its new initiatives on their goals. In June 1996, IRS provided that information on 276 taxpayers, usually very large corporations, that had used or were using 1 of the 8 initiatives. These initiatives attempt to meet goals related to reducing the time, costs, and burden of dispute resolution. To improve the resolution of tax disputes between IRS and taxpayers, IRS’ Appeals, Chief Counsel, and Examination functions have implemented at least eight initiatives since 1990. One of these initiatives—Appeals’ mediation initiative—uses neutral parties to help resolve disputes. Two initiatives seek to prevent disputes, three seek to resolve disputes before they reach Appeals, and two seek to resolve Appeals cases more quickly. Generally, the goals of these initiatives are to reduce the overall time, costs, and taxpayer burden of resolving disputes without litigation. To Date, Use of Initiatives Is Limited
As of November 30, 1996, IRS records showed that CEP and large corporate taxpayers had used 7 of IRS’ initiatives to resolve at least 209 tax issues in dispute between IRS and taxpayers since 1990. Performance measures that effectively identify whether a program is achieving its stated goals either (1) directly measure change (e.g., amount of time required to resolve disputes with and without the initiative), (2) use a reasonable proxy for the goal (e.g., taxpayer satisfaction with the initiative as an indicator of reduced burden), or (3) provide the data needed to evaluate specific research questions about the program and its effectiveness. However, IRS functions are not yet able to show whether their initiatives are achieving these goals, partly because many of the performance measures selected by the functions do not directly gauge the impacts of the initiatives on these goals. They cited problems in collecting reliable data and isolating the impacts for highly complex tax issues that may involve future tax years. These difficulties, while real, do not prevent IRS from developing indicators that more directly measure the impacts of the initiatives on the time, costs, and burden of dispute resolution. They said they hope to have sufficient measures during the spring of 1998 to more fully evaluate the initiatives’ impacts on the stated goals. Such efforts, if successful, would help IRS to determine whether the initiatives worked as intended and how they might be improved or expanded to other tax issues or groups of taxpayers. Using these measures, the functions should, after sufficient data are available over a period of time, analyze whether each initiative reduces the time, cost, and taxpayer burden of dispute resolution. Second, in discussing the limited usage of the eight initiatives, IRS officials said IRS plans to expand the pool of eligible taxpayers. Other Initiatives to Resolve Tax Liability Disputes and Other Issues
1. 4. 5. 6. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO reviewed the Internal Revenue Service's (IRS) initiatives to resolve tax liabilities disputes without litigation, focusing on IRS': (1) design of these initiatives and taxpayers' use of them; and (2) plans for evaluating the impacts of its new initiatives on the stated goals.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) since 1990, IRS Appeals, Chief Counsel, and Examination have implemented at least eight initiatives to improve dispute resolution between IRS and taxpayers over certain tax issues; (2) each of the initiatives apply to specific groups of taxpayers, generally large corporations; (3) two of these initiatives seek to prevent disputes, three seek to resolve disputes before they reach Appeals, and two seek to resolve disputes in Appeals more quickly; (4) only one initiative uses a neutral third person as a mediator to help resolve disputes in Appeals; (5) generally, the goals of these initiatives are to reduce the overall time, costs, and taxpayer burden of dispute resolution; (6) in June 1996, IRS identified 276 taxpayers that had used or were using 1 of IRS' 8 initiatives to resolve tax disputes since 1990; (7) as of November 30, 1996, IRS data showed that these taxpayers had used IRS' initiatives to resolve 209 disputes over tax issues; (8) this is a small fraction of the relevant disputed tax issues since 1990; (9) various reasons exist for the limited use of the initiatives to date; (10) also, IRS officials said use of the initiatives ultimately depends on the willingness of eligible taxpayers; (11) IRS has established some performance measures intended to evaluate the impacts of its initiatives on reducing the time, costs, and taxpayer burden in dispute resolution; (12) GAO's analysis indicated that many of these measures will not allow IRS to directly gauge the initiatives' impacts on these goals; (13) Appeals has established some measures, such as the level of taxpayer satisfaction, that are more directly related to its initiatives' goals of reducing the time, costs, and burden of dispute resolution; (14) IRS officials said they thought it was too early to assess the impacts of all of their initiatives and was difficult to obtain data that would isolate the impacts, particularly when the issues being resolved are highly technical and can carry over to future tax years; (15) IRS officials described ongoing efforts to develop other measures, in conjunction with a special IRS task force, by the spring of 1998; and (16) measures that more directly gauge the impacts of the initiatives on their goals would help IRS determine, after sufficient data are available over a period of time, whether and the extent to which the initiatives had the intended effects of reducing the time, costs, and burden of resolving tax disputes. |
gao_GAO-05-64 | gao_GAO-05-64_0 | The single separation exam program is designed to provide a single physical exam that can be used to meet the physical exam requirements of the military services and VA. In September 1998, DOD’s Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs issued a policy to the Assistant Secretaries for the Army, Navy, and Air Force stating that servicemembers who leave the military and intend to file a claim for VA disability benefits should undergo a single physical exam for the military services and VA.
VA and the Military Services Have Established Some Single Separation Exam Programs, But Program Monitoring Is Lacking Despite Plans for Expansion
Since 1998, VA and the military services have collaborated to establish single separation exam programs using various approaches to deliver the exams, including those used in the original pilot program. However, while we were able to verify that the exams were being delivered at some installations, DOD, its military services, and VA either could not provide information or provided us with inaccurate information on program sites. Although VA reported that 28 of 139 BDD sites had programs in place as of May 2004, we found that 4 of the 8 sites we evaluated from VA’s list did not actually have a program in place. Nonetheless, VA and DOD leadership continue to encourage the establishment of single separation exam programs and have drafted a new MOA that contains a specific implementation goal to have programs in place at all of the BDD sites by December 31, 2004—an ambitious goal given the seemingly low rate of program implementation since 1998 and the lack of accurate information on existing programs. However, when we evaluated programs at 8 of these installations, we found that 4 of the installations did not actually have programs in place. For example, the draft MOA delegates responsibility for establishing single separation exam programs to local VA and military installations, based on the medical resources—including physicians, laboratory facilities, examination rooms, and support staff— available to conduct the exams and perform any additional testing. In fiscal year 2003, the military services administered separation exams for an estimated one-eighth of servicemembers who left the military. Another challenge to establishing these programs is that some military officials told us that they need their resources, such as space and medical personnel, for other priorities, including ensuring the health of active duty servicemembers. The Military Services May Not Benefit from Single Separation Exam Programs Due to Their Infrequent Use of Separation Exams
Despite increased convenience for individual servicemembers, the military services may not benefit from single separation exam programs—designed to eliminate the need for two separate exams—because the military services usually do not require servicemembers who are leaving the military to have separation exams. 1.) Although the 1998 MOU encouraged the establishment of these programs for servicemembers leaving the military and filing VA disability claims, some local military officials told us that their installations did not currently have these programs because they decided to use available resources to support other efforts, such as conducting wartime training and ensuring that active duty servicemembers are healthy enough to perform their duties. Military Staff Turnover Creates Challenges for Maintaining Established Single Separation Exam Programs
Because single separation exam programs require coordination between personnel from both VA and the military services, staff changes or turnover can make it difficult to maintain existing programs. Conclusions
Since 1998, VA and DOD’s military services have attempted to establish single separation exam programs in order to prevent duplication and streamline the process for servicemembers who are leaving the military and intend to file a disability claim with VA. To obtain information on the challenges associated with establishing single separation exam programs, we identified and visited military installations that did not have single separation exam programs. 2. | Why GAO Did This Study
Servicemembers who leave the military and file disability claims with the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) may be subject to potentially duplicative physical exams in order to meet requirements of both the Department of Defense's (DOD) military services and VA. To streamline the process for these servicemembers, the military services and VA have attempted to coordinate their physical exam requirements by developing a single separation exam program. In 1998, VA and DOD signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) instructing local units to establish single separation exam programs. This report examines (1) VA's and the military services' efforts to establish single separation exam programs, and (2) the challenges to establishing single separation exam programs. To obtain this information, GAO interviewed VA and military service officials about establishing the program; evaluated existing programs at selected military installations; and visited selected installations that did not have programs.
What GAO Found
Since 1998, VA and the military services have collaborated to establish single separation exam programs. However, while we were able to verify that the program was being delivered at some military installations, DOD, its military services, and VA either could not provide information on program locations or provided us with inaccurate information. As of May 2004, VA reported that 28 military installations had single separation exam programs that used one of five basic approaches to deliver an exam that met both VA's and the military services' requirements. However, when we evaluated 8 of the 28 installations, we found that 4 of the installations did not actually have programs in place. Nonetheless, VA and DOD leadership continue to encourage the establishment of single separation exam programs and have recently drafted a new memorandum of agreement (MOA) that is intended to replace the 1998 MOU. Like the original MOU, the draft MOA delegates responsibility for establishing single separation exam programs to local VA and military installations, depending on available resources. However, the draft MOA also contains a specific implementation goal that selected military installations should have single separation exam programs in place by December 31, 2004. This would require implementation at 139 installations--an ambitious plan given the seemingly low rate of program implementation since 1998 and the lack of accurate information on existing programs. Several challenges impede the establishment of single separation exam programs. The predominant challenge is that the military services may not benefit from a program designed to eliminate the need for two separate physical exams because they usually do not require that servicemembers receive a separation exam. As of August 2004, only the Army had a general separation exam requirement for retiring servicemembers. The other military services primarily require separation exams when the servicemember's last physical exam or medical assessment received during active duty is no longer considered current. In fiscal year 2003, only an estimated 13 percent of servicemembers who left the military received a separation exam. Consequently, the military services may not realize resource savings by eliminating or sharing responsibility for this exam. According to some military officials, another challenge to establishing single separation exam programs is that resources, such as facility space and medical personnel, are needed for other priorities, such as ensuring that active duty servicemembers are healthy enough to perform their duties. Additionally, because single separation exam programs require coordination between personnel from both VA and the military services, military staff changes, including those due to routine rotations, can make it difficult to maintain existing programs. |
gao_GAO-03-603T | gao_GAO-03-603T_0 | Background
The Air Force is developing the F/A-22 aircraft to replace its fleet of F-15 air superiority aircraft. The F/A-22 is designed to be superior to the F-15 by being capable of flying at higher speeds for longer distances, less detectable, and able to provide the pilot with substantially improved awareness of the surrounding situation. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998 requires us to annually assess the F/A-22 development program and determine whether the program is meeting key performance, schedule, and cost goals. We have issued six of these annual reports to Congress. We have also reported on F/A-22 production program costs over the last 3 years. Most recently, we reported on F/A-22 production and development in February and March 2003, respectively. Performance Issues
In the past several years, we have reported on a range of performance issues that have arisen during the development of the F/A-22. F/A-22 estimated performance in the areas of supercruise, acceleration, maneuverability, radar observability, combat radius, and radar range in searching targets have so far been met or exceeded. However, problems have surfaced related to some overheating concerns during high-speed flight-testing, reliability, avionics that perform radar, communication, navigation, identification and electronic warfare functions as well as excess movement of the vertical tails. Modifications are being made to some test aircraft to address some of these problems. For now, however, testing in some areas is restricted. Yet, we have been reporting on delays of flight tests for the F/A-22 and that these delays have contributed to scheduling and cost problems affecting the program. Each year since 1998, we have reported that assembly of the test aircraft was requiring more time than planned and that this was causing the test aircraft to be delivered late to the test center for flight-testing. We have also reported annually since 2000 that the flight-test program efficiency—the amount of flight-testing accomplished—has been less than planned. In addition, late delivery of development aircraft to the flight-test center continued to be a contributing problem. Cost Increases
Cost increases have plagued the F/A-22 program since it began in 1991. Development Costs
Since 1997, the Air Force’s estimated cost to develop the F/A-22 has increased by $3.2 billion. Production Cost Growth
Over the last 6 years, DOD has identified about $18 billion in estimated production cost growth during the course of two DOD program reviews. As a result, the estimated cost of the production program currently exceeds the congressional cost limit. However, this amount exceeds the production cost limit of $36.8 billion. Modernization Cost Increases
Modernization costs have increased dramatically in recent years. Such a decrease, in turn, has jeopardized the Air Force’s ability to modernize its fleet of tactical aircraft. Aging equipment contributes significantly to increased operating and support costs. Risks in the F/A-22 Acquisition Plan
Despite continuing development problems and challenges, the Air Force plans to continue acquiring production aircraft at increasing annual rates. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Air Force is developing the F/A-22 aircraft to replace its fleet of F-15 air superiority aircraft. The F/A-22 is designed to be superior to the F-15 by being capable of flying at higher speeds for longer distances, less detectable, and able to provide the pilot with substantially improved awareness of the surrounding situation. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998 requires us to annually assess the F/A-22 development program and determine whether the program is meeting key performance, schedule, and cost goals. We have issued six of these annual reports to Congress. We have also reported on F/A-22 production program costs over the last 3 years. Most recently, we reported on F/A-22 production and development in February and March 2003 respectively. This testimony summarizes our work on the F/A-22 program, covering performance, cost, and scheduling issues.
What GAO Found
In the past several years, we have reported on a range of problems affecting the development of F/A-22. Specifically, F/A-22 estimated performance in the areas of supercruise, acceleration, maneuverability, radar observability, combat radius, and range in searching targets have so far been met or exceeded. However, problems have surfaced related to overheating during high-speed flight-testing, reliability, avionics that perform radar, communication, navigation, identification and electronic warfare functions as well as excess movement of the vertical tails. Modifications are being made to some test aircraft to address some of these problems. For now, however, testing in some areas is restricted. Each year since 1998, we have reported that assembly of the test aircraft was requiring more time than planned and that this was causing the test aircraft to be delivered late to the test center for flight-testing. We have also reported annually since 2000 that flight-test program efficiency--the amount of flight-testing accomplished--has been less than planned. Cost increases have plagued the F/A-22 program since development began in 1991. Since 1997, the Air Force's estimated cost to develop the F/A-22 has increased by $3.2 billion bringing the total estimate to $21.9 billion. In addition, over the last 6 years, DOD has identified about $18 billion in estimated production cost growth bringing the total estimate to $42.2 billion--which exceeds the congressionally mandated production cost limit of $36.8 billion. Further, modernization costs have increased dramatically in recent years. Actions to offset estimated cost growth have had mixed success. These problems have dramatically affected the F/A-22 program. Cost increases, in part, have forced the Air Force to substantially decrease the number of aircraft to be purchased--from 648 to 276. Delays in testing also have significant consequences. Continuing to acquire aircraft before adequate testing is a high-risk strategy that could serve to further increase production costs. Moreover, F/A-22 problems have limited DOD's ability to upgrade its aging tactical aircraft fleet. If the F/A-22 program had met its original goals, the Air Force could have been replacing older aircraft with F/A-22 aircraft over 7 years ago. Now, however, it will not begin replacing aircraft until late 2005 at the earliest. The rate of replenishment will be substantially lower, due to the decrease in the number of new aircraft to be purchased. As a result, DOD will have to continue to use tactical aircraft that contribute to increased operating and support costs and it will have to wait longer than anticipated to have access to the advanced capabilities to be offered by the F/A-22. |
gao_GAO-12-930 | gao_GAO-12-930_0 | Background
The purpose of the TAA for Firms program is to help trade-impacted, economically distressed U.S. manufacturing, production, and service firms make adjustments that may enable them to remain competitive in the global economy. TGAAA Changes Led to Program Improvements and More Participation
The 2009 legislative changes to the TAA for Firms program resulted in reduced firm certification processing times, new performance reporting, and increased firm participation. However, EDA officials and TAA Center staff said that the lapse of these legislative changes from February 2011 to October 2011 and the uncertainty regarding program funding contributed to a decrease in firm participation in fiscal year 2011. Four changes mandated by the 2009 legislation contributed to improvements in program operations and increased participation:
Creation of director’s and other full-time positions. EDA’s Performance Measures and Data Collection Limit Its Ability to Gauge Program Effectiveness, but Our Analysis Shows Positive Impact
EDA collects data on 16 measures reported in its annual report to Congress and in Commerce’s performance and accountability report, but we found that these performance measures, and EDA’s use of them, do not adequately focus on program outcomes. Our data analysis showed that participation in the program was positively associated with an increase in sales, and our survey respondents reported satisfaction with the assistance they received from the program. Our Analysis Shows Participation in the TAA for Firms Program Is Statistically Associated with Increases in Firm Sales and Productivity
Given the weaknesses we found in EDA’s performance measures and data collection, and because few other studies have examined the effectiveness of the program, we undertook further analysis to determine the impact of the TAA for Firms program. We found that participation in the program was associated with increased sales, although other factors, such as a firm having multiple plants, had a stronger effect on performance. Over 80 percent reported that the program helped them to identify projects and business process improvements, and 62 percent said that the program helped them to identify management weaknesses. Though EDA deobligates and reallocates any unspent funds, it uses its allocation funding formula to do so, thus perpetuating the deficiency of failing to consider variable needs and costs in allocating its funds. EDA’s funding formula divides two-thirds of allocated funding equally among the 11 centers according to base funding and two fixed factors:
Geographic size: The TAA Center’s service region in square miles
Number of firms: The service region’s share of the nation’s firms in the agricultural, mining, and manufacturing sectors The funding formula divides the remaining one-third of allocated funding among the TAA Centers according to three variable factors:
Approved business recovery plans: The center’s share of the total number of business recovery plans approved by EDA within the past 2 fiscal years
Employees in approved recovery plans: The center’s share of the total number of employees in the business recovery plans approved in the last 2 fiscal years
Firms achieving expected results: The center’s share of the total number of firms that reported achieving anticipated outcomes from actions the firms took as a result of the program assistance they received during the past fiscal yearOnce it had determined the funding formula factors and measures for each, EDA weighted the factors to determine how it would distribute annual funding to the 11 TAA Centers. Funding Allocation Formula Does Not Take into Account Differences in Program Need
EDA’s TAA for Firms funding formula does not include a direct measure of the number of firms potentially in need of the program based on the program’s key objective of providing technical assistance to firms that have lost sales and employment because of increased competition from imports. For example, there are wide differences in the numbers of certified petitions and approved business recovery plans among the centers. Funding Allocation Formula Does Not Take into Account TAA Centers’ Varying Costs
EDA’s allocation of funding also does not take into account variations in TAA Centers’ costs of providing firms assistance. 7). 8). Five centers spent their entire funding allocation by the conclusion of the 3-year cooperative agreement period 2008 through 2010, while six centers did not. To ensure that the performance measures used to evaluate the TAA for Firms program demonstrate program results and to help ensure that EDA can comprehensively evaluate the effectiveness of the program, broaden the program’s evaluation approach, for instance, by developing additional quantifiable outcome-oriented performance goals and measures for key program areas and conducting further analysis of the data to isolate the impact of the TAA for Firms program from other influences, such as economic trends. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
The Trade and Globalization Adjustment Assistance Act of 2009 (TGAAA), part of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, mandated that we report on the operation and effectiveness of the Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) for Firms program. We examined (1) the results of the legislative changes on program operations and participation, (2) the performance measures and data that EDA uses to evaluate the program and what these tell us about the program’s effectiveness, and (3) how program funding is allocated and spent. We collected from the Department of Commerce’s (Commerce) Economic Development Administration (EDA) and the 11 TAA Centers’ data on certifications and approved adjustment plans from fiscal years 2008 to 2011. | Why GAO Did This Study
Over the past decade, U.S. imports of goods and services have almost doubled, reaching $2.7 trillion in 2011. Although trade expansion can enhance economic welfare, many firms and workers experience difficulties adjusting to import competition. The TAA for Firms program assists tradeimpacted, economically distressed U.S. firms in making adjustments that may enable them to remain competitive in the global economy. The Department of Commerce's EDA administers the $15.8 million program through 11 TAA Centers throughout the United States. In 2009, the Trade and Globalization Adjustment Assistance Act, as part of American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, amended the TAA for Firms program and mandated that GAO review its operation and effectiveness. GAO examined (1) the results of the legislative changes on program operations and participation, (2) the performance measures and data EDA uses to evaluate the program and what these tell us about the program's effectiveness, and (3) how program funding is allocated and spent.
GAO reviewed pertinent legislation, program documentation, and data; conducted an economic analysis and a survey of participant firms; and met with EDA officials, representatives of the 11 TAA Centers, and others.
What GAO Found
Changes to the Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) for Firms program mandated by the Trade and Globalization Adjustment Assistance Act led to program improvements and increased participation, but participation declined when the legislative changes lapsed and the program faced funding uncertainty. The changes resulted in reduced time to certify firms, new performance reporting, and increased participation. For example, officials told GAO that creating a director position and other full-time positions for the program reduced time to certify firms. In fulfilling new reporting requirements, the Economic Development Administration (EDA) collected information on performance measures and issued three annual reports. Also, EDA certified 26 services firms not previously eligible, as well as 32 additional firms based on more flexible certification requirements to demonstrate trade impacts. Although EDA increased the number of certified petitions and approved business recovery plans from fiscal years 2008 through 2010, the lapse in the legislative changes from February to October 2011 and uncertainty about program funding contributed to a decline in certified petitions and approved plans in fiscal year 2011.
EDA's performance measures and data collection for the TAA for Firms program provide limited information about the program's outcomes, although GAO's economic analysis found that participation in the program is statistically associated with an increase in firm sales. EDA collects data to report on 16 measures to gauge the program's performance, such as the number of firms that inquired about the program and the number of petitions filed, but most of these measures do not assess program outcomes. EDA is exploring better ways to assess the effect of their efforts on firms. In addition, EDA does not systematically maintain data collected by the TAA Centers on the firms they assist, resulting in gaps in centralized data that EDA could use to evaluate the program and meet reporting requirements. However, GAO's analysis of data collected from the centers showed that the program was associated with increased sales and productivity for manufacturing firms, although some factors were more strongly correlated with improved performance than was participation in the TAA for Firms program. GAO's survey of and interviews with firms participating in the program found that many firms reported satisfaction with the program's impacts. Notably, 73 percent reported that the program helped them with profitability; 71 percent that it helped them retain employees; and 57 percent that it helped them hire new employees.
To allocate funding to the TAA Centers, EDA uses a formula of weighted factors, such as each center's share of approved business recovery plans. However, the formula does not factor in differences in program need and costs in centers' service regions, even though centers varied in their use of program funds. For example, the formula does not take into account potential need for the program based on its objective of assisting firms that have lost sales and employment due to import competition. The formula also does not take into account the considerable differences in the costs of operating the centers to assist firms. As a result, some centers had spent their entire allocation by the conclusion of the most recent grant period, while other centers had not. Although EDA de-obligates and reallocates any unspent funds, it uses its allocation funding formula to do so, thus perpetuating the deficiency of failing to consider variable needs and costs.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that Commerce establish more effective measures of program outcomes, improve its data collection, and allocate funds in a way that considers program needs and costs. Commerce concurred with GAO's findings and recommendations. |
gao_HEHS-95-21 | gao_HEHS-95-21_0 | Other federal programs also provide some early childhood services. Both nonprofit and for-profit centers may be sponsored by church, community, and other organizations. Disadvantaged Children Need Full Range of Services to Prepare Them for School
As stated in chapter 1, the first national education goal articulates the fundamental elements—high-quality, developmentally appropriate preschool, (in this report, early childhood centers); parents who support their children’s learning; and adequate health care and nutrition—that are needed to prepare all children for school. Developmentally Appropriate, High-Quality Services Help Prepare Children for School
Child development services that are appropriate to the child’s age and individual level of development should promote relationships between the child and adults. Most Disadvantaged Children Do Not Receive Services From Early Childhood Centers That Prepare Them for School
Early childhood centers do not provide most disadvantaged children the full range of services—child development, parent, and health and nutrition—that they need to be prepared for school. Of the disadvantaged children who do attend centers, most attend centers less likely than Head Start centers to provide the full range of services. 3.2). Head Start centers provided more health services or referrals to these services than other kinds of centers. Information on the number of 3- and 4-year-old children enrolled in other federal and state-funded early childhood programs is limited. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed early childhood services for disadvantaged children, focusing on the: (1) services disadvantaged children need to prepare for school; (2) extent to which early childhood centers provide these services; and (3) reasons early childhood centers may not deliver all the needed services.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) disadvantaged children need intellectual stimulation, parental support, and adequate health care and nutrition to prepare for school; (2) early childhood centers provide all the necessary services and also promote developmental activities suitable to a child's age and individual level of development; (3) most disadvantaged children do not receive a full range of services from early childhood centers because of the limited number of centers and subsidies and narrow program missions; (4) school-sponsored, nonprofit, and for-profit childhood centers are often less likely to provide a full range of services than Head Start centers; and (5) despite Head Start's full range of services, the quality of its services has been uneven. |
gao_NSIAD-99-7 | gao_NSIAD-99-7_0 | In addition to establishing the direct ground combat assignment rule in 1994, the Secretary of Defense also permitted the services to close positions to women if (1) the units and positions are required to physically collocate and remain with direct ground combat units, (2) the service Secretary attests that the cost of providing appropriate living arrangements for women is prohibitive, (3) the units are engaged in special operations forces’ missions or long-range reconnaissance, or (4) job related physical requirements would exclude the vast majority of women. Numbers and Types of Assignments Currently Closed to Women
At the time of our review, about 221,000 positions, or about 15 percent of the approximately 1.4 million positions in DOD, were closed to servicewomen. DOD’s Current Rationale for Excluding Women From Direct Ground Combat
When DOD formalized its policy excluding women from direct ground combat positions in 1994, it adopted the primary elements of the Army’s ground combat exclusion policy as the DOD-wide assignment rule. At the briefing, defense officials said they believed that “integrating women into ground combat units would not contribute to the readiness and effectiveness of those units” due to the nature of direct ground combat and the way individuals need to perform under those conditions. The DOD official providing the briefing said that physical strength and stamina, living conditions, and lack of public support for women in ground combat were some of the issues considered. As of September 1998, DOD had no plans to reconsider the ground combat exclusion policy because, in its view, there is no military need for women in ground combat positions because an adequate number of men are available. Additionally, DOD continues to believe that opening direct ground combat units to women lacks congressional and public support. However, DOD’s definition of direct ground combat links these tasks to a particular location on the battlefield—“well forward.” In making this link, the definition excludes battlefields that may lack a clearly defined forward area. Should this trend continue, defining direct ground combat as occurring “well forward on the battlefield” may become increasingly less descriptive of actual battlefield conditions. To determine the relationship of DOD’s definition of direct ground combat to current military operations, we reviewed Army and Marine Corps ground combat doctrine. Positions Closed to Women, by Service
About 15 percent of all positions across the armed forces are closed to women because they (1) are in occupations that primarily engage in direct ground combat, (2) collocate and operate with direct ground combat units, (3) are located on ships where the cost of providing appropriate living arrangements is considered prohibitive, or (4) are in units that engage in special operations missions and long-range reconnaissance. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed various issues pertaining to the treatment of men and women in the armed forces, focusing on: (1) the numbers and types of positions that are closed to women and the associated justifications for closure; (2) Department of Defense's (DOD) current rationale for excluding women from direct ground combat; and (3) the relationship of DOD's definition of direct ground combat to current military operations.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) approximately 221,000 of DOD's 1.4 million positions are closed to women, who comprise about 14 percent of the armed services; (2) about 101,700 of these positions are closed based on DOD's policy of not assigning women to occupations that require engagement in direct ground combat; (3) the remaining 119,300 positions are closed because they are collocated and operate with direct ground combat units, are located on certain ships where the cost of providing appropriate living arrangements for women is considered prohibitive, or are in units that conduct special operations and long-range reconnaissance missions; (4) GAO found no positions closed to women because of job-related physical requirements; (5) DOD's current rationale for excluding women from direct ground combat units or occupations is similar to its rationale when it first formalized the combat exclusion policy in 1994; (6) at that time, DOD officials did not consider changing its long-standing policy because they believed that the integration of women into direct ground combat units lacked both congressional and public support; (7) furthermore, transcripts of a 1994 press briefing indicate that DOD officials believed that the assignment of women to direct ground combat units would not contribute to the readiness and effectiveness of those units because of physical strength, stamina, and privacy issues; (8) at the time of GAO's review, DOD had no plans to reconsider the ground combat exclusion because in GAO's view: (a) there is no military need for women in ground combat positions because an adequate number of men are available; (b) the idea of women in direct ground combat continues to lack congressional and public support; and (c) most servicewomen do not support the involuntary assignment of women to direct ground combat units; (9) DOD's definition of direct ground combat includes a statement that ground combat forces are well forward on the battlefield; (10) this statement, however, does not reflect the less predictable nature of emerging post-Cold War military operations that may not have a well-defined forward area on the battlefield; and (11) if this trend continues, DOD's definition of direct ground combat may become increasingly less descriptive of actual battlefield conditions. |
gao_GAO-04-479T | gao_GAO-04-479T_0 | These changes are designed to ensure that the system aligns individual performance and pay with the department’s critical mission requirements and to protect the civil service rights of its employees. However, it is important to note at the outset that the proposed regulations do not apply to nearly half of all DHS civilian employees, including nearly 50,000 screeners in the Transportation Security Administration (TSA). We have found that having one performance management system framework facilitates unifying an organizational culture and is a key practice to a successful merger and transformation. Based on the department’s progress in implementing the system and any appropriate modifications made based on their experience, DHS should consider moving all of its employees under the new human capital system. To this end, the DHS proposal takes another valuable step towards results- oriented pay reform and modern performance management. While aligning individual performance expectations with DHS’s mission and strategic goals will be key to DHS’s effective performance management, it is important to note that DHS has not yet released its strategic plan which may hamper creating the formal linkage to the performance management system and make it difficult to ensure that the proposed regulations support and facilitate the accomplishment of the department’s strategic goals and objectives. Providing Adequate Safeguards to Ensure Fairness and Guard Against Abuse
According to the proposed regulations, the DHS performance management system must comply with the merit system principles and avoid prohibited personnel practices; provide a means for employee involvement in the design and implementation of the system; and overall, be fair, credible, and transparent. Adverse Actions and Appeals
The DHS proposal is intended to streamline the employee adverse action process, while maintaining an independent third-party review of most adverse actions. Providing an avenue for an independent appeal can enhance employee trust of the entire human capital system. The proposal authorizes the Secretary of DHS to identify specific offenses for which removal is mandatory. When developing these proposed regulations, DHS should learn from the experience of the Internal Revenue Service’s (IRS) implementation of its mandatory removal provisions. Labor Management Relations
The DHS proposed regulations recognize the right for employees to organize and bargain collectively. However, the proposal reduces the scope of bargaining by removing the requirement to bargain on matters traditionally referred to as “impact and implementation,” which include the processes used to deploy personnel, assign work, and use new technology, for example, and redefining what are traditionally referred to as the “conditions of employment.” A DHS Labor Relations Board is proposed that would be responsible for determining appropriate bargaining units, resolving disagreements on the scope of bargaining and the obligation to bargain, and resolving impasses, and would be separate and independent from the Federal Labor Relations Authority (FLRA). Regardless of whether it is as a part of collective bargaining, involving employees in such important decisions as how they are deployed and how work is assigned is critical to the successful operations of the department. DHS Faces Multiple Implementation Challenges
Once DHS issues final regulations for the human capital system, the department will be faced with multiple implementation challenges. Implementing the system using a phased approach. We strongly support a phased approach to implementing major management reforms. Providing adequate resources for additional planning, implementation, and evaluation. At the same time, DHS is requesting a substantial amount of funding that warrants close scrutiny by Congress. The strategic workforce plan can be used, among other things, as a tool for identifying core competencies for staff for attracting, developing, and rewarding contributions to mission accomplishment. DHS should also continue to build safeguards into its revised human capital system. DHS’s overall effort to design a strategic human capital management system can be particularly instructive for future human capital management and reorganization efforts within specific units of DHS. Its effort can also prove instructive as other agencies design and implement new authorities for human capital management. Appendix I: Methodology
In presenting our preliminary observations on the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) regulations, we reviewed the proposed human capital regulations issued jointly by DHS and the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) on February 20, 2004, in the Federal Register. | Why GAO Did This Study
The creation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) almost one year ago represents an historic moment for the federal government to fundamentally transform how the nation will protect itself from terrorism. DHS is continuing to transform and integrate a disparate group of agencies with multiple missions, values, and cultures into a strong and effective cabinet department. Together with this unique opportunity, however, also comes significant risk to the nation that could occur if this transformation is not implemented successfully. In fact, GAO designated this implementation and transformation as high risk in January 2003. Congress provided DHS with significant flexibility to design a modern human capital management system. GAO reported in September 2003 that the design effort to develop the system was collaborative and consistent with positive elements of transformation. Last Friday, the Secretary of DHS and the Director of the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) released for public comment draft regulations for DHS's new human capital system. This testimony provides preliminary observations on selected major provisions of the proposed system.
What GAO Found
The proposed human capital system is designed to be aligned with the department's mission requirements and is intended to protect the civil service rights of DHS employees. Many of the basic principles underlying the DHS regulations are consistent with proven approaches to strategic human capital management, including several approaches pioneered by GAO, and deserve serious consideration. However, some parts of the system raise questions that DHS, OPM, and Congress should consider. Pay and performance management: The proposal takes another valuable step towards results-oriented pay reform and modern performance management. For effective performance management, DHS should use validated core competencies as a key part of evaluating individual contributions to departmental results and transformation efforts. Adverse actions and appeals: The proposal would retain an avenue for employees to appeal adverse actions to an independent third party. However, the process to identify mandatory removal offenses must be collaborative and transparent. DHS needs to be cautious about defining specific actions requiring employee removal and learn from the Internal Revenue Service's implementation of its mandatory removal provisions. Labor relations: The regulations recognize employees' right to organize and bargain collectively, but reduce areas subject to bargaining. Continuing to involve employees in a meaningful manner is critical to the successful operations of the department. Once DHS issues final regulations for the human capital system, it will be faced with multiple implementation challenges. DHS plans to implement the system using a phased approach, however; nearly half of DHS civilian employees are not covered by these regulations, including more than 50,000 Transportation Security Administration screeners. To help build a unified culture, DHS should consider moving all of its employees under a single performance management system framework. DHS noted that it estimates that about $110 million will be needed to implement the new system in its first year. While adequate resources for program implementation are critical to program success, DHS is requesting a substantial amount of funding that warrants close scrutiny by Congress. The proposed regulations call for comprehensive, ongoing evaluations. Continued evaluation and adjustments will help to ensure an effective and credible human capital system. DHS has begun to develop a strategic workforce plan. Such a plan can be used as a tool for identifying core competencies for staff for attracting, developing, evaluating, and rewarding contributions to mission accomplishment. The analysis of DHS's effort to develop a strategic human capital management system can be instructive as other agencies request and implement new strategic human capital management authorities. |
gao_GAO-13-365 | gao_GAO-13-365_0 | An important element of innovation is research and development (R&D), the testing and application of new ideas. These disincentives may be particularly difficult to overcome for small- and medium-sized enterprises (SME). Other U.S. agencies support manufacturing as part of their program activities, including the Department of Defense, the Department of Energy, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and the National Science Foundation. Other Economically Advanced Countries Have Instituted a Varied Mix of Programs to Address Key Manufacturing Issues in Their Countries
The four countries we analyzed—Canada, Germany, Japan, and South Korea—take varied approaches to government support for manufacturing, with each providing a different mix of programs to support their manufacturing sectors. South Korea has substantially expanded investments in R&D to strengthen its manufacturing sector. South Korea has also emphasized the development of a network of technoparks—regional innovation centers that provide manufacturing assets, R&D facilities, business incubation, and education and production assistance to industry—to encourage growth and development throughout the country. Foreign Manufacturing Programs Offer Some Key Contrasts to Those in the United States
When compared to the United States, the countries in our study offer some key distinctions in government programs to support the manufacturing sector. Based on our comparison of selected U.S. programs, the foreign countries place a stronger emphasis on innovation programs that support commercialization, especially through programs that provide technical support and product development and support for infrastructure and clusters. In contrast, the United States spends a relatively high amount on competitive funding for R&D projects with commercial potential. Within trade policy, countries in our study all provide similar services but there are several differences in how they are delivered. For example, the United States is an acknowledged leader in intellectual property protection, but the United States government plays a less prominent role than Japan in developing technological standards. Commercialization Is a Key Goal of Foreign Innovation Programs
While the United States and the four countries we studied all provide support for innovation and R&D, Canada, Germany, Japan, and South Korea have made commercialization a central goal of their innovation programs. Innovation programs abroad incorporate three broad strategies: (1) providing technical support and product development for client firms, especially SMEs; (2) fostering collaboration between manufacturers and researchers, as well as between small and large manufacturers; and (3) providing competitive grants for private-sector R&D efforts with commercial potential. Germany’s Sustained Commitment to Vocational Training Helps Provide a Supply of Skilled Manufacturing Workers
Germany’s national government has maintained a substantial commitment to a dual training system, which helps provide a supply of skilled workers for the manufacturing sector. While the United States does not have a national system to issue industry-recognized credentials, the manufacturing industry, with participation from the federal government, has recently started moving in this direction. The national government enforces the dual training system’s regulations and has coordinated with industry, union, and state government stakeholders to develop skill standards in 350 occupations. In contrast, the United States and Canada have a more decentralized system of skills training programs, with management of these programs largely devolved to states and localities. This was particularly evident in Germany. More generally, our analysis of the manufacturing programs in the four selected countries shows the broad extent to which U.S. competitors are leveraging the public sector to help their manufacturing industries maintain competitiveness in a rapidly changing global economy. What government strategies and programs have other advanced economies implemented to approach issues similar to those facing manufacturing in the United States? What key distinctions exist between policy approaches to support manufacturing in other advanced economies and those in the United States? For example, in some countries, we did not examine training or trade programs because through expert opinion, input from U.S. officials, and our literature review, we did not identify programs in these areas as being particularly informative for U.S. policy. Applied Research and Commercialization Initiative. Nationally recognized credential. According to officials from the Federal Institute for Vocational Education and Training. | Why GAO Did This Study
Over the last decade, the United States lost about one-third of its manufacturing jobs, raising concerns about U.S. manufacturing competitiveness. There may be insights to glean from government policies of similarly-situated countries, which are facing some of the same challenges of increased competition in manufacturing from developing countries.
GAO was asked to identify innovative foreign programs that support manufacturing that may help inform U.S. policy. Specifically, GAO examined (1) government strategies and programs other advanced economies have implemented to approach issues similar to those facing U.S. manufacturing, and (2) the key distinctions between government approaches to support manufacturing in other advanced economies and those in the United States. Based on input from experts and federal officials, and an analysis of manufacturing programs in other advanced countries, GAO selected Canada, Germany, Japan, and South Korea for study. In each country, GAO interviewed program officials and reviewed documents describing their programs. To identify distinctions between foreign and U.S. approaches to supporting manufacturing, GAO researched comparable programs in the United States, and interviewed staff administering those programs.
GAO is not making any recommendations in this report. GAO received only technical comments on this report from federal agencies.
What GAO Found
The four countries GAO analyzed--Canada, Germany, Japan, and South Korea--offer a varied mix of programs to support their manufacturing sectors. For example, Canada is shifting emphasis from its primary research and development (R&D) tax credit toward direct support to manufacturers to encourage innovation, particularly small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). Germany has established applied institutes and clusters of researchers and manufacturers to conduct R&D in priority areas, as well as a national dual training system that combines classroom study with workplace training, and develops national vocational skills standards and credentials in 350 occupations. Japan has implemented science and technology programs--with a major focus on alternative energy projects--as part of a comprehensive manufacturing strategy. South Korea has substantially expanded investments in R&D, including the development of a network of technoparks--regional innovation centers that provide R&D facilities, business incubation, and education and production assistance to industry.
When compared to the United States, the countries in GAO's study offer some key distinctions in government programs to support the manufacturing sector in the areas of innovation, trade, and training.
While the United States and the other four countries all provide support for innovation and R&D, the foreign programs place greater emphasis on commercialization to help manufacturers bridge the gap between innovative ideas and sales. These include programs that support infrastructure as well as hands-on technical and product development services to firms, and that foster collaboration between manufacturers and researchers. In contrast, the United States relies heavily on competitive funding for R&D projects with commercial potential.
Within trade policy, the United States and the four countries in GAO's study provide similar services, but there are several differences in how they are delivered. For example, the United States is an acknowledged leader in intellectual property protection, but the U.S. government plays a less prominent role than the Japanese government in developing technological standards on industrial products.
A key difference related to training programs pertains to the sustained role of government in coordinating stakeholder input into a national system of vocational skills training and credentialing, which helps provide a supply of skilled workers for manufacturers. This was particularly evident in Germany. In contrast, the United States largely devolves vocational training to states and localities and does not have a national system to issue industry-recognized credentials. However, the U.S. manufacturing industry, with participation from the federal government, has recently launched an effort to establish nationally portable, industry-recognized credentials for the manufacturing sector.
Overall, GAO's analysis shows the broad extent to which four countries who are U.S. competitors are leveraging the public sector to help their manufacturing industries maintain competitiveness in a rapidly changing global economy. |
gao_GAO-03-1015 | gao_GAO-03-1015_0 | Such actions may include rules and regulations that propose or implement licensing, permitting, or other conditions, requirements or limitations on private property use. Justice Has Not Updated Its 1988 Guidelines, but Has Issued Supplemental Guidelines for Three of the Four Agencies
Justice has not updated the general guidelines that it issued pursuant to the EO in June 1988 for evaluating the risk of and avoiding regulatory takings, but it has issued supplemental guidelines for three of the four agencies. Officials at Justice and two of the four agencies said that changes in takings case law related to Supreme Court decisions made since 1988 have not been significant enough to warrant a revision of the general guidelines. Implementation of Key Provisions by the Four Agencies Has Changed Over the Life of the Executive Order
Although the EO’s requirements have not been amended or revoked since 1988, the four agencies’ implementation of some of its key provisions has changed over time because of subsequent guidance provided by OMB. For example, the agencies no longer prepare annual compilations of just compensation awards or account for these awards in their budget documents because OMB issued guidance in 1994 advising agencies that this information is no longer required. According to OMB, this information is not needed because the number and amount of these awards is small and the awards are paid from the Department of the Treasury’s Judgment Fund, rather than from the agencies’ appropriations. Hence, these officials said the annual reporting of just compensation awards was unnecessary. Agencies Report That They Fully Consider the Takings Implications of Their Planned Actions but Provided Little Evidence to Support This Claim
The four agencies said that they fully consider the potential takings implications of their planned regulatory actions, but provided us with limited documentary evidence to support this claim. Agencies provided us a few written examples of takings implication assessments. Agency officials said that these assessments are not always documented in writing, and, because of the passage of time, those assessments that were put in writing may no longer be on file. However, the EO’s requirements for assessing the takings implications of planned regulatory actions applied to only 3 of these 14 cases. As of the end of fiscal year 2002, Justice reported that 54 additional regulatory takings cases involving the four agencies were pending resolution. For the other 11 cases, the agency action involved either predated the EO’s issuance or was otherwise excluded from the EO’s requirements. Of the three cases subject to the EO’s requirements, we found evidence that a regulatory takings implication assessment had been done in only one instance. With the exception of OMB, the agencies provided us with technical corrections and editorial comments that we have incorporated as appropriate. Major contributors to this report are listed in appendix V.
Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The Chairman of the House Subcommittee on the Constitution, Committee on the Judiciary, asked us to provide information on measures taken by the Department of Justice to implement certain provisions of Executive Order 12630 (EO) regarding regulatory takings of private property and the efforts of four agencies—the Department of Agriculture, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Environmental Protection Agency, and the Department of the Interior—to comply with the requirements of the EO. Specifically, the Chairman asked us to examine the extent to which (1) Justice has updated its guidelines to implement the EO to reflect changes in case law and issued supplemental guidelines for the four agencies, (2) the four agencies have complied with the specific provisions of the EO, and (3) awards of just compensation have been assessed against the four agencies by the courts for regulatory takings in recent years and, in these cases, whether the agencies assessed the potential takings implications of their actions before implementing them. Finally, regarding awards of just compensation made against the agencies and, in these cases, whether the agencies had assessed the takings potential of their actions, we obtained from Justice a list of all takings cases related to the four agencies that were concluded during fiscal years 2000 through 2002. | Why GAO Did This Study
Each year federal agencies issue numerous proposed or final rules or take other regulatory actions that may potentially affect the use of private property. Some of these actions may result in the property owner being owed just compensation under the Fifth Amendment. In 1988 the President issued Executive Order 12630 on property rights to ensure that government actions affecting the use of private property are undertaken on a well-reasoned basis with due regard for the potential financial impacts imposed on the government. GAO was asked to provide information on the compliance of the Department of Justice and four agencies--the Department of Agriculture, the Army Corps of Engineers, the Environmental Protection Agency, and the Department of the Interior--with the executive order. Specifically, GAO examined the extent to which (1) Justice has updated its guidelines for the order to reflect changes in case law and issued supplemental guidelines for the four agencies, (2) the four agencies have complied with the specific provisions of the executive order, and (3) just compensation awards have been assessed against the four agencies in recent years. We provided the agencies with a draft of this report for comment. They provided technical and editorial suggestions that we incorporated as appropriate.
What GAO Found
Justice has not updated the guidelines that it issued in 1988 pursuant to the executive order, but has issued supplemental guidelines for three of the four agencies. The executive order provides that Justice should update the guidelines, as necessary, to reflect fundamental changes in takings case law resulting from Supreme Court decisions. While Justice and some other agency officials said that the changes in the case law since 1988 have not been significant enough to warrant a revision, other agency officials and some legal experts said that fundamental changes have occurred and that the guidelines should be updated. Justice issued supplemental guidelines for three agencies, but not for Agriculture because of unresolved issues such as how to assess the takings implications of denying or limiting permits that allow ranchers to graze livestock on federal lands managed by Agriculture. Although the executive order's requirements have not been amended or revoked since 1988, the four agencies' implementation of some of these requirements has changed over time as a result of subsequent guidance provided by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). For example, the agencies no longer prepare annual compilations of just compensation awards or account for these awards in their budget documents because OMB issued guidance in 1994 advising agencies that this information was no longer required. According to OMB, this information is not needed because the number and amount of these awards are small and the awards are paid from the Department of the Treasury's Judgment Fund, rather than from the agencies' appropriations. Regarding other requirements, agency officials said that they fully consider the potential takings implications of their regulatory actions, but provided us with limited documentary evidence to support this claim. For example, the agencies provided us with a few examples of takings implications assessments because, agency officials said, these assessments are not always documented in writing or retained on file. In addition, our review of the agencies' rulemakings for selected years that made reference to the executive order revealed that relatively few specified that a takings implication assessment was done and few anticipated significant takings implications. According to Justice, 44 regulatory takings lawsuits brought against the four agencies by property owners were concluded during fiscal years 2000 through 2002, and of these, 14 cases resulted in just compensation awards or settlement payments totaling about $36.5 million. The executive order's requirement for assessing the takings implications of planned actions applied to only three of these cases. The actions associated with the other 11 cases either predated the order's issuance or were otherwise excluded from the order's provisions. The relevant agency assessed the takings potential of its action in only one of the three cases subject to the order's requirements. According to Justice, as of the end of fiscal year 2002, 54 additional regulatory takings lawsuits involving the four agencies were pending resolution. |
gao_GAO-09-369 | gao_GAO-09-369_0 | FEMA—a component in DHS—is the federal agency responsible for leading the nation’s preparedness activities. involves these preparedness stakeholders in plans that define roles a responsibilities, exercises, and assessments of capabilities. Although best practices for program management state that a program management plan is an essential tool for implementing a program, FEMA, in coordination with DHS and other federal entities, has not yet fully developed such a plan to help ensure the development and integration of policies and plans that define roles and responsibilities and planning processes for emergency response. Two of these 4 policies have been completed. Although Action Has Been Taken to Develop and Complete Some Plans That Define Roles and Responsibilities, 68 Percent of the Plans Have Not Been Completed
While DHS, FEMA, and other federal entities with a role in national preparedness have taken action to develop and complete some plans that detail and operationalize roles and responsibilities for federal and nonfederal entities, these entities have not completed 68 percent of the plans required by existing legislation, presidential directives, and policy documents as of April 2009. Despite Exercises Demonstrating the Need for the Development of Complete Policies and Plans, FEMA Has Not Fully Developed a Program Management Plan for Their Development and Integration
Recent Exercises Have Demonstrated the Importance of the Development of Complete Policies and Plans to Define Roles and Responsibilities
In addition to the lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina, recent exercises have demonstrated the ongoing need for the development of complete policies and plans that define roles and responsibilities for national preparedness. Officials at all six states we visited cited actions taken by FEMA to implement the National Exercise Program as positive contributions to their exercise efforts. However, the after-action report did not identify a department or an agency official who was to be responsible for ensuring that this corrective action was implemented. However, FEMA’s checklist does not include specific items, such as compliance with HSEEP requirements, as called for by HSGP guidance. While FEMA has developed a project management plan for completing the comprehensive assessment system by 2010, the lack of (1) milestones for establishing quantifiable metrics for all 37 target capabilities and (2) specific actions for how FEMA will integrate preparedness information to develop the system, coupled with the (3) the lack of risk assessment information for the system raises questions about FEMA’s ability to establish the system in accordance with its anticipated 2010 completion date. FEMA’s National Preparedness Directorate Does Not Have a Strategic Plan for Implementing the National Preparedness System
While FEMA has recognized that its components need to develop strategic plans that detail program goals, objectives, and strategies, FEMA’s National Preparedness Directorate (Preparedness Directorate) has not yet developed such a plan for the national preparedness system. Although the Post-Katrina Act and the directorate’s draft annual operating plan outline certain elements of a strategy, such as the directorate’s vision, mission, and goals, they do not include several other desirable characteristics of a strategic plan, such as a discussion of how the directorate will (1) measure its progress in developing the national preparedness system, (2) address risk as it relates to preparedness activities, (3) coordinate with its preparedness stakeholders in developing and carrying out the various elements of the national preparedness system, and (4) integrate the elements of the national preparedness system. The characteristics are a starting point for developing a strategic plan. A key part of a national preparedness strategic plan would be the clear delineation of organizations and their roles and responsibilities, as well as processes to coordinate their responsibilities. Specifically, our reporting objectives were to review the extent to which the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) has: 1. developed policies and plans that define roles and responsibilities and planning processes for national preparedness; 2. taken actions since 2007 to implement the National Exercise Program and track corrective actions at the federal and state levels and what challenges remain; 3. made progress in conducting a nationwide capabilities-based assessment, including developing required preparedness reports, and what issues, if any, it faces in completing the system; and, 4. developed a strategic plan for implementing the national preparedness system. The exercises that comprised this data set were identified by FEMA officials as well as counsel to the White House Homeland Security Council. State Preparedness Reports. Pilot Capability Assessment (PCA). Homeland Security: DHS Improved its Risk-Based Grant Programs' Allocation and Management Methods, But Measuring Programs' Impact on National Capabilities Remains a Challenge. Homeland Security: Preparing for and Responding to Disasters. GAO's Preliminary Observations Regarding Preparedness and Response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. | Why GAO Did This Study
Hurricane Katrina was the most destructive disaster in our nation's history and it highlighted gaps in preparedness for a catastrophic disaster. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), a component within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), is the lead federal agency responsible for developing a national preparedness system. The system includes policies and plans as well as exercises and assessments of capabilities across many public and private entities. GAO was asked to assess the extent to which FEMA has (1) developed policies and plans that define roles and responsibilities; (2) implemented the National Exercise Program, a key tool for examining preparedness; (3) developed a national capabilities assessment; and (4) developed a strategic plan that integrates these elements of the preparedness system. GAO analyzed program documents, such as after-action reports, and visited six states located in disaster regions. While the results of these visits are not generalizable, they show how select states carry out their efforts.
What GAO Found
While most policies (41 of 50) that define roles and responsibilities have been completed, such as the National Response Framework, 68 percent (49 of 72) of the plans to implement these policies, including several for catastrophic incidents, are not yet complete. As a result, the roles and responsibilities of key officials involved in responding to a catastrophe have not been fully defined and, thus, cannot be tested in exercises. The lack of clarity in response roles and responsibilities among the diverse set of responders contributed to the disjointed response to Hurricane Katrina and highlighted the need for clear, integrated disaster preparedness and response policies and plans. Although best practices for program management call for a plan that includes key tasks and their target completion dates, FEMA does not have such a plan. With such a plan, FEMA would be better positioned to ensure that the policies and plans are completed and integrated with each other as intended as well as with other elements of the preparedness system. Since 2007, FEMA has taken actions to implement the National Exercise Program at the federal and state levels by developing, among other things, program guidance and systems to track corrective actions; however, FEMA faces challenges in ensuring that the exercises are carried out consistent with program guidance. For example, the Homeland Security Council (an interagency entity responsible for coordinating homeland security policy) and state participants did not systematically track whether corrective actions had been taken to address deficiencies identified by exercises as called for by program guidance. As a result, FEMA lacks reasonable assurance that entities have taken actions aimed at improving preparedness. FEMA has made progress in developing a system for assessing national preparedness capabilities by, among other things, establishing reporting guidance for state preparedness, but it faces challenges in completing the system and required reports to assess preparedness. While FEMA has developed a project management plan for the new system, the plan does not fully identify milestones and program risks for developing quantifiable metrics necessary for measuring preparedness capabilities. A more complete project plan that identifies milestones and program risks would provide FEMA with greater assurance that it can produce a system to assess capabilities and inform decisions related to improving national preparedness. FEMA's strategic plan for fiscal years 2008-2013 recognizes that each of its components need to develop its own strategic plans that integrate the elements of national preparedness. FEMA's National Preparedness Directorate has yet to develop its strategic plan, but instead plans to use a draft annual operating plan to guide its efforts. This plan does not include all elements of a strategic plan, such as how the directorate will integrate the various elements of the system over time to improve national preparedness. Having a strategic plan would provide FEMA with a roadmap for addressing the complex task of guiding and building a national preparedness system. |
gao_GAO-01-722 | gao_GAO-01-722_0 | Diseases once regarded as declining in significance have also reemerged in recent years to once again become major global health threats. The emergence of previously unknown diseases and the development of disease strains resistant to antimicrobial drugs further complicate international disease control efforts. Surveillance provides information for action against infectious disease threats. Multiple Surveillance Systems Created to Support Disease-Specific Control Programs
The strongest influence on the evolution of the existing surveillance framework has been the collaboration among medical professionals, national governments, and foreign assistance agencies to develop control programs and associated surveillance efforts that focus on specific diseases or groups of diseases. For example, the 1918 to 1919 influenza pandemic killed more than 20 million people in locations as diverse as China, Spain, the United States, and Samoa. Surveillance systems in industrialized and developing countries suffer from a number of common constraints, including a lack of human and material resources, weak infrastructure, poor coordination, and uncertain linkages between surveillance and response. For example, total health care spending per capita in low income countries amounts to about 3 percent of per capita spending in high income countries. Impact of Improvement Initiatives Remains to Be Demonstrated
The international community has recently launched a number of initiatives that may improve global surveillance. All three diseases have their most severe impacts in sub-Saharan Africa. However, the most recent report on the project’s results includes data from geographic areas that include only about 28 percent of the reported tuberculosis cases in the world and two-thirds of the 23 high-burden countries targeted by the Stop TB campaign. Broader Initiatives Aimed at Strengthening Global Surveillance
The international community has introduced a number of initiatives to strengthen overall global capacity for surveillance of infectious diseases as a group. These include efforts to improve laboratory and epidemiological capacity and to increase disease-mapping capability. International public health officials concerned about the overall threat of infectious disease are seeking to take advantage of the global community’s apparent willingness to commit itself to achieving measurable progress against three major disease threats—HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria—to support broader systemic improvements in developing country surveillance and response capacity. However, given the need to demonstrate progress against these three diseases in particular, the extent to which the global public health community can manage the new disease-specific initiatives in a manner that significantly improves surveillance for all infectious disease threats, remains to be demonstrated. Human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) causes acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS), a disease of the immune system. | What GAO Found
According to the World Health Organization, infectious diseases account for more than 13 million deaths every year, including nearly two-thirds of all deaths among children under age 5. Infectious diseases present a substantial threat to people in all parts of the world, and this threat has grown in volume and complexity. New diseases have emerged, others once viewed as declining in significance have resurged in importance, and many have developed substantial resistance to known antimicrobial drugs. Infectious disease surveillance provides national and international public health authorities with information that they need to plan and manage efforts to control these diseases. In the mid-1990s, public health experts in the United States and abroad determined that global infectious disease surveillance was inadequate, and both the World Health Assembly and the President of the United States called for the development of an effective global infectious disease surveillance and response system. The strongest influence on the evolution of the current global infectious disease surveillance framework has been the international community's focus on specific diseases or groups of diseases. The international community has created diverse surveillance programs to support global and regional efforts to control particular diseases. Surveillance systems in all countries suffer from a number of common constraints. However, these constraints have their greatest impact in the poorest countries, where per capita expenditure on all aspects of health care amounts to only about three percent of expenditures in high-income countries. Surveillance in developing countries is often impaired by shortages of human and material resources. The international community recently launched several initiatives that may improve global surveillance. The community has committed itself to reducing the global burdens imposed by three diseases--tuberculosis, human immunodeficiency virus/acquired immunodeficiency syndrome, and malaria. The community has also begun more broadly targeted initiatives to upgrade laboratories, strengthen epidemiological capacity, and otherwise improve surveillance for infectious diseases as a whole. |
gao_GAO-12-771 | gao_GAO-12-771_0 | Research on RF Energy Exposure from Mobile Phones Has Not Demonstrated Adverse Health Effects, but More Studies Are Under Way
Scientific Research
Scientific research to date has not demonstrated adverse human health effects from RF energy exposure from mobile phone use, but additional research may increase understanding of possible effects. Also, studies and experts identified several areas for additional laboratory studies. Current Research Activities
Current research activities of federal agencies, international organizations, and the mobile phone industry include funding and supporting ongoing research on the health effects of RF energy exposure from mobile phones. Although other federal agencies are not directly funding research in this area, some agencies are providing support for ongoing studies. FCC’s RF Energy Exposure Limit May Not Reflect Latest Evidence on Thermal Effects, and Mobile Phone Testing Requirements May Not Identify Maximum Exposure
RF Energy Exposure Limit
In 1996, FCC adopted the RF energy exposure limit for mobile phones of 1.6 watts per kilogram, averaged over one gram of tissue, a measurement of the amount of RF energy absorbed into the body. exposure from mobile phone use, although actual exposure depends on a number of factors, including the operating power of the phone, how the phone is held during use, and where it is used in proximity to a mobile phone base station. FCC officials told us that they rely heavily on the guidance and recommendations of federal health and safety agencies when determining the appropriate RF energy exposure limit and that, to date, none of these agencies have advised FCC that its current RF energy limit needs to be revised. Officials from FDA and EPA told us that FCC has not formally asked either agency for an opinion on the RF energy limit. Nevertheless, by not formally reassessing its current RF energy exposure limit, FCC cannot ensure that it is using a limit that reflects the latest evidence on thermal effects from RF energy exposure, and may impose additional costs on manufacturers and limitations on mobile phone design. FCC has not reassessed its testing requirements to ensure that testing identifies the maximum RF energy exposure for the other usage conditions a user could experience when mobile phones are in use without body-worn accessories or as advised by the manufacturer’s instructions, rather than the head. Federal Agencies and Mobile Phone Industry Provide Information to the Public through Websites and User Manuals
Information Provided by Federal Agencies
Federal agencies provide information to the public on the health effects of mobile phone use and related issues primarily through their websites. The types of information that federal agencies’ websites provide on mobile phone health effects and related issues vary, in part because of the agencies’ different missions, though the websites provide a broadly consistent message. The information provided in user manuals by manufacturers is voluntary, as there are no federal requirements that manufacturers provide any specific information to consumers about the Most manuals we reviewed provide health effects of mobile phone use.information about how the device was tested and certified, as well as the highest energy exposure measurement associated with the device. This evidence has led to a new RF energy exposure limit recommendation from international organizations. Reassess whether mobile phone testing requirements result in the identification of maximum RF energy exposure in likely usage configurations, particularly when mobile phones are held against the body, and update testing requirements as appropriate. FCC also noted that a draft Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, along with a new Notice of Inquiry, which has been submitted by FCC staff to the Commission for their consideration, has the potential to address the recommendations made in this report. To determine the current research activities of federal agencies related to mobile phone use and health, we interviewed officials from the Department of Defense; Department of Health and Human Services’ Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), Food and Drug Administration (FDA), and National Institutes of Health (NIH); Department of Labor’s Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA); Environmental Protection Agency (EPA); and Federal Communications Commission (FCC). To determine the research activities of other organizations, we interviewed representatives from IARC, academic institutions, consumer groups, mobile phone industry associations, mobile phone manufacturers, and mobile phone providers. We also reviewed and summarized FCC testing and certification regulations and guidance for mobile phones. To determine the actions federal agencies and the industry take to inform the public about issues related to mobile phone health effects, we reviewed the information on federal agency websites. French Environmental Health and Safety Agency. 2. | Why GAO Did This Study
The rapid adoption of mobile phones has occurred amidst controversy over whether the technology poses a risk to human health as a result of long-term exposure to RF energy from mobile phone use. FCC and FDA share regulatory responsibilities for mobile phones. GAO was asked to examine several issues related to mobile phone health effects and regulation. Specifically, this report addresses (1) what is known about the health effects of RF energy from mobile phones and what are current research activities, (2) how FCC set the RF energy exposure limit for mobile phones, and (3) federal agency and industry actions to inform the public about health issues related to mobile phones, among other things. GAO reviewed scientific research; interviewed experts in fields such as public health and engineering, officials from federal agencies, and representatives of academic institutions, consumer groups, and the mobile phone industry; reviewed mobile phone testing and certification regulations and guidance; and reviewed relevant federal agency websites and mobile phone user manuals.
What GAO Found
Scientific research to date has not demonstrated adverse human health effects of exposure to radio-frequency (RF) energy from mobile phone use, but research is ongoing that may increase understanding of any possible effects. In addition, officials from the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and the National Institutes of Health (NIH) as well as experts GAO interviewed have reached similar conclusions about the scientific research. Ongoing research examining the health effects of RF energy exposure is funded and supported by federal agencies, international organizations, and the mobile phone industry. NIH is the only federal agency GAO interviewed directly funding studies in this area, but other agencies support research under way by collaborating with NIH or other organizations to conduct studies and identify areas for additional research.
The Federal Communications Commissions (FCC) RF energy exposure limit may not reflect the latest research, and testing requirements may not identify maximum exposure in all possible usage conditions. FCC set an RF energy exposure limit for mobile phones in 1996, based on recommendations from federal health and safety agencies and international organizations. These international organizations have updated their exposure limit recommendation in recent years, based on new research, and this new limit has been widely adopted by other countries, including countries in the European Union. This new recommended limit could allow for more RF energy exposure, but actual exposure depends on a number of factors including how the phone is held during use. FCC has not adopted the new recommended limit. The Office of Management and Budgets instructions to federal agencies require the adoption of consensus standards when possible. FCC told GAO that it relies on the guidance of federal health and safety agencies when determining the RF energy exposure limit, and to date, none of these agencies have advised FCC to change the limit. However, FCC has not formally asked these agencies for a reassessment. By not formally reassessing its current limit, FCC cannot ensure it is using a limit that reflects the latest research on RF energy exposure. FCC has also not reassessed its testing requirements to ensure that they identify the maximum RF energy exposure a user could experience. Some consumers may use mobile phones against the body, which FCC does not currently test, and could result in RF energy exposure higher than the FCC limit.
Federal agencies and the mobile phone industry provide information on the health effects of mobile phone use and related issues to the public through their websites and mobile phone manuals. The types of information provided via federal agencies websites on mobile phone health effects and related issues vary, in part because of the agencies different missions, although agencies provide a broadly consistent message. Members of the mobile phone industry voluntarily provide information on their websites and in mobile-phone user manuals. There are no federal requirements that manufacturers provide information to consumers about the health effects of mobile phone use.
What GAO Recommends
FCC should formally reassess and, if appropriate, change its current RF energy exposure limit and mobile phone testing requirements related to likely usage configurations, particularly when phones are held against the body. FCC noted that a draft document currently under consideration by FCC has the potential to address GAOs recommendations |
gao_GAO-16-585 | gao_GAO-16-585_0 | The office relies on plutonium analysis equipment to support its work. For example, the first best practice is for the schedule to capture all activities necessary to complete the project. NNSA Did Not Identify the Plutonium Analysis Capacity That Its Revised CMRR Project Should Provide, So the Project May Not Meet DOE and NNSA Needs NNSA’s Requirements for the Revised CMRR Project Did Not Define the Plutonium Analysis Capacity the Project Should Provide
NNSA defined a set of requirements for the revised CMRR project, but these requirements did not include key performance parameters, such as the plutonium analysis capacity that the project should provide. NNSA officials and Los Alamos contractor representatives said that the program requirements document for the revised CMRR project does not contain a pit production-related performance parameter because NNSA tasked the revised project only with replacing plutonium analysis equipment that had been located in the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research facility. NNSA’s Revised CMRR Project Has a Lower Estimated Total Cost than the Previously Approved CMRR Project, but Agency Estimates of Cost Savings May Be Overstated
The total estimated cost for the revised CMRR project is lower than the total estimated cost for the previously approved CMRR project that included constructing the CMRR nuclear facility, but estimates of cost savings may be too high because the revised project includes less scope and is likely to provide less plutonium analysis capacity. NNSA reported that it expected the nuclear facility to support the production of up to 80 pits per year. According to NNSA officials and contractor representatives, NNSA’s cancellation of the previously approved CMRR project’s nuclear facility may yield benefits in terms of an improved funding profile. NNSA’s Schedule Did Not Include Most Activities Needed to Complete the Project
NNSA did not maintain a schedule for the revised CMRR project that included all activities needed to complete the project and did not sufficiently analyze risks to determine whether the project’s estimated completion dates are reasonable. We reviewed an updated project schedule from August 2015 and assessed the extent to which it reflected best practices for creating a high-quality, reliable schedule. According to best practices, a project team should develop and maintain an integrated master schedule that includes the entire scope of work required for a project’s successful execution. By maintaining a schedule that is limited to short-term work ending in 2017, however, NNSA and its contractor have limited insight into how current performance affects completion dates beyond 2017, including completing the first subproject to install analysis equipment in the radiological lab in December 2019—in support of ending operations in the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research facility—and completing the rest of the revised CMRR project by 2024. These performance parameters are important because they define how well a project will perform its functions, expressed in terms such as capacity or throughput. NNSA needs a sufficient amount of plutonium analysis capacity to support the agency’s pit production plans, but it is currently unclear how well the project will support NNSA’s plan to develop the capability to produce 50 to 80 pits per year by 2030. Recommendations for Executive Action
We are making seven recommendations to the Secretary of Energy. To ensure that NNSA will acquire sufficient plutonium analysis equipment and space to meet its needs, including pit production to support critical life extension programs, we recommend that the Secretary direct that the Under Secretary for Nuclear Security, in his capacity as the NNSA Administrator: update the program requirements document for the revised CMRR project to identify a key performance parameter that describes the plutonium analysis capacity the CMRR project is required to provide to support specific pit production rates and specify plans for how the agency will obtain additional plutonium analysis capacity if the revised CMRR project will not provide sufficient plutonium analysis capacity to support NNSA’s pit production plans. Instead, NNSA stated that it will perform an analysis to estimate a pit production capacity range that the project will support and include a reference to this analysis in its next revision to the program requirements document. GAO staff who made significant contributions to the report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
In this report, we assessed: (1) the extent to which the National Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA) revised Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement (CMRR) project is expected to meet NNSA and other Department of Energy (DOE) programs’ plutonium analysis needs at Los Alamos National Laboratory; (2) the extent to which the Plutonium Modular Approach is expected to meet plutonium analysis needs at Los Alamos; (3) how the revised CMRR project’s scope and cost compare with those of the previously approved CMRR project; and (4) the extent to which the revised CMRR project’s schedule and cost estimates reflect scheduling and cost estimating best practices. | Why GAO Did This Study
In recent years, NNSA has spent billions of dollars designing large construction projects, only to revisit options after cost increases and schedule delays. At Los Alamos, NNSA reversed its prior decision to build a nuclear facility as part of the CMRR project after spending $450 million. The facility was to provide analysis equipment needed to support the production of pits as part of nuclear weapons life extension programs. Instead, NNSA approved a revised CMRR project to install plutonium analysis equipment in existing facilities.
Senate report 113-44 includes a provision for GAO to review NNSA's revised CMRR project. GAO's report assesses (1) the extent to which the revised CMRR project is expected to meet plutonium analysis needs, (2) how its cost and scope compare to the previously approved project, and (3) the extent to which its schedule and cost estimates reflect best practices, among other objectives. GAO reviewed project documentation, assessed cost and schedule estimates against GAO-identified best practices, and interviewed NNSA and DOE officials and CMRR contractor representatives.
What GAO Found
The Department of Energy's (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) defined requirements for the revised Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement (CMRR) project to provide plutonium analysis equipment at its Los Alamos site but did not specify the capacity for analyzing plutonium that the project should provide, making it possible that the project would not meet plutonium analysis needs. NNSA policy states that project requirements should include key performance parameters, which describe how well a project will perform its functions, expressed in terms such as processing rate or capacity. However, NNSA did not identify a key parameter that addresses a primary function of the project's analysis equipment—to analyze plutonium in support of producing an essential part of a nuclear weapon, known as a pit. NNSA has determined that it needs sufficient analysis capacity to support producing pits, including at planned rates of 10 pits per year in 2024 and 50 to 80 pits per year by 2030, but an NNSA analysis shows that the revised CMRR project may not support these rates. NNSA officials said the project's requirements do not include a pit production-related parameter because NNSA only tasked the CMRR project with replacing analysis equipment used in an aging facility, regardless of analysis capacity. Not identifying this parameter likely contributed to the project potentially not providing sufficient analysis capacity to support planned pit production and may have contributed to different understandings among senior agency officials about how well the project will support pit production. By identifying a pit production-related parameter that describes the analysis capacity that the revised CMRR project is to provide, NNSA could clarify the extent to which the project will support such pit production.
NNSA's total estimated cost for the revised CMRR project is lower than the cost of the previously approved CMRR project, which included a large nuclear facility, but NNSA may have overstated its cost savings. NNSA's estimated savings from cancelling the previously approved nuclear facility did not account for work that the agency deferred to future projects, including a storage vault and tunnel. NNSA's approach for the revised CMRR project allows costs to be spread out over time, improving NNSA's ability to concurrently fund other work. However, the revised CMRR project includes less scope and is likely to provide less plutonium analysis capacity than the previously approved nuclear facility.
The revised CMRR project schedule and cost estimates only partially met best practices. For example, the schedule did not include most of the work needed to complete the project. According to best practices, agencies should develop and maintain a schedule that contains all necessary work activities, but the revised project's schedule was limited to near-term work ending in 2017. When NNSA created the revised CMRR schedule, DOE did not specifically require projects to maintain complete schedules after project approval. Since then, DOE has issued a memorandum directing that all schedules contain the entire scope of work, but NNSA does not plan to develop a complete schedule for the entire CMRR project until mid-2017. Continuing to rely on a partial schedule limits managers' insight into how current activities might affect future completion dates, including NNSA's goal to end plutonium work in an aging facility at Los Alamos.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is making seven recommendations to NNSA, including that it identify a pit production-related parameter for the revised CMRR project and develop a CMRR project schedule that includes all necessary work activities. NNSA generally neither agreed nor disagreed with the recommendations but described some actions it was taking. GAO continues to believe that the recommendations are valid, as discussed in this report. |
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